

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED



CALL INSIDER

MAY-JUNE 2018



Director's Corner

One of my regrets as I wrap up my two years as the Director of CALL and 30 years of military service is that I did not give enough back to the Army so that the Army as a whole could learn. I was very good at conducting unit After Action Reviews and implementing unit-level changes, but was not good at informing the Army institution through writing articles to periodicals and submitting After Action Reports to CALL and others to use in driving necessary changes for problem resolution and to share best practices for adoption by others. This is an inherent responsibility for every member of the Army and particularly for Commanders. The better we do at this the more ready and lethal we will be. Learn from my lesson and do better at this than I did.



I am going to leave you with the following story and its lessons as something to think about. The story is interesting, and true, even if it is about squirrels. The lessons are relevant now and will continue to be relevant. My main point is that you should be learning from everything that you see, that you do, and that others do. The day that you stop learning is the day that you have topped out.

One day last fall I passed a couple of squirrels in my front lawn gathering acorns for the winter. Squirrel #1 immediately dropped its acorn and ran under the neighbor's porch when I approached as most squirrels will instinctively do. Squirrel #2 stayed in place with its acorn, but kept a close eye on what I was doing to determine if I would be a threat. Bam! A hawk comes out of nowhere, grabs squirrel #2 by the shoulders, does a 180-degree turn, and flies down the street with him while the acorn falls on the ground. Over the next few days, squirrel #1 continues to gather acorns, but eventually becomes dinner for the hawk also. There is a lot to learn from this real story that applies today to the Army:

1. The threat is 360 degrees in three dimensions even if you are not used to it being that way.
2. Know, understand, and use your doctrine. It is sound and gives you an operational start point for military problems.
3. Make sure you have your eye on all threats, but particularly the most dangerous one.
4. Surprise is a combat multiplier.
5. Adapt your TTPs to changing circumstances within your doctrine; change doctrine to meet new threats.
6. Those that do not learn will fail and/or die.

I bid you all to be passionate about and take a personal interest in helping the Army learn, in taking time for your own self-improvement, in improving your unit, and in developing your subordinates. You can only get better by learning. It's been a great ride,


Mike Pappal
COL, AR



18-28: Operating in a Denied, Degraded, and Disrupted Space Operational Environment

The space domain is a vital component of the emerging concept of multi-domain operations. The warfighter is reliant on the space domain's capabilities to successfully prepare for current conflicts. Today's adversaries are aware of the U.S. military's use of space-enabled

equipment and will try to disrupt those assets. The space domain is critically important to Joint/Coalition forces; it takes an integrated team effort to succeed and remain ahead of our potential adversaries. This handbook gives the warfighter techniques and strategies to successfully operate in a denied, degraded, and disrupted space operational environment (D3SOE). [JLLIS link](#).



18-27: Hurricane Season 2017 (CAC login required)

This bulletin is a reference for Soldiers, sister Services, and unified action partners to use to enhance readiness for the next hurricane season. It covers the Department of Defense's (DOD's) role and responsibilities in support of the lead federal agency during defense support of civil authorities and humanitarian

assistance/disaster relief operations. Unity of effort is essential in bringing together the unique capabilities of diverse organizations. Together, DOD and federal agencies mitigated the trauma at multiple and often simultaneous disaster areas in 2017. This bulletin includes both rewarding successes and frustrating challenges. It includes multiple observations, lessons, and recommendations that expound on these accounts. [JLLIS link](#).



