Director’s Corner

In my almost two years as CALL Director, I’ve asked for and received feedback from Soldiers and leaders in the field: What products are you using? What topics should we be covering? How can we keep you informed on trends in the force? We have always listened, and whenever possible, we have taken steps to drive change and improve our processes. On this note, I am pleased to announce an upcoming product that incorporates two feedback initiatives. Our “The First 100 Days for Platoon Leadership” handbook, expected publication in May, is a direct result of Soldier input to members of our collection teams. Further, we are making it available via our new pre-order capability. Now you can visit our CAC-enabled website, select items for pre-order, and have those products sent directly to your unit as soon as they arrive at the Army Training Support Center warehouse. Please let us know how this initiative is working at your level.

We are also starting a new monthly series where we will feature a historical after action report and juxtapose that circumstance with topics relevant to today’s complex battlefield. In this issue of the CALL Insider, we are highlighting the Battle for Manila in comparison to urban warfare seen in Mosul and Raqqa. I hope you find these features thought provoking and that the ideas may generate discussions in your units.

At CALL, we are always striving to strike the balance between what our customers need and what our customers want. Tell us how we are doing. I look forward to hearing from you.

Mike Pappal
COL, AR

Recent CALL Publications

18-16: Maneuver Leader’s Guide to Stinger
This guide is designed as a single entry point for brigade combat team and maneuver battalion commanders and their staffs to effectively train and fight Stinger teams as part of an integrated combined arms team. These planning and employment techniques should prove invaluable to effectively maximize mission effectiveness, allow maneuver forces to retain the initiative, and provide freedom of maneuver from the air. JLLIS link.

18-18: JAGIC MTT Insights (CAC login required)
This handbook is a companion piece to Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 17-04, Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC), January 2017 (CAC login required). It provides additional JAGIC-related insights, lessons, and best practices from mobile training team (MTT) visits, Warfighter exercises, and other training events. The insights, lessons, and best practices in this handbook provide key information to division commanders and staffs that when implemented (i.e., codified tactical standard operating procedures, developed and rehearsed battle drills, mission execution) will reduce preparation and training time while helping ensure mission success. JLLIS link.

18-15: Mission Command Training in Unified Land Operations (CAC login required)
This bulletin captures key observations collected by Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) observer-coach/trainers (OC/Ts) during exercises throughout FY17. These are the most recent and salient points distilled from multi-echelon and multi-component mission command training exercises conducted in the decisive action training environment (DATE). These observations are not only for future training audiences but for all brigade through corps commands and staffs. JLLIS link.

Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center
This organization, started in 2002, operates as a national, interagency, federally-funded organization with interagency staffing. Its goal is improving safe work performance and organizational learning for all wildland firefighters.

Hurricane Season Resources (CAC login required)
Recent CALL Publications

**18-20, 18-21, 18-22: 2017 U.S. Army Ordnance Crucible**
These bulletins provide the Army’s operating force with recommendations based on a deliberate collection of tactical and technical observations gained during the U.S. Army Ordnance Crucible. This event consisted of three major competitions, each in a separate bulletin: Ammunition Transfer and Holding Point, Combat Repair Team, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The competitions were designed to test Soldiers’ teamwork and critical thinking skills as they applied technical solutions to real-world problems. The recommendations made based on the observations from this competition will facilitate improvements in institutional, operational, and self-development domains. [JLLIS link](#).

**18-12: Mission Command Systems Integration** (CAC login required)
Across the Army, units must face challenges in leveraging the full suite of mission command systems. This handbook and the Mission Command Digital Master Gunner (MCDMG) course are training solutions. MCDMG Soldiers facilitate the staff’s digital training, integrate the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), and display common data on the Command Post of the Future (CPOF). This handbook represents a portion of the MCDMG program of instruction and focuses on the integration of mission command systems (formally known as ABCS) at the brigade and battalion level. [JLLIS link](#).

**Southwest Border Support Mission Catalog** (CAC login required)
This resource guide provides links to documents from Operation Jump Start, the Southwest border support mission from June 2006-July 2008. Documents include lessons and best practices and a compendium of observations from the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). [JLLIS link](#).

**Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 07-71-001: Combat Skills for Small Unit Leaders**
This GTA is a pocket-sized quick reference guide for U.S. Army Soldiers providing summarized checklists, processes, and critical data to support Soldiers and leaders conducting small unit operations. The information contained in this GTA encompasses the basic fundamentals of the Army Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills to enhance Soldier capabilities while conducting missions in training or operational environments. [JLLIS link](#).

**18-17: Multinational Interoperability and Deployments in Europe — Exercise Anakonda Special Study** (CAC login required)
Exercise Anakonda 2016 (AN-16) presented multiple, positive takeaways, but there also were major challenges and lessons learned from this experience. Based on the information drawn from various sources including after actions reviews, lessons learned, case studies, articles, and key leader interviews, this publication highlights some of the successes and unique challenges experienced by units participating in this historic exercise. [JLLIS link](#).

**Subterranean Operations Quick Reference Guide** (CAC login required)
This guide describes how the subterranean operations environment’s unique attributes affect mission variables as applied to troop leading procedures, the mission analysis phase of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), and surface and subsurface maneuver. The guide is a consolidated and integrated set of existing doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions that enable units to establish a training path to meet complexities associated with subterranean environments and achieve readiness objectives. [JLLIS link](#).

**Best Practice Submissions**

**Three Roles of the Brigade Engineer Battalion in the DATE** (CAC login required)
The brigade engineer battalion (BEB) within an Army brigade combat team (BCT) is often considered among the most challenging organizations to effectively align and leverage for success in both training and operational environments. This article highlights how today’s engineer battalion is upholding its reputation as an expert problem solver as it delivers specialized capability to enable the brigade’s success in the DATE.

**Response Cell Operations for a Brigade Warfighter Exercise or Similar Simulation Exercise** (CAC login required)
This best practice is a must-read for anyone tasked with running a response cell (RC) for a brigade level Warfighter exercise. Upon preparation for the task, the authors searched for lessons learned/after action reports from other simulation-supported exercises, but found none. This article captures how they developed an effective and efficient way to man, equip, organize and operate their response cell. [JLLIS link](#).
News From the Front and CTCs

Five Requirements for Accurate Fire — Afghan National Army (CAC login required)
In support of Operation Freedom Sentinel, Security Force Advise and Assist Teams (SFAATs) work hand-in-hand with Afghan partner artillerymen on a daily basis. The SFAAT team employs the five requirements for accurate fire (5RAF) as a framework for instructing the Afghan National Army (ANA) artillerymen. This article describes how the train, advise, and assist (TAA) efforts from the SFAAT have increased the ANA’s capability to achieve the 5RAF. JLLIS link.

Lessons Learned From Deploying an SSA to an Immature Area (CAC login required)
The purpose of this article is to provide lessons learned and best practices from a brigade support battalion (BSB) supply support activity (SSA) that deployed in support of a named operation, Operation Atlantic Resolve. JLLIS link.

Cyber Defense Insights (CAC login required)
This article provides recent insights, lessons, and best practices for cyber defense from the 25th Infantry Division Warfighter 17-04. JLLIS link.

Medical Preparation and Prevention in the Horn of Africa
There are numerous health risks throughout the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) area that are potential threats to deployed personnel. The information presented here will familiarize you with the environment of the Horn of Africa and help you recognize your potential “enemies.” As the preponderance of military forces are in Djibouti, this article discusses medical preparations and preventive measure that leaders and Soldiers should take when deploying to the Horn of Africa, Camp Lemonnier, and Djibouti City. JLLIS link.

PESCAA S-6 Operations (CAC login required)
This article is intended for members of the Conference of American Armies (CAA) serving as the S-6 of the Permanent Executive Secretariat Conference of American Armies (PESCAA). It presents the S-6 roles and responsibilities during the Preparatory and Commander’s Conferences. This publication discusses the processes and procedures in leveraging the CAA’s technology that significantly enhanced the management, administration, and development of products and plans for the 32nd Cycle. JLLIS link.

Introduction to Geographical Information System (CAC login required)
This paper provides a unified vision of Army Mission Command Interoperability capability development and related learning through 2025 to inform and support ongoing and future Army Interoperability initiatives.

