SPECIAL STUDY

NO. 18-05

STRATEGIC LANDPOWER IN EUROPE

Lessons and Best Practices

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Strategic Landpower in Europe
Special Study

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Foreword

Major outcomes of the Wales Summit 2014 and Warsaw Summit 2016 defined 2017 as the year of execution. By the summer of 2017, NATO had twice the number of land forces committed to collective defense and security in Eastern Europe.

The operating environment of Europe has drastically changed in recent years because of the illegal occupation of Ukraine by Russia, calling for a shift of focus from assurance to deterrence and defense through an increased allied presence. U.S. prosperity is directly tied to the stability of Europe. It is in our collective interest to help Europe maintain regional security in an increasingly complex threat environment. The nucleus of U.S. Army Europe’s (USAREUR’s) “strong Europe” year of execution was landpower.

Atlantic Resolve 2.0 was the execution of capabilities and demonstration of will through landpower, and was a crucial component of the U.S. commitment to Europe. In January 2017, the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team from 4th Infantry Division deployed all of its personnel and equipment from Fort Carson, CO, to Poland shortly followed by the 10th Combat Aviation Brigade, which in February 2017, deployed from Fort Drum, NY, to multiple locations in Germany, Latvia, and Romania. In April 2017, the 497th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion positioned its assets across the continent in order to provide logistical support beyond the capabilities of each brigade’s organic assets. These brigades were the first of the “heel-to-toe” or continuous units to serve as a regionally aligned force, effectively increasing the capacity of combat power in Europe by bringing America’s landpower an ocean closer. In combination with the capacity provided by our Europe-based units, these rotational forces ultimately give our political leaders greater capability and options when responding to a threat.

Essential to any military response are three speeds: speed of recognition, speed of decision, and speed of assembly. Speed of assembly was repeatedly tested through the deployment of units supporting Atlantic Resolve 2.0. USAREUR used and validated seaports of debarkation and airports of debarkation in over 10 different counties ranging from the Baltics to the Black Sea Region, and confirmed the freedom of movement of U.S. forces. These accomplishments in logistics demonstrated the U.S. Army’s ability to quickly respond to a threat.
In summer 2017, USAREUR and its allies and partners executed Saber Strike and Saber Guardian exercises. These multinational and complex exercises demonstrated readiness under a collective defense through the massing of an armored brigade combat team. They also demonstrated force projection capability and freedom of movement. A true testament of interoperability, these exercises work to continually improve the processes, policy, and integration of 29 allies and partners across Europe.

The execution of Atlantic Resolve 2.0 and its associated exercises were enabled by the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Dedicated and long-term funding allows the U.S. to sustain transatlantic commitments through many aspects to include infrastructure projects to improve ports, railheads, ranges, and motor pools. The ERI effectively increased Atlantic Resolve 2.0 units’ interoperability and readiness and ultimately supported the “Strong Europe” year of execution.

Army Strong! Strong Europe!

Frederick B. (Ben) Hodges
LTG, U.S. Army
Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe
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Acknowledgements

The Center for Army Lessons Learned would like to recognize the assistance and guidance provided by the following members of U.S. Army Europe and the 4th Infantry Division for their assistance in this special study:

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

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Executive Summary

The primary objective of this special study is to inform Army and joint leaders, and their staffs about the current state and future evolution of U.S. landpower in Europe. The intent is to provide a holistic overview of current landpower in Europe. Staffs, Soldiers, and leaders of USAREUR; its enablers; and the units stationed, deployed, and rotating through Europe can use this study to develop an understanding of the operational environment not available elsewhere. Army Service component commands (ASCCs) and units in other areas of responsibility may find this study a useful model for “seeing themselves.” The primary target audience is the theater ground component commander and ASCC staffs. The secondary audience includes Department of Army staff, joint staff, and unified action partners.

U.S. ground forces are transitioning away from a period of sustained large-scale counterinsurgencies and preparing for future conflicts. The evolution of ground operations foretell a synthesis of counterinsurgency versus traditional warfare, unconventional versus conventional, and irregular versus regular for future military engagements in Europe. Through a review of the geopolitical environment and strategic and operational theater missions, this study examines not only the role of the ASCC in theater, but also lessons and best practices that can be leveraged for future missions.

To develop this study, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has leveraged the expertise, experience, and collections from subject matter experts who are focusing on Europe today. Primary sources included observations from European-focused events such as Anakonda 16 and Austere Challenge 17, Operation Atlantic Resolve, and theater-level sustainment events. Building on collaboration with the U.S. Army Europe staff, CALL analysts synchronized multiple collection opportunities, coordinated key leader interviews, and integrated multiple reviews for this special study.
Chapter 1

Defining the European Strategic Environment

“Landpower is the ability — by threat, force, or occupation — to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”

— GEN Robert W. Cone, Former Commanding General, U.S. Army, 27 JUN 2013

“The recent deployment of company-sized Army elements to Poland and the Baltic States offers a rubric for what ... global landpower ... may look like going forward. With a relatively small footprint, our Army achieves strategic aims by employing trained and ready units fully prepared for joint combined arms maneuver that are adaptive and flexible, prepared to carry out a range of operations with partner-nation forces.”

— GEN Daniel B. Allyn, Former Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Remarks at the Association of the U.S. Army’s Institute of Land Warfare Hot Topic “Army Networks,” 09 JUL 2015

Introduction

The strategic environment has changed immensely in the past three years. Regional stability in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific have deteriorated in the past decade in ways that were not anticipated. Geographic boundaries, rules of the international system, and social and political identities have been in flux. The U.S. remains a global power with worldwide interests that require the nation to remain globally engaged in order to advance its national interests. History has shown that Army Forces cannot operate independently, but are part of a larger national and international effort characterized as unified action. To be successful, Army leaders must integrate their actions and operations within this larger framework and collaborate with entities outside their direct control. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) is once again in the lead of providing the strategic landpower in Europe necessary to prevent future conflict through deterrence, to shape the security environment by reassuring its allies through presence and action, and if absolutely necessary, to win in battle. This chapter defines the European strategic environment in more detail and addresses the geopolitical and historical background of USAREUR.

Geopolitical

Although Europe is located in a mature theater with substantial infrastructure and superb support facilities, it is also positioned closer to key areas of concern than comparable continental U.S. (CONUS)-based assets. The maturity of the theater allows the U.S. to use existing infrastructure and support facilities as well as the ability to establish formal support agreements. This provides a reliable and most needed source of capacity and flexibility in conducting both steady-state and contingency operations. This theater infrastructure has been heavily utilized and was critical to the support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. assets in the European theater provide a secure intermediate staging base for five combatant commands covering a variety
of current and potential future contingencies in the European and surrounding theaters. The
importance of this infrastructure has reemerged once more since the needed increase of U.S.
forces in Europe and support for the various exercises being conducted throughout the theater.
Although Europe is a mature theater, many different challenges in regards to logistical and
political issues exist. Many of these challenges have not been experienced by the U.S. Army
since the end of the Cold War.

The U.S. and Europe have more in common than any other two regions of the world. Europe
consists of a number of modern, stable democratic states with market-based economies. The
stability and prosperity of Europe is vital to U.S. national interest. The U.S. and European
Union (EU) economies are the largest by far. The 18 trillion EU economy and 17 trillion U.S.
economy represent more than one third of global gross domestic product (GDP). The EU is the
largest U.S. trade partner with almost 1 trillion in trade annually. About one half of the global
GDP and one third of the global trade come from the combined U.S. and EU economics. The
largest foreign investor in the EU is the U.S., and the largest foreign investors in the U.S. are
in Europe. Together, the U.S. and EU annually account for 4 trillion in collective foreign direct
investment (FDI), close to 50 percent of the world’s FDI, an average of 15 million jobs related to
transatlantic trade per year, 5 trillion in commercial transatlantic sales per year, and 120 billion
in U.S.-EU development assistance globally per year. In addition, 98 percent of U.S.-EU trade
is dispute free. Europe is the largest regional investor in the U.S., representing approximately
two thirds (66 percent) of FDI through 2013. Asia is a distant second with 17 percent. In short,
a peaceful and economically stable Europe is vital to the U.S. and in the direct national security
interest of the U.S.

Shared political and economic perspectives between the U.S. and EU result in a number of
shared interests, with the security concern being on top of the list. The EU, similar to the U.S.,
is able to consistently export security to other regions. This combination of shared interest and
security capability makes engagement in this region particularly important.¹

**Historical Background**

Following World War II, conflict between the western nations and the Communist Eastern Bloc
led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) began almost immediately. The USSR
oversaw the installation of pro-Soviet governments in many of the areas it had taken from
Germany during the war while the U.S. and its Western Allies sought ways to prevent further
expansion of Communist influence on the European continent. On 04 APR 1949, the political
and military alliance called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed. NATO
is one of the world’s major international institutions that protects its members from outside
threats by the Article 5 agreement. This article states that a military attack against any of the
signatories would be considered an attack against them all. NATO continuously grew since its
inception and currently consists of 28 member states.

During the Cold War years, the U.S. had around 400,000 combat-ready troops in West Germany
ready to halt any potential Soviet advance. At the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989,
USAREUR had 218,000 Soldiers on more than 850 installations, organized under 41 garrisons
with multiple corps, divisions, and theater enablers. With the end of the “Soviet threat,”
intermediate nuclear weapons were withdrawn, chemical weapons were moved out of Europe,
and units began to depart the European continent while others were inactivated. This downsize of
military forces was not only observed in the U.S. Army but throughout the European countries.
Despite the reduction in forces in central Europe, USAREUR deployed more than 75,000 personnel plus 1,200 tanks, 1,700 armored combat vehicles, and over 650 pieces of artillery in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The redeployment and inactivation of units and combat power continued following the Gulf War. In 1992, approximately 70,000 Soldiers redeployed to CONUS with approximately 90,000 family members. The command was reduced from 213,000 Soldiers in 1990 to 122,000 in 1992. From 858 installations in 1990, USAREUR went down to only 415 in 1993 with more scheduled to close in the years ahead. A new challenge and therefore a shift from deterrence and reaction to the Soviet threat to humanitarian support operations such as disaster relief, peacekeeping, and noncombat evacuations, would mark the USAREUR of the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1993, the command supported 42 deployments that involved a total of about 95,000 personnel. The conflict in the Balkans quickly became one of the Department of Defense’s primary areas of focus.

Peace enforcement in the former Yugoslavia was a harbinger of future military operations. From 1990 to 1995, USAREUR conducted mostly humanitarian operations in the area that shifted to a NATO-led peacekeeping mission with a United Nations (UN) mandate in 1999 to separate warring factions. In support of these operations, USAREUR deployed forces in the largest combined air-rail-sea-road movement since Operation Desert Storm and constructed the longest assault float bridge in military history, which measured 620 meters (2,034 feet). Currently, Multinational Battle Group-East still conducts peace support operations in the operating environment of Kosovo to contribute to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement. The majority of U.S. Soldiers came from U.S. Army National Guard units, with different states taking the lead for each rotation of approximately nine months.

Following the September 2001 attacks, USAREUR became a logistics hub for operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. Many USAREUR units and individual Soldiers continuously supported operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the next 15 years. During this time, USAREUR continued its drawdown of forces. March 2013 marked the departure of the last M-1 Abrams tank and the end of the U.S. Army’s 69-year history of basing main battle tanks in Germany.2

Even before the Russian-backed annexation of Crimea and the invasion of the Ukraine, Air Force General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s supreme allied commander, Europe, and head of the Pentagon’s European Command, tried to forestall additional cuts in U.S. military forces in Europe. Breedlove has increasingly warned that rotational forces in Europe are no substitute for permanently forward-deployed units. According to Breedlove, “A diminished posture, in terms of capabilities and personnel, means diminished access and diminished ability to influence outcomes favorable to the interests of the U.S. ‘Virtual presence’ by U.S. forces will be translated by both friends and adversaries as ‘actual absence’.”

At this time, USAREUR consisted of the USAREUR headquarters, 21st Theater Sustainment Command, 7th Army Training Command, and its subordinate Joint Multinational Readiness Center (the only outside the continental U.S. [OCONUS] combat training center in the Army), 2nd Cavalry Regiment, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, 173rd Airborne Brigade, along with intelligence, signal, and medical support elements. About 30,000 USAREUR Soldiers engaged allies throughout its 51-country area of operations through combined exercises and security cooperation partnerships. USAREUR forces are further strengthened by the regionally aligned force from the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division that forward deployed to Poland in January 2017.3
Threats to Europe and NATO

Europe and NATO are facing threats externally by Russian aggressions and internally by centrifugal European forces spawned by persistent economic challenges and immigration.

In the summer of 2014, Russian-backed separatists forcibly annexed Crimea from Ukraine and then actively started to support ethnic Russian separatists in an ongoing irredentist bid in Eastern Ukraine. This aggressive policy threatened to challenge NATO and the U.S.’s support of the Ukraine and other nations of Eastern Europe that seek NATO membership. Moscow prevented a quick response from the West. Russian leaders operated inside the decision-making cycle of NATO and therefore retained the strategic initiative. This approach exploits fissures between NATO and the EU. When the Russian president believes employing conventional forces is too risky, he resorts to using unconventional forces, scaled and adapted to the strategic environment. This “strategy of ambiguity” is being applied with effect in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.4
The 2014 NATO summit in Wales was attended by leaders and senior ministers from the 28-member states; it marked their first meeting since Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine. The following were the three main focus areas of the summit: (1) enhancing allied readiness and collective defense in response to Russian aggression, (2) increasing defense spending and boosting military capabilities, and (3) boosting NATO support for partner countries outside the alliance including a new “Defense Capacity Building Initiative.” Overall, the key outcome was NATO’s strategic shift away from the broad “out-of-area” focus embodied by the Afghanistan mission, toward a narrower historic focus on territorial defense and deterrence to counter Russia’s aggressive resurgence in eastern Europe.

NATO’s new collective defense initiative is a “readiness action plan” that enables a continuous NATO military presence even to its easternmost member states: an increase in military exercises and enhanced troop rotations in Central and Eastern Europe and the establishment of a high readiness force able to deploy within a few days. However, the enhanced troop rotations will not amount to a permanent NATO military presence due to previous agreements between NATO and Russia in the hopes of not escalating the situation.

Another concern addressed was the ongoing decline in European defense spending. In 2013, only four allies met the alliance’s target to spend two percent of GDP on defense. The participants agreed to reverse the trend of declining defense budgets and aim toward the NATO guideline of spending two percent of GDP on defense expenditures within a decade.5

In 2015, the situation to NATO’s south has evolved from a minor distraction to a major concern for many European countries. The present threats from this region are terrorism infiltrating from failed states across the Middle East and North Africa and the collateral flow of refugees from the same conflict zones. This flow of refugees was multiplied by Russia’s active military involvement in Syria, which created a further increase of refugees. Countering terrorism includes protecting national homelands from attack, but also intelligence-gathering and protecting the flow of energy and commerce. Terrorists from the south have struck NATO members throughout Europe. This growing danger and the flow of refugees challenges all of Europe, and more importantly lets many European countries forget the threats toward the east.6

The Warsaw Summit of 2016 established a partnership interoperability initiative for willing and capable partners to become better prepared for future crisis management missions. Another Warsaw Summit program offered enhanced opportunities for those partners making substantial operational contributions to draw even closer to the Alliance. The summit also typified most summits by publishing separate declarations by heads of state on topics of particular importance such as Ukraine, transatlantic security, Afghanistan, commitment to resilience, cyber, Georgia, and NATO-EU relations. Several NАТО commitments that are especially important in regards to this special study is the continuous rotational deployment of NATO battalion battle groups beginning in 2017 in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland; the establishing of the framework for a NATO multinational division headquarters in Poland; the continuous rotation of a U.S.-armored brigade in Germany with prepositioned equipment; the substantially increased funding (3.4 billion) for the European Reassurance Initiative; further construction of missile defense facilities ashore in Poland; and additional deployments of maritime and air forces in the NATO area, including the Black and Baltic Sea regions.7
Endnotes


Chapter 2

Shaping the Security Environment in Europe

“Our theater priorities and supporting activities in Europe fully support both the National Security and the National Military Strategies. First and foremost they support our national direction to counter malign Russian influence and aggression, as well as meet our enduring interests — the security of the U.S., a strong U.S. economy, respect for universal values at home and abroad, and a rules-based international order.”

— GEN Philip Breedlove, Former EUCOM Commander, Posture Statement, 25 FEB 2016

This chapter addresses U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) (as European Command’s [EUCOM’s] Army Service component command [ASCC] challenges associated with supporting the combatant command in a complex theater. The U.S. Army has maintained a continuous presence in Europe and strong regional relationships since Prussia, Poland, Hungary, and France assisted the U.S. during the War of Independence more than 230 years ago. Since its creation in 1942, USAREUR has ensured the security of Europe. Since 1949, it has been fulfilling the U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) allies and partners. In the 1980s, USAREUR began shrinking its footprint and refocusing its efforts, resulting in a reduction of Soldiers from more than 200,000 to approximately 30,000 today. With the emergence of new threats and the region’s dynamic security environment, the U.S. has focused national assets and attention to this strategic and challenging region.

The U.S. and NATO face two primary threats to U.S. mutually supporting security interests: renewed Russian aggression and growing instability on the southern flank. Russia continues to create security concerns in multiple points around the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Simultaneously, U.S. and NATO allies must deal with a variety of transnational threats that largely emanate from instability in Iraq, Syria, North Africa, and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The U.S. and NATO must take a 360-degree approach to security. The U.S. posture must address the full spectrum of security challenges from any direction and ensure it is using the military element of national power in a supported and nested fashion with elements of power.

USAREUR is the most visible landpower force of the U.S.’s commitment to Europe and the NATO alliance. Changing missions and massive reductions to force structure aside, USAREUR’s enduring value has been its commitment to NATO. These relationships are enhanced through the employment and demonstration of expeditionary capabilities. USAREUR looks to implement new initiatives to set the theater while streamlining and operationalizing command relationships within Europe. Building stronger ties with regional armies and land-domain stakeholders will be equally critical.
As EUCOM and USAREUR focus their attention and resources on Russian aggression and instability on the southern flank it is important to understand the role of the ASCC and its contribution to theater security cooperation and theater posture planning. The most decisive factor in defeating or destroying the enemy is the Army’s ability to prevail in ground combat. Although the enemy may yield in air and sea, it typically does not yield on land. Being successful in this environment requires the theater army to set the theater and assist Army forces into the fight. A corps will integrate landpower throughout each phase of a campaign. Divisions maneuver to destroy enemy ground forces, seize and exploit operationally significant objectives, and match decisive action to ground conditions. For corps and divisions to be successful, the theater army commander must set the conditions for effective use of this landpower.

In order to gain access and understanding of the operational environment, the theater army and its theater-assigned Army forces must support the combatant commander’s theater engagement plans and security cooperation. The theater army and its assigned forces set the theater and the joint operations area for the employment of Army forces for both contingencies and campaigns. To achieve this, the theater army must anticipate, plan, request, receive, train, sustain, and support redeployment of landpower within its AOR or joint operations area (JOA).

One of the primary missions of USAREUR has been to train and prepare capable forces for global engagements while working to strengthen alliances, build partner capacity and capabilities, support NATO as mandated by law, and continually improve the readiness and quality of life of the workforce. USAREUR is the Army’s representative in Europe and advances the U.S. interests as a visible symbol of commitment to security. USAREUR includes a 51-country AOR and spans seven major garrisons in three countries. USAREUR has 30,000 Soldiers forward in Europe, regionally aligned forces, and units rotating for exercises. Supporting this is an on-the-ground support command conducting reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of active, reserve, and Army National Guard forces of up to brigade size; and air defense artillery battalions for Atlantic Resolve, Stabilization Force, Kosovo Force, and missile defense.

