

CALL INSIDER

SEP-NOV 2017



### Director's Corner

Recently, I read an article from MAJ John Spencer at Modern War Institute and published in the *Washington Post* that really hit home for me. In "[How the Military is Making it Hard to Remember our Wars](#)," MAJ Spencer notes the unfortunate loss of historical records during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because of a lack of individual knowledge and established procedures when we transitioned from paper-based to digitally-based records. The magnitude of this loss in terms of history and lessons for the Army is incalculable. Here at CALL, we are committed to collecting, archiving, and sharing lessons from the field, so the importance of units saving and forwarding that information to us cannot be overstated. This effort guides all of our actions.




Throughout its history, the Army has recognized the need to share information or lessons gained from training and actual combat operations. From "combat bulletins" during World War I and Korea, to quarterly operational reports during Vietnam, Soldiers have contributed and shared their experiences with other Soldiers. This tradition continues and each of you has a part to play in this process. What can you do? Write about your experience for publication as a *News From the Front* article, send us your insights when we conduct data calls (see page 5), volunteer for an assignment as a military analyst (forward), or share with us your unit best practices. To learn more about all of these efforts and to stay informed, visit our [website](#) (Common Access Card [CAC] required) and subscribe to our monthly newsletter. Join us in making a difference.

Finally, CALL recently released the Mosul Study Group's initial observations from Operation EAGLE STRIKE. This document synthesizes hundreds of data points into useful insights for the Army and our sister Services. While this version is restricted in its distribution, we are working a publicly releaseable volume for future publication.

Mike Pappal  
COL, AR

### Recent CALL Publications




**17-24: Mosul Study Group: What the Battle for Mosul Teaches the Force** (CAC login required)

The purpose of this report is to provide immediate impressions of Operation EAGLE STRIKE that may or should directly impact the Army and how it approaches future conflicts. It also recommends areas that require further study in order to better prepare the Army for future combat operations. This report will inform Army force design, force structure, future force development decisions, concepts, doctrine, and readiness through the timely feedback of relevant observations and impressions from Operation EAGLE STRIKE. It does not attempt to form conclusions about what these observations mean for the future character of war. This report is the result of an intense 45-day effort to study Operation EAGLE STRIKE in order to provide the Army with relevant observations that can be immediately injected back into the force.



### 17-28: CTC Trends FY2016

This bulletin identifies trends for fiscal year 2016 across the CTCs based on observations from OC/Ts and collection and analysis teams from CALL, with support from various Army Centers of Excellence. A trend is defined in Army Regulation 11-33, *Army Lessons Learned Program*, as "an identified issue or best practice supported by three or more observations from multiple sources within a reasonable period." Organized by Army tactical tasks from the Army Universal Task List, these CTC trends reflect both positive performance (sustains) and areas that need emphasis (improves). CTC trends provide valuable information to units developing and executing training for deployment to a CTC or an operational environment. [JLLIS link.](#)



### [17-27: Korea Theater of Operations Multinational Interoperability](#) (CAC login required)

Improving interoperability and executing effective multinational operations are persistent challenges to U.S. ground forces and U.S. allies. U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) armed forces have been at the forefront in developing solutions

and integrating capabilities to address these gaps. The KTO is unique by nature due to its wartime combined task organization and execution of combined operations through the use of combined command posts and combat support liaison teams. In the execution of operations, forces must routinely deconflict and synchronize the details of movement, protection, fire support, and even public affairs/information operations. This handbook serves as a reference for executing multinational operations through the lens of both ROK Army and U.S. perspectives. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [ABCANZ Lessons Collection Team Report: Exercise Hamel 2017](#) (CAC login required)

Exercise Hamel is conducted every year in Australia to assess an Australian combat brigade for its readiness to deploy in a wide range of military response options according to Australian government policy. Generally, every second year Exercise Hamel is conducted as a discreet field exercise within the greater Exercise Talisman Sabre. Talisman Sabre is typically referred to as a bilateral US-Australia activity, but it also routinely includes significant participation by the New Zealand Defence Force. The ABCANZ lessons collection team personnel were merged into the Exercise Hamel evaluation team during the data collection phase in order to consolidate collection effort and to benefit from the expertise of the Australian evaluation personnel. The results of the collection are summarized in an executive summary and described in detail in the relevant sections of the report. An examination of the 476 observations captured by the evaluation team led to 36 insights and additional themes that can be used to inform future program work.

