TRANSITION TO A JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Planning Insights for Echelons Above Brigade Formations
Lessons and Best Practices
Transition to a Joint Force Headquarters:
Planning Insights for Echelons above Brigade Formations

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Foreword

This handbook leverages Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) collections in active joint operational areas and joint exercises in order to provide commanders and staffs at echelons above brigade with a guide to transitioning to a joint force headquarters (JFHQ). As the Army faces the threats of today and the future in a dynamic and competitive operational environment, commanders and staffs of a theater army, corps, and division (echelons above brigade [EAB]) must be prepared to rapidly transition to a JFHQ and effectively operate across the range of military operations. This joint force will enter a global operating environment that has drastically changed in recent years and one in which our adversaries will employ a mix of traditional, unconventional, and hybrid strategies.

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013, directs that U.S. military operations are conducted as a joint force, activities in which elements of two or more military departments operate under a joint force commander. This is further reinforced in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 19 Aug 2010. This describes Army forces operating as part of a joint, interorganizational, and multinational force to accomplish the mission and win in a complex world. This is an environment that is not only unknown but unknowable and constantly changing. Furthermore, experiences gleaned from operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, Russian aggression in Europe, and the pandemic in Africa highlight the complexity, uncertainty, interdependence, and speed with which events can escalate.

Topics contained in this handbook include:

• Build the command and control architecture
• Form the joint headquarters
• Plan and operate in the joint/combined environment
• Integrate force enablers
• Leverage joint, interorganizational, and multinational processes
The key insights, lessons, best practices, and challenges contained in this handbook are intended to provide EAB commanders and staffs with considerations for forming and operating as a joint headquarters. This product complements the recently released Training Circular 6-6, *Training the Mission Command Warfighting Function: Transitioning to a Joint Headquarters*, 15 Jan 2018. Commanders and staffs are encouraged to use both of these products as they prepare for future missions to support joint efforts around the globe.

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COL, FA  
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned
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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this handbook is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as Army Regulations (ARs), Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs), Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRPs), Army Techniques Publications (ATPs), Field Manuals (FMs), and Technical Manuals (TMs), must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.
Introduction

No study is possible on the battlefield. One does simply what one can in order to apply what one knows. Therefore, in order to do even a little, one has already to know a great deal and know it well.

Marshal Ferdinand Foch
*Precepts and Judgements*, 1919

The intent of this handbook is to provide EAB commanders, leaders, and staffs with some considerations and potential solutions to challenges others experienced as they transitioned to a combined/joint headquarters and functioned as an Army force (ARFOR). Army doctrine on forming a joint headquarters can be accessed at the Army Publishing Directorate site: http://www.apd.army.mil (public website). In-depth discussions on forming a joint headquarters from a joint perspective can be accessed at the Joint Electronic Library site: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine (public website).

This handbook provides key insights, lessons, best practices, and identified challenges associated with the transition of the theater Army, corps, and division – the EAB – into a joint headquarters. The handbook also encompasses insights into ARFOR responsibilities. In today’s operational environment, EAB headquarters can function in a variety of roles, from the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all ARFOR assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, multinational command, or senior tactical headquarters. The intellectual foundation of this guide originates from multiple sources, from interviews conducted with commanders, leaders, and staff from the 101st Airborne Division (Operation United Assistance – Liberia) and multiple theater exercises to include U.S. Army Central Command (Operation Inherent Resolve – Iraq), I Corps and U.S. Army Pacific Command (Yama Sakura 71), U.S. Army European Command (Austere Challenge 17), U.S. Army Africa Command (Judicious Response 17), and U.S. Army Southern Command Panamanian Exercise [PANAMAX] 16).
By definition, the ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. The ARFOR is the Army component of any joint force. However, Army doctrine distinguishes between the Army component of a combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant commander. The Army component of the combatant command is an Army Service component command, and the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR. The term is not used as an acronym in Army doctrine.


The unique and crucial role of the U.S. Army is to provide landpower to the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs). The Army may provide its EAB headquarters for joint land operations in the form of a joint force land component command. In addition to a joint force land component command, the GCC may task the EAB headquarters to provide the nucleus of a joint task force (JTF) or joint force land component command headquarters to fill the needs of an emergent crisis such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), a contingency operation, or an enduring/rotational requirement (Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Inherent Resolve).

These versatile higher headquarters are tailored for contingencies, albeit without joint augmentation until directed. They are capable of evolving so that commanders can exercise mission command of Army operations or command and control of joint operations. Doctrine allows EAB headquarters to task organize for specific HA/DR operations, contingencies, major operations, and campaigns. With few exceptions, joint Manning and organizations remain ad hoc. However, by an Army/Air Force memorandum, "Army/Air Force Liaison Support," 31 March 2011, the Air Force provides some Air Force augmentation for corps and divisions regardless of their role. The nature of counterinsurgency campaigns, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, require Army headquarters to transition to a JFHQ and function as joint and multinational integrators. In subsequent years came the surge in Afghanistan, current operations in Iraq/Kuwait/Syria, Russian aggression in Europe, and the pandemic in Africa. Within this setting, the complexity, uncertainty, speed, and interdependence of events in today’s environment compelled the military to transition to highly adaptable formations capable of integrating operations across the operational environment as a joint force. Army leaders and their staffs are now challenged to master the whole of government approach which
integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to achieve unity of effort toward a common goal.

Commanders and staffs of Army EAB forces must be prepared to operate at the joint level across the range of military operations and multi-domains as the core of a JFHQ. In this regard, commanders of Army EAB must be well versed in joint operations processes to drive the process in achieving the strategic and operational objectives of the GCC. Many of today’s threats transcend GCCs’ areas of responsibility (AOR). A whole of government and international approach is required to confront these threats across AOR boundaries. An international approach incorporates the government and military organizations of the U.S. and multinational partners. JTFs and joint force land component commands can be combined commands comprised of military forces from a variety of organizations, both joint and multinational. They will also operate with other government departments and agencies (often American embassies) and international organizations.

There are many challenges associated with Army EAB organizations forming and functioning as a joint headquarters. They come at a significant cost in terms of manpower; equipment; training; time to form; and operating and leading in joint, interorganizational, and multinational operations. While the organization and purpose of each EAB headquarters is different, they must have the capability of transitioning from an Army to a JFHQ with personnel and equipment augmentation. This requires EAB commanders and staffs to plan for the transition and operate as the command structure for a joint headquarters in order to accomplish the objectives as directed by the senior commander.

As a general rule, JTF headquarters conduct command and control of joint forces in accordance with Joint Publication (JP) 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 31 Jan 2018. Forming and organizing the JTF headquarters generally follows the information contained in Chapter 2 of that publication. JTFs use other joint doctrine to conduct operations within the defined joint operations area (JOA) assigned to the JTF. Of note, a JOA has different attributes and requirements than a normal land component area of operations (AO) (See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 Jan 2017).
Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters Readiness

- Establishing authority validates HQ readiness to serve as JTF HQ
- HQ develops joint manning, equipping, and training plans
- Establishing authority selects HQ and establishes readiness requirements

Legend:
- HQ: headquarters
- JTF: joint task force

Historic Trend Line: Minimal readiness until crisis occurs

- Crisis Occurs

Establishing authority activates Service HQ as JTF HQ

HQ sustains readiness

Sustainment Events and Exercises

Crisis Occurs

Joint task force capable-headquarters readiness (JP 3-33).
EAB organizations designated as a joint force land component command conduct command and control of land forces within their assigned AO in accordance with JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, 24 Feb 2014. In accordance with current Army doctrine (Army Techniques Publication 3-92, *Corps Operations*, 7 Apr 2016), a joint force land component command can also be an ARFOR. However, a joint force land component command would never also accomplish the duties of a JTF and/or a tactical echelon. Of note, joint doctrine has command relationships while Army doctrine has command and support relationships. Tactical EAB headquarters conduct mission command of assigned land forces within their AO in accordance with the Army definition of mission command and Army EAB doctrine.

To prepare for future joint force missions, commanders and staff should review the recently released Training Circular (TC) 6-6, *Training the Mission Command Warfighting Function: Transitioning to a Joint Headquarters*, 15 Jan 2018. This TC is a guide for division and corps commanders to use during unit training management and planning upon receiving notification of transitioning to a joint headquarters. This TC provides the framework for command, leadership, and Soldiers who plan, prepare, execute, and assess training of mission command in transitioning to the joint level.

The figure on the previous page depicts a typical JTF-capable headquarters (HQ) readiness model that guides the designation, organization, staffing, command and control, equipping, training, and readiness of designated Service HQ. The generic force readiness model shown can be used to portray the anticipated status of any designated Service HQ within a combatant command. It depicts the performance typically associated with forming a JTF HQ in an ad hoc manner, compared to the projected readiness levels and performance of a Service HQ that is designated to become a JTF-capable HQ and initiates pre-crisis readiness preparations. The model should be tailored for each designated Service HQ based on various factors, such as the AOR in which the JTF-capable HQ is formed and existing Service force generation cycles and materiel fielding schedules.
Chapter 1
Trends and Insights:
Lessons and Best Practices from Recent Operations and Exercises

You can only deter your opponent if your opponent believes that you have the will and the capability. So, readiness has a deterrent value as well as a warfighting value.

General Mark A. Milley
Army Chief of Staff
U.S. Army Reserve Senior Leader Conference, Apr 2016

Background

As the U.S. Army looks to the future of warfare, new aspects of the operational environment are changing the character of war. The force of the future must be prepared to fight in a joint, interorganizational, and multinational environment to face ever-more adaptive and often unpredictable adversaries. In the recently published Restoring American Power, Senator John McCain, 16 Jan 2017, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee noted:

The joint force must be bigger but more importantly, it must be more capable. Our adversaries are modernizing their militaries to exploit our vulnerabilities. If all we do is buy more of the same, it is not only a bad investment, it is dangerous. We must rethink how our military projects power, invest in new capabilities, and devise new ways of operating.¹

The global environment is driving the need for change across the Army. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 31 Oct 2014, recognizes the need for Army forces to provide foundational capabilities required by the joint force and to project power onto land and from land across the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. The AOC is grounded in a vision of future armed conflict that considers national defense strategy; missions; emerging operational environments; advances in technology; and anticipated enemy, threat, and adversary capabilities.² Diverse enemies will employ traditional, unconventional, and hybrid strategies to threaten U.S. security and vital interests. Threats may emanate from nation states non-state actors such as transnational terrorists, insurgents, and criminal organizations. Enemies will continue to apply advanced as well as simple technologies to disrupt U.S. advantages
in communications, long-range precision fires, integrated air defense, electronic warfare, cyber, and surveillance. When considering the complex missions required of echelons above brigade (EAB) organizations, the subsequent paragraphs describe some of the capabilities that must be executed to achieve theater objectives:

- **Freedom of movement** is a critical capability shaped through deployment activities and events and best developed through building partnership cooperation and security cooperation activities throughout the area of operations. It seeks to prepare for and facilitate early entry in a time of crisis and capitalize on the superb regional military infrastructure.

- A crucial element of the U.S. commitment to regions around the globe is the ability to **mass combat power**. Regionally aligned forces (RAF) face challenges to provide logistical support beyond the capabilities of each brigade’s organic assets. Brigades recently deployed to U.S. Army Europe were the first of the “heel-to-toe,” or continuous units, to serve as a RAF effectively increasing the capacity of landpower in each theater. In combination with the capacity provided by U.S. partner nation forces, these RAF ultimately give U.S. political leadership greater capability and options when responding to a threat.

- **Setting the theater** requires significant planning efforts and preparations to support the theater and the specific joint operations area (JOA). Army Service component command (ASCC) staffs struggle to accomplish the multitude of tasks, yet requirements remain unchanged since modified table of organization and equipment reductions. Lack of a forward presence requires sophisticated, early planning; preparation; and execution in theater opening; port and terminal operations; and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. The lack of theater enablers in the ASCCs hinder their ability to “set the theater” to support combatant command (CCMD) operations and to simultaneously accomplish Title 10 requirements and Army support to other Services.

- **Security cooperation** is continuous and shapes the security environment through all joint phases. Leveraging exercises shapes and sets the theater for the commander by employing unique total Army capabilities. Exercises influence the security environment by building trust, developing relationships, and gaining access through rotational forces, multilateral exercises, military-to-military engagements, coalition training, and other opportunities.

Today and for the foreseeable future, our adversaries will seek opportunities to evade and disrupt our capabilities to exploit our weaknesses to accomplish their objectives. To that end, they will continue to educate and
train their leaders on asymmetric tactics to avoid our strengths and exploit perceived weakness.

With our allies and partners, we will make greater efforts to coordinate our planning to optimize their contributions to their own security and to our many combined activities. The U.S. would likely need to count more on allied and partner contributions in future confrontations and conflicts.

Quarterly Defense Review 2014

Theater armies across the globe provide landpower to geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) to execute operations in the multi-domain environments of both the present and future. Winning in these environments requires all Army EAB organizations to execute their assigned roles and responsibilities. The theater army sets the theater and assists in employing Army forces into the fight. Army corps integrate landpower throughout each phase of a campaign. The Army’s combat divisions outmaneuver the enemy, destroy enemy ground forces, seize and exploit operationally significant objectives, and match decisive action to ground conditions.

To support future analysis, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Capability Manager-EAB, identified a number of military challenges for consideration when conducting trend analysis regarding EAB organizations. Adversaries have overmatch/enhanced capabilities in:

- Long range and lethal fires
- Integrated air defense, anti-access and area denial (A2AD)
- Electronic warfare, cyber, and space
- Information operations

Other military challenges to support future analysis include:

- Continental U.S.-based Army forces require movement over extended distances for employment and sustainment
- Multi-domain battle concept for future warfare in all domains
- Threat forces operate decisively, increasing the importance of achieving strategic objectives during the competition phase and if necessary, achieve a position of advantage prior to armed conflict, and return to competition

All theater army, corps, and division headquarters (HQ) have considerable flexibility integrated into their structure, allowing them to adapt to and plan for the battlefield environment specific to that JOA. As designed, each HQ element can fulfill multiple roles based upon tasks and requirements
assigned by the GCC and with the use of joint enablers assigned to augment the unit. Army capabilities in theater execute a broad range of roles, from serving as a joint task force HQ to the tactical employment of brigades and battalions. The theater army is responsible to tailor each subordinate echelon, including itself, for its role to support the theater campaign plan. Each HQ modifies its internal organization to meet the requirements of the assigned mission and adjusts the configuration of subordinate units between HQ by conducting task organization.

**Challenges**

In the joint or combined operational environment, land operations become even more complex for joint commanders and their staffs. As the multi-domain battle concept is further refined and incorporated, aspects to consider include: urban environments, subterranean environments, space, cyberspace, A2AD, civilians on the battlefield, infrastructure protection, freedom of movement, and communications interoperability. Adversary actions further complicate operations in the JOA or across the theater by delivering effects on, from, within, and outside of the operational area; all with potentially global impacts and influence. To win the campaigns of today and tomorrow, commanders must execute land operations with effective and efficient command and control structure to compete, dominate, and win.

The following focus areas were identified as common trends between multiple ASCCs during Fiscal Year 2017 training events and exercises, to include Austere Challenge 17, Yama Sakura 17, and Judicious Response 17. Other issue areas that are specific to individual ASCCs may be found on the Joint Lessons Learned Information System.

- **HQ manning and equipping.** Due to directed HQ reductions under Focus Area Review Group II, ASCC HQ manning was significantly reduced. In one instance, contingency command post (CCP) manning dropped from 96 positions to 26. The reduced structure is the minimum manning that can maintain and deploy an ASCC HQ and prepare to accept enablers and communications packages tailored to the mission. HQ employment, however, requires augmentation across all warfighting functions. This provides just enough manpower to service and maintain its equipment in garrison. It can also deploy the CCP forward in preparation to receive staff and enablers required to expand this command and control element to a full joint task force (JTF) HQ. However, reduced HQ force design does not provide what is required to operate 24/7 functioning as two- or three-star JTF HQ.

- **Forming the joint task force/joint force land component command HQ.** EAB (theater army/ASCC, corps, and divisions) must be prepared to operate and lead in joint, interorganizational, and multinational operations. More specifically, they must have
the capability of transitioning from an Army-focused HQ, when augmented with personnel and equipment, to a joint force HQ.

○ The preferred approach to forming a JTF HQ is to do so around an existing command and control structure. Typically, this is a CCMD’s Service component HQ or a subordinate Service component HQ. The establishing authority (typically the combatant commander [CCDR]) determines the appropriate level based mission first, then the scope and scale of the operation. In some cases, the CCDR may request a deployable team from the U.S. Transportation Command, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command to assist the designated Service HQ transition to the JTF HQ which the CCDR and commander of the JTF would then augment with additional Service functional experts.

○ Augmentation of a JTF HQ is a function of the JTF’s mission and force composition. The JTF’s mission is the most important factor in determining the required type of core staff augmentation. Mission analysis should consider the JTF HQ required capabilities and other related functions.

• **Theater preparation (set the theater).** ASCCs have the mission to set the theater. However, in some cases, the entire theater of operations cannot be set simultaneously. In one case, U.S. Army Africa prioritizes and shapes the security environment regionally and sub-regionally. Key elements to setting and shaping the area of responsibility are sustainment, intelligence, mission command posts, fixed and deployable communication systems, and networks.

○ In addition, the theater army must develop detailed regional and country support plans, identify authority gaps, and integrate RAF and theater forces such as the European Rotational Force units. They must do this all while meeting the GCC’s theater security cooperation (TSC) objectives and the desires of the various stakeholders must continue during a conflict in the JOA.

○ The key task for the ASCC staff is to plan, develop, align, and prioritize TSC activities within the theater and the GCC’s planning process. TSC professionals recognize that the difficulty is in integrating the various planning inputs and resources into a coherent plan that will support the objectives of the GCC, the country team, and the theater army.

• **Leader and staff education.** There is a need to acquire an understanding of ASCCs and related experience earlier in an Army leader’s career. Military officers’ career progression up until the rank of major (and in many cases lieutenant colonel), is focused mainly
in tactical positions within divisions. ASCC’s are faced with unique challenges and are constantly executing their real-world mission. A balance must be found in the current educational and assignment system to provide leader’s exposure to ASCCs earlier in their careers. Broadening assignments to an ASCC for majors after key development postings should become the standard.

Summary

As a result of current and future force design, EAB organizations form the core of the future Army by moving from today’s known point to an expeditionary land force for tomorrow. The complex operational environment of 2025 requires the Army to operate differently. Theater armies, corps, and divisions must be able to conduct operations to prevent, shape, and win using agile, responsive, and innovative combined arms, wide area security, and special operations guided by mission command. In the end, the theater army, regardless of the role directed by the GCC or the Service, must allow the command to enable strategic positioning, remain regionally engaged, and respond globally through expeditionary maneuver to restore strategic balance.

Endnotes


3. Ibid.
Chapter 2

Echelons above Brigade Forces

The crucial role of the Army is to provide landpower to the geographic combatant commander (GCC) across the range of military operations in that area of responsibility. Army headquarters (HQ) – theater army, corps, and division – operating at echelons above brigade (EAB) provide the combatant commander several options necessary for the employment of landpower in an interdependent joint force.

Field Manual (FM) 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, 21 Apr 2014

Background

The growing threats to U.S. and allied interests throughout the world demand U.S. forces be proficient across the range of military operations. Military forces alone cannot achieve national objectives. Joint forces must effectively collaborate with U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies, allied and partner nations, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, private and commercial entities, and local and regional stakeholders. The nature of current and future challenges to U.S. interests demand armed forces operate as a closely integrated joint team with U.S. organizations and multinational partners across the range of military operations. Joint doctrine divides military operations into three broad categories illustrated in Figure 2-1.

![Range of Military Operations](image)

Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national power across the conflict continuum in a wide variety of operations that are commonly characterized in three groups as this figure depicts.

*Figure 2-1. Range of military operations (Joint Publication [JP] 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 Jan 2017).*
Using unified action, a comprehensive and whole-of-government approach is essential to advancing U.S. interests to strengthen security relationships and capacity by, with, and through military forces of partner nations, U.S. and foreign government agencies, state and local government agencies, and interorganizational or nongovernmental organizations. Unified action is a key ingredient of joint operations to maintain effective unity of effort with USG departments, agencies, and multinational partners for achieving success. The military cannot do it alone. Key to achieving success in today’s complex environment requires harmonizing and synchronizing military actions with other elements of national and international power.

**Unified action.** The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operation to achieve unity of effort.

**Unity of effort.** Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action.

JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 12 Jul 2017

**Joint Operations**

The U.S. wages war by employing all instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The Armed Forces of the U.S. are employed by the President to achieve national strategic objectives.

The Armed Forces of the U.S. conduct military operations as a joint force. “Joint” means activities in which elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military departments participate under a single joint force commander (JP 1). Joint matters relate to the integrated employment of U.S. military forces in joint operations including matters relating to:

- National military strategy
- Deliberate and crisis action planning
- Command and control of joint operations
- Unified action with Department of Defense (DOD), interorganizational and multinational partners

The capacity of the Armed Forces of the U.S. to operate as a cohesive joint team is a key advantage in any operational environment. Success depends on well-integrated command HQ, supporting organizations, and forces that operate as a team. Integrating Service components’ capabilities under a single joint force commander (JFC) maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of the force. However, a joint operation does not require that all
Service components be employed even though they are assigned. The JFC has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces to the mission (JP 3-0). While joint operations integrate the capability of Service components under a single JFC; unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), interorganizational entities (such as the United Nations), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort to accomplish common objectives.

U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) transitioned to a combined joint task force (JTF) four times since 1991, three times of which occurred since 2001.

Critical to success is the effective information sharing among DOD, other USG departments and agencies, and state and local agencies.

The combined JTF’s staff had a fundamental role in unified action and the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Initial Impressions Report 16-10

**USARCENT Transition to a Combined Joint Task Force, Mar 2016,** Combined JTF Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)

**Supporting the Joint Force Commander**

Army forces provide for versatile higher HQ that are tailored for contingencies and capable of evolving so that commanders can exercise mission command for campaigns and major operations. The Army provides EAB HQ for joint land operations and often provides the nucleus of JTF and joint force land component command HQ for contingency operations. JTFs and joint force land component commands will most likely be combined JTFs and combined joint force land component commands, comprised of military forces from a variety of organizations that are both joint and multinational. They will also operate with other U.S. Government departments (i.e., U.S. Agency for International Development) and agencies
(often U.S. embassies) and international organizations (such as the United Nations Mission for the Ebola Emergency Response and the United Nations Mission in Liberia) for humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Army EAB may also be missioned to function as the Army component and senior Army HQ of all Army forces (ARFOR) assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. The ARFOR is the Army component of any joint force. Army doctrine distinguishes; however, between the Army component of a combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant commander. The Army component of the combatant command is an Army Service component command (ASCC) and the Army component of the subordinate joint forces is an ARFOR. A detailed discussion of Army EAB is found in FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*.

The Army HQ assigned to become a combined JTF or joint force land component command must plan on the transition to that type of HQ. The staff has to plan the transition in becoming a combined JTF/joint force land component command. Having a base joint manning document (JMD) linked to possible theater contingencies assists in this HQ transition planning. Education of the base ASCC staff on joint doctrine, terminology, the other agencies’ abilities, and breaking the Service parochial thinking (the “only we can do this” process). In the example of U.S. Army South (USARSOUTH), we understand that support to Department of Homeland Security Migrant Operations is one of our combined JTF HQ mission sets and therefore we have spent the necessary time in building a JMD that incorporates the other Services and agencies required for mission execution. Beyond the JMD, we have conducted exercises and training opportunities working with our joint and interagency partners. That training has focused on education on what the other Services and agencies bring to the mission as well as their requirements.

USARSOUTH, G-5 Plans comments, 25 Apr 2017, to CALL Handbook No. 08-02, Transitioning into a JTF/Combined JTF.¹

There are three types of joint forces: combatant command (CCMD), subordinate unified command (also called sub-unified command), and a JTF. A CCMD is a unified or specified command with a broad and continuing mission under a single commander. A CCMD is established and so designated by the President of the U.S. through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
TRANSITION TO A JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

A JTF is one of several command and control (C2) options for conducting joint operations. A JTF may be established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the contingency or crisis require capabilities of Services from at least two military departments operating under a single JFC. The JTF establishing authority designates the commander (CJTF), assigns the mission, designates forces from currently-assigned forces, or in the case of a CCMD without assigned forces, the JTF submits a request for forces through the global force management process to form a JTF. Additionally, the JTF establishing authority delegates command authorities and relationships and provides other C2 guidance necessary for the CJTF to form the joint force and begin operations. The appropriate authority may establish a JTF on a geographic or functional basis or a combination of the two. In either case, the establishing authority typically assigns a joint operations area (JOA) to the JTF. There may also be situations in which a JTF has a logistics-focused mission. In these situations, the combatant commander (CCDR) should delegate directive authority for common support capabilities over specific logistic forces, facilities, and supplies to the JTF.

A CJTF has authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and require coordination among subordinate commanders. Unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Generally, a CJTF should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function as they were designed. The intent is to meet the commander’s mission requirements while maintaining the functional integrity of Service components. A CJTF typically organizes the joint force with a combination of Service and functional components and additional attachments as required. A functional component is a command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments, e.g., a joint force air component command. A commander JTF may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. The CCDR may request a Joint Enabling Capabilities Command deployable team from the U.S. Transportation Command to assist the designated Service HQ transition to the JTF HQ, which the CCDR and CJTF would then augment with additional Service functional experts and mission-tailored detachments.

Army Operations
The Army provides geographic combatant command landpower to conduct operations across the range of military operations in that specific geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility. To meet theater strategic as well as operational and tactical objectives, the Army can deliver a wide
variety of Service-specific capabilities. Most importantly the Army, when directed, provides the geographic combatant command an interlocking array of higher HQ trained and equipped to apply landpower from the theater level, through operational level, and down to the tactical employment of various brigades and battalions. Together the theater army, corps, and division, the EAB, give the geographic combatant command several options necessary for the employment of landpower in an interdependent joint force.

The theater army integrates landpower with other joint capabilities (i.e., air and maritime capabilities as well as and multinational forces). The corps represents an operationally significant Army force with its array of combat power capable of altering the land balance of forces in each geographic combatant command. The division is the tactical hammer translating operational level plans into offensive, defensive, and stability tasks on the ground. Figure 2-2, derived from FM 3-94, depicts an overview of the EAB roles and functions.

Landpower is the ability by threat, force, or occupation to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.

Army Doctrine Publication 1, *The Army*, 17 Sep 2012

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**Figure 2-2. Echelons above brigade roles and functions.**
The geographic combatant command has ever-changing requirements for landpower to prevent, shape, and win across the range of military operations in that area of responsibility (AOR). Prevention requires flexible and credible U.S. military power to dissuade potential adversaries from threatening vital American national interests.

Landpower deters aggression through perceived capability and presence. Stability and counterinsurgency operations require boots on the ground, if not American, often indigenous ground forces trained and supported by U.S. Soldiers. If war breaks out, landpower complements joint capability by confronting the enemy with a lethal dilemma involving air, land, and maritime powers.

The theater army commander sets conditions for effective use of landpower. While commanding Army forces supporting AOR-wide engagement, the theater army commander matches Army capabilities to joint requirements, oversees the arrival of Army forces in the theater, and ensures Soldiers across the AOR receive the support they require for as long as they are in the AOR. The corps is the principal HQ for applying landpower as a component of a campaign. The corps commander translates campaign objectives into broad missions for ground forces and sets the conditions for the tactical use of Army and multinational ground forces to accomplish those missions.

The corps commander coordinates land forces with air, maritime, and special operations forces to dominate land portions of joint operations areas. The division controls ground forces, synchronizing Army and joint combat power according to the conditions on the ground.

Each EAB HQ has considerable flexibility built into its structure. Each can fulfill multiple roles and functions depending upon the combatant commander’s requirements and appropriate joint augmentation. This ranges from serving as the joint task force HQ, as a joint and multinational force land component, down through to the tactical employment of brigades and battalions. The theater army tailors each echelon, including itself, for its role in the campaign. Each HQ varies its internal organization to accomplish the mission. Each echelon adjusts the distribution of subordinate units between HQ to meet the particular requirements of a phase or mission, which is known as task organization.

Operational and administrative responsibilities vary between echelons. Operational responsibilities include command of forces, direction of operations in time and space, and control of assigned areas of operations. The administrative responsibilities encompass the Service-specific
requirements for equipping, sustainment, training, unit readiness, discipline, and personnel matters. The Army also has specified Service responsibilities to the joint force including certain logistics support and specialized support such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense. The theater army, as the ASCC for that geographic combatant command, determines the most effective and efficient distribution of Service responsibilities. Depending upon the joint structure, the corps or division assumes Army component responsibilities within that joint force. An overview of the roles and responsibilities of the theater army, corps, and division is provided in FM 3-94.

The Echelons above Brigade Organizations: Roles and Responsibilities

Theater Army/ASCC

The ASCC is the dedicated theater army for each geographic combatant command. The theater army is the primary interface between the geographic combatant command, Department of the Army (DA), Army commands, and other ASCCs. The theater army is responsible for administration and support of all Army forces assigned, attached, or under the operational control (OPCON) of the geographic combatant command. The theater army commander plans and requests tailored Army force packages. Tailoring the force requires the theater army to determine the composition of the force of how many and what types of units, its optimum deployment sequence given combatant commander priorities and available lift, and the initial command and support relationships. The theater army assumes responsibility for supporting all deployed Army forces in that AOR and OPCON of all Army forces within the AOR that are not OPCON to a JTF or sub-unified command. The theater army is responsible for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of the Army force package into the joint force. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-93, *Theater Army Operations*, 26 Nov 2014 provides an in-depth discussion on the organization, roles, functions, tasks, and operations of the theater army HQ.

In the role as an ASCC to a geographic combatant command, the theater army fulfills all requirements of a Service component for Army forces assigned or attached to the geographic combatant command. Responsibilities of a Service component are determined from Title 10, U.S. Code (USC) - Armed forces; Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5101.1 - *DOD Executive Agent*; Army regulation (AR) 10-90, *Department of Defense Executive Agent Responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army*, 9 Feb 2018; and the combatant commander’s daily operational requirements.
### Figure 2-3. Theater army roles, functions, and tasks (ATP 3-93, *Theater Army Operations*, 26 Nov 2014).

Title 10, USC, contains the statute governing the Armed Forces of the U.S. and delineating the organization of the DOD, including the combatant commands. Title 10 charges the Army with execution of Service-specific requirements and administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces assigned to combatant commands. The theater army is responsible for execution of Title 10 requirements as the geographic combatant command requires.

DODD 5101.1 describes the DOD executive agent as the head of a component of the DOD to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, administrative, or other designated activities.
DA Memorandum 10-1 defines an executive agent as a component of the DOD which has been designated by the President, DOD, or Congress as the sole agency to perform a function or service for others. However, whether the term “executive agent” is used or not, the theater army on behalf of the Army, is responsible for the support functions in all theaters as designated by the GCC or higher authorities.

A role is the broad and enduring purpose for which the organization or branch is established (ADP 1-01, Doctrine Primer, 2 Sep 2014). The theater army’s primary role is ASCC to a geographic combatant command. The theater army can also serve as a JTF or joint force land component command, with augmentation, for immediate response and small-scale operations (using a contingency command post).

A function is a practical grouping of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) that are united by a common purpose (ADP 1-01). A function delineates the set of executable capabilities that an organization or branch requires to perform its role. The theater army depends on four functions:

- Execute CCDR’s daily operational requirements.
- Set the theater.
- Set the joint operations area.
- Enable the theater army commander to exercise mission command of immediate crisis response and small-scale operations.

A task is a clearly-defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization that must be done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority (JP 1). A task may be collective or individual. Figure 2-3 lists theater army functions and tasks depending on its specific role.

The theater army is the ASCC assigned to a geographic combatant command. It is organized, manned, and equipped to perform three roles:

- The role of a theater army for the geographic combatant command to which it is assigned
- The role of a JTF HQ (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in that AOR
- The role of a joint force land component command (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in that AOR
The key tasks associated with its roles and functions include:

- Serve as the primary interface between the combatant command, Department of the Army, Army commands, and other ASCCs.
- Develop Army plans to support the theater campaign plan within that AOR.
- Tailor Army forces for employment in the AOR.
- Control RSOI for Army forces in the AOR.
- Exercise OPCON of deployed Army forces not subordinated to a JFC.
- Exercise ADCON of all Army forces operating within the AOR.
- Provide support as directed by the combatant commander to other Service forces, multinational forces, and interagency partners.
- Exercise OPCON of all joint forces attached to it as either a joint force land component command or JTF HQ, as required by the combatant commander.
- Provide planning in support to the GCC’s strategic planning, theater campaign plan, theater posture plan, theater security cooperation plans, theater global force management plans, deliberate plans, and crisis action planning.

As required, the theater army provides Army support to other Services (ASOS), provides common user logistics, and carries out DOD-specified Service executive agent and combatant command support agent responsibilities in the AOR. See FM 3-94 for a detailed discussion of ARFOR responsibilities.

The Army Corps

The Army corps is the Army’s most versatile HQ. The corps must be as adept at planning a rapid noncombatant evacuation operation as supporting a multiyear major combat operation. The Army corps is deployable and scalable to meet almost every requirement of the CCDR for a senior-level HQ. The corps now functions as the principal integrator of landpower into campaigns and is the link between the operational and tactical levels of war. In the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, U.S. Army corps have commanded all land forces in those countries. The corps is the preferred Army HQ for joint augmentation and employment as a JTF or combined JTF. As a joint or multinational land component command, an Army corps HQ commands multiple Army divisions, brigades, and other formations, and multinational forces and organizations. The corps HQ often functions as the ARFOR (a senior Army HQ) for deployed Army forces, exercising
command over Army forces in a joint operations area and prioritizing the extensive support provided by the theater army against the tactical needs of joint and multinational forces.

The corps HQ is an essential element of the Army’s expeditionary capabilities. These capabilities enable the Army to deploy combined arms forces into any AOR and operate effectively upon arrival. Contingency operations require the corps and its subordinate forces to deploy quickly and set conditions to seize the initiative and accomplish the mission. The corps is organized, manned, and equipped to serve in four roles:

- Provide the ARFOR within a joint force for campaigns and major operations.
- Serve as the joint or multinational land component command HQ (with augmentation) in campaigns and major operations.
- Serve as a JTF HQ (with augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency operations.
- Serve as a tactical HQ commanding two to five Army divisions together with supporting brigades and commands in campaigns and major operations.

The key tasks involved in these roles include:

- Command Marine Corps and multinational brigades and divisions.
- As a supported component, integrate supporting joint capabilities with landpower within a JOA.
- As a supporting component, integrate Army capabilities with supported component operations.
- Exercise ADCON over Army forces in a joint operations area as specified by the ASCC.
- Integrate special operations forces with conventional force operations.
- Provide ASOS as required by the JFC.
- ATP 3-92, Corps Operations, 7 Apr 2016, provides in-depth discussions on the organization, roles, functions, tasks, and operations of the corps.

**The Army Division**

The division HQ operates as a tactical HQ under OPCON of an Army corps or Marine Expeditionary Force HQ (FM 3-94, Chapter 1). It may become a joint force land component command HQ. In limited contingency
operations, it may become a JTF. As a tactical echelon of command, the division task organizes subordinate units and specifies the command or support relationships needed. The division assesses the effort required for offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in its area of operations and organizes its subordinate units accordingly. The division HQ sets the conditions for employment of its brigades, then controls and synchronizes their tactical actions. The division allocates resources, designates the main effort as required, forecasts operational requirements, and establishes priorities of support. Sustainment and other functional units (military police, engineers, air and missile defense, and military intelligence) provide support in accordance with priorities established by the supported division commander. The historical designations of the division HQ, such as the 1st Cavalry Division, do not necessarily reflect the capabilities of the subordinate forces task-organized under them.

The roles of the division include:

- Serve as a tactical HQ in campaigns and major operations.
- Serve as the joint and multinational land component HQ under a JTF in crisis response and limited contingency operations.
- Serve as a JTF or combined JTF HQ (with augmentation) for limited contingency operations.
- Serve as the ARFOR within a JTF in crisis response and limited contingency operations.

Key tasks for the division include:

- Command two to five brigade combat teams together with supporting brigades in decisive action.
- Serve as the joint or multinational land component HQ (joint force land component command or combined joint force land component command) under a JTF (or multinational combined JTF) in crisis response and limited contingency operations.
- Exercise tactical control (TACON) over Marine Corps and multinational forces.
- Exercise ADCON over attached Army forces.

ATP 3-91, *Division Operations*, 17 Oct 2014 provides in-depth discussions on the organization, roles, functions, tasks, and operations of the division.
Transition to Joint Forces Command: Operation United Assistance

In 2014, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) transitioned to JFC-Operation United Assistance (OUA) to lead a five-month deployment in Liberia in support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission to prevent the spread of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa. JFC-OUA was not the supported command. Instead, the 101st Airborne Division was supporting the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team, which supported the Government of Liberia. The 101st Division operated in a collaborative atmosphere that built trust and confidence with the international community and unified action partners. The key takeaways included:

- Know the chain of command and understand the roles of all the military organizations.
- The strategic link is the commanding general’s key leader engagements with a strategic leader focus.
- Speak with one voice and synchronize communications.
- Nest lines of effort that focus on supporting the Government of Liberia.
- When exercising mission command, exploiting the expertise of the division can enable success in others and create products that enhance the unified action partners’ abilities.
- Shared understanding includes emphasizing information sharing, combined meetings, working groups, and the use of unclassified networks.
- During Soldier readiness processing, knowing the standards for specific geographic regions can ensure deployment readiness.

