NEWS FROM THE FRONT

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Commander's Perspective
CJFLCC-OIR Operations

Insights from MG Robert “Pat” White,
Commanding General, 1st AD and CJFLCC-OIR

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Front Cover: MG Pat White, commanding general of CJFLCC-OIR and 1AD and Fort Bliss, Texas, congratulates COL Suzanne D. Adkinson, DCOS of CJFLCC-OIR and 1AD MCP-OD, Texas Army National Guard, during a combat patch ceremony in Baghdad, Iraq, Aug. 1, 2017. The combat patch denotes wartime service and confirms a Soldier’s status as a combat veteran. The MCP-OD was an integral piece to the command structure of the 1AD. The 1AD commands CJFLCC-OIR, a Coalition of 23 regional and international nations which have joined together to enable partnered forces to defeat ISIS in Iraq to restore stability and security. (U.S. Army Photo by SGT Von Marie Donato)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Center for Army Lessons Learned conducted a key leader interview (KLI) with MG Robert “Pat” White, Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division (1AD). MG White assumed responsibility of Combined Joint Force Land Component Command-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJFLCC-OIR) on 12 July 2017. Building off of the momentum and gains of its predecessors the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 1st Infantry Division – CJFLCC-OIR worked by, with, and through its partner forces to defeat the ISIS Core in Iraq.

This News from the Front (NFTF) is a transcription of the KLI covering various topics ranging from the preparation to transition from a division to a combined-joint entity to working by, with, and through the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) partner force.

Key takeaways:

**Multi-domain Battle Concept:** The convergence of capabilities to create windows of advantage across multiple domains and contested areas throughout the depth of the battlespace to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; defeat enemies; and achieve military objectives. The changes needed must break the way we think about how the Army operates in any environment. As part of a joint and coalition force, how we train and educate in our institutions has to be very deliberate – capable of resonating across generations.

**Information Operations:** Information Operation must be able to keep up with the changing environment and battlefield in order to address unfolding events and the adversary narrative. Both lethal and non-lethal targeting become a by, with, and through methodology if you’re going to come to a place like Iraq. It’s more about the Iraqis getting in front of the camera and talking about their success vice the U.S./Coalition.

**Mission Command Post – Operational Detachment (MCP-OD):** The MCP-OD is a unique unit made up of 91 National Guard and 5 Army Reserve personnel. The unit can deploy all or just what the Commander requires for the forward mission. The unit is well designed and able to flex to meet any mission. What the MCP-OD brings to the Division headquarters flows back to the reduction of the active component headquarters by numbers and skills.

**Accelerated Campaign Challenges:** The greatest challenge for us was what we called Prime Directive #1, (and still do), which consists of two things: first, don’t become the main effort and second, don’t make the ISF wait for us.

These items address the adaptability and flexibility inherently needed in military operations. Additional details and insights are included within the base document.
Q: Some 30 years ago we were prepared for the big war to occur in the Fulda Gap, but times have changed and doctrine has changed to meet new and ever-changing threats. Where do you see the major changes in doctrine that will need to be addressed? Are you able to integrate any of the ideas expressed in the multi domain battle concept?

MG White: I think that if we’re moving forward with multi-domain battle, at least in my mind based on where we are in the Army today, there needs to be a very deliberate process for us as an institution to break the way we think about how our Army operates in any environment. If multi-domain battle is the watchword for the Army, as part of a greater joint and coalition force, then I think how we train and how we educate in our institutions has to be very deliberate, and over a period of time be sufficient enough for it to resonate across generations. I mention that because the hardest transitions will be the older guys, who are used to operating in a certain way.

Although we think we are not biased in how we think, your experience is what you draw from. I think if you’re trying to compare and contrast air-land battle and then name whatever our operational framework is for the Army in joint and combined operations, you’ll find it difficult. That’s because environments change over time. The way we approach operations changes daily both from a human capital perspective and from what technology exists at that period of time. Air-land battle as compared to multi-domain battle is apples and oranges. It’s all about the environment.

