



CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED



CALL INSIDER

1st QTR, FY20


DIRECTOR'S CORNER

This edition of the *CALL Insider* wraps up a dynamic quarter for our organization. In addition to publishing the products listed, we continue to prepare to support Defender Europe 2020. We will be looking at this exercise during all phases to provide senior leaders with lessons and best practices that can improve our strategic readiness. This, while we simultaneously begin planning for Defender Pacific, will be the main effort for our team over the next six to nine months. I look forward to sharing our observations. Specific items of interest this issue include an article from COL Simmering, Commander, Operations Group, National Training Center. He takes the time to outline how units can focus their training and “think about what mastery of the fundamentals truly means.” I encourage you to read and share this article. Another feature is our “News You Can Use” where we highlight products from other units/organizations that you may find useful. What are we missing? Are there other ways we can share our products, services, and information? Please feel free to contact my team at usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.call-rfi-manager-mailbox@mail.mil with your suggestions.




Christopher J. Keller
COL, IN

RECENT PUBLICATIONS



[Command Post Computing Environment Initial Lessons and Best Practices](#) (CAC login required)

The Command Post Computing Environment (CPCE) provides Warfighters with an integrated, survivable, and mobile command and control system that will ultimately replace the Command Post of the Future and its associated systems across the Army. Consisting of highly intuitive software loaded on a smaller, lighter, and more mobile server footprint, CPCE has already received positive feedback as formal testing and evaluation has begun in portions of the force. This publication provides lessons and best practices from first units equipped, proponents, developers, and others, and is designed for commanders staffs, knowledge managers, tactical/operational network managers, and individuals/teams involved in command post operations and information management. [JLLIS link.](#)




[Corps and Division Planners Guide to Reconstitution Operations](#)

Reconstitution of combat forces has always been critical to the Army's success in past battlefields and will remain so for the Army's continued success. Large-scale combat operations (LSCO) will require extensive reconstitution of combat forces and will require staffs to execute operations they may not have the experience or knowledge base to execute. Planners will need to be agile and work within those challenges to be successful. They will have to understand their roles and responsibilities and consider items that are unfamiliar while operating in a counterinsurgency environment. This handbook serves as an aid to corps- and division-level headquarters staffs as they plan and prepare to conduct reconstitution operations. [JLLIS link.](#)




Recent CALL Publications, cont.



[Commander and Staff Guide to Main Command Post-Operational Detachment](#)

(CAC login required)

The Main Command Post-Operational Detachment (MCP-OD) is a U.S. Army National Guard/U.S. Army Reserve organization designed to augment Title 10 headquarters during both exercises and operational contingencies. Because policy and procedures have evolved, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) determined there was a need for a commander and staff guide to facilitate the detachment's integration into command post operations. This guide serves three purposes: 1. Provide techniques for manning, training, and equipping MCP-ODs while conforming with the appropriate U.S. title codes; 2. Provide the units resourcing a MCP-OD with the best practices and lessons learned from previous MCP-ODs; and 3. Provide active component corps and divisions with background information about MCP-OD capabilities and limitations throughout all phases of deployment. [JLLIS link.](#)




[U.S. Army South Transition to a Multinational Force Headquarters](#)

From our partners at U.S. Army South comes an inside look into the planning, execution, and challenges associated with Panamax 18 (NOBLE FUTURE), a U.S. Southern Command-sponsored, combatant commander exercise. Operation NOBLE FUTURE enabled the U.S. Army to share a regional security vision and work with joint counterparts, interagency representatives, and multiple countries across the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility to confront mutual challenges and threats. The lessons learned here, however, may apply to any Army Service component command charged with transitioning to a multinational force headquarters. [JLLIS link.](#)




[Commander and Staff Guide to Liaison Functions](#)

Liaison officers (LNOs) are critical to the successful integration of diverse capabilities. Despite the importance of the functions LNOs perform, CALL continues to capture observations that indicate significant issues concerning their selection, training, and employment. This handbook is designed to provide planning and execution guidance for the employment of LNOs in a single source document. [JLLIS link.](#)



[Map Reading and Land Navigation](#) (CAC login required)

This graphic training aid (GTA) explains and illustrates the fundamentals of map reading for Soldiers as well as gives a quick guide on how to conduct land navigation. The information conforms as closely as possible to approved Department of the Army doctrine and is intended to complement existing training literature. [JLLIS link.](#)



[Grenadier Guide](#)

This GTA provides technical information about combat techniques for the M320 grenade launcher and gives designated grenadiers basic information to successfully integrate the M320 into their combat operations. [JLLIS link.](#)



Recent CALL Publications, cont.