Coming Soon

DID YOU KNOW that CALL has launched a pre-order capability? Now you can avoid the wait and have new titles sent to your unit as soon as they arrive at the Army Training Support Center warehouse. Find out more at https://call2.army.mil (CAC login required)

The First 100 Days of Platoon Leadership
This volume for new platoon leaders and platoon sergeants contains insights on leadership, training management, Army systems, and more. Vignettes and lessons from current and past platoon-level leaders allow newly assigned leaders to learn from those who have gone before. Publication is expected in early June 2018. Available for pre-order at https://call2.army.mil (CAC login required)

Reconnaissance and Security Brigade Combat Team Excursion
The articles in this collection are the insights and lessons learned authored by Soldiers and leaders who participated in an 18-month intensive training path that included classroom, constructive, and live training. These insights represent the complexity of reconnaissance and security at the operational level and the tremendous challenges it presents in the multi-domain battlefield of the 21st century.

Transition to a JFHQ
This upcoming handbook leverages CALL collections in active joint operation areas and joint exercises to provide commanders and staffs at echelons above brigade (EAB) with a guide to transitioning to a joint force headquarters. As the Army faces the threats of today and the future in a dynamic and competitive operational environment, commanders and staffs of a theater army, corps, and division must be prepared to rapidly transition to a joint force headquarters (JFHQ) and effectively operate across the range of military operations. This handbook will complement the recently published Army Training Circular 6-6, Training the Mission Command Warfighting Function: Transitioning to a Joint Headquarters.
The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) continues to emphasize multinational interoperability. Interoperability is defined in Allied Joint Doctrine as “the ability of the forces to operate together coherently, effectively, and efficiently” in three key domains — human, procedural, and technical. Stay up-to-date with our ability to “fight tonight” with Allies and Partners in our JMRC Newsletter (CAC login required).

Lessons — Mission Command — Multinational Success in the Offense: Deliberate simplicity can lead to mission accomplishment in a complex multinational environment as was evident when a multinational battalion task force achieved overall mission success during a movement to contact with a rapidly assembled multinational task organized unit. All elements within the organization were able to communicate, execute fires, and have situational understanding of unit locations throughout the entirety of the operation.

1. Clear Chain of Command and Feasible Span of Control. To counter the complexity of a growing multinational formation, the battalion commander kept the task organization as pure as possible, maintained a clear chain of command with a feasible span of control, and assigned key leaders specific tasks during the mission.

2. Mission Command During Execution. To establish an effective communications plan across the battalion, the battalion commander first conducted face-to-face planning, decided to operate over Single Channel Cypher Text, conducted a communications rehearsal that validated all maneuver elements were able to communicate, established a common battalion net to maintain situational awareness, and used a command and control vehicle to maintain long-range communications with all his elements.

3. Fires Planning and Rehearsal. Fires planning for this operation was a complete success and enabled the dismounted maneuver elements freedom of maneuver as they approached their final march objective. The battalion commander worked with his attached U.S. fires NCO and identified specified indirect fire targets. Coordination with higher headquarters and a simple but well executed fires rehearsal created shared understanding by all subordinates, which was crucial for executing unobserved fires and a fires plan with no fratricide during the mission while maintaining complete situational awareness across the formation.

4. Operational Simplicity. To tie everything together, the battalion commander kept the plan simple. He began collaborative planning with his company commanders to facilitate shared understanding and parallel planning. He focused his maneuver on controlled and multiple simple successive bounds by four mutually supporting maneuver elements under the cover of an indirect fires plan and trailed by casualty evacuation assets controlled by graphic control measures. Using designated avenues of approach and controlled by phase lines, this simplistic synchronized and understood plan effectively mitigated the risk of lack of speed and enabled the unit to accomplish the mission.

NTC continues to conduct tough, realistic, unified land operations with unified action partners. A few observations from recent rotations include manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T), parallel planning, and medical communications for combat casualty care (MC4).

- The migration of tactical unmanned aircraft system (TUAS) assets from the military intelligence company (MICO) to the combat aviation brigade (CAB) requires a paradigm shift from surveillance and intelligence gathering as a stand-alone platform to active reconnaissance in concert with rotary-wing maneuver. Rotational units deployed to the NTC consistently struggle with the MUM-T concept because of this failure to adjust to the shift. Aviation maneuver unit commanders must take deliberate action to increase incorporation of UAS into their scheme of maneuver. This requirement must begin at the battalion/squadron level during MDMP and/or rapid decision making and synchronization process (RDSP) and end at the aircrew mission brief.

