



# HANDBOOK



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# ADVISING AT THE SENIOR LEVEL

*LESSONS AND BEST PRACTICES*

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## Advising at the Senior Level

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
## Foreword


The purpose of this handbook is to provide senior advisors a convenient reference to enable them to work at the ministry, Service component, and tactical levels of a foreign security force (FSF). Increasingly, members of the U.S. Armed Forces and civilian personnel within the Department of Defense (DOD) are called upon to advise partner nation (PN) counterparts at all levels. The use of senior advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in other PNs throughout the world has expanded significantly. In general, DOD civilian personnel receive sufficient training through the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) and other programs that prepare them to advise at the ministry and Service component levels of an FSF. Many members of the U.S. Armed Forces, however, do not receive that education and training, which puts them at a significant disadvantage when serving as senior advisors within the ministry or Service component level of an FSF.

Ideally, uniformed and civilian advisors would be developed over the course of their careers rather than just before a senior advisor assignment. To address this gap in training and capability, the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) conducted a senior advisor study, facilitated several DOD-wide working groups to identify senior advisor training and education gaps, and proposed ways to mitigate these gaps institutionally. In support of this effort, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), JCISFA, and the MoDA Program teamed together to produce this handbook to inform senior advisors, help shape doctrinal discussions, and assist developers of training and curriculum.

To fulfill these purposes, this handbook provides useful insights into what senior advisors do, their operational environment, and how they fit within the interorganizational domains of the DOD, Department of State, and Coalition partners.

  
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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this handbook is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

**Note:** Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as Army Regulations (ARs), Field Manuals (FMs), and Technical Manuals (TMs), must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.

## INTRODUCTION

This document is a reference that offers senior advisors (general officers, colonels, security force assistance brigade [SFAB] leaders, and U.S. Government [USG] senior officials) at the ministerial level (executive and generating functions) a perspective on how to better interoperate with international governments, ministries of defense, embassies, and foreign security forces. It bridges gaps in expertise when advising at the ministerial level through insights and best practices as to what senior advisors do, how the operational environment differs, and how to integrate through interorganizational processes of the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), and partner nations (PNs).

Working “by, with, and through” our PN forces is more than just a bumper sticker – it is a proven method to achieve lasting success. Security cooperation activities have evolved over time; notably, they have come a long way since the early days of U.S. involvement in Iraq. Successful security cooperation requires well-articulated intent and guidance from senior leaders as well as integration into the campaign plan.

It is clear that early and continuous security cooperation activities are crucial to preventing conflicts and are essential in developing regional and country expertise and understanding. Shaping and influencing operations can be a cost-effective way of addressing conflict that obviate the need for larger, costlier interventions. Lessons indicate that successful security cooperation activities depend upon advisors with the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes (KSAA) to effectively operate by, with, and through PN forces.

There is no substitute for expertise in PN history, geography, culture, and languages. Continuing to build that expertise is paramount and must be accomplished by continually engaging with partners in the area of responsibility (AOR). Further, these KSAs must be institutionalized into education and training of the force to best implement and apply the provisions of Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23 – Security Sector Assistance; Title 10 U.S. Code (USC) – Armed Forces, Section 332: Friendly Foreign Countries, International and Regional Organizations, Defense Institution Capacity Building and Building the Capacity of PNs; and, Title 22 USC – Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Section 2751: Security Cooperation Activities to Augment and Enhance Knowledge and Skills.

Experience has shown that ministerial advising is problematic because these advisors require additional knowledge, skills, and abilities to operate effectively. Consequently, DOD developed a solution by creating the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) Program, which is intended to develop qualified ministerial-level advisors. However, the MoDA Program by itself is only a partial solution. Significant improvements in advisor selection and training are required across the Joint Force.

To that end, this handbook was designed to provide a resource for military officers and DOD civilians who are performing duties as senior advisors.

- **Chapter 1** provides context and reviews pertinent fundamentals, principles, methods, and pitfalls of advising.
- **Chapter 2** provides relevant information to support understanding of the operational environment and assist senior advisors with preparing for and executing their assignment.
- **Chapter 3** delves into institutional capacity building and offers insights that will spur the advisor to reflect on the totality of the effort needed to affect institutional change in foreign security institutions. This reflects an evolution in thinking on defense institution building.
- **Chapter 4** consolidates lessons and best practices from senior advisors who advised on executive functions (ministry), generating functions (Service-equivalent components), and operating functions (tactical formations) of a PN.

## CHAPTER 1

## Reviewing the Fundamentals: Enhancing Advisor Effectiveness

It became clear to me at the age of 58, I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in the military manuals or on the battlefield. In this position [Chief of Staff, Army, 1939-1945], I am a political Soldier and will have to put my training in rapping out orders and making snap decisions on the back burner, and have to learn the arts of persuasion and guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills.<sup>1</sup>

GEN George C. Marshall  
Washington D.C., reflecting on 1939

### YOU'RE GOING TO BE AN ADVISOR ...

If this is your first assignment of this type, you are probably eager for some insights to further your preparation. If you have already served as an advisor, you are probably also interested because you recognize that, regardless of the professional success you have enjoyed, and the reputation you have earned, serving effectively as an advisor is not a given; it takes conscious thought, discipline, and preparation.

You no doubt have considerable functional experience, yet the challenge you now face is how to best prepare yourself to interact with your counterparts, to communicate what you know. Your foremost task is to improve your ability to “transfer your knowledge”<sup>2</sup> (of your functional area, organizations, leadership, and more) in ways that will lead to enduring improvements in individual and institutional capacity for those whom you will advise. This chapter provides some context to frame this discussion, and reviews some principles, methods, and pitfalls, all designed to assist you to deal successfully with the challenges you will encounter.

## **GREATER RELIANCE ON ADVISING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY**

It is no secret that advising is likely to play a vital, and potentially, an increasingly larger role in achieving our national security and defense objectives. Our U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) states:

We will give priority to strengthening states where state weaknesses or failure would magnify threats to the American homeland. As we participate in them, we must ... advance American interests and values. For instance, engagement in Afghanistan seeks to prevent the reemergence of terrorist havens. We will continue to join with other states to defeat jihadist terrorists and other groups that foment hatred and use violence to advance their supremacist Islamic ideologies.<sup>3</sup>

Our U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) asserts similar ideas:

Our alliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security. [We will] uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability. By working together with allies and partners, we amass the greatest possible strength for the long-term advancement of our interests.<sup>4</sup>

Accordingly, excellence in advising is taking on added importance across the Department of Defense (DOD).<sup>5</sup> With the support of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, and the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), each of the Services is taking steps to increase the education, training, and capabilities they provide for the Joint Force.

Since 2017, the Army joined the other Services by establishing the Military Advisor Training Academy, which complements the training mission performed by the U.S. Army's Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA. This academy performs a mission similar to that performed by the U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Operations School and the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. In addition, each of the Services are exploring options to increase the capabilities they can provide to the combatant commanders, the largest in scale being the creation of the U.S. Army's security force assistance brigades (SFABs), of which one has deployed.

Although the largest concentration of deployed U.S. advisors is unquestionably in Afghanistan, in support of Operation Resolute Support (RS), DOD civilian advisors trained and deployed by the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) Program also serve in places such as Botswana, Colombia, Georgia, and Latvia. While at any one time, approximately 80 DOD advisors are deployed to Afghanistan, 20 others are deployed to serve in global billets. Numerous requests for advisors from other allies and partners are in various stages of coordination within DOD.

U.S. advisors involved with RS execute their duties at all four functional levels of advising, as depicted in Figure 1-1: the governance or national level; the executive or cabinet departmental level; the generating or Service headquarters level; and the operating or tactical level (corps, divisions, brigades, etc.). Advisors in global billets operate primarily at the executive level.<sup>6</sup>




Figure 1-1. Four functional levels of advising.

The locations in which U.S. advisors serve are vastly different from one another. There are, however, a set of features common to each of the environments in which they will operate, as well as a set of principles which, if applied pragmatically, will generally lead to success.<sup>7</sup> In addition, there exists some experientially based methods that, more often than not, will lead to positive outcomes. Moreover, there are some well-identified pitfalls that will undoubtedly decrease the likelihood of achieving success and may well lead to failure. What follows is an examination of context, principles, methods, and pitfalls derived from years of experience teaching and observing advisors and serving as an advisor.

## UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS

A useful starting point for considering how to increase one's chances to be an effective advisor is to define and understand the term itself. An advisor is one who "counsels, recommends [with respect to] a decision, or provides information."<sup>8</sup> However, an effective working definition of an advisor, who operates in a military context, includes the following ideas regarding their overarching purpose, key roles, and fulfilling significant responsibilities to contribute to accomplishing larger national security objectives.

An **advisor** is a subject matter expert who serves with foreign security forces, or their ministerial-level security institutions, to advise, counsel, and assist their partner nation counterparts. An advisor's primary purpose is to create professional relationships that will inspire and influence their counterparts, and their counterparts' organizations, to become more effective and accomplish their missions, while putting in place sustainable processes that will endure beyond their tour as an advisor.

Advisors also observe, assess, evaluate, and report on the capacity or performance of their assigned counterpart, organization, or unit. Although they are not liaison officers, advisors are normally charged to assess and improve performance, resolve problems, or build confidence. They also communicate to inform their leadership (e.g., chief, security cooperation office or commanding general and staff), and their partner nation counterparts at the ministerial level or military echelon (normally at corps level and below) of progress and challenges.

**The description of an advisor draws heavily upon that found in Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces; Section 332, Advisors:**

- Provide institutional, ministerial-level advice, and other training to personnel of the ministry or regional organization to which assigned in support of stabilization or post-conflict activities; [and]
- Assist such ministry or regional organization in building core institutional capacity, competencies, and capabilities to manage defense-related processes.<sup>9</sup>

**Section 332 continues:**

Advisors provide training and associated support to personnel of foreign ministries of defense (or ministries with security force oversight) ... for the purpose of enhancing civilian oversight of foreign security forces; establishing responsible defense governance and internal controls in order to help build effective, transparent, and accountable defense institutions; assessing organizational weaknesses and establishing a road map for addressing shortfalls; and enhancing ministerial, general or joint staff, or service-level core management competencies.<sup>10</sup>

The ideas advanced by the U.S. Institute for Peace add clarity to this definition: the advisor “is sent by a foreign country ... to help build capacity in [a] transitional society [and] has no executive function. His/her role is limited to [providing] advice ... for reforming or transforming an organization.”<sup>11</sup>

Numerous other definitions may be found in U.S. Code and U.S. military policy and doctrine; however, five key themes are common to all of these characterizations. To accomplish the various duties they will be assigned, advisors are required to:

- Establish productive relationships with the leaders they support at strategic (executive and governance) levels of activity which are characterized by relatively open communication and, ideally, mutual respect;
- Contribute to the development of individual and collective competencies (in functional and organizational processes) within the organizations they support;

- Work with their counterparts to establish or strengthen processes and systems needed to achieve enduring, sustainable capacity growth;
- Avoid “becoming part of the organization” they are tasked to advise and perform no executive functions;
- Demonstrate the confidence, resilience, and agility to adapt to the challenges they will encounter.

From this definition and the accompanying analysis – supported by the observations of numerous advisors and leaders of advisors – a general set of roles emerges for advisors who support either the mission of a named operation (e.g., Resolute Support, Inherent Resolve, etc.), security cooperation office (e.g., U.S. Embassy Ukraine, U.S. Embassy Georgia, etc.), or other advising missions. In simplest terms, advisors perform the following roles in planning how they will approach their advisor mission and assessing the performance of their counterpart(s).

**Advisor Roles in  
Planning and Performance Assessment**

- Identify the critical factors of the environment in which their advisee is operating.
- Focus advisory efforts.
- Create relevant, attainable objectives.
- Establish reasonable, attainable expectations for performance.
- Serve as a focal point for applying all relevant advisory methods and techniques.
- Serve as a focal point for obtaining and employing all resources available to train, advise, and assist.
- Understand potential risks and act, in an informed manner, to mitigate their effects.
- Assist in establishing metrics.
- Report on performance relative to these metrics ... and analyze and explain this performance.

## ADVISING SUCCESSFULLY

Those who are most effective as advisors assist those they advise, and those to whom they report, to establish and achieve realistic, attainable objectives.<sup>12</sup> They also serve to identify situations or events which could result in failure to achieve these objectives, known as risks.

In more direct terms, effective advisors strive to increase the capacity of their counterparts and the organizations to which their counterparts belong. They understand their situation and that of their counterparts, establish productive working relationships, and determine actionable steps that will lead to progress. A clearer, “so what” expression of the capabilities advisors must be able to demonstrate is listed below.

It is interesting to note that while advisors must demonstrate all of these capabilities to be successful, failure in any one is likely to lead to failure overall. To illustrate, it is difficult to imagine an advisor performing effectively without having a solid understanding of their situation. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine an advisor succeeding without having a deep understanding of the U.S. mission or the resources available to support the advisory effort.

### **Successful advisors:**

- Understand their situation and priorities.
- Foster a sense of mission and purpose for counterparts if needed.
- Formulate a concept to focus and guide their advisory efforts.
- Understand what resources are available to support their work.
- Understand what risks could lead to failure (to achieve their mission).
- Assess progress (which may be nonexistent).
- Explain performance (either good or bad) ... and recommend how to improve.

These ideas are covered in detail by MG Willard Burluson in a 2018 published interview conducted by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) upon completion of his tour of duty as senior advisor to the Minister of Defense (MinDef), U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, May 2016 - June 2017. Burluson “emphasized ... that understanding the context of the MinDef’s priorities ... promotes trust.” Further, he indicated the “Minister’s priorities should be the center of gravity for building unity of effort for advising activities.”<sup>13</sup>

### **UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

Once deployed, advisors will find themselves in an operational environment shaped by the combined effects of numerous factors: organizational, cultural, historical, ethnic, economic, financial, political, and military, to name a few. Although each environment will be unique, some characteristics are quite common. Senior advisors will normally discover that their counterpart:

- Either leads or belongs to an organization which is charged to achieve a set of mission-related tasks, or expected functional process outcomes (e.g., policy development, campaign planning, logistical reporting, inventory management, human resource management [HRM], payroll, strength management, etc.).<sup>14</sup>
- May well be trying to implement some sort of change or broader reform.
- Will most likely lack depth, competence, and experience in their organizations (i.e., while their counterpart may have strong language skills and professional competence, it is doubtful that their counterpart’s direct reports will be equally talented).

### **Advisors should expect to operate in situations which are:**

- Turbulent, highly political, and at times, extremely dysfunctional. Rarely will advisors discover well-documented, well-executed processes and procedures for achieving organizational requirements. (Chances are, that if they did, there would be little need for their advisory presence).
- In completely “foreign terrain,” which would require them to navigate cultural, ethnic, and linguistic barriers and challenges.

**Advisors should also expect:**

- To be issued only “mission-type orders,” based largely on the intent or broad instructions communicated by their bosses (advisors commonly have more than one).
- To assume their duties – despite best intentions – without the benefit of a comprehensive, well-orchestrated transition with their predecessor. Therefore, in the absence of much-desired continuity, they will discover that they are left to “figure things out” based on their instincts, knowledge, and experience.<sup>15</sup>

**ESTABLISHING DIRECTION**

As they prepare to confront the challenges they will face, senior advisors will benefit from understanding and adhering to a set of guiding principles which may help them establish direction and chart their course. The four listed below are used in the MoDA course, which prepares DOD senior civilians (General Schedule pay grade 13-15) and uniformed personnel (of all ranks) to serve as advisors worldwide.

**Guiding Principles of Advising**

- **Demonstrate respect, humility, and empathy.** Be respectful of the people you interact with as well as the processes and practices currently in place. Remain mindful that, regardless of the contributions of the nation you represent, you are a “guest” in the host nation.
- **Do no harm.** Demonstrate awareness that any intervention can produce unintended effects, and thus, creates a measure of risk. To minimize risk, consult with stakeholders at all levels and coordinate with all affected actors to the best of your ability.
- **Support local solutions.** Seek outcomes to situations or problems that “will work” in the organizational and cultural context in which your counterpart operates. A locally developed solution is more likely to be successfully implemented than a foreign solution that is “imposed” upon counterparts.
- **Promote sustainability.** Seek to assist your counterparts to put in place solutions that will remain in place and continue to be effective even after the intervention ends or the advisor who is “the intervenor” departs.

The use of principles defined as “comprehensive laws, doctrines, or assumptions”<sup>16</sup> is a common tool to prepare people to frame difficult problem sets and face new challenges.<sup>17</sup> The messages in these principles are largely self-evident and require little amplification.

Despite their intellectual appeal, and the “golden rule” image they project, most readers will not find it very hard to recall a well-publicized incident or personal experience in which these principles were roundly ignored or violated. An unintended slight; cultural misstep; failure to see a situation through the eyes of the counterpart; premature or unrealistic establishment of expectations; discounting of the effectiveness of existing processes or procedures; promise that cannot be fulfilled; adoption of an overly complicated approach in a literacy or numeracy-challenged society; or the recommendation for a quick-fix, transactional solution that will not outlive the tenure of the advisor ... all of these outcomes occur every day in deployed settings. Again, many of them are easy to recall by those who will serve, or have served, as advisors.

### **PUTTING THE PRINCIPLES TO WORK**

Prudence, discipline, and patience – all learned behaviors – are required to apply these principles. One challenge many senior advisors face is that they are often (unknowingly) victims of their own professional success. Although they may be earnest and sincere in their desire to be effective advisors, they may feel no need to assess themselves, their social styles, and how they interact with others. Because they have enjoyed professional success, they may feel no need to reflect on themselves and their modes of interpersonal behavior and communication.

Many of their behaviors might be perfectly well-suited for commanding a military organization or supervising a team of professionals; however, they are not well-suited for establishing a meaningful relationship – intended to assist a counterpart to be successful – in a foreign culture. With a practical measure of self-awareness as a foundation, conscious actions, and often self-regulating measures, are required to become effective as an advisor. Such actions are observed in the form of attributes, admittedly, reflective of an ideal or “model” advisor. The attributes listed below are used in the MoDA course. They were developed by the U.S. Institute of Peace through research into the attributes of advisors deemed to be successful.

### Attributes of the Model Advisor

- **Functional expertise.** Foundational knowledge required to accomplish a task or project; often used to describe the combined experience of an individual gained during a career (within a chosen area of professional activity).
- **Active listening.** Type of behavior which focuses on clearly understanding the message being communicated by another person and signaling sincerity.
- **Curiosity.** Desire to investigate an issue or topic to improve understanding; willingness to learn about the concerns, perspectives, and priorities of others.
- **Observant.** Quick to notice or perceive; looking, watching, or regarding attentively.
- **Humble.** Modest, deferential, or self-effacing; never being arrogant or rude.
- **Empathetic.** The ability to see and understand a situation in the same manner as their local counterparts.
- **Respectful.** In the realm of advising, demonstrating a sincere understanding and appreciation for capabilities and processes already in place.
- **Committed.** Dedicated to a specific cause, project, or perspective.
- **Patient.** Enduring challenges calmly and without complaint, despite opposition, difficulty, or adversity.
- **Intuitive.** Discerning information affecting a situation one believes to be true without a great deal of deliberation or conscious reasoning; instinctive.
- **Flexible.** The ability to adapt to unique circumstances as well as new or changing requirements.
- **Consistent.** Acting in the same or unchanging manner with respect to a person, behavior, or process over time.

Again, just like the guiding principles of advising, there is no formula that will yield success; however, such attributes, and there may well be others, are characteristic of successful advisors. The first step in modeling such behaviors is honest self-reflection.

Three of these attributes, highlighted in bold text, link directly to, and help to apply, the guiding principles of advising discussed earlier: **active listening**, **empathy**, and **respect**. Thus, they are central to advising effectively.

**Active listening** describes a set of communicative skills that require patience and discipline to apply. It describes the actions one takes to ensure full understanding of the messages communicated by another. It involves both verbal (clarifying and summarizing) and nonverbal signals (attentive and focused) which communicate a genuine interest in the ideas of another person. It encompasses a set of skills, applied consciously, to ensure accurate understanding and conveys a willingness to listen and support the ideas of another. Beyond merely being attentive, active listening means listening for the purpose of enhancing understanding – not merely waiting for an opening in the conversation to inform others of credentials, qualifications, related experiences, or other ideas.

Active listening involves both nonverbal (e.g., posture, attentiveness, etc.) and verbal (e.g., questioning, affirming, etc.) techniques. It also involves exercising caution to avoid gestures, such as nodding reflexively, which could unintentionally signal support of another's ideas.

Listening actively is more difficult to do when using an interpreter; however, it can be done effectively by maintaining normal eye contact with the counterpart, even as the interpreter is communicating the intended message. In sum, in the context of advising, listening actively involves asking open [vice simple yes-no] questions, and clarifying, to verify comprehension of the counterpart's message(s).

**Empathy** is a quality which involves an advisor's ability to understand a situation or condition in the same manner as his counterpart. It does not imply agreement or approval – merely understanding. Empathy is best described as being able to look through the eyes of another person – without getting emotionally attached – to understand that person's perspective;

in other words, how (and why) that person is responding to a situation or challenge. It is a fundamentally “human quality [that an advisor brings] to the professional work environment. [It is] one of the things that advisors need most. [Advisors] can learn the technical stuff, but cannot be taught the human stuff.”<sup>18</sup>

Understanding and, ideally, demonstrating this human quality, while guarding against becoming emotionally connected to a situation or development, is a critical determinant of success. Looking from “the outside in” at advisory relationships, it may seem relatively easy to be empathetic; however, it is often challenging for the advisor to manifest these qualities once entered into an advisory relationship with a counterpart. MG Richard Kaiser, commanding general, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, 2016-2017, emphasizing empathy, sums it up clearly, “Unless you have the requisite knowledge [and] understanding, you won’t be effective and you will fail, guaranteed.”<sup>19</sup>

In short, demonstrating a commitment to genuinely understand what motivates others is a prerequisite to developing effective, durable relationships. Empathy is a major aspect of this understanding. It must be genuine and cannot be contrived or manufactured.

**Respect**, in the context of advising, involves a conscious effort to appreciate the capacity and competence that may be present in an organization and/or its leadership. Demonstrating respect has many dimensions. It means being respectful not only of culture, history, religion, and ethnic differences, but also of the accomplishments (of both the partner nation [PN] and the achievements of the counterpart and his/her organization). It is often described as showing respect for whatever is in place at the outset of the advising relationship in terms of processes, procedures, policies, and other symbols of organizational accomplishment or development.

Guarding against cultural bias plays a major role in demonstrating respect. Avoiding the tendency to approach “the counterpart ... with hubris ... especially a belief that ... procedures developed in the West are inherently superior to those [developed] in the PN [is critical since such behavior] significantly decreases the likelihood of ... success.”<sup>20</sup>

This caution is well-placed. Any slight which might result from such behavior is normally not the result of overt racism or prejudice. Instead, it is most likely to be unintentional and result from an insensitivity to possible foreign reactions to American behaviors.

Advisors must learn to adjust behavior with respect to foreign traditions. American culture may be unusual to people not familiar with it. Americans generally take pride in their ability to identify and solve problems. In meetings, they are often quick to focus on the task.

In other cultures, particularly in Afghanistan, PN officials want to focus on the relationship first, and substantive matters second.

Looking at his new environment, the [American] advisor may feel that action is vital and should be immediate. The foreign official, on the other hand has a different view of time and a different perspective. His focus is indefinite, and he will not be rated on one year's performance. [H]e generally will not share the American's urgency.<sup>21</sup>

The lesson here is that patience – and demonstrating understanding of local norms – is an important aspect of respectful behavior – and one that will pay dividends in terms of establishing an effective, productive advisory relationship.

To this point, this chapter has focused on imperatives intended to increase the prospects for advising effectively. To be effective, senior advisors cannot rely solely on adherence to principles and demonstration of desired attributes. They must also work consciously to avoid pitfalls. The remainder of the discussion in this chapter centers on practices to avoid.

### **Avoiding Pitfalls**

#### **Failure to:**

- Commit to understanding the context.
- Invest in building relationship(s).
- Adapt to the environment.

**Failure to understand the context** refers to the significance of the effort required to understand the shared space – or context – in which both the advisor and advisee operate. Although an outsider may never achieve full understanding of it, committing to do so, nevertheless, is essential to offering relevant, constructive advice. In other words, making the effort is integral to achieving advisory success.

As stated earlier, the context in which the advisor operates results from the interplay and effects of numerous forces – political, ethnic, tribal, cultural, historical, etc. – and each warrants consideration. Other factors may require carefully structured analysis and observation. For example, truly understanding the context includes developing an understanding of the following types of questions:

- What are the missions, roles, and functions of the organization to which the counterpart belongs?
- What is the organization’s record of performance, reputation, and major factors (e.g., new leadership, budget constraints, major priorities, etc.) impacting the organization?
- What major factors may be influencing the counterpart (e.g., political, professional, ethnic, personal [to be gained over time], etc.)?

Although it is not hard to generate these sorts of questions, it is hard to demonstrate the discipline to develop workable answers to them.

The single hardest task for the senior advisor is to gain a reasonable understanding of the operational environment. I was several months into my tour before I fully grasped [the] significance [of this imperative]. [Had I recognized this earlier] I would have been a much better advisor.<sup>22</sup>

Without a deep understanding of the limitations of the nations or organizations we find ourselves advising, we accept enormous risk and may fall prey to our own worst tendencies – which is to push what we know rather than what is most likely to work. In reflecting on U.S. military advisory efforts from Vietnam to Afghanistan, John Gillette, who served a two-year tour as a member of the first team deployed under the MoDA Program in Afghanistan, offers these thoughts: “When we embark on institution building with a lack of understanding of the inherent capabilities of the nation in question, and its institutions, we will ... often fall victim to our own hubris.”<sup>23</sup>

Describing the U.S. experience in Afghanistan, he adds, “We failed to grasp the depth of the Afghan environment ... as it related to their ... levels of literacy. In doing so, we established far-too-advanced technology systems and bureaucratic processes.”<sup>24</sup> Understanding the context takes time, deliberate and focused effort, and depends on other areas such as developing meaningful relationships.

**Failure to invest in relationships** ignores the reality that they are the primary vehicle to provide advice to a counterpart (that will be well-received and offer the potential to lead to enduring change). Relationships enable meaningful person-to-person dialogue (often across linguistic and cultural barriers). The quality and openness of this dialogue are a direct reflection of the quality of the relationship established between the advisor and the counterpart. U.S. Joint doctrine offers a harder-hitting description of the importance of establishing a productive relationship:

Relationships ... help promote U.S. interests; enable PNs to provide the U.S. access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with U.S. defense objectives.<sup>25</sup>

COL Joseph McLamb, in commenting on his assignment as senior advisor to the Afghan MinDef said, “As your first priority, maintain your relationship with the Minister. To be successful, a senior advisor must have consistent access to the Minister and his personal staff ... . The best relationship the senior advisor can have is [one characterized] by trust and mutual respect.”<sup>26</sup>

In short, to be effective, advisors must establish practical working relationships with those whom they are tasked to advise. There are no “rules” that will lead to healthy, productive person-to-person interaction, which is the core of a relationship; however, below are some conscious actions or techniques that may prove to be helpful at any level:

- Be respectful and courteous during introductory meetings.
- Be humble and explain relevant functional experiences to the counterpart in simple, clear terms.
- Demonstrate genuine concern for the situation of the counterpart.
- Seek to become a resource – or asset – to the counterpart.

- Demonstrate sensitivity to local culture and customs (e.g., business etiquette, appropriate inquiries about family, patience in getting acquainted rather than getting to business, etc.)
- Be patient in communicating goals for the relationship to prevent raising unrealistic and premature expectations.
- Use active listening techniques (verbal and nonverbal) appropriate for establishing a new, constructive relationship.
- Demonstrate mastery of working with an interpreter (by remaining focused on advisor-counterpart communication, language skills notwithstanding).<sup>27</sup>

This list of techniques is interesting because it reflects the integration and application of many of the principles and attributes discussed earlier in this chapter.

The thread that runs through these ideas is the centrality of relationships and accordingly, the importance of mastering relationship-building skills to advisors who seek to advise effectively. “True reality and what is achievable is rarely understood in a single visit or discussion with a counterpart. Issues in need of resolution are typically complex and multi-layered, with the root causes understood only after considerable dialogue.”<sup>28</sup> Relationships – nurtured and developed over time through routine dialogue and interaction – provide the means to determine mutually acceptable, practical goals.

Just as in our organizations, healthy, courteous relationships help us accomplish our mission. Strong relationships can withstand the stress of wartime adversity, anxiety, and ever-present uncertainty. Ideally, our goal as advisors is to build – over time – relationships characterized by courtesy, mutual respect, open communication, sharing of information, timely reporting of good and bad news, and, ultimately, trust.

**Failure to adapt** to new surroundings is a final pitfall to touch upon. All advisors will discover the on-the-ground reality of their deployment environment to be different from what they prepared for. Advisors can expect to operate in dynamic situations, which will differ from the mental images they constructed during their pre-deployment preparation. Additionally, the environment in which they operate will change dramatically from day to day, and, at times, from hour to hour, based on political, security, military, and other factors – which may impact the local, regional, and national situations. To be successful, advisors must be not only smart and skilled, they must also be flexible, creative, and adaptable.

Advisors commonly use the catchphrase that “the only thing constant is change.” A common theme in all post-deployment debriefings is the need for advisors to be flexible and able to adapt to changing situations. Some of the sources of change include change in assigned advisory role; change in PN resulting in a change of counterpart; change in meeting times or “battle rhythms;” change in availability of counterpart for routine meetings; and simply cancellation, postponement, or rescheduling of key events.<sup>29</sup>

Nearly all advisors returning from deployments cite the need to be flexible and adaptive as a key “survival skill,” and certainly, a key determinant of effectiveness. In the words of one such returning advisor, “The biggest thing is being flexible and adaptable . . . . You need to be able to adjust and remember your training and not object to [changes].”<sup>30</sup>

In his remarks following his assumption of command of Operation Resolute Support on 02 SEP 2018, GEN Scott Miller emphasized that effectiveness and ultimate success is predicated on the ability to learn, understand, and adapt. “We must be wary of bias and easy conclusions. They don’t exist here. I challenge [you] to always increase your understanding of the complexities, [and to] be adaptive.”<sup>31</sup>

## **EASY TO WRITE ABOUT ... HARD TO DO**

Success in the realm of advising is neither easy to predict, nor assured by careful adherence to rules. It is predicated upon developing a clear – and foundational – understanding of the historical, social, political, and military context in which the advising mission is being performed, as well as the true nature of the broader, overarching national mission.

Moreover, success depends on the advisor’s awareness of self – both strengths and weaknesses – and ability to adapt individual behaviors to become most effective within the context in which they will operate. Perhaps of greatest importance, success depends on the ability of the advisor to establish productive, durable relationships that will lead to open communication and shared commitment to discernible goals and objectives.

Advisory success is no doubt easier to write about than to achieve; however, the prospects for success improve when the advisor commits to gaining an understanding of self, counterparts, context, and mission and acting in a correspondingly deliberate, informed manner to achieve desired outcomes.

## CHAPTER 2

# Understanding the Operational Environment of a Senior Advisor

**Department of Defense (DOD) senior advisor:** Any individual (uniformed, civilian, or contractor) assigned by DOD to bring about development in one or more principals within a foreign security establishment. This is done by building relationships, and providing advice that improves how the principal organizes, directs, controls, and resources their organization. The organizations are typically found within a respective ministry, component, or strategic entity through operational echelons of the foreign security force (FSF).

DOD senior advisors often organize and employ other advisors and advisor teams within their functional purview (e.g., ministry) in collaboration with a joint force headquarters, U.S. Service component to an international force, U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies, and multinational stakeholders to bring about development in an FSF through security cooperation and security force assistance (SFA).

## GOVERNANCE, EXECUTIVE, GENERATING, AND OPERATING (G-EGO) FUNCTIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to provide information that assists senior advisors in understanding the G-EGO functions. The chapter describes the G-EGO functions, their applicability to the operational environment, and informs senior advisors where to focus their advising responsibilities.

Historically, advisors were identified in relation to strategic, operational, or tactical levels. This chapter introduces the G-EGO and how advisors are identified in relation to that construct.

Derived from Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, the following two pages display the executive, generating, and operating (EGO) functions. This chapter adds the governance function and amplifies EGO functions depicted.

**Executive, Generating, and Operating Functions  
(JP 3-20, page B-6).**

**Executive Functions**

- Formulate policy
- Advise political leadership
- Strategic planning
- Assess readiness
- Coordinate with other departments
- Supervise force intelligence activities

**Generating Functions**

- Organizing
  - Doctrine
  - Recruiting
  - Administering
  - Mobilizing
  - Demobilizing
  - Servicing
  - Supplying
  - Maintaining

**Executive, Generating, and Operating Functions  
(continued).**


- Training and Education
- Equipping
  - Constructing military equipment
  - Outfitting military equipment
- Rebuilding/building buildings, structure, utilities, real property
  - Constructing real property
  - Maintaining real property
  - Repairing real property
  - Acquiring real property

**Operating Functions**

- Direct subordinates and forces for military operations, training, and logistics
- Prescribe the chain of command
- Assign command functions to subordinate commanders
- Task-organize the command and forces
- Employ the command's forces
- Coordinate and approve administration, support, and discipline
- Select command staff, subordinate commander; suspend subordinates and convene courts-martial

## INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES

The institutional structure of an FSF essentially defines the alignment of the organization’s EGO functions and their relationship with the governance function of a PN government. Figure 2-1 illustrates these institutional functions and reflects how the DOD, via SFA, focuses on the EGO functions and where the Department of State (DOS) and/or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has primary equity in the development of the governance function. The SFA tasks of organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise (OTERA) provide the DOD with developmental activities to build capacity within each of the EGO functions of an FSF.<sup>32</sup>



**Figure 2-1. G-EGO functions of an FSF (JCISFA).**


The OTERA tasks illustrated above do not have to be applied sequentially (e.g., left to right) for successful capacity building. In its simplest form, capacity building occurs with a single advancement in one or more G-EGO functions; however, it is generally viewed as something far more complex. As such, the collaborative efforts of the DOD and the DOS working with PN counterparts in the G-EGO functions are what produce sustainable outcomes. This provides an FSF the capability and capacity to defend itself and contribute to multinational operations.

## UNDERSTANDING THE ALIGNMENT OF SENIOR ADVISORS TO THEIR COUNTERPART IN AN FSF

The environment where senior advising typically occurs is at the highest levels of organizational control and direction within an FSF. Understanding the alignment of a “senior advisor” to the principal in an FSF is essential to planning, executing, and assessing SFA developmental activities in an FSF.

For the purpose of clarity, this text will define principal counterparts (regardless of the G-EGO function) as typically those FSF individuals (uniformed or civilian) that have authority to direct a particular organization and allocate resources to an organization as appropriate. For example, the deputy Minister of Defense (MinDef) for acquisition, technology, and logistics (AT&L); a director for strategy and policy (S&P); or, a commander of a tactical formation such as a corps, division, brigade, squadron, or ship (or higher formation) all qualify as a principal because the commander allocates to staff and subordinate organizations.

Normally, the authority of a principal pertains to the counterpart employing or purposing one or more subordinate organizations or core functions to satisfy certain ends (see Figure 2-2). For example, a principal would direct the outputs (or results) of the S&P process and force management (FM) process within a ministry. To illustrate, a principal-directed output of the FM core process could be operational employment priorities codified within a document such as guidance for employment of the force (GEF).



**Figure 2-2. Principal counterpart relationship to one or more core processes (Source: JCISFA).**

A principal's duty to prioritize and allocate resources primarily concerns funding or approving budgets of the organizations the principal counterpart has responsibility for within an FSF. Principals may also coordinate and request resources from higher and adjacent counterparts to include elected officials within a PN government, such as members of a parliament.

In addition, a principal is concerned with managing the outcomes of one or more core functional areas (e.g., outputs). For example, as the FM process produces the GEF, the principal would ensure the GEF document is usable as an input to other functional areas or organizations in an FSF. The utility of an output from this process provides a measure of its effectiveness as an input to other processes.

### **ADVISOR RELATIONSHIPS**

Principal advising has practical linkages to other advising efforts that occur elsewhere within the institutional structure of an FSF. These advising efforts normally include process or subject advising within the EGO functions. Process advising typically focuses on process owner counterparts (see Figure 2-2) within an FSF. Subject advising focuses on other FSF counterparts that carry out specific tasks within a particular core process.

**Note:** The role of a principal and process advisor may overlap to an extent that may require a subject matter expert (SME) to provide military advice to the principal and process owner within an FSF.

In effect, other FSF counterparts serve as the core manpower structure within an organization or core process of an FSF. For example, other FSF SMEs include a crew that operates an FSF weapon system as part of the "fires" core process in the operating function of a particular FSF tactical formation such as a battalion or ship.

Furthermore, a principal advisor may have sole responsibility to integrate process and subject advisors as part of a broader advising effort. For example, a principal advisor team could include a principal advisor, process advisor, and subject advisor that provide the necessary SMEs within the team to assess and influence the development of a particular FSF counterpart. To explore further, Table 2-1 provides capability descriptions and examples for each type of advisor within the EGO functions of an FSF.

**Table 2-1. Advising Descriptions within the EGO Functions of an FSF.**

<b>Executive Function</b>	
<b>Senior Advisor</b>	An ability to advise principals on <b>managing, controlling, and resourcing</b> one or more core processes in a ministry (e.g. MinDef or minister of interior [MinInt]) of an FSF. Includes an ability to advise principals on how to inform elected officials in the governance function.
<b>Example:</b> A joint force commander (JFC) or staff directorate provides recommendations to a MinDef or chief of defense (ChoD) on the employment of security forces to participate in U.S.-led multinational exercises and operations.	
<b>Process Advisor</b>	An ability to advise process <b>owners</b> on how to <b>organize, man, train, and equip</b> a particular core process (e.g., human resource management [HRM], FM, etc.) for which the counterpart has formal responsibility in a ministry of an FSF.
<b>Example:</b> A military department FM subject matter expert (SME) deploys in support of a geographic combatant command requirement to provide FM best practices to the “process owner” counterpart for FM in the executive function of a PN security force.	
<b>Subject Matter Advisor</b>	An ability to advise “other FSF SMEs” on carrying out <b>specific tasks or operating and maintaining systems</b> in a particular core process in a ministry of an FSF.
<b>Example:</b> A geographic combatant command J-1 staff directorate assembles a team of SMEs from defense governance and management team (DGMT) to interact with HRM SME counterparts to share lessons learned on how to operate and maintain a newly installed force-wide pay system.	
<b>Generating Function</b>	
<b>Senior Advisor</b>	An ability to advise principals on managing, controlling, and resourcing one or more doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities (DOTMLPF) core processes in a component (e.g., air, land, maritime) of an FSF.
<b>Example:</b> A geographic combatant command J-7 staff directorate teams with an SME from the U.S. Army Futures and Concepts Center and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to provide recommendations and best practices to a principal counterpart on how to develop concepts to support doctrine and organization development.	

**Table 2-1. Advising Descriptions within the EGO Functions of an FSF. (continued)**

<b>Process Advisor</b>	An ability to advise process <b>owners</b> on how to <b>organize, man, train, and equip</b> a particular core process (e.g., doctrine, materiel, etc.) for which the process owner has formal responsibility in a component of an FSF.
<b>Example:</b> An SME from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) deploys in support of a security cooperation operational requirement to provide insights to a process owner counterpart on how to establish a lessons learned program.	
<b>Subject Matter Advisor</b>	An ability to advise “other FSF SMEs” on carrying out <b>specific tasks</b> or <b>operate and maintain systems</b> in a particular DOTMLPF core process in a component of an FSF.
<b>Example:</b> An SME from U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency deploys as part of the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) Program to work with organization SME counterparts in improving table of organization and equipment for PN security tactical formations.	
<b>Operating Function</b>	
<b>Senior Advisor</b>	An ability to advise principals on <b>leading, controlling, and resourcing</b> one or more core processes in an FSF tactical formation or across multiple FSF tactical formations. Typical core processes in an FSF tactical formation include the joint functions – command and control (C2), intelligence, fires, maneuver, protection, and sustainment.
<b>Example:</b> SFA brigade (SFAB) commanders and staff directorates interact with a PN security force division commander on how to improve the division’s warfighting functions in preparation for an upcoming geographic combatant command-hosted multinational exercise and operations.	
<b>Process Advisor</b>	An ability to advise process <b>owners</b> on how to <b>organize, man, train, and equip</b> a particular core process (e.g., C2, fires, sustainment, etc.) for which the process owner has formal responsibility to perform. Process owners in FSF tactical formations normally include joint/operational/tactical staff directorates or officers.
<b>Example:</b> An SFAB logistician SME interacts with the PN security force division G-4 to provide best practices for logistics planning as part of a multinational exercise and operation.	
<b>Subject Matter Advisor</b>	An ability to advise “other FSF SMEs” on carrying out <b>specific tasks</b> or <b>operating and maintaining systems</b> in a particular core process (e.g., fires, sustainment, etc.) in an FSF tactical formation.
<b>Example:</b> An SFAB logistician SME works with PN security force division G-4 (logistics) SME on how to organize fuel distribution and resupply during a multinational exercise.	

In effect, other FSF counterparts serve as the core manpower structure within an organization or core process of an FSF. For example, other FSF SMEs include a crew that operates an FSF weapon system as part of the “fires” functional area in the operating function of a particular FSF tactical formation.

Therefore, ideally a senior advisor will have the ability to integrate other advisors as part of a broader advising effort. For example, an advisor group could include one or more senior advisors, some operating as individuals and some leading teams of their own with subordinate SME advisors to assess and influence the development of a particular FSF counterpart and its organization.

### INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF A FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE

As mentioned earlier, the institutional structure of an FSF primarily includes the G-EGO functions. These functions operate under the governance function, which is carried out by elected officials of a PN government. Combined, the G-EGO functions and their core processes provide the necessary structure within an FSF to focus developmental activities that occur as part of security cooperation and SFA.

**Note:** The boundaries of the EGO functions and core process structure of an FSF may not be distinct from a physical or organizational standpoint. This may also hold true when working within the core processes of the governance function of a PN government.

**Governance function.** The governance function provides a PN government a means to organize and purpose its security forces by way of laws and policy and provides necessary resources (e.g., funding) to the FSF. Typical instruments within this national function include general law, specific laws (e.g., U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]), and annual authorizations, each generated by actions established by the PN’s particular form of government. The DOS has primary equity and responsibility in the development of the governance function in a PN government.

Governance Function (Parliament)	
Authorizations	Appropriations

**Core processes include:**

- **Authorizations.** Authorizations are actions and methods that the PN government institutions (legislative and/or executive branches) utilizes to produce lawful rules and permissions to which the PN security force must adhere. Outputs of an authorization process typically include general law and annual refinements to legal rules and permissions pertaining to one or more EGO functions of a PN security force.<sup>33</sup>
- **Appropriations.** Appropriations are primarily financing and budgeting activities that occur in parallel to outputs from the annual authorizations process. Typical outputs from an appropriations process are funding allocations for the PN security force. An example is the U.S. fiscal year wherein funding allocations may be itemized within EGO.<sup>34</sup>

**Note:** As part of the governance function, the executive branch and particularly the executive (i.e., president or prime minister) of a PN government may inform the **authorizations** and **appropriations** processes through the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), and budget requests.

The executive function (described below) provides the executive of a PN government an ability to direct the PN security force by way of policy and provide input to the authorizations and appropriations processes that occur within a respective parliament.

The legislative branch, as part of exercising its role in the governance function, may constrain or restrain the actions of the executive of a PN government.

**Executive function.** The executive function enables a security ministry (e.g., MoD or ministry of interior [MoI]) to accomplish administrative requirements to direct an FSF. It provides a means to inform the governance function of FSF needs, such as resources and authorities. It interacts with other PN ministries to implement national laws and policy.

Executive Function (Ministry)					
Strategy and Policy	Resource Management	Force Management	Human Resource Management	Logistics and Acquisition	Inspector General

**Core processes include<sup>35</sup>:**

- **Strategy and policy (S&P).** The S&P process provides the MoD of an FSF a way of organizing the means, ways, and ends of the FSF as a whole. Typically, S&P development within an MoD focuses on near-term (less than 1 year), short-term (1-3 years), and long-term (3-5 years) planning horizons. Some MoDs may plan further out on the horizon of up to 10 years. Depending on the PN, the advisor should not necessarily expect the FSF to be able to plan strategically in anything more than the near term.
- **Human resource management (HRM).** The policy approaches within an FSF provide for the planning, approval, and resourcing of matters dealing with selecting (e.g., recruitment, conscription, etc.), assigning, retaining, paying, separating, medical treatment, disability, and retiring of uniformed and civilian personnel reside within one or more EGO functions of an FSF. This activity includes identifying use requirements for an individual such as necessary skills, experience, and education that enable an individual to perform a particular job or task. It also includes organizing and integrating other activities (e.g., training, stationing, etc.) needed to satisfy manning/staffing requirements in one or more EGO functions of an FSF.
- **Resource management (RM).** The RM processes enable an MoD to carry out financing and budgeting activities within the EGO functions and, generally speaking, probably occurs within the FSF through a process similar to the U.S. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Depending on the PN, the budgeting cycle can be highly variable. In the more developed nations, it is likely that the PN will use a year-to-year budgeting cycle or, possibly, even a fiscal policy that may go about planning and programming over a 3-5 fiscal year (FY) period with budget requests that address funding needs in the first FY of the 3-5 fiscal year period.
- **Force Management (FM).** The FM process provides a means within an MoD to organize, employ (e.g., force employment), and prioritize FSF activities and purposes across the operational environment.<sup>36</sup> As a sub-function of an FM, force development as a process provides an MoD an ability to administratively control development, like what occurs in the generating function of an FSF.

- **Acquisition and Logistics (A&L).** The A&L policies within an MoD organize activities related to supplying and equipping the FSF.
- **Inspector General (IG).** An IG function within an MoD enables the ministry to conduct, monitor, and take action related to audits and investigations on FSF-programmed resources, its processes, and operations. Typical outputs include independent reports on how to improve the use of resources or the effectiveness in how an FSF operates. Outputs of an IG process also include investigations that may lead to prosecutions or civil actions as part of enforcing the rule of law within one or more EGO functions of an FSF.

**Generating function.** The generating function provides capacity within an FSF service or component (e.g., air, land, maritime) to fulfill development and sustainment of FSF tactical formations.

Generating Function (Air, Land, and Maritime Components)						
Doctrine	Organization	Training	Materiel	Leadership Education	Personnel	Facilities

**Core processes include:**

- **Doctrine.** A doctrine process provides an FSF the means to codify its body of knowledge that describes or dictates how it will operate. Approved doctrine within an FSF provides a cornerstone for how the FSF develops its organizations, trains itself, acquires equipment, educates its leaders, recruits and develops its people, and structures its facilities.
- **Organization.** An organization process provides the FSF with a means to build and sustain organizations. Building organizations typically includes organizing and employing people, structuring processes, and developing and integrating technology (e.g., equipment). When established, the organization is normally a permanent structure such as a battalion, squadron, or ship.
- **Training.** Similar to the organization process, training activities normally occur to implement approved doctrine. Without approved doctrine, the training process incurs unnecessary risks. A training process enables components of an FSF to develop individual and collective readiness. Training may occur in an FSF training center or at a local level within an FSF organization. The FM process drives training requirements.

- **Materiel.** The materiel process designs, procures, integrates, and distributes supplies and equipment. As an extension of the A&L and RM processes, the materiel process focuses on methods and solutions to satisfy supply and equipment requirements in an FSF.
- **Leader development and education.** The leader development process educates and assigns FSF leaders throughout their careers. Leader development may include both uniformed and civilian personnel within an FSF. Critical inputs to the leader development process include laws and policy applicable to the FSF that mandate education and career assignments.
- **Personnel.** The personnel process provides a means to recruit, assign, promote, and integrate FSF personnel (active and retired) to meet the needs of the force. As an extension of the HRM process, the personnel process focuses on methods and solutions to satisfy personnel requirements in an FSF.
- **Facilities.** The facilities process pertains to engineering and FM initiatives that focus on the building, basing, and stationing of FSF organizations. Typical activities within the facilities process focus on design, general construction, and the maintenance of roads, bridges, airfields, seaports, buildings, and other structures (e.g., ranges).

**Operating function.** The operating function empowers FSF strategic, operational, and tactical formations to employ military capabilities by way of command and control (C2), intelligence, maneuver, fires, force protection, and sustainment during actual security operations to satisfy security goals.

Operating Function (Tactical Formations – Corps, Wings, etc.)					
C2	Intelligence	Fires	Maneuver	Protection	Sustainment

**Core processes include:**

- **Command and control.** The C2 function enables tactical formations of an FSF to plan, prepare, execute, and assess their doctrinal and assigned missions. Essential outputs of C2 activities are guidance, plans, orders, control measures, and allocation and prioritization of resources to support operations.
- **Intelligence.** The intelligence process manages, integrates, and analyzes collected information to generate understanding and support decision making.

- **Fires.** The fires process allocates and employs fires to support operational and tactical formations. The process includes target identification, decision making, and the application of lethal and non-lethal fires. Key outputs are allocation of fire support and assessments of effectiveness.
- **Movement and maneuver.** The movement and maneuver process focuses on synchronizing forces with the other warfighting functions to mass at the appropriate time and place to achieve actions on the objective.
- **Protection.** The protection process deals with the ability to plan and assess to recover personnel, protect operational information, mitigate fratricide, and increase survivability of personnel, weapon systems, and facilities. Key outputs include organized and employed security forces, operations security (OPSEC) plans and procedures, and force protection assessment indicators.
- **Sustainment.** The sustainment process ensures the FSF has the ability to allocate resources and maintain, transport, and distribute its weapons, equipment, and personnel in order to carry out the other warfighting functions and achieve required levels of readiness.

### ADVISING ENVIRONMENT INSIGHTS

The nature of an advisor's interactions with a counterpart may be part-time, full-time, or a hybrid of the two. The most difficult is advising in an episodic or ad hoc manner.

**Part-time or episodic.** The nature of the advising mission may occur in an episodic manner or may take place under conditions where a joint force commander (JFC) coordinates, then aligns an individual SME to a principal on a regular or full-time basis. Episodic and full-time senior advising can occur in both steady-state and contingency operational environments.<sup>37, 38</sup>

Episodic engagements can occur in a number of ways – and may include staff directorates and other SMEs or a joint task force (JTF) headquarters equivalent that provides military advice (e.g., lessons learned) to a principal of an FSF. These episodic interactions usually occur as part of routine interactions such as security cooperation planning forums or conferences, to include multinational training or exercise event after-action reviews.

Episodic instances of senior advising also occur with defense institution building (DIB) programs (such as a defense governance and management team [DGMT]) or military department (e.g., Department of the Army or Service headquarters) tiger teams that work with principals at the ministry or Service level to scope and resolve institutional problems, usually within the executive and generating functions of an FSF.

**Advising in a contingency OE.** A JFC may integrate SMEs as senior advisors on a full-time basis to provide military advice to one or more principals in an FSF. A practical example includes joint individual augmentees (JIAs) or U.S. Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDAs) within the Resolute Support (RS) Headquarters aligned to one or more Afghan principals in the Afghan MoD or MoI.

Other advisory efforts may include the staff of security cooperation organizations (SCOs). For example, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) provides advice to Afghan principals as part of routine staff tasks (e.g., CSTC-A Capability Development Directorate) that produce relevant information to inform a principal in an FSF to strengthen his understanding and drive decision making.<sup>39</sup>

**Full-time or steady-state advising.** DIB programs such as the U.S. MoDA Program may provide civilian SMEs on a semi-permanent (e.g., a year or more) basis to advise a principal or other counterpart (e.g., process owner) at the ministry or service levels of an FSF. Of note, the MoDA Program also provides SMEs within contingency OEs, like the RS mission where the MoDA Program trains and deploys SMEs to serve as senior advisors within the Afghan MoD, MoI, and general staff.

Uniformed individuals can expect to advise at the senior levels. Revisions to Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 16, Section 332 provide authority to conduct defense institution capacity building and clarify that advisors or trainers that provide institutional advice include members of the armed forces.

## **RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SENIOR ADVISORS, STAFF DIRECTORATES, AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS**

As an advisor, you must never ignore the fact that in addition to your own command and staff, there are likely to be a host of stakeholders (e.g. DOS, USAID, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], private voluntary organizations [PVOs], etc.) with whom you must integrate to generate the most efficient advising effort possible. However, it is beyond the scope of this handbook to try and imagine the myriad of combinations of stakeholders that may be present, so the focus will be on the functional area staff directorates within your own command; however, remember that others will be present and should have a voice.

Generally, a JFC aligns senior advisors to a principal within the EGO functions of an FSF to affect the fulfillment of broader developmental objectives within the PN security force. A JFC's developmental objectives normally focus on assisting a principal of an FSF with improving one or more core processes (e.g., HRM, FM, or doctrine) for which they are responsible.

Core processes within the EGO functions of an FSF typically have functional compatibility with staff directorate functions in a geographic combatant command or JTF headquarters. For example, personnel matters that exist in the G-EGO functions of an FSF pertaining to law, policy, doctrine, or sustainment are compatible for planning and assessment purposes to the J-1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate of geographic combatant command or JTF headquarters. Hence, a J-1 staff directorate may have planning equity for personnel matters when developing an FSF during the conduct of SFA.

Similarly, functional compatibility of core processes in G-EGO of an FSF have linkages to SMEs that reside within Service headquarters, military departments, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In effect, a senior advisor exists within a broader network of SMEs who have equity either functionally, or as a force provider, in assisting a JFC with achieving development objectives in an FSF.

In some instances, a senior advisor may need to leverage a network of SMEs to provide capacity to address technical or process issues that he and his principal counterpart face. For example, a senior advisor may coordinate with a J-4 (logistics directorate) of a joint staff on matters pertaining

to logistics to organize and request other advisors asJIAs or MoDAs. Likewise, a senior advisor in partnership with a joint staff directorate may generate a request for assistance (RFA) from a Service department to provide a team of SMEs on a temporary basis to study a particular problem.

Other ways a senior advisor can draw upon SMEs may include working collaboratively with a respective staff directorate to coordinate and conduct forums (e.g., conferences, working groups, online forums, etc.) within a functional network of SMEs. Such forums or communities of interest (COI) provide a senior advisor with access to SMEs to explore difficult issues and collaborate on ways to resolve or mitigate an issue that benefits the principal, protects U.S. interests, or contributes to attaining a developmental objective.

The collaborative relationship between senior advisors and respective staff directorates provide a JFC a “whole of staff” approach during the conduct of SFA. Whole of staff provides functional compatibility in the attainment of developmental objectives normally aligned to one or more core processes in the EGO functions of an FSF. Benefits include:

- Provides a JFC functional COI aligned institutionally (e.g., Service headquarters) within the joint force and FSF.
- Aids a JFC in organizing relevant SMEs at the appropriate level within the EGO functions of an FSF.
- Provides a means for a JFC to match best practices to typical problems within one or more core processes of G-EGO.
- Offers practical reach-back support and integration of resources for carrying out development across one or more G-EGO functions.
- Enables collaborative planning to strengthen understanding and decision making at the appropriate level – increases the net assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) capacity across staff directorates to better inform campaign approaches as well as strategic direction and guidance.<sup>40</sup>

## CONCLUSION

This chapter provided perspectives on the operational environment where senior advising occurs as well as the relationship with stakeholders outside the command (e.g., USAID), which will undoubtedly impact the advising efforts within an FSF.

It is important that senior advisors recognize that they will face a host of obstacles; some will be predictable, some will not. Here are four obstacles that are often present, yet often overlooked:

- The “military mindset” creates pressure to achieve results, is fundamentally impatient, and rewards a bias for action.
- International and national political expectations are often incompatible with historical, cultural, and social realities.
- Training for military advisors results in only limited understanding of the operational environment (in terms of history, culture, and language).
- Military advisors receive little-to-no training in advising principles and skills prior to deployment.

Along similar lines, you must be ever alert to the myriad of risks (corruption, politicization, nepotism, fear of reprisal, etc.) that every advisor must consider as part of their capacity building plan as well as for their personal safety.

Finally, the information contained herein emphasized the collaborative relationship that senior advisors typically have with staff directorates in geographic combatant commands and JTF headquarters.

## CHAPTER 3

# Institutional Capacity Building

People fear change for many reasons; not the least of which is the uncertainty that will accompany it. Moreover, fear of change is not limited to the individual; it can span institutions, even a nation. Fear can crush change at any point in the process, yet change is essential for true capacity building.

John M. Gillette, member of the first team deployed under the MoDA Program in Afghanistan

The purpose of this chapter is to offer advisors some insights and thoughts that, when coupled with the fundamentals outlined in Chapter 1, will spur reflection on the totality of the effort needed to affect institutional change.

Institutional capacity building (ICB) is the evolutionary offspring of security sector reform (SSR), security sector assistance (SSA), and defense institution building (DIB) – three terms long used to describe U.S. efforts to assist partner nations (PNs) in building their security institutions. For years, those terms were perfectly appropriate. It is doubtful that 15 years ago, anyone envisioned either U.S. uniformed personnel or Department of Defense (DOD) civilians would ever advise a PN institution if it were not defensive in nature. However, the reality of conflict, and its associated risks, has in any number of instances left no one other than a military or DOD advisor to work with foreign institutions who are, on the surface, seemingly unrelated to defense.

DOD's contribution to ICB includes security cooperation conducted to establish or reform the capacity and capabilities of a PN's defense institutions (and other institutions, as appropriate) at the ministerial/department, military staff, and service headquarters.<sup>41</sup>

ICB does not supplant SSR, SSA or DIB; rather, it can enhance it in select situations. Moreover, if you are new to SSR and/or DIB, the intent herein is to discuss doctrinally grounded principles frameworks, techniques, and reference works (regardless of the lexicon) that will assist you in any of those complex endeavors, as well as ICB. Greater capacity in foreign security institutions is not some revolutionary new approach, nor does it require abandonment of DIB. The work published to achieve effective DIB is applicable to other institutions. ICB could easily be substituted for DIB as defined in Joint Publication [JP] 3-20, *Security Cooperation*. The quote under the following subhead, “Defining Institutional Capacity Building,” speaks to that understanding.

Look no further than Afghanistan where both military and DOD civilians have advised in a variety of ministries to include the Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Finance (MoF) as well as a number of others; some so diverse as the Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MoTA).

At first blush, you might ask “Why?” In the following pages, we ask you to consider a number of concepts and ideas that, upon reflection, will help you better understand why the DOD deploys advisors to seemingly non-defense-related ministries.

### DEFINING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING

**Institutional capacity building (ICB)** is difficult to define. Since the term’s introduction, . . . it has been used to provide a strategic rationale to describe and resource DOD programs designed to build the security forces of weak and failing states, as well as broader DOD cooperative activities with a variety of actors, including the Department of State (DOS), U.S. state and local governments, security institutions in foreign countries, private companies, and nongovernmental organizations.<sup>42</sup>

JP 3-20, states that, “Partner capacity can be described as an extant, yet limited capability...within a PN’s security or civil sector that can be improved and employed on a national level. Building partner capacity (BPC) requires a long-term, mutual commitment to improve capacity, interoperability, and when necessary, the employment of that PN capacity in support of U.S. Government (USG) strategic objectives.”

## THERE IS NO JOINT OR UNIVERSAL DEFINITION OF CAPACITY BUILDING

Start at a basic level, such as a U.S. Marine advising a group of foreign security force (FSF) soldiers in basic squad tactics. History will tell you the Marine will do a superb job, but a year later, the FSF's capability has all but disappeared. Why? The answer is simple: unless the FSF defense institution (call it the MoD for the purposes of this chapter) develops the capacity to strategize; promulgate clear policy and doctrine; as well as plan, recruit, train, sustain, and employ sound resource management (RM) while effectively managing the force, the rifle squad's capability simply erodes due to mismanagement and attrition. We recognized that problem long ago and focused on SSR or DIB, believing that was the solution.

What we learned, however, is that the problem is frequently much larger. DIB is only part of the solution because – just like the FSF soldier – the MoD cannot grow and function in a vacuum. What took us longer to understand was that, in addition to building the capacity of the MoD, we have to look at the capacity, or overall health, of the “whole of the host nation government.” In addition, we have come to accept that there are risk-driven circumstances in which there is no one but a U.S. military or DOD advisor to work with seemingly disparate institutions, which contribute to establishing security.

**Bottom line.** You can train a highly capable rifle squad, but unless the PN's institutions have the institutional capacity to pay them on a timely basis; provide them clothing, food, equipment, and munitions; and enable them to provide the resources needed for them to employ that capability on a sustained basis, whatever tactical success you may have achieved will be to no avail.

For the purposes of this handbook, we will simply note that capacity building means assisting a PN to improve its ability to manage the essential capabilities, which enable security to be established, and upon which the effectiveness of the overall institution depends. Foremost, for any organization, are capable leaders and fiscal responsibility. However, given the specific mission and purpose of the institution, there will be additional, equally specific capabilities that must be developed.

Within defense institutions, it is widely accepted that there are four critical capabilities: (1) strategy and policy (S&P), (2) RM (finance), (3) human resource management (HRM) (often referred to as force management), and (4) acquisition and logistics – each with a variety of core functional subsets as described earlier in this handbook.

But look deeper — as an extension of the Executive Branch, must not the MoD rely on the Executive Branch to determine its S&P? Must not the MoF provide effective funding before it can effectively manage resources (financial and otherwise)? Ensuring the effectiveness of these seemingly disparate non-security institutions documents the foundational concepts and vital necessity of ICB.

### **THE CENTRAL QUESTION**

The most important question advisors must ask and answer is, “Do the host nation’s other institutions have the capability to do their part?” One could draw an analogy that an institution is like a living organism, such as the human body, where there are certain organs and systems without which the body cannot function effectively. Moreover, the healthier each organ and system is, generally speaking, the healthier the overall body is.

The same holds true of any institution within the host nation government. Without certain capabilities, the institution will not flourish – and without healthy institutions, the host nation government will not flourish. This realization, that the success of a variety of institutions are all inextricably intertwined, gave rise to the recognition of the need for ICB, rather than simply concentrating on the defense and security institutions.

In simplest terms, much like the Marine who advised successfully in squad tactics, only to see the overall capacity of the FSF wither and disappear due to an ineffective MoD, we have determined that without the support of effective enabling institutions (e.g., the MoF, MoI, etc.), the MoD will never be effective. Perhaps of greater significance, without effective governance and rule of law, the host nation government will never be able to provide the funds and guidance required to sustain the MoD.

Reflect back to the analogy about the human body, whose health depends upon symbiotic relationships in which seemingly unlike organisms live and function together. The same line of reasoning applies to the institutions that, in their entirety, form a government and thus, the importance of ICB. Of greater importance is the vital role that DOD advisors, both military and civilian, perform to advance it. They advise – regardless of their technical specialties – in what might appear, at first glance, to be non-defense roles. For security to be established, however, these institutions enable MoD functioning, and therefore require considerable focus, attention, and the presence of creative, flexible, and adaptable advisors.

## **GUIDING THOUGHTS FOR INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING**

Chapter 1 reviewed the fundamentals of advising at the personal level. Consider these insights and best practices and how they relate to ICB.

**Stakeholder coordination and integration is essential.** By coordination, we mean actions, consciously and deliberately taken, to achieve cooperation. By integration, we mean, ideally, combining the resources stakeholders can bring to bear to achieve desired effects. Stakeholders, operating in the advising space, include a wide array of entities: other nations, non-governmental organizations, international business investors, etc. Not everyone will be on the same page of the playbook. Therefore, it is unrealistic to believe true unity of effort will be achieved; however, it is possible to promote greater understanding of the goals and objectives of the individual stakeholders – to increase the likelihood of achieving common objectives and decrease the effects of conflicting agendas. Some form of integration and coordination process is essential to reduce duplication of effort and the associated waste of resources. An example of integrating efforts was offered by MG Willard Burleson, 7th Infantry Division commander, during an oral interview with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) following his tour as the advisor the Afghan Minister of Defense (MinDef).

MG Burleson noted through his private discussions with the MinDef that he built a trust-based relationship through which he was able to determine the MinDef's priorities. He then used those priorities to create a Dari/English contract, which the MinDef then reviewed and approved. The contract was then briefed across the MoD, Resolute Support (RS) staff, and other stakeholders. Afterward, if an issue arose, MG Burleson displayed the contract asking: "Why are you not following the MinDef's priorities? Are you telling me he changed his priorities? Has the MinDef been briefed? When are you going to brief the MinDef? When are you going to brief the RS staff?" MG Burleson stated he never used the term "compliance" or forced them to do something; he simply used the contract to ensure all advisors, staff, and counterparts were pursuing precisely the same lines of effort (LOE) as were he and the MinDef. This unified messaging ensured unity of effort and prevented advisor fratricide.

**Macroeconomics is crucial.** Every institution's success is directly tied to the nation's capacity to practice effective fiscal management. Ultimately, budgets are the heart of everything else. Every institution's concepts, strategies, and plans must fit within their budgetary constraints or they can be neither accomplished nor sustained.

Historically, failure to coordinate efforts "has led to significant confusion about what works in capacity building efforts, and in turn, [has] had negative effects on the country receiving the assistance ... some host country counterparts have learned to leverage ... this by ... affecting little or no change ... while acquiring large quantities of ... donations."<sup>43</sup>

In Afghanistan, “to a very large extent, security sector policies and spending ... had not been determined by the capacity of the national resources to finance them ... . According to a World Bank report from 2014, [security] wages ... alone accounted for some three-quarters of the operations budget and 7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Targets for the size of the security sector apparatus should be set within the reality of the capability of the national resources to finance them.”<sup>44</sup>

**Early focus on identifying requirements and generating sufficient funds within the PN’s budget is essential**, along with the processes established to execute those funds. An integral part of this is developing an understanding with the PN’s leadership of the linkage between funding, logistics requirements, readiness of the force, and, ultimately, the ability of the forces to function professionally.

**Systemic failures in one institution may not be solvable without adaptations by other national institutions**, as well as the executive function. A single failure point in a critical government function may impact the ability of the nation to govern. Consistent failures in a fledging or weak government undermines public and international trust and confidence.

**Required capabilities, coupled with a capacity to govern, should be based on clear understanding of the particular nation’s related national security objectives** (of both the PN and the stakeholders). In addition, they must be achievable within the host nation’s culture and the combined resources of the host nation and its stakeholders.

**Understanding the national security objectives of the PN and what is achievable cannot be done without direct, regular, and intimate contact** with host nation leaders and a clear understanding of both your and their reality. Successful advising is not accomplished from “inside the wire.”

**Increased capacity results from change.** Change requires consensus – and eventually change must come internally. Partners can, and must, help influence thinking about change; however, real capacity building occurs with those rare advisors who forge powerful relationships and then engage in deep, contextual, meaningful discussions wherein new ideas are discussed, analyzed, synthesized and then, the net result is their counterparts adopt the idea of change. That is critical because only counterparts, not the advisors, can be agents for change within the FSF. To think otherwise invites failure.

**Transactional advising will not lead to sustainable outcomes.** There are two types of advising: transactional and transformational. **Transactional advising** uses quid pro quos to buy change (i.e., “I will get you X so long as you do Y.”). This approach will not lead to enduring change – it merely addresses an immediate solution. **Transformational advising** focuses on influencing counterpart thinking (e.g., “I know this problem concerns you. Would you care to discuss it and see if we can identify ideas that might help you solve it?”).

**Don’t confuse *deference* and *agreement*.** At the point of exhaustion or to avoid conflict, the counterpart may simply “agree to do it your way.” To be enduring, change requires persuasion with ideas and doctrines understood and embraced by the counterparts. An advisory force cannot simply overlay its doctrine and assume success will follow; history has proven it will not. In 2010, several people witnessed an encounter between a U.S. advisor and an Afghan lieutenant general, upon whom he was forcing the idea of adopting pull rather than push logistics. Finally, the Afghan general said, “OK, I will do it your way, but when you leave I will go back to the way the Russians taught us.” That night, the advisor declared a victory. It was not a victory because the Afghan deferred and he did not agree with the advice.

**You must understand the true nature of the problem and your counterpart’s capacity before you can recommend courses of action, plans, and initiatives.** Further, the problem should be defined by the gap between “required” and current capabilities and capacity. All initiatives should be linked to closing this gap.

**Begin with the problem, not the solution.** All too often, advisors begin by offering solutions. Solutions should follow, not precede questions and the development of a deeper, perhaps common understanding of the problem. This is even truer with advising in a non-defense institution, which, quite likely, would be far less familiar to an advisor. Just as in the case of doctrine, solutions will not endure unless they are jointly acceptable.

**Technology is a tool, not a solution.** Do not fall prey to the all-too-common mistake of thinking, “**All they need to solve that problem is a contemporary computer system.**” Advisors may be called on to advise in PNs where basic technology (e.g., telephones, internet access, reliable electrical systems, etc.) scarcely exists or is totally unreliable. In such cases, the near-term imposition of modern technology can be disastrous.

**Our concept of the best solution is probably not attainable.** Be willing to settle for **good enough, as opposed to best.** Identify joint solutions, which guide the PN to bridge gaps between where they are **now** and what is simply **good enough.**

**Scale your expectations appropriately.** To be effective, you must pragmatically and realistically assess the institution to which you are assigned. U.S. capacity-building partnerships might send you to advise an FSF or other ministry with only a few thousand personnel, or one with hundreds of thousands. Similarly, the budgets supporting FSFs may range from less than 20 million to more than 5 billion U.S. dollars. You might find yourself working where there is no viable FSF, no ministries, and limited human capital on which to build them. On the other hand, you might find yourself working in a location where all those elements are present, but are so adversely impacted by other problems (e.g., corruption or extra-judicial conduct) that they are, in large part, ineffective. Systemic, often endemic, issues such as corruption have nearly invisible, yet powerful, negative impacts on achieving change. When identified, you must report the issues to your chain of command and continue to perform your advisory duties.

**Clearly, you must scale your expectations according to the specific nation.**

**Civilian control of the military is desirable, but may not be a reasonable reality.** Make no mistake, legitimate or not, the reality is there are PNs where the MoD “tells” the government what they want, and they get it. Many countries have a history of military control over the political process or functioning of government institutions. In some of those instances, the threats posed by military meddling or outright intervention are very real and can have a dramatic effect on the efficacy of the overall advisory effort.

**Beware of imitation.** In assessing the performance of the counterpart or the organization to which the counterpart belongs, beware of what some refer to as “isomorphic mimicry,” which is defined as, “**the ability of an organization to [demonstrate actions to earn] sustain legitimacy through imitation of forms of other institutions, while lacking [true understanding of, or adherence to, the underlying concepts] functionality.**”<sup>45</sup>

**Leadership is a prized commodity.** Ultimately, the success of the capacity building effort will depend on the quality of its leadership. Identifying, nurturing, and supporting the development of leaders – as well as the actions of those who sacrifice to achieve progress – is a critical component of the advising effort. It goes almost without saying that our success in building capacity will be a function of the quality of the PN’s leadership.


**The political pressures placed on coalition policy makers often force unrealistic, unattainable timelines.** Put simply, advisors often face enormous pressure from superiors to demonstrate progress in comparatively short timeframes – yet they must report their assessments accurately. Experience shows that it takes sustained focus to achieve progress.

“Institution building takes time. Recent analysis comparing country experiences for institutional reform suggests it takes 15 to 25 years to improve institutions a single standard deviation – this is not moving Haiti or Somalia to the level of ... Canada in terms of institutional quality, but rather moving them to something that is “good enough” to deliver basic government services.”<sup>46</sup>

## **THE ORGANIZATIONAL CORE FUNCTIONS**

Synthesizing these ideas into a model (see Figure 3-1, which is a slightly modified version of one created specifically for DIB) incorporates many of the imperatives and features of successful senior advising such as national interests, cultural impacts, and the guiding thoughts and advising fundamentals previously outlined.


The most important takeaway is that an advisor cannot overlay our culture, priorities, objectives, and plans across an institution or nation and proclaim that we have an approach to move forward. Instead, we must try to identify areas of mutual interest (the sweet spot). There you will find a starting point to identify **good enough** solutions that build capacity, are achievable, and will prove to be sustainable.



**Figure 3-1.**  
**“The sweet spot” of “good enough” capacity building.**  
**(Provided by Thomas Davies, Naval Postgraduate School)**

**Where do I begin? How do I find the sweet spot?** Again, there’s no better way than by applying a logical, cyclical approach as used in many disciplines: assess, scope, design, implement, monitor, and evaluate ... and repeat.

The model described in Figure 3-2 displays this cycle in greater detail. It was developed with DIB **measuring and evaluation** in mind, yet applies equally well to advising in any institution (e.g., MoD) or institutional subset (e.g., MoD S&P development). All effective senior advisors start by assessing and reflecting; they ask questions, scope, build context, plan, assess risk, and consider risk mitigation, etc., before arriving at solutions – a process not unlike preparing to take command or preparing to lead an organization or major project. Your challenge now is to apply these skills while serving as an advisor, working daily to develop solutions to close gaps in capacity that will be suitable, feasible, and acceptable for your counterparts in another nation as well as those leaders to whom you report.



**Figure 3-2. The successful cycle of institutional advising. (Provided by Thomas Davies, Naval Postgraduate School)**

Perhaps the most important takeaway in this area is that assessing is cyclic. From day 1 to day N (however long your tour may be), you must constantly reapply this model. The world in which you work will likely be incredibly complex; at times chaotic; often marked by disagreement with both your host nation counterpart and donor nation stakeholders; and move at a near-frenetic pace – all factors combining to rapidly outpace your initial assumptions and priorities.

## **CHARACTERIZING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CORE FUNCTIONS**

The purpose of this section is to provide background on the core functions and how they interrelate with each other. It is safe to assume that the advisor was chosen for this assignment because he has the depth of training, practical knowledge, and experience commensurate with the position responsibility.

### Key Takeaway

The best senior advisors have tremendous depth in all functional areas of an organization. Surprisingly, many senior advisors, who spent their entire career serving in a particular discipline, are assigned to be senior advisors in functional areas where they have little or no practical experience (in order to enable them to bring their considerable command, leadership, and supervisory skills to bear to assist their counterpart and their counterpart's organization).

It is fairly common to have Naval nuclear engineers advising on logistics with an Afghan infantry brigade, a doctor of psychology advising the Afghan National Police, a financial manager advising the commander of the Afghan Army Support Command, etc.


The following assumes that you will be assigned as a senior advisor to an executive-level counterpart in an MoD (the most likely scenario) where you will focus on (what was earlier termed) the widely accepted critical systems of a MoD:

- Strategy and policy (S&P)
- Resource management (RM)
- Human resource management (HRM)
- Acquisition and logistics (A&L)

With this assumption in mind, the following describes each of these core functions and how they impact the institution. Of note, many characterizations of these include planning as an integral part of S&P. To ensure continuity, this handbook does not include planning as a part of the S&P functional area.

Planning deserves special emphasis in this handbook, because every advisor will participate in developing plans either in support of the PN or the command or organization to which he/she is assigned.

Consider each of the defense core functions in a graphic framework (Figure 3-3):



**Figure 3-3. Core functions.**

Planning is a critical requirement in every core function. Therefore, a common emphasis in improving the capacity of every core function is planning. Planning forms a bridge that converts strategy into requirements for capacity and capabilities at the national level. When doctrine and objectives are added, the result dovetails into a complex, orderly, resourced, sequenced series of tasks, activities, and directions for subordinates to accomplish.

Exploring these core functions, recall the human body analogy:

- S&P is the brain; it assimilates information, synthesizes it, and decides on courses of action.
- RM is the heart; it pumps fiscal capability throughout the system.
- HRM is the blood; it circulates people where needed.
- Finally, A&L is the digestive system; it gathers resources, breaks them into manageable pieces, and then distributes them in the amounts needed to maintain the health of each organ and cell in the body.

## STRATEGY AND POLICY

Continuing with the human body analogy, S&P is the MoD's brain. A useful starting point is to establish a common perspective on what is meant by the two words **strategy** and **policy**. Currently, the U.S. Army War College puts forth eight definitions of strategy, each depending on the context in which it is being used (e.g., National Strategy vs. National Military Strategy). With this in mind, the focus will be on a model for military strategy development you have probably already encountered during your career.

### **Military Strategy = Military Objectives (Ends) + Military Strategic Concepts (Ways) + Military Resources (Means)<sup>47</sup>**

S&P provides the MoD of an FSF a way to go about organizing the ways, means, and ends of the FSF as a whole. As offered earlier, S&P development focuses on near-term (one year) and long-term (3-5 years) planning horizons. Five ideas are offered to assist advisors with matters of policy and/or strategy development:

- Planning horizons reflect U.S. doctrine and may not fall within the bounds of any FSF. Remember, you must be flexible and adaptable.
- Policy is fundamentally little more than the (written) rules designed to direct plans and actions; however, it must be well-developed to improve any of the “downstream” products for which it is designed to establish parameters.
- S&P actions require both interagency and intraagency integration. Ideally, they must clearly and explicitly define the MoD's objectives – admittedly a very difficult requirement to achieve. Coordination and integration of the ideas from across the PN government – also difficult requirements – can be time-consuming, cumbersome, even contentious; but are absolutely essential. Advisors must work to this end.

- Military strategists collect information from a host of sources: strategic documents promulgated by the governance and executive functions, core processes, command intent, etc. They then gather assessments of available resources from other ministerial staff sections. Finally, they synthesize the collective information into a viable concept that supports the national policy. Ideally, as a result of capacity, the advice advisors provide, or both, the strategy articulates clear objectives (ends), courses of action (ways), the available resources (means) which can be brought to bear to achieve the ends, and any anticipated risks (with appropriate mitigation measures).
- S&P is difficult, complex, and heady work; even for advanced nations. Do not be surprised if you are assigned to advise an FSF MoD that plans, acts, and thinks tactically.

### **Recommended References for Strategy and Policy**

- *U.S. Army Guide to Strategy*, Joseph Cerami and James Holcomb, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001. ISBN 1-58487-033-8
- *U.S. Army Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3rd Edition; edited by COL (Ret.) Stephen J. Gerras, Ph.D.; Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College

## **RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (FINANCE)**

Managing financial resources is the heart of any organization. It involves the execution of the financing and budgeting activities across the executive, generating, and operating functions. Many of you may be familiar with the U.S. system of planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE). If so, you are also familiar with how difficult it is for U.S. organizations to manage the process effectively, because RM is inherently complex and reflects both uncertainty and the political environment in which the activities must be performed. However, every PN must have the ability to perform those processes even if in a manner less effectively than what you may be familiar with. Advising an RM function requires comprehensive solutions (created between the advisor[s] and the counterpart[s]) which are “right-sized” for the supported MoD.

Every ministry must have the ability to analyze the requirements generated by the various subsets of the organization. Based on this analysis, they allocate the available monies to most effectively meet the ministry's strategic needs, and then ensure those monies are spent in accordance with the budget plan. Finally, they analyze the results over time to validate their execution and then reallocate funds as necessary.

### **Recommended References for Resource Management**

- *Integrating Defense into Public Expenditure Work*, Nicole Ball and Malcolm Holmes, Report commissioned by the UK Department for International Development, 11 JAN 2002
- *Public Expenditure Management Handbook*, World Bank, 1998, ISBN 0-8213-4297-5

## **HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**

Think of HRM as the remainder of the circulatory system. It moves human capital (people) throughout the institution. People will ultimately determine just how successful any organization becomes. An FSF may refer to HRM as either "Force Management" or "Total Force Management." The MoD's two basic HRM functions are:

- First, determine human resource requirements based on defense requirements and force plans.
- Second, manage and develop people – as individuals and in the aggregate.

Initially, these two statements appear too simplistic to cite as the role of such a vital core function. Deeper examination reveals that they clearly state the basic, overarching objectives of a series of highly complex, interlocking processes – each with their own myriad sub-functions and processes that exist to provide the human resources needed to execute the institution's strategy.

The MoD is reliant on HRM when it comes to resourcing human capital across the functions performed at the EGO functions. It must recruit and retain; help define the requirements for the force structure; classify occupational specialties; and train those recruited, throughout their careers, to ensure they have the skills needed for a viable force structure.

HRM is also charged to design and manage appropriate compensation and benefit programs. Each of these areas of effort are complex issues in their own right. They are closely linked not only to the organizational needs, but also to the development of the MoD's budget.

### **Recommended References for Human Resource Management**

- *NATO Human Resources (Manpower) Management*, Research and Technology Organization Technical Report (TR-SAS-059), February 2012, System Analysis and Studies Panel, North Atlantic Treaty Organization. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a560294.pdf>
- *Human Capital Development and FDI in Developing Countries*, Muhammad Tariq Majeed and Eatzaz Ahmad, Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper No. 57514, 24 JUL 2014. [https://mpr.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57514/1/MPRA\\_paper\\_35454.pdf](https://mpr.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57514/1/MPRA_paper_35454.pdf)

## **ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS**

In practice, A&L is treated as two different functions; however, for purposes of this handbook, they are viewed as complementary. This handbook submits that the more advanced the ministry, the less the lines between acquisition and logistics will be blurred. For the purpose and scope of this guide, the two are combined and addressed as a single core function.

A&L may include one or more of the following:

- Anticipating military requirements
- Acquiring those required goods and services (procurement)
- Distributing resources equitably (to include personnel) in accordance with the various plans and priorities developed by the MoD
- Measuring continuously to ensure satisfactory equipment maintenance and readiness across the enterprise

The role of logistics is further defined by denoting NATO’s expectation, which includes managing materiel, movement, infrastructure, services (non-materiel support), and health (health services and medical supplies and support).

Many nations, to include those in NATO, use a demand-based system (**pull**) in which user-generated requirements drive the system. However, there are a variety of different systems across the world. The Russians use a system that uses pre-planned tables to calculate subordinates’ needs, which they then **push** to the unit(s) deployed in the field.

On the other hand, China, another near-peer state, is rapidly modernizing its logistics enterprise. However, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) logistic doctrine in the year 2000 stipulated that an individual must carry his own support and sustainment packages. Since the 1930s, the PLA philosophy had been that company-sized units had to grow their own subsistence on small farms.<sup>48</sup>

An invaluable tool to assist in assessing the PN’s logistic capacity and capabilities, and any gaps, is the **DOD-facilitated Vertically Integrated Logistics Assessment (VILA)**. The VILA provides a holistic, vertical, and horizontal representation of “where the PN is, in terms of capacity and capabilities.” It does so in a consistent, repeatable fashion. It also provides a starting point for meaningful discussions intended to allow stakeholders to identify existing capacity gaps and, at the same time, conceptualize “good enough” solutions to close identified gaps.

**Bottom line:** Be prepared to deal with any number of variables. Like other areas of advising, be open-minded to what is “good enough” and what is simply beyond the abilities of your counterparts to execute, especially for developing nations with nascent capabilities and capacities. Finally, never overlook the fact that acquisition cost is a fraction of total expense. Maintenance, training, technical assistance, support costs, fleet upgrades, etc., typically more than double the initial acquisition cost.

### **Recommended References for Acquisition and Logistics**

- *NATO Logistics Handbook*, November 2012
- *Vertically Integrated Logistics Assessment Functional Guide Version 2.0*, 07 APR 2016

## SUMMARY

There is an old adage that cautions, “Look before you leap.” Nothing could be more applicable to any senior advisor, in any situation, institution, or country to which you may be assigned.

To review, this chapter sought to communicate six major themes:

- **No single institution stands alone.** To build enduring capacity requires a “macro” approach, coupled with a clear understanding of the complexity of the symbiotic interrelationships which form among an institution’s internal organizations. An effective advisor works to understand not only the institutions themselves, but how the institutions across the PN government interact.
- **Institutional change takes time – sometimes generations.** Moreover, this basic tenet of advising is often overlooked by pressure from those above who do not have that same understanding and, simply push to “get the mission accomplished.” Time is our only non-renewable resource; use it wisely.
- **U.S. “best” solutions are rarely the “right” solution for other nations.** However, “right” solutions are often overcome by events and pressure from above. Strong vertical and horizontal relationships, coupled with in-depth country study, allows you to better understand the context of host-nation decision making – and better understand how your counterparts think and decide. The deeper your grasp of that context, the greater the odds you will propose solutions and approaches that will earn the support of those you advise.
- **To be enduring, solutions must also be sustainable.** Championing unaffordable “best” solutions is counterproductive and wasteful in the near term. Simply ask yourself, “Can they afford this proposal over time?” If you examine history, the answer has often been “no,” yet for any number of reasons, the proposed idea was put in place.

- **Your partner must be the actual agent for change.** If this is not the case, the change will not endure. Change is difficult for many to accept. The deeper your relationship with your counterpart, the greater the likelihood of building trust and mutual respect. The greater this level of trust, the more likely that your counterpart will consider and work to affect the potential change you ask him to consider.
- **The core functions of organizations are the lifeblood of the ministries you will support.** Some of the various descriptions and models offered are admittedly “dry,” yet you are expected to understand them and assess how your counterparts contribute to their effectiveness. Some models are universally applicable; others are specific to an MoD or a subordinate organization to which you may be assigned.

This chapter reflects many years of advising experience. It attempts to illuminate the challenges associated with this endeavor. On one hand, advising at the senior or executive level will be intense and frustrating, with progress often slow and, at times, nonexistent. On the other hand, many find it the most rewarding assignment of their careers. Our advice is to take MG Burluson’s insight to heart: “Immerse yourself in the environment and commit to forging powerful relationships that will enable the difficult conversations needed to achieve positive change.” (CALL News from the Front, *Advising at the Ministerial Level in Afghanistan: Insights from Major General Willard M. Burluson III*, September 2018).



## CHAPTER 4

# Senior Advisor Insights

This chapter consolidates thoughts and experiences on senior advising at the institutional level (the executive function [ministry], the generating function [air, land, and maritime components], and the operating function [tactical formations]) of a partner nation (PN). The intent is to provide insights associated with advising that should inform and assist senior advisors. These insights have application at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Senior advising is a critical, complex mission and requires a unique skill set to be effective. Members of the Armed Forces and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians consistently demonstrate exceptional professionalism, competence, courage, and dedication to their jobs. However, individuals who serve as senior advisors must also possess personal traits such as empathy, the ability to work amiably with foreign security force (FSF) principals, patience, the ability to influence without formal authority, and the ability to work in ambiguous situations.

### SECTION 1

#### **THE U.S. MILITARY ADVISOR: DEALING WITH FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE PRINCIPALS**

The excerpts that follow derive from the original Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) paper, *The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World*, written by Michael J. Metrinko and published by PKSOI and SSI in August 2008.

**Note:** “Senior level official” used by Metrinko was intentionally replaced with “FSF principal” in this chapter to provide a consistent lexicon throughout this handbook.

Based on personal experience, Metrinko’s paper offers experiences of a number of diplomats and military officers who have extensive service in the Islamic world and in many conflict zones. His paper points out the complexities inherent to the military advisor, as well as the tools an advisor must use in order to perform successfully. The guidance in his paper is still applicable and provides advisors insights to resolve advising challenges.

**Defining the relationship of a senior advisor to FSF principals.** Although countries and cultures differ from one another, and methods of approach will change depending on locale, there are certain generalities that define the relationship of an advisor to FSF principals:

- The advisor can assist and consult, but he cannot command.
- The advisor should have expertise, but he does not have the last word.
- The advisor must cooperate with other players, both foreign and U.S.
- The advisor must be a true American, but not an “ugly American.”
- The advisor should be humble.
- And finally, the advisor must be helpful, but also credible.

**Enhancing the advisor and partner nation official relationship.** The advisor interprets the U.S. viewpoint to the PN official and helps him avoid misunderstandings that can affect both countries. He can reach back to the U.S. Government (USG) on the official’s behalf to harness and help direct resources that will have great impact on the PN’s stability and prosperity. By being sensitive to the PN official’s concerns, and by giving credible and honest advice when both can speak in full confidence, the advisor directly affects the two countries’ relations.

**Differences in perception.** An FSF principal may not see any need for an advisor, no matter what agreements have been made between his president and the U.S. military commander or ambassador.

The advisor must be sensitive to the burden of historic precedence. For this reason, an FSF principal who uses a foreign advisor may be regarded by some of his countrymen as a collaborator with a foreign occupying force.

Local reaction to the presence and activities of U.S. Soldiers can range from welcoming, to the intense and hostile, even from ostensibly “friendly” counterparts.

An advisor must not let himself be regarded as just another person who has come to pass out gifts in order to curry favor. He must not be regarded as simply a source of materiel assistance, supplies, high-tech presents, and trips abroad under the rubric of training.

The advisor must look at himself through local eyes and the local culture. If the advisor’s “can do” attitude is too highly developed, he may just seem ill-mannered and abrasive to the FSF principal and his staff, who often operate

at a different tempo than that in U.S. military circles. If he appears to be too young and lacking in authority, the advisor may be regarded simply as a decorative foreign staff aide who tags along to add luster to the FSF principal's entourage.

Age is important in many parts of the world. Tribal and village elders are the source of advice and authority, not the younger generation, and young men attending a major meeting or assembly are expected to sit silently and listen to the older generation.

The advisor and the FSF principal will come to their own understanding of an appropriate scope of responsibility and access. The initial arrangement will probably change over time. There are no fixed parameters, and personalities and local reality will be the deciding factors in determining what the advisor is supposed to do and how he will do it.

**Differences in time frame: today, tomorrow, never.** The FSF principal and the advisor may have very different concepts of the time necessary to complete an action. Some cultures do not place value on undue haste, and the smart advisor soon learns that their counterpart may seemingly agree to something, but may mean that action has been relegated to some other time and place, but probably not any time soon or any place near.

**Do not ignore local cultural concepts of timeliness.** Ignoring the local cultural concepts of timeliness will simply lead to frustration and ultimate failure for the advisor, and cause hidden discomfort and annoyance in his local counterpart in response to his frustration. Holidays and routing events may take precedence over scheduled meetings, and decisions may be made in loose informal gatherings with endless cups of tea rather than at official conference tables.

An individual assigned as an advisor normally knows how long his tour of duty will be. From the day that he arrives in-country, he hears a clock ticking off the days left in his assignment, and he may feel a subconscious compulsion to complete a checklist of "things to do" to satisfy performance goals.

The FSF principal, on the other hand, has a different view of time and a different perspective. His focus is indefinite, and he will not be rated on one year's performance. By the same token, the FSF principal's tenure is ultimately uncertain. Because he owes his position to local politics in what is probably a volatile environment, he can be reassigned, disgraced, promoted on a whim, or assassinated.

**The local calendar takes precedence.** The advisor should know the local calendar and understand the ramifications of holidays, local weekends, etc. These can change from country to country and even from region to region. This can be a several-day period, and the savvy advisor will not try to arrange meetings for American delegations or expect his local colleagues to give up their family time.

Just as other countries have their own holidays, do not expect FSF principals to take the U.S. calendar into account. The bottom line is to know the local calendar well in advance, and refuse official requests for meetings and visits that affect important observances.

**Rank, gender, and age.** Many foreigners do not accept contemporary U.S. views about rank, gender, age, or race. Insisting that they do so will hinder or doom the advisory mission. Cabinet-level and command positions in the U.S. military are routinely filled by women, and both law and custom now enshrine the principle that men and women are equal in every legal respect. This is not the case in many other countries ... where gender and age are important considerations in selection for assignments, and where they are essential considerations in assessing someone's professional merit. Ethnic background, skin color, and religious faith also play a role, based on local society and tradition. Rank is real, whether earned or bestowed as a gift. Rows of medals carry weight in foreign eyes, and until proven otherwise, ribbons, medals, and insignia connote gravitas, intelligence, experience, entree, and authority. In traditional societies, they are signs of high rank, and an advisor of high rank is (initially, at least) much more acceptable to an FSF principal and much more likely to command the official's attention and esteem.

**Adjust to foreign culture and habits.** The advisor must be ready to play the roles of both teacher and student, be open to an unfamiliar cultural environment, have evident interest and respect for unusual people and places, and be willing to subject his own comfort, preferences, and timing to those of a foreigner. A good advisor will adjust to foreign culture and habits to enable his message and guidance to be presented effectively. He must be intellectually curious, and also be able to keep silent and just listen. It is also essential that an advisor have the professional and personal qualifications to perform his duties.

**Professional, academic, and life experience.** The advisor's background and skills will be quickly judged by his foreign counterpart, and an FSF principal official is often highly trained and experienced in his own right. The U.S. military system, on the other hand, does not normally generate national-level expertise in any sector of study. The real expert in a technological or other field is more likely to be a civilian contractor attached to the advisory team rather than the military officer, and collegiality and collaboration will be vital for success. If the advisor does not measure up in one aspect, he must recognize and acknowledge his limitations and give advice in that context. The advisor must play to his strengths when opportunities arise and conditions permit, and look for ways that demonstrate his particular expertise and talents.

At the most basic level, whatever the FSF principal's exotic clothing or lack of Western polish, he has survived to exercise power . . . . Understanding how this happened and analyzing the FSF principal's history can be an invaluable lesson for the advisor in his efforts to develop a relationship and package his advice for success.

**Don't confuse paper with qualifications.** The advisor must show that he has qualifications that complement the FSF principal's skill set, and that he can add value to the FSF principal's performance and provide useful advice and assistance. How he does this will differ with time and location, but it is a challenge he must analyze and meet to accomplish his mission.

**Personal flexibility.** The lifestyles of FSF principals make it less likely that advisors will have . . . constant access. However, the advisor must be willing and able to relegate his own schedule and preferences to those of the FSF principal. For most FSF principals, there is no demarcation line between work and down-time. In many parts of the world, privacy is not a value or even much of a concept, and the advisor should be willing to adapt to discussions held in loud social settings, or to talking with the FSF principal while 10 or 20 or even 50 others are sitting in the room and listening silently.

**Knowing the local culture.** The American advisor should seek local guidance on cultural and social customs and etiquette, watch others around him, and ask questions about proper norms of behavior from local sources. No “one size fits all” book on etiquette and culture encompasses the wide variety of the world. Differences between foreign and American etiquette are endless, and ignorance of local customs will harm the advisor’s effectiveness. No one can possibly know everything about a foreign culture – or even his own culture – but some basic humility, an open mind, intellectual curiosity, and the ability to laugh at himself will carry the advisor a long way. He must be aware of what is merely permissible, what is recommended, and what is prohibited in the local environment, because if local norms are not respected, the advisor’s best efforts to present ideas and influence FSF principal counterparts will be frustrated or even counterproductive. Some social settings may be difficult for the advisor, but he will adapt quickly if he wants to be successful.

Orders of precedence are essential to understand. The protocol of eating is profoundly important in many places, and ignoring it can sink a mission. Foreigners are watched carefully and judged by their willingness to partake in proffered hospitality, and in some areas they might actually be at risk until they have shown they are friendly by accepting refreshment (e.g., in the Pashtun tribal belt). Sometimes hospitality can be carried to extremes.

Advisors are human, and there will be a line beyond which one cannot go, foods one cannot eat, gifts that one cannot accept, and behavior that one cannot tolerate. Personal principles and standards of integrity should not be sacrificed, and it is always acceptable to just say “no,” as long as it is done politely, firmly, and with no hint of condemnation. A simple explanation of “why” – an explanation that should never become a self-righteous sermon – is perfectly acceptable in most cases.

Remember that a foreign advisor is always under observation, from servants, other guests, and the eyes of scores of nameless security guards, drivers, other staff, and even the beggars sitting outside along the road (who may be reporting his activities to the local security service). He will be tested repeatedly to gauge his reactions and standards, and his character and professionalism judged accordingly.

Social customs and behavior differ from one place to another, and the advisor will have to put this into perspective and practice some degree of flexibility. A successful advisor will study and ask about local social norms, and adjust in an appropriate way to the setting while maintaining his personal principles and standards.

**Knowing American culture and history.** Advisors serve as a quick reference for all questions that FSF principal counterparts have about the U.S., ranging from etiquette points to serious discussions about American history, religion, politics, and policy.

**Knowing the terrain.** In theory, the advisor must know everything possible about the history, society, culture, economy, and politics of the country to which he is assigned if his advice is to have any connection to the reality of the FSF principal's world. He should strive to learn as much as he can, and show interest, enthusiasm, and commitment to the learning process, because knowledge of the local human terrain will determine the nature of his advice, the way it is presented, and the likelihood that it will be received and implemented.

The advisor must understand American policy, and know the limits of what he can and cannot say or do. He cannot exceed the parameters established by his commander or the ambassador. Exceeding his authority may leave the advisor in a position where his credibility disappears, and thus he will no longer be able to perform his duties.

**The hypocrisy factor.** The advisor must remember that his foreign audience may see him differently than he views himself, and will react to his advice accordingly. The advisor will be judged by his audience as the representative of a larger power, and seen in the light of that power's own actions.

Despite their good intentions, many foreigners are perceived as hypocrites by foreign audiences, and their message met with annoyance or even anger because of the manner it is presented.

**The language problem.** The ideal advisor should be fluent in the local language, but this ideal is rarely met. Professional relationships, accuracy, and security will all be affected by the advisor's inability to speak the language. Most advisors use interpreters, making it difficult to establish a truly effective relationship with the FSF principal they are advising. Even if everyone speaks English, the advisor must be sensitive to differences in understanding which are caused by differences in background and life experience. None of this is impossible, but language is a complicating factor in relationships and requires close attention.

**Use of interpreters.** The perfect interpreter is impossible to find, but the advisor must cope nonetheless. In the real world, the interpreter is more likely a local citizen who left his country decades in the past and has only returned on a contract, or someone whose parents are from the country in question and who learned the language from his family while growing up in America, or a local citizen who studied English in school. Facts, figures, and details will often be mistranslated, and nuances of meaning may be totally lost.

The only way to avoid these pitfalls is to speak slowly, clearly, and succinctly, to rehearse key points in advance with the interpreter, and to check and recheck the interpreter's accuracy with figures and other data. Even then, however, no translation will be completely correct, and inaccuracies and bias on the interpreter's part may color the advisor's intended statements.

The advisor can improve his message by avoiding military jargon and abbreviations. Metaphors, similes, and humor do not translate well into other cultures. Asking an interpreter to repeat back what you have said or plan to say improves the chances of accuracy.

The advisor should avoid analogies, and recognize that an interpreter may drop a point, or guess at it, if he has not fully understood the concept. Most of all, the advisor should not surprise the interpreter with unusual vocabulary or new subjects of discourse. The interpreter's fluency in one subject should not be confused with vocabulary expertise or familiarity with other topics.

**Using "basic" English.** Problems are also associated with reliance on the FSF principal's knowledge of English. Unless the principal is very fluent, the advisor may be misunderstood even while both assume they understand each other perfectly. Even when both parties speak English well, differences exist between American usage and British/Australian/other usage which can lead to misunderstandings. These differences can be more treacherous because they are completely unexpected, and each side of the discussion assumes that the other understands him perfectly.

**Understanding what is heard and what is said when the advisor's terms of reference are not those of the FSF principal.** Understanding the differences in connotation of words and differences in concepts is essential for the advisor if he is to communicate effectively. When two cultures are not parallel in their focal points, misunderstandings can occur and inaccuracies can be perpetrated by the application of familiar concepts in a foreign environment. This does not mean that communication is impossible, just that communication is not always easy, and the advisor must take special care to ensure he really understands what he hears, and that his own meaning is conveyed accurately when he speaks. There are ways to minimize the difficulties and achieve the advisor's goals. Beginning to learn the local language – or at least the minimal expressions of courtesy and greeting – is an important first step. Self-study and help from interpreters can assist the advisor in this.

**Non-verbal communication.** Paying close attention to facial and body language and other forms of nonverbal communication is also important for the advisor, and allows him to gauge reaction before the words are translated. Over time, as the advisor and principal counterpart become familiar with one another, and as the advisor works to understand the language, gestures, and local customs, communication will become easier.

Signs, facial expressions, and physical gestures that Americans take for granted and routinely use while talking may have far different meanings in other cultures, and an advisor must be very careful to understand the signals he is sending.

**The office as battle space.** The advisor must study his counterpart, learning his history and his cultural and social milieu. He must come to understand what affects the principal's thought process and decision-making, and learn the local factors that determine the FSF principal's ultimate success. While much basic information about an FSF principal can be obtained from news accounts on the Internet and intelligence sources prior to beginning an assignment, the best way for an advisor to understand his counterpart comes through physical proximity and observation over time.

**The first "who" in "who's who."** Knowing as much as possible about his counterpart is imperative for the advisor. Learning the truth, however, is a subtle and time-consuming process. Understanding the nature and structure of the FSF principal's office and agency is as important as knowing a battlefield before an engagement. The organization, the staffing, the place in the government structure, and the duties and responsibilities of the principal and his colleagues are all essential knowledge for an advisor.

**FSF principals' sources of income.** Knowing how principals and bureaucrats are paid is essential to the advisor, because income sources directly affect decision-making. In the underdeveloped regions of the world, the disparity between rich and poor may be severe, with both extremes reflected in the bureaucracy of the FSF principal's agency.

**Local perception of government service.** The advisor must understand where his ministry or government agency fits in the popular mind, and whether it has a popular constituency and support. In the U.S., there is an assumption that government officials, police, and military are basically service-oriented, professional, educated, and honest. This is not true in many other countries, and knowing how the public regards senior officials (e.g., FSF principals) and/or their bureaucracies is important for the American advisor.

**The trap of personally identifying with foreign officials.** This means that the American advisor may inherit friends and enemies whom he has never met, giving him both entrée as well as putting barriers in front of him.

Any intelligent official – especially a shrewd and sly one – will make use of his American advisor as a scapegoat for his own misdeeds and mistakes, claiming that assignments, appointments, or allocation of resources are being forced on him by the American. On the other hand, the FSF principal might use his relationship with his American advisor to enhance his personal power. It is not the American advisor's role to help the principal gain higher office or more power.

**The U.S. Government writ large.** In addition to his own U.S. military organization in the country, the advisor may have to deal with various members of the American Embassy's country team or any number of American representatives. In many cases, these organizations' functions will be carried out by contractors who are hired to implement development programs, and perform specific training, logistics, or advisory functions.

Except for the conduct of military operations, the senior American official in-country will always be the ambassador, who directly represents the U.S. President. In general, the senior official with whom the advisor deals may also be routinely meeting with the American ambassador or other members of the country team, and the advisor may never learn what is discussed in private between the ambassador and the FSF principal. The advisor must understand that the ambassador's word is the final one, and that the ambassador sets American policy towards the principal and his ministry.

Various other Americans may see the FSF principal official less often than the advisor does, but if they are directly providing financial assistance to him or are perceived as trusted and discreet partners, they may have far more influence than the military advisor.

**The country team.** Every American embassy has a country team, composed of senior American staff of the various USG agencies and military units represented in the embassy. An advisor will probably not be a member of the country team, but he will certainly be called on to brief officials who are, and he will also routinely report through his chain of command to senior military officers who are members.

The advisor must establish a working relationship with the members of the country team, but must be aware that he will not always receive assistance, full disclosure, or cooperation from all members of the country team.

**Other international players.** Conditions change from country to country, but it is certain that some combination of international agencies and advisors will also be dealing with and trying to influence the FSF principal. The United Nations (UN) may have a significant presence in the host country, and the UN is composed of a wide variety of different agencies. International organizations like the Red Cross and the World Food Program may be very active, and there are certain to be a number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are in-country. Other countries will have embassies and visiting delegations that affect the FSF principal's decision making as well.

**The media.** The advisor should be well versed in dealing with the media. Journalists and cameras will be omnipresent around an FSF principal, and can be useful and positive factors in the advisor's mission. Knowing when and when not to engage with the media must be a standard skill for a senior advisor. Most importantly, however, the advisor must follow country team and military command guidelines in any contact with media. Facing a camera is not the time to freelance. The advisor should not appear to be avoiding the media, nor should the advisor be seeking out the media for personal advantage.

**Partner nation perception of senior advisor.** The advisor must be sensitive to the burden of historic precedence. For this reason, an FSF principal who uses a foreign advisor may be regarded by some of his countrymen as a collaborator with a foreign occupying force. However, in some cases, the counterpart may gain in stature by showing he has a senior U.S. advisor at his command.

## SECTION 2

### **ADVISING THE AFGHAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE: A MID-TOUR ASSESSMENT, BY COL JOSEPH S. MCLAMB, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE**

The selected excerpts that follow are derived from COL McLamb's *Senior Advisor to the Minister of Defense* article, dated 03 April 2015, contained in Center for Army Lessons (CALL) Newsletter, No. 18-08, *Defense Institution Building: Perspectives on Ministerial Advising*, pages 39-48.

COL McLamb's article is a summary of what he discovered in his efforts to learn a whole new set of skills as a senior advisor. The information he provides reflects what he learned in the first nine months as the senior advisor to the Afghan Minister of Defense (MinDef). The intent of the article was to provide his successor a broad, philosophical introduction to that mission.

**The minister is a political appointee.** It is very easy in day-to-day actions to forget that the minister, whether or not he has a military background, was appointed by the president to his current position, had to navigate the parliamentary confirmation process to get into office (or, in the case of an acting minister, faces the prospect of doing so), and serves at the pleasure of the president. No matter how solid his understanding of the military situation, the minister will always have one eye on the political situation, and will often weigh political factors much more heavily than military ones.

**The minister is a strategic leader.** Although the minister's duties and responsibilities roughly parallel those of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (SecDef), as a senior advisor, it is incredibly tempting to divert the minister's attention to operational, and even tactical issues that are of concern to one or more leaders within the coalition and with which the senior advisor has a level of personal comfort. To be effective, the senior advisor must fight this temptation and do everything possible to keep the minister focused on the strategic level.

**The minister is a human being.** Ministers possess and reflect all the normal human tendencies. At various times, ministers are tired, frustrated, angry, enthusiastic, greedy, generous, thoughtful, insightful, petty, narrow-minded, and brilliant. Like most men in positions of authority, ministers are susceptible to flattery, but are no fools; they can usually tell when a coalition leader is being patronizing. Pride and ambition make up no small

part of a minister, and a senior advisor is wise to recognize the differential in age and experience between a minister and an Army colonel. Consistently treating the minister with the same respect due to the U.S. SecDef, to include honoring such simple formalities as remaining standing until invited to sit, is a critical component of success for a senior advisor.

**The senior advisor is a member of the personal staff of the MinDef.** The minister has a small group of trusted agents that manage his office, time, and day-to-day activities. When the members of the minister’s personal staff begin to treat the senior advisor as a member of the team, rather than a visitor to the office, the senior advisor is well positioned for mission accomplishment. To reach this level of trust, however, the senior advisor must be ready and willing to “pull his weight” on the team. This can mean things like helping the staff draft letters or talking points for the minister, providing reminders of upcoming events, helping them understand coalition positions on specific topics, preparing the minister for meetings with senior coalition leaders, and serving as a sounding board for the minister’s ideas. The senior advisor must be available to the minister at the minister’s convenience, not at the convenience of the senior advisor or in accordance with coalition battle rhythms or planning timelines.

**The senior advisor is the primary advocate to the minister for coalition positions.** When the coalition wants to influence the minister’s behavior, the senior advisor will likely be the primary advocate for the coalition position. The minister may seek the senior advisor’s views on a topic, even after senior coalition members have discussed the topic with the minister. In some cases, the minister’s final decision on such matters may be influenced by what the senior advisor says as well as by what the senior coalition leader said. Therefore, it is paramount the senior advisor be fully cognizant of coalition objectives, or the senior advisor can inadvertently damage the coalition cause. Even with a full understanding of coalition goals, the senior advisor must carefully consider his approach when advocating for a coalition position.

**Use of threats.** The view that the coalition “holds all the cards,” particularly with regard to resourcing, makes it possible for the coalition to threaten to punish the minister for not complying with a coalition request, typically by denying one of more resources which the minister needs to be successful. It appears such an approach almost universally works in the short-term, but brings long-term negative consequences that often outweigh the gain. Even if completely effective, a threat delivered by a senior advisor will almost

always taint the relationship with the minister in a manner that is difficult, if not impossible, to repair. As a general rule, the senior advisor should stay far away from threats to the minister in an attempt to influence his behavior. If a threat simply must be delivered, it is best to allow another coalition leader to deliver it.

**The senior advisor is the honest broker to the coalition for the minister's positions.** The minister will frequently share views on a topic with the senior advisor well in advance of mentioning these views to senior coalition leaders. In some cases, the minister is simply seeking input from his senior advisor on how the coalition is likely to respond. In many instances, the minister fully expects the senior advisor to take these views to the senior leaders within the coalition and, within the senior advisor's available means, influence those coalition leaders to recognize the logic of the minister's views, even if they do not completely align with coalition views. A senior advisor who does not devote himself to communicating the minister's views clearly and effectively will soon find his influence with the minister evaporating.

**The senior advisor's first priority is maintaining his relationship with the minister.** Success is dependent upon the senior advisor having consistent access to the minister and staff, but such access comes at the discretion of the minister himself. It is easy for a minister to "freeze out" an advisor when the minister loses confidence in the advisor. The best relationship the senior advisor can have with the minister is that of mutual trust and respect.

**Stick to the unvarnished truth.** Although a healthy dose of tact is a critical component of a successful senior advisor, any attempt at "spin" or "messaging" in communicating with either ministry or coalition leaders is a perilous venture. Instead, an effective senior advisor should seek to gain and maintain a reputation for consistently providing an unbiased and straightforward report to both coalition leaders and the MinDef.

**Leave your ego at the door.** Advisors have no authority, and this can be a major adjustment for a senior colonel coming out of brigade command. An advisor cannot compel either the coalition or the minister to do anything, and will often find themselves being pushed by both in their attempt to influence the other. The surest way for an advisor to lose their perspective and utility is to attempt to force either the coalition leader or the minister into a course of action. Advisors do not command, and any hint that the advisor does not understand this can quickly diminish the trust necessary for success.

**Be comfortable in using your own best judgment.** Senior advisors operate largely independently, without immediate oversight and often facing new situations not covered in standing guidance. This requires a certain level of confidence in one's own judgment and abilities, without which a senior advisor is likely to be overwhelmed.

**Maintain your perspective.** It is easy to get caught up in the atmosphere of perpetual crisis which seems to pervade all large staffs, but this will rapidly degrade your ability to serve as a trusted advisor to the minister. Finding time each day to do physical training and think is critical. A sleep-deprived advisor who has given up physical training because "there just isn't time," or one who endlessly scurries from meeting to meeting when not with the minister, is well on his way to being ineffective, or worse.

**Carry your own rucksack.** Senior advisors usually do not have a staff and must fend for themselves and should not be a burden to the MinDef or the coalition.

### SECTION 3

#### INSIGHTS ON INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP BUILDING

**Understand the stakeholders.** As an advisor, you must never ignore the fact that in addition to your own command and staff, there are likely to be a host of stakeholders (e.g., Department of State [DOS], U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], NGOs, private voluntary organizations [PVOs], etc.) with whom you must integrate in order to generate the most efficient advising effort possible. However, it is beyond the scope of this handbook to imagine the myriad of combinations of stakeholders that may be present, so the focus will be on the functional area staff directorates within your own command. Also, remember that others will be present and should have a voice.

**Understand core functions to better serve your counterpart.** Core processes within the executive, generating, and operating (EGO) functions of an FSF typically have functional compatibility with staff directorate functions in a geographic combatant command or joint task force (JTF) headquarters. For example, personnel matters that exist in the governance, executive, generating, and operating (G-EGO) functions of an FSF pertaining to law, policy, doctrine, or sustainment are compatible for planning and assessment purposes to the J-1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate of geographic combatant command or JTF headquarters. Hence, a J-1 staff directorate may have planning equity for personnel matters when developing an FSF during the conduct of security forces assistance (SFA).

**Leverage subject matter experts (SMEs).** Functional compatibility of core processes in the G-EGO functions of an FSF have linkages to SMEs that reside within Service headquarters, military departments, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In effect, a senior advisor exists within a broader network of SMEs that have equity, either functionally, or as a force provider in assisting a joint force commander (JFC) in achieving development objectives in an FSF.

- In some instances, a senior advisor may need to leverage a network of SMEs to provide capacity to address technical or process issues that he and his principal counterpart face. For example, a senior advisor may coordinate with a J-4 (logistics directorate) of a joint staff on matters pertaining to logistics to organize and request other advisors, such as joint individual augmentees or Ministry of Defense Advisors. Likewise, a senior advisor in partnership with a joint staff directorate may generate a request for assistance from a Service department to provide a team of SMEs on a temporary basis to study a particular problem.
- Other ways that a senior advisor can draw upon other SMEs may include working collaboratively with a respective staff directorate to coordinate and conduct forums (e.g., conferences, working groups, online forums, etc.) within a functional network of SMEs. Such forums or communities of interest (COIs) provide a senior advisor with access to other SMEs to explore difficult issues and collaborate on ways to resolve or mitigate an issue that benefits the principal, protects U.S. interests, or contributes to the attainment of a developmental objective.

**Build a collaborative environment.** The collaborative relationship between senior advisors and respective staff directorates provides a JFC a “whole of staff” approach during the conduct of SFA. The whole of staff approach provides functional compatibility while attaining developmental objectives normally aligned to one or more core processes in the EGO functions of an FSF. Benefits include:

- Providing a JFC with a functional COI that is aligned institutionally (e.g., Service headquarters) within the joint force and the FSF.
- Aiding a JFC in organizing relevant SMEs at the appropriate level within the EGO functions of an FSF.

- Provides a means for a JFC to match best practices to typical problems within one or more core processes of G-EGO.
- Offers practical reach-back support and integration of resources for carrying out development across one or more G-EGO functions.
- Enables collaborative planning to strengthen understanding and decision-making at the appropriate level. This increases the net assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) capacity across staff directorates to better inform campaign approaches as well as strategic direction and guidance.<sup>49</sup>

Anyone may find themselves in a senior advisor role. Other senior advisor interactions may include commanders or senior staff of U.S. Army security force assistance brigades (SFABs) or other joint forces that interact to some extent with a principal of an FSF during the course of other security cooperation or activities. Although highly unlikely, the commander or staff of an SFAB that works with a tactical formation (e.g., corps, division, or brigade) of an FSF could find themselves providing military advice to a higher-level principal (e.g., at the ministry level). This is in addition to the principal of the tactical formation the SFAB primarily aligned with to provide military advice. Although this example contradicts normal thinking about the U.S. military's span of control, it is a possible scenario, particularly in high-risk, early-stage involvement in a PN.



## Endnotes

1. Extracted from the *U.S. Army Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3rd Edition, edited by Stephen J. Gerras, Ph.D., Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College, 2010. This observation made by GEN George C. Marshall is often in articles describing the adaptation that senior leaders must undergo to serve effectively at the strategic level. Marshall was promoted from a brigadier general, as the Chief of the Military Mission in Brazil, directly to general to serve as the Chief of Staff of the Army 01 SEP 1939. Clearly, his experience is atypical; yet his insights, offered while reflecting upon his career, underscore the different skills and perspectives needed by most senior leaders. His reflection captures the change in mindset needed to transform from “doer to advisor” (explored later in this handbook).
2. The ability to “transfer knowledge” for the purpose of building institutional capacity in PNs is a concept developed by Dr. Nadia Gerspacher, and her colleagues Ariana Barth and Natascha Meden, during their work for the U.S. Institute of Peace. This concept is captured in a study commissioned by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency entitled *Principles and Methods for Strengthening Advisor Recruitment and Performance*, 01 OCT 2014. This quote was summarized from the text found on page 13, hereafter cited as *Principles and Methods*.
3. Extracted from the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), 18 DEC 2017, pages 40 and 42.
4. Extracted from the U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), 17 JAN 2018, pages 2 and 9.
5. Another factor which suggests that more advisors will be deployed worldwide to advance U.S. interests in a dangerous and unpredictable international security environment is the greater authority vested in the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to deploy advisors from the Department of Defense. The Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) affirms that “The SecDef is authorized to conduct . . . programs to provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity of such forces.” The NDAA stipulates the requirements to obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State and to notify the Congress.
6. The four levels depicted in this chart are also referred to as simply “advisory functions” and are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, *Understanding the Operational Environment of a Senior Advisor*.
7. Certainly, there are no “hard and fast” principles that will guarantee success; however, there is a set that can serve as a guide to action in complex, ambiguous, or formative relationships.
8. Summarized from Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Edition, Merriam-Webster, Inc., *sub verbo*, *advisor*. Hereafter cited as “Merriam-Webster.”
9. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, Section 332, Advisors.
10. Ibid.

11. These ideas are discussed in greater detail in Dr. Nadia Gerspacher's book entitled *Strategic Advising in Foreign Assistance: A Practical Guide*. The glossary defines "advisor" on page 151. Guiding principles are covered on pages 19-38. Hereafter cited as *Advising*.

12. A possible example of what could be realistically achieved during the expected tour of the advisor is contained in the targets found in the Financial Commitment Letter between the U.S. Government (USG) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). In this example, the DOD Inspector General (IG) found, in a 2015 Report (DODIG-2015-082) addressing the effectiveness of GIROA's controls over the contract management process, that the "GIROA's Ministries of Defense and Interior did not have effective controls over the contract management process for U.S. direct assistance funding provided to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces. Specifically, the Ministries of Defense and Interior did not accurately develop, award, execute, and monitor contracts funded with U.S. assistance." An example of what might be a realistic, achievable objective for an advisor, instead of simply trying to fix all problems, might be for the advisor to commit to work to, "Improve GIROA's ability to execute and monitor contracts during the coming year." The key idea in this instance is that the advisor must focus on fixing critical problems, rather than trying to fix the entire system(s) they deal with, all at once.

13. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), News from the Front, *Advising at the Ministerial Level in Afghanistan: Insights from Major General Willard M. Burlison III*, September 2018, pages 3, 5, and 7. They are also addressed in CALL Newsletter 18-08, Chapter 5, by COL Joseph McLamb, Senior Advisor to the Minister of Defense, and Chapter 6 by COL Richard Creed, Senior Advisor to the Afghan Army Chief of the General Staff. The ideas captured in this list reflect a synthesis of the ideas contained in these two chapters.

14. A thorough examination of core processes (also referred to as core competencies) is found in Chapter 3 of this handbook.

15. Commenting on the continuing problems associated with transition, COL Scott King, in a post-deployment interview with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), commented, "The U.S. repeats mistakes due to a lack of continuity – we change our personnel with little to no transition conducted." CALL, Newsletter No. 18-08, page 36. Hereafter cited as "CALL Newsletter 18-08."

16. Merriam-Webster, principle defined.

17. These principles are advocated in the MoDA course. They were originally developed by the U.S. Institute of Peace. Many of these ideas are described as security force assistance (SFA) imperatives in Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, 23 May 2017. JP 3-20 states that the following imperatives are essential to SFA activities, and they have universal application for the numerous security cooperation activities and larger-scale Service and joint operations and missions supported by SFA activities. They are: understand the operational environment; ensure unity of effort; provide effective leadership; build legitimacy; synchronize information; promote sustainability; support host nation ownership; incorporate principles of good governance and respect for human rights; link security and justice; foster transparency; and do no harm.

18. *Principles and Methods*, page 13.
19. CALL, News from the Front, *Ministerial Advisors, Interview with MG Kaiser*, 01 AUG 2017, page 13.
20. Adapted from *Principles and Methods*, page 15.
21. Michael Metrinko, *The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World*, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and Strategic Studies Institute, August 2008. Accessed on the PKSOI website at [http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/American\\_Military\\_Advisor.pdf](http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/American_Military_Advisor.pdf), page 13.
22. COL Joseph McLamb, CALL Newsletter No. 18-08, page 39.
23. John Gillette, *Confusing Deference with Agreement*, Small Wars Journal, [www.swj.com](http://www.swj.com), 06 DEC 2011, page 3.
24. John Gillette, *Afghanistan: What Went Wrong?* Small Wars Journal, [www.swj.com](http://www.swj.com), 05 FEB 2013, page 2.
25. Joint Publication 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, 23 MAY 2017, page v.
26. CALL Newsletter 18-08, page 46.
27. Summarized from the ideas advanced in *Advising*, Chapter 8, pages 91-118.
28. Mark Rocke and John Gillette, *Why Americans are Inclined to be Poor Advisors ... and What to do About It*, *Small Wars Journal*, posted 03 JUN 2018, [www.swj.com](http://www.swj.com), page 4.
29. *Principles and Methods*, page 20.
30. *Ibid.*, page 38.
31. As quoted in Jim Garamone, Defense Media Activity, *Miller Takes Over NATO, U.S. Commands in Afghanistan*, 02 SEP 2018, <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1618550/miller-takes-over-nato-us-commands-in-afghanistan/>.
32. For more information on EGO and OTERA see JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, 23 MAY 2017.
33. Authorizations may include **organizational roles and functions** to include defining relationships between an FSF and other ministries or private industries.
34. Itemization of funding within the EGO functions may include matters pertaining to **personnel, equipment, training, operations**, and other categories.
35. Other core processes within the executive function may include a **legislative affairs** process, an **information communication technology (ICT)** process, and others.
36. FM in an FSF MoD is similar to force management that occurs in DOD and the joint force. "Force Management is an organizing construct of processes, policies, organizational information, and tools that informs senior leader decision making on the global joint sourcing of the defense strategy. DOD Instruction (DODI) 8260.03, *The Global Force Management Data Initiative*, 19 FEB 2014, with change 1 dated 19 MAR 2018.

37. Contingency OE include (Operation) Resolute Support (RS) and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR).
38. Steady-state OE normally involves a security cooperation organization (SCO) aligned to a U.S. Embassy country team.
39. See Budgeting and Execution timelines, Army AL&T Magazine, April-June 2016, “Bringing Afghan Defense Forces Under Budget,” page 24, figure 1, COL Garret D. Heath, Director of Combined Security Transition Command, Capabilities Development Directorate.
40. Strategic direction and guidance pertains to U.S. strategic policy such as U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) or the Joint Strategic Plan within the Department of State (DOS).
41. Summarized from JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, Appendix A, *Security Cooperation: Related Programs and Authorities*, 23 MAY 2017.
42. Summarized from Kathleen J. McInnis, Coordinator, *What Is “Building Partner Capacity?”* Potential Key Issues for Congress (page 2). Congressional Research Service, 18 DEC 2015.
43. *Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense Institution Building*, edited by Alexandra Kerr and Michael Miklaucic, Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, page 59, Washington, D.C., 29 NOV 2017.
44. *Ibid.*, page 263.
45. *Ibid.*, page 252.
46. *Ibid.*, page 255.
47. *U.S. Army Guide to Strategy*, edited by Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 01 FEB 2001, ISBN 1-58487-033-8, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=362>
48. David A. Payne, Chinese Logistics Modernization, *Army Logistician*, PB 700-08-04, Volume 40, Issue 4. August 2015.
49. Strategic direction and guidance pertains to U.S. strategic policy such as U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) or the Joint Strategic Plan within the Department of State (DOS).

## APPENDIX A

# Acronyms and Abbreviations

A&L	acquisitions and logistics
AM&E	assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
AOR	area of operation
ASCOPE	area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
AT&L	acquisition, technology, and logistics
ATP	Army techniques publication
BPC	building partner capacity
C2	command and control
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
ChoD	Chief of Defense
CMO	civil-military operations
COI	communities of interest
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DIB	defense institution building
DGMT	Defense Governance and Management Team
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DOS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EGO	executive, generating, and operating
FID	foreign internal defense
FSF	foreign security force
FM	force management
GDP	gross domestic product
GEF	guidance for employment of the force
G-EGO	governance, executive, generating, and operating

HRM	human resource management
ICB	institutional capacity building
ICT	information communication technology
IG	inspector general
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
JCISFA	Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
JFC	joint force commander
JIA	joint individual augmentee
JTF	joint task force
JP	joint publication
JSCP	Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
LOE	lines of effort
MinDef	Minister of Defense
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoDA	Ministry of Defense Advisors
MoTA	Ministry of Tribal Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	(U.S) National Defense Strategy
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSS	(U.S.) National Security Strategy
OIR	Operation Inherent Resolve
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTERA	organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise
PKSOI	Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
PN	partner nation
PPBE	planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
PPD	Presidential policy directive
PVO	private voluntary organization
RFA	request for assistance

RM	resource management
RS	Operation Resolute Support
SCO	security cooperation organization
SFA	security force assistance
SFAB	security force assistance brigade
SME	subject matter expert
SOLLIMS	Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System ( <a href="http://www.pksoi.org">www.pksoi.org</a> )
S&P	strategy and policy
SSA	security sector assistance
SSR	security sector reform
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	U.S. Government
VILA	Vertically Integrated Logistics Assessment



## APPENDIX B

# Terms and Definitions

**Advise.** All activities to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to foreign security forces (FSF) while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising may occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups. Activities such as assessment, provision of materiel assistance, and liaison with U.S. or coalition-enabling capabilities may all be inherent in advising FSFs. (Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance [JCISFA], Security Force Assistance [SFA] Planner’s Guide, 01 January 2016).

**Capability.** Resources and processes that a government, institution, or security actor possesses to execute a task under specified conditions and to a defined level of performance.

**Capacity.** Extent (scale, scope, and duration) to which a task can be performed. Capacity can relate to manpower, equipment, or programming required to sustain the ability to execute the task. At the individual level, capacity refers to the knowledge and skills that people have acquired by study or experience. At the organizational level, capacity refers to management structures, processes, systems, and practices as well as an institution’s relationship with other organizations and sectors including public, private, and community organizations.

**Defense institution building (DIB).** Security cooperation conducted to establish or reform the capacity and capabilities of a partner nation’s (PN) defense institutions at the ministerial/department, military staff, and service headquarters levels. (Joint Publication [JP] 3-20)

**Executive function.** The executive function includes national-level organizations or key individuals responsible for developing national policy for the PN's security force. This guidance consists of policies, procedures, and authorities for the generation and employment of the operating force. All security forces apply some level of executive function, which empowers and guides the generating and operating functions. The national government's departments or ministries that perform this function direct and develop national security policy and provide resources for the PN security forces. The executive function establishes, justifies, and seeks authority from the legislature or the appropriate governing body. It also determines the parameters for the generation of military forces and capabilities, and directs the employment of operating forces. (JCISFA, SFA Planner's Guide, 01 January 2016)

**Foreign internal defense (FID).** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

**Foreign security force (FSF).** Foreign security forces include, but are not limited to military forces; police forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; paramilitary forces; forces peculiar to specific nations, states tribes, or ethnic groups; prison, correctional, and penal services; infrastructure protection forces; governmental ministries or departments responsible for the forces previously mentioned. (JP 3-22)

**Governance function.** The governance function provides a PN government with a means to organize and purpose its security forces by way of laws and policy and provides necessary resources (e.g., funding) to the FSF. Typical instruments within this national function include general law and annual authorizations generated by actions in the upper and lower domains of a parliament. (JCISFA White Paper: "Understanding the Operational Environment of a Senior Advisor")

**Generating function.** The generating function develops and sustains the capabilities of the operating function. The generating function supports the organization, training, equipping, and building of the PN's security forces. In situations where the FSF has been destroyed, disbanded, or is non-existent, the SFA force (U.S. advisors) initially performs these tasks to promote development in the FSF. The assisting force helps the PN to identify, resource, and resolve capability gaps in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) of the FSF.

**Nongovernmental organization (NGO).** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 1-02)

**Operating function.** The operating function employs military capabilities through application of maneuver, intelligence, fires, force protection, sustainment, and command and control (C2) during actual operations. Organizations or military units from the corps level down to the squad or equivalent that perform the actual security-related missions for the PN security force constitute the operating force. U.S. or coalition forces may employ FSF organizations during partnered operations based upon the FSF's warfighting capabilities if the FSF is not capable of assuming the lead in security operations. Employment of PN police forces (when authorized) may include training and actual operations with the integration of patrolling, forensics, apprehension, intelligence, investigations, incarceration, communications, and sustainment, or any other activities that support the PN's legitimate criminal justice or customs enforcement authorities. (JCISFA, SFA Planner's Guide, 01 January 2016)

**Partner nation (PN).** 1. A nation that the U.S. works with in a specific situation or operation (JP 1). 2. In security cooperation, a nation with which the Department of Defense (DOD) conducts security cooperation activities. (JP 3-20)

**Principal counterpart.** Principal counterparts typically are those FSF individuals (uniformed or civilian) that have authority to direct a particular organization and allocate resources to an organization as appropriate. At the ministry levels, a principal counterpart normally includes the minister and deputy or assistant ministers. Principal counterparts at the ministry level typically have responsibility for directing one or more core processes in a ministry and managing resources accordingly. (JCISFA White Paper: “Understanding the Operational Environment of a Senior Advisor”)

**Security assistance.** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State (DOS) to be administered by DOD/Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) are considered part of security cooperation. (JP 3-20)

**Security cooperation.** All DOD interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and PN military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and PNs. (JP 3-20)

**Security force assistance (SFA).** The DOD activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of FSFs and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)

## APPENDIX C

# Advisor Checklist

This advisor checklist was adapted from Michael J. Metrisko (2008), *The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. The advisor checklist is contained in *Advisor Tradecraft – Handbook of Cross-Cultural Advising for Transitional Environments*, 2014, sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and edited by MESH Solutions, LLC (a DSCI company), in collaboration with McKellar Corporation and at the direction of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness).

A standard, “one size fits all” advisor checklist is not feasible, considering the various operational environments to which an advisor may be assigned. The checklist is a living document and is intended to allow the user to make modifications to fit the mission. The intent of the checklist is to provide advisors with a comprehensive listing of pertinent items that should be considered to navigate through the challenges of conducting their mission. It is not an all-inclusive document; however, it is provided as a way ahead for the user from which to develop a personalized checklist suited to the operational environment.

### PREPARATION CHECKLIST

#### Predeployment

- Has historical/situational awareness of the host nation
- Has practical knowledge of the country
- Has identified and contacted personal contacts in the host country or with recent experience in it
- Understands local and national holidays
- Understands the U.S. and international policy toward the region
- Has read all essential documents (e.g., bilateral agreements, international declarations on the nation, etc.)
- Understands the local government structure
- Knows the basics of the language

- Understands local nonverbal communication
- Understands and can apply cultural knowledge
- Has contacted predecessor for advice and knowledge
- Has fully researched assigned host nation partner
- Understands the U.S. command structure
- Understands key individuals in the chain of command

### **Upon arrival in country**

- Has identified the in-country logistical support groups:
  - Arranging transportation
  - Cell phones, radios, chargers
  - 24/7 contact information for an interpreter
  - Force protection
  - Key personnel contact numbers
- Meet your interpreter
- Meet your predecessor, if possible
- Ask for an introductory meeting with your host nation counterpart, and attend it with your predecessor
- Observe the current status quo
- Transition duties from your predecessor and begin to take action

### **Sample development plan outline**

A typical development plan may address some or all of the following sections:

- Key personnel and plan stakeholders
- Mission and functions: Overview of the plan's capabilities, mission, functions, and tasks

- Ministerial assessment:
  - Lists the overall strategic assessment and include comments about whether the ministry is on schedule to achieve milestones
  - Lists transition objectives
  - Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats
  - Current objectives
- Transition path for achieving independent host nation operation; list the objectives, deadlines, and points of contact
- Information technology systems required by the plan; describe requirements, timelines to acquire if not on hand, and points of contact for persons responsible
- Equipment and facilities: list what is on hand, and what is required for both equipment and facilities
- Risk assessment
- Policies: What is completed, in progress, or still needed for self-reliance; include relevant dates and status of each
- Understand the organization:
  - Organizational chart
  - Training issues related to workforce
- Assess advisors:
  - Which advisors are required (human resources)
  - Advisors on hand and where they are from (e.g., U.S. military, Ministry of Defense Advisors [MoDA] Program, contractor, other)
- Key leadership meetings:
  - Actions taken to date
  - Actions still needed and recommendations

- Create a “capability pentagon”; showing progress assessments in the following categories:
  - Training
  - Equipment
  - Manpower
  - Facilities
  - Sustainment

### **Meeting your interpreters checklist**

Get to know your interpreter by inquiring about the following topics:

- **Work-related background:** Which languages (dialects) does your interpreter know? Was he previously an interpreter for someone else and who?
- **Religion:** It is important to ask about religion, because someone’s beliefs may create biases that could affect the interpretation of messages.
- **Proficiency:** What level of education do they possess? How good is their English? Local interpreters have varying levels of English proficiency.
- **Subject matter familiarity:** How familiar is your interpreter with the technical substance (e.g., finance, judicial regulations) on which you will be advising?
- **Personal details:**
  - Where is he from?
  - Where does his family live?
  - How old is your interpreter?
  - Political affiliation? Ethnicity or tribal identity?
  - Is it culturally appropriate for the interpreter to speak to a village elder? Is your interpreter’s gender or religion an issue in the environment in which you will be working? Because traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, it is important to check with in-country colleagues or area studies for specific taboos or favorable characteristics.

## Meeting with your counterpart checklist

### Stage 1: Pre-meeting preparations:

- Purpose of meeting, time, and place
- Broader context of the meeting
- Activities for building rapport
- Analysis of possible issues to be raised
- Preparations with interpreter: context and ground rules
- Documents to be used (translated beforehand)
- Practice of greeting, opening, key points, and questions
- Personal security measures

### Stage 2: Meeting developments:

- Greetings and business etiquette
- Seating and positioning of participants
- Building rapport and adapting to cultural differences
- Listening and observing skills and body language
- Using the interpreter
- Understanding issues raised/not raised
- Hidden agendas and mixed messages
- Closing comments and departure

### Stage 3: Post-meeting follow-up:

- Debrief of interpreter – hidden insights?
- Level of rapport – indicators?
- Assessment: What was said and not said?
- Ambiguous exchanges: What actually happened?
- Requests: What was requested?
- Commitments: What promises were made?

- Important takeaways for follow-up?
- Points for your daily report to your superior

## GETTING TO KNOW YOUR COUNTERPART CHECKLIST

The following framework offers prompts to help you build rapport with your counterpart:

- **Interests:** What does your counterpart value as being good for himself and those for whom he is responsible? What does he value most? Security? Pleasure? Honor? Reputation? Responsibility? Money? Power? Piety? Why and how do these specific interests influence his behavior?
- **Identity:** How does your counterpart identify himself? Religion? Tribe? Family? Profession? Social class? Reputation? Nationality? How does this identity influence his behavior?
- **Networks:** With whom does your counterpart prefer to relate? What patronage networks does he operate within? What affiliations are critical to advancing his personal interests? How do these networks influence your counterpart's behavior?
- **Narratives:** What historical narratives inspire your counterpart? What stories or cultural events shape your counterpart's mindset about what is important to him? How do these cultural narratives influence his behavior?
- **Leaders:** What social, political, and religious leaders influence your counterpart? Which leaders do your counterpart listen to for guidance about what should be done in the future? Where do his loyalties reside? How do these leaders influence your counterpart's behavior?

## NEGOTIATION PRINCIPLES

### Types of bargaining:

**Distributive:** Seeking a “win-lose” outcome

- The disputants are adversaries and the goal is victory.
- Fixed resources can be divided so one side receives more.
- One person's interests or position opposes the others.

- Dominant concern is maximizing one's own interests.
- Distributive strategies include understanding the point at which your opponent will walk away from the negotiation and pushing him almost to that point by manipulation or withholding information.

**Integrative:** Seeking a “win-win” outcome

- Joint problem solvers seeking a wise decision
- Understanding needs will allow resources to be divided.
- The relationship between the parties is critical.
- Dominant concern is to maximize joint outcomes.
- Integrative strategies include cooperation, sharing information, and mutual problem solving.

**Other factors that impact negotiations:**

- Time: cultural view of time (e.g., high vs. low context)
- Environment: cultural views, man's impact on the world
- Self: individual and collective “face” and face-saving
- Nonverbal communication: body language and tone

**Sample reflective practice prompts:**

- What ...
  - ... is/was the problem/situation?
  - ... was my role in the situation?
  - ... was I trying to achieve?
  - ... actions did I take?
  - ... was the response of others?
  - ... were the consequences for my counterpart? Myself? Others?
  - ... feelings did it evoke in my counterpart? Myself? Others?
  - ... was good/bad about the experience?

- So what ...

... does this tell me about me/my counterpart's relationship? My advisory techniques? Me/my counterpart's attitudes?

... was going through my mind as I acted?

... did I base my actions on?

... could/should I have done to make it better?

... is my new understanding of the situation?

... broader issues arise from the situation?

- Now what ...

... do I need to do to resolve/improve the situation and better relate to my counterpart?

... broader issues need to be considered if this action is to be successful?

... might be the consequences of this action for me? My counterpart? The U.S. strategic mission? The ministry?

... can I do to transfer this learning to other contexts?

### **Assess the initial advisory situation**

Prior to deployment and during the first weeks of arrival in the host nation, focus on assessing the advisory situation. This is one of the critical skills of an advisor's tradecraft. This list addresses a range of important questions an incoming advisor would be interested in raising in the first weeks on the ground.

#### **1. The host nation**

**Language and culture:** What are the major ethno-linguistic groups in the area? What general cultural values and ways of thinking do societal groups follow? What are the major local narratives? What is the local history, both in the short term and from a wider perspective? What are the predominant religions?

U.S. Army Civil Affairs assesses civilian status and considerations within an operational environment using a framework called areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

- **Areas:** What are the local societal demographics? What are the major tribes and sects? What values and codes of conduct do the tribes and sects follow? Is there ethnic tension – where and why? What are the key locations within the operational environment (e.g., water sources, road coverage, construction sites, and gang territories)? How do these affect your mission, and how might different actions affect life and activities in these areas?
- **Structures:** What are the locations, functions, and capabilities of the local infrastructure (e.g., marketplaces, tea shops, internet cafes, radio stations, hospitals, military barracks, banks, bridges)?
- **Capabilities:** What capabilities does the population have to independently sustain itself? What public administration, safety, agriculture and food supply, emergency services, employment, consumer goods, and other public services are available?
- **Organizations:** What civil organizations (with or without government affiliation) exist in the operating in the area (e.g., business organizations, political groups, community organizations, religious organizations, gangs, insurgent groups)?
- **People:** Who are the current host-nation leaders at the national, regional, and local levels? Are there any informal leaders operating in your region? Who are the influential people within your area of operation (AOR), as well as those outside your immediate area who may affect your mission (e.g., key national stakeholders)? How do people usually communicate (e.g., phones, political speeches, internet, door-to-door, religious gatherings, and markets)?
- **Events:** What are the major civilian events (e.g., planting and harvesting seasons, elections, weddings, holidays, major religious occasions, sporting events, provincial gatherings)?

## 2. Communication

**Counterpart:** Is your counterpart fluent in English? Source of language education? Understands English, but cannot speak well? Fluency in third language? Familiar with American history and culture? Counterpart's efforts to improve English speaking and writing skills? Are you expected to help? What communication issues have occurred that may need continued attention?

**Interpreter:** Who will be your interpreter? Capable? Reliable? Strengths? Noticeable difficulties? Knowledge of specialized vocabulary? Personal background? Routine for pre-meeting preparation, meeting engagement, and post-meeting assessment? Rehearsal for a difficult session? Key issues beyond interpretation (e.g., security requirements, ministry procedures, other ministry offices, etc.)? Shared expectations? Contact information? Working hours? Personal issues? Security of extended family?

**Translation support:** Who will translate written documents? How long does it take? Who proofreads the translated document? Hours of operation?

### **3. Your counterpart and the ministry**

**Host-nation counterpart:** What are some important points in your counterpart's background – family history, ethnic background, education level, military experiences, political orientation, etc.? What are your counterpart's core interests? How did your counterpart get appointed to his current position? As a senior government officer, is your counterpart effective in leading and accomplishing the mission of his office? Is he professional, capable, and proactive? How is he rated among his peers in the ministry? Has your counterpart ever been involved in corrupt or questionable practices – if so, how? Does your counterpart have other advisors – do they work with you or are they independent?

**Key subordinates:** Who are your counterpart's key subordinates? What are their office roles and responsibilities? Backgrounds? Interests? Networks? Clout – why? What is your relationship with each of these subordinates? Who are their advisors – do these advisors work for/with you, or are these advisors independent? What should you be concerned with when dealing with your counterpart's key subordinates?

**Office mission and organization:** What is the mission of your counterpart's office in the ministry? How important is this mission to the overall functional performance of local security forces in the field? How is the office organized? What is its span of control?

How does its authority extend beyond the ministry in the capital to the field? Does the office have a standard operating procedure for completing its work – is it used?

**Office authorities and resources:** What ministry policy documents outline the authority of your counterpart and his office, particularly for the transition? What do these documents authorize? How are the office's finances managed? What is the office's budget for conducting its activities? What is the organization or structure for staffing the office? How well is procurement managed by the office staff? How do these authorities and resources impact mission performance of the office? How do these resources affect achievement of the tasks outlined in the relevant ministerial development plans? What should you worry about as the transition unfolds in the coming year?

