Director’s Corner

One of my primary goals as CALL Director has been to increase the number of After Action Reports (AARs) we take in from the field and thereby increase the information sharing back to the force. We are trying to make this easier to do by adding a new AAR “upload” button on the front page of the CAC-enabled CALL website. By accessing this link, individuals and units charged with preparing an AAR can not only submit reports, but also find useful resources such as the recommended format, sample AARs, and archived reports. We are always open to new ideas, so tell us how we can make this process better!

Part of being a learning organization is assessing events and situations and then making needed changes to overcome deficiencies or improve performance. The after action review is a routine process, a part of the Army culture at the unit level. We do this well with our tactical units, adjusting training, updating SOPs, increasing understanding, always learning and growing even as personnel turnover occurs.

How does the Army as an institution learn, grow, and fix problems that are identified in operational units? The answer is the After Action Report. Not just doing these reports, but getting them into the Army archive, the long-term memory. An individual report sent to the right person can impact a specific discrete problem. The true power of archiving our reports in a central database is the identification of less obvious but consistent problems that can be identified when analyzing multiple reports over time.

This is how the institution can learn better, but that learning can only happen if the information exists and is accessible. In the future, artificial intelligence has the potential to do this analysis more quickly and with greater depth; however, any analysis, human or machine conducted, is only as good the information available.

Mike Pappal
COL, AR

Recent CALL Publications

Brigade Sustainment in Decisive Action Operations

Providing sustainment in a decisive action environment is extremely challenging, but these observations and best practices from Operations Group, National Training Center, should help units in synchronizing the sustainment plan with the scheme of maneuver and in developing home station training that addresses observer-coach/trainer (OC/T) observations. “When sustainment operations are not synchronized or managed, they limit the commander’s options and freedom of movement.” JLLIS link.

Deployment Readiness Exercise Lessons and Best Practices (CAC login required)

In a “fight tonight” scenario involving multiple Stryker and Armor Brigade Combat Teams deploying simultaneously against an aggressive-peer opponent, there will not be time to “just figure it out.” The ability to rapidly deploy equipment and personnel from home station to an area of potential conflict is critical. Leaders at all echelons should take the lessons and recommendations in this publication and conduct an assessment of their own installation’s current state. JLLIS link.

Saber Guardian 17 Post Exercise Report (CAC login required)

This report provides a summary of key observations, insights, lessons, and best practices collected by a 19-member CALL-led multi-organizational collection and analysis team (CAAT) during Exercise Saber Guardian 17 (SG-17). SG-17 and associated exercises were conducted between 6-22 JUL 2017 at various locations throughout Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. SG-17 consisted of a command post exercise (CPX)/computer assisted exercise (CAX), an air defense artillery live fire exercise (ADA LFX); LFXs, field training exercises (FTX); several wet gap crossings and a mass casualty exercise (MASCAL). JLLIS link.
News From the Front and CTCs

ATTACK! Insights and Issues with the BCT
Offense in DATE (CAC login required)
The senior OC/Ts and their respective divisions compiled this list of planning and execution issues in offensive operations in the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). It is a review of the most common offensive operations and attack planning at the JRTC. This list is not all inclusive, nor is it a restatement of JRTC trends for the past couple of years — although many of these same issues do pop up in the trends. This list looks specifically at the offense, and in some case narrowly, at particular operations within a larger offense. JLLIS link.

Infantry and Engineer Combined Operations in the DATE (CAC login required)
This article is intended for all units conducting home station training to prepare themselves for a combat training center (CTC) rotation. The author discusses a recurring trend that many infantry units from company-level up to brigade combat team (BCT) failed to integrate their engineers early in the planning process. JLLIS link.

The Brigade Engineer Battalion Role at the Joint Readiness Training Center (CAC login required)
The author finds the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) consistently conducting additional tasks beyond its functional role to provide engineer coordination for combined arms maneuver, countermobility and survivability, as well as the requisite military intelligence, signal, and chemical reconnaissance support to the BCT. In a sense, the term “brigade enabler battalion” seems to apply, especially when the BCT commander relies on the BEB to serve as his mission command “problem solver.” JLLIS link.