When you commit the Army, you’re committing the nation; you’re committing human capital to that fight. The environment that existed back in the 70s and 80s and somewhat so into the 90s is tremendously different than the one that we’re dealing with today. Today’s environment affects how you interact with partnered forces, how you interact with your coalition forces and how you interact amongst our services; this is not solely because of technology.

Q: How has the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) changed since you were here last?

MG White: The last time I was here was as a brigade commander. Where I focused and the missions that we were taking on, were a component or a subcomponent of a broader, multi-national Division, multi-national Corps and Multi-National Forces Iraq nested up and down in each of those headquarters. I
didn’t understand as a Brigade Commander, necessarily, the effects that were being achieved in the institution, in the training realm for both the police and the army. Reflecting back on the capability of the Army and the Police Force then, as opposed to now, the current force is probably the most tested and battle hardened force we have globally. The Iraqi Forces have been fighting for three and a half years; people have been shooting at them and they’ve been shooting at the bad guys. They’ve been integrating joint fires and effects.

It is hard to really bridge between that experience as Brigade Commander and my present one as a CJFLCC/Division Commander, but the main difference right now in my mind is that the present Iraqi force is a more experienced force; it is more experienced in operating both intra- and inter-service, inclusive of counter-terrorism services, police forces, army forces and coalition enablers. Whereas last time, if I was conducting a mission with a partnered force, it was primarily police centric or army centric. Trying to get the 2nd National Police Commander and the 17th Army Iraqi Division Commander to do combined operations was not something they were comfortable with when I was a Brigade Commander. Now, it is how they operate, to keep those services working together is the value of the Combined Joint Operations Center-Baghdad (CJOC-B), sitting right across the street from my location. The CJOC is so important from an above-ground combined arms maneuver perspective and the after effect of the security that will fall out of this and what we term as a “hold force” in an area that has just been cleared of Da’esh or some other violent extremist organization. That would be the primary difference.

**Q:** *ISF had transitioned to a force willing to take the fight to ISIS in a very deliberate and effective way. Can you talk about what you think were the big reasons for this development and what CJFLCC’s role was in partnering with the Iraqi Security Forces? What is CJFLCC’s role in helping to maintain or institutionalize these changes?*

**MG White:** You have to understand that the coalition were the second element to come to the fight. When Da’esh invaded Iraq and established half the physical caliphate here on their territory, while the Iraqis were fighting to preserve what they could, the Popular Mobilization Forces were called first. At the same time, we were generating forces to fill an advisory role, but primarily to provide them with precise enabler effects. They lacked joint fires effects for their forces the most. Starting with LTG Paul Funk and moving through the previous CJFLCC commanders to MG Joseph Martin, with whom I transitioned in
early summer 2017, I think the CJFLCC was essential in doing what I described early on, which is allowing the Iraqis to fight as a team, not individually and not geographically dispersed. It enabled the Iraqis to understand priorities, effectively, what is most important today. It allowed mass effects to be delivered to an area to destroy Da’esh and wide area security to be provided, before moving to the next one. This campaign construct through the operations process and the operations framework is the greatest boon that CJFLCC provided the ISF. There were multiple engagements going on up above the CJFLCC to help the Iraqi government to see themselves in what was happening. I think the greatest value of the CJFLCC was organizational in nature; to partner with the Command and Control structure that they had. We have to ensure that the Iraqis are first and foremost integrating their own combat potential, and then adding ours on top of that, in order to achieve precise effects against the enemy that are prioritized, rather than just all over the country.

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As we fought through Iraq to destroy the physical caliphate and to provide the Iraqis freedom of choice on what they’d do next, the vision that I had was to enable the Iraqis to understand their environment better. They’re experts at human intelligence, they are networked out there; they talk to the Sheiks; they have agents observing the environment; the average citizen will help them out. They are experts at human intelligence but it’s not refined enough in order to conduct an operation with precision. The first step was to ask the Iraqis “What do you want most out of the Coalition’s effort?” “If you’re going to ask us to stay here, what do you want most?” Here are some of my thoughts. We can talk the by, with, and through methodology as that has been used by previous commanders and works, but first and foremost it is the fusing of intelligence that gives you precision so you can undertake an operation, which will make it successful. For example, the Iraqis are good at what we call clearing operations with mass. So, grab five brigades, go into Kirkuk, then clear Kirkuk. But there’s no military objective associated with the clearance operation. You need to ask, what are you really trying to go after? So, it’s a case of walking it back and applying the red pen first. Where’s the enemy, and then shape your operation around defeating that enemy. That was number one. Number two was knowing that as they came out of these major combat operations as a large, joint and combined main body moving around Iraq destroying Da’esh, how were they going to command and control those forces once they were done?