## ***News From the Front and CTCs***

### [News From the Front: Commander's Perspective: CJFLCC Operations in Iraq. Insights from MG Joseph M. Martin. Commanding General](#)

This News From the Front summarizes the key insights from an end of tour interview with MG Joseph Martin, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division and Combined Joint Force Land Component Command-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJFLCC-OIR). The interview, conducted at the conclusion of his tour in Iraq, contained focus areas that capture best practices and lessons learned during his tenure as the Commanding General. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [News From the Front: Operating in the Interorganizational Environment: Insights from U.S. Army Africa](#)

U.S. military leaders and planners must understand the purpose and mission of the many governmental, nongovernmental and international organizations in the area of operations to facilitate collective cooperation. This paper highlights some challenges the U.S. Army faces when operating in the interorganizational environment and provides insights to enhance collaboration to achieve mutual objectives. These insights were collected during the civilian-led interorganizational tabletop exercise conducted in Washington, D.C., hosted by the U.S. Institute for Peace in conjunction with the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff J-7 Exercise Directorate from 17-20 JUL 2017. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [News From the Front: Training to Improve Basic Combat Skills](#)

The purpose of this article is to illustrate how U.S. Army Cadet Command approached improving basic combat skills and fieldcraft through command emphasis, mission command, and the eight-step training model. While Cadet Command's efforts are what inspired this document, the lessons and best practices are applicable for training programs for most junior Army leaders. This Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) document was produced with the cooperation and input of Cadet Command and ROTC Advanced Camp cadre and staff. [JLLIS link.](#)

### [News From the CTC: Assault Platoon Integration With the Rifle Company](#) (CAC login required)

For many light infantry companies, a CTC rotation is the first time they work with an attached assault platoon. Depending on the background of the company leaders, some may not fully understand the capabilities of all the equipment that an assault platoon brings to the fight. When executed properly, the integration of assets enhances the unit's ability to lethally mass effects at the decisive point to destroy the enemy. When assets are poorly integrated, lethality drops, inefficiency grows, and operations easily become desynchronized. This article provides a focused discussion on the best practices and trends observed at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) regarding assault platoon integration with rifle companies. [JLLIS link.](#)



## News From the Front and CTCs

### [News From the CTC: Employment of the BEB HQ and HHC at the JRTC](#) (CAC login required)

Brigade engineer battalion (BEB) headquarters and headquarters companies (HHCs) traditionally focus on two main tasks while conducting operations at the JRTC. Conducting mission command and base security operations generally consume the resources (both personnel and equipment) of the HHC and can cause great challenges in maintaining accountability and securing the battalion footprint during decisive action training environment (DATE) rotations. In this article the authors provide insights and best practices of the actions successful units have taken during their rotation at the CTC. [JLLIS link](#).

### [News From the Front: Religious Affairs in the Horn of Africa](#)

Religious affairs in joint military operations play a vital role in supporting commanders throughout the operational area, in alignment with the commander's overall theater security program. This NFTF article discusses a program known as Voices of Religious Tolerance (VORT), which was employed in Afghanistan, Jordan, and Somalia and provides a way to involve religious affairs to support countering extremist ideas. This NFTF should be useful to religious affairs teams attempting to use this program or build something similar. [JLLIS link](#).