Preparing the Brigade Engineer Battalion for the Joint Readiness Training Center (CAC login required)
As the BEB prepares to deploy to the JRTC, a few points must be emphasized to ensure the organization as a whole is properly prepared to operate in the DATE. The author discusses a recurring trend during each Leader Training Program (LTP). Task Force 5 briefs the BEB, focusing on battle command and staff planning, coordination, integration, synchronization, and execution of BEB-specific combat operations in the DATE. Since LTP usually occurs one to three months prior to a unit’s JRTC rotation, it is usually too late to affect common training shortfalls and trend observations. JLLIS link.

Digits? We Don’t Need No Stinking Digits!
How G-Man Wins with Pure Mission Command (CAC login required)
Mission command is not a single piece of gear, nor is it a system of interconnected systems. Mission command is a philosophy of command built on the platform of commander’s intent. The opposition force (OPFOR) or “G-Man” focuses on this philosophy to exercise mission command as defined in doctrine as “the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions.” G-Man adds a key ingredient to that definition using another even older military principle: Keep It Simple, Stupid or KISS. JLLIS link.

Where Did I Put That? Knowledge Management at Company and Battalion
In this article, the author discusses the challenge rotational units face in debating the use of analog versus digital products. While each method has its own merits, each presents its own challenges as it relates to knowledge management (KM). Thus, each method should have associated techniques for ensuring effective knowledge flow to higher, subordinate, and adjacent headquarters. JLLIS link.

Saving 30% More: Lowering Died of Wound Rates in a Decisive Action Training Environment (CAC login required)
The author discusses how can a unit can significantly reduce the died of wounds rate if personnel effectively incorporate Army Health System Support into brigade and battalion-level planning, operationalize the plan through deliberate resourcing and rehearsals, and execute the plan in accordance with tactical combat casualty care. JLLIS link.

Deliberate Aeromedical Evacuation Employment in Support of Decisive Action
(CAC login required)
The author discusses a recurring trend at the JRTC that Army aeromedical evacuation (AE) is not a “one size fits all” model. AEs must be incorporated into the health service support plan and need to be built and developed based on the current mission and associated mission variables. JLLIS link.

The Challenges of Providing Relevant Advisor Training
The author discusses some of the challenges that the Security Force Assistance (SFA) Academy faces as one of the staple courses of the 3rd Battalion, 353rd Armor Regiment, for preparing future advisors. The goal of the academy is to teach the two categories of individual advising skills: enabling skills and developing skills. JLLIS link.
Recent After Action Reports

**Operation Saber Focus Final Report** (CAC login required)
Report from 1-6 Aviation Reconnaissance Squadron (ARS) and 601st Aviation Support Battalion (ASB), 1st Combat Aviation Brigade (1CAB), CPX held 1-6 OCT 2016 at the Fort Riley Mission Training Center, the mock airfield, and the 1st Infantry Division (ID) training area in order to validate the squadron’s ability to execute its near wartime mission.

**Final Report of 1st Air Cavalry Brigade Expeditionary Deployment ISO Atlantic Resolve** (CAC login required)
Now, more than ever, U.S. Army aviation assets are in high demand as part of the U.S. Army's dynamic presence in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). Building a “Strong Europe,” through regionally aligned forces (RAF) in a highly energized environment presents complex challenges for CABs transitioning from their home station into the European theater. This paper assesses the different aviation-specific considerations and requirements necessary to achieve success during reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

**3/2 CR Summer Shield 16** (CAC login required)
3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment had the opportunity to participate in Summer Shield 2015 and 2016. Participation in consecutive exercises allowed the squadron’s leadership to observe the exercise’s progression to meet not just fires and mission command training objectives, but also to incorporate sustainment, intelligence and movement and maneuver.

**Lessons Learned from Task Force Black Falcon** (CAC login required)
Provided are two lessons learned/after action report (AAR) white papers provided by Task Force (TF) Black Falcon which capture major observations and recommendations from the battalion and fire direction center perspectives. Both documents are highly recommended as “must-read” for fires units deploying in advise and assist roles. There are lessons and best practices on sustainment, counter-fire, targeting, precision munitions, and five requirements for accurate fire, from an advise and assist perspective.