- Fires battalions within a BCT fail to conduct parallel planning with the brigade. By waiting for the brigade to produce an operations order before beginning the MDMP, the fires battalion has almost no time to plan, and is unable to adhere to the one-third/two-thirds planning rule for dissemination of information to firing batteries. Immediately upon receipt of the mission from brigade, usually in the form of a verbal or Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) message warning order (WARNORD), the fires battalion must begin MDMP. The fires battalion executive officer (XO) has the responsibility for supervising the field artillery battalion MDMP and creating the planning timeline. This timeline must nest with the brigade MDMP timeline. Additionally, the battalion staff must effectively manage its time to keep up with this parallel planning timeline through actions such as maintaining updated running estimates and continually sharing and coordinating with brigade counterparts. They cannot wait for order publication to start these actions.

- Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care (MC4) is the system of record for deployed medical units. Observations have shown that units typically do not emphasize the importance of MC4. Most units use MC4 solely for ordering class (CL) VIII, and that is generally limited to the brigade support medical company (BSMC). Units request CL VIII by JCR messaging to the medical company’s medical logistics (MEDLOG) section. Rather than loading patient documentation into MC4, medics and medical providers hand write medical records that are uploaded into clinic computers once units return to home station. Thus, MC4 is not being used for its intended purpose at NTC. MC4 readiness and training at home station should be emphasized. In order to ensure MC4 computers, associated equipment, and operators are ready, units should also emphasize the importance of training and technology support. As for applicability, units can train with MC4 and incorporate it into their standard operating procedures (SOPs).
Joint Readiness Training Center

In the past 90 days, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) completed rotations with the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade; 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division; and 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The training center finished 2nd Quarter of Fiscal Year 18 with a rotation with 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division. JRTC rotations show that the following five areas commonly need more emphasis in planning:

a. Plan for airspace control. Brigades should develop, synchronize, resource, and rehearse the plan to establish and maintain airspace control.

b. Create an effective terrain management plan. Detailed terrain management plans to position subordinate elements and their assets improves the BCT’s ability to conduct air land operations and effective indirect fire missions. A lack of terrain management planning forces the commander to conduct unplanned, sequential operations, as opposed to a more deliberate, simultaneous execution.

c. Describe command relationships clearly. Poorly understood command relationships and delineation of fights are habitual friction points. Articulate the delineation of fights, integrate joint elements into the tactical plan, and further assign adequate headquarters with the correct degree of control necessary for mission command to be effective during a joint forcible entry (JFE).

d. Manage transitions. Improper management of transitions begins with insufficient planning, ineffective rehearsals, and poor delineation of authorities between command posts (rear, Army airspace command and control, airspace control plan, tactical, etc.), degrades flexibility, and prevents the complete integration of organic/joint enablers.

e. Establish a common operational picture (COP). Properly planning and rehearsing the echeloning of equipment to identify the minimum analog and digital requirements for establishing a COP helps BCT situational awareness and shared understanding. During execution, most BCTs establish a complete and comprehensive COP including effective staff running estimates, to build and continually maintain situational understanding of the operating environment, both on the ground and in the airspace.

The CALL Cell and the Operations Group completed a six-month project documenting a multi-echelon cross-phase approach to avoiding the multiple valleys of death at the JRTC. Our intent was to at once separate the phases of a JRTC rotation to examine it in detail by echelon and as necessary warfighting function (WFF). At the same time, we highlighted the strands of connective tissue that bind operations from one phase to the next, bridging the transition, or run throughout an operation, beginning to end. For that reason, you can expect to see issues repeat themselves; a functional command post is every bit as important in the last phase as it was during the JFE. Consider repetitive imperatives as focal points for SOPs. Repetitive or singular, we put them as imperatives; those things the wise will address in transitioning the fight at the JRTC in DATE.

News You Can Use

Doctrine and Terminology Updates

ADP 3-05, Special Operations supersedes ADP 3-05, dated 31 August 2012.
ADR P 3-05, Special Operations supersedes ADP 3-05, dated 31 August 2012.
ATP 3-14.3, Techniques for Army Space Forces, is a new publication.
ATP 3-90.20, Regional Support Group, is a new publication.
ATP 3-94.1, Digital Liaison Detachment, is a new publication.

