SECURITY COOPERATION
and the STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

Lessons and Best Practices
Security Cooperation and the State Partnership Program

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Foreword

For more than 20 years, the National Guard has played an integral role in international security cooperation. Through the State Partnership Program (SPP) – which has grown from 13 partnerships with the newly independent nations of Eastern Europe in the early 1990s to 73 partnerships today across all six geographic combatant commands (CCMDs) – the National Guard has contributed to the accomplishment of the U.S. national security objectives by developing and sustaining enduring relationships around the world.

The SPP’s success centers on the National Guard’s ability to provide trained and professional Soldiers and Airmen who bring civilian and disaster/emergency response skillsets to their engagement with partner nations. These capabilities, along with the authority to engage with security and disaster/emergency response organizations in addition to the partner nation’s military, provide a uniquely useful security cooperation tool for the geographic combatant commanders.

As the SPP grows, it has become increasingly integrated in combatant commanders’ theater security cooperation strategies, as well as U.S. ambassadors’ integrated country plans. Multiple current and former combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors have testified to the benefits of the program, as well as the access, influence, and insight it provides.

The future vision of U.S. security cooperation that integrates multi-agency and multinational entities in a whole-of-society approach, where the American military engages partners and allies through civic, economic, and societal frameworks to help them participate in bolstering global security, lies within the SPP.

The National Guard remains committed to providing effective, relevant security cooperation through the enduring relationships created by the SPP. The lessons learned captured by CALL are an essential step in that journey.

General Joseph L. Lengyel,
Chief, National Guard Bureau
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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Executive Summary

The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation program, managed and administered by the National Guard Bureau (NGB), executed and coordinated by the geographic combatant commands (GCCs), with personnel sourced by the National Guard. It is an innovative, small-footprint tool supporting the security cooperation goals of the GCCs and the U.S. Chief of Mission (CoM) for the partner nation (PN). This publication provides an overview of program highlights and activities.

The SPP has built enduring relationships for more than 25 years that, as of the end of fiscal year (FY) 2016, included 73 partnerships with 76 countries spread across all six GCCs. By the end of FY 2016, three new partnerships had received initial approval from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as Department of State (DOS) concurrence, but designation of partner states and final approval had not yet been completed.

All 54 U.S. states and territories with National Guard elements have at least one SPP partnership. Through more than two decades, the SPP has evolved to meet the changing requirements of DOD’s security cooperation efforts. From helping to reform Eastern Europe’s military establishments after the Cold War, to helping PNs participate in coalition operations and improve their disaster response capabilities, the SPP’s enduring relationships have provided uniquely valuable support in the accomplishment of GCCs’ security cooperation goals. The National Guard remains committed to maintaining the enduring relationships that the SPP provides to help ensure U.S. strategic access; sustain and increase U.S. presence and influence; and enhance PN defense, security force, and disaster-response capabilities in support of GCC goals.

The SPP builds cumulative benefits for both the U.S. and the PN over time through recurring individual, professional, and institutional contacts and relationships. These benefits go beyond just enhanced influence and access for the U.S. – they generate trust, the essential ingredient for successful operations when times are tough.

The invaluable trust engendered by enduring SPP relationships has, over the 25-year course of the program, resulted in 38 PNs which have deployed personnel in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, INHERENT RESOLVE, ENDURING FREEDOM, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Of those, 16 PNs made co-deployment with personnel from their partner state a condition of their deployment in support of coalition operations, and 17 deployed forces to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, 52
SPP PNs – three-quarters of the total – are contributing or have contributed to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions around the world. These additional faces and forces not only demonstrate international support for multinational action in overseas trouble spots, but also reduce the amount of U.S. forces needed.

SPP activities are coordinated and approved by GCCs and U.S. CoMs to ensure National Guard security cooperation efforts are aligned with both U.S. and PN objectives. Prior to the start of an FY, partner states and the supported GCC collaborate at multiple points throughout the security cooperation planning cycle. The partner state’s SPP director (SPPD) receives operational guidance from his GCC counterpart and develops SPP activity concepts to support the combatant command’s (CCMDs) security cooperation lines of effort (LOEs) and military objectives.

These SPP activity concepts are validated through a series of stakeholder meetings with the GCC. Once projected activities have been verified, approved, prioritized, and synchronized, the SPPD inputs them into the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS), the DOD security cooperation database of record.

Under the SPP, the National Guard also has authority, with DOD approval, DOS concurrence, and 15-day advance congressional notification, to engage with PNs’ non-military security forces and disaster/emergency-response organizations. Here, the partner states leverage expertise and experience gained in their Title 32, U.S. Code roles in their respective home states, both in disaster/emergency response and other missions such as border security. This not only benefits PNs by helping them improve their own capabilities, but also mitigates whether and how much U.S. forces (and other U.S. agencies) need to respond when natural or man-made disasters strike.

This publication cross-walks security cooperation from a joint perspective (via Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation) to Army Security Cooperation Strategy, and SPP supporting the achievement of U.S. security cooperation objectives.
Chapter 1

Security Cooperation

Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities support or are combined with other assistance programs and often are a part of nation assistance. This often occurs in a manner that may appear confusing or convoluted to the joint warfighter. While some activities directly support one another, others have distinct boundaries between their definitions and functions. The joint community addressed the framework of security cooperation in joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, Security Cooperation. It is important to embark with clear definitions and understanding of the complex relationship among these terms to facilitate understanding by the joint force.

Security cooperation is referred to in both joint professional military education programs and joint staffs as a tool to be employed by combatant commands (CCMDs). However, in other settings, it is a set of programs managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Extensive review of joint doctrine and policy reveals that the definition of security cooperation appears to encompass these areas and more. After expanding our understanding of security cooperation, other terms such as security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security assistance provide additional specificity for the tasks being conducted, yet some of these actions fall outside security cooperation. Even though security cooperation spans the range of military operations and is inclusive of large-scale operations conducted in support of foreign nations, it is not all-encompassing of security-related support from U.S. agencies other than DOD.

Nation assistance is support rendered by foreign forces within another nation’s territory based on mutual agreements. While this term is used to describe the comprehensive approach to assisting other nations, the definition associated with nation assistance has two limitations: it does not encompass support to regional organizations, and it is only assistance by foreign forces. A better, broader term is foreign assistance, which is assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. When examining definitions for foreign assistance and nation assistance, we find significant overlap:

**Foreign assistance** to foreign nations ranges from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. U.S. foreign assistance takes three forms: development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.
This term is likely to resonate with the Department of State (DOS), which has an Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance and a designated foreign assistance budget.

**Nation assistance** is assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.

The term nation assistance is not often used in policy or strategy. For example, the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) mentions foreign assistance three times, but does not use the term nation assistance. The first opportunity to create some clarity is to replace the term nation assistance with foreign assistance in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*; and JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.

