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Commanding GeneralCAC USARBG Katherine A. TrombleyDeputy Commanding General - EducationArmy UniversityBG David FoleyDeputy Commanding GeneralCAC - TrainingBG Scott WoodwardDirectorMission Command Center
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Multiple Dilemmas: Operation DRAGOON and the Liberation of Southern France (1944)
Operation DRAGOON, the code name for the Allied invasion of Southern France, was initially planned for simultaneous execution with the Normandy landings on D-Day (6 June 1944). However, resource constraints delayed execution until mid-August. The goal of the operation remained the same: divert German divisions from the main effort advancing across northern France and to secure logistically vital ports on the Mediterranean coast. DRAGOON was, from the outset, a multinational, joint, combined-arms effort.
In the best tradition of institutional knowledge-sharing, the Allied Command derived insights from earlier amphibious landings at Anzio and Normandy. Thus, the debarkation points avoided defensible high ground. Major General Lucien Truscott commanded the three-division landing force and the Allies utilized all arms to isolate the beaches. A preliminary air campaign pounded enemy units and destroyed several bridges. Airborne and commando drops then seized local high ground behind German lines. Furthermore, five battleships and twenty cruisers provided naval gunfire in support of Truscott’s infantrymen. To ensure Allied legitimacy, French Army B followed the initial invasion divisions ashore and coordinated with local resistance fighters.
The first waves of the U.S. VI Corps included engineers to breach the significant German minefields on the beaches. The poorly trained German defenders (most of the best divisions had diverted north to the Normandy sector) were no match for the Allies and nearly all objectives were seized by nightfall on 15 August. Airborne landings, commando raids, and resistance attacks combined with the battered transportation infrastructure behind the lines to stymie German counterattacks and ensure DRAGOON’s success.
At both the operational and strategic levels, Operation DRAGOON presented the Germans with “multiple dilemmas” and forced the enemy to grapple with several Allied armies on numerous fronts. Following the initial landings, the Allies liberated most of Southern France in just four weeks, and the seizure of ports at Marseille and Toulon solved many of the Allies’ supply problems in France.