Security Cooperation in Iraq

Insights from
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Deputy Chief, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq

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News from the Front:
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Forward

The purpose of this document is to share insights into the consolidation of gains, specifically the execution of security cooperation and assistance activities, as we defeat The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq. This document summarizes the key points from: (1) an End of Tour interview with Brigadier General (BG) S. Clinton Hinote, USAF, Deputy Chief for the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. State Department) (OSC-I) from Feb 2017 to Feb 2018. The interview, conducted at the conclusion of his tour, contained a few focus areas that capture best practices and lessons learned during his tenure as the Deputy Chief for the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq and (2) BG Hinote’s white paper entitled “Iraq What Now? Consolidating Coalition Gains with Smart, Limited Investments.”

The End of Tour interview questions focused on the following but were not limited to:

- White paper entitled “Iraq What Now? Consolidating Coalition Gains with Smart, Limited Investments”.
- Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR).
- Training.
- Synchronization.

Front Cover: The first shipment of M1A1 Abrams tanks arrived August 7, 2010 at the port of Umm Qasr, Iraq. This initial delivery of 11 was the first of 140 systems that were delivered throughout the following year as part of a foreign military sales agreement between the U.S. and Iraqi governments. (Photo Credit: DVIDS, United States Forces – Iraq, Deputy Commanding General (Advising and Training) 08.07.2010)
Iraq: What Now? Consolidating Coalition Gains with Smart, Limited Investments
(White Paper Executive Summary)

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is no longer able to hold territory inside Iraq, so many are asking, “What now?” This paper explains why the Coalition should stay engaged in Iraq and identifies a realistic approach that sets priorities and pursues objectives that are limited and achievable in a post-caliphate consolidation phase called “Operation Reliable Partnership.” If productive, this approach can be continued.

Military success against ISIS has provided the Coalition an opportunity to consolidate gains and invest in Iraq’s future, avoiding the mistakes of 2011 and the crisis of 2014. It’s clear, however, that the Coalition cannot do everything for Iraq. Iraqis must solve most of Iraq’s most intractable problems. In the post-caliphate environment, it is in the Coalition nations’ interest to help establish an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and independent. This is to the extent that it can counter a continuing threat from both the Sunni and Shia extremists. It must also address the root causes of extremism within its population and diminish the extremists’ ability to use Iraq to conduct external attacks. In Iraq, sectarianism and corruption combine to create dysfunction, harming the legitimacy of the government. A symptom of this dysfunction is the rise of extremist groups that employ violence and intimidation in a struggle for power and resources. Extremism, therefore, leads to the most dangerous and most likely security threat in Iraq: a well-resourced terrorist network with access to sanctuary, coupled with an irregular militia capable of employing sophisticated weapons. These groups could challenge both the legitimacy and viability of the Iraqi government and conduct external attacks around the world.

Stated simply, the Coalition cannot solve sectarianism and corruption in Iraq. It can, however, build the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to counter terrorist networks and militias. If ISF establish legitimate security against this threat, it gives the Iraqi government time and space to address the root causes of sectarianism and corruption, slowly robbing extremism of its sources of power.

As it helps to build ISF ability to counter terrorist networks and militias, the Coalition should prioritize increasing Iraq’s capacity to meet four critical requirements that will form the backbone of Iraq’s layered security approach:

1. Counterterrorism: Conducting operations to disrupt terrorist networks/militias and deny sanctuary throughout Iraq.

2. Policing: The establishment of a legitimate, community-based police force that is able to contain insurgency activities at an acceptable level.

3. Border Control: Reestablishing control of the Iraq-Syria border region to deny freedom of movement in and out of sanctuary in Syria and prevent access to resources stockpiled there.
4. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Protecting key facilities, population centers, and network nodes from “spectacular” attacks that would fracture the government, damage the economy, and provoke spiraling sectarian violence.

As the Coalition focuses on these requirements, it must also work with Iraqi leaders to encourage them to make the difficult choices necessary for Security Sector Reform (SSR). Iraq’s security institutions require reform, or they will fade under pressure once again. All of the Coalition’s long-term interests in Iraq will be affected by the success or failure of the current SSR strategy approved by the Prime Minister. There is one area in SSR where the Coalition can help the Iraqis the most: establishing roles and responsibilities for individual components of the ISF.

