New CGSC course creates AI sharpshooters

Before any Soldier steps up to a sniper hide or takes a precision shot, they must first know their weapon inside and out. From day one of basic training, Soldiers are taught to field-strip their rifles, understand the mechanics of the bolt carrier group, and know exactly what to do when the weapon malfunctions. It isn’t magic; it is simply a tool of the trade. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s newest AI Basics elective course is applying that same philosophy to Artificial Intelligence.

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Randi Stenson, Tuesday, August 11, 2026

CAC advances AI-powered knowledge platform, VICTOR

The U.S. Army is creating VICTOR, a new artificial intelligence-powered network engagement platform designed to transform how soldiers and Army career professionals discover, share and apply operational knowledge. Managed by the leaders within the U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, the effort represents the next step in connecting the Army’s institutional knowledge with the needs of Soldiers across the force.

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Randi Stenson, Friday, August 7, 2026

TLLM-C2I graduates 13 from Advanced Builder Course

Students and instructors from the Combined Arms Command Transformation Integration Directorate’s Advanced Builder Course pose for a graduation-day photo, July 24, 2026, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Advanced Builder Course is designed to equip participants with digital skills that will accelerate decision-making processes, streamline information management and reinforce command-level synchronization during high-tempo operations. 

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Randi Stenson, Monday, August 3, 2026

Combined Arms Command establishes Transformation Integration Directorate

The U.S. Army Combined Arms Command has established the Transformation Integration Directorate, a new organization that will help the Army integrate change across the force by connecting operational experience with institutional action. Created as part of the Army's transformation under the U.S. Army Transformation and Training Command, the directorate provides command-level integration across multiple warfighting functions and organizations. 

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Randi Stenson, Tuesday, July 14, 2026

Army Joint Support Team (AJST)

The Army Joint Support Team (AJST), in support of USAF 505th Command and Control Wing, conducts U.S. Army and Joint air-ground operations education, training and command and control systems integration. AJST initiatives support training requirements for all four DoD Services and for elements of joint organizations in order to provide relevant and ready forces to joint force commanders.

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Randi Stenson, Monday, July 6, 2026
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Not Enough Evidence? That's OK, I Have Another Way

Situation:

As the provost marshal in the Republic of Korea, my military police investigators worked diligently to eliminate black market operations in and around our installation. A main suspect of the Black Market Task Force was the manager of the shoppette on post. As they worked to build a solid case against the shoppette manager, suspected black market local nationals, also employed on the installation, threatened one of my investigators' wives. We were able to discern the names of the two men who may have been involved with the threats and brought them in for questioning.

After a lengthy interview, it was clear we were not going to get the information we were looking for. Instead of turning them loose, I contacted the town's Chief of Civilian Police who owed me a favor. I asked him to have his investigators interview the suspects to obtain information; I knew the Koreans use more 'effective' interview techniques than I was permitted to use. I handed the suspects over to the civil authorities, even though they had no real jurisdiction for the threats issued on post. Within 48 hours we had the names of the men who made the threats, as well as some much needed black market information. During this same time period we interviewed the shoppette manager and were certain he too was involved in the black market. Unfortunately we could not prove it, so we had to let him go.

In jest, I asked the interpreter working with me during the interview how to get rid of this manager as he was a real pain in the neck. The interpreter offered a solution: handcuff the manager in a public place for all to see. Culturally Korean men cannot lose face, and it is very degrading for a Korean to be placed in handcuffs. Through our continued investigation, we collected more evidence to bring the shoppette manager in for a second round of questioning. I directed my military policemen to apprehend the shoppette manager at the front gate during the morning rush hour. I instructed them to make it as public as possible, to include a wall search, and to place him and hold him in handcuffs for a short period of time before placing him in the patrol car. When he was brought to the station we took his statement and released him. From that point forward, we never saw the two Korean men who issued the threats or the shoppette manger again. The families of my investigators were no longer threatened and the black market operations were held to minimum activity. Did I make the right call in using unethical means to protect my investigators?

Reflection...

I have come to the conclusion that I cannot and should not use illegal means even if it is for the right reason. When I resort to illegal means. I sink to the level that law and order does not necessarily matter and that I am above the law. In addition, what kind of mentorship am I providing for my Soldiers who observed all of the actions? I was acutely aware that I was a hero in their eyes, but is that how our heroes should act? I no longer think so.

The role of the major participants in the scenario: As the provost marshal for the installation, I was responsible for the safety of the personnel who lived and worked on the premises. I took this role very seriously.

Ethical dilemma at the time of the incident: I resorted to illegal means to address a threat to my Soldiers. Ethically. tuming the Korean suspects over to civilian authorities to conduct an interrogation using questionable means was wrong. The suspects should have been released and monitored for future illegal acts that we could prove.

Rules/Laws that apply: Uniform Code of Military Justice, Status of Forces Agreement

At what point did you say. "Enough is enough"? As soon as the threat was issued against my investigators and their families, I knew it was time to take any necessary action. Although it was unusual for Koreans to resort to violence, these threats were very real.

Conflict or Tension of the Seven Army Values? How did you resolve those conflicts? My actions were in conflict with the Anny Values of integrity and personal courage. I did not do what was right both legally and morally. I faced fear and adversity and did not choose the ethical course of action. I overcame the conflict by focusing on the safety of my investigators and blatantly ignoring established rules.

Consideration of others COAs and the 2nd or 3rd order affects: This really was the only COA possible to deal with the problem. I did not consider the 2nd and 3rd order effects of this COA. Some of those could have been "what would the other Investigators do to get the info they needed?"

How did your recognize unethical behavior? How did you process or judge this was an ethical dilemma? I ignored the uneasy feeling in my gut about how seriously Korean nationals view being placed in handcuffs. especially in a public manner. As soon as I recognized my involvement, I knew the outcome would directly impact my life.

How did you get the courage to do the harder right? I did not choose the harder right: I chose the easiest, most effective means to get what I wanted done.

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