**Office performance:** What office functions are critical to effective performance of its mission? Which of these critical functions does your counterpart think need improvement – why? What are your counterpart's priorities of effort to improve functional performance? Within available resources, what steps does your counterpart (or key subordinates) think will help improve functional performance? What possible approaches does your counterpart consider might be tried and then assessed? How might lessons be learned and applied as your counterpart moves forward? Who needs to be engaged in the ministry to help your counterpart move forward? How might your counterpart solicit their assistance and support for improving office performance?

**Office routines:** Do you have open access and good physical working arrangements? What office routines need to be followed when working in your counterpart's office? What routines and personal approaches do you intend to implement to build staff confidence and reliance upon you? How will you know if they are working to build rapport among the office staff?

**Ministry transition strategy and priorities:** What is the ministry's transition strategy and priorities over the next several months? What ministry policies are important to your counterpart's office in building capacity to perform critical functions? What new policies, if any, is your counterpart considering for approval to strengthen local capacity to conduct effective operations in the field?

**Host-nation national plans, strategies, and laws:** What are the national plans and strategies of the local government that apply to your office in the ministry? What laws and legal requirements of the host-nation government control the manner in which your office’s functions are performed?

**First step – build the relationship:** Given that your primary responsibility is to be a good advisor to your host-nation counterpart over the coming year, what should you be concerned about in the next several weeks? What are the potential trouble spots for building a good relationship? What lessons can you apply to effectively deal with these worries? Finally, what is your plan for steadily building rapport, confidence, reliance, and partnership with your counterpart over the next 90 days?

#### **4. The international advisory mission**

**Mission and campaign:** In the coming year, what is the primary focus of the international mission? What has been said and what is the real picture? How does your office in the ministry play in the success of the international mission’s campaign? What should you worry about as the international coalition seeks to accomplish its mission over the next year?

**Chain of command and key individuals:** What is your chain of command’s view of the “advisory world?” How well do key individuals appreciate the overarching importance of “the relationship” as well as the guiding principles of advising?

#### **Typical roles and considerations for an advising mission:**

**Senior advisor:** Does your senior advisor see the “big picture” in building sustainable ministerial capacity? Does your senior advisor “walk the talk” on good advising? If not, who steps up to advance this important perspective? How is unity of effort among your team of partner advisors?

**Chief advisor:** How does the chief advisor encourage advisors to build sustainable ministerial capacity? What guidance does the chief advisor provide in moving forward through the transition and beyond?

**Deputy commander:** How does your deputy commander communicate his goals for the transition and beyond? How often will you meet with the deputy commander? How does the deputy commander view your host-nation counterparts? Does the deputy commander ask good, relevant questions?

**Military commanding general:** Does the mission involve military-civilian coordination? Who is the military commanding general? What does he say about ministerial advising? How does the general engage with the advisory group in leading the ministerial advisory effort to build sustainable capacity owned and operated by the host nation?

**Development plans and processes:** Which departmental or ministerial development plan(s) will you be supporting in the coming months? According to those plans, what are the currently defined milestones for your office in the ministry? What does the latest quarterly assessment say about achieving these milestones? What are your responsibilities for gaining decisions related to milestone progression and defining tasks necessary to achieve each of these milestones? In the next few weeks, what are the expectations for you in contributing to the ministerial development process?

**International partners:** Who are your fellow international advisors – from U.S. civilian agencies, contractors, other countries, international organizations, etc.? What roles do each play – supportive, cooperative, or problematic? What “clans” or “tribes” exist within the internationals? What mechanisms and procedures enable collaboration? How does your advisory effort fit in with theirs? What does each one bring via comparative advantage? What could you read to understand their focus and contributions? What should you worry about in the next few weeks?

**Ad-hoc coordinating network:** Consider everyone working in the host nation to support the international mission, including advisors from your own organization, the embassy, and elsewhere; who should you coordinate with on an ad hoc basis to exchange information and track progress in other offices of the ministry? Who should be part of your ad hoc coordinating network? What do they need from you? How should you build an effective relationship with each of them to ensure their cooperation when it is needed? When necessary, how will you work closely with them to make progress? What is their contact information?

**Partner team of advisors:** How does your senior advisor encourage effective collaboration among the various partners on the team? What roles are performed by members of your partner team? Which members can you rely on to get good information and guidance on handling problems? What is the contact information of each member?

**Local battle rhythm:** What is the daily schedule for advisors working in the local area for meetings, briefings, and reports? What is your role in any of these daily events?

**Daily situational awareness:** How best can you keep track of what is going on in the international mission and within the ministry? How can you achieve daily situational awareness within the host nation? How can you avoid surprises when others make key decisions and/or unexpected events drive significant actions in the local area?

**Available assistance:** What assistance, if any, is available to you in advancing your mission? Approval requirements? Expected time for delivery of requested assistance?

**Local travel:** What travel should you expect in the coming months? What is the process for gaining approval for traveling with your counterpart? What vehicles are used – international coalition or host-nation vehicles? What is required to complete a successful trip?

**Media issues:** What is the policy for media inquiries and interviews with international journalists? What is the host-nation government's policy regarding local journalists? What is a good standard operating procedure in dealing with the media?

**Corruption issues:** What is the current international coalition guidance for reporting evidence of corruption to proper authorities? Who is responsible for following up? What are the “do’s and don’ts” for an advisor regarding corruption?

**Personal security threat environment:** In the coming weeks, what are your responsibilities for ensuring proper personal security at all times? What are some potential bad scenarios (e.g., “green on blue” insider threat attacks, terrorist bombing, etc.) that you should be prepared to handle? When a breach of security is underway, what is the best action you should take, and what should you avoid doing? What has happened recently in the area that endangered international personnel? What was learned from those events?

**Upcoming events and deadlines:** In the near future, what events or deadlines might have an impact on your activities? Changes of key coalition or host-nation leaders? Major host-nation holidays or events? Transition deadlines? Scheduled milestones for a different or new way of doing business in the international coalition or in the ministry? How should you anticipate and prepare for these milestones?

## 5. Previous advisor's perspective

Who previously advised your counterpart? A good relationship – why/why not? Any suggestions for approaching your counterpart in building rapport and trust? What does your counterpart value or seek from an American advisor? Important professional courtesies to observe? Social habits? Likes and dislikes? Travel? Potential difficulties in the relationship? Any sensitive areas – advice about handling them? What has been recently tried but failed/completed successfully? Trouble spots over the next few weeks? Plan for the hand-off of responsibilities?

## 6. Sponsor continuity folder

Who is your sponsor? Email contact? Is there a continuity folder? What documents, files, or reports should you study? Where can you find them? Background on the ministry? Your advisory position? Your counterpart's background, habits, work priorities? Your counterpart's key assistants? Your counterpart's office in the ministry? Current ministerial initiatives? Overall trends in the transition?

## SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTION

### Context

- Do you effectively use cross-cultural skills to accomplish difficult tasks? Do you live up to the following guidelines?
- Have you learned enough of the language for simple conversation?
- Understand the role of an advisor?
- Do you have a good command of the host-nation history and institutions? Do you understand local and national holidays?
- Do you have a thorough knowledge of host-nation ministry goals, capabilities, and processes?

### Technical efforts

- Do you liaise with other agencies including other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, other host-nation ministries and agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)?
- Do you consider the long-term strategic ramifications of all actions?
- Do you use “confidence” projects to build rapport and assess capability and progress?

- Do you help your counterpart establish sustainable and effective standardized procedures?
- Are you objective in reporting on your counterpart's and the ministry's proficiency with special attention to corruption and incompetence?

### **Integration**

- Do you frequently spend time with your counterpart?
- Do you socialize and eat with him in addition to business meetings? In other words, is segregation between you and host-nation personnel kept at an absolute minimum?

### **Advisor-counterpart relationship:**

- Do you frequently spend time with your counterpart?
- Do you respect your partner's rank and social status?
- Are you subtle and patient with your counterpart; do you explain the benefits of an action and encourage him to internalize it?
- Do you act diplomatically, correcting your counterpart only in private, while openly praising successes and helping to instill pride in the ministry?
- Do you make sure your counterpart takes the lead and primary ownership in all efforts?
- Do you share as much information as is allowed with your counterpart?
- Do you strive to mentor, train, and otherwise improve your counterpart and other ministry personnel?
- Do you maintain a properly respectful, professional bearing and manner at all times?
- Do your counterpart and other ministry officials understand the roles and limitations of advisors and work with you accordingly?

## APPENDIX D

# Advising References

**Note:** This handbook was derived from many of the following publications and others listed that may provide the reader with additional insights and perspectives regarding the subject matter. Some items are available only to authorized Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of the Army common access card (CAC) holders. Asterisks (\*) signify particular relevance to the subject of senior advising.

### **PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVES**

\* PPD 23 – *U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy*, 05 APR 2013. This policy provides the goals of U.S. security sector assistance to help other nations address common security issues, promote support for U.S. interests and universal values, and strengthen the collective security of the U.S. and partner nations (PNs).

### **PERTINENT U.S. LAW**

\* Title 10 U.S. Code (USC), Chapter 16, *Security Cooperation*. Authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the host nation. (particularly sections 332 and 333).

Title 22 USC, *Foreign Relations and Intercourse*. Authorizes the transfer of defense articles and services (including training) by the U.S. Government to friendly foreign countries in furtherance of the security objective of the U.S. and in consonance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

### **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

DOD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*, 26 APR 2012. Provides guidance for the administration and implementation of security assistance and related activities in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act, Arms Export Control Act, and related statutes and directives.

**Department of Defense Directives (DODDs). Most DODDs are available at <http://www.esd.whs.mil/directives/issuances/dodd>.**

DODD 1322.18, *Military Training*, 13 JAN 2009 (includes change 1, dated 23 FEB 2017). This document directs U.S. Special Operations Command to establish training standards for general purpose forces to train to the security force assistance (SFA) mission. See page 10, para 11.

DODD 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, 16 SEP 2009 (includes change 1 dated 29 JUN 2017). This directive updates policy and assigns responsibilities for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.

DODD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*, 28 AUG 2014. This directive provides guidance to train, advise, and assist foreign security forces and partners at the ministerial, service, and tactical levels to ensure security in their sovereign territory or to contribute forces to operations elsewhere.

\* DODD 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, 21 DEC 2010. This directive states that the Services shall organize, train, and equip forces to contribute unique service capabilities to the joint force commander (JFC) to conduct building partner capacity (BPC).

DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*, 29 DEC 2016. This directive establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the administration of security cooperation to encourage and enable allied and PNs to apply their military capabilities and capacities, consistent with U.S. strategy, priorities, and defense objectives.

**Department of Defense Instructions (DODIs). Most DODIs are available at <http://www.esd.whs.mil/directives/issuances/dodi/>**

DODI 3000.11, *Management of DOD Irregular Warfare (IW) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) Capabilities*, 03 MAY 2016. This instruction establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures to identify and manage DOD personnel with skills, training, education, and experience related to IW and SFA.

DODI 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance (SFA)*, 27 OCT 2010. This instruction establishes policy and assigns responsibilities regarding the

preparation of DOD personnel and operational planning for, as well as the conduct of, SFA across the DOD.

DODI 8260.03, *The Global Force Management Data Initiative*, 19 FEB 2014 with change 1, dated 19 MAR 2018.

**Joint publications (JP). Most joint publications are available online: <http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/>**

JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*, 03 AUG 2016. This publication provides doctrine for stability mission, activities, and tasks as part of stabilization efforts across the range of military operations.

JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*, 12 OCT 2016 (validated 18 OCT 2017). This publication provides joint doctrine to coordinate military operations with other USG departments and agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector.

JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, 16 JUL 2013. This publication provides doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States when they operate as part of a multinational force. It addresses operational considerations that the commander and staff should consider during the planning and execution of multinational operations.

\* JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, 23 MAY 2017. This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing security cooperation activities.

JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, 12 JUL 2010. This publication establishes joint doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting foreign internal defense (FID). It discusses how joint operations involving the application of all instruments of national power support host-nation efforts to build capability and capacity to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 25 APR 2018. This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess counterinsurgency operations.

JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 03 JAN 2014. This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, 11 SEP 2013. This publication provides joint doctrine for planning and conducting civil-military operations (CMO) by joint forces, employing civil affairs forces, conducting civil affairs operations, and coordinating with departments, agencies, or other organizations during the execution of CMO.

**Army publications. Most Army doctrinal publications are available online at <http://www.apd.army.mil/>.**

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, *Stability*, 31 AUG 2012 (with change 1, dated 15 FEB 2013). This publication is the Army's doctrine for stability tasks.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-07, *Stability*, 31 AUG 2012 (with change 1, dated 25 FEB 2013).

\* Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.10, *Advising Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces*, 13 NOV 2017.

Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook*, 06 FEB 2015.

## **OTHER REFERENCES**

\* *Advisor Tradecraft: Handbook of Cross-Cultural Advising for Transitional Environments*, sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and edited by MESH Solutions, LLC, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government [USG] Printing Office, 2014). This handbook presents best practices from the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) training program. It is “designed to summarize the broad range of knowledge, skills, and attitudes that senior-level cross-cultural advisors use to help strengthen and stabilize fragile partner-nations.”

\* *Aide Memoire — Advising and Mentoring Foreign Militaries: 60 Tips to Become a More Effective Advisor*, CPT Nicholas Wilson, Australian infantry officer, and published by Grounded Curiosity, 05 JAN 2018. “Grounded Curiosity” is a website that aims to strengthen the intellectual foundation for the Australian profession of arms via pertinent articles, publications, writings, and lesson reports. While the insights, lessons, and best practices are from an Australian officer's perspective, they have applicability to advising and mentoring challenges globally.

*Bringing Afghan Defense Forces Under Budget*, COL Garret D. Heath (director of Combined Security Transition Command, Capabilities

Development Directorate). Published by the Army AL&T Magazine, April-June 2016.

\* *Confusing Deference with Agreement*, Gillette, John M. Published by Small Wars Journal, November 2011.

*Defense Institution Building in U.S. Africa Command: Lessons Learned and Best Practices*, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), Joint Staff J-7, 23 MAR 2015.

\* *New Rules for Advisors at the Strategic and Institutional Levels*, Donnelly, Edward P. Published by Small Wars Journal, 27 AUG 2017.

*Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense Institution Building*, edited by Alexandra Kerr and Michael Miklaucic, Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 2017.

*Preparing Advisers for Capacity-Building Missions*, Gerspacher, Nadia. Special Report 312. U.S. Institute of Peace, August 2012. This report focuses on preparing ministerial advisors for capacity-building programs, to include best practices.

*Strategic Advising in Foreign Assistance: A Practical Guide*, Gerspacher, Nadia. Published by Kumarian Press, Sterling, VA, 04 APR 2016. This guide offers practical, step-by-step guidance for any advisor joining an assistance mission tasked with effective and long-lasting local capacity building.

*Global Cultural Knowledge Network (GCKN)*, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2, Fort Leavenworth, KS. GCKN guides knowledge and expertise to the point of decision, provides the Army with an understanding of key variables in current and potential operational environments, facilitates access to expertise and information, develops products and innovations, and provides services to enhance operational environment understanding at the operational level.

*Guidance on Common Training Standard for Security Force Assistance (SFA)*, 14 JAN 2014, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Cleared for open publication, DOD Office of Security Review, 28 MAR 2016.

*The Advisory Challenge*, Grdovic, Mark. Special Warfare, Volume 21, Issue 1 (January-February 2008), pages 22-28. This article discusses advisory best practices as a result of experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq.

*What Lessons Did We Learn (Or Re-learn) about Military Advising After 9/11*, LTC Remi Hajjar, U.S. Army. Article published in *Military Review*, edition November-December 2014.

\* *The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World*, Metrinko, Michael J., Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and Strategic Studies Institute, August 2008. This study discusses preparations for advisory missions in Islamic countries as well as best practices for advising.

*Professionalizing Ministerial Advising*, Millen, Raymond A., Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, PKSOI. This study recommends the establishment of an advisory training program, preparing for advising missions, and best practices in advising.

*Ministerial Advising*, October 2011 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler,” Volume 2, Issue 4. Published by PKSOI, 21 OCT 2011.

*Rapport Primer: Building Influence and Effective Relationships in Security Force Assistance Operations*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), 18 JUN 2010. This paper looks at the definition of rapport, its role in advisory missions, constraints affecting rapport-building, and possible ways to develop adequate rapport to accomplish the mission.

*Roles and Functions of Senior Advisors: Perspectives on Institutional Level Advising*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: JCISFA, February 2012. Leaders, planners, and advisors can leverage this document during strategic planning, preparation, execution, and assessment to shape and influence partner nation (PN) security force development to meet broader security cooperation goals and objectives.

\* *Afghanistan: What Went Wrong?* Gillette, John M. Published by Small Wars Journal, 2013.

\* *Why Americans are Inclined to be Poor Advisors (and What to do About It...)*, Roche, Mark D. and Gillette, John M., Published by Small Wars Journal, 03 JUN 2018.

## KEY WEBSITES AND ORGANIZATIONS

**Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS)** is a knowledge management initiative started by the U.S. Army War College, PKSOI, that offers a collaborative environment for the global peace and stability operations community. SOLLIMS is designed to allow U.S. military, USG civilian agencies, multinational military and civilian organizations, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and private sector organizations to engage in a collaborative process for the collection, analysis, dissemination, and integration of lessons learned and best practices for peace and stability operations. SOLLIMS website is [www.pksoi.org](http://www.pksoi.org).

**Army University Press.** The Army University Press is a multimedia organization that focuses on advancing the ideas and insights military professionals need to lead and succeed. It is the Army's entry point for cutting-edge thought and discussion on topics important to the Army and national defense.

## CALL NEWS FROM THE FRONT ARTICLES

\* *Ministerial Advisors – Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A)*, 01 AUG 2017. SGM John Hilton conducts an end-of-tour key leader interview with MG Richard Kaiser, CSTC-A commanding general. The interview focuses on the Resolute Support mission, highlighting train, advise, and assist engagements at the ministerial level known as defense institution building (DIB).

\* *Advising at the Ministerial Level in Afghanistan: Insights from Major General Willard M. Burleson III*, September 2018. The purpose of this News from the Front (NFTF) article is to share some poignant advising insights from CALL's interview with Burleson, 7th Infantry Division commander, CALL's Strategic Analysis Branch conducted an interview 09 JUL 2018, with Burleson, to collect insights into his activities while he was serving as the senior advisor to the Ministry of Defense (MinDef), U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (Resolute Support), May 2016 to June 2017. The theme of the interview was to get Burleson's perspectives on what is required for successful advising at the MinDef and institutional levels.

**\* CALL Newsletter 18-08, Defense Institution Building (DIB) – Perspectives on Ministerial Advising, January 2018**

The newsletter contains articles highlighting insights that focus on security cooperation activities, SFA operations, security sector reform (SSR), and ministerial advising.

**\* CALL Bulletin 16-09, Security Cooperation – Lessons and Best Practices, March 2016**

This bulletin provides insight into U.S. Army and interagency security cooperation activities to deter potential adversaries and solidify relationships with allies and partners to build the capacity and interoperability of PNs.

**CALL Handbook 15-15, Unified Action Partners' Quick Reference Guide**

This guide provides non-U.S. Army agencies, organizations, and staff an overview of key Army doctrine, processes, concepts, policies, and structure. The intent of the guide is to allow the user to gain a better understanding of U.S. Army planning activities and operations and to enhance collaboration and coordination when working with U.S. Army forces

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**Telephone:** DSN 552-9533; Commercial 913-684-9533

**Fax:** DSN 552-4387; Commercial 913-684-4387

**Mailing Address:** Center for Army Lessons Learned  
ATTN: Chief, Analysis Division  
10 Meade Ave., Bldg. 50  
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**Center for Army Leadership (CAL)**

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and research. CAL integrates and synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and Civilian Education System.

**Combat Studies Institute (CSI)**

CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history.

**Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)**

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) or the Central Army Registry.

**Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)**

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G-2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world.

**Military Review (MR)**

MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense.

**TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)**

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G-2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas.

**Capability Development Integration Directorate (CDID)**

CDID conducts analysis, experimentation, and integration to identify future requirements and manage current capabilities that enable the Army, as part of the Joint Force, to exercise Mission Command and to operationalize the Human Dimension.

**Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)**

JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence.

*Support CAC in the exchange of information by telling us about your successes so they may be shared and become Army successes.*





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