To help each component fulfill its role as determined through SSR, the Coalition will execute Operation Reliable Partnership, the consolidation phase of the campaign to defeat ISIS. During this phase, the Coalition will apply its resources and manpower to six functional efforts: security policy, security operations, training, sustainment, intelligence, and counter terrorism. Through Operation Reliable Partnership, the Coalition is committed to creating time and space for the Government of Iraq to establish legitimacy and meet the needs of its people. This paper presents leading indicators that can help Coalition nations assess positive and negative trends over the coming years.

As ISIS recedes as a threat to the central government, the struggle for power and resources will be fierce in the post-caliphate context. The outcome is far from clear. The approach outlined in this paper applies limited marginal investments by the Coalition to give Iraq a chance to be sovereign, stable, and independent. The Coalition cannot do more, but it should not do less. This opportunity may not come again.

Key Takeaways

Persons new to the Security Cooperation (SC) field might be overwhelmed with new terms, funding authorities, and understanding how SC fits into the larger picture. CALL has published previous handbooks on topics ranging from Theater Security Cooperation to Defense Institution Building.

CALL Publications of Interest
- 18-08 Defense Institution Building, Jan 2018
- 17-03 Theater Security Cooperation, The Military Engagement Team Handbook
- 14-14 Army Security Cooperation Newsletter
- News From the Front, Ministerial Advisors, Aug 17
Security Cooperation

Field Manual (FM) 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, defines SC as all of the Department of Defense (DOD) interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests and develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. To provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (Joint Publication [JP] 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense). SC includes all security assistance programs administered by DOD that build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests. Security assistance programs include all international armament cooperation activities and other security assistance activities.

Funding

Understanding funding sources for SC can be complex and requires expertise. Staff officers who operate outside the G-8 realm typically have little experience with funding authorities. An understanding of the differences between Title 10 SC and Title 22 security assistance funding and authorities is critical. In the most simplistic terms, if the Department of State (DOS) funds it, it is going to be Title 22 funding, as opposed to funding by DOD, which is Title 10. OSC-I operations and funding can be easily miscommunicated or misstated. This article will not go into the nuances of the above, but it is important to realize that OSC-I, while in its present form, is nested with the U.S. Embassy and answers to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq; it operates in a Title 22 environment. At the same time, much of its current funding is from DOD and will eventually come from DOS.

Training

Training for positions in SC can be challenging in today's high optempo environment. OSC-I, due to a number of reasons, faces the challenge of not always having personnel that have appropriate training. If time permits, there are classes available that will assist the majority of personnel before they arrive. The task then becomes identifying personnel who will fill key billets in a timely manner that will allow them to take necessary courses before their arrival to theater.

Synchronization

The key to a successful mission in a crowded environment is teamwork, a plan, and more importantly a shared vision. OSC-I personnel face a big task with an active military operation occurring while they are completing their mission. Having a defined plan, in this case a paper titled Iraq, What Now?, allows them to have a shared vision with multiple interests. In addition, it keeps all parties working towards the same goal.
OSC-I has a long-term view of Iraq and should; if we don’t, were not adding value to the situation.

The OSC-I mission, its interaction with CJTF-OIR and the coalition, the recent Iraq history, and how it all fits into the big picture

BG Hinote: Major General (MG) Felix Gedney, United Kingdom (UK), the Deputy Commander of Strategy and Support, CJTF-OIR, gathered quite a few of the one stars together and talked about the future of engagement in Iraq. The mixture included American, Australian, Canadian, and French BGs. We were talking through what is important right now. One of the things we decided that was quite important was being able to tell the story about “What now?” This was the genesis of the white paper idea. The caliphate in Iraq is no more; they don’t control territory. “What now? What do you do now?” It is not that we never had a plan, we did. People were ready for an answer; they are ready to discuss this because it is time to move on. Many of the coalition nations, although publicly saying we are through the defeat of Da’esh and we are solid in support of the coalition; are privately having individual conversations with what their commitment to Iraq ought to look like going forward. They need a plan, they need to balance shortfalls and dedicate resources and there are always too many requirements and not enough resources to meet those requirements. After 30 minutes of discussion, we needed to articulate what it is that the coalition can and should accomplish in Iraq. Of course, OSC-I is not part of the Coalition Joint Task Force, but we have been included in many different things. I attribute that to great leadership on the part of Lieutenant General (LTG) Paul E. Funk II, Commanding General, CJTF-OIR and his subordinate commanders. They understand that OSC-I has a long-term view of Iraq and should; if we don’t were not adding value to the situation.