Freedom of movement is critical to USAREUR’s success in Europe and in its support of EUCOM and NATO. In many ways, it is the most critical aspect of U.S. landpower on the continent. The USAREUR exercise program seeks to prepare for and facilitate early entry in a time of crisis and capitalize on the superb military infrastructure in Europe to include battalion live fire ranges and a combat training center (CTC). An example of this is Operation Dragoon Ride, which demonstrated freedom of movement with allies from seven nations joining USAREUR’s 2nd Cavalry Regiment. Numerous types of combat vehicles and aircraft traveled more than 1,800 kilometers over 11 days from Estonia to Vilseck, Germany, in this complex movement and display of force.

The roles and responsibilities of USAREUR are not necessarily reflected in its resourcing enablers and internal structures. USAREUR, like other theaters, is not fully resourced to accomplish the tasks of setting the theater, providing Title 10 support. It is limited in its ability to command a contingency operation. The rotating of an aligned division forward command post operating as a mission command element (MCE) has alleviated the burden placed on USAREUR of having to act as a tactical headquarters. This habitual relationship will facilitate the handover from the ASCC contingency command post to the division headquarters during a contingency and becomes a force multiplier for the land component command.
Set the Theater

Setting the theater is about so much more than just sustainment. The term set the theater, as Field Manual (FM) 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, states, “refers to a broad range of actions necessary to employ landpower before and during a crisis. This includes base development, theater opening, RSOI, Army support to other Services, Department of Defense (DOD) Command and Control Support Activity/Agency requirements, and other sustainment-related support in the AOR.”¹ Setting the conditions for the success of the Mission Command Network requires careful and deliberate attention. The theater army, with its theater sustainment command, if assigned, prepares support and sustainment estimates that outline the responsibilities and requirements for maintaining access and setting the theater where U.S. military presence is forward-stationed or deployed. FM 3-94 states setting the theater may also involve the following:

- Providing flexible Army headquarters to meet various joint command and control requirements
- Providing force protection
- Forward-stationing and rotational deployment of Army forces
- Modernizing forward-stationed Army units.

A theater is considered set when it has the necessary forces, footprints, and agreements in place to support regional operations and missions. These include basing agreements to include status of forces agreements and other legal and diplomatic agreements; overflight rights; spectrum management of communications and radars; and the building of physical infrastructure like airfields, ports, and ammunition supply points. The positioning of land domain capabilities — at one time reaching three corps and massive infrastructure — has set the theater and enabled security and stability in the European region so much so that USAREUR projected a corps to Operation Desert Shield within 90 days and rotated or hosted divisions into the Balkans for the past three decades. These missions, within and outside the EUCOM AOR, could include response to aggression, disasters, humanitarian assistance, or theater security cooperation engagements. A set theater requires building partnerships with regional armies and other interested parties to enable unified action (this includes former Warsaw Pact countries enthusiastically providing forces for the Iraq and Afghanistan). A set theater ultimately serves as the basis for stability and security across the AOR and is the foundation of the USAREUR theater strategy. Importantly, theater posture (and a set theater) must be firmly grounded in a USAREUR strategy that supports the Guidance for Employment of the Force, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, U.S. Europe Command Campaign Plan, and the Army Campaign Plan.

To keep the theater set, infrastructure assessment is critical. USAREUR and its enablers continuously assess the adequacy of infrastructure in the AOR to support anticipated military operations, determine requirements for additional infrastructure, and manage infrastructure development programs assigned to Army forces for execution. Infrastructure development activities may include identifying requirements for the mission command network, forward basing, and myriad transit rights through the sovereign territories of partner or neutral nations within the AOR.
Setting the theater also implies the theater Army is prepared to support a specific JOA or even multiple JOAs in the AOR. Through its theater campaign support plan, USAREUR identifies bases in the joint operations area for logistics, medical support, protection, and infrastructure development. This is done with the assistance of land component commander planners, interagency partners, and partner nations. Setting the JOA, as seen in Atlantic Resolve, includes identifying responsibility for Army support to other Services and agencies, land transportation, petroleum operations, and common-user logistics. Lastly, setting the JOA also requires planning, preparation, and execution of theater opening, port and terminal operations, and RSOI functions.

![Figure 2-1. The 3-116 Cavalry Brigade Combat Team equipment being off-loaded from a vessel at the Port of Constansa, Romania, in support of Operation Saber Guardian. (Photo by U.S. Army)](image)

Security Cooperation

The routine military and interagency security cooperation activities USAREUR performs to deter potential adversaries and solidify relationships with allies and partners can be described as shaping activities. In Europe, shaping the security environment is a cost-effective way to ensure peace and stability and prevent conflict. U.S. relationships with international partners in this critical AOR are essential to protecting U.S. and allies’ national security interests. By helping build capacity and enhance the interoperability capability of partners, the Army contributes to a more secure world.

*USAREUR’s security cooperation activities, such as readiness-building training exercises like Anakonda 16, provide additional opportunities to enhance the Army’s overall readiness, training, leader development, and build interoperability with allied and partner armies. The USAREUR exercise program shapes and sets the theater for the commander and EUCOM by employing unique total Army capabilities. Exercise programs like USAREUR’s influence the security environment by building trust, developing relationships, and gaining access through rotational forces, multilateral exercises, military-to-military engagements, coalition training, and other opportunities.*
The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) directs military departments and defense agencies to develop integrated campaign support plans for the execution of steady-state shaping activities. The USAREUR campaign support plan focuses on activities that promote the achievement of combatant command objectives and contribute to campaign and GEF regional, functional, and global end states. USAREUR planners seek to effectively plan, execute, and assess security cooperation activities in campaigns and operations that are consistent with DOD security cooperation policy to achieve combatant command objectives.

USAREUR executes its shaping of the operational environment as a relationship-based and human-focused endeavor. USAREUR support to EUCOM provides landpower capabilities that develop an understanding of the operational environment while creating professionalism, leadership, and experience that contribute to partner capacity and trust-building. The limited forces assigned to USAREUR further enhance security cooperation by providing deployable and scalable regionally focused Army forces in direct support of geographic and functional combatant commands and joint priorities (i.e., another Chief of Staff of the Army [CSA] strategic priority).

Security cooperation is a core competency the U.S. Army must sustain to ensure strategic success in the operating environment. Insights from Army and joint security operations examined in this special study provide useful observations, analysis, lessons, and best practices gleaned from the past decade of war that may be useful and applicable toward future theaters of operations.

Regional alignment of the Army to better support the needs of the land component command relies on the ASCCs for their knowledge of the operational environment, regional expertise, and sustainment. In USAREUR’s case, due to its physical presence in the region, the ASCC is uniquely positioned for understanding of and access to a specific operational environment. USAREUR’s continuing and ongoing engagement with partner nations over decades has built relationships with allies that cannot be created overnight. In EUCOM, theater security cooperation is an expanding requirement that has emerged as a priority. EUCOM’s physical location and mission in support of NATO and other regional partnerships while expanding relationships with new and imperiled partners to “shape and prevent” is a growing mission set.

In April 2013, the Presidential Policy Directive 23: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy was released. This directive demonstrates the Army is aligned with national strategic objectives. Theater army strategy and the execution of security cooperation activities in support of the land component commands have taken on new significance with the CSA’s regionally engaged, globally responsive guidance. The CSA’s direction for the Army security cooperation strategy is straightforward: engage with partners, foster mutual understanding through military-to-military contacts, and help partners build the capacity to defend themselves all while developing new partners. In this guidance, security cooperation has a threefold purpose: It builds partner capacity to prevent conflict, shapes the international security environment while maintaining a stabilizing presence, and forges strategic relationships that are critical for winning the peace. The security cooperation challenge for ASCCs will be in connecting ends and ways to means to build partner capacity in a manner consistent with national and military strategy.
The U.S. Army has had some major successes in security cooperation. The most significant example is NATO. NATO-focused security cooperation has brought change to Europe and its security sector. Security cooperation activities were focused on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) — now the Commonwealth of Independent States — security cooperation was a significant factor in reintegrating Europe. The international security assistance force’s (ISAF’s) participation and capability in Afghanistan was greatly aided by NATO standardization agreements. Although the same type of effort and results may not be completely replicated in Europe, security cooperation activities and exercises with Europe treaty allies such as Anakonda and Austere Challenge go a long way to bridging that gap.

Mongolia is another USAREUR success story. It is an example of a small but critically important security cooperation and engagement plan bearing success for U.S. interests in the region. Located between China and Russia, Mongolia is ultimately a pro-U.S. nation with a nascent democratic tradition. Shedding the weight of Soviet political and military malfeasance, Mongolia was able to build the capacity to join the U.S. and international forces in Iraq and Afghanistan with U.S. assistance and support. Mongolia offered to send more troops at a time when many countries where planning transitions out of the theater.

USAREUR is a major player in regional and global building of partner capacity. Crucially, Europe is a creator and exporter of security. The training and preparation of ISAF and Ukrainian forces has been facilitated by USAREUR. In particular, the Joint Multinational Training Command is an enormous capacity-building tool and generates trained partner forces for deployment outside of EUCOM.
Theater Posture

By direction of the President of the United States in the Unified Command Plan, direction and guidance of the President and the Secretary of Defense in the GEF and direction and guidance of the Chairman in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the EUCOM commander (and each combatant commander) prepares a strategy and campaign plan in the context of national security and foreign policy goals.

The EUCOM strategy prioritizes the headquarters’ efforts within and across theaters and functional and global responsibilities. It considers all means and capabilities available in the design of the combatant command’s operations, activities, and investments to achieve objectives and complement related U.S. government efforts over a five-year time frame.

Of the components as they relate to theater posture, the Army is arguably the most critical and even more so in Europe. Army and joint force commanders will require ports and facilities for terminal operations and RSOI. The location and positioning of forward operating stations and cooperative security locations is important to the theater army’s success in the setting the theater. The EUCOM theater campaign plan has a large security cooperation-related component and addresses posture, ongoing combat operations where applicable, and the Phase 0 component of the combatant command’s contingency planning. The “ways” EUCOM has identified to “shape the theater” are to build strong relationships, assured presence (posture), and strategic communication. USAREUR’s theater campaign support plan is nested in EUCOM’s theater campaign plan. USAREUR planners understand that the actions and objectives in each area will affect the others. Deconflicting and balancing activities to ensure actions and objectives in one area do not adversely affect others. Failure to nest these efforts or viewing them as distinct and separate areas of planning risk make posture activities counterproductive. It almost goes without saying that a failure to nest these activities may create adverse impacts at both the operational and strategic levels of war.
USAREUR is the critical element of the Army’s future regional posture. Army input to the combatant command when it lays out the resources it has available is crucial. The concept developed for the theater campaign plan must consider the Army’s requirements for theater posture as an important consideration. Posture has a direct effect on how forces can be employed and supported in theater and may affect other combatant commands as well. Army planners must consider that posture initiatives may also alter the requirement for certain kinds of forces and increase the need for others. Posture planning must use the GEF and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to focus its support of the theater strategy and has to be developed with the theater campaign plan. Addressing what must be done to get from the baseline to the objective requires Army planners to know the full array of resources available to the command.

USAREUR’s deep and long ties to the European AOR enable them to build partnerships with regional allies, combatant commands, and other U.S. government agencies. Despite this central role in the Army and Europe’s posture, they are under-resourced and under-staffed. The military activities that execute posture and shape the theater are done by, with, and through the ASCCs. It is imperative that their resourcing and structure should reflect that responsibility. The center of gravity in echelons-above-brigade command remains at the division and corps, which are tactical- and operational-level warfighting headquarters. Although critical to winning wars, CONUS-based division and corps headquarters are suboptimal formations for long-term engagement aimed at shaping the environment and preventing conflicts.

The regional alignment and focus of the Army to better support the needs of all geographic combatant commanders rely heavily on the ASCC. As demonstrated in Anakonda 16, knowledge of the operational environment and the ability to attain freedom of movement cannot be built overnight.

Lack of regional expertise and gaps in basing and sustainment will inhibit the command’s ability to respond in a crisis.

In Europe, through their enduring presence in and focus on the region, USAREUR has the capability to achieve understanding of and access to a specific operational environment, but not necessarily the capacity. Lastly, USAREUR seeks to create regional and unified action partner unity of effort. Coordinating this regional expertise, sustainment, and unity of effort is the essential task for USAREUR.
Atlantic Resolve

Following growing instability across Europe since 2014 in the Ukraine at the beginning of 2014, Atlantic Resolve was established as a demonstration of continued U.S. commitment to collective security through a series of actions designed to reassure NATO allies and partners of the U.S.’s dedication to enduring peace and stability in the region in light of the Russian intervention in Ukraine.² USAREUR leads land forces efforts on behalf of the U.S. military by conducting continued, enhanced, multinational training and security cooperation activities with allies and partners in Eastern Europe. These multinational training and security cooperation activities take place in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary and are part of Atlantic Resolve. The training and security cooperation activities improve interoperability and strengthen relationships and trust among allied armies, contribute to regional stability, and demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO. “Think of Operation Atlantic Resolve as a yearlong, continuous series of exercises from Estonia to Bulgaria,” said LTG Frederick “Ben” Hodges, commanding general of USAREUR.³ These exercises included the following:

**Exercise Bayonet Thrust (03-05 NOV 2015).** The 173rd Airborne Brigade’s vehicle road march, known as Bayonet Thrust, was the capstone event of its participation in Operation Atlantic Resolve. The road march traversed more than 1,629 miles across nine allied borders and included participation from the armed forces of each country involved in the march. The MCE of 4th Infantry Division supported the event by synchronizing assets to conduct the movement and provide real-time updates for USAREUR.

**Exercise Combined Resolve (02-06 NOV 2015, Hohenfels, Germany).** Combined Resolve V had more than 4,600 participants from 10 NATO allied nations including Albania, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovenia, the U.S., and three partner nations of Georgia, Montenegro, and Serbia. The purpose of this exercise was to execute a command post exercise that incorporated offensive and defensive operations focused on mission command in order to build mission command capability, increase readiness, and develop the cohesiveness of U.S. and allied and partner nations.

**Exercise Trident Juncture (19 OCT-06 NOV 2015).** Exercise Trident Juncture was the largest NATO exercise conducted in the past 20 years with around 36,000 troops from more than 30 nations including both NATO allies and partners. More than 5,000 U.S. Service members participated in the exercise designed to train troops of the NATO Response Force. Activities were hosted by Spain, Portugal, and Italy with training in Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway, and at sea in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. The U.S. Marine Corps’s 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Black Sea Rotational Force, and Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response participated in the multinational exercise.

**Exercise Dragoon Shock (31 JAN-15 FEB 2016).** The 2nd Cavalry Regiment executed a Level III Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise. Cobra Battery, Field Artillery Squadron, deployed on 96 hours’ notice to Rukla, Lithuania, via a tactical road march, pausing in route in Torun, Poland, for 10 days to execute gunnery. As part of its arrival to Torun, Cobra participated in a celebration in the city center, setting up a static display of artillery equipment alongside Polish partners.
Many other such exercises fall under the umbrella of Operation Atlantic Resolve. Other activities supporting Operation Atlantic Resolve include the 4th Infantry Division, MCE, which is a regionally aligned division headquarters that has deployed to Baumholder, Germany, since 2015. The MCE oversees rotational units and tactical headquarters for U.S. land forces, as well as provides USAREUR a division-level command and control capability.4

The deployment of the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 4th Infantry Division in January 2017, marked the start of back-to-back, nine-month rotations of U.S. troops and equipment to the region. The 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team will bring approximately 3,500 Soldiers, 80+ M1 Abrams tanks, 140+ M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 15+ M109A6 Paladins, and 400+ High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. Following the ABCT’s consolidation in Poland near the Drawsko, Pomorskie, and Zagan training areas, the ABCT will be dispersed across seven locations in Eastern Europe for training and exercises with European allies. These rotations enhance the deterrence capabilities, increase the ability to respond to potential crises, and defend NATO and its allies. The ABCT rotations will remain under U.S. command and will focus on strengthening capabilities and sustaining readiness through bilateral and multinational training and exercises.5
The 10th Combat Aviation Brigade from Fort Drum, NY, deployed to Europe in February 2017 and headquartered in Illesheim, Germany, with forward-positioned aircraft in task forces in Latvia, Romania, and Poland. The 10th Combat Aviation Brigade consists of approximately 10 CH-47 Chinooks, 50 UH-60 Blackhawks, 1,800 Soldiers, 24 AH-64 Apaches, and an additional 400 Soldiers from an attached Fort Bliss, TX, aviation battalion.

In July 2017, the rotational units demonstrated their full capabilities during Exercise Saber Guardian 17 when they trained with their allies and partners. The armor rotational force put U.S. armor back into Europe after its complete withdrawal in 2013. Furthermore, it reassures the U.S.-European strategic partnership. Article 5 in the North Atlantic Treaty states that an attack on one member is an attack on all, and is “the core of what NATO is all about,” LTG Hodges said. He further elaborated by noting, “The task in front of NATO — and the U.S. — now is to assure its allies closest to Russia.”

Figure 2-4. An M1A2 Abrams Tank belonging to the 1st Battalion, 68th Armored Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, fires off a 120 mm round 26 JAN 2017 during a gunnery range near Trzbin, Poland. (Photo by U.S. Army)
On the 25th anniversary of Freedom Day in Warsaw, Poland, President Barack Obama reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to NATO, Poland, and each of the Baltic States. “We stand together — now and forever — for your freedom is ours. Poland will never stand alone. But not just Poland — Estonia will never stand alone. Latvia will never stand alone. Lithuania will never stand alone.”

President Obama reinforced the enduring national interests of the U.S. through the security of itself and its allies and partners, central of which is NATO. Not only is the collective defense important under the Articles of NATO, but building partner capability and capacity within the member states reduces or assists in the prevention of conflict. The most visible commitment was the tripling of funding to increase U.S. military commitments to Europe. The European Reassurance Initiative funding increased to $3.4 billion in 2017 from $985 million in 2015, which pays for “rotational deployment of an ABCT to Central and Eastern Europe, prepositioning of equipment of equipment for a fires brigade, sustainment brigade, division headquarters, and other enabling units.”

In essence, President Obama articulated a transition in U.S. strategy from assurance to deterrence. Effective deterrence requires the “three C’s: clarity about red lines that cannot be crossed (for example, attacking a NATO ally), capability to respond in ways that will make the cost of aggression greatly exceed any benefits an aggressor could hope to achieve, and credibility about our determination to fulfill our commitment.”

This is consistent with deterrent theory practices. The U.S. National Security Strategy describes that forward deployed and rotational forces “demonstrate the capability and will to act,” should any actor threatens U.S. national interests, allies, or partners.

The most significant aspect of European Reassurance Initiative is the rotation of an ABCT, a rotational combat aviation brigade, and a division headquarters mission command element. These rotational elements significantly increase the overall commitment of U.S. Army Forces to the permanently stationed forward presence within USAREUR. By the end of 2017, USAREUR will number around 30,000+ Soldiers, distributed across the USAREUR headquarters, 21st Theater Sustainment Command, 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, and the tenant units 2nd Signal Brigade, 66th Military Intelligence Brigade, and Regional Health Command Europe.

Although this commitment is a considerable increase, the theater security cooperation commitments for ground forces is even higher than the available forces across Europe. This results in each of the maneuver formations (173rd, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, and the rotational ABCT) to “fracture” throughout Eastern Europe for rotational exercises and other theater security cooperation commitments. For example, former Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter described this in a NATO Defense Ministers Conference in October 2016, “We also made a commitment, as the U.S. to a battalion from our rotational ABCT to associate and train with the Romanian multinational brigade as part of the enhanced tailored presence oriented toward the southeastern portion of NATO.” Simultaneously, the U.S. will deploy and transfer operational control of the U.S. battalion from the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander placed under the tactical control of a Polish brigade, diluting not just one, but two of the brigade combat teams in Europe. The National Military Strategy delineates the challenges:
In Europe, the U.S. remains steadfast in our commitment to our NATO allies. NATO provides vital collective security guarantees and is strategically important for deterring conflict, particularly in light of recent Russian aggression on its periphery. U.S. Operation Atlantic Resolve, our European Reassurance Initiative, NATO’s Readiness Action Plan, and the many activities, exercises, and investments contained in them serve to underline our dedication to alliance solidarity, unity, and security. We also will continue to support our NATO partners to increase their interoperability with U.S. forces and to provide for their own defense.

