Director's Corner

This month we delivered several highly anticipated products that I am sure will benefit your units and formations. The “Radio and System Operators Handbook,” Version 2, updates one of our most requested products with step-by-step instructions for operating radios and systems up through Capability Set 15. We also released “Ten Fundamental Brigade Combat Team Skills Required to Win the First Fight” and “Fighting with Fires” in collaboration with the subject matter experts at the National Training Center. I think you will find these newsletters useful as you prepare for decisive action rotations.

We are launching a “Key Insights” section in this issue of the CALL Insider featuring observations from the field that deserve wider distribution to the force. The results from the 2017 Gainey Cup provide several challenges scout teams faced that apply more generally to training shortfalls in other unit formations.

I highly encourage those of you who are common access card (CAC) holders to subscribe to our monthly “New Pubs and Announcements” email. From the CALL CAC-enabled website (https://call2.army.mil), scroll to the bottom right-hand corner of the web page. Select “Subscribe.” You will receive an email at the beginning of every month keeping you up-to-date on CALL's latest projects, published works, and requests for information.

Finally, congratulations are in order for CPT Thomas Malejko, 65th Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB), for producing last quarter’s best “Best Practice.” His submission, “Fighting the Analog War … Again,” gives us several key lessons and products developed by the planners in the 65th BEB. Well done!

Mike Pappal
COL, AR

Recent CALL Publications

17-19: Ten Fundamental Brigade Combat Team Skills Required to Win the First Fight
Written by subject matter experts at the National Training Center (NTC), this publication communicates doctrinal solutions to persistent observations, helping leaders quickly understand the issues and change their training strategies as required. The 10 fundamental skills were derived from senior leader input, persistent observations, and trends. They will be re-evaluated and updated regularly to ensure the NTC operations group provides the best feedback to the force that will enable brigade combat team success. JLLIS link.

17-23: Fighting with Fires (CAC login required)
In the 1990s, the fire support community published an excellent three-volume series of observations and recommendations based on a decade of experience against a world-class opposing force (OPFOR). Fighting with Fires, Volume IV, expands the series with recent observations from the combat training centers (CTCs) based on the last three years of training in a decisive action training environment. The goal of this publication is to assist brigade combat teams (BCTs) in training-to-proficiency in planning, preparing, and executing fires so the combined arms team is ready to win the first battle of the next conflict. JLLIS link.

Version 2 updates one of CALL's most requested publications. It includes detailed instructions for radios and systems used by Soldiers up to and including Capability Set (CS) 15. This handbook provides the user with a quick reference guide and step-by-step instructions to quickly and securely place communications systems into operation. JLLIS link.
17-25: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Special Study
(CAC login required)
CALL, in coordination with academic and technical threat experts, conducted a study addressing the significance of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) in contemporary and future operating environments. The study is bracketed into the following topics: evolution of Islamic State UAS employment in Iraq and Syria, current enemy methods of countering friendly force UAS, future UAS threat potentials with Islamic State specific analysis, and framework and methodology for Army leaders to approach UAS operations. JLLIS link.

17-22: Yama Sakura 71 (CAC login required)
Yama Sakura (YS) is the largest bilateral, multifaceted exercise conducted by Japan and U.S. ground components. This is a challenging and vitally important exercise for U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Western Army. The progress that both militaries are making with each iteration of YS continually improves readiness by enabling organizations at all levels to train and execute operations more effectively. This initial impressions report was produced to provide the warfighter with unified action partners with lessons and best practices from YS 71. JLLIS link.

17-21: Permanent Executive Secretariat of the Conference of American Armies Vol. II
The Conference of American Armies (CAA) is an international military organization made up of and led by armies from the American continents. This bulletin, volume two of three, provides valuable information to leaders from all conference nations on the goals, processes, and procedures as a contributing army. This specific volume is the “how-to” guide for member nations, outlining the structure and two-year cycle of events of the PESCAA. JLLIS link.