Our mission was to support the lead federal agency, USAID, by providing our unique military capabilities to help contain the virus and reduce the spread of Ebola in Liberia and to execute our tasks with speed and flexibility that would not only help build confidence among Liberians that the virus could be defeated but also to help garner the support of the international community to also assist in the fight against this disease.

MG Gary J. Volesky, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division
How does the Army Support the Theater?

Army Service Component Commands

The ASCC is the command responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a combatant command (JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 24 Feb 2014). The ASCC is the senior Army command assigned to a combatant command. It consists of the Army Service commander and all those Army forces such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command to include the support forces assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command. If the combatant commander of a geographic combatant command establishes a subordinate unified command, the Department of the Army will form an Army component HQ appropriate for that subordinate unified command.

The Secretary of the Army may redirect some or all Service responsibilities outside the normal ASCC channels. In similar fashion, the ASCC may distribute some administrative responsibilities outside of the ARFOR. They primarily focus on the effectiveness of Army forces and the care of Soldiers.

Each theater army will have operational and administrative responsibilities. Through assignment or attachment of Army forces to that geographic combatant command by the DOD, the theater army exercises OPCON of all Army forces until the combatant commander attaches those forces to a subordinate joint command. Regardless of whether Army forces are OPCON to the theater army or not, the theater army commander retains responsibility for ADCON of all Army forces. Although the responsibility for ADCON of Army forces within the AOR remains with the theater army commander, that responsibility involves the entire Army.

The ASCCs usually share ADCON for at least some administrative or support functions. This is especially true for Reserve Components. Certain administrative functions, such as pay, stay with the Reserve Component HQ even after unit mobilization. Shared ADCON also applies to direct reporting units of the Army that typically perform single or unique functions. The direct reporting unit, rather than the ASCC, typically manages individual and unit training for these units. The Secretary of the Army directs shared ADCON. For example, the theater army normally divides ADCON responsibilities for a military intelligence brigade stationed in that AOR. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command manages intelligence-specific equipment, activities, Manning, and funding. The theater army manages facilities, common item maintenance, and discipline.
Figure 2-4. Theater army functions and required capabilities (FM 3-94
_Theater Army, Corps and Division Operations_, 21 Apr 2014).
ARFOR

The ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army HQ of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. The ARFOR is the Army component of any joint force (see JP 1 and JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, 31 Jan 2018). Army doctrine distinguishes; however, between the Army component of a combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant commander. The Army component of the combatant command is an ASCC and the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR (see FM 3-94).

The ARFOR in a Subordinate Joint Force

All JTFs that include Army forces have an ARFOR. The ARFOR consists of the Army commander, the commander’s associated HQ, and all Army forces attached to the JTF. The ARFOR provides administrative and logistics support to all Army forces and retains OPCON over Army units not subordinate to another component of the JTF. The senior Army officer assigned to the JTF, not in a joint duty assignment, becomes the ARFOR commander. Since the preferred joint approach for a JTF HQ uses an existing Service HQ, the JTF commander and HQ would retain all responsibilities associated with both command positions (ARFOR and JTF). This can overload the JTF HQ unless the commander delegates authority for Service-specific matters to another commander. For example, when a corps becomes a JTF HQ, the corps commander becomes the JTF commander. The corps retains ARFOR responsibilities through the ASCC back to the Army unless the corps commander shifts Service responsibilities to another HQ. The corps commander normally designates a subordinate Army commander and staff as the deputy ARFOR commander for performing those duties (see JP 1 and JP 3-33).
Figure 2-5. Possible joint task force components (JP 1).

While the JTF will always have an ARFOR if it commands Army units, the operational roles of the ARFOR can vary. It is important to understand that the ARFOR exercises both OPCON and ADCON over Army forces in the JTF. However, not all Army forces are necessarily OPCON to the ARFOR. The ARFOR commander retains OPCON over Army forces attached to the joint force until the JFC places selected Army units under the command of another component in the JTF. The JFC may designate the senior Army commander and HQ as the joint force land component command, in which case the Army commander exercises OPCON or TACON over other Service forces in addition to OPCON and ADCON over Army forces. In this case, dual command responsibilities as ARFOR and joint force land component are manageable, since the preponderance of forces are Army and missions assigned to other land forces are similar in nature.
Attachment has different purposes in joint and Army doctrine. The combatant commander attaches forces to a JTF in order to transfer OPCON. The Army attaches forces to transfer both OPCON and ADCON. Therefore, when the combatant commander attaches an Army unit to a JTF, it is automatically attached to the ARFOR unless the JFC specifies otherwise. The ARFOR then exercises OPCON and ADCON over the Army unit.

The combatant commander detaches Army forces from the theater army and attaches them to a JTF or another joint force, such as a sub-unified command. This removes them from the OPCON of the theater army and places them under the OPCON of the gaining JFC.

When command transfers to the gaining JTF, the ARFOR in the JTF exercises OPCON over Army forces attached to the JTF until the JFC directs otherwise. The JTF commander organizes the joint force by specifying command relationships (OPCON, TACON, or support) between attached forces. The ARFOR commander retains OPCON over those Army forces not subordinate to another component commander such as a joint special operations component. The ARFOR commander is responsible for all aspects of planning and executing operations as tasked by the JFC.

As required by the theater army, the ARFOR commander exercises ADCON over all Army forces in the JTF, including those subordinate to other components. Depending on the JTF organization, the ARFOR commander may exercise OPCON of some or all Army forces assigned to the task force and remain responsible for ADCON of those forces. However, the exercise of OPCON is a delegation of joint command authority and not a function of ADCON.

The theater army commander will specify the ADCON responsibilities of the ARFOR with the theater army normally retaining control of RSOI, logistics support of the deployed force, personnel support, and medical support. Administrative responsibilities normally retained by the ARFOR include internal administration and discipline, training within the joint operations area, and Service-specific reporting. The theater army normally retains OPCON of Army sustainment and medical commands operating in the joint operations area. The theater army commander establishes an Army support relationship between the ARFOR and these units. FM 3-94 provides further details.
Army Support to Other Services

In addition to controlling Army forces, the ARFOR coordinates ASOS. ASOS includes provision of common-user logistics and executive agent support to the JTF as required by the JTF-establishing authority. To make this coordination more manageable, the theater army normally retains command of logistics and medical support units that are not part of the brigades. These units provide area support not only to the Army forces but also to the joint force. The ARFOR HQ manages support to other Services including but not limited to:

- Missile defense
- Fire support
- Base defense
- Transportation
- Fuel distribution
- General engineering
- Intratheater medical evacuation
- Veterinary
- Logistics management
- Communications
- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense
- Consequence management capability
- Explosive ordnance disposal

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight in all elements, with all Services, as one single concentrated effort.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower

Regionally Aligned Forces (Supporting Corps and Divisions)

Regionally aligned forces (RAF) provide the GCC a scalable and tailorable Army capability to meet designated requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises and security
cooperation activities. RAF provides trained and ready Army forces to the geographic combatant commands in support of their theater campaign plans and support the GCCs’ ability to shape the environment, mitigate tensions, and deter potential conflict in their AOR. The RAF concept is an organizing principle that provides units and capabilities based on the specific operational requirements for that theater. In addition, the regional alignment concept provides designated units a focus and direction for unit training and preparation. Regional forces are drawn from across the Army, which includes the U.S. Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve.

As approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army, RAF forces are defined as:

Regionally aligned forces provide the CCDR with up to joint task force capable HQ with scalable and tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to CCMDs, allocated to a CCMD, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for CCMD regional missions. RAF includes Army total force organizations and capabilities, which are forward stationed; operating in a combatant command AOR; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional missions are driven by CCMD requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.2

The Army intends that the RAF concept will “support CCMD and U.S. Government requirements to prevent, shape, and win, while remaining operationally adaptable to respond to global contingencies if required.” For purposes of the RAF concept, the U.S. Army must have trained and ready forces who will cultivate relationships with allied and partner forces during steady-state activities. Through these relationships, the U.S. Army, as part of a joint and likely combined force, will be capable of compelling an adversary not to fight and if necessary, be decisive victors in military actions in the land domain. Corps and divisions are aligned to ensure joint task force capability to every GCC. Through regional alignment, the Army maintains its warfighting skills and complements these skills with language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness training. Forces that are assigned to the theater must be prepared to transition from their current mission set to a new one if directed by the Army Service component commander and the GCC.

Its main purpose is to align the total Army forces to a CCMD whether that be assigned, allocated, or Service retained CCMD aligned (SRCA). Apportionment guidance of forces for planning are described in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. RAFs are provided to CCMDs by U.S. Army
Forces Command through the Mission Alignment Order. Inside of this construct are three categories of units:

- **Assigned to combatant commands.** Assigned forces are those forces and resources which have been placed under combatant command of a unified commander at the direction of the SecDef. Assigned units have a longstanding relationship with the command and have been used over time to address standing requirements within the AOR as the environment mandates. The CCDRs prefer this type of assignment due to their ability to influence specific organizations and, more importantly, it incorporates a clear chain of command.

- **Allocated to a combatant command.** Allocated forces are those forces temporarily provided to the CCMD with capabilities to meet specific mission requirements. The President of the U.S. or the SecDef provide allocated forces to a combatant commander for the execution of a specific assigned mission. Missions may include current operations and theater campaign plans within the parameters established by the SecDef. The majority of RAF task-organized under theater army control are allocated. They rotate in and out of theater, many on a rotational basis.

- **Service retained, combatant command aligned.** Service retained forces can be aligned to a combatant command, but trained by the Army in culture, language, and customs for a specific mission or to a region or sub-region of a CCDR’s AOR. Strike coordination and reconnaissance forces are neither assigned nor allocated to a unified combatant commander under the provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 162 and the unified command plan. As such, they remain under Army ADCON to execute functions assigned by the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY). The SECARMY has the authority to conduct the Title 10 recruit, train, and equip responsibilities that provide the limits of use to the CCMD during this period. Responsibilities are not restricted to the Continental U.S. and they could, if properly authorized, be done in the CCDR’s AOR.

To meet these upcoming challenges, the capabilities organically assigned in a brigade combat team (BCT) make it the RAF sourcing unit of choice for CCDRs. A BCT is the Army’s primary land domain maneuver force and is organized as a combined-arms team. BCTs are nearly self-sustaining for up to 72 hours and doctrinally require only limited external augmentation to conduct the full range of military operations.
Endnotes

1. U.S. Army South, Memorandum, Subject: G-3 COIC Recommendations, CALL Transitioning into a C/JTF, 25 Apr 2017. The USARSOUTH, G-5 Plans comments are contained in this memorandum in response to a CALL request for comments to update CALL Handbook No. 08-02, Transitioning into a JTF/Combined JTF, Dec 2007.


4. Assignments of forces are found in the Secretary’s “Forces for” Unified Commands Memorandum and in Section II of the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) pursuant to the Unified Command Plan (UCP).
Chapter 3
Preparing and Planning for Joint Operations

Part of the challenge is that as Army officers, we grow and develop predominantly in divisions from companies, batteries, battalions, squadrons, and brigades. As a consequence, our leaders do not necessarily grow to have the same in-depth understanding that the ASCC have. Often, many officers who have long and distinguished careers, lack the visibility of how this level of command sets theaters and engages, postures, and presents in relationships because you cannot surge relationships.

Senior Leader Insights, Judicious Response 17

Background

The key ingredient for a first rate and joint-capable staff is its ability to organize and train for joint operations. Whether the joint force is the geographic combatant command headquarters (HQ) itself, an Army Service component command (ASCC), a corps, or division, the HQ and its staff require a detailed process for integrating the people, information, and technology across the command. A trained joint planning staff understands operational art and should be able to translate the commander’s guidance and intent as well as efficiently and effectively devise suitable operational approaches. The joint planning staff should know how and when the commander makes decisions and develops a battle rhythm that complements the commander’s decision cycle.

Combatant commands usually stand up a joint task force (JTF) from either in-theater forces or from the continental U.S. in response to a crisis. The JTF HQ is likely to have significant forming challenges, especially in a no-notice crisis response scenario. Newly forming JTF HQ will likely not have the same level of operational environment knowledge or relationships, as the theater Service and functional component commands.

Being sourced from outside the theater is even more complicated. Division and corps HQ could be further challenged with understanding the operational and strategic environment. This complicates forming, planning, and the conduct of operations.

Recent operations and exercises indicate that without a significant effort, they will experience manning, equipping, and training challenges which could delay their forming and command and control (C2) capability. This includes the command’s ability to integrate their subordinate forces into a cohesive organization, and additionally, developing an understanding of how to best leverage supporting force capabilities for future operations.
Most commands orient across three event horizons: current operations (answering “what is”), future operations (focusing on solving “what if” questions), and future plans (looking at “what’s next”). Organizing planning actions over time helps in reconciliation and makes efficient use of limited time and other resources. Each of these event horizons usually requires some capacity for planning to develop appropriate plans and orders. Each event horizon has its own set of planning efforts that are competing for the limited personnel, capability, and expertise within the HQ. Once event horizons are established in the joint force HQ (JFHQ), staff principals are able to task personnel to be members of operational planning teams (OPTs) that analyze problems and develop options. Current and future operations planning normally falls under the purview of the J-3 with future plans under the J-5.

**Critical Recent Exercise Observations**

We need to make sure all OPT members understand the problem statement from the start.

Exactly who was an OPT member was unclear…

A number of OPTs are resourced with untrained personnel.

There was a lack of expertise within the OPT, particularly from the interagency community.

We need to train and practice our transitions between event horizons (handoffs).

We need more training on the planning processes for non-planners.

The joint force commander was over engaged, if planning is to be commander centric, then we need to treat time as a resource and husband it.

Army Universal Task List, Army tactical task – 5.1.3.5, Conduct Transitions, was used as the base reference in developing event horizons for an echelon above brigade (EAB) formation designated as a joint HQ. Transitions mark intervals between the ongoing operation and full execution of branches and sequels. Transitions often mark the change from one dominant type of operation, such as offense, to another such as stability. Commanders at all levels must possess the mental agility to rapidly transition from one type of operation to another. For example, at lower echelons, transitions occur when one formation passes through another or when units must breach an obstacle belt. Links between phases and the requirement to transition between phases are critically important.
Commanders establish clear conditions for how and when these transitions occur during planning. Although phases are distinguishable to friendly forces, the operational design conceals these distinctions from opponents through concurrent and complementary joint and Army actions.

Important to understand and directly impacting the ability of EAB HQ to form a JFHQ is that in 2013, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) directed 15-40 percent force reductions. Senior leader reduction guidance was based on Army fiscal constraints. The reductions were not based on the actual roles, functions, and requirements of the theater army. The reductions create a significant capability gap for some theater armies to meet all of their Title 10, Army support to other Services (ASOS), executive agent, and geographic combatant commander (GCC) directed operational requirements. Personnel cuts have had a deep impact on the theater army’s ability to conduct planning.

**Joint Planning**

Simplicity in planning fosters energy in execution. Strong determination in carrying through a simple idea is the surest route to success. The winning simplicity we seek, the simplicity of genius, is the result of intense mental engagement.

Carl von Clausewitz

The Joint Planning Process (JPP) is applicable for all planning efforts at the joint level; Army sourced JTFs should use this process vice the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) so that Service components can better integrate. Similar to MDMP and like operational design, it is a logical process to approach a problem and determine a solution. Staffs should master this process while understanding that it is a tool to be used by planners but is not prescriptive.

The JPP is an orderly and analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action (COAs); select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. Much like the application of operational design provides the conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations, the JPP provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners. The staff should use it to focus on defining the military mission and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission.

Familiarity with operational art and operational design (Joint Publication [JP] 5-0, Joint Planning, 16 Jun 2017) is critical to understanding the GCC’s intent and to discern the correct mission and develop creative and
adaptive concept of operations to accomplish the mission. JPP applies to both supported and supporting joint force commands and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. The HQ should use JPP to facilitate interaction between and among the commander, staff, and subordinate and supporting HQ throughout planning.

The Army War College’s Campaign Planning Handbook is an excellent resource for joint planners. Its purpose is to assist commanders, planners, and other staff officers in combatant commands, JTFs, and Service component commands. It supplements joint doctrine and contains elements of emerging doctrine as practiced globally by joint force commanders. It portrays a way to apply doctrine and emerging doctrine at the higher levels of joint command, with a primary emphasis at the combatant command level.

Comparing the Joint Planning Process and the MDMP

The MDMP is a deliberate process used by Army staffs to produce written orders. It may be used in full, or partially, depending on the situation, the time constraints, and the experience of the commander and staff.

The MDMP is an iterative planning methodology that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate HQ, and other partners to understand the situation and mission; develop and compare courses of action; decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an operation plan or order for execution.3

The MDMP is further defined in Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 5 May 2014, by the following:

- It helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions.

- It helps commanders, staffs, and others think critically and creatively while planning.

- It facilitates collaborative planning. The higher HQ solicits input and continuously shares information concerning future operations through planning meetings, warning orders, and other means.
• It shares information with subordinate and adjacent units, supporting and supported units, and other military and civilian partners.

• It encourages active collaboration among all organizations affected by the pending operations to build a shared understanding of the situation, participate in course of action development and decision-making, and resolve conflicts before publishing the plan or order.

• It focuses on developing an understanding of the current situation and determining what to assess and how to assess progress using measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

Figure 3-1. MDMP and JPP Comparison (School of Advanced Military Studies)
Like the MDMP and other Service-specific processes for decision making, the JPP is an analytical method providing an orderly approach to planning before and during joint operations. The focus of the JPP is on the interaction between a military commander, staff, and commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands. Although the ultimate goal of the JPP is the completion of an operational plan or order, the process is ongoing as a unit must continually plan and produce operational plans, orders and fragmentary orders for future operations and to make adjustments to current operations. Staff officers must be fully involved in each step of the JPP if one is to ensure all capabilities are integrated into all phases of operations.

**Planning Insights and Observations from Current Operations and Exercises**

These insights and observations include the following:

- Leverage the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). The JECC remains the key enabler to an EAB HQ transitioning to a JTF HQ. Successful HQ integrate the JECC personnel into several joint planning groups.

- Getting joint planners on a joint manning document (JMD) fully resourced and approved is still a challenge. Having pre-built and approved JMDs specific to designated operational plans and mission sets (i.e., humanitarian assistance/disaster relief [HA/DR], pandemic outbreaks, or decisive operations) will address some of the challenges. The most significant challenges affecting an EAB HQ transitioning to a JTF HQ remains the time it takes to fill the JMD once it is activated.

- Incorporating the sustainment enterprise (Army Material Command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, and Defense Logistics Agency) into the U.S. Army Africa planning process early was key to success. Further logistics planning is not sustainment business, it is commanders’ business.

- Joint and Army doctrine states that the Army corps is the preferred option for forming a joint force land component command or JTF; while combatant commanders often see component commands as the preferred option. The Army has limitations in terms of the number of corps available and the required pre-deployment preparation.

- The need to communicate a clear mission to subordinate organizations is critical. In today’s multi-domain operational environment, the lines between warfighting and condition setting are now blurred and may exist across both time and space. This may be observed if a theater army is transitioning to a JTF and also must retain its theater shaping mission. In addition, one must also consider the impact on personnel
in the headquarters if a single organization is given the task of transitioning to a JTF without adequate augmentation.

- Clearing of the mission command lines for conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF) is critical. While integration of CF and SOF improved throughout the operation, more cooperation between CF and SOF on the ground is needed in Phase 0 (shape).

- Understanding the roles of Title 22, U.S. Code (USC), *Foreign Relations and Intercourse* and Title 10, USC, *Armed Forces* organizations is needed. Title 22 contains the principal set of rules and regulations issued by federal agencies regarding foreign relations, while Title 10 outlines the role of armed forces. Title 10 provides the legal basis for the roles, missions and organization of each of the Services as well as the U.S. Department of Defense. The role of security cooperation and foreign military sales (Office of Security Cooperation and the respective embassy) must complement the role of Army and joint forces in partner nation exercises, training, and equipping.

- Plans for sharing information across the coalition must be considered prior to the transition to a joint headquarters, to include network command and control integration, trained foreign disclosure officers and classification instructions. The most formidable challenge is that, often, coalitions are ad hoc in nature. Despite detailed planning prior to the formation of the coalition, adjustments may still be required in order for the commander, the staff, and subordinate units to effectively share information both vertically and horizontally across the JTF.

- The EAB planners operating in a joint HQ are challenged to maintain productivity over longer periods of time due to a lack of personnel depth across staff sections; specifically smaller staff sections.

- Lack of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) II field grades inhibits joint planning.

- Staffs are challenged to plan for or understand transitions between echelons.

- Commander’s critical information requirements and decision tools do not support timely decisions.

- Poor knowledge management such as point-to-point (i.e., email) communication inhibits shared understanding.

**Transition planning considerations for determining the joint HQ.**

Planners must consider whether the force is to be used across the area of responsibility (AOR) or for a single joint operating area (JOA).
Consideration must also include the size of the force and the capabilities of the Service force commanders and their staffs. The staff must consider other missions assigned (or likely to be assigned) to the Service force commanders. Normally the Service component commander with the preponderance of land forces to be tasked and the requisite command and control capabilities will be designated the functional component commander. For instance, when the theater level Service component commander is designated, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) normally delegates as many of the Service component-related duties as practical to a subordinate.

**Transition planning considerations for composition of the joint force land component command staff.** The staff size should reflect the size, composition, and capability of the assigned forces. The HQ will be required to conduct detailed functional planning and execution with the staff to accomplish this. Normally the JFLCC will build his staff around the “core” of his existing Service HQ with augmentees from the other Service components or multinational forces to provide the necessary expertise and representation. As an example, when U.S. Army Central becomes the joint force land component command for the U.S. Central Command, it is normally augmented by more than 100 Marines.

**Structuring the combined JTF and joint force land component HQ.** The combined JTF/joint force land component command HQ should be structured with a command group, command staff, a robust plans team (with near, mid-term, long-term campaign planning), and an operations section (daily operations, information integration, operations synchronization, and coordination). There should be an interagency coordination and integration cell (for agencies that do not have a daily role in the combined JTF/joint force land component command HQ operations). Included as well, is an intelligence fusion cell (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyber, information, and influencing operations), and a knowledge and information management section (network management, knowledge management, assessments).

**Task organization.** Task organization of critical assets (i.e., unmanned aerial systems, fires, radars, mobile bridge companies) should be a deliberate decision based on a larger, iterative discussion and articulation of division and subordinate unit roles and responsibilities at certain points during combat operations. The commander sets priority of resources based on the phase of a mission (if phased). There will always be a tension based on a desire to maintain centralized control of a critical asset and the ability to maintain tempo and combat capability at the lowest tactical levels (1st Infantry Division Warfighter, Exercise 16-04).
**Staff actions required for transition.** The Army HQ designated to become a combined JTF/joint force land component command HQ must conduct thorough planning to facilitate the transition to the respective joint force land component command HQ. The staff has to plan the transition in becoming a combined JTF/joint force land component command HQ like any other operation or endeavor. The G-3/J-5 (operations) in collaboration with the G-5/J-5 (plans) and the other G/J staff must review the base JMD’s base JMD (modification may be required) to ensure it takes into account potential theater contingencies and assists the EAB in the transition to a joint force land component command. Education of the core EAB HQ staff on joint force land component command doctrine, terminology and processes, other agency and coalition abilities, and breaking the Service parochial thinking (the “only we can do this” process) is critical. Practice, thorough review of after action reviews, and fine tuning planning processes and operations as seen in numerous theater-level exercises, pays off. Understanding the various JFHQ mission sets and spending the time in building an operable JMD that incorporates the required other Services and agencies required for mission execution provides significant dividends.

**Figure 3-2. Combined JTF/joint force land component command HQ options.**

**Assignment of planning efforts.** EAB HQ small planning staffs are challenged to quickly identify, assign, and track planning efforts that would support development of branches and sequels. The EAB HQ, post focus area review group (FARG) II, will require a more effective process for assigning planning efforts to future operations (FUOPS) and plans. In a personnel constrained environment, the HQ must design a method to effectively receive guidance and information coming from various updates and assessment briefings and incorporate them into the planning cycle and organize OPTs to support these operations. The requirement for
potential branches and sequels must be vigorously tracked. As planning efforts are identified and assigned to either FUOPS, Plans, or OPTs, back briefs should be scheduled with the commanding general (CG) to receive new or additional guidance, review the status of plans and operations, and potentially obtain decisions.

To meet this challenge and work through the change in the manning situation, the EAB HQ must use the Joint Staff Officer’s Guide to produce standard operating procedures (SOP) and training to the organization. The development of a sustainable battle rhythm is critical. The battle rhythm must capture the commander’s guidance and the process of identifying implied tasks that lead to assigning planning efforts with required touch points. Planning management venues should be established to discuss efforts, obtain further guidance, or get approval from the CG.

**Develop situational understanding.** A thorough understanding of the mission must be obtained through mission analysis and framing of the problem sets being presented by the mission.6

The use of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) provides a starting point to understanding the mission in a complex environment. This methodology assists analysts in providing a systematic approach to guide staff sections and decision makers’ understanding and to ensure each category interacts and affects the others at the operational level for each particular environment. Including representatives from the Department of State during this planning effort provides an important mechanism to appropriately conduct planning and coordination. Focus on the information element of PMESII-PT allows a means to formulate a plan to expand and explain what the military mission is and stress the importance of the transition to Phase IV (stabilize) of the operation. The PMESII-PT analysis framework allows analysts to refer back and adjust as new information becomes available to best understand complex environments in which they operate.
While collective training is a critical component of the preparation construct, it is not the only component nor is it a foundational component. Before we can effectively train collectively, we must first establish competencies at the individual level. Moreover, all training requirements should be driven by mission derived capability requirements. Taken in sum, the need to enhance existing collective joint force land component command training activities, develop individual joint force land component command training activities, and orient joint force land component command training towards warfighter mission capability requirements are the key drivers behind today’s joint force land component command training re-engineering efforts.

“Re-engineering Joint Training – Phase I” Paper
Joint Staff J-7/Joint Training Division

Assess joint readiness and develop a training plan. As units become aware of potential JFHQ requirements, the commander and staff should conduct an assessment of the level of joint education and training on staff. If time and resources are available, the unit may be able to leverage professional education. Otherwise, the command can leverage other means to obtain increased joint fundamentals for the staff in the following ways:

- Identifying personnel with joint experience (both joint qualified and having served in a joint assignment)
- Assigning personnel to complete relevant joint training and other functional capability focused courses on Joint Knowledge Online
- Educating the base staff on joint doctrine, terminology, the other agencies abilities, and breaking the Service parochial thinking (the “only we can do this” process)
- Coordinating for joint doctrine deployable training teams through the Joint Staff J-7 to lead professional military education sessions at home station
- Acquiring allocations for the JPME II course for key personnel
- Integrating “joint” training objectives into Service (i.e., Army) exercises. If possible, the command should coordinate for observer/coach trainer with joint expertise from either the Mission Command Training Program, the Joint Staff Deployable Training Teams, or from the supported combatant command
Identifying and agree to participate in joint exercises during the geographic combatant command or Army level resourcing conferences. Units may use the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) to locate joint exercises that have requested Army sourcing for HQ elements to support the exercise.

**Joint manning plan.** The EAB HQ should conduct JMD analysis before a crisis occurs. The JFHQ will tailor the JMD to accomplish specific mission requirements before the GCC assigns a mission. However, an EAB HQ can develop a baseline joint manning plan (JMP) built around a capabilities-based JMD and eliminate, add, or resize positions upon mission assignment. Another approach is to have several pre-tailored JMDs aimed at discrete potential missions identified during mission analysis. In both options, the EAB HQ can refine rather than develop a JMD from scratch during crisis action planning.

The JMP should account for what JMD positions are ideal for coalition staff, unit fills, or joint and interagency enablers. The JMP must also identify key positions that require immediate fill, specific ranks, skillsets, or Service fills. Since JMD sourcing is a time-consuming process, especially when it comes to individual augmentees, the JMD should fill the JMD with internal staff, dedicated enabler support such as JECC, the combatant command and its Service components’ staff, units, and sub-units, in that order.

Joint publications discuss the tasks associated with forming and operating as a JFHQ in general terms. A review of the Universal Joint Task List will provide insight into the tasks associated with forming and operating as a JFHQ. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, 31 Jan 2018 provides checklists for transition to permanent operations, joint staff directorates, joint special staff, and transition of a JTF into a multinational force. EAB transitioning to a JFHQ should consider developing a joint training plan that prepares the staff to operate as a JFHQ focusing particularly on understanding and using joint doctrine and the joint planning process.

**Plans, future operations, and current operations transitions.** Joint planning SOPs are critical – staffs are expected to master the JPP and be well-versed in the elements of operational art. The HQ must conduct a deliberate development of a battle rhythm in accordance with established working group arrangements. Some HQ lack a joint plans SOP, which prevents the unit from transitioning planning efforts and associated products from plans to FUOPs and current operations (CUOPS) or from FUOPS to CUOPS. An SOP that describes the relationship and plans handover between plans, FUOPS, and CUOPS is critical. It is even more crucial in a post FARG II environment. The lack of this capability limits shared understanding. It is critical that, for example, members of CUOPS know where to locate and how to display critical execution tools on the current
TRANSITION TO A JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

operations integrations cell (COIC) floor, such as the decision support matrix, decision support template, execution matrix, and graphics. The formal handover brief will ensure that the COIC staff fully understands the plan before execution. The transition briefing is a mission briefing that generally follows the five-paragraph operation order (OPORD) format. See Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 17 May 2012, for an in-depth discussion.

![Figure 3-3. U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) JMD Process (ARCENT G-5 Plans).](image)

Staff training and a well-developed SOP is key to a successful “handover” which ensures all members of the COIC fully understand the plan before execution. Headquarters should use professional development sessions to develop processes for plans to operations transitions or “handover” to increase an overall shared understanding.
**Best practice:** Creating a knowledge management venue and system, captured in the SOP, where all integrating and functional cells understand where products are located for reference.

**Security cooperation – building partnership capacity during the competition phase and beyond.** The joint force command must assess security cooperation (SC) and security force assistance (SFA) requirements while continuing to support the detailed regional and country support plans. Identifying authority gaps as well as integrating regionally aligned forces while meeting the GCC’s theater security cooperation (TSC) objectives, and the desires of the various stakeholders must continue during a conflict in the JOA. The joint force command staff must plan, develop, align, and prioritize SC activities within the theater and the GCC’s planning process. TSC professionals recognize that the difficulty is in integrating the various planning inputs and resources into a coherent plan that will support the objectives of the GCC, the country team, and the theater army. This is exacerbated during conflict. JTF’s should leverage the ASCC’s relatively robust SC planning apparatus. The nascent security force assistance brigade (SFAB) brigades and the Ministry of Defense Advisor (MODA) program greatly enable a JTF to influence the host and partner nations.

![Three Event Horizons](image)

**Figure 3-4. Event horizons.**
**Planning branches and sequels.** Many EAB HQ do not have an effective process for assigning planning efforts to FUOPs based on Chief of Staff and J-3 operational guidance and information received from various update and assessment briefings. When the CG and deputy CG (DCG) direct planning efforts, the J-35 (future operations) and J-5 (plans) must organize OPTs to support these operations. As planning efforts are identified and assigned to either FUOPS, Plans, or OPTs, touch points should be scheduled with the CG to review the statuses, receive additional planning guidance, and obtain decisions.

Flexible plans help units adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Commanders and planners build opportunities for initiative into plans by anticipating events that allow them to operate inside of the enemy’s decision cycle or to react promptly to deteriorating situations. Identifying decision points and designing branches ahead of time, combined with a clear commander’s intent, help create flexible plans.⁹

As previously stated, units must produce SOPs and develop a battle rhythm to capture the commander’s guidance and the process of identifying implied tasks that lead to assigning planning efforts with required touch points. Planning management venues should be established to discuss efforts and obtain further guidance or get approval from the CG.

![Figure 3-5. Functional versus integrating cells (FM 3-94, Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operation, 21 Apr 2014).](image-url)
ASCCs have the mission to set the theater. However, the entire U.S. Africa Command Theater cannot be set simultaneously. Therefore, U.S. Army, Africa prioritizes and shapes the security environment regionally and sub-regionally. Key elements to setting and shaping the AOR are sustainment, intelligence, mission command posts, fixed and deployable communication systems and networks.

**Collaborate - Coordinate - Share**

**Expansion of conflicts beyond the battlefield.** The containment of the actions and effects of a conflict to a particular physical space in a small or isolated AOR is increasingly rare. State and non-state actors equally have access to resources that will allow them to expand the range of conflicts beyond this space. In the battlespace, the inclusion of cyber and information dimensions, for example, emerges as a reality to be faced in conflicts.

**Growing importance of information operations.** Advances in information technology are providing greater synergy in combat by combining advanced C2 capabilities, intelligence, the use of artificial intelligence, and robotics. Situational awareness and the ability to inform and influence specific audiences assumed a role of irreversible importance in the operating environment.

The proliferation of long-range precision weapons will enable a greater number of countries to obtain the capacity for destruction of their opponent’s strategic structures. The increase of military capabilities leveraged by incorporating information technology into combat systems makes their own information a priority target in future conflicts.

**Evolution of irregular war capabilities.** Conflicts will rarely be decided on traditional battlefields. These conflicts (between states or otherwise) tend to be a mixture of conventional weapons, tactics, and employment of irregular terrorist actions in the battlespace. The profusion of light armaments and modern communication technologies (satellites, mobile telephony, internet, and commercial encoding), combined with compact navigation devices and high-capacity information systems (with the ability to manage a large amount of data including text, maps, digitized images, dynamic digital layers and videos) facilitate any agent’s access to capabilities previously exclusive to state military forces. With such capabilities, nonstate groups can more easily organize, coordinate, and perform actions against governments and populations, contributing to a significant portion of the threats of the future assuming forms of irregular combat.

**Prevalence of the nonmilitary aspects in the solution of conflicts.** In current conflicts with few exceptions, the use of political, economic,
psychosocial, and scientific technological expressions of national power have preponderance over military expression. Contemporary society’s repulsion for the loss of human lives should amplify the option for alternative solutions. The use of instruments of economic pressure, control of resources (natural and technological), and the exploitation of information tend to influence even more directly in the search for solutions to conflicts.

The employment of typically military capabilities is assuming new forms. Civil affairs, civil-military cooperation, humanitarian assistance (national and international), and the participation of international organizations, among others, will normally be present in this new operational environment.

**Planning for unified action partner integration.** During mission analysis, identify partners and the coordination requirements for planning use of liaison officers (LNOs) up front. The time to allow others to participate cannot be replaced. Determine if the command will require a digital liaison detachment and get it moving at the earliest possible time. Request unified action requirements to the joint staff as soon as possible as this will avoid planning in a vacuum without the benefit of interagency input.

The value of the LNO cannot be underestimated in a joint operating environment. LNOs provide key information from their units to the command in regards to planning and capabilities. By definition, the LNO is the commander’s representative to the supported or supporting command and as such, has authority to engage the commander.

The LNOs, if used effectively, can provide critical information to the command in multinational and unilateral efforts. The LNO team fosters a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitates the transfer of vital information, enhances mutual trust, and develops an increased level of teamwork. The LNO supplies significant information for the joint force HQ about subordinate force readiness, training, and other factors. Early establishment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications systems, doctrine, and operating procedures.

Observations from current operations and exercises confirm that having the LNO present provides timely information before said information is presented at a formal briefing. For example, a joint force land component command received information an hour after critical information was received from a subordinate unit. Also critical is to select, as the LNO, a highly competent officer or noncommissioned officer that is comfortable speaking to higher ranking personnel.

Staff understanding of treaties and authorities is critical to planning efforts and overall success. Knowledge of organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and partner capabilities and processes is critical to have at hand. Understanding and leveraging partner capabilities
ensures combat power is not wasted. Conducting professional development with partner or host nation staffs is a great way to educate the staff. If resources are available, send select personnel to the JPME II course or partner courses like the NATO Staff Officer Course.

**Intelligence planning.** The joint intelligence process provides the basis for common intelligence terminology and procedures. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment is the continuous process through which J-2 (intelligence) manages the analysis and development of products that help the commander and staff understand the complex and interconnected operational environment which is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities that bear on the decisions of the commander. Intelligence must be equally prepared to support linear and nonlinear operations. Nonlinear operations are particularly challenging due to their emphasis on simultaneous operations along multiple lines of operations. The complexity of nonlinear operations places a premium on a continuous flow of accurate and timely intelligence to help protect individual forces. This flow of intelligence supports precise targeting, mobility, freedom of action, and is enabled by persistent surveillance, dynamic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance management as well as a common intelligence picture – the intelligence portion of the common operating picture.