If foreign assistance were to replace nation assistance in joint doctrine, the definition would include that portion of security cooperation that falls outside the realm of nation assistance. Foreign assistance then encompasses all of security cooperation and reduces some of the ambiguity. Security cooperation then focuses strictly on the DOD contribution to foreign assistance and encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build both national and regional defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

Having addressed the larger constructs, it is possible to review and clarify the relationships between other programs and activities that occur within them. First is security assistance with a specific definition in relation to both DOD and DOS. It refers to a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. These programs are funded and authorized by the DOS to be administered by DOD through the DSCA. This is the process by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services. That portion of security assistance outside of security cooperation reflects DOS and other civilian agency involvement.

Foreign internal defense, one of the 11 core activities of special operations, is frequently thought of as only small engagement teams training foreign forces. Actually, it represents more to include the “participation by a foreign government in any of the programs taken by a host nation to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.” It encompasses involvement in the internal defense of a host nation by both civilian and military agencies. As long as there is
an internal threat to the host nation, any support provided by the U.S. to that nation falls under the definition of foreign internal defense. Large-scale U.S. counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counterdrug operations conducted in support of a host nation are just as much foreign internal defense as using special operations forces to train and advise foreign security forces.

This range of support to a host nation is captured in the three categories of foreign internal defense. The first is **indirect support**, with emphasis on strengthening national institutions through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. The overlap of security assistance and indirect support reflects the DOS–funded programs administered by DOD, which provides training and/or equipment to a foreign nation facing an internal threat to its security. Second is **direct support**, involving everything short of combat operations that provides direct military assistance to the host nation civilian populace or military when it is faced with a threat beyond its capabilities. This support does not overlap security assistance because these activities involve the employment of the joint force in a supporting role, are joint or Service funded, and do not involve the transfer of arms or equipment. This support is typically in the form of logistics and intelligence support to the host nation. The final category of foreign internal defense is **U.S. combat operations** and is meant to serve only as a stopgap measure until host nation security forces are able to provide security for the population. This includes major operations against internal threats but remains strategically defensive in nature. Although not widely recognized as such, the U.S. conducted foreign internal defense campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan after the establishment of the host nation governments.

All three categories of foreign internal defense can take place simultaneously, with security assistance programs providing funding and equipment to the host nation (indirect support), intelligence-sharing with the ministry of defense (direct support), and American forces conducting large-scale counterinsurgency operations (combat operations). The level of U.S. involvement is driven by the political decisions of its elected leaders, the host nation’s capability and capacity, and the nature of the threat, but all efforts must be in support of the host nation’s programs for internal defense and development. The U.S. can assist in the development and assessment of these programs, but they must be administered by the host nation with all activities across all categories of foreign internal defense working toward a common objective. Based on the intensity and scope of the threat (for example, terrorists, violent criminal enterprises, or an insurgency), the U.S. could support some of the defense and development programs through routine security cooperation activities.
To promote U.S. interests and support allies and partners around the globe, the U.S. often provides security force assistance to train host nation forces. Security force assistance is DOD’s contribution to a unified action effort to support and augment the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions toward achievement of specific objectives shared by the U.S. government (USG). The approaches used by the joint force to build relationships and promote U.S. security interests vary widely from country to country.

Some U.S. partners already possess extensive security capability (qualitative) and capacity (quantitative), and it is important to develop interoperability with these partners through bilateral exercises and military-to-military exchange and education. Other partners’ security forces benefit from security force assistance that focuses on the sustainable development of the foreign security forces’ capabilities and capacities. These efforts represent only DOD activities, but they can be applied to all types of security forces and supporting institutions. Defense ministries and training institutions can be the target of security force assistance as well as local police and border patrol forces. These activities include organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and building, and advising and assisting, but they must be conducted by, with, and through the foreign security forces.

As security force assistance is only a DOD activity, it remains fully inside the realm of security cooperation. A portion of security force assistance falls outside of the definition of nation assistance in the figure because the U.S. can provide security force assistance to regional organizations such as the African Union. Some security force assistance activities are funded by security assistance programs, but only those that contribute to the sustainable capacity and capability of the host nation security forces. Some international military sales involve subsequent military training on the operation and maintenance of the equipment. While selling equipment does not constitute security force assistance, some subsequent military training on the equipment would fit into its definition.

Security force assistance is a primary tool to support partner nations when an internal threat is present. When the U.S. conducts indirect and direct support foreign internal defense, security force assistance is the means to bolster the host nation’s efforts to counter internal threats. These security force assistance activities must be conducted by, with, and through the host nation’s forces, never as a substitute. The employment of U.S. forces in combat operations is a separate category of foreign internal defense and does not directly improve the capability or capacity of the host nation’s forces. U.S. combat operations establish the time and space necessary to develop a host nation’s forces until security can be provided with, through, and ultimately by them.
As previously discussed, security cooperation is a broad term encompassing many related, but nonhierarchal programs, operations, and activities encompassing ends, ways, and means. Ends are the desired objectives or endstate. Ways are the sequence of actions, methods, tactics, and procedures most likely to achieve the ends. Means are the resources required to achieve the ends, such as forces, weapons systems, funds, will, and time to accomplish the sequence of actions. For the DOD contribution to foreign assistance, joint and Service operations and campaigns represent the ways as they guide the employment of the joint force toward a common objective and the desired endstate. Security assistance programs and security force assistance activities are part of the means in an ends-ways-means methodology.

Successful national security strategy (NSS), supported by foreign assistance and security cooperation, typically encourages a whole-of-government approach using all USG instruments of national power. This approach is supported by the joint force through interagency coordination. A more comprehensive approach designated as unified action integrates activities of the military, other interagency partners, multinational partners, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations for unity of effort by all participants in a given activity, operation, or campaign. Much thought must be put into what type of foreign forces we are supporting or enabling. Equal thought must be placed on the strategic endstate for the security cooperation and foreign assistance efforts supported by the U.S. and the future use for the foreign security forces the nation is supporting. The U.S. cannot expect to create foreign forces in its own image; the history and culture of the host nation must define the organization and ethos of its security forces. We must also take the nature of the threat and the operational environment into account when training and equipping foreign forces. Not all partners will fight wars of proxy for the U.S. Instead they will use their forces as they deem appropriate, so security force assistance could dramatically shift the balance of power in underdeveloped regions or create other undesired or unanticipated consequences.

Grouping together the various security cooperation–related topics aids in budgeting and appropriating resources to accomplish strategic objectives. The employment of military forces, however, should never be obfuscated by unnecessary redundancies in language and definitions. It is important for the joint force commander and a joint staff to understand both the means available and the ways to sequence operations. Joint doctrine consists of the fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is important for future joint doctrine to define and explain the relationship of security cooperation terms to facilitate understanding by the joint force.
JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, addresses the related terms and programs that support our nation’s foreign policy. This emerging doctrine must refrain from forcing the security-related topics into a hierarchal relationship. It must explain the supporting relationships while properly defining the ends, ways, and means of employing the joint force in support of security cooperation activities and related joint operations (for example, foreign internal defense). The JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, synchronizes the development of JP 3-20, while also expanding the discussion of the third category of foreign internal defense, U.S. combat operations, to consider large-scale counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations conducted in support of a host nation. Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, *Security Force Assistance*, also assists the joint force commander in identifying tools and resources for assisting foreign forces. However, none of these documents should be viewed as the synchronizer of all DOD activities; rather, each should highlight its unique planning considerations and use of existing programs to support strategic objectives.

