DIRECTOR’S CORNER

It is my pleasure to introduce myself to the larger CALL audience with this edition of the CALL Insider. Since coming on board in August, I have been learning something new every day about the good work being done in house and by those of you in the field who share your observations, lessons, and products with us. Keep those coming! With a new face also comes a new look for our newsletter and social media sites. This update illustrates our commitment to optimizing for multi-domain/large-scale combat operations (MD/LSCO) and multinational interoperability. Next year’s Defender Europe exercise will test that commitment, and CALL will be there to document those lessons for the Army. Also, as the Army continues to modernize critical core capabilities to compete against near-peer adversaries, CALL is finalizing its initial MD/LSCO report on the gaps and challenges to field sufficient, capable forces to compete and win in this environment. This collective function will ensure CALL is postured to address the needs of the Army today and into the future. I look forward to working with many of you in the coming months and continuing the important work of this organization.

Christopher J. Keller
COL, IN

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

19-18: Commander and Staff Guide to Rehearsals. A No-Fail Approach

“Unrehearsed plans are like brand new boots, you can use them, but you won’t go far.”
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 1944

This handbook provides a cohesive instructional guide to rehearsals, incorporating doctrine and best practices to mitigate recent difficulties in executing rehearsals at all levels, while also acknowledging the basic tenets of rehearsals have not changed. U.S. forces operate in a complex operating environment of cyber, multinational, and multi-domain players. This increases operational complexity, thus necessitating the use of timely and effective rehearsals to optimize these capabilities and increase the likelihood of success. The intent of this handbook is to update the information from CALL Newsletter 98-5, Rehearsals, and highlight recent insights and best practices from units that have improved performance. JLLIS link.

19-19: Multi-Domain Operations

The Multi-Domain Operations Catalog provides links to useful insights and perspectives related to the emerging concept of multi-domain operations (MDO). This catalog is not all encompassing, but rather serves as a primer and vehicle for analytical discourse. This catalog is a living document and will be updated periodically. MDO documents in this catalog span the period from 2014 to 2019, highlighting the evolvement of the MDO concept and the beginning of its operational application by the Army. JLLIS link.
RECENT CALL PUBLICATIONS, CONT.

GTA 19-10-005: Considerations for CID Support (CAC login required)

This graphic training aid (GTA) provides commanders and staff at all echelons information to effectively enlist and accommodate Criminal Investigation Division (CID) support in deployed locations to include countering criminal networks in large-scale combat operations. It addresses ways to improve cooperation between supported and supporting CID units, other enablers, and various unified action partners. The front of this GTA lists operational and policy references, provides a comprehensive overview of capabilities and employment options at echelon, describes and lists detailed capabilities and terminology, and provides a summary of the top six reasons for commanders and staff to request CID support. The back describes the six mutually supporting functions in detail. JLLIS link.

NEWS FROM THE FRONT AND CTC

Observations and Tools to Assist With Planning and Operationalizing Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration at the National Training Center (CAC login required)

Brigade Maintenance Meeting for Decisive Action (CAC login required)

1-3-5-M-M: A Useful Reminder (CAC login required)

In Search of Synchronized Tactical Logistics (CAC login required)

BEST PRACTICE SUBMISSIONS

Division Artillery (DIVARTY) S-2 Lessons Learned and Best Practices in Large-Scale Combat Operations (CAC login required)

To provide commanders, senior decision makers, senior intelligence officers, fire support coordinators, targeting officers, and intelligence analysts with a qualitative and quantitative analytical approach to division artillery (DIVARTY) S-2 lessons learned and best practices observed during six Warfighter Exercises (WFX 18-3 and WFX 19-1 through WFX 19-5). This paper discusses nine focus areas relevant to supporting DIVARTY and division operations in large-scale combat operations against a near-peer threat. These focus areas are contribution and integration with division G-2, enemy counterfire analysis, input to the division’s targeting process, integration of ground-moving target indicators, manning shortages and intelligence architecture, synchronization with adjacent DIVARTY S-2s, integration of the terrain team, and federated battle damage assessments. JLLIS link.