Newly formed J-2 CUOPS must codify procedures for managing the tactical entity database (TED) and critical information protection (CIP) across the implemented mission command systems. In addition, establishment of an SOP that facilitates subordinate unit understanding of data inputs into the TED can ensure easy ingestion and translation to other systems. Finally, the analysis and control element and COIC should routinely display enemy information two levels below the responsible HQ along with known or templated locations of separate elements containing high payoff target list units.

The newly formed J-2 directorate’s representatives deliver tailored products to staff working groups or provide personnel with required experience to represent the section in those working groups. Many working groups began with a brief general update of the enemy situation rather than one tailored for the specific function or topics of the working group. This reduced the situational understanding of those in attendance and thereby directly impacted the overall effectiveness of the meeting’s outputs. In addition, intelligence representatives should disseminate the minutes of all working group sessions with the rest of the J-2 to provide awareness of actions and workgroup discussions across the command.

**Commonality in topographic products.** The joint force commander (JFC) should consider establishing a geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) cell (to
include partner nations) early in the planning process to manage GEOINT activities under the joint force’s command structure. The JFC can request the establishment of this cell via the supported combatant command, which typically includes both the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency civilian and military personnel, with representation from Service GEOINT organizations. GEOINT, in the form of features, topography, elevation, terrain, hydrology, controlled imagery base, geodetic sciences, geographic names and boundaries, aeronautical, maritime digital point positioning database, and human geography, provides the basic framework for visualizing the joint common operational pictures. Making sure the joint force and its partner nations have a common foundation for supporting joint operations will better enable mission accomplishment across the range of military operations (JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations).

**Special operations integration.** Integration of special operations personnel into the HQ can give the commander and staff access to capabilities that do not reside in an EAB HQ. Enduring military and security assistance missions conducted by special operations forces (SOF) can be a critical link to incorporate partner and host nation support into the planning and execution of operations. Without the SOF LNO team, the joint force command will not be able to exploit unique SOF capabilities that could enhance its ability to understand and shape the battlefield, as well as address gaps the HQ organic capabilities could not address. This understanding includes situational awareness of partnered host nation activities, intelligence associated with the U.S. Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (USJFSOCC) components, personnel recovery support through nonconventional assisted recovery, and precise targeting and battle damage assessment. The SOF LNOs should be invited to all planning and rehearsals and should be integrated into all phases of planning and operations. As an example of this, during an exercise, the USJFSOCC common operational picture and support to the JFHQ, to include task and purpose, was not discussed.

The JFHQ must request and incorporate SOF LNOs into the staff as early as possible, to include participation in the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), mission rehearsals, and throughout planning and execution of operations. Their inclusion informs the staff on the current situation, as well as the SOF mission, intentions and requirements (FM 6-05, Conventional Force-SOF Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability and Interdependence, 4 Apr 2018).

**Sustainment planning.** For an EAB HQ in the role of a JTF or joint force land component command HQ to be successful, the sustainment staff and planners must understand the authorities, goals, and limitations of other joint enterprise partners in Phase 0 (shape). Capitalizing on and leveraging
other stakeholders’ capabilities and resources is critical. Determine what support other U.S. government agencies and non-governmental organizations can provide. These agencies can play a key role in providing logistics support during combat as well as relief and reconstruction operations. Likewise, plan to support other agencies and execute ASOS agreements.

Sustainment is one of the seven joint functions supporting joint forces in an increasingly complex operating environment that will be a common aspect of joint operations into the near future. The sustainment and logistics demands in complex contingencies require an “enterprise” approach as they often overcome the ability of a particular nation, military, or government to manage alone. Early and continuous sustainment planning and execution cannot be overemphasized. Sustainment planning is vital and must be deliberate, detailed, in-depth, and continuous.

Sustainment in the joint sense includes the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. The definition of sustainment is not always clearly understood in the joint operating environment. Sustainment encompasses all of the core logistics capabilities to include supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, health services support, logistics services, engineering, and operational contract support as well as personnel services, including human resources support, religious ministry support, financial management, and legal support. This is particularly important as an ASCC transitions into a joint force and must be capable of immediately operating in this environment.

**Time phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) and human resources planning requirements.** To support TPFDD flow and setting the theater, theater support commands may require a human resource service center (HRSC) in theater prior to initiation of the concept plan or operations plan. The Army has established HRSCs as “theater committed.” This places those units last on the list for deployment through the global force management process. Unfortunately, as the Army has executed force reductions, the number and size of HRSCs has reduced. The original concept was for a larger HRSC to self sustain deployments by having duplicate sections that could rotate in a theater of operations and conduct reach back operations. The Army has reduced the size of the HRSC from 84 to 67 personnel and eliminated this capability. The Army currently maintains three Active Army and two Army Reserve HRSCs. This means that with a one-to-one dwell or ratio for Army forces and a one-to-five for Army Reserve forces, HRSCs are guaranteed to deploy as long as we are allocating an additional HRSC to the U.S. Central Command AOR.
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Wartime replacement operations. Planners should be aware that there is a lack of clarity for wartime replacements between U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC); Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) G-1; and U.S. Army Forces Command. Follow-on unit force flow would be required to regenerate combat power within the theater.

Army Regulation 600-8-111, *Wartime Replacement Operations*, 13 Aug 1993 prescribes the development of a wartime replacement SHELF (This term is used to determine the military and civilian personnel filler requirements and stratify the Army military casualty replacement requirements. This function is known as the SHELF. The SHELF is the basis for the development of the non-unit-related personnel portion of the TPFDD) that would provide individual personnel to the theater that would be held and distributed by replacement battalions and companies under the ASCC and corps. The Army no longer has replacement units. The HRC now directs individual replacement personnel to the brigade combat teams at their home stations and they are processed through the Continental U.S. Replacement Center for direct fill to their assigned unit on the battlefield. Additionally, the Army has shifted its focus to unit rotation versus reconstituting units via individual replacement operations.

JTFs and joint force land component commands often struggle with understanding authorities. Developing a matrix of authorities or similar tool will allow JTFs and joint force land component commands to better understand and track the myriad of authorities and facilitate decision making. Planners must have a thorough knowledge and understand the particular plan they are executing and know the plans that link into the original plan. This should be accomplished through academics or scheduled train-up sessions. In any given AOR, there are several Joint Chiefs of Staff approved plans. These singular plans may be executed in sequence or in parallel, will be joint, and likely to involve bilateral, multilateral, or coalition partners. Officers need to understand the cascading or cumulative effects of moving air missile defense and other assets based on the plans being executed (how they are interconnected and how they affect risk).

While it may not be possible to leverage officers with joint experience, action officers with appropriate familiarity, knowledge, and experience with the mission need to be present at the many working groups.

Planners at multiple levels struggle with joint phasing applicability in the multi-domain battle operational environment. The joint phasing construct is based on a warfighting concept that envisions a campaign or operation as it is preferred to be fought. It likely will not unfold this way with an uncooperative enemy that has studied and understands our intentions and capabilities. This is true of campaigning in the competition phase and in armed conflict. Branches and sequels to operations and
campaigns must account for previously unknown factors that will reveal themselves in all domains. Previously hidden external forces, despite our successes, will reshape the conflict into new competition in the domains of their choosing.

The enemy in all phases, for the most part, will use its capabilities and strategies to deny U.S. forces the ability to operate seamlessly across domains. They will do this while simultaneously seeking to deliver effects in the cyber, space, and information realms. These realms, which will obfuscate phases, give them the chance to achieve objectives before even engaging U.S. forces in combat. Multi-domain battle (MDB) planners must look beyond phasing while not excluding or discarding it. JP 5-0 supports this and states that commanders determine the number and purpose of phases used during a campaign or operation. The use of the phases provides a way to arrange activities in all domains – and may prove most applicable at the tactical mid-operational levels. The problem that MDB identifies is that some domains will be in different stages of competition or conflict while others remain clearly in Phase 0 (or another stage). To that end, the JFLCC may eschew phasing and may find it useful to be sequential and phase his operations in a linear deploy-forcible entry-defense-offense-consolidate gains type of progression.

Endnotes

1. There are two types of ASCCs: theater armies and functional commands. In accordance with AR 10-87, theater armies are ASCCs assigned to a geographic combatant command. Functional commands, such as U.S. Army Special Operations Command and U.S. Army Cyber Command, exercise their functions, roles and tasks with their aligned combatant commands (in this case, U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Cyber Command).
5. Ibid.
6. ARSOUTH Input to CALL Transition HB, page 1
7. Reference CJCSI 1330.05A ‘Joint Officer Management Programs and Procedures’ for additional information on joint officer qualification.
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Chapter 4
Forming the Headquarters

The individual Services have evolved capabilities and competencies to maximize their effectiveness in their respective domains. Even more importantly, the ability to integrate these diverse capabilities into a joint whole that is greater than the sum of the Service parts is an unassailable American strategic advantage.

Admiral M. G. Mullen
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Background

Army echelons above brigade (EAB) (theater army/Army Service component commands [ASCC]), corps, and divisions) must be prepared to operate and lead in joint and combined operations. More specifically, they must have the capability of transitioning from an Army headquarters, when augmented with personnel and equipment, to a joint force headquarters (JFHQ). Army leaders and their staffs must understand that at a specific point in time, their focus will shift from Army-centric to combined/joint-centric operations.

This chapter highlights some of the challenges and insights associated with forming an Army-centric joint headquarters from a number of venues to include insights as well as lessons and best practices identified during interviews with senior leadership and staff from 101st Airborne Division in Operation United Assistance–Liberia and U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) Operation Inherent Resolve–Iraq. In addition, this study integrates observations and analysis from recent theater exercise collections in which Army organizations that transitioned to a joint headquarters (U.S. Army Europe-Austere Challenge 17, U.S. Army Pacific-Yama Sakura 17, and U.S. Army Africa-Judicious Response 17). Finally, the chapter contains some insights identified by the Joint Enabling Capability Command (subordinate command to U.S. Transportation Command) and the Joint Staff J-7 Deployable Training Team during named recent operations and joint training exercises. Some of the identified challenges include the following:

- Understanding establishing authorities
- Understanding the differing options available to commanders
- Understanding the options to augment the headquarters, specifically, joint manning document (JMD) development and insight into the manpower requirements and sourcing personnel to effectively
transition a single-Service organization (typically an Army corps) from its Service-related missions to that of a JFHQ

- Understanding the different sources of augmentation available to a JFHQ core staff
- Identifying, developing, and understanding some of the authorities involved with conducting operations
- Integrating support elements

U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and Europe confirmed that achieving national strategic objectives in today’s global environment is a task beyond the capabilities of any single U.S. Government (USG) organization. The scope, complexity, uncertainty, speed, and interdependence of events in today’s environment require highly adaptable organizations capable of integrating operations across the whole of government spectrum. To a greater degree diplomatic, informational, and economic factors, as well as the military, (U.S. elements of national power), affect and contribute to national security in this complex and unpredictable environment. A comprehensive and whole of government(s) approach incorporates unified action and the integrated efforts of a wide range of external organizations. To achieve success, U.S. military operations, must be conducted as part of a larger consortium of USG departments and agencies, nongovernmental and private organizations, as well as to include the governmental and nongovernmental organizations of other nations.¹

Although individual Services may plan and conduct operations to accomplish tasks and missions in support of Department of Defense (DOD) objectives, the primary way the DOD employs two or more Services (from two military departments) in a single operation, particularly in combat, is through joint operations. Joint operations is the general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces in specified command relationships with each other.²

Significant challenges exist to effectively integrate and synchronize Service and combat support agency capabilities in joint operations. Functionally related capabilities and activities can be grouped into what are termed joint functions. Joint functions facilitate planning and employment of the joint force and include capabilities and are nested with the Army Warfighting functions. This includes command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment (Joint Publication [JP] 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, 31 May 2016).³ In subsequent chapters, insights from recent exercises and deployments will analyze lessons and best practices as Army EAB organizations transitioned from their standing structure to support the joint commander.
Strategic Guidance and Planning

In previous years, combatant commanders (CCDRs) and their staff received numerous strategic documents to provide guidance regarding theater missions. As many products were not synchronized with the others and often released independent of each other, the result was collective strategy that lacked a coherency required to conduct efficient joint operations. In 2008, the DOD consolidated and integrated five separate guidance documents into a single strategic directive now known as Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF, which is only available to authorized individuals, addresses security cooperation, contingency planning, global posture, global force management, and U.S. policy regarding nuclear weapons.4

In addition to the GEF, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides guidance to the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP accurately reflects the dynamics of ongoing conflicts and changes in strategic guidance dissemination. Most importantly, CCDRs can be tasked to develop a variety of plans that includes: campaign plans, contingency plans, and plans common to all combatant commands (CCMDs).

One aspect of the current JSCP that differs from earlier versions is the force apportionment construct. Earlier JSCPs contained tables which apportioned forces to specific plans – a configuration that was adequate for the pre-Global War on Terror force structure. However, the current JSCP seeks to mitigate the realities of the current operational environment by apportioning forces based upon the knowledge of both current and projected force deployments in support of ongoing operations.

Beginning with the 2008 GEF/JSCP, the requirement was introduced for CCDRs to develop campaign plans in support of their theater (or functional) strategies. The intent of the campaign plan is to “operationalize” CCDRs’ strategies and to transition planning from a “contingency-centric” focus to a “strategy-centric” design with an eye towards identifying all steady state force and resource requirements.

While CCDRs have been given latitude in how the campaign plan might be constructed, geographic combatant command plans are expected to include:

- A comprehensive integration of steady state activities (security cooperation and other shaping activities)
- Theater posture plans (as annexes to the theater campaign plans)
- Contingency plans (“branches” to the campaign plan)
Identification of supporting force providers (DOD Services, functional component commands, as well as DOD agencies and field activities)

Planners, at both the geographic combatant command and ASCC, can use this guidance to begin shaping theater (and specifically, joint task force [JTF] or joint force land component command requirements) for their respective contingency plans. As GEF/JSCP-directed plans are developed, staffs can develop transition plans and begin working through the Global Force Management (GFM) process to source personnel and equipment to support both emerging and existing contingency plans. For more detail on GFM, refer to Appendix B, Global Force Management.

Recognizing that operations against Daesh required full joint integration, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) designated combined joint force land component command-Iraq as Combined JTF-Operation Inherent Resolve, eventually becoming a combined JTF in the middle of October 2014. The JMD was created to sustain a combined JTF while continuing theater army responsibilities for a command that was also designated as a combined joint force land component command by USCENTCOM for operations in the joint operations area. The time frame from submission of the JMD until boots were on the ground was anticipated at 120 days from the Secretary of Defense’s approval. To mitigate this gap, USARCENT was able to work with joint Service component commands in theater — another USARCENT standing relationship — to assist with joint fills until the respective Service headquarters could assess their requirements.

Center for Army Lessons Learned
Initial Impressions Report
Combined JTF-Operation Inherent Resolve

Authority to Establish

In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10 U.S. Code Armed Forces, and as described in the Unified Command Plan, combatant commands (CCMDs) are established by the President through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), with the advice and assistance of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) when so authorized by the SecDef. JTFs can be established by the SecDef, combatant commander (CCDR), subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander.

Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs normally will direct the delegation of operational control (OPCON) over forces attached to those subordinate commands. A joint force commander (JFC) has the authority to organize assigned or attached forces with specification of OPCON to best accomplish the assigned mission based upon intent, the concept of operations (CONOPS), and consideration of Service organizations (JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 31 Jan 2018).

**Operational control.** This is command authority that may be exercised by commanders to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces. It includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not by itself include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training (JP 3-33).

**Tactical control** (TACON) is inherent in OPCON. TACON is command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Commanders may delegate TACON to subordinate commanders and may exercise TACON over assigned or attached forces or military capabilities or forces made available for tasking (JP 3-33).

**Options to form a Joint Force**

**What is the preferred approach?** The preferred approach to forming a JTF headquarters (HQ) is to do so around an existing command and control structure. Typically, this is a CCMD’s Service component HQ or a subordinate Service component HQ. The establishing authority (typically the CCDR) determines the appropriate level based on the scope and scale of the operation and nature of the mission. In some cases, the CCDR may request a deployable team from U.S. Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM) Joint Enabling Capability Command to help the designated Service HQ transition to the JTF HQ, which the CCDR and commander JTF would then augment with additional Service functional experts.
Building upon an existing Service HQ. The DOD relies primarily on Service component HQ to adapt with little or no notice into a JTF HQ, often under crisis action planning (CAP) conditions. However, the newly designated JTF HQ typically will require additional resources that are not organic to the core Service HQ. Examples include joint command and control equipment and training and regional language and cultural experts, an operational contract support integration cell, and augmentation from the JTF’s Service components. The commander, JTF (CJTF) and staff should plan for the time required to integrate new personnel and capabilities and accommodate other military and nonmilitary liaison personnel and the private sector expected to be involved in the operation. Once the JTF HQ is established, it takes time to receive, train, and integrate new members and then to begin functioning as a cohesive joint HQ with common processes, standards, and procedures. Furthermore, mission requirements may limit the time available for a Service HQ to reorganize into a fully functioning and proficient JTF HQ prior to deployment (see Appendix C, Training for Joint Operations).

Mission requirements drive a joint headquarters’ organization and manning since each joint force’s mission is different. The commander, JTF provides guidance early that affects how the JTF HQ will organize and function. Headquarters staffs exhibit a tendency to grow in size over time. Large HQs often take on unnecessary functions, require more internal coordination, and have the potential to overwhelm mission partners with demands and information. These characteristics can impede information exchange and reduce focus on providing agile and optimal support to the commander JTF’s decision requirements.

Joint Insights and Best Practices
Joint Headquarters Organization

Defining the J-Code organization. The traditional J-code organization continues to be the preferred basic staff structure for joint headquarters. This basic structure provides the headquarters with effective and efficient control, accountability, and administration characteristics less evident in other types of organizations. The vertical J-code structure promotes unity of command, speeds hierarchical information flow, and ensures the directorate principals remain accountable through the chief of staff to the commander for the major functions of the HQ. In addition to clear accountability and authority
lines, the J-code structure also adds significant interoperability benefits when compared to other basic staff structures. The structure provides clear recognizable locations within the staff where functional information exchanges occur across the JTF staff and with JTF components, supporting commands, and interorganizational participants. The J-code structure allows different HQs to speak a common language, facilitates the rapid integration of staff augmentees, and enhances communication with outside mission partners. As a basic organizing model, the J-code structure provides a common reference point for broad functional expertise, staff oversight, and accountability (e.g., logistics and intelligence). The drawback of a pure J-code structure is the tendency for information to get stove-piped within the directorates. This challenge can be overcome through staff integration in cross-functional working groups (WGs), operational planning teams, and cross-staff organizations (e.g., liaison officer cells).

Functional and mission-based HQ organizations. Experience continues to support the J-code structure as the best HQ organizational option for most missions. Figure 4-1, Joint Headquarters Organizational Template, depicts a traditional J-code structure on the bottom and two other organizational options on the top. Alternative HQ organization structures may be useful in some circumstances for some missions. However, headquarters that organized other than by the traditional J-code functions (J-1, J-2, J-3, and so forth) typically find interaction more difficult with other traditionally organized HQs’ J-code staffs. One challenge to effective interaction is a lack of a common reference point (counterpart). This problem becomes more pronounced during crisis operations and when there is frequent rotation of HQ personnel in the traditional J-code HQ. With this type of HQ organization there can be a loss of accountability for certain traditional functions, such as intelligence and logistics, as personnel in the functional and mission-based HQ focus on nontraditional tasks.
Figure 4-1 Joint HQ Organizational Template (JP 3-33).
The JTF composition is a key factor that affects the type of augmentation the core staff should receive. Generally, the JTF staff should be representative of the force composition as to numbers, experience, and influence of the position and rank of members among the JTF’s Service and functional components. The combined JTF should also consider whether and how to represent supporting commands and multinational forces (MNFs) in the HQ. However, the best HQ composition is more an issue of having relevant expertise in the right positions to ensure the most effective employment of the JTF’s capabilities in the context of the mission than of having equal component representation.

Global Force Management is a process to align assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces to combatant commanders in support of the national defense strategy and joint force availability requirements.

Department of Defense Issuance 8260.03, The Global Force Management Data Initiative

To illustrate, a JTF may be formed around an Army corps HQ if ground combat dominates the mission requirements. Consequently, many key positions may be filled by members of that Army corps HQ and other Army organizations. However, that same JTF may have significant mission requirements to integrate airpower and special operations forces (SOF) and operate in close conjunction with multinational partners. The CJTF will likely augment the Army corps staff with expertise from the Air Force, SOF, and perhaps multiple multinational partners. The multinational augmentation might be even greater if the JTF has a subordinate multinational component or is operating as a subordinate element of a multinational HQ. Historical examples include JTF Sea Angel in Bangladesh in 1991, which was formed around the III Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters and the HQ for the 1991 Operation Fiery Vigil, which was formed around the Headquarters of Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Several JTFs have been built around Navy fleet headquarters afloat.

Commander responsibilities. Although specific responsibilities will vary, a JFC possesses the following general responsibilities:

- Provide a clear commander’s intent and timely communication of specified tasks together with any required coordinating and reporting requirements.
• Transfer forces and other capabilities to designated subordinate commanders for accomplishing assigned tasks.

• Provide all available information to subordinate JFCs and component commanders that affect their assigned missions and objectives.

• Delegate authority to subordinate JFCs and component commanders commensurate with their responsibilities.

A commander of a unified command (such as U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. European Command) may establish sub-unified commands (like U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Forces Korea, Alaskan Command, and U.S. Forces Iraq) to conduct operations on a continuing geographic or functional basis. A CCDR will be the JTF establishing authority in most situations; however, the SecDef, a sub-unified command commander, and a CJTF may also establish subordinate JTFs.

Transfer of Forces and Command Relationships Overview

• Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.

• When transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) the forces should be reassigned. The CCDRs will exercise combatant command (command authority), and subordinate JFCs normally through the Service component commander, will exercise OPCON over reassigned forces.

• When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary, the forces will be attached to the gaining command, and JFCs, normally through the Service component commander, will exercise OPCON over the attached forces.

• Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 Mar 2013

**Understand mission requirements.** Consider the critical lines of effort (LOE) when building the JMD and headquarters. Prioritize LOE, weight the main LOE for resources, then resource the remaining LOE. The organizational structure and size of a JTF HQ, as reflected in the
TRANSITION TO A JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

JMD, should be based on mission requirements, a CONOPS, the CJTF decisionmaking process, both the supported CCDR’s and CJTF’s guidance, and other factors external to the JTF HQ control, such as an imposed maximum footprint ceiling or multinational participation. A well-balanced JTF HQ staff should be representative of its subordinate forces, as well as joint, interorganizational, and coalition partners and possess a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. Furthermore, the organization of the staff should be established and modified as the needs of the HQ evolve over time. There is a requirement for supported CCMDs, force providers and applicable DOD agencies to track personnel filling JMD positions and report status using the Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System (FMTS). Refer to JP 1-0 for specific requirements.

**Figure 4-2. Forming the Headquarters Framework (Joint Insights, Forming a JTF HQ, Sep 2015)**

**Building the Joint Manning Document**

The JMD provides the venue for requesting the joint individual augmentation necessary to staff the JTF HQ. The CJTF, in concert with the establishing commander’s staff, develops and organizes a draft JTF JMD that will be forwarded for the establishing commander’s validation and approval. This document provides the baseline for JTF HQ staffing and is used for strength reporting, personnel accounting, awards eligibility determination, base support, and a host of other services and functions.5
Once a mission is delineated via SecDef orders, the unit identified to form the core of the JTF HQ should identify its personnel requirements (see Figure 4-3). These requirements are translated into a JMD to achieve adequate manning levels with a proper mix of military and civilian personnel with the correct skills to facilitate mission success.

The CJTF or supported CCDR will document the requirements to support the mission in the form of a JMD. The supported CCDR will review and validate all JMD positions for accuracy and necessity. The SOF JMD requirements should be approved by the theater special operations command prior to CCDR validation. Upon CCDR validation, the CCMD J-1 (personnel) will forward the applicable JMD billets, along with position descriptions, grade/skill/clearance requirements, specific reporting instructions, and desired report date to its Service components to fill. Since the CCDR should attempt to fill all requirements internally, the CCDR should also look to staff, contractors, or MNFs available or request support from a combat support agency prior to asking the joint staff for assistance. Billets which cannot be filled internal to the CCDR will then be sent from the CCDR to the Joint Staff (JS)/J-1, for prioritization and sourcing of any unfilled positions. The supported CCDR should estimate the duration of the position in the remarks of the JMD.

**Joint manning document.** The JMD provides the venue for requesting the joint individual augmentation necessary to staff the JTF HQ. The commander of the JTF, in concert with the establishing commander’s staff, develops and organizes a draft JTF JMD that will be forwarded for the establishing commander’s validation and approval. This document provides the baseline for JTF HQ staffing and is used for strength reporting, personnel accounting, awards eligibility determination, base support, and a host of other services and functions.

Upon receiving the validated JMD from the supported CCDR, the joint staff will start the JMD prioritization and sourcing review process. The joint staff J-1 will be responsible for coordinating the process after approving the JMD for sourcing. During the first phase of the process, the JMD is sent to the Joint Force Coordinator (J-31) for sourcing determination on the remaining unfilled billets. The J-31 will work with force providers which include Services, U.S. Special Operations Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense/Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, and USTRANSCOM, to fill the remaining requirements. Additional details on joint individual augmentation (JIA) sourcing procedures can be found in CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 1301.01F, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures.*
Effective planning for personnel support to joint operations can support the ability of the JFC to accomplish the mission. The J-1 must be fully involved in all phases of deliberate planning and CAP efforts and collaborate with other staff directors in the preparation of the commander’s estimate, plan development, and force flow conferencing. At a minimum, the JMD must contain the following critical elements: command, activity, department, line number, billet title, duty description, grade, skill/specialty, security clearance, source type, Service, location, latest arrival date, and tour length.

**Figure 4-3. Building upon the core staff (JP 3-33).**

**Options for Augmenting the JTF Headquarters**

Augmentation of a JTF HQ is a function of both the combined JTF’s mission and the force composition. The combined JTF’s mission is the most important factor in determining the required type of core staff augmentation. Mission analysis should consider the combined JTF HQ required capabilities and other related functions. The following factors are among many that the new CJTF and staff must consider as they determine augmentation requirements and sources:

- **Current staffing level of the designated HQ.** Fill key vacancies and replace non-deployable personnel.

- **Linguist and interpreter support.** Requirements for interpreters and translators (I/T) will vary according to the location of the joint
operations area (JOA) and must be considered during peacetime planning and early in the augmentation process. The identification, assignment, training, security classification processing, and verification of the skills represent a significant undertaking for a newly forming JTF. Some I/Ts may be non-native speakers academically trained in the language. The most effective I/Ts are typically native speakers from the region or dialect desired.

- **Interagency requirements.** The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is an initiative that can assist the CJTF and staff coordinate effectively with other USG departments and agencies. The JIACG, an element of a CCDR’s staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts assigned to CCDRs and tailored to meet the CCDRs’ specific needs, the JIACG provides the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG departments and agencies. The JIACG members participate in development of theater campaign plans, contingency plans, and operation orders. They provide a collaborative conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of nonmilitary organizations. When the CCDR’s JIACG is not sufficient or there is a need to focus on a single mission, then a joint interagency task force or other appropriate organization may be a better option. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, 12 Oct 2016, provides detailed information on interagency coordination.

- **Multinational considerations.** U.S. commanders should expect to conduct military operations as part of an MNF. These operations, which could occur in a formal multinational alliance or a less formal coalition, could occur across the conflict continuum and require coordination with a variety of other interorganizational partners and other participants. Much of joint doctrine’s information and guidance on unified action and joint operations applies to multinational operations. However, commanders and staffs must account for differences in partners’ laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language. Multinational considerations also include international law, agreements, and arrangements in place or required to protect the sovereign interests of national territories that JTF forces must cross, particularly if affected nations do not participate in JTF operations. There is no standard template and each alliance or coalition normally develops its own protocols and operation plans. Multinational operations may complicate traditional U.S. unilateral planning and decision making and require additional procedures to properly address a host of issues such as information sharing, communication
TRANSITION TO A JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS


• Sustainment. This involves logistic and personnel support requirements beyond normal organizational capabilities such as contracting capability for host nation support and legal expertise.

• Liaison requirements. The commander JTF and staff generally must manage significant liaison requirements both to and from the JTF HQ. These requirements may include; however, are not limited to the following: higher HQ and JTF components, supporting commands, the U.S. Embassy, multinational military forces, USG agencies and departments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and host nation organizations.

• Private sector considerations. The private sector is an umbrella term that may be applied in the U.S. and foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected NGOs. The private sector can assist the commander JTF and staff by sharing information, identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, assisting in deliberate planning and crisis action planning, and providing other assistance as appropriate.

• Considerations related to other potential participants. Integration and coordination between the military force and nonmilitary counterparts are much less rigid than military command and control. Unlike the military, other USG departments and agencies and most other nonmilitary participants are not staffed, equipped, or organized to plan and operate in a wide variety of military operations. The lack of a prescribed or uniform interorganizational coordination process will require the commander JTF, and staff to be aware of the other participants varied and somewhat unique structures, processes, procedures, and organizational cultures to accommodate their participation with the military. Some organizations may have policies that conflict with those of the USG, particularly those of the U.S. military. Depending on the type of operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of nonmilitary involvement, the focal point for coordination may occur at the JTF HQ, the civil-military operations center (CMOC) if established, or the humanitarian operations center.

• Classified information. Unlike many USG departments and agencies and MNFs, most other participants will not have the capability and appropriate authorization to handle or have access to classified
information. An important consideration is how to balance and control information in a way that involves relevant stakeholders’ capabilities and contributions while preserving operations security information sharing with NGOs and the private sector that may be more restrictive, but options such as the JIACG and CMOC are available to the JFC to facilitate interorganizational coordination and information sharing.

**Joint individual augmentation (JIA).** JIA is an important mechanism for providing personnel to a joint staff. The core staff or establishing combatant command identifies individual augmentation requirements and publishes them in a JMD. Augmentation considerations should include core competencies not resident on the core staff or special subject matter expertise. JIA enables CCMDs to augment JTFs with allocated temporary personnel resources to enable them to effectively perform assigned joint missions. The J-1 may not use the JIA process to fill permanent manning shortfalls or for joint training or exercise positions. Filling permanent manpower and training (including scheduled exercises) billets is covered by CJCSI 1001.01B, *Joint Manpower and Personnel Program*, and CJCSI 1600.01B, *Charter for United States European Command North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Manning Division*, and other CJCS publications.

JIA requirements are identified by the HQ designated to be the JTF or the establishing authority (usually a CCDR) and documented in a JMD. The JIA requirements are then sourced in accordance with CJCSI 1301.01F, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures* and the Global Force Management process. The JMD is validated by the establishing authority and submitted to the J-1 for individual augmentation sourcing solution development. In multinational operations, partner nations also may provide JTF HQ individual augmentation beyond liaison requirements. The designated HQ should identify individual augmentation requirements as early as possible when forming the JTF HQ due to the extended time that may be required to source, process, and deploy individual augmentees, especially those with special technical or language skills. For more details concerning JIAs, refer to CJCSI 1301.01, JP 1-0, and the Chairman of the CJCS Memorandum 3130.06, Series, *Global Force Management Allocation Policies, and Procedures*.

**JMD Considerations and Insights**

**Ad hoc takes time and a steep learning curve.** Building an ad hoc JMD for an ASCC is not easy because it requires field grades with specific skill sets not usually found within the ASCC headquarters. This is particularly true when the requirements trend toward the need for skills and personnel inherent in a tactical headquarters. **Because ad hoc is not planned, it is not preferred.**
TRANSITION TO A JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

**Force manning level must be considered.** When planning for and developing the JMD, ASCCs must carefully consider the impact of the force management level (FML). Consider assigning dual roles and responsibilities to positions where practical when the FML restricts the number of personnel permitted in the headquarters. Be prepared for some members of the headquarters to have a dual-hatted role (e.g., ASCC commander, ARFOR commander, commander JFLCC, or commander JTF).

**Off the shelf JMD menu of options.** The joint staff (or CCMD) should develop off-the-shelf JMD packages, including certification requirements to key billets such as targeting intelligence, cyber, and information operations military occupational specialties as a ready starting point for building a contingency headquarters JMD. Build mission packages for small, medium, and large command posts that balance austerity with the potential length of the mission.

**Establish a JMD working group.** A formalized, structured JMD WG should be established at the JTF levels to confirm and validate the JMD positions by skill, grade, and component; track by-name arrivals and departures for each position; determine or refine current and future manning requirements; and submit requests to higher HQ to change the JMD based on approved additions, deletions, and modifications identified by the JMD WG. The JMD WG, chaired by the J-1 with a co-chair from the J-3, meets on a recurring basis with a set agenda with all staff sections participating.

**J-1 leads the operational planning team.** The J-1 consolidates the capability requirements to include position descriptions and proposed organizational structure submitted by all JTF HQ staff elements. The commander JTF approves the resulting JMD and submits it to the supported CCMD for review and validation. Following validation, the CCMD loads the JMD into the FMTS. The FMTS is the primary management information system used to manage and document joint staff, CCMDs, CJCS-controlled activities, associated joint activities, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) manpower authorizations.

**Talk to the CCMD J-1 early and often.** The JTF J-1 should work with the supported CCMD J-1 to prepare specific reporting instructions. The supported CCMD forwards the JMD along with position descriptions, specific reporting instructions, and desired report date for each position to its Service component commands and the combat support agencies to fill. The Service components and combat support agencies will then request individuals per their respective Service policies and report back to the supported CCMD what personnel from their commands will fill positions on the JMD. The supported CCDR will then send the JMD to the J-1 for prioritization and sourcing of any unfilled positions validation and submission to the J-35 (future plans) for resource sourcing.
Sourcing JMD requirements. After documenting its manpower requirements in a JMD, the JTF HQ in coordination with its supported CCMD, should build a joint manning plan to source the JTF HQ manpower requirements. A joint manning plan can provide a methodical approach to transitioning the existing organic staff of a single-Service organization into a joint staff HQ and it should consider the full range of available personnel sources:

- The designated Service HQ own organic staff
- Augmentees from within the CCMD, such as the Service components
- Other temporary duty and temporary additional duty augmentation requirements
- Interagency and multinational partners
- Reserve Component personnel

Initiating Movement of Forces

Personnel visibility is attained by having reliable personnel data from various authoritative data sources for all Service members, DOD civilian employees, and contractors authorized to accompany the force physically present in a GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR). Establishing personnel visibility is a joint mission with a goal of providing accurate, near-real-time, and readily available personnel information DOD wide in a net-centric environment.

The joint personnel visibility mission does not infringe upon the Service’s Title 10 responsibility for personnel accountability. The Services report their joint personnel status on their personnel who are physically located in a GCC’s AOR. This data approach leverages existing technology to produce a data validation joint personnel status and casualty report.
As it requires the right Army forces to deploy at the right time to the right place, a process like requests for forces (RFF) where commanders can tailor forces packages individually as the contingency unfolds, would seem to make the process tailorable to particular contingencies. However, the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) process with adequate planning can create a time-phased deployment adequate to the demands of the combatant commander as well. From the macro perspective, both types of deployments can be responsive in the theoretical framework provided proper preplanning is accomplished. The TPFDD responsiveness then becomes limited to proper preplanning time while the responsiveness of the RFF depended on the efficiency of the bureaucratic approval process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situations change constantly and one must have the capability to adjust accordingly…After a few rounds of “massaging” the deployment sequence, I found that the people I was requesting on day one, were not necessarily the people I need most when they arrived on day six.</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>LTG William “Gus” Pagonis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director of Logistics,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm</td>
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Staff Integration: Building the Team

The CCDR relies upon the theater army commander to integrate landpower into the GCC’s plans for that AOR. The theater army coordinates with Department of the Army and the primary Service force provider, U.S. Army Forces Command (USFORSCOM), when it needs resources beyond its capability to integrate combatant commander requirements within the global force management and sustainable readiness processes.

The theater army coordinates through USFORSCOM for theater-specific training and preparation of regionally aligned forces by providing Army training development capability approved task names and task numbers to
USFORSCOM. As required, the theater army may also coordinate directly with supporting combatant command ASCCs if the SecDef directs the supporting CCDR to provide forces. The gaining theater army commander recommends to the combatant commander the composition, sequence of deployment, and operational chain of command for Army forces deploying to the AOR. The theater army commander exercises OPCON as specified by the CCDR and administrative control as specified by the Secretary of the Army. The theater army performs a critical task in shaping the AOR for the geographic combatant command. The theater army maintains a theater-wide focus in support of security cooperation.

JP 3-33, discusses the commander’s role in preparing for operations. As the headquarters continues transition and prepares for future operations, it must conduct a series of activities to increase the overall readiness of the staff. These activities include (but are not limited to) the following: continued analysis of the situation; reconnaissance and surveillance operations; refinement of the plan, coordination and liaison, rehearsals, training, inspections, and movements. The relationship between the GCC or commander JTF and subordinate component commanders during this phase is critical. Often commanders JTF must adapt their organization and training for missions that they had not fully anticipated and then had significant shortfalls in many of the key specialties needed to accomplish those missions. Gaining the personnel needed to augment the deployed headquarters was more often an issue than was the ability to move an existing headquarters to a contingency.