The white paper we created was a collaborative effort; everybody on the Joint Task Force (JTF) including the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command (CJFLCC), the Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF), as well as folks around the green zone as far as bilateral relationships, between - UK and Iraq, - Australians and Iraq, and others. Certainly, the staff of CJTF and OSC-I, all worked this together. The decision to publicly talk about the ideas that are in the paper, it was an effort to explain to everyone, including our coalition partners, what the plan was going forward, what are the things we could do. There wasn’t an appetite for unlimited commitment, but it was there for, “tell us what is good enough.” A large part of the paper’s theme is attempting to articulate, “This is good enough for the coalition involvement in Iraq going
“forward.” It does not have to be 100,000 troops on the ground assuming security for cities and things like that; nobody has the appetite for that. However, a training/advisory mission that has a long-term focus, prioritized on the things they must do now, and what they must do going forward – that is what the paper is about.

**OSC-I is the long term. What about the next two years?**

**Spotlight on the importance of Security Cooperation**

Thank God OSC-I was here in 2014. …OSC-I gave the Iraqis that capability because they had a consistent relationship. They were still in the relationship business with the Iraqi Army even when we were gone from 2011-2014. They were here. The Office of Security Cooperation was the interface between the U.S. and Iraqi militaries. Fortunately, they had some relationships that we were allowed to take-in and take-on and help grow. (LTG Paul E. Funk II, Commanding General, CJTF-OIR SEP 2017 to SEP 2018)

Events are unfolding quickly in Iraq and in the adjoining countries. Many of the events that are happening such as the election results being influenced from outside parties and cannot be forecasted or controlled, that is to be expected. A good SC plan should always be well planned, with known objectives that look at long-term stability.

**BG Hinote:** Most people will tell you there are two years remaining for CJTF but there is no specific mandate for how long this thing will last. There is a decision point after the upcoming election and the formation of the government and we'll take a look at that during that time. However, if you don’t know where you want to go over the next 2-5 year period, it’s really hard to understand what the next steps should be as we transition into Reliable Partnership.

The white paper’s purpose is to be the overall vision for the U.S. involvement in Iraq on the security front. It’s not politics, not economics, but focuses on security. OSC-I has a long-term view of Iraq and should; if we don’t we're not adding value to the situation again

**Preparation for the OSC-I mission**

**BG Hinote:** The longest we (U.S.) have anybody in OSC-I is a year, the shortest is 4 to 6 months, and our assistant Staff Judge Advocate rotates every two months. Continuity is a very difficult challenge here. Then, you add in the fact that all of us here are amateurs at SC. I have had a one-week executive course at the Security Cooperation Agency… it’s great but it’s too much information in too little time. “I came over here and I was thrown into the fire; that’s how I learned.” That may work but we are constantly relearning the same things. For example, having served in Korea, at Kunsan Air Base,
that is 100% manned by one-year remote tours, we used to talk about how we have been in Korea for 50 years but it’s really that we’ve been in Korea for 50 one-year tours! One continues to learn and you would like to think that you build on previous people’s work, in some cases, you do, but a lot of that continuity is lost because of the length of the tour. There is a lot of SC out there but it doesn’t come to OSC-I for some reason. I don’t know the answer. We staff OSC-I with amateurs. Except with the possible exception of one or two of our people who just got here, everybody is new to the SC world.

**Training that is currently out there for SC planning**

The Army and the DOD know that the GCCs would benefit from individuals well versed in SC. While foreign area officers (FAOs), regionally focused experts in political-military with language proficiency, would be considered ideal candidates for SC positions, SC does not always require that level of experience. Given the limited number of FAOs available versus the number of SC individuals needed, the Army has tasked the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS) to conduct educational courses designed to improve the knowledge and enhance the skills of a wide audience in the field of SC.

Courses range from a short three-day course in SC Management that provides an orientation-level understanding of SC to more detailed courses in the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program in support of the partners nation’s defense that can be as long as 15 days.

