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Focus: It is easy to say, but much harder to do in this instantaneous, information-driven age. Often, many experienced leaders find it challenging to focus on what really matters. The minute any leader takes charge of his formation, the ability to focus dissipates for a variety of reasons. Unforeseen higher-echelon actions or reactions, unanticipated problems with Soldiers, and a seemingly endless litany of tasks constitute just a few reasons why focus can be difficult.

Whatever the challenges, the Army’s overall purpose never changes. Sure, we have been better or worse at times for a myriad of reasons, but the mission of the U.S. Army remains to fight and win our nation’s wars. It serves as the fundamental reason we recruit Soldiers the way we do. It is the fundamental reason driving all Army modernization initiatives. It is what drives personnel initiatives.

The Army’s increased emphasis on taking care of Soldiers and combatting corrosive behaviors is an essential task. Without focusing on our Soldiers, we endanger the ability to accomplish the missions our nation expects of its Army. Regardless, some may struggle to understand the link between caring for Soldiers and our ability to organize, equip, train, and prepare for combat. General William E. DePuy said it best when he stated that, “Nice, warm human relationships are satisfying and fun, but they are not the purpose of an Army. Establishing the most marvelous, friendly, warm, sympathetic, and informed relationships is unimportant, except in the context of making the teamwork better. In that context, it is all important.”

We know our Army cannot accomplish its mission without cohesive small teams. However, focusing solely on cohesive teams or corrosive behavior, independent of a common purpose, achieves limited results. Soldiers and leaders must have a purpose linked to the fundamental reason their team exists. No winning team has ever accomplished anything of significance without first defining a common purpose and subsequently focusing on what mattered to achieve that purpose. Soldiers and leaders must be focused on what fundamentally matters in their formation to help fight and win the nation’s wars.
By focusing formations on mastering a handful of fundamental tasks, leaders begin to transform purpose into capability. We build teams specifically to accomplish these tasks. We maintain equipment to accomplish these tasks. We care for each other so that we can accomplish these tasks. We execute all organizational activities to enable us to accomplish these tasks on the future battlefield.

Regardless of echelon, the Army needs units to be masters in a handful of fundamental tasks. By focusing an organization’s energy on a few, simple, achievable tasks, leaders create a purpose that directly contributes to the Army’s mission. Every effort in the organization begins and ends with that purpose in mind, from our care for Soldiers to our training, maintenance, and leader-development programs.

As a leader at any level, you must take the time to create a common focus for your organization the minute you take charge. This National Training Center publication provides the nexus for a conversation every leader should have at every echelon in his formation. What is our focus? In what areas must we be experts?

Before you start telling your Soldiers to master the fundamentals, take the time to have a conversation with your team. What are those fundamental tasks at echelon? How do you structure every organizational activity around the tasks? How do they collectively contribute to the overarching purpose and reason for your organization’s existence? How does the accomplishment of these tasks nest with the essential task of cohesive small units? Your subordinates will thank you.

Purpose leads to focus, and focus leads to fundamental tasks that drive every aspect of great units. Focus minimizes confusion and maximizes teamwork. True teamwork builds cohesive units that care for one another, because everyone matters. Genuine teamwork builds trust and confidence in ourselves, the organization, and one another. Repetitive practice leads to teams that can truly master the fundamentals.

As always, if you or any member of your team requires assistance, do not hesitate to ask.

COL Michael J. Simmering  
Outlaw 01  
Operations Group  
The National Training Center and Fort Irwin

Endnote

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SECTION I

Mastering the Fundamentals
CHAPTER 1
Refocusing on Battle Focus

COLONEL MICHAEL J. SIMMERING, COMMANDER, OPERATIONS GROUP

Within many units, a lack of focus presents a consistent challenge on a daily basis. Too often, organizational energy dissipates as we leap from training events, to maintenance efforts, to personnel readiness with seemingly little rhyme or reason to our efforts. Unsynchronized activities on the part of many higher headquarters, a failure to plan properly, and knee-jerk reactions to perceived or emerging challenges further complicate subordinates’ ability to focus. To build better formations, Soldiers and leaders must have the ability to focus on what truly matters: The next battle.

WHY ARE WE HERE?

Any combat-seasoned leader will say the most critical aspect of a mission statement is the purpose. Purpose gives organizations focus, constitutes the reason for existence, and drives organizational activities. The purpose of our Army is to win the nation’s wars. There is no other real purpose behind an Army. We deter adversaries to prevent fighting wars. We reassure allies to build wartime alliances. We fight for the sole purpose of winning.

Oftentimes, organizations find themselves unable to convey their true purpose. Some units stretch from deployments, to home-station training events, to combat training centers, and back to deployments without ever understanding the underlying purpose of Army activities. Each brigade combat team (BCT) within the Army serves a unique purpose, contributing to the Army’s ability to fight and win the nation’s wars. Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team (19 January 2021),1 explains why each type of BCT exists in the Army:

- **Armored brigade.** The armored brigade combat team (ABCT) organizes to concentrate overwhelming combat power utilizing mobility, protection, and firepower to conduct offensive tasks with great precision and speed and defensive tasks to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, and develop favorable conditions for offensive action.

- **Infantry brigade.** The infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) is an expeditionary, combined arms formation optimized for dismounted operations in complex terrain and can conduct entry operations by ground, air land, air assault, or amphibious assault (via surface or vertical) into austere areas of operations with little or no advanced notice.
• **Stryker brigade.** The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) gains the initiative early, seizes and retains key terrain, any locality, or area, the seizure of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant and conduct massed fire, fire from a number of weapons directed at a single point or small area to stop the enemy.

If these statements are accepted as the succinct, fundamental reason for why these BCTs exist, then commanders should theoretically be able to direct every effort within their formations toward making that underlying purpose a reality for the Army. At the end of the day, every commander must have a mission focus and central purpose around which his organization exists. If your BCT does not have an overarching, combat-focused purpose, then you have to ask what drives your organization on a daily basis? If your are not focused on the combat capability of your unit, then your are probably wasting your time.

**CREATING TIME**

Often cited by commanders, acknowledged by superiors, and lamented by subordinates, time is in short supply for the Army. Because the Army consists of fallible human beings—each with individual backgrounds, needs, and desires—no leader can simply put a checklist of tasks together to create a combat-ready force. Outside of real combat, the time required to build a group of individuals into a cohesive team willing to fight and die for each other is a high standard. Each unit wrestles with unique challenges and with creating a combat-ready force in a world that has become more complicated. Focus helps create the time subordinates need to build cohesive units.

No army has ever had every resource it requires. In 1999, General Robert W. Cone wrote, “We are limited by money, repair parts, facilities, and most importantly Soldier training time.” If time and other resources are not increased to build combat-ready formations, two viable options remain: First, units can “do less” better, and, second, units can “do the same” to a lesser standard.

Given the Army’s well-understood predisposition against lowering combat-proven standards, leaders are left with the single option of doing less. Doing less implies an understanding of risk and a deliberate choice. Leaders at every level are left asking themselves what they need to focus on.

Focus ensures all aspects of subordinates’ efforts contribute to the overall priority for the greater team and the time to accomplish their prescribed tasks to standard. Focus provides leaders a means to hold subordinates accountable for the unit’s performance, and provides superiors a means to allocate their most precious resource: Soldier time.
ACHIEVING TASK FOCUS

The concepts of fleeting resources and focusing on fundamentals are not new. However, few consciously accept risk and deliberately choose to focus on only a handful of tasks. In an age where there are prescribed mission-essential task lists (METLs) from the Department of the Army level, leaders have devolved to simply do what they are told. They fail to execute the requisite mission analysis and create a viable course of action that balances resources available to provide their formation the ability to focus. The Army has been here before.

The process of achieving focus has always begun with the approval of a unit’s mission-essential tasks (METs). In the absence of a real-world contingency, today’s leaders are told to focus on prescribed METs. In fact, Headquarters, Department of the Army prescribes these METs down to the company level. Although necessary for standardization absent a clear and present enemy, prescribed METs do not absolve leaders of their responsibility to focus their formation. Time has arguably become more limited in the present environment. This notion does not negate the leader’s responsibilities. As leaders, we must “discipline ourselves to focus tactical training on complete mastery of a relatively small number of training tasks. Our ability to execute these critical tasks violently and aggressively at the section and platoon level provides the foundation for mission success.” Today, Army doctrine calls these battle tasks, but the approach is the same.

In some cases, every prescribed MET cannot be trained to a high standard, given the current resource constraints and primarily because of time. At echelon, each task selected creates a cascading pyramid of supporting subordinate tasks that must be trained to the same high standard. Leaders must be unapologetically selective in where they choose to focus their energy. Take the following experience of General Martin E. Dempsey as a case study:

When General Dempsey took command of the 5,200 Soldiers of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in 1996 at Fort Carson, CO, he found a unit unsettled by transition. They had recently relocated from Fort Bliss, TX. Much of the leadership had changed during the transition. They had absorbed Soldiers from inactivating units at Fort Carson. They were in an unfamiliar place and unfamiliar with the new leadership of the post.
Compounding the issues brought about by the transition was the fact that it came at a time when the Department of the Army had become notorious for publishing numerous detailed, expansive, and mandatory instructions of things that had to be accomplished as a priority by unit commanders and Soldiers across the Army. This was not the first time General Dempsey had seen this. In peacetime, everyone develops an opinion about when the armed forces will next be needed, and what they will be doing. Such was the case in 1996. Each headquarters at every level sought to reduce risk of being wrong about the requirements of the next deployment by adding to the tasks required of subordinate headquarters. But, of course, as Dempsey knew, when everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.

So when General Dempsey took command, the first question he was asked by the unit’s leaders was how he would prioritize their activities. It was a fair question. But rather than answer for them, and rather than take the list and simply place tasks in some descending order of importance, Dempsey gathered his team leaders and asked them, “What’s the one thing?” But they were not exactly sure what he meant. What is the one thing that will define your time as a leader in this regiment?

Through a collaborative process, General Dempsey and the leaders of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment arrived at a conclusion. An armored cavalry regiment exists to provide a corps commander with information. Therefore, everyone was a scout. It served as the overarching purpose of the organization. Subsequently, they narrowed their METL down to the single mission that most contributed to their ability to provide the corps commander with information: the movement to contact.4

At the brigade level, General Dempsey narrowed the focus of his organization to a single mission to best train his formation for combat based on a fundamental purpose for which the Army designed the organization. To succeed in today’s environment, the process has not changed.
When subordinate commanders take a similar approach, they unlock the power of focusing their formations. For example, a combined arms breach at the brigade level might be the most complicated mission executed routinely at the National Training Center (NTC). We must use observers to call accurate indirect fires to suppress the enemy on a portion of the objective. Simultaneously, we must orchestrate the obscuration of other enemy forces through artillery or ground-delivered smoke. Finally, we must maneuver support, breaching, and assault forces into position to violently overwhelm the enemy with direct and indirect fires to seize the objective. The task of a combined arms breach represents an orchestra of lower-level collective tasks that must be executed properly. In the words of General Cone, a subordinate of General Dempsey at the time:

This is all very impressive and the principle reason commanders have two field-grade officers and a staff to help think this through. But what does that mean to a tank platoon sergeant? I would submit it means little or nothing in terms of his success. The business of winning at the platoon level means lethal execution of a handful of critical tasks … our job is to focus the energies of platoons on mastering a set of simple, critical tasks, which will lead to success in a variety of missions.5

Review your unit METs. Decide the tasks you really want to focus on. Then, and most importantly, identify the five or six platoon-level critical collective tasks you must master to achieve a high level of proficiency.

Today’s commanders should take the same approach: Decide on the reason the organization exists, review unit METs, decide the tasks to focus on, and identify the supporting METs that contribute to the organization’s focus. Then, and most importantly, work with subordinate leaders to identify the five or six platoon-level, high-payoff critical collective battle tasks that must be mastered to achieve a high level of proficiency in those unit METs.

This publication provides that recommended MET crosswalk for an ABCT commander. It also provides critical collective task (i.e., battle task) recommendations for each platoon within an ABCT. It is okay if you do not agree on these tasks, but focus your formation on what is important at echelon. Your fundamental tasks are those that become the building blocks driving your organization’s entire training regime.
DEFINING MASTERY

Another common challenge beyond the ability to focus is defining what constitutes success during training to execute these tasks. Leaders and Soldiers alike want to know the standard. Leaders all want a checklist. The training and evaluation outlines published at the Department of the Army level provide a solid foundation to standardize efforts, but they do little to help leaders understand what true mastery implies. Simply executing a checklist will never guarantee success in war. There are too many variables involved and there are times subordinate leaders must instantaneously decide their next action based on their trained instinct.

Training to master the most fundamental tasks must take place on a realistic battlefield. Soldiers should not encounter the friction, chaos, and uncertainty of battle for the first time during war. To train properly, that environment must be created for them. Most importantly, to collectively train organizations properly, the enemy must be encountered. Small units must be forced to deal with the tiring action, reaction, counteraction process of battle. To master the fundamentals, you must accomplish these training tasks against “resistance provided by a living, breathing, and thinking opposing force (OPFOR) or enemy. Simply stated, in order to win, you have to be able to beat somebody.”

Some units prioritize live-fire exercises (LFXs) above maneuver situational training exercises. Ideally, LFXs present the same level of rigor to small units. However, no LFX can possibly replicate the resistance of a competitive OPFOR. Even at the NTC, where we possess a living, breathing, live-fire system driven by members of Operations Group, we cannot replace the friction and chaos induced by the professional 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment OPFOR.

Leaders must examine their idea of mastering these fundamental skills. If your idea of success revolves around a series of checklists or a throwaway enemy force, you are not preparing your Soldiers for the rigor of combat. To master a task, it must be executed successfully under battlefield conditions against a competitive enemy. At the end of the day, someone is labeled the loser, and another the winner.

REPETITION

Leaders often complain about their ability to execute repetitions and sets to achieve true mastery. By focusing your formation on what matters, true mastery is possible. However, mastery is only possible, if you are willing to put in the repetitions. Too many formations focus on the execution of a single iteration of a task and then simply move on to the next task. That approach builds an acceptance of mediocrity, not mastery.
I have seen and experienced both models. In my first exercise as a platoon leader where I served as an observer, my regimental commander subjected the unit to a grueling 72-hour exercise designed to train platoons in every conceivable task. I watched platoons pour through this centralized exercise never really understanding what they did wrong and with zero opportunity to correct mistakes.

In my second exercise, I participated as part of the training audience. General Cone had taken a much more focused approach. To this day, I can recall how different the event appeared. Every platoon conducted an actions on contact lane first, which was designed to teach platoons how to react to forms of direct contact. As a scout platoon leader, my platoon spent two days on that lane executing numerous iterations. We did not get it right the first time. We got better the second time. We did well the third time. However, we did it repeatedly until we were confident in our ability to execute. Between iterations, leaders ramped up or ramped down the OPFOR to achieve specific learning outcomes. The training event contained built-in time for repetition of the most basic tasks. Every iteration consisted of execution, remediation of identified shortcomings, and re-execution.

Home-station training events must provide small units (squads and platoons) the resources to achieve mastery. For the average BCT, it takes at least 70 to 80 percent of a unit’s annual resources to achieve mastery in only a handful of platoon-level tasks throughout the formation. The remaining 20 to 30 percent of the resources are then dedicated to company-level training at home station and then to training battalion and brigade staffs.

Commanders can only achieve mastery through the repetition of a handful of critical collective tasks at the small-unit level. Remove any part of the equation, and it will not work. Focus + Repetition = Mastery.

**THE “SO WHAT” OF FOCUS + REPETITION = MASTERY**

Many leaders do not understand what this approach to training has to do with the current challenges confronting the Army. They will exclaim, “You are focusing too much on readiness” or “we need to focus on building unit cohesion” or “we need to teach our formations to be intolerant” of certain behaviors. These leaders do not understand how to build a team.

Nobody is more disappointed in the Army than that first-term Soldier who is part of a unit that loses consistently. The Soldier who feels that nobody cares, like his efforts do not matter, and believes he is unimportant cannot feel good about the Army. The Soldier who does not believe in his leaders cannot feel good about the Army. The Soldier in a unit where nothing makes sense cannot feel good about the Army.
By focusing the predominance of efforts on building lethal small units, we cannot help but focus on building teams or creating an environment of inclusion because everyone matters. The maintenance of equipment begins to matter because it directly impacts the ability to execute fundamental tasks. Sergeant’s Time Training becomes more focused because small-unit leaders know exactly what they will be expected to do. Taking care of a Soldier’s challenges becomes possible because subordinate leaders find themselves less encumbered by the mandatory and more focused on the necessary.

Achieving mastery of the fundamentals increases a leader and Soldier’s confidence in their ability to execute their wartime tasks. A Soldier confident in their leaders and fellow Soldiers sees the Army in a more positive light. They begin to believe in each other. That belief carries the team forward.

**CONCLUSION**

At our very core, small-unit leaders only serve two functions for the Army: Leading Soldiers and small units during battle, and preparing Soldiers and small units to fight the battle.\(^7\)

The Foundational Training Strategy published by U.S. Army Forces Command seeks to provide the time for small-unit leaders to do what they must do to build teams. However, the best strategy executed by leaders unwilling to accept risk will fail. Without focusing on subordinates’ efforts, leaders eat away at the time the Army senior leadership is attempting to create. Without a conscious, disciplined decision regarding an organization’s focus, time will remain an issue. Without acknowledging that only practice makes perfect, leaders will accept less than mastery of the fundamentals at the small-unit level. Regardless of what you decide to brief to your superiors, your Soldiers will know whether they are part of a combat-ready, winning organization that cares for them. Soldiers always know.

**Endnotes**

3. Cone, page 311.
5. Ibid., page 313.
General Michael X. Garrett assumed duties as the 23rd Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Fort Bragg, NC, on 21 March 2019. As commander of the U.S. Army’s largest organization, he commands 215,000 active duty Soldiers, and 190,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve, while providing training and readiness oversight of U.S. Army National Guard. In total, the FORSCOM team includes 745,000 Soldiers and 96,000 Civilians. General Garrett has commanded at every level from company through Army Service component command, and led units in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Shortly after I took command of FORSCOM, I received my initial counseling from then-Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark Milley. He looked me dead in the eye and said, “Mike, you’re responsible for the readiness of our Army.” I sat back in my chair and thought, “Wow … that’s a really big deal!” But, after I thought about it for another minute or two, I realized, “While this is a big deal, we have—and will continue—to get it done.”

When I assumed command in March 2019, the Army was in a strong readiness posture. This was due in large part to my predecessor, General Abe Abrams, and the Army senior leaders, because as a whole, the Army had been surging on readiness for large-scale combat operations for about three solid years.

As I conducted my initial commander’s assessment, I traveled across the country engaging our leaders and Soldiers, and observing training—particularly, rotations at our combat training centers (CTCs). It occurred to me that while our battalions and brigades were more ready than they had ever been, at lower echelons, quite frankly, we were not as good as I thought we were. The Army’s surge on readiness produced significant gains in our readiness metrics—across all components—and we absolutely needed that focus to produce those gains. However, these readiness levels came at the expense of individual Soldier skills, and our crews, teams, squads, and platoons. Although generally capable, we were not as proficient with our weapons, equipment, and systems as we could be. We lacked mastery of our warfighting fundamentals.
It appeared to me that we had a mismatch between our training strategy, our readiness models, and readiness metrics. The FORSCOM readiness model relied on a 12-month training strategy. Our brigades, however, found themselves trying to execute their training strategy with only seven to nine months of available time. Intensifying this were the impacts of operational requirements and resource constraints. When it came to training, we had a difficult time meeting the strict, codified requirements for crew qualifications, gunneries, and live-fire exercises in accordance with our training strategy—which were already tough—while simultaneously managing continuous personnel turnover within our brigades. As a result, our armored brigade combat teams had to shoot multiple sustainment gunneries each year, and our artillery formations were trapped in continuous section certification cycles, which further exacerbated the time challenges in our brigade combat teams. Our Soldiers could shoot, but not necessarily maneuver, which meant they were losing more than they were winning at the point of contact. All of these conditions when combined created palpable and unsustainable stress on the force.

Over the course of my 36-year career, the best units I have been in had highly trained crews, squads, and platoons that could win at the point of contact. In other words, when these small teams encountered an obstacle—anticipated or not—they could quickly defeat it and move on to the next objective. Winning at the point of contact generates organizational momentum, which permeates throughout the unit. The formations where I experienced this sort of momentum achieved it through disciplined training and high standards on individual and small-unit tasks.

Regardless of the location or mission, the Soldiers in our crews, squads, and platoons will be the first to make contact with the enemy, and it is at that point they must decisively prevail. I believe that you can have the best strategy in the world, but if you cannot win at the point of contact, you cannot win—period.

To be clear, the concept of “winning at the point of contact” extends to all of our warfighting functions and military occupational specialties, and beyond the contact layer. Whether it is a tank crew acquiring and engaging targets faster than the enemy crew does, a cyber operations specialist neutralizing a web-based threat, or a wheeled vehicle mechanic troubleshooting faults on a Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicle, the expert execution of actions on contact creates organizational momentum.

Winning at the point of contact requires squads and platoons to gain positional advantage by mastering transitions between movement and maneuver. This momentum frees commanders to drive the operations process, and consolidate gains, which sustains the momentum created.
In other words, momentum creates temporal space where commanders and their staffs are not solely focused on the immediate close fight. They can focus on what is next: On sustaining momentum, on using resources to win the next fight, and the next, rather than resources consumed to “save the day.” That temporal space allows them to better integrate and synchronize warfighting capabilities at echelon, shaping the future fight and enabling more wins while preserving combat power.

That is why winning at the point of contact matters. So, how do we get there? In my fiscal year 2020 training guidance, I describe a training progression aimed at mastering the fundamentals at the individual, crew, and squad level, and progressing through multiple repetitions and sets, under varying conditions. I call this the “Foundational Training Strategy” (see Figure 2-1).

![Figure 2-1. Training approach](image)

We want to reinforce that we train to standard, not to time. This means commanders must make time for subordinate units to retrain, do it again until they get it right, and never get it wrong. More than just skill acquisition, mastery is a mindset. It is difficult to achieve and requires grit, persistence, and determination. Most importantly, it requires time.

Strengthening leader development is something I think a lot about; it is a Freedom 6 priority. Small-unit training is one of the best ways to develop leaders, and investment in leader development is essential, especially today as we wrestle with the competing demands for our noncommissioned officer (NCO) talent.
That is why I directed commanders to dedicate and protect time each week for what we call “Leaders Time Training.” Now, for many of you, this might sound a lot like the old Sergeant’s Time Training (STT), and it should. The fact is that, over the years, this sort of protected time to focus on the basics became passé, or at least perceived as such. As a result, commanders did not prioritize STT, which led to inconsistent application across the force. I have always believed that by increasing emphasis on individual and small-unit skills, and empowering NCOs to execute this training, Soldiers can become masters of the fundamentals, and in turn, those Soldiers will, one day, train their Soldiers to a level of mastery.

Anyone who has been around the Army long enough will tell you that our training strategy is anything but revolutionary. However, since adopting the Foundational Training Strategy last year, we are beginning to see concrete, positive returns on our investment. Our CTC cadre are reporting an increase in successful defense operations at echelon, from orders process planning to defense preparation. Cadre also report that units are entering the 14-day force-on-force period at increased levels of proficiency, which has led to the World-Class Opposing Force (OPFOR) being more challenged when faced with rotational training unit defenses. Our ability to “close the gap” with OPFOR at the CTCs is a direct result of investing the necessary time for repetitions during home-station training.

Although these reports are promising, we still have work to do. Commanders at echelon must improve their ability to integrate the full measure of their forces during conflict. For example, units that do not incorporate Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wireless-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin teams; mine plow and rollers; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE); communications; and maintenance find themselves challenged to win at the point of contact against a near-peer threat. Commanders need to ensure that their training glide path incorporates a holistic approach while gaining efficiency through multi-echelon training to ensure that critical areas are not overlooked. According to the CTC cadre, small oversights such as these become readily apparent when conflict begins.

Increased repetitions and sets at the lower echelons result in better trained small units, but, as I stated earlier, the foundational approach applies to all warfighting functions, and includes staffs. When commanders and staffs commit to the repetitions and sets, they are more prepared to drive the operations process and can synchronize operations, while building tactical readiness, generating real options. That is how we master the fundamentals.

People often ask me why I, a four-star commander, am so focused on our Army’s lowest echelons. Every time, my answer is, “That is where we win ... and if you haven’t already heard ... winning matters.”
CHAPTER 3

The Mission-Essential Task Crosswalk: A Dying Art

Colonel Michael J. Simmering, Commander, Operations Group

This chapter conducts a simple mission-essential task (MET) crosswalk for an armored brigade combat team (ABCT). Beginning with the underlying purpose of an armored brigade (BDE) and logically linking focused tasks at echelon, it depicts the critical linkages that must drive all organizational activities to successfully focus team and small-unit activities when no deployment-related assigned mission exists. It culminates with four to six critical, high-payoff tasks at the platoon level designed to most impact an organization’s ability to perform its focused METs.

Many leaders fail to focus their formations because they believe that Department of the Army-mandated METs absolve them of their responsibility to conduct a thorough analysis. Nothing could be further from the truth. Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, Army Command Policy (24 July 2020), highlights training as the top peacetime priority:

The commander is responsible for all aspects of unit readiness. Training is the cornerstone of unit readiness and must be the commander’s top peacetime priority. Establishing a positive leadership climate within the unit and developing disciplined and cohesive units contributes to combat readiness and sets the tone for social and duty relationships and responsibilities within the command. As the primary unit trainers, commanders must develop their leaders to extract the greatest training value from every opportunity in every activity in order to build combat readiness and prepare their units and Soldiers to rapidly deploy and accomplish their decisive action missions.¹
Further, Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Train to Win in a Complex World* (5 October 2016), acknowledges that commanders must be selective:

A battle-focused unit trains selectively. It cannot train to standard on every task at once, whether due to time, or other resource constraints. A unit that attempts to train to proficiency all the tasks it could perform only serves to diffuse its training effort. A unit that simultaneously trains to all its capabilities at once will most likely never achieve a T or T- in all those tasks. Focusing on the tasks to train, based on the higher commander’s guidance, and taking into account that time and resources are limited, is battle-focused training.\(^2\)

Therefore, commanders who fail to dissect the Army’s prescribed METs at echelon and fail to balance time and resources available are derelict in one of their primary responsibilities as a commander.

Beyond examining the underlying purpose of the formation, the following does not explain the rationale for each choice. The remainder of the publication, where linkages are examined, dives deeper into the rationale for each task at echelon. Regardless of whether or not you agree, as a commander, you need to ask yourself, “Have I focused the effort of my formations on what truly matters?”

**THE ARMORED BRIGADE PURPOSE**

Field Manual (FM) 3-96, *Brigade Combat Team* (19 January 2021), and the Army clearly explain the reason ABCTs are kept in the Army inventory.

The ABCT organizes to concentrate overwhelming combat power. Mobility, protection, and firepower enable the ABCT to conduct offensive operations with great precision and speed. The ABCT conducts defensive operations to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, and develop favorable conditions for offensive actions.\(^3\)

The ABCT exists for the sole purpose of concentrating overwhelming offensive or defensive combat power against an enemy. The critical capabilities of an ABCT to accomplish these tasks consist of mobility, protection, firepower, precision, and speed. In short, when a U.S. Army ABCT encounters an enemy formation, it is expected to achieve its objectives. Nothing is more powerful as a ground formation within the U.S. Army than an ABCT.
Narrowing down the purpose of an ABCT begins to reveal characteristics that must be trained into the formation. All parts of an ABCT must be mobile; it must sustain large distances, and be capable of coordinating across multiple formations quickly to concentrate combat power. Although the list could go on, just establishing an underlying purpose begins to create focus for subordinate units.

**THE ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM DIRECT MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASKS**

After examining the directed METs, commanders should ask themselves, “Which METs I have been directed to train most contribute to the underlying purpose of the organization?” The following are the current Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)-directed METs for an ABCT:

- Conduct Area Security (07-BDE-1272).
- Conduct an Area Defense (17-BDE-1030).
- Conduct a Movement To Contact (17-BDE-1074).
- Conduct an Attack (17-BDE-1094).
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment Operations (55-BDE-4800).

By looking at the directed METs for an ABCT, the commander can quickly determine that only three METs contribute to the overarching purpose of an ABCT: attack, movement to contact, and defense. Although area security and deployment operations might be important, only the remaining three tasks directly relate to the organization’s overall purpose.

Furthermore, depending on time and resources, commanders can logically argue that a movement to contact results in two possible sequels: an attack or a defense depending on the size of the enemy force encountered and the conditions of the encounter. Further, an attack is launched when commanders see a clearer enemy picture. Focusing on an attack vice a movement to contact could absolve subordinate commanders of their responsibility to develop the situation during home-station training. Lastly, if trained properly, a movement to contact can be used as a method to train an attack if training conditions are properly managed.

Regardless, the direction for the ABCT is clear: There are offensive-directed tasks and defense-directed tasks. For the purposes of focusing formations, we will narrow the focus for this ABCT to two focused METs for training. The brigade combat team (BCT) will accept risk in the remaining three by ensuring these two tasks are truly mastered. The tasks for this ABCT are movement to contact and area defense. Figure 3-1 presents the following focus for our ABCT.
ABCT Purpose
Concentrate overwhelming offensive or defensive combat power against an enemy.

HQDA-Directed METs (ABCT)
- Conduct Area Security.
- Conduct Area Defense.
- Conduct Movement to Contact.
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment.

Brigade-Focused METs
- Conduct Area Defense.
- Conduct Movement to Contact.

Figure 3-1. Brigade-focused METs for an ABCT

Often forgotten when focusing on unit training programs, commanders must tell their subordinates how they plan to fight their formation to accomplish these brigade-level selected METs. Although doctrine provides a solid foundation, this step more than any other delves into the art of command. It requires commanders to understand the personalities, strengths, and weaknesses of their subordinate commanders, and the culture within subordinate units. Doing so allows commanders to capitalize on units’ strengths while minimizing the effects of organizational weaknesses.

For example, when envisioning conducting a brigade-level movement to contact, most brigade commanders will default to the doctrinal idea of placing the cavalry squadron to identify the disposition and composition of enemy forces. However, which battalion best coordinates with other members of the team? Which organization acts most decisively and aggressively? Which battalion best handles unknown situations. These all sound like mundane questions, but in reality, they represent the most critical questions a commander must answer to help focus the training for subordinate units.

The battalion that acts most aggressively and decisively might represent the main effort as the BDE transitions from a movement to contact to a hasty attack. A battalion that typically excels at developing the situation might be the battalion that serves as the advanced guard for the BCT. The battalion that best coordinates with other members of the team might be a unit that brings together a combined arms breach and serves as the breach force formation for the BCT.

The number of questions and corresponding answers could literally be endless, and limited only by the imagination of a commander. The resulting answers to these types of questions help focus subordinate unit-training programs. They provide lower echelon leaders a critical understanding of how their formation contributes to the overall success of the team.
SUBORDINATE BATTALION AND BELOW-FOCUSED MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASKS

Once commanders select the METs best suited to train the BCT and decide how they intend to utilize subordinates, commanders must crosswalk these METs for their subordinate elements to ensure a consistent focus and a nesting of purpose. Although seemingly mundane at the higher levels, the power of the process becomes more apparent when examining small-unit tasks at the platoon level.

Figure 3-2 depicts a crosswalk from the BCT level down to a scout platoon within a cavalry troop in the cavalry squadron.

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<th>Brigade-Prioritized METs</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Conduct Area Defense.</td>
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<td>• Conduct Movement to Contact.</td>
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</table>

Cavalry Squadron (ABCT) (HQDA-Directed)

- Conduct Area Defense. 07-BN-1272
- Conduct a Screen 17-SQDN-9225
- Conduct a Zone Reconnaissance. 17-SQDN-9315
- Conduct Area Reconnaissance. 17-SQDN-9315
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment Operations. 55-BN-4800

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<th>Squadron-Prioritized METs</th>
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<td>• Conduct Zone Reconnaissance. 17-SQDN-9314</td>
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The BDE commander visualized utilizing the cavalry squadron well ahead of the main body to allow time for defensive preparation. Additionally, seeking to train the BDE’s ability to concentrate overwhelming defensive combat power, the BCT commander consulted current doctrine, which states “The tasks required of a screening unit are minimal compared to other security missions. Therefore, the screening force may have a wide coverage.” Additionally, the BCT commander realized that by training his unit to conduct a proper guard within an assigned area of operations, the subordinate elements of the HQDA-directed task of screen and area security could automatically be trained. Finally, the BCT commander examined the additional requirements of a guard mission and realized that this mission automatically forced the cavalry squadron to integrate enabling fires and other assets from the main
body of the BCT. By training a guard mission properly, the BCT commander builds a formation capable of conducting reconnaissance, “attacks, defends, and delays as needed to provide reaction time and maneuver space to the protected force.”

### Figure 3-3. Scout platoon high-payoff battle tasks

Given the BCT-level missions of movement to contact and an area defense, the tasks that must be trained have been narrowed to a high level in every scout platoon down to five tasks (see Figure 3-3). Subsequently, these tasks should drive activities for all scout platoons within the cavalry squadron, and shape and inform all crew- and individual-level training within the organization. They should drive maintenance efforts, personnel efforts, individual training, and a host of other activities within the organization to accomplish these five high-payoff tasks.
CONCLUSION

Whether or not individual readers agree with the tasks selected in the above examples is irrelevant. Commanders must take the time to deliberately focus the efforts of their subordinates. Adding additional tasks as time and resources allow is possible; however, without beginning with a focused training regime, commanders risk individual subordinates arriving at their own conclusions. In the above construct, a cavalry squadron commander might choose to worry more about operating across a broad front, independently placing greater emphasis on a screen. Scout platoon leaders might decide independently that their individual ability to conduct a route reconnaissance is more important than other tasks. In these cases, commanders relegate their responsibility of providing purpose, direction, and motivation to those that they lead. They risk subordinates arriving at their own conclusion and not maximizing the finite resources available to make sure their organization is prepared to fight as part of a combined arms team.

Endnotes

1. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 24 July 2020, page 2.
5. Ibid., page 6-58.
CHAPTER 4

Multi-Echelon Training and Company and Platoon Situational Training Exercise Design

LTC Erik Oksenvaag, MAJ James Braudis, and MAJ Karl Kuechenmeister, Operations Group

INTRODUCTION

Leaders across the U.S. Army are challenged with maintaining highly functioning and lethal teams given the resources available. This is not a new challenge. Truncated training glide paths, cancellations of individual and collective training and short-notice adjustments to calendars characterize the operating force’s struggles, not just during the past year but for the last several decades since the U.S. has chosen to use the military instrument of power more frequently. As the U.S. negotiates these ambiguous times, adversaries on the international stage remain. Adversaries are training, adjusting, and adapting to the “new normal” just as the U.S. is attempting to do so on a daily basis.

To prepare Army formations and focus training, it must be creative and thoughtful in the design. Specifically, the Army must utilize multi-echelon training to harden teams for the crucible of ground combat. Multi-echelon training must remain the vehicle to maximize readiness and enable exploitation of the Army’s most fleeting resource: time. This publication can help provide a framework for multi-echelon training and can explain how this methodology applies to a battalion and brigade combat team (BCT) when executing platoon- and company-level situational training exercises (STXs). Ideally, these STXs can demonstrate how to synchronize resources to enable impactful, simultaneous training to increase lethality within the depth of a formation.

MULTI-ECHELON TRAINING

This chapter describes two models on how a battalion can conduct platoon STXs and a BCT can conduct company STXs using a multi-echelon approach. Key to understanding is to clearly articulate the definition for multi-echelon training. Simply put, it is a method to train subordinate elements and all warfighting functions, systems, and processes of the higher unit or echelon within the same exercise. Multi-echelon training is the best method to efficiently use time, and it is the surest way to add repetition before entering into a field-training exercise, combat training center (CTC) rotation, or a real-world deployment.
THE BATTALION TRAINING MODEL: PLATOON SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISES

Battalions can train their respective platoons utilizing this creative approach to provide every facet and function internal to the unit an opportunity to grow and achieve repetition. The central data point that must be understood is the resources required for the primary training event, which for this example is a platoon STX. As units address and analyze the land and terrain associated with the platoon STX, they can envision how the greater company and battalion can align and creatively determine how they can construct the exercise to achieve simultaneity in the training event.

Specifically, company and battalion command and control nodes including the combat trains command post (CTCP) and field trains command post (FTCP) can be templated on the terrain adjacent to the platoon STX. Now that the battalion staff can physically envision the location of units and assets, they can split efforts between two planning teams. One team can deep-dive into the training objectives and lane design for the platoon STX, and the other can determine how it can incorporate company- and battalion-level functions into the platoon STX.

As planning and resource coordination is completed, the battalion should ideally have a tactical approach to deployment into the training area. A simple operation order that addresses a detailed plan for how the battalion will “uncoil” from the cantonment area and sequence movement to the field can have a huge return on investment. If the operation order is issued out soon enough, a battalion combined arms rehearsal can precede movement and provide the staff, company, and battalion commanders the chance to conduct a free repetition at this crucial step in the preparation for the combat phase of an operation. Once D-day arrives and the battalion is set to deploy to the training area, it is advisable to employ the tactical command post first as a command and control node that can discreetly control the movement of companies into the field. This entire micro-concept, known as “fight to the field” can again provide several systems and processes a chance to be exercised. The result of the fight to the field concept is the battalion assembled in a tactical assembly area with the CTCP and FTCP assembled in the rear area. The final event before the battalion releasing from the tactical assembly area to conduct training should be establishment of the battalion main command post and execution of a key battle rhythm event, specifically a commander’s update brief (CUB).
As the battalion transitions from the fight to the field to execution of platoon STXs, the main command post is situated and ready to conduct current operations (CUOPS) and fulfill the six functions of a command post. The reception and tracking of information will naturally occur as the company command post passes along information associated with the platoon STX. The tracking of information, update and management of a holistic common operational picture, and the execution of disciplined battle rhythm events (shift change, two- and seven-minute drills, battle update briefs, and CUBs) will be solid repetitions for the battalion staff as it negotiates the execute phase of the operations process. Additional functions that will be closely monitored and controlled by the main command post include logistics package (LOGPAC) operations, downed vehicle evacuation to the unit maintenance collection point, field maintenance, and casualty evacuation to Role 1 medical care as part of the platoon STX. All these battalion-level functions occur as part of the greater scenario for platoon-level training.

The last component of the multi-echelon approach to a battalion-led platoon STX is designing a way to exercise the plan and prepare phase of an operation while executing CUOPS (see Figure 4-1). Specifically, the planners and staff need to practice receiving a BCT-level tactical order and conducting the military decision-making process (MDMP). As part of planning for the event, the staff needs to seek support from the BCT staff or simply take a BCT-level order off the shelf, potentially from an old command post exercise or CTC rotation. Often, an installation’s mission command training center can provide the resources such as a BCT-level order that can help fulfill this objective. If time and proficiency permit, there is utility in having the staff conduct a rapid decision-making and synchronizing process drill to further build familiarity in truncated tactical problem solving. It may seem daunting at the battalion level to conduct, but if properly planned and thought out, a unit can truly exercise all of the systems, processes, and crucial functions at a crawl or walk pace. This will help solidify standard operating procedures (SOPs), build familiarity and confidence, and help define how the battalion fights, while providing world-class training for their respective platoons.
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PREPARING FOR MULTI-ECHELON TRAINING AT THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM LEVEL

Battalion and BCT operations officers must identify training resource shortfalls for company-level STXs and combined arms live-fire exercises (CALFXs), as available resources will vary for each installation. For example, battalions and BCTs should look to internally resource requirements such as opposing force (OPFOR), observer coach/trainers (OC/Ts), and evaluators as other units’ training or deployment schedules may preclude the sharing of these tasks. However, the model does not specify evaluators, and OC/Ts must be certified by the BCT to establish a single standard before collective training. Additionally, it is recommended that BCT organic enablers be trained and certified before their maneuver company training. This is so they receive the requisite training and retraining time, are properly integrated into the maneuver plan, and that there are no detractors during maneuver training and certification. Note: This model provides an example for the cavalry squadron troop STX, but it is recommended that this training occurs before combined arms battalion company STXs. When the multi-echelon approach is applied at the BCT level, it will train and certify companies, troops, and batteries.

THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM TRAINING MODEL: COMPANY SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISES

The following training model, in a prescribed four-week block of time planned and resourced by the BCT and executed by companies and battalions, is an example of multi-echelon training focused on company STXs and CALFXs (see Figure 4-2). This enables the BCT to execute training across all warfighting functions through repetition, and creates a focus for the BCT enablers by supporting the company STX and CALFX. This provides maneuver companies two weeks of focused training at echelon with execution of BCT-established STX lanes, and the execution of company CALFXs with appropriate enabler support. In addition, the employment as an OPFOR creates additional training opportunities for platoons and companies.

One of the most important aspects of this model is the execution of tactical sustainment by the brigade support battalion (BSB) and respective battalion forward support companies. To truly take advantage of this training opportunity as a crawl or walk phase before the CTC run, the BCT must employ its brigade support area and establish its respective battalion-level field trains and combat trains. Different installations and range complexes dictate the distance and lines of communication, but proficiency of tactical sustainment through disciplined LOGPACs and logistics release points from the BSA to the company level can only be achieved through repetition and practice. Many units choose to not practice tactical sustainment at home station and rely on administrative movements of logistics to support training. These units never practice to build and refine their SOPs through disciplined
repetition and synchronized execution. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), and training on day one at the National Training Center is too late for a unit to learn how to execute sustainment from BCT to company echelon.

Another crucial aspect of multi-echeloned training is establishing BCT and battalion command nodes (main command post, tactical command post when necessary, FTCP, and CTCP) to increase command and control training opportunities at home station. The deliberate employment of these nodes creates the opportunity to operate and validate command and control systems, build and refine command post SOPs, and execute required battle-rhythm reporting and command post functions. These established command posts allow staffs to practice CUOPS and plans in a tactical environment across all warfighting functions. To train CUOPS staffs, they need to be stressed through larger amounts of data and a higher demand of battle tracking to create a common operational picture to prepare them for upcoming CTC rotations. Company STX and CALFX lanes create that CUOPS demand including multiple battalions and companies executing various training events with reporting on friendly and enemy dispositions being routed from companies, to battalion CUOPs, to BCT staff. In addition, BCT and battalion plans can conduct MDMP training to practice required planning horizons, future operations, and transitions to enable a successful one-third, two-thirds rule from BCT to battalion levels.

This model allows the BCT CUOPS to create venues for the commander’s update assessments and CUBs, from battalion commanders to the brigade commander using available command and control systems in the upper and lower tactical internet to synchronize effects across the battlefield. In this model, these effects are the placement of OPFOR, OC/Ts, evaluators, combat power available, and placement of enablers in time and space to support the training event.

When properly resourced and synchronized, this model will enable BCTs to achieve a higher level of readiness and prepare them to deploy to a theater of operations or CTC. If time is a constraint for collective training at the battalion and BCT levels, it is recommended that units focus on creating lethal platoons and companies through the synchronization of fires and maneuver, and execution of tactical sustainment in the field.
Figure 4-2. Multi-echelon training (company STX)
CONCLUSION

As the most professional and lethal Army in the world, it must continually look at its methods and practices to building lethal teams of teams. As the Army contends with a shifting world, external constraints on training timelines, and specifically prioritizing lower echelons at squad and platoon level, it must seize every opportunity to train BCT- and battalion-level functions across various warfighting functions. Meticulous planning and disciplined execution of multi-echeloned training at platoon- and company-level STXs or LFXs can yield training readiness at the battalion and BCT echelons in preparation for future CTC rotations or deployments. Many BCTs will not have the opportunity for a battalion- or BCT-level FTX, and must create other opportunities to rehearse and train higher-level functions. Multi-echeloned training is the only viable option to start building and refining the ability to synchronize across various warfighting functions at the BCT and battalion levels through repetition, learning from mistakes before stepping into a CTC rotation.
CHAPTER 5

Leader Tasks: Setting the Conditions for Effective Collective Training

Operations Group, National Training Center

As members of Operations Group formulated the mission-essential tasks (METs) for an armored brigade combat team, three tasks repeatedly presented themselves as a point of debate: operation orders (OPORDs), troop leading procedures (TLP), and rehearsals. Members of the team debated whether these tasks truly constitute a collective task. Per Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0, Training (31 July 2019), “collective tasks require organized team or unit performance, leading to the accomplishment of a mission or function.”\(^1\) In other words, for something to be defined as a collective task, it must produce a collective action vice an individual response. In Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World (5 October 2016), the Army labeled these as “leader tasks.”\(^2\)

Regardless of debate over semantics, these leader tasks underpin the execution of every MET for companies and every battle task at the platoon level and below. Commanders must take the time to train and certify their leaders in their ability to quickly and succinctly conduct TLP, issue an OPORD, and conduct a rehearsal. Focusing on training these tasks for all company-level leaders and below best ensures a common understanding throughout the organization and prepares them to execute the collective task at hand. Training these three tasks will maximize resources and time, as they target METs to be successful at the National Training Center (NTC). The following are recommended tasks:

- Conduct TLP (71-CO-5100).
- Conduct Rehearsals (07-CO-5009).
- Prepare an OPORD (071-326-5626).
CONDUCT TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

TLP receive more stress than all the other common tasks. Unit plans must be flexible and consider contingencies. An attack can be executed with minimal planning and it is driven by battle drills. This is not so with the defense, especially against an armored threat. All Soldiers must have a clear understanding of how they fit into the defense. Engagement, disengagement, and displacement criteria must be clear and concise. Junior leaders on the ground need to trust their superiors to make rapid decisions based on these criteria. Requiring permission from the company command post results in additional casualties and lost time. Soldiers also need to know priority intelligence requirements and the decisions they drive.

CONDUCT A REHEARSAL

Competency allows Soldiers to be familiar with the operation, practice anticipated actions, synchronize effects and efforts, and improve overall performance during the mission. Companies should rehearse mounted maneuver during home-station training. Commanders should not assume their sections know how to use terrain, change formations on the move, or react to contact. Based on several rotations during the past year, the most commonly skipped areas of TLP were the conduct reconnaissance and execute rehearsals steps. Even if time is short, a well-trained company can leverage minimal force rehearsals and use maps or digital systems to reconnoiter its objectives. Repetition, achieved during home-station training, enables the company to accelerate timelines. Commanders should review their standard operating procedures (SOPs) with senior noncommissioned officers and determine where talent exists within the company to assign responsibilities to assist with TLP.

The NTC requires leaders to execute TLP in a dynamic, time-constrained environment. Leaders must prioritize the steps to create a detailed, thorough plan while adhering to the one-third, two-thirds rule. Commanders should train their leaders on the various types of rehearsals and reinforce the need to focus on synchronizing efforts. Mechanized infantry platoons and squads should be proficient at their individual Soldier tasks and battle drills. This requires formal instruction and situational training exercises to achieve a level of mastery.

PREPARE AN OPERATION ORDER

The OPORD is a plan format to assist subordinate units with the conduct of military operations. An OPORD describes the situation the unit faces, the mission of the unit, and the supporting activities the unit will conduct to achieve the commander’s desired end state. In time-compressed situations, leaders must begin their plans with actions on the objective and backwards plan accordingly.
Leaders use verbal orders when operating in an extremely time-constrained environment. These orders offer the advantage of rapid distribution, but they risk important information being overlooked or misunderstood. One common trend at the NTC is that verbal orders lead to a company failing to transition from movement to maneuver and culminate at their probable line of deployment. Verbal orders are usually followed by written fragmentary orders.

Leaders issue written plans and orders that contain text and graphics. Graphics convey information and instructions through military symbols. They complement the written portion of a plan or order and promote clarity, accuracy, and brevity. Staffs often develop and disseminate written orders electronically to shorten the time needed to gather and brief the orders group. Leaders need to ensure that orders contain only the information needed to facilitate effective execution. Orders should not repeat what is in unit SOPs. They should be clear, concise, and relevant to the mission.

Endnotes

1. ADP 7-0, Training, 31 July 2019, paragraph 1-9.
2. FM 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World, 5 October 2016, page B-7.
SECTION II

Brigade Operations
Recommended Focused Task Areas
CHAPTER 6

Winning at the Point of Contact: The Brigade-Level Readiness Fight

General Michael X. Garrett, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command

The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Foundational Training Approach is designed to ensure small units are manned, equipped, and trained to win at the point of contact. It is important that we master the fundamentals to achieve overmatch against any enemy we may face. We see success with this approach; however, we are continually assessing and refining our training, conducting retraining as necessary, and developing our company-level leaders, which will ensure we win at the point of contact. Much like FORSCOM generates readiness for any contingency, brigade and battalion commanders generate company-level readiness for large-scale combat operations and multi-domain operations to include meeting any other assigned mission requirements. It is our brigade and battalion commanders—organizational commanders—who measure readiness and build lethal commanders and leaders at the company level at the point of contact.

The Army is people, and ready people are the foundation of Army readiness. Time and risk management are the critical dependencies of our Army senior leaders’ action plan to prioritize people and teams. Organizational commanders are outside the proverbial knife fight of direct leadership. Company-level leaders—direct leaders—require protected time to get to know their Soldiers and build individual and collective readiness. Direct leaders require observation, coaching, training, risk assumption, and development from experienced, objective organizational leaders. They produce highly trained, disciplined, and fit squads, platoons, and companies as the foundation of our Army’s readiness.

HOW THE BRIGADE LEVEL ASSESSSES WINNING AT THE POINT OF CONTACT

Battalion and brigade commanders bridge the gap between operational objectives and tactical tasks for company level and below. The brigade staff has the experience and formal, professional military education to measure if task performance achieves standards. Whether preparing for a specified mission or maintaining readiness for large-scale combat operations and multi-domain operations, the brigade staff confirms the companies are doing things right through an external evaluation program. The organizational commanders have the competence, demonstrated commitment, and sufficient vision to assess if the platoons and companies are doing the right things.
When companies achieve the “sweet spot” of doing the right things well, the battalion and brigade commanders report their readiness in Army metrics. Two of those metrics, the monthly unit status report (USR) and quarterly or semiannual training briefs (Q/SATB) serve different but supporting purposes. The USR demonstrates how well the unit used resources (time, money, people, and equipment) as a predictor of potential. It affects all levels of objective decision making from the potential deployment of that unit to that unit’s priority for the assignment of the next military occupational specialty critical to the success of the unit. Subjectively, the Q/SATB allow the organizational commanders to measure the knowledge, skills, and attributes of direct leaders and identify shortfalls to prioritize resources as a contract to achieve readiness.

That contract, the product of the Q/SATB, is strengthened and reinforced iteratively. I believe the “special sauce” (borrowing from Lieutenant General Jim Rainey) of our Army is the existence of leader attributes demonstrated through leader competencies from organizational commanders to direct leaders. Organizational commanders provide purpose, direction, and motivation to win at the point of contact. There are three primary ways battalion and brigade commanders use to build the next generation of senior leaders while maintaining strength and overmatch at company level and below today.

First, battalion and brigade commanders counsel platoon leaders and company commanders to set expectations and provide purpose. Counseling allows the organizational commanders to empower the direct leaders to use their intellect and develop the way forward.

Second, battalion and brigade commanders observe company-level leaders to motivate and reinforce success directly. Observation demonstrates presence as well as building vertical trust. Observation, although supported by technology, cannot be done behind a desk, through an application, or from a text or radio transmission. Rather, organizational commanders must be present with their direct leaders to understand the struggle, and, more importantly, discern growth, maturity, or failure to overcome the challenge.

Third, battalion and brigade commanders engage in commander-to-leader/commander-to-commander dialogue, which embodies character in building empathy and discipline to achieve comprehensive success at the point of contact. Dialogue enables the organizational commander to understand fully the operational environment of the direct leader, while ensuring understanding of the importance of the mission set and associated constraints important to the direct leader. Together, the commanders and leaders at echelon will synchronize tasks and resources in time, space, and purpose to win.
We develop, execute, and assess training to ensure that if failure happens, it happens in the training environment. It is essential that organizational commanders set conditions, prioritize resources, underwrite initiative, assume risk, and measure and assess success in the training environment. Whether conducting home-station, multi-echelon training, or fighting Geronimo or Black Horse at our combat training centers (CTCs), when we fail, we retrain until we achieve the standard. We do not have the luxury to make the failure a note in the back of our green book to revisit under better conditions. Retraining creates the muscle memory—the repetitions and sets—necessary to empower our smallest tactical units win at the point of contact.

**PLANNING IS RESOURCE INFORMED**

Battalion and brigade commanders have the unique perspective—bridging the gap between the operational Army and tactical readiness—to understand and enforce the purpose of tailored readiness. Tailored readiness is not paying for an ounce of readiness more than is required for the mission at hand. A practical example of tailored readiness is eliminating the perception of gated training requirements for a brigade to attend a CTC rotation. Our CTCs are exceptionally agile and can dial up or down rotational events, depending on the brigade’s road to readiness.

It is urban legend that gates exist for a brigade to conduct discreet events sequentially or in sum during its training ramp to a CTC. The aspiration to achieve those events coupled with small unit deployments, new equipment fielding, modernization training, and ad hoc defense support to civil authorities leads to an untenable operational tempo. Subsequently, our Army senior leaders seek to reduce that tempo, not to coddle Soldiers, but to increase the priority of the lethality of our smallest tactical units and provide expectation management to those Soldiers and their families. The Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM) creates a culture to balance readiness and modernization while understanding people are the number-one priority. A CTC rotation is a training event to generate readiness, not just assess readiness.

Home-station training must be creative and comprehensive. When a platoon conducts a live-fire exercise, the company command post controls the operation while the battalion tactical command post resources, and the brigade operations center assesses the performance and effectiveness of the training. Because of a variety of reasons such as personnel turnover, new equipment fielding and training, or support to a sister unit, the brigade and battalion may not have the time or resources to conduct separate field-training exercises. Therefore, the they must seek to exercise the staff and operations process, while time and resources priority remains with squad, platoon, and company readiness.
Tailored readiness demands battalion and brigade commanders to develop critical readiness conditions for subordinate units. For example, the critical readiness condition for the battalion task force on the road to the Operation Atlantic Resolve mission will look different from the critical readiness conditions for the infantry brigade combat team slated to assume the immediate response force mission. Critical readiness conditions allow the organizational commanders to counsel and achieve shared understanding with the direct leaders. They provide the metrics for the battalion and brigade commanders to observe, assess, and measure readiness vertically. Critical readiness conditions facilitate productive commander-to-commander dialogue to answer the questions of what was supposed to happen, what happened, and what comes next. Finally, they are an agile product of the battalion and brigade commanders’ understanding of the operational environment and communicating that visualization down and in as well as up and out.

CALL TO ACTION

The Soldiers in our squads, platoons, and companies are always the first to make contact with the enemy. It is at that point they must decisively prevail. To do this, battalion and brigade command teams provide the leadership, which includes assessment that ensures squads, platoons, and companies can prevail at the point of contact. We balance readiness and modernization with a foremost understanding that people are our number-one priority. Battalion and brigade commanders must understand tailored readiness and develop critical readiness conditions to guide their direct leaders. Assessment ensures our company-level units are training the right tasks the right way to build readiness to win at the point of contact.

Reporting that readiness enables operational and strategic planning. Leading and counseling done with candor, when added to character and commitment of company-level leaders, increases competence and courage to produce overmatch at the point of contact. Providing time, underwriting initiative, assuming risk, and assessment are the battalion and brigade commander’s repetitions and sets. I’ll say it again, when our commanders at echelon commit to repetitions and sets, synchronization occurs, we prioritize people, our lowest echelons master the fundamentals, and we are prepared to win at the point of contact.
CHAPTER 7

The Armored Brigade Combat Team Headquarters

Operations Group, National Training Center

As part of its focused training program, the brigade combat team (BCT) should pay particular attention to the natural transition point as a movement to contact transitions to a hasty attack or a hasty defense. Typically, brigades find themselves challenged with transitioning from offensive tasks to defensive tasks or vice versa. The following are the top collective training tasks an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) headquarters (HQ) should be trained in while at home station:

- Conduct a Movement to Contact (07-6-1072).
- Conduct an Area Defense (07-6-1028).

If the members of an ABCT HQ and subordinate HQ focus on these tasks and master how to identify and set conditions to transition between them before their National Training Center (NTC) rotation, their organization stands a greater chance of success. The ABCT HQ and subordinate HQ should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Becoming overly focused on current operations, with stovepipes between the operations and intelligence sections neglecting to synchronize and coordinate across warfighting functions.
- Failing to plan branches and sequels with clearly identified conditions for successful transition.
- Utilizing an exercise checklist strictly adhering to designated timelines, avoiding conditions, and H-hour timelines.
- Failing to create and fight utilizing the brigade’s fighting products, enabling synchronization across the BCT and subordinate HQ.
- Not having or training sufficient battle-tracking standard operating procedures (SOPs) and products across the BCT and subordinate HQ to support rapid information flow, analysis, and dissemination.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the BCT HQ must establish SOPs and train to enable the identification of transitions. This process begins with planning. The brigade staff must clearly understand the commander’s visualization of the fight and plan potential branches and sequels between offensive and defensive operations. The BCT staff must establish conditions and triggers within the plan that enable success, embedding them into the brigade fighting products such as an information collection matrix, enemy event templates, H-hour timelines, and decision support matrixes.

Brigade and subordinate HQ current operations personnel need to utilize and fight with these fighting products as they strive to answer priority intelligence requirements and accurately determine the enemy’s course of action. While on the offense, HQ personnel should pay attention to where and when the brigade may culminate based on situation reports and logistics statuses. This leads to raising questions such as the current location of combat configured loads to establish the brigade’s approaching defense. The staff must understand what and how the brigade should consolidate the gains achieved from recent offensive operations. In the defense, conditions focused on the percentage of enemy destroyed and friendly ammunition, causalities, and combat power status must be known to inform the decision to re-initiate offensive operations. The goal is to quickly regain the initiative. These decisions are facilitated by maintaining an accurate and up to date common operational picture across all brigade command posts supported by routine reporting, dissemination, and updating of information.
CHAPTER 8

The Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Operations Group, National Training Center

The headquarters and headquarters company constitutes one of the most unique organizations for a brigade combat team (BCT). While it encompasses the approximately 140 Soldiers in the brigade staff, it also provides a company headquarters, commander, and first sergeant for administrative functions. In a field environment, most brigades find it challenging to define roles and responsibilities for this unique company-level headquarters.

An armored brigade combat team (ABCT) headquarters and headquarters company’s (HHC’s) tactical function boils down to a few simple functions the brigade commander must personally empower the HHC commander and first sergeant to accomplish. These functions are support to the main command post, preparation and planning for movement of the main command post, sustaining the main command post, and securing the main command post. Everything a brigade HHC command team does should revolve around one of these tasks.

Placing the onus of these tasks on the operations sergeant major or the brigade executive officer detracts from their primary responsibilities of operating the staff and coordinating activities across the BCT. Brigade commanders should make their HHC commander responsible for conducting quartering party activities, battle rostering staff members for tactical road marches during jumps, etc.

The following are collective training tasks that serve as the primary collective training focus for a brigade HHC to support the BCT. These tasks should be trained in-depth during home-station training:

- Support Command Post for Companies (71-CO-0433).
- Perform Quartering Party Activities (63-CO-4008).
- Conduct Sustainment Support Operations (Company) (63-CO-4574).
- Conduct Staging Activities (55-CO-4826).
The Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) tasks provide an objective task evaluation matrix for each task and the performance steps and measures by which to assess the training events. If the members of an HHC brigade in a BCT focus on these tasks and master them before their National Training Center (NTC) rotation, their organization stands a greater chance of success. The HHC BDE command teams should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Not clearly defining what roles the HHC brigade is the key owner of in supporting a command post, versus what the brigade staff (executive officer, S-3, operations sergeant major) see as the HHC brigade’s role.

- Not executing situational training exercises on quartering party roles and responsibilities.

- Not understanding what elements and enablers will be a part of the BDE main command post/tactical command post before execution, therefore, limiting planning, understanding, and capacity for sustainment requirements.

- Lack of rehearsing and/or having a codified system (standard operating procedures [SOPs]) in place for staging, preparation, and onward movements.

- Lack of rehearsals, training, and allocation of the right personnel to the security plan for a command post, ensuring it is survivable in large-scale combat operations.

To avoid these common pitfalls, the HHC brigade must clearly understand the personnel it will have assigned and what each person’s role is within the HHC BDE’s fight for the BCT. Once this is determined, the HHC BDE must plan training that will incorporate all of its personnel, including the BDE staff, to ensure roles and responsibilities in a non-garrison environment are understood by everyone. This is done in a realistic training environment where personnel can test systems and SOPs over distance and ensure they are using the equipment and enablers the unit will deploy with. The HHC BDE command team must have multiple playbooks that allow them to dynamically task-organize people according to the BCT commander’s and executive officers’ desire for command node emplacement.
The HHC BDE is responsible for ensuring the BDE command nodes can stage, prepare, and conduct tactical movement to a point of advantage and then ensure its survivability through security. To do this, the HHC BDE trains elements on the five collective training tasks outlined in this chapter. SOPs are codified so that everyone knows who and what the quartering party for each echelon of command node establishment entails. The HHC BDE must have a logistical understanding of how it will sustain multiple command nodes over distance for full operating capacity. The HHC BDE must be a force multiplier that knows all levels of command post operations, ensuring the main command post, mobile command group, and tactical command post can operate simultaneously, over distance, while properly sustained. The HHC BDE must also ensure command nodes are properly protected through a vigorous training path allowing the BCT’s command nodes to be successful and able to execute command and control functions for the BCT.

A key issue that plagues HHC BDEs is the lack of a codified training plan that focuses on the five collective tasks. An HHC BDE commander must allow ample time to train these tasks and ensure the support of all enablers, including those external to HHC BDE throughout the BCT. An HHC BDE commander plans and prepares a training plan to allow time to train in these five collective training tasks. The BCT commander and staff should be aware of this training plan and the needed training events that require their participation. Doing so will result in a HHC BDE that is a well-trained and enabling organization.
CHAPTER 9

The Brigade Combat Team
Tactical Command Post in an
Armored Brigade Combat Team

Operations Group, National Training Center

As a subordinate element of the headquarters and headquarters company, the brigade combat team (BCT) tactical operations center is too often forgotten until the eve of a National Training Center (NTC) rotation. Many brigades are still challenged in identifying when, where, and why to deploy a tactical command post (TAC). Instead, they attempt to operate it continuously throughout the rotation. This approach leads to staff burnout, untrained personnel operating critical systems, and ill-defined roles and responsibilities for all command posts at the BCT level.

Brigades must first understand when they intend to employ a BCT-level TAC. Second, to ensure continuous operations, commanders must understand the science of how they are allocating personnel for a troop-to-task. Third, commanders must understand the human limitations of their organizations.

After determining how brigades will fight the TAC, they should focus on the following high-payoff collective tasks for all BCT TAC personnel while at home station:

- Prepare for Tactical Operations (71-BCT-5120).
- Establish a Brigade/Group Command Post in an Operational Environment (71-BCT-0050).
- Conduct Information Collection (71-BCT-2300).
- Control Field Artillery Fire Missions (06-BCT-5053).

If the members of a BCT TAC in an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) focus on these tasks and master them before their NTC rotation, their organization has a greater chance of success.
The BCT TAC members should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Waiting until a deployment or combat training center (CTC) rotation to validate TAC systems and setup.
- Not having sufficient battle-tracking products for a main command post and TAC.
- Not conducting a thorough battle handover before sending out the TAC.
- Neglecting to provide clear expectations for how long and with what assets a TAC will provide command and control (C2) support for the BCT.
- Becoming overly focused on C2 operations and neglecting local sustainment and security considerations.

To avoid these common pitfalls, the BCT staff must identify the personnel it will assign to the BCT TAC and determine the amount of C2 support the TAC can realistically provide for the BCT. Once this is determined, the BCT must validate the TAC setup and its systems. This is done in a realistic environment where all personnel can test systems over distance, concurrently with the operations of other C2 nodes, and without relying on any equipment the unit will not deploy with.

Although the BCT TAC cannot fully replicate the C2 functions of a main command post, it must strive to maintain as much situational awareness and battle-tracking capabilities as possible. This involves having duplicates of the products found at the main command post and ensuring these products are updated as accurately as possible during a battle handover. In the event that unit has limited numbers of certain platforms (Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System [AFATDS], Distributed Common Ground System- Army [DCGS-A], etc.), the BCT must determine an appropriate time to transition control of these platforms to the TAC.
CHAPTER 10

The Brigade Intelligence Section

Operations Group, National Training Center

Many commanders do not realize the brigade intelligence (S-2) section in a field environment grows immensely. Absorbing a portion of the brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) military intelligence company during tactical operations, personnel fail to train together for the first time until they operate in a field environment.

The military intelligence training strategy, published by U.S. Army Forces Command, provides a venue for collective training. However, as a team, the brigade S-2 section must be trained to help the commander see the battlefield and understand the multiple possible futures facing the BCT, based on possible enemy actions.

The following are the top staff tasks a BCT S-2 section must include in home-station training to better drive operations and support situational understanding in the BCT main command post:

- Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) (34-SEC-3180).
- Maintain the Intelligence Portion of the Common Operational Picture (COP) (34-4-3175).
- Develop the Intelligence Running Estimate (34-4-3183).
- Provide Intelligence Support to Information Collection Planning (34-SEC-3173).
- Provide Intelligence Support to the Targeting Process (06-BDE-2000).

If the BCT S-2 section prioritizes these collective tasks in its training strategy, the BCT stands a better chance of synchronizing efforts at the decisive point and disrupting the enemy commander’s decision cycle during training and in large-scale combat operations. The BCT S-2 section should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Not thoroughly developing enemy courses of action (ECOAs) and leaving them as concepts.
- Failure to maintain fighting products (event template [EVENTEMP]).
- Failure to transition information between future operations and current operations.
• Overreliance on echelons above brigade intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.

• Failure to synchronize the information collection plan with a friendly scheme of maneuver.

The BCT S-2 section facilitates the commander’s understanding of the operational environment and variables through IPB. Too frequently, BCT S-2 sections conduct IPB by following a rigid “check-the-block” process that starts with a generalized terrain analysis that fails to assess the decisive advantage of micro-terrain. From there, the S-2 section moves to develop ECOAs that are conceptual in nature, and finishes in a generalized time-distance analysis captured in an EVENTEMP.

As a BCT S-2 section fighting product, the EVENTEMP is the basis for establishing the latest time information is of value (LTIOV) in support of information collection planning and asset synchronization. Similarly, the EVENTEMP also establishes shared understanding between the BCT for speed of recognition (forms of contact), speed of decision making (branch plan or sequel), speed of action (synchronization of warfighting functions), and operational tempo (maneuver). If the S-2 section is unable to create and maintain an EVENTEMP, it is unlikely the BCT will effectively synchronize effects at the decisive point against an opposing force.

Although BCT S-2 sections frequently fail to conduct detailed IPB, Maintaining the Intelligence Portion of the COP (34-4-3175), in combination with, Develop the Intelligence Running Estimate (34-4-3183), are the second- and third-most untrained tasks observed at NTC. These critical tasks support the following collective tasks:

• Establish the COP for Brigades (71-BDE-5319).

• Develop a Running Estimate (71-BDE-5144).

• Army Tactical Task (ART) 2.2.4, Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch.

The COP and the intelligence running estimate provide the BCT commander and staff with the metrics required to assess the tactical situation through measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. BCT S-2 sections that do not train and are unprepared to maintain a COP and intelligence running estimate often fail to achieve shared understanding within the BCT.
The basis for maintaining a COP and running estimate starts with an effective information collection plan. Information collection is frequently mischaracterized as a purely intelligence function, and independent, rather than nested, with the maneuver plan. For intelligence to drive operations and for operations to enable intelligence, the information collection plan must be detailed, synchronized, and operationalized with the BCT’s reconnaissance, maneuver, and fires plan. Training and development for successful execution of information collection starts with understanding that information collection must incorporate all warfighting functions. Typically, an overreliance on division and above ISR support is the result of inadequate IPB, and a failure to integrate ground reconnaissance and maneuver forces into the information collection plan.
CHAPTER 11

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: Terrain Analysis

MAJ Cortis Burgess, CPT Crescencio Padilla, and CW3 Bary McMaster

Brigade Intelligence Trainers, Operations Group, National Training Center

The intelligence warfighting function (IWfF) facilitates the commander’s understanding of the operational environment and variables through intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) conducted during the military decision-making process (MDMP). Paramount to successful IPB is understanding the threat and the operational environment in-depth to describe how the enemy will fight. Observations gathered at the National Training Center (NTC) demonstrate that brigade combat team (BCT) intelligence staffs lack the knowledge and experience required to develop enemy courses of action (ECOAs) during IPB that are feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete. The inability of IWfF personnel to develop appropriate ECOAs is not directly associated with whether they understand the opposing force’s capabilities; rather, it is their inability to operationalize terrain.

Too frequently, IPB is conducted by the BCT intelligence staff following the “check-the-block” process. From there, the intelligence staff moves to develop ECOAs that are conceptual in nature, and finishes in a generalized time-distance analysis captured in an event template (EVENTEMP). Neither the ECOA nor EVENTEMP captures the effects of terrain on mobility, survivability, or weapons system employment. Time-distance analysis is the basis for establishing a latest time information is of value (LTIOV) in support of information collection planning and asset synchronization. Time-distance analysis in support of shaping operations prevents an opposing force from achieving positions of relative advantage. Time-distance analysis also establishes speed of recognition (forms of contact), speed of decision making (branch plan or sequel), speed of action (synchronization of warfighting functions), and operational tempo (maneuver).
Current home-station training models for BCT intelligence staffs severely overlook the importance of describing the operational environment and its effect on military operations. Similarly, digital mission command training exercises do not capture or provide the means for intelligence staffs to validate their IPB by witnessing the effects of terrain on the opposing force commander’s decision making. In addition, mission command training exercises do not provide the fidelity of after action reviews that prove IPB wrong. By training this way, against an enemy that is unconstrained or advantaged by the use of its warfighting functions in the terrain, the intelligence staff is unable to achieve sufficient proficiency in IPB. As a result, intelligence staffs provide conceptual and unrealistic ECOAs that do not support effective friendly maneuver planning during MDMP.

To effectively train and build proficiency among the BCT intelligence staff on the collective tasks, Conduct Mission Analysis (71-BDE-5112), and Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (34-SEC-3180), the BCT IWfF requires close training with the maneuver force. Cross-functional training opportunities provide intelligence staffs a better understanding and visualization of the multiple variables that impact military operations and decision making.

Through observation and experimentation, instead of lecturing over a map, the BCT IWfF is better postured to enter the enemy’s planning cycle; understanding and visualizing its scheme of maneuver; and predicting actions, reactions, and counteractions based on how the operational environment and force characteristics affect operations. Finally, IPB does not stop at orders production; rather, it is a continuous process of analyzing the enemy scheme of maneuver against its characteristics and terrain. The opposing force commander is constantly reassessing its scheme of maneuver, and changing directions in the middle of the fight to achieve a position of relative advantage by controlling the tempo. The intelligence staff must train for, and practice returning to, updating IPB products constantly throughout a training event.

REFERENCES


ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 31 July 2019.

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 1 March 2019.

ATP 3-34.80, Geospatial Engineering, 22 February 2017.


**Endnotes**

2. Ibid.
CHAPTER 12
The Brigade Fire Support Element

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the collective training tasks a fire support element in a brigade combat team should focus on during home-station training:

- Prepare the Fire Support Plan (06-BDE-5062).
- Synchronize Fire Support (06-BDE-1084).
- Produce the Fire Support Plan (06-BDE-1081).
- Conduct Battle Tracking (06-BDE-1079).
- Perform a Transfer of Fire Support Operations to an Alternate Fire Support Element (06-BDE-6060).

If a fire support element supporting a brigade combat team focuses on these collective training tasks and masters them, the fire enterprise and brigade combat team stands a better chance of remaining synchronized and successful at the National Training Center. The fire support element should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Failure to integrate in planning and produce draft products.
- Lack of fighting products and poor dissemination.
- Failure to synchronize fire support with information collection.
- Lack of analog products and common operational picture.
- Failure to transfer control of fires to the brigade tactical command post.

Fighting products are essential for the brigade to remain synchronized and understand the fire support plan. Fighting products should be standardized through their standard operating procedure. As the brigade staff begins planning, the fire support officer or fires planner must understand when products should be developed and refined within the military decision-making process (MDMP). Developing draft products in conjunction with specific steps of the MDMP are vital to efficient orders production. Products should be developed and disseminated in time to allow subordinates to conduct bottom-up refinement.
During brigade planning, the fire support officer or fires planner must understand the information collection plan and maneuver plan to ensure fires are synchronized. To ensure fires are synchronized with information collection, the fire support officer or fires planner must discuss information collection asset capabilities and focus areas to determine if the assets can identify targets or triggers and provide assessments. This can also be accomplished by comparing the information collection synchronization matrix with the target synchronization matrix and correcting any gaps identified.

Brigade fire support elements sometimes struggle to battle track and maintain understanding of the maneuver situation and fire support situation. This can be traced directly to the lack of analog fighting products, running estimates, and a fires common operational picture. Analog fighting products are vital to current operations as they provide options for the fire support element, brigade battle captain, or brigade commander to provide direct fires against dynamic targets. Running estimates provide an overview of the constraints, limitations, and current situation of the fires enterprise, if updated correctly. Running estimates should also be provided to the fires planner for consideration in future operations. A fires common operational picture is essential to avoiding fratricide or other firing incidents. A fires common operational picture should be kept up-to-date and contain all fire support coordination measures, maneuver graphics, and enemy situation templates.

Transferring the control of fires between the brigade main command post and the tactical command post needs to be well-planned and rehearsed at home station. Fires personnel, vehicles, and equipment expected to support the tactical command post should be identified in the brigade or field artillery battalion’s standard operating procedures. Equipment and vehicles must be fully mission capable to support the brigade main command post and tactical command post. Analog products and a copy of the fires common tactical picture must accompany the tactical command post as it maneuvers forward in preparation for the main command post transferring control of fires. Failure to have equipment, vehicles, personnel, or products will result in a fires coverage gap and derail synchronization of the brigade fires enterprise.
CHAPTER 13

The Air Defense Airspace Management/Brigade Aviation Element in a Brigade Combat Team Command Post

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top air defense airspace management (ADAM)/brigade aviation element (BAE)-related collective training tasks a brigade combat team (BCT) main command post in a BCT should focus on during home-station training:

● Emplace the ADAM/BAE Shelter (44-SEC-9101).

● Integrate Airspace Management in BCT Operations (44-SEC-9106).

● Coordinate Air-Ground Operations When Providing Attack Aviation Support (44-BCT-0436).


● Provide ADAM Cell Input to the Common Operational Picture (44-BCT-9102).

These tasks show the objective task evaluation matrix for each task and the performance steps and measures by which to assess the training events. If a brigade ADAM/BAE focuses on these five tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The ADAM/BAE at the brigade main command post should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● Senior members of the ADAM/BAE often perform multiple roles in the main command post.

● Airspace priorities are not identified during the military decision-making process (MDMP).

● The unit airspace plan (UAP) is not adequately developed during the MDMP.

● The primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan is not developed to support the aviation task force or air defense artillery (ADA) battery.
● Battle handovers during command and control node transitions (main command post to tactical command post) are ineffective.

● Airspace user synchronization is not rehearsed.

● Graphics are not disseminated, resulting in high risk of fratricide.

To avoid these common pitfalls, the ADAM/BAE must ensure it allocates the appropriate number of personnel to tasks, and ensure they are extensively cross-trained. It should verify the BCT commander’s preference between fires and aviation. The ADAM/BAE should develop a simple UAP during course of action development that is easy to understand for airspace users, and integrate with aviation and ADA units early to develop and exercise a solid PACE plan. It should allocate sufficient personnel and equipment to the mobile command post. Finally, the ADAM/BAE should ensure the fires planner, aviation planner, tactical command post, and ADA battery commander brief during rehearsals (at a minimum, information collection, fires, and combined arms rehearsal), disseminate airspace graphics across the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) through the Data Distribution Service (DDS), and build analogue products for battalions.
CHAPTER 14

The Signal Staff Section in Brigade Combat Team Command Posts and the Signal (S-6) Section

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a signal section (S-6) in a brigade combat team (BCT) must plan for and successfully incorporate into the orders process, and should focus on during home-station training:

● Provide a Network Transmission Path for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-9060).

● Provide Network Switching Services for the Brigade Signal Company/Platoon (11-CO-9070).

● Provide Tactical Radio Support for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-9075).


● Perform Predeployment Maintenance Activities (43-CO-4805).

The S-6 section has a unique working relationship with the elements of the signal company that supports the BCT. It must effectively develop the planning portion of these tasks to ensure commanders and subordinate leaders are able to communicate across formations. The signal staff should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services and communications maintenance.

● Failure to ensure operators (10-level) understand and are able to complete basic tasks (S-6 Soldiers filling radios, etc.).

● Failure to conduct S-6 synchronization meetings.

● Failure to follow through with task completion.

● Lack of local security at retransmission sites.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the S-6 section must be engaged in the entire planning and operations process. Communications maintenance must be a command emphasis. Developing a section of the maintenance meeting dedicated to communications equipment will facilitate this effort and ensure issues and tasks are tracked until resolved. Individuals must treat communications systems with the same attention to detail as a weapons system. Develop a training program that empowers Soldiers to teach communications refreshers, instead of enabling a lack of understanding culture by “just getting it done” to do it faster. Conduct routine S-6 section synchronization meetings across the echelon so units become familiar with challenges and provide mutual support through effective crosstalk.
CHAPTER 15

Protect and Defend the Brigade
Upper Tactical Internet

MAJ Ben Hunter and CW4 Willie Newkirk
Operations Group, National Training Center

Brigade combat teams (BCTs) face a contested cyber environment where the ability to securely operate tactical internet (TI) will change the outcome of battle. Threats include nation states, criminals, and insiders who will damage systems or steal information if given the opportunity. Focus should be given to the following fundamental tasks to protect upper-TI systems:

**Align personnel with their roles and responsibilities.** Form a brigade network operations and security center (NOSC) for conducting cyberspace operations under the supervision of the brigade information systems engineer (26B). Network technicians (255N, 25N) and services technicians (255A, 25B) perform cyberspace security actions within the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) operations mission for their systems by reducing or eliminating vulnerabilities and ensuring availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. Cyber defenders (255S, 25D) execute cyberspace defense actions to defeat specific threats by detecting and mitigating threats. In a tactical environment, network, services, and defenders should physically sit together to ensure information flows rapidly within the NOSC.

**Maintain cyber hygiene.** The foundation for a secure and defensible upper-TI is cyber hygiene. Doctrinally, cyber hygiene exemplifies cyberspace security actions performed in support of DODIN operations. Many of these actions support the cybersecurity compliance program that must be executed by regulation. Deploy the latest baseline operating systems and patch all network infrastructure, servers, and clients. Control administrative accounts through the principle of least privilege. Some command and control systems require excessive permissions during configuration, but they should be immediately restricted after deployment. Enforce secure configurations through policy and central management tools. Deploy host-based security to every endpoint, including program of record (POR) systems. There are no exceptions to policy for host-based security. Use the full features of firewalls that operate at the application layer and treat all networks as untrusted.
Gain visibility into security events. Everyone gets breached sooner or later; ensure to posture to detect an incident. Detect in-depth by operating the security information and event management (SIEM) software provided by the program of record. SIEM becomes a single pane of glass for monitoring. Many event sources exist natively within networks and must be added to SIEM for correlation. Pull logs and events from all existing systems including endpoint security, system logs, network traffic such as NetFlow, and applications such as domain name system (DNS) and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). Deploy network security monitoring sensors throughout networks at choke points after all primary logging sources are in SIEM. Real-time monitoring, triage, incident analysis, coordination, and response are the core tasks of cyberspace defense actions.

Enforce physical security standards. Weak physical security is one of the easiest ways for threat actors to access classified information. The physical security program belongs to the brigade S-2, but physical controls protecting information systems are the responsibility of the S-6. The S-6 and S-2 must work together to limit access to only people who are cleared and need to know. Many organizations fail to consider the importance of physical security in a field environment.

Practice incident response. When the inevitable security incident occurs, the team must be prepared to execute the incident response process. The phases of incident handling are preparation, detection, containment, eradication, and recovery. Reports of each cyber incident must flow efficiently to the division and across battalion headquarters. Resolve incidents under the guidance of the brigade NOSC and prevent recurrence of the same incident by implementing secure configuration or changing procedures.

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Army Regulation 25-2, Army Cybersecurity, 4 April 2019.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 6510.01B, Cyber Incident Handling Guide, 10 July 2012.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 25-2-17, Incident Reporting, 8 April 2019.


Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, 8 June 2018.

SECTION III

Cavalry Squadron Operations
Recommended Task Focus Areas
CHAPTER 16

Cavalry Squadron in an Armored Brigade Combat Team

Operations Group, National Training Center

Army doctrine clearly lays out the fundamental role of an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) cavalry squadron.

The cavalry squadron’s fundamental role is to perform reconnaissance and security to provide accurate and timely information across the area of operations. Reconnaissance and security provides the ABCT commander with combat information to develop situational understanding, make plans and decisions quickly, and visualize and direct operations. The cavalry squadron has the capability to defend itself against most threats.1

Although many Combined Arms Training Strategies-specified tasks relate to the overarching role of a cavalry squadron inside a brigade combat team (BCT), at the end of the day, the cavalry squadron essentially needs to accomplish two tasks: Move forward to develop the situation, and provide time and space for a BCT to act. Therefore, when challenged by training time and resources, the cavalry squadron builds the greatest amount of readiness possible by focusing on its ability to execute the following two tasks to a high standard:

- Conduct Zone Reconnaissance (17-SQDN-9314).
- Conduct a Guard (17-SQDN-9222).

Properly constructed, a zone reconnaissance includes specified areas for subordinates to reconnoiter. Additionally, a properly constructed zone reconnaissance during training exercises emphasizes the critical decision points that must take place. What role does the cavalry squadron play inside of an overall BCT information collection effort? How does the cavalry squadron nest properly with the BCT planning timeline to initiate reconnaissance in a timely manner? Does the BCT transition to a hasty attack or hasty defense based on information from the squadron? Does the cavalry squadron become decisively engaged to continue to buy time and space for the BCT commander? Each of these aspects can be trained amid a properly constructed zone reconnaissance lane.
Similarly, a guard mission challenges the squadron to integrate enabling assets from outside its organic units. It requires the integration of fires and possibly engineer elements to perform a guard effectively in a combined arms fashion. By properly constructing a guard mission during home-station training, the cavalry squadron maximizes time and resources to train its central role of providing time and space for the BCT commander. The cavalry squadrons should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of an effective and efficient operations process.
- Lack of sustainment systems and processes that enable continuous reconnaissance and security operations.
- Failure to integrate and synchronize intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and fires.
- Failure to rehearse and conduct reconnaissance handover with combined arms battalions (CABs).

Squadron staffs often lack an effective and efficient operations process that enables rapid receipt, analysis, production, and distribution of an operation order and fighting products to the troops. An ineffective operations process prevents effective integration and synchronization of warfighting functions and prevents subordinate units from clearly understanding priority intelligence requirements or BCT decision points. An inefficient operations process at the squadron consumes time that troops and platoons need for troop leading procedures. Squadrons also fail to develop and rehearse expeditionary sustainment and maintenance systems in a way that enables continuous reconnaissance and security. Maintenance collection points are frequently too far to the rear with incomplete manning or equipment, and fail to rapidly repair vehicles and return them to the fight. Squadrons that fail to synchronize their intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, and echelon fires cannot maneuver effectively at the National Training Center (NTC). Frequently, the maneuver plan does not synchronize information collection and fires because of independent planning by different staff sections and an ineffective war game during course of action analysis. Squadrons fail to conduct effective reconnaissance handovers with the CABs and fail to coordinate effectively with task force scouts during reconnaissance handover. Troops typically arrive to NTC with little experience working with task force scouts and do not follow any standard operating procedures, checklists, or measures of performance for reconnaissance handover. This prevents the squadron from effectively communicating critical information to the CABs.

Figure 16-1 illustrates the complete recommended mission-essential task crosswalk for an ABCT cavalry squadron including platoon-level, high-payoff tasks.
## MASTERING THE FUNDAMENTALS

### Cavalry Squadron (ABCT) (HQDA Directed)

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### Cavalry Troop-Prioritized METs

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### Scout Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks

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<td>Provide Ground Ambulance EVAC Support. 08-PLT-0319</td>
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### High-Payoff Leader Tasks

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These tasks should be a leader-development focus for every company commander, first sergeant, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leader within the formation before the initiation of collective training.

### SQDN Tank Company METs (HQDA Directed)

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### Armored Company-Prioritized METs

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**Figure 16-1. Recommended mission-essential task crosswalk for an ABCT cavalry squadron**
Endnote
CHAPTER 17

The Headquarters and Headquarters Troop in a Cavalry Squadron

Operations Group, National Training Center

The headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) of a cavalry squadron serves a unique purpose with fewer capabilities to influence the brigade combat team (BCT) fight than a combined arms battalion headquarters company. Other than the assigned medical platoon, the HHT focuses predominately on enabling command and control of the squadron and manning the combat trains command post (CTCP) to coordinate sustainment activities.

In certain tactical situations, the HHT commanders might be asked to provide command and control for attached elements; therefore, their ability to receive and integrate attachments is important in specific instances. Regardless, the operations of the CTCP and support to the squadron main command post are of primary importance to an HHT. The following are the top collective training tasks an HHT in a cavalry squadron should focus on during home-station training:

- Conduct Sustainment Support Operations (Company) (63-CO-4574).
- Coordinate Replenishment/Sustainment Operations (Company) (63-CO-4000).
- Support Command Posts for Companies (Company) (71-CO-0433).

If an HHT in a cavalry squadron focuses on these tasks and masters them before its rotation at the National Training Center (NTC), its organization stands a greater chance of success. The HHT should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lacking preventive maintenance checks and services, and maintenance control systems.
- Failure to maintain or bring protection equipment (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives).
- Lack of logistics status reporting format, times, and procedures.
- Lack of local security.
- Lack of repetitions in operating a command post.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the commander and first sergeant must build a culture of maintenance, assign a noncommissioned officer (NCO) from each staff section to oversee maintenance in the HHT, ensure each NCO is trained on Army standards for maintenance, and ensure equipment in the formation has an actual technical manual -10. The HHT commander must supervise loadout for NTC with input from the executive officer and first sergeant. Staff section officers in charge (OICs) and noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOICs) must brief the commander on any modified table of organization equipment they plan to leave at home station. Additionally, the commander and first sergeant must ensure the unit packs Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) in a consolidated connex box for issue at NTC or that is issued to every Soldier, packed and verified before loadout. The squadron S-4 must create and enforce a standardized logistics status format focused on quantities for classes of supply being reported; avoid a “green, amber, red, and black” system. Ensure the squadron uses this format and sends reports over a common communications medium (for example, the Joint Battle Command-Platform [JBC-P] system) in accordance with the unit’s standard operating procedures during the train-up to NTC. The HHT commander and first sergeant must establish a security plan and posture at the CTCP. Vehicles and crews at the maintenance collection point, commonly co-located with the CTCP, are part of the security plan. The CTCP should have AT4s and a Stinger for local security. Finally, the CTCP should train as a troop command post and alternate squadron command post during training events. Establish the CTCP during weekly squadron maintenance activities to track maintenance status across the squadron.

THE MEDICAL PLATOON IN A CAVALRY SQUADRON

The following are the top collective training tasks a medical platoon in a cavalry squadron should focus on during home-station training:

- Manage Health Service Support Operations (Platoon) (08-PLT-0312).
- Provide Emergency Medical Treatment, Non-Medical (Platoon) (08-PLT-0313).
- Provide Ground Ambulance Evacuation Support (Platoon) (08-PLT-0319).
- Treat Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Contaminated Casualties (Platoon) (08-PLT-0232).
If a medical platoon in a cavalry squadron focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of succeeding in the environment it encounters. The medical platoon should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Not integrating with staff during the military decision-making process (MDMP).
- Not clearly delegating roles and responsibilities in the platoon.
- Not updating the medical material mobilization planning tool.
- Not enforcing maintenance standards.

Medical officers (MEDOs) must understand they are not platoon leaders, but members of the special staff. The MEDO must coordinate through the S-4 to meet the commander’s intent for medical support. The MEDO attends MDMP sessions and update briefs. The MEDO works through the S-4 to ensure the concept of medical support effectively supports the maneuver plan. The MEDO attends rehearsals, and maintains and distributes the medical common operational procedure. Medical platoon standard operating procedures should outline the roles and responsibilities for each section and each NCO to increase the effectiveness of the platoon. Several duties must be specified including the evacuation sergeant, triage sergeant, and Class VIII sergeant. The Class VIII sergeant is responsible for establishing the local account for the squadron and monitoring the Class VIII on hand in the platoon and with line medics. This aids in planning and forecasting Class VIII supply requests. The MEDO and platoon sergeant reinforce a culture of maintenance, assign an NCO from each section to oversee their section’s maintenance, ensure each NCO is trained to the Army standard on maintenance, and ensure equipment is assigned with a technical manual -10 on hand. The MEDO and platoon sergeant must supervise the loadout for their section and brief the commander on any equipment they plan to leave at home station.
CHAPTER 18

The Cavalry Troop in an Armored Brigade Combat Team

(Operations Group, National Training Center)

Trained properly, armored brigade combat team (ABCT) cavalry troops provide a tremendous amount of flexibility and maneuver space. Improperly trained, cavalry troops constitute some of the most vulnerable formations within a brigade combat team (BCT). They likely will be the first to make direct contact with enemy forces. More so than other company-level formations, the decisions a cavalry troop commander makes on the ground affect the entire scheme of maneuver for a BCT. To overcome these inevitable outcomes, commanders must appropriately focus home-station training.

The zone reconnaissance and screen are the hallmark of cavalry troop operations. Providing sound reconnaissance and security guidance is the responsibility of the brigade commander and further refined by the squadron commander.

The final fundamental task for a cavalry troop to train in preparation for a National Training Center (NTC) rotation is area security. At NTC, commanders are often forced to commit cavalry troops to secure an assailable flank or a portion of the BCT front. During these critical transition periods, displacement might not be feasible. Disengagement might not be feasible. Reinforcements from follow-on forces might not be feasible. During these finite periods, the task of area security more aptly describes the following tasks cavalry troops are asked to perform:

- Conduct Area Security (07-CO-1272).
- Conduct Zone Reconnaissance (17-TRP-4010).
- Conduct Screen (17-TRP-9225).

The most common cavalry troop home-station training shortcomings expose themselves at NTC during transition periods. During these times, commanders at the brigade and squadron levels push their troops forward using the simple mantra of “scouts out.” Although great for building unit pride and cohesion, this approach simplistically pushes cavalry troops forward on the battlefield in a hasty fashion without considering the enemy positions they must reconnoiter, the terrain and its effects, or the very forces they are tasked to protect. The following are common shortcomings:
● Failure to develop a situation template (SITTEMP).
● Failure to plan and synchronize fires.
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), maintenance enforcement, and field maintenance team positioning.
● Failure to train and develop troop command posts.

Troop commanders frequently fail to fully analyze the enemy situation and typically restate the information received from the squadron S-2. They must refine the SITTEMP the S-2 provides and plot range rings for anti-tank systems, mortars, and artillery to understand where to transition from movement to maneuver and how to synchronize friendly fires with dismounted and mounted maneuver. An inability to depict the enemy prevents proper planning and synchronization of mortars and artillery. It also prevents effective employment of the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle. Failing to visualize the enemy effectively results in decisive engagement, failure to achieve reconnaissance objectives, premature disengagement, or destruction of the troop. Commanders routinely fail to understand maintenance systems and often retain portions of the field maintenance teams too far forward. Field maintenance teams should keep the M88, contact truck, and a maintenance team with the troop trains. The remainder of the field maintenance team, including the forward repair system and the supply stock list should remain at the maintenance collection point. Troop commanders routinely fail to establish clear priorities of work resulting in inconsistent maintenance and a broken workflow with Department of the Army (DA) Form 5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet (1 March 1991). This leaves the troop lacking parts required to maintain combat power as they continue the fight. Troops often fail to identify, train, and develop their command post personnel during training progressions. This leads to command posts lacking in reporting standards or tracking systems and frequently pulls the commander into managing routine reports. Command post personnel should train at all events and be treated as a vehicle crew.
THE SCOUT PLATOON IN A CAVALRY TROOP
(ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM)

The following are the top collective training tasks a scout platoon in a cavalry squadron (ABCT) should focus on during home-station training:

- Conduct Actions on Contact (07-PLT-9012).
- Conduct Zone Reconnaissance (71-PLT-5100).
- Conduct Area Reconnaissance (17-PLT-4011).
- Establish an Observation Post (07-PLT-9016).
- Conduct Screen (17-PLT-4010).

If a scout platoon in a cavalry squadron (ABCT) focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. Scout platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Failure to properly develop a SITTEMP.
- Failure to plan for and employ dismounts.
- Failure to plan fires.
- Failure to establish priorities of work, especially maintenance.

To avoid common pitfalls, platoon leaders must properly analyze the enemy plan and refine the SITTEMP provided to them. Platoon leaders often restate what they receive from their commander and fail to refine the picture of how the enemy will fight for the platoon. This lack of understanding drives poor maneuver decisions that lead to decisive engagements and the destruction of friendly forces. Platoons fail to identify appropriate locations for vehicle drop-offs of their dismounts outside of anti-tank system range, or do not ensure dismounts are properly equipped for their mission. Failure to standardize dismount kits and inspect them leads to observation posts without long-range communications or anti-tank weapons. Platoon leaders fail to echelon fires as they maneuver, and typically only call for immediate suppression while in contact. Platoons fail to issue clear priorities of work, fail to ensure operators properly conduct maintenance and PMCS, and fail to ensure mechanics verify faults.
THE SCOUT SECTION IN A CAVALRY SQUADRON
(ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM)

The following are the collective training tasks a scout section in a cavalry squadron (ABCT) should focus on during home-station training:

- Supervise Scout Platoon Tactical Formations (171-123-1306).
- Perform Techniques of Movement (171-121-4057).
- Integrate Direct Fires (07-PLT-3027).
- Integrate Indirect Fire Support (07-PLT-3036).
- Conduct Reconnaissance Handover (17-PLT-4025).

If scout platoon sections focus on these tasks and master them before their NTC rotation, their organization stands a greater chance of success. Scout platoon sections should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of proper PMCS.
- Failure to follow priorities of work.
- Inability to use dismounted and mounted elements in mutually supportive roles.
- Failure to understand and identify probable lines of contact.
- Senior scouts and section noncommissioned officers (NCOs) not involved in troop leading procedures (TLP).

To avoid the common pitfalls, NCOs must ensure they enforce maintenance standards and supervise daily PMCS with a technical manual -10 and record faults on DA Form 5988-E. NCOs must enforce priorities of work within their sections to maintain a high level of readiness. Section leaders fail to dismount far enough from anti-tank fires or close enough to the enemy to maintain tempo. Section leaders often emplace dismounts in position without proper equipment because of a lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs), precombat checks (PCCs), or precombat inspections (PCIs). Dismounts must have long-range optics, Javelins, and radios. Sections often fail to transition from movement to maneuver because of a lack of understanding of the enemy situation and probable lines of contact. Sections frequently become decisively engaged or are destroyed when making contact with mounted forces against enemy anti-tank systems. Section leaders and NCOs within the section must participate in the platoon’s planning. Participating in planning improves the section’s understanding of the mission and assists the platoon leader and platoon sergeant in completing TLP in time for sections to finish preparations.
INDIVIDUAL AND CREW TASKS IN A CAVALRY SQUADRON (ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM)

The following are the individual and crew training tasks a cavalry squadron (ABCT) should focus on during home-station training:

- Engage Targets With a Javelin (071-060-0005).
- Perform Voice Communications (113-COM-1022).
- Inspect Personnel and Equipment (071-328-5301).
- Conduct TLP (150-LDR-5012).
- Conduct Movement Techniques by a Platoon or Section (071-326-5630).
- Prepare a Situation Report (171-121-4051).
- Plan a Reconnaissance Mission (171-123-1313).
- Camouflage Yourself and Your Individual Equipment (052-COM-1361).
- Conduct Movement Techniques by a Squad (071-326-5610).
- Coordinate With Adjacent Units (171-121-4034).

If individuals and crews in a cavalry squadron (ABCT) focus on these tasks and master them before their NTC rotation, their organization stands a greater chance of success. Individuals and crews should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of PCCs and PCIs.
- Failure to properly conduct PMCS.
- Failure to boresight.
- Lack of familiarization of equipment and platforms.
- Failure to report in a timely and accurate manner.
- Inability to use the right movement technique and formation.
To successfully fight and train at NTC, individuals and crews must perform the tasks listed above to standard. Individuals and crews often arrive at the NTC unfamiliar with assigned weapons, optics, and communications equipment and are ineffective on the battlefield. Individuals and crews fail to conduct PCIs or PCCs, and frequently send individuals forward with not mission-capable equipment or without critical equipment. Units do not arrive with functional tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs) or individuals do not realize that many useful checklists reside in unit TACSOPs. Crews fail to conduct PMCS to standard resulting in the loss of combat power to compounding vehicle faults over time. Developing training on how to complete DA Form 5988-E, developing an SOP, and strictly enforcing the SOP is crucial to maintaining equipment at NTC or in the field. Units must ensure their crews know how to operate multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) and boresight daily.
The Armor Company in a Cavalry Squadron

Operations Group, National Training Center

The tank company in a cavalry squadron serves a unique purpose, enabling the squadron to retain and seize terrain. It provides the lethal firepower needed to set the final conditions required before the commitment of combined arms battalions into the fight. Most often at the National Training Center (NTC), the commitment of the squadron’s tank company represents the final culminating step of the squadron’s mission to shape the fight for the brigade combat team (BCT). At this point, higher headquarters typically tell the tank company to execute one of two tasks: To either reinforce a cavalry troop’s security effort, or reinforce a cavalry troop’s reconnaissance effort. However, the following training tasks depict the movement to contact as one of the most critical. Although many units treat reinforcing a cavalry troop’s reconnaissance effort as an attack, at the lowest levels, regardless of the clarity of the enemy situation, everything becomes a movement to contact. Gaining situational awareness, moving forward, establishing initial contact with the smallest element possible, and then massing the effects of combat power of the committed platoon or company to destroy, disrupt, or delay an enemy is at the heart of the tank company’s role on the decisive action battlefield:

- Conduct an Area Defense (Tank Platoon) (17-PLT-1030).
- Conduct a Movement to Contact (Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team) (Armored Brigade Combat Team [ABCT]) (17-CO-1074).

Armor companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of a trained and functional command post.
- Lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for routine actions such as establishing a tactical assembly area, stand-to, and forward passage of lines.
- Lack of accurate logistics status (LOGSTAT) reporting.
- Lack of experience with logistic release point (LRP) operations.
Companies often lack a trained and functional command post capable of performing the six command post functions. Company commanders should establish their command post whenever possible at home station. Frequently, company command posts are only established during company-level or higher collective training. However, commanders can establish their command post during weekly maintenance operations, crew gunnery, or other collective training to further develop the command post and its personnel. Similarly, commanders should operationalize logistics during training events. Instead of establishing a fuel truck at the gunnery range for service station operations, commanders can train multiple tasks, enforce LOGSTAT reporting from platoons, establish LRPs, and gain proficiency at LRP procedures. Companies benefit from entering NTC with established SOPs. Actions that happen frequently, such as establishing a tactical assembly area and conducting stand-to should have checklists in an SOP that can easily be passed from platoon leaders to tank commanders and gunners for execution.

**THE TANK PLATOON IN A CAVALRY SQUADRON**

The following are the top collective training tasks a tank platoon in a cavalry squadron should focus on during home-station training:

- Conduct Tactical Movement (Platoon) (07-PLT-1342).
- Conduct Actions on Contact (Platoon) (07-PLT-9013).
- Conduct an Area Defense (Tank Platoon) (17-PLT-1030).
- Conduct an Attack by Fire (Platoon) (07-PLT-1256).

If a tank platoon in a cavalry squadron focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. Tank platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of accurate LOGSTAT reporting.
- Lack of established SOPs for priorities of work during troop leading procedures (TLP).

Platoon sergeants must submit timely and accurate LOGSTATs and consumption reports to the company or troop executive officer. The executive officer must forecast the next 24, 48, and 72 hours accurately to allow time for supplies to be routed to the company or troop. This is enabled by accurate LOGSTATs from the platoons. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants should develop SOPs that establish priorities of work for their crews during TLP. Once the company or troop commander issues a warning order that describes the type of operation, the platoons can begin preparing for the mission and conduct rehearsals. Platoon SOPs should define what each crewmember does for mission preparation. For example, the driver conducts preventive
maintenance checks and services (PMCS) before operations, the loader conducts machine gun maintenance, and gunner conducts boresight. Platoons can then focus on mission-specific rehearsals. Many crew and platoon preparations can be completed before the company or troop operation order, allowing time for precombat inspections and checks, rehearsal of battle drills, or rehearsals of the operation.

THE TANK CREW IN A CAVALRY SQUADRON

The following are the top collective training tasks a tank crew in a cavalry squadron should focus on during home-station training:

- Boresight an M1A2 System Enhanced Package Tank With a Muzzle Boresight Device (Crew) (17-CW-5695).
- Engage Targets With the Main Gun From an M1-Series Tank (Crew) (17-CW-5622).
- Occupy a Vehicle Firing Position (Crew) (17-CW-2500).

If the tank crews in the cavalry squadron focus on these tasks and master them before their NTC rotation, their organization stands a greater chance of success. Tank crews should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of conducting boresight routinely.
- Lack of PMCS and maintenance.

The squadron needs lethal tank crews and platoons to succeed. Crews must focus on maintenance and boresight operations to demonstrate lethality. Tank commanders must enforce routine boresight procedures while at NTC, ideally twice daily. A technique that works well is to boresight immediately following stand-to and an hour before end evening nautical twilight. Additionally, tank commanders must enforce before, during, and after PMCS daily. PMCS must be conducted using a technical manual -10 and not from memory. A culture of ownership of equipment and maintenance must start at home station. The tank commander is responsible to ensure all actions to maintain the vehicle are done to standard every day, ensure that mechanics verify faults, and ensure that the Department of the Army Form 5988-E, *Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet* (1 March 1991), makes it to the platoon sergeant.
MASTERING THE FUNDAMENTALS

CHAPTER 20
The Forward Support Troop in a Cavalry Squadron
Armored Brigade Combat Team

Operations Group

Sustainment of reconnaissance and security operations challenges every armored brigade combat team cavalry squadron. The vast distances, ambiguous situations, and evolving nature of the battlefield present a robust problem set for every squadron. Additionally, current doctrine regarding tactics, techniques, and procedures for sustainment on the large-scale combat operations battlefield remains underdeveloped.

Combined Arms Training Strategy currently does not provide a training and evaluation outline for critical sustainment tasks such as establish a field trains command post (FTCP) or unit maintenance collection point. Further, the current Headquarters, Department of the Army-directed mission essential tasks do not adequately cover each of the fundamental tasks a forward support company must enable in a large-scale combat operations scenario construct.

The maintenance teams from the forward support troop (FST) must be capable of conducting field maintenance operations. The company headquarters should be established with primary responsibility for FTCP operations. The distribution platoon must be split between the combat trains command post (CTCP) (emergency Class III and V supply) and the FTCP (logistics package operations). The FST must understand how to ensure troopers remain fed during combat operations. The entire company must be trained to operate over distance from the brigade consolidation area to the battalion rear area. Wherever they are located on the battlefield, the elements of the FST must be capable of protecting themselves. The following are the top collective training tasks an FST should focus on during home-station training:

- Perform Field Maintenance (43-CO-4552).
- Provide Field Feeding Support (10-CO-0556).
- Conduct Unit Defense (63-CO-0727).
- Establish Company Headquarters (63-CO-4518).
- Direct Distribution Operations (63-CO-4882).
The FST should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of knowledge on doctrinal sustainment operations.
- Lack of integration between the FST and S-4 for sustainment operations.
- Lack of troop command post operations.
- Undefined duties and responsibilities for key leaders in an operational environment.
- Not maintaining communications.

Challenges within an FST mimic the challenges with most forward support companies, albeit on an amplified scale. The extended distances for an FST, challenges of negotiating combined arms battalion battlespace, and communications more prominently impact a FST. Therefore, increased attention to these areas and ensuring the right leaders are placed at the points of friction, best mitigates the challenges these organizations face.

Doctrinal sustainment operations should be reviewed and compared to the squadron’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) on sustainment operations to provide insight on the differences and expectations. Army Techniques Publication 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion (5 February 2016), Chapter 7, provides guidance on sustainment operations and the CTCP. Understanding doctrinal sustainment also provides defined duties and responsibilities for the S-4 (logistical planner) and FST (logistics executioner), which can avoid miscommunication, lack of integration and synchronization, and lack of logistical support. If the FST executive officer, who usually runs command post operations, operates away from the main troop command post, then ensure that the FST headquarters element executes command post operations in accordance with published SOPs. Analog tracking, battle tracking, and digital communications (frequency modulation [FM], Joint Capabilities Release [JCR], and Joint Battle Command-Platform [JBC-P]) are all critical to the success of the FST as it provides the FST commander a clear picture of the FST and logistics for the battalion. Communications is key to maintaining command and control and visibility of all assets. Lastly, FST commanders need to provide clear, concise duties and responsibilities to key leaders within the company according to their position, role, and location (FTCP, CTCP, and forward logistics element). That means, ensuring that each leader understands his role, expectations, and responsibilities. For example, if the executive officer is at the FTCP, is he expected to attend brigade support battalion logistics synchronization? Does he communicate with the BSB for any issues, friction points, or concerns, or is he there just to be a body in the brigade support area?
THE DISTRIBUTION PLATOON, FORWARD SUPPORT TROOP

The following are the top collective training tasks a distribution platoon in a cavalry squadron should focus on during home-station training:

- Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition (55-PLT-0012).
- Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution Operations (10-CO-0237).
- Conduct Tactical Convoy (63-TS-2924).
- Defend Convoy Elements (63-TS-2924).

If a distribution platoon in a cavalry squadron focuses on these five tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The distribution platoon should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Failure to execute logistic release point (LRP) procedures.
- Improper execution of mounted land navigation.
- Inadequate load plans and tie-down procedures.
- Lack of blackout driver training using night-vision devices.
- Lack of local security
- Lack of integration and synchronization with the CTCP or FTCP forward to troop trains.

To avoid these common pitfalls, the distribution platoon must train on and validate procedures for executing LRPs contained in the unit tactical standard operating procedures. Additionally, the distribution platoon must train on mounted land navigation and blackout driving in less than 25-percent illumination. During home-station training, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant must enforce proper load planning and cargo tie-down procedures. They must conduct precombat inspections and checks as part of troop leading procedures as a matter of routine. The distribution platoon must develop and train on its SOPs and enforce a minimum of a 25-percent security posture. The distribution platoon should incorporate stand-to procedures during training. Additionally, the distribution platoon should execute resupply operations and LRPs with first sergeants in accordance with unit SOPs during all training events.
The following are the top collective training tasks a maintenance control section in a cavalry squadron should focus on during home-station training:

- Set Up Maintenance Section(s) (63-TS-4021/43-CO-0020).
- Conduct Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (63-TS-3398/43-CO-4575).
- Perform Maintenance Control Functions (63-TS-4021/43-CO-4506).

If a maintenance control section in a cavalry squadron focuses on these five tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The maintenance control section should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Having a not mission-capable common operational picture (COP) not reflecting the equipment status report.
- Lacking maintenance, recovery, and support requirements.
- Lacking shop stock list management at the field maintenance team.
- Struggling to monitor Department of the Army (DA) Form 5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet (1 March 1991), workflow and parts requisition.
- Lacking local security in the maintenance control point.
- Mismanagement of parts requisitions and petroleum, oil, and lubricants consumption reporting.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the squadron maintenance officer and squadron maintenance technician must develop a not mission-capable COP that reinforces the equipment status report accuracy. All vehicles, JBC-P systems, communication equipment, and ancillary equipment must reflect proper administrative numbers in the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army). Equipment deadlines must reflect accurately by bumper number in the equipment status report, and the maintenance control section must track them on the not mission-capable COP. At home-station training, the squadron must conduct field maintenance away from the motor pool during gunnery, situational training exercises, and live-fire exercises to reinforce and validate expeditionary processes, reporting, and DA Form 5988-E workflow. The maintenance control section must develop a maintenance collection point SOP that includes stand-to and provides local security posture of at least 25 percent. Units must train on their SOPs during home-station training.
SECTION IV

Combined Arms Battalions
Recommended Task Focus Areas
CHAPTER 21

The Combined Arms Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The central role of an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) combined arms battalion (CAB) is “to close with and destroy enemy forces using fire, maneuver, and shock effect, or to repel his assault by fire and counterattack.” The very nature of an ABCT CAB’s role on the modern battlefield requires the ability to move quickly, combine capabilities dynamically, and coordinate among multiple units to rapidly achieve the desired effects.

Although seemingly simple, these aspects of a CAB’s fundamental role imply lethal crews and platoons that know each other, can coordinate, and can bring overwhelming firepower to bear to compel an enemy to react. Given a CAB’s fundamental purpose on the battlefield as part of an ABCT, commanders can narrow the focus of their battalions to train these critical capabilities.

As a result, CABs should focus their home-station training on three specific mission-essential tasks (METs). First, CABs must be capable of rapidly moving forward on the battlefield and establishing contact with the smallest element possible, rather than marching the entire formation into an enemy engagement area. Second, when the enemy situation is more developed, CABs must be able to quickly coordinate across the battalion to mass firepower to accomplish brigade combat team (BCT)-level objectives. Finally, once seized, CABs must retain terrain or critical areas to prevent an enemy from performing a successful attack or counterattack. The following are the top collective training tasks a CAB should focus on during home-station training:

- Conduct an Area Defense (17-BN-1030).
- Conduct a Movement to Contact (17-BN-1074).
- Conduct an Attack (17-BN-1094).

Units should use the training and evaluation outline for each task to assess proficiency in executing tasks. These three tasks constitute the majority of battalion-level activities during a typical rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). Furthermore, these tasks serve as the foundation for CABs during large-scale combat operations as units are always either attacking (when on the move) or defending (when stationary). Units conduct a movement to contact when the situation is uncertain, followed by a transition to a hasty attack or defense based on information gained by the unit in contact.
A CAB should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Failing to synchronize warfighting functions and combined arms.
- Lack of specificity in the unit’s task organization.
- Unclear unit boundaries.
- Lack of anticipating transition points and supporting the CAB through replenishment operations.
- Inadequate systems for timely and accurate reporting.

To overcome these pitfalls, CABs should routinely incorporate personnel from outside the CAB, such as the fire support element personnel and engineers, to build familiarity, refine standard operating procedures (SOPs), and increase staff integration. The CAB’s fire support element should be integrated into the CAB’s main command post layout and current operations section. CABs should develop a planning SOP, clearly defining the minimum requirements for annex A, task organization. This should include the “effective as of” date and time group and the appropriate command and support relationships. Staffs should rehearse terrain management and the development of graphic control measures to support the commander’s intent. These graphic control measures enable subordinate freedom of action by assigning company areas of responsibility that allow greater control over the employment of direct- and indirect-fire weapon systems. Units should execute Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) and Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) training to build familiarity with passing graphics via digital command and control systems. Even during home-station training, companies should coordinate through the CAB S-4 and the forward support company to receive classes of supply and execute resupply via logistics package operations at a logistics release point. Lastly, CABs should develop a detailed primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan by warfighting function for all reports. A single PACE plan lacks the specificity required for a company executive officer to understand how to send a yellow-1 logistics status when the JBC-P breaks or for the battalion fire support officer to request field artillery fires when the frequency modulated fires digital system goes down.

Figure 21-1 depicts the mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for a CAB in an ABCT. By focusing training on these tasks, the lower echelons of the BCT increase their likelihood of success.
Figure 21-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for a combined arms battalion in an ABCT
Endnote

CHAPTER 22
The Main Command Post in a Combined Arms Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top training tasks a main command post (MCP) in a combined arms battalion should focus on during home-station training:

- Conduct Command Post Operations (150-MC-5200).
- Provide Input for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (150-MC-2210).
- Perform a Rehearsal (150-MC-5122).
- Integrate the Command and Control Network (150-MC-5251).
- Establish the Common Operational Picture (150-MC-5315).

Units should use the training and evaluation outline for each task to assess proficiency in executing tasks. These five tasks provide the foundational functions of the MCP and enable it to receive, analyze, process, and share information. An MCP should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- No future operations (FUOPS) to current operations (CUOPS) handover.
- Poor layout that stifles warfighting function integration and collaboration.
- Failure to perform basic preventive maintenance checks and services of MCP equipment.
- Unclear responsibilities during command post transitions.

To avoid these common pitfalls, MCP staff should rehearse the formal handover of a plan from the FUOPS section to the CUOPS section. This should include a deliberate backbrief of the plan with WfF representatives. By design, MCP setup and layout should facilitate crosstalk and communication between staff sections. This collaboration is difficult to achieve when staffs stovepipe information flow in separate vehicles. Analog products such as map boards, combat power trackers, enemy kill charts, and printed fighting products should be positioned where the staff can easily update them. Units should routinely set up their MCP at home station to validate command post standard operating procedures (SOPs) and identify equipment issues. Each staff section should receive training on how to set up, tear down, and maintain command post equipment. Particular attention should be paid to
communications equipment and generators. A lone specialist cannot maintain these systems and troubleshoot the inevitable faults that arise from operations in austere conditions. Furthermore, the more familiar staff members are with the command post equipment, the more they can leverage the capabilities organic to a combined arms battalion MCP. Lastly, units should review their command post SOP and ensure it includes the actions associated with a deliberate transition between the tactical command post, MCP, and company trains command post. SOPs should include responsibilities and authorities associated with key personnel at each of these command posts during a transition.
CHAPTER 23

The Fire Support Element in a Combined Arms Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the collective training tasks a fire support element in a combined arms battalion should focus on during home-station training:

- Produce the Fire Support Plan (06-BN-1081).
- Develop an Observation Plan (061-284-4009).
- Conduct Rehearsals (Battalion/Squadron Fire Support Element and Company/Troop Fire Support Team [FIST]) (06-TM-5089).
- Process the FIST Fire Plan (06-TM-5048).
- Conduct FIST Fire Missions (06-TM-5046).

If a fire support element supporting a combined arms battalion focuses on these collective training tasks and masters them, the fires enterprise and combined arms battalion stand a greater chance of remaining synchronized and achieving success at the National Training Center (NTC). The fire support element should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Failure to maintain vehicles (Bradley fire support vehicle and other fire support vehicles), communications equipment, and associated fire support systems (Fire Support Sensor System, stand-alone computer units, or ruggedized handheld terminal units).
- Lack of fighting products and poor dissemination.
- Lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities within the fire support element.
- Failure to develop an observation plan.
- Lack of fire support plan understanding among the company/troop FIST.

At NTC, units struggle to properly identify if a Bradley fire support vehicle or other fire support vehicles are fully mission capable. Fire support noncommissioned officers must ensure fire support and communications equipment are fully mission capable and should not just report the vehicles maneuverability and weapon system status. A Bradley fire support vehicle and other fire support vehicles that cannot observe or communicate should be considered not mission capable.
Fighting products are essential for the company/troop FIST to remain synchronized and understand the fire support plan. Fighting products should be standardized using standard operating procedures (SOPs). Fire support officers must understand when products should be developed and refined within the military decision-making process (MDMP) and troop leading procedures. Products should be developed and disseminated to provide adequate time for subordinates to develop bottom-up refinements.

Roles and responsibilities within the fire support element and FIST should be provided in an SOP while referencing Army Techniques Publication 3-09.42, *Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team* (01 March 2016), and Field Manual 3-09, *Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations* (30 April 2020). Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, fire support elements and FISTs struggle to identify priorities of work and become desynchronized and unable to focus on the execution of fires.

Rehearsals are vital for the synchronization and proper execution of the fires plan. Rehearsals must be conducted at all echelons to ensure understanding at the lowest level. Within the rehearsals, an observation plan should be discussed. Observation plans should consider risk-estimate distances combined with line of sight to develop primary, alternate, and possibly tertiary observation posts. During the rehearsal, each target should be briefed with its associated task and purpose in the form of a fire support task. This will provide understanding and importance of a target to the company/troop FIST.
CHAPTER 24

The Battalion S-6 Section in a Combined Arms Battalion Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a battalion signal (S-6) section in a combined arms battalion should focus on during home-station training:

- Establish a Combat Network Radio Voice/Data Network (11-6-8009).
- Operate the Command Post Node (11-CW-7023).
- Provide Tactical Radio Support (11-CO-5002).

If a battalion S-6 section in a combined arms battalion focuses on these five tasks and masters them before its National Training Center rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The battalion S-6 section should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Not conducting precombat checks or inspections to standard for CNR RETRANS operations.
- Before, during, and after signal maintenance is not conducted to standard.
- Lack of command post location planning.
- Not conducting systems planning, engineering, and evaluation device (SPEED)/line-of-sight (LOS) analysis.
- Not spending time providing tactical radio support.
To avoid these common pitfalls, combined arms battalion S-6 officers in charge and noncommissioned officers in charge should use the certification outlined in Training Circular 6-02.1, *The United States Army Signal Corps 2019 Training Strategy* (11 July 2019), for their RETRANS team and CPN/Satellite Transportable Terminal (STT) team. Weekly repetitions of establishing and conducting preventive maintenance checks and services of RETRANS equipment and the CPN/STT are crucial to S-6 personnel identifying broken equipment, training on the equipment, and becoming more proficient on troubleshooting procedures. Signal maintenance needs to be prioritized similar to wheeled maintenance. Services and signal maintenance activities should be tracked on the equipment status report and discussed at weekly maintenance meetings to fix shortfalls and broken signal equipment across the battalion. S-6 officers in charge need to plan in coordination with the S-3 operations sergeant major for future command post locations using SPEED or a similar LOS analysis tool. Lastly, the S-6 section should prioritize tactical radio support throughout maintenance activities and field exercises to maintain the signal equipment across the battalion.
CHAPTER 25

The Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Combat Trains Command Post Operations in a Combined Arms Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top training tasks a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) in a combined arms battalion (CAB) should focus on during home-station training:

● Maintain Communications (63-CO-4017).

● Coordinate Replenishment/Sustainment Operations (63-CO-4000).

● Coordinate Transportation Support Requirements with Battalion Headquarters (55-CO-0076).

● Establish a Company Command Post (71-CO-0050).

The HHC commander has the responsibility of ensuring every Soldier in the company is trained to support combat trains command post (CTCP) operations. In practice, the CTCP coordinates supply and personnel movement across the area of operations in support of the CAB commander’s requirements. The CTCP should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● Lack of functioning Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P)/Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) systems.

● Inadequate forecasting to anticipate requirements.

● Failure to track battalion operations and reporting.

To serve as a command post, the CTCP must communicate with other entities in the brigade combat team’s area of operations. Since the CTCP is normally positioned 5 to 8 kilometers away from the CAB’s main command post, it will likely require beyond line-of-sight communications platforms. The JBC-P/JCR capability provides reliable communications for the CTCP no matter the distance from the CAB main command post or field trains command post. Additionally, units should consider how to manage the process of receiving battle damage and casualty reports. Normally, the S-1 and S-4 sections compile these reports and submit reconstitution and personnel regeneration packets. The brigade combat team may require these reports over Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) systems. The unit Combat Service
Support Automated Information Systems Interface (CAISI) should be tested before any operation, especially with up to three CAISIs at the CTCP (S-1, S-4, and HHC). The CAB S-1 and S-4 are key players in replenishment and sustainment operations and transportation. The S-4 should be trained on how and when to communicate with the forward support company commander, brigade combat team S-4, and support operations officer. From forecasting and movement of supplies by the distribution platoon to requesting recovery assets, the S-4 executes duties from the CTCP. The S-1 should also train on casualty evacuation operations and how to contact Role 1, Role 2, and mortuary affairs to get Soldiers back into the fight. The CTCP serves as the CAB’s alternate command post; therefore, it requires personnel from HHC to operate it and battle track. Several CTCPs struggle to receive and distribute information. This may be caused by lack of equipment and manning shortfalls. The CTCP requires staff sections to provide a representative to work out of the CTCP to provide continuity in the event of the main command post being destroyed.

THE SCOUT PLATOON IN A COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a scout platoon in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:

- Conduct Actions on Contact (07-PLT-9012).
- Conduct Zone Reconnaissance (17-PLT-4010).
- Conduct Area Reconnaissance (17-PLT-4011).
- Conduct Route Reconnaissance (17-PLT-4000).
- Conduct Reconnaissance Handover (17-PLT-4025).

Scout platoons should use the training and evaluation outline (T&EO) for each task to assess proficiency in executing tasks. These tasks constitute the majority of scout activities during a typical rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). Furthermore, the supporting collective and individual tasks associated with these five collective tasks provide a thorough training plan for units preparing for large-scale combat operations. Scout platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of operational combat power (M2A3 Bradley).
- Failure to maintain or bring special equipment (Long-Range Acquisition System [LRAS], Target Reconnaissance Infrared Geolocating Range Finder [TRIGR], Raven, Javelin, or high-frequency radio).
- Lack of the commander’s reconnaissance guidance (focus, tempo, engagement and disengagement criteria, displacement criteria, or bypass criteria).
- Lack of local security.

To avoid these pitfalls, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant should enforce maintenance standards, and provide leader participation and supervision during preventive maintenance checks and services. During home-station training, the platoon should validate load plans and review where specialized equipment is stored or mounted. The platoon should develop a standardized priority of work for each vehicle in the platoon. This level of detail enables the platoon to rapidly execute priorities of work during a consolidation period. Understanding the importance of detailed commander’s reconnaissance guidance cannot be overstated. This guidance allows the platoon to understand how to execute actions on the reconnaissance objective. CAB leadership should be prepared to provide detailed commander’s reconnaissance guidance. Additionally, the scout platoon should work closely with the CAB S-2 section to develop the information collection synchronization matrix and collection plan. Developing working relationships with the S-2 section enhances the platoon’s ability to answer commander’s critical information requirements and enables the commander to make decisions. Scout platoons should rehearse planning and executing local security operations. This includes defining minimum security posture requirements (normally, no less than 25-percent awake at all times) and incorporate stand-to procedures during field exercise.

THE MORTAR PLATOON IN A COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a mortar platoon in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:

- Operate a Mortar Fire Direction Center (07-PLT-5072).
- Process a Mortar Call for Fire (07-PLT-5090).
- Reciprocal Lay With Aiming Circle (07-PLT-D9268).

Units should use the T&EO for each task to assess proficiency in executing tasks. These three tasks constitute the majority of mortar platoon activities during a typical rotation at NTC. Furthermore, these tasks serve as the foundation for other collective tasks the platoon may be required to execute. Mortar platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Inadequate maintenance focus, specifically the M1064 mortar track.
- Lack of Infantry Mortar Leader Course (IMLC)-qualified Soldiers.
• Shortfalls with a functioning JBC-P or JCR.
• Lack of a CAB fire support standard operating procedure (SOP) that includes mortar employment.

To avoid these common pitfalls, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant must work with their maintenance section to ensure vehicles are maintained properly. Because of the age of the M1064 and the challenges of operating the equipment in the austere environment of NTC, platoons may not be able to maintain all their vehicles. During the year, several mortar platoons arrived to NTC without IMLC-qualified Soldiers. This shortfall limits the platoon’s ability to provide indirect fire support for the CAB. The mortar platoon sergeant should closely monitor the status of IMLC qualifications in the platoon and promptly highlight issues to battalion leadership as needed. The mortar platoon should field and train with modified table of organization and equipment-authorized equipment before arriving to NTC. Over the past year, several mortar platoons failed to bring working JBC-P or JCR platforms and possessed marginal very high frequency (VHF), frequency modulated (FM) radios. The platoon should execute technical rehearsals at home-station using its equipment to validate the functionality of sensor-to-shooter links. The fire direction center serves as a safety check when clearing ground in support of indirect fire missions. It cannot perform this requirement without working command and control systems. The mortar platoon leader and platoon sergeant should work closely with the CAB S-3 and fire support officer to validate the unit’s fires SOP and tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs). The SOP should include details such as responsibilities, positioning authorities, unit basic loads, and fire mission processing procedures.

THE MEDICAL PLATOON IN A COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a medical platoon in a combined arms battalion should focus on during home-station training:

• Manage Health Service Support Operations (08-PLT-0312).
• Provide Emergency Medical Treatment (08-PLT-0313).
• Provide Sick Call Services (08-PLT-0316).
• Provide Ground Ambulance Evacuation Support (08-PLT-0319).
Army Techniques Publication 4-02.3, *Army Health System Support to Maneuver Forces* (9 June 2014), should be used in conjunction with the aforementioned T&EOs to develop training plans and assess training proficiency. Medical platoon training should focus on supporting the commander’s scheme of maneuver while retaining a focus on the delivery of medical care. The following are common pitfalls the medical platoons should avoid:

- Failure to plan.
- Lack of a medical SOP.
- Lack of established priorities of work.
- Lack of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE), and enhanced conventional weapons training.
- Lack of support for casualty evacuation.
- Lack of mass casualty training.
- Lack of patient tracking.

To overcome these pitfalls, the CAB medical officer and platoon sergeant must ensure they focus on planning and continuous training. Planning is a dynamic and continuous process. During home-station training, the medical officer should include noncommissioned officers and the surgeon/physician assistant when developing platoon SOPs. A standardized priority of work should be identified and developed for each section in the platoon to ensure everyone can immediately start working through the list of tasks during a consolidation period. Additional emphasis should be placed on operations in a CBRNE-contaminated environment, decontamination operations, triage of patients, and evacuation considerations. The medical officer and platoon sergeant should develop a mass casualty plan and include company leaders to ensure a shared understanding of responsibilities during mass casualty operations. Enforce patient tracking using electronic systems, or if not available, rehearse the application of appropriate documentation and forms during home-station training.
CHAPTER 26
The Armor Company in a Combined Arms Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a tank company should train on to be effective at the National Training Center (NTC). These tasks are often the building blocks of larger tasks and areas the task force commander should expect company commanders to execute with minimal guidance:

- Conduct Movement to Contact (17-CO-1074).
- Breach an Obstacle (17-CO-3070).
- Conduct Area Defense (17-CO-1030).
- Conduct an Attack (17-CO-109407-CO-1342).

Tank companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services.
- Failure to maintain or bring special equipment (plows; rollers; or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives [CBRNE] equipment).
- Lack of established priorities of work.
- Lack of local security.
- Lack of forecasting consumption (water, food, fuel, or ammunition).

Tank companies normally operate aggressively while at NTC; however, every attack eventually transitions to a defense, and every defense provides the company with an opportunity to prepare for an attack. Companies cannot afford to forgo the steps of establishing local security while they consolidate, reorganize, and prepare for future operations. The armor company executes combined arms breaches as part of a larger combined arms force. Leaders should become familiar with and rehearse their possible roles in supporting the combined arms battalion execute breaching fundamentals. A commander should not wait to discover the plows and rollers do not work because of lack of inspecting equipment before the rotation. The occupation of an assembly area is a deliberate task that provides the space and time for troop leading procedures (TLP), maintenance, and sustainment to occur. The failure
to occupy an assembly area stems from units not following their standard operating procedures (SOPs). The composition and tasks of a quartering party, priorities of work, and necessary security should be understood throughout the company and trained at home station.

**TANK PLATOON IN A COMBINED ARMS BATTALION**

The following are the top collective training tasks a tank platoon should focus on during home-station training to be effective at NTC. These tasks are often the building blocks of larger tasks and are areas the company commander should expect platoon leaders to execute with minimal guidance:

- Conduct Actions on Contact (07-PLT-9012).
- Conduct Tactical Movement (07-PLT-1342).
- Change Formation While Mounted (17-PLT-D9435).
- Establish Attack by Fire/Support by Fire (07-PLT-1256, 07-PLT-3000).
- Conduct a Linkup (07-PLT-1063).

Units should use the training and evaluation outline for each task to assess proficiency in executing tasks. These tasks constitute the majority of platoon-level activities during a typical rotation at the NTC. Tank platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services.
- Failure to maintain or bring special equipment (plows, rollers, or CBRNE equipment).
- Lack of established priorities of work.
- Lack of local security.
- Lack of consumption reporting (water, food, fuel, or ammunition).

Tank platoons must fight while in maneuver formations and make use of available cover to prevent losses. Platoon leaders should rehearse changing formations and intentionally limit very high frequency (VHF), frequency modulated (FM), Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P), or Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) systems to stress the platoon’s ability to maintain tempo in a degraded environment. Typically, tank platoons support other company team requirements from an attack by fire or support by fire position. These tasks often occur during rearward passage of lines or forward passage of lines operations and should be rehearsed during home-station situational training exercises. Platoon leaders should review unit SOPs and ensure tank commanders understand the procedures for linkup with the passing unit.
To overcome the pitfalls stated above, platoon leaders must educate their Soldiers on equipment including systems within the M1 tank. Classes with field maintenance team representatives should be held to quickly and accurately identify faults, correctly record faults within the Army system of record, and return the tank to fully mission capable status. Platoon leaders should work with platoon sergeants to review standards for priorities of work with consolidating and reorganizing. This should include considerations for local security and camouflage, and preparing range cards and sector sketches. Lastly, the platoon sergeant should work with the company executive officer to validate reporting formats and confirm the primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (PACE) plan to ensure the platoon provides accurate and timely logistics status reports.
CHAPTER 27

The Mechanized Company in a Combined Arms Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a mechanized infantry company in a combined arms battalion (CAB) should focus on during home-station training:

- Conduct Movement to Contact (07-CO-1073).
- Conduct an Attack in an Urban Area (07-CO-1261).
- Breach an Obstacle (With Engineer Support) (07-CO-3073).
- Conduct an Area Defense (07-CO-9003).

The mechanized infantry should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of planning and rehearsals at the company level.
- Failure to maintain movement formations and control during movement to contact and actions on contact.
- Lack of casualty evacuation plans.
- Failure to understand field maintenance operations and forecasting classes of supply (especially Class I, III, V, and IX).
- Not integrating mounted and dismounted anti-tank systems into offense and defense schemes of maneuver.

THE MECHANIZED PLATOON IN A COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a mechanized infantry platoon in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:

- Conduct Actions on Contact (07-PLT-9012).
- Conduct a Mounted Movement Infantry Platoon (071-420-0008).
CONDUCT AN ATTACK BY A MECHANIZED INFANTRY PLATOON (URBAN) (071-440-0022).

CONDUCT AN AREA DEFENSE (07-PLT-1030).

The mechanized infantry platoon should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of direct fire and graphic control measures (specifically in support of urban operations).
- Failure to execute deliberate planning and rehearsals at the platoon level.
- Failure to anticipate the probable line of contact and planning for dismount points.
- Not maintaining control of the platoon element during actions on the objective or actions on contact (tactical patience).

THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY SQUAD IN A COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a mechanized infantry squad in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:

- CONDUCT MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES BY A SQUAD (071-326-5610).
- CONDUCT MANEUVER OF AN M2 BFV SECTION/SQUAD (071-420-0007).
- CONDUCT AN ATTACK ON A BUILDING (M2 BFV) (URBAN) (071-440-0014).
- CONDUCT A POINT ANTI-ARMOR AMBUSH (M2 SQUAD) (071-326-5804).
- CONDUCT A DEFENSE (MOUNTED SECTION) (URBAN) (071-440-0016).

The mechanized infantry squads should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Squad leaders fail to conduct mission-specific battle drill rehearsals.
- Lack of integration of a dismounted infantry maneuver with BFV support (to include understanding).
- Managing the dismounted Soldier’s loads across restricted terrain movements.
- Failure to conduct Soldier-level precombat checks and inspections.
The National Training Center (NTC) requires leaders to execute troop leading procedures in a dynamic, time-constrained environment. Leaders must prioritize these steps to create a detailed, thorough plan while adhering to the one-third, two-thirds rule. Commanders should train their leaders on the various types of rehearsals and reinforce the need to focus on synchronizing efforts. Mechanized infantry platoons and squads should be proficient at their individual Soldier tasks and battle drills. This requires formal instruction and situational training exercises to achieve a level of mastery. Furthermore, Soldiers should be proficient on the employment of all modified table of organization and equipment-authorized weapon systems and aiming devices under limited visibility and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced conventional weapons conditions. Particular attention should be paid to the employment of anti-tank weapon systems such as the FGM-148 Javelin missile and the M2 BFV’s Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wireless-Guided Bunker Buster (TOW 2B) system.

Vehicle load plans should be inspected during home-station training events to validate unit standard operating procedures and ensure the requisite classes of supply are accounted for. This includes considerations for situational obstacle construction and its associated Class IV requirements. Additionally, company and platoon leaders should inspect command and control systems to repair faults ahead of deploying to NTC. Platoons should train on integrating their M2 BFVs with dismount squads when fighting in restrictive terrain. This includes the employment of heavy weapons to reduce bunkers or built-up fighting positions in urban areas.

Lastly, leaders at all echelons in the mechanized infantry company should spend time cross training on vehicle maintenance. The dismounts squads will struggle to reach their objectives if the M2 BFVs are not mission capable. Therefore, everyone in the company should have a vested interest in maintaining their assigned equipment. This requires leaders to use the eight-step training model (especially step 2, train the trainers) to educate their Soldiers on how to work, employ, and maintain equipment.
CHAPTER 28

The Forward Support Company in a Combined Arms Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a forward support company (FSC) in a combined arms battalion (CAB) should focus on during home-station training:

- Perform Field Maintenance (43-CO-4552).
- Conduct Unit Defense (63-CO-0727).
- Establish Company Headquarters (63-CO-4518).
- Direct Distribution Operations (63-CO-4882).

The FSC should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of knowledge on doctrinal sustainment operations.
- Lack of integration between the FSC and S-4 for sustainment operations.
- Untrained company command post operations.
- Undefined duties and responsibilities for key leaders in an operational environment.
- Not maintaining communications.

Doctrinal sustainment operations should be reviewed and compared to the CAB’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) on sustainment operations to provide insight on the differences and expectations. Army Techniques Publication 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion (5 February 2016), provides guidance on sustainment operations and the combat trains. Understanding doctrinal sustainment also provides defined duties and responsibilities for the S-4 (logistical planner) and the FSC (logistics executioner), which can avoid miscommunication, lack of integration and synchronization, and lack of logistical support. If the FSC executive officer, who usually runs command post operations, operates away from the main company command post, then ensure the FSC headquarters element executes command post operations in accordance with published SOPs. Analog tracking, battle tracking, and digital communications (frequency modulation [FM], Joint Capabilities Release [JCR], or Joint Battle Command-Platform [JBC-P]) are critical to the success of the FSC, because it provides the FSC commander a clear
picture of the FSC and logistics for the battalion. Communication is key to maintain command and control and visibility of all assets. Lastly, FSC commanders need to provide clear and concise duties and responsibilities to key leaders within the company according to their position, role, and location (field trains command post [FTCP], combat trains command post [CTCP], or forward logistics element). This means ensuring each leader understands his role, expectations, and responsibility (i.e., if the executive officer is at the FTCP, is he expected to attend brigade support battalion [BSB] logistics synchronizations? Does he communicate with the BSB concerning issues, friction points, or concerns, or is he there just to be a body in the BSA?).

THE FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY FIELD TRAINS COMMAND POST

The following are the collective training tasks an FSC in a CAB should focus on during home-station training to establish an FTCP:

- Maintain Continuity of Command and Control (71-CO-5250).
- Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (71-CO-5100).
- Establish a Company Command Post in an Operational Environment (71-CO-0050).
- Conduct a Hasty Displacement (63-CO-4023).
- Occupy an Assembly Area (07-CO-9014).

By focusing and mastering these five tasks before a National Training Center (NTC) rotation, the FTCP will provide effective support to the CAB.

An FTCP FSC should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of proper personnel at the FTCP.
- Inability to communicate with the CTCP and battalion.
- Junior leaders positioned at the FTCP not having a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities.
- Lack of synchronization with the BSB support operations officer for resupply.
- Not understanding the role of the FTCP and integrating into the BSB and maneuver battalion plan.
The FTCP is typically co-located with the BSA for the purpose of synchronizing and integrating the FSC with BSB operations. The FTCP provides the connection between the CAB and the BSB for any support requirements. The FSC commander must carefully analyze which personnel and assets will remain at the FTCP that could increase the ability to provide adequate and timely logistical support to the maneuver battalion. Distribution assets including company supply trains are recommended to position at the FTCP so they can build out unit breaks and provide tailored supply packages to companies. Personnel from the maintenance control section should also remain at the FTCP, because they are the connection and processing for Class IX parts from the supply support activity. They provide a forcing function to ensure the flow of Class IX parts forward to the unit maintenance collection point. Effective FTCP operations require functioning command and control systems to communicate with other command posts in the CAB (main command post, unit maintenance collection point, and CTCP). The FTCP should include a JBC-P/JCR tactical operations center kit or, at a minimum, a working vehicle kit. Soldiers assigned to the FTCP should understand their responsibilities and receive a copy of the unit’s command post SOP to enable disciplined initiative.

THE FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY FIELD-FEEDING SECTION

The following are the top collective training tasks a field-feeding section in an FSC in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:

- Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area (10-CO-0058).
- Maintain Field-Feeding Safety and Sanitation (10-PLT-4501).

By focusing on and mastering these tasks before an NTC rotation, the field-feeding section can provide appropriate Class I support to the CAB. A field-feeding section in an FSC should avoid the following pitfalls:

- Failure to adhere to sanitation standards and regulations.
- Failure to utilize assault kitchens as an option for hot chow.
- Lack of proper licensing on equipment.
- Lack of knowledge or synchronization of a maneuver plan to understand a ration meal cycle.
- Inability to conduct night-driving operations.
The constant forward movement of a CAB leaves limited time for the field-feeding section to set up, prepare, cook, and tear down. Leaders should consider the option of employing assault kitchens rather than containerized kitchens, because they provide greater flexibility. Safety and sanitation regulations must be well known and adhered to. Although it is easier to have a field shower and hygiene location near the field-feeding area for the Army food service specialists, proper spacing of personal hygiene areas must be maintained to preserve combat power. FSC commanders and first sergeants should check to ensure the field-feeding section understands and employs safety and sanitation requirements. Every Soldier in the field-feeding section should be properly licensed on the section’s equipment. The section should be able to operate a prime mover along with a trailer. In addition to licensing, the section should be able to drive under limited visibility conditions. A critical part of field-feeding support is knowing the ration cycle and how it ties in with the maneuver plan. Field-feeding sections should work to obtain the CAB’s plan to understand Class I requirements.

THE FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY DISTRIBUTION PLATOON

The following are the top collective training tasks an FSC distribution platoon in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:

- Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition (55-PLT-0012).
- Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution Operations (10-CO-0237).
- Conduct Tactical Convoy (63-TS-2924).
- Defend Convoy Elements (63-TS-2924).

A distribution platoon in an FSC should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of knowledge on different types of logistics release point operations.
- Failure to conduct convoy briefs, rehearsals, and precombat checks and inspections.
- Lack of knowledge to conduct mounted land navigation.
- Inability to execute nighttime operations.
- Lack of proper knowledge on convoy operations.
The distribution platoon serves as the lifeline between sustainment support and the CAB; therefore, it should train on and rehearse different methods of distribution in accordance with Army Techniques Publication 4-90, *Brigade Support Battalion* (18 June 2020). Logistics release point operations should be rehearsed in conjunction with other unit training events. Platoon leadership should practice the troop leading procedures for all home-station training events and ensure convoy briefs are executed along with rehearsals, precombat checks and inspections, and communications checks. Platoons should also train on convoy operations and cover battle drills, convoy composition, order of march for commodities, and communications plans. Leaders should stress the importance of land navigation training and ensure modified table of organization and equipment-authorized equipment functions. Every vehicle commander should carry a map and understand how to plot the current location and destination, and provide directions to the driver. Additionally, leaders should ensure Soldiers train on how to operate their equipment under limited visibility conditions. This is especially important given the requirements placed on the distribution platoon to push classes of supply at all hours.

**THE FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY FIELD MAINTENANCE PLATOON**

The following are the top collective training tasks an FSC field maintenance platoon in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:

- Perform Field Maintenance Team Functions (43-CO-4053).
- Perform Recovery Operations (43-CO-4071).
- Establish a Maintenance Collection and Classification Point (43-CO-4393).
- Perform Maintenance Control Functions (43-CO-4506).
- Conduct Maintenance Repairs and Inspections (43-CO-7040).

A field maintenance platoon in an FSC should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Failure to properly inventory and label containers (shop stock list [SSL]).
- Lack of demand analysis before deployment.
- Not maintaining an analog tracker for combat slant and equipment status reports.
- Failure to properly employ the field maintenance teams into the maintenance support plan.
The maintenance platoon relies heavily on its SSL to minimize the turnaround time on critical pacing items. The organization and proper inventory of its containers provides a quick identification and the location of parts when needed. The shop office needs to ensure inventories are conducted per Army Regulation 710-2, *Supply Policy Below the National Level* (28 March 2008), and replenish parts as they are consumed. Besides the SSL, auto replenishment and re-order points need to be identified and annotated to upkeep the unit’s SSL. Before a combat training center rotation, battalion maintenance teams should review demand analysis to determine shop and bench stock demands and order Class IX supplies accordingly. By doing so, the platoon will decrease repair time and maintain combat power. The shop office mainly works off the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) connectivity and the very small aperture terminal (VSAT) in operational environments; however, analog trackers are just as important. They provide a quick look at the combat slant and a running log of equipment statuses. Analog trackers also provide continuity when the unit maintenance collection point displaces, or in between VSAT hours. As a system of record and annotation of identified faults, DA Form 5988-E serves as the communication bridge between vehicle crews and maintenance enterprise. The maintenance platoon should establish a feasible DA Form 5988-E workflow plan that supports the maneuver units, maneuver plan, and maintenance operations. Field maintenance teams should also train on their own recovery and repair capabilities along with communications systems required for coordination with the unit maintenance collection point.
SECTION V

Field Artillery Battalion
Recommended Task Focus Areas
CHAPTER 29

The Field Artillery Battalion in an Armored Brigade Combat Team

Operations Group, National Training Center

Army doctrine clearly defines the fundamental role of a field artillery (FA) battalion in an armored brigade combat team (ABCT):

“The field artillery has the role of destroying, defeating, or disrupting the enemy with integrated fires to enable maneuver commanders to dominate in unified land operations. The FA battalion also provides counterfire against enemy mortar, cannon, and rocket elements ... The FA battalion performs basic FA tasks derived from Field Manual 7-15, The Army Universal Task List, to include: deploy and conduct maneuver; develop intelligence; employ fires: close combat, shaping, and counterfire; perform sustainment; exercise mission command; protect the force.¹

The FA battalion is responsible for synchronizing and sustaining indirect fire throughout the operation, acquiring and developing an observer plan, and assisting the ABCT with employing and managing indirect fire assets. The following are collective tasks that provide the greatest amount of readiness:

- Control Field Artillery Operations (06-BN-1021).
- Direct the Employment of FA Acquisition Assets (06-BN-2006).
- Conduct Battalion Fire Missions (06-BN-5001).
- Synchronize Fires (06-BN-5076).
- Conduct Fires (06-BN-6011).

To effectively deliver timely and accurate indirect fires in support of an ABCT, it is imperative for a FA battalion to control FA operations. The FA battalion’s ability to synchronize fires and integrate acquisition assets, employing them in support of a brigade combat team’s targeting process, provides the brigade the capability to detect and deliver fires. ABCTs collectively demonstrate their ability to synchronize fires when conducting battalion fire missions, massing their guns at the decisive point.
A field artillery battalion should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Incomplete rehearsals.
- Desynchronized or incomplete primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plans.
- Poor analysis of required effects versus fire order standards.
- Failure to integrate a complete sustainment plan into future operations.

FA battalions in ABCTs often find that the execution of their plan hinges on the completeness of the field artillery support plan (FASP) and how it was rehearsed. Although the battalion must take part in the greater fires enterprise and is often beholden to the brigade’s plan and rehearsal schedule, there is plenty the FA battalion can do internally to ensure success of an operation. The battalion should ensure the PACE plan has a variety of systems, not just different methods or channels using the same equipment. The fires digital net is not holistically different from the fires voice net. These both are likely frequency modulation and would be considered primary number one and two, as opposed to primary and alternate. Battalions should incorporate high frequency, blue force trackers and other systems into the PACE plan. The plan must also be synchronized to the higher and lower command node locations. Planners must consider use of retransmission teams and transitions from the main command post to tactical command posts.

On the fire mission processing side, fire orders should reflect the effects desired against the enemy in the impact area. The battalion must work with the brigade intelligence section and the battalion S-2 to understand the disposition and composition of the enemy the battalion will fire upon. Understanding who and what the enemy is, combined with the effects desired by the commander, should drive the fire orders given at the battalion level. A battery fire mission of three rounds of high explosive will not destroy an enemy tank formation.
To ensure the battalion is capable of completing fire orders, planners must ensure a complete sustainment plan is integrated into the FASP. Ammunition management is paramount. Sustainment and operation planners should have a shared understanding of what and where combat configuration loads are located. Leaders from the battalion level down should understand the time and distance required to replenish ammunition, how much ammunition they can carry, and at what trigger they must call forward for that ammunition. Additionally, other commodities must be accounted for through regular battle rhythm events like logistic status reports and maintenance meetings. Specifically, maintenance for an M019A6/7 Paladin must be a main concern for battalion leaders. Equipment service reports must reflect ground truth, and Department of the Army Form 5988-E, *Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet* (1 March 1991), workflows must be incorporated into battle rhythms and plans.

Finally, a complete tactical and technical rehearsal will synchronize all these parts. The tactical rehearsal should not be an operation order brief. Subordinate commanders and staff sections should brief their actions throughout the operation as briefed in time and space. The S-3 should lead the tactical rehearsal and the S-2 should brief the enemy situation. The result of the tactical rehearsal is the collective understanding of all units and identification of significant issues with the plan. The battalion should complete, at minimum, two technical rehearsals. The first should be internal to the battalion to validate primary and alternate shooters, and provide bottom-up refinement to the brigade’s fire support plan. The second rehearsal should be completed with the entire fires enterprise, sensor to shooter, and should end with complete understanding of the mission flow as the operation unfolds and the method by which the mission should be sent to the shooter. Focusing on these challenges during home-station training will allow for a successful National Training Center rotation and deployment.

Figure 29-1 depicts the mission essential/battle task crosswalk for the FA battalion of an ABCT. By focusing training on these tasks, the lower echelons of the BCT increase their likelihood of success.
**Figure 29-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for the FA Battalion of an ABCT**

**Endnote**

CHAPTER 30

The Main Command Post in a Field Artillery Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a main command post (MCP) in a field artillery battalion should focus on during home-station training:

- Establish an Operations Center (06-BN-1063).
- Prepare the Field Artillery Operations Estimate (06-BN-1036).
- Control a Field Artillery Unit Move (06-BN-1038).
- Perform a Rehearsal (71-BN-5122).

If an MCP in a field artillery battalion focuses on these five tasks and masters them before its National Training Center rotation, it stands a greater chance of success. The MCP should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of leader involvement in command post site selection.
- Not adhering to the doctrinal military decision-making process (MDMP) steps.
- Lack of tactical and technical rehearsals.
- Lack of communication across warfighting functions within the MCP.

The site selection for the MCP must take into account the ability to communicate with subordinate units, adjacent units, and higher headquarters, along with dispersed sections such as retransmission and radar. The staff should understand the inputs and outputs required by each staff section to effectively contribute to the MDMP. Staff sections outside the S-3 section do not identify friction points early in the planning process or maintain a running estimate throughout the exercise. Maintaining a running estimate by staff section identifies friction points and planning considerations that assist in planning during a condensed MDMP timeline. Tactical and technical rehearsals provide shared understanding across the staff and subordinate units. Technical rehearsals identify friction points in the target list worksheet and allow time to adjust the firing order before execution. Communication across the staff within the MCP ensures a shared understanding and ensures leaders are informed when issues arise.
CHAPTER 31
The Field Artillery Battalion
S-6 Section

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the collective training tasks a battalion S-6 section in a field artillery (FA) battalion should focus on during home-station training. These tasks focus on specific training shortcomings observed at the National Training Center (NTC) as a supplement to basic military occupational specialty proficiency and unit training:

- Establish a Combat Network Radio (CNR) Voice/Data Network (11-6-8009).
- Select a Radio/Retransmission Station (RETRANS) Site (113-611-1000).
- Conduct CNR RETRANS Operations (11-CW-7017).
- Conduct Table IV through VI certification for RETRANS and Satellite Transportable Terminal/Command Post Node Crews (Section 3-2 of Training Circular 6-02.1, The U.S. Army Signal Corps 2019 Training Strategy [11 July 2019]).
- Install Army Navy (AN)/Vehicle Radio Communications-104 High Frequency Vehicular Radio or Similar Equipment (13-620-4001).

These identified collective tasks provide FA battalion S-6 sections a list of tasks that directly address challenges at NTC and increase their chances for success during their rotation. FA battalion S-6 sections should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services and precombat checks and inspections for CNR RETRANS operations.
- Lack of knowledge on brigade maneuver and RETRANS plans.
- Inability to perform systems planning, engineering, and evaluation device (SPEED)/line-of-sight (LOS) analysis.
- Inability to perform night driving and land navigation.
- No integration with the battalion fire direction center.
These common pitfalls affect all levels of the FA battalion S-6 section. Inexperienced junior Soldiers who are unable to perform preventive maintenance checks and services on their equipment prevent RETRANS team chiefs and section noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOIC) from planning effectively and conducting precombat checks and inspections. Basic Soldier tasks such as land navigation and night driving are often ignored or not properly prioritized, causing delays and failure when establishing RETRANS sites. Qualified drivers and tank commanders are also often reassigned to provide coverage elsewhere, creating military occupational specialty and skill-level mismatches for RETRANS teams and other functional teams within the section or headquarters and headquarters battery (i.e., a 25Q noncommissioned officer who does land navigation will be assigned as a RETRANS team chief, or the S-6 NCOIC is forced to emplace RETRANS to ensure he arrives at the site). S-6 officers in charge and NCOICs hinder their ability to perform their functions as primary staff officers and planners when they are unable to utilize SPEED or other LOS analysis tools and do not understand the brigade’s maneuver and RETRANS plans.

The FA battalion is a brigade-level asset, and its staff must understand the brigade’s view of the fight and its operational plans; therefore, the FA battalion S-6 must also understand the brigade’s maneuver plan and RETRANS plan to effectively plan the FA battalion’s signal support and maintain its link to the fires enterprise. FA battalion S-6 sections often do not have any interaction with the battalion fire direction center, which degrades its ability to function because of a lack of redundant signal support (i.e., fires digital via local access network/Warfighter Information Network-Tactical [WIN-T]) or the ability to collect critical products to support the five requirements for accurate fire (i.e., no plan to collect meteorological data).
CHAPTER 32

The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery in a Field Artillery Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) in a field artillery battalion should focus on during home-station training:

- Occupy a Tactical Area for Headquarters Battery (06-BTRY-3000).
- Perform Reconnaissance Operations for Artillery Positions (HHB) (06-BTRY-3005).
- Establish an Aid Station (06-SEC-6025).
- Provide Unit Supply Support (10-CO-4515).
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment Operations (55-CO-4830).

If an HHB in a field artillery battalion focuses on these five tasks and masters them before its National Training Center (NTC) rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. An HHB should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of leader coordination in command post site selection.
- Lack of established priorities of work.
- Failure to directly delegate logistical and security tasks.
- Inability to maintain security and logistical support to satellite units.

The HHB command team and leaders must ensure they are involved beyond the accountability aspect of battery leadership. The HHB commander is the primary person responsible for maneuvering the battalion’s main command post from one place to another. Just as a firing battery commander is responsible for reconnaissance, security, and occupation of a position, so is the HHB commander for the main command post. The HHB first sergeant should be the primary leader responsible for logistics and security of the main command post and satellite units such as radar, medical platoon, and retransmission sections. In the event the HHB command team is unable to monitor these responsibilities directly, they must clearly delegate the authority to complete these tasks.
THE TARGET ACQUISITION PLATOON IN A FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a target acquisition platoon in a field artillery battalion should focus on during home-station training:

- Provide Input to the Targeting Process (06-BN-5435).
- Emplace a Weapons Locating Radar (06-SEC-2046).
- Reconnoiter a Lightweight Countermortar Position (06-SEC-5088).
- Locate Targets With a Radar System (06-SEC-6047).

If a target acquisition platoon in a field artillery battalion focuses on these four tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. Target acquisition platoons should avoid the following pitfalls:

- Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services and maintenance.
- Lack of established priorities of work.
- Lack of digital communications capability and experience.
- Radar site selection criteria is not understood.
- Lack of communication with the S-2 regarding a counterfire picture.

To avoid these common pitfalls, the target acquisition platoon leaders and platoon sergeant must ensure they enforce maintenance standards and provide the right leader focus to daily preventive maintenance checks and services. By establishing checklists within the platoon standard operating procedures, priorities of work are understood and executed to standard. Home-station training should include digital sustainment training to ensure everyone understands the equipment and its operation. Proper training and mentorship of the radar section chiefs ensures they understand proper site selection. Conducting site reconnaissance for follow-on positions can help ensure movements are quick and effective. Finally, the counterfire section must incorporate itself into the intelligence warfighting function to help the S-2 see what the enemy fire support assets are doing on the battlefield. This leads to accurate analysis of the enemy situation, and feeds valuable information to the targeting working group.
CHAPTER 33

The Field Artillery Battery

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a field artillery battery should train focus on during home-station training:

- Occupy a Tactical Area (06-BTRY-3001).
- Perform Reconnaissance Operations for Self-Propelled Artillery Positions (06-BTRY-3003).
- Process Fire Missions (06-BTRY-5424).
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment Operations (55-CO-4830).

If a field artillery battery in a combined arms battalion focuses on these four tasks and masters them before its National Training Center (NTC) rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. Field artillery batteries should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of troop leading procedures (TLP).
- Lack of maintenance standards and Department of the Army (DA) Form 5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet (01 March 1991) workflow.
- Lack of local security.
- Lack of rehearsals.
- Inability to manage ammunition.

To avoid these common pitfalls, battery leaders must focus on adhering to one-third, two-thirds planning before major movements, and issue fragmentary orders as the operating environment changes. Often, units begin by issuing detailed operation order briefs at the battery and platoon level, but fail to continue TLP during later phases of the operation. Similarly, the battery defense is not consistently addressed in a unit’s priorities of work. Leaders at all levels in the battery must be diligent about conducting thorough preventive maintenance checks and services, beginning with operators correctly filling out DA Form 5988-E, that is verified by a supervisor and confirmed by a maintenance team. The result of the preventive maintenance checks and services process is valid national stock numbers for parts required for a specific administrative number. Units that fail to maintain an accurate equipment status report struggle to catch up on maintenance as operational
tempo increases, testing the capabilities of the equipment. Batteries must ensure operations centers are fighting off common products that have the capability of tracking ammunition by howitzer, palletized load system, and ammunition carrier. Batteries should not fight with “hot and cold” fire direction centers (FDCs), but rather one “hot” and one “warm” FDC, ensuring battle tracking and firing capability maintains, regardless of the rest plan. Batteries should continually rehearse technical and tactical aspects of specific operations. Batteries should also rehearse typical battle drills such as platoon operations center (POC) transfers, ammunition updates, and fire support coordination measure scrubs.

THE FIELD ARTILLERY FIRE DIRECTION CENTER

The following are the top collective training tasks a field artillery FDC should focus on during home-station training:

- Process Fire Missions (06-PLT-5424).
- Conduct Emergency Fire Missions (06-PLT-5010).
- Determine Firing Data (06-SEC-5016).
- Perform the Fire Mission in Degraded Mode on the M109A6/7 Paladin Howitzer (06-SEC-5027).
- Perform the Transfer of Fire Direction Battery Operations Center (BOC) Control Functions (06-BTRY-6009).

If a field artillery FDC in a combined arms battalion focuses on these five tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The field artillery FDC should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of common tracking products (BOC and POC).
- Lack of understanding on degraded operations.
- Limited understanding of Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) capabilities.
- Improper emergency fire mission procedures.
- Lack of knowledge troubleshooting fire missions.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the fire direction officers and noncommissioned officers must ensure the battery has common BOC and POC tracking products so both centers can assume either role efficiently. FDCs must train on conventional and special mission types. In concert with the platoon, FDCs must develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for troubleshooting to decrease fire mission processing times. The battery must ensure it is proficient at degraded operations, such as voice fire commands, and understands when to switch from digital to degraded mission processing, because of fire missions type and capabilities of the systems (specifically AFATDS). Batteries must understand the process of conducting an emergency fire mission, such as laying the howitzer, determining the best possible firing unit location, and ensuring accurate firing data is computed. Failure to include all FDCs in rehearsals often results in delayed effects and can be remedied by conducting internal battery rehearsals with both POCs.

THE FIELD ARTILLERY PLATOON

The following are the top collective training tasks a field artillery platoon should focus on during home-station training:

- Occupy a Tactical Area (06-BTRY-3001).
- Establish Firing Capability for a Paladin Platoon (06-PLT-5012).
- Control a Field Artillery Unit Move (06-PLT-1038).
- Conduct TLP (71-PLT-5100).
- Conduct Area Security (06-BTRY-4004).

If a field artillery platoon in a combined arms battalion focuses on these five tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The field artillery platoon should avoid the following pitfalls:

- Lack of platoon defensive plan.
- Lack of maintenance standards.
- Lack of ammunition management.
- Lack of personnel management.
- Inaccurate logistics status reporting.
To avoid these common pitfalls, leaders must continually adhere to priorities of work within their individual battalion and battery tactical standard operating procedures. Platoons should adjust security as necessary through every new emplacement. Leaders should check for range cards under day and night conditions and readjust to ensure interlocking sectors of fire. Platoon leaders should also take a vested interest in validating running Department of the Army (DA) Form 5988-E, *Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet* (1 March 1991), and prioritizing turn-in of DA Form 5988-E for any pacing item that is not mission capable and requires a part on order. Coordination between internal maintenance assets is key to ensure national stock numbers are accurately reflected so vital combat power can be regenerated as training progresses. Additionally, platoon leaders play a vital role in ensuring accurate ammunition data is tracked at the gunline and in all ammunition carries to feed information to POCs. Without leader involvement at the gunline, howitzers are often unable to support preplanned targets because they do not have the right munition type or quantity on board the howitzer. Similarly, platoon leaders must understand the ground truth and ensure they track and submit accurate commodities data in their logistics status reports.
CHAPTER 34

The Forward Support Company in a Field Artillery Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a forward support company (FSC) in a field artillery battalion should focus on during-home station training:

● Provide Field-Feeding Support (10-CO-0056).
● Establish a Company Headquarters (63-CO-4518).
● Direct Distribution Operations (63-CO-4882).
● Conduct Unit Defense (63-CO-0727).
● Perform Field Maintenance (43-CO-4552).

If an FSC in a field artillery battalion focuses on these five tasks and masters them before its National Training Center (NTC) rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The FSC should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● Lack of command and control architecture. Who has decision authority (Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy [24 July 2020])? What is the task organization of the FSC? How is equipment from the modified table of organization and equipment leveraged to help the FSC commander visualize combat trains (primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency [PACE] plan)?

● Failure to adhere to the “bump plan” with respect to truck crews and platforms.

● Lack of established priorities of work.

● Lack of security at logistics nodes.

● Misunderstanding and delineation of roles and responsibilities between the S-4 and FSC.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the FSC commander and first sergeant must first understand their roles and responsibilities and how they differ from the battalion S-4. The S-4 provides all consumption analysis and synchronizes resupply timelines and triggers with the battalion S-3 throughout all phases of the military decision-making process (MDMP). The FSC commander provides feedback throughout the MDMP, as the senior logistician develops the concept of support with the battalion S-4. The FSC commander and first sergeant own this product. The S-4 determines the “what” and FSC provides the “how” regarding the concept of support. The FSC must establish firm and clear understanding of command and support relationships and must leverage existing equipment to assist in visualizing the combat trains. The FSC must give special consideration to its PACE plan, the FSC commander location, the positioning of its distribution platoon and maintenance platoon, and any agreements with other command teams for support.

THE FIELD-FEEDING TEAM IN A FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY IN A FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a field-feeding team in a FSC in a field artillery battalion should focus on during home-station training:

● Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area (10-CO-0058).

● Perform Field Sanitation Functions (08-CO-0002).

If a field-feeding team in a field artillery battalion focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The field-feeding team should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services, and other maintenance.

● Failure to maintain or bring special equipment (containerized kitchen versus assault kitchen, and field sanitation centers).

● Lack of established priorities of work.

● Establishing how the Army culinary specialists (92Gs) are integrated into the greater security plan when the ration cycle is M-M-M.

● Failure to leverage available distribution assets to deliver rations.
The FSC headquarters section must plan ahead to avoid these common pitfalls. First, if a ration cycle is M-M-M, commanders must understand how to leverage the cooks in their formations. Can they man a fighting position? Are they trained to man an entry control point? If the cooks are not cooking, what are they doing? Too often in a ration cycle where M-M-M is planned and implemented for greater than three days, observer coach/trainers observe cooks who are underutilized at NTC. On the other hand, when units observe a ration cycle of A-M-A, FSC commanders often rely on cooks to deliver rations directly to the battery (separate from normal logistics package operations) or rely on unit first sergeants to pull rations from the combat trains command post. Although both methods may benefit and enhance the overall concept of support, there is a missed opportunity to streamline distribution activities and alleviate work strain on cooks and the distribution platoon, if rations and general supplies are not integrated together into the concept of support.

THE DISTRIBUTION PLATOON IN A FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY IN A FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a distribution platoon in a FSC in a field artillery battalion should focus on during home-station training:

- Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition (55-PLT-0012).
- Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution Operations (10-CO-0237).
- Conduct Tactical Convoy (63-TS-2924).
- Defend Convoy Elements (63-TS-2924).

If a distribution platoon in a field artillery battalion focuses on these five tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The distribution platoon should avoid the following pitfalls:

- Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services, and other maintenance impacting haul capacity.
- Lack of understanding of concept of support (resupply triggers, and method of distribution versus method of resupply).
- Failure to adhere to rest and work cycles.
- Lack of comprehension of combat trains (field trains command post versus combat trains command post composition).
To avoid these common pitfalls, the distribution platoon leader and platoon sergeant must ensure they focus attention on how the FSC supports logistic package operations to the battalion and where commodities are stored inside the combat trains with a push/pull concept. Although individual training of Soldiers and crew is paramount (night-driving training, radio operations, navigation, and battle command systems integration), it is equally important that the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leaders understand the sustainment fight 24, 48, and 72 hours out and how the S-4 receives and processes that data from logistics status reports. Additionally, the platoon leaders must understand the method of distribution and resupply (i.e., tailgate and unit distribution wastes time, the logistics release point and service station does not). Without this knowledge, it is extremely difficult for the FSC commander to rely on or leverage the expertise in the platoon to meet the intent for sustainment.

THE MAINTENANCE PLATOON IN A FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY IN A FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks an FSC in a field artillery battalion should focus on during home-station training:

● Perform Field Maintenance Team Functions (43-CO-4053).

● Perform Recovery Operations (43-CO-4071).

● Establish a Maintenance Collection and Classification Point (43-CO-4393).

● Perform Maintenance Control Functions (43-CO-4506).

● Conduct Maintenance Repairs and Inspections (43-CO-7040).

If a maintenance platoon in a field artillery battalion focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The maintenance platoon should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● An unclear command relationship between field maintenance teams and battery (attached, operational control, and tactical control).

● Failure to establish a Department of the Army Form 5988-E, *Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet* (1 March 1991) turn-in cycle.

● Failure to track parts between the brigade combat team supply support activity and field maintenance teams, and parts tracking outside the brigade combat team.
• Roles and responsibilities not clearly defined between maintenance platoon leaders and the maintenance control section.

• Passback of field maintenance support.

To avoid these common pitfalls, maintenance professionals should focus on how maintenance best supports the battalion in the most efficient manner. There is no approved solution for how to accomplish this end state. Determining the command support relationships for the field maintenance teams and other maintenance individuals will greatly reduce friction during a rotation.
SECTION VI

Brigade Engineer Battalion
Recommended Task Focus Areas
CHAPTER 35

The Engineer Battalion in a Brigade Combat Team

Operations Group, National Training Center

Army doctrine concerning the roles of an engineer battalion in a brigade combat team (BCT) is broader than that of the previously defined battalions in the BCT because of the nature of the role that a brigade engineer battalion (BEB) plays in the organizational construct.

The BEB provides organic engineer, military intelligence, signal (anti-tank Stryker BCT only), planning, and execution capabilities to the BCT.\(^1\)

The BEB in each BCT provides a baseline of combat capabilities that can be augmented with specialized units from the echelons above brigade. The assistant brigade engineer section within the BCT staff identifies the required augmentation and coordinates its application. Each BCT has organic geospatial engineering capabilities to provide a baseline of geospatial support. Additional Army, joint, multinational, interagency, and other engineering capabilities may be available and task-organized to augment the BCT for various phases of operation. Additional engineer operational force is a complementary and interdependent relationship between four major unit categories (organic engineer, engineer headquarters, baseline engineer, and specialized engineer).\(^2\)

The BEB has a variety of missions and required focal areas because of the diverse nature of its subordinate units. To best nest these enablers and focus them in support of the armored brigade combat team (ABCT)-prioritized mission-essential tasks (METs), the BEB can train in the following tasks:

- Provide Engineer Support to Mobility Operations (05-BN-0010).
- Conduct Engineer Countermobility Operations (05-BN-0012).
- Conduct Survivability Operations (05-BN-0013).
- Manage Information Collection (34-CO-3001).
BEBs focus on providing mobility and countermobility support to the BCT. If the battalion and the staff focus on these five training tasks, they stand a greater chance of success during their rotation. The battalion staff cannot ignore the military intelligence or signal company. However, the most complex tasks the engineer battalion staff will be asked to complete are the engineer missions: Planning and executing a combined arms breach through complex obstacles; and planning, resourcing, and tracking a deliberate defense across multiple engagement areas. The BEBs should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Failure to maintain and have standard operating procedures for all communications equipment.
- Failure to integrate with the brigade plans cell throughout the military decision-making process (MDMP).
- Use of newly published or unrehearsed report formats.
- Lack of local security.
- Inaccurate or incomplete running estimates.
- Inadequate differentiation and implementation of a tactical command post versus a tactical operations center.

To avoid these common pitfalls, staffs should publish tactical standard operating procedures and rehearse them at least once during a tactical field exercise. This field exercise should primarily make use of distributed meetings over frequency modulation, high frequency, or Joint Battle Command-Platform, and focus on timely reporting, managing obstacle construction and breach operations. During garrison operations, staff must routinely communicate with their counterparts at brigade to develop effective working relationships.

Figure 35-1 depicts the mission-essential/battle task crosswalk for the BEB. By focusing training on these tasks, the lower echelons of the BCT increase their likelihood of success.
**BDE-Prioritized METs**

- Conduct Area Defense.
- Conduct Movement to Contact.

**BEB (ABCT) (HQDA Directed) METs**

- Provide EN Support to Mobility OPS. 05-BN-0010
- Conduct EN Counterintelligence OPS. 05-BN-0012
- Conduct Survivability OPS. 05-BN-0013
- Conduct DODIN OPS. 11-BN-0000
- Manage Information Collection. 34-CO-3001
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-BN-4800

**BEB (ABCT)-Prioritized METs**

- Provide EN Support to Mobility OPS. 05-BN-0010
- Conduct EN Counterintelligence OPS. 05-BN-0012
- Conduct Survivability OPS. 05-BN-0013
- Conduct DODIN OPS. 11-BN-0000

**HHC BEB (ABCT) METs (HQDA Directed)**

- Coordinate Company Support OPS. 63-CO-4050
- Establish Company Headquarters. 63-CO-4518
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830

**HHC BEB (ABCT)-Prioritized METs**

- Occupy New Operating Site. 63-30-4009
- Establish Company Headquarters. 10-CO-4817
- Treat Casualties. 08-CO-003
- Evacuate Casualties. 08-CO-004
- Provide Unit Supply Support. 10-CO-4515

**MP Company METs (HQDA Directed)**

- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
- Perform Support to Mobility. 19-CO-1002
- Perform Support to Security. 19-CO-3111
- Perform Police OPS. 19-CO-4001
- Perform Detention OPS. 19-CO-3111

**MP Company-Prioritized METs**

- Perform MP Support to Breaching. 19-CO-1401
- Perform Convoy Security. 19-CO-2004
- Perform Detention OPS. 19-CO-3111

**Mobility Assurance Company METs (HQDA Directed)**

- Conduct Reconnaissance Planning. 05-CO-0410
- Provide EN Support for Mobility OPS. 05-CO-1025
- Provide EN Support to Counterintelligence. 05-CO-2012
- Coordinate Survivability Ops. 05-CO-3000
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830

**Mobility Assurance Company Prioritized METs**

- Provide EN Support for Mobility Ops. 05-CO-1025
- Provide EN Support to Counterintelligence. 05-CO-2012
- Coordinate Survivability Ops. 05-CO-3000

**MAC Sapper Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks**

- Reduce an Obstacle With a MICLIC. 05-3-D0015
- Create a Lane with a MICLIC. 05-4-D0005
- Establish a Lane Using Mechanical Techniques. 05-PLT-1001
- Reduce an Obstacle with a Bangalore. 05-3-D0003
- Perform an Obstacle Reconnaissance. 05-PLT-1004

**MAC Counterintelligence Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks**

- Emplace a Volcano Minefield. 05-PLT-2011
- Emplace a Disrupt/Fix Volcano Minefield. 05-4-D0008
- Perform Reload of the Volcano (Ground). 05-4-D3016
- Construct a Wire Obstacle. 05-PLT-2019

**A and B Company BEB (ABCT) METs (HQDA Directed)**

- Conduct Reconnaissance Planning. 05-CO-0410
- Provide Engineer SPT for Mobility OPS. 05-CO-1025
- Provide EN SPT to Explosive Hazards Clearing. 05-CO-1700
- Provide Engineer SPT to Counterintelligence. 05-CO-2012
- Coordinate Survivability OPS. 05-CO-3000
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830

**A and B CO BEB (ABCT) METs (HQDA Directed)**

- Provide Engineer SPT for Mobility. 05-CO-1025
- Provide Engineer SPT to Counterintelligence. 05-CO-2012
- Coordinate Survivability OPS. 05-CO-3000

**Sapper PLT (ABCT) High-Payoff Battle Tasks**

- Create a Lane-Through Obstacle with Explosives. 05-PLT-1000
- Emplace Situational Obstacles. 05-PLT-2001
- Emplace a Volcano Minefield. 05-PLT-2011
- Conduct Vehicle Fighting Positions. 05-PLT-3013

**Construction PLT (ABCT) High-Payoff Battle Tasks**

- Construct a Tank Ditch. 05-PLT-2015
- Construct Protective Earth Walls and Berms. 05-PLT-3002
- Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions. 05-PLT-3013

**High-Payoff Leader Tasks**

- Conduct TLP. 71-CO-5100
- Conduct Rehearsals. 07-CO-5009
- Prepare an OPORD. 071-326-5626

These tasks should be a leader-development focus for every company commander, first sergeant, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leader within the formation before the initiation of collective training.

Figure 35-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for the BEB
### BDE-Prioritized METs
- Conduct Area Defense.
- Conduct Movement to Contact.

### BEB (ABCT) (HQDA Directed) METs
- Provide EN Support to Mobility OPS. 05-BN-0010
- Conduct EN Countermobility OPS. 05-BN-0012
- Conduct Survivability OPS. 05-BN-0013
- Conduct DODIN OPS. 11-BN-9000
- Manage Information Collection. 34-CO-3001
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-BN-4800

### BEB (ABCT)-Prioritized METs
- Provide EN Support to Mobility OPS. 05-BN-0010
- Conduct EN Countermobility OPS. 05-BN-0012
- Conduct Survivability OPS. 05-BN-0013
- Conduct DODIN OPS. 11-BN-9000
- Manage Information Collection. 34-CO-3001

### Military Intelligence Company METs (HQDA Directed)
- Conduct Aerial Reconnaissance Missions. 01-CO-9015
- Manage IC Requirements. 34-CO-3001
- Perform Situation Development. 34-CO-3002
- Conduct Human Intelligence Collection. 34-CO-3003
- Conduct Signals Intelligence Collection. 34-CO-3004
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830

### Military Intelligence Company-Prioritized METs
- Coordinate Unit Access to the Intel Architect. 34-CO-0012
- Conduct Aerial Reconnaissance Missions. 01-CO-9015
- Manage Information Collection Requirements. 34-CO-3001
- Conduct Human Intelligence Collection. 34-CO-3003
- Conduct Signals Intelligence Collection. 34-CO-3004

### UAS PLT High-Payoff Battle Tasks
- Conduct AVN Mission Planning/Preparation. 01-CO-5198
- Integrate Aircraft Survivability Measures to the AVN Mission. 01-CO-5163
- Conduct UAS Surveillance Missions. 01-SEC-7927
- Perform UAS Screening Missions. 01-SEC-7928

### Forward Support Company METs (HQDA-Directed)
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
- Provide Field-Feeding Support. 10-CO-0056
- Establish Company Headquarters. 63-CO-4518
- Direct Distribution OPS. 63-CO-4882

### Distribution PLT High-Payoff Tasks
- Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition. 55-PLT-0012
- Conduct Logistics Package Support. 63-TS-3390
- Conduct Tactical Convoy. 63-TS-2924
- Defend Convoy Elements. 63-TS-2924

### MAINT Control Section High-Payoff Tasks
- Perform Field MAINT Team Functions. 43-CO-4053
- Perform Recovery OPS. 43-CO-4071
- Establish a MAINT COLL and Classification PT. 43-CO-4939
- Perform MAINT Control Functions. 43-CO-4506
- Conduct MAINT Repairs and Inspections. 43-CO-7040
- Perform an Obstacle Reconnaissance. 05-PLT-1004

### Brigade Signal Company METs (HQDA Directed)
- Provide Network TRANS Path for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9060
- Provide Tactical Radio Support for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9075
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830

### BDE Signal Company-Prioritized METs
- Provide Network Trans Path for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9060
- Provide Tactical Radio Support for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9075

### HCLOS High-Payoff Battle Tasks
- Provide Network Transmission Path. 11-CW-7017
- Establish a Multi-Channel LOS Radio Terminal. 11-CW-7022

### RETTRANS High-Payoff Battle Tasks
- Provide Tactical Radio Support for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9075

### NOSC High-Payoff Battle Tasks
- Conduct Automated TCF Activities. 11-CW-7303
- Conduct Cybersecurity. 11-CW-6530
- Establish Tactical Switching Node. 11-CW-6002
- Conduct IDM/Content Staging CS activities. 11-CW-7113
- Conduct Enterprise Management. 11-CW-7166

### High-Payoff Leader Tasks
- Conduct TLP. 71-CO-5100
- Conduct Rehearsals. 07-CO-5009
- Prepare an OPORD. 07-326-5626

These tasks should be a leader-development focus for every company commander, first sergeant, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leader within the formation before the initiation of collective training.

### Field-Feeding High-Payoff Tasks
- Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area. 10-CO-0058
- Maintain Field-Feeding Safety and Sanitation. 10-PLT-4501

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**Figure 35-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for the BEB (continued)**
Endnotes


2. Ibid., page 1-15.
CHAPTER 36

The Headquarters and Headquarters Company in a Brigade Engineer Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the critical collective tasks a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) in a brigade engineer battalion (BEB) should focus on during home-station training:

- Occupy a New Operating Site (63-30-4009).
- Establish Company Headquarters and Administrative Areas (10-CO-4817).
- Treat Casualties (08-CO-003).
- Evacuate Casualties (08-CO-004).
- Provide Unit Supply Support (10-CO-4515).

The HHCs should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Not anticipating the resource needs of the BEB headquarters.
- Not understanding the tactical requirements of the BEB headquarters.
- Lack of a tactical assembly area (TAA) location and TAA jumps.
- Lack of TAA security plans.
- Sluggish employment of the Role 1 medical care facility and lack of dedicated security to transport casualties to the Role 2 medical care facility.
- Unclear expectations, roles, and responsibilities among HHC elements and BEB headquarters for managing and maintaining the TAA.
The primary mission of an HHC is to provide support to the battalion staff so it is capable of planning, executing, and monitoring the fight. This mission is best accomplished by understanding the operational tempo and anticipating the needs of the battalion commander. Considerations include planning TAA jumps, integration of on-ground elements for security, rapid employment of a Role 2 facility, and identifying security elements to move casualties to a Role 2 facility. Success comes from a shared understanding of the TAA plan, clear understanding of roles and responsibilities, and personal investment in the plan among the company commander, battalion staff, and battalion command team. Friction occurs when clear expectations about TAA management and maintenance are not shared between the company and staff, resulting in delayed and disorganized TAA jumps, inadequate security posture, and critical resource shortages that diminish the BEB’s effectiveness in supporting the decisive fight.
CHAPTER 37

Military Police in a Brigade Combat Team

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a military police company in support of a brigade combat team should focus on during home-station training:

- Perform Military Police Support to Breaching (19-CO-1401).
- Perform Detention Operations (19-CO-3111).

If a military police company in support of a BCT focuses home-station training on these three tasks, it is likely to excel during its rotation at the National Training Center. Military police companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of clearly established command and support relationships.
- Inability to provide an effective capabilities brief to supported units, and coordinate with the BCT provost marshal.
- Failure to follow troop leading procedures.
- Failure to maintain or bring special equipment (detainee collection point kit; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear equipment; route signage kit; Joint Capabilities Release/ Joint Battle Command-Platform; or recovery assets).
- Failure to understand and follow a published brigade engineer battalion tactical standard operating procedure (TACSOP).
- Failure to ship organic rolling stock.
Avoiding these common pitfalls requires meticulous preparation beginning several months before the scheduled rotation. Military police companies must coordinate with the brigade combat team provost marshal to schedule capabilities briefs with the brigade combat team commander, brigade combat team staff, and supported battalion leaders to ensure they understand how to best employ military police capabilities. Company commanders must develop and publish a company TACSOP, then evaluate and enforce it during train-up for the rotation, and make changes to it as necessary based on an ongoing evaluation of the document. The company should share its TACSOP with the supported brigade combat team and request the brigade combat team’s TACSOP. Soldiers should understand and follow key elements of the TACSOPs.
CHAPTER 38

The Mobility Augmentation Company and Echelon-Above-Brigade Sapper Company

National Training Center

The following are the top collective tasks a sapper company and mobility augmentation company (MAC) should focus on during home-station training before a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC):

- Reduce an Obstacle With A Mine-Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC) (05-3-D0015).
- Create a Lane With a MICLIC (05-4-D0005).
- Establish a Lane Through an Obstacle Using Mechanical Techniques (05-PLT-1001).
- Reduce an Obstacle With a Bangalore Torpedo (05-3-D0003).
- Perform an Obstacle and Restriction Reconnaissance (05-PLT-1004).

The following are the top collective tasks a countermobility platoon (mobility augmentation company [MAC] only) should focus on during home-station training before a rotation at the NTC:

- Emplace a Volcano Minefield (05-PLT-2011).
- Emplace a Disrupt/Fix Volcano (Ground) Minefield (05-4-D0008).
- Perform Reload of the Volcano (Ground) (05-4-D3016).
- Construct a Wire Obstacle (05-PLT-2019).

The sapper and MAC companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of planning, coordination, and rehearsals when employing the Volcano minefield.
- Failure to understand the trigger to initiate the emplacement of the minefield based on the decision support matrix.
- Failure to use the REACT formula \( R > E + A + C + T \), where \( R \) = time for enemy travel, \( E \) = emplacement time for munitions, \( A \) = arming time of munitions, \( C \) = command and control time for direction to emplace, and \( T \) = travel time for emplacement asset.)
• Failure to communicate and integrate with scouts and friendly units conducting rearward passage of lines.

• Lack of rehearsals conducted with the breach, support, and assault forces, especially if the supported task force has never worked with a MAC or sapper company.

• Not advocating to the task force the requirement for a maneuver platoon to serve as a security element for the breach force, which greatly enhances the speed, survivability, and success of a breach.

• Lack of crew proficiency and knowledge on the MICLIC and Volcano systems.

• Inability at the platoon-leader level to brief capabilities to task force commanders.

• Lack of ability to communicate inside and outside of the unit (Joint Battle Command-Platform/Joint Capabilities Release, frequency modulation, or reporting).
CHAPTER 39

The Alpha and Bravo Companies in a Brigade Engineer Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks combat engineer and equipment support platoons in an alpha or bravo company, brigade engineer battalion (BEB), should focus on during home-station training before a rotation at the National Training Center:

- Create a Lane Through an Obstacle Using Explosive Techniques (05-PLT-1000).
- Emplace Situational Obstacles (05-PLT-2001).
- Emplace a Volcano Minefield (05-PLT-2011).
- Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions (05-PLT-3013).

Platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Failure to understand when to change from movement to maneuver and proper maneuver techniques (see Army Techniques Publication 3-90.1, Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team [27 January 2016] Chapter 2, pages 33-42).
- Lack of planning, coordination, and rehearsals when employing the Volcano minefield.
- Failure to understand the trigger to initiate the emplacement of the minefield based on the decision support matrix,
- Failure to use the REACT formula \((R > E+A+C+T)\), where \(R\) = time for enemy travel, \(E\) = emplacement time for munitions, \(A\) = arming time of munitions, \(C\) = command and control time for direction to emplace, and \(T\) = travel time for emplacement asset).
- Failure to communicate and integrate with scouts and friendly units conducting rearward passage of lines.
- Failure to execute proper engagement area development (see Army Doctrine Publication 3-90, Offense and Defense [31 July 2019]).
Lack of understanding the terrain’s effect on engagement area development (see Field Manual [FM] 3-90-1, *Offense and Defense Volume 1* [22 March 2013]).

Failure to understand the enemy’s movement effect on engagement area development (see FM 3-90-1).

Failure to understand the concepts behind these pitfalls results in increased casualties and poor effects on the enemy. To avoid these pitfalls, platoons must understand and train on the fundamentals of patrolling (planning, reconnaissance, security, control, and common sense). Squads need to understand demolitions, the capabilities of their equipment, and how to breach a variety of obstacles. Platoons need to practice constructing obstacles that tie into terrain and report progress to the company command post.
CHAPTER 40

The Engineer Construction Company and Engineer Support Company in an Echelon-Above-Brigade Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks an engineer support company or an engineer construction company should focus on during home-station training before a rotation at the National Training Center:

- Construct a Tank Ditch (05-PLT-2015).
- Construct Protective Earth Walls and Berms (05-PLT-3002).
- Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions (05-PLT-3013).
- Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (71-CO-5100).

The engineer support company and engineer construction company should avoid the following pitfalls:

- Lack of leaders and Soldiers understanding the decisive action training environment (not thinking tactically).
- Lack of understanding the company’s dig rates and relaying it to battalion.
- Failure to properly plan tactical movement and route selection to transport equipment in rough terrain.
- Not using time wisely when conducting rehearsals.
- Failure to establish tactical assembly area security (sector sketch, sergeant of guard, or interlocking sectors of fire).
- Lack of communication inside and outside of the unit (frequency modulation, Joint Battle Command-Platform, training on systems employment, or lack of basic issue items).
CHAPTER 41
The Military Intelligence Company in a Brigade Combat Team

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a military intelligence company in a brigade combat team should focus on during home-station training:

- Coordinate Unit Access to the Intelligence Architecture (34-CO-0012).
- Manage Information Collection Requirements (34-CO-3001).
- Conduct Human Intelligence Collection (34-CO-3003).
- Conduct Signals Intelligence Collection (34-CO-3004).
- Perform Situation Development (34-CO-3002).

The military intelligence company should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services, and other maintenance (vehicles, communications equipment, and specialty equipment).
- Failure to codify task-organization relationships of signals intelligence and human intelligence teams in a written order.
- Failure to update system software (Intelligence Processing Center-2, Prophet, or Global Broadcast Service [GBS]).
- Failure to establish a reliable primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan.
- Failure to submit requests for access (GBS, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET] tokens, satellite communications, etc.).
CHAPTER 42

The Unmanned Aircraft System Platoon in a Military Intelligence Company

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) platoon in a military intelligence company should focus on during home-station training:

- Conduct Aviation Mission Planning and Preparation (01-CO-5198).
- Integrate Aircraft Survivability Measures Into Aviation Missions (01-CO-5163).
- Conduct UAS Surveillance Missions (01-SEC-7927).
- Perform UAS Screening Missions (01-SEC-7928).

A UAS platoon should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Failure to conduct air defense artillery threat assessment.
- Failure to conduct analysis of jumps and their impacts on crew rest.
- Failure to establish a reliable primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan.
- Failure to understand the brigade combat team collection plan.
- Lack of local security.
CHAPTER 43

The Signal Company

Operations Group

The signal company is a unique and versatile company that only has four mission-essential tasks, three of which are important to the readiness of the rotational unit. Each applies to a different section within the company:

- Provide Tactical Radio Support for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-9075).
- Provide Network Switching Services for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-9070).

The following is the list of the most important collective tasks for the signal company in preparation for a combat training center rotation. The signal company should arrive trained in these tasks. These tasks encompass the core of what the signal company does and is known for, enabling the brigade to talk across the battlefield.

The network extension platoon (upper tactical internet [TI]):

- Establish a Satellite Transportable Terminal (11-CW-6050).
- Establish a Tactical Switching Node (11-CW-6002).
- Provide a Network Transmission Path for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-9060).
- Establish a Multi-Channel, Line-of-Sight Radio Terminal (11-CW-7022).

The network extension platoon (lower TI):

- Provide Tactical Radio Support for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-9075).
- Operate a CNR System (11-CW-8013).
- Operate a Radio RETRANS Station Using a Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System Family of Radios (113-000-1001).
- Select a Radio RETRANS Site (113-611-1000).
Common struggles for the signal company include but are not limited to the following:

- Lack of established priorities of work.
- Failure to bring spare equipment.
- Lack of reporting.
- Failure to conduct command post operations (tracking personnel status, logistics status, and communications status).
- Failure to conduct drivers training and night driving.
- Failure to conduct land navigation.
- Failure to conduct preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and equipment testing.

Most companies perform the first two collective tasks successfully, because this is the training they focus on while at home station. However, companies need to focus on RETRANS and high capacity, line-of-sight (HCLOS) operations as well. For the company to be successful, they need to focus on all the tasks. Company Soldiers must acquire muscle memory to be proficient. While doing motor pool operations, Soldiers should establish a RETRANS site inside the motor pool. While setting up the upper TI, Soldiers need to incorporate HCLOS operations.

**BRIGADE SIGNAL COMPANIES**

The following are the top collective training tasks a brigade signal company in a combined arms battalion should focus on during home-station training to provide HCLOS capabilities while in a battlefield environment:

- Provide a Network Transmission Path for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-9060).
- Establish a Multi-Channel Line-of-Sight Radio Terminal (11-CW-7022).

If a brigade signal company in a combined arms battalion focuses on these tasks and masters them before its National Training Center (NTC) rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. Signal companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Failure to conduct before, during, and after signal maintenance.
- Failure to conduct precombat checks (PCCs) and precombat inspections (PCIs) for HCLOS operations.
- Lack of tactical and technical knowledge.
To avoid these common pitfalls, commanders and first sergeants need to be aggressive in their approach to HCLOS training. Command teams including platoon leaders should use the certification outlined in Training Circular (TC) 6-02.1, *The United States Army Signal Corps 2019 Training Strategy* (11 July 2019). Weekly repetitions of establishing and conducting PMCS is crucial in identifying and repairing and replacing broken equipment. Signal maintenance needs to be prioritized similar to that of wheeled maintenance. Services and signal maintenance activities should be tracked on the equipment status report and at weekly maintenance meetings. Platoon leader involvement is key to ensure PCCs and PCIs are completed correctly. Additionally, training on equipment by executing static displays, site placement and displacement, and validating HCLOS transmission with a distant end will enable HCLOS personnel to become more proficient in HCLOS operations.

**BRIGADE SIGNAL COMPANIES (RETRANSmissions)**

The following are the top collective training tasks a brigade signal company in a combined arms battalion should focus on during home-station training to provide RETRANS capabilities while in a battlefield environment:

- Provide Tactical Radio Support for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-9075).
- Conduct CNR RETRANS Operations (11-CW-7017).
- Operate a CNR System (11-CW-8013).

If a brigade signal company in a combined arms battalion focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. Signal companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Failure to conduct before, during, and after signal maintenance.
- Failure to conduct PCCs and PCIs for CNR RETRANS operations.
- Lack of tactical and technical knowledge.
- Failure to provide tactical radio support.

To avoid these common pitfalls, commanders and first sergeants need to be aggressive in their approach to RETRANS training. Command teams including platoon leaders should use the certification outlined in TC 6-02.1 for their RETRANS teams. Weekly repetitions of establishing and conducting PMCS of RETRANS equipment is crucial in identifying, repairing, and replacing broken equipment. Signal maintenance needs to be prioritized similar to that of wheeled maintenance. Services and signal maintenance activities should be tracked on the equipment status report and at weekly maintenance meetings. Platoon leader involvement is key to ensure PCCs
and PCIs are completed correctly. Additionally, training on equipment by executing static displays, site placement and displacement, and validating of RETRANS mode will enable RETRANS personnel to become more proficient in RETRANS operations.

**NETWORK OPERATIONS AND SECURITY CENTER**

To effectively conduct Department of the Defense Information Network (DODIN) operations, the brigade S-6 must form a network operations and security center (NOSC). The following are the top collective training tasks the NOSC should focus on during home-station training:

- Conduct Automated Technical Control Facility Activities (11-CW-7303).
- Conduct Cybersecurity (11-CW-6530).
- Establish a Tactical Switching Node (11-CW-6002).
- Conduct Information Dissemination Management/Content Staging Activities (11-CW-7113).
- Conduct Enterprise Management (11-CW-7166).

If the NOSC focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The NOSC should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of upper TI transport and services validation.
- Unscreened access to networks and systems.
- The help desk consumed with operator tasks.
- Passively monitoring network and systems.
- Separation of network, system, and cyber defense technicians.

To avoid these common pitfalls, NOSC personnel should validate transport and services through human-to-human communications, not an Internet Control Message Protocol ping. A ping may show the network path is there; however, it does not confirm that the ports, protocols, or services are functional. Test whether a Command Post of the Future (CPOF) operator can create a pasteboard viewable by another operator, or the S-3 can talk to the division via Ventrilo. Digital systems enable human interaction, so focus on ensuring people can communicate.
The NOSC needs to be aware of how command and control systems, workstations, and servers communicate; which protocols are required; and where this network traffic occurs. For example, a CPOF client box will need to connect to CPOF servers and other domain services, but should never need to communicate directly with another CPOF client.

Make it easier for every operator and S-6 by placing common instructions and references on every desktop. This will alleviate help-desk congestion. These references include items such as a phone book, how-to instructions, and links to portals and shared drives that can easily be pushed through group policy.

The NOSC must be proactive in monitoring the network with outages and reasons for the outages. Reach out to battalions to determine why a terminal or system is down. This may require the use of lower TI assets in the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan such as frequency modulation or Joint Battle Command-Platform. Without being proactive, it could be hours or days before support or parts reach the degraded command post.

Finally, the network, systems, and cyber defense personnel need to co-locate and collaborate to provide a robust and secure network. Without collaboration, each entity focuses on individual priorities instead of the priorities of the brigade S-6 and commander.
CHAPTER 44

The Echo Forward Support Company in a Brigade Engineer Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks distribution and maintenance platoons in an echo forward support company (FSC) brigade engineer battalion (BEB) should focus on during home-station training before a rotation at the National Training Center:

Maintenance platoon:

● Perform Field Maintenance Team Functions (43-CO-4053).
● Perform Recovery Operations (43-CO-4071).
● Establish a Maintenance Collection and Classification Point (43-CO-4393).
● Perform Maintenance Control Functions (43-CO-4506).

Distribution platoon:

● Conduct Logistics Package Support (63-CO-4546).
● Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution Operations (10-CO-0237).
● Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition for an FSC (55-SEC-0012).

The distribution and maintenance platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● Lack of technical manuals on-hand to conduct preventive maintenance checks and services, and other maintenance at the Soldier level.
● Failure to bring special equipment (straps; night-vision devices (NVDs); basic issue items; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced conventional weapons equipment).
● Lack of established priorities of work (very small aperture terminal, command post establishment, security, etc.).
● Failure to establish tactical assembly area security (sector sketch, sergeant of the guard, or interlocking sectors of fire).
• Lack of ability to communicate inside and outside of the unit (frequency modulation, Joint Battle Command-Platform, training on systems employment, or lack of basic issue items).

• Lack of trained operators capable of conducting logistics package operations during limited visibility (adequate amount of NVDs, operator knowledge of equipment, limited experience using NVDs, and not trained in night land navigation).
SECTION VII

Sustainment Battalions
Recommended Task Focus Areas
CHAPTER 45

The Brigade Support Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

Army doctrine defines the role of a brigade support battalion (BSB) to:

... provide sustainment support (logistics and medical support) to a brigade combat team. The BSB core competencies are planning, synchronization, and execution of sustainment to support brigade combat team operations. The BSB performs the following functions: distribution management and operations, transportation, supply support, field maintenance, and Role 2 medical care.¹

The following tasks are based on a deeper inspection of doctrinal roles and responsibilities a BSB would need to accomplish during a large-scale combat operation. The following tasks were selected as those that nested with the armored brigade combat team (ABCT)-prioritized METs and should be focused on during home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center (NTC):

- Coordinate Onward Movement for the Battalion (55-BN-4862).
- Conduct Actions Associated With Area Defense (63-BN-4885).
- Establish the Battalion Sustainment Operations Center (63-BN-4884).
- Coordinate Distribution Support (63-BN-4033).
- Establish a Command Post (Forward) (63-BN-4016).

Similar to other battalions, the BSB needs to conduct movement throughout the battlespace to conduct sustainment, while the ABCT conducts either an area defense or a movement to contact. Additionally, it must secure itself against discrete threats from infiltrating forces or hostile actors. These actions must occur in conjunction with the BSB’s continued sustainment and distribution operations. Finally, the BSB must be able to conduct distribution management and operations; coordination for this is essential for its command post operations.
BSBs should use the associated training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) to train these top tasks before deploying to NTC. Although these tasks are not explicitly outlined in the mission-essential task list (METL) tasks or T&EOs, the prioritization and integration of the following subtasks will greatly increase the BSB’s success while deployed at the NTC:

- Organically deploy and displace the common authorized stockage list.
- Adhere to priorities of work during the establishment of a perimeter defense.
- Standardize and rehearse sustainment operations center command and control processes and systems.
- Conduct an operationalized communication exercise (COMMEX) to validate upper and lower tactical internet (TI), and local internet service.

A BSB should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- The BSB not acting as the sustainment coordinator for the brigade combat team and synchronizing efforts (particularly related to distribution) across the BSB base companies and forward supply companies.
- The BSB stopping short of establishing a defense in-depth and engagement areas in support of its brigade support area (BSA) defense.
- Lack of published, shared, and rehearsed standard operating procedures (SOPs).
- The BSB not conducting an operationalized COMMEX to validate upper and lower TI systems.
- The BSB stopping short of a full command post exercise (CPX), therefore, falling short of truly validating command and control systems.

To avoid common pitfalls, BSB commanders need to take ownership of their role as the sustainment coordinators for the brigade combat team to the degree that field artillery battalion commanders take ownership of their role as the fires coordinator for the brigade combat team. They need to parallel plan with the brigade combat team to synchronize the sustainment plan (particularly the sustainment distribution plan) starting at the future operations and plans horizons, and not the current operations horizon that is common among BSBs today.
BSBs need to increase lethality training and focus on survivability tasks in addition to their core sustainment proficiency training. Operationalizing sustainment tasks while in garrison is a great avenue of approach to this end. BSBs need to stop operating one way while in garrison, and transitioning to operating in a different, operationalized manner while supporting the BCT in a field environment.

The BSB staff often attempts to holistically figure out and develop battalion tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs) while at their combat training center rotation. The lack of an established TACSOP and staff proficiency in tailoring and integrating respective warfighting efforts to the sustainment warfighting function is commonly observed in the early stages of the rotation. The rippling effect of not having a standardized or clearly communicated battalion TACSOP creates unnecessary friction and impedes efficiency from the BSB platoon level to the battalion. Subordinate units must invest in the battalion TACSOP and be nested. Furthermore, having an established SOP that is not clearly communicated or rehearsed will only provide the unit a 50-percent solution. Units must conduct rehearsals of established standards and processes to reach close to maximum capability. Only through the combination of understanding the established standards and processes, and building muscle repetition will a BSB succeed in being efficient, effective, and sustainable. The following are common observations from a lack of an established and rehearsed TACSOP:

The Battalion Main Command Post Layout

Lack of digital and analog mission-critical common operational pictures (COPs) inside the battalion main command post with detailed data necessary for the commander to make a decision and enable shared understanding: logistics common operational picture (LOGCOP), maneuver common operational picture (BLUECOP), enemy common operational picture (REDCOP), and base defense common operational picture.

Lack of a robust communications primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan internal and external to the unit and warfighting functions. At times, either the staff fails to identify what it takes to fight in a contested environment under secure communications (how many SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET] hardware, laptops, and pertinent software are needed) or consequently fails to stress or load test its communications PACE plan based on the standard systems on-hand or fully mission capable to command and control.
BSA Occupation and Establishment

Units struggle to execute priorities of work upon BSA occupation at battalion and company levels. Units fail to understand the time-sensitive, sequential actions-on-objective tasks from occupying and establishing respective company sectors, establishing 360 security, filling out standard range cards, to establishing beyond line-of-sight communications. Units do not visualize what 100-percent company fighting positions manning or weapon capabilities look like; where company casualty collection points are located; what medical capabilities and limitations are available; what entry control point procedures are in place to control and account for personnel, assets, and commodity flow; etc.

Often, the BSB validates its upper TI systems, but leaves companies to validate lower TI systems. This course of action can be successful, if companies have solid guidance on how to conduct the COMMEX, have well-trained communications representatives, and provide accurate, timely reporting. Often, guidance is lacking and the understanding of what fully mission capable means varies from company to company. For example, fully mission capable means a message can be sent and received from both ends. Without this shared understanding, companies may consider their systems are fully mission capable simply because systems turn on or send messages. However, companies do not verify whether they have the ability to receive messages. Another common issue is that a unit will validate frequency modulation (FM) by swapping hand microphones and batteries to test the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radio. This is an issue because it does not show the radio’s actual capability. If the radio itself works, but the unit does not have the hand microphones, batteries, operational vehicle radio communications, etc., the system does not necessarily add capability to the unit. It is simply a spare component.

Additionally, the S-6 scrambles to get updates from the companies and lacks true asset visibility until it receives accurate numbers. This affects the S-6’s ability to plan and assist companies. A successful technique is to make the COMMEX a deliberate operation, with the FM and Joint Capabilities Release (JCR)/Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) tactical operations center kits being monitored at the company or battalion level, depending on confidence level and understanding. Company communications representatives troubleshoot basic issues, and S-6 representatives assist with issues the communications representatives cannot fix. The radiotelephone operator monitoring the tactical operations center kits keeps a tracker by bumper number of the systems that are successfully validated through two-way communications checks. If there are multiple radios in a vehicle, they should be noted as radio A or B for validation. If the validation is at the company level, the S-6 should conduct spot checks and receive updates throughout the validation.
As stated, oftentimes, units will conduct an upper TI COMMEX to validate their Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) nodes. Although this step is essential, it is not the end of validation. To validate command and control systems, similar to Command Post of the Future (CPOF) or Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A), units must conduct a command post exercise. The COMMEX tests the functionality of systems and is run by the S-6, but the command post exercise tests the operations of these systems and is run by the S-3. The command post exercise requires users to log into the systems, validate their accounts, and verify they can utilize services (i.e., mail, file sharing, chat, Ventrilo, etc.). If the command post exercise is not conducted correctly with all services validated by operators, several issues occur that can delay operations, such as not able to receive orders, realizing users do not have valid accounts and need to request them, lacking situational awareness because of no access higher headquarters’ common operational picture, etc.

Figure 45-1 depicts the mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for the BSB of an ABCT.
### Figure 45-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for the brigade support battalion

#### BDE-Prioritized METs
- Conduct Area Defense.
- Conduct Movement to Contact.

#### BSB (ABCT) (HQDA Directed) METs
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-BN-4800
- Direct Establish of Subordinate Units and HQ. 63-BN-4019
- Conduct Sustainment Operations. 63-BN-4028
- Coordinate Distribution Support. 63-BN-4033
- Conduct Actions Associated with Area Defense. 63-BN-4885

#### BSB (ABCT)-Prioritized METs
- Coordinate Onward Movement for the BN. 55-BN-4862
- Conduct Actions Associated with Area Defense. 63-BN-4885
- Establish the BN Sustainment OPS Center. 63-BN-4884
- Coordinate Distribution Support. 63-BN-4033

#### HHC BSB METs (HQDA Directed)
- Provide Field-Feeding Support. 10-CO-0056
- Provide Unit Supply Support. 10-CO-4515
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830

#### Distribution Company METs (HQDA Directed)
- Provide ATHP Support. 09-TM-0125
- Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution OPS. 10-CO-0237
- Direct Distribution Company Supply OPS. 10-CO-0717
- Manage Transportation OPS. 55-CO-4557
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
- Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727
- Establish Company HQ. 63-CO-4518

#### Field-Feeding High-Payoff Tasks
- Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area. 10-CO-0058
- Maintain Field-Feeding Safety and Sanitation. 10-PLT-4501

#### Medical Company METs (HQDA Directed)
- Manage Health Service Support OPS. 08-CO-0312
- Manage Ground Evacuation OPS. 08-CO-0350
- Conduct Sustainment Support OPS. 08-CO-1302
- Conduct FHP. 08-CO-8104
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830

#### Medical Company METs (HQDA Directed)
- Manage Health Service Support OPS. 08-CO-0312
- Manage Ground Evacuation OPS. 08-CO-0350
- Conduct Sustainment Support OPS. 08-CO-1302
- Conduct FHP. 08-CO-8104
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830

#### HQ PLT, BSMC High-Payoff Battel Tasks
- Conduct Ambulance Shuttle OPS. 08-CO-0353
- Provide Medical Supply Support. 08-CO-4515
- Establishing a Company Command Post. 71-CO-0050
- Develop a COP Using Overlays/Graphics. 011-15B-0001

#### Maintenance Company METs (HQDA Directed)
- Conduct Support Maintenance OPS. 43-CO-0029
- Perform Field-Level Maintenance. 43-CO-4552
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
- Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727
- Establish Company HQ. 63-CO-4518

#### Fuel and Water PLT High-Payoff Battel Tasks
- Transportation Bulk Petroleum. 55-CO-0041
- Conduct Actions on Contact–PLT. 07-PLT-5181
- Establish an Assembly Area–PLT. 07-PLT-5181
- Conduct an Area Defense–PLT. 07-PLT-5000

#### Maintenance Company-Prioritized METs
- Conduct Support Maintenance OPS. 43-CO-0029
- Perform Field-Level Maintenance. 43-CO-4552
- Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
- Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727
- Establish Company HQ. 63-CO-4518

#### Maintenance Company-Prioritized METs
- Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727
- Perform Field-Level Maintenance. 43-CO-4552
- Perform MAINT Control Functions. 43-CO-4506
- Perform Predeployment MAINT Activities. 43-CO-4805

#### Maintenance PLT High-Payoff Battel Tasks
- Conduct TLP. 71-PLT-5100
- Conduct Tactical Movement. 07-PLT-1342
- Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions. 05-PLT-3013
- Set up Forward Repair PLT HQ/Sections. 43-PLT-4531

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### Endnote

CHAPTER 46

The Sustainment Battalion Main Command Post

MAJ James Hubbard, Brigade Support Battalion Operations Trainer

INTRODUCTION

Combat sustainment support battalions (CSSBs) operating within a division support area and brigade support battalions (BSBs) operating within a brigade support area require command and control. A sustainment battalion main command post (CP) is no different from a maneuver battalion main CP in that it is the center of all staff functions, controlling and synchronizing current and future operations, and exercising the operations process. Unlike a maneuver battalion, a sustainment battalion does not traditionally fight out of multiple CPs such as the main and tactical CPs. It does however have the ability to split into a main CP and early entry CP.

THE MAIN COMMAND POST AND THE EARLY ENTRY COMMAND POST

According to Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4-93.1, *Combat Sustainment Support Battalion* (19 June 2017), a CSSB can support a main CP and an early entry CP.¹ “The main CP is a facility containing the majority of the staff designed to control current operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations.”² “An early entry CP is a lead element of a headquarters designed to control operations until the remaining portions of the headquarters are deployed and operational.”³ Similarly, ATP 4-90, *Brigade Support Battalion* (19 June 2020), explains that a BSB commander “can establish an early entry CP to help them control operations during the deployment phase of operations.”⁴

The best use of a sustainment battalion’s doctrinal capability to simultaneously form an early entry and main CP is for displacement. BSBs and CSSBs at the National Training Center (NTC) often launched an early entry CP to their desired future location to conduct reconnaissance of the new site and establish a command and control node. Once established, the early entry CP can assume command and control of the battalion while the main CP at the rearward site breaks down, relocates, and establishes at the new site.
WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS AND INTEGRATING CELLS

Doctrine states that commanders organize their CPs into various cells, including functional cells and integrating cells. Sustainment battalions often struggle to find the personnel and equipment (based on the modified table of organization and equipment [MTOE]) to establish these cells in an effective manner. To be successful, sustainment commanders must prioritize what cells they create, and develop methods to gain efficiencies by combining multiple integrating cells into single entities. Of specific interest, is the current operations integration cell, doctrinally “the focal point for the execution of operations.”

Observations at the NTC consistently revealed that a doctrinal current operations integrating cell is the linchpin of successful sustainment operations, overlaid with the supported brigade combat team’s scheme of maneuver. By virtue of having a map, a convoy tracker, and radio, a sustainment battalion has a current operations section. But is it effective? Are all warfighting functions present? Does it facilitate a common operating picture?

Commanders struggle to establish a current operations section that includes a cross-section of the entire staff, and therefore all assigned warfighting functions, for multiple reasons. First and foremost, commanders default to establishing a field CP in a manner similar to their garrison headquarters: With compartmentalized sections and offices. Second, limited personnel and equipment based on MTOE is an issue. Finally, some believe that establishing a CP that is dispersed in nature—covering multiple tents and/or mounted workspaces, such as the M1087 Expandable Van Shelter, or “expando-van”—offers a degree of protection. In this construct, a common practice is an S-1/S-4 space, S-2/S-3 space, S-6 space, and a support operations (SPO) space. Unfortunately, the result is a very compartmentalized staff, or the classic stovepipe analogy. When asked, commanders would explain that the SPO space is the future operations or plans cell, while the S-2/S-3 space is the current operations cell. Unfortunately, the S-2/S-3 space (or the current operations section) almost never includes all warfighting functions. This is a departure from doctrine, but more importantly, it impedes the effectiveness of the current operations cell and the overall CP itself.

The mistake of the stovepipe CP leads to each staff section, or cluster of two or three staff sections, which are working hard and doing the best they can, but ultimately failing because they are working independently of each other. A stovepiped CP can perform the following three of the four CP functions defined by ATP 4-93.1:

- Plan and prepare for operations.
- Receive, analyze, and disseminate information.
- Prepare reports.
However, a stovepiped CP cannot adequately perform the fourth: Control operations, integrate resources, and synchronize current operations. For this reason, the CP current operations cell should contain all representatives possible.

A main CP current operations section with an S-1 representative can maintain situational understanding of the accountability of the battalion and other units within the support area as elements are continuously departing and returning. An S-2 representative is required to update the common operational picture of the supported units’ ever-evolving scheme of maneuver and the enemy’s constantly changing location and composition. The S-4 representative must inform the team on the status of internal battalion resources so the S-3 can integrate those resources into the current operation. An S-6 representative is vital to keep the CP up on all forms of communication and rapidly troubleshoot problems as they arise. A SPO representative can inform the battalion commander of how a last-minute change will impact the operation 96 hours from now. Finally, the current operations cell with a protection cell representative can command and control the battalion’s area defense fight in the event of enemy contact.

SURVIVABILITY OF THE MAIN COMMAND POST

Although uncommon, one or two battalion commanders at the NTC have deliberately stovepiped their CP with survivability as the main consideration. For example, if indirect fires destroys their S-2/S-3 tent or current operations integrating cell, then they can relocate the cell to the S-4 tent. Although a sound concept, when a main CP is dispersed in this manner, its ability to accomplish what a main CP must achieve is impeded. Furthermore, commanders may establish a compartmentalized CP in the name of survivability, but emplace the sections only meters apart, well within the destructive radius of even a 60-millimeter mortar round, which defeats the purpose of dispersion and simultaneously degrades the synergy of the staff. In effect, dispersing a main CP in this manner is the worst of both worlds.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Sustainment commanders should pay particular attention to establishing a main CP with a doctrinal current operations integrating cell with all warfighting functions present and synergized. As discussed, it is difficult if not impossible for sustainment battalions to create all of the functional and integrating cells that doctrine recommends because of personnel and equipment issues. Commanders need to combine the current operations integrating cell and the protection-integrating cell. Both cells are of vital importance in a peer or near-peer fight during large-scale combat operations. Both cells require all staff sections and warfighting functions present, in addition to every available communications platform. Each cell needs as perfect as possible situational awareness to accomplish its mission. The best thing a commander
can do to gain efficiencies between these two very requirement heavy cells is to combine them. The current operations cell and all the personnel and equipment dedicated to it, should simultaneously serve as the protection cell. When the first round impacts the support area, the S-3 should stand up, not as the battalion operations officer, but as the protection cell officer in charge, and start commanding the fight. Under this construct, the S-3 will already have all the personnel, warfighting functions, communications equipment, and situational awareness to do so.

**SUMMARY**

Doctrine explains that BSBs and CSSBs are resourced to operate out of main CPs and early entry CPs. It also explains that sustainment battalions are capable of establishing a current operations integrating cell within the main CP, a vital section of any CP that contains representation from all staff sections and warfighting functions. Sustainment commanders struggle to establish an effective CP because they do not establish an effective current operations cell with all appropriate representation present. For several reasons, sustainment battalion CPs in the field are built compartmentalized and stovepiped that impede the synergy of the staff, detract from shared situational awareness and understanding, and cannot adequately perform all tasks and functions necessary of a CP. Therefore, commanders must place special emphasis in the structure, organization, and composition of their CPs with a special focus in a true fusion of all staff and warfighting functions within the current operations integrating cell. Combining the current operations integrating cell with the protection cell will gain efficiencies and set up the support area for success in a fight against a near-peer enemy during large-scale combat operations. Sustainment commanders establishing a secure support area, commanded and controlled by a doctrinal CP, is a key building block for success in the fight to come.

**Endnotes**

3. Ibid., page 1-3, paragraph 1-12.
5. FM 6-0, Page 1-8, paragraph 1-44.
6. ATP 4-93.1, Page 2-4, paragraph 2-21.
CHAPTER 47

The Headquarters and Headquarters Company Brigade Support Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a headquarters and headquarters company, brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center (NTC):

- Define Base Defense Roles and Responsibilities (07-CO-3027/19-CO-9016).
- Implement Chemical, Biological, Radiological, And Nuclear Protective Measures at the Company Level (03-CO-9201).
- Employ Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception Techniques (05-CO-3003).
- Occupy an Assembly Area (Company) (07-CO-5181).
- Conduct Tactical Convoy (55-CO-4003).

If a headquarters and headquarters company focuses on these five tasks and masters them before their NTC rotation, their organization stands a greater chance of success. The HHC should avoid the following pitfalls:

- Lack of a clear task and purpose for the HHC command team.
- Failure to have enough certified Raven operators (or all operators come from same section).
- Lack of established priorities of work during expeditionary reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.
- Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other maintenance operations.

To avoid these common pitfalls, the HHC command team needs to develop its role in the battalion’s operation with the battalion commander and command sergeant major regarding base defense and patient holding-area operations. A clear understanding of how the HHC command team can best support the battalion helps the entire organization by assigning a task to a commander that the staff may not have the capacity to handle.
Operating the battalion’s main intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset is critical to enabling the battalion to conduct reconnaissance of convoy routes and future brigade support area locations. Typically, the only Raven operators come from the battalion’s S-2, which is authorized three personnel (an officer in charge, noncommissioned officer in charge, and analyst). To ensure the Raven can be employed when needed, trained Soldiers from across the staff can benefit the battalion’s planning efforts.

Building combat power early is necessary, as the support battalion is critical for the brigade’s success in large-scale combat operations. The HHC typically attempts to execute a full planning cycle and build combat power simultaneously, and it can result in neither effort being executed well. Understanding how to get the company through the expeditionary reception, staging, onward movement, and integration requirements rapidly can allow the staff to plan follow-on operations thoroughly and allow subordinate units proper time to execute troop leading procedures.

Lastly, maintenance operations are critical to the company’s success. Designating time daily to PMCS and ensuring the Department of the Army Form 5988-E, *Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet* (01 March 1991), is turned in pays dividends 96 hours into operations. Failing to execute PMCS typically results in critical pieces of equipment (containerized kitchens, multi-temperature refrigerated container system, Satellite Transportable Terminal, or generators) becoming inoperable.
Outlined below are the top training tasks that a field-feeding section in a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) of a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center (NTC):

- Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area (10-CO-0058).
- Maintain Field-Feeding Safety and Sanitation (10-PLT-4501).

Units should use the training and evaluation outline to assess proficiency in executing tasks. By focusing and mastering these tasks before an NTC rotation, the field-feeding section can provide appropriate Class I support to the brigade support battalion. A field-feeding section should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of proper licensing on equipment.
- Inability to execute night-driving operations
- Lack of integration of the field-feeding team into a protection plan during an M-M-M ration cycle.
- Lack of communication through the battalion S-4 to the brigade food service section.

To avoid these common pitfalls, the field-feeding team needs to have a deliberate drivers training plan and provide Soldiers the opportunity to train on the equipment they are expected to utilize. Typically, Soldiers have minimal experience driving assigned equipment and are inexperienced driving at night because of garrison dining facility shift requirements. Commanders need to prioritize night drivers training so their Soldiers are prepared to navigate and operate equipment at night.

The field-feeding team is underutilized within the HHC protection plan, especially when the battalion is on an M-M-M ration cycle. The section can provide support to the protection of the brigade support area when the ration cycle permits. Typically, the Soldiers do not have a task and purpose if they are not preparing the next meal, which leaves them underutilized.
Lastly, communication between the field-feeding team to the food service section within the brigade S-4 is limited and unclear. The typical garrison channel of communication—the section’s senior noncommissioned officer to the food service technician—is not compatible in the field environment. The logistics status report, submitted through the battalion S-4, is the primary means of communication for the field-feeding team. The senior field-feeding team noncommissioned officer struggles to communicate with the battalion S-4 effectively to ensure the battalion has what it needs. Training this line of communication during garrison operations can give the battalion’s S-4 more experience handling these planning considerations.
CHAPTER 49

The Distribution Company in a Brigade Support Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a distribution company in a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center:

- Conduct Tactical Convoy (55-CO-4003).
- Defend Convoy Elements (55-CO-4006).
- Conduct Hasty Displacement (63-CO-4023).
- Conduct Unit Defense (63-CO-0727).