Recent CALL Publications

[18-31: Post-Isolation Reintegration](#) (CAC login required)

This publication provides information key to accomplishing post-isolation reintegration tasks. Post-isolation reintegration is the U.S. Army doctrinal term for the fifth task of personnel recovery (PR). The goal of reintegration is to gather critical information from recovered personnel through a series of debriefings while protecting the individual's health and welfare. This allows the return of a physically and emotionally healthy recovered person to duty as quickly as possible. This handbook applies equally to the individual Soldier, small unit leaders, Department of the Army civilians (DACs), and contractors. [JLLIS link.](#)

[18-29: Theater Army Insights: U.S. Army Europe as a Joint Force Land Component Command](#) (CAC login required)

This collection of lessons and best practices comes from U.S. Army Europe's participation in exercise Austere Challenge. It is provided to improve U.S. theater transition support to a joint force land component command (JFLCC). This study analyzes theater army-level operations, ranging from the operational level to tactical levels of war across the exercise's six phases (shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and establish civil authority). [JLLIS link.](#)

[18-30: Permanent Executive Secretariat of the Conference of American Armies, Volume III](#)

The purpose of this bulletin is to capture and share the valuable lessons learned in organizing and directing the Permanent Executive Secretariat of the 32nd cycle of the CAA. The U.S. Army had not taken on this responsibility in more than 20 years and very little information remained in the archives from the last time this responsibility was held. This document serves to avoid that problem in the future and will be made available to other armies that may consider volunteering to assume this important mission. [JLLIS link.](#)

News From the Front and CTCs

[Commander's Perspective CJFLCC-OIR Operations: Insights from MG Robert "Pat" White, Commanding General, 1st Armored Division and CJFLCC-OIR](#)

This News From the Front article provides a detailed summary of CALL's key leader interview (KLI) with MG Robert "Pat" White, Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division (1AD). MG White assumed responsibility of Combined Joint Force Land Component Command-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJFLCC-OIR) on 12 July 2017. Building on the momentum and gains of its predecessors, the 82nd Airborne Division and the 1st Infantry Division, CJFLCC-OIR worked by, with, and through its partner forces to defeat the ISIS core in Iraq. This interview covers various topics ranging from preparation and transition from division to a combined-joint entity to working by, with, and through the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) partner force. [JLLIS link.](#)

[Senior Advisor Training Building the Ready Bench](#)

This article discusses the purpose and outcomes of the Senior Advisor Training Working Group hosted by the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) October 16-20, 2017. The article discusses the background on the senior advisor training problem, the three topic areas the working group considered, and the working group's recommendations. The primary finding from the Senior Advisor Training Working Group was that the solution to the training and education gap cannot be training alone, but rather a cohesive joint solution that applies to the entire advisor enterprise. [JLLIS link.](#)

Recent After Action Reports

[Operation Wolverine Winter \(Arctic Exercise\) After Action Report](#) (CAC login required)

[CJFLCC-OIR/Task Force Gladiator: Phase I Transfer of Authority Lessons Learned](#) (CAC login required)

[1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division Operation Freedom's Sentinel Deployment After Action Report and Lessons Learned](#) (CAC login required)

[833rd Transportation Battalion Deployment and Distribution Team Support to U.S. Army Alaska Arctic Edge](#) (CAC login required)

[47th Combat Support Hospital-CJTF-OIR: Task Force Medical Pre-Deployment and First 90-Day After Action Report](#) (CAC login required)

[212th Combat Support Hospital Forward Surgical Element Enhanced Forward Presence Mission](#) (CAC login required)

[1st Area Medical Laboratory Culminating Training Exercise After Action Report](#) (CAC login required)

Coming Soon

Transition to a JFHQ

This upcoming handbook leverages CALL collections in active joint operation areas and joint exercises to provide commanders and staffs at echelons above brigade (EAB) with a guide to transitioning to a joint force headquarters. As the Army faces current and future threats in a dynamic and competitive operational environment, commanders and staffs of a theater army, corps, and division must be prepared to rapidly transition to a joint force headquarters (JFHQ) and effectively operate across the range of military operations. This handbook will complement the recently published Army [Training Circular 6-6](#), *Training the Mission Command Warfighting Function: Transitioning to a Joint Headquarters*.