Courses are also available for Senior Executives (O7 or equivalent) to gain a better understanding of the overall United States Government (USG) security cooperation/security assistance purpose, policies, management structure, and execution processes. More detailed courses are also available in SC Management that are designed to meet the educational requirements of U.S. security cooperation organization (SCO) personnel and geographic combatant command staff personnel directly supporting SCOs and can range in length from one to five weeks.

Training for OSC missions can be difficult to obtain if it is not planned for several months out. The OSC-I mission experiences many of the same training obstacles that are experienced by personnel going to the Afghanistan Theater. These obstacles range from having personnel minimally experienced in dealing with foreign personnel and customs to having personnel arrive in theater with no training whatsoever. Though not the norm, in rare instances, positions are filled when personnel arrive in theater.

While last minute fills and taskings are to be expected in the Services, they do degrade the mission. Having a focused career field or a skill qualifier would go a long way in professionalizing the SC field.
BG Hinote: Our J8 lead is Ministry of Defense Advisor (MODA) trained. We are hoping to bring over a training team from Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to train us on a few topics soon. Most people here will be rotating out this summer though. It’s good training; I’d rather we all had it than not, but it’s hard to see how continuity comes from that.

Are you really going to man a place like this with two-year people? You are probably not and it’s not recommended; it’s too long away from home and family. At the same time, the mission suffers. There is a lot of on the job training for us since we don’t have deep backgrounds. In almost every case, we are taking people who are generalists and we’re trying to make them look like someone who is a specialist in a few programs that they can manage while they are here and also manage the relations with the Iraqis within those programs.

**Addressing these training challenges**

BG Hinote: In the new National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), LTG Charles Hooper, Chief, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, has been told to create a SC career field. It is hoped that one of the reasons why that was put in the NDAA was to create a career field that provides expertise to places like OSC-I. People will come here and understand the challenges: they have worked with foreign military sales, they know the computer programs, and they understand some of the pitfalls that could/will happen. I think that’s one of the main things – there are just standard friction points in any of these programs. You can anticipate them if you have the experience and understanding; our people don’t have that experience so they walk right into the friction point. They have to figure out how to manage it and at times, it ends up being untenable.

**Security Cooperation Program in Iraq requires significant Support**

Having a sustainable program is an important part of a good Security Cooperation Program. When Iraq first made purchases in the 2008 period, oil prices were still high and there was a strong belief that Iraq could sustain the program they were purchasing. With the subsequent drop in oil revenue, that is no longer the case.

BG Hinote: We’ve made some significant mistakes in SC with Iraq since we withdrew in 2011. One of the things that clearly was a mistake was overselling equipment that has to be maintained through contracted logistic support. Their (Iraqis) force structure is non-sustainable in the long term yet there was never (at least if there was it was never handed off to us) a plan for weaning them off very expensive contracted logistic support. It was just assumed that they could pay for it – well they can’t. Reconstruction dollars are more strategically important than keeping some of these expensive weapons.
programs running. They just don’t have the budget for it. You could say that no one anticipated oil prices dropping the way that they did, that’s true, but we are in a situation now where there was never a branch plan on how to taper down the contracted logistic support.

**The likely outcome right now**

For example, they need so many dollars per year, in the out years to keep the F-16 program going. So what happens the first year they can’t pay it? We demobilize Lockheed who is fixing the F16s and we demobilize SallyPort that has the Base Operation Support contract and so on. It goes from very high level of support, everything going well – they’re flying, their fixing, they’re fine – to nothing. What do you think happens at that point? They park their aircraft and the aircraft lose their value. After a year of not flying and being out in the desert, you will never be able to resell those aircraft; no one will want them. The program has now failed. We have to figure out a way draw the program down so that the Iraqis realize that they have to learn how to do flight line maintenance; how to refuel the aircraft; or how to run the airfield. They’re not doing any of those things right now. It’s the biggest example money wise, but you could replicate that scenario across many of these weapon systems.

Someone made the decision to sell these things, the F-16s. They had to know what level of support was required because they had to put that into the contracts. It was never handed off to us (OSC-I) as to what that plan was. What I got from my successor was, “This is a problem. You’re going to have to worry about this.” However, there was no plan on getting out of there. This is a byproduct of the mature nature of OSC-I. It’s been a year and I’m fluent in it, trying to influence Washington D.C., the implementing agencies back in the States - and trying to influence the Iraqis. Nevertheless, I will go, my successor will come in, I’ll have a five-day hand off with him, and we’ll see where he goes with it.
How does OSC-I utilize the Defense Attaché Office?