**82nd Airborne Division Artillery Lessons Learned during Exercise Dynamic Front II** (CAC login required)
Exercise Dynamic Front II encompassed a week-long CPX that featured a near-peer, hybrid enemy force. The 82nd Airborne Division artillery, as primary training audience, served as a Force Field Artillery Headquarters for the 4th Infantry Division (simulated) under the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.

**2/101 Mission Command AAR** (CAC login required)
2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division, provides feedback on the types of systems and processes used following fielding of Capability Set (CS)-15, its use during a unified land operation/decisive action JRTC rotation, and the subsequent deployment in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq. These recommendations are specific to those experiences and are to inform future similar efforts.

News You Can Use

**JMRC Quarterly Newsletter** (CAC login required)
This edition features lessons that apply to organizations at the BCT, battalion, and company level. This issue focuses specifically on interoperability topics and Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) OPFOR tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). These newsletters are designed to be useful and contribute to your unit’s leader development program and preparation for CTC rotations. The next newsletter will be published in April 2018 and will include lessons learned from Allied Spirit VII and VIII rotations.

**DLA Center for Lessons Learned Update** (CAC login required)
This issue contains Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) tips for Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) users and an update from the DLA Rapid Deployment Team that spent five weeks in Puerto Rico orchestrating critical support to victims of Hurricane Maria.

**Joint Lessons Learned Program Update** (CAC login required)
DD J-7 has deliberately implemented a scaled-down format to focus on content, deliver information more responsively, and simplify dissemination. The hope is that a simplified format will prompt users to more broadly disseminate this newsletter. Wherever appropriate, points of contact and links to the lessons-based content are provided for easier access.

**CALL Warehouse Move**
The CALL publications warehouse has closed on Fort Leavenworth and online orders will now ship from the Army Training Support Center at Fort Eustis, VA (the link for orders remains unchanged). During the transition, mail orders will be delayed, but we expect normal service to resume on or about 12 March. Publications can still be downloaded and accessed at https://call2.army.mil (CAC login required).
Cold Hit Live Fires - Building Confidence and Trust in Leaders (CAC login required)

Infantry assaulting an objective, sight unseen with live munitions and combined arms support, is as close to combat conditions that we can replicate. This 1-27 Infantry Battalion white paper discusses how the unit developed and conducted cold hit live fire exercises to promote and sustain readiness at peak levels.

A Critical Review of TUAS Operations at the Joint Multinational Training Center (CAC login required)

The evolving threat of facing a near-peer adversary in a conventional fight necessitates a shift in mindset in how a BCT organizes and employs the Shadow Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems (TUAS) platoon. In a DA fight, the TUAS platoon must be prepared to conduct a dynamic mission set from concealed tactical assembly areas (TAAs) with co-located hasty landing strips to launch and recover aircraft. The purpose of this paper is to share relevant experiences of the 588th BEB Shadow Platoon at JMRC, discuss the challenges of operating the Shadow platform from a hasty launch and recovery site, and make recommendations on improving Shadow TTP in a decisive action environment.

Contingency Operating Site Warrior Religious Support Team Actions during MASCAL (CAC login required)

This memorandum for record outlines the actions taken by the contingency operating site (COS) Warrior Religious Support Team during a MASCAL event that occurred in Iraq in September 2011.

Operating in a Denied, Degraded, Disrupted Space Operational Environment Handbook

The space domain is a vital component of the emerging concept of multi-domain battle and the warfighter is reliant on the capabilities it provides to be successful in executing operations. This collaboratively-produced handbook will give the warfighter techniques and strategies to successfully operate in a denied, degraded, disrupted space operational environment (D3SOE).

JAGIC Insights

This handbook will serve as a companion piece to 2017’s CALL Handbook Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC). It will provide additional JAGIC-related insights, lessons, and best practices from mobile training team (MTT) visits, Warfighter exercises, and other training events led by the Army Joint Support Team teamed with U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, and the Fires Center of Excellence subject matter experts.