News From the Front (NFTF) and CTCs

News from the CTC: When Do We ENDEX?: Maximizing Home Station Training (CAC login required)
This article is intended for all units conducting home station training to prepare themselves for a combat training center (CTC) rotation. The author notes that units routinely struggle to synchronize warfighting functions (WfF) during decisive action and joint forcible entry. He surmises that this is due to the way units train while at home station and goes on to explain a simple way to include other WfFs while training. This is accomplished by not concluding the training event once the unit has consolidated and reorganized, but continuing until other tasks, such as requesting MEDEVAC and evacuating all casualties, receiving replacement personnel, and resupply are accomplished. Other WfFs can be added with additional planning for the training event. JLLIS link.

News from the CTC: Who Are You Going to Call? FAST (CAC login required)
In today’s world of saturated communications, there are any number of ways to call for help, but time and distance will always affect the outcome. If a reacting force is not staged to respond, or at least ready to deploy, events may unravel any plan to get such a force to those in need. The Marine Corps has taken that need to heart. In this article, the authors introduce the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) in its first time training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). This environment enables the Marine FAST to sharpen its skills in a full-scale interactive collective training environment. JLLIS link.

News from the CTC: Integrating BEB Terrain Management into BCT Operations (CAC login required)
Brigade engineer battalions (BEBs) continue to struggle with terrain management primarily due to the lack of integration of terrain management into the brigade combat team (BCT) operations process, and the lack of BEB capacity to integrate and synchronize adjacent battalions within the BCT. In this article, the author highlights the terrain management steps in the operations process that, when conducted at the BCT level, eliminate or lessen the burden of terrain management on the BEB. JLLIS link.

News From the CTC: Airborne Delivery of AN-TPQ-50 Planning Considerations (CAC login required)
This article provides planning considerations for the Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar (LCMR) system, which has evolved to be rugged as a result of subsequent builds and improved hardware and software. The LCMR provides the capabilities of being a ground-mounted, vehicle-mounted, air-mobile, or air-deliverable system. JLLIS link.

Theater Planning Considerations for Displaced Persons in the USARPAC AOR Newsletter (CAC login required)
One of the most vexing challenges the U.S. military has faced has been large groups of displaced persons. These groups, whether refugees or internally displaced persons, universally share the same needs and vulnerabilities. Knowing what can, should, and/or must be done to protect displaced persons will undoubtedly become an operational imperative for units. This handbook assists in that endeavor and offers a valuable tool for practitioners to apply in just such an occurrence. JLLIS link.
News From the Front (NFTF) - Ministerial Advisors Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CAC login required)
This paper summarizes the key points of an interview with MG Richard Kaiser, Commanding General (CG) for the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). This interview, conducted at the conclusion of his tour, includes his reflections on training for advisors, interagency cooperation, and best practices/lessons learned during his tenure as CG. JLLIS link.

NFTF: CJTF-OIR Operations and Targeting Board
This NFTF gives an overview of the Combined Joint Task Force -- Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Operations and Targeting Board (OTB). The function of the OTB is to outline, deconflict, and synchronize operations conducted in the combined joint operations area (CJOA) in the short to medium timeframe. The ultimate goal of the OTB is to maintain transparency while developing the CJTF-OIR priority of effort (PoE), which informs the weight of effort (WoE) applied to each named operation. The WoE is then used to develop the strike allocation in order to communicate the commander’s intent for air asset apportionment during the execution week.

News from the CTC: Brigade Combat Team Army Health System Operations
As the focus of the Army shifts from COIN operations toward the hybrid threat inherent in the decisive action environment, the combat training centers prepare units for an austere and dynamic threat that places Army Health System (AHS) operations on the forefront of the operation. This emphasis highlights the need for AHS integration into planning, training, and execution at all levels. This article outlines common AHS challenges experienced by BCTs at NTC and the courses of action and best practices that have proven most effective in mitigating or eliminating them.