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Our greatest contribution is really three fold: one is to help them build their intelligence enterprise and show them what right looks like; two is to be positioned in Iraq in critical areas to enable those ground forces in integration of our enablers and Iraqi enablers to conduct precise operations against an enemy based on that intelligence; three is to train them to become more professional in nature. We structured ourselves that way and we are in transition right now, so that in locations throughout Iraq we have what we’re calling Combined Operation Centers (COC). Contained within that COC is either a targeting cell or a targeting center. That

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brings in our partner Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF), with all of the great resources they have in a combined intelligence targeting center with Iraqis sitting right next to us in all of those centers. That will take a year or so but we are already reaping the benefits of our efforts with the Iraqis in those Operation Centers and Targeting Cells. We are partnered with the CJOC and are showing the Iraqis the value of having a CJOC that has oversight of the joint force and all its components: police, army, counter-terrorism, energy police and border guards, so that you have one entity for the Prime Minister (PM) that is watching the environment and can provide advice to the PM on what to do next.

Q: **How did you coordinate your efforts with other coalition elements (SOJTF, OSC-I, etc.) and what percentage of your time did you have to devote to this?**

MG White: Commander SOJTF, MG Jarrad, has two subordinate commands, one in Syria and one in Iraq. Special Operations Joint Task Force-Iraq (SOJTF-I), which is currently commanded by a Marine one star, BG. Jim Glynn, is partnered in everything we do. Any battle rhythm event we have in our operations process, BG Glynn has the seat which is to my left. Down in our subordinate commands it is the same way. SOJTF-West commander, who owns west of Baghdad and geographically speaking, south of Sinjar and Tal Afar all the way down to the Saudi border with the forces he has assigned to him, coordinates, lives, sleeps and breathes with the Anbar Operations Command and the Jazirah Operations Command coalition contributions. It is the same for SOJTF-North, primarily based out of the Ninewah Operations Command in Mosul with its primary HQ in Erbil airport. Nothing happens without both commanders being in the loop and being partnered with the Iraqi forces. I think it works well; part of it is personality based but most of it is the structure that has been developed prior to now. It was tested during the battles that led up to Mosul, and then post Mosul as ISF moved through the rest of the country.

Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) is a growth industry for the CJFLCC. Up until this point, I was not necessarily concerned about the “programmatic” that OSC-I provides for the Iraqis through the CENTCOM commander into Iraq working as Title 22 authority. In the end, we were partnered with a force that was fighting and behind that was an apparatus that was providing programs to support F16s, M1’s, etc. We were at the user end of all that and really there was no need for me to necessarily call out to MG Bradley Becker [OSC-I commander] regarding specific issues; they had it in hand. There is a five year program that was moving forward. I think that the Iraqis now have an opportunity to start making some choices, the relationship with CJLCC [CJTF] and OSC-I will become tighter. It will have to become tighter; we will now be focused on moving the Iraqis through a training cycle that gets them to operate on their own. Train themselves and organize themselves, that’s within a two to three year period. That has to merge with the plan that OSC-I has for the programs in Iraq so that we don’t take the Iraqis off in a direction that creates a demand that is not programmed, planned, and agreed to by the Government of Iraq.

There hasn’t been much interaction with OSC-I other than a weekly meeting while I was here. I think [the next CJFLCC commander] MG Walt Piatt, will have much, much, more interaction with OSC-I, to the point that he will embed people into the OSC-I structure under a Title 22 role in order to establish that linkage.

