Director's Corner

Although my time as CALL Director is drawing to a close, I will never stop sharing my belief that the lessons learned process is key to our success as an Army. Learning from our experiences and sharing those lessons across the force sets us apart from our adversaries and makes us stronger. But, we can't get better or make our formations better if we aren't documenting those lessons in an after action report — an AAR that is sent to CALL for analysis, archiving, and sharing. When we hear leaders say there is no time for AARs, I say we don't have time for another Task Force Smith or Kasserine Pass. Failing to learn leaves us with unnecessary dead and wounded. At CALL, our job is to drive change in the Army. That change starts with you and your units. We are here to help, so please contact us if you have questions or are looking for resources.

Mike Lawson
COL, FA

Recent CALL Publications

**19-16: Commander and Staff Guide to the Battlefield Coordination Detachment**

The battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) performs a critical function and role for the Army Service component command. As an Army coordination detachment and liaison to a designated air operations center (AOC), the BCD represents the Commander, Army forces, while working in and among the Air Component Commander (ACC) staff in the AOC. The BCD facilitates the coordination between Army forces and the ACC, specifically between both headquarters. This handbook is designed to inform Army leaders of the BCD's functions, roles, and capabilities, along with best practices and lessons from numerous exercises, experiments, and named operations. These insights should prove invaluable to all Army leaders, newly assigned BCD personnel, and organizations that work with BCDs. [JLLIS link](#).

**GTA 19-10-004: Brigade Combat Team Commander and Staff Detainee Operations Considerations** (CAC login required)

This graphic training aid (GTA) provides brigade combat team commanders and staff, military police leaders, and those at other echelons the means to plan, prepare, and execute detainee operations in a large-scale ground combat operations (LSGCO) environment. The entire GTA contains content for operational units, as well as those managing legal and policy aspects for detainee operations. It lists key terms at echelon and provides a pictorial detainee flow at echelon, along with flow principles and considerations. [JLLIS link](#).

**19-17: Army Pre-Positioned Stocks APS-2 (Europe and Africa)** (CAC login required)

The Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) program is the cornerstone of the Army's ability to quickly react to urgent situations. The Army prioritizes and dedicates significant resources to ensure the readiness and availability of APS, which maintains combat-ready equipment and materiel strategically located and ready for use at a moment's notice. The intent of this catalog is to provide a reference point for commanders and staff in support of APS issuance and turn-in operations, with an emphasis on APS-2 in Europe and Africa. The resources listed in this catalog include current and historic doctrine, handbooks, academic research, after action reports, and other publications. [JLLIS link](#).
Recent CALL Publications, cont.

10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) the Last CJFLCC Iraq
This newsletter focuses on the 10th Mountain Division’s experience dealing with the initial transition of the Army Headquarters and mission in Iraq. Chapter 1 discusses two challenges the division experienced: 1) The overarching Army challenge in Iraq transitioning to phases IV (stabilize) and V (enable civil authority) from its traditional lead role during combat operations, and 2) The division’s reorganization of the CJFLCC and CJTF into a single headquarters to support the transition. Chapter 2, “Winning the Peace in Iraq,” sets the stage for the newsletter and a series of papers named “Hays Horizons,” Chapters 3-9. These think pieces tackle many of the issues and challenges discussed in the lead paper, which the division experienced during its deployment. JLLIS link.

The Third Offset Strategy and the Army Modernization Priorities (CAC login required)
From the CALL Director’s Action Group comes an article intended to spur discussion among leaders: For nearly two decades, the Army deferred modernization in order to support continuous combat operations all while the global security environment has grown more competitive and volatile. The Army must divest itself from a counterinsurgency and stability operations footing and prepare for the harsh realities of potential large-scale ground combat operations. The Army will need to synchronize capabilities quickly and decisively across domains, geographic boundaries, functions, and authorities to maintain freedom of maneuver inside an adversary’s anti-access/area denial region. These capabilities will result from the Third Offset Strategy. JLLIS link.