[FY19 National Training Center Observation](#)**[Analysis](#)** (CAC login required)

This publication is intended for all units conducting home station training to prepare themselves for a combat training center (CTC) rotation and combat. The Operations Group at the National Training Center (NTC) released observations from rotations throughout FY19. These observations were then integrated together according to the Army Universal Task List and analyzed to determine root causes and doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) implications.

[USAREUR Southern Exercise Campaign 19 Initial Impressions Report](#) (CAC login required)

This Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS)-generated collection report provides a summary of key observations, lessons, and best practices collected by a two-person CALL collection and analysis team during the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Southern Exercise Campaign 2019 (SEC19) and associated exercises. These exercises were conducted between 15 May to 24 June 2019 at various locations throughout Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Republic of North Macedonia, and Croatia in order to improve interoperability and readiness. [JLLIS link](#).

[Insights from Dynamic Front White Paper](#)

(CAC login required)

Dynamic Front 2019 (DF19), 7th Army Training Command's fourth exercise in the Dynamic Front series, focused on how three elements of combat power (leadership, mission command, and fires) inform the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) performance in large scale ground combat operations against a peer threat. This paper addresses lessons and best practices from DF19.

[The Army Mission Partner Environment Concept of Operations](#) (CAC login required)

To fight as multinational formations, the U.S. Army perspective is to man, train, and equip Army Forces with a Mission Partner Environment (MPE) capability. The MPE includes a network package that is reliable, protected, and configurable at the desired classification level to meet information and data exchange requirements. The Army MPE concept of operations helps address this overarching requirement by providing detailed operational descriptions, desired characteristics, employment considerations, impacts and desired outcomes.

BEST PRACTICE SUBMISSIONS

[Artillerization of IPB in Large-Scale Combat Operations](#) (CAC login required)**[Consolidating Gains and the Transition to a Consolidation Area: A Perspective from Warfighter 19-5](#)** (CAC login required)

NEWS FROM THE FRONT AND CTC

[The Brigade Combat Team Counterfire Operations Section: Setting Conditions for Effective Counterfire](#) (CAC login required)**[Put the Camera Down: Preparing the Public Affairs Officer for a JRTC Rotation](#)****[Unit CBRN Readiness Training — A Way](#)****[The Engagement is the Mission](#)****[How the Kosovo Security Force Built a Successful Lessons Learned Program](#)****[The Science of Control: Synchronizing Current Operations Cells](#)****[Bloodhound Package](#)** (CAC login required)

NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

The below article comes from COL Michael J. Simmering, Commander, Operations Group, National Training Center (Follow COL Simmering @simmering216 on Twitter)

Focusing on the Fundamentals

In November 2019, NTC released “Company and Platoon Observations and Best Practices.” Intended to allow Commanders to refine unit standard operating procedures and home station training techniques, this document set forth what good units ruthlessly execute well at the National Training Center. We wanted to utilize this edition of the *CALL Insider* to expand upon our rationale: The best units arrive at NTC with lethal, disciplined squads, platoons, and companies with adequately trained battalion and brigade staffs capable of planning and synchronizing operations in a combined arms fashion. That’s it. Nothing more. Nothing less.

If you want to truly focus training for your unit in support of large-scale combat operations, we must take a step back and think about what mastery of the fundamentals truly means.

1. Your Operating Environment: The key to preparation for those who haven’t seen conflict is imagination. Let’s face it — few, if any of us, have seen large-scale combat operations against a near-peer threat. We need to understand the battlefield conditions we’re likely to encounter. In this complex age, filled with a variety of threats, it’s easy for Commanders to lose sight of what they need to be ready to do. With the Army’s gravitation back towards large-scale combat operations, some units fail to truly understand the Army’s prescribed decisive action training environment. Absent a specific threat in a time of war, at NTC, your units are expected to accomplish their mission in an environment that assumes:

- **Free-Thinking Enemy forces** — The enemy doesn’t do lane training. The enemy spends just as much time trying to think about beating you as you do thinking about him (if not more).
- **Presence of Proxy Forces (w/ tech)** — This enemy is playing on his home field, and he has friends. He provides his friends with access to technology (unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs], anti-tank [AT] weapons, mines, etc.) as these items become cheaper and cheaper to acquire.
- **Part of a Division Fight (limited resources)** — You’re not the only one on the battlefield. You’re part of a larger scale fight. Working together is critical. Synchronized operations only create windows of opportunity. Most of the time, you’re fighting with what you brought. If you’re organized with a higher-level asset, you only have it for a limited time for a specific purpose.
- **Continuous Enemy Contact (360/24/7)** — This enemy has the combat power to continually maintain contact with your forces. You’re never alone, and you’re always enduring one of the eight forms of contact.
- **Cyber-Electromagnetic Activity (CEMA) Denied** — This enemy has the capability to disrupt your communications at will. He has the ability to find you using sophisticated methods such as your radio signatures.
- **Constant Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Threat** — Once he finds you, this enemy has access to special munitions that instantly change the battlefield conditions.
- **Air Parity w/Superiority Windows** — The skies are no longer the purview of only the U.S. military. This enemy has access to fixed wing and rotary wing aviation, and he can easily steer them to your front lines. He has increased access to air defense assets which allow him to destroy your aviation assets seemingly at will.
- **Significant Artillery Threat** — The enemy has access to artillery that can both outrange and out-mass your artillery. Dispersion and camouflage for friendly formations takes on an increased importance when the enemy can place fires on your position at will.
- **Enhanced AT Threat** — The proliferation of technology provides this enemy increased access to AT systems which, employed properly, can stop a formation that does not combine arms.
- **Challenged Mobility** — The land domain aspect of anti-access/area denial theory is decreased mobility for friendly forces. Obstacles are everywhere. Some new ... some have been in place for years. All of them are effective.
- **Built Up Urban Areas** — You can no longer simply “go around” towns. The high rate of urbanization has finally forced you to deal with urban areas in some way or another. The enemy loves to hide among these cities.
- **Extreme Distances** — You can’t see everyone. There is no “golden hour” to limit your movement. Your unit will be spread across vast distances. Everything seems to take longer than it does at home station. (cont. on page 5)



2. Focus + Repetition = Mastery: If you know what your enemy is like and understand your operating environment, then you must figure out how you are going to train your Soldiers to operate in that environment. Winning in this environment starts with a rigid focus on the mastery of fundamental tasks at echelon. Often, we fail to comprehend what this key phrase truly means.

- **Fundamental:** Leaders consistently argue over what we mean by fundamental. Is physical training (PT) fundamental? Yes. Is maintenance fundamental? Yes. But, in the context of collective training, fundamental simply means, “Can your unit perform the basic tasks for which it was designed?” Every unit in the Army has been manned and equipped to accomplish specific tasks on the battlefield. These tasks should always, above all others, be considered fundamental tasks expected of a unit, regardless of echelon.
- **Mastery:** Just because we train a particular task during a field exercise does not imply mastery. It simply implies you have executed the task. To truly master a task, you must be capable of performing it under combat conditions against a living, breathing, thinking enemy — in the imagined operational environment. It also means repetition under increasingly complicated battlefield conditions until execution for your unit becomes nearly second nature. You must be able to execute that task day, night, under NBC conditions, in a CEMA-denied environment, etc.
- **Focus:** We don’t have time to train everything. Believe it or not, the Army never has. Commanders do not attempt to train all the tasks and supporting collective tasks that support their unit mission essential tasks (METs), or all the capabilities specified in the unit’s table of organization and equipment or table of distribution and allowances mission statement. Commanders at all levels train to master a select few mission-focused collective tasks — even though they know they will probably have to adapt to unforeseen missions. When selecting collective tasks to train, commanders seek the right collective tasks that not only support the mission, but also are more likely to enable the unit to adapt to unexpected missions.
- Your resulting goal: Simply put, the goal of any unit training plan should be to master a handful of fundamental tasks, focused to achieve the highest level of training proficiency possible given the time and resources available.

3. Task Identification: Most units fail to identify the handful of critical collective tasks their units must perform, at echelon, in a decisive action operating environment and then ruthlessly structure a training program that concentrates on those tasks alone. Too often, Commanders fail to consciously accept risk. In reality, whether operating at the squad, platoon, or company level, there are a handful of tasks (usually around five ... sometimes more, sometimes less) which serve as the basis for lethal formations. For example, as a tank platoon, it really doesn’t matter how complicated the mission is at the brigade combat team (BCT) level. You’re usually doing the same handful of tasks. You are usually tactically moving from point A to point B (Conduct Tactical Movement), reacting to contact (Conduct Actions on Contact), placing overwhelming fires at the decisive point (Conduct Attack by Fire [ABF]/Support by Fire [SBF], or defending your position (Defend a Battle Position). That’s it. A tank platoon that cannot master these fundamental tasks will not perform well. A tank platoon that can execute those tasks in the correctly imagined operational environment easily changes the course of a firefight.

The same logic holds true for every small unit in the U.S. Army. What are the fundamental tasks that your unit must accomplish, at echelon, in order to be successful? Only you, and your team can answer that question. Get together, figure them out. Crosswalk the chosen tasks from specific battalion and company METs to platoon and squad supporting battle tasks. Make your teams backbrief you on what they believe those tasks are. Make sure that your tasks nest through a solid crosswalk. Most importantly, gain your subordinates’ buy in. Approve the final list for each type of subordinate unit in your organization, then hold your subordinates accountable for their ability to perform those tasks.

4. The Rest of the Training Process: From there, our doctrine ([Army Doctrine Publication \[ADP\] 7-0, Training](#)) does a great job at spelling out how to establish and run a unit training program to achieve a high level of proficiency in specific tasks. However, many units fail at these first steps. Correctly imagining your operating environment and then building a structured, disciplined, home station program to train those tasks to a high level at the company level and below constitutes the heart of lethality in our Army. Units that do this well, do well at the NTC. Units that waste time training other tasks or fail to train their Soldiers in an environment that forces them to collectively execute their assigned missions as part of a disciplined cohesive team, come up short.

5. Conclusion: Great units arrive at the NTC having mastered fundamental tasks at the lower echelons. Units that arrive with inadequately trained platoons and companies struggle in the fight. Units that arrive with staffs incapable of understanding how to combine arms and synchronize operations struggle in all phases of the operations process. Lethal platoons and companies capable of sustaining operations in this environment allow battalions and brigades with trained staffs to exit the NTC at a higher level. This is how our Army must move forward as it seeks to continually “Master the Fundamentals at Echelon.”



ADDITIONAL NTC RESOURCES

[National Training Center Update: Company and Platoon Observations and Best Practices \(CAC login required\)](#)

NTC's November 2019 update highlights a selection of the best practices observed among rotational units at the Company level and below. Although not all encompassing, these types of observed best practices are critical to honing and sharpening our skills to fight America's enemies. As leaders incorporate these best practices into their SOPs and train them throughout their formation, the refinement and mastery of the fundamental tasks at echelon can begin to occur.

[Working to Reverse NTC's Routinely Observed Training Shortcomings \(CAC login required\)](#)

This document focuses on the common challenges that the observer-coach/trainers (OC/Ts) observe from multiple rotational units at the NTC. The goal of the document is to assist upcoming rotational units to focus on the fundamentals during their home station training, before arriving at the NTC and to win the U.S. Army's next fight.

JOINT MULTINATIONAL READINESS CENTER



Planning: Staffs, at all echelons, are most effective during reception, staging and onward movement (RSOM) operations when they did not have a competing current operations fight to manage. Additionally, commanders and the staff are generally co-located, setting conditions for the routine articulation and dissemination of guidance. BCT staffs have mostly adhered to the one third, two-thirds rule while allowing battalions enough time to plan for their operations.

Preparation: During RSOM, BCTs are disciplined in the execution of a Mission Command Validation Exercise, Fire Support Validation Exercise, an Information Collection/Fires Rehearsal, Combined Arms Rehearsal (CAR), and a Sustainment Rehearsal before the BCT moved into the box. The BCTs with the most success used the CAR as a vehicle for transitioning the overall plan to the BCT current operations (CUOPS) section. This is an effective technique for CUOPS to own the plan, but BCTs struggle with repeating the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in subsequent CARs once inside the box. Successful BCTs consistently produced appropriate fighting products and map specials for subordinates before the start of each CAR to ensure common graphics across the team. Successful BCTs also routinely executed distributed conditions checks before the start of each major operation to positive effect.


Execution: Multiple BCTs operated two simultaneous mission command nodes for the duration of the fight. Splitting these command nodes helped reduce the mission command post footprint and increased survivability. Although an effective methodology for delineating the BCT's fights (deep/close with tactical command post [TAC], rear for tactical operations center [TOC] between the two command nodes), those BCTs with smaller, more junior staffs were faced with challenges in operating both simultaneously. Successful BCTs used a disciplined adherence to a battle rhythm and robust primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan to ensure a common operational picture was shared and understood at echelon. Although BCTs are deliberate in executing a targeting cycle, an overreliance on echelons above brigade (EAB) assets was observed. Units would gain big dividends by leveraging organic capabilities observing named areas of interest (NAIs) while enhancing capacity through EAB assets while available.

Assessment. The most effective BCTs were able to capitalize on lessons learned during their previous rotations at JMRC, codified them into BCT standard operating procedures (SOPs), "how we fight" documents, and subsequent TTP. These products and processes were applied to great success once the BCT was in the box. It is imperative that units do not stop their learning from a CTC rotation once they have departed the training center and ensure they use the after action review process to build training strategies for implementing lessons learned once they are back at home station.

JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER




The Joint Readiness Training Center continues to provide relevant, rigorous, multi-echelon training to BCTs in preparation for large-scale combat operations on the decisive action battlefield against a near-peer threat with multi-domain capabilities while maintaining interoperability with our unified action partners. In an effort to reverse some of the historical trends seen at the BCT level, the staff at the JRTC worked tirelessly to put together several products designed to assist units in their preparation for a successful rotation at any CTC and increase overall unit readiness.



DEFENSE OF THE CAJUN BAYOU: This interactive decision-making book underscores the importance of decisions and is designed to prepare BCTs to succeed in decisive action. It is specifically designed to be interactive and not to be read straight through as you would a normal book. This book is an effort to reach units prior to their arrival at JRTC by giving commanders and staff realistic scenarios to think about while following

the fictitious Cajun Brigade through the planning and execution of a defense. Leaders, from the brigade commander to the battle captain, must adjust to the rapid pace and need for constant focus on the brigade fight where every decision matters. (*Defense of the Cajun Bayou* was originally published at the end of 3rd QTR FY19 but was again published with the Commander Operations Group's outreach for 1st QTR FY2020.)



LIVE FIRE TRENDS REVERSAL SERIES: This project consisted of a two-part series that focused on trends observed by Live Fire Division over multiple iterations to assist units achieve trend reversal in order to better assist units in their development and execution of their training paths towards live-fire operations. Part 1 focused on individual, crew, and small unit-level trends observed

over multiple iterations as well as home-station training suggestions. In Part 2, the focus of the observations are on collective and leader tasks to assist units achieve the same purpose. Much like the individual and crew-level observations, trends observed at the collective and leader level boil down to understanding and applying the basic fundamentals and science of warfighting.

Continuing along these lines of efforts for trends reversal, the major upcoming project is "Homestation Battle Drills to Help Achieve Success at JRTC." This product will feature a compilation of battle drills that will not be resource intensive and will be simple to understand and execute. These battle drills will specifically target the individual and collective-level training tasks associated with the observed trends; the end goal is better preparing units for operations in a decisive action environment.

These products and more can be found at the all new [JRTC Milsuite Site!](#) (CAC Login Required)



NEWS YOU CAN USE

[Iran Quick Reference Guide](#) (CAC login required)

A quick reference guide for U.S. Army formations to increase awareness of Iranian doctrine and networks, their proxies and capabilities, and their tactics and capabilities operating within multiple battlefield domains.

[Special Operations Joint Task Force Handbook](#) (CAC login required)

This handbook consists of two parts for use by two distinct audiences. Section one, the Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) Employment Guide is an “up and out” strategic communication guide for use by senior leaders and staff members who will find it useful when incorporating a SOJTF into LSCO campaign plans and contingency operations. Section two is a “down and in” document aimed at SOJTF commanders and their staffs who can use the information as a checklist for developing SOJTF plans and policies when supporting the Joint Force in LSCO at the operational level of war.

[Emission Control 21st Century Noise and Light Discipline](#) (CAC login required)

[MCCoE Sends Newsletter](#)

News you can use from the Mission Command Center of Excellence. Latest on training, doctrine, lessons learned, network integration, and more.

COMING SOON

How to Master Wargaming: Commander and Staff Guide to COA Analysis

“The general who wins the battle makes many calculations in his temple before the battle is fought. The general who loses makes but few calculations beforehand.”

*Sun Tzu
The Art of War*

The purpose of this handbook is not to repeat doctrine on course of action (COA) development. Instead, it focuses on three items: first, how to improve and develop the skill of visualization; second, thoughts on training staff; and third, improving the methods and conduct of action, reaction, counteraction adjudication of COA analysis.

***Musicians of Mars
Tactical Vignettes for Professional Discussion
Volume IV: The Mustang’s War***

This book will be the second follow-up to Musicians of Mars II. By design, it is more to the format of the epic *Defense of Duffer’s Drift* as opposed to a tactical decision text (e.g., John Antal’s *Tank Platoon and Infantry Combat*). Its focus is on tactical leaders’ decisions as Task Force Mustang transitions from a hasty pursuit to a more deliberate offensive operation to restore the Bolcavia (host nation) and Arcania (aggressor nation) border. As with previous volumes, tactical leaders’ decisions, both good and poor, are designed to stimulate discussion of small unit training, leadership, professionalism, and planning in a large-scale combat operation.

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