Readers can access all publications at the APD Website.

Terminology Update

captivity exploitation (new): The captor’s effort to achieve its goals and objectives through the use of propaganda, interrogation, legal justification, concessions, reprisal, indoctrination, and forced labor against captive individuals or groups. (ATP 3-50.20)
denied, degraded, or disrupted space operational environment (new): A composite of those conditions and influences in which space-enabled capabilities have been impaired by hostile threats or non-hostile means. (FM 3-14)
Also called D3SOE.
deny (new): A task to hinder or prevent the enemy from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, or facilities. (ATP 3-21.20)
rally point (modified): An easily identifiable point on the ground at which units can reassemble and reorganize if they become dispersed. (ATP 3-21.20)
recovery area (new): A predetermined expanse of terrain of no standard dimension where isolated personnel and recovery forces can safely link-up if communications are degraded or immediate recovery efforts are not successful. (ATP 3-50.20)
traveling (new): A movement technique used when speed is necessary and contact with enemy forces is not likely. (ATP 3-21.20)

To access the most current list of terminology that describes new, revised, and rescinded terms visit the following website https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-25269 (CAC login required).

DLA Center for Lessons Learned Update
(CAC login required)

Joint Lessons Learned Program Update (CAC login required)
BLAST FROM THE PAST!

Seventy years before the bloody fight to liberate Mosul from ISIS, the U.S. Army fought a strikingly similar battle. The 1945 Battle of Manila lasted 30 days and cost the lives of more than 100,000 people, virtually destroying the city’s vast urban landscape. Like ISIS, the Japanese defenders faced an overwhelming asymmetric threat from U.S. airpower, armor, and artillery. To counter, they relied on improvised weapons and explosive devices and utilized Manila’s civilian population as human shields to neutralize American firepower. As in Mosul, Manila’s population suffered horrific atrocities on a massive scale. The Battle of Manila after action report (AAR) is a lessons learned document written by those who planned and fought. It provides insight into both operational and tactical challenges in an urban environment involving high risks of collateral damage that any veteran of Mosul or Raqqa would immediately recognize.

From the 6th U.S. Army AAR: “It should be emphasized at the outset that the defense of Manila was influenced by certain factors which may not be present, either in part or in entirety, during future operations of a similar nature. Some of these circumstances complicated the defense; others facilitated it. In the first category were the following conditions: (a) the relative scarcity of weapons; (b) the lack of training and inexperience of the majority of enemy troops; (c) the conglomerate nature of those troops; and (d) the presence of essentially unfriendly civilians. On the other hand, the enemy’s problems were simplified by: (a) the disproportionately large number of automatic weapons available as a result of the cannibalization of armament on planes and ships; (b) the prohibition against aerial bombing by American forces; (c) the initial restrictions on our artillery fire, a procedure prompted by our desire to preserve property to the greatest possible extent; and (d) our efforts to protect the friendly civilian population and our consequent reluctance to proceed ruthlessly. ... In spite of excellent positions, good employment of weapons and fierce resistance by his troops, the enemy’s defense was seriously impaired by his failure to coordinate centers of resistance. ... In his [the enemy’s] favor were: his shrewd use of terrain; his excellent location and construction of individual positions; his ingenuity in improvising and adapting weapons; his skilled employment of individual weapons; and, above all, his great tenacity in defensive combat. He was guilty on the other hand, of several basic errors, among them; his inability to develop any degree of overall coordination in the plan of defense; his weak and ineffective employment of artillery; and his lack of appreciation of the potentialities of mines as defensive weapons. Read the full AAR here.

SOUND FAMILIAR?

Social Media

Want to be informed about new products and items of interest at CALL? Like us on Facebook @CenterforArmyLessonsLearned or follow us on Twitter @USArmy_CALL.

Driving Army Change for More Than 30 Years

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
10 Meade Ave., Bldg. 50
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350
(913) 684-3035
CALL Public Website: http://call.army.mil
CALL Restricted Website: https://call2.army.mil
Joint Lessons Learned Information System JLLIS