Security Cooperation & State Partnership Program

The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a Department of Defense security cooperation program, managed and administered by the National Guard Bureau, executed and coordinated by the geographic combatant commands (GCCs), with personnel sourced by the National Guard. It is an innovative, small-footprint tool supporting the security cooperation goals of the GCCs and the U.S. Chief of Mission for the partner nation. This SPP bulletin provides an overview of program highlights and activities.

Best Practice Submissions

[Achieving Multinational Tactical Interoperability: LNO Package Observations and Best Practices](#) (CAC login required)

Friction between combined forces multiplies at the tactical level where standardized solution sets most often do not exist or are not well-rehearsed. The exchange of liaison officer (LNO) packages is the primary and most effective method units employ to overcome the inherent friction of multinational operations. This white paper discusses observations and best practices from the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) regarding LNO packages. [JLLIS link](#).

[82nd Airborne Division Military Intelligence Training Strategy Information Paper](#) (CAC login required)

Military Intelligence Training Strategy (MITS) is designed to help brigade combat teams (BCTs) train their intelligence enterprises through individual, team, and collective training. The goal is to train intelligence teams to successfully support their commanders and units in a decisive action environment. This information paper outlines the planning, preparation, execution, and revision of the MITS training platform from the perspective of the 82nd Airborne Division G-2, which oversaw the execution of the pilot program at Fort Bragg.

Colombian Army Lessons Learned Exchange



In support of a U.S. Army South request and an Army-to-Army Agreed-to-Action, CALL conducted an exchange with the Director, Colombian Army (COLAR) Lessons Learned Center, and staff in Bogota, Colombia, 13-19 May 2018. This engagement also included 60 COLAR LNOs, from corporal to major, preparing them to conduct lessons learned program functions at operational units and across schools and centers. The CALL presentations on the Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP) enabled course attendees to better understand processes and procedures used across the U.S. Army and how those may apply/benefit the COLAR. Major focus areas included dialogue on how to leverage LNOs, ways to standardize the after action review process, and updates on the

center's progress. It was evident that monumental advancements have been made since CALL's last visit in November 2017. The exchange supported initiatives under "Project Daniel," COLAR Lessons Learned Program transformation, and met U.S. Army security cooperation objectives with effects promoting greater U.S. Army-COLAR interoperability. After the closing ceremony, CALL conducted a [video interview](#) on relationships and progress, which was immediately sent to U.S. Army South, the COLAR Commander, and to the COLAR Chief of Defense (CHOD) highlighting outcomes. All agreed that the COLAR is well on its way to having a viable and proactive program capable of addressing Army-level information requirements across operating and generating forces. In November 2018, CALL analysts are scheduled to return to Colombia to conduct a follow-on exchange with a final group of COLAR Lessons Learned Program LNOs and to observe the center's proficiency.

Combat Training Centers

Joint Readiness Training Center



The CALL cell at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) completed the draft newsletter on the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade rotations at the training center and submitted *1st and 2nd Quarter Trends Fiscal Year 2018*. The trends — as we should expect — remained fairly constant from the last several collections. The breakout across echelons and warfighting function (WfF) is below. A total of 126 trends crossed the WfFs and echelons, brigade to company, as indicated. The breakout did not include the Commander, Operations Group's (COG's) challenges. Clearly, mission command dominates the field when it comes to trends from brigade through company.

1st and 2nd QTR FY18 126 Trends			
WARFIGHTING FUNCTION	BDE	BN	CO
MISSION COMMAND	22	55	47
MOVEMENT & MANEUVER	7	16	20
FIRES	16	20	22
INTELLIGENCE	11	14	15
SUSTAINMENT	11	28	25
PROTECTION	10	16	23

As of 21 May 2018

Similarly, the COG's "Top Ten" issues remained unchanged:

1. BCTs do not operationalize reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI).
2. BCTs struggle to move from conceptual planning to detailed planning.
3. BCTs do not have functional, agile, or survivable mission command nodes.
4. BCTs fail to define and maintain the common operational picture (COP) and to maintain this COP in both analog and digital form.
5. BCTs neither protect critical nodes nor secure their rear area while conducting offensive operations.
6. BCTs do not conduct effective reconnaissance and/or security operations.
7. BCTs are not conducting effective fire support planning and they are not effectively delivering fires.
8. BCTs fail to develop and rehearse a detailed plan for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of casualties.
9. BCTs do not adequately defend their networks against cyber-attack.
10. BCTs are ill-prepared to conduct military operations in a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environment)

Joint Multinational Readiness Center



The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) continues to emphasize multinational interoperability. Interoperability is defined in allied joint doctrine as "the ability of the forces to operate together coherently, effectively, and efficiently" in three key domains: human, procedural, and technical.

Best Practice - Mission Command - Fundamentals for Interoperability Success

The following five fundamentals for interoperability success provide principles for overcoming procedural, technical, and human incompatibilities in multinational units:

1. **Liaison Packages, Not Just Liaison Officers.** The exchange of LNO packages is the primary and most effective method units employ to enhance multinational interoperability. Units must identify interoperability gaps or vulnerabilities and then select individuals and equipment with the correct tactical and technical capabilities to facilitate mission command and other mission critical functions. To effectively enhance cooperation, understanding, coordination, and unity of effort, liaison packages must be trained to represent the command in conveying the commander's intent, guidance, mission, and concept of the operations.
2. **Understand Capabilities and Limitations.** Developing shared understanding of capabilities and limitations across multinational units not only improves tactical employment, but also highlights opportunity and exposes risk.
3. **Face-to-Face Mission Preparation for Shared Understanding.** During mission preparation and transitions between missions, commanders and staffs require face-to-face touch points and simplification of the mission orders process to ensure plans are feasible and that orders are received and understood.
4. **Critical Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).** Develop, implement, and deliberately rehearse SOPs at a minimum, using NATO standardized agreements and allied joint publications as a baseline for fratricide avoidance (vehicle marking, near and far recognition, adjacent unit coordination); forward and rearward passage of lines; reporting; call for fire; and medical evacuation procedures.
5. **Complete Common Operational Picture (COP).** An effective COP starts with consolidated, shared operational graphics and relies on timely and accurate subordinate unit reporting in accordance with the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications plan. The COP should be supported by effective communication systems — reducing miscommunication that prohibits synchronization and leads to fratricide, and allowing for the effective integration of multinational enablers, most importantly fires.



National Training Center



NTC continues to conduct tough and realistic unified land operations with our unified action partners. A few observations from recent rotations include overdependence upon the Joint Capabilities Release (JCR), overextended ground lines of communication (GLOCs), and poor control and maintenance of system passwords for the Army's weapon locating radar platforms.

- Multiple task forces (TFs) in the BCT rely solely on JCR for communications and for their COP. These TFs do not adequately establish other systems in their published PACE plan to account for loss of JCR capability. Although JCR is a powerful tool, units must avoid using one system as their sole means of communicating and maintaining situational understanding. Our potential adversaries have committed time and resources into systems and capabilities to deny our ability to mission command. Therefore, we must not canalize ourselves in the electromagnetic spectrum, making it easier for the enemy to deny us. PACE plans should be well-developed and rehearsed and should address current threats and the environment. They enable units to seamlessly transition from one system to another without losing capability and are established by warfighting function, using the full range of the spectrum available.
- NTC observes rotations where the battalion GLOCs are unsecured and overextended. Enemy forces frequently disrupt battalion main supply routes (MSRs) and alternate supply routes (ASRs) displaying such characteristics. Disruption attacks along GLOCs prevent units from using planned supply routes and impede convoy operations between sustainment nodes. The battalion (BN) should commit necessary combat power to secure GLOCs and counter threats to sustainment nodes and convoys. Forces dedicated to securing routes should be separate from reserve tasks that address unforeseen situations. A separate, dedicated security element is a more effective solution to protecting MSRs and ASRs than is a reactive force employed after enemy contact.
- Another frequent observation is the poor control and maintenance of system passwords for the Army's weapon locating radar platforms, particularly the AN/TPQ-53 radar. Rotational training units (RTUs) arrive to NTC without the ability to operate their AN/TPQ-53 radar systems or conduct validation on digital communication due to expired access to the radar software. This critical oversight affects platoon leadership and Soldiers by preventing timely pre-execution checks in preparation for radar operations and support of the brigade mission. In order to prevent this dilemma, the target acquisition platoon leader (TAPL) should consider including "password retention" in the platoon SOPs. This should identify a system administrator and direct proper maintenance of the login name and password.