The U.S. Army role in security cooperation enables strategic success through an ends-ways-means approach outlined in the Army Security Cooperation Strategy. This strategy facilitates the accomplishment of theater-strategic objectives of the Army and the combatant command.
Chapter 2

Army Security Cooperation Strategy

National security strategy (NSS) and Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance shape the strategic objectives of both the Army and the combatant commands (CCMDs). CCMDs develop theater strategies to achieve and maintain security and stability within each area of responsibility (AOR). Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) design campaign plans to support both sets of objectives. The Army Plan (TAP) articulates the geo-strategic landscape, strategic demands for Army capabilities, and institutional goals and objectives to support strategic guidance. Key to the Army’s success are balanced land forces which must be prepared to perform four major functions in the 21st century security environment:

- Prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns.
- Engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure friends and allies.
- Support civil authorities at home and abroad.
- Deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors.

Army security cooperation enables strategic success primarily in the second of these four roles. Security cooperation activities are intended to build another nation’s capacity to secure their people and territory, prevent the use of their territory by violent extremist organizations, and build lasting and meaningful relationships to ensure access and cooperation in military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Security cooperation also contributes to the other three roles in a less direct manner. Army security cooperation missions support civil authorities at home and abroad through assistance of foreign government agencies with political, economic and information programs in accordance with U.S. national strategy. Army security cooperation leads to ancillary contributions to prevailing in protracted counterinsurgency operations, deterrence, and defeat of hostile states and hybrid threats mainly through the enhanced capacity of foreign partners. Security cooperation also provides ancillary benefits to U.S. forces to include, but not limited to, enhancing the operational capabilities of the U.S. Army by improving interoperability, developing culturally-attuned leaders and Soldiers, and gaining access to leading technologies.

Principles of Army Security Cooperation

- Derived from national and CCMD objectives and strategies
- Focused on the long view
- Emphasizes partner capacity
- Requirements-based
- Planned, prepared, and executed by, with, and through ASCCs
Security cooperation is conducted to achieve two main ends: lasting and meaningful relationships and improved capability and capacity of security forces and institution. Partners capable of securing themselves are able to protect their populations and maintain their territorial integrity from both external and internal threats without significant foreign assistance. Partners that maintain good long-term relationships with the U.S. will naturally be more willing to support the U.S. in military operations in a variety of ways including: the forward stationing of forces, the prepositioning of U.S. equipment, the staging of forces within their country for a contingency operating as part of a U.S.-led multinational coalition, or granting access or over-flight permissions. In addition, partner and U.S. cooperation sends a powerful regional and often global strategic communications message of a commitment to threat indication, support of host nation (HN) sovereignty, and regional stability. These ends enable a partner nation to develop the capability to export security capacity-building regionally or globally as appropriate, and expand our ability to influence countries or regions where U.S. presence is either unwelcome or impractical.

There are five principals that guide Army security cooperation. First, Army security cooperation is derived from national and CCMD objectives and strategies. Second, it focuses on the long view, building improved personal, organizational, and strategic relationships, enhancing trust and improving interoperability through increased commonality and cooperative interaction. Third, it is focused on development of partner capacity while recognizing the mutual benefits to both the U.S. Army and our partners, such as improved language and cultural skills that enhance multinational operations. The focus on partner capacity requires the Army to engage the right country with the appropriate means to achieve the desired effect. Fourth, Army security cooperation is based on requirements determined by ASCC in support of CCMD security cooperation objectives. Lastly, Army security cooperation activities are planned, prepared and executed by, with, and through the ASCC as the Army representative assigned to the CCMD. ASCCs are the Army’s focal point for all assessments of foreign partner capabilities and gaps, development of plans to further security cooperation objectives, and assessments of progress. The ASCCs are the supported institutions and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army commands (ACOMs), and direct reporting units (DRUs) are the supporting institutions to the ASCCs.

The Army strategy for security cooperation, depicted in Figure 2-1, depends on ASCCs to articulate demand for and employ means from five broad categories, blended ways along five interrelated and mutually supporting lines of effort (LOEs) to accomplish the identified ends.
ASCs in coordination with CCMDs, country teams, and security cooperation organizations assess capabilities and capacities of regional and national security forces and institutions and articulate requirements to request Army capabilities necessary to achieve desired effects. The Army provides individuals, units, capabilities, programs, and equipment by, with and through the ASCCs to enable execution of their campaign plans along five interrelated LOEs.

The Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, is authorized to establish a program of activities, known as “State Partnership” to support the achievement of U.S. security cooperation objectives, between members of the National Guard of a state or territory and any of the following:

- The military forces of a foreign country.
- The security forces of a foreign country.
- Governmental organization of a foreign country whose primary functions include disaster response or emergency response.

The DOD State Partnership Program is one example of security cooperation activities supporting CCMDs theater strategies and ASC’s support plans.
Chapter 3
State Partnership Program History

As the Soviet Union disintegrated between 1989 and 1991, U.S. government (USG) officials explored options to minimize instability and encourage democratic governments in the former Soviet bloc nations. One effort to address these policy goals was to expand military-to-military contacts with the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe to promote subordination to civilian leadership, respect for human rights, and a defensively oriented military posture. At the time, most of these newly independent states had militaries that were based on the Soviet model and focused on countering threats from NATO nations. The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) took the lead in this effort by establishing the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) in 1992. The JCTP originally was composed of active component personnel and included members of the Special Forces because of their language skills. However, when the JCTP began to engage the Baltic nations of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, senior defense officials insisted that National Guard and Reserve personnel play a leading role in any military liaison teams operating in those countries, apparently in response to those governments’ desire to establish reserve-centric defense establishments and to assuage Russian concerns about U.S. expansion into its former satellites.

In November 1992, LTG John Conway, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and BG Thomas Lennon, head of the JCTP, visited the Baltics. A few months after their trip, in early 1993, the National Guard initiated the first state partnerships: New York-Estonia, Michigan-Latvia, and Pennsylvania-Lithuania. Additional partnerships were proposed later in 1993 for Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Romania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. The SPP benefited the JCTP by providing additional personnel, funding, and access to military personnel from U.S. ethnic-heritage communities that often had relevant language and cultural skills. The program has since expanded to 73 partnerships covering all combatant commands (CCMDs), with nearly all state National Guards participating. Figure 3-1 illustrates the number of partner country relationships within each CCMD.
Both the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report and the 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America identify security cooperation and building partner capacity as priorities in multiple regions, including the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. In addition, both documents emphasize the need to strengthen and expand the United States’ network of international partnerships to enhance security. The NMS instructs the CCMDs, among others, to partner with other agencies to pursue theater security cooperation. As such, the SPP acts as a force enabler for the CCMDs, and SPP activities are part of the CCMDs’ theater security cooperation (TSC) plans. SPP activities are to be approved by the CCMDs, as well as the U.S. ambassador in their respective partner nations, before they can be executed.