Recent operations have shown that JTF HQs that have been established are often undermanned, underequipped, undertrained, and do not fully integrate the joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities needed to accomplish their missions.

In many cases, the training (or lack thereof) can be one of the biggest challenges for the JFHQ commander. Trained personnel from the appropriate military Service are required to man the boards, centers, and cells that the commander JTF decides to include in his headquarters. Joint augmentees can provide depth in such critical areas as intelligence (J-2), logistics (J-4), and communications (J-6). To best train the JMD augmented staff, the unit must consider exercise opportunities in which all enablers can deploy to the exercise location and integrate into the base headquarters staff. This is most important for Reserve Component enablers that have limited time and resources in which to conduct training. It should be the goal for the headquarters to train with all enablers concurrently to ensure the JMD is accurate and all shortfalls in personnel and equipment needs are identified.
CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve leveraged USARCENT manning and requested support for numerous enablers as the Combined JTF HQ stood up. Enablers came from the JECC, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Information Operations Command, U.S. Cyber Command, and USCENTCOM HQ. He also sent out several by-name-requests to USCENTCOM. Lastly, he requested assistance from the J-7 to assist his staff with forming, organization, and decision-making processes.

Joint Insights-Forming a JTF HQ

With the theater army acting as both an ASCC and combined joint force land component command simultaneously, both civilian and military workforces would be stretched thin. The ASCC would depend on its civilian workforce to make the effort even possible. If this is happening in a war zone, only emergency essential civilian employees would remain in place while non-emergency essential employees may leave as the intensity and danger of the area increases.

**EAB command posts must be ready to deploy and set conditions.** The ASCCs must train for the rapid deployment of their contingency command post as a combined joint force land component command or combined JTF. Having a forward presence facilitates the situational awareness and deployment of the JTF into the area of operations and strengthens relations with the host nation.

**Reach out early.** When standing up a JTF headquarters, seek assistance from the joint agencies that provide training and assistance such as the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command and its subordinate organizations (Joint Public Affairs Support Element, Joint Planning Support Element, and Joint Communications Support Element) and the 1st Information Operations Command.

**Getting the message out is important.** Appoint a coalition spokesperson to represent the JTF when disseminating information to the media and the public. This can reduce the perception that the force is U.S. dominated with a mission focused solely on the U.S.

**Civilian workforce integration.** The EAB organizations need to ensure that most, if not all, civilian employees are designated emergency essential. If there were a contingency, and the civilians were to leave, operating the headquarters in a remotely functional manner would be exponentially more difficult. Marking these positions emergency essential now, enables the employees in the slots to understand their responsibilities if war should breakout and will allow the headquarters to plan ahead. Lastly, all commands must track their civilians who are also military personnel in reserve to not “double tap” personnel.
Anticipate “enabling” staff. Anticipate the need for liaison and interpreter and communications personnel requirements, especially as these relate to effective coordination and integration with multinational partners, the USG agencies and departments, and NGOs. Manning, communications, and other technological interoperability commonly associated with mission partners can have an impact on the organizational structure of the JTF HQ. When working with USG agencies and departments and multinational partners, e.g., NATO, it is critical to maintain current and accurate billet descriptions to ensure these partners provide personnel who meet the necessary experience levels and qualifications. Generating coalition and interorganizational billet descriptions in conjunction with the senior national representatives and senior agency representatives facilitates overall HQ integration and provides the best means of successfully influencing the assignment of partner personnel to the JTF HQ staff. When possible, advance coordination and exercises with these partners can lead to the development of common procedures prior to the execution of an integrated operation and can contribute to the development of a comprehensive JMD and the readiness of the JTF HQ.

Joint and government participation needs to be more robust to truly transform the corps to a JTF. The topic of manning shortfalls was mentioned during several key leader interviews…but joint and government participation needs to be more robust to truly transform the corps to a JTF. Integrate more joint, intergovernmental, and interagency players into the exercise in order to realistically stress joint interorganizational and multinational capabilities and contributions to the JTF.

USARPAC Insights

Main Command Post-Operational Detachment
As a result of recent directed force reductions, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) redesigned a smaller corps and division headquarters that focuses on deployable tactical and assault command posts with a reachback capability in the main command post (MCP) that may be augmented by a Reserve Component organization and complete a force design update requirement determination for implementation that began in fiscal year 2016.
Figure 4-5. Headquarters and headquarters battalion configuration.

The Reserve Component Main Command Post-Operations Detachment (MCP-OD) provides expansibility for the corps and division headquarters by providing increased capacity for the MCP and the headquarters and headquarters battalion. The MCP-OD’s capabilities and functions are an organic requirement to the aligned unit’s headquarters and headquarters battalion table of organization and equipment which allows the organization to execute missions across the full range of military operations. The Division MCP-OD is a 96-space standalone unit partnered with specified Active Component or Army National Guard division headquarters.

MCP-ODs are partnered with their respective division headquarters to develop training readiness. A partnership is an established relationship of mutual cooperation between two aligned units with the purpose of promoting leader development, sharing training opportunities, developing staff functionality, and sharing lessons learned. Augmentation by the MCP-OD increases capacity and capability for simultaneous execution of missions, extended operations, and support for forward deployment of the MCP.
Planning Insights:

- Integrate the MCP-OD into the corps and divisional training plans. Use drills for specific training requirements and annual training periods for integration into the corps and division staff during exercises. Closely integrating MCP-OD personnel during training may alleviate disruption of staff activities experienced by select units.

- Develop standard operating procedures that consider how to best integrate the detachment, then use them as a training tool to prepare the detachment. Active Component (AC) commanders should consider planning and integrating AC training with MCP-ODs on select individual training weekends throughout the year.

- Determine how best to use the MCP-OD based on the mission. Although integrating all (or some) of the MCP-OD into the deployed headquarters in one mission might be the best solution in one area of responsibility, it might not be the best in another.

- If the organization transitions to a joint headquarters, an MCP-OD forward may not be required due to the large numbers of joint augmentees that will be requested to fill the JMD. In this case, the MCP-OD may not need to be activated or it could back fill division staff at home station.

Endnotes


2. Ibid.

3. “Information” as a joint Function is included in Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, Change 1-Estimated Publication FY18, 2d QTR. Reference on p. xii of JP 3-0. The information function encompasses the management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to influence relevant actor perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and supports human and automated decision making. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations. This function provides JFCs the ability to integrate the generation and preservation of friendly information while leveraging the inherent informational aspects of all military activities to achieve the commander’s objectives and attain the end state.


6. Ibid.
Chapter 5
Building the Command and Control Architecture

To create great armies is one thing, to lead them . . . is another.

Sir Winston Churchill

Background

Today, the U.S. and its military forces abroad continue to operate in an ever-changing and complex operational environment. To meet these challenges, Army forces must be rapidly tailored to the mission and exercise mission command. The responsibility of a joint or coalition force commander grows as he must consider and integrate all unified action partner capabilities whether they be joint, interorganizational, or multinational into an organization working toward one goal and one objective.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040, 31 Oct 2014, addresses many of the challenges that both commanders and their staffs will face in future conflicts. Leaders operating in this environment must understand complex situations in depth, breadth, and context by integrating intelligence and operations while operating with multiple partners. Information becomes even more important as forces must process, exploit, and analyze information from a variety of sources and push that information to the point of need. In spite of this, more information does not equate to better understanding. Information can become blurred, contradictory, or even false very often in war. Army forces as part of joint teams see, fight, learn, and adapt operations across wide areas while maintaining contact with the enemy over land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.1

Commanders and staffs must consider options to align efforts in time, space, and purpose to achieve campaign objectives with the greatest effect. Effective operations allow forces to achieve operational overmatch and seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.2

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012
The commander’s ability to make decisions is tied to the understanding of the operational environment, their current status, and how to better accomplish the mission. To be able to achieve the assigned objectives, the commander must be able to make decisions based on the information that is available at the time. In addition, staff analysis and recommendations are vital and even more so when planning time is limited.

This is often done through the use of the commander’s critical information requirements. These data points assist the joint or coalition commander in focusing support to their decision-making requirements. Much of this information may not be in the precise form of answering a traditional and detailed question, but rather as the result of a broader assessment, providing an answer regarding the accomplishment of designated campaign objectives together. The assessment must be accompanied with recommendations for the commander and address why this is important to the commander, i.e., the “so what.”

**Figure 5-1. Commander’s Decision Cycle (Source: Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper, *Design and Planning*, First Edition, July 2013).**
Mission Command in Joint and Army Organizations

Mission command is not a mechanical process that the commander follows blindly. Instead, it is a continual cognitive effort to understand, to adapt, and to effectively direct the achievement of intent.

Joint Staff Mission Command White Paper, 3 Apr 2012

The term “mission command” is a term that crosses from Army doctrine into joint operations. From the Army perspective, mission command is a philosophy that is one of the foundations of unified land operations. As defined in ADP 6-0, it states that, “Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”

“Unified land operations includes the simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability, or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win the nation’s wars as part of unified action.” (ADP 3-0, Operations). “Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.” (Joint Publication [JP] 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013). Mission command accounts for the nature of today’s operating environment. During operations, when commanders are given responsibility and decision-making authority, they can integrate the military functions at hand to exploit unexpected opportunities and gain advantage over today’s rapidly adaptive enemies.

ADP 6-0 best summarizes the importance of mission command and the challenges that face the joint or coalition force commander:

An effective approach to mission command must be comprehensive, without being rigid, because military operations as a whole defy orderly, efficient, and precise control. Military operations are complex, human endeavors characterized by the continuous, mutual give and take, moves, and countermoves among all participants. The enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted upon. It has its own objectives. While friendly forces try to impose their will on the enemy, the enemy resists and seeks to impose its will on friendly forces. In addition, operations occur among civilian groups whose actions influence and are influenced
by military operations. The results of these interactions are often unpredictable—and perhaps uncontrollable.\textsuperscript{5}

The Army mission command doctrine further incorporates the “exercise of mission command” as an overarching idea that unifies the mission command philosophy of command and the mission command warfighting function—a flexible grouping of tasks and systems. The exercise of mission command encompasses how Army commanders apply the foundational mission command philosophy together with the mission command warfighting function.\textsuperscript{6}

When reviewing joint doctrine, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 7 Jan 2017 notes, “The command and control (C2) function is commander-centric and network-enabled to facilitate initiative and decision making at the lowest appropriate level. If a commander loses reliable communications, mission command—a key component of the C2 (joint) function—enables military operations through decentralized execution based on mission type orders.”\textsuperscript{7}

The Art of Command and the Science of Control

Joint doctrine defines command as the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel (JP 1). Army doctrine defines the art of command as the creative and skillful exercise of authority through timely decision making and leadership. As a subset to the mission command discussion is command and control.

Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. Aided by staffs, commanders exercise control over assigned forces in their area of operations. Staffs coordinate, synchronize, and integrate actions, inform the commander and exercise control for the commander. Commanders exercise control to account for changing circumstances and direct the changes necessary to address the new situation. Commanders impose enough control to mass the effect of combat power at the decisive point in time while allowing subordinates the maximum freedom of action to accomplish assigned tasks. The science of control is based on objectivity, facts, empirical methods, and analysis. Commanders and staffs use the science of
control to overcome the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate. The science of control supports the art of command.8

From the joint operations perspective, JP 3-0 again highlights that, “C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. Command includes both the authority and responsibility to use resources to accomplish assigned missions. Control is inherent in command.”9

In a recent article in Joint Force Quarterly entitled “The Trouble with Mission Command – Flexive Command and the Future of Command and Control,” the authors noted, “There is confusion surrounding the term mission command and the distinct ways that it is used.”10 They also noted that in JP 3-0, “mission command means a way to command by delegating authority and empowering subordinates to carry out last mission orders.” This reflects the thoughts contained in the 3 Apr 2012 Mission Command White Paper in which then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) GEN Martin Dempsey directed a focus on mission command training that would prepare and enable subordinate commanders to adapt and act without direct guidance in achieving mission success.

No C2 technology has ever successfully eliminated the fog of war, but it can create the illusion of perfect clarity from a distance.

Joint Staff Mission Command White Paper, 3 April 2012

Joint and Army Attributes of Mission Command

Both the Army mission command doctrine and the joint mission command white paper draw upon several similar attributes:

- **Building cohesive teams through mutual trust.** “Trust is the moral sinew that binds the distributed force together enabling the many to act as one in cross domain application of the appropriate amount of cumulative combat power at the right place and time.”11

- **Creating shared understanding.** “Understanding equips leaders with the insight and foresight required to make effective decisions.”12 Shared understanding and situational awareness are factors in a complex equation that influences the speed of decisions. Hill and Niemi note, “…the situational awareness (SA) reduction through each level of a hierarchy diminishes the quality of adaptations decided by higher echelons (since their information is more incomplete than that of lower echelons). Controlling for the quality of decisions, the SA reduction reduces the timeliness of adaptations decided by higher echelons, since higher levels must expend precious time replicating the situational awareness held by lower levels.”
• **Provide a clear commander’s intent.** Commanders must provide “a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state.”

• **Exercise disciplined initiative.** Disciplined initiative is action in the absence of orders when existing orders no longer fit the situation or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. Leaders and subordinates exercise disciplined initiative to create opportunities. Commanders rely on subordinates to act and subordinates take action to develop the situation. This willingness to act helps develop and maintain operational initiative that sets or dictates the terms of action throughout an operation. Hill and Niemi noted that the 1996 Marine Corps publication, *Command and Control*, remarked that commanders must choose appropriate levels of control – “No commander will rely entirely on either purely detailed or purely mission methods. Exactly what type of command and control we use in a particular situation will depend on a variety of factors such as the nature of the action or task, the nature and capabilities of the enemy, and perhaps most of all, the qualities of our people.”

• **Use mission orders.** Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them. Commanders use mission orders to provide direction and guidance that focus the forces’ activities on the achievement of the main objective, set priorities, allocate resources, and influence the situation. They provide subordinates with maximum freedom of action in determining how best to accomplish missions. Mission orders seek to maximize individual initiative while relying on lateral coordination between units and vertical coordination up and down the chain of command. The mission orders technique does not mean commanders do not supervise subordinates in execution; however, they do not micromanage. They intervene during execution only to direct changes, when necessary, to the concept of operations.

• **Accept prudent risk.** Commanders accept prudent risk when making decisions because uncertainty exists in all military operations. Prudent risk is a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost. Opportunities come with risks. The willingness to accept prudent risk is often the key to exposing enemy weaknesses.

Decision cycles in military operations constantly vary. In some circumstances, the speed and character of decision cycles may be controlled. One model is U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd’s, *Observe-Orient- Decide-Act*, which has become a foundational concept in military strategy. One of Boyd’s colleagues, Harry Hillaker noted:
The key is to obscure your intentions and make them unpredictable to your opponent while you simultaneously clarify his intentions. That is, operate at a faster tempo to generate rapidly changing conditions that inhibit your opponent from adapting or reacting to those changes and that suppress or destroy his awareness.

Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available information and knowledge. Competing demands for decision makers’ attention and resources can impact the need to decentralization of control, especially in a dynamic environment where conditions are ever-changing and the pace is rapid and continuous.

Problem complexity also impacts the mission command equation. Tactical units often have fewer resources to solve complex problems as expertise or equipment available is limited. This is where problems can be addressed by the combined intelligence of decision makers supporting the operation.

**Interoperability and Mission Command**

Fundamentally, joint forces require high levels of interoperability and systems that are conceptualized and designed with joint architectures and acquisition strategies. This level of interoperability reduces technical, doctrinal, and cultural barriers that limit the ability of joint force commanders (JFCs) to achieve objectives. The goal is to employ joint forces effectively across the range of military operations.

Ensure interoperability and operate in interorganizational environments. Operations go more efficiently and effectively by placing a primary point of contact (liaison officers) in each of the joint task forces (JTFs) to work hand-in-hand with their counterparts to facilitate dynamic shaping operations.

**U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) Insights**

**Unified action demands maximum interoperability.** The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively, in part through interoperability. This includes joint force development, use of joint doctrine, the development and use of joint plans and orders, and the development and use of joint and interoperable communications and information systems. It also includes conducting joint training and exercises. It concludes with a materiel development and fielding process that provides materiel that is fully compatible with and complementary to systems of all Services. A key to successful interoperability is to ensure that planning processes are joint from their inception. Those responsible for systems and programs intended for joint use will establish working groups that fully represent the services and functions affected. Combatant commanders will ensure maximum interoperability and identify interoperability issues to the CJCS, who has overall responsibility for the joint interoperability program.
Other government departments and agencies and interorganizational and multinational organizations should be invited to participate in joint training and exercises whenever possible.\textsuperscript{18}

In the end, mission command is a command philosophy that integrates personnel, networks, information systems, processes, and equipment into a tool for commanders to use that enables disciplined initiative among empowered agile and adaptive leaders to fight and win during unified land operations (ADP 6-0).

Employment of mission command systems. Subordinate units must have the necessary Army Battle Command System (ABCS) equipment (i.e., Air and Missile Defense Workstation, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, and Tactical Airspace Integration System) in order to achieve full integration into a joint organization. Common operational picture (COP) data must be available to the commander as the command post is transitioning. Units must schedule travel to the area of operations (AOR) early and specify which ABCSs and other automation that must be on hand. Earlier travel permits the conduct of functional tests and additional time to solve problems prior to the start of the mission. Units should consider integration requirements when preparing deployment timelines for supported operations plans.
**Joint interoperability.** A recent Command Post of the Future (CPOF) fielding prevented the theater army mission command systems to easily communicate with geographic combatant command staff. Additionally, CPOF was not able to transfer data and graphics and created issues for the joint force Service components in delineating AORs and establishing fire control measures. System operators can mitigate some of the system communication shortfalls (primarily between fires, aviation, and targeting), but it is not an optimal solution. It is time intensive and may also lead to errors as information is transferred.

**Mission command.** Issuing and coordinating command guidance is often simple at the higher echelons of leadership but must be clearly disseminated to the current operations team to ensure the commander’s directives and guidance are accurately issued across the organization to both staff and subordinate units. To accomplish this, the leadership must allow the staff to provide accurate and timely information to the commanding general or his representative to enable him to make the best decisions. A large amount of information flows into the headquarters and most of it is not pertinent. The focus should be on filtering out what is superfluous and packaging the relevant information into a concise format for analysis.

**Integrating capabilities.** Coordination must be conducted to ensure subordinate units are represented during operations. For example, during a recent exercise, the digital liaison detachment (DLD) was not tasked to support due to the event being a unilateral event. The DLD (U.S. Army Reserve) was co-located with the command and could have provided support and acted as a critical asset to facilitate tracking and communications between the joint force land component command and other commands.

**Leadership.** Leaders often face continuing challenges requiring innovative and adaptive leadership in unfamiliar and austere environments. Those involved, more often than not, perform at least one level higher than their current grade. To ensure success, some organizations place personnel in positions at a higher grade or level of responsibility to provide them with more experience.

Some generals consider only unilateral action whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites … no strategy ever survives the first engagement with the enemy.

Carl von Clausewitz
Multinational Interoperability

Nations form partnerships in both regional and worldwide patterns as they seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and engage in peace operations. Cultural, diplomatic, psychological, economic, technological, and informational factors will all influence multinational operations and participation.19

JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, 16 Jul 2013, defines multinational operations as operations conducted by forces of two or more nations usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an interorganizational entity such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Two primary forms of multinational partnership that the JFC will encounter are an alliance or a coalition. An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad and long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

While the tenets (of multinational operations) cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort.  

JP 3-16

Communications are fundamental to successful multinational operations. Planning considerations include frequency management, equipment compatibility, procedural compatibility, cryptographic and information security, identification friend or foe, and datalink protocols. Multinational force (MNF) commanders should anticipate that some forces from multinational forces will have direct and near-immediate communications capability from the operational area (OA) to their respective national political leadership. This capability can facilitate coordination of issues but it can also be a source of frustration as leaders external to the OA may be issuing guidance directly to their deployed national forces. Many communications issues can be resolved through equipment exchange and liaison teams. When exchanging equipment, special consideration must be paid to the release of communications security devices as well as the level and nature of classified information (material) released to individual countries per national disclosure policy (NDP) and any applicable exceptions. The ability of the MNF to exchange information at all levels (i.e., strategic, operational, and tactical) should be a consideration during planning and throughout execution.20
The speed at which a message is delivered is dependent upon the recipient of the message. When working in a coalition environment, it is important to take time to ensure that the message is accurately conveyed to non-native English speakers.

Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography, and location of the MNF. It is critical that operations and communications planners begin the coordination process early to ensure U.S. and MNF communication requirements are identified and sourced prior to operations. Interoperability is often constrained by the least technologically proficient participant. Effective communications support enables control over diverse and widely dispersed air, maritime, ground, and space elements. Access to both military and commercial satellites should be an early planning requirement to support dispersed elements. The MNF commanders should address the need for integrated communications among all participating forces early in the planning phase of the operation. MNF planning and technical communications systems control centers should be established as soon as possible to coordinate all communications.\(^2\)

**Standardization.** Even after many years of emphasizing interoperability and NATO Standard Agreements (STANAGs) to foster it, recent missions have shown the limits of interoperability. Recognizing this situation, alliance leaders created the Connected Forces Initiative. Its purpose is to ensure NATO formations can communicate, train, and operate together effectively. Dr. James Derleth, Senior Interagency Training Advisor at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, identified key areas that impact interoperability and the following are excerpts from his digital article, *Enhancing Interoperability: The Foundation for Effective NATO Operations, 25 Sep 2013.*\(^2\)

Interoperability impacts include:

- **Technology disparities.** To mitigate this situation, the JMRC has pursued low tech solutions. These include vehicle markings to identify friendly forces using simple graphic control systems to control movement, reliance on frequency modulation radio communications, conducting rehearsals to achieve a shared understanding, and most effectively; ensuring every battalion or higher level formation has liaison officers (LNOs) to synchronize its operations with adjacent and higher-level formations. Exchanging LNOs is particularity effective as they facilitate integration and foster peer-to-peer contacts.

- **Mission command and control.** The past decade of war has reinforced the importance of integrated command and control.
Operations have become very complex and distinguished by continuous interactions between friendly forces, enemy forces, and local populations. Simply giving national formations a “task and purpose” within a JTF is not enough. It requires collaborative planning and integration to develop and maintain a common understanding of the operational environment and the mission. Too often, units are deployed without knowledge of their allies’ systems or an understanding of what type of information is transmitted to them. This lack of interoperability makes it difficult for units to communicate and maneuver effectively.

Major systems appear to be interdependent yet suffer from a lack of interoperability. Hardware updates for capability enhancement and interoperability lag or lack and they involve significant outlays of funding. Although some unilateral progress has been made to address issues of interoperability, further attention in this area is required. Internationally, senior leadership is prepared to challenge the notion of life support for capability acquisition and the subsequent permissions required to communicate.

USARPAC Insights

- **Doctrinal differences.** To diminish doctrinal differences between countries, the JMRC has learned to make diversity a virtue. It does not force allies or multinational partners to use U.S. military doctrine, instead it fosters functional interoperability.

- **Resource gaps.** Interoperability is affected by different terminology, traditions, capabilities, capacities, and so forth. Differences range from how many spare parts are carried to the type of rations Soldiers eat. While many countries were able to access the U.S. supply system in Afghanistan, expeditionary deployments to the JMRC have shown that some alliance members have difficulty providing their own ammunition, food, and fuel let alone taking care of sanitary needs, housing, water, etc. The JMRC attempts to implement the NATO principle of providing logistical support on a functional, rather than a national basis. Tactically, this can be accomplished through early pre-mission planning discussions between logisticians in a multinational working group. This group identifies capabilities and requirements to mitigate possible sustainment shortfalls.
A challenge that we did experience and we need to get better at was in the sharing of intelligence. With our partnership of U.S., United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand we are doing well. However, when we brought in Italy and other international (NATO) partners, we encountered challenges in sharing this information. And, throughout the last few years, we have developed a lot of work-arounds but there are still policies and standard operating procedure issues we have to address. There are still systems which we use that are not accessible to our partners and while we will not solve this issue today, as we look to future operation we have to figure this out.

BG Kenneth H. Moore, Jr.
U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) Deputy Commanding General
U.S. Army Reserve
Observations and Insights, Judicious Response 17

**Intelligence sharing.** A multinational intelligence center is necessary for merging and prioritizing the intelligence requirements from each participating nation and for acquiring and fusing all the nations’ intelligence contributions. Likewise, the center should coordinate the intelligence collection planning and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations of each nation. The multinational intelligence center should include representatives from all nations participating in the multinational operation. Designating a single director of intelligence for the multinational command may assist in resolving potential disagreements among the multinational members. Coalition members should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary consistent with NDP and theater guidance. However, information about intelligence sources and methods should not be shared with coalition members unless approved by the appropriate authority.\(^{23}\)
Combined, knowledge management and information management, enable the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time and in a usable format in order to facilitate understanding and decision making.24

**Knowledge management** is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making (Army Doctrine Reference Publication [ADRP] 6-0, *Mission Command*, 17 May 2012).

**Information management** is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products. ADRP 6-0

Battle rhythm events are essential to the proper function and knowledge flow within the headquarters. Commanders make decisions based on the information and recommendations that are shared and analyzed through the battle rhythm process. Attendees are directed to attend to provide specific knowledge and expertise that they are responsible for to give the entire staff the most complete set of knowledge available to make
informed recommendations and decisions. The battle rhythm synchronizes required meetings, locations, and relevant personnel between the combatant command, joint force land component command (ASCC), and subordinate units. During some exercises, well-meant but non-analyzed changes to the battle rhythm cause confusion among potential attendees and their availability to attend the changed meeting(s). Meeting spaces are in high demand and changes produce a potential “traffic jam” for other meetings and cancelled meetings mean that reserved meeting spaces are left vacant. Changes also produce a trickledown effect for subordinate organizations who cannot standardize their own battle rhythms and interrupt their own planning and coordination.

The staff must understand the terms of reference (TOR) to run successful cross-functional decision making. While the staff understands that these integrating structures provide the forums for bringing together functional expertise from across the staff and from external stakeholders in supporting the commander’s decision cycle, they require training as well as practice and repetitions to be truly useful.

U.S. Army Soldiers need to understand that their audience in a combined joint force land component command is comprised of a number of non-native English speakers which makes the presentation of information all the more important. U.S. presentations and ideas need to be made accessible (intellectually, physically, and visually) to afford non-native English speakers the ability to review and clarify ideas following briefings that involve a lot of talking.

1st Infantry Division, Combined Joint Force Land Component Command Operation Inherent Resolve, key leader interview

Cross-functional execution. Many echelons above brigade headquarters run their battle rhythm via a cross functional methodology. In the past, the boards, bureaus, cells, centers, and working groups (B2C2WGs) model assisted the commander and staff in visualizing, describing, and planning using inputs and outputs from staff collaborative teams. The recently released JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters, 31 Jan 2018, reflects modifications to the existing joint force headquarters structure and focuses on the integration of planning teams, working groups, and boards. Regardless of the process used, when implemented, the cross functional planning and decision making does the following:

- **Inform the staff.** Provide information and decisions (inputs) to other working groups so that they can accomplish their work (outputs).

- **Inform the commander.** Provide the commander with information that increases his situational awareness and supports future decision making (an example is the commander’s update brief).
**Gain command decision.** If the commander delegates authority to a staff member (i.e., G-3 [operations]), the decision is still a command decision and synchronizes the staff.

Meeting chairs and facilitators need to enforce the TOR, take proactive ownership of their meetings, follow the agenda, and stay cognizant of the time. The chair and facilitator must analyze the time and information requirements for the conduct of the meeting against their 7-minute drill. This refers to the fact that a staff officer has seven minutes to provide a briefing based upon a set format to a decision maker (JP 3-33) and adjust actions in accordance with guidance provided by the decision maker. If meeting times are continually starting or ending late, meeting leads must analyze the problem and submit changes to the knowledge management section for staffing and approval. A properly executed cross-functional process makes staff coordination routine, facilitates monitoring as well as assessment and planning, and allows for the timely management of current and future operations and future plans. Some headquarters leverage virtual collaboration tools to facilitate inclusiveness at these venues.25

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**Figure 5-3. B2C2WGs in support of decision making (Joint Insights).**
**Analog COP.** Using analog systems to create a COP works extremely well and also works well as a backup to digital systems. The use of analog systems such as shared map boards in the operations, intelligence, and fires sections, as well as in the current operations integration cell, allowed the staffs to create a mutually understood COP. The use of these systems and the constant face-to-face communication within the joint, interorganizational, and multinational community ultimately helps mitigate the effects of a technology mismatch and the effects of a successful cyber-electromagnetic activities (CEMA) attack (USAREUR Insights).

**Battle rhythm development.** There is a need to develop multiple battle rhythms for an ASCC, one for the Title 10, U.S. Code, *Armed Forces*, steady state role and another for standing up the JTF. The joint manning document (JMD) build needs to account for which gaps in the staff are not sent forward. These gaps are then filled by the joint force or the Army to support an ASCC standing up a JTF headquarters.

Figure 5-5 shows a sample battle rhythm for a joint task force headquarters (JTFHQ). As the staff develops the battle rhythm, it must be integrated with the higher command’s battle rhythm. This is to ensure that JTFHQ cross-functional meeting outputs are submitted to the higher command in a timely manner and to inform the commander’s decisionmaking process.

![Figure 5-4. USAREUR Command Post at the Novo Selo Training Area in Bulgaria during Saber Guardian 2014.](image-url)
### Sample Joint Task Force Headquarters Battle Rhythm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Note: Event Time is Situationally Dependent</td>
<td>Shift Change</td>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Battle Staff/others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targeting Meeting</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>As Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situation Update to CJTF</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's Personal and Special Staffs, Component Liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plans Update to CJTF</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's Personal and Special Staffs, Component Liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CJTF's VTC Call to Components</td>
<td>CJTF Conference Room</td>
<td>CJTF, Component Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JPG</td>
<td>J-5 Plans Conference Room</td>
<td>J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, Core Planners, Component Liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTCB Meeting</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>DCJTF, J-2, J-3, JFACC, Component Liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Information Management Board</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>COS, J-3, J-6, Staff Information Management Representatives, Component Liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IO Working Group</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>IO Staff, CA, PA, DSPD, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, Component Liaison, JMISTF, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCS Working Group</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>Component Liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battle Update Assessment</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's Personal and Special Staffs, Component Liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection Working Group</td>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>FP Officer, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, Component Liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shift Change</td>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Battle Staff/others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROE/RUF Working Group</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, SJA Component Liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combat Assessment Board</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF's Personal and Special Staffs, Component Liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- **CA**: civil affairs
- **CCS**: commander’s communication synchronizaton
- **CJTF**: commander, joint task force
- **COS**: chief of staff
- **DCJTF**: deputy commander, joint task force
- **DSPD**: defense support to public diplomacy
- **FP**: force protection
- **IO**: information operations
- **J-1**: manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
- **J-2**: intelligence directorate of a joint staff
- **J-3**: logistics directorate of a joint staff
- **J-4**: operations directorate of a joint staff
- **J-5**: plans directorate of a joint staff
- **J-6**: communications system directorate of a joint staff
- **JFACC**: joint force air component commander
- **JOC**: joint operations center
- **JPG**: joint planning group
- **JTCB**: joint targeting coordination board
- **PA**: public affairs
- **ROE**: rules of engagement
- **RUF**: rules for the use of force
- **SJA**: staff judge advocate

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Figure 5-5. Sample JTFHQ battle rhythm (JP 3-33).
Establishing a COP across disparate information and knowledge management systems and processes with combined, joint, interorganizational, and multinational elements. Consider the minimum security requirements to safeguard the sources of the information feeding the COP. In the case of migrant operations where no multinational partners were involved, most organizations used the All Partners Access Network and the Non-classified Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) network to share the COP with interorganizational and multinational partners. In the role of a MNF headquarters for Panamax exercises, the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System was used to have active multinational participation. Additionally, in the case of migrant operations, an interorganizational coordination center (IOCC) was used to facilitate information sharing and problem set solving. At update briefings, interorganizational and multinational elements were asked to provide briefing during COP updates.
Cross-Functional Organization in a Joint Headquarters

Joint Publication 3-33 explains that the most common technique for promoting cross-functional collaboration is the formation of an organizational structure that blends J-code functional management with task accomplishment by cross functional teams of subject matter experts from multiple J-codes. These organizations are venues through which the cross functional expertise of the staff is brought to bear on the planning and execution problems being addressed by the commander. Horizontal cross-functional organizations overlaid on the vertical J-code structure provide a powerful method of staff integration. For many new staff members, the interaction of cross-functional organizations in relation to a typical functional staff can be confusing, so the chief of staff (COS) must continually reinforce the value and necessity of this horizontal and cross-functional approach and ensure appropriate participation by the J-code directorates.

Differing slightly from the working group model, this cross-functional design implements centers, groups, cells, offices, elements and boards (command and functional). For detailed definitions of these organizations, see JP 3-33. Regardless of the new nomenclature, the process must still define the purpose and authority, agenda, proposed membership, event location and timing, required product inputs and outputs for all groups.

Cross-Functional Integration and Battle Rhythm Guidelines

• If a meeting involves input/output from/to another organization, it belongs on the battle rhythm.

• It is recommended that staff sections maintain their own internal battle rhythms.

• If the event only involves members from within a single directorate, then it does not go on the master battle rhythm, post it on your staff/section internal battle rhythm.

• If the event produces a product or decision, then a 7-minute drill should be done on the event.

• Be as specific as you can on the 7-minute drills.

• If you require input from another staff section, coordinate with them. Your required input equals their required output.
Figure 5-6. Staff interaction supporting decision making (JP 3-33).
Command Post Mobility and Positioning

With the initial shift of the geographic combatant command from shaping to deterrence, the Army’s priority of effort moves to setting the AOR and the joint operations area (JOA). Most of this initial effort focuses on refining contingency plans and preparing initial estimates for the landpower needed for flexible deterrent options. As the dimensions of the crisis take shape, a range of basing and deployment options are examined. Concurrently with actions intended to confront and deter an adversary, commanders at multiple echelons set the theater to enable landpower to exert its full capabilities. This includes extending the existing signal and network infrastructure to accept the land component and its supporting units.

Theater Army Headquarters Considerations

The theater army executes many responsibilities across multiple phases to include Phase 0 and the deter phase. To prepare for future operations, the theater army must examine several considerations to include:

- Providing flexible Army headquarters to meet various joint command and control requirements.
- Providing force protection.
- Forward stationing and rotational deployment of Army forces.
- Modernizing forward-stationed Army units.

If necessary, combat ready Army units deploy to threatened areas to conduct exercises, communicating unmistakable U.S. intent to partners and adversaries. These are tangible effects of the Army’s role in security cooperation and assistance.

Field Manual 3-94, Theater Army, Corps and Division Operations

The theater army and its supporting commands assess the adequacy of infrastructure in the AOR to support anticipated military operations, determine requirements for additional infrastructure, and manage infrastructure development programs assigned to Army forces for execution.

As the combatant commander shifts priorities to a specific nation or region in the AOR, the theater army focuses on setting the joint operations area. In conjunction with the geographic combatant command staff and interagency partners, the theater army identifies bases in the joint operations area for logistics, medical support, protection, and infrastructure development. The functions inherent in setting the joint operations area include identifying responsibility for Army support to other Services and agencies, land transportation, inland petroleum pipeline operations, and common user
logistics. The associated functions of theater opening; port and terminal operations; and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of Army and joint forces are critical to the initiation of military operations in the joint operations area.\textsuperscript{27}

The theater army also prepares to support joint command and control in the joint operations area. Army contributions to joint command and control include establishing, maintaining, and defending the communications and network architecture to support Army and joint forces operating within the joint operations area and maintain connectivity between land based forces and the rest of the AOR. The Army is designated as the Department of Defense combatant command support agent for theater communications and network architecture. Army forces execute the responsibilities primarily through the signal command (theater) assigned to support the AOR.

The theater army headquarters divides its staff focus among AOR wide control and support of Army forces and administrative control of Army and joint forces within an active JOA. The staff will continue to plan, prepare, and assess military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence outside the joint operations area. Simultaneously, the staff will focus on support of Army, joint, and multinational forces inside a joint operations area. Because each geographic combatant command is unique, each theater army will have unique methods for organizing its headquarters to address these challenges.

As defined in Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 6-0.5, \textit{Command Post Organization and Operations}, 1 Mar 2017, a command post is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities. It is a facility that includes personnel, equipment, information systems, and networks, guided by processes and procedures that assist commanders in the exercise of mission command.\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
During Austere Challenge 17, the USAREUR Combined Operations Intelligence Center was the nexus for information in the joint force land component command headquarters. To build and maintain situational understanding, the command post must conduct a number of activities to include:\textsuperscript{27}  \\
\hline
\hline
• Receive information including reports from subordinate units  \\
• Analyze information  \\
• Generate, distribute, and share information and knowledge products to include reports required by higher headquarters  \\
• Conduct battle tracking  \\
• Conduct update and information briefings \hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
The combatant commander may use the theater army contingency command post (CCP) as the nucleus of a small JTF headquarters. The CCP receives additional personnel based upon a JMD or individual augmentation requests for Army and other Service component forces to accomplish the mission. The CCP is a viable option for short notice and limited duration operations because of its established internal staff working relationship. This capitalizes on the CCP’s flexibility and rapid deployment.