News You Can Use

The CTC Operations Groups produce videos on a variety of topics that are relevant to units. These informative and instructional products provide value far beyond preparing rotational training units for success. Visit the [Army Training Network](#) (CAC login required) to learn more about the following:

- OPSYNC Meeting
- Wargaming/Course of Action (COA) Analysis
- Battalion Combined Arms Rehearsal (CAR)
- COA Development
- Air Assault Mission Planning
- Targeting Working Group
- BCT Fire Support Rehearsal
- Fires Technical Rehearsal
- Sustainment Rehearsal
- Sustainment Synchronization Meeting
- Information Collection Rehearsal
- Obstacle Planning
- Terrain Management
- Mortar Employment

Other topics can be accessed via the [U.S. Army NTC Operations Group milSuite page](#) (CAC login required). Click each subject below to learn more.

- [Common Operational Picture](#)
- [Operate in a CEMA Denied Environment](#)
- [Operational Graphics](#)
- [Sustainment Estimate](#)
- [Communications Planning at the Brigade Combat Team and Battalion Level](#)
- [Company Operations Orders](#)
- [Execution Products](#)
- [Artillery Reconnaissance, Selection, Occupation of a Position \(RSOP\)](#)
- [Aviation Movement to Contact](#)
- [Battalion Mission Command Nodes](#)
- [Establishment and Collapse of the Security Area](#)
- [Brigade Combat Teams — Shaping the Deep Fight](#)

BLAST FROM THE PAST!



Before he wrote *We Were Soldiers Once, and Young* ...

Immediately after the epic battle at Landing Zone (LZ) X-RAY, then LTC Hal Moore wrote a detailed after action report (AAR) to share his insights and lessons learned to benefit other units and inform senior leadership.

“... the principal points that I would like to emphasize are:

A. We must make imaginative and constant use of our tremendous fire support advantage to kill the PAVN [People’s Army of Vietnam] enemy before he gets so close that we must fight him on his terms. This includes heavy use of the M-79 and even hand grenades to hold him out so that artillery, TAC Air, and ARA [aerial rocket artillery] can work on him.

B. We must take time and every opportunity to train our men, and especially our replacements, to perfection in small-unit fire and movement and fire and maneuver. If we do not do this, men will be killed who would not otherwise be killed.

C. The commander on the battlefield must continually anticipate what the future may bring or could bring and take steps to influence the future before it comes about. This applies to the enemy; to fire support; supply of ammo, water, and medical supplies before the requirement arises; to friendly reaction to possible enemy action; and to all other matters having a bearing on a particular situation. Also, periodically throughout a battle, the commander must mentally detach himself from the action and objectively think — what is not being done which should be done to influence the situation, and what is being done which should not be going on.”

This tradition of hard-earned knowledge sharing is carried on through the Army Lessons Learned Program where units are required to write AARs after deployments, combat training center rotations, or other major events and submit them to CALL through the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) portal so the rest of the Army can learn.

Read Hal Moore’s original LZ X-RAY operations order (OPORD) and AAR [here](#) (CAC login required). Additional historic and current AARs can be found through the restricted [CALL website](#) or by searching [JLLIS](#) (CAC login required)

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

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Joint Lessons Learned Information System [JLLIS](#)