![Figure 3-1. GCC PN and associated U.S. state partnership.](image-url)
Chapter 4
National Guard Role in State Partnership

Section 341 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2017 (NDAA 17) authorizes the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, “to establish a program of exchanges of members of the National Guard of a state or territory and the military forces, or security forces or other government organizations whose primary functions include disaster response or emergency response, of a foreign country.” Each program established under this authority shall be known as a “State Partnership Program.”

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) serves two complementary purposes: It is a training platform that enhances the capabilities of National Guard members to meet Federal and non-Federal responsibilities, and it is a versatile security cooperation tool for achieving combatant commanders’ objectives in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs).

The SPP is administered by the National Guard Bureau (NGB) in accordance with Department of Defense (DOD) regulations and directives, guided by Department of State foreign policy goals, implemented by the geographic combatant commands (GCCs), and sourced by National Guard forces. The National Guard executes SPP activities to maintain enduring partnerships that ensure access and influence; enhance the capabilities of both the State; National Guard and the partner country’s defense and security forces build partner nation’s military capacity; increase interoperability; and to promote National Guard core competencies of civil support, humanitarian assistance/disaster assistance and joint force headquarters’ (JFHQ) institutional functions. Activities are identified, approved, and coordinated through the GCCs, U.S. Embassy country teams, and other agencies as required to ensure that SPP activities are tailored to meet U.S. and partner country objectives.

The SPP is designed to provide a consistent, enduring global presence, established through professional, institutional, and personal relationships. Each State National Guard’s unique, community-based structure with low personnel turnover and size relatively comparable to many SPP partners’ militaries make it the ideal DOD asset to provide an enduring security relationship – particularly with small-to-moderate-sized countries. Being a reserve component force makes the National Guard ideally suited to develop capabilities in countries with relatively smaller force structures. Additionally, the National Guard, as the primary U.S. homeland defense force, has niche civil support capabilities in areas such as disaster preparedness and response and consequence management that
directly support many GCC objectives. The SPP leverages interagency/intergovernmental relationships and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and corollary engagements in accordance with DOD authorities. All activities are approved through the GCCs, the chiefs of mission (COM), and other agencies as appropriate to ensure National Guard cooperation is tailored to meet both U.S. and partner country objectives. One measure of the program’s success is 15 SPP partner countries, in 79 rotations from 2013 to 2015, co-deployed troops to Iraq and/or Afghanistan with their partner State National Guard units.

Through the program, the National Guard conducts primarily military-to-military engagements in support of defense security cooperation goals; however, it also leverages whole-of-government and whole-of-society relationships and capabilities to advance broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. This is consistent with the President’s direction in Presidential Policy Directive-23 to foster interagency collaboration in security sector assistance. The NDAA 17 specifically authorizes SPP activities between a State National Guard and its partner country’s non-military security forces or other government organizations whose primary functions include disaster response or emergency response. Interagency military-to-civilian events often focus on defense support of civil authorities, including disaster response and crisis management.

In many cases, the relationships initiated by the National Guard between U.S. states and SPP partner countries have facilitated inclusion of civilian agency connections, and nongovernmental and civil society organizations, in areas such as education, health, commerce and agriculture. While these activities do not use DOD funds, they may support GCC and U.S. Embassy goals by enhancing local and regional stability, promoting trade and economic growth, and improving the U.S. image in the partner country.

While the National Guard will continue to be responsive to requests from interested countries, NGB is instituting a more proactive approach to partnering, the strategic direction of which is set by higher-level strategic guidance from the U.S. National Security Strategy to security cooperation objectives and foreign policy goals outlined by the Departments of State and Defense. For example, in planning for future partnerships, NGB will work through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD’s) SPP comprehensive global plan process to ensure new partnerships are aligned with global priorities. NGB will also consider new partnership approaches, including trilateral partnerships that leverage the more established SPP partnerships in the USEUCOM AOR to work with countries in other regions, particularly in Africa. Building enduring relationships is central to the success of the program. Therefore, there are no plans to graduate or remove countries from
the program. NGB intends to maintain and build upon all SPP relationships and identify new ways to leverage those relationships to further U.S. foreign policy goals. Additionally, SPP is being included in the security cooperation portion of the draft Global Employment of the Force. NGB will be tasked to develop campaign support plans (CSPs) in the draft Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The National Guard SPP Resource Allocation Model (RAM) sets funding priorities by evaluating the priority assigned to each current or prospective partner country by DOD, DOS, and the respective GCC’s objectives, and postures the program to respond to future developments. Through the RAM and intensive planning and coordination, NGB ensures that the SPP delivers maximum return on investment for the DOD and combatant commands, while providing long-term dividends for the nation as a whole through closer political, economic, and cultural ties with the international community.

The National Guard’s annual capacity for adding new SPP partnerships depends on several factors from resource availability to approaches best-suited to support U.S. national security and foreign policy goals. The approach selected requires a thorough examination of the interests and objectives of the U.S. and the partner country, national and regional policy considerations, and the availability of National Guard resources. Close coordination will be required with OSD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the relevant GCC, and U.S. Embassy in selecting the best approach.

Except for cases where an unforeseen or out-of-cycle SPP partnership is required, the SPP comprehensive global plan should provide for adequate resources to be available when a new SPP partnership is established.

The standard resource baseline associated with the addition of a new SPP partnership include: costs for one SPP bilateral affairs officer (BAO) to be located within the U.S. Embassy in the country; one SPP state coordinator located within the state; and adequate resources for the execution of an average of seven SPP events in U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), six SPP events in U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and five in all other GCC AORs. Certain variables will influence this average model. For example, if one U.S. Embassy serves multiple SPP countries paired with one state, only one BAO may be required for multiple SPP partners (e.g., North Dakota-Ghana, Togo, Benin). The number of annual SPP events will also vary based on GCC objectives for SPP in that country. The selection process of an appropriate state partner for a new SPP partnership may be modified based on the partnering approach used. The process would be considerably shorter where a state having an established relationship with an SPP partner country is directly selected to pair with a neighboring
country or a country served by the same U.S. Embassy (an SPP regional country collective). The selection of a state for a traditional SPP partnership where a solicitation for proposals is sent to all states and territories to match the best-suited state with the country will require more time.

Based on the considerations above, four to five new partnerships annually should be supportable. Additional partnerships may be possible if approaches such as a regional country collective approach are used and if the states under consideration are able to support new partnerships given capabilities and resources required. Finally, thought must be given to the countries under consideration for partnerships. Some may not be interested or suited to traditional state-to-country partnership or other approaches.
Chapter 5
New Partnership Process

Any nation requesting a state partnership sends its official request to its respective U.S. ambassador. Once the partnership is endorsed, the request is forwarded to the appropriate combatant command (CCMD). If the CCMD finds that the partnership meets strategic objectives and priorities, the it sends the request to the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The Chief of the NGB reviews the request to determine the viability of the partnership. If the chief accepts the request, he notifies the CCMD and solicits proposals from the adjutants general of the state guards. State guard proposals include a statement of intent; background on the state guard and its capabilities; proposed areas of military engagement with the partner nation; potential benefits to both the state guard and partner nation; discussion of historical, cultural, and academic similarities between the state and the partner nation; and any documentation supporting the state guard’s nomination. The proposals go through three levels of review within Department of Defense (DOD), and the chief of the NGB forwards a recommended nominee to the CCMD and the partner country’s U.S. Embassy for final approval. Figure 5-1 illustrates the request and approval process.

Figure 5-1. Process for establishing new partnerships.
The selection of potential countries for inclusion in the State Partnership Program (SPP) is based on a thorough analysis of specific country attributes, including the country’s military and security forces structure, U.S. objectives in the country and region, the potential partner country’s desired national security capabilities, and their willingness to join the program. The analysis outlines how well country attributes match National Guard/SPP goals and strengths and why SPP is the right security cooperation program for the country. With SPP focus on disaster preparedness and emergency response capabilities, based on Section 1205 authorities, new SPP partnerships will focus on countries where disaster preparedness, consequence management, and military-civilian integration are key priorities. However, final departmental priorities for expanding the program are based on strategic priorities for improving access and influence among key partners and allies and an assessment of how and where SPP can best help meet these priorities. Other factors in final prioritization include interest in demonstrating long-term U.S. commitment, the desire to improve long-term personal and professional relationships to enhance access and influence, or the scope of a foreign country’s military capabilities best match the scope of National Guard units and capabilities.
As National Guard core competencies related to security cooperation activities are formally established, they will provide a basis for conducting assessments of potential new SPP partner countries.

Departmental prioritization for engagement with foreign countries is based on initial CCMD inputs and coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and Department of State (DOS) regional bureaus, as well as Services, NGB, and other interagency stakeholders. This conceptual plan balances priorities for program expansion across the geographic CCMDs with resources available to support expansion. However, the DOD recognizes that establishing state partnerships is not a linear process. It is influenced by many factors and conditions that are constantly changing. While the CCMDs have articulated a strategy and prioritization for engaging and shaping future partnerships, it must be recognized that our potential partners also “get a vote.” The established priorities will assist CCMD staffs, OSD, DOS, and NGB in developing plans and engagements to shape the conditions necessary to encourage our potential partners to request a partnership. The establishment of partnerships may occur in a different sequence than established priorities.

CCMDs should communicate their intentions to execute new partnerships using established staffing procedures outlined in DOD Instruction 5111.20. Under no circumstances, however, should CCMDs independently pursue partnerships that have not been identified in the SPP Comprehensive Global Plan without fully staffing a decision brief through the Joint Staff to OSD Policy.
Chapter 6
State Partnership Mission and Goals

The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a strategic enabler for pursuing security cooperation objectives globally, across all combatant commands (CCMDs), and across multiple other security cooperation programs. The cross-cutting nature of the program, along with the continuity provided by the stability and longevity of personnel assignments in the National Guard, provide a win-win situation where CCMDs, National Guard states and territories, Services, and foreign partner countries each benefit. The unique direct relationship of the National Guard to civilian leadership and emergency response organizations within each state and territory provides an ideal venue to demonstrate democratic governance and civilian control of the military to our foreign partners. Consistent with Section 1205 of the fiscal year 2014 (FY14) National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), SPP program activities should focus on areas of key strengths the National Guard provides to CCMDs based on their foundational mission to “Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities.” Accordingly, specific Department of Defense (DOD) goals for SPP include:

- Establish, develop, and maintain strong, enduring partnerships between National Guard states and territories and foreign partner countries.
- Cultivate enduring personal, professional, and institutional relationships with foreign partner countries through continuity, senior leader engagements, and planned multi-year activities.
- Support CCMD efforts to build partner capacity by focusing SPP engagements on areas of National Guard strengths and core competencies or by complementing other security cooperation programs.
- In cooperation with CCMDs, leverage access and influence to solicit and secure partner country participation in DOD priority activities, such as U.S.-led or supported international contingency operations or United Nations peace support operations.
- Enable improved interagency planning and coordination, especially in the areas of disaster and emergency response, by proactively engaging with Department of State (DOS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other appropriate U.S. organizations.
The SPP conducts a variety of activities in support of partner nations. A list of some common types of partnership activities are provided below, along with a brief summary and an illustrative example. According to NGB, the typical SPP event is a week-long subject matter expert exchange, with three to five National Guard subject matter experts participating, with an average cost of approximately $20,000.

**Subject Matter Expert Exchanges.** During these events, National Guard personnel with expertise in a certain area share their knowledge with partner nation personnel. For example, in 2005, the Uruguayan Army’s infantry and engineer units in Montevideo and Maldonado hosted the visit of U.S. Army National Guardsmen from Connecticut. During the subject matter expert exchange, delegates visited Uruguayan Army units and discussed a wide range of topics to include peacekeeping and humanitarian de-mining operations, infantry and engineer training, as well as soldier and officer training at unit level.

**Familiarizations.** These are demonstrations of certain capabilities that the Army or Air National Guard has, or discussions of policy issues related to those capabilities. For example, in the late 1990s, the Pennsylvania National Guard was instrumental in assisting Lithuania with the development of its Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Academy, which was modeled after the U.S. NCO Education System. A total of 26 Lithuanian officers participated in five train-the-trainer familiarization visits to Pennsylvania, with the focus on curriculum development for NCO course preparation at the newly created Lithuanian NCO Academy in Kaunas. These officers became acquainted with a diversity of topics such as medical specialist instructor course development; field artillery NCO course development; leadership; training management; democratic civil-military relations; NCO development; interoperability; and emergency operations.

**Senior Leader Visits.** These are visits between senior leaders of the state National Guard, such as the adjutant general, and senior leaders of the partner nation’s armed forces. For example, in May 2001, the Georgia Guard had the honor of hosting 12 representatives from the Republic of Georgia along with representatives from the U.S. DOS, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and others for the Bilateral Working Group at Savannah, GA. The high-level discussions focused on defense reform, the Georgia National Guard SPP, the Georgia Border Security Program, and the Helicopter Program. Participants were also able to observe a B-1B bombing demonstration at Hunter Army Airfield and activities at the Georgia Air National Guard Combat Readiness Training Center.
Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams. Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) provided mentoring and training for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and served as liaisons between the ANA and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. They are composed of 13-30 personnel from one or more countries. National Guard personnel have embedded with their partner nation’s OMLTs and accompanied them throughout their deployments to Afghanistan (they have also conducted similar embedded operations with partner nation forces in Iraq and Kosovo). One such deployment from 2010 is described as follows:

Eleven Colorado Army National Guard Soldiers will pair up with 90 Slovenian soldiers and deploy to Afghanistan this October to form an operational mentor and liaison team. Their combined mission will be to train and mentor an ANA infantry battalion, better empowering it in the use of infantry maneuvers and tactics, so the ANA can ultimately take control of its military operations ... The [Colorado Army National Guard] and the Republic of Slovenia have become strong allies over their 17-year collaboration through the National Guard’s SPP.