Q: **How well were you prepared? Did your WFX and MRX prepare you and the staff to assume the core of the CJFLCC-OIR mission? What worked best in terms of training events?**

MG White: The way I took on my role as a Division Commander, is that we would be about 30% of a larger staff. I contributed just over 400 people that would then disperse themselves into a larger staff…I said that the first thing that we’re going to do is to deliver for the Chief of Staff of the Army, so he can deliver to the Combatant Commanders a headquarters that is trained according to our Mission Essential Tasks. That means we will focus on execution of the Warfighter Exercise (WFX) which will tell us how
good we are against each of these tasks. WFX stretch higher end kinetics, although they are now primarily weighted towards the heavier end kinetics. You also fight the hybrid enemy dimension, which includes all the things you see here in Iraq. So the first priority was to get through the WFX and enable us to deliver a trained Division Headquarters that can fight as a standalone US headquarters or be missioned as joint task force for any mission. We focused on that first and foremost. We executed our WFX in late January-early February [2017] and then we turned the spotlight on Iraq because we had sufficient time to do that since we weren’t rolling people into Iraq until May. We had 90 days to take all the lessons we had learned from the WFX in terms of delivering joint fires effects. If the operational framework is deep / close / rear in the traditional sense, we were able to focus on the deep aspect of it, then the coordinate with the rear and enable the brigades in the close. I mention all that because it ties into what we saw for the first 6 months here.

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The Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) was about getting a shared understanding of the Iraq environment, with the assistance of the Joint Staff, all our partners at State and other 3 letter agencies – including intelligence agencies. We needed to understand the current environment and the historical context, to see how we would be missioned against that environment, and then work with the 1st ID to see what they were doing.

WFX enables you to gain your core competencies as a Division in the US Army and deliver a trained and ready Division HQ for the Chief of Staff under Title 10 authority. The MRX requires a shift focus to operating with other components, to help us rapidly learn about the Iraq environment. …All of that appears to have worked pretty well to date. When we assumed the mission in Iraq, we were in the throes of the last vestiges of the Mosul fight that had been going on for eight months. We took it on in the last month and finished it off, knowing that there were other fights that were going to occur, so we went back to what we learned at the WFX. We created an operational framework for the environment that allowed us to prosecute a deep fight as a CJFLCC; we conducted the shaping that was required in order for the Iraqi ground forces, effectively an Army Brigade, to enter into the close fight with Da’esh. There is a period of time where you conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPOE), you do targeting development for the deep fight and then you separate those targets into deep and close. You’re protecting: your rear; the Iraqi rear; and their lines of communication within your rear battle area. Everything that we learned during the WFX, was directly applied to the conflict here in Iraq through a partnered force with joint fires and effects and enablers that we provided. That worked well because we were then able to get the Iraqis thinking more than a day ahead.

Again, the fight in Mosul, which was the most horrific fight that anyone has seen in a long time, was a daily scrap. Every day, inch by inch and block by block, no one was especially concerned about what came next. It was about, “we have to win this fight in Mosul.” The opportunity the 1st ID and the Iraqis handed us was that we were actually able to establish a framework off the back of their success that enabled us to plan with the Iraqis how they were going to destroy the rest of Da’esh and liberate all of their population centers. That culminated near towards the end of 2017 as we finished off Al Qaim. That was the last great battle of the major combat operations. Because of what we learned in the WFX, we have already transitioned our operational framework to where we are today which is back to what I talked about at the beginning; I won’t call it a network centric fight, but it is a conflict between the Iraqis and Da’esh in pursuit of the successes that they gained by liberating all their population centers. With our support, Iraqi Security Forces continue to pursue the pockets of resistance that still exist, through intelligence driven operations. They aren’t necessarily massing formations any longer and sweeping
through towns and fighting that way…So right now we are in transition between what was major combat operations, and consolidate gains. If you want to look at it doctrinally, we will then move into a phase of wide area security; protection of borders, counter terrorism operations and protection of the populace.

Q: How have you leveraged the 23 nation and 4 sister services coalition to defeat ISIS and build partner capacity?