GEN Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Commander USEUCOM and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, highlighted how the U.S. and other NATO nations affirmed their commitment to Article 5, “that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all.” However, he goes on to identify two significant challenges facing NATO in Europe, the first being that the information environment has significantly reduced leaders’ decision space to hours, and secondly the ability to understand the adversaries’ (Russia’s) intent. As such, NATO established NATO Force Integration Units to facilitate the rapid deployment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and allied follow-on forces along its eastern flank. Additionally, a joint logistics support group headquarters is being established to help manage movement and support of all follow-on forces.

A visible step to work on the integration and interoperability of U.S. landpower in Europe is Operation Atlantic Resolve. Operation Atlantic Resolve is a demonstration of U.S. commitment to NATO collective security, strengthening relationships, and building interoperability in units and headquarters. In the construct of Operation Atlantic Resolve, the 4th Infantry Division headquarters was tasked with providing a MCE to serve as the division-level headquarters for USAREUR under the regionally aligned forces concept. The advanced element of the 100-person MCE deployed from its home station of Fort Carson, CO, in February 2015, to assume responsibility for the land forces training as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve and assume initial mission command responsibility during crises until the full deployment of the remainder of the division headquarters.

Deployed to Baumholder, Germany, the 4th Infantry Division MCE was responsible for the tactical control of the Operation Atlantic Resolve participating units. Until that point, the participating units were still under the training and readiness authority/oversight of other organizations and commands. For example, if any element of the 173rd Airborne in Italy was to participate in an Operation Atlantic Resolve exercise, all training and readiness information goes straight to USAREUR, bypassing the MCE. This is the same in the event of hostilities actually occurring. The commander MCE will build his situational awareness of the capabilities and capacity of his own units, while simultaneously trying to understand the intent, actions, and locations of the adversary.

To complicate issues, the MCE was not manned or equipped to conduct sustained multi-domain combat operations. Under the current modified table of organization and equipment, a division-level headquarters is authorized 517 personnel when fully manned. Additionally, the 4th Infantry Division commanding general is also the senior mission command for all of Fort Carson, CO. This places the commander in a position to have to manage and mitigate risk in where and how he places capabilities and capacity in conjunction with multiple competing headquarters.
Exercise Anakonda 2016 from 07 through 17 JUN 2016 in Poland was a test for the 4th Infantry Division MCE and the 4th Infantry Division headquarters. Anakonda 16 was the culmination of joint exercises conducted with the Polish military that started in 2006 and has increased in scope with 31,000 troops from across 24 NATO and partner nations. USAREUR tied several overlapping multinational and multi-echelon events across the Total Army (active, National Guard, and reserve) with rapid deployment from CONUS and with units from across Europe. Based on the scope and requirements for mission command, the entire 4th Infantry Division headquarters deployed from Fort Carson, CO, with its U.S tactical systems of record. Throughout the exercise, issues with the interoperability of mission command systems, familiarity with NATO standard operating procedures, and various sustainment issues developed as reoccurring themes that needed to be addressed. The lessons demand attention and highlight the challenges in deterrent and shaping operations. Anakonda 16 was one of seven major exercises executed in 2016. In 2015, there were at least 17 major exercises conducted across the breadth of Europe, from Estonia in the North to Romania in the South.

Given the complexity of conventional warfare in Eastern Europe, the U.S. ground component will undoubtedly find itself fighting within some form of a NATO construct. This is not new. During the Cold War, the integration of multinational land forces was allocated to NATO from corps and division levels. However, in the years between the end of the Cold War and the first invocation of NATO’s Article V in the wake of 11 SEP 2001, there have been no attempts to update command authorities requirements to match the requirements of multinational force commanders. The dual chains of command afford a level of ambiguity for each nation that allows participation while preventing the full release of authority.

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2030 discusses the expanding whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance approach in conventional deterrence strategies. The combination of forward presence, theater security cooperation efforts, and flexible deterrent options are required in every domain and must ensure proper interoperability and building of relationships for proper situational awareness. The creation and maintenance of command and support relationships is critical to achieving these goals:

U.S. joint doctrine defines and describes three variances of multinational command structures as integrated, lead nation, or parallel command. An example of an integrated command structure is found in NATO where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup. A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command structure can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers.

Although this provides a doctrinal framework for understanding ways that command structures can be developed, problems or friction arise within any of these structures once employed. The more integrated the command, the greater the operational efficiency. However, even with recent experiences in Afghanistan, NATO has done little to address problems caused by reorganization of the integrated command structure. While the doctrinal tenets of multinational operations cannot guarantee success, ignoring them until hostilities commence may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort. These issues are routinely discussed and identified by U.S. Army officers assigned to NATO billets during bilateral or NATO-designated exercises.
U.S. Capabilities in Europe

For nearly a century, the U.S. has maintained a presence in Europe during both periods of conflict and of peace. Beginning with the U.S. entry into World War I, security of Europe has been in the forefront of American foreign policy. To execute this policy, the U.S. government must have the tools available to counter threats in the region. The units listed are those that were assigned at the time of this publication. Information on all subordinate units can be found on the USAREUR website at http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/units.htm.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe

USAREUR is the ASCC in U.S. European Command (EUCOM). USAREUR is an operational-level Army force designated by the Secretary of the Army. It consists of operational organizations and serves as the ASCC or joint force land component command/joint task force-capable headquarters to support the commander, EUCOM requirements for command and control of joint and/or coalition forces. The headquarters exercises administrative control over all Army forces located here and within the area of responsibility. As an ASCC, USAREUR performs specific Title 10 functions: servicing; supplying; training units; maintaining/servicing and constructing/outfitting Army equipment; mobilizing/demobilizing; administering, including the morale and welfare of personnel; construction, maintaining, and repairing buildings, structures, and utilities; and management and acquisition of real property.

USAREUR performs the following three key functions:

- Responsive to EUCOM or other combatant commands with facilities and capabilities
- Engaged with regional partners
- Assigned forces are trained and ready to support the assigned or designated combatant command with landpower to prevent (deter), shape (assure and coerce), and win (compel).
2nd Cavalry Regiment

The 2nd Cavalry Regiment “Dragoons” is a U.S. Army brigade combat team headquartered at Rose Barracks, Vilseck, Germany. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment consists of approximately 5,000 dragoon Soldiers in seven subordinate squadrons. The unit’s 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Squadrons are mounted infantry units equipped with the highly mobile, net-centric Stryker vehicle. The 4th Squadron provides the brigade with reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition capability. The Fires Squadron provides organic artillery support. The Regiment Support Squadron provides combat services support, while the Regimental Engineer Squadron focuses on assured mobility, counter-mobility, general engineering, and survivability support.
Founded in 1836, the regiment has the distinction of being the “longest active serving cavalry regiment in the U.S. Army.” Today, the regiment is a modern, rapidly-deployable, self-sustaining force with a proven record of providing decisive landpower and contingency response capabilities to combatant commanders.

3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (Regionally Aligned Force)

The 3rd ABCT from Fort Carson, CO, began arriving in Germany in January 2017. For this deployment, the unit transported approximately 3,500 personnel, 87 M1 Abram tanks, 18 M109A6 Paladins, 419 HMMWV variants, and 144 M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles (446 tracked vehicles, 907 wheeled vehicles, 650 trailers) from Colorado to the port of Bremerhaven. This deployment represented a continuous presence and back-to-back rotations of U.S. troops and equipment. Beginning in February 2017, the brigade’s units moved to the following locations across central and Eastern Europe:

• Brigade headquarters; brigade engineering and support battalion; 3rd Battalion, 29th Field Artillery Regiment; and 4th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment — Poland (Zagan, Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area, Swietoszow, Skwierzyna, and Boleslawiec)

• 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment — positioning in Baltic nations until the Enhanced Forward Presence was in place, then rotated for exercises

• 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment — primarily in Bulgaria and Romania

• 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment — Grafenwöhr, Germany, for training and maintenance

The armor rotational brigade continues to stay commitment to the U.S.-European strategic partnership. This rotational force, deploying with its full complement of equipment, puts U.S. armor back into Europe. The forward presence of U.S. Soldiers illustrates the U.S.’s ability to assure allies, deter adversaries, and posture to act in a timely manner if deterrence fails. The rotational forces conducted exercises across the theater during the course of their nine-month rotation, routinely demonstrating speed of assembly and massing for training events. These forces trained with U.S. allies and partners, ultimately leading to greater interoperability. Rotational units demonstrated their capability in July 2017, at exercise Saber Guardian 17 in the Black Sea region.
10th Combat Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain Division

The 10th Combat Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, is home stationed at Fort Drum, NY, and is supported by 1st Battalion, 501st Aviation Regiment, 1st Armored Division, from Fort Bliss, TX. The brigade deployed with about 2,200 Soldiers for a nine-month rotation from February through November 2017. They deployed with 86 aircraft to include 12 CH-47 Chinooks, 38 UH-60 Black Hawks, 12 HH-60 Black Hawks (medical evacuation), and 24 AH-64 Apaches. The brigade headquarters, with a majority of its helicopters and personnel, worked primarily out of Illesheim, Germany. In addition, other aircraft operated out of Lievare Air Base, Latvia, and Mihail Kogainiceanu Air Base, Romania. The brigade supported Operation Atlantic Resolve, other training, and missions across Europe. Missions included medical transport, exercise support, and aviation operations throughout Europe to improve interoperability and strengthen relationships.

12th Combat Aviation Brigade

The 12th Combat Aviation Brigade “Griffins” is an aviation brigade of the U.S. Army based in Ansbach, Germany, returning from its most recent deployment to Afghanistan in 2013. As the U.S. Army’s only aviation unit in Europe, the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade provides critical lift, attack, and aerial medical evacuation capabilities. Army aviation delivers a force-multiplying effect with its unmatched application of maneuver, firepower, mobility, logistics, command, control, intelligence, and security. Providing operational flexibility and mission tailorability, it is at the forefront of landpower dominance.

With over 100 airframes, assault and attack units fall under one command, making close air support available in flexible packages for commanders. The brigade’s 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 159th Aviation provide attack and reconnaissance with AH-64 of the 158th Aviation provide lift assets for troops and cargo in CH-47 Chinook Cargo Helicopters and UH-60 Blackhawk Utility Helicopters. The 1st Battalion, 214th Aviation provides general aviation support across Europe, including aerial medical evacuation dedicated to training at the Joint Multi Readiness Center in Hohenfels and fixed-wing aviation in support of USAREUR and EUCOM. The brigade’s support elements include the 412th Aviation Support Battalion for sustainment and the 3rd Battalion, 58th Aviation, which conducts airfield operations at the brigade’s airfields.

10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command

10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) serves as USAREUR executive agent for all theater air and missile defense operations and air and missile defense force management. The command helps strengthen strategic ties while building partnership capacity for USAREUR, U.S. European Command, and NATO. AAMDC does this by integrating with joint and multinational partners in all aspects of air and missile defense for missions such as Patriots to Poland, the European Air Defense Task Force, NATO air missile defense operations in Turkey, and providing sensor management. The 10th AAMDC joint and multinational operations support full-spectrum operations under the European Phased Adaptive Approach.
Headquarters, 21st Theater Sustainment Command

The 21st Theater Sustainment Command is USAREUR’s lead organization for all sustainment activities including logistics support, transportation, combat sustainment, human resources, finance, contracting, and other areas in the field of sustainment. The 21st Theater Sustainment Command also serves as the responsible headquarters for USAREUR’s military police, medical, and sustainment brigades providing combat engineers and military police to partnership training and other operations in support of USAREUR, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Central Command.

Subordinate to the 21st Theater Sustainment Command is the 16th Sustainment Brigade, 30th Medical Brigade, 7th Civil Support Command, 18th Military Police Brigade, and the Theater Logistics Support Center-Europe.

66th Military Intelligence Brigade

Located in Wiesbaden, Germany, the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade or “Dagger Brigade” conducts theater-level, multidiscipline (signals intelligence, counterintelligence, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence) and all-source intelligence to include collection, analysis, production, and dissemination. The 66th Military Intelligence Brigade provides advanced skills training and linguist support and, when directed, deploys tailored expeditionary forces in support of unified land operations for U.S. Army Europe, U.S. European Command, and other combatant commands.

19th Battlefield Coordination Detachment

Located at Ramstein Air Base in Ramstein, Germany, the 19th Battlefield Coordination Detachment represents the Army Forces commander in the Air Operations Center; it is a vital link between ground and air operations. As a part of its mission, they coordinate air support requests and exchange operational and intelligence information through the Army Mission Command Systems/Theater Battle Management Core Systems interface.

In addition, the battlefield coordination detachment facilitates battlefield synchronization in the areas of air interdiction; theater airlift; air reconnaissance; close air support; electronic warfare; ballistic missile defense; Army Airspace Command and Control; reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; and space operations. It also provides oversight of ground liaison detachments stationed with Air Force fighter and airlift wings.
Multinational Battle Group-East

Multinational Battle Group-East conducts peace support operations in the operational environment to contribute to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement. It is one of two multinational battle groups, which constitute Kosovo Force that is ready to react to any threatening situation. Kosovo Force derives its mandate from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 JUN 1999, and the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. Kosovo Force is operated under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. As such, it is a peace enforcement operation, which is generally referred to as a peace support operation. Multinational Battle Group-East has approximately 1,000 troops consisting of five countries to include Hungary, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and the U.S.

Endnotes


17. Ibid.


19. Ibid.


23. Ibid., page 3.

24. Ibid., pages i, 1-24, and 30-41.


28. Ibid.


31. The reference of friction is a nod to Carl von Clausewitz’s definition in On War. “Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.” Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, page 121.


33. The tenets of multinational operations are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission focus, and trust and confidence. JP 3-16, page ix.

34. Riley, Jason, Commander, U.S. Army NATO Brigade, telephone interview, 05 JAN 2017. U.S. Army NATO Brigade conducts the individual Soldier and Family training, logistics, human resources, and Service-specific support at over 40 U.S. Army NATO locations in 20 countries. Various issues relating to joint and multinational integration, and interpretations of language, including NATO standardized terms, are brought forward during individual and unit after action reviews to the command.

35. Army Regulation 10-87, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units, 04 SEP 2007, paragraph 5-2.


Global readiness is a critical component for the U.S. Army to deploy forces worldwide. The Army Chief of Staff in his recent testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee, iterated this thought. U.S. forces in Europe today are in an environment that did not exist a few years ago. This includes growing Russian influence, instability in southeastern Europe (Black Sea, Levant), internal threats (terrorism, refugee crisis), and foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.

U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) — U.S. European Command’s (EUCOM’s) Army Service component command (ASCC) — faces challenges associated with supporting the combatant command in a complex theater. Annually, EUCOM and its multi-Service components actively engage in more than 100 exercises and operations that enhance their ability to engage in transatlantic security and defend the U.S. forward. EUCOM has partnered with other nations and U.S. government agencies to broaden its perspective and help maintain high standards of performance.2

### Integrating Exercise Programs to Achieve Theater Campaign Objectives

USAREUR’s exercise programs support the geographic combatant commander’s objectives by ensuring interoperability with current and potential coalition partners and by resolving potential mission command issues to prepare for future operations. These exercises leverage numerous organic capabilities that allow execution of U.S. and multinational operations. Exercises are facilitated by the 7th Army Training Command (ATC) at the Joint Multinational Simulation Center (JMSC) and Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC).

### 7th Army Training Command

The 7th ATC3 is headquartered in Grafenwöhr, Germany. It is the U.S. Army’s largest overseas training command. The 7th ATC combat maneuver and simulation centers, live fire ranges, classrooms, and facilities that provide realistic, tailor-made training solutions. The 7th ATC is a unified command consisting of seven directorates: The Combined Arms Training Center, Grafenwöhr Training Area, International Special Training Centre, JMRC, JMSC, 7th Army Noncommissioned Officer Academy, and Training Support Activity Europe. The 7th ATC provides dynamic training, preparing forces to execute unified land operations and contingencies in support of the combatant commands, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other national requirements. The 7th ATC is a unique institution, efficiently and effectively providing innovative multinational training solutions for an uncertain future.
Joint Multinational Simulation Center

JMSC\(^4\) maintains its preeminent role in delivering comprehensive training by incorporating technical and doctrinal innovations. JMSC provides component and unified action partners with training capabilities in support of geographic and functional component commands’ theater engagement strategies focused on EUCOM, Africa Command, Central Command, Special Operations Command, and NATO. It provides and facilitates mission command training at all echelons through the integration of established training environments (live, virtual, and constructive). Its key capabilities include the Mission Command Program, Digital Mission Command System Training, support to small-unit collective training, and the development and execution of command post exercises. JMSC is capable of linking training and simulation centers across Europe to provide simulated exercise rehearsals and simultaneous constructive simulations that supplement live training and expand the battle space for U.S. and multinational training units.

Joint Multinational Readiness Center

JMRC\(^5\), the Europe-based combat training center (CTC) with a worldwide mobile training capability, trains multinational partners, leaders, staffs, and units up to brigade combat team level to dominate in the conduct of unified land operations anywhere in the world. It is situated among the highest concentration of U.S. allies and partner-nation countries. The Hohenfels Training Area is 163 square kilometers and has 1,345 buildings for training, 319 kilometers of road, numerous cross-country trails, and one short take-off landing airfield. Observer coach/trainer teams observe, coach, and train elements from sections through brigade level during the planning, preparation, and execution phases of simulated combat operations at JMRC. These teams collect, analyze, and provide feedback to rotational units through after action reviews and take-home packages.

Shaping the Theater

USAREUR’s Strong Focus 2017-18\(^6\) guidance continues to increase U.S. interaction with allies and partners who are under pressure from Russia or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, as well as those who face challenges arising from the influx of refugees. USAREUR’s strong focus assures allies and partners of U.S. interest in and commitment to their security and stability.