101st Support to Operation Resolute Support – Afghanistan 2019 (Insights for Division Commanders and Staff) (CAC login required)
The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Headquarters (HQ) replaced the 3rd Infantry Division HQ in Afghanistan and served as the fourth operational division HQ for U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), National Support Element (NSE) from 16 November 2017 to 15 November 2018 in support of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and NATO’s Resolute Support (RS) mission. The HQ USFOR-A Bagram joint staff of Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, Department of Defense (DoD) Civilians, and Contractors executed Title 10 and NSE functions for all U.S. Forces in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan. This report captures the observations and best practices from that deployment. JLLIS link.

Initial Impressions Report, Yama Sakura 75: Integrating Multi-Domain Operations Capabilities into Bilateral Operations (CAC login required)
This CALL Initial Impression Report (IIR) provides insights, lessons, and best practices regarding the integration and application of multi-domain operations (MDO) capabilities executed by the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) in the bilateral exercise Yama Sakura (YS) 75. The primary target audience for this publication is leaders, troops, and units in the U.S. Army Pacific Command (USARPAC), I Corps, and other Army/Joint formations that work with multinational partners in the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR). It also serves to inform the development of additional MDTF formations, regardless of geographic location. In addition to observations centered on MDO, this IIR provides insight into mission command, multinational partnered interoperability, security cooperation, and bilateral staff operations. JLLIS link.

GTA 30-04-001: Information Collection Rehearsal
This GTA provides information on when to conduct the information collection rehearsal and how to validate the information collection (IC) plan, the allocation of IC assets by phase, and the intelligence architecture by phase. JLLIS link.

GTA 11-02-001 Retrans Mission Checklist
This GTA provides the reader with a checklist in order to accomplish a retransmission mission. JLLIS link.

GTA 13-01-001: Cyber and EW Threat Quick Reference Card (CAC login required)
This GTA provides the reader with some tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to counter electronic attack threats and cyberspace attacks. JLLIS link.

AAR Submissions
TCM-SFAB DOTMLPF-P Annual Lessons Learned Report, 1 May 2019 (CAC login required)
Lessons on Combined Joint Theater and Missile Defense Planning (CAC login required)

Effective Time Management at the Company-Level (CAC login required)

BCT S-2’s Guide for Success at the National Training Center (CAC login required)

BN S-2’s Guide to Transition From COIN to Decisive Action (CAC login required)

NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) for Commanders and Staff

Conference of American Armies - Countering Threat Networks

Joint Force Land Component Command - Synchronization of the Land Domain

News From the Front and CTCs

Building Partnership Capacity Through Train, Advise, and Assist - Insights From BG Jackson, Commander, 1SFAB

Fighting With Afghan Fists: Insights From CSM Todd Sims

Achieving Unity of Effort - A Case Study in Leadership

Lessons in HQs Evolution for Commanders and Staff, Reorganizing a CJTF-OIR HQs

Operationalizing Knowledge Management in an Army Service Component Command

Operation Sentinel French Homeland Security Operation

Best Practice Submissions

Warfighter 19-4: Defense-in-Depth on the Mission Partner Environment Network (CAC login required)

BCT Fire Support Coordinator and Direct Support Field Artillery Battalion Commander: How to Mission Command! (CAC login required)

Conducting Effectives Fires Rehearsals (CAC login required)

Military Police Capabilities Quick Reference Guide (CAC login required)

Comprehensive Expeditionary Readiness at the Company Level Throughout PTDO Missions (CAC login required)

FM 3-0 Operations (NEW Audiobook Format!)

The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), in a collaborative effort led by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) and supported by the Army Training Support Center (ATSC) - Mobile Learning Division (MLD) and Enterprise Multimedia Center (EMC), is producing a pilot series of Army doctrine audiobooks. The first publication produced as an audiobook is Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, a manual that marked the shift in the Army’s focus toward large-scale combat operations when published in October 2017. Audiobooks are not new to the publishing industry; however, this marks the first time the Army has ventured into this medium as a way of delivering Army doctrine. The Army doctrine audiobooks are intended to provide Soldiers with an alternate means of accessing Army doctrine. They provide knowledge at the point of need in order to enhance understanding, and serve to support how many Soldiers prefer to receive information. Army doctrine audiobooks are produced from published and authenticated doctrine, abridged for the audio format. Like print publications, online presentation of audiobooks follows a standardized format that includes the publication’s introduction, each of the chapters, and the appendices. Army doctrine audiobooks use industry standard .mp3 files that can be accessed by users across multiple platforms, including laptops, e-Readers, tablets, smartphones, and other mobile devices. FM 2-0, Intelligence, and Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs) 3-90, Offense and Defense, and 7-0, Training, are currently in production and will be available later this summer. The viability and use of the audiobook format, as well as future production of additional doctrinal publications, will be evaluated as part of this pilot program.
Recently, leaders at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) established the Trends Working Group. This working group convenes monthly to validate and modify rotational training unit (RTU) observed trends. The end state of the working group is to provide RTU trends to the total force and identify and provide feedback to the Army Staff on deficiencies attributed to larger doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) shortfalls.