### [News From the Front: Task Force Warrior CJTF-HOA Predeployment Activities](#) (CAC

login required )

Army Reserve and National Guard participation with the Active Component providing support for theater security operations and exercises, both CONUS and OCONUS, has increased drastically over the past 15 years. Units are given the maximum time possible between the date alerted and the date required to report for active duty; some units may be alerted, but not actually begin active duty for several weeks. Under some mobilization conditions, however, an emergency situation may require extremely short active duty notice. This NFTF article provides insights into one National Guard battalion's mobilization process as it prepared to deploy to the Horn of Africa. [JLLIS link](#).

### [News From the CTC: Intelligence Support to Sustainment](#)

Today's Army logisticians rely on a robust intelligence enterprise to provide timely and accurate information to deter threats and minimize interruptions to sustainment operations. Within combat sustainment support battalions (CSSBs), the intelligence cell is required to provide intelligence information to support current and future operations and plans. The Army's active duty and reserve CSSBs test this support requirement regularly at the combat training centers (CTCs). [JLLIS link](#).

### [News From the CTC: Analog Mission Command Systems in a Direct Action Fight](#)

(CAC login required)

Mission command at the company and battalion levels is best executed with shared understanding among all units, not just vertically, but also horizontally. Many units tend to focus on creating a shared understanding through digital systems without having strong, working analog systems already established. Leaders have become comfortable operating with the digital systems of the forward operating bases (FOBs) and armored vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan, but have lost practice in maintaining an analog common operational picture (COP). This article provides several examples of analog COPs that may be useful to leaders. [JLLIS link](#).

### [News From the CTC: The Brigade Engineer Battalion Signal Company](#) (CAC login required)

During the high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) of the JRTC rotations, the BEB headquarters is often consumed by the overwhelming effort required to plan, coordinate, and execute brigade-wide engineer tasks of terrain management, mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability. The additional, and often unfamiliar, signal mission requirements become an interference or even an afterthought. In this article, the author highlights the challenges exposed by the high OPTEMPO during JRTC rotations and provides insights to set up the BEB, S-6, and the signal company for success. [JLLIS link](#).

### [News From the CTC: Combat Engineer Operations as a Service-Based Industry](#)

(CAC login required )

Engineer rotational training units often succeed or fail at JRTC based on their understanding of the resurging importance of customer service. Recent operations have allowed many engineers to focus almost solely on their product (defeating improvised explosive devices [IEDs] or deconstructing FOBs) as opposed to their customer, the supported maneuver unit. In this article, the author pinpoints three key components to improved customer service: a customer-service orientation, a structure that supports this orientation, and a flow of information to allow customer analysis. [JLLIS link](#).

### [News From the CTC: Company Fire Support and Airspace Management Lessons](#) (CAC login

required

Fire support teams have struggled with the integration of indirect fires, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and unmanned aircraft system platforms. In this article, the authors provide planners with some guidance to help units succeed with these skills during a DATE rotation. [JLLIS link](#).

**Best Practice Submissions**

**Home Station Training Tip: Maximizing the Benefits of Digital Ranges** (CAC login required )

The author, a subject matter expert at the Army Training Support Center, discusses recommended changes resulting from observations, surveys, and discussions with more than 700 Soldiers using digital and non-digital ranges. First observation? Leadership presence at AARs is critical.

**FOX FIST and the OSRVT** (CAC login required )

This article describes how one unit used the One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) to enable the Fire Support Team (FIST) to develop situational awareness on the battlefield in real-time. This allowed the FIST to process faster calls for fire, observe at greater depths throughout the area of operations, and track friendly forces movements with greater accuracy.

**Mobile Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)** (CAC login required )

Learn how one civil affairs unit developed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for a “Rolling CMOC” by using a Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTV) combined with a Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelter (DRASH) tent and generator to facilitate mobile CMOC operations at JRTC. According to the author, “We timed our jumps, and were able to be mobile in approximately 20 minutes without trouble. It worked very well as a mobile, expeditious CMOC.”

**25th Infantry Division Warfighter Lessons Learned: Joint Air-Ground Integration Center (JAGIC) Operations** (CAC login required )

From January to April 2017, the 25th Infantry Division fires community refined its processes and procedures to combat the Army-wide trend that division joint fires struggle to effectively shape the division deep fight. Over the course of multiple division-level command post exercises, the JAGIC identified and eliminated multiple barriers enabling rapid engagement of enemy systems. This article focuses on three key factors identified as critical to effectively shaping the adversary with joint fires.