Central Region

USAREUR’s central region is the core platform from which forces deploy to meet both national and theater objectives. Expansion of presence in both southern and western Europe through exercises, engagements, and exchanges with France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain continues to be a priority of the command. The foremost objective in these areas is driven by the need to assist nations in this region to build capability and capacity, strengthen relationships, and improve overall deterrence and security.
Central Europe provides many advantages including flexibility for involving partner nations in more complex exercises. Central Europe also provides the nucleus for synchronizing virtual and simulation activities. The Joint Multinational Training Center (JMTC) and JMRC have the capability to support mission command exercises for brigade level and higher to include NATO corps and joint task force (JTF)-level, and maneuver exercises up to brigade level. Current training capacity in the region includes the following:

- JMTC/JMRC, Germany
- Boletice, Hradiste, Libava, Brezina, and Czech Republic (maneuver and gunnery/live fire)
- Lest, Slovakia (battalion-level maneuver, live fire, military operations on urban terrain, live fire, close air support)
- Papa, Hungary (airborne operations), Tabofalva, Varpolota, Ujdrogd, and Bokony (up to battalion maneuver training including opposing force, Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System, and close air support training)
- Pocek Range, Slovenia (small arms, mortar)
- Slunj, Croatia (maneuver), Zagreb, Croatia (simulation center connected to JMTC)

As noted earlier, JMTC is the hub for exportable training packages into the central region. It also provides a technological hub for the North and South Regions. Grafenwöhr is also host to the European Activity Set, an armor task force and brigade mission command prepositioned equipment set that provides the foundation for additional prepositioned sets from the U.S. or NATO.7

North Region

The North Region8 (Ukraine, Baltics, Poland) is for up to battalion-sized task force rotations to the Poland hub with company-sized elements rotating into Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Initially, the North Region will be more closely integrated with NATO. The countries of the North Region along with Romania from the Black Sea Region are the current locations of NATO plans rotations with Szczecin, Poland, as the location for the announced NATO mission command element. Current training capacity in the region includes the following:

- Szczecin, Poland (expected NATO mission command hub)
- Drawsko Pormorskie, Poland (mission command and battalion-level gunnery and maneuver)
- Tapa, Estonia (motorized company team training)
- Gaiziunai, Lithuania (motorized company team training)
- Adazi, Latvia (motorized company team training)
The North Region provides periodic presence and, in coordination with NATO, utilizes Drawsko Pomorskie as a battalion task-force hub with a mixture of infantry/airborne, Stryker, and heavy forces from regionally aligned forces (RAF). The intent is to integrate connected training opportunities with JMTC and NATO allies in the region. Tapa, Gaiziunai, and Adazi are spokes from the Drawsko Pomorskie hub for bilateral company level and below live fire exercises. There is scope to improve Drawsko Pomorskie into a regional training center over time. U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program exercises, leveraging current partnerships between Illinois and Poland, Pennsylvania and Lithuania, Michigan and Latvia, and Maryland and Estonia will create significant training opportunities to further build interoperability throughout the North Region.

Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) is the training center for development and doctrinal assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces. The U.S. will continue training and advising Ukrainian security forces until 2020. The JMTG-U oversees defensive and security training for up to five battalions of Ministry of Defense forces per year. The training is focused on partnering at the battalion level and below, building professional and capable Ukrainian units to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The headquarters is also working with Ukrainian partners on the development of its training center and cadre at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center.

**Black Sea Region**

The Black Sea Region has the most mature U.S. infrastructure east of Germany with U.S. facilities in Mihail Kogalniceanu, Romania, and Novo Selo, Bulgaria. These facilities together can equal up to a brigade-sized element. Their associated training areas have the capability to support a battalion-level maneuver and live fire. With improvements, these facilities provide broader training for light infantry, heavy, or Stryker units. Elements of the NATO Readiness Action Plan are expected to rotate into Romania once NATO planning is complete. Current training capacity in the region includes the following:

- Mihail Kogalniceanu, Romania (reception, staging, onward movement, and integration [RSOI] hub, mission command site, mobility training, and airport of debarkation)
- Novo Selo, Bulgaria (company team level and below)
- Babadag, Romania (company team-level maneuver and live fire)
- Cincu, Romania (battalion-level NATO regional training and maneuver)

Periodic presence in the Black Sea Region includes light forces (both infantry and airborne), Stryker, and heavy forces. Forces deploy into the region for 30- to 45-day rotations, utilizing the multimodal capacity at Mihail Kogalniceanu as the hub for mission command and RSOI. Existing infrastructure facilitates linked training through JMTC to the other regions and simulation centers. Using training capacity at Cincu, Romania, improvements to the training architecture can create a regional training center with supporting company-level facilities in Novo Selo and Babadag. Air operations at Mihail Kogalniceanu and ongoing training events of the U.S. Marine Corps Black Sea Rotational Force continue to be leveraged for both joint and expanded NATO training opportunities. Similar to the North Region, existing State Partnership Program partnerships (Alabama-Romania and Tennessee-Bulgaria) provide additional training options.
Key Exercises in 2017-2018

Exercise Saber Guardian (11-22 JUL 2017)

Saber Guardian is USAREUR’s keystone exercise that demonstrates U.S., allied, and partner nation commitment to the collective defense of the security and stability in the Black Sea Region. This is a brigade-level, computer-aided, command post exercise and a battalion-level, field-training exercise designed to promote regional stability, strengthen partner capacity, improve interoperability, and demonstrate deterrence in the Black Sea Region through a linked exercise approach to exercises Swift Response 2017, Sea Breeze 2017, and Noble Partner 2017.

Exercise Saber Strike 2017 (06-22 JUN 2017)

Exercise Saber Strike is a long-standing, USAREUR-led cooperative training exercise designed to improve joint interoperability through a range of missions that prepare the participating nations to support multinational contingency operations. Saber Strike 17 also serves as the certification exercise for the Multinational Corps Northeast.

Figure 3-1. Artillerymen with the Romanian Land Forces Mixed Artillery Regiment 69 conduct a live fire exercise near the Romanian Land Force CTC in Cincu, Romania. (U.S. Army Photo by SSG Kyle J. Warner, 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team, Public Affairs)
Deployment Activities

Dragoon Ride

Since 2015, USAREUR forces have conducted a lengthy road march across areas of Eastern Europe. In early April 2015, more than 400 Soldiers assigned to USAREUR’s 2nd Cavalry Regiment completed a historic road march across Eastern Europe. The road march, dubbed Operation Dragoon Ride, was the longest movement the U.S. Army has made across Europe since GEN George S. Patton diverted his Third Army to relieve Bastogne, Belgium, in 1944. The road march began as three convoys consisting of nearly 100 vehicles to include 60 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles. These formations drove over 1,100 miles from Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland, converging in the Czech Republic before returning home.

In addition to the Soldiers of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division’s Mission Command Element, from Fort Carson, Colorado, provided oversight and assistance throughout the operation. Helicopters from the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, Army logisticians from the 21st Theater Sustainment Command, NATO jets, and U.S. Air Force assets also assisted in the mission’s success.

![Figure 3-2. U.S. Army Strykers in the Czech Republic (Photo by U.S. Army)](image)

Enhanced Force Protection

An important component of NATO’s strengthened deterrence and defense posture is having military presence in the eastern and southeastern areas of alliance territory. Allies are implementing the 2016 Warsaw Summit decisions to establish NATO’s forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland and to develop a tailored forward presence in the Black Sea Region. NATO is enhancing its forward presence in the eastern part of the alliance territory with four multinational battalion-sized battle groups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland on a rotational basis. These battalion-sized battle groups, led by the UK, Canada, Germany, and the U.S. respectively are robust, multinational, combat-ready forces demonstrating the strength of the transatlantic bond. This effort is part of the biggest reinforcement of alliance collective defense in a generation. The following allies have confirmed contributions to these forces: Albania, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain contribute to the Canadian-led battle group in Latvia; Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway contribute to the German-led battle group in Lithuania; Denmark and France contribute to the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia; and Romania and the UK contribute to the U.S.-led battle group in Poland.
NATO is developing a tailored forward presence in the southeast of alliance territory. This consists of a land element built around a multinational framework brigade under Multinational Division Southeast in Romania and coordinated multinational training through the Combined Joint Enhanced Training Initiative. NATO is increasing its presence in the Black Sea Region on land, at sea, and in air with several allies ready to contribute with forces and capabilities.

Elements of the Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group based in Poland departed Rose Barracks, Germany, to Orzysz, Poland, to support NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence mission, 25 MAR 2017. The 2nd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, and troop contributing nations conducted a tactical road march using routes through Germany, Czech Republic, and Poland. Once in Orzysz, they integrated with the Polish 15th Mechanized Brigade, 16th Infantry Division. The battle group consisted of 1,000 Soldiers from the U.S. and 350 personnel from the UK and Romania. They deployed a variety of Stryker vehicles to include the Infantry Carrier Vehicle, mortar carrier, and medical evacuation vehicles, as well as howitzers.14

Anakonda 16

“This exercise has strengthened the unity of our alliance and that strength is our center of gravity and that is what is going to keep Europe whole, free and at peace.”

— LTG Ben Hodges, Commanding General, USAREUR

Background

Exercise Anakonda 16, conducted during 07 through 17 JUN 2016, was the largest joint exercise of the Polish armed forces with the international participation of allies and partners in the modern history of Poland. The exercise was first conducted in 2006 with the goal of improving cooperation between the Polish military and nonmilitary services such as the police, border guard, and fire service. Since then, the biennial exercise has progressed into an allied exercise with increased participation of NATO countries. In 2012, Soldiers from the U.S. Army, Canada, and the Multinational Corps Northeast participated in the exercise for the first time. Anakonda 14 highlighted the readiness and responsiveness of 12,500 Polish and 750 multinational forces from Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, UK, and the U.S. Anakonda 16 almost tripled in size as this exercise included approximately 31,000 troops (estimated 13,000 U.S.), 3,000 vehicles, 100 aircraft, and 12 ships from 24 NATO and allied partner nations. Each allied contribution was integrated into a single unified command structure.

Anakonda 16 was prepared and led by the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command with the goal to test the ability, readiness, and interoperability of the Polish armed forces with allies and partners, while conducting a joint defensive operation on a large scale. Two NATO headquarters participated in the exercise. The NATO land component command, based in Izmir, Turkey, participated with its intermediate command element during a planned handover-takeover with the Polish operational command. Multinational Corps Northeast participated during the handover-takeover event as one of two corps subordinated to the NATO land component command. The Polish land component command participated as the other corps headquarters subordinated to the NATO land component command.
Not seeking to antagonize Russia, Poland chose to use the NATO Skolkan exercise scenario during a computer assisted exercise, which depicted an attack from the north by a fictitious enemy. This exercise along with the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 were a clear demonstration of Poland’s essential role and contribution to NATO and its allies for the security and defense of Europe’s eastern flank.

Figure 3-3. U.S. and Polish leaders plan the next mission during Anakonda 16. (Photo by U.S. Army)

Anakonda 16 was a multiphase exercise (an overlap of Anakonda 16, Swift Response, and Saber Strike), which included a command post exercise and a field training exercise that had three internal phases for U.S. forces. Anakonda 16 briefly overlapped with Swift Response 2016 and Saber Strike 16, two independent but associated exercises. Saber Response 16 was an airborne assault into the Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area, Swidwin, and Torun. Anakonda 16 incorporated heavy forces primarily in the Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area and bridging exercises in the Chelmo and Zagan areas. As part of Anakonda 16, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment conducted a bridge crossing and forward passage of lines in Poland enroute to the Baltic countries to conduct Saber Strike 16. The various training areas did not represent a contiguous battlefield. Open maneuver rights outside the training area was not authorized. Upon completion of bridging and forward passage of lines and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment cleared Poland, there was no longer a connection between Anakonda 16 and Swift Response 16. Once the 82nd Airborne cleared Poland, there was little connection between Anokonda 16 and Saber Strike 16. The command post exercise during Anakonda 16 was not contiguous with the field training exercise. The task organizations changed from command post exercise to field training exercise by phase. The field training exercise consisted of a series of internal training events that were not
always connected. The NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) at the conclusion of its deployment exercise and prior to the start of Anakonda 16, participated in Phase 1 of the field training exercise. Administration and logistics across the theater was not in tactical play. The administrative and logistical chain was separate from the command post exercise and field training exercise chains of command. This distinction was important because the commander for logistics could not be the tactical commander/battlespace owner at a particular training area. However, unit commanders with internal sustainment assets could exercise tactical sustainment play within their training areas at their discretion. Anakonda 16 was conducted in the following three phases:

- **Phase I (Deploy).** Conducted 01 MAR through 06 JUN 2016, units marshalled forces in the continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS) and converged on Poland through means of air, sea, rail, line-haul, and self-deployment and conducted RSOI.

- **Phase II (Exercise).** Conducted 06 through 17 JUN 2016 during which units participated in a series of live and simulation activities in diverse training areas. During this period, Anakonda 16 and Swift Response 16 briefly merged with the airborne joint forcible entry exercise (Joint Forces Command) and Saber Guardian 16, a passage of line in Poland by forces moving on to the Baltic nations.

- **Phase III (Redeploy).** Conducted 17 JUN through 07 JUL 2016, during which units either returned to home station or assumed another training mission in support of Atlantic Resolve.

The objectives of this exercise was to support NATO assurance and deterrence, demonstrate allied force projection and interoperability, provide theater RSOI for U.S. forces, and demonstrate readiness at echelons above brigade headquarters through a command post exercise and field training exercise.

USAREUR’s participation in Anakonda 16 provided a visible symbol of the U.S.’s commitment to the region and its European allies while directly supporting the theater security cooperation objectives. Anakonda 16 was viewed as a series of overlapping multinational, multi-echelon events executed under a multinational command as a demonstration of unity, resolve, readiness, and ability to mass forces with speed. Active duty, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve units demonstrated the value of the Total Army with rapid deployment and effective integration of 11 Army National Guard and nine U.S. Army Reserve units into the exercise. The Total Army was especially important during Anakonda 16 where 25 percent of all U.S. Soldiers that participated in the exercise were either Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve. The commanding general of USAREUR, LTG Ben Hodges, mentioned on several occasions that he could not have met the expectations of the Polish-led, multinational exercise without the support of the reserve components. During the exercise, the U.S. Army’s training events included multinational air assault and airborne operations, air defense operations, bridging operations, live fire, command post operations and exercises, field training, cyber and electronic warfare, and other training activities led by the U.S. Army’s 4th Infantry Division Headquarters.

During the planning stages of Anakonda 16, the USAERUR staff utilized lines of effort (LOEs) to plan, coordinate, and synchronize USAREUR’s participation in the exercise. These LOEs included the following:
• **LOE 1: Exercise Environment.** The USAREUR G-3/7 training and exercise staff was responsible for synchronizing activities though an operational planning team, drafting and issuing orders to support the exercise, maintaining the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) and Army Training Information Management System (ARTIMS) entries, managing training area usage in accordance with host-nation authorities, and defining the tasking organization for the exercise.

• **LOE 2: Mission Command.** The USAREUR G-3/3 operations developed the command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence architecture for the exercise.

• **LOE 3: Sustainment.** The USAREUR G-4 plans, operations, and exercise division was responsible for overseeing the planning of life support, host-nation agreements, and contracting.

• **LOE 4: Fires.** The USAEUR G-3/3 fires coordinator was responsible for overseeing the planning of the Future Combat Systems and the combined arms live fire exercises.

• **LOE 5: Movement.** The USAREUR G-4 planned and oversaw both inter-theater and intra-theater movement of U.S. forces.

• **LOE 6: Strategic Communications.** USAREUR G-3/9 information operations, in collaboration with the USAREUR strategic communications chief, developed the information operations and strategic communications plans, orchestrated key leader engagements, supported Poland in managing the Joint Visitor’s Bureau and the Distinguished Visitor Day.

• **LOE 7: Intelligence Support.** The USAREUR G-2 provided the scenario design support to Poland to include development of the Road to War and the master scenario event list.

• **LOE 8: Reserve Component Integration.** The USAREUR G-3/5/7 manpower and reserve affairs worked with the USAERUR staff to integrate the Army Reserve and Army National Guard into the exercise.

Exercises similar to Anakonda 16 and the routine military and interagency activities the U.S. Army performs to deter potential adversaries and solidify relationships with allies and partners are described as deterrence and shaping activities. These are Joint Phase 0 activities that set conditions in the theater across the range of military operations. Shaping the security environment in Europe and elsewhere is the most cost-effective way to ensure peace and stability and to prevent misunderstandings or conflict. The U.S. Army’s relationship with international partners such as Poland are essential in protecting the U.S. and its allies’ interests. Anakonda 16 underscored a continued commitment by the U.S. and Poland to work as dedicated partners in support of NATO and for peace and stability in Europe.
Readiness and Anakonda 16

Anakonda 16, as a platform to build readiness for U.S. formations, experienced varied results that generally depended on the echelon of the unit. By its nature, Anakonda 16 was not a venue to generate large amounts of readiness for U.S. Army units at all levels, with the exception of reserve component units. However, readiness-building opportunities were actively sought by leaders at all levels ensuring that unique opportunities were not lost. As stated by MG Timothy McGuire, deputy commanding general, USAREUR “whenever you can get Soldiers together to work through complex training scenarios, we will improve.”

The greatest amount of readiness building was conducted at the platoon through company levels (most notably demonstrated with 1/3 Armored Brigade Combat Team [ABCT] at the Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area). At the Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area, the 1/3 ABCT was able to conduct numerous iterations of multinational, company level, force-on-force training exercises and company combined arms live fire exercises. These company-sized training exercises were incredibly effective and integrated multinational elements into most of the formations.

At the battalion and brigade levels, readiness was sustained but not generated. At the battalion and brigade level operating in the field, the extent that readiness was developed was limited to static command post operations. Beyond this, the primary focus was facilitating the training happening at the company level. In addition to the lack of readiness-building opportunities at the battalion and brigade level, the 1/3 ABCT encountered unique readiness inhibitors due to its status as a RAF unit. As the European RAF unit, 1/3 ABCT was required to draw its fleet of equipment from the European Activity Set, leaving its organizational fleet at home station.
In order to maintain the mandated operational readiness of its CONUS fleet, 1/3 ABCT was required to keep critical maintainers at home station (augmented by contracted maintenance support), which consumed resources and detracted from the training opportunity of these Soldiers.

A major focus issue observed during Anakonda 16 was the ability to operate in a denied, degraded, and disrupted space operational environment or under a cyber electromagnetic activity attack. In today’s operational environment, units at all levels rely on digital mission command systems, often with little or no analog backups. Soldiers must know how to identify and react to electronic warfare and cyber attacks. Training to counter this threat will enhance a unit’s ability to operate in a cyber electromagnetic activity environment. Another challenge is the presence of large and relatively immobile command posts. To enable effective mission command, unit leaders must examine methods to reduce both physical and electronic signatures to reduce threat opportunities. In addition, units must rehearse and plan for displacement to reduce dwell time and exposure to enemy physical and electronic observation.

At echelons above brigade, Anakonda 16 provided a unique venue to improve the preparedness of Army forces to conduct a major contingency operation in Europe. The ability to set the theater and conduct expeditionary-style sustainment operations was a critical training objective, especially after more than a decade of sustainment operations in a counterinsurgency environment. A great deal of sustainment readiness was gained despite issues. Sustainment commands experienced challenges without an established system to provide solutions. The major success was the development of the coalition logistics support group. The coalition logistics support group provided the ideal venue for all allied and partner nations to resolve logistics issues with the host nation. The coalition logistics support group was critical in sustainment success and is a concept that needs to be considered as a permanent organization for future coalition exercises and operations. The one area of sustainment that indicated a lack of readiness was the use of contract solutions. For example, contracts were established for bottled water acquisition, tactical vehicle recovery during transit, and shower facilities, which could have been provided by military assets. Although contracting does provide easy solutions, it does at the expense to budgets and future readiness when operating in an expeditionary environment.
During Anakonda 16, the reserve component, which provided 24 percent of the U.S. forces in the exercise, had the most readiness-building opportunities. U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units provided critical enabling and mission command capabilities that were otherwise unavailable. Anakonda 16 was a unique opportunity for many reserve units because it allowed them to conduct dynamic training over several consecutive months. Despite this being an excellent readiness-building opportunity, reserve units were severely hindered by policy limitations that restricted the duration of consecutive training days for Soldiers to approximately 23 days. This limitation meant that, depending on the amount of time the unit spent preparing for and supporting Anakonda 16, the unit would be between one-third and one-half strength.

**Effective Building of Partner Capacity in Anakonda 16**

Anakonda 16 demonstrated the necessity for interoperability and provided a unique opportunity to build partner capacity with numerous allied and partner nations. Integration of multinational forces occurred at the platoon level and showed the importance relationship-building has on the interoperability of forces. Unable to have all mission command systems synchronized with one another, basic human interactions and relationship building with the help of liaison officers (LNOs) became the foundation for success. Units at the brigade level and below received LNOs from their attached multinational units. The commanding unit likewise provided its own LNO to these units. The use of the LNOs was critical to bridge cultural, language, and systems gaps.
The interoperability of mission command systems was a challenge that was not solved during Anakonda 16. For example, there was no ability for a digital common operational picture to be shared among multinational units, despite the overall reliance on these systems. As previously mentioned, the use of LNOs and nonsecure communications was the only way to share a common operational picture.