**Corps Headquarters Considerations**

The corps is normally the highest Army echelon deployed to a JOA. It commands joint, Army, and multinational land forces in campaigns and major operations. Commanders can employ the tactical command post (TCP) as a task force headquarters that temporarily controls a named operation. The TCP functions as a major subordinate command providing staff support and command post facilities to support the task force commander.

Although the corps main command post (MCP) can operate from a field location, the preferred location for the corps MCP is a permanent structure such as an unused warehouse or office complex augmented by field shelters as required. The ideal location for the MCP is often a forward operating base located near the division MCP and the supporting commands. Whenever possible, the MCP should be within a short driving distance of a fixed wing capable airstrip. Once emplaced, the MCP normally remains in place for the duration of that phase of the campaign.

The corps MCP has limited mobility and no organic security. The TCP is fully mobile but has no organic security. Deployment of the corps MCP is lift intensive and requires careful integration into the deployment sequence. Once deployed, the corps headquarters battalion normally receives an attached security company such as a reinforced military police company. Protection emphasizes both active and passive measures including a designated security force, air and missile defense, access control, dispersion, and hardening of facilities.

U.S. Army Africa’s CCP, like other ASCC’s CCPs, was reduced from 96 positions to 26 positions. The 26-man team is enough to maintain and deploy the CCP and prepare to accept enablers and communications packages tailored to the mission. Employment however, requires augmentation across all warfighting functions.

**Division Headquarters Considerations**

The division headquarters may serve as a joint force land component command headquarters with joint staff augmentation (primarily Marine
Corps) in a limited contingency operation. When serving as a JTF headquarters, the division headquarters organizes and operates in accordance with joint doctrine. JP 3-33 provides doctrine for the JTF and JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 24 Feb 2014 provides it for the joint force land component command.

When the division headquarters becomes a JTF headquarters, it requires an ARFOR (senior Army headquarters). See Appendix E, Terms and Definitions, for more information. The expeditious solution is to designate the division TCP as the ARFOR headquarters. The TCP, with an assistant division commander, co-locates with the largest brigade’s command post and exercises operational control (OPCON) over land forces.

The division has a TCP and a MCP. The division’s TCP is 100-percent mobile using organic transportation. The division MCP is not 100-percent mobile; it requires additional transportation to displace. It is also not fully transportable by C-130 aircraft and requires numerous C-17 aircraft sorties to deploy by air. Normally the MCP deploys by a combination of air and sealift and also requires RSOI to reach full capacity. Neither command post has an organic security force. The division tasks a subordinate unit to secure the MCP and TCP as required.

Insights

CCP Systems. Key to the ASCC CCP is its ability to gain and maintain situational awareness and facilitate mission command in the initial stages of any contingency. Thus, the CCP requires modern technological and reliable communications equipment. One important piece of equipment is the Battle Command Communication System. This system provides an internal server to the CCP team, so that in the event that communications are lost or the satellite shot is lost, the CCP can function while communications are being reestablished with higher headquarters.

Training for headquarters deployment. FM 3-94 addresses headquarters deployment training considerations that apply to theater army, corps, and division headquarters. Each option for forming the JTF requires staff with specific military skill sets and training levels. One important requisite skill set is the staff’s proficiency with joint command and control systems, networks, and software applications. The corps headquarters is equipped with various Army mission command systems so the staff can train on them. However, the respective headquarters coordinates with the geographic combatant command to gain access to joint command and control capabilities for command post training. The division TCP, corps early entry command post, or theater army CCP can and should deploy as part of a joint rapid deployment exercise. The headquarters can also exercise in simulation as the core element of a JTF for limited interventions. It should also provide augmentation as a staff plug to another Service headquarters tasked to form
a JTF headquarters as part of an exercise. Each opportunity to participate in joint exercises increases the experience of the corps staff and builds knowledge that the corps staff can incorporate into unit standard operating procedures and contingency plans.

Figure 5-7. U.S. Army Africa Contingency Command Post set up during Judicious Response 17-01 (CALL Judicious Response Initial Impressions Report, 30 Jun 2017).

An effective training program involves the corps in joint exercises with access to joint command and control systems. The deployable joint command and control suite of equipment for each geographic combatant command provides a rapidly deployable, scalable, and modular command post suite. Reconfiguration of the deployable joint command and control system allows for rapid response and enroute communications capabilities if required. Deployable joint command and control provides a standardized command post with full joint command and control capabilities. These capabilities include the servers, workstations, and satellite uplinks to support the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System, global mission network, nongovernment organizations, SECRET Internet protocol router networks, nonsecure Internet protocol router networks, the Global Command and Control System-Joint, and other collaborative information environment and communications capabilities.

**Theater planning considerations.** The limitations of the theater army headquarters include the following (FM 3-94):

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• The theater army is not designed, organized, or equipped to function as a combined forces land component command or a field Army in major combat operations. It does not exercise OPCON over corps and larger formations.

• The MCP operates from a fixed location and is not mobile.

• The MCP can provide personnel for a multinational land component headquarters, but this degrades the ability of the headquarters to provide and control theater-level support across the AOR.

• The CCP requires joint augmentation for employment as a JTF headquarters. With augmentation, it can become a JTF for limited contingency operations. Although the CCP is deployable, it has limited endurance without reinforcement and additional security.

• Some theater-level capabilities required for campaigns and major operations must deploy from the continental U.S. (CONUS).

• Augmentation for both a JTF and for capabilities at the theater level is frequently provided by forces mobilized from the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

Most theater-level capabilities required for campaigns and major operations are in the Reserve Component and must be mobilized and deploy from the CONUS.

Figure 5-8. U.S. Army North’s Sentinel Operational Command Post performs its mission during exercise Ardent Sentry (www.army.mil).
Endnotes

2. Ibid.
4. ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
8. ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.
12. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
Chapter 6

Integrating Joint Force Enablers

The process of forming a joint headquarters (HQ) with a theater army, corps, or division as the nucleus of the joint HQ may vary depending upon the assigned mission, operational environment, composition, and capability of existing and potential adversaries or nature of the crisis or contingency. A joint HQ commander may have only a few days or several months to plan the mission, train his staff, and request capabilities required to accomplish the mission in achieving the end state. As the process continues, shortfalls in required capabilities may become evident, requiring the joint HQ commander and staff to seek assistance from external sources. The joint HQ staff must be aware of the resources available to augment and enhance the capabilities of the joint force. It is those capabilities that enable the joint force to accomplish the broad spectrum of challenges. This chapter provides insight into specific Army, joint, interorganizational, and multinational organizations and enablers that may provide augmentation to the joint force. The organizations and enablers addressed in this chapter provide insight into the types of augmentation a joint force may receive and the purposes behind that augmentation.

Joint Enabling Capabilities Command

The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) is a subordinate command of the U.S. Transportation Command and provides decisive joint communications, planning, and public affairs support to the joint force that will meet the emerging requirements of combatant commands and joint task force capable HQ.1

The JECC’s subordinate joint commands operate and train regularly with all geographic combatant commands, maintain cross-domain awareness, and bring recent experience to rapidly evolving operational environments. The JECC’s subordinate elements are highly adaptable and can be tailored in size and capability. Their performance in peacetime and in war ensured that the JECC is the trusted enabler of joint command and control capabilities in complex operational environments.

The JECC should be requested each time an Army HQ is directed to form a joint HQ.

Comment made by U.S. Army Central (USARCENT)/Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF [NATO])-Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) General Officer
The JECC consists of three subordinate joint commands:

- **Joint Planning Support Element**, headquartered at Naval Station Norfolk in Virginia, provides rapidly deployable and tailored teams of joint planners for operational and strategic HQ with expertise to accelerate the formation and increase the effectiveness of a joint force HQ (JFHQ) during emerging operations.

- **Joint Communications Support Element**, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, provides rapidly deployable, scalable, enroute, and early entry communications capabilities across the full spectrum of operations in order to enable rapid action of the joint force.

- **Joint Public Affairs Support Element**, headquartered at Naval Station Norfolk in Virginia, provides ready and rapidly deployable joint public affairs support to facilitate establishment of a JFHQ, bridge joint public affairs requirements, and conduct effective training in order to meet current and emerging information environments.

The JECC rapidly deployed a mission tailored package to USARCENT during transition to CJTF-OIR. The JECC experts assumed critical CJTF staff positions that facilitated development of a CJTF battle rhythm; a joint intelligence support element; nonlethal fires; information operations; future operations; sustainment operations; engineering; land use and facility agreements; campaign planning and assessments; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence infrastructure and network design; and public affairs, strategic themes, and messaging. JECC experts and capabilities facilitated the maturing of the CJTF-OIR staff until the joint manning document could be resourced.

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
Initial Impressions Report No. 16-10
**USARCENT Transition to CJTF-OIR**
8 March 2016

What follows are some of the Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. executive departments and agencies, and other organizations (other than the JECC) that may provide augmentation to the JFHQ. This list is not all inclusive; however, it should provide insight into the type of augmentation a JFHQ can receive and the purpose behind that augmentation. For more information, refer to U.S. Government Manual (http://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov); Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, 12 Oct 2016; and JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, 5 Jul 2017.
Department of Defense Organization Augmentation

**National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).** The NIST is a nationally sourced team of intelligence and communications experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and other agencies. The NIST’s purpose is to provide a national level, deployable, all source intelligence team to meet combatant command (CCMD) or joint task force (JTF) requirements. For more details concerning a NIST, refer to JP 2-01.

**Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).** DTRA’s mission is to safeguard America and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear [CBRN]) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat and mitigate its effects.

**Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC).** The JIOWC is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) controlled activity and the principal field agency for joint information operations support of CCMDs. It supports the joint staff in improving DOD’s ability to meet CCMD information related requirements, improve development of information related capabilities, and ensure operational integration and coherence across combatant commands and other DOD activities.

**Joint Communications Security Monitoring Activity (JCMA).** The JCMA conducts communications security (COMSEC) monitoring (collection, analysis, and reporting) of DOD telecommunications (encrypted and unencrypted) and automated information systems and monitoring of related noncommunications signals. Its purpose is to identify vulnerabilities exploitable by potential adversaries and to recommend countermeasures and corrective actions. The JCMA provides COMSEC monitoring and analysis support (less conventional wire line telephone) to the unified commands, Military Departments and Services, DOD agencies, and the staff at the joint level.
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA). The JPRA (https://public.jpra.mil) is the principal DOD agency for coordinating and advancing personnel recovery (PR). JPRA currently provides for commanders, forces, and individuals on joint PR activities through development and conduct of education and training courses as well as specialized individual training. The agency assesses, advises, and evaluates PR curriculum and establishes joint PR standards in collaboration with the components of the DOD for formal joint PR training to include code of conduct and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE). The JPRA also provides components of the DOD with analytical support, technology research and integration, maintenance of databases and archives, and development of lessons learned. The JPRA encourages partnerships by assisting with non-DOD agencies, multinational partners, and others with PR-related education and training programs.2

Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC). The JWAC (http://www.jwac.mil/) assists in preparation and analysis of joint operation plans and Service chiefs’ analysis of weapons effectiveness. The JWAC normally provides this support to JFHQ through the supported CCMD. The JWAC uses information provided by the intelligence community to analyze and recommend solutions to some of the most complex problems faced by U.S. military and civilian leaders. JWAC supports both crisis operations and contingency planning.3

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The DLA (http://www.dla.mil/) supports JFHQ using a variety of capabilities. The DLA has robust logistic planning experience, logistic surge and sustainment expertise, forward deployed and expeditionary organizations, and personnel embedded physically and virtually with the warfighting and support organizations. In addition to executing its responsibilities as the executive agent for Classes I (subsistence), III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants [POL]), IV (construction materiel), and VIII (medical materiel), DLA exercises item manager duties for supply support across the other classes of supply. The DLA can access and use a variety of information management tools to monitor the availability of supplies and equipment. Geographic combatant commanders can request the DLA’s Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office to augment the CCMD or a joint task force HQ to synchronize and integrate operational contract support.
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U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). The USCYBERCOM (http://www.stratcom.mil/) is a sub-unified command under U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of specified DOD information networks and prepares to, when directed, conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in the operational environment, and facilitate U.S. and Allied freedom of action in cyberspace while denying the same to adversaries.

National Security Agency. The NSA (https://www.nsa.gov) leads the U.S. government in cryptology that encompasses both signals intelligence and information assurance products and services and enables computer network operations in order to gain a decision advantage for the U.S. and its allies.

The NSA has deployed personnel to all of the major military commands and to locations around the globe where there is a U.S. military presence. The NSA analysts, linguists, engineers, and other personnel deploy to Afghanistan and other hostile areas to provide actionable signals intelligence and information assurance support to warfighters on the front lines. Many of NSA’s deployed personnel serve in cryptologic services groups, providing dedicated support at the CCMD or higher HQ level. Since the mid-2000s, NSA personnel have served on cryptologic support teams, which are assigned to support smaller units such as brigade combat teams to ensure they are receiving the intelligence and information assurance products and services they need to accomplish their specific missions. These teams have enabled the NSA to push the full capabilities of their global cryptologic enterprise as far forward as possible.

Defense Intelligence Agency. The DIA (http://www.dia.mil) is an intelligence combat support agency under the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and a member of the national intelligence community. The Director of DIA reports to the SecDef through the CJCS. The DIA’s combat support mission is to provide support for operating forces planning for or conducting military operations, including support during conflict or in the conduct of other military activities related to countering threats to U.S. national security. The DIA conducts overt and clandestine human intelligence collection focusing on requirements of importance to the DOD. The DIA also leads efforts to
align intelligence activities and links and synchronizes national defense and military intelligence.

**National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.** The NGA (https://www.nga.mil) is an intelligence combat support agency under the SecDef and is dual tasked as a member of the national intelligence community under the Director, National Intelligence (DNI). The Director of NGA serves as the functional manager for geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and is the principal GEOINT advisor to the DNI, SecDef, CJCS, and combatant commanders. As functional manager, the NGA develops GEOINT tradecraft standards, develops strategic guidance and procedures, and develops and enforces information technology architecture and standards. The NGA also ensures coordination across intelligence disciplines and intelligence community elements.

The GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. The GEOINT exploitation includes analysis of electro-optical, infrared, and radar imagery; full motion video; moving target indicators; geospatial information; and spectral, laser infrared, radiometric, polarimetric, spatial, and temporal data.

**Multinational Operations**

**Multinational operations** as a term is collectively used to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (FM 3-16, *The Army in Multinational Operations*, 8 Apr 2014). Although each nation has its own interests and often participates within limitations of national caveats, all nations bring value to the operation. Each nation’s force has unique capabilities and each usually contributes to the operation’s legitimacy in terms of international or local acceptability (see FM 3-16).

**Alliances** are relationships that result from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad and long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 Jan 2017). Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), allow partners to establish formal standard agreements.

In addition to alliances, a **coalition** is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, 16 Jun 2017). Nations usually form coalitions for focused short term purposes. A coalition action is an action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Army forces may conduct coalition actions under the authority of a United Nations resolution.
When directed, an Army theater sustainment command can provide logistics and other support to multinational forces. Integrating support requirements of several nations’ forces, often spread over considerable distances and across international boundaries, is challenging. Commanders consider multinational force capabilities, such as mine clearance which may exceed the capabilities of U.S. forces.

Persons assigned to a multinational force face many demands. These include dealing with cultural issues, different languages, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respective forces, and underdeveloped methods and systems for commanding and controlling.

Role of the Liaison Officer (Service and Multinational)

Exchanging liaison officers (LNOs) is the most commonly employed technique for establishing close, continuous, physical communications among organizations. The LNOs enhance information sharing and contribute significantly to mission success.

The joint force commander (JFC) must identify the requirement for LNOs based on command relationships and mission support requirements. The LNOs must be requested at the earliest opportunity. Per this request, any specific qualifications and functions for these personnel should be noted by the JFC. The LNOs to the JFHQ should be of sufficient rank (recommend equal rank to JFHQ primary staff officers) to influence the decisionmaking process. Ideally, LNOs should possess the requisite skill sets (technical training or language) to liaise and communicate effectively with receiving organizations. The JFC should establish a familiarization program for all LNOs. A joint personnel reception center could perform this requirement. The JFC must determine what staff officer or staff section will have overall cognizance of all LNOs reporting to the JFHQ for duty (examples include joint force deputy commander, chief of staff, or J-3 [operations]).

Involving subordinate unit (LNOs) is beneficial in the planning process because it facilitates parallel planning, creates a shared understanding, and sets the subordinate units up for success in their operations.

Liaison should be established between the JFHQ and higher commands, between adjacent units and between supporting, attached, and assigned forces, and the JFHQ. Additionally, the JFHQ may also exchange LNOs.
with multinational forces, host nation, and interorganizational entities. Normally, LNOs perform their duties within the JFHQ directorate that is responsible for functions related to the LNO’s assigned duties. They are representatives of their commanders and normally will attend briefings and maintain close contact with the JFHQ joint operations center. The LNOs should have access to the JFC. Although the LNOs may have workspace in the operations center to facilitate the exchange of information, LNOs are not duty officers but representatives of one commander to another.

The LNOs, whether individually or in teams, perform several critical functions that are consistent across the range of military operations. The extent to which these functions are performed depends on the mission and the direction established by the commander they represent. A successful LNO performs four basic functions:

- **Monitor.** The LNOs monitor joint force operations, the gaining organization, and the sending organization, and must understand how each one influences the other. LNOs must know the current situation and planned operations, understand pertinent staff issues, and understand their commanders’ intent. The joint force battle rhythm, in part, drives the LNOs’ daily schedule and allows them to maintain the current situation and better advise their commanders.

- **Coordinate.** The LNOs help synchronize current operations and future planning between the sending organizations, gaining organizations, or the JFHQ. They accomplish this by coordinating with other LNOs and other organizations. Successful coordination requires a collaborative process that enhances communications between the LNOs’ organizations. This process may range from understanding how various organizations function to collaborative systems that improve communications between organizations.

- **Advise.** The LNOs are the experts on the sending organizations’ capabilities and limitations. They advise the JFC, joint force staff, and the gaining organizations concerning capabilities of their organizations. They must be proactive in providing the supported staff with relevant information on their organization’s capabilities. The LNOs are not decision makers and cannot commit their parent organizations to actions without coordination and approval.

- **Assist.** The LNOs provide assistance to various organizations by providing their expertise and facilitating coordination between their organizations. They must not accept formal tasking by the joint force or any other organization. Formal taskings should be accomplished through normal command and control channels or as agreed to by the respective organizations.
**Liaison Officer Guidelines**

- LNOs are personal and official representatives of the sending organizations and should be treated accordingly.
- LNOs support the gaining organizations and serve as critical conduits between organizations.
- LNOs remain in their parent organizations’ chain of command.
- LNOs perform four basic functions: monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist.
- LNOs (to include multinational LNOs) must have sufficient access to information to be effective.
- LNOs are not full-time planners.
- LNOs are not watch officers.
- LNOs are not substitutes for delivering critical information through normal command and control channels or a conduit for general information sharing.
- LNOs are not replacements for proper staff-to-staff coordination.
- LNOs are not replacements for augmentees or representatives.
- LNOs do not have the authority to make decisions for their commander without coordination and approval.

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**Figure 6-1. Liaison officer guidelines (JP 3-33, Joint Task Force HQ, 31 Jan 2018).**

The LNOs provide an essential command and control bridge between the JFHQ, its parent organizations, and its subordinate organizations. To help ensure LNOs are properly employed and not misused, the JFHQ should follow certain basic guidelines (see Figure 6-1, Liaison Officer Guidelines, for details). JP 3-33 provides LNOs with an in-depth checklist to assist in accomplishing liaison tasks.

The LNOs are critical for collaboration and communications between subordinate, adjacent, higher, and host-nation units involved in the operation. The LNOs provide key information from their units to the command with regard to planning and capabilities. By definition, the LNO is the commander’s representative to the supported or supporting command and, as such, has various authorities to engage the commander.
The LNOs, if used effectively, can provide critical information to the command in both multinational and unilateral efforts. A LNO team fosters a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitates the transfer of vital information, enhances mutual trust, and develops an increased level of teamwork. The LNO or liaison team supplies significant information to the joint force HQ about subordinate force readiness, training, and other factors. Early establishment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications systems, doctrine, and operating procedures.

Insights:

- **LNO integration.** Observations show that having the LNO present provides timely information before said information is presented at a formal briefing. For example, a joint force land component command received information an hour after critical information was received from a subordinate unit. Also critical is to select, as the LNO, a highly competent officer or noncommissioned officer that is comfortable speaking to senior personnel.

- **Location.** Timely placement of LNOs at critical points and the reception of LNOs from supporting agencies and organizations are important aspects of operational success.

- **LNO significance.** The importance of LNOs cannot be overstated in an austere environment and in theater. The 101st Airborne Division made extensive use of LNOs, ensuring that experienced and knowledgeable personnel were used to fill LNO positions.

- **Talent management.** “Build cohesive teams with the right people in the right place. Talented personnel were identified early and specifically selected to perform as LNOs to support the mission,” (101st Airborne Division [Air Assault] assistant division commander-support).

- **Manning LNO positions.** “As a joint force command, the division was given a joint manning document, even though a vast majority of the staff was from the 101st Division. Most unique was the number of LNOs (between 22 and 24) sent from the division to other HQ. LNOs were sent to U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), the U.S. Embassy, and the National Ebola Command Center (NECC). Temporary LNOs were sent to work with the United Nations in Liberia. The division also received 12 LNOs from other organizations,” (101st Airborne Division [Air Assault] chief of staff).

- **Critical communications link.** “The use of LNOs is a critical and integral part of the communication and collaboration links between commands especially with the joint, interorganizational, and
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multinational community supporting Operation Unified Assistance. Having mature, experienced, and knowledgeable LNOs was critical. Not only can a LNO assist in staffing requirements, but an LNO can provide a strategic voice and speak on the unit’s behalf. Mature and knowledgeable liaisons have two effects. First, they provide insight to the gaining unit through command messaging with a strategic voice. Second, the information they receive can be used by the parent organization to maintain situational awareness and obtain a sensing of the pulse of plans, operations, initiatives, and decisions of the other joint, interorganizational, and multinational organizations and agencies in theater.” (101st Airborne Division [Air Assault] G-9/J-9 civil-military operations).11

Digital Liaison Detachments (DLD)

Working closely with allies and partners is a key and enduring element of U.S. national strategy. The U.S. frequently requires support from its partners and allies to prevail in contemporary conflicts. Likewise, U.S. partners and allies often require extensive U.S. support during regional and internal conflicts.

Liaison among military HQ allows commanders to integrate military operations in joint, interorganizational, multinational, and other applicable environments by providing necessary staff interface, mentoring, support, and communication required for U.S. partners and allies to accomplish their missions. The DLDs are units specifically designed and dedicated to providing a critical capability for mission command liaison and interoperability.

The DLDs are assigned or attached to a selected theater army and Service component command of the Army for employment at theater army or in support at corps and division echelons. These teams provide an Army Force (ARFOR) commander with the capability to conduct liaison with subordinate or parallel joint and multinational HQ within the operational area.

The DLD provides liaison capability between ARFOR, joint force land component command, coalition force land component command, joint task force, subordinate HQ, and multinational HQ to ensure communication, mutual understanding, unity of purpose, and action. The DLD provides a coalition partner with the interoperability link to integrate and stimulate U.S. mission command systems and a synchronized digital common operational picture (COP) through the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). The DLD digital architecture includes several organic systems with multifunctional work stations. These include: Command Post of the Future (CPOF), Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System, Distributed Common Ground System-Army, Air and Missile Defense Workstation,
and the Tactical Airspace Integration System. System integration issues are precisely why a DLD is necessary. Stimulation of U.S. mission command systems is done by DLD operators who manually enter information obtained from unified action partners.

The DLD provides Army representation inside the coalition partner HQ to assist in clarifying orders, interpreting the commander’s intent, and identifying and resolving problems involving plans, policies, and procedures. Potential coalition partners may lack operational experience in large-scale military operations and may not fully understand U.S. Army doctrine or Army tactics, techniques, and procedures. The DLD LNO team provides the supported coalition partner with U.S. Army subject matter experts on maneuver, fires, intelligence, and sustainment. These experts assist the coalition partner in planning, executing, and assessing military operations and ensuring the coalition partner’s operations are adequately coordinated and synchronized with the operations of the overall coalition force.

Commanders and staff operating as a joint HQ must be aware that multinational brigades normally lack the ability to communicate digitally, or if they do, their systems might prove incompatible. This often creates an additional layer of complexity to planning and execution.

FM 3-94, *Theater, Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, 21 Apr 2014

The DLDs are composed of 30 subject matter experts (SMEs) in five functional areas: operations/maneuver, intelligence, fire support, logistics, and air and missile defense. These SMEs are capable of providing advice and assistance to supported partner units and ensuring rapid and more accurate communication between different HQ. The DLDs may have organic transportation but must receive communications support, security augmentation, logistics/life support, and medical support from theater army units. The DLDs may require augmentation with specific language capabilities. The DLDs are augmented with qualified linguists and interpreters with specific language capabilities. These detachments operate as a single entity for liaison with a major multinational HQ or provide two smaller teams for digital connectivity and liaison with smaller multinational HQ or are tailored to match a given mission.

Either as a tactical HQ or as a joint force land component command, the division commands multinational forces. Normally, these forces are under the tactical control of the division. Depending on the size of the multinational force, the division commander reorganizes the staff and command group (JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*). In Afghanistan, for example, American divisions frequently operated with a NATO general officer in their command group when the division commanded a brigade
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equivalent from that nation. The division commander may deploy the
tactical command post to the command post of a large multinational
formation to ensure that the multinational force has full connectivity with
the division’s main command post. Normally, the division receives a DLD
to support this requirement. 12

**Digital liaison detachment mission and capabilities.** While the mission
of a DLD is to provide digital liaison capability to theater army, corps, and
division HQ for connectivity with allied and multinational forces and other
Services of the U.S., a DLD also provides:

- Functional area expertise via LNOs to joint and multinational HQ
- Digital information management and communications interface
capability for U.S. systems with a partner nation HQ
- U.S. HQ representatives inside a supported multinational HQ
to facilitate mission command by clarifying orders, interpreting
commander’s intent, and identifying and resolving issues
- The partner nation HQ with Army experts on maneuver, fires,
inelligence, sustainment, and air and missile defense
- Army mission command systems

In addition to the DLD’s mission and capabilities, its core tasks include:

- To establish a liaison presence between an assigned HQ and partner
  nation
- To develop cross functional (operations, intelligence, fires,
sustainment, and air defense) rapport with multinational HQ, partner
  nation ministries, or nongovernmental agencies as required
- To develop rationalization and standardization agreements as required
to facilitate staff interactions between multinational HQ
- To act as the forward information exchange and coordination center
  for joint forces
- To conduct rapid assessment and coordination of operational situations
  between HQ
- To move information between an assigned unit HQ and supported and
  adjacent unit HQ
- To represent supported partner nation HQ inside the assigned HQ
- To provide project and program liaison support as required
• To provide continuity between staff rotations to preserve momentum of current and future operations

**Digital liaison detachment and force structure.** DLDs exist in three components: Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard. The Department of the Army (DA) will permanently assign some DLDs to a forward Army HQ for continuous liaison with allied ground HQ. Other DLDs may be assigned directly to a theater army HQ in priority theaters. The DLDs assigned to a theater army or forward HQ will be regionally aligned to include requiring regional language and cultural training requirements.

The DA may also regionally align DLDs in the Army Reserve to a theater army and forward station them outside of the U.S. National Guard DLDs stationed in the U.S. will normally remain in the force pool to provide rotational depth but may also be regionally aligned. Before mobilization, National Guard DLDs remain under command of the States and Army Reserve DLDs under Army Reserve Command or command of a forward theater army.

Upon mobilization, Reserve Component DLDs in the continental U.S. come immediately under the command and training readiness oversight of U.S. Army Forces Command (USFORSCOM). The USFORSCOM has delegated this training readiness oversight to commander, 1st Army. Upon deployment, DLDs normally transfer to the command of the gaining overseas theater army HQ.

For more information on DLDs, please see CALL Handbook 18-06, *Leader’s Guide to the Digital Liaison Detachment*, 28 Dec 2017. This handbook provides leaders and supporting staff in the operational Army with an overview of how to plan, train, and leverage the capabilities of DLDs that render a critical capability for mission command liaison and interoperability. Also included are operational insights from CALL assessment teams during exercises Anakonda 16 and Saber Guardian 17.

**Digital liaison detachment support for unified action.** DLDs conduct liaison to support unified action. Unified action includes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place in unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or a JTF under the overall direction of the commanders.
of those commands. Unified land operations are the Army’s contribution to
unified action. The DLDs provided by the Army to joint force commanders
provide a critical liaison capability for the conduct of unified land
operations, especially the synchronization of U.S. and multinational forces.

Multinational considerations. To maintain situational understanding of
the multinational issues and perspectives, the corps should have a liaison
detachment from each national force embedded in the combined land
component HQ. The corps also provides additional communications and
liaison support to each multinational force, either directly or by tasking a
subordinate Army unit. In many cases, this requires reinforcement by the
theater army to the supporting communications units. For example, the
corps may receive and deploy a DLD as a subordinate theater army unit.¹³

Digital and analog proficiency. The DLD is designed to operate at
division level in a “digital” capacity. In those instances when the DLD
operates below division level in analog mode, it is important for the DLD
to maintain digital connectivity/relationship with the division. The division
level connectivity provides up-to-date information flowing to the DLD that
may further be used to populate an analog COP. Two skill sets and areas of
training become important to the DLD with the observation above:

- Digital skills must be maintained with DLD personnel
- Analog skills must be maintained by DLD personnel.

The recommendation is to ensure that DLD personnel receive training to
keep current on digital and analog skills. Specifically, more junior DLD
personnel should be trained in analog areas, e.g., map skills. More senior
personnel would be advised to train on current or recent developments in
technology.

Communications equipment. Leveraging organic communications
capabilities are a primary concern of DLD leadership in recent
exercises. Senior personnel, to include the commanding officer and
executive officer, must agree what organic communications equipment
should be made available to DLD units. In some cases, DLD organic
communication equipment may create an increased footprint, and require
additional personnel, associated communication equipment training, and
additional coordination. The DLD leadership prefers to “fall in” on the
communications equipment that is provided by host nation or current U.S.
Army units on the ground. With no organic communications equipment,
the DLD must coordinate with the gaining unit prior to arrival regarding
communications equipment needs. There may be scenarios where different
DLDs, dependent upon their role and partnership to multinational partners,
desire more or less capability for organic communications equipment.
The additional personnel enhanced the DLD capabilities to help cover potential gaps in the allied command structure and extended operational mission command capability, enhancing unity of effort. The robust DLDs enabled U.S. forces to mitigate risks through better force management and more effective military-to-military multinational force interoperability with U.S. allies. Additionally, the rapid changes in the security environment created opportunities for the U.S. forces to strengthen alliances and build capacity.

CALL Handbook 18-06, Leader’s Guide to the Digital Liaison Detachment

Planning for DLD utilization. Because the DLD is a very small and a relatively “unknown” entity, there is a common misunderstanding across the U.S. Army of the DLD mission and purpose. This may lend itself to a wandering mission set for DLDs in the planning stages for exercises and actual operations. If host nations do not understand the mission and purpose of DLDs, then relationships are more difficult to understand and encapsulate in an exercise scenario. In cases of little or no prior liaison for DLD familiarization, there is an increased time period for efficient performance of the DLD. Additionally, there is little to no understanding of the support that a DLD will need upon arrival in the area of operations (AO). Additional strategic communications are needed on DLD mission and purpose. Develop a “marketing plan” for describing the DLD’s mission and purpose to Active Army units. The DLD conducts liaison to enable mission command and achieve unity of effort between U.S. Army forces and unified action partners (UAPs) but few others in the U.S. Army know about the DLD. It must also be described that DLDs may need the following items for support upon arrival in an AO: 1. linguistic support 2. security augmentation 3. logistics support 4. signal platoon support and 5. medical support.

Bridging the UAP gap. Emphasize LNO capabilities with personnel authorizations, specialized training, and mission command equipment (radios and mission command information systems). The LNOs continue to be an effective means of direct unit-to-unit interface at the appropriate tactical level for conducting planning, coordination, synchronization, and integration of UAPs. Specialized training is required such as cultural, language (especially if conducting regionally aligned forces missions and security assistance training), and familiarization with the UAP decisionmaking process. Consider developing a language translator application that provides real-time translations of voice/text for the most common languages. The application uses regional etymology and UAP common terms and definitions.
Vignette: Leveraging Digital Liaison Detachments

Although conducting joint and combined operations in the Republic of Korea (ROK), the corps commander directed his staff to integrate the two Active Army DLDs into the theater mission command architecture.

The DLDs, already stationed on the peninsula, recently received augmentation with additional personnel from the National Guard. Both detachments were equipped with full ABCS and additional linguists to facilitate interoperability with ROK multinational partners. Note: The field often requires more liaison capacity than they can meet.

Based on experiences from recent exercises, the corps staff coordinated with the DLD commander and his staff to implement a plan that would allow the U.S. HQ to share the corps COP with their Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) counterparts. In addition, the DLD would need to help translate the U.S. corps directives and orders to ensure coalition operations could be executed.

With the augmentation from the National Guard, the DLD staff was able to support operations across all the warfighting functions. Partnered with the corps staff, the DLD staff was able to leverage its expertise to rapidly communicate key information using a variety of mission command systems.

Without the DLD functions, the corps commander and staff would have had immense difficulty communicating with their ROKA counterparts. The DLD capabilities enabled U.S. and the partner nation unit to conduct operations, bridging both technology and cultural divides that allowed the corps and theater army to accomplish the mission.

CALL Handbook 18-06

Endnotes

1. JECC


3. JWAC Homepage

4. NSA-Support to the Military

5. ATP 6-0.5, Command Post Organization and Operations, 1 Mar 2017.

6. Ibid.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.


Chapter 7
Leveraging Civilian Agencies

More than ever before, crisis management, reconstruction, and development demand a new level of cooperation and between nations and international organizations where military and civilian instruments are applied.

Jaap De Hoop Scheffe
Former Secretary General
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Background

In unified action, the U.S. Army seeks the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. This is defined in both the Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations, 6 Oct 2017, and Joint Publication (JP), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013. As military forces synchronize actions, they achieve unity of effort. Unified action includes actions of military forces synchronized with activities of other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), interorganizational stakeholders, and the private sector. Unified action partners (UAPs) also include joint forces and components, multinational forces, and U.S. government (USG) agencies and departments. Through engagement, military forces play a key role in unified action before, during, and after operations. The Army’s contribution to unified action is unified land operations (ULO).

Interagency coordination is inherent in unified action. Within the context of Department of Defense (DOD) involvement, interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between elements of the DOD and engaged USG agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 Jan 2017). Army forces conduct and participate in interagency coordination using strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) play a pivotal role in unified action. However, subordinate commanders also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations. Additionally, activities of the host nation and local populace should be considered. For the U.S. Army, this is ULO. More specifically, ULO is how the U.S. Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order
to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution (ADRP 3-0).

**Interorganizational cooperation** is the interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD; participating USG departments and agencies; State, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*, 12 Oct 2016). Building partner capacity secures populations, protects infrastructure, and strengthens institutions as a means of protecting common security interests. Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements that enhance the ability of partners to establish security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. The U.S. Army integrates capabilities of the Army’s operating and generating forces to support interorganizational capacity building efforts primarily through security cooperation interactions. The U.S. Army’s operating forces consist of those Army forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof. The Army’s generating forces consist of those U.S. Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army’s capabilities for employment by joint force commanders.

Personal contact and rapport building are essential. Command emphasis on immediate and continuous coordination encourages effective cooperation. Commanders should establish liaison with civilian organizations to integrate their efforts as much as possible with Army and joint operations. Civil affairs units typically establish this liaison. Army forces provide sustainment and security for civilian organizations (e.g., another government agency) when directed because many of these organizations lack these capabilities.

**Army Cooperation with Civilian Organizations**

Civilian organizations such as international organizations, governmental organizations, NGOs, and contractors bring resources and capabilities that can help establish host-nation civil authority and capabilities. Most civilian organizations are not under military control nor are they controlled by a U.S. ambassador or a United Nations commissioner. Civilian organizations have different organizational cultures and norms. Some may be willing to work with Army forces while others may not. Also, civilian organizations may arrive well after military operations have begun. Figure 7-1 provides a comparison of U.S. agency organizational structures.
### Figure 7-1. Comparison of U.S. agency organizational structures (JP 3-08).

**Notes:**

1. The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs, and the private sector toward theater strategic objectives.

2. The commander, joint task force, within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other
military forces, USG agencies, NGOs, and the private sector toward theater operational objectives.

3. The ambassador and embassy (which includes the country team) functions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and may support joint operation planning conducted by a combatant commander or commander of a joint task force (CJTF) or may lead an integrated planning team.

4. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Central Intelligence Agency liaison officer or any other U.S. agency representative assigned to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group or otherwise assigned to the combatant commander’s staff.

5. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance provides its rapidly deployable disaster assistance response team, which includes specialists trained in disaster relief.

U.S. Government Departments and Agencies

**Department of State (DOS).** The DOS (http://www.state.gov/) is responsible for planning and implementing foreign policy. The Secretary of State (SECSTATE), the ranking member of the cabinet and fourth in line of Presidential succession, is the President’s principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for U.S. representation abroad. A key DOS function is assembling coalitions to provide military forces for U.S. led multinational operations. In coordination with the National Security Council and the DOD, the DOS contacts foreign governments at the highest level to request participation of their forces in planned multinational operations. When forces are offered, the DOS formally accepts them from the foreign government and arranges for military-to-military contact. The DOS’s principal role in its relationship with the DOD is to ensure that defense activities support national foreign policy and to facilitate defense activities overseas.

**U.S. Agency for International Development.** The USAID (http://www.usaid.gov) is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the SECSTATE. Through its assistance programs, USAID plays an active and vital role in promoting U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The investment made in developing countries has long-term benefits for
America and the American people. Development now takes its place alongside defense and diplomacy as the three essential components of American foreign policy. The USAID is the principal USG provider of global development, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. The USAID has established relationships with USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and private voluntary organizations. In carrying out its responsibilities, USAID draws on these organizations, as required, to coordinate the USG’s response to foreign disasters. Similarly, these organizations look to USAID for advice and assistance, as appropriate, in handling their assigned responsibilities. Involvement of military forces in civil activity abroad is matched by an increase in situations in which civil agencies face emerging military threats. As such, the joint force commander (JFC) facilitates the coordination of all U.S. military forces’ support to USAID. In addition, a joint force command may encounter scores of NGOs and international organizations in a joint operations area. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 3 Jan 2014, provides an in-depth discussion of USAID and its relationship with U.S. military forces.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS (https://www.dhs.gov) is responsible for homeland security to prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage U.S. borders, enforce and administer U.S. immigration laws, protect cyberspace and critical infrastructure, and strengthen national preparedness and resilience to disasters. The DHS works closely with numerous federal agencies, in particular with the DOD and its subordinate organizations. The DOD organizations and agencies provide numerous liaison officers (LNOs) to the DHS and components of the DHS. The DOD LNOs may represent organizations and specialties such as combatant commands (CCMDs), intelligence organizations, or engineers.

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The USDA (https://www.usda.gov/) provides leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, rural development, nutrition, and related issues based on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management. Operations that involve coordination efforts with the USDA and the DOD primarily converge on biological threats, surveillance, protection, and countermeasures as related to animal transmitted diseases to humans. The USDA also provided agriculture advisors for provincial reconstruction teams in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). The DOC (https://www.commerce.gov/) is the primary USG department for building government-to-government relationships with host nation ministry-level representatives from trade, industry, and economic development related ministries; resolving international trade issues. Routine interactions between the DOC and the DOD primarily focus on ongoing technical assistance in foreign countries, as well as developing coordinated DOD and DOC projects for various countries or regions. The DOC has significant capacity building capabilities that have been used when working with host nations in the pursuit of national security objectives.

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The mission of the DOJ (http://www.justice.gov) is to enforce the law and defend the interests of the U.S. according to the law, ensure public safety against threats both foreign and domestic, provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime, seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior, and ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans. During operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DOJ expanded its capabilities to support U.S. military forces in the counterterrorism mission and rule of law assessment.

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The mission of the DOE (https://energy.gov/) is to ensure America’s security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental, and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology solutions. The DOE has senior energy advisors at some CCMDs and these individuals support and advise CCDRs on energy, defense, DOE capabilities, and radiological and nuclear issues.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. The Department of the Treasury (http://www.treasury.gov) serves the American people and strengthens national security by managing the USG’s finances effectively; promoting economic growth and stability; and ensuring the safety, soundness, and security of the U.S. financial system. Within the USG, the Department of the Treasury is also a member of national security focused interagency
working groups like the threat mitigation working group, has representatives posted with law enforcement task forces, and deploys personnel to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). These liaisons serve as valuable points of contact and provide guidance, advice, and expertise to these organizations regarding the Department of the Treasury-related matters and support to CCMDs.

**U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).** The DOT (https://www.transportation.gov/) oversees the formulation of national transportation policy and promotes intermodal transportation. Other responsibilities include negotiating and implementing international transportation agreements, ensuring the fitness of U.S. airlines, enforcing airline consumer protection regulations, issuing regulations to prevent alcohol and illegal drug misuse in transportation systems, and preparing transportation legislation. The DOT has considerable expertise involving the civilian and military use of the nation’s transportation system (rail, roads, air, and maritime). For this reason, the DOT can redirect the nation’s transportation assets and change priorities, usually through a Presidential executive order or emergency decree. The DOT maintains close coordination with U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to ensure movement of military resources is not impeded.

**Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).** The CIA (https://www.cia.gov) is an independent agency that provides intelligence relevant to national security and strategic policy interests of the U.S. to senior U.S. policymakers. The CIA’s primary mission is to collect, analyze, and produce timely analysis of foreign intelligence to assist the President and senior USG policymakers in making decisions in support of national interests and goals. The CIA does not make policy, it is an independent source of intelligence information for those who do. The CIA may also conduct covert action at the direction of the President to preempt threats or achieve U.S. policy objectives.
As a separate agency, the CIA serves as an independent source of analysis on topics of concern and also works closely with other intelligence community organizations and allied organizations to ensure that the intelligence consumer, whether Washington policymaker or battlefield commander, receives the best intelligence possible. The CIA’s reconnaissance and intelligence assessment capabilities are essential ingredients to interagency strategic and operational planning. They provide real-time response in the quest for essential information to form the basis for interagency action.

The Associate Director for Military Affairs coordinates, plans, executes, and sustains worldwide activities that support CIA and DOD interaction based on priorities established by the CIA’s director to achieve national security objectives. It serves as the bridge for the CIA’s intelligence and operational capabilities to support deployed U.S. forces. The Associate Director for Military Affairs is composed of CIA personnel from all directorates and of military personnel from all the uniformed Services. It is the only component of the CIA with the exclusive mission of supporting military plans and operations and has the mandate to coordinate CIA support to include intelligence community capabilities as applicable and military customers. The Command and Coordination Group provides support to CCMDs and other major military command headquarters (HQ). For more information, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jul 2017.

Cultural or opinion gaps between the general public and the military community worry us but there is little evidence that they cause actual harm. The mistrust and mutual ignorance that often characterizes relations between high-level civilian and military decision makers is another story. Here, misunderstandings and mistrust lead to arbitrary decisions and can do genuine harm both to the military and to U.S. interests.

Secretary of Defense James Mattis

Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military
Other Organizations

Nongovernmental organizations. A NGO is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). These NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible organizations whose mission is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives. Examples include Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere and Doctors without Borders.

NGOs play an increasingly important role in both the domestic and international arenas. NGOs typically operate under approval of the host nation and provide humanitarian or other assistance in many of the world’s trouble spots. They normally seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to military missions. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on the scene before the U.S. military. They may have a long-term established presence in the crisis area. NGOs frequently work in areas where military forces conduct military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. NGOs are independent, diverse, and flexible, grassroots-focused organizations that range from primary relief and development providers to human rights, civil society, and conflict resolution organizations.

NGOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Although philosophical differences and divergent agendas may exist between military forces and NGOs, short term objectives are frequently very similar. Discovering common ground with NGOs is essential and they will likely object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement of military objectives. For U.S. forces, there are legal restrictions on the provision of support to NGOs, which must be carefully considered in any military-NGO cooperation. Their mission is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives. Ultimately, activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action.
**Private sector.** The private sector is an umbrella term that may be applied in the U.S. and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected NGOs. Such organizations can be large and multinational or small with limited resources and focused on one country. In addition, there may be a plethora of small private sector entities and NGOs in a country. Inside the U.S., the private sector owns and operates some 85 percent of the U.S. critical infrastructure. The private sector can assist the USG by sharing information, identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, assisting in deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP), and providing other assistance as appropriate. The scope in which private organizations can be involved includes theater security cooperation, combat support, and reconstruction.4

**Multinational corporations (MNC).** The MNCs are separate and distinct entities from the “not-for-profit” NGOs. The MNCs may offer civil-military operations much in the way of local insight, in-country equipment and resources, pre-established organization, and a means by which to assist with reconstruction of devastated areas. During an operation, MNCs existing in-country prior to the event which initiated DOD intervention are often well postured to advise the chief of mission (COM) and the JFC on matters of working with the local government, culture, terrain, and logistics needs.

**Academia.** Universities, think tanks, and research organizations are an important resource for the DOD. The work these organizations provided in conjunction with the DOD in Iraq to recover archeological items and protect historical sites is a good example. In the U.S., academic organizations and consortiums such as the Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Institute for Defense and Business, and the University of Colorado Natural Hazards Center provide a means for research, a source of knowledge and ideas, and a means of establishing common dialogue between the DOD and academia.

**Operational contract support.** Military forces will often be significantly augmented with contracted support. Successful operational contract support is the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing that support to the joint force in a designated operational area. This is a complex and challenging process. Commanders and their staffs should have a working knowledge of key joint contract support integration and contractor management related terms, since these terms are not widely known outside of the professional acquisition community.

**International organizations.** International organizations may be established for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Examples include the United Nations, NATO, Organization of American States.
(OAS), and the African Union (AU). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and NATO are regional security organizations, while the European Union, the AU, and the OAS are general regional organizations. However, some general regional organizations and sub-regional organizations conduct security-related activities.

A contractor is a person or business operating under a legal agreement who provides products or services for pay. A contractor furnishes supplies and services or performs work at a certain price or rate based on the contract terms. Contracted support includes traditional goods and services support, but may also include interpreter communications, infrastructure, and other related support. Contractor employees include contractors authorized to accompany the force as a formal part of the force and local national employees who normally have no special legal status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keys to Success</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The use and importance of LNOs and digital liaison detachments cannot be overstated.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Relationships are key to coordination and unity of effort. They must be built and nurtured.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• For echelons above brigade formations transitioning to a joint task force, training and rehearsing with unified action partners is critical to success.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Identify and then focus on common goals and objectives to attain unified action.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Avoid the over classification of documents.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Consider methods to include partners vice excluding them.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Consider the other elements of national power first as in the Ebola response in which the military might not be the main effort or even the lead agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Go to school” on your partners to understand the different roles, authorities, missions, culture, and processes of external organizations so you can leverage their capabilities.</td>
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Unified Action Partner (UAP) Considerations

**Partnership.** During Pacific Pathways, integration and interoperability are real and they occurred at the lowest levels. From a joint, interagency, interorganizational, multinational perspective integrating with host nation
forces and interoperating with multiple country teams and embassies cannot be replicated at training venues in any other setting.

**Educate UAPs on the U.S. Army.** UAPs are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom U.S. Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (ADRP 3-0). The UAPs include joint forces (activities in which elements of two or more U.S. Military Departments participate), multinational forces, and USG agencies and departments.

The Iraq and Afghanistan wars highlight the necessity for collaboration, cooperation, and synchronization among USG, NGOs, and private sector agencies to focus the elements of national power in achieving national strategic objectives. The U.S. experience in these conflicts accentuates the importance of foreign governments, agencies, and militaries participating, in concert with the U.S. in order to achieve common objectives. Meeting the challenges of complex environments, infused with fragile or failing nation states, non-state actors, pandemics, natural disasters, and limited resources, requires the concerted effort of all instruments of U.S. national power plus foreign governmental agencies, military forces, and civilian organizations.

**Unity of effort.** Leaders should realize that there will not be pure “unity of command” with one single authority and clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Understand that absolute “unity of effort” is very difficult. Interagency partners, and most other UAPs, do not have the funding, number of personnel or the capacity of the U.S. military. Further, their perspectives on a situation and possible solutions can be different. Leaders should understand the inherent friction of working together with the different “cultures” of other agencies and organizations. Staffs should understand that other agencies use different planning and decisionmaking processes than do military commands.
TRANSITION TO A JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Training and operating with partner nations. Develop an implementation plan in conjunction with allies and foreign partners. Keeping foreign partners included as active members of the planning process, when possible, and implementation is important for strengthening the alliance. It is not uncommon for some leaders and Soldiers to get tunnel vision and attempt to do all the work themselves. It is imperative they understand that going through the process with all participants involved is laying the foundation for future partnerships to collaborate and learn capabilities. After meeting with allies and foreign counterparts, it is important to understand the limitations or challenges due to hardware and software. Software compatibility with foreign militaries is a significant challenge and requires skilled programming to create a bridge between varying software.

The U.S. Army depends on its joint partners for capabilities that do not reside within its structure. U.S. Army forces cannot operate effectively without support from those joint partners. Likewise, USG agencies outside the DOD possess knowledge, skills, and capabilities necessary for success. The active cooperation of partners often allows U.S. Army leaders to capitalize on organizational strengths while offsetting weaknesses. Only by creating a shared understanding and purpose through collaboration and dialogue with all elements of the friendly force can U.S. Army leaders integrate their actions within unified action and synchronize their own efforts and operations.

ADRP 3-0 and CALL 15-15, Unified Action Partners Quick Reference Guide

Recognize and overcome organizational mismatches. Operations at the national-strategic and theater-strategic levels are problematic because the agencies representing the instruments of power organize themselves differently. The DOD and the DOS, as the core players regionally, are most representative of these problems. The DOD has six geographic CCMDs responsible for the various regions but the DOS’s regional organization is different. The State Department has six regional bureaus but their boundaries do not match those of the DOD. For instance, the USCENTCOM commander must coordinate efforts with three regional state bureaus: African Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, and South/Central Asian Affairs as well as a respective U.S. embassy country team for each of the 27 countries encompassed. Since most emergencies transcend national boundaries, the lack of a compatible operational framework between the DOS and the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) creates a problem. Resourcing and readiness of personnel are significantly different. There are only 6,600 professional foreign service officers today, this is about the size of one U.S. Army brigade combat team of which there are approximately 45. Along those same lines, the USAID has less than 3,000 people.
performing what amounts to doing the contract management that outsources their entire development mission.

Establish a partnership with host nation security forces early and consistently maintain contact. The same goes for your interagency partners. Understand your partner’s capabilities and areas of shared interest. They can be a significant combat multiplier.

1st Infantry Division Warfighter Exercise 16-04 Insights

**Relationship building.** There are challenges associated with unified action and interagency coordination. The players recognize that there will not be pure “unity of command” with one single authority and clearly defined roles and responsibilities. They acknowledge that absolute unity of effort is often difficult. Interagency and unified action partners often do not have the funding, number of personnel, or the capacity of the U.S. military. Further, their perspectives on a situation and possible solutions can be very different from U.S. entities. There is also the simple friction of working together with the different cultures of other agencies and organizations. Most agencies use different planning and decisionmaking processes than U.S. military commands and interagency coordination is just not as easy as one would like it to be. That said, the U.S. military observes a continuing recognition and effort toward integration of complementary lines of effort toward common goals.

Some of the **key insights to facilitate relationship** building in achieving common goals and ease interaction include the following:

- Personal relationships are key to coordination and unity of effort.
- Focus on common goals and objectives to attain unified action.
- Command, control, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration are more appropriate concepts to gaining unity of effort than terms like command and control (C2).
- Including, not excluding, external stakeholders is important during planning, execution, and assessment. Inclusion allows better understanding of the situation and the broader problem (beyond a military only perspective), leading to better whole of government solutions.
- Understand the different roles, authorities, missions, cultures, and processes of external stakeholders.
- Coordination and execution with numerous stakeholders in this complex environment is extremely challenging and needs continuous effort to keep on track.
• Recognize and mitigate the classification and information sharing implications.

• Effective relationships, coordination, and collaboration with all stakeholders is the key to achieving common goals.

**Interoperability.** It is likely that USG departments and agencies, civilian, partner nation and host nation agencies, and multinational entities will have unique communication networks. These may include commercially leased circuits and satellite services as well as high frequency radio equipment. Joint force HQ should be equipped with communications equipment that facilitates collaboration with all participants. The need for interoperability of communications equipment in foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations may necessitate using unclassified communications. The U.S. military forces may face challenges in conducting operations via unclassified means in order to promote interorganizational coordination and synchronization. The use of classified and unclassified modes of communication are both necessary, as classified modes are routinely used to relay militarily significant information to military recipients while unclassified modes are needed for communication with nonmilitary entities. See JP 3-29 for more information.

**Information sharing.** Information sharing is critical to the efficient pursuit of a common humanitarian purpose. Although many different groups and authorities can and should work in parallel, a collaborative information environment (CIE) facilitates information sharing. Constructing a CIE is not primarily a technology issue, as effective low-cost network equipment and data management systems exist today and more are being developed. Rather, the challenges are largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational. These impediments can limit and shape the willingness of civilian and military personnel and organizations to openly cooperate and share information and capabilities. The components of civil-military coordination consist of information and task sharing as well as collaborative planning, all of which depend on communications and management of data and information. JP 3-29 provides a detailed discussion on information sharing. However, the following issues often complicate effective civil-military coordination:

• Lack of understanding about the information culture of the affected nation

• Suspicions regarding the balance between information sharing and intelligence gathering

• Tensions between the military’s need for classification of data which implies secrecy versus the civilian need for transparency
• Differences in C2 between military operations versus civilian activities.

• The compatibility and interoperability of planning tools, processes, and civil-military organization cultures

U.S. military forces provide unique capabilities to USG efforts. These include military-to-military relationships, extensive resources (e.g., logistics), and people ready to rapidly respond to multiple global crises. Additional unique military capabilities include C2 resources supported by worldwide communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructures; robust organizational and planning processes; civil affairs (CA) personnel and their civilian acquired skills; and air, land, and sea mobility support for intertheater or intratheater requirements.

JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation

Bilateral command structures. The C2 structure for a recent U.S. Army Pacific exercise lacked a combined element for a bilateral U.S. partner nation integrated mission command element. There have been a number of activities at the operational level of the exercise where decisions have been made by the U.S. or partner nation governments and staffs unilaterally which caused issues for the other government and staff entities. For example, the partner nation decided to move an air defense asset to better support their scheme of maneuver which left a critical U.S. asset uncovered.

As a result, many of these issues are being worked at the senior commander level between the two nations which leave the staff unaware and the components working to try to coordinate their efforts bilaterally with the other component. One recommendation is that each government should designate a staff to form either a combined joint task force or an integration element to maintain the appropriate level of integration and fully coordinate key actions to better synchronize their efforts.

U.S. Embassy and Department of Defense Integration
(for more information: https://diplomacy.state.gov)

Today, U.S. embassies are the nerve center for a country’s diplomatic affairs within the borders of another nation, serving as the HQ of the chief of mission (COM), staff and other agencies. An embassy is usually located in the capital city of a foreign nation and there may also be consulates located in provincial or regional cities.
The U.S. bilateral representation in a foreign country is known as the diplomatic mission. The HQ of the mission is the embassy and is led by a COM, either an ambassador or a charge d’affaires. The COM is responsible for recommending and implementing national policy regarding the foreign country and is responsible for overseeing the activities of USG employees in the mission. The COM has authority over all USG personnel in country (except for those assigned to a CCMD), a USG multilateral mission, or an interorganizational stakeholder. The country team, headed by the COM, is the senior in-country interagency coordinating body. Within a theater, the geographic combatant command remains the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater military strategies, policies, plans, and engagements that require interagency coordination. As such, the GCC coordinates closely with each COM within his area of responsibility to develop country plans which provide overall focus and strategic goals. In the absence of the ambassador, the deputy chief of mission (DCM) becomes the charge d’affaires.

The ambassador is supported within the embassy by a DCM; foreign service officers and specialists who perform the full range of mission activities; and representatives of many other U.S. agencies such as USAID and the DOD along with the commerce, justice, and agriculture departments among others. The staffs of all of these agencies report to the ambassador. Figure 7-2 is an example of a U.S. embassy country team organization.

![Figure 7-2. Example of U.S. Embassy Country Team organization](image)

Besides the more obvious functions of issuing visas and assisting American citizens abroad, embassy and consulate staff interact with host governments, local business and nongovernmental organizations, media, educational institutions, and private citizens to create positive responses to U.S. policy and the U.S. in general. Mission staff report on political and economic issues that affect bilateral relations and possibly impact the U.S.
directly. They also help U.S. businesses to find partners and customers and sponsor American scientists, scholars, and artists to promote professional, educational, and cultural exchanges.

**U.S. Embassy Country Team**

The country team is a council of senior officers, normally section heads, working under the COM’s direction to pool their skills and resources in the national interest of the U.S. The country team system makes possible rapid interagency consultation, action, or recommendations from the field and effective execution of U.S. missions, programs, and policies.

The organization of each country team varies based on the COM’s desires, the specific country situation, the number and size of U.S. programs, and the qualifications of the senior officers representing the agencies. **The country team normally consists of the following members:**

- Deputy chief of mission
- Consular officer
- Chief of station
- Regional security officer
- Political counselor
- Commercial attaché
- Agricultural attaché
- Science officer
- Public affairs officer
- Administrative officer
- Economics officer
- Director of the U.S. Information Service
- Drug Enforcement Agency attaché
- Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development
- Director of the Peace Corps
- Defense attaché
- Chief, Security Assistance Office (SAO)
Defense representatives in a typical U.S. embassy include:

- **Defense attaché.** The Defense Attaché System is an arm of the Defense Intelligence Agency tasked with representing the U.S. in defense and military related matters with foreign governments around the world. Defense attaché offices (DAOs) operate from U.S. embassies in more than a hundred locations globally. The DAOs are composed of both civilian and military employees, most of whom receive specialized training at the Joint Military Attaché School before their appointment.

- **Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC).** The Chief of ODC directs all actions pertaining to the basing of U.S. military stationed overseas, fosters cooperation with foreign governmental and military organizations, directs the U.S. Security Assistance Program for the host nation and facilitates cooperation in defense-related programs between the U.S. and the host nation.

- **Security assistance officer.** The SAO interfaces with the host nation military services to establish and process requirements that are to be satisfied via the U.S. DOD Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. These include acquisition of major weapon systems and equipment items, including follow-on technical assistance and logistics support.

**International training programs.** The training programs manager (TPM) is responsible for all training purchased by the host nation military via FMS and develops training plans for newly acquired weapons systems. This includes professional military education (PME), pilot training, management training, technical courses and English language training. The TPM also administers personnel exchange programs and PME exchanges between the U.S. and the host nation.

**Defense Cooperation in Armaments (DCA).** The DCA staff serves as the in-country liaison between the DOD acquisition agencies, the U.S. defense industry, the host nation ministry of defense and associated acquisition agencies. The goal is to foster cooperation through exchange of personnel; research, development, test, and evaluation of defense articles and equipment; and procurement of foreign technology, logistics, or support.

**Programs include:**

- Defense, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Information Exchange Program

- International Cooperative Research, Development, and Acquisition Programs

- Coalition Warfare Program
• Foreign Comparative Test Program
• Defense personnel exchanges (e.g., Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program)

The staff assists in the development of cooperative programs by investigating host nation capabilities, requirements, interest areas, and defense funding, then recommending cooperative opportunities to the DOD acquisition workforce and U.S. defense industry partners.

**Operations, plans, and agreements (OPA).** The OPA Section facilitates host nation support for U.S. forces operating in or passing through air, land or waterways during contingencies, exercises, or war. They also coordinate mutual support agreements between the geographic combatant command and the host nation government and serve as the principal liaison office between the geographic combatant command and all host nation defense military staffs. Additionally, they establish and maintain all Small Unit Training Exchange Program agreements between the U.S. and host nation forces. Finally, this staff provides assistance as required to U.S. forces in dealings with other authorities and agencies to coordinate and conduct these actions.

**Logistics and Infrastructure**

The logistics and infrastructure staff is the focal point for all basing issues between the ministry of defense, other ministries, and U.S. forces located in the host nation. They coordinate bilateral infrastructure negotiations, communications, customs, and transportation issues pertaining to all U.S. military installations. In addition, these staff members provide assistance as required to U.S. forces in dealings with customs, police, and other host nation authorities.

**Endnotes**

3. This coordination includes the Armed Forces of the U.S.; USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; NGOs; and the private sector. Interagency coordination describes the interaction between USG departments and agencies and is a subset of interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*, 12 Oct 2016.
Chapter 8  
Staff Considerations for Joint Operations and Exercises

A commander employs elements of combat power in symmetrical and asymmetrical ways so as to attain positional advantage over an enemy and be capable of applying those massed effects.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90, *Offense and Defense*, 31 Aug 2012

Background

This chapter is a compilation of general observations from multiple theater level training events from multiple commands to include U.S. European Command’s (USEUCOM) Austere Challenge, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) Yama Sakura, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) Judicious Response, USARPAC Pacific Sentry, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Ulchi Freedom Guardian and U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) Lion Focus. While these staff insights are drawn from the joint operations and exercises listed above, they are written for public release level and therefore units and locations are omitted within a specific insight.

Intelligence

Intelligence is a process where available information on foreign adversaries is analyzed to meet the commander’s information requirements. The intelligence enterprise is spread across a number of organizations and inherently combines joint, interorganizational, and multinational efforts. To support situational understanding and the commander’s ability to make decisions, intelligence must be timely.

Intelligence enables commanders to visualize the complex operational environment, organize their forces, and control operations to achieve their objectives by answering specific requirements, all focused in time and space.

The joint intelligence process provides the basis for common intelligence terminology and procedures. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) is the continuous process through which the J-2 (intelligence directorate of a joint staff) manages the analysis and development of products that help the commander and staff understand the complex and interconnected operational environment (OE). This includes the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities that bear on the decisions of the commander.
Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations.

ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, 31 Aug 2012

Intelligence must be prepared to support linear and nonlinear operations equally. Nonlinear operations are particularly challenging because of their emphasis on simultaneous execution along multiple lines of operations. The complexity of nonlinear operations places a premium on a continuous flow of accurate and timely intelligence to help protect individual forces. This flow of intelligence supports precise targeting, mobility, and freedom of action and is enabled by persistent surveillance and dynamic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) management and a common intelligence picture (the intelligence portion of the common operational picture).4

### Key Planning Factors for Intelligence In Force Projection

- **Staying out front in intelligence planning:**
  - Begin to generate intelligence knowledge as soon as possible.
  - Develop a steady effort.
  - Prioritize intelligence requirements for development of the initial priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
  - Identify intelligence training requirements (to include augmentees).

- **Understanding how to get intelligence support:**
  - Identify asset, sensor, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination-enabler requirements.
  - Identify personnel augmentation requirements.
  - Leverage the intelligence enterprise.
  - Integrate into the intelligence enterprise
Common intelligence picture. The J-2 (current operations) must codify procedures for managing the tactical entity database (TED) and common intelligence picture across the implemented mission command systems. In addition, establish a standard operating procedure that helps subordinate units understanding data inputs into the TED in order to ensure easy ingestion and translation to other systems. Finally, the analysis and control element (ACE) and the current operations integration cell (COIC) should routinely display enemy information two levels below the responsible headquarters (HQ) along with known or templated locations of separate elements containing high payoff target list (HPTL) units.

Intelligence products. The J-2 directorate’s representatives deliver tailored products to staff working groups or provide personnel with the requisite experience to represent the section in those working groups. Many working groups began with a brief general update of the enemy situation rather than one tailored to the specific function or topics of the working group. This reduced the situational understanding of those in attendance and thereby hindered the overall effectiveness of the meeting’s outputs. Intelligence representatives should disseminate the minutes of all boards, bureaus, centers, cells and working group sessions with the rest of the J-2 in order to provide awareness of actions and working group discussions across the command.

**Joint Fires and Targeting**

A target is:

- An entity or object that performs a function for the adversary considered for possible engagement or other action.
- In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed.
- An area designated and numbered for future firing.
- In gunfire support usage, an impact burst that hits the target.

Joint Publication 3-60, *Joint Targeting*, 31 Jan 2013

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 Jan 2017, describes targeting as:

The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them considering operational requirements and capabilities.
Targeting is a critical multiple step process for the commander and staff, in that targeting identifies enemy resources (targets) that if destroyed or degraded will contribute to the success of the friendly commander’s mission. By effective targeting, the enemy commander’s operational and tactical operations may now be limited due to resources being destroyed or his ability to maneuver constrained. Targeting processes must identify critical target subsets that when successfully acquired and attacked significantly diminish enemy capabilities. By denying critical resources to the enemy, his capability is reduced and now opens execution opportunities (branches and sequels) to the friendly commander and his subordinate organizations.

Targeting is a complex and multidiscipline effort that requires coordinated interaction among many command and staff elements. Successful targeting demands that the commander synchronize information related capabilities, intelligence, maneuver, fire support systems, nonlethal effects, and special operations forces to attack and eliminate critical target(s) using the most effective system at the right time and place.5

Establishing a Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC). The JAGIC is a model for divisions to effectively organize personnel and equipment to build personal relationships and teamwork between Soldiers and Airmen. This is accomplished through the physical integration of the air support operations center (ASOC) and tactical air control parties (TACPs) with division fires, airspace, air and missile defense, and aviation personnel and functions within the COIC. This gives the division a powerful joint team capable of collaborative fires while maximizing the use of airspace.6 This basic concept can be implemented at any echelon above brigade organization, but the availability of support assets can impact this endeavor.

The JAGIC is both modular and scalable, designed to integrate and coordinate fires and air operations over and in the division commander’s area of operations (AO). It is an execution center using personnel within the COIC. There is no change in existing roles or authorities for the fire support element (FSE), TACP, ASOC, airspace control, aviation operations, and air and missile defense.7

The JAGIC must be within the COIC in the division’s deployed command post. The COIC is led by the G-3’s (operations) chief. The COIC monitors current operations and directs and synchronizes operations according to the concept of operations and commander’s intent. The cell’s planning horizon is hours and days. It focuses on what is happening and rapidly progresses through the decision cycle by executing its internal battle drills. For the JAGIC to operate most effectively, personnel must be seated in locations that facilitate cross talk. Although the JAGIC resides in the COIC, it must retain the ability to isolate itself during battle update briefings (BUBs) and
Airspace planning and the JAGIC. Airspace planners should plan to ensure that the JAGIC and all airspace users have the easiest airspace plan possible:

- Ensure that planned airspace use supports the commander’s intent and concept of operations.
- Maximize the use of procedural means of control.
- Limit (number, size, and duration) air control measures (ACMs) to the minimum required for mission accomplishment to maximize flexibility for airspace users.
- Comply with the commander’s airspace risk guidance.
- Address airspace conflict resolution procedures and war-game to verify.
- Develop ACMs when ground units use Army aviation to conduct attacks when in close proximity to friendly forces.

Liaison officers (LNOs) improve multinational and bilateral fires. Joint and bilateral LNO participation improves the bilateral targeting process. The multiple targeting meetings and working groups facilitate joint, interorganizational, and multinational participation and shared input. A bilateral targeting synchronization meeting can be leveraged to apply guidance from the targeting coordination board (commander’s intent for shaping and the use of the HPTL) and draft potential targets, non-lethal efforts (cyberspace electromagnetic activities, space, and information operations), consider potential enemy actions, ISR efforts and tasking, and scheme of maneuver through staff coordination, and bilateral coordination and input. This meeting and its dialogue creates shared understanding, between the many organizations and facilitates unity of effort in the creation of joint, interorganizational, and multinational products (ADRP 3-0, Operations, 6 Oct 2017).

Target development – mobile targets are difficult. Some joint force land component commands are challenged to strike mobile targets. The joint force air component command will not include mobile targets on the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) in the case of targets that do not previously appear on the joint target list (JTL). The rationale for this is that mobile targets do not require the degree of weaponeering conducted in the target effects team (TET) process and are too difficult to strike because they are not tied to a known physical location which enables them to pre-assign joint desired points of impact (JDPI). The problem is that the
JIPTL is the means by which the joint force commander (JFC) prioritizes assets against targets and without the weight of his authority, mobile targets (both Army and Navy targets) could potentially not be effectively tracked and subsequently attacked. The work around that the Air Force advocates is the utilization of air support requests (ASRs) to locate the target in the geographic area reference system boxes and then deliver strike packages. This method, however, relies upon the joint force air component command’s air operations center (AOC) versus the joint force command to ensure that the joint force land component command targets are correctly prioritized through the master air attack planning (MAAP) process.

Combined joint force land component command operations necessitate the use of the joint targeting process which is not something that is normally taught or trained in the Army. Organizations transitioning to a joint task force (JTF) or a combined joint force land component command should have predeployment training on the joint targeting process and should send their targeting personnel to applicable joint targeting schools.

1st Infantry Division Warfighter Exercise 16-04

Figure 8-1. Targeting and the Military Decisionmaking Process (Army Training Publication [ATP] 3-60, Targeting, 7 May 2015).
Training as you fight is critical. The geographic combatant commander and joint staff with U.S. Air Force support need to ensure that a means or methodology to input mobile targets onto the JIPTL is incorporated into training and systems development. Issues can often be attributed to a lack of training and flexibility at both the joint force land component command and the joint air operations center (JAOC) TET. In some cases, the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) may be able to mitigate the training shortfalls but adds additional challenges to existing processes.

System synchronization is a challenge. In order for the BCD to know whether their systems will be linked between the Service components when they are needed, they must be exercised periodically with the cooperation of both the joint force land component command and the JAOC. While everyone understands the conceptual process, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that drive actions must be understood across the targeting enterprise. For example, the TET chief may understand the process for planning mobile targets from the land component but also must have the skills to build them in a deliberate targeting environment. In some instances, the BCD and joint force land component command personnel have a solid conceptual understanding of the deliberate targeting process but rapidly get overwhelmed when attempting to build complete target packets.

Theater army targeting symposiums or conferences will assist in developing joint TTPs. One solution to educate the staff on targeting processes is to conduct a joint force land component command targeting symposium. Held prior to execution, the symposium would provide conceptual insights and discussion for planning at the joint force land component command and JTF joint targeting control boards. It is recommended that the BCD, joint force land component command targeting (fires, J-2 [intelligence], engineers, J-3 [operations]), and JAOC TET personnel attend the event to foster the development of joint TTPs for target development in the theater using JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 31 Jan 2013 as a guideline. These TTPs can then be validated during periodic digital collective training executed by operators at the joint force land component command and the JAOC. This training will stress the Army mission command systems (AMCS) link as well as train operators on TTPs for building and nominating targets. Both scheduled and on call targets, air control measures (ACMs), and tactical data exchange should be also rehearsed.

Start the target development process early. The target development process should begin well in advance of the start of an exercise or deployment. During crisis action planning (CAP) for example, most targeting teams do not have a large role in the process. This is a perfect opportunity to begin target development. In a recent exercise, the joint force land component command used the USEUCOM joint target development
working group to update target information to include the last known location, joint desired points of impact (JDPI) for firing points and hide positions, and so forth, in order to update the JTL so that they can be used on the JIPTL through the master air attack plan (MAAP). This process would answer the “fixed” target location for “moving” targets that are stationary and are expected to remain that way for the foreseeable future for targeting purposes.

**High priority targets – joint force land component command fires personnel must study and understand the HPTL process.** While the joint force land component command may want a specific desired effect, the targeting chain between the joint joint force land component command through the AOC may have a difficult time achieving these effects if they do not understand the system. For instance, one commander identified a particular target set and asked why it was not part of the joint force land component command’s time sensitive target (TST) list. Not only was that target not on the TST list, it also was not on the joint force land component command’s HPTL. JP 3-60 outlines the definitions and sources of the HPTL and how they are identified in planning. These targets are nominated by the Service components to the JTL for development and eventual nomination into the JIPTL to be serviced. Components have the option to designate HPTs for inclusion in the joint force land component command’s TST list. If targets do not make the joint force land component command’s TST list, they can be designated as a Service component commander’s critical targets (C-CT) which are targets that are particularly important to the Service component’s scheme of maneuver (JP 3-60). While not having the high priority of a TST, a C-CT will get a much higher prioritization from the command of the joint force air component.
Help the TET help you. The BCD plans team can support the joint force land component command targeting for TST and C-CT by requiring the TET to articulate the process for TST nomination and C-CT designation. In addition, the targeting team specifically needs to assist the joint force land component command staff in developing the competency required to build and maintain targeting packets to support these nominations. A potential method to develop this competency is to update the operational plan (OPLAN) with real world targets of the modernized integrated database. While targets do not have to be actually nominated into the plan, the planning and targeting teams benefit from training the process. Note that this function is primarily a function of intelligence support to targeting and not just the responsibility of the fires team.\textsuperscript{11}
Combined joint force land component command target nominations – use the joint targeting toolbox (JTT) if your targets are not making the JIPTL. Issues with getting targets onto the JIPTL can be alleviated by reverting back to the JTT so that target nominations go through the air tasking order (ATO) process, this ensures they make it onto the JIPTL and target locations are updated and input to the JTT prior to attack.

Time sensitive targeting – rehearse the TST. A TST is a joint force command validated set of targets of such high importance to accomplishment of the joint force command mission or that presents such a serious strategic threat that Service components must divert all available assets away from other targets. In other words, all efforts immediately shift to dynamically kill something on the combatant commander’s TST list. Also, there should be a “quick fire link” and procedures described in a concept of operations and rehearsed by the combatant command (CCMD) and the Service components for these targets. Therefore, if these targets are on the TST, the entire kill chain should be rehearsed, to include getting the combatant commander’s approval.