**2-116 FA TOC Battle Drills** (CAC login required )

These tactical operations center (TOC) battle drills are based on studies indicating the human brain has an easier time finding and remembering images rather than words. Pictures were added to tables, making it easier to locate the right battle drill quickly. This unit also created the ASK, DO, TELL model. The radio-telephone operator (RTO) follows the ASK column to make sure they have received the relevant information; the battle captain follows the DO column, applying judgment as needed; and finally the battle captain or NCO follows the TELL column to disseminate the information.

**Battalion Sustainment in Decisive Action, a Lost Art** (CAC login required )

Current and former National Training Center OC/Ts developed this sustainment concept over time as the result of several rotational observations. Bottom-line: It is “a way” for S-4/sustainment cells at the maneuver battalion level to read and gain insight on how to best plan and execute sustainment operations.

**Colombian Army (COLAR) Exchange**



In support of U.S. Army South request and Army-to-Army Agreed-to-Action, CALL conducted an exchange with the Director, COLAR Lessons Learned Center, and staff in Bogota, 6-10 NOV 2017. This event was a reciprocal engagement from a recent COLAR visit to CALL and other Combined Arms Center organizations. CALL has been working with the COLAR Lessons Learned Center since 2010. In 2016, COLAR directed the establishment of a 4-year program, “Project Daniel,” to enhance its lessons learned capabilities. During the visit, CALL shared the value of instilling a cultural understanding that the primary function of a lessons learned program is meeting the Army’s information requirements. Analysts spent the week discussing, developing, and refining processes/procedures and providing insights on how to better leverage database

networks to quickly disseminate lessons and best practices across operating and generating forces. General Mejia, Commander of the Colombian Army, acknowledged CALL’s presence and support, passing on that this function is deemed essential to their Transformation Program. This Defense Institution Building event reinforced U.S. Army South country plan objectives, COLAR transformation initiatives, and exemplifies CALL’s mission/vision to “Maintain global situational awareness and provide timely and relevant knowledge across the Army and with our unified action partners.” In May 2018, CALL analysts are scheduled to return to Colombia to conduct a follow-on subject matter expert exchange with COLAR Lessons Learned Program liaison officers stationed at brigades, divisions, schools, and training centers.



**DATA Call**

**“First 100 Days” Handbooks**

We are capturing lessons, best practices, and vignettes describing what a company commander and first sergeant (1SG) can expect in their first 100 days of assuming command or responsibility. We are also requesting the same type of information for platoon leaders and platoon sergeants (PSGs). Specifically, we are looking for your responses, personal stories, and vignettes that address the questions below:

- Who did you turn to when you had questions about difficult problems, issues, or situations? In retrospect, was this the right person?
- What positive things did your battalion commander or command sergeant major (CSM) do to create an environment that allowed you to say you didn't know something?
- What preparations did you conduct before your time as a commander or 1SG that paid dividends after you took the guidon?
- How did you build a relationship with the battalion staff, and were those actions successful?
- How did you get to know the leaders of the civilian agencies on post? Were there any that you wished you had met before more urgent situations arose?
- What did you wish your career course or noncommissioned officer education system (NCOES) would have taught you to help prepare you for company leadership?
- What critical skills do captains (CPTs) think their platoon leaders (PLs) are lacking when they leave Basic Officer Leadership Course?
- What critical skills do 1SGs think their PSGs are lacking from NCOES?
- What are the questions that a new CPT or 1SG asks their peers soon after taking over?
- What were the key things you did or wish you had done to ensure more successful change of command inventories took place?
- How should a CPT counsel his/her senior enlisted advisor?
- What products did you use to track the array of statistics for your company? (Please include any best practices as attachments with your response.)
- What tools do you continue to use to ensure the members of your company can get in touch with you after you have transitioned out of company leadership?
- What questions should we be asking of current or past commanders and 1SGs to add content to this publication?