BG Hinote: We do for the things that they are experienced and good at but there are very few if any people in the current Defense Attaché Office who have SC backgrounds. They have attaché backgrounds, and they have attaché training and they are fantastic at those tasks but not necessarily in the cooperation tasks or in the things we need to be able to do to manage things like Foreign Military sales or military financing.

OSC-I is Title 10 funded, how does this affect the way you work in a Title 22 environment?

BG Hinote: We are a Title 22 organization. Someone was saying the other day, “When are you going to make the switch from Title 10 to Title 22?” I will tell you, we are clearly a Title 22 organization with a little bit of Title 10 responsibility thrown in there. Some funding comes from Title 10, which is not inconsequential, it’s Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, and we use that to be able to do our jobs. If that funding went away, we’d have to do less. That being said, the focus of what we do is clearly Title 22 stuff, run by the State Department, administered by us. We know that and understand that. The Attaché office is responsible for different things than we are. The Attaché office clearly wants there to be a Senior Defense Official (SDO) / Defense Attaché (DATT) that is over everything. It would be better for the synergy between the offices. The ambassador would like that too. We put up a request to designate the Chief of OSC-I as the senior defense official and the Defense Attaché as well. We'll see if that gets approved; it'll be a long process if it does.

What are Senior Defense Officials (SDO) / Defense Attachés (DATT)?

It is the principal DOD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The SDO or DATT is the Chief of Mission's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The SDO or DATT is considered the dual-hatted chief of both the security cooperation organization (SCO) and defense attaché office (DAO) in the embassy. This position was established by DODD 5105.75, Department of Defense Operations at U.S. Embassies, December 21, 2007. The same document gives coordinating authority (see glossary definition) to the SDO or DATT for ensuring that all DOD elements in a country are working in consonance with each other and under the guidance of the Chief of Mission. The SDO or DATT program replaces the now defunct U.S. Defense Representative (USDR) model.
**Synchronization: Keeping OSC-I, CJTF-OIR and coalition forces on the same page**

According to Colonel Robert Davis, USAF, Director, Security Assistance, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, the coordination between OSC-I and CJTF isn't built into either organization's structure. The organizations don't report to the same boss. The CJTF holds a weekly synchronization meeting that includes OSC-I. There is a realization that there needs to be unity of effort; there needs to be a synchronized effort because things that both organizations do will affect each other’s mission. If there wasn’t a willingness to coordinate and synchronize then the forcing function to make that happen would be very high up the chain of command.

**BG Hinote:** The way that the U.S. does foreign engagement is challenging. I can think of at least seven semi-autonomous headquarters of military here. When I say headquarters, I also mean units that are semi-autonomous - doing their own thing. If it weren’t for the senior leadership we could easily all get off the grid. In my humble opinion, we’re pretty well aligned with all of those but it takes a tremendous amount of relationship building, and that’s just with the military. Let’s start talking about Treasury, State, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When you start talking about how the U.S. engages with others, it’s not at all clear who is running the engagement, of course everyone will say the Chief of Mission is the President’s representative inside of the country. Totally agree, but that does not necessarily reflect all of the detail that has to happen in order for our engagements to line up and all pursue the same overall objectives.

On Interaction with OSC-I

…I think that the Iraqis now have an opportunity to start making some choices, the relationship with CJFLCC [CJTF] and OSC-I will become tighter. It will have to become tighter; we will now be focused on moving the Iraqis through a training cycle that gets them to operate on their own. (MG Robert “Pat” White, Commanding General, Combined Joint Force Land Component Command-OIR, Mar 2017 to Mar 2018).

We need more interagency alignment underneath an agreed upon construct, whatever that construct would be and look like. That would be a big, big reform effort on our part. We talk about Security Sector reform for others, but security sector reform that we need is being able to bring the interagency together at a level that’s different than the National Security Council. It works here to the degree of good relationships and good trust being built across people who are trying to help each other out. But there’s no reason why it has to work; it works because people are doing the right thing.