The mission command system interoperability is of continuing concern among armies in theater and is critical in the execution of fire mission processing and airspace control operations. Interoperability is limited with NATO and partner systems requiring manual processes to be implemented. This did not create major issues during sporadic missions, but becomes challenging as operational tempo increases. Early in the exercise, the multinational fires units conducted static weapons demonstrations among themselves to better understand weapons and mission command systems capabilities. This also provided the opportunity for the exchange of LNOs. These LNOs were critical in processing multinational fires missions at the fires headquarters.

Anakonda 16 illustrated differences between U.S. and allied doctrine, specifically regarding airspace control and clearance of fires. U.S. doctrine delegates airspace control from surface to coordinating altitude to the Air Support Operations Center, which is located in the division Joint Air to Ground Integration Center. Allied doctrine calls for airspace control to remain at the air component command level. This difference of airspace control authority has a tremendous impact on the prosecution of timely fires missions and is an area for collaboration to build partner capacity.
The greatest success experienced in building partner capacity in Anakonda 16 was demonstrated in the use of the coalition logistics support group. As previously mentioned, the coalition logistics support group was an artificial construct that provided a venue for allied and partner nations to coordinate and resolve logistics issues quickly and effectively. Also, sustainers at the coalition logistics support group were able to learn the assets and capabilities of each other’s formations, therefore building the sustainment capacity of coalition logistics support for Anakonda 16 and future exercises and operations.

**Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine: Building Partner-Nation Capability**

“JMTG-U is a pretty impressive operation in terms of the setup and the example we are showing the Ukrainians. It’s really clear that it’s just not cooperation but it’s a partnership. In terms of how we work with the Ukrainians, how they work with us and how the training program is going.”

— U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch

In early 2014, Russian-backed separatists quietly annexed the Crimea in Ukraine. This action, in what is now labeled a “gray-zone campaign,” involved the ambiguous insertion of Russian regular forces to the Crimean peninsula under the guise of a local rebellion. Russian regular armed forces elements rapidly consolidated their gains in Crimea. International condemnation was swift, but not before Russia attempted an incursion into Ukraine proper in the eastern Donbas Oblast region using a mix of proxy militia and Russian regular special operations forces and conventional forces supported by the sanctuary of Russia proper. Ukraine regular forces and Ministry of Interior para-military forces initially proved incapable of stopping the invasion as Russian innovation and a “new hybrid” style of warfare proved insurmountable in the early stages of this phase of the conflict. The resulting initial defeat was a significant embarrassment to the Ukrainian armed forces. The rapidity of the Russian advance was also alarming to U.S. military leadership on the continent, whose concerns were also mirrored by NATO. What did the Ukrainian armed forces encounter? Why and how was the aggressor’s force so effective? The answers to these questions formed a body of literature describing a hybrid or new generation style of Russian warfare. Numerous academic institutions and respected think tanks investigated the problem. U.S. military studies did the same, seeking the broader implications to U.S. strategy and contingency plans on the continent. Not completely clear in these studies were the perspectives from the Ukrainian soldiers directly exposed to this conflict. The traditional way of fighting for the Ukraine Army was not working and needed to change quickly.
In late 2015, JMTG-U was established to provide the mission command headquarters for a broader multinational assistance force, with the U.S. being the lead nation. Using the Ukraine-U.S. Joint Commission document as the framework, U.S. military forces were assembled to assist in providing security force assistance training to Ukrainian armed forces units. The purpose for this training group, per the Joint Commission, was in part to “build an achievable, sustainable engagement plan to institute fundamental reform, build [partner] capability, grow capacity, and develop a transformed Ukrainian armed forces.” The location of this assistance mission was at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center (IPSC), near Yavoriv, Ukraine. The JMTG-U grew to over 1,100 personnel from seven countries (all NATO allied force contributions) and Ukraine. These seven countries included the U.S., Canada, UK, Lithuania, and Poland serving under the JMTG-U organization. Supporting the Canadian contingent within the JMTG-U is Denmark. However, Denmark is not an official troop contributor to the JMTG-U. Lastly, Estonia is supporting this mission in a strictly bilateral nature with Ukraine. They too, do not formally fall under the JMTG-U. The fruition of this mission is intended to be the development of an enduring Ukrainian CTC for brigade-sized units at the IPSC.

Figure 3-7. Ukrain Army Colonel Vikter Sphin, deputy commander of the International Peacekeeping and Security Center speaks with U.S. Army CPT Jason Ayres and Canadian Army Sgt. Maj. Luc Desrochers about the new Range Operations building. (U.S. Army photo by CPT Scott Kuhn)
JMTG-U was formed by a mix of active component and National Guard units. Its headquarters was resourced predominately from the California Army National Guard due largely to the state’s role in the State Partnership Program with Ukraine. The California Army National Guard’s State Partnership Program relationship with Ukraine began in 1993. With 23 years of experience, the choice to deploy elements of the California Army National Guard made obvious sense. The headquarters was built around the leadership and key personnel from the 79th Infantry Brigade Combat Team. Rounding out the roughly 50 personnel involved, other California Army National Guard members were hand selected to fill typical and unique staff section requirements through volunteer mobilization. This was not a traditional headquarters company. In short, the 79th Infantry Brigade Combat Team’s headquarters deployed as an ad hoc headquarters element. The JMTC provided specialized rotational CTC subject matter expert augmentation (planner, master gunner, range safety office, and a U.S. civilian liaison for enhanced coordination with USAEUR) to the California Army National Guard. Subordinate to the JMTG-U headquarters were active component security force assistance (advise-and-assist) training battalions, derived initially from 1-91 Cavalry and later by CONUS-based Forces Command formations. These battalions did not deploy to the Ukraine at full strength, but rather task-organized to support the needs of the training assistance mission, which required about 250 Soldiers. Also supporting the JMTG-U were national contingents from Canada, UK, Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia.

Figure 3-8. Lt. Gen. Pavlo Tkachuk, commander of Ukraine’s Land Forces Academy shows LTG Ben Hodges, commander of USAREUR, training ranges on a map. (Photo by Army SSG Elizabeth Tarr)
Prior to establishing the JMTG-U, a previous mission titled Operation Fearless Guardian supported a similar security force assistance mission. This mission focused on building capability within the Ukrainian National Guard under the Ministry of Interior. This earlier mission was conducted by advise-and-assist elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team. The precedent this security force assistance activity generated influenced the next program that was developed to support training for the Ministry of Defense Armed Forces tactical formations. The JMTG-U was responsible for overseeing this training. The 1-91 Cavalry (173rd ABCT) was a holdover formation that straddled the transition between Fearless Guardian I and the JMTG-U. While the program transitioned based on the change in the primary training audience, the initial tactical security force instruction team was similar. The small advance force elements of the California Air National Guard arrived in theater in late November 2015 and was ready to begin training the first Ukraine armed forces Army unit. An additional and critical enabler to the early beginnings of the JMTG-U was an attached company of Canadian Army soldiers. The Canadian advise-and-assist battalion (representing its national contingent) was headquartered at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center conducting assistance missions similar to the 1-91 Cavalry, but at multiple training sites. This Canadian mission was titled Operation Unifier. A similar detachment of soldiers from the UK Royal Army also had a security force assistance role under Operation Orbital, which was conducted at several Ukrainian land forces training centers and bases.

JMTG-U manning reflected the security force assistance expertise from the force-contributing countries. The task-organization of JMTG-U was built to support the partner-and-advise training teams that were the focal point of this important training mission. A direct subordinate to USAREUR, the JMTG-U conducted mission command using a traditional Napoleonic staff with minor modifications. The staff sections with select augmentation from alliance partners were as follows: operations, sustainment team, and assessments and standardization cell. Supporting the JMTG-U were two sections: the training center development group composed of members from JMRC and a special operations forces cell. While the JMTG-U reported to USAREUR directly, it also maintained a coordination relationship with the Office of Defense Cooperation in Kyiv, which engaged with the Joint Commission. Also supporting the JMTG-U was a Canadian contingent that directly supported JMTG-U with roughly 85 personnel (backed with a national contingent that would surge back and forth but average around 189), 16 Lithuanian soldiers for all five rotations, an average of 35 Polish for 3 rotations, and one UK soldier. This force was augmented with over 60 contracted interpreters. Conducting the security force assistance training were partner-and-advise training teams led by a U.S. Army battalion headquarters of roughly 30 personnel who coordinated the execution of the 55-day training program through the employment of three partner-and-advise training teams of 77 to 98 personnel each. Overall, the total partner-and-advise training teams’ boots on ground was 330. This total 380-man compliment of U.S. Soldiers and alliance soldiers supported the training for each 580-man Ukraine infantry battalion and mentored the host nation in building the infrastructure and personnel needed to run its own CTC.

The higher headquarters guidance, taken from a JMTG-U command brief was fairly succinct. It suggested to “build Ukrainian defensive capability through training, laying the groundwork for institutional reforms.” This focused guidance resulted in purpose and vision statements that were developed by JMTG-U. The purpose statement stated “JMTG-U assists in strengthening Ukraine Armed Force’s interoperability and training capacity, to facilitate Ukraine’s long-term military reform efforts.” The vision stated “JMTG-U integrates allies and partner nations in training five Ministry of Defence battalions and one special forces unit, improving the capacity and
capabilities within the International Peacekeeping and Security Center, and developing Ukrainian military doctrine and structure to meet interoperability requirements.” Lastly, the outcomes desired from the JMTG-U mission were stated “assist in strengthening Ukraine’s internal defense capabilities and the training capacity of Ukraine’s armed forces. Contribute to Ukraine’s planned long-term military reforms.” The following four LOEs supported the stated JMTG-U security force assistance ambitions:

1. Mission command
2. Train ministry of defence battalions
3. Training center development
4. Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF), and institutional-level reform

The mission command LOE, although might appear to be a largely internal task, involved significant external coordination and engagement with numerous U.S., allied, partner-nation, and host-nation representatives, especially the Ukrainian armed forces. The mission alone required frequent engagement with the Joint Commission and the Ukraine Ground Force Subcommittee. Additionally, frequent coordination with the Office of Defense Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv occurred to provide regular updates on the progress of the mission to the Ukraine Ministry of Defence. Seeking special permission to conduct events as simple as conducting battalion-level leadership lessons learned interviews was a complicated but necessary process. LOE 1 was not a simple “care and feeding” responsibility. It involved a tremendous outward focus on influence and engagement. LOE 2, train ministry of defence battalions, focused on delivering relevant tactical-level security force assistance directly to select Ukraine Army battalions. This activity was the most personnel-intensive aspect of the JMTG-U mission and involved the greatest amount of direct face-to-face interaction with Ukraine soldiers. Supporting this LOE was a 55-day program of instruction that focused on three primary audiences: battalion staff training, individual/collective infantry company-level and below training, and key enabler training (focusing on crew-served medium/heavy weapon systems). At the battalion staff level, the training focused on staff planning, warfighting function integration, and NATO interoperability. Training at the company level and below focused on individual and collective infantry-level tasks (i.e., improved proficiency of infantry-related tasks before they returned to the eastern front). Key enabler training is the last of three training focuses and the area in which Canada, Lithuania, and Poland contributed the heaviest. These modules focused on team, squad, and section training for medium/heavy weapon systems, vehicle operator and employment, and other topics. Culminating each rotation was a battalion-oriented final field training exercise.

Considerable effort was expended in developing and refining the program of instruction delivered at the JMTG-U. Breaking through the cultural/institutional predispositions of Soviet-era leadership and training imposed on the Ukraine Army proved difficult. The stovepiped and highly centralized leadership style prevalent in the Ukraine Army, especially when coupled with the lack of a professional noncommissioned officer corps, initially resulted in cognitive dissonance between the U.S. Army and Ukraine soldiers. Mirror imaging U.S. expectations on its Ukraine training partners was not beneficial either. Lastly, there were shortfalls in the Ukraine basic training for contracted soldiers. Due to the shortened nature of enlisted basic training, Ukraine soldiers were at a lower level of readiness. This was magnified as Ukraine soldiers entered the training rotation at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center. To
the uninitiated, these problems would appear insurmountable, but the professional soldiers of the JMTG-U expertly and professionally worked through these initial difficulties and quickly. Reconciling the real capabilities against the estimated capabilities of the first Ukrainian battalion that underwent training revealed what needed to be changed with the Program of Instruction. Ukraine initial entry training was not as robust nor as effective as the U.S. equivalent, which meant the starting product coming into the JMTG-U needed to begin training from a more rudimentary starting point. The ease with which U.S. and Canadian trainers necessarily modified the Program of Instruction was impressive and reflected the flexible nature of security force assistance.

![The 3rd Infantry Division teaches suppressive fire to Ukrainian soldiers](Photo by SSG Elizabeth Tarr)

The third LOE is the most important from a defense institution-building perspective and needs to have an enduring quality of assisting the Ukraine Ministry of Defense in building its own CTC capability at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in western Ukraine. This International Peacekeeping and Security Center was selected because it had the appropriate square kilometers of training area to host a Ukraine CTC. Additionally, the International Peacekeeping and Security Center also had the only developed infrastructure to handle a CTC. The critical missing component was a cadre of trained soldiers to run and manage a CTC-like capability. Additionally, the institutional influence-operation to inculcate at the highest levels of the Ukraine Ministry of Defence is a necessary component facilitating defense institution-building.

At its inception, the JMTG-U received pushback on building a CTC capability at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center. The front along the Donbas region has three major rear area support bases that also serve as rest and refit installations where tactical-level refresher training can be quickly accomplished prior to sending an infantry battalion back into a defensive sector. These are the locations where most senior Ukraine leaders wished to enhance existing training facilities. However, these locations are vulnerable. Establishing a major facility further to the rear in western Ukraine was viewed by U.S. planners as the more prudent choice. There remains concern that transporting infantry battalions far from the front on a routine basis
is too costly over a sustained and programmed manner. This argument has tremendous merit when competition for finite fiscal resources is paid the appropriate attention. Through patient dialogue and engagements, this location at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center has generated a level of acceptance that appears promising for the near and mid-term.

The next challenge with building a CTC capability at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center is the requirement for a cadre of competent trainers and the necessary support infrastructure that can provide the training mandate for a CTC. JMTG-U viewed itself properly in the role of train-the-trainer. In a programmed and progressive manner, the partner-and-advise training teams have slowly introduced Ukraine cadre into the program of instruction. By late July 2016, the number of Ukraine training cadre at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center was 60 soldiers that also included support personnel such as range control managers. Although this is not a suitable population of cadre to sustain the International Peacekeeping and Security Center as a CTC in the long-term, it is a start. The ambition is to increase that number to 105 members. The current tendency is that once a Ukraine soldier has been fully trained as a cadre member, he is reassigned elsewhere in country based on the temporal needs of the fight in the anti-terrorist operation zone. With JMTG-U moving into its second full year and the appropriate focus on this LOE remains in the forefront. The efforts to continue building this CTC training cadre will continue to make progress. In order to work JMTG-U out of a job, this needs to remain a top priority. In June 2016, the Ukraine land forces committed the remainder of the necessary CTC cadre (instructors, staff, simulation group, and opposing force for training by JMTG-U. Despite these institutional victories, there remains challenges, some of which are not yet fully understood.

The last major concern within this LOE is the actual training facility at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center. As was noted earlier, this training establishment does possess the requisite square kilometers of land. However, land management at this facility has not always been properly tended. It was revealed early in the deployment of the JMTG-U that select portions of the International Peacekeeping and Security Center were retained for “priority use” by numbered infantry units in the Ukraine Army. The impact on the JMTG-U was that they could drive to the International Peacekeeping and Security Center and use that training space without coordinating with installation operations or range control. This is an ineffective way of managing this facility causing disruption to the LOE 2 program of instruction on numerous occasions. Although this is a service-culture problem that can be changed, it will need fixing by Ukraine leadership. Additionally, some parcels of land within the International Peacekeeping and Security Center are actively farmed by outlying farmers near this installation. This has also caused problems as this usage has not been centrally managed effectively and instead was done through the force of personality or through favoritism and patronage. This is disruptive to the efficient management of the International Peacekeeping and Security Center as a CTC. Lastly, one of the biggest problems was safety through effective terrain management and unexploded ordnance. Once empowered to make decisions, the Ukraine CTC leadership solidified terrain management and safety procedures. Assisting in this effort, the U.S. initiated a significant unexploded ordnance remediation effort with explosive ordnance detachments from the 21st Theater Sustainment Command. In March 2017, a three-year effort to clear critical training areas of unexploded ordnance began in earnest.
The last remaining effort, LOE 4, DOTMLPF and institutional-level reform, is continued engagement, much of it beyond the boundaries of the International Peacekeeping and Security Center, to build and develop institutions that will improve the Ukraine military. One primary activity the JMTG-U has been advocating in the LOE is a lessons learned capability and cultural mindset within the Ukraine military. The value and relevance of a major CTC institution is its ability to respond to the needs of the force it is training. There is an absence of understanding on what problems the primary training audience is facing and how to best train to address these concerns at the CTC. If not addressed, this will keep the International Peacekeeping and Security Center from fulfilling its training mandate efficiently and effectively. A bottom-up tactical refinement, although accepted at the lower tactical echelons, has not been embraced at the highest echelons of the Ukraine army. This will change over time, however the development of the International Peacekeeping and Security Center as a CTC currently happening and the ability to rapidly make changes to the program of instruction is a requirement that to date is not fully functioning. The JMTG-U did place significant emphasis behind this LOE by conducting a series of battalion-level interviews designed to gather perspectives on the gravest challenges Soldiers were facing in the anti-terrorist operation zone and returning these findings into meaningful training solutions at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center. Traction is being gained as JMTG-U has already conducted focused interviews with five infantry battalions. Transcripts of these interviews are being shared internal to the Ukraine Army and have also been shared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) with U.S. Army and NATO alliance partners. Continued engagement with the Ukraine Ministry of Defence would not be possible without the continued active support of the Office of Defense Cooperation in Kiev. The commander of the JMTG-U has repeatedly stated that his success was enabled by the close cooperation of the U.S. military professionals at the Office of Defense Cooperation in Kiev. This relationship will undoubtedly remain strong as the JMTG-U continues to make progress in this LOE. The critical capability that this LOE is designed to yield is a Ukraine lessons learned formation that can take the work JMTG-U and others have already accomplished, improving on it, and building programs that have an enduring quality that is unique to an improving Ukraine military.

The JMTG-U transitioned headquarters and partner-and-advise training team formations in January 2017. The Oklahoma Army National Guard, by deploying the 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, assumed this vital mission. Under the first year of JMTG-U, five Ukraine infantry battalions were trained. Although this is a small percentage of the total number of Ukraine infantry battalions, the early feedback from the front is that the training provided via the program of instruction was effective. This could not have been possible without the professional officer and noncommissioned officer training cadres that started with 1-91 Cavalry and later transitioned to 3-15 Infantry and 6-8 Cavalry (both from 2-3 Brigade Combat Team). Today, 1-179 Infantry, an Oklahoma Army National Guard infantry formation, has assumed this training cadre mission. Another four Ukraine infantry battalion tactical groups were trained in 2017 in preparation for the first brigade-sized rotation in early 2018. The effectiveness of the JMTG-U, using a surprisingly small U.S. military population is actually impressive. This economy of force security force assistance mission has earned a well-deserved reputation within the Ukraine defense circles.
Lessons Learned from U.S. Army Europe: Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine Security Cooperation Education and Training Versus Request for Forces

LTC David K. Spencer

Introduction

On 23 NOV 2015, Soldiers and leaders from the U.S. Army, NATO allies, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces stood together in formation at a training area in western Ukraine. This ceremony marked the beginning of the JMTG-U, a security cooperation effort employing U.S. forces and allies to assist the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense in its ongoing training and reform efforts.