Transitions to a JFHQ

This upcoming handbook leverages CALL collections in active joint operation areas and joint exercises to provide commanders and staffs at echelons above brigade (EAB) with a guide to transitioning to a joint force headquarters. As the Army faces the threats of today and the future in a dynamic and competitive operational environment, commanders and staffs of a theater army, corps, and division must be prepared to rapidly transition to a joint force headquarters (JFHQ) and effectively operate across the range of military operations. This handbook will complement the recently published Army Training Circular 6-6, Training the Mission Command Warfighting Function: Transitioning to a Joint Headquarters.
The JMRC continues to emphasize multinational interoperability, which in Allied Joint Doctrine is defined as “the ability of the forces to operate together coherently, effectively, and efficiently” in three key domains: human, procedural, and technical. As a tactical center of excellence for multinational interoperability, JMRC is committed to improving our ability to fight tonight with our Allies and Partners while continuing to see gains in U.S. formations’ readiness.

Best Practice — Mission Command — Fundamentals for Interoperability Success:
The five fundamentals for interoperability success provide principles for overcoming procedural, technical, and human incompatibilities in multinational units.

1. Liaison Packages, Not Just Liaison Officers. The exchange of liaison officer (LNO) packages is the primary and most effective method units employ to enhance multinational interoperability. Units must identify interoperability gaps or vulnerabilities and then select individuals and equipment with the correct tactical and technical capabilities to facilitate mission command and other mission critical functions. To effectively enhance cooperation, understanding, coordination, and unity of effort, liaison packages must be trained to represent the command in conveying the commander’s intent, guidance, mission, and concept of the operations.

2. Understand Capabilities and Limitations. Developing shared understanding of capabilities and limitations across multinational units not only improves tactical employment, but also highlights opportunity and exposes risk.

3. Face-to-Face Mission Preparation for Shared Understanding. During mission preparation processes and transitions between missions, commanders and staffs require face-to-face touch points and simplification of the mission orders process to ensure plans are feasible, and orders are received and understood.

4. Critical Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Develop, implement, and deliberately rehearse at a minimum SOPs, using NATO Standardization Agreements and Allied Joint Publications as a baseline, for fratricide avoidance (vehicle marking, near and far recognition, adjacent unit coordination), forward and rear passage of lines, reporting, call for fire, and medical evacuation procedures.

5. Complete Common Operational Picture (COP). An effective COP starts with consolidated, shared operational graphics and relies on timely and accurate subordinate unit reporting in accordance with the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan. It is also supported by effective communication systems that reduce the miscommunication that prohibits synchronization and leads to fratricide, and allows for the effective integration of multinational enablers, most importantly fires.

The National Training Center (NTC) continues to conduct tough realistic, unified land operations with our unified action partners. A few observations from recent rotations include planning for organic intelligence collection (IC) assets, effective employment of aviation LNOs, and graphics distribution.

- BCTs at the NTC often focus their IC planning efforts on EAB assets provided by division, leaving their organic assets with minimal guidance. As a result, collection usually does not answer the BCT commander’s priority information requirements (PIRs). The BCT operations and intelligence staff, along with the BEB and military intelligence company leadership must develop sound collection plans for organic assets first, to ensure they have guidance to execute their mission, and that support units understand their role in the collection mission, and then close any existing gaps with EAB assets.

- Observations of the brigade and division command posts show aviation liaisons are identified late, given little guidance, and given no reporting structure from their organic unit. Operating in a decisive action environment, with a large volume of information passing through each command post, an aviation LNO is uniquely positioned to ease planning efforts and ensure aircraft are employed in accordance with the aviation task force commander’s intent. LNOs should be empowered by their aviation command, and come prepared with aviation estimates, aircraft capabilities, PIR, commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), maps, crew duty cycles, and their own means of communication.