If a distribution company in a brigade support company focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. Distribution companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of coordination with supporting units.
- Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other maintenance.
- Lack of troop leading procedures and precombat checks and inspections.
- Lack of established priorities of work.
- Lack of local security.
To avoid these common pitfalls, company leaders must focus on coordinating with supporting units, either directly or indirectly, for linkup times and locations before launching a logistics package from the brigade support area. Company leaders should enforce maintenance standards and ensure Soldiers understand how to conduct a proper PMCS to avoid mission delays caused by shortcomings. While at home station, focus on proper enforcement of the one-third, two-thirds rule for training events. At the same time, Soldiers need to understand the importance of conducting precombat checks and inspections and what they entail, while leaders need to be aware of key items that could cause issues during a mission (lack of night-vision devices, food, water, etc.). The company should develop a standardized priority of work for each platoon and section to ensure Soldiers understand their roles and responsibilities when occupying a new area (security, communications, supply points, etc.). Concurrently, the company needs to develop a local security plan nested with the battalion that enforces supply points to secure primary and secondary fighting positions during the field training exercise.
CHAPTER 50

The Transportation Platoon in a Brigade Support Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a transportation platoon in a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center (NTC):

- Provide Motor Transport Support (55-PLT-0011).
- Conduct Actions on Contact (Platoon) (07-PLT-9013).
- Set Up a Truck Platoon (55-PLT-0007).
- Conduct an Area Defense (Platoon) (07-PLT-9003).

If a transportation platoon in a brigade support company focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The transportation platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other maintenance.
- Lack of troop leading procedures, and precombat checks and inspections.
- Lack of convoy security.

To avoid these common pitfalls, platoon leaders must focus on enforcement of maintenance standards and ensure their Soldiers understand how to conduct proper PMCS to avoid delays of missions because of shortcomings. While at home station, focus needs to be given on proper enforcement of the one third, two-thirds rule for training events. At the same time, Soldiers need to understand the importance of conducting precombat checks and inspections what they entail. Leaders need to know key items that could cause issues on a mission (lack of night-vision devices, food, water, etc.). Platoon leaders should ensure convoy security is integrated into missions habitually, and Soldiers understand their roles in security of the convoy.
CHAPTER 51

The Supply Platoon in a Brigade Support Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a supply platoon in a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center (NTC):

● Conduct a Tactical Convoy (55-CO-4003).
● Conduct Actions On Contact (Platoon) (07-PLT-9013).
● Conduct an Area Defense (Platoon) (07-PLT-9003).
● Provide Ammunition Transfer Point Support—Ammunition Holding Area (09-PLT-0125).

If a supply platoon in a brigade support company focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The supply platoon should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other maintenance.
● Lack of troop leading procedures, and precombat checks and inspections.
● Lack of local security.

To avoid these common pitfalls, platoon leaders must enforce maintenance standards and conduct proper PMCS to avoid delays. While at home station, focus needs to be given on proper enforcement of the one-third, two-thirds rule for training events. At the same time, Soldiers need to understand the importance of conducting precombat checks and inspections and what they entail. Leaders need to know key items that could cause issues during displacements of supply points (lack of night-vision devices, proper securing of loads, etc.). Platoon leaders should focus on development of a local security plan that is nested with the company, and enables sections to secure themselves with primary and secondary fighting positions during a field training exercise.
CHAPTER 52

The Fuel and Water Platoon in a Brigade Support Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a fuel and water platoon in a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center (NTC):

- Transport Bulk Petroleum (55-CO-0041)
- Conduct Actions on Contact (Platoon) (07-PLT-9013).
- Occupy an Assembly Area (Platoon) (07-PLT-5181).
- Conduct an Area Defense (Platoon) (07-PLT-9003).

If a fuel and water platoon in a brigade support company focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The fuel and water platoon should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other maintenance.
- Lack of troop leading procedures, and precombat checks and inspections.
- Lack of convoy security.

To avoid these common pitfalls, maintenance standards must be enforced and Soldiers must understand how to conduct proper PMCS. While at home station, focus needs to be given on proper enforcement of the one third, two-thirds rule for training events. At the same time, Soldiers need to understand the importance of conducting their precombat checks and inspections and what they entail. Leaders need to know key items that could cause issues on a mission (lack of night-vision devices, proper hoses for liquid distribution, etc.). Platoon leaders should ensure convoy security is integrated into missions habitually, and Soldiers understand their roles in convoy security.
CHAPTER 53
The Field Maintenance Company, Brigade Support Battalion

National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a field maintenance company in a brigade support battalion should focus during home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center:

- Perform Predeployment Maintenance Activities (43-CO-4805).
- Conduct Unit Defense (63-CO-0727).
- Perform Maintenance Control Functions (43-CO-4506).
- Perform Field Maintenance (43-CO-4552).

The field maintenance companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Roles and responsibilities not being clearly defined.
- Not having required special maintenance tools on hand.
- Not establishing mutually supportive fighting positions.
- Not establishing a clear process for Department of the Army (DA) Form 5988-E, *Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet* (01 March 1991), within the brigade support area.
- Not leaning forward on the support operations section to anticipate maintenance requirements.

To avoid these common pitfalls, a field maintenance company command team needs to ensure the commodity shops are properly nested with the brigade concept of support (as defined by the support operations section, brigade S-4 section, and maneuver battalion requirements) and the company is providing brigade-level support during brigade training events in garrison. Roles and responsibilities need to be clearly defined for running company priorities of work. All required special maintenance tools, test maintenance diagnostic equipment, maintenance support devices, and Class IX support packages must be on hand for providing field-level maintenance.
Mutually supportive fighting positions must be part of the brigade support area defense plan, and unit sector sketches must be properly nested within the brigade support battalion’s base defense plan. The shop office must have a clear process for DA Form 5988-E workflow within the brigade support area to allow brigade support battalion units to properly execute dispatching procedures within a defined cycle.

The company must lean forward on the support operations section and forward support company requirements to properly allocate specialty maintenance capability based on a defined priority of support across the brigade. Maintenance companies need to manage maintenance support and base defense manning requirements concurrently. Maintenance companies must continually leverage the brigade support battalion executive officer for refinement of the internal maintenance cycle among adjacent units during field operations.
CHAPTER 54

The Maintenance Control and Area Support Platoon
Field Maintenance Company

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a maintenance control and area support platoon in a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center:

● Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (71-PLT-5100).
● Provide Inspection and Classification Support (43-PLT-0006).
● Perform Maintenance Control Functions (43-CO-4506).
● Set Up Maintenance Platoon Headquarters and Sections (43-PLT-4570).

The maintenance control and area support platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● Not doing proper site selection for maintenance commodity shops.
● Not establishing communications with the company headquarters.
● Not establishing clear priorities of work within the brigade support area (BSA).
● Not establishing a clear process for Department of the Army (DA) Form 5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet (01 March 1991) workflow for within the BSA.

To avoid these common pitfalls, a maintenance control and area support platoon leader needs to ensure the platoon establishes a layout plan for the company headquarters, maintenance control and service, and recovery section. Digital and analog communications must be established between the platoon headquarters, maintenance control section, company headquarters, and support operations. Roles and responsibilities need to be clearly defined for running platoon priorities of work. Required maintenance special tools, test maintenance diagnostic equipment, maintenance support devices, and Class IX support packages must be on hand for providing field-level maintenance.
The platoon must have clearly defined fighting positions and sector sketches properly nested with the company unit defense plan. The maintenance control section must have a clear process for DA Form 5988-E workflow within the BSA to allow brigade support battalion units to properly execute dispatching procedures on a defined cycle. The maintenance control section must monitor the status of all work requests throughout the workflow process, managing Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A) or logistics information systems reports to minimize maintenance downtime.

The platoon must have an established recovery plan with properly trained H8/H9-qualified personnel for conducting service and recovery operations. Personnel must be proficient with operating Joint Battle Command-Platform to properly relay maintenance requirements with forward maintenance sections conducting field-level maintenance.
CHAPTER 55

The Maintenance Platoon, Field Maintenance Company

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a maintenance platoon in a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center:

- Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (71-PLT-5100).
- Conduct Tactical Movement (07-PLT-1342).
- Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions (05-PLT-3013).
- Set Up Forward Repair Platoon Headquarters and Sections (43-PLT-4531).

Maintenance platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Not doing proper site selection for maintenance commodity shops.
- Not establishing communications with the company headquarters.
- Not establishing crew-served fighting positions within the brigade support area.
- Not conducting drivers training.

To avoid common pitfalls, a maintenance platoon leader needs to ensure the platoon establishes a layout plan for the platoon headquarters; field maintenance; ground support equipment; and missile, electronic, and armament repair sections. Digital and analog communications must be established between the platoon headquarters, company headquarters, and commodity maintenance sections. Roles and responsibilities need to be clearly defined for running platoon priorities of work. Required maintenance special tools, test maintenance diagnostic equipment, maintenance support devices, and Class IX support packages must be on hand for providing field-level maintenance.
The platoon must have clearly defined fighting positions and sector sketches properly nested with the company unit defense plan. Vehicle crew-served fighting positions must be properly emplaced and integrated with the overall brigade support area defense plan. The platoon must be prepared to execute base defense operations and provide field-level maintenance concurrently. Personnel should have experience conducting entry control point operations. Personnel must also be proficient with operating Joint Battle Command-Platform to properly relay maintenance requirements with forward maintenance sections conducting field-level maintenance. Personnel need to conduct proper drivers training before executing tactical convoy operations.
CHAPTER 56

The Brigade Support Medical Company, Brigade Support Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center

The following are the top collective training tasks a medical company in a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center (NTC):

- Manage Health Service Support (08-CO-0312/08-TM-0220/1).
- Conduct Ambulance Shuttle Operations (08-CO-0353/08-TM-0319).
- Maintain Communications (63-CO-4017/441-14H-1036/113-25U-1009).
- Inspect Cargo Shipping Documents (551-88N-3001).
- Perform Duties as a Driver Trainer/ Examiner (551-88M-2426).

Medical companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:

- Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other maintenance.
- Lack of established priorities of work and rest cycles.
- Failure to integrate the company commander and first sergeant into brigade medical planning or maintaining communications.
- Failure to conduct an operation order (OPORD) brief and observe subordinate leaders’ briefs.

The brigade support medical companies (BSMCs) arrive to NTC having practiced on Role 2 medical care under little to no duress. However, Soldiers and leaders do not fully grasp the importance and nuances derived from this task to more easily facilitate their establishment of Role 2 medical care. Before any detailed planning is done, being thoroughly practiced on this task can alleviate many of the issues experienced with Role 2 medical care caused by the operational environment of NTC. The most common issues are lack of established teams to facilitate offload of equipment, established teams to set up tents, no power distribution (with primaries and alternates), and lack of equipment in the Role 2 medical facility. Another common issue is ebbing and flowing of personnel based on leaders directions, resulting in personnel being underutilized. This planning needs to be solidified in the platoon and company tactical standard operating procedures, outlining required tasks that can be planned based on the personnel and time available during particular missions.
BSMCs do not arrive at NTC having thoroughly exercised their ambulance exchange point (AXP) operations. Although practiced at home station-training, it lacks the dynamic operations seen at NTC over extended ground lines of communications with time and/or conditions-based triggers for multiple AXPs. This causes the BSMC and evacuation platoon to not track or be aware of the triggers to activate or deactivate AXPs, which are found in several products in the brigade (for example, the OPORD, fragmentary order, annex F, appendix 3 to annex F, and the brigade’s medical common operational picture). Ultimately, this results in an increased died-of-wounds rate from delayed start points of BSMC platforms, and missed patient handoffs caused by traveling to incorrect AXPs.

The BSMC, as the brigade combat team commander’s role of care, has brigade-level influence on medical operations. The most successful BSMCs accomplish this task by maintaining effective communications with the brigade, specifically the surgeon section, administrative and logistics operations center, BSB, maneuver battalions (specifically Role 1 medical care), and their organic platoons. This is facilitated by establishing all their platforms including Joint Battle Command-Platform, Joint Capabilities Release, two frequency modulation (FM) Advanced System Improvement Programs (ASIPs) with OE-254/GRC antennas, and Combat Service Support Automated Information System Interface (CAISI). These systems are used by BSMCs to establish their medical communications for combat casualty care and Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET).

Commonly, BSMC command posts only establish one FM ASIP that jumps between BSB and company nets, and JBC-P that lacks chat groups for the entirety of the brigade’s medical community. This is further extended to the treatment platoon that is authorized by the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) to have the ability to run FM communications from the Role 2 medical facility (line-item number P40750 with any Army Navy [AN]-Vehicle Radio Communication [VRC] configuration), minimizing the requirement of runners that often becomes the primary means. A point in this execution that requires planning and rehearsing is the utilization of the AN/VRC radio communications system, because the BSMC is only authorized enough AN/VRC systems for its vehicles. This requires the platoon and company to identify how to establish this internal, static FM communication system. At home-station training, PMCS and testing can significantly reduce the issues most commonly experienced at the NTC.
BSMCs attend the NTC with an overall solid understanding of what equipment it requires to facilitate the full capability of its broad operations. In turn, the company has a general understanding of what platforms transport individual pieces of equipment, containers, and personnel. However, Soldiers and company leaders lack the meticulous level of analysis, planning, and documentation on how to truly configure and annotate their loads to maximize their lift capability and operational efficiency. This leads to the following issues:

- Delayed displacement operations by attempting to “fit” equipment into vehicles.
- The inability to locate critical pieces of equipment stored deep and far forward in their light medium tactical vehicles and trailers.
- Lack of the ability to transport organic equipment as required by BSMC doctrine.
- Loss of government property because of damaged or unsecured loads.

As outlined in the training and evaluation outline, the BSMC should verify these load plans monthly. Although potentially excessive, it ensures accuracy of loads, understanding by all Soldiers, and facilitates ease in displacement operations.

When the BSMCs arrive at NTC, at the platoon level, there is lack of driver’s training, night-driver’s training, and licensed personnel for all vehicles assigned to the BSMC. Unfamiliarity with vehicle platforms, especially using night-vision devices, leads to patient delay of care moving from point of injury through the roles of care to Role 3 care. This delay in or slowed movement leads increased driver fatigue, and resources being drawn away from Role 2 care for prolonged periods of time. Delay in movement is often caused by lack of properly licensed personnel available to move vehicles, and is extended to BSMC displacements. BSMCs should prepare for NTC at the platoon level to conduct extensive drivers training with an emphasis on night-drivers training and driving using night-vision devices. Newly arrived personnel should have gone through proper driver’s training and licensed on all vehicles assigned to the BSMC, regardless of their duty position.
COMMON PITFALLS MEDICAL COMPANIES SHOULD AVOID

Historically, all units, including the BSMC, attend NTC with vehicles and equipment not mission capable, often with known issues brought forward from home station with ambitions of correcting faults at NTC. Before attending NTC, specifically on rolling stock, faults need to be identified using thorough PMCS and subsequently corrected. This mindset needs to continue at NTC with daily, in-depth PMCS to identify and correct minor faults before they become significant. Specifically for the BSMC, this results in the brigade losing one of its few medical evacuation platforms or Role 2 care attempting to cross-load equipment to accomplish an initial operating capability on its next displacement while forced to leave other mission-critical equipment behind. To assist with this issue, the BSMC should conduct a PMCS course at home station using applicable technical manuals on its rolling stock and ensure those Soldiers who operate the rolling stock attend the course. Every rolling stock needs a hard copy of the technical manual. Leaders need to oversee and spot-check Soldiers conducting PMCS to ensure Soldiers are adhering to the standard before and during NTC.

The BSMC, as with all medical units, is tasked with a 24-hour unknown work cycle. This unpredictable work cycle can wreak havoc on the morale, effectiveness, and safety of the BSMC if not effectively managed. Several ways the BSMC can positively influence these impacts is by establishing and rehearsing priorities of work, duties and responsibilities, and a work and rest cycle. The most common friction comes during Role 2 care displacement operations for priorities of work and duties and responsibilities. A way of alleviating this friction is by establishing a detailed displacement timeline with the priorities of work depicting what is required, and when and who owns the responsibility. However, duties and responsibilities extend to daily sustainment operations (who and when are generators refueled and checked, water buffalo filled, trash collected and thrown, etc.). The work and rest cycle is most commonly impacted in the evacuation and treatment platoons. All too often, a single casualty is in-bound, resulting in all MEDEVAC platforms and treatment personnel spun up for prolonged durations to result in a majority of personnel not utilized and watching. The decision of mass casualty should be the only time all personnel are available for patient care, but even this should be scalable. These factors need to be rehearsed at home station in an austere environment through platoon and levels up using field exercises. During a field exercise, the company will be able to facilitate internal training on priorities of work, but should coordinate with adjacent and higher echelons to facilitate the mass casualties work and rest cycle.
The BSMC commander and first sergeant are often the most senior medical service corps officers and Army Medical Department (Career Management Field 68) in the brigade combat team. Often, both have previously served in the brigade combat team surgeon section, and are the command team of the brigade commander’s role of care. The pair have the experience to positively shape the brigade combat team medical operations. However, because of numerous factors, the pair are often not requested to assist in providing input into the medical concept of support. The BSMC command team must ensure it is integrated into the brigade medical concept, providing the ground-up refinement for the duration of the operation. Furthermore, the command team must not let the limited communications platforms organic to the BSMC prevent this integration (utilize in-person visits and scheduled Secret Voice over Internet Protocol conversations). The command team should start this integration with the brigade surgeon section at home station by conducting a synchronization meeting, at minimum bimonthly, potentially directly before or after the brigade medical synchronization meeting. This synchronization meeting should not only cover current operations as a brigade, but also how it is going to operate in the field (duties and responsibilities, “swim lanes,” how the BSMC and surgeon sections are wanting to fight, limitations and constraints of the BSMC, etc.) to build confidence and rapport among the teams.

As part of the Basic Officer Leader Course, Captains Career Course, Senior Leader Course, and Master Leader Course, the company command team has been instructed and presented multiple OPORD briefs and received formal guidance on troop leading procedures (TLP) in the institutional setting. The use of the company OPORD and TLP should not be exhausted at the institutional setting and should continue within the BSMC. The BSMC command team often takes the BSB OPORD and repeats it to the company, if an OPORD brief is even conducted. The company command team must process the BSB OPORD and appendix 3 to annex F to provide concise OPORD briefs applicable to its company. Often, leaders within the BSMC do not utilize their TLP, which makes this overall process vague and incomplete. Field Manual 3-21.11, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Rifle Company (29 April 2014), Appendix D, provides an excellent input/output process the company command team can follow to significantly reduce these issues. Additionally, the command team should watch and validate subordinate leaders’ OPORD briefs to their subordinates to ensure the mission statement, commander’s intent, tasks to subordinates, and coordinating instructions are correct, which can create success for the BSMC and subsequently brigade medical operations. The TLP and OPORD processes need to be trained down to the team leader level and integrated into daily operations at home station, teaching muscle memory of conducting these processes. Therefore, by the time the BSMC attends NTC, leaders at every echelon can efficiently execute all aspects without requiring guidance or refinement in the overarching process, and the command team can verify details of the operations.

209
THE HEADQUARTERS PLATOON/SECTION, BRIGADE SUPPORT MEDICAL COMPANY

The following are the top collective training tasks a headquarters platoon in a BSMC should focus on during home-station training before deploying to NTC:

● Conduct Ambulance Shuttle Operations (08-CO-0353/08-TM-0319).
● Provide Medical Supply Support (08-CO-4515/081-68J-3102).
● Establishing a Company Command Post in an Operational Environment (71-CO-0050).

THE TREATMENT PLATOON, BRIGADE SUPPORT MEDICAL COMPANY

The following are the top collective training tasks a treatment platoon in a brigade support medical company should focus on during home-station training before deploying to NTC:

● Manage Health Service Support Operations (08-CO-0312/08-TM-0220/1).
● Provide Patient Administration Services (08-DET-0230/081-68G-1042).
● Provide Emergency Medical Treatment (08-PLT-0313).
● Provide Patient Holding (08-CO-0318).

EVACUATION PLATOON, BRIGADE SUPPORT MEDICAL COMPANY

The following are the top collective training tasks an evacuation platoon in a BSMC should focus on during home-station training before deploying to NTC:

● Conduct Ambulance Shuttle Operations (08-CO-0353/08-TM-0319).
● Conduct Patient Accountability (081-70E-2000).
● Provide Ground Ambulance Evacuation Support (08-CO-0319).
● Evacuate Patients From Supported Units (08-CO-0354).
A common struggle among units at the National Training Center (NTC) is synchronizing sustainment with operational demands. Even the most developed operational plans suffer when something as simple as a late start point (SP) by an individual logistical package (LOGPAC) takes place. Late SPs are typically the result of failure to adequately plan and prepare for the mission, leading to operators identifying a dead-lined piece of equipment shortly before the SP, leaders dedicating an inadequate amount of time to supply loading, or precombat checks (PCCs) and precombat inspections (PCIs) pinpointing deficiencies (from communications issues to weapon problems) too late to fix before an on-time SP.

No unit at the NTC is immune from these common maladies. These are struggles shared by the composite supply companies and composite truck companies of the combat sustainment support battalions, the A distribution companies of brigade support battalions (BSBs), and the forward support companies of maneuver battalions. The only solution is dedicating as much time as possible for deliberate mission preparation.

THE NOTIFICATION-HOUR SEQUENCE

A well-defined notification-hour (N-hour) sequence establishes a timeline for LOGPAC preparation. Troop leading procedures (TLP) are used by company-, platoon-, squad-, and section-level leaders to prepare for missions. But TLP and a deliberate preparation process require time. The battalion implementing an N-hour sequence and battle tracking the execution of that sequence help the companies prepare for execution in two ways. First, it structures the time available to address personnel and equipment issues leading up to mission execution. Second, it manages the time by providing the battalion situational awareness and early warning if that preparation begins to fall behind. Then, the battalion can surge efforts to get the preparation back on track.
RECOMMENDATION

The N-hour sequence is an essential tool to address issues during LOGPAC preparation. Table 57-1 is an example of an effective N-hour sequence observed at NTC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N-24</td>
<td>Convoy commander notified of the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-24-20</td>
<td>Convoy commander analyzes personnel, equipment, supplies, and the route needed for convoy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-20-19</td>
<td>Personnel are notified of convoy requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-19</td>
<td>The convoy manifest of personnel, equipment, supplies, and route is submitted to the battalion operations officer (S-3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-19-17</td>
<td>Preventive maintenance checks and services of equipment is performed; necessary equipment replaced or maintenance notified of the need for repairs; all vehicles are fueled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-17-13</td>
<td>Commodities are loaded, strapped, and recorded on the load plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-13-12</td>
<td>Vehicles are staged for convoy departure; equipment and personnel manifests are locked at the battalion level; PCCs conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-12-4</td>
<td>Personnel rest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-4</td>
<td>Personnel wake up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-3</td>
<td>Final PCIs of equipment and personnel; the S-2 provides an intelligence update to the convoy commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-2</td>
<td>Convoy brief conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-1</td>
<td>A hard stop to drop equipment that is not mission capable for the mission is completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-1</td>
<td>Final rehearsals are conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-Hour</td>
<td>SP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Convoy preparation on a time constraint affects personnel rest. To allow more time for personnel rest, other personnel can prepare convoy loads and check equipment while operators rest.
CRASHING THE SEQUENCE

When NTC coaches provide the above N-hour sequence to the rotational training unit, the first response is that a preparation cycle that consumes 24 hours is unrealistic. The notion that a unit would have more than 24 hours of notice to provide to the executing company or platoon is a lofty goal. This mindset is an indicator that sustainment units struggle to get ahead of requirements and too often fall into a more reactionary stance when it comes to mission preparation and execution. Units must combat this mindset with more future operations planning, and interface with the maneuver planners sooner to better forecast requirements. Continuous coordination with higher and adjacent units, and a solid method for battle tracking within the current operations cell of the BSB headquarters, tied with the proper use of the military decision-making process (MDMP) will mitigate a number of concerns. Additionally, issuing warning orders and maintaining current running estimates will ensure timely and accurate dissemination of information to subordinate units, ultimately facilitating the successful execution of the N-hour sequence.

Unfortunately, last-minute sustainment requirements will develop during large-scale combat operations (LSCO). The nature of armed conflict against a peer or near-peer enemy ensures that logistical forecasts are never perfect, and sustainer will need to react to shifts in the scheme of maneuver and the resulting concept of support. However, if sustainer become more practiced at deliberate mission forecasting and allow time for more deliberate mission preparation, they will be better postured to crash these systems and react in a timelier manner. The unit that is proficient on deliberate mission preparation and on-time execution is the unit most suited to truncate its preparation and execution timelines down from 24 hours to 12 hours, or even 4 hours when the situation warrants. This unit will find success regardless of the timeline because it has the requisite system in place.

SUMMARY

Units training for LSCO at NTC struggle to execute sustainment as planned and on time based on the supported scheme of maneuver because of shortfalls in mission preparation. A deliberate and battle-tracked, N-hour preparation sequence will facilitate success via structured time management. The unit that is disciplined in this endeavor will be the unit that is most prepared to modify its system and still enjoy mission success. Rising to the occasion when the unexpected happens, preparation sequences shortened to meet emerging and changing sustainment requirements is always a key to success. However, this can never be the primary course of action. Sustainment organizations must develop systems and adhere to those systems in a disciplined manner to consistently prepare for success in the fight to come.
# GLOSSARY

## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCS</td>
<td>Army Battle Command System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCT</td>
<td>armored brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>attack by fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADAM</td>
<td>air defense airspace management</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFATDS</td>
<td>Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHA</td>
<td>ammunition holding area</td>
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<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Army Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Force Generation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ART</td>
<td>Army Tactical Task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIP</td>
<td>Advanced System Improvement Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATHP</td>
<td>ammunition transfer holding point</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATK</td>
<td>attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>ammunition transfer point, Army Techniques Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVN</td>
<td>aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AXP</td>
<td>ambulance exchange point</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAE</td>
<td>brigade aviation element</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAS</td>
<td>battalion aid station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE</td>
<td>brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEB</td>
<td>brigade engineer battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFV</td>
<td>Bradley Fighting Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLUECOP</td>
<td>maneuver common operational picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN</td>
<td>battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOC</td>
<td>battery operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>brigade support area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSB</td>
<td>brigade support battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTRY</td>
<td>battery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>combined arms battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAISI</td>
<td>Combat Service Support Automated Information Systems Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALFX</td>
<td>combined arms live-fire exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATS</td>
<td>Combined Arms Training Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCD</td>
<td>camouflage, concealment, and deception</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNR</td>
<td>Combat Network Radio</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>company</td>
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<td>COLL</td>
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<td>COMMEX</td>
<td>communication exercise</td>
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<td>COMMO</td>
<td>communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPOF</td>
<td>Command Post of the Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>combat support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSB</td>
<td>combat sustainment support battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>combat training center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTCP</td>
<td>combat trains command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUB</td>
<td>commander’s update brief</td>
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<td>CUOPS</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCGS-A</td>
<td>Distributed Common Ground System-Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDS</td>
<td>Data Distribution Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEF</td>
<td>defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHCP</td>
<td>Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol</td>
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<td>DNS</td>
<td>domain name system</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODIN</td>
<td>Department of Defense Information Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOA</td>
<td>enemy course of action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Term</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
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<td>EN</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVAC</td>
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<td>EVENTEMP</td>
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<tr>
<td>FA</td>
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<td>FASP</td>
<td>field artillery support plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>fire direction center</td>
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<td>FHP</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual, frequency modulation</td>
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<td>U.S. Army Forces Command</td>
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<td>forward support company</td>
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<td>Global Broadcast Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCSS-Army</td>
<td>Global Combat Support System-Army</td>
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<td>HCLOS</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>headquarters and headquarters troop</td>
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<td>HICON</td>
<td>higher command</td>
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<td>headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBCT</td>
<td>infantry brigade combat team</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>indirect fire</td>
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<td>IDM</td>
<td>information dissemination management</td>
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<td>Infantry Mortar Leader Course</td>
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<td>intelligence preparations of the battlefield</td>
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<tr>
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<td>in the vicinity of</td>
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<td>IWIF</td>
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<td>JCR</td>
<td>Joint Capabilities Release</td>
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<td>JSLIST</td>
<td>Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology</td>
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<td>LFX</td>
<td>live-fire exercise</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>LOGCOP</td>
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<td>line of sight</td>
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<td>LRAS</td>
<td>Long-Range Acquisition System</td>
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<td>LRP</td>
<td>logistics release point</td>
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<td>LTIOV</td>
<td>latest time information is of value</td>
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<td>MET</td>
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<td>mission-essential task list</td>
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<td>MICLIC</td>
<td>mine-clearing line charge</td>
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<td>MILES</td>
<td>multiple integrated laser engagement system</td>
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<td>military occupational specialty</td>
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<td>military police</td>
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<td>MRAP</td>
<td>Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected</td>
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<td>movement to contact</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIPRNET</td>
<td>Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<td>objective</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBS</td>
<td>observation</td>
</tr>
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<td>observer coach/trainer</td>
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<td>officer in charge</td>
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<td>OPFOR</td>
<td>opposing force</td>
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<td>operation order</td>
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<td>operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency</td>
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<tr>
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<td>platoon</td>
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<td>POC</td>
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<tr>
<td>POR</td>
<td>program of record</td>
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<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTDO</td>
<td>prepare to deploy order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q/SATB</td>
<td>quarterly or semiannual training briefs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ReARMM</td>
<td>Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECON</td>
<td>reconnaissance</td>
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<td>REDCOP</td>
<td>enemy common operational picture</td>
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<td>RETRANS</td>
<td>retransmission</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>request for forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>reception, staging, onward movement, and integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTU</td>
<td>rotational training unit</td>
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<td>SBCT</td>
<td>Stryker brigade combat team</td>
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<td>SBF</td>
<td>support by fire</td>
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<td>SP</td>
<td>start point</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td>SPEED</td>
<td>systems planning, engineering, and evaluation device</td>
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<td>support operations</td>
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<tr>
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<td>support</td>
</tr>
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<td>squad</td>
</tr>
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<td>squadron</td>
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<td>SSL</td>
<td>shop stock list</td>
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<tr>
<td>STT</td>
<td>Satellite Transportable Terminal, Sergeant’s Time Training</td>
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<td>situational training exercise</td>
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<td>SUP</td>
<td>support</td>
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<td>TACSOP</td>
<td>tactical standard operating procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCF</td>
<td>technical control facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;EO</td>
<td>training and evaluation outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>tactical internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>troop leading procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>tactical operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wireless-Guided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW 2B</td>
<td>Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wireless-Guided Bunker Buster</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>training</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRIGRF</td>
<td>Target Reconnaissance Infrared Geolocating Range Finder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAP</td>
<td>unit airspace plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAS</td>
<td>unmanned aircraft system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMCP</td>
<td>unit maintenance collection point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>unit status report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>very-high frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>VRC</td>
<td>Vehicle Radio Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSAT</td>
<td>very small aperture terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIN-T</td>
<td>Warfighter Information Network-Tactical</td>
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</table>
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No. 21-19

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