Figure 3-10. JMTG-U opening ceremony, 23 NOV 2015
(Photo by SSG Adriana Diaz-Brown)

The JMTG-U training was the result of consultations between EUCOM and its Service components with the Ukrainian military following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. In July 2015, the U.S. government announced U.S. participation in training Ukrainian forces. The land forces training plan had USAREUR forces training five Ministry of Defense battalions sequentially through December 2016 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in western Ukraine. It followed on the heels of an effort called Fearless Guardian in which USAREUR forces trained units of the Ukrainian National Guard at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in April to November 2015.

The JMTG-U training is significant in that it emphasizes the strong U.S. support for partners in Europe. Given the situation in Ukraine, the highly visible effort resonates in a number of capitals on both sides of the Atlantic. Its purpose is to assist the Ukrainian military with developing a long-term training capacity as well as strengthening Ukrainian internal defense capabilities. The training itself is the most visible aspect of the JMTG-U effort which includes an associated equipping program, assistance in training center development at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center, and advisory on Ukrainian defense reforms.
However, a successful training start required a determined planning effort across a number of organizations in 2015. After receiving its mandate from EUCOM and meeting with Ukrainian armed forces staff and leaders, the first step was for USAREUR to develop a land forces program of instruction with the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) which would conduct the first training rotation. The program of instruction was based on the previous Fearless Guardian effort and lessons learned from the Ukrainian military, which currently uses Soviet-era doctrine, organization, and equipment. The JMTG-U headquarters continues to revise the program of instruction throughout the land forces training program to facilitate NATO interoperability and assist the Ukrainian land forces in its defense reform efforts through 2020.

Once the training program was developed, planners had to identify the size and scope of the partner-and-advice training teams and finalize their mission command and support systems. USAREUR planners then worked with the Ukrainian land forces on life support and billeting options for trainers and trainees since the total number of required personnel would exceed the capacity of the designated cantonment area at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center. USAREUR planners addressed these factors while developing a viable cost estimate within the funding available for the Title 22 Foreign Military Financing case that would fund the security assistance training for the land forces.

Preparations for the training occurred in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv as well. The USAREUR staff worked with the Office of Defense Cooperation in Kyiv, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Ukrainian Land and Special Operations Forces, allies, and other stakeholders to create the training support agreement with the Ukrainians that (1) Authorized the training to occur on Ukrainian soil, and (2) identified the key responsibilities and requirements including the training and training support, security, and customs clearances.

Concurrently, USAREUR and EUCOM planners began discussing the sourcing requirements for personnel and equipment beyond what USAREUR could provide while simultaneously supporting ongoing Atlantic Resolve activities. Normally, this would involve a request for forces. However, as JMTG-U is a security cooperation effort associated with Title 22 money and authorities, planners used a relatively unfamiliar process called a security cooperation education and training (SCET) team request. It was not immediately evident that this would be a challenging path. But the SCET request became both a point of friction as well as a useful lesson learned due to the nature of the requirements and the associated solutions. Through familiarity with this process and the variables that can complicate it, as well as lessons learned from the JMTG-U SCET process, planners at combatant commands and their Service component commands can mitigate friction in similar situations in the future.

**Security Cooperation Education and Training Versus Request for Forces**

The request for forces process is not a new one to combatant commands and Service component commands. It originates with a requirement for additional forces from outside of the combatant command. The combatant command sends the request to the joint staff and Secretary of Defense for validation. The Secretary of Defense signature provides the policy approval that validates the requirement, which is then sent to the respective Service for sourcing. Leaders and planners at Service component commands understand this process and know who to contact if the process stalls.
The SCET process is a different method of obtaining forces that can be used for security cooperation requirements. The request itself, the Department of Defense (DOD) Form 2964, *Security Cooperation Education and Training*, is a method of requesting trainers to assist in a military-to-military training program. The requirement is usually generated by discussions between a host-nation military and the U.S. Security Cooperation Organization in that country — known as an Office of Defense Cooperation within the EUCOM area of responsibility. The host nation drafts the details of the desired security cooperation effort, which goes through the Security Cooperation Organization to the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC). USASAC will write a “case” based on the request. Additionally, after discussions with relevant stakeholders, the Security Cooperation Organization passes the SCET request itself to the combatant command, routing through the Theater Special Operations Component Command, if applicable. Because these training teams are typically small, the combatant commands will likely try to source the effort from within one of its respective Service component commands, sending it outside of the combatant commands only if there are special circumstances or it cannot internally source the requirement.
If the SCET does need to go outside the combatant commands, the process diverges here from a request for forces. The SCET request then goes to the appropriate Service secretary’s agent for approval. In the Army’s case, this is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation (DASA DE&C). The DASA DE&C is the Army’s policy approver for a SCET request, versus the Secretary of Defense for a request for forces. After the SCET is approved, the DASA DE&C staff simultaneously sends notifications to the Army G-3/5/7 and USASAC for unit sourcing. USASAC’s subordinate organization, the Security Assistance Training Management Organization manages cases OCONUS, and the approved SCET allows the Security Assistance Training Management Organization to release the case funds to the executing unit.

The SCET process itself is not a new one, and security cooperation personnel at combatant commands and Service component commands should be familiar with it. However, the scale and scope of the JMTG-U SCET complicated this case, requiring energetic engagement to ensure success through scheduled delivery of personnel and equipment to support the high-visibility training effort.

**Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine Security Cooperation Education and Training**

The force and equipment generation aspects of the SCET request for the JMTG-U land forces training were atypical. First, planners at USAREUR discovered that using a SCET to request forces from outside EUCOM was an infrequent occurrence. The last time USAREUR’s security cooperation division and global force managers recalled the Army trying this type of SCET request was during Operation Iraqi Freedom for a handful of trainers. The SCET request was eventually dropped because the process became too challenging. This example was concerning to USAREUR planners, who were assisting with a SCET request that was greater in size for a high-visibility requirement.

Other aspects of this SCET request made it an unusual one, at least in EUCOM. First, JMTG-U was a large-scale, long-duration effort: the land forces training would require over 200 U.S. trainers and enablers to train five Ukrainian Ministry of Defence battalions sequentially in nine-week rotations from November 2015 to December 2016 in western Ukraine. (Special operations forces training occurs at a different location with a different timeline.) Further, the mission command and support aspects generated a requirement for a significant amount of organizational equipment. This type of equipment is not typically associated with SCET requests in Europe.

Finally, in order to provide mission command for the JMTG-U effort in western Ukraine, the plan required personnel and equipment for headquarters and support elements. The California National Guard, state partner with Ukraine, agreed to assist with the mission to include providing some of the key leader positions. This helped USAREUR solve a number of problems, but complicated the request through the proposed use of Title 32 forces for a Title 22 mission.

Although the JMTG-U SCET request originated with the host nation and Office of Defense Coordination in Kyiv, USAREUR was closely involved with the planning and the process as EUCOM’s Army Service component command. USAREUR planners had a number of concerns with the SCET request in the early stages: (1) it was a relatively unfamiliar process to operational planners, (2) the process was unclear on exactly how the California National Guard would receive the order it would require to employ forces to support the effort, (3) there was concern that a validation from the DASA DE&C might carry less weight than the Secretary of Defense during Service sourcing considerations, and (4) lack of clarity on whether the SCET request, normally used for trainers (personnel), would generate the organizational equipment...
requirements. It was also unclear whether five separate SCET requests were needed (one for each land forces battalion rotation), or if a single SCET request would cover multiple rotations. These concerns were addressed over time, but some of the aspects, including National Guard integration, required more engagement than others to ensure success.

**National Guard Bureau Considerations**

From the USAREUR perspective, National Guard assistance in providing personnel and equipment for the training effort was welcome. However, this created complications that would not arise had the sourcing come solely from the active component. In short, USAREUR was attempting to request Title 32 forces and equipment for use alongside Title 10 forces in a Title 22 mission in Ukraine using a process unfamiliar to many of the USAREUR staff and other stakeholders. An additional aspect was that the JMTG-U effort was based on a presidential authorization versus a joint staff or Office of Secretary of Defense directive. This added an additional shade of unfamiliarity for an already unusual process.

A significant consideration for using National Guard forces for a Title 22 mission is the statutory authorities to mobilize or bring these forces to active duty. The two primary authorities discussed for this case were 12304b, an involuntary mobilization authority for preplanned requirements, and 12301(d), a voluntary active duty authority called Active Duty Operational Support. The JMTG-U case used 12301(d) at the outset, but either can be employed with the sourcing solution that comes with a SCET request.

The 12304b authority, if employed, would have involuntarily mobilized personnel and equipment together to support the requirement. In the case of JMTG-U, this was a headquarters element and associated mission command equipment. This authority increases the likelihood of obtaining a unit that has trained and worked together. The authority also provides flexibility in that an involuntary mobilization does not require any waivers for personnel with over 16 years of Service who might receive retirement sanctuary through participation in the mission. However, 12304b requires significant lead time (180 days prior to start) to process as a preplanned Service requirement for approval by the Secretary of the Army. It also only provides authority for 365 days, which includes mobilization and demobilization time. The JMTG-U effort was scheduled to exceed that period and would have required a gap-bridging solution between the end of the first 365-day period and the next.

The 12304b mobilization would have provided fewer benefits for Soldiers than 12301(d). For example, under 12301(d), Soldiers supporting JMTG-U receive the Transition Assistance Medical Program for the Soldier and family for six months after demobilization, and age 60 drawdown in benefits. The 12301(d) authority has other relevant considerations as well. For example, the authority does not require extension from the Secretary of the Army; the Soldiers can extend voluntarily at the end of the 365 days. Additionally, one of the major drawbacks to the use of 12301(d) authority was that the assembled JMTG-U headquarters team would be an ad hoc one that had not trained and operated together. As an added consideration, it would complicate the sourcing of organizational equipment since there was no associated unit identified.
Funding is also a significant consideration for employing National Guard forces for a Title 22 mission. USAREUR planners were informed during the process that Title 22 funding cannot be used for National Guard Military Pay and Allowances (MP&A). Fortunately, USAREUR had a limited amount of funding available that was sufficient to cover the National Guard MP&A for JMTG-U, while the Title 22 JMTG-U case funds would cover the transportation and operating costs associated with the training. Planners considering using National Guard forces versus active component (or reserve) forces for a Title 22 mission must consider (1) whether sufficient funding is available to cover National Guard MP&A, and (2) the relative priority of the mission (i.e., the command should prioritize all the projected efforts that could require use of its available funds for National Guard MP&A and leverage active component forces for the lower-priority efforts). This may not be possible based on the nature of the missions, but planners should look at the applicable efforts within the command holistically rather than piecemeal over time.

These authorities and funding considerations to employ National Guard Forces present different advantages and disadvantages. Operational planners must understand them and consider the characteristics of their particular situation to determine which is preferable.

**Lessons for the Force**

In the end, the SCET request was successful in obtaining the forces and equipment required to accomplish the mission, and the JMTG-U training began in November 2015. By the second rotation of training in early 2016, this and follow-on SCET requests had brought trainers, enablers, and individual and organizational equipment from various locations across the U.S. to Ukraine to train and partner with USAREUR assigned forces and allied troops from multiple NATO countries to support the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence.

There are a number of lessons learned that can assist other combatant commands and Service component commands in the future when using the SCET process to support a complicated security assistance requirement. First, operational planners and leaders must understand the process. At USAREUR, the lack of experience (outside of USAREUR’s security cooperation division) caused planners to create products comparing the SCET to the request for forces to help stakeholders better understand the process. Planners should use Army Regulation 12-7, *Security Assistance Teams*, and Army Regulation 12-15, *Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training*, as guides to the process while leveraging in-house or advisory security cooperation experts.

Operational planners must assemble the right team to advise on the requirements associated with supporting a multifaceted SCET request. This includes legal advisors knowledgeable about fiscal law and associated statutes, force managers, security cooperation advisors, and planners familiar with reserve and National Guard affairs. Planners leveraging reserve and National Guard forces through a SCET request must also consider the benefits and drawbacks associated with the mobilization or active duty statutory authorities as well as constraints on Title 22 funds for National Guard MP&A.
Finally, planners must be properly networked to successfully complete a SCET request and get forces on the ground in a timely manner. This network will differ depending on the level of organization. The USAREUR planners’ network required contacts at (1) EUCOM (operational planners, security cooperation, and Security Assistance Training Management Organization liaison), (2) Security Assistance Training Management Organization, (3) the host-nation Office of Defense Cooperation, (4) Department of the Army G-3/5/7, (5) Forces Command, (6) National Guard Bureau, (7) National Guard planners in respective states, (8) active component unit planners for Title 10 forces tasked, and many others. A complicated SCET provides many hurdles for planners. Building the right relationships and network allows planners to quickly overcome these.

**Conclusion**

Familiarity with the SCET process is an asset for operational planners at combatant commands and Service component commands in the Army and other Services. In the case of complicated SCET requests for unusual requirements, understanding the above lessons can assist planners to successfully negotiate the required hurdles.

Geographic combatant commands are not likely to have assigned forces to accomplish all anticipated requirements in coming years. The use of the RAF concept is one way to mitigate this. Another is through the use of reserve and National Guard forces. However, if a significant security assistance requirement exceeds a combatant command’s capacity to accomplish with available forces, familiarity with the SCET process, then the lessons learned here will be useful for planners and leaders working to solve challenging problems.

**Endnotes**

13. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
15. U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch, “U.S. Ambassador visits Joint Multinational Training Group-
training_group_ukraine.

commission.

17. I am indebted to a number of people for their advice and assistance with this article to include COL Nick Ducich,
the JMTG-U commander; members of EUCOM EC J-5/8; members of U.S. Army Europe’s Security Cooperation
Division, Mobilizations and Reserve Affairs division, Reserve Component Augmentation, and Global Force
Management section; and representatives of the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command and U.S. Army Security
Assistance Training Management Organization, among others. The views expressed in this article are the author’s
and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or U.S.
government.

flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope_images/2327635935/in/album-72157659284597053/.

19. The special operations training commenced at a separate installation in western Ukraine.

20. USAREUR developed the broad program of instruction framework with the Ukrainian armed forces and other
stakeholders and the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) created the detailed program of instruction for
training. The JMTG-U headquarters revised the program of instruction during the first battalion’s training rotation to
provide additional focus on interoperability.

21. According to the JMTG-U commander, “This included standard support along the classes of supply, but also
more unusual requirements such as interpreter support.” (Email, COL Nick Ducich to author, 21 MAR 2016.)

22. Title 22 is the section of the U.S. Code that deals with foreign affairs engagement. Funds are appropriated under
Title 22 to the State Department. SCET requests follow the guidelines of Army Regulation 12-7, Security Assistance
Teams, and Army Regulation 12-15, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training. (Email, Timothy S. Burke
to author, 12 JUL 2016.) Mr. Burke is the Chief, Education and Training Branch, EUCOM J-5/8.

23. Assembled from multiple sources to include EUCOM, Office of Defense Cooperation-Kyiv, USAREUR Global
Force Management, Security Assistance Training Management Organization, and the Department of Defense
Form 2964 itself, which describes the SCET process. This graphic simplifies these processes. For example, SCET
routing through the Theater Special Operations Command has been omitted. Additionally, the interaction of the
Security Assistance Training Management Organization (as part of U.S. Army’s Security Assistance Command) in
the SCET process is challenging to display comprehensively here, and thus is only generally described. Mr. Riley
Costa and LTC Eric Hiu from the USAREUR Global Force Management section assisted in the construction of this
comparison chart.

24. Timothy Burke provides the following as additional background information for SCET requests. “In the vast
majority of training cases, our partners create a letter of request to the U.S. government asking for a “blanket
training” foreign military sales case. When implemented by the respective U.S. military department in the form
of a letter of offer and acceptance, this becomes, in essence, the blank check for acquiring training resources.
The “blanket training case” is supported by funds from the host-nation or U.S. grant funds (Title 10 or Title 22).
Subsequent to the letter of acceptance, when the host nation identifies required training, the security cooperation
organization will work with the relevant Service component to develop a program of instruction. Once the program
of instruction and resources to support the program of instruction are agreed, the security cooperation organization
will fill out a Department of Defense Form 2964.” (Email, Timothy S. Burke to author, 20 JUL 2016.)

25. The SCET process is detailed on page 1 of the Department of Defense Form 2964. Besides my experience with
the JMTG-U SCET request process, this description comes from multiple sources to include representatives from
USASAC, SATMO, USEUCOM, DA G3/5/7, USAREUR Global Force Management section, and USAREUR
Security Cooperation Division, as well as the Department of Defense Form 2964 itself. Natalya Dean of USASAC
provided resolution on the process after DASA DE&C approval as well as related to the USASAC and Security
Assistance Training Management Organization interaction with the process. (Email, Natalya Dean to author, 09 JUL
2016; phone conversation, Natalya Dean to author, 19 JUL 2016.)
26. Email, Mr. Timothy S. Burke to author, 12 JUL 2016.

27. One SCET request was able to encompass multiple rotations and provided the required equipment.

28. My description of the process related to National Guard SCET considerations is based on comments and discussion from multiple sources to include LTC Brian Johnson of USAREUR’s Central Taskings Branch, as well as COL Charles Crosby, the USAREUR’s M&RA division chief and his team members who assisted with information regarding the associated authorities. COL Ducich, the JMTG-U commander, also advised in this area and was able to confirm the actual entitlements that his Soldiers were receiving. The age 60 drawdown in benefits allows a Soldier to receive retirement benefits an additional three months prior to age 60 for every qualifying 90-day mobilization period.
Chapter 4

Sustaining Landpower Capability in Europe

“Men without weapons in modern war are helpless, but weapons without men are nothing.”
— GEN Omar N. Bradley

Since April 2014, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) has led land forces efforts on behalf of the U.S. military by conducting continuous, enhanced multinational training and security cooperation activities with allies and partners in Eastern Europe. These multinational training and security cooperation activities are taking place in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. These training events improve interoperability, strengthen relationships and trust among allied armies, contribute to regional stability, and demonstrate U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

For example, currently Atlantic Resolve demonstrates the U.S. commitment to the security of NATO allies on air, land, and at sea. To ensure its own security, NATO must have strong, committed, and capable allies, which is why the U.S. has fought, exercised, and trained with its European allies for the past 70 years. The U.S.-European strategic partnership is built on a foundation of shared values, experiences, and commitment to a Europe that is stable and prosperous.

As a microcosm of European Command’s (EUCOM’s) many exercises and commitments taking place, sustaining Atlantic Resolve has been extremely challenging to the 21st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) and subordinate and partner units. Limited resources have been stretched to the limit, but never broken.

Freedom of Movement

USAREUR defines freedom of movement as the ability to mobilize and deploy units quickly throughout the European Theater and from the continental U.S. (CONUS). For the sustainment community, the definition expands to add the ability to move freely within the theater in order to supply forces. Today’s reality is that it is extremely difficult to provide sustainment to exercises and forces deployed into Eastern Europe and the Baltic regions due to cumbersome and time-consuming requirements to gain diplomatic and security clearances for convoys. The long lead time (normally 30 days), specificity required, and inability to change requests make the process a great hindrance to the command. The lack of diplomatic agreements, such as a Status of Forces Agreement, with these nations is burdensome to the command.

Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of forces are skills that have atrophied in Europe. The reduction of force structure and end to deployments into theater gradually eroded the structure and skills necessary to conduct RSOI. Multiple regionally aligned forces (RAF) deployments have identified gaps in the processes and capabilities necessary to support RSOI. The lack of a robust sustainment infrastructure does not allow any single command to focus on the process. USAREUR is developing an RSOI standard operating procedure based on experiences from RAF, which should assist future rotations. Exercises such as Anakonda and Saber Strike/Guardian, that require the deployment of active and reserve component forces from CONUS will also assist in maturing the process.
During the RAF rotations conducted to date, there have been repeated gaps identified in the deployment skills of units, particularly in the movements area. CONUS-based units normally have an installation transportation office that provides assistance in movements. This reduces stress for unit movement personnel but does not give them opportunities to refine skills in preparing data and inputting into the Transportation Coordinator-Automated Information for Movements System (TC-AIMS). Incorrect or incomplete data results in unit movement lists that are inaccurate, generating incorrect requirements for the Surface Deployment Distribution Command regional brigades. This results in frustrated cargo at ports, missed shipments, incomplete shipments, and cargo arriving at the destination piece meal. Additionally, once in Europe, intra-theater and redeployment operations are not supported by an installation transportation office, but by the small distribution staff at the 21st TSC. Brigade-level deployments have succeeded despite these issues because they involve relatively small amounts of cargo. Larger deployments could be impacted if this training gap is not closed.

**Sustainment Resources**

U.S. Army forces in Europe were significantly reduced during the past 15 years. The last series of reductions eliminated heavy forces in Europe. The sustainment force structure was reduced as well. The theater no longer has the capability to properly support heavy forces with either maintenance or supply. Whereas the Pacific region has a TSC, two expeditionary sustainment commands (ESC), and three sustainment brigades, the European region has a TSC, no ESCs, and only one sustainment brigade. The 16th Sustainment Brigade (headquartered in Baumholder, Germany) has only one combat sustainment support battalion, whereas all others have at least two. This dearth of sustainment force structure has been stretched thin in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. To the credit of the command, it has not failed in any mission. There have been costs in the high rates of early return of dependents and family stress. In the 16th Sustainment Brigade, many Soldiers spend as much as 140 days per year away from home.

Faced with limited assets and required to provide area support in a geographic region that spans 4,000 kilometers (km), the sustainment brigade came up with a sound plan of assigning mission command responsibilities across the theater. The combat sustainment support battalion and the movement control battalion would split mission command of forward elements, with one in the north and one in the south. Company-level command elements would rotate forward, with platoon and below leadership at the smaller sites. This structure allowed for unity of command and excellent leader development experiences for the junior leader, while accomplishing the mission assigned.

During the initial RAF rotations that have supported Operation Atlantic Resolve, there has been a recurring issue with the level of sustainment forces deploying with the RAF brigade. Sustainment has often been a bill payer for the force, with critical maintenance, supply, and medical forces being left at home. With the limited theater sustainment resources currently in Europe, RAF should deploy with all available organic sustainment capability while enablers from aligned sustainment brigades should be brought along to reduce stress on the 16th Sustainment Brigade.

The mission of the 7th Mission Support Element, a U.S. Army Reserve component command within USAREUR, has evolved into coordinating USAREUR efforts to secure U.S. Army Reserve in EUCOM. There have been numerous examples of U.S. Army Reserve units and individual Soldiers deploying to provide needed support to Operation Atlantic Resolve, particularly in the transportation and maintenance fields. There have been some issues with getting needed support into theater.
The 361st Civil Affairs Brigade, under the 7th Mission Support Element, has been an invaluable asset in theater, providing language skills needed in some of the countries where forward elements are deployed.

**Supporting Heavy Forces**

With the placement of heavy equipment sets in Lithuania, Romania, and Bulgaria, and exercises being conducted in Spain, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and other nations, there is a huge geographical dispersion of forces in the European Theater. To put this in perspective, the 16th Sustainment Brigade in Baumholder routinely conducts resupply convoys of distances over 1,000 km across numerous borders. There are challenges in crossing borders, which add complexity and time to convoy operations. The 21st TSC developed weekly logistical resupply runs to support forces in the north and south, but without freedom of movement it has been difficult to develop a sound theater distribution plan.

Sustaining heavy forces brings with it challenges of scale, larger quantities of fuel, more and heavier types of ammunition, and greater complexity and cost in maintenance and repair parts. Most of these challenges have been met successfully, with the exception of the shortage of heavy vehicle mechanics and repair parts. Detailed planning and execution of sustainment on an economy of force basis has allowed the command to meet the support requirements, despite the heavy work load, deployment schedule, and resulting impacts on units.

The lack of track combat platforms in Germany for years resulted in there being no authorized support-level line numbers for these critical fleets in theater other than Army prepositioned stocks. The demand history to raise stockage levels in the Army prepositioned stocks authorized stockage levels was not developed. Parts were not received during rotations in a seamless manner. Discussions between USAREUR and Army Material Command resulted in a joint Army Material Command-Defense Logistics Agency-USAREUR endeavor to forward position non-Army-managed item and Army managed item line numbers at Germersheim for critical fleets and long lead-time parts in European activity sets and USAREUR-assigned fleets.

Established in 1998 as the General Support Center-Europe, the organization has evolved into the Theater Logistics Support Center-Europe (TLSC-E), with a reputation as a responsive, reliable, and truly multifunctional logistics organization. It executes theater sustainment and force protection support and maintains the theater sustainment base by providing logistical services to joint, combined, Army, and multinational forces supporting USAREUR and theater combatant commands. TLSC-E provides support to force projection, supply, maintenance, distribution, and all other logistical functions to help maintain the rotational force readiness and collective regional security.

**Concept of Support: Challenges for Vast Geographic Dispersion**

The 16th Sustainment Brigade, the lone sustainment brigade within Europe, supports elements with supply convoys from Estonia to Bulgaria to Spain. With the 16th located roughly in the middle of the three nations, the distance from one end of the spectrum to the other is over 4,000 km.
Convoys must stop at each border and go through inspections and clearance procedures. This adds delays and complications to the process.

Diplomatic clearances must be submitted at least 30 days prior to the convoy and must match security clearance requirements that are processed by other agencies. Detailed information on vehicles, drivers, and cargo must be included and cannot change. These requirements allow for little flexibility for planners and units.

Each nation has its own set of restriction on the type, weights, and requirements for shipping cargo. Often requirements differ between countries that must be traversed during the same convoy. Convoys require a level of coordination that is taxing to planners and convoy leaders, adding significant time and complexity to convoy operations.

**Class III (Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants).** Bulk Class III operations have been successful with few issues. There are some issues with lack of standardization of equipment with partner nations, such as nozzle heads and fitting, but these have been easily overcome. There have been issues with availability of some packaged Class III products. Again, the lack of heavy forces in theater has resulted in the reduction of some types of packaged Class III that support these systems. Contingency stocks of packaged Class III have also been greatly reduced over the years, requiring restocking and additional cost. This has resulted in the need for units to bring these supplies with them or to establish resupply from CONUS, which is less responsive.

**Class V (Ammunition).** The establishment of ammunition storage sites in Eastern European and Baltic countries has been a challenge. Establishing storage facilities that meet Army standards has been a work in progress, resulting in the need to gain waivers and seek methods to mitigate shortfalls until improvements can be made. The small pool of ammunition specialists in theater have been challenged to meet every day job requirements and travel to forward sites to assist in improving storage locations. Issues such as ammunition accountability standoff distances, security systems not meeting standards, training unit personnel, and conducting unit assistance visits has taxed the capabilities of the command.

**Class IX (Repair Parts).** The European theater maintenance supply system, which is based on demand history, is not postured to support heavy forces. There is no actual supply support activity located in theater that maintains repair parts for heavy vehicles. During recent RAF rotations, 80 percent of requisitions associated with heavy vehicle systems had to be sent to CONUS because of lack of availability in theater. Many vehicles were non-mission capable for long periods of time awaiting repair parts. There are also systemic challenges affecting interface between the Army War Reserve Deployment System and Standard Army Maintenance System. In effect, the Army prepositioned stocks Army War Reserve Deployment System cannot “talk” to the Standard Army Maintenance System. When equipment is in unit hands, the system of record for that equipment cannot be maintained with current data. Going forward, the 21st TSC has been tasked with standardizing and developing workarounds for these maintenance reporting issues. As the Army prepositioned stocks are exercised and manned on a semipermanent basis, history should begin to populate the supply system with repair parts at local supply support activities and authorized support levels.
The current approved production system, the Army War Reserve Deployment System, uses a Secured File Transfer Protocol interface to communicate with the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army). This is the same Secured File Transfer Protocol process used by the Standard Army Maintenance System.

Forward-positioned equipment sets (Army prepositioned stocks), cannot be viewed as a “rental fleet.” These sets require maintenance when being utilized by units. It is critical that maintenance time is built into exercises and operations and that units conduct maintenance training and meetings to monitor equipment status and take action when repairs or repair parts are needed. Numerous comments from the maintenance community indicate there is no maintenance time built into exercise or training schedules. Additionally, when equipment turn-in takes place, there are significant differences between unit readiness reports and the results of joint initial inspections of the equipment. Heavy forces are maintenance intensive, whether in storage or used in training or operations. Command emphasis on unit maintenance training and programs is required to ensure unit readiness.

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

1LT Justin J. Rojek, 627th Transportation Detachment (Movement Control)
39th Transportation Battalion (Movement Control)

Introduction

One of the crucial items that movement controllers must execute in a deployed environment, whether combat or training, is reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). The factors that affect these operations are vast and vary greatly from one unit to another depending on the number of personnel, number and type of vehicles, structure of the organization, location of departure (CONUS or outside the continental U.S. [OCONUS]), mode of reception (ground, sea, rail, or air), size of the advance party, level of coordination with the deploying element unit movement team, capabilities of the host nation, and numerous other factors. As movement controllers in Atlantic Resolve North attack these challenges, they do so with even more daunting challenges before them. Unlike wartime deployments to combat environments which the U.S. Army has been accustomed to in the past 15 years, deploying to fellow NATO countries in a noncombat training environment requires a completely different outlook and approach. As the U.S. has its own system of imports, exports, movement of tactical vehicles, and other logistic elements, which may vary from state to state, so do partner Atlantic Resolve North nations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Just as New York’s requirements differ from Pennsylvania’s so do Lithuania and Poland’s. This situation may come as a shock for incoming units and logisticians unfamiliar with a European environment. However, this must be quickly overcome to effectively and efficiently execute reception, staging, and onward movement in Atlantic Resolve North.
Coordination

If the deploying unit is located within Europe (most likely in Germany or Italy), the element moves its equipment via ground or rail. The departing countries will have their normal stipulations, but the first major challenge will be Poland, which requires a 30-day timeline to process diplomatic clearances. In each of the other three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the required timeline is only 15 days, which can be accelerated in case of an emergency. Additionally, the timeline of 30 days in Poland does not ensure that one’s diplomatic clearance will be approved. In light of this fact, the deploying unit must give as much lead time as possible for movement coordination.

Regardless of goods arriving by ground, air, or sea, the sending unit’s branch movement control team will receive requests from the supported unit and submit the appropriate diplomatic clearances and permits to deploy for the applicable countries. As these become approved, the transportation detachment will begin the process of tracking all the arrivals, shipments, and convoys of both personnel and cargo into the country. The transportation detachment will provide secondary customs clearance for arriving goods as the deploying unit’s customs clearance officer is the primary. At least one customs clearance officer from the transportation detachment is located in each country to allow for a seamless execution of these duties. Although the deploying unit is responsible for customs clearance, the transportation detachment will be in regular contact and communication with the officials at the National Movement Coordination Center in each nation, which will allow the transportation detachment to easily execute many of the customs duties.

Personnel

As deploying personnel will mainly arrive by air, movement controllers will process and coordinate the deploying unit’s request for transportation from the airport to the outlying stations. In most cases, these will arrive on military flights in two stages: the advance party and the main body. As flight times for military planes are likely to change times, if not days, over the course of the weeks leading up to a deployment, the reception team will remain in regular contact with the contracted bus companies to ensure the buses arrive at the correct time. Because the bus drivers, buses, and any accompanying trailers will be escorted onto the airfield by host-nation movement control escorts, it will be essential to acquire a list of the bus drivers’ names, phone numbers, and vehicle information for airport security clearance.

Upon receiving an incoming flight of deployed passengers, movement controllers ensure that all aspects move smoothly from the execution of the baggage team’s offloading duties to the movement of Soldiers safely off the plane and onto their bus. As baggage for any deploying unit will be excessive, whether the advanced liaison or the main body, it is crucial to have trailers for each bus and a cargo truck provided from the host-nation military. In the case of the advanced liaison, the entire advance party for all three upper Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) will often arrive on a single airplane in one country, such as Latvia. Ensuring that each Soldier properly loads his/her equipment and himself/herself onto the correct bus is a no-fail situation to guarantee onward movement.

Additionally, if any Soldiers arrive by commercial airline, they must have appropriate Department of Defense Form 1610, Request and Authorization for TDY Travel of Department of Defense Personnel, which is validated by host-nation customs. Any supercargo that arrives must be reported to the National Movement Coordination Center. Flights arriving with weapons
will also have to be noted in advance, and host-nation military police will provide escorts for the buses to their final location. For buses traveling across national borders, coordination with the receiving host-nation military police will have be conducted at the time of departure from the airport to ensure a correct border-crossing time. For personnel, reception, staging, and onward movement is executed quickly if adequate planning is completed.

Figure 4-1. Soldiers offload an M88A2 recovery vehicle from the Green Ridge ship during the reception, staging and onward movement phase of Exercise Saber Strike. (U.S. Army photo by SSG Jill People)

Equipment

Reception of equipment may be executed over ground, rail, sea, or a combination of all three. In the case of ground reception, all transportation movement requests must be processed through the originating and receiving branch movement control team. As previously stated, diplomatic clearances and permits to deploy will be completed for each country it enters with entry lists of all equipment, particularly hazardous materials, ammunition, weapons, war material, and other special items that will require host-nation escorts. Upon completion of the initial paperwork, movement controllers will be in contact with the deploying unit, whether military or commercial, to guarantee that timelines are met. Upon receiving equipment at its destination, material handling equipment must be coordinated with the host-nation S-4/G-4 with the appropriate quantity and type, whether crane or forklift. In the case of large-scale arrivals of tactical vehicles, heavy cranes may have to be contracted. Ground movements will generally arrive at the staging area for offloading in the unit’s motor pool, or nearby, and the deploying unit will ensure that its vehicles are properly placed, whether for the length of the deployment or in anticipation of onward movement.
Sea

Reception of equipment by sea requires movement controllers to process the deploying unit’s request for contracted assets to receive and offload their cargo at the port. The Surface Deployment Distribution Command, the transportation detachment, and deploying unit’s unit movement officer will work in conjunction to ensure this process is executed properly. The deploying unit’s unit movement officer ensures safe offloading of cargo is performed by the contracted company. All pieces of equipment are validated by the customs clearance officer and are placed in the staging area of the port according to country and the rail load plans. Movement controllers guarantee that equipment is moved via contracted assets from the staging area onto the railcars. They then validate that all pieces are on the correct cars going to the correct final destination.

Rail

Each of the main training areas in the upper Baltics (Tapa, Adazi, and Rukla) have rail stops in close proximity to the training areas. The transportation detachment processes the request for a contracted company to move and download the cargo. At the rail site, the unit ensures that all equipment is accounted for and safely offloaded. The deployed unit is on-site to receive its vehicles and equipment. Mission-capable vehicles may be driven off the railcars or offloaded with material handling equipment. Bulk fuel assets provide refueling capabilities to the unit and the vehicles are quickly queued into convoy lines to conduct onward movement with host-nation escorts to the training area. All non-mission-capable vehicles and equipment are placed onto contracted line-haul trucks for onward movement. The host-nation National Movement Coordination Center personnel are on-ground during the offloading to facilitate the process and handle any local issues that may arise.

Conclusion

Reception, staging, and onward movement is a multifaceted, complicated process with numerous moving parts that must all synchronize perfectly. Yet, movement controllers are always ready to rise to the challenge and meet the obstacles that will certainly arise. Through ground, air, rail, and sea, movement control will be executed throughout the Baltics to support rapid onward movement of equipment and personnel.
Development of Army Prepositioned Stocks

LTC William J. Shinn, Jr.; MAJ Larry Wright, Jr.; Curtis Dabney; and Michael Printer

Background

“For the U.S. ... we are making significant adjustments to the European force posture consistent with our new defense strategy. Yes, it includes the downsizing of some of our less-relevant Cold War forces, such as the two heavy Army brigades that we removed from Europe.

But let me be clear that this effort is not primarily about cuts. It’s about reshaping our cooperation for the new challenges ahead. That means, even as we make some reductions, we will be supporting new rotational deployments, enhanced training, enhanced exercises, and other new initiatives that bolster the readiness of our forces and build their capacity to seamlessly work together.

Whether deploying ballistic missile defense, such as our destroyers, our Aegis destroyers to Rota, establishing a new U.S. aviation detachment in Poland, deploying U.S. Army battalions on a rotational basis to participate in the NATO Response Force, we are making tangible investments in these new forms of cooperation to make the alliance more responsive and more agile. And we are doing so in a cost-effective way that meets our fiscal responsibilities.”

— Speech by former Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, 18 JAN 2013, at King’s College London.

As former Secretary Panetta stated in his January 2013 speech at King’s College London, the Army has reduced brigade combat teams in Europe from four to two: the 170th Heavy Brigade Combat Team inactivated in October 2012 with the 172nd Heavy Brigade Combat Team following in October 2013. According to Secretary Panetta, one of the actions mitigating the loss of two brigade combat teams in Europe would be centered on rotational deployments of U.S. Army battalions to Europe and their participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF).

The Chief of Staff, Army has emphasized his intent to deploy a CONUS battalion task force and a brigade headquarters command and control element to train in Europe twice annually. Apart from providing cost-effective training, participation of U.S.-based forces with partner nations will reinvigorate the NRF and enhance the responsiveness and agility of NATO. Altogether, 15 nations have taken part in the training during the first rotation.

The Joint Multinational Training Command, located in Grafenwöhr, Germany, and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, located in Hohenfels, Germany, have been designated the command and training locations to support the Chief of Staff, Army’s intent. In an effort to support the new mission, the Department of the Army is establishing the European Activity Set in Grafenwöhr. The European Activity Set will consist of a modernized, fully independent, combat-ready combined arms battalion with brigade enablers for the designated CONUS force to utilize as directed in support of NATO contingency operations.
The European Activity Set is part of Army prepositioned stocks-2, which is the Army’s equipment set in Europe. It consists of a mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle fleet in Livorno, Italy, still in its infancy, and the European Activity Set in Grafenwöhr, Germany. Army prepositioned stocks-2 is Army-owned, but managed, accounted for, and maintained by Army Material Command. Army Field Support Battalion-Italy is responsible for the equipment at Livorno, Italy, while Army Field Support Battalion-Germany manages the European Activity Set.

Equipment in Army prepositioned stocks must be ready to be issued to any organization as directed by the Department of the Army to support any contingency operation throughout the world. A secondary mission is to enable Department of the Army-designated RAF to conduct joint and multinational training in support of the NRF/European Response Force without transporting their organic equipment from CONUS.

Planning for the logistics of the European Activity Set began in October 2012 when technical experts from Army Material Command, Army Sustainment Command, USAREUR, Installation Management Command-Europe, and the 21st Theater Sustainment Command assembled to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. The cost-benefit analysis has been completed and that document is now shaping the size of the European Activity Set workforce, which is a mix of the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and table of distribution and allowances equipment, number of facilities, and amount of funding required to support the European Activity Set.

Manning

The cost-benefit analysis work group recommended the European Activity Set workforce consist of five Department of the Army Civilians, supplementary contracted logistics support (i.e., contractors), and 47 mechanics from the Theater Logistics Support Center-Europe. The Department of the Army Civilians identified to support the European Activity Set mission were a GS-13 logistics management specialist and four GS-12 logistics management specialists. The GS-13 was the European Activity Set program manager, responsible for the daily operations of the EAS workforce. The GS-12s are quality assurance/quality control technicians, who represented the government in regard to work performed by the contractors and the Theater Logistics Support Center-Europe.