- Intelligence sections often struggle to distribute analog graphics to the company level. Currently, most intelligence sections produce hand-drawn overlays on large maps and then hand-copy the graphics on acetate. This method is time consuming and lacks the necessary accuracy. The Multi-Function Workstation (MFWS) is a program that exists on the Distributed Common Ground System Army (DCGS-A) in which analysts can create highly accurate icons and graphic control measures that are geo-rectified with this program. Once these elements are templated in MFWS, the analyst can turn off the mapping layer, leaving gridlines and any elements that need to be produced on an overlay. At this point, the analyst can print an overlay by placing clear overhead projector sheets into a traditional LaserJet printer which can be placed on any map of the same scale.
Combat Training Centers, cont.

**Joint Readiness Training Center**

During the past month, the JRTC Observation Detachment (CALL Cell) worked on the "Expeditionary Warfighting Handbook." The handbook, driven by the Commander, Operations Group (COG) and Deputy COG (DCOG), synchronizes the "COG’s Top Ten" with the latest observed trends down through the formations to the platoon level. The resulting product is intended to educate both rotational training units (RTUs) as well as JRTC OC/Ts and serve as a “rolling estimate” of operational imperatives by phase.

Operations Group (Ops Grp) executed the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) rotation during the month and recovered multiple data points to help refine SFAB training and equipment requirements. RTU, Ops Grp, and the Call Cell are currently working to complete the capture of observations by both the RTU and Ops Grp. While refining data from the 1st SFAB rotation, we remain focused on collecting trends for the next quarter.

**Key Insights**

**French Lessons Learned**

A recent lessons learned report from our counterparts in the French Army had this to say about operations in Estonia: “This mission shows the necessity of different and complementary skills. Some ‘old’ Cold War skills have to be used again (camouflage, discretion … ). Some ‘new’ skills have to be developed more: the cyber threat is permanent and the ability to use a paper map (vs. a GPS) shall be preserved. The advance in technology has to be conserved (information exchange, night vision, long distance firing capability).”

**CTC Huddle Feedback**

During the last CTC Huddle, senior leaders noted that reconnaissance and security (R&S) skills require more training emphasis. Units must focus on R&S fundamentals at home station, as well as at the CTCs. CALL has resources available to help with these tasks. Scouts in Contact delivers the fundamentals of R&S and provides training vignettes for scout platoons. To gain a broader perspective, see the Reconnaissance and Security Commander’s Handbook (CAC login required) for doctrinal guidance, direction, observations, and techniques for commanders, leaders, and staffs at the BCT-level and below.
Lesson Learned Training

The Lessons Learned Course is a resident (or Mobile Training Team) Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) course designed to train personnel in Lessons Learned regulatory guidance, program management as well as Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) training. In addition to Army Regulation 11-33 requirements for AAR input sent to CALL and placed into JLLIS, attending the Lessons Learned Course is a TRADOC requirement for quality assurance and accreditation. All centers of excellence (CoEs), academies, and school houses must have a lesson manager or personnel in charge of their lessons learned program that have attended the course. Multiservice/Interagency/Government/Federal Civilians may attend the course.

New! Contractor attendance at the Lessons Learned Course — Army contractors are welcome to attend the Lessons Learned Course at no cost, provided they are responsible for their organization’s lessons learned program and that lessons learned requirements have been written into performance work statements (PWS).

New! Requests for mobile training team (MTT) courses — Army requests for a lessons learned MTT must be submitted through the Army G-1 Functional Training Resource Arbitration Panel (TRAP) process. Other non-Army DOD or Government organizations may submit requests for an MTT directly to Army G-1; approval will be based on unit’s ability to fund the course and subject to instructor availability.

Remaining FY 18 Lessons Learned Courses:

• Class 005 - Fort Leavenworth 14-18 May 18
• Class 006 - Fort Leavenworth 25-29 Jun 18
• Class 007 - Fort Leavenworth 6-10 Aug 18

The Joint Staff has recently released the Joint Lessons Learned Course on JKO (CAC login required). This course covers the Joint Lessons Learned Program elements and includes JLLIS tutorials. Call 913-684-5150 for more information.

Social Media

Want to be informed about new products and items of interest at CALL? Like us on Facebook @CenterforArmyLessonsLearned or follow us on Twitter @USArmy_CALL.