Input may be sent to our operations section at [usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.call-rfi-manager-mailbox@mail.mil](mailto:usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.call-rfi-manager-mailbox@mail.mil) (ATTN: MAJ Kaczor [Company CDR/1SG] or CPT Beale[PL/PSG])

**Coming Soon**

**Leader’s Guide to the Digital Liaison Detachment**

This handbook will provide leaders and supporting staff in the operational Army (i.e., the target audience of this publication) with an overview on how to plan, train, and leverage the capabilities of digital liaison detachments (DLDs) that render a critical capability for mission command liaison and interoperability. These teams provide an Army Forces (ARFOR) commander with the capability to conduct liaison with subordinate or parallel joint and multinational headquarters within the operational area.

**Deep Operations**

This handbook, designed to accompany Army Techniques Publication 3-94.2, *Deep Operations*, 31 AUG 2016, combines Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017 Warfighter exercise lessons and best practices to enable corps- and division-level commanders and staffs to learn from their peers. These invaluable insights should drive commanders and staff to improve their processes for the requisite, complicated deep operations synchronization.

**News You Can Use**

[Joint Multinational Readiness Center \(JMRC\) Newsletters](#) (CAC login required)

[Stryker Warfighting Forum Newsletter via StrykerNet](#) (Registration and CAC login required)

[Air Force Lessons Learned Bulletin \(September 2017\)](#) (CAC login required)

[U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center \(USACRC\) Mishap Summaries](#) (The USACRC produces one-page accident investigation summaries for accident prevention purposes. These summaries contain information protected by DODI 6055.07 under the safety privilege and are only available to CAC holders within the .mil network.)

[CALLing All Volunteers!](#) by CPT Brian Gulden (via Army.mil)

Interested in a challenging and rewarding assignment opportunity? CALL is looking for Army officers (MAJ-COL) and NCOs (SFC-SGM) to fill military analyst (forward) positions around the globe.

## Combat Training Centers

### National Training Center



NTC continues to conduct tough, realistic, unified land operations with our unified action partners. A few observations from recent rotations include crew duties for the fire direction center (FDC); task force (TF) medical platoon in decontamination operations; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integrated into operations.

- Artillery battery and platoon FDCs understand the importance of crew duties, but often do not execute them doctrinally. Crew duties for the FDC are a set of procedures that build precision, speed, skill, and teamwork in order to accomplish an overall objective. Each tactical operation, from conducting advance party to displacing a FDC, has specific crew duties identified by doctrine in TC 3-09.81. Not having crew duties identified directly hinders the ability to conduct advance party, occupation, fire mission processing and displacement in a timely and accurate manner.
- The battalion operations officer must integrate the TF medical platoon leader into the planning process so this platoon leader can fully understand the operational environment and adequately plan medical support to maneuver elements. Failure to involve the medical personnel in the planning process will lead to an incomplete and ineffective medical support plan. The medical plan should include contingency actions in the event of chemical threats or other enemy capabilities that will reduce the TF's ability to adequately evacuate casualties.
- TF ISR assets need to be understood and properly dedicated through the course of operations to ensure they are properly integrated into operations. Units sometimes fail to incorporate both organic and external enablers into the planning process, to include battalion orders and rehearsals. The lack of synchronization causes gaps in the collection process. Often, named areas of interest (NAIs) can be more effectively surveilled with different collectors/enablers.

