This is an exciting and challenging time to be a Soldier. As the new Director of the Center for Army Lessons Learned, my principal goal is to continue our organization’s service as one of the drivers of Army change and the Army’s daily focal point for adaptive learning — providing timely and relevant knowledge to our warfighters. Our Army’s warfighting shift from counterinsurgency to near or peer competition and conflict requires deliberate learning, sharing, and training for large-scale operations.

One of the strengths of our Army, as recently stated by GEN Townsend, is the deliberate learning process of sharing best practices, observations, and lessons. Ultimately, these deliberate efforts at learning and sharing — the “how to” of large-scale operations demands that CALL provide critical, relevant, and value-added knowledge from the tactical to strategic.

The repository of knowledge and shared experiences needed for large-scale operations is expansive. Examples of this repository include recent publications such as Transition to a Joint Force Headquarters, Korea Theater of Operations Multinational Interoperability, and Brigade Sustainment in Decisive Operations. While these are valuable tools, our warfighters demand more and CALL is responding quickly with coming publications on rehearsals, wargaming, company leadership first 100 days, operational targeting, and a battlefield coordination detachment handbook. Warfighters are our priority. Aiding our warriors in readiness, learning, and experiential development to plan, sustain, execute, and win large-scale combat operations drives CALL daily.

**Fight Tonight!**

Mike Lawson
COL, FA
Hurricane Season 2018: An Information Brief

This briefing is provided for anyone who needs to present an overall introduction to hurricanes and the hurricane season. During this period, hundreds of storm systems spiral out from the tropical regions surrounding the equator and between 40 and 50 of these storms intensify to hurricane levels. This briefing covers causes, effects of storm surge, history, and preparedness.

18-27: Hurricane Season 2017

This bulletin is a reference for Soldiers, sister Services, and unified action partners to use for hurricane season. CALL has assembled multiple resources on hurricane recovery efforts and disaster mitigation in a Community of Practice binder 2018 Hurricane Relief Operations on JLLIS.

Commander’s Guide to Gunnery

This guide is written primarily for commanders of maneuver units in armored, Stryker, or infantry formations, as well as cannon artillery and stinger air defense units. This handbook will encompass the critical training that builds a unit’s ability to shoot, move, and communicate effectively and efficiently.

Security Force Assistance Catalog

This catalog will provide advise and assist doctrinal references, operational observations, and insights that focus on past and present security force assistance (SFA) mission sets. The resources come from SFA-focused CALL handbooks, AARs, news from the fronts (NFTFs), field manuals (FMs), regulations, executive summaries (EXSUMs), and other products.

Decisive Action Vols. I and II

In continuing support to the warfighter, CALL is compiling lessons and best practices from all the maneuver CTCs into two volumes. These articles, written largely by observer/coach-trainers (OC/Ts), cover topics at the tactical level and across the warfighting functions. Topics include operations synchronization; COP in a multinational environment; FM communications; reception, staging, and onward integration (RSOI); brigade S-2 operations; the planning process; digital fires; multinational logistics; and aeromedical evacuation.

Peace and Stability: 3ID Support to Operation Resolute Support — Afghanistan 2018

In a post-deployment collection, CALL conducted a series of video teleconferences and sent a collection team to Fort Stewart, GA, from 11-15 June 2018 to complete key leader interviews. These findings are intended to inform follow-on division headquarters staffs. JLLIS link.
The National Training Center (NTC) continues to conduct tough, realistic unified land operations with our unified action partners. A few observations from recent rotations include assembly area security, air assault operations in a time constrained environment, and triggers for suppression of enemy air defense.

• Units do not go into enough depth when determining how they are going to respond to an enemy assault. The outer perimeter tends to consist of several gun trucks positioned in an outline of the assembly area. These gun trucks are manned by two or three Soldiers and often do not have working communications. The crew operating the defensive vehicles usually have little information on how to respond to a threat, or they are left to conduct all of the defensive measures and communication on their own. Due to the mobile nature of command nodes in a decisive action environment, heavy fortifications cannot be built. The best planning a defense can produce is an effective surveillance and reconnaissance plan in order to provide early detection. The outer perimeter tends to be only walking distance from the reserve force when it should be 1-2 kilometers out and on elevated terrain. If early detection can give the reserve force five minutes of warning then there is time to adjust inner defenses and possibly send an appropriately equipped force to neutralize the threat prior to it reaching the inner defense.