The contractors were hired to perform supply operations and limited maintenance support, which included small arms repair and communications and electronics repair. The 47 mechanics from Theater Logistics Support Center-Europe were under operational control to the European Activity Set workforce. These technically proficient local-national mechanics worked at the Maintenance Activity, Vilseck, Germany, and have been repairing U.S. Army military equipment for many years. These table of distribution and allowances positions from USAREUR were reassigned to the Army Material Command table of distribution and allowances. Up until the transfer, Army Material Command reimbursed USAREUR for the man-hours.

Facilities

Installation Management Command-Europe provided facilities for the European Activity Set logistics workforce to establish and maintain daily operations. These facilities are located at Tower Barracks, Grafenwöhr, Germany. The facilities required renovations as well as new construction to support the European Activity Set support mission. The facilities initially consisted of tank parks and a motor pool.
The 405th Army Field Support Battalion-Germany and the 405th Brigade support operations staff determined that the facilities could not adequately support the European Activity Set logistic support mission. An additional 40,000 square feet of storage was required to store all authorized stockage levels, basic issue items, and facilities necessary to conduct maintenance operations. The brigade support operations staff located two 20,000 square foot tent fabric structures at the Germersheim, Germany, staging site that were no longer being used by Army Material Command. Both tents were eventually shipped to Tower Barracks to provide the European Activity Set mission the 40,000 square feet required for storage.

USAREUR approved the use of a motorpool facility on a temporary basis to support the initial operations of the European Activity Set until renovations and construction are completed at the assigned facilities. This approval came in time as authorized stockage levels/bench stock/prescribed load list items began arriving on 13 OCT 2013. These items were first stored within the temporary facilities because a workforce was not available to support this new unfunded mission. The 405th Army Field Support Battalion worked through this issue and directed the Logistics Readiness Center-Bavaria to provide a small workforce to begin an inventory and accounting for the items received. The authorized stockage level/prescribed load list was containerized pending the contract award for supply operations. However, after the contract was awarded, an additional 40,000 square feet of storage space were still required.

**Equipment**

Both MTOE and table of distribution and allowances equipment are required to support the European Activity Set. The MTOE was approved by the Department of the Army with input from USAREUR and Army Material Command and consisted of a combined arms battalion(-) plus brigade enablers, such as command and control equipment. The table of distribution and allowances equipment was required by the European Activity Set workforce to maintain the European Activity Set MTOE equipment.

The European Activity Set was also supported by three Class IX (repair parts) support packages. All three support packages of Class IX were verified and approved by the Army Material Command staff. The first support package was the authorized stockage list consisting of 19.5 million in Class IX supplies. The second and third support packages were designed to support the daily maintenance and servicing operations of the European Activity Set MTOE equipment. These packages included bench and shop stock. In a cost-saving effort and in the interest of enhancing Army best-business practices, Army Field Support Battalion-Germany and Logistics Readiness Center-Bavaria teamed together to store, issue, and replenish the authorized stockage list/prescribed load list directly in the local Regional Supply Support Activity, thereby increasing efficiencies and flattening labor efforts to drive down operating costs.

Since the European Activity Set’s primary mission is to support Department of the Army’s Army prepositioned stocks-2 program (Army prepositioned stocks-2 Europe), the Army requires this European Activity Set MTOE equipment to be maintained at 10/20 standard and deployable within 96 hours after Department of the Army notification. This maintenance standard requires the technical expertise and logistics support to maintain, sustain, and manage this equipment by an RAF.
Rail Cargo Express Corridor Network for European Command

MAJ William Foster, 21st Theater Sustainment Command

“Build no more defensive forts; build railways instead.”

— Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff, 1905

During the event of contingency operations or conflict, rail is a crucial asset in the movement of large amounts of military cargo across the Europe. Germany will become the most important transit country in Europe in the event of conflict. Therefore, the development of the Rail Cargo Express Corridor Network (RCECNET) should start in Germany to support the movement of U.S. military, Bundeswehr, NATO, and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). Key debarkation nodes for the U.S. military within Germany will be the Army prepositioned stock sites, (two within Germany, one in Belgium, and one in Netherlands, both close to Germany’s western border), ammunition depots, and other power projection platforms. These particular locations will be the first to push out, at the same time as NATO or the ERRF. CONUS forces’ equipment will take at least 20 to 35 days to arrive. The time frame for the afloat equipment, if called on to support operations in Europe, can vary anywhere from 5 to 15 days, depending on the ship’s location.

Discussion

Movement of large volumes of military cargo is accomplished with the use of rail across the continent of Europe. The need for RCECNET to have main rail routes and secondary rail routes developed for the Northern/Central and Southern regions of EUCOM’s area of responsibility in order to meet the USAREUR commander’s intent for “freedom of movement” and “speed of assembly” during contingency operations or conflict.

The RCECNET lines designated must handle the heavy loads of military cargo, and meet oversized and outsize dimension requirements to prevent delays. Any cargo that is oversized/over dimension should be predetermined prior to rail movements and therefore transported by commercial or military truck transport.

European Railway Facts

Unlike the U.S. railroad industry, which is a nongovernment entity, European railroads differ in their operations from country to country. Specifically, these differences are:

- Government owned and operated
- Government owned and commercially operated
- Commercially owned and operated

U.S. military cargo is a small percentage of revenue (less than .1 percent) for the European railroad industry. Like any other capitalistic business, railroads generate revenue and profits for their stakeholders. The U.S., NATO, and ERRF militaries will be competing for rail assets against the movement of commercial cargo during non-contingency and contingency operations.
The German rail industry, known as the Deutsche Bahn (DB), is a German railway company. Headquartered in Berlin, it is a private joint-stock company (AG) with the Federal Republic of Germany being its single shareholder. DB (also known as DB AG) describes itself as the second-largest transport company in the world and is the largest railway operator and infrastructure owner in Europe.

DB Cargo is the logistics arm of DB AG. DB Cargo rail operates in 15 countries in Europe including its own companies, subsidiaries, holdings, and joint ventures. DB Cargo rail offers efficient haulage capacities in block trains, single freight car system, and combined transport. Its main focus is the market units’ metal, coal, chemicals, mineral oils, construction materials, industrial and consumer goods, and intermodal and automotive goods. DB Cargo rail departs about 4,800 freight trains daily. The amount of carried goods totaled 329 million tons. With around 89,000 freight wagons and about 2,878 locomotives, including a high percentage of cross-border operating multisystem locomotives, DB Cargo rail has the largest fleet in Europe.

As of today, nearly 60 percent of the freight trains cross at least one border. DB Cargo rail consists of the three regions, East, Germany/Central, and West. The region West companies include DB Schenker Rail U.K. as the biggest rail freight operator in Great Britain, Euro Cargo Rail France, No. 2 in France, as well as Transfesa/Euro Cargo Rail Spain.

A close inter-working relationship needs to be established and fostered between the U.S. military in Europe, NATO, ERRF, DB Schenker, and other rail carriers in Europe for the purpose and understanding of how rail operations will work efficiently and effectively during the event of contingency operations or conflict.

European rail gauge is not uniform throughout EUCOM. Many of eastern Europe NATO allies (of the former Soviet bloc) have converted to the standard gauge of 1,435 millimeter (mm) with their rail systems. However, the NATO nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remain on the broad gauge 1,520 mm. When crossing from one gauge to another, cargo must be trans-loaded between different gauge railcars. There are a limited number of specialized railcars with adjustable wheels. However, these specialized cars are typically not used for Department of Defense cargo.

**Order of March**

Mission specifications and rail requirements need to be mapped out in advance, as well as who will need to receive rail assets first, where the assets will be drawn from, timetables established, who will be conducting shunting operations, etc. In other words, all stakeholders will know what their roles and responsibilities will be in advance of a contingency and or wartime operations.
Government Agencies and Ministries of Defense

During non-contingency operations, such as military exercises, movement of military cargo by rail plays a key role. However, the U.S. military cargo does not receive preferential treatment from the rail carriers. Overloading of the existing rail system and infrastructure, train delays, crew shortages, changes in rail builds is to be anticipated. During the event of a conflict, occurrences that took place during non-contingency operations must be mitigated. In order for such mitigations to take place, European government agencies and the Ministries of Defense all need to be in agreement with the RCECNET concept. During conflict, business and commerce still take place. This is all the more reason why RCECNET needs to be implemented and signed off on at the highest level so the U.S. military, NATO, and ERRF can truly have speed of assembly and freedom of movement.

Permissive Rail Block Options

In order to have “speed of assembly” and “freedom of movement” by rail in the EUCOM area of responsibility during contingency operations or conflict, the implementation of permissive block options for rail should be adopted (see Figure 4-2). Permissive block options allow for movement of rail in one direction along the RCECNET.

Permissive block options basically give the military exclusive use and track rights for the large movement of cargo. Train movements and timetables can therefore be established for the continuous movement of cargo to get to the fight. Implementation and the timeframe needed for the use of the permissive block options will have to be determined according to events taking place in the EUCOM area of responsibility. What is the trigger or event that would implement the use of permissive block options in order to meet the USAREUR commander’s intent of speed of assembly and freedom of movement?

Figure 4-2. Permissive block options
Recommendations and the Way Ahead

Going forward, there are many variables to consider when planning rail operations. The following are some of the many variables and considerations to implement:

1. Continue working with the Bundeswehr Joint Logistical Command (Bonn, Germany) in the development of RCECNET and feeder lines from the northern and central regions of Germany.

2. Develop the RCECNET for the southern region of EUCOM’s area of responsibility.

3. Determine “order of march.” Who will be in need of the limited rail assets first, second, third, etc.?

4. Implement the use of permissive block options during the event of contingency or conflict.

5. Meet and discuss with NATO members to join the RCECNET program.

6. Develop and submit contingency or war-time rail plans to the rail industry and refine plans as they mature and develop. U.S. rail plans should include Army prepositioned stocks, sea ports of debarkation, aerial ports of debarkation, ammunition facilities, and other rail power projection platforms. Rail plans from NATO members should also be submitted.

7. Purchase of Standard Army Materiel Management System rail cars (capable of transporting one M1A2 Abrams tank) for movement of an armored brigade combat team heavy equipment across the EUCOM area of responsibility.

8. Lease and contract agreements with the rail industry to provide locomotives and personnel to perform shunting operations on a 24/7 basis.

9. Develop “pusher” and “receiver” units for movement of cargo out of the Army prepositioned stocks sites.

10. Develop a closer working relationship with the Europe rail industry similar to the relationship the U.S. military has with the CONUS rail industry.

11. Develop operation plans for what should move by rail and what will move by truck.

Endnote

Chapter 5
Building a Strong Europe: From Assurance to Deterrence

Mission

U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) provides trained and ready land forces across the U.S. Army European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) to assure U.S. allies, deter Russia from further aggression, and protect U.S. interests and personnel in Europe.

Assurance to Deterrence

USAREUR will seize and retain the initiative to address the arc of instability along the North American Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) periphery and beyond. As the European arm of the Global Readiness Force, USAREUR provides decision space for political leaders to address threats in and around Europe. USAREUR will shift to a deterrence posture by ensuring it is in the right place (Army prepositioned stocks [APS], ammunition positioning, infrastructure) with the right equipment (armored, mobile, interoperable, and “green”), and can get to potential crisis areas quickly (speed created by freedom of movement) with confident, trained, and ready formations. In the simplest sense, USAREUR is ready to “fight tonight” throughout the European theater.

Regional Focus Areas

USAREUR will continue to increase its interaction with allies and partners who are under pressure from Russia or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as those who face challenges arising from the influx of refugees to continue assuring them of U.S. interest in and commitment to their security and stability. By the end of 2016, USAREUR achieved increased effects in the Black Sea Region (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, and Romania), the Balkans, and on NATO’s southern flank. As the first major post-Warsaw exercise, Exercise Saber Guardian 2017 demonstrated USAREUR’s increased emphasis in the Black Sea Region to make Russia compete. USAREUR will continue to expand its presence in the south through exercises, engagements, and exchanges with France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Its goal in the south is to help these nations build capability and capacity, strengthen relationships, and improve overall deterrence and security.

USAREUR will expand its influence in some countries and regions where previous effects have been episodic. In addition, it will increase the presence of U.S. Army personnel in embassies and offices of defense cooperation in those countries. It will also promote the establishment of National Guard State Partnership Program relationships with Greece and Portugal to assure nations along NATO’s southern flank of the commitment of the alliance and the U.S. to the region’s security. USAREUR’s strategy also includes more visible and productive cooperation with component commands of other military services (U.S. Army Africa/Southern European Task Force, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet, U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Force Africa, and the Joint Forces Command-Naples).
U.S. policy continues to mature in its relationship with Turkey after the coup. The Vice President of the U.S. reaffirmed the strength and resilience of Turkish democracy, the U.S.-Turkey alliance, and particularly Turkish efforts as a vital member of the counter-ISIL coalition. Turkey is a NATO ally and a member of the counter-ISIL coalition. USAREUR will continue to work with Turkey as ISIL is ultimately degraded and defeated. USAREUR will work toward a settlement of the conflict in Syria. Accordingly, NATO operations will continue in Turkey. USAREUR will work with EUCOM, interagency partners, and NATO allies to meet U.S. goals in the region.

In early 2017, the 4th Infantry Division Mission Command Element, led the implementation of a 2.0 presence as USAREUR moved from assurance to deterrence in the Atlantic Resolve area of operations. Through EUCOM, USAREUR implemented its Framework Nation responsibilities for Poland as part of the alliance’s commitment to Warsaw. USAREUR will execute its task of the Enhanced Forward Presence (or “eFP,” which is a NATO brevity code) battalion in Poland as the outcome of the Warsaw Summit. The year 2017 was the year USAREUR transitioned to the “heel-to-toe” regionally aligned force (RAF) structure that consisted of an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) and a combat aviation brigade deployed for 9-month rotations across Eastern Europe.

USAREUR will work with EUCOM and the alliance to determine the appropriate U.S. Army contribution to the “tailored forward presence” in the southeast part of the alliance territory described in paragraph 41 of the Warsaw Communique. USAREUR will focus its efforts toward the Black Sea Region with active participation in the Romanian initiative to establish a multinational framework brigade to help improve integrated training of allied units under Headquarters, Multinational Division Southeast. USAREUR will contribute to the alliance’s strengthened deterrence and defense posture, situational awareness, and peacetime demonstration of NATO’s intent to operate without constraint. USAREUR’s actions will provide a strong signal of support to regional security.

Vision

USAREUR’s 30,000 assigned, forward-stationed Soldiers must look and feel like 300,000 to achieve the three strategic effects: assurance, deterrence, and protection of U.S. interests and U.S. personnel. USAREUR has a culture of readiness. Consequently, everyone in formations should be able to answer the question, “Do you know where your helmet is?” USAREUR will employ its three key concepts to achieve the three strategic effects: speed, enabling the environment, and key exercises.

Speed. Speed is essential to providing deterrent landpower effects for EUCOM and the NATO enabling environment:

**Speed of recognition.** Speed of recognition requires an increased capability to detect indicators and provide warning; an increased understanding of Russian capabilities, personalities, and vulnerabilities; increased intelligence sharing; and improved integration into NATO as well as bilateral and multilateral intelligence organizations and operations. Improved coordination and information sharing with the U.S. Special Operations Command-Europe will enable USAREUR to address conventional and unconventional threats and protect infrastructure and garrisons. USAREUR integration of U.S. forces into and its support of theater ballistic missile defense is equally vital to the speed of recognition.
**Speed of decision.** Decisions will be made by nations and by the alliance. USAREUR will be ready to act on a bilateral or multilateral basis or as part of the alliance. The Graduated Response Plan prepared by the Allied Land Command and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe represents the alliance’s efforts to accelerate decision making. USAREUR is expected to be integrated into the Graduated Response Plan process as USAREUR is with the EUCOM operational planning process. USAREUR should be closely linked to EUCOM, ambassadors, and country teams in each country in its area of operation, and to the NATO commands to improve understanding. This in turn will enable USAREUR to make quick decisions.

**Speed of assembly.** A demonstrated capability to move and deliver forces and effects is the ultimate key to deterrence. This includes the immediate deployment of forward-stationed forces (including Patriot systems) and the rapid reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of arriving RAF to fall in on APS. Because USAREUR anticipates short-notice warning of any state-sponsored attack, and obviously much less in the case of terrorist attacks, its units and leaders must be able to build multinational formations or work with host-nation security forces immediately. USAREUR will not have six to 12 months to prepare for deployment. This is why Installation Management Command-Europe has been directed to assess and invest in infrastructure such as motor pools and rail and maintenance facilities that will allow rapid assembly for onward movement. Having the readiness platforms on key installations is critical to the ability to meet the mission. USAREUR will improve and exercise freedom of movement with EUCOM and allies to ensure it has the capability and requisite infrastructure to mass the RAF ABCT within 72 hours anywhere in Europe.

**Enabling the environment.** Enabling the environment is at the heart of all of this and is critical from a U.S. and NATO perspective. Specific areas in which USAREUR will need to improve in the near-term to achieve the required speed include the following capabilities with multinational formations:

- Multinational secure tactical radios capable of frequency modulation that use frequency-hopping technology to minimize the risk of jamming, dual frequency, interception, and subsequent targeting

- System interoperability to enable multinational digital-fire missions (for example, U.S. radar linked to allied artillery for counter-fire)

- Development of a multinational common operational picture where visual representations (icons) of the subordinate unit populate the common operational picture of the higher headquarters, regardless of the system used
Freedom of movement. Freedom of movement requires strong habitual relationships with NATO force integration units; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOMI) (the NATO brevity code for RSOI); the equivalent of a “military Schengen zone” that allows rapid transnational movement of units, ammunition, aircraft, and Soldiers; and a perfect knowledge of infrastructure (for example, bridge military-load classifications, overpass heights, airfields, staging areas, bulk storage areas, main supply route designations, route-movement control, and host nation security). The Theater Sustainment Terrain Walk (April 2017) explored three key capabilities: move the APS ABCT to an assembly area, mass the RAF, and enable the Very High-Readiness Joint Task Force. This will require rigor and practice to improve the ability to convey will and readiness. USAREUR must work with country teams in its AOR to ensure mobility and freedom to move quickly across Europe.

Information and intelligence sharing. There will be no daylight between USAREUR and the U.S. country teams in each nation within its AOR. USAREUR will ensure the command has sufficient Russian linguists by identifying and tapping existing Soldiers with Russian language capability, looking at reserve component linguistic capabilities, and improving Russian linguistic capability by utilizing Defense Language Institute resources. USAREUR will increase sharing with special operations forces; host nations; the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center; and multinational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance intelligence fusion centers. USAREUR will also encourage the pervasive use of the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System. USAREUR will secure and emplace radar identification and direction towers, aerostats, or other means of surveillance along borders to support the intelligence collection performed by host nations.

Sustainability of the rotation plan for forward-stationed and continental U.S.-based forces. This includes accurate forecasts of requirements and rotations, reachback to the continental U.S. to ensure the preparation and readiness of rotational units, and lessons learned from previous rotations to ensure that USAREUR is adequately programmed and has the necessary resources for Atlantic Resolve and numbered plans.

Host-nation relations. Assurance, deterrence (to include RSOI), and the protection of U.S. interests in Europe would be impossible without the strong cooperation from the host nations. USAREUR will continue to expand its efforts to build trust, to be transparent, and to cultivate relationships that are both broad (public outreach program) and deep (political-military relations). This will extend from the U.S. embassy and national European-government level (through U.S. defense attaché officers and USAREUR liaison officers), to the European state government level (through U.S. forces liaison officers and U.S. consulates), and down to local U.S. military communities (U.S. Army garrisons). USAREUR will not only talk about the importance of great host-nation relations, USAREUR will live it each day, so that it can “fight tonight.”
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