### Joint Readiness Training Center



Brigade combat teams in the DATE at JRTC are often challenged in the areas listed below. The numbered points are followed by keys to success to address those challenges. Some BCTs:

1. Do not operationalize reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). Keys to success:
  - Define reporting requirements and standards
  - Integrate external units and enablers into the RSOI process
  - Define, establish, and maintain a COP for RSOI
  - Own key portions of RSOI (i.e., mission command system validation, MILES draw)
  - Establish RSOI battle rhythm that enables shared understanding and adjustment decisions
2. Struggle to move from conceptual planning to detailed planning. Keys to success:
  - Staff must be proficient and confident in MDMP and RDSP
  - Complete detailed courses of action (COAs) that address all warfighting functions and integrate all enablers
  - Staff must develop a commander-directed COA into a complete COA
  - Develop functional and complete execution products that enable control and decisions
  - Produce and disseminate complete operational graphics in both analog and digital versions
3. Do not have functional, agile, or survivable mission command nodes. Keys to success:
  - Assign staff officers, NCOs, and soldiers to particular battle stations
  - Be proficient on the various mission command systems
  - Shorten the time required to break down, pack up, move, and establish mission command nodes
  - Reduce visual, audio, and electronic signatures
  - Execute passive defense measures (natural concealment, camouflage nets, and dispersion)
  - Formalize procedures for handoff of operations from future operations (FUOPs) to current operations (CUOPs)
4. Fail to define and maintain the COP and to maintain this COP in both analog and digital form. Keys to success:
  - Define the standard for analog and digital COP
  - Task and train personnel to update COPs in mission command nodes
  - Establish and enforce reporting procedures to facilitate the maintenance of COPs
  - Ensure updated planning products are transferred to the COP
  - Publish consolidated graphics so that each echelon starts with the same understanding

(cont.)



Joint Readiness Training Center, cont.



- 5. Neither protect critical nodes nor secure their rear area while conducting offensive operations. Keys to success:
  - Understand hybrid threat capabilities and intentions with regard to the BCT rear area
  - Develop an event template (EVENTEMP) to synchronize collection and fires against enemy's deep, close, and rear areas
  - Conduct combined arms operations
  - Leaders within critical nodes must deliberately defend these nodes
  - When not attacking...Defend!
- 6. Do not conduct effective reconnaissance and/or security operations. Keys to success:
  - BCT and cavalry squadron must be proficient in reconnaissance and security doctrine
  - Create tactical depth to enable reconnaissance and security (R&S) operations.
  - Cavalry squadrons must be proficient at executing the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and troop leading procedures (TLPs) in a distributed fashion
  - Link decisions to commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) to a collection plan
  - Include the squadron in COAs; incorporate the squadron into information collection plans
- 7. Are not conducting effective fire support planning and they are not effectively delivering fires. Keys to success:
  - Conduct integrated fires planning in accordance with the commander's guidance; clarify if incomplete
  - Produce a common overlay to synchronize fires and airspace control measures
  - Account for battalion-level fires and unmanned aircraft system (UAS) assets, as well as rotary-wing aircraft (attack helicopter [AH] and utility helicopter [UH])
  - Align and rehearse the fire support system (from sensor to shooter) to achieve the fire support tasks
  - Integrate the targeting process with the operations process based on the commander's guidance for fires
  - Develop and rehearse systems to rapidly clear ground and air. Ensure clear boundaries, a reliable common operational picture (COP), effective communications, etc.
- 8. Fail to develop and rehearse a detailed plan for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of casualties. Keys to success:
  - Understand doctrinal models for MEDEVAC in decisive action
  - Plan and rehearse a robust and redundant casualty transportation network
  - During sustainment rehearsal, cover MEDEVAC in a detailed manner with key leaders
  - Command sergeants major (CSMs) and 1SGs should take an active role in planning, rehearsing, and executing MEDEVAC
  - Unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) must adequately address MEDEVAC and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) (responsibilities, markings, reporting, standards)

(cont.)