News From the CTC: Religious Support Planning in the Decisive Action Training Environment
Unit ministry teams (UMTs) familiar with counterinsurgency and/or unfamiliar with decisive action training environment (DATE) scenarios face numerous challenges when attempting to develop religious support plans. Current challenges facing UMTs include inadequate doctrinal understanding and execution of the operations process; heavy dependence upon past and outdated tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); deficiencies in effective staff integration; and the struggle to understanding roles and responsibilities at the brigade UMT level. In this article, the authors discuss these challenges and provide a way forward for UMTs attending the Joint Readiness Training Center to develop doctrinally sound and integrated religious support plans for DATE scenarios. JLLIS link.

News From the CTC: Impact of Capability Set (CS) 15 on Battalion Operations Planning (CAC login required)
To determine how CS15 is affecting the ability of an infantry battalion to conduct planning operations, three battalions were surveyed and observed during a DATE rotation. These units were in the rotation cycle three times: 90 days prior to their rotation at the leadership training program (LTP), during preparation (reception, staging, onward movement, and integration [RSOI]), and after completion of the rotation (change of mission [COM]). This article documents these findings and identifies lessons in the areas of architecture, training, and maintenance. JLLIS link.

News From the CTC: The Art and Science of the Communications Exercise (CAC login required)
The key to a BCT’s success at the JRTC often lies in its preparation and the same holds true when it comes to the BCT’s communications. In this article, the author discusses the importance of setting the unit up for success by executing a communications exercise in preparation for the unit JRTC DATE rotation. JLLIS link.

News From the CTC: Military Police Disciplines in Decisive Action (DA): Lessons Learned (CAC login required)
Military police OC/Ts at the JRTC observed a growing gap between the expectations for MPs and their displayed ability to enable combat power for BCT commanders during DATE rotations. Multiple factors may contribute to underuse or limited mission execution. In this article, the authors highlight the importance of the MP leadership involvement in the battalion planning process which arms the battalion staff with subject matter expertise when applying MP capabilities against the desired end state. JLLIS link.

News From the CTC: Developing and Maintaining Running Estimates: JRTC Lessons Learned (CAC login required)
Commanders use running estimates to drive both the decision-making process and the development of viable courses of action. The groundwork of developing running estimates is rooted in identifying mission requirements and those variables affecting the Army’s military decisionmaking process (MDMP). In this article, the authors define the running estimate and discuss its development, factors affecting development, expectation management, and maintenance. JLLIS link.

News From the CTC: Cavalry Operations at the JRTC (CAC login required)
Cavalry troopers have adapted tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to meet the demands of the ever-evolving battlefield. In this article, the authors discuss the security and reconnaissance missions historically performed by the cavalry. These missions are essential to the lethality and survivability of the main battle force. JLLIS link.
News From the CTC: From FOB Artillery to Field Artillery: Lessons Learned from the JRTC (CAC login required)
The occupation of forward operating bases (FOBs) and combat outposts (COPs) and the inactivation of all division artillery has created unintended impacts and long-term consequences on field artillery (FA) combat readiness. Some skills have atrophied in executing a wide array of tactical artillery missions and related operations at the JRTC. This article describes some of the areas FA leaders find most challenging in the DATE and what areas need emphasis to improve performance. JLLIS link.

News From the CTC: Mission Command Transition - A Lost Art (CAC login required)
Units consistently overlook mission command planning for an operation and forget to incorporate the basic required planning considerations. Between the constricted planning timeline and a baseline understanding of common interoperability capabilities the communication package possesses, control and transfer of mission command are very difficult. In this article, the authors discuss the five recommended planning considerations, in addition to the Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) task, that a battalion should take account of to be successful. If these planning considerations are taken into account, units will execute jump command post operations with substantially less friction. JLLIS link.

News From the CTC: Refining the Field Artillery Task (CAC login required)
The field artillery battalion supports unified land operations by facilitating the brigade commander’s ability to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative in an offensive, defensive, or stability operation. After observing numerous field artillery battalions at the JRTC, OC/Ts report that battalions struggle when developing a field artillery task (FAT), a main aspect of the field artillery support plan (FASP). In this article, the authors discuss the importance of developing FATs in a battalion FASP to support the maneuver commander in achieving his overall objective. JLLIS link.

