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NFTCTC - A Peek Behind the Curtain: Leveraging Interagency at JRTC for Real-World Engagement

The purpose of this article is to facilitate effective engagement between unified action partners (UAPs) and the centerpiece of the Army's formation, the brigade combat team (BCT). It provides valuable insights from interagency (IA) and international organization experts who have supported dozens of training rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The goal is to help BCT leaders and units better navigate and leverage UAP, particularly IA, in the operational environment.

NFTCTC - Intelligence After Action Review Trends at the National Training Center

This article delivers an unaltered, non-attributional list of trends and recommendations for improvement based on the mid-rotational intelligence warfighting function after action review (AAR) comments gathered during six rotations. The majority of the AAR comments can be grouped into three distinct categories: communication, transitions, and information collection.

NFTCTC - Put the Camera Down: Preparing the Public Affairs Officer for a JRTC Rotation

This article is intended for all units conducting home station training to prepare themselves for a combat training center (CTC) rotation. The author discusses a recurring trend at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the challenges that the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) face. Fig 1. Shows the results of misplaced PAO home station training. A Soldier during a recent JRTC rotation covers the camera lens of a credentialed, American Media on the Battlefield (MoB) Role-player.

NFTCTC - The Pareto Principle in Combat Operations

The Pareto principle simply stated is that 80% of the desired results are derived from 20% of the input (also known as the 80/20 rule in which roughly 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes). This principle has been proven in business and finance, in addition to military implications. This article focuses on key components that produce the greatest impact across the brigade combat team (BCT).

NFTCTC - Unit CBRN Readiness Training - A Way

There appears to be a dilemma on how to manage finite training opportunities and best conduct small-unit level chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) tasks during home-station training to ensure units are effectively trained in mission oriented protective posture gear exchange, selective unmasking, and decontamination. Much of what will be asked of a Soldier against a near-peer threat in a contaminated battlefield will require fighting "dirty" for extended periods of time.

NFTF - 1-153 IN Regt, Task Force Warrior CJTF-HOA Pre-deployment Activities

The Army Reserve and National Guard participation with the active component providing support for theater security operations and exercise both CONUS and OCONUS has increased drastically over the past 15 years. Army Reserve and National Guard units are given the maximum time possible between the date alerted and the date required to report for active duty. Some units may be alerted, but not actually begin active duty for several weeks. However, under mobilization conditions, an emergency situation may require extremely short active duty notice.

NFTF - Advising at the Ministerial Level in Afghanistan: Insights from Major General Willard M. Burleson III

CALL's Strategic Analysis Branch conducted an interview on 9 July 2018, with MG Burleson, 7th Infantry Division Commander, to collect insights into his activities while he was serving as the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Defense, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL (Resolute Support), May 2016 – June 2017.

NFTF - Building Partnership Capacity through Train, Advise, and Assist - Insights from BG Jackson, Commander, 1SFAB

The 1SFAB supported RSM and OFS with the Army’s first unit dedicated to training, advising, assisting, accompanying and enabling (A3E) conventional foreign security force partners from February to November 2018. The 1SFAB had a positive impact on NATO and U.S. strategic initiatives in Afghanistan by advising Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) at tactical levels of command that had not been consistently and directly advised since 2015.

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