- 9. Do not adequately defend their networks against cyberattack. Keys to success:
  - Use strong (not generic or common) passwords for mission command systems
  - Actively scan networks for suspicious activity or intrusions
  - Rehearse battle drills for cyberattack, and practice operating in a degraded (analog) mode
  - Identify threat, address it during COA development, and identify how to defend during COA analysis
  - Develop cyber defense as a shaping operation in support of the overall mission
- 10. Are ill-prepared to conduct military operations in a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) environment. Keys to success:
  - Prioritize the packing of Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) and the wear of protective masks
  - Integrate CBRN operations into COA development and COA analysis
  - Track CBRN detectors/sensors, and ensure Soldiers and leaders are trained on their use
  - Plan for operations in a CBRN environment (clean/dirty routes, clean/dirty aid stations, etc.)
  - Rehearse and resource decontamination operations

Lessons Learned Training

All units and organizations must have a lessons learned capability. All brigades and higher (or specialty units/units that deploy and operate separately) must have a formal lessons learned program. We need your after action reports (AARs) and other lessons learned documents to help the Army run as efficiently and effectively as possible!

CALL conducted a Lessons Learned Course 23-27 OCT 2017 at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Ten students attended the course. This course is an Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) course (00-F5/000-F4 [MC]) and will train your leaders to put a lessons learned program into place. See your unit ATRRS or training clerk to request a seat now!

Unit requests for a lessons learned mobile training team must be submitted through the Training Resources Arbitration Panel (TRAP) process. This process requires a lead time of approximately 220 days from the requested engagement. Plan accordingly!

Below are the CALL Lessons Learned Course dates at Fort Leavenworth:

- FY 18
- Class 002, 4-8 DEC 17
- Class 003, 22-26 JAN 18
- Class 004, 12-16 FEB 18

More information about the course, available dates, and how to register can be found at: <http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call/ll-course.aspx>.



### Key Insights

This month our key insights come from Commander Operations Group (COG) Joint Multinational Operations Center's presentation at the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Warfighting Forum, September 2017. The COG briefed his "Five Fundamentals for Success." Although these are focused at the brigade, they can be applicable across echelons.

- 1. **Mission Command.** Can you communicate, are you leveraging all systems, and do you have a shared understanding/common visualization across the brigade?
- 2. **Battle Rhythm.** Do you have an effective battle rhythm to enable mission command? Commander's update brief (CUB)/ battle update brief (BUB), intelligence synch, logistics synch, and targeting meetings inform the operations synch; plans to current operations (CUOPS) transition; and frequent commander dialogue/touch points in battle rhythm.
- 3. **Targeting.** Is your targeting process having effects (lethal and non-lethal) on the enemy prior to direct fire? Dynamic vs. deliberate? Is observer plan tied to fires? Are we fighting off high-payoff target list (HPTL)? Counterfire — are we good enough at predictive and reactive?
- 4. **Common Operational Picture (COP).** Do we maintain analog and digital COPs (blue forces [BLUFOR] with multinational forces, opposing forces [OPFOR], logistics, engineer) in real time? COP in coordination with commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) feeds the decision support matrix and facilitates synchronized operations and shared understanding/ visualization.
- 5. **Planning and Rehearsals.** Do planning and rehearsals reflect commander's guidance? Have we moved beyond conceptual to provide enough detail to synchronize operations? Are we getting warning orders 1-3 and operation orders with the 1/3, 2/3 standard? Anticipating transitions? How effective are ISR/fires, sustainment, and combined arms rehearsals to shared understanding/common visualization? Are we rehearsing brigade combat team commander's intent and fight or just backbriefing battalion operations?

### JLLIS News

Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) users can now access Watson with their Common Access Card (CAC). IBM Watson provides an enhanced JLLIS enterprise search capability and enables further lessons learned analysis. If you need a Watson account, please follow these instructions: To request an account, complete a DD2875 and submit to the Watson program manager by digitally signed email. Go to [https://www.jllis.mil/trainingcenter/DD2875\\_Template.pdf](https://www.jllis.mil/trainingcenter/DD2875_Template.pdf) to download the DD2875. Sections I, II, and III must be completed.

### Social Media

Want to be informed about new products and items of interest at CALL? Like us on Facebook @CenterforArmyLessonsLearned or follow us on Twitter @USArmy\_CALL.



**CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED**  
 10 Meade Ave., Bldg. 50  
 Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350  
 (913) 684-3035  
**CALL Public Website:** <http://call.army.mil>  
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