Bringing Back the Fire Support Task: The Future of the Fire Support Rehearsal (CAC login required)

Reducing enemy combat power in the deep fight is ultimately the business of fires and intelligence professionals. As the fires and intelligence warfighting functions enable maneuver operations, the essence of that relationship hinges on the effectiveness of the fire support task (FST). The doctrinal fire support rehearsal (FS RxL) highlights FSTs, but without the level of granularity necessary to describe the execution of those tasks through all the available enablers. The FS RxL and all subsequent planning must change to revolve around the FSTs as the basis of discussion for each critical event or phase. To understand the need to change the FS RxL framework, it is important to define FSTs through existing doctrine, highlight the current execution of FS RxLs, and discuss the way forward for FS RxLs with the FST as the focal point. JLLIS link.
A Battery Commander’s Lessons Learned From National Training Center Rotation 19-07 (CAC login required)

In December 2018, the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) was set for an intensive training cycle to prepare for its first return to the National Training Center (NTC) in more than a decade. Only six months prior, the 1-9 Field Artillery Battalion, located at Fort Stewart, GA, had converted to a mechanized force and was slated to provide fire support to the ABCT. This article is a reflection on failures and discovery that occurred during one battery’s rotation as a part of the Army’s newest ABCT.

SALVADORAN ARMY EXCHANGE

In support of a U.S. Army South request and Salvadoran Army (SLVAR)–U.S. Army South Agreed to Action (ATA), CALL sent two military analysts to conduct a Lessons Learned Program Development exchange at the Doctrine and Education Command (CODEM) in San Salvador, 24-28 June 2019. The purpose was to assist El Salvador in establishing a lessons learned system under its Joint Force Command to conduct this function across Service component commands at operational units, and across schools and centers. During the engagement, the CALL analysts received a briefing on CODEM’s current status and vision for incorporating lessons learned capabilities in El Salvador’s armed forces. CALL provided information and facilitated dialogue on the U.S. Army Lessons Learned Program’s methodology and processes to 13 Salvadoran military officers across the Army, Air Force, and Navy (ranging in grade from 01-05) designated to assume lessons learned function duties. The CODEM is in the process of establishing a lessons learned center in the near future. This event proved an excellent opportunity to strengthen partnerships and enhance interoperability between the two nations. Per FY20 ATA, the next scheduled event is a CALL assessment on advancements made, with a focused look at the newly established center in San Salvador.

USASOC LESSONS LEARNED

USASOC Combat Training Center 2/3rd Quarter Trends Report (CAC login required)

Combat Best Practice — Reducing Battlefield Mortality (CAC login required)

USASOC Lessons Learned Product Repository (CAC login required)

ARMY LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM (ALLP) HIGHLIGHTS

ARNORTH: Vibrant Response 19 Summary Report (CAC login required)

USAREUR: EDRE 19-02 Agile Shock, Balkan Region Exercises AAR (CAC login required)

ARSOUTH: Integrated Advance 19 (CAC login required)

PKSOI: Conflict Prevention (CAC login required)

CCoE: Army Techniques Publication 3-12.3 EW Techniques (Jul 19)

ICoE: Intelligence Readiness, Determine Sufficiency of Intelligence Support to Operations (CAC login required)

SCoE: Pacific Sentry, WFX 19-04 (CAC login required)

ALLP Sharepoint Site (CAC login required)
NTC continues to conduct tough, realistic unified land operations with our unified action partners. A few observations from recent rotations include transitioning from movement to maneuver, battalion-level unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and the radar cueing schedule.

- Commanders and leaders are challenged in identifying and synchronizing transitions from movement to maneuver, resulting in delayed deployment of ground forces and ineffective indirect fire support. A simple example to illustrate is a unit’s use of the line of departure (LD). Doctrinally, the LD designates the departure of attack elements, marks the transition from movement to maneuver, and facilitates the coordination of fires. Often, units implement LDs into their plan but fail to associate the transition from movement to maneuver, plan fires to support maneuver, or rehearse the actions triggered by the crossing of an LD. Unit actions following the crossing of a designated LD are reminiscent of the counterinsurgency mindset, often used synonymously with an "SP," which only depicts the commencement of an element’s movement, oftentimes in column, toward an end point with no consideration to transition, enemy disposition, or indirect fires support. The basic concept of executing actions at the crossing of an LD requires the dissemination of “fighting products,” terrain analysis, and effective rehearsals of those actions to synchronize and mass effects accordingly.