Over the last several rotations, JMRC observer, coach, trainers (OCTs) across the warfighting functions (WfFs) identified the following trends (listed in no particular order):

1. Command Post Operations
   • Survivability: Main Command Post footprints are too large. RTUs struggle with balancing survivability, mobility, functionality, and connectivity. Command Posts also struggle with movement, either not displacing fast or often enough.

2. Operations Process
   • Course of Action (COA) Analysis: Conditions are not set at the start of COA analysis (i.e., incomplete COA, cursory fighting products, branch plan and/or sequel not developed).
   • Battle Rhythm: RTUs fail to execute a predictable battle rhythm once deployed causing desynchronization across WfFs and units at all echelons.
   • Rehearsals: Units are unable to validate synchronization during combined arms rehearsals and are inconsistent with conducting conditions checks before major operations.

3. Recon and Security Operations
   • Synchronization: RTUs are challenged with synchronizing all available information collection assets, specifically organic assets, and in establishing and maintaining contact with the enemy.
   • Ownership: Mixed ownership between the reconnaissance & surveillance (R&S) and information collection enterprises leads to gaps in the brigade's situational awareness.
   • R&S Guidance: Unclear R&S guidance and lack of shared understanding observed across echelons. Task Force Scout platoons often do not receive R&S guidance and are not nested with the squadron.

4. Targeting
   • Brigade/Battalion Fights: Challenges in defining and conceptualizing the brigade and battalion fights while synchronizing assets in both deep and close fights. BCTs tend to focus on the deep fight, losing sight of the close fight and rear area security. Lastly, lack of target and observer-location refinement, leads to ineffective fires.
   • Deep fight: The deep fight is not defined by effects on formations or linked to the close fight. Named areas of interest and target areas of interest are not linked through an integrated and layered observer plan.
   • Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) Assets: RTUs are challenged to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize EAB assets (i.e., attack aviation, close air support, air defense artillery, unmanned aircraft systems, nonlethal tools, special operations forces, and general support artillery).

5. Engagement Area (EA) Development/Defense
   • Establishing the Defense: There is a failure to understand the threat, visualize how and where to kill the enemy, and how to mass the effects of organic combat power, enablers, and materials.

6. Employment of Attack Aviation and Airspace Control
   • Attack Aviation employment: Limited planning results in desynchronized coverage windows and increased vulnerability in an integrated air defense system environment.
   • Airspace: Challenges in developing and maintaining unit airspace plans that simultaneously enable aviation maneuver, ground scheme of maneuver, and permissive fires.

7. Sustainment Synchronization and Survivability
   • Sustain the Warfighter: Challenges in synchronizing sustainment actions/activities and adequately defending logistics assets. Reactive versus proactive sustainment results in desynchronized sustainment and maneuver operations at all echelons.

8. Interoperability
   • Multinational Interoperability: Key weapons, capabilities, their tactical employment, as well as operational terms are misunderstood across multinational organizations. Units struggle to gain and maintain secure FM and digital communications with multinational units.
The CALL Cell at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) just compiled Operations Group Commander (COG) Challenges along with the 1st and 2nd Quarter Fiscal Year 2019 Trends. On the 1st and 2nd Quarter Trends Fiscal Year 2019, they remain — as we should expect — fairly constant from the last several collections. Our breakout across echelons and WfF is below. A total of 142 trends crossed the WfFs and echelons, brigade to company, as indicated. The breakout did not include the COG’s challenges. Clearly, Mission Command dominates the field when it comes to trends from brigade through company.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st and 2nd QTR FY19 142 Trends</th>
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<tr>
<td>WARFIGHTING FUNCTION</td>
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Systems are daunting in their complexity and that complexity has only grown with new capability set (CS) fielding every year since 2014. Training to keep up with that complexity is a never-ending challenge for both operators and leaders due to personnel turbulence. In truth, personnel turnover across BCTs every year means that a BCT that came to a rotation in 2016 was not the same BCT when it came back in 2017 or 2018.