The focus of SPP activities varies depending on the needs of the partner nation, the capabilities of the state National Guard, the goals of the respective U.S. ambassador and the combatant commander, and statutory authorities and restrictions. Some common focus areas are:

- Disaster management and disaster relief activities
- Military education
- Noncommissioned officer development
- Command and control
- Search and rescue
- Border operations
- Military medicine
- Port security
- Military justice
Another aspect of the SPP that distinguishes it from similar engagements by active component forces stems from the National Guard’s dual status as both a state and a federal organization. In its federal status, the National Guard is a reserve component of the Army and the Air Force and is trained, organized, and equipped to conduct a wide spectrum of military activities. However, the National Guard is also the organized militia of each state, and, in that capacity, routinely operates under the control of its state governor, typically to respond to disasters and civil disorders. National Guard personnel in a “Title 32 status” have also conducted counterdrug, border security, and airport security missions. The practical expertise the National Guard has acquired in these areas may be complemented by the skills that National Guard personnel develop in their civilian occupations. For example, a National Guard Soldier may serve as an infantryman in his Guard unit, but may be a state trooper, paramedic, or emergency dispatcher in his civilian job.

The expertise that National Guard units have acquired in conducting these types of operations are often in demand among foreign militaries, which frequently play a major role in their nation’s disaster response plans, and may play significant roles in their nation’s border security, civil disorder, or counterdrug operations. Although active component forces have significant expertise in these areas, as evidenced, for example, by the role active component personnel played in responding to the earthquake in Haiti and the floods in Pakistan in 2010, it is typically not exercised with the frequency of National Guard forces and, in certain cases, is intentionally limited by law.
Chapter 7
State Partnership Program Engagements

Much of the management of State Partnership Program (SPP) activities is handled by SPP coordinators assigned to each state’s National Guard headquarters, and by military officers assigned full-time to the U.S. Embassy accredited to the partner nation – normally from the state National Guard involved in the partnership – whose duty description includes coordinating SPP and often other Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities. The combatant commands (CCMDs) manage the latter group, providing for their pay and performance evaluations. These officers serve in a Title 10 status, typically hold the rank of captain through lieutenant colonel, but have different titles and tours of duty depending on the CCMD to which they are assigned. For example, officers serving in embassies within the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) are known as bilateral affairs officers (BAOs) and serve two-year tours, which can be extended. Those in the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) AOR are known as traditional combatant commander’s activities (TCAs) coordinators and are usually on six-month temporary duty assignments, which can be extended. In nations without a BAO, TCA, or similar officer, the state’s SPP coordinator travels to the partner nation to coordinate SPP activities. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) would prefer to have a BAO, TCA, or similar officer stationed at the U.S. Embassy for each of the 73 partnerships, and it is currently working on a plan to fund this.

According to the NGB, the U.S. ambassador to a given country must approve the establishment of a state partnership with that nation, as well as all SPP activities conducted therein. The process normally requires approval by the ambassador, combatant commander, and the state National Guard before activities are conducted. If NGB funds are used for an activity, the NGB must also approve the activity. In a “model” flow scheme, proposed activities are (1) developed by the BAO, TCA, or SPP coordinator with the partner countries; (2) discussed with and approved by the home state National Guard; (3) presented to the ambassador for approval; and (4) presented to the combatant commander for final approval. However, the actual process for coordinating SPP activities varies by country and CCMD.

One unique aspect of the SPP is the ability to forge relationships between particular individuals over a long period of time. For active component personnel, a duty assignment that includes regular contact with the military of a foreign nation would typically last for about two to three years. At the end of the tour of duty, the U.S. service member would normally be reassigned as part of his or her career progression. In contrast, National Guard personnel participating in the SPP may well participate in
engagements with partner nation military personnel repeatedly throughout their career. This is due to both the duration of the state National Guard and foreign nation partnership – some of which have been in existence for nearly two decades – and the frequency with which National Guard personnel serve their entire reserve careers within one state National Guard. Thus, for example, individuals who joined the Michigan National Guard in 1993 and continued to serve to the present would have had the opportunity to participate in SPP activities with Latvia numerous times over the past 25 years. In that time, both the National Guard personnel and the foreign military personnel with whom they engaged will have been promoted to higher ranks, potentially providing for strong relationships between the now fairly senior National Guard and foreign military personnel. The ability to develop such long-term relationships are rare for active component personnel because of career assignment policies. An additional benefit of an enduring relationship is that it provides National Guard personnel with the opportunity to develop.

There is a limited supply of U.S. forces available to conduct security cooperation activities with foreign nations. Thus, combatant commanders target security cooperation activities toward foreign nations that they deem most important to engage at a given time. Some nations do not “compete well” in this process and are passed over for security cooperation activities. Combatant commanders target SPP activities toward their engagement priorities as well; but so long as a partnership exists, a baseline level of roughly three SPP events per year are conducted, even if the foreign nation is considered to be a comparatively low-priority for engagement. From one perspective, this may be considered a long-term investment in nations that, while not currently priorities for engagement, may well become so in the future. From another perspective, this can be interpreted as a misallocation of limited resources; the National Guard assets might be better used engaging with higher-priority nations.

A final area in which the SPP differs from active component security cooperation activities lies in the role of individual states in the relationship. Active component security cooperation activities are purely federal in nature; there is no connection with any U.S. state. SPP activities have both a federal and a state connection; and the latter relationship can be important from several perspectives. For the state and the foreign nation, the SPP provides a link between senior state and foreign nation officials. The adjutant general (the head of a state National Guard) is typically a senior official in his state government, normally heading up the state department of military affairs, and sometimes leading the state department of emergency management or homeland security. This can provide a conduit for the state and the foreign nation to develop relationships beyond that with the state
National Guard – for example, enhancing economic ties or conducting educational exchanges. From the federal perspective, a strong relationship between a state and a foreign nation could potentially contribute to a stronger relationship between the U.S. and the foreign nation. On the other hand, conflicts of interest could conceivably develop between the state and the U.S. in their relationships with the partner nation.

The SPP is based upon a variety of statutory authorities (detailed in Chapter 8). None of these authorities are specific to the SPP. They are authorities used generally by active and reserve component forces to conduct security cooperation activities.