News From the CTC: E FSC BEB Role and Trends While Operating at the JRTC (CAC login required)
The newly established E forward support company (FSC) mission is to provide full-spectrum logistics support to the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) to sustain unified land combat operations. E FSCs deploy to the JRTC with a mission to provide direct support to the BEB. In this article, the author discusses the FSC pitfalls/trends most commonly observed at the JRTC. JLLIS link.

Best Practice Submissions

2IBCT 25ID Lightning Forge 17-01 PACE Plan Enabler (CAC login required)
One consistent problem that plagues brigade combat teams (BCTs) in a DATE is the way in which information is distributed throughout the battle space. In this best practice, learn how the 2nd BCT, 25th Infantry Division, has harnessed a capability of the secure mission data loader (MDL) to move information, products, and graphics from secret internet protocol routing (SIPR) network systems to the Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) system to be distributed across the battlefield.

The UAS Platoon Leader’s Survival Guide (CAC login required)
This document is a collection of tools and recommendations that can help new or inexperienced unmanned aircraft system (UAS) platoon leaders during their first leadership assignment. Although it is primarily written for personnel in RQ-7B units, Soldiers in MQ-1C organizations may find it just as useful. The author provides screenshots from annexes, websites, and slide shows of beneficial products.

Successful Consulate Operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (CAC login required)
BCTs rotating through the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) DATE are required to send a liaison team to coordinate with the U.S. consulate country team. This team should be dynamic, flexible, and possess organic and non-organic enablers and equipment in order to be successful. This article identifies best practices, lessons learned, and keys to successfully engaging the interagency, intergovernmental, and interdependence spheres amongst unified action partners.

Achieving Interoperability in a Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational (JIIM) Environment (CAC login required)
This paper outlines Task Force Warrior’s initial analysis of achieving interoperability with the United Kingdom’s 1st Battalion, Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment (1LANCS), while conducting JRTC Rotation 17-04. It provides a framework for successfully integrating a battle group or similar battalion-sized unit into an infantry BCT, from addition of the unit, to the brigade task organization, through execution of tactical operations during a DATE rotation. Read more to learn how Task Force Warrior created a liaison team specifically designed to embed with 1LANCS to facilitate effective communication and dissemination of mission orders.
**“First 100 Days” Handbooks**

We are capturing lessons, best practices, and vignettes describing what a company commander and 1SG can expect in their first 100 days of assuming command or responsibility. What did you wish you knew going in as you look back on the experience of assuming your position as a commander or 1SG? We are also requesting the same type of information for platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. These publications are planned for delivery in 4th quarter FY18. Input may be sent to our operations section at usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.call-rfi-manager-mailbox@mail.mil (ATTN: MAJ Kaczor [Company CDR/1SG] or CPT Beale [PL/PSG])

**Korea Theater of Operations Multinational Interoperability**

Improving interoperability and executing effective multinational (MN) operations are persistent challenges to U.S. ground forces and its allies. U.S. and Republic of Korea armed forces have been at the forefront in developing solutions and integrating capabilities in addressing these gaps. This guide should serve as a reference for executing MN operations through the lens of both ROK Army and U.S. perspectives. It will specifically highlight the successes and challenges within the Korea Theater of Operations and serve as a resource to other combatant command areas of responsibility that face similar challenges. (CAC login will be required)

**Set the Theater — Sustainment**

In this bulletin, the 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) will define what set the theater-logistically (STT-L) means in the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) area of responsibility, and describe how the 8th TSC sets the USARPAC theater in Phase 0. The authors will also describe how STT-L is accomplished and assessed. This bulletin is written for theater and Army service component command sustainers, the sustainment community, and strategic enablers. (CAC login will be required)

**News You Can Use**

**Hurricane Harvey Community of Practice (COP)**

CALL has established binder #30881 in the Joint Lessons Learned Division’s Hurricane Harvey COP (#3171) that contains a variety of lessons learned and after action reports from hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, along with an assortