Building Mutual Trust Between Soldiers and Leaders

White Paper

Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force
Capabilities Development Integration Directorate
Mission Command Center of Excellence (MC CoE)
Executive Summary

Purpose

Mutual trust between leaders and their followers, called vertical trust, is important for all organizations. However, due to the increasing complexity of the operational environment and continued implementation of Mission Command, vertical trust will be especially critical for the Army of 2025 and beyond (F2025B). In order to effectively design and implement measures to increase vertical trust throughout the institution, the Army needs to:

- Gain an understanding of how vertical trust relationships are developed and maintained, specifically in the types of operational settings anticipated for F2025B,
- Gain an accurate understanding of the existing levels of vertical trust throughout the Army,
- Identify where trust is low and what specific conditions and factors are causing the trust deficiencies, and
- Design and implement measures to address the identified concerns.

To assist in this effort, this paper 1) reviews relevant and foundational trust literature, 2) reviews ongoing trust initiatives, both internal and external to the Army, and 3) makes recommendations regarding the way ahead.

What We Know About Trust

Trust occurs when one person willingly makes himself vulnerable to the actions of another based upon a subjective assessment of the other person’s competence and character. Trust is both dynamic and contextual. Although people tend to differ in the degree to which they initially trust or distrust new people, it is generally believed that trust emerges over time. Trust increases as the trustor accepts increasing amounts of risk as long as the trustee continues to meet the trustor’s positive expectations. However, trust can also be reduced or eliminated should the trustee fail to meet the positive expectations. A subordinate leader might therefore trust his superior at one point in time, but, based upon the superior’s actions, might not trust him in the future. Additionally, a leader might completely trust a subordinate to perform one task without supervision, such as preparing slides for a high-level brief, while still not trusting that same subordinate to perform a different task such as operating independently and making tactical decisions. This situational dependence renders the question, “Do you trust your commander?” incomplete, requiring clarification of “to do what?”
This paper adopts Dietz’s Trust Process as the most applicable model for the analysis of vertical trust within the Army. According to this model, one person’s decision to trust another person in a given situation can be influenced by a wide range of variables, including those relating to:

- The trustor. People tend to differ in the degree to which they view others as generally trustworthy. This propensity to trust appears to be formed through their early life experiences and is thought to be generally stable by the time one reaches adulthood.

- The trustee. When deciding whether or not to trust, a person typically assesses the other person’s ability, benevolence, and integrity (ABI). People differ, however, in the relative importance that they place upon each of these characteristics. Additionally, the same person might weight the individual characteristics differently in different situations.

- The relationship between them. For vertical trust, this relationship is of leader and follower.

- The situation. Although the decision to trust involves the dyad of trustor and trustee, in organizational settings these two people are not isolated but rather part of a complex institutional and social system.

For the purposes of trust in Army settings, trust has a belief component (the belief that the other party is trustworthy in the specific context), and a behavior component (the intention to take some action based upon that belief). The belief that the other party is trustworthy, normally based upon the assessment of their ABI, is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient for the development of trust. For instance, a leader might believe a subordinate to be trustworthy, but still refrain from taking a variety of specific actions based on that belief due to perceived risk (to mission or career).

What We Know About Current Vertical Trust in the Army

The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) continues to lead the effort in the assessment of vertical trust in the Army. The 2013 edition of their Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) included an increased focus on trust. The survey showed that 68% of respondents reported having “high” or “very high” levels of trust in their immediate superiors. In all rank categories, the respondents reported levels of trust for their subordinates that were equal or within a few percentage points of their trust for their immediate superiors. Accordingly, at the macro level, it appears that the Army has very strong vertical trust throughout its ranks. However, there remain a number of significant unknowns that warrant exploration and additional analysis.

1. The CASAL data reflect a pattern by which junior leaders tend to trust less, and be trusted less, than do senior leaders. This pattern appears in the data for both enlisted
and officer ranks. We currently do not know what causes this pattern. Potential explanations for this phenomenon include: 1) Statistical anomaly, 2) Army leaders are more trusting of those with greater experience (or who have indicated their intention to make the Army their career), 3) Junior leaders are more candid on the survey, and 4) There are generational differences in the way leaders view trust.

If junior Army leaders’ trust levels are impacted significantly by their experience, it could be expected that their levels of trust will follow an upward trajectory as they gain experience and maturity. However, if the difference between their trust levels and those of more senior leaders is the result of generational differences, the junior officers might carry a problematic less-trusting perspective with them as they grow into senior ranks in F2025B.

2. We do not know how the responses to the CASAL were distributed throughout the Army, specifically the approximately 32% of the respondents that reported having only moderate, low, or very low levels of trust in their immediate superior. Due to the need to protect the anonymity of the respondents, the CASAL does not collect unit data. Potential distributions include:

a. A generally uniform distribution throughout the Army with each unit having approximately equal percentages of trusting and distrusting leaders. The within-unit differences could potentially be caused by individual differences in situations / experiences or individual differences in propensity to trust.

b. A non-uniform distribution in which leaders having only moderate, low, or very low levels of trust in their immediate superior are grouped in particular units.

c. A non-uniform distribution in which those leaders having only moderate, low, or very low levels of trust in their immediate superior are grouped in particular types of units or occupational fields.

d. A non-uniform distribution in which those leaders having only moderate, low, or very low levels of trust in their immediate superior are disproportionately represented by some demographic category.
Recommendations

General Recommendations

1. The Army should continue to invest in efforts required to develop a more in-depth understanding of trust, and how it is developed and maintained in Army units. It is important that, in the current environment characterized by budget reductions, these efforts remain prioritized and resourced.

2. Establish a process for inter-organizational coordination of Human Dimension (HD) initiatives in order to achieve unity of effort throughout the Army assessment, education, training, research, and experimentation efforts.

Specific recommendations

Immediate

1. Enhance the command climate survey program by adding the following items to the DEOCS to enable analysis of trust, aggregated by unit:
   - “I am completely willing to rely on my immediate leader’s work-related judgments.”
   - “I am completely willing to rely on my immediate leader’s task-related skills and abilities.”
   - “I am completely willing to depend on my immediate leader to back me up in difficult situations.”
   - “My immediate leader bases his decisions upon the mission and the welfare of the Soldiers instead of his/her own personal advancement.”

2. Incorporate the following new essential elements of analysis into learning demand no. 7 of Army Warfighting Challenge #9:
   - “Why do the Army’s junior leaders tend to trust less and be trusted less than senior leaders?”
   - “Why do the estimated 32% of Army officers that have only moderate, low, or very low trust for their immediate supervisors feel that way?”
   - “What is the distribution by unit of the estimated 32% of Army officers that have only moderate, low, or very low trust for their immediate supervisor?”
3. Have the HD Capabilities Development Task Force coordinate with the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) in order to collect qualitative data regarding vertical trust from the participants of their Solariums. The combined quantitative data from the CASAL (the “what”) and qualitative data from Solariums (the “why”) would provide Army leadership a much more in-depth understanding of the status of trust in the Army.

**Near Term**

1. Contract to have an expert or team of experts in trust conduct a “train the trainer” seminar aimed at:
   - Providing leaders the “best practice” tools and methods for assessing levels of trust existing within their units; and
   - Designing actions to increase trust.

The seminar should be taught to Army leaders and key staff and faculty at organizations such as the Mission Command Training Program, and the School of Command Preparation. Three potential providers for this seminar are:

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| N.C. State GEN H. Hugh Shelton Leadership Center, Poole College of Management | **Expertise:** Has Dr. Roger Mayer on their team, who is among the most widely published foremost experts on trust.  
**Experience with military:** Has already provided support to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). |
| Sweeney Leadership Development Group | **Expertise:** Led by COL (ret) Patrick Sweeney, who designed, conducted, and published results from studies of trust conducted with Army units deployed to Iraq.  
**Experience with military:** Retired Army colonel, designed research and instruction into trust for Army while stationed at the United States Military Academy (USMA). |
| The Consortium for Trustworthy Organizations | **Expertise:** Led by Dr. Bob Hurley, who has conducted extensive research into trust and authored the book, “The Decision to Trust: How LEADERS Create High-Trust Organizations.”  
**Fresh Approach:** Specialty has been working with businesses. New perspectives might serve useful.  
**Applicability /Utility:** Has developed a tool that leaders can use to assess which factors in their organization are currently facilitating trust, and which are inhibiting trust. |

2. Make “Building Mutual Trust between Leaders and Followers” the focus of an upcoming HD workshop, with representatives from the Human D. Ensure that
leaders from various levels of Army operational units and experts in trust are both present. The purposes of the workshop would include:

- Gaining a better understanding of the variables impacting trust between Army leaders and followers, specifically during prioritized anticipated missions of F2025B;
- Design a sustainable process for measuring trust between leader and follower and the variables impacting the same; and
- Design the organizational process for measuring, tracking, and taking actions to influence the variables identified as critical to the development of leader-follower trust in specific Army operational contexts.

The results of this workshop should be presented to the Army Human Dimension Council (AHDC).

3. Form a research partnership with Dr. Sabrina Salamon, professor at York University in Toronto, in order to design and conduct a study of Army units similar to her study. Her study found causal relationships between the degree to which employees felt trusted by their managers, aggregated at the store level, and the degree to which the employees felt responsible for organizational outcomes, which consequently led to higher performance. The rough research questions for this study would include:

- What specific leader behaviors lead to Soldiers feeling trusted by the leader?
- How varied or uniform are the perceptions of trust and feeling trusted throughout the members of Army units?
- What is the relationship between collective felt trust (CFT) in Army units and the responsibility norms (RN) of the units’ Soldiers?
- What is the relationship between unit outcomes and the RN and CFT of the unit’s Soldiers?

The study with Army units should build upon her study design with a few additional aspects:

- Add a qualitative component designed to capture Soldier perspectives regarding the specific leader behaviors that made them feel that their leaders trusted them – and in what contexts.
- Collect data with regard to the degree that Leaders report that they trust their subordinates. This would enable analysis to identify if there is agreement between how much leaders report they trust their subordinates and how much the subordinates actually felt trusted by their leaders.
The results of the study could, by identifying specific leader behaviors that led to CFT in operational settings, inform refinements to the MSAF 360 assessment questions and the assessment cards being developed for use by observers at the Combat Training Centers during coaching and mentoring of Army leaders.

4. A follow-on white paper should build upon this white paper, and address specifically the cross-cultural aspects of trust. As the literature makes clear, the nature of trust is highly subjective, and one’s culture and prior experiences significantly impact the assessment of the trustworthiness of others. Coupled with the increasing requirement for our F2025B units to be capable of effectively partnering with forces from other nations and cultures it becomes critical that our leaders understand how people from countries view trust and make trust judgments. This paper would address the following essential elements of analysis (EEA) for the Team Building learning demand of Army Warfighting Challenge #9:

- What does the Army require to strengthen relationships with partners in order to gain access, integrate capabilities, and enhance cooperation required to conduct security operations?
- What methods are effective for fostering shared understanding and cohesive, collaborative environments among a diverse modular army design and JIM team?
- What does the Army require to train and educate strategists with regional expertise to successfully collaborate with unified action partners at the operational and strategic levels of warfare?

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“Trust is the single non-negotiable foundational value of our Army”

General Martin Dempsey, USA

Introduction

This paper explores the concept of trust between leaders and followers in order to inform Institutional Army Warfighting Assessments and contribute to Army efforts to optimize human performance. After over a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is now conducting organizational reflection, assessment, research, analysis, and experimentation in efforts to make policy and resource decisions that will ensure the Army of 2025 and beyond (F2025B) is fully prepared to accomplish all assigned missions.³ Although technology and weaponry has always been, and always will be, important to the warfighting effectiveness, the Army’s current emphasis on the “human dimension” signals a new prioritization of learning and implementing tools, methods, and processes that will facilitate human performance optimization – as individuals, and as teams.⁴

Due to the reality that Soldiers deploy and fight not as individuals, but in units, the Army has designated “understanding and enhancing Army leaders’ abilities to build cohesive and effective teams” as one of the focal points of their human dimension efforts.⁵ The Army Human Dimension Capability Development Task Force (HDCDTF) further articulated as a supporting learning demand (LD), “How can the Army best facilitate positive team dynamics at all echelons that promote mutual trust, shared understanding, disciplined initiative, prudent risk taking, and foster cohesive and collaborative environments?”⁶

This paper supports that learning demand by exploring the construct of trust with a focus on the mutual trust between leaders and their followers. Although there are other dimensions of trust that are important to the Army, such as the trust that the American people have in the Army as in institution, this paper focuses on the mutual trust between leaders and followers, often called “vertical trust.”⁷ This paper intends to provide a review of the concept of trust and how it is developed and maintained, discuss its relevance to the US Army, identify examples of the US Army’s ongoing efforts and initiatives designed to foster the development of vertical trust, and suggest recommendations for next steps. Most importantly, the purpose of this paper is to serve as a common point of departure to stimulate discussion among the members of the HD community of practice in order to nurture a systematic and sustained exploration of how the US Army can enhance operational effectiveness through the development of vertical trust between Soldiers and leaders. It is noteworthy that due to time constraints this paper is preliminary in nature.

The paper is organized into four sections, starting with an exploration of the context and why trust is critical to the Army’s mission in section 1. In the second section the paper reviews the trust literature to develop an understanding of the nature of vertical trust and the individual, organizational, and situational variables that impact its development.

In the third section, the paper examines some of the existing initiatives, in the Army and in the professional sector, which are aimed at understanding, measuring, and enhancing vertical trust. In the final section, recommendations for future steps forward are provided regarding enhancing vertical trust in Army units.

The personal pronouns "he," "him," or "his" are utilized throughout this paper for sake of consistency and ease of reading, and shall be construed as neutral in gender.

Context

“Our profession is built on the bedrock of trust.” This was the message that General Ray Odierno, the 38th and current Chief of Staff of the Army delivered to the audience at the 2012 Association of the United States Army Annual Meeting and Exposition in Washington, D.C. During his speech, he emphasized how important it is for Army leaders to earn the trust of their subordinates, peers, and seniors. Making a point that will be addressed throughout this paper, he added that trust is not rank-oriented. And although the need for military leaders to be trusted by their followers is not new, it will be especially critical to the Army of 2025 and beyond (F2025B).

The increasing importance of trust to the Army is partly the result of the evolving nature of the operational environment (OE), but mostly the result of the Army’s adoption of the concept of Mission Command. The global fiscal situation, competition over limited resources, rapid advances in technology, the emergence of instantaneous world-wide personal communications through social media, and ethnic and religious animosities all interact to generate an

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increasingly complex and unpredictable environment.\textsuperscript{10} The wide range of threats to US national interests and security objectives range from emerging national powers seeking to increase global influence to non-state actors such as violent extremist to transnational criminal organizations.\textsuperscript{11} Additionally, the United States’ fiscal situation has necessitated significant cuts in Department of Defense and Army spending. Adversaries, both real and potential, have certainly noticed this substantial shift and, as a result, may be emboldened to take aggressive action against US interests.

As a result of this complex OE, the Army must prepare to perform an increasingly diverse set of missions, in an equally broad range of settings, and do so with less funding.\textsuperscript{12}

These factors have led the Army to pursue, instill, and practice mission command. Mission command is defined as, “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution with subordinate leaders at all levels using professional judgment and exercising disciplined initiative.”\textsuperscript{13} 14 15 To effectively utilize this approach to command and control, the unit leader, who is ultimately responsible for the unit’s success or failure, must be willing to relinquish some control. More accurately, the leader must not merely allow his subordinates to make decisions and exercise initiative; he must often require it. This act of relinquishing control of something that matters -- and in the process making oneself vulnerable to the actions of another person -- is the very crux of trust.

And it does not stop there. The vertical trust between leader and follower must be mutual. Thus, it is not sufficient for the commander to place trust in the subordinate, the subordinate, who would now be empowered and expected to take the initiative, making tactical and

\textsuperscript{10} President of the United States, \textit{The National Security Strategy}, 2010, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{11} Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, \textit{Army Operating Concept}, US Government Printing Office, Fort Eustis, VA, 2014, 10-12.
\textsuperscript{12} Secretary of the US Army and the United States Army Chief of Staff, 6-8.
\textsuperscript{13} Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Mission Command White Paper}, 2012, 3.
operational decisions, and bearing the associated burden\textsuperscript{16} must trust his leader to respond fairly to the subordinate’s behavior. The subordinate must also believe that the commander has communicated his intent and given directions that are aimed primarily on accomplishment of the mission and welfare of the Soldiers rather than the commander’s personal advancement.\textsuperscript{17} This relationship of mutual trust between leaders and followers is a prerequisite for the successful practice of mission command, and it is the intangible quality that enables the Army to truly be adaptive.\textsuperscript{18} As critical as trust is to the Army, however, it cannot be bought, requisitioned, or ordered – it must be earned.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Review of the Trust Literature and Ongoing Trust Initiatives}

\textbf{What is Trust?}

While there is yet no consensus regarding the definition of trust in the literature,\textsuperscript{20,21} most definitions include the concepts of risk and vulnerability on the part of the trustor\textsuperscript{22}, and the concepts of fairness and predictability on the part of the trustee.\textsuperscript{23} For example, Baier defined trust as “the accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) toward one.”\textsuperscript{24} Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman defined trust as the, “Willingness of a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{16} A vivid example of the psychological burden associated with making decisions in combat can be found in Carlo D’Este’s book, \textit{Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life} (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002). Struggling with the decision to commence the amphibious landing at Normandy in WWII, General Eisenhower recorded in his journal, “Probably no one who does not have to bear the specific and direct responsibility of making the final decision as to what to do can understand the intensity of these burdens.” (p. 519).
\item \textsuperscript{17} The January 2014 edition of \textit{Army Magazine} includes a section in which the authors share the personal narratives of company commanders serving in Afghanistan as they discuss situations in which their commanders either earned or lost their trust: \textit{Army Magazine}, How Trust Is Earned or Lost, January 2014, 57-61, accessed November 12, 2014, \url{http://cc.army.mil/pubs/armymagazine/docs/2014/CC_ARMY_(Jan2014)_Trust.pdf}.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Trust enables organizations to be adaptive by accelerating the decision process (Stephen M.R. Covey. \textit{The Speed of Trust: The One Thing that Changes Everything} (New York: Free Press, 2006): 127-229.) and enhancing the morale, and therefore performance, of the lower level leader that is trusted (Sabrina D. Salamon, “Trust That Binds: The Impact of Collective Felt Trust on Organizational Performance,” \textit{Journal of Applied Psychology}, 93 no.3 (2008): 593.).
\item \textsuperscript{19} US Army Training and Doctrine Command, \textit{Army Profession Campaign Annual Report}, April 2, 2012, 7.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Sandra C. Hughes, Cecily McCoy, and Joan H. Johnston, “Fostering trust within mixed-culture teams: Challenges and initial recommendations” In \textit{Proceedings of 7th Biennial DEOMI Equal Opportunity, Diversity, and Culture Research Symposium} Edited by J. C. Scarpate & D. P. McDonald (Patrick AFB, FL: Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, 2009): 497-516.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Annette Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” \textit{Ethics} 96, no. 2 (1986): 231-60.
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party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.” Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone defined trust as the expectation that an actor can be relied upon to fulfill obligations, will behave in a predictable manner, and will act and negotiate fairly even when the possibility for opportunism or exploitation is present. In his book, “The Decision to Trust,” Hurley defines trust as “the degree of confidence you have that another party can be relied on to fulfill commitments, be fair, be transparent, and not take advantage of your vulnerability.” Army doctrine defines trust as the “assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something,” leaving the vulnerability of the trustor implied.

Trust has both a belief and a behavioral component. Thus, trust requires more than just accepting vulnerability or relying upon the other person. To say that Person A trusts Person B, Person A must:

1. Believe that B can protect A’s interests,
2. Believe that B will protect A’s interests,
3. Take some action or inaction, based upon these beliefs, by which he accepts vulnerability to B and incurs risk.

So, if by trusting, a person is accepting risk and making themselves vulnerable by placing an outcome that is important to them in someone else’s control, why would one do it? In fact, we trust strangers routinely. When driving, we trust that other drivers will obey stop signs and red lights. When boarding an aircraft, we trust that the flight crew is trained and capable of flying the plane safely to its destination. Therefore, people trust when they believe that they have the possibility of obtaining a better outcome by trusting than they do by not trusting.

It therefore follows, that, for the Army to increase the levels of trust between leaders and trusting yields a more optimal result than does the act of distrusting. Further, the would-be trusting party needs to believe it to be so. Taking a hypothetical example that has often been

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28 Department of the Army, ADP-1 The Army, 2012, 2-2.
31 McKnight and Chervany, “Trust and Distrust Definitions: One Bite at a Time,” 34-35.
discussed from the Army’s recent operations, the delegation or withholding of the authority to engage insurgents, it can be modeled in an admittedly overly-simplified but informative manner as a two-by-two matrix (See Table 1).

The Commander can trust his subordinates by delegating the authority to engage on their own, or distrust them by requiring them to request approval prior to engaging. The subordinate leader, however, may or may not be well prepared to make the decision based upon factors such as training, maturity, and state of mind. As Table 1 suggests, for the unit to be adaptive and operationally effective, the commander needs to trust his subordinate leaders, who themselves must be capable.

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<td>Trust the subordinate leader</td>
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<td>(delegate and allow subordinate</td>
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<td>Don’t Trust the subordinate</td>
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*Table 1. Potential Trust Decisions with Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Outcomes*

Although it appears that in most situations, most people perform this calculation in an intuitive manner rather than using in a deliberate, analytical process, they nevertheless arrive at the decision to trust through some means of evaluating and choosing from alternative options. This process and the various inputs to it will be discussed in depth in the following sections.
Finally, the literature recognizes two additional aspects of trust. First, trust is context dependent. A person can trust another to do one specific action but not another. For example, a commander might trust a subordinate leader to work independently and prepare the slides for a senior level briefing but not trust that same leader to make tactical decisions in an operational setting.

Second, the relationship between trust and perceived vulnerability is also complicated. For example, if a commander shares some sensitive information with his executive officer (XO) whom he trusts greatly, the commander might not feel very vulnerable. If he were to share this same information with a member of another unit who he does not trust as much, the commander would likely feel more vulnerable, even if the negative repercussions to him would be the same regardless of who compromised his trust and revealed the sensitive information. In this regard, Nicole Gillespie commented, “...the paradox is that vulnerability is central to trust, yet the subjective experience of vulnerability typically decreases as the level of trust in the relationship increases.” Indeed, having high trust in another enables one to trust that person without experiencing a great sense of vulnerability.

These points, together, illustrate why many scholars assert that trust has two components, a belief in the trustworthiness of another and an intention to take an action as a result of that belief. For example, using the situation from Table 1, a commander might believe a subordinate of his to be an honest and completely trustworthy individual, yet still require him to request approval prior to engaging due to the anticipated severity of the negative repercussions to the mission associated with “getting it wrong.” Certainly both components of trust are important when viewed in the context of enhancing Army operational effectiveness. Therefore, based upon its utility for facilitating analysis and the degree to which it has been accepted in applied research on trust, especially within the field of trust in the military,.

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this study adopts the Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman definition and considers trust to be, “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.” In other words, trust exists when Soldier A is willing to be vulnerable to the actions of Soldier B based on the expectation that Soldier B will perform an action important to Soldier A without Soldier A closely monitoring or controlling Soldier B. Note that in this definition Soldier A can be either the leader of or the subordinate to Soldier B. In the next section, this paper explores the variables that impact the development of vertical trust between leaders and followers.

What Affects Trust Between Leaders and Followers?

Trust has been studied by scholars in a wide variety of disciplines and fields, including leadership, economics, sociology, organizational behavior among others. As a result, there are a number of models of how trust develops. This paper reviews two such models of trust. The first is a model published in 1995 by Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman, which was chosen due to its applicability to a broad range of organizations, and its influence in the scholarly study of trust as evidenced by it being cited by over 10,000 scholarly works. In order to keep their model generalizable to a broad range of organizations, the authors limited the range of inputs to the trust process to those deemed relevant across many domains. This paper therefore also reviews a model for the development of trust published by Graham Dietz in 2011 that includes additional categories of variables that impact trust. Among the features common between these two modes, and most published models of trust is the basic “flow” of the process a person, hereafter referred to as the “trustor,” goes through when deciding whether or not to trust another person, hereafter referred to as the “trustee.” This flow, from the perspective of the trustor includes:

1. Evaluating the trustworthiness of the trustee. If the trustee appears trustworthy, the trustor then forms positive expectations regarding the trustee’s behavior and intent, a

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willingness to be vulnerable, and an intention to trust. This is the belief aspect of the trust process.

2. Assessing the risk and other associated factors. If the risk is ultimately deemed acceptable by the trustor, then he will form an intention to demonstrate the trust-informed behavior. This is the behavior aspect of the trust process.

3. Assessing and learning from the results of the action. If the trustee’s behavior meets or fails to meet the positive expectations, the trustor will modify his assessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness accordingly. This is the evaluation aspect of the trust process.

For ease of understanding, this paper describes the decision process assuming the trustor’s thought process is always conscious, analytical, rational, and deliberate. This of course is not always the case, and most readers can probably recall an instance of feeling that they could trust someone, or couldn’t trust someone without being consciously aware of the reasons for their feeling. A good discussion on the subconscious aspect of the decision to trust and other interpersonal interactions can be found in Daniel Goleman’s book, “Social Intelligence: The Revolutionary New Science of Human Relationships.”

The Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman Model of Trust

Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman published their “Integrative Model of Trust” in 1995, shown here in Figure 2. The model portrays how trust develops between two parties, of which one could be a leader and the other a follower. This trust between two specific individuals has been called interpersonal trust by some scholars and dyadic trust by others.

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According to this model, the development of trust is impacted by characteristics and factors of both the trustor and the trustee. Perhaps the most obvious factors impacting a person’s decision to trust are what Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman call the “Factors of Perceived Trustworthiness.”\(^5\) According to them, when making the decision to trust, the trustor makes an assessment of the trustee’s:

- **Ability** – “...that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain.” Since peoples’ abilities tend to be domain-specific, trust is also domain-specific.\(^5\)

- **Benevolence** – “...the extent to which the trustee is perceived to want to do good to the trustor...”\(^5\)

- **Integrity** – “...the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable.”\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Ibid, 717.

\(^5\) Ibid, 718.

\(^5\) Ibid, 719.
In addition to these factors regarding the trustee, the decision to trust is impacted by the trustor’s propensity to trust.\(^\text{54}\) Closely related to what some scholars have termed either “holistic trust”\(^\text{55}\) or “dispositional trust,”\(^\text{56}\) a person’s propensity to trust is their general willingness to trust other people. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman point out that there is no objective, absolute measure of the trustee’s characteristics of ability, benevolence, and integrity. Rather, what matters to his decision to trust is the trustor’s perception of the trustee’s characteristics. This is why the trustor’s propensity to trust is important, because it serves as a kind of a lens that shapes the way that the trustor both “fills in” missing information about the trustee and shapes the way that the trustor interprets the information perceived about the trustee.

Propensity to trust is thought to be a relatively stable trait by the time a person reaches adulthood.\(^\text{57}\) Research has suggested that people with higher propensities to trust, in addition to being more trusting of other people, tend to be more trustworthy in their actions.\(^\text{58}\) In one study, people with high propensities to trust tended to work equally hard whether or not they thought they were being observed by their supervisors, whereas people with lower propensities to trust tended to work significantly less hard when they thought they were not being watched.\(^\text{59}\)

So, proceeding with the model, based upon the trustor’s propensity to trust and perceptions of the trustee’s ability, benevolence, and integrity, the trustor will make an assessment of the trustee’s overall level of trustworthiness. This assessment is not a dichotomous “yes or no” determination, but rather an assessment along a continuum.\(^\text{60}\) This assessment determines the degree to which the trustor “trusts” the trustee. According to their model, however, there is a distinction between the psychological state of trusting, and the behavioral function of taking action. As the scholars say, “There is no risk taken in the willingness to be vulnerable (i.e. to trust) but risk is inherent in the behavioral manifestation of the willingness to be vulnerable.”\(^\text{61}\)

According to the model, once the trust level has been determined (by the perceived trustworthiness of the trustee and the propensity to trust of the trustor), a trustor will engage in risk taking behavior that corresponds to the risk in the situation. Trusting and accepting risk

\(^{54}\) Ibid, 714.  
\(^{60}\) Mayer, Davis, Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,” 721.  
\(^{61}\) Ibid, 724.
are therefore context dependent according to this model. This again illustrates why the question, “do you trust your leader?” must be qualified with, “to do what?”

Graham Dietz Trust Model

The next model of how trust is developed between people was published by Graham Dietz (see Figure 3). As can be seen, Dietz’s model has the same overall “flow” as the Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman model, progressing from inputs to an assessment of the trustworthiness of the other person, and from there to a decision and ultimately an action. What Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman call “Trustor’s Propensity” Dietz calls “Pre-Disposition to Trust,” but both mean generally the same thing. Both models include a feedback loop through which the trustor can learn from experience and increase the degree of trust and risk that he is willing to extend and accept respectively. However, Dietz’s model adds additional elements that are important.

Dietz’s trust process starts with the trustee’s behaviors as “inputs.” He includes the trustor’s perception of the trustee’s predictability to the ability, benevolence and integrity inputs to the process that Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman listed. Additionally, he includes the nature of the relationship between the trustee and the trustor as an input to the process. Even when limiting our analysis to trust between leader and follower as we do here, the nature of the trustee-trustor relationship is in no way a constant. Dynamic situations, such as a new commander takes over a seasoned unit, or a task force being formed for a specific mission in the midst of ongoing operations, highlight the degree to which the nature of the trustor-trustee relationship can vary and have significant impact on the development of trust.

Dietz adds the Trustor’s character, motivations, abilities, behaviors as an input. This is an important factor in the process, because in addition to having an overall propensity to trust, the trustor might have specific motivations, beliefs, or biases that influence the decision to trust. Kramer describes category-based trust as trust “predicated on information regarding a trustee’s membership in a social or organizational category – information which, when salient, often unknowingly influences others’ judgments about their trustworthiness.”

Additionally, Dietz adds “Domain-specific concerns” as another variable in the trust process. An example of this might be an Army unit operating alongside on of our Unified Action Partners (UAP) and being unable by policy to share specific intelligence information. Even though the

62 Ibid, 729.
act of withholding information is a major cause of distrust, the leader might have no alternative. Dietz also includes under “situational influences” culture, institutions, role, and reputation. The institution and reputation can have significant impacts upon the development of trust, especially in the military.

Finally, Dietz has included an input to the trustor’s decision to accept risk that he calls, “consequences beyond the relationship.” For example, a person might opt to accept the risk and perform a trusting action even though his analysis indicated that the trustee was not completely trustworthy if the need to demonstrate that trust was important for another goal of the trustor.

Key to Dietz’s process is that, “the sequence and dynamic is universal, but people’s idiosyncratic preferences and influences and localized external conditions shape the content and process at each stage.” Dietz’s point here is that, while the basic steps and sequence are universal, in

any actual instance, a person’s decision to trust might be impacted by any combination of these variables. And it is very possible that the trustor will “feel” that another person is trustworthy or untrustworthy without being consciously aware of the reasons.\textsuperscript{73}

At the end of this process, if the trustor deems the risk acceptable, he will take the trust-informed action. The degree to which the trustor will actively trust is therefore related to his level of risk tolerance.\textsuperscript{74} The important aspects here are:

- The trustor, by taking this action, is willingly accepting vulnerability to the actions of the trustee, and
- The trustor has reason to believe that the trustee will, through his actions, protect the trustor’s interests.

Based on the Trustee’s actions and the outcome, the Trustor will adjust his assessment of trustworthiness, and continue interaction or seek to take actions to reduce or eliminate dependency and vulnerability.\textsuperscript{75} This is important because trust is not a static concept, but rather a very dynamic one, with trust developing to greater extents as the trustor’s positive expectations continue to be met.

In summary, the decision to trust is impacted by four categories of variables (see Table 2); variables related to the Trustor, variables related to the Trustee, variables related to the relationship between the trustee and the trustor, and variables relating to the context and situation. In this next section the author will explore what the Army could do, and in many cases is already doing, to influence these variables in order to enable leaders to more effectively build relationships of mutual trust with their seniors and subordinates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Variables Impacting the Decision To Trust\textsuperscript{76}</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trustee Variables</td>
<td>Trustee Characteristics; Motives, Abilities, Behaviors</td>
<td>Trustee Ability, Benevolence, Integrity, and Predictability. Even though these are listed as Trustee variables, what matters is not the trustee’s characteristics, but how the trustee perceives them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trustor Variables</td>
<td>Propensity to trust, biases, beliefs, and worldview</td>
<td>These variables can shape the way the trustor interprets trustee behavior and influence the resultant assessment of trustworthiness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{76} Dietz and Den Hartog, “Measuring trust inside organisations,” 561-563.
Variables regarding the Trustee-Trustor relationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the relationship</th>
<th>Are they coequals or is one subordinate to the other? How interdependent are their tasks and responsibilities?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions, culture, roles, and reputations</td>
<td>As the Army embraces Mission Command, the organizational expectation will be that commanders decentralize the decision-making process and empower their subordinate leaders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Categories of Variables Impacting the Decision to Trust, Adapted from Graham Dietz, 2011.

Increasing Trust between Leaders and Followers

In this section, the paper first explores a sample of actions that the Army is currently taking to understand and increase the levels of trust between leaders and their followers. Following this, the paper examines select trust-related initiatives that commercial and academic organizations have developed and implemented. These lists are in no way comprehensive, but rather consists of those defense and commercial organizations that the HDCDTF knew of through professional networks or identified through literature review and internet search.

To provide structure, the paper utilizes the framework of Assessment, Education, Training, and Research &Experimentation. Assessment is important because it can be important to gain an understanding of the problem, or even if there is a problem, prior attempting to solve the problem. For trust, assessment can be important at the individual, the unit, and the organizational level. Specifically, assessment of trust can:

- Provide leaders with an understanding of the current state of trust within the Army, and identify if there are trust deficiencies that are negatively impacting the Army’s operational effectiveness.
- Inform the design and effectiveness of training, education, research, and experimentation. If there are identified patterns of operationally-significant trust deficiencies, in what situations do they occur? Do they tend to exist by echelon or by element (e.g. do the Officers tend to not trust their NCOs? or do all of the subordinate leaders in a given unit not trust their leadership?) What variables tend to be leading to the identified trust deficiencies?

Due to the importance of understanding the situation and the problem in as much detail as possible prior to taking action, this paper will explore assessment first.

Army Trust Initiatives – Assessment
In April, 2012, following a year-long campaign of learning to assess how the last decade of war has impacted the Army as an institution, TRADOC published its report which included eight recommendations specifically addressing trust. The recommendations included making trust a focused discussion topic for all unit and organizational professional development programs, and including trust in the curricula of professional military education. The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) is currently playing a lead role in the assessment of leadership-related areas in the Army. Vertical trust is one such area, and the 2013 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) included this as an area of emphasis. The 2013 CASAL findings revealed that 68% of active component Army leaders reported having high or very-high trust in their immediate superiors.”

As seen in Figure 4, the degree to which respondents indicated that they trusted their leaders appears to correspond with the rank of the leader, with higher ranking leaders being more trusted than lower ranking leaders. For example, among active duty commissioned officers, the lieutenants were the least trusted and General Officers the most trusted with 63% and 87% of their direct subordinates indicating that they had high or very high levels of trust in them respectively. The same pattern can be found in the data from the enlisted Soldiers. Of interest, as seen in Figure 5, the degree to which leaders reported trusting their subordinates appears to follow the same trend, with field grade officers reporting that they trust their subordinates at higher levels than do company grade officers, and senior NCOs reporting that they trust their subordinates at higher levels than do junior NCOs. This information is valuable, and the clear pattern that the lower level of leaders, both among the enlisted and the officer ranks, tend to trust less, and be trusted less, provides an initial starting point for the design of future initiatives to increase vertical trust in the Army.

It is not possible with the data currently available to determine with certainty why the junior leaders in both the officer and enlisted ranks are tending to trust less and be trusted less, but one possible explanation could be that this is caused by differences in trust perspectives across a generational gap.

In his 2004 article titled, “Validating Generational Differences,” Paul Arsenault published the results of his study that found significant differences among and between generations in how they valued various characteristics in leaders such as honesty, determination, and ambition. Differences between leader and follower in values held, such as what Arsenault found, might result in different expectations between leader and follower. Ultimately, at the individual level,

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78 Ibid, 51.
such differences in the prioritization of leader characteristics could result in the interpersonal assessment that the other person is untrustworthy.

![Graph: Trust in AC Leaders by Rank as Rated by Direct Report Subordinates (2013)]

There are, however, other potential explanations for this pattern of lower level leaders trusting and being trusted less. It is possible that the junior leaders are expected to perform tasks in operational settings when deployed that they are not required to perform in garrison and during home station training. It is also possible that the differences in trust levels simply reflect a perceived lack of experience of junior leaders. Due to the importance of trust between junior leaders and their subordinates and seniors to the Army’s ability to conduct mission command, this paper recommends the following additional essential element analysis to be associated with Army Warfighting Challenge # 9:

**Recommended New Essential Element of Analysis #1:** “Why do the Army’s junior leaders tend to trust less and be trusted less than senior leaders?”

The CASAL is critical to the leadership’s ability to understand the current status of the human dimension within the Army. It provides answers to many important organizational questions regarding leadership in the Army. In some cases, however, its value is in providing the information required to know what questions should be asked. The distribution of those leaders reporting that they have only moderate, low, or very low levels of trust in their immediate superior is one such area.
Currently, in order to safeguard the anonymity of the respondents, the CASAL does not collect unit information from the respondents. Without this information, it is impossible to know the distribution of the roughly 32% of the respondents who reported that they have moderate, low, or very low trust in their immediate superior. It is possible that these sentiments are distributed throughout the Army in a relatively uniform manner, with each unit having a percentage of Soldiers that do not trust their leaders. However, it is also possible that the degree to which leaders are trusted by their subordinates is largely a result of the leaders’ behavior, resulting in a wide variance between different units’ vertical trust levels.

Figure 5. AC Leaders Levels of Trust in Subordinates, Peers, Immediate Superior and Superior 2 Levels Higher from 2013 CASAL

Figure 6 depicts the two different hypothetical distributions. In order to design effective initiatives to increase vertical trust in the Army, it is important to understand how trust is currently distributed throughout the Army.

Another assessment initiative currently being used in the Army is the enhanced command climate survey program. Implemented at the end of 2013, the program mandates that commanders use the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) to assess their unit’s organizational climate within 30 days of assuming command, and periodically thereafter. The DEOCS has a few items that directly or indirectly
Items 16, 32, and 39 refer to the unit leadership’s perceived integrity and benevolence, and could be aggregated by unit and used to assess the vertical trust level within the unit. Additionally, due to the existing requirement for commanders to conduct command climate surveys periodically, they could be used to see the dynamic aspect of trust within a unit. This is important because trust is not static, but rather tends to develop or erode over time. If modified, the DEOCS could be used to gain a depth of understanding of the existing vertical trust distribution that would facilitate effective organizational actions in the forms of personnel screening and assignment policies, training, and education programs. Therefore, this paper recommends the following essential elements of analysis to be associated with the learning demands supporting Army Warfighting Challenge #9:

**Recommended New Essential Element of Analysis #2:** “Why do the estimated 32% of Army officers that have only moderate, low, or very low trust for their immediate supervisor feel that way?”

**Recommended New Essential Element of Analysis #3:** “What is the distribution by unit of the estimated 32% of Army officers that have only moderate, low, or very low trust for their immediate supervisor?”
An additional aspect of assessment involves the assessment and feedback loops utilized by leaders to reflect on unit and individual performance during training events. Although not fully implemented, the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) has developed coaches’ cards to assist the observers at the Combat Training Centers (CTC) in their role of assessing and coaching. These cards are reflect the leadership doctrine published in ADRP 6-22 include a section for assessing the leadership core competency of Builds Trust (See Figure 7). Having the exercise observers, who are in a position to observe the Soldier-leader interaction throughout the training, providing feedback and coaching to the Army leaders could be a very effective method for helping leaders develop their trust-building skills. However, for it to be effective, leaders and coaches alike will need to have an informed and shared understanding of the specific leader behaviors that constitute each of these actions (e.g. assesses factors or conditions that promote or hinder trust) and how to measure each.

**Army Trust Initiatives – Education**

The Army currently teaches classes on trust and trust development to leaders at different levels. For example, leaders attending the School of Command Preparation (SCP), receive specific classes in how to earn and maintain trust, as well as how trust is lost. The classes are interactive, and include vignettes from recent operations to provide the context for the theories and principles discussed. The SCP curriculum on trust features courseware based upon Stephen Covey’s work and the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) video entitled,
“Trust is our Bedrock” in their curriculum. Although the course’s main focus is on considerations and methods to increase trust and influence by increasing the leader’s perceived trustworthiness, it also covers the leaders’ needs to extend trust to their subordinates.

The Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) has also developed courseware pertaining to trust. Their courseware is available online, and can be downloaded and taught at the unit level. They are placing an emphasis on trust and they designated trust the focus of their “America’s Army – Our Profession” Education and Training Program for the 4th quarter of the previous year.

Army Trust Initiatives – Training

Training plays a critical role in the development of trust. Through training, leaders at all levels gain and demonstrate proficiency that earns the trust that is required for cohesion and unit effectiveness on operations. Training provides the opportunity for trust to be incrementally earned, upheld, and increased. This is especially important as a platform for leaders to empower and trust subordinate leaders to make decisions and learn, in an environment conducive to coaching, mentoring, and leader development. So although trust is rarely the primary training objective, it can be an important by-product of realistic, challenging training.

Training is also important in the development of the “swift trust” that enables some highly specialized, temporary groups to perform as if they have been working together for a long period of time. The keys to the development of swift trust include:

- A specialized labor pool in which one’s professional reputation is important for the attainment of desired individual outcomes. This creates an expectation that fellow group members will likely perceive a deterrent against poor task performance or violations of group interpersonal norms.
- Unambiguous roles and task specificity. All members must know their roles and the roles of their fellow members.
- Moderate levels of task interdependence. All members’ talents are required and valued, but individual members can perform their individual roles with moderate levels of dependence on fellow members.
- Individual members are credentialed by an organization with standards that are recognized to be relevant, demanding and enforced. This enables members to trust the organization’s quality control process before they have had opportunity to assess the ABI of individual teammates.

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81 Ibid, 167.
82 Ibid, 167.
83 Ibid, 180-183.
Realistic and challenging training, with demanding and enforced standards, is critical to the development of the organizational reputations that enable the formation of swift trust.⁸⁴ As the Army implements a more expeditionary stance in accordance with the 2014 Army Operating Concept there will likely be a greater need for swift trust. ⁸⁵

**Army Trust Initiatives - Research and Experimentation**

There is currently a significant number of research studies that involve trust underway in the Army. The Army Research Institute (ARI) and the Army Research Laboratory’s Human Research and Engineering Directorate (ARL HRED) are both conducting and sponsoring research into interpersonal trust. Anna Cianciolo and Arwen DeCostanza conducted research to develop and validate a conceptual model of the development of interpersonal trust in distributed teams, seeking to identify behavioral indicators of trust.⁸⁶ These behavioral indicators of trust are being incorporated into an assessment system for real-time, automatic metrics of unit dynamics including trust that can facilitate Army leaders’ efforts in performing expected trust-related assessments (e.g. assess factors or conditions that promote or hinder trust), as well as continually monitor and improve unit dynamics involving trust. ARI is also conducting research in order to develop training modules that cover how units can better develop swift trust. This concept stands to be increasingly important as the Army implements the Army Operating Concept 2020-2040. This highlights the importance of this type of research to the Army, and the degree to which the functions of assessment, training, education, and research & experimentation are all interrelated.

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⁸⁵ Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, *Army Operating Concept*, 17.

External Trust Initiatives – Education & Training

The Army is certainly not alone in its need for, and interest in, building trust between leaders and followers. Studies have found trust between leaders and followers to be significantly correlated to organization effectiveness in businesses and team performance (winning) in NCAA basketball teams. In his Forbes article, *The Most Valuable Business Commodity: Trust*, David K. Williams said of trust, “It is the relationships we forge—and the trust we create—that matters most to our success at the end of the day.” As important as trust is to business, it is unsurprising that there are many individuals and organizations that provide education and consultation services. Following the review of the trust literature, the author selected three such for-profit entities to review based upon their apparent utility and applicability to the Army.

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N.C. State GEN H. Hugh Shelton Leadership Center, Poole College of Management: This team has the capability to design and deliver educational programs and seminars tailored to the client’s needs. Among their list of past and current courses are the Department of Defense Joint Executive Management Program, and the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Strategic Leadership Course. Their team has genuine experts in the field, including Dr. Roger C. Mayer, author of numerous scholarly articles on trust, including “An integrative model of organizational trust: Past, present, and future,” and “The effects of changing power and influence tactics on trust in the supervisor: A longitudinal field study.”

Sweeney Leadership Development Group: This team specializes in helping organizations enhance their leadership capacity, with focus on leader development, building trust, and leading change. Although they also possess the capability to design classes and seminars to meet client demands, they specialize in offering an Enhancing Trust and Building Teams Workshop, Leading Organizational Change Workshop, and Leader Development Workshops and Consulting. Led by Dr. Patrick J. Sweeney, Director of Leadership, Character & Business Ethics Initiatives at Wake Forest University and author of, “Do Soldiers Reevaluate Trust in Their Leaders Prior to Combat Operations,” and “Trust and Influence in Combat: An Interdependence Model,” this team also has expertise in trust, especially as it applies to the military.

The Consortium for Trustworthy Organizations: This team specializes in providing consulting services to assist organizations assess their current trust needs, existing trust levels, and designing ways to build and reinforce trust in relationships. This team is led by Dr. Robert F. Hurley, professor at Fordham University’s Graduate School of Business, and author of, “The Decision to Trust: How Leaders Create High-Trust Organizations.” Dr. Hurley’s Decision to Trust Model (DTM), shown in Figure 6, is a tool that enables leaders to assess, for a given relationship, where the conditions and factors favor the development of trust, and where the existing conditions do not. Through the identification of conditions that are conducive to the development of trust and those that hinder trust development, this tool can enable commanders to gain better situational awareness and take informed action to build trust and minimize risk.

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Stephen M. R. Covey’s 13 Trust Behaviors: In his book, “The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything,” Covey lists 13 character and competence behaviors that he asserts build trust (see Table 2). A 2012 study conducted at the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command Life Cycle Management Command (TACOM) at Warren, Michigan found that employees perceived by their colleagues and managers as demonstrating these behaviors also tended to be more trusted. That same study also found that individuals tended to feel that they valued these behaviors differently than did their organization. A tool using these behaviors might prove useful in assisting leaders reflect on their efforts and results at building trust within their units, as well as assisting them in developing their subordinate leaders and increasing their abilities to build trust with their subordinates. This tool might also be useful in

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assisting leaders at all levels provide specific and meaningful feedback to seniors, peers, and subordinates when participating in 360 feedback sessions.

**External Trust Initiatives – Assessment / Research**

As discussed earlier in the paper, mutual trust between leaders and followers entails that the two parties trust one another, with subordinates trusting their leaders and the leaders trusting their subordinates. Interestingly, however, while many studies on trust have examined subordinates’ trust in their leaders, very few have studied whether and how subordinates respond to feeling trusted by their leaders.

One study that did so was Sabrina D. Salamon’s study linking subordinates’ collective felt trust (CFT) to organizational outcomes. Salamon’s field study, which surveyed around 4,000 employees working in 88 separate locations of a major retail business in Canada, found that the degree to which the employees of a store collectively felt that their managers trusted them (CFT) was correlated with their responsibility norms (the degree that they individually accepted responsibility for organizational outcomes). Further, individual store CFT levels predicted organizational outcomes – stores where the employees felt trusted enjoyed higher customer survey ratings and higher profits. It is noteworthy that, through cross-lagged panel analyses Salamon identified that CFT led to the organizational outcomes and not vice versa.

The theoretical explanation for this finding is that when the employees felt responsible for the organization’s success, they would demonstrate initiatives and take action on their own to solve or prevent problems instead of waiting on a manager’s direction. This behavior – understanding the organization’s purpose and objectives, and taking independent action to bring it about without requiring direct command, is the very behavior the Army seeks from its Soldiers and leaders of all ranks. Moreover, the finding that employees’ collective felt trust levels varied across the different locations although all 88 locations were of the same chain, operating under

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93 Ibid, 597-599.
common management policies, suggests that these differences in trust levels were not determined by the organization’s top management directive or policy, but rather by the behavior of the local leader and the climate that he or she established with subordinates that made the difference. This study, then, appears directly relevant to the Army as it embraces and embodies the principles of Mission Command.

**Summary and Recommendations**

In summary, we know that mutual trust between Army leaders and their followers is important to the Army’s ability to effectively operate utilizing the concept of mission command. We know that relationships of trust -- defined as the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party -- are complex, situationally dependent, and dynamic.

We know that trust has a belief component (belief in the trustworthiness of another) and a behavior component (intention to take an action based upon the belief). We know that the individual decision to trust can be impacted by numerous variables, including the trustor’s propensity to trust, the perceived motives and characteristics (e.g. ability, benevolence, integrity) of the trustee, the nature of the relationship between them, and the nature of the specific task that the trustee is expected to perform.

We know that 68% of the respondents on the 2013 CASAL reported having high or very high levels of trust in their immediate supervisor, although we do not know either what specific task or situation the respondents were envisioning as they completed the survey or what perceived characteristics of their supervisor influenced their trustworthiness assessments. We know that the CASAL data suggest that there is a pattern in the Army in which junior leaders tend to trust less, and be trusted less, than senior leaders in both officer and enlisted ranks. We do not know why junior leaders tend to be less trusting and less trusted than Army senior leaders. We do not know the distribution by unit or occupational field of the 19% of Army leaders surveyed that responded to the CASAL, and therefore cannot be sure that the non-respondents have the same level of trust in their leaders as do the respondents.

We also do not know how the 32% of respondents who reported having only moderate, low, or very low levels of trust in their immediate supervisor are distributed throughout the Army (e.g. distributed uniformly throughout, consolidated in particular units, consolidated in particular types of units, or unevenly distributed with some demographical category disproportionately represented).

We know that the senior leadership has emphasized the need for vertical trust in the Army and that classes on trust are currently being taught in resident schools and are available online for
leader self-development. Current classes emphasize the characteristics of trustworthy leaders, but provide less information to leaders regarding situational and organizational variables leading to or inhibiting the development of trust. Additionally, although leaders are taught the importance of trust, there are currently few tools available to assist them in accurately assessing the levels of trust within their units.

Based upon what we know, and what we don’t, the following recommendations are provided:

**Overall recommendations:**

1. The Army must continue to invest the energy and resources required to develop a more in-depth understanding of trust, how it is developed, and what individual, relational, organizational, and situational variables impact its development in Army units. While it could be tempting to address the need by ensuring all resident schools “include trust in the curricula,” if the course developers and instructors do not know the answer to the preceding questions, even well-intentioned instruction will likely have minimal impact. The research into trust, such as that conducted by COL Pat Sweenet (ret.) and that currently being conducted by the Army Research Laboratory’s Human Research and Engineering Directorate (ARL HRED), coupled with assessments such as the CASAL are vital to the Army’s success in 2025 and beyond. It is important that in the current environment characterized by budget reductions, these efforts remain prioritized and resourced.

2. Establish a process for inter-organizational coordination of HD initiatives in order to achieve unity of effort throughout the Army assessment, education, training, research, and experimentation efforts. This recommendation is not specific to the topic of trust, but during the analysis and writing of this paper the need became clear. For each identified HD Learning Demand, the associated assessment, education, training, research, and experimentation efforts should be identified and mapped. The status of each should be tracked and potentially briefed (by exception) at the periodic meetings of the element performing HD coordination and oversight functions.

**Specific recommendations:**

Immediate

4. Add the following items\textsuperscript{94} to the DEOCS to enable analysis of trust, aggregated by unit:

\textsuperscript{94} Items designated with * are designed to measure the respondent’s willingness to take trust-related action based upon their assessment of the referent’s competence, and integrity and have been adapted from Nicole Gillespie’s Behavioral Trust Inventory (BTI). See Nicole Gillespie, “Measuring Trust in Working Relationships: The
• “I am completely willing to rely on my immediate leader’s work-related judgments.”
• “I am completely willing to rely on my immediate leader’s task-related skills and abilities”
• “I am completely willing to depend on my immediate leader to back me up in difficult situations.”
• “My immediate leader bases his decisions upon the mission and the welfare of the Soldiers instead of his/her own personal advancement.”

5. Incorporate the following new essential elements of analysis into learning demand no. 7 of Army Warfighting Challenge #9:

• “Why do the Army’s junior leaders tend to trust less and be trusted less than senior leaders?”
• “Why do the estimated 32% of Army officers that so reported on the 2013 CASAL have only moderate, low, or very low trust for their immediate supervisors feel that way?”
• “What is the distribution by unit of the estimated 32% of Army officers that have only moderate, low, or very low trust for their immediate supervisor?”

6. Collaborate with the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) in order to develop and implement the means to gain from their Solarium participants their individual experiences perspectives regarding vertical trust. Specific objectives would be to identify the specific situational conditions and leader and subordinate behaviors that inspired trust or distrust. This information would facilitate qualitative analysis that could complement the quantitative analysis of the CASAL. The combined quantitative (the “what”) and qualitative (the “why”) could provide Army leadership with a much more in-depth understanding of the status and trajectory of vertical trust in the Army.


Item designated with ^ measures the degree to which the respondents feel their commanders are motivated to accomplish the mission and care for their Soldiers or motivated to seek personal advancement. This item is based upon the theme found in the narratives of leaders who have lost trust in their commanders as published in Army Magazine, How Trust Is Earned or Lost, January 2014, 57-61, accessed November 12, 2014, http://cc.army.mil/pubs/armymagazine/docs/2014/CC_ARMY_(Jan2014)_Trust.pdf
Near Term

5. Contract to have an expert or team of experts in trust conduct a “train the trainer” seminar aimed at:
   - Providing leaders the “best practice” tools and methods for assessing levels of trust existing within their units, and
   - Designing actions to increase trust.

The seminar should be taught to Army leaders and key staff and faculty at organizations such as the Mission Command Training Program, and the School of Command Preparation. Three potential providers for this seminar are:

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<th>Organization</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
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| N.C. State GEN H. Hugh Shelton Leadership Center, Poole College of Management | **Expertise**: Has Dr. R. Mayer, among the most widely published foremost experts on trust, on their team.  
**Experience with military**: Has already provided support to Joint Special Operations Command. |
| Sweeney Leadership Development Group               | **Expertise**: Led by COL (ret) Patrick Sweeney, who designed, conducted, and published results from studies of trust conducted with Army units deployed to Iraq.  
**Experience with military**: Retired Army colonel, designed research and instruction into trust for Army while stationed at USMA. |
**Fresh Approach**: Specialty has been working with businesses. New perspectives might serve useful.  
**Applicability / Utility**: Has developed a tool that leaders can use to assess which factors in their organization are currently facilitating trust, and which are inhibiting trust. |

6. Make “Building Mutual Trust between Leaders and Followers” the focus of an upcoming HD workshop. Ensure that leaders from various levels of Army operational units and experts in trust are both present. The purposes of the workshop would include:
• Gaining a better understanding of the variables impacting trust between Army leaders and followers, specifically during prioritized anticipated missions of F2025B,
• Design a sustainable process for measuring trust between leader and follower and the variables impacting the same,
• Design the organizational process for measuring, tracking, and taking actions to influence the variables identified as critical to the development of leader-follower trust in specific Army operational contexts.

The results of this workshop should be presented to the Army Human Dimension Council (AHDC).

7. Form a research partnership with Dr. Sabrina Salamon, professor at York University in Toronto, in order to design and conduct a study of Army units similar to her study. Her study found causal relationships between the degree to which employees felt trusted by their managers, aggregated at the store level, and the degree to which the employees felt responsible for organizational outcomes, which consequently led to higher performance. The rough research questions for this study would include:

• What specific leader behaviors lead to Soldiers feeling trusted by the leader?
• How varied or uniform are the perceptions of trust and feeling trusted throughout the members of Army units?
• What is the relationship between collective felt trust (CFT) in Army units and the responsibility norms (RN) of the units’ Soldiers?
• What is the relationship between unit outcomes and the RN and CFT of the unit’s Soldiers?

The study with Army units should build upon her study design with a few additional aspects:

• Add a qualitative component designed to capture Soldier perspectives regarding the specific leader behaviors that made them feel that their leaders trusted them – and in what contexts.
• Collect data with regard to the degree that Leaders report that they trust their subordinates. This would enable analysis to identify if there is agreement between how much leaders report they trust their subordinates and how much the subordinates actually felt trusted by their leaders.

The results of the study could, by identifying specific leader behaviors that led to CFT in operational settings, inform refinements to the MSAF 360 assessment questions and the assessment cards being developed for use by observers at the Combat
Training Centers during coaching and mentoring of Army leaders.

8. A follow-on white paper should build upon this white paper, and address specifically the cross-cultural aspects of trust. As the literature makes clear, the nature of trust is highly subjective, and one’s culture and prior experiences significantly impact the assessment of the trustworthiness of others. Coupled with the increasing requirement for our F2025B units to be capable of effectively partnering with forces from other countries and cultures it becomes critical that our leaders understand how soldiers from the militaries of our Unified Action Partners view trust and make trust judgments. This paper would address the following essential elements of analysis (EEA) for the Team Building learning demand of Army Warfighting Challenge #9:

- What does the Army require to strengthen relationships with partners in order to gain access, integrate capabilities, and enhance cooperation required to conduct security operations?
- What methods are effective for fostering shared understanding and cohesive, collaborative environments among a diverse modular army design and JIM team?
- What does the Army require to train and educate strategists with regional expertise to successfully collaborate with unified action partners at the operational and strategic levels of warfare?

Bibliography