Accordingly, the SPP shares many similarities with other security cooperation activities carried out by the military.
Chapter 8
Statutory Authorities and Funding Mechanisms

The State Partnership Program (SPP) has no dedicated statutory authority. Rather, SPP activities are currently carried out under one or more U.S. Code Title 10 (Armed Forces), Title 32 (National Guard) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorities that are related to the types of missions conducted. The main authorities that may be used by SPP are discussed below and summarized in Appendix B. There are circumstances in which a state National Guard may operate under Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse) authorities in support of their partner nation, but these activities are not considered to be “SPP events” by the National Guard Bureau (NGB). For a fuller discussion of such Title 22 activities, see Appendix A.

One authority under which SPP activities may be carried out is 10 U.S.C. 168 (Military-to-Military Contacts and Comparable Activities). It provides authority for the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to fund military-to-military contacts that are “designed to encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries.” Under 10 U.S.C. 311 and 312, the secretary may provide funds for nine specific purposes: (1) the activities of traveling contact teams, including transportation, translation services, or administrative expenses; (2) the activities of military liaison teams; (3) exchanges of civilian or military personnel between Department of Defense (DOD) and defense ministries of foreign governments; (4) exchanges of military personnel between units of the armed forces and units of foreign armed forces; (5) seminars and conferences held primarily in a theater of operations; (6) distribution of publications primarily in a theater of operations; (7) personnel expenses for DOD civilian and military personnel to the extent that these expenses relate to participation in an activity described at (3), (4), (5), or (6) above; (8) reimbursement of military personnel appropriations accounts for the pay and allowances paid to reserve component personnel for service while engaged in any of these activities; and (9) the assignment of personnel described in (3) and (4) can be made on a nonreciprocal basis if the SecDef considers such an assignment in the interest of the U.S.

SPP activities may also use other authorities, including:

- 10 U.S.C. 312 (Bilateral or Regional Cooperation Programs). This provision authorizes the SecDef to pay the travel, subsistence, and similar personal expenses of defense personnel of developing countries in connection with their attendance at a bilateral or regional
conference, seminar, or similar meeting, with certain restrictions. An amendment in 2002 specifically extended this authority to NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) country personnel traveling to other PfP countries. Section 1051 requires that the SecDef determine whether payment of authorized expenses is in the interest of U.S. national security.

- 10 U.S.C. 345 (Latin American Cooperation) authorizes reimbursement of costs associated with training for purposes of regional defense for combating terrorism or irregular warfare.

- 10 U.S.C. 321 (Combined Exercises). This provision authorizes the SecDef, after consultation with the Secretary of State, to pay incremental expenses incurred by a developing country as a direct result of participation in bilateral or multilateral military exercises. It requires that the exercises be undertaken primarily to enhance the security interests of the U.S. and that the SecDef determine whether a country’s participation is necessary to achieve the fundamental objectives of the exercise.

Another set of authorities revolve around humanitarian and civic assistance. Of the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs, officials interviewed by Congressional Research Service (CRS) specifically mentioned 10 U.S.C. 401 and 2561.

- 10 U.S.C. 401 (Humanitarian and Civic Assistance). This provision authorizes DOD to carry out humanitarian and civic assistance activities in host nations in conjunction with military operations, if the activities promote the security interests of both nations and benefit the operational readiness skills of participating armed forces personnel. Humanitarian and civic assistance is defined to include medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care in rural and underserved communities, rudimentary construction and repair of public buildings, well drilling, and construction of sanitary facilities and rudimentary surface transportation systems.

- 10 U.S.C. 2561 (Humanitarian Assistance). This provision authorizes the expenditure of humanitarian assistance funds for the transportation of humanitarian relief and other humanitarian purposes.

Other humanitarian assistance authorities may also be used, including 10 U.S.C. 402, 404, and 2557 (see Appendix B for a brief description of each).

Several other security cooperation authorities have been used in conjunction with SPP activities according to those interviewed by CRS. One is 10
U.S.C. 345, the regional defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), which authorizes the use of funds to pay the costs associated with the attendance of foreign military officers, ministry of defense officials, or security officials at U.S. military educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, and at civilian venues, or other training programs conducted under the CTFP. Another is the “Section 1206” building partnership capacity funding authority established by Section 333 of NDAA 17 (P.L. 109-163, as extended and amended). A third is the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CRT) program, which funds expenses related to preventing weapons proliferation and other activities.

For SPP events conducted overseas, National Guard members are typically placed in a duty status by orders issued under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 12301. For SPP events conducted within the U.S., National Guard members are placed in a duty status by order issued under 32 U.S.C. 502. This permits the participating members to receive appropriate military pay and benefits.

Current funding for SPP activities includes the pay and allowances for the National Guard participants, which are normally funded by the Army and Air National Guard personnel accounts of DOD appropriations. However, those who serve overseas full-time in support of the program have their pay and allowances covered by the active component Army or Air Force personnel account. Other significant costs for SPP are travel-related expenses, such as transportation, lodging, and meals. These expenses may be incurred by National Guard personnel or foreign military personnel participating in an SPP event. Such travel-related expenses are typically paid for out of one of the operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts, although some of the travel expenses for National Guard personnel may be paid out of personnel accounts. This O&M funding has historically flowed to SPP through a number of programs and activities:

- Traditional Combatant Commander’s Activities (TCA)
- National Guard Bureau’s International Affairs Division
- Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (CCIF)
- Warsaw Initiative Fund/Partnership for Peace (WIF/PfP)
• Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CFTP)
• Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR)
• Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative Fund (APRI)
• Latin American Cooperation (LATAM COOP)
• Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Assistance (OHDCA)
• Minuteman Fellowship (MMF; no longer in existence)

References

b. NGB. FY 2014 State Partnership Program Comprehensive Global Plan.
e. DoDI 5111.20, State Partnership Program (SPP), 12 OCT 2016.
Appendix A
State Partnerships and Title 22 Authorities

According to National Guard Bureau (NGB) representatives, the State Partnership Program (SPP) currently operates only under U.S. Code Title 10, Title 32 and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorities. Under this definition, therefore, SPP events do not occur under Title 22 authorities at the present time. However, there are circumstances in which a state National Guard might operate under Title 22 authorities in support of their partner nation. For example, a nation that is approved to receive peacekeeping training under the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) may request that the state National Guard it is partnered to provide some of the trainers. If such a request were approved by the appropriate Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) officials, then GPOI funds would be used to fund some of the expenses associated with the state National Guard training of its partner nation’s forces. While these are not considered to be “SPP events” by the NGB, the distinction may not be apparent to many of those participating in the training.

Individuals interviewed for this report referred to three Title 22 authorities that have been used in the past to fund training by a state National Guard with its partner nation. They are listed below. Determining the frequency of such Title 22 events was outside the scope of this report, but they appear to have been relatively infrequent in comparison to the frequency of Title 10 SPP events. Appropriations for these three Title 22 programs are provided under the State Department’s security assistance (previously the military assistance) account.