Under those circumstances, training becomes a mitigating strategy to offset personnel turmoil. We see four continuity measures that will assist training for a CTC rotation at home station and performing in a CTC rotation. Our “Big 4” for brigade through company level are:

- Military Decisionmaking Process/Troop Leading Procedures
- Standard Operating Procedures
- Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) Planning
- Common Operational Picture (COP)

Supporting Rotational Documents

Five supporting rotational take-home packages (THPs) from Fiscal Year 2018 are in the JRTC Community of Practice (CAC login required) on the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). We post sanitized RTU THPs every six months as we collect trends.

Our process involves removing identifying data — unit identification, dates, rotation numbers, etc. — while leaving the observations, context, and other content intact. When we post the trends for two quarters of a fiscal year, we go back and clean the THPs for rotations in the previous two quarters. We recommend that you look at these sanitized THPs as a data source for the accompanying trends even though they precede the trends period of collection by six months. THPs record observations for each rotation; if you look at several, you will see repeat observations that develop into trends. If you wish to track such trend development and consistency, these sanitized THPs are an excellent source. A simple word search for “observation” produces 5,217 hits. They also provide an excellent resource for understanding the challenges of a rotation by echelon and WfF. We trust you will find them useful.
The National Training Center (NTC) continues to conduct tough, realistic unified land operations with our unified action partners. A few observations from recent rotations include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection and decontamination readiness; the capabilities of the fires warfighting function; and the battery operations center (BOC) employment and functions.

- A common theme for units at NTC is an overall lack of familiarization and/or readiness of CBRN detection and decontamination equipment. Units understand the expectation to be able to react to a CBRN environment/event and identify the requirement to bring personal protective equipment (PPE), detection, and decontamination equipment. Yet, one in four units come close to 100 percent of all required equipment. And not only is bringing the required CBRN equipment forward a struggle units have at NTC, a bigger problem is that units/Soldiers do not know how to use the CBRN equipment that they are bringing forward. Units need to incorporate basic precombat checks (PCCs) and precombat inspections (PCIs) of their CBRN equipment as part of their pre-battle checks. Likewise, homestation CBRN equipment training and readiness is needed and most effective when units incorporate CBRN training into all of the training events.

- Commanders do not fully understand the capability of the fires warfighting function and how they can shape the fight. Additionally, the fire support officers fail to articulate that and provide visualization to that effect. The primary mission of fires is to create certain effects on the enemy or the battlespace as directed by the maneuver commander who controls that battlespace. In accordance with FM 3-09, these effects include deceive, defeat, delay, destroy, disrupt, divert, neutralize, or suppress. The fire support team must help the maneuver commander understand how fires and assets available can help the battalion fight. It is more than filling out a “quad-chart.” It is continually updating the commander directly with what capabilities, targets, or assets are prepared to shape the fight. The maneuver commander, in turn, must understand and provide clear, concise guidance, as well as assume acceptable risk that will allow the employment of fires to better support the maneuver in a decisive action environment.

- Units deploy to NTC and do not employ battery operation centers (BOCs) within their artillery formations. Batteries use their active fire direction center (FDC) to battle track and process fire missions simultaneously. BOCs are consistently underutilized or neglected by the rotational unit during their deployment to NTC. There is a clear lack of practice and knowledge of how a BOC can be used as an operational multiplier to the battery. Army Training Publication 3-09.50 para 2-5 states, "The battery commander and BOC facilitate control of the firing battery. The BOC serves as a focal point for internal battery operation including battery defense, coordinating sustainment, and all other operational functions normally performed by a headquarters. It also serves as the alternate FDC by providing backup fire direction capability with a tactical automated fire control system."

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