The TST list is limited and does not change quickly. The TST can be conflated with Service component critical high-payoff targets. TSTs should be a limited number of targets due to the required investment of assets and disruption of planned targets. The TST does not necessarily change based on the phase of the operation or supported command. If it changes, it should be based on an emerging strategic threat.

Deliberate targeting is difficult in terms of the accuracy of the target locations. Pulling target locations from databases with a historical location not relevant to the current situation will confound any ISR request or task that would facilitate providing an updated target location. In Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-3, *Combat Aircraft Fundamentals*, the procedure for the TET describes specifically how land component mobile targets may be nominated. For example, they can be entered with a center mass JDPI for the last known position (or best estimate) with the understanding and specification that the nominating component had the responsibility to update the targeting information with an accurate location before execution. In most cases, target nominations on mobile targets are usually not paired with an ISR effort to update that target. If these targets had been approved by the TET they would not, in all probability, be struck effectively.

ISR synchronization during the targeting process. The G-2/J-2 intelligence sections should assist the fires cell in linking specific ISR tasks or requests with deliberate target nominations in order to enforce target location updates. AFTTP 3-3 allows for mobile targets to be entered as ASRs directly into the MAAP as a strike coordination and reconnaissance mission. ATP 3-60.1, *Dynamic Targeting, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques,*
TRANSITION TO A JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

and Procedures for Dynamic Targeting, 10 Sep 2015, and ATP 3-60.2. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance, 31 Jan 2018). However, this usually becomes the default method for getting joint force land component command fires. If the targets are not on the JIPTL, additional problems are usually encountered and require work arounds. Overreliance on dynamic targeting is a common result of insufficient intelligence support to the targeting process. The joint force land component command HPTL at a minimum, should justify nominations to the JTF JIPTL.

Targeting in a degraded environment – global positioning system (GPS) jamming potentially alters the delivery accuracy of numerous fires systems. For example, the accuracy of GPS directed ordnance may not match aim points due to degradation (or denial) in the GPS field order of merit precision. Effects in the GPS-denied environment, however can be mitigated by incorporating the Army Space Coordination Element (ASCE) and the Training and Doctrine Command capability manager fires GPS jamming estimates into the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). Their expertise can help planners position firing units to reduce the effects of enemy jamming.

Incorporate GPS jamming estimates into planning. The IPB and JIPOE should incorporate GPS jamming into the modified combined obstacle overlay during mission analysis. By overlaying GPS denied areas, the fires, maneuver, and mission command warfighting functions (WfFs) are provided an opportunity to array forces accordingly and assist course of action development. Space planners should be tasked to attend CAP and applicable planning conferences. Space personnel are also uniquely prepared to advise WfFs during the reverse (WfF) IPB and assist in creating a high value target list (HVTL) for eventual incorporation into a HPTL.

Air Defense Integration

Integrating joint control systems and Army mission command systems with sensor, strike, and shooter assets requires careful planning. The Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) normally provides direct support to the area air defense commander (AADC). Frequently the joint force air component commander (JFACC) is also the AADC. The AADC is the commander with the preponderance of air defense assets in a joint operations area (JOA). The AADC integrates air and missile defense capabilities in the JOA. Specifically, the AADC establishes central control of theater air and missile defense. This requires integration of joint control systems and Army mission command systems with sensor, strike, and shooter assets. Normally, the AAMDC commander is the deputy AADC. Through careful planning, the theater army develops an air and missile
defense task force package consisting of sustainment assets, security forces, and HQ for deployment to partner nations outside the JOA.

Understand the difference between the doctrinal definition of the operational area and the one required by the air and missile defense (AMD). The AMD system can affect the battlespace in many different ways and dimensions that are much larger in size and scope than the doctrinal AO. The AMD system may have a sensor capable of detecting a threat missile launch from hundreds of miles away. Upon detection, the commander can now begin operations toward mission accomplishment. The commander can provide early warning of a launch to appropriate agencies or installations so that personnel can seek cover or the sensor can be part of an integrated air and missile defense network and use this launch information to cue other weapon systems that are responsible for target engagement. The AMD system may have interceptors that share the airspace with friendly air assets. It would be critical to the prevention of fratricide to define these areas of missile operation and areas in which missile engagements are expected to occur. These are just a couple of examples of the difference between the AMD AO and the doctrinal AO. The purpose of the AMD IPB is to identify all areas where the AMD system can affect the operational environment.13

Synchronization and integration. Successful counterair battle management supports synchronization and integration of active and passive AMD efforts with other air operations supporting unity of effort and reducing the expenditure of resources and the risks of friendly fire. For subordinate commanders and controllers, effective battle management requires situational awareness, managing available resources, directing and controlling the correct action in a timely manner, and monitoring and assessing execution.14

Authority delegation. Based on the principles of centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution, the JFC typically delegates commit, identification, and engagement authority to the JFACC/AADC and authorizes further delegation to the optimum level for mission accomplishment consistent with the rules of engagement (ROE). The responsibilities and authorities assigned to battle managers should be clear and unambiguous and may be limited in time, scope, or by specific operations and activities.15

Automation. Automated battle management aids can assist operators in sensor management and weapons pairings, allowing operators to manage by exception. The speed of the engagement process and the complexity of sensor weapons performances and integration may require some degree of automation to assist in effective intercepts. Automated systems are not infallible and weapons systems operators must maintain situational
awareness and exercise sound judgment in accordance with ROE to prevent fratricide.\textsuperscript{16}

**Obtaining joint firewall permissions in the AMD community can take an inordinate amount of time and create risk.** It is much easier and quicker to obtain firewall permissions for a same Service organization. In the case of the multi-domain task force (MDTF), it will be faster to gain access to existing U.S. Army systems rather than obtaining permissions from the U.S. Air Force or U.S. Navy. Past experience has shown that it can take a significant amount of time for an Army organization to obtain permissions from the Air Force while an Army-to-Army permission can be obtained in as little as 24 hours. For example, the 94th AAMDC has a well established, working interoperability solution that it provides in the most expeditious manner to provide MDTF conductivity to USARPAC, the JTF, the joint force land component command, the land operations center, and the maritime operations center. One solution is to establish an approved, standardized procedure to obtain firewall permissions, and exercise those procedures regularly.

**Mobility/Countermobility Operations (Freedom of Movement)**

**Understand requirements for engineer force packages.** The lack of engineering assets can present a challenge to freedom of movement in the theater. To support the joint force land component command, engineers must be able to support early-entry operations (including forcible entry where access is denied) to enable the seizure, establishment, and expansion of lodgments in an immature theater.\textsuperscript{17} If warranted, a U.S. Army theater engineer command (TEC) or engineer brigade may be provided to the joint force land component command to supervise large-scale engineering efforts in the joint force land component command’s area of operations. These units could be supplemented by either U.S. Navy “Seabee” mobile construction battalions or U.S. Air Force “Red Horse” engineering squadrons. The TEC coordinates major construction planning and operations with the engineering staff section of a joint staff, when established, and receives planning and direction from the joint force land component command.

**Plan for the right mix.** The theater army commander recommends the appropriate mix of forces and the deployment sequence for forces to meet the geographic combatant command requirements. Engineer force packages must contain the right mix of capabilities to assure timely and relevant engineer support to the joint force command. This mix will often need to change drastically during transitions, and the joint force engineer must anticipate and plan for these changes. For example, combat engineers often make up the majority of engineer forces in-theater during sustained combat operations. However, combat engineers must be reinforced during transition
to operations that are dominated by stability tasks because they typically do not have the right capabilities to accomplish the required general engineering tasks.\textsuperscript{18}

**Understand the theater specific engineer training requirements.** Engineer units operating across the globe (both organic and rotational) must possess specific skills. Training plans must incorporate gap crossing using assault, support, and line of communications bridging (LOCB). In terms of a LOCB, multiple industry leaders provide gap crossing solutions that will be required for ground line of communications bridge replacement, allowing sparse tactical bridging to be reused in support of maneuver. Incorporating bridging scenarios into training exercises familiarizes combined arms forces on the complexities of gap crossing. In addition to gap crossing scenarios, gated training strategies must be weighted to focus the most attention on technical engineer reconnaissance (both digital and analog), construction of combat roads and trails, combined arms obstacle integration, and combined arms breaching.

**Train the appropriate engineer tasks for the area of responsibility (AOR).** Add verbiage to OPLANs and rotational orders mandating the incorporation of tasks associated with gap crossing, specifically LOCB familiarization. Moreover, the training audience for LOCB should expand beyond just engineers. The majority of the other tasks are most likely part of an organic and rotational unit’s objective training strategy. Maintaining a weighted focus on the aforementioned tasks throughout the gated training strategy ensures units are prepared to operate within the AOR.

**Protection**

**Understand the protection requirements.** Protection emphasizes the importance of planning and expanding protection priorities, to include protecting unified action partners, civilian populations, equipment, resources, infrastructure, and cultural landmarks across the range of military operations.\textsuperscript{19} Commanders consider the most likely threats and hazards and then decide which personnel, physical assets, and information to protect.

**Link protection priorities to commander’s guidance.** Criticality, vulnerability, and recuperability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities that become the subject of commander guidance and the focus of area security operations. The scheme of protection is based on the mission variables and should include protection priorities by area, unit, activity, or resource. Although all military assets are important and all resources have value, the capabilities they represent are not equal in their contribution to decisive operations or overall mission accomplishment. Determining and directing protection priorities may be the most important decisions that commanders make and that staffs
support. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide the same level of protection to all assets. For this reason, commanders use risk management to identify increasingly risky activities and events, while other decision support tools assist in prioritizing protection resources.20

**Space Operations**

Space operations are, by their nature, joint operations. Every Service contributes to the integrated whole which is synchronized by the joint force HQ. Army space operations support joint force missions and receive support from Service components and other joint force, government, civil, and commercial space assets. Establishing “space superiority”21 is now ever more important to ensure the joint force can maintain current and future battlefield capabilities. To support joint and Service component requirements, Army Regulation (AR) 900-1, *Department of the Army Space Policy*, 21 Apr 2017, highlights key space domain capabilities that are integrated into joint operations and for which the Army is responsible such as:22

- Position navigation and timing
- ISR
- Satellite communications
- Missile warning
- Space situational awareness
- Space control (space control includes defensive space control, offensive space control, and navigation warfare [NA VWAR])
- Satellite operations
- Leverage appropriate Department of Defense space-related capabilities to support land force operations

**Requesting an Army space coordination element.** The JFC may request an ASCE to provide Army space operations expertise via a request for forces. Upon validation of the request for forces, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff deployment execution order will be sent to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). If an ASCE is requested, the ASCE may perform the following functions:

- It provides Army space representation and support to the commander with space coordinating authority (SCA).
- It assists the space support elements (SSEs) in ensuring Army space equities are recognized and incorporated into joint space operations.
- It assists in the joint space planning process and development of the space priorities.
• It coordinates space operations through the Army battlefield coordination detachment.

Establishing an SCA. The joint force land component command may be delegated SCA at the discretion of the JFC. This is most likely to happen if the Army has the preponderance of space capabilities in theater or otherwise has sufficient expertise available to justify JFC confidence and has adequate mission command to fully coordinate space issues. The nature and duration of the overall mission are also factors when assigning SCA to a commander. If the joint force land component command is designated with SCA, that HQ should request appropriate Army, joint, and Service component space augmentation in order to perform the functions required to support the execution of SCA. The commander with SCA consolidates Service component space requirements and issues, and coordinates implementation through joint force command to USSTRATCOM. When delegated SCA, the joint force land component command may exercise direct liaison with other Service space components if authorized.

Leveraging space personnel. Theater army, field army, corps, and division HQ are assigned organic SSEs for planning, integration, coordination of space capabilities, and to conduct mission command of space forces. This group of Soldiers and civilians, across all Army WfFs, have documented training and experience in the space domain. It is a diverse group with a common mission to develop, plan, acquire, and operate space capabilities to fulfill mission requirements in the five space mission areas: 1. space situational awareness 2. space force enhancement 3. space support 4. space control 5. space force application.23

Space domain training. Adversaries are constantly seeking ways to create denied, degraded, and disrupted space operational environment (D3SOE) effects and use them to their advantage. The threat to Army and joint operations from D3SOE may create vulnerabilities which may make electromagnetic interference or physical attack against space capabilities look attractive to adversaries. The U.S. Army depends on Soldiers to understand unit equipment, capabilities, limitations, and tactics, techniques, and procedures to fight through a D3SOE. Army space capabilities and effects contribute to successful unified land operations. Academic instruction on D3SOE considerations may be requested by the training audience to be included in a Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) hosted mission command training event. Reachback support to D3SOE planning and operations is coordinated through the division SSEs and is available as staffs develop their plans and annexes for warfighter exercises (WFXs). Additional support can also be requested for D3SOE planning and operations during home station command post exercises or other work-ups to the capstone exercises. Finally, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command provides observer-
controller/trainer augmentation focused on D3SOE to the MCTP Operations Groups Alpha and Delta, division, corps, and Army Service component command (ASCC) HQ.24

**Space cadre staff contributions.** SSEs and Army space support teams (ARSSTs) must be equipped and trained to contribute to current operations (CUOPS) and future operations (FUOPS). As with any other staff section, SSEs must maintain running estimates to include such information as satellite statuses, terrestrial weather impacts, space weather impacts, enemy and friendly space activity, and status of space support requests. SSEs and ARSSTs should be required to brief relevant space information, at least by exception, during drills, updates, and assessments. They should be equipped with the appropriate communications, web portal access systems, and collaboration tools to enable real-time information sharing. Space operations need to be considered across all planning horizons (CUOPS, FUOPS, and plans), and across all WfFs. Units must ensure standard operating procedures and battle drills address contested space conditions (electromagnetic interference of GPS, satellite communications, and space based ISR systems).

**Establishment of a joint space element (JSE).** Recent joint operations experience has shown that the designated SCA should consider establishing a JSE to aid the SCA in the execution of day-to-day responsibilities. All Service components need to provide some level of support to the designated SCA to create synergy in space planning. The JSE provides the Services and operational units in the operational area with a vehicle for planning space operations.25

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We have got to recondition ourselves to a different type of war, since 9/11, we’ve been doing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism against relatively lightly armed and low tech foes but there are many other types of war, and the one that is perhaps most difficult and challenging — and a very real possibility — is a larger war against a near-peer or a much more capable state adversary...in very rugged, urban, complex terrain. In that environment...if you’re stationary, you’ll die. Your logistics lines and your lines of communications are going to be under intense stress, (and) the electromagnetic spectrum is going to be at least degraded if not completely disrupted...and yet you’re still going to have to fight and you still have to win.

GEN Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA).

Breaking Defense

“Let Leaders Off The Electronic Leash”: CSA Milley

By Sydney J, Freedberg Jr., May 05, 2017
Electronic Warfare (EW) and Cyber Operations

Superiority in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) provides a decisive advantage to commanders at all levels in modern combat. The Army’s ability to exploit cyberspace and EW capabilities will prove critical to the success of unified land operations (ULO). As cyberspace and EW operations develop similar and complementary capabilities, the Army must plan, integrate, and synchronize these operations with ULO.\(^\text{26}\)

The distinctions between cyberspace and EW capabilities allow for each to operate separately and support operations distinctly. However, this also necessitates synchronizing efforts to avoid unintended interference. Any operational requirement specific to the electronic transfer of information through the wired portion of cyberspace must use a cyberspace capability for affect. If a portion of cyberspace uses only the EMS as a transport method, then it is an EW capability that can affect it. Any operational requirement to affect an EMS capability not connected to cyberspace must use an EW capability.\(^\text{27}\)

Commanders rely on cyberspace to exercise mission command. In the 2014 Army’s Strategic Planning Guidance, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army jointly stated:

> Similar to other domains, Army leaders and organizations must be capable of employing capabilities in cyberspace but not to the point of dependency should those capabilities be negated. This convergence between land and cyberspace has created dependencies and vulnerabilities for the Army’s ability to exercise mission command through the Army network. The Army will prioritize the defense of its network and key systems against increasingly sophisticated and evolving threats in order to retain freedom of maneuver and exploit its advantages. As the Army addresses these challenges, it will build cyberspace capabilities that are integrated within a joint construct but also include integration with Army units down to the tactical edge. Finally, when authorized, the Army must be prepared to plan and conduct cyberspace operations in support of national, joint, and Service requirements.\(^\text{28}\)

**Command support.** Signal personnel must learn to communicate and use language familiar with the audience when defining signal, information technology (IT), or cyber efforts. Translating signal, IT, and cyber terms into familiar mission command terms helps the commander and the commander’s staff comprehend the intent of the signal, IT, or cyber effort. Creating a common language is vital to effectively creating a collective understanding. For example, the networks are roads, information systems are combat platforms, security measures are the obstacles, and the cyber actors are enemy combatants.
Space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and communications authorities. Issues associated with space assets and capabilities are not related to a question of integration (elements are integrated), it is an issue of authorities. Early, good planning can help mitigate space element issues (i.e., employing space assets during Phase 0 vice waiting until Phase 3 in a reactive mode to enemy space threats).

Supporting AMCS. Persistent and proactive engagement with all system subject matter experts (SME) is vital to the total security theme. Persistent education, help, and verification with a focus on hardening compliance and password discipline are vital to closing security holes. Any system is a weak link and a compromising liability. All systems, AMCS SMEs, and Soldiers must be integrated into the security solution.

Superiority through synchronization. Superiority in cyberspace and the EMS to support Army operations results from effectively synchronizing Department of Defense Information Network operations, offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, electronic attack, electronic protection, electronic warfare support, and spectrum management operations.

Predeployment planning. During a division transition to a combined joint force land component command, it is necessary to identify the primary network that is currently in use by the combined joint joint force land component command as early as possible. Identifying the network on which the majority of data and communications can take place affords all coalition forces the ability to coordinate for training and account creation prior to deployment. This issue should be identified during the predeployment site survey and should be a shared responsibility of the G-6 (signal) and G-3 (operations) to develop a training plan to ensure their organization is prepared to operate with new mission command systems.

Sustainment Operations (Operational Reach)

Sustainment is one of the six joint functions and supporting joint forces in an increasingly complex operating environment will be an increasingly common aspect of joint operations into the near future. The sustainment and logistics demands in complex contingencies require an “enterprise” approach as they often overcome the ability of a particular nation, military, or government to manage alone.

Sustainment in the joint sense includes the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. The definition of sustainment is not always clearly understood in the joint operating environment. Sustainment encompasses all of the core logistics capabilities, including supply,
maintenance, deployment and distribution, health services support, logistics services, engineering, and operational contract support as well as personnel services, including human resources support, religious ministry support, financial management, and legal support. An ASCC, as it transitions into a joint force, must be capable of immediately conducting operations in this environment.

The sustainable readiness process (SRP) is the Army’s strategic process for planning, synchronizing, governing, and executing sustainable readiness across the total force. The SRP enables informed senior leader readiness decision making, shaping the annual planning, programming, and budgeting process to maximize readiness and generate forces in support of global force management. SRP replaces the Army’s progressive readiness process known as Army Force Generation.

AR 525-29, Army Force Generation, 14 Mar 2011

There are some key challenges the ASCC faces when transitioning to a joint force. For the ASCC to be successful in the role of a joint force land component command, the sustainment staff and planners must understand the authorities, goals, and limitations of other joint enterprise partners in Phase 0. Capitalizing on and leveraging other stakeholders’ capabilities and resources is critical. Determine what support other U.S. government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can provide. These agencies can play a key role in providing logistics support during combat as well as relief and reconstruction operations. Likewise, plan to support other agencies and execute Army support to other Services (ASOS) agreements.

Conduct wide area security (consolidation and joint security areas). Planners must consider many more issues related to sustainment due to the emerging concept of “adaptive basing” in order to be successful. Users do not understand how to input logistics requirements into the tasking system. Without valid requirements in the queue, it gives leadership and planners a false impression (i.e., supply is greater than demand) and creates an unrealistic expectation of airlift capacity and responsiveness.

Extended Employment. The Pacific Pathways force built readiness through multiple iterations of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and port operations, increasing knowledge of the area of operations and speed through repetition. For example, at the beginning of Pacific Pathways, port preparation of the aviation task force lasted 18 hours. By the time it arrived at the final exercise, the unit had learned how to reduce the operational timeline from 12 down to six hours. In addition, working with the country teams, embassies, and host nations to facilitate RSOI activities developed new skill sets at the division, brigade combat team, and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command echelons.
Conducting multiple iterations of mission command and sea and aerial port mobility; employing units and equipment in and out of multiple countries; gaining detailed understanding of the Pacific Theater time, space, and terrain; and working with diverse partner nations achieves an operational-level readiness that cannot be gained in a combat training center rotation.

Setting the theater is one of Pacific Pathway’s greatest values. Linking several of these exercises together into a coherent operation allows 1st Corps specifically to extend mission command through a division HQ in theater and across the International Date Line in real time and within an active theater of operations. From a sustainment perspective, the 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), as well as the 19th ESC on the Korean peninsula, is able to rehearse multiple iterations of RSOI and sea and aerial port of debarkation openings and closings. The 593rd ESC also can provide logistics throughout the theater, giving it significant understanding of the area of operations in terms of port capabilities, host-nation infrastructure, and medical and hospital capabilities. All of this builds a picture of the theater, which 1st Corps did not have before and obtained through Pacific Pathways. This logistical situational awareness is a significant part of setting the theater in Phase 0.

Casualty operations (CASOPS). When a division is preparing to “fall in” on a combined joint force land component command they should add CASOPS procedures into their list of requests for information and processes on which to train. The combined joint force land component command is responsible for more than just U.S. Army units and developing a process or procedure prior to arriving in theater for dealing with CASOPS. This would help alleviate issues trying to figure it out after relief in place/transfer of authority (1st Infantry Division Combined Joint Force Land Component Command, Operation Inherent Resolve, Key Leader Interviews).

Seeing yourself – leveraging automated planning systems. The Joint Deployment Logistics Model (JDLM) provided commanders and their staffs a tool to use when conducting mission planning, rehearsals, and training associated with power projection. Live data feeds were incorporated into the JDLM in 2001 which allowed logisticians to track operational deployments and redeployments in the Balkans. In early 2004, the JDLM/logistics common operational picture was formally adopted by the Product Manager for the Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3) at Fort Belvoir in Virginia. JDLM operations integrated the capabilities of the Combat Service Support Control System to become the Army BCS3.
Problems identified during recent exercises included inaccurate information entered into JDLM, specifically, unit identification codes (UICs) that do not reflect their modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and mission. Some unit UICs were misinterpreted and do not follow the Fiscal Year 17 MTOE while others reflect JDLM quantities that are either drastically short, overly abundant, or nonexistent.

**Resource management considerations.** The following are some important topic areas to consider when transitioning into the joint and multinational financial management field:

- Determination of the executive financial management agent
- Mobilization, temporary change of station, and temporary orders procedures and entitlements bill-payers
- What are HQ Department of the Army, U.S. Transportation Command, and Service components specific costs versus sustainment costs to be paid by the JTF
- Creation and alignment of sustainment systems (i.e., supply, fuel, medical, transportation) codes with the Army financial system
- Standing acquisition cross servicing agreements with other nations; types and reimbursement types
- Interaction and financial responsibilities between the Department of Defense and NGOs
- Contingency operations that require later reimbursement to the executive financial management agent

**Endnotes**

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. ATP 3-60 *Targeting*, May 2015.
8. CALL *Joint Air Ground Integration Center* Handbook, page 4 (Available only to authorized CAC holders).
10. Weaponeering is the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal means required to create a desired effect on a given target, JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*, 31 Jan 2013.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.


18. Ibid.


20. Ibid.


23. Army Space Personnel Development Office

24. Space, Missile defense vital for Joint forces


27. Ibid.

Appendix A

Joint Headquarters Command and Staff Roles and Responsibilities
(Command and Staff Terms of Reference)

Headquarters organization options. Not all joint headquarters are the same. Operational mission requirements drive required capabilities, which in turn drive organization, manning, and processes. The traditional J-code structure remains the preferred basic organizing construct even though commanders will often tailor the structure to their specific requirements. This basic structure provides the joint headquarters with effective and efficient control, accountability, and administration characteristics less evident in other types of organizations. This “vertical” J-code structure promotes unity of command, speeds hierarchical information flow, and ensures the major directorate principals remain accountable through the chief of staff (COS) to the commander for the major functions of the joint headquarters. Early in organizing the joint headquarters commanders focus on getting the right key billet fills, getting subject matter experts, and getting external mission partner representation to best support their decision making and enable unified action. Figure A-1, Notional joint task force staff organization, depicts a headquarters organization template for a joint force headquarters (JFHQ). Based upon mission requirements, some of the listed staff directorates may not be required to support accomplishment of the commander’s objectives.

Effective staff integration is achieved when functional expertise from across the staff and from external mission partners is brought together in direct support of the commander’s decision requirements. Throughout interaction between J-codes, working groups, operational planning teams, and decision boards leverage the analytical capability of the entire staff and mission partners to support decision requirements. The use of these kinds of staff cross functional organizations (referred to as centers, groups, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and operational planning teams) makes staff coordination more routine; facilitates monitoring, assessment and planning; and allows for the management of activities across the three event horizons (current operations, future operations, and future plans). For further information on joint headquarters staff integration, see the Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J-7, Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Joint Headquarters Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm, Jul 2013. Joint Publication (JP) 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 31 Jan 2018, provides a detailed discussion of a typical J-code organization and the use of staff integrating elements.
Figure A-1. Notional joint task force staff organization (JP 3-33, page II-22).
Joint Headquarters Command and Staff Roles and Responsibilities

Joint force commander (JFC). Although specific responsibilities will vary, a JFC possesses the following general responsibilities:

- Provide a clear commander’s intent and timely communication of specified tasks, together with any required coordinating and reporting requirements. Tasks should be realistic yet leave subordinate commanders with flexibility in their concept of operations and the ability to take the initiative as opportunities arise.

- Transfer forces and other capabilities to designated subordinate commanders for accomplishing assigned tasks.

- Provide all available information to subordinate JFCs and component commanders that affect their assigned missions and objectives.

- Delegate authority to subordinate JFCs and component commanders commensurate with their responsibilities.


Deputy commanders. Deputy JFCs in a joint force may be designated as the JFC’s principal assistant available to replace the JFC, if needed. Normally, the deputy commander is not a member of the same Service as the JFC. The deputy JFC’s responsibilities may include the following:

- Perform special duties (e.g., chair the joint targeting coordination board, cognizance of liaison personnel reporting to the joint force headquarters, interorganizational coordination).

- Work with the components to keep the JFC updated.

- Recommend refinements in the relationship with and between the components to provide the most efficient and effective command relationships.

- Track the JFC’s critical information requirements to ensure compliance.
• For further information on the roles and responsibilities of deputy commanders, see the Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J-7, *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Chief of Staff Roles and Functions at Joint Headquarters*, Apr 2013.

**Principal staff officer.** The COS functions as the principal staff officer, assistant, and advisor to the JFC. The COS coordinates and directs the work of the staff directorates. One or more deputies to the COS and a secretary of the staff may be provided to assist the COS in the performance of assigned duties. A deputy COS normally should be from a Service other than that of the COS. The secretary of the staff is the executive in the office of the COS and is responsible for routing and forwarding correspondence and papers and maintaining office records. For further information on chief of staff functions, roles and responsibilities, see the Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J-7, *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Chief of Staff Roles and Functions at Joint Headquarters* and JP 3-33, Annex A, *Checklist for Chief of Staff to Appendix A*.

**Personal staff group of the commander.** The JFC’s personal staff performs duties prescribed by the JFC and is responsible directly to the JFC. This group, composed of aides to the JFC and staff officers handling special matters over which the JFC exercises close personal control, will include a staff judge advocate, political advisor, public affairs officer, inspector general, provost marshal, chaplain, surgeon, historian, and others as directed. JFCs should be aware that participation in multinational operations may affect the size and responsibilities of this group. For further information on the JFC’s personal staff group, see JP 3-33, Chapter XIV, Special and Personal Staff.

**Special staff group.** The special staff group consists of representatives of technical or administrative services and can include representatives from government or nongovernmental agencies. The general functions of the special staff include furnishing technical, administrative, and tactical advice and recommendations to the JFC and other staff officers; preparing the parts of plans, estimates, and orders in which they have primary interest; and coordinating and supervising the activities for which each staff division is responsible. Because the headquarters of a joint force is concerned primarily with broad operational matters rather than with technical problems associated with administration and support of assigned and attached forces, this group should be small to avoid unnecessary duplication of corresponding staff sections or divisions within the Service component headquarters. When a JFC’s headquarters is organized without a special staff group, the officers who might otherwise compose the special staff group may be organized as branches of the divisions of the joint staff or as additional joint staff divisions. For further information on the JFC’s special staff group, see JP 3-33, Chapter XIV, Special and Personal Staff.
**Joint functions and joint staff directorates.** The joint staff typically is comprised of staff directorates. These are the manpower and personnel directorate (J-1), intelligence directorate (J-2), operations directorate (J-3), logistics directorate (J-4), plans directorate (J-5), and communications system directorate (J-6) corresponding to the major joint functions of command. Three optional directorates of a J-Code headquarters include: training and education directorate (J-7), resource management and financial support directorate (J-8), and civil-military operations directorate/interagency operations directorate (J-9). The head of each staff directorate may be designated as a director or as an assistant COS. The directors or assistant COSs provide staff supervision for the JFC of all activities pertaining to their respective functions. Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to assist the JFC and component commanders integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups: command and control (C2), intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as C2, intelligence and sustainment, apply to all operations. Others such as fires, apply as the JFC’s mission requires. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each function and some could apply to more than one joint function. The joint functions reinforce and complement one another and integration across the functions is essential to mission accomplishment. See JP 3-0 for a comprehensive discussion of joint functions. See JP 3-0, *Operations*, Chapter III, Joint Functions, for a comprehensive discussion of joint functions.

**Manpower and personnel directorate of a Joint Staff (J-1).** The J-1 is the principal staff assistant to the JFC on manpower management, personnel readiness, and personnel services. The planning for joint task force (JTF) manpower and personnel support requirements must begin early in the planning process and continue through the execution of operations and redeployment. The J-1 maintains the joint manning document, is the focal point for personnel support actions, and is responsible for managing, optimizing, and synchronizing personnel support provided to the joint task force in the joint operations area (JOA). Although the Services have the primary responsibility for providing personnel services support to their members, the J-1 tracks the efforts of Service components to stay abreast of personnel activities that could impact the joint force. For background information and guidance on JTF personnel and administration matters, refer to JP 3-33, Chapter V, Manpower and Personnel Directorate, and JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*, 31 May 2016.

**Intelligence directorate of a Joint Staff (J-2).** The intelligence directorate’s primary function is to provide information and analysis to facilitate accomplishment of the mission. This is accomplished through an intelligence process which involves the collection, processing, exploitation,
analysis, and dissemination of information important to decision makers. The JTF J-2 conducts all source and multi-discipline intelligence operations and ensures full access to an uninhibited flow of information from all sources in accordance with Department of Defense (DOD) and Director of National Intelligence approved procedures.

The J-2’s intelligence priorities and efforts are driven by the JFC’s need for a holistic understanding of the operational environment. Both DOD and non-DOD intelligence agencies and organizations provide assistance to the J-2 in support of activities and operations within the JOA. The JFC may establish a JTF-level intelligence element such as a joint intelligence support element (JISE) or a joint intelligence operations center (JIOC), under the direction of the JTF J-2, to manage the intelligence collection, production, and dissemination. The JISE integrates intelligence operations with operational and planning functions and performs common intelligence functions. By design, the JISE is scalable to meet the needs of the joint force and it is tailored to fit the operational environment based on identified JFC requirements. In a particularly large or protracted campaign, the JFC may decide to employ an operational level JIOC. The JIOC incorporates the capabilities inherent in a JISE but is generally more robust.

The decision as to the type of intelligence element required will be based on the scope and breadth of the mission assigned to the JTF. If the JFC requires a JIOC, the decision to establish a fully manned JIOC at the JTF level may require augmentation and should be approved by the combatant commander.

**Note.** JISE will be used throughout this publication when discussing the JTF-level intelligence element. For specific guidance concerning JTF intelligence support, refer to JP 3-33, Chapter VI, Intelligence Directorate, and the JP 2-0 series of publications.

**Operations directorate of a Joint Staff (J-3).** The JTF J-3 assists the commander in directing and controlling operations. In this capacity the J-3, typically in concert with the higher headquarters and JTF components’ operations directorates, will plan, coordinate, and integrate operations. Within the JTF staff, this is accomplished in part by working closely with the rest of the staff to recommend material for inclusion in the commander’s intent so that it is captured in planning, informs the commander’s decisionmaking process, and contributes to the execution and assessment of operations. JTF planning and execution typically considers supported or supporting activities and the integration of interagency, multinational participants, nongovernmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations. The JFC should establish a joint operations center (JOC), under the direction of the Joint Force J-3, to manage all matters related to planning and executing current operations. For more information concerning organization and procedures of the JTF J-3, refer to JP 3-33, Chapter VII, Operations Directorate.
Logistics directorate of a Joint Staff (J-4). The J-4 helps the JFC manage the provision of logistics to the joint force. The ultimate goal is for logistics planners to develop a feasible, supportable, and efficient concept of logistic support and to be able to identify risks to the execution of the concept of operations (CONOPS).

The JTF J-4’s concept of logistic support often involves coordination with the host nation (HN), private contractors, and interorganizational partners. The quality and quantity of potential host-nation support and acquisition and cross-servicing agreements can significantly affect the logistics concept and the JFC’s CONOPS. The JTF J-4 should consider establishing a joint movement center.

If the J-4 determines that there is a requirement to form a joint logistics operations center or a joint deployment and distribution operations center, approval must be given by the commander of the JTF or geographic combatant commander (GCC) respectively. Because logistic limitations affect all planning and execution, it is essential that logistic planners are integral members of a joint planning group (JPG) and appropriately integrated throughout the staff. For more details concerning JTF logistic support, refer to JP 3-33, Chapter VIII, Logistics Directorate, and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, 16 Oct 2013.

Plans directorate of a Joint Staff (J-5). Before execution, the JTF J-5 develops, updates, reviews, and coordinates joint plans required for successful accomplishment of JTF mission(s). During execution of current operations, the J-5 focuses on future plans which are typically for the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. The J-5 also supports the future operations planning effort which normally occurs in the J-3. The J-5 typically establishes a JPG to facilitate integrated planning across the staff. A JPG should include representation from all JTF principal and special staff sections, components, and interorganizational partners as required. For homeland defense or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations, the J-5 will typically include National Guard Bureau (NGB) and National Guard (NG) JFQH-State elements in the JPG. For more details concerning JTF planning and policy procedures, refer to JP 3-33, Chapter IX, Plans and Policy Directorate.

Communications system directorate of a Joint Staff (J-6). The JTF J-6 assists the JFC in all responsibilities for communications infrastructure, communications-computer networking, communications electronics, information assurance, tactical communications, and interoperability. This includes development and integration of communications system architecture and plans that support the command’s operational and strategic requirements as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable communications system support to exercise
command in the execution of the mission. The JTF J-6 may need to use reachback to the J-6 at the level of combatant command in order to accomplish accreditation of communication systems.

The JTF communications system should support an overall JTF operational requirement and an organizational design that encourages timely, effective, and accurate flow of information and guidance within the joint force and with interorganizational partners. The system must effectively link all higher, supporting, and subordinate organizations. It should also provide a rapid, reliable, and secure flow of data to ensure continuous information exchange throughout the JTF from the earliest stages of planning through redeployment. Communications limitations influence all planning efforts. Therefore, it is imperative that communication planners are integral members of the JPG and appropriately integrated throughout the staff. For further information on the J-6, refer to JP 3-33, Chapter X, Communications Systems Directorate, and JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, 10 Jun 2015.

**Training and education directorate (J-7).** The J-7 assists the commander in planning and executing the joint training program for the staff and forces assigned to the theater in order to enhance joint and multinational mission readiness and warfighting capabilities. The J-7 is normally formed for long standing or permanent JTF.

Combatant commanders conduct the joint training of assigned forces, unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Combatant commands ensure the readiness of assigned headquarters staffs designed to perform as a JTF or functional component headquarters staff. The combatant commander, as the establishing authority, defines the readiness criteria for JTF capable headquarters. These readiness criteria shape the design of joint training for those headquarters.

Joint training must be accomplished by effectively matching the training requirements and training audiences with appropriate training methods and modes within available resources. There are two types of training:

- **Individual joint training.** This is training that prepares individuals to perform duties in joint organizations (e.g., specific staff positions or functions) or to operate uniquely joint systems.