Global Peace Operations Initiative. Through GPOI, the U.S. government (USG) provides foreign military forces from developing countries with training in peacekeeping skills and helps develop associated peacekeeping capacity. GPOI was built on the earlier African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and its Africa component often is still referred to by that acronym. The State Department is primarily responsible for the program, but works closely with DOD to plan and implement programs through DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the geographic combatant commands. Authorization is provided by Section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2348), as amended.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. The IMET Program provides foreign military personnel with the opportunity to attend a variety of U.S. military educational institutions and training courses. The Expanded-IMET (E-IMET) component provides foreign civilian and military leaders and managers of foreign military
establishments with opportunities to enhance their skills in managing and administering military establishments and budgets, creating and maintaining effective military judicial systems and military codes of conduct (including observance of international recognized human rights), and fostering respect for the principle of civilian control of the military. The State Department, with input from DOD, decides which foreign countries will be permitted to participate and their respective funding levels. DSCA implements the program. Authorization is provided by Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2347), as amended.

**Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing Programs.**
The FMS program is the USG’s primary vehicle for sales of weapons and associated equipment and training to friendly foreign governments. Through the FMF element of the program, the USG may extend loans to countries that have difficulty paying for needed weapons, military equipment, and related items, or it may forgive payments altogether. The State Department is primarily responsible for determining which nations receive military assistance from this program. DSCA bears primary responsibility for implementing the program. FMS is authorized by Sections 1-4 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2751 - 2754), as amended; FMF is authorized by Section 23 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2763).
Appendix B

Title 10 and National Defense Authorization Act
Authorities That May Be Used by the
State Partnership Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statutory Authority</th>
<th>Purposes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 166a</td>
<td>Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (CCIF). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) may make funds available to combatant commanders for a variety of purposes, including joint exercises, humanitarian and civic assistance, military education and training for foreign military and related civilian personnel, and personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral and regional cooperation programs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 USC 311, 312</td>
<td>Military to Military Contacts (also referred to as Traditional Commander’s Activities). Authorizes the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) “to conduct military to military contacts and comparable activities that are designed to encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries.” Authorized activities include traveling contact teams, military liaison teams, exchanges of military personnel between U.S. and foreign units, exchanges of military and civilian personnel between Department of Defense (DOD) and a foreign defense ministry, seminars and conferences held primarily in a theater of operations, reimbursement of military personnel appropriations accounts for the pay and allowances of reserve component personnel engaged in such activities, and the assignment of DOD civilians and military personnel on a non-reciprocal basis. No activities may be conducted under this authority in a foreign country without the approval of the Secretary of State.</td>
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<td>Section</td>
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<td>10 USC 342</td>
<td><strong>Regional Centers for Security Studies.</strong> Authorizes the SecDef to administer five regional centers for security studies, which are to serve as forums for “bilateral and multilateral research, communications, and exchange of ideas involving military and civilian participants.” The five centers are the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, DC, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC, and the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC. Participants may include military, civilian, and non-governmental personnel from the U.S. and foreign countries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 USC 401</td>
<td><strong>Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations.</strong> The secretary of a military department may carry out humanitarian and civic assistance activities in conjunction with ongoing military operations as the secretary determines it will be beneficial to the security interests of both the U.S. and the affected foreign country, and will promote the operational readiness skills of the U.S. military personnel who participate. The Secretary of State must approve any such assistance. Humanitarian and civic assistance as defined in this statute includes medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary assistance to underserved areas, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided; construction of rudimentary roads; well drilling and constructing basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 USC 402</td>
<td><strong>Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries.</strong> The SecDef may transport humanitarian relief supplies furnished by a non-governmental source to any country, on a space-available basis, without charge. This authority may also be used in certain circumstances to transport supplies to respond to an event that threatens environmental harm (such as an oil spill).</td>
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<td>Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 USC 404</td>
<td><strong>Foreign Disaster Assistance.</strong> At the direction of the President, the SecDef may provide transportation, supplies, services and equipment outside the U.S. to respond to natural or man-made disasters to save lives or prevent serious harm to the environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 USC 345</td>
<td><strong>Latin American Cooperation: Payment of Personnel Expenses.</strong> “The SecDef or the secretary of a military department may pay the travel, subsistence, and special compensation of officers and students of Latin American countries and other expenses which the Secretary considers necessary for Latin American cooperation.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 312</td>
<td><strong>Multilateral, Bilateral, or Regional Cooperation Programs: Payment of Personnel Expenses.</strong> “The Secretary of Defense may pay the travel, subsistence, and similar personal expenses of developing countries in connection with the attendance of such personnel at a multilateral, bilateral, or regional conference, seminar, or similar meeting if the secretary determines that the attendance of such personnel... is in the national security interests of the U.S.,” and such other expenses in connection with the meeting as the secretary considers in the national security interests of the U.S. Normally, these expenses may only be paid for travel to, from, or within the area of responsibility of the combatant command (CCMD) in which the conference, seminar, or meeting is held, with exceptions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 USC 345</td>
<td><strong>Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.</strong> Under regulations prescribed by the SecDef, DOD funds may be used to pay any costs associated with the education and training of foreign military officers, defense officials, or security officials at educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, or other training programs conducted under the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Program. Expenditures are capped at $35 million per fiscal year.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 USC 2557</td>
<td><strong>Excess Non-Lethal Supplies.</strong> The SecDef may provide excess non-lethal DOD supplies for humanitarian relief purposes. Such supplies must be transferred to the Secretary of State, who is responsible for distribution.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>10 USC 2561</strong></td>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Assistance.</strong> Funds authorized to be appropriated to DOD for humanitarian assistance shall be used to provide transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes. The SecDef may use funds authorized for humanitarian assistance to transport supplies intended to be used to respond to events that threaten serious harm to the environment (such as an oil spill) if other sources are not available.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Section 311, P.L. 104-201</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agreements for Exchange of Defense Personnel Between the United States and Foreign Countries.</strong> The SecDef may enter into agreements to exchange military and civilian personnel of DOD with military and civilian personnel of a foreign defense ministry. Exchanged personnel may be assigned to positions as instructors; DOD personnel may be assigned to positions in private industry that support the foreign defense ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Section 333, P.L. 109-163</strong></td>
<td><strong>Authority to Build Capacity of Foreign Military Forces.</strong> “The President may direct the SecDef to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces for that country to (1) conduct counter-terrorist operations; or (2) participate in or support military and stability operations in which the U.S. armed forces are a participant.” Such a program may include providing equipment, supplies, and training. The program shall include elements that promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and respect for legitimate civilian authorities within that nation. The program shall be jointly developed by the SecDef and the Secretary of State, and the SecDef shall coordinate with the Secretary of State on its implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Section 311, P.L. 111-84</strong></td>
<td><strong>Authority for Non-Reciprocal Exchanges of Defense Personnel Between the United States and Foreign Countries.</strong> The SecDef may enter into agreements with the governments of allied or friendly foreign countries for the exchange of military and civilian personnel of the foreign defense ministry. They may be assigned to positions in the DOD.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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