• Based on observations at the NTC, air assault operations are desynchronized and units are challenged to properly execute in a constrained timeframe. Air assaults need to be managed more thoroughly at the BCT level and task organized to prevent shortfalls in key manning positions. Upon receipt of an air assault mission, the air assault task force (AATF) executive officer should develop a timeline to ensure all key aspects of the planning phase are met prior to mission execution including conditions checks and a detailed rehearsal. Additionally, units should strive to accomplish more full-scale air assaults during home station training, ensuring proper leadership presence, and creating detailed standard operating procedures (SOPs) that clearly delineate roles and responsibilities throughout the BCT. Refining this vast capability will enhance the lethality of the BCT and allow for rapid generation of combat power to influence the area of operations.

• Aviation (AVN) task force (TF) fire support officers (FSOs) at the NTC often face an incomplete targeting cycle when planning suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). When an air defense artillery (ADA) threat is identified, it is essential for SEAD planning to begin immediately to ensure active suppression (artillery, mortar, or Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS] fires) or passive suppression (electronic warfare) is planned and coordinated at all echelons. Planning SEAD requires the FSO to coordinate with several components of the AVN TF staff in addition to representatives on brigade and division staffs. Additionally, the FSO must ensure the company/troop leadership has a shared understanding of the scheme of fires and the subsequent triggers. As multiple AVN TF FSOs have experienced in the decisive action training environment (DATE) at the NTC, planning SEAD without effective collaboration results in a lack of understanding by aircrews, a desynchronized plan, and an inability to overcome friction during execution. Cooperative planning led by the AVN TF FSO is key to successful planning and execution of SEAD. While planning, using an event-based trigger allows for flexibility for the fire support element (FSE) and the firing unit to adjust with the timing of the aircraft within the effective range of enemy air defense weapon systems.

The CALL cell at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) completed in-briefs with the new Commander of Operations Group (COG) COL David Gardner, as well as the new Deputy COG, COL Gregory Cannata. They briefed the COG on an upcoming product: Into the Valleys of Death – Avoiding the Pits of Transition in Operations, emphasizing the transition graphic. The COG has placed the following graphic as his lead item in all his briefings, using the title “25 Years of Learning at JRTC”:

The COG’s “Top Ten” issues remain unchanged:
1. BCTs do not operationalize RSOI.
2. BCTs struggle to move from conceptual planning to detailed planning.
3. BCTs do not have functional, agile, or survivable mission command nodes.
4. BCTs fail to define and maintain the COP and to maintain this COP in both analog and digital form.
5. BCTs neither protect critical nodes nor secure their rear area while conducting offensive operations.
6. BCTs do not conduct effective reconnaissance and/or security operations.
7. BCTs are not conducting effective fire support planning and they are not effectively delivering fires.
8. BCTs fail to develop and rehearse a detailed plan for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of casualties.
9. BCTs do not adequately defend their networks against cyberattack.
10. BCTs are ill-prepared to conduct military operations in a CBRN environment.
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) continues to emphasize multinational interoperability in a DATE environment. Interoperability is defined in Allied Joint Doctrine as “the ability of the forces to operate together coherently, effectively, and efficiently” in three key domains - human, procedural, and technical. Stay up-to-date with our ability to “fight tonight” with Allies and Partners in our JMRC Newsletter (CAC login required).

Lesson - Fires – Use of Cluster Munitions (ART 3.2.1.1 Conduct Surface-to-Surface Attack)

On November 30, 2017, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued an update to the DOD policy on cluster munitions. The use of dual-purpose improved cluster munitions (DPICM) allows the allies of NATO to retain a qualitative and quantitative advantage over our pacing threat while lending credibility to our conventional deterrence capability. Units authorized to use DPICM must plan and implement mitigating measures that will reduce the risks to friendly units and the local populace associated with these munitions. Based upon observations from a recent rotation, units should:

- Maintain and promulgate an accurate COP. Ensure that humanitarian safe routes, populated areas, safe zones, etc., are included in the COP in addition to friendly tactical and operational control graphics. This will enable leaders to consider these factors in their decision to employ munitions and to take steps to avoid or minimize potential impacts on friendly units and the civilian population. Capture and promulgate DPICM fire mission locations on the unit’s COP to include the Fires Command and Control system – AFATDS.
- Educate leaders and staff on DPICM. DPICM is far more lethal than a standard high-explosive round, and it is vital that units educate themselves prior to planning and executing fire missions with cluster munitions. FSOs and maneuver planners must include a thorough reading of Chapter 6 in Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-09.30 and must include their findings and interpretations during mission analysis, course of action development, the associated risk mitigation for force mission, and the development of decision support matrices.
- Prepare public statements, themes, and messages about DPICM use. Proactively engage local media to explain how and why the munitions are being deployed and to educate the public about their dangers. In so doing, Army units can establish an environment of transparency in their actions. In the event of civilian casualties, planning should call for direct follow-up with host nation leaders and news media representatives. In this way, units can put forth the facts proactively and combat false narratives.
- Employ information-related capabilities during DPICM consequence management. Conduct battle drills that include the fire support officer immediately notifying the civil affairs officer whenever DPICM is employed. This will cue the non-lethal cell to execute pre-planned mitigation measures, such as dissemination of information to the local populace via social media and through local media contacts.
- Conduct liaison with civilian authorities and key-leader engagements to consolidate gains. Coordinate with the relevant authorities, such as the BRK, in order to cordon-off danger areas and realign safe routes as necessary, thereby minimizing the potential for civilian casualties.

News You Can Use

- **DLA Center for Lessons Learned Update** (CAC login required)

  - **Doctrine Updates**
    - ADP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, 14 AUG 18.
    - ADP 2-0, Intelligence, 04 SEP 18.
    - ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense, 13 AUG 18.
    - ADP 7-0, Training, 29 AUG 18.

  Our headquarters, the Mission Command Center of Excellence, is now on Facebook. Like and follow @ USArmyMCCoE to stay up-to-date on doctrine, knowledge management, information operations, air-ground support training, and more.

  - **PANAMAX 2018 Collection**

    The CALL liaison to U.S. Army South collected lessons and best practices supporting PANAMAX 18, 3-10 August 2018, at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. PANAMAX is U.S. Southern Command/U.S. Army South's largest annual multinational exercise, featuring 16 troop contributing nations and more than 2,000 participants at various U.S. locations. This year's scenario required U.S. Army South's transition to Multinational Force South (MNFS), operating under a United Nations Security Council Resolution, to secure the Panama Canal and its approaches. The focus for the exercise was combined joint task force structure and functionality, enhancing multinational interoperability across the warfighting functions, and component/partner nation integration. CALL collection priorities centered on mission command, interoperability, and multidomain operations.
CALL provides the warfighter insights, lessons, and best practices to accomplish the mission today. However, the mission and tactics, techniques, and procedures used today will differ tomorrow. To bridge this gap, CALL established the Director's Action Group (DAG) to translate national security strategic objectives into prioritized and comprehensive planning tools for CALL to shape and scope operations, actions, and activities.

The DAG is uniquely positioned to look globally at the current and future threats and, through regular consultation across academia, military, governmental, and industry fields, provide emergent issues and insights to counter this threat. Policy guidance such as the global employment of the force and emerging threats dictate that the Army must have flexibility to respond rapidly to new missions while maintaining traditional roles. As the threat drives new requirements, the DAG looks to expand CALL's traditional portfolio and engage in a new mission space. This endeavor will ensure CALL is postured to address the needs of the warfighter and Army, today and into the future.

"If the CAG [DAG] is to be more than a group of administrative assistants, it must maintain an eye to the future and remain a crucible of thought."

~CJSC Action Group (CAG) Chief's Statement

Salvadoran Army Visit / Subject Matter Expert Exchange at CALL

In support of U.S. Army South request and Army-to-Army Agreed to Action, CALL conducted an exchange with a Salvadoran Army (SLVAR) delegation that included visits across multiple CAC organizations, 14-16 August 2018. Delegation members were the Deputy Commander, Center of Doctrine and Education (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC] equivalent); Chief of Army Training (U.S. Army G-3 equivalent); and the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces training officer (Joint Staff J-7 equivalent). Since January 2017, CALL has engaged with the SLVAR in developing a lessons learned program initial operating capability and future lessons learned center. The SLVAR representatives spent two days at CALL gaining a greater understanding of how the U.S. Army implements its program and integrates lessons/best practices across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) domains.

Social Media

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