- Battalion-level UAS are consistently the most underutilized intelligence collection system during NTC rotations, primarily due to an inability to properly coordinate restricted operations zones (ROZs). As such, battalion intelligence sections are challenged to fully develop the intelligence picture for their respective areas of operations and lean heavily on second-hand information from the brigade UAS platforms while battalion UAS platforms go unused. Traditionally, battalion ROZ requests start with a recommendation from the battalion S-2 to the battalion commander, which is then tasked by the battalion S-3 to the battalion fires cell. This ROZ is deconflicted with battalion fires before being sent to the brigade aviation element (BAE) for approval. Unfortunately, most ROZ requests end after submission to the BAE and the battalion fires cell fails to check up on the requests. Observer, coach/trainers observe success when battalion commanders task the S-2 to oversee the entirety of the ROZ request process, rather than ambiguously and simultaneously placing the responsibility between the battalion S-2 section and the battalion fires cell.

- During multiple rotations at the National Training Center, units were unprepared to manage the maintenance, crew rest, and cueing of the target acquisition radars. Ineffective planning overwhelms the radar sections that are expected to conduct survivability moves every two hours without a schedule. Development of a cueing schedule, however, provides predictability for system operators and is critical to the operation of these systems. It is interdependent and must focus on detection of enemy systems, maintenance, crew rest, and survivability. Planning for the schedule begins with analysis of the enemy during mission analysis in the military decisionmaking process and is modified based on assessments from the targeting process. The battalion targeting officer develops a schedule for each course of action (COA) during COA development. They are finalized for publication following the COA analysis (wargame), and refined based on current assessments during the targeting working group.

The National Training Center has a robust community on Twitter!
For great insights and observations follow:

- @OPSGRP_NTC
- @simmering216
- @NTC_Bronco
- @NtcScorpions
- @N Panther07
- @NTC_WOLF_FIRES
- @NTC_Tarantula
- @EagleTeam_NTC
- @NGoldminers
- @Cobra_NTC
- @IntelNtc
- @TeamRavenUSAf
JOINT MULTINATIONAL READINESS CENTER

The unique opportunity the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) provides in training with multinational forces has been extended to divisions as JMRC incorporates division headquarters during rotations. This requires the division to analyze, plan, and integrate the unique equipment and skill sets presented when planning and operating with a multinational subordinate unit. Beginning with exercise Combined Resolve X in April 2018, JMRC has integrated a U.S. active duty division at various levels, culminating with the participation of a full division staff and DIVARTY headquarters during Saber Junction 19 in September 2019.

Combined Resolve X incorporated the European Theater Mission Command Element, augmented by USAREUR serving as the higher command (HICON). This effort provided the division headquarters serving as the Mission Command Element an introduction into HICON operations as part of a JMRC rotation. During Combined Resolve XII, JMRC extended the Instrumentation Training Analysis Computer Simulations and Support to the division home station, allowing the division to observe events and activities and validate the ability to conduct command post operations from CONUS. These two events led to the complete integration of the division staff and DIVARTY during Saber Junction 19, during which the division operated live from both the Hohenfels training area in Germany with the division tactical command post (DTAC) and from home station with the division main command post (DMAIN). The DTAC synchronized staff and subordinate activities and coordinated support requests. The DMAIN planned future operations, published fragmentary orders, and conducted the targeting cycle.

Saber Junction 19 provided a new layer of complexity for the rotational training units, as the division’s participation as a free thinking headquarters required increased situational awareness of higher headquarter activities from subordinate units. Additionally, training units were required to participate in the division battle rhythm events to include operations synchronization (OPSINC), logistics synchronization (LOGSYNC), targeting working groups, and commander’s update assessments.

CALL CUOPS UPDATE

If you are interested in receiving current operations information from today’s operations conducted by the combatant commands and Army Service component commands, submit a request for information to CALL at usarmy.leavenworth.mccoembx.call-rfi-manager-mailbox@mail.mil. You must include a valid SIPR email address to receive this product.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
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Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350
(913) 684-3035
CALL Public Website: https://call.army.mil
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