MG White: To add some specifics, there are partner nations here that are fully committed in the special operations realm. They seek to help advise Iraqi partners in some capacity and also gain experience on the ground. Some have national caveat restrictions, and some don’t. Of the coalition of 23 nations, we have 12 that make contributions to the Kurdish Training and Coordination Center in Erbil, training the Kurdish security forces. Germany is the lead nation in it at the moment, and it switches between Germany and Italy. The Spanish are absolutely committed out at Besmayah. The Aussies, the New Zealanders, the British and some other nations are fully committed at Taji, which is a build partner capacity site, while the Italians are fully committed to police training. So, you take what each of those nations does really well and can see that they’ve given their best people to help the Iraqis. Underneath what I have just described, is the second mission, where the 23 nations contributing forces to CJFLCC have fully committed to work as a coalition to get the Iraqis to a point where they are professional enough to be able to train and lead themselves. There’s a conditional end state that has been developed in our campaign plan that we continue to track along the way. When we engage with the senior leadership from these coalition nations, whether they be civilian or military, that is what we talk to them about. Namely, how their forces are being committed, what those commitments are producing for the Iraqis, what the end-state is and how close are we to achieving this.

Q: How has CJFLCC-OIR adjusted to the acceleration in the campaign? What were the most significant challenges encountered as a result of this acceleration? Opportunities?

MG White: It is a case of chicken and egg and goes back to the discussion about the ability of the CJFLCC to take on the role of a Land Component Command in its operations process and operational framework. We needed to look into the deep fight more, to enable the ISF to fight the close battle and destroy the enemy. As Da’esh lost control of Mosul, it became readily apparent that much of their “A-team” had been there. Other areas in Iraq were being used as support zones either for finance or human capital to fight against the Iraqis and to hold ground, or as way-points for foreign fighters or others to move through. I think the reason the campaign accelerated was because of the effort between the CJFLCC and the Iraqis in deliberately going after the challenges still existing in the country. The greatest
challenge for us was what we used to call Prime Directive #1, (and still do), which consists of two things: first, don’t become the main effort and second, don’t make the ISF wait for us. So if they’re transitioning from Mosul to Tal Afar, I can’t walk over and tell sLTG Abdul Amir that it’s going to take us three weeks to get some bases built, to get fire support assets in place and put advise and assist teams in. We had to be smart enough to be rolling with the Iraqis as they moved and put ourselves in a position to provide them the same type of support they’ve become accustomed to from Fallujah through Tikrit all the way up to Mosul. Luckily for us, the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division had a method for doing that. We just had to understand how to accelerate it in order to stay on line with what the Iraqis wanted to do and to be in position with our resources for that to happen.

Q: How are you managing risk as the CJFLCC transitions from offensive operations to consolidation of gains?

MG White: My number one priority is to protect the Force. All decisions rotate around that and goes back to the amount of resources that are apportioned and allocated against the CJFLCC mission in Iraq. If a Task Force Commander tells me that the risk he has to assume in order to partner with the Iraqi forces is greater than the resources I’ve given him, then we have an adult conversation with our higher headquarters about whether we’re going to do the task, as well as a conversation with our Iraqi partners. We are as transparent as we can be. The second way we’ve made adjustments was to take account of both the protect the force priority and Prime Directive #1, and shift the model of how we advise and assist the Iraqis back to where it pretty much started in 2014. Namely a model where we Advise, Assist, and Enable (A2E) from a geographic location from where we can provide support to the Iraqis that offsets the violence that is occurring. Effectively the Operations Commands that I previously mentioned. Whereas during 2016 and 2017 we were conducting Advise, Assist, Accompany and Enable (A3E) which meant we were based forward. This is what drove Tactical Directive #1 to come about. We are now primarily back to A2E. A3E is only conducted by exception and is approved only by me. This means that going forward our guys can advise and assist Iraqis from Operational Command Centers now that we are in this consolidate gains phase under Reliable Partnership. We can also share intelligence with the Iraqis and enable them to go forward to conduct whatever operation it is that they determine. For example, conducting A3E operations in Mosul meant that the last covered and concealed position before the objective could have been a city block away from the target. Now that only happens by exception, and normally when we conduct A3E operations it is special operations centric with a partnered force that is going to detain a high-value individual or break down a network. It’s rarely with a conventional force such as the army brigades or Marines that are out in Anbar.