- **Collective joint training.** This is training, instruction and applied exercises that prepare joint staffs or joint staff elements and joint organizational teams to integrate and synchronize capabilities to perform tasks deemed necessary by combatant commanders.
The JFC and COS determine the structure of the J-7 based on the mission’s expected duration and the magnitude of the operation. Some of the J-7 training responsibilities within the JFHQ and assigned units include:

- Prepare training guidance for the commander’s approval.
- Identify training requirements based on the unit’s mission.
- Determine requirements for, and allocation of, training resources.
- Maintain the unit readiness status of each unit in the command.
- Incorporate functional training requirements (i.e., information operations, cyberspace, and operational contract support) into individual and collective training as necessary to meet mission readiness requirements.
- Regularly incorporate and evaluate cyberspace operations training objectives to develop and refine the ability to operate in a denied or manipulated environment and to execute continuity of operations plans.

The J-7 should ensure a joint training program is established for the JFHQ staff. This joint training can be accomplished even in a time-sensitive operation. Success of the joint force operation, in part, depends upon the training the joint force staff receives prior to and during the operation. The following are potential training areas for the joint force staff:

- Individual military skills training
- Functional area staff training
- JFHQ situational awareness training
- Joint operations area specific culture and customs
- Mission focused training and exercises

For more details concerning the J-7 and shaping the training for the JFHQ and assigned units, refer to JP 3-33, Chapter XI, Training and Education Directorate, and JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Chapter VI, Joint Force Development, Section B, Joint Force Development, 25 Mar 2013.

**Resource management and assessment directorate (J-8).** Based on the scope and duration of the joint force’s mission and nature of the operation, the JFC may establish a resource and assessment directorate (J-8) of a joint staff. The J-8 staff should be a cross-Service representation of the joint force. If a J-8 is established, the JFC and COS will determine the extent of J-8 responsibilities. For example, the J-8 could simply focus on comptroller...
requirements for the joint force and have no assessment responsibilities. If a J-8 is not established, see JP 3-33, Appendix C, Commander, Joint Task Force Personal and Special Staffs, Annex G, Personal Staff: Comptroller.

Resource management is a financial management function that provides advice and guidance to the commander to develop command resource requirements. It involves an ongoing analysis of the commander’s tasks and priorities to identify and ensure that adequate and proper financial resources are available and applied under appropriate management controls to support the mission’s accomplishment. The JTF’s resource requirements must adequately reflect the concept of logistic support. Resource requirements include but are not limited to, contracting; transportation; and support to multinational and interagency partners, international organizations, foreign humanitarian assistance, and force sustainment.

Financial support for a joint operation can present a challenge because of diverse fiscal requirements, sources, and authorities of funds. The JTF J-8 must identify multiple funding sources and authorities in order to balance constraints imposed by fiscal law with emergent time critical operational requirements. For more information on resource management and funding, see JP 3-33, Chapter XII, Resource Management and Financial Support Directorate, and JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations, 11 Jan 2016.

Operation assessment is a continuous operational activity that spans both planning and execution functions. The J-3 and J-5 typically are responsible for different aspects of assessment. Regardless of the composition or function of the joint force J-8, the J-8 performs myriad duties that may reach across all the directorates of the joint force staff. These duties may affect operation assessment as well as force structure, resource management, and finance support.

**Civil-military operations directorate (J-9).** The J-9 assists the commander in the pursuit of unified action by facilitating the integration of interorganizational perspectives in design, planning, execution, and assessment. Some commanders may also have interorganizational coordination as a part of the directorate title. Successful interaction with these organizations, who are not under U.S. military command authority, depends upon the establishment of coordination mechanisms and processes in order to build and share a common understanding of strategic guidance and the operational environment, develop relevant objectives, and harmonize required actions. The J-9 is a hub from which the JFC can facilitate unified action. The J-9 may serve as the initial and primary point of contact for interorganizational coordination and the single physical location for representatives and liaison officers. The specific role and staff
structure of the J-9 may vary based on the nature of the JFC’s mission and the specific Service headquarters designated as the joint force headquarters. The JFC and COS determine the structure of the J-9 based on the joint force’s mission and expected magnitude of the operation.

A role of the J-9 is to assist in the identification of and establish the linkages and contacts with the appropriate external organizations who may influence or affect the command’s mission across all phases of the operation. Cross-functional staff representation in design and planning forums is important in understanding some of the following interorganizational coordination considerations:

• Determine the influence and effects of external organizations on the JTF’s mission.

• Identify and understand the perspectives of current partners and stakeholders with whom the JTF is interacting.

• Evaluate the effectiveness and adequacy of current interorganizational coordination processes for supporting JTF operations when the JTF is in either a supported or supporting role.

• Determine future requirements and identify potential partners.

• Define future coordination mechanisms, processes, and transitions.


For additional joint task force HQ staff checklists and information, refer to JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force HQ*, Appendix A, Checklists. Included are checklists for: the chief of staff, transition to permanent operations, J-1 (personnel), J-2 (intelligence), J-3 (operations), J-4 (logistics), J-5 (plans), J-6 (signal), J-9 (civil-military), health services, inspector general, information management, and transition of a joint task force into a follow-on multinational force.
Global Force Management

Global force management (GFM) is the Department of Defense (DOD) process to align force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies to support joint force availability requirements, enable comprehensive insight into global availability of U.S. military forces, and provide senior decision makers with a vehicle to accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in assignments, apportionments, and allocations.

GFM implementation guidance (GFMIG). The GFMIG describes the processes, roles, missions, and functions to support the sourcing of combatant command (CCMD) requests for capabilities and forces to support emerging or crisis-based requirements. This biennial Secretary of Defense (SecDef) document establishes the processes to implement the GFM framework.

- The SecDef assigns forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs) to meet Unified Command Plan missions and responsibilities.
- The SecDef apportions forces to CCDRs for planning.
- The SecDef allocates forces to CCDRs to meet current operational requirements.

The three processes of assignment, allocation, and apportionment are related to each other. Figure B-1 shows the entire DOD force pool (every military unit, Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine) within the “Service Institutional Forces” (recruiters, instructors, Service Title X forces—man, train, and equip) and “Operational Forces” boxes. This force pool is further divided by “assigned” (forces for) to a CCDR, “unassigned” forces, as well as “Service retained” forces.

- **Unassigned forces.** These are forces not assigned to a CCDR but retained under Service control to carry out functions of a Military Department.

- **Service retained forces.** These are Active and Reserve Component operational forces under the administrative control of respective Secretaries of the Military Departments and not assigned to a CCDR. These forces remain under administrative control of their respective Services and are commanded by a Service-designated commander responsible to the Service, unless allocated to a CCDR for the execution of operational missions.
• **Apportionment for planning.** Forces are grouped by the GFMIG into one of three apportionment “bins” (Figure B-1). The first bin contains forces apportioned for homeland defense (HD) planning. Bin “A” contains forces committed to ongoing operations. Bin “B” contains forces available for planning, both those that are readily available and those that are not (units in a degraded readiness posture for a variety of reasons that will require time to attain a deployable status). If a CCMD’s deliberate planning determines it requires forces from Bin “A,” the CCDR must address this unsourced requirement with the SecDef through the Global Force Management Board (GFMB) process. The next edition of the GFMIG should add more granularity to the “not readily available” force pool within Bin “B” so that commanders and staffs can plan more accurately.

• **Allocation for execution.** Actual allocation of forces and capabilities occurs through the SecDef allocation process. As a point of clarification, the GFMIG only provides guidelines, policy, and processes for force allocation.

![Figure B-1. Force apportionment, assignment, and allocation bins.](image-url)
**Global force management board.** The Director of the Joint Staff (JS) chairs the GFMB with membership by representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, Services, CCMDs, and DOD agencies. The GFMB assesses and prioritizes CCMD requests for rotational capabilities, provides a prioritized list of CCMD requests to the joint force coordinator and joint force providers (JFPs) to use in identifying joint solutions for military capabilities among the Services and frames any contentious issues for decision by the SecDef.

**Joint force providers.** The JFPs, working through their assigned Service components, provide global sourcing recommendations through a rotational force schedule to fill GFMB validated rotational force requirements. Responsibilities include the following:

- The JS J-35 (future operations) is the conventional joint force coordinator.
- United States Special Operations Command serves as the special operations forces JFP.
- United States Transportation Command serves as the mobility JFP.
- United States Strategic Command serves as the joint force manager (JFM) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and missile defense. The JFM develops recommended sourcing solutions collaboratively with the joint force coordinator and JFPs for ISR and missile defense capabilities and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities.
- The CCMDs serve as JFP for the general purpose forces (GPFs) assigned to their commands.
- The Services serve as JFP for the GPFs not assigned to a CCMD.
- DOD agencies are JFPs for certain other capabilities not assigned to CCMDs or to the Services.

**Force allocation process.** The DOD uses the following force allocation process (including the corresponding steps in Figure B-2):

- CCDRs determine and validate the requirement and then submit a request for forces or capability (RFF/C) to support annual or emerging operational requirements to the SecDef via the JS (steps 1 and 2 in Figure B-2).
- The JS validates the request and assigns the request to a JFP to determine a recommended sourcing solution (steps 3 and 4 in Figure B-2).
• The joint force coordinator and JFPs develop sourcing recommendations in coordination with the Services via their assigned global-looking Service components.

• The recommendations will include any associated risks and other information considered germane to the sourcing recommendation. The recommendation must conform to existing OSD policy. Any deviations must be accompanied by a detailed explanation for the SecDef approval (steps 5 and 6 in Figure B-2).

• The JS receives the sourcing recommendations and staffs the draft deployment order (DEPORD) with the DOD agencies and the OSD. CCDRs and Service Chiefs may communicate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff their assessment of risk or other issues associated with the recommended global sourcing solution. The JS coordinates with the OSD, agencies, Services, or CCMDs with issues or equity to either articulate or adjudicate (if possible) issues that would result in a nonconcurrence. The JS will, as required, convene an off-cycle GFMB, or Service Operations Deputies’ think tank or Joint Chiefs of Staff think tank to address and attempt resolution of contentious issues (step 7 in Figure B-2).

• The JS forwards the recommended sourcing solution with the nonconcurrence, if not adjudicated in the GFMB, to the SecDef for approval (step 8 in Figure B-2.).

• Upon SecDef approval, the deployment order is forwarded for force flow execution in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The GFMAP is a consolidated directive that contains all SecDef allocation decisions in one document (step 9).
Figure B-2. Force allocation process.

Endnote
Appendix C
Training for Joint Operations

Joint warfighting is not academic. It is the application of the acquired knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes in an operational environment where increased levels of experience correspond directly with increased levels of proficiency and performance of mission tasks.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3500.01G, Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States

A typical transition to a joint headquarters is less than 42 days. Effective commanders with support from the existing staff identify known and unknown gaps toward the end state of becoming a joint task force (JTF) or combined joint task force. Transitions are not discrete events. They consist of overlapping groups of actions that, over time, interact to create various challenges. The transition of operational responsibilities from a combatant command (CCMD) (or designated theater special operations command or component headquarters) to a joint headquarters usually occurs in the early stages of a crisis.¹

Therefore, it is important that a joint staff training program be implemented in theater armies to both train and maintain a proficient battle staff at the joint force land component command level. In addition, if identified by a CCMD or theater theater army, Army corps and division headquarters (HQ) can also prepare for future missions by conducting joint training. Training is directed in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.03E, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, 20 Apr 2015, and enhances the combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute assigned missions. Components of the Services within the Department of Defense (DOD) supporting geographic CCMDs’ missions use the Joint Training System to develop joint training programs; plan, execute, and assess joint training based on mission essential tasks (METs) and campaign plan requirements; and document the training status in the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) for input into readiness reporting in the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Strategic (DRRS-S). Foundations for joint training programs should be based on each command’s or agency’s required capabilities as specified in its mission essential task list (METL). Joint staff training is a very perishable skill requiring sustainment training at a collective and individual level on a recurring basis.²
Types of Joint Training
Joint training must be accomplished by effectively matching the training requirements and training audiences with appropriate training methods and modes within available resources. Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 Mar 2013, addresses the following audiences:3

**Individual joint training.** This is training that prepares individual members and commanders to perform duties in joint organizations, e.g., specific staff positions or functions or to operate uniquely joint systems. Individuals should be proficient in the requisite knowledge, skills, and ability to apply joint doctrine and procedures necessary to function as staff members.

**Staff joint training.** This is training that prepares joint staffs or joint staff elements to respond to strategic and operational taskings deemed necessary by CCDRs and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to execute their assigned missions.

**Collective joint training.** This includes instruction and applied exercises that prepare joint organizational teams to integrate and synchronize owned and provided capabilities in order to execute assigned missions. Collective exercise programs include the President’s National Exercise Program, the Chairman’s Exercise Program, and the Joint Exercise Program.

**Note.** For further guidance on joint training, refer to the CJCSI 3500.01G, *Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 15 Mar 2012.

**Joint Exercise and Training Program Insights**
Joint exercise programs exist to prepare CCMD assigned and allocated forces and joint force HQ (JFHQ) to operate successfully across the full range of military operations in a joint, interorganizational, and multinational integrated environment. These programs train in-theater forces and commanders, train and prepare JFHQ, sustain the readiness of rotational and expeditionary forces deployed into the theater, increase coalition and alliance warfighting capabilities, enhance the ability of United States to operate with the forces and within the countries across the area of responsibility (AOR) of the geographic CCMD, and contribute to theater security cooperation objectives.
Commanders train. Commanders at all echelons ensure that their commands are prepared to accomplish assigned missions. Commanders establish joint training plans (JTP) within JTIMS to include training objective (TO) libraries. They execute and observe TOs (training performance observations). They evaluate TOs (training proficiency evaluations), and they assess joint mission essential tasks (JMET) associated with their JTPs (training proficiency assessments) to determine program effectiveness. Commanders assess, report, and (where required) certify their readiness to perform as a JTF capable HQ in the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). The CCMD and subordinate Service component commands will certify their readiness to stand up a JTF-capable headquarters in the DRRS.

Focus on the mission. Geographic CCMDs train to mission based TOs derived from JMETs (and training tasks) within JTIMS. Commanders define TOs based on high level, specific, and implied tasks associated with command missions and the readiness assessments of forces and HQ to perform the tasks essential to accomplish assigned missions. Each event in the joint training schedule is designed to meet specific TOs derived from the participating training audiences’ joint or Service METLs (and training tasks). The following issues also apply:

- Whenever prudent and consistent with the readiness TOs to be accomplished in the event, the event is to be designed and scheduled to perform tasks in support of theater and Service component security cooperation objectives. However, events are not included solely to meet security cooperation objectives.

- Training event design will provide opportunities to improve interagency, international and nongovernmental organization (NGO), coalition, and alliance interoperability, as well as mission capabilities. However, training events are not included solely for the training of other nations’ forces or HQ or international HQ.
Geographic CCMD training events support force transformation by providing limited opportunities for experimentation with new concepts; equipment; and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Unless otherwise directed by CCMD leadership. However, events are not scheduled solely to meet experimentation objectives.

The 25th Infantry Division Commander stated that the leadership development resulting from Pacific Pathways, particularly the tactical and operational problem solving, made the missions successful. These execution problem sets cannot be readily simulated or re-created at a home station or at a combat training center due to the dynamic environment in which a Pacific Pathways force operates.

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 16-27, Pacific Pathways, Sep 2016

Train the way we intend to fight. Joint training events and exercises should be as realistic as appropriate to meet TOs. The training conditions (training situations) and standards (levels of performance) derived from mission essential tasks reflect the physical, military, and civil environments and constraints in which the training audiences must be prepared to operate. Considerations follow:

- Joint and Service METs (with conditions and standards) derived through analysis of theater strategic objectives and plans and, when possible and prudent, current and real world scenarios are employed as a basis for training.

- Training is accomplished in appropriate combinations of interagency, alliance, and coalition theater strategic as well as operational environments, with the involvement of international and NGOs in the AOR and accommodating unique conditions for mission execution at locations within the AOR.

- Geographic CCMD-directed training events are conducted in appropriate joint context and, as prudent as possible, providing realistic training with a credible opposing force using common ground truth and high quality feedback.

- Training resources and training time are limited. The need to train as much of the training audience as possible in a limited number of events generates pressure to grow training events beyond real-world employment plans resulting in scenarios, forces, or HQ staffs that do not realistically represent theater plans and operational requirements. The officer conducting the exercise must maintain an appropriate balance so that training artificialities do not obstruct TOs or create negative learning environments.
Exercises Lion Focus and Judicious Response are key events which allow U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) to rehearse its planning processes and develop operational plans. These measures also challenge the headquarters to organize and surge for contingency operations while maintaining steady state Title 10 responsibilities. It is a rehearsal for planning, task organizing, and employing our contingency command post in order to provide the combatant commander with options.

*CALL, Judicious Response Insights 17-01, 30 Jun 2017*

**Use joint doctrine.** The CCMD trains to joint doctrine and operational concepts. Joint doctrine provides common terms, TTPs, and perspectives. Other considerations may be made regarding coalition operations and training. For example, in the USEUCOM AOR through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standardization process, U.S. joint doctrine incorporates Alliance doctrine.

**Train efficiently.** Training resources – funding, transportation, training staff, and available training time (operations tempo and personnel tempo) – are constrained. Accordingly, each training event is planned and designed to address required training and then to obtain the highest quality results such as the following:

- Training in real world venues across the theater includes significant factors that planners cannot fully control with inherent risks to successful execution of the training mission. Joint training planners will apply a risk management approach to identify and track the sources and status of operational risk. Risk assumption is a command function. Accordingly, only officials authorized to speak for the responsible commander may assume risk in the planning and execution of a training event.

- Joint training builds upon Service component core competency training. Each Service component training program must complement and integrate smoothly into the CCMD JTP (including supporting METS which tie subordinate JTPs with the higher HQ) in order to reduce duplication of effort and maximize readiness value.

**Training Concept**

The theater joint training concepts may focus on the requirements of the training audiences. Three general categories characterize theater training audiences: 1. Joint and combined forces, 2. Joint and combined forces’ HQ, and 3. Joint and combined forces’ commanders. Training includes:
• Training joint and combined forces. This joint and combined force training concentrates on the personnel of integral military units accomplishing their primary functions. Joint and combined forces training includes a mixture of live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) (computer aided) training in appropriate joint context designed to meet objectives based on the joint and Service METs of the training audiences.

• The foundation of force training is the individual and unit core competency training sponsored and conducted by Service components. This training includes both Service-specific and joint force proficiencies in order to provide those basic skills that are prerequisite for participation in joint operations. For global presence and expeditionary forces, the majority of this training is performed before forces deploy into the theater. In-theater training is designed to sustain proficiency. Forward-based forces; however, generally must complete the full cycle of Service training in-theater.

• CCMD scheduled, Service component conducted joint and combined exercises, and academic training courses provide venues for multi-Service and joint training for CCMD assigned and allocated forces. These training events include a mixture of LVC exercises designed to meet TOs based on the joint and Service METs of the training audiences. For example, USEUCOM’s exercise program exploits NATO and Partnership-for-Peace venues, invitations to events hosted by other nations, and other multinational security cooperation opportunities to provide realistic interaction with partner forces, international organizations, and NGOs.

**Joint and combined force training objectives and tasks.** The joint and combined force HQ training addresses, at a minimum, select JMETs which must be exercised in order to assist with an organization’s ability to certify their readiness to act as a JTF-capable HQ in the DRRS. Objectives include the following:

• Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) may implement or activate a standing JFHQ or JTF-capable HQs which are also designated audiences that convene to train against their respective missions. A fully activated joint or combined HQ is normally composed of individuals from different Services and joint staffs and agencies from inside and outside the theater. Joint and combined force HQ are tailored on activation to a functional composition appropriate to the specific mission and forces assigned.
Efficient JFHQ training focuses on the individuals designated to perform the duty in an actual employment. These individuals fall roughly into three training audience types (staff, management and directors, and command group). Each group has its own TOs. Additionally, training requirements address individual skills, workgroup skills, and unit skills. In order to address this variety of requirements, a combination of training methods and opportunities in a planned training evolution is required. While real-world events employ only the required staff, training events provide training opportunities to as many members of the training audience as can effectively be trained. Further, JFHQ training serves a standardizing function by encouraging headquarters to employ common TTPs in order to maximize interoperability among JFHQs and transfer qualifications of trained personnel.

JFHQ training events are designed to meet the TOs defined by the respective JFCs under GCC-approved operational scenarios. Each training audience derives its objectives from an analysis of their assigned missions and a review of organizational METs (and JTIMS “training” tasks).

TOs are met through a combination of individual and group academic training and live virtual gaming exercises. JFHQ training events are designed to use the JNTC where appropriate, including where appropriate to the mission focus, including vertical integration of joint and Service HQ, interagency and multinational environments, and coordination of operations among CCMDs and functional combatant commands.

Training joint force commanders and Service component commanders. To help meet the training requirements of senior commanders, the CCMD schedules seminars supported by training staff, senior mentors, and facilitators. These seminars provide controlled venues for the exchange of views on significant leadership challenges related to the command’s JMET list.

Achieving unity of effort in operations and training requires the DOD to coordinate its contribution across all aspects of national power. The CCMD training and exercise plan leverages resources and integrates activities with other entities to include as appropriate, other U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, U.S. and foreign NGOs, and members of the private sector.
Training the Staff

Appoint a dedicated joint force land component command training officer to conduct a number of tasks to include:


- Manage the joint force land component commander’s training program to maintain and report readiness to perform assigned joint warfighting headquarters missions in the USEUCOM AOR.

- Prepare and present an annual training brief and prepare annual training guidance.

- Supervise monthly training assessment updates in JTIMS. Lead a bimonthly joint force land component command training working group to synchronize training and readiness and exercise execution.

Training to transition. Units that are preparing to transition to a JFHQ should refer to Army Training Circular (TC) 6-6, *Training the Mission Command Warfighting Function: Transitioning to a Joint Headquarters*, 15 Jan 2018, to develop a training plan. TC 6-6 should be used during unit training management and planning upon receiving notification of transitioning to a joint headquarters. TC 6-6 provides the framework for commanders, leaders, and Soldiers who plan, prepare, execute, and assess training of mission command in transitioning to the joint level. The products described in this publication are developed to support the METL and to establish assigned METL training strategies.

Training Capabilities

Mission Command Training Program (MCTP). The MCTP supports the collective training of Army units as directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army and scheduled by the United States Forces Command (USFORSCOM) to provide commanders and leaders the opportunity to train on mission command in unified land operations. The MCTP is the only deployable combat training center. It consists of eight operation groups and a supporting unit of the 505th Command and Control Wing, Detachment 1, United States Air Force.
TRANSITION TO A JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Each of the operations groups trains commanders and staff on effective integration of warfighter functions in a joint, interorganizational, and multinational operating environment to achieve operational mission command. Operations groups’ observer controllers/trainers (OC/Ts) provide high quality academic seminars and formal after action reviews during warfighter exercises (WFXs) to improve the readiness and combat effectiveness of each training audience.

MCTP priorities:

- Conduct exercises as scheduled by USFORSCOM.
- Increase joint and allied participation in WFXs.
- Establish joint and allied duty positions within MCTP.
- Reduce exercise costs.
- Develop multiple operating environments.

What MCTP provides the Army: MCTP serves as an engine of change for implementing doctrine by providing feedback to the Army on future doctrine, unit organization, and application of that doctrine. MCTP’s annual collection of key observations made at brigades through Army component command (ASCC) levels enables the Army’s future force to grow and develop from lessons learned.

To keep up with the operating tempo across the Army, MCTP supports events throughout the year. A recent year of supported events included five corps and division level WFXs, five ASCC exercises, and six National Guard brigade combat team WFXs. Each exercise generally requires a one-year planning cycle including multiple training and planning events to enable training in execution. These exercises are conducted in a distributed manner and consist of a multi-echelon, total Army force (Active Component, United States Army Reserve, and Army National Guard) and stress special operations force (SOF) interdependence.

MCTP provides a trained world class opposing force consisting of Soldiers and contractors to portray a free thinking, near-peer, and hybrid threat. MCTP features professional OC/Ts and highly qualified senior mentors (retired 1-4 star general officers). This cadre enables staffs and commanders to train on their prospective METLs and assess their readiness.

MCTP consists of eight operations groups with distinct focus areas:

- Operations Groups A and D train division, corps, and ASCCs.
- Operations Groups B and F train functional and multifunctional (F/MF) brigades.
• Operations Group C trains National Guard brigade combat teams (select F/MF brigades).

• Operations Group J includes SOF conventional force integration, interoperability and interdependence, and SOF HQ

• Operations Group S trains sustainment brigades (theater support commands and expeditionary support commands).

• Operations Group X develops and provides mission command for exercises.

**Joint Staff J-7 deployable training division.** The Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J-7 helps inform both the joint Warfighters and key functions within the J-7 and most notably in lessons learned, doctrine, education, and future joint force development.

The DTD gains insights on operational matters through regular contact and dialogue with combatant and joint task force commanders and their staffs as they plan, prepare for, and conduct operations. The DTD observers and trainers collect and compare practices among the different headquarters, draw out and refine “insights” and “best practices,” publish these practices, and share the practices across the operational, training, lessons learned, doctrine, and joint development communities.

**Endnotes**


4. The following is an excerpt from EUCOM ECM 3501.02 – “Joint Training and Exercise Program, Enclosure A (Policy and Responsibilities for Joint Training).” Modifications have been made to the original text in order to standardize insights across multiple theaters.

**Appendix D**

**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2AD</td>
<td>anti-access area denial</td>
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<tr>
<td>AADC</td>
<td>area air defense commander</td>
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<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>Army Air and Missile Defense Command</td>
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<td>ABCS</td>
<td>Army Battle Command System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>analysis and control element</td>
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<td>ACM</td>
<td>air control measure</td>
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<td>ACO</td>
<td>airspace control order</td>
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<td>ADCON</td>
<td>administrative control</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Reference Publication</td>
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<td>AFTTP</td>
<td>Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>AMCS</td>
<td>Army mission command systems</td>
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<td>AMD</td>
<td>air and missile defense</td>
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<td>AMDWS</td>
<td>air and missile defense workstation</td>
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<td>Army Force Generation</td>
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<td>ARSST</td>
<td>Army space support teams</td>
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<td>Army Service component command</td>
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<td>ASCE</td>
<td>Army space coordination element</td>
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<td>ASOC</td>
<td>air support operations center</td>
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<td>ASOS</td>
<td>Army support to other Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASR</td>
<td>air support request</td>
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<td>air tasking order</td>
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<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army Techniques Publication</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>airspace workstation</td>
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<td>BCS3</td>
<td>Battle Command Sustainment Support System</td>
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<td>brigade combat team</td>
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DOC  United States Department of Commerce
DOD  Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense Directive
DOE  Department of Energy
DOJ  Department of Justice
DOS  Department of State
DOT  Department of Transportation
DR  disaster relief
DRRS Defense Readiness Reporting System
DRRS-S Defense Readiness Reporting System - Strategic
DTD deployable training division
EAB echelons above brigade
EMS electromagnetic spectrum
ESC Expeditionary Sustainment Command
EW  electronic warfare
F/MF functional and multi-functional
FARG focus area review group
FM  Field Manual
FML  force management level
FMS  foreign military sales
FMTS Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System
FUOPS future operations
G-3 assistant chief of staff for operations and training
GCC geographic combatant commander
GCCS-A Global Command and Control System-Army
GEF guidance for employment of the force
GEOINT geospatial intelligence
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<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>PMESII-PT</td>
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<td>Warfighter exercise</td>
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<td>working group</td>
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Appendix E

Terms and Definitions

**Administrative Control:** The direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. (Joint Publication 1)

**Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS):** The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) software is used to plan, execute and deliver lethal and nonlethal effects within the overall Mission Command and Control Enterprise. AFATDS inter-operates and integrates with more than 80 different battlefield systems, including Navy and Air Force command and control weapon systems and German, French, Turkish and Italian fire-support systems. (http://asc.army.mil)

**Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS):** A common defense/staff planning and situational awareness/situational understanding software tool that is deployed with air and missile defense (AMD) units at all echelons. The AMDWS performs all aspects of AMD force operations. It assists in the automated development of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield; provides situational awareness; and is capable of planning, coordinating, and synchronizing the air battle. (https://www.msl.army.mil)

**Area of Operations (AO):** An operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

**ARFOR:** The Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. (Field Manual [FM] 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*)

**Army Service Component Command (ASCC):** (DOD) Command responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a combatant command (JP 3-31) See FM 3-94.

**Combatant Command:** A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1)
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS): A collection of classified coalition networks, called enclaves, which enable information sharing through the use of email and Web services, instant messaging or chat, the common operational picture service, and Voice over Internet protocol. CENTRIXS supports combatant commands throughout the world, including the U.S. Pacific, Central and European commands. (Defense Information Systems Agency Briefing)

Combined Joint Task Force (JTF): A combined JTF is a multinational JTF the commander commands from a multinational and joint HQ. The purpose of creating a combined JTF is to provide flexible and efficient means to generate, at short notice, rapidly deployable combined JTFs with dedicated command and control (C2) capability and to facilitate operations in concert with partners.

Combat Power: The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR): An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. (JP 3-0)

Common Operational Picture (COP): A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. (JP 3-0)

Digital Liaison Detachments (DLD): DLDs are Army units providing liaison teams with digital information sharing capabilities in support of Army headquarters. (Draft Army Training Publication [ATP] 3-94-1)

Early Entry Command Post: A lead element of a headquarters designed to control operations until the remaining portions of the headquarters are deployed and operational. (FM 6-0)

Global Command and Control System (GCCS): The DOD joint C2 system used to provide accurate, complete, and timely information for the operational chain of command for U.S. Armed Forces. “GCCS” is most often used to refer to the computer system, but actually consists of hardware, software, common procedures, standards, and numerous applications and interfaces that make up an “operational architecture” that provides worldwide connectivity with all levels of command. GCCS incorporates systems that provide situational awareness, support for intelligence, force planning, readiness assessment, and deployment applications that battlefield commanders require to effectively plan and execute joint military operations.
Global Force Management (GFM): A process that provides near-term sourcing solutions while providing the integrating mechanism between force apportionment, allocation, and assignment.

Host Nation (HN): A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 3-57)

Host-Nation Support (HNS): Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 4-0)

Interoperability: (1) The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks (JP 3-0). (2) The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 6-0)

Joint Desired Point of Impact (JDPI): A unique, alpha-numeric coded precise aimpoint associated with a target to achieve an explicit weaponeering objective, and identified by a three dimensional (latitude, longitude, elevation) mensurated coordinate.

Joint Fires: Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective. (JP 3-0)

Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC): The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. (JP 3-0)

Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL): A prioritized list of targets approved and maintained by the joint force commander. (JP 3-60)

Joint Operations Area (JOA): An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. (JP 3-0)
Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI): A phase of joint force projection occurring in the operational area during which arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel transition into forces capable of meeting operational requirements. (JP 3-35)

Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB): A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance, synchronization, and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. (JP 3-60)

Joint Target List (JTL): A consolidated list of selected targets, upon which there are no restrictions placed, considered to have military significance in the joint force commander’s operational area. (JP 3-60)

Knowledge management (KM): The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision-making (ADRP 6-0). Knowledge flow is the ease of movement of knowledge in organizations. Knowledge management uses a five-step process to create shared understanding. The steps of knowledge management include: Assess, Design, Develop, Pilot, and Implement. (ATP 6-01.1)

Landpower: The ability – by threat, force, or occupation – to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. (ADP 3-0)

Liaison: That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 3-08)

Main Command Post: A facility containing the majority of the staff designed to control current operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations. (FM 6-0)

Mission Command: The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

Mission Command System: The arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations. (ADP 6-0)

Objective T: Procedures for leaders and units to objectively evaluate, assess, record and report training proficiency IAW FM 7-0, *Train to Win in a Complex World.*
Operation: 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1)
2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0)

Operational Access: The ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-0)

Operational Control: The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1)

Operational Environment (OE): A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

Operational Reach: The distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 3-0)

Planning Horizon: A point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events. (ADRP 5-0)

Operational Level of Warfare: The level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.

Planning: The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired end state, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. (ADP 5-0)

Protection: Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area.

Regionally Allocated Forces (RAF): Those forces that provide a combatant commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, those Army units allocated to a combatant command, and those Army capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. (FM 3-22)
Security Force Assistance: The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-22)

Security Cooperation: All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. (JP 3-20)

SHELF: A listing of all requirements by military occupational specialty (MOS) and grade supporting a specified operation plan. It consists of two parts: fillers and replacements. Fillers are personnel required to bring a deployed unit up to its wartime required strength. The replacement portion is an estimate of personnel requirements (post D-day) necessary to backfill units because of personnel losses (e.g., killed in action, wounded in action, missing in action, and disease nonbattle injury). (AR 600-8-111)

Strategic Level of Warfare: The level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. (JP 3-0)

Sustainment: The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS) Airspace Workstation (AWS): The TAIS AWS provides automated airspace control planning and enhanced airspace control execution. TAIS interfaces with Army and joint command and control systems and provides a direct link to the theater air-ground system through interface with the theater battle management core system. It also has an added civil and government interagency capability. (FM 3-52)

Tactical Command Post: A facility containing a tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed to control portions of an operation for a limited time. (FM 6-0)

Tactical Control: The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (JP 1)
**Targeting**: The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)

**Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS)**: The TBMCS is the air war-planning tool mandated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the generation, dissemination, and execution of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Airspace Control Order (ACO). The host system resides with the aviation combat element (ACE) in the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) and enables dynamic mission updates, from across the Marine air-ground task force (MAGFT), increasing situational awareness and facilitating the execution of the ATO and ACO. (JP 3-0)

**Unified Action**: The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

**Unified Action Partners**: Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. (ADRP 3-0)

**Unified Land Operations**: Unified land operations are simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win the Nation’s wars as part of unified action. (ADRP 3-0)

**Warfighting Functions**: A group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (ADRP 3-0)
Appendix F

References

Note. This handbook was derived from the following publications and may provide the reader with additional insights and perspectives regarding the subject matter. Some items are available only to authorized Department of Defense and Department of the Army Common Access Card holders.

United States Codes
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Title 14, USC. Coast Guard
Title 22, USC. Foreign Relations and Intercourse
Title 32, USC. National Guard

Office of the White House
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Dec 2017

Department of Defense
Department of Defense Issuance 8260.03, The Global Force Management Data Initiative, 19 Feb 2014
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 4 Mar 2014
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DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, 28 Jul 2017
DODD 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, 29 Dec 2016
DODD 7730.65, Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), 11 May 2015

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DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Aug 2017

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions
CJCSI 1001.01B, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program, 7 Oct 2014
CJCSI 1301.01F, Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures, 17 Nov 2014
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CJCSI 3150.25F, Joint Lessons Learned Program, 26 Jun 2015
CJCSI 3155.01B, Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) Operational Framework Policy, 8 Jan 2016
CJCSI 3340.02B, Joint Enterprise Integration of Warfighter Intelligence, 24 Oct 2013
CJCSI 3370.01B, Target Development Standards, 6 May 2016
CJCSI 3500.01G, Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States, 15 Mar 2012

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CJCSM 3130, Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework, 29 May 2015
CJCSM 3130.01A, Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities, 25 Nov 2014
CJCSM 3130.06, Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures, 6 Sep 2000
CJCSM 3150.25A, Joint Lessons Learned Program, 12 Sep 2012
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CJCSM 3500-04C, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), As of 11 Dec 2017

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JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, 31 May 2016
JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013
JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jul 2017
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JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, 14 Aug 2013
JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, 12 Oct 2016
JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 12 Dec 2014
JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 25 Nov 2014
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JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, 6 Jan 2016
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JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 31 Jan 2013

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JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*, 10 Jun 2015

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*Forming a JTF HQ*, Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper, published by the Deployable Training Division Joint Staff J-7, Sep 2015


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ATP 3-60.1, *Dynamic Targeting, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Dynamic Targeting*, 10 Sep 2015
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ATP 3-93, *Theater Army Operations*, 26 Nov 2014
ATP 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations*, 1 Mar 2017

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Army Training Network Website: https://atn.army.mil/fso/default.aspx
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31 March 2011


Internet Resources

General Information
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives (lists all current Chairman’s instructions and manuals): http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives
Joint Electronic Library Plus: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis

Joint Websites
Online resources to increase knowledge of joint doctrine and other operational matters includes the following websites:
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (official website of JCS): http://www.jcs.mil
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): http://www.nato.int/

U.S. Forces in Europe
U.S. Army Europe: www.eur.army.mil

U.S. Forces Pacific

U.S. Forces Africa
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U.S. Forces Central (Middle East, Southwest Asia)

U.S. Forces in South America

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- Special Studies
- News From the Front
- Training Lessons and Best Practices
- Initial Impressions Reports

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https://twitter.com/USArmy_CALL
https://www.facebook.com/CenterforArmyLessonsLearned
The CAC home page address is: http://usacac.army.mil

Center for Army Leadership (CAL)

Combat Studies Institute (CSI)
CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)
CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) at http://www.apd.army.mil or the Central Army Registry (formerly known as the Reimer Digital Library) at http://www.adtdl.army.mil.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)
FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G-2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil.

Military Review (MR)
MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)
TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G-2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas.

Capability Development Integration Directorate (CDID)
CDID conducts analysis, experimentation, and integration to identify future requirements and manage current capabilities that enable the Army, as part of the Joint Force, to exercise Mission Command and to operationalize the Human Dimension. Find CDID at http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/cdid.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)
JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx.

Support CAC in the exchange of information by telling us about your successes so they may be shared and become Army successes.
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