Q: Describe the information environment across the CJOA and the CJFLCC’s ability to compete in that environment?

MG White: Harking back to “how did you train up for it,” we put some emphasis on the non-lethal aspect of warfare. What I don’t think we had an idea about, and one of the changes I think I would make if I had to do this all over again, is executing that process through a partner. Where there are very deliberate information operations or public affairs stances that will be taken by the coalition or by the
U.S. in the area of responsibility, all the effects that you are trying to achieve come from your partnered force. So if an Iraqi is saying something, it means a whole lot more than if we’re saying it to the Iraqi people. In the environment in which we now operate, there are legitimate elements of the Iraqi government and other elements that are less compliant with the Iraqi government, which are seeking to remove the coalition from Iraqi soil, and more specifically the U.S. In this non-lethal process as we develop whether effects will be achieved through electronic warfare, cyber warfare, information operations or public affairs, the first move sits with the Iraqis. All we can say to them is “We’re your partner, we’re your preferred partner as you stated publicly, and we’ve been here with you fighting. You now have somebody saying or doing something in the information environment that you should be countering if you want us to stay.” These elements are trying to affect the information environment, so you need to counter it first and work with the Iraqi enterprise in order to do that.

On reflection, that is something that we could have worked harder on. You never would’ve imagined it would be the way it is. Both lethal and non-lethal targeting become a by, with, and through methodology if you’re going to come to a place like Iraq. It’s less about LTG Funk getting up on stage or me getting in front of a camera and talking about how great the coalition is and all the things the U.S. has done. It’s more about having the Iraqis say that. Those are the nuances that are out there.

Both lethal and non-lethal targeting become a by, with, and through methodology if you’re going to come to a place like Iraq.

There wasn’t a lot of cyber play at my level. There are some authority issues with it but there are some resource issues as well. That is normally a couple of echelons of command above me. But it’s a case of truth versus fiction and a battle between who is countering or getting in front of who. For example, if we know that we’re going to conduct an operation on the 6th February and we’re going to strike 63 targets simultaneously during the hours of darkness in an area in Iraq, it’s best if the Prime Minister is the guy who says the next morning, “I approved that operation.” If he says that, then no one else can say anything about it. That’s the direction we’re headed in now and that’s what we’ll pass off to 10th Mountain Division.

**Q:** What was your experience with the National Guard 1st AD Mission Command Post – Operational Detachment (MCP-OD pronounced McPOD)?

**MG White:** One, they’re not allowed to call themselves a MCP-OD anymore; they’re a part of the 1st AD Headquarters and they were from the day they were assigned to the 1st AD Headquarters from the State of Texas. We integrated them into the team early. There will always be some awkwardness with the way the augmentation is formed; it doesn’t necessarily come easily for a singular unit in nature. There are inputs for expertise based on what the requirement is, so it’s a case of “here are the things inside our headquarters that we are missing, can you help us out with that?” And so from the outset these augmentees become part of the 1AD team and put our patch on. It doesn’t matter what unit they came from before, we had to transition ourselves forwards and integrate them into the team. This included the warfighter train-ups, WFX, and then the deployment to Iraq, to take advantage of the tremendous skills.
that were contained within the forming of the MCP-OD and then the MCP-OD assignment to the 1st AD Headquarters.

We’re not the first headquarters to receive this type of augmentation and we certainly won’t be the last. In fact 10th Mountain has got an element as well that will be deploying with them. We have shared some of our Lessons Learned there. But primarily the MCP-OD and what the MCP-OD brings to the Division Headquarters flows back to the reduction of the active component headquarters by numbers and skills. As we did our force alignments and were seeking to gain back spaces to buy other things like electronic warfare operators, we went from north of 700 in a Division Headquarters to just south of 500. So there are 200 people that are no longer a part of your organization. With that exodus also goes a number of skills that you still require, but the guard or reserve has, of which you can then take advantage.

But primarily…what the MCP-OD brings to the Division Headquarters flows back to the reduction of the active component headquarters by numbers and skills.

I think this is a great experience for them. Probably not all of the MCP-OD personnel feel the same way I do, but I feel pretty strongly that they’re a part of 1AD. They’re on the team, and were since the moment that they were assigned. They are also now a part of the history of Iraq; they will be able to talk about that forever and ever.

We are all one team and in one fight together. That extends beyond the MCP-OD; it also applies to the coalition and the Iraqis. It applies to everybody.

**Final Thoughts**

**MG White:** The Chief has created the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) for a purpose and the primary purpose is to do things that 3rd BCT, 10th MD have done in the past. The first SFAB is going to go to Afghanistan. They’ve taken the lessons we have learned along the way in all the theaters, and applied these to the training of particular formations. For Division Headquarters and higher - Echelons above Brigade - the light bulb that went on for me is the amount of physical and intellectual energy that is required to get your partner force into a position where they will succeed. It’s clear to us but because in this case it happens to be Iraqis; how they view the world and how they operate is the way they have done it for centuries. It’s an Arab mentality that in its nature is not westernized as much as we would like to think it is. There is a constant back and forth; you plant the seed, you water it every day until it sprouts, until one day it starts to grow out of the ground and the flower comes out. I wasn’t initially prepared for the amount of energy it takes to do that with your partnered force. It is a case of just constantly talking, constantly making it their idea - not your idea - and building the consensus on their side - not our side – so that it trickles down through all the components of the headquarters, not just the commander. Having complete buy in to that process takes you back to Prime Directive #1, and the “Don’t become the main effort” principle. As soon as you start to step forward and do all the planning and do all the coordination during execution, you’re the one with your foot in the door first; the partner force will never develop to the level that this particular partner force has developed so far. When they start veering off you have to figure out how to pull them back toward the

**The Effect of Coalition Training from the CJTF perspective:**

“But, let’s consider this – the Iraqis went from running away, abandoning their equipment; basically the army could not conduct any effective offensive or defensive operations. But three years later they are executing a division level attack – over 120 kilometers from Baiji all the way out to the border.”

27JAN18 interview with LTG Funk, Commander, CJTF-OIR
center. In some cases, you have to let them go, because what they want to do might makes zero sense to you, but it has an effect that in the end is what you were trying to achieve in the first place. It’s just the nuances of all the working by, with, and through a partner force that you think you are preparing for, until you get in the mix and realize, “I have to spend a lot of time thinking about how to engage with the partner force to get them to stay on path.”

As I circulate around Iraq, pride is a great word to describe how I feel, but honor is another, seeing as the Iraqis did ask us to come here in the first place. It is an opportunity for me to talk about the experiences our people have had here and to be proud of what the Iraqis have achieved. The Iraqis fought ISIS on their soil, but it wasn’t just for the Iraqis. This fight has been about a global defeat of ISIS, and the first wind that we have by way of evidence of that global defeat, just happens to be here in Iraq. We are now hoping that everything that we have learned and the resources we have used to enable the Iraqis to be successful, will enable other places to also be successful. Therefore if you’re PVT Smith, who has been tucked away behind a computer as an analyst in the J2 shop, you had a significant role in the success of the Iraqis. Be proud of it and talk about it.

MG Pat White, commanding general for 1st Armored Division, and (Right) Command SGM Danny Day, senior enlisted adviser for 1st AD, case their division colors during the transfer of authority ceremony for the Combined Forces Land Component Command -- Operation Inherent Resolve in Baghdad, Iraq, March 19, 2018. The 1st AD transferred authority to the 10th Mountain Division after a nine-month deployment in support of CJFLCC-OIR. (US Army Photo by U.S. Army photo by MSG Horace Murray)

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In general, it has been one heck of an experience. If you had asked me seven and a half months ago if we would be where we are right now, I probably would have chuckled a little bit and said that this is going to take some time. The deliberateness of the campaign and its associated framework, which leads toward getting a partnered force to execute something that resembles that framework, will take a period of time to achieve. The acceleration was not necessarily a big surprise but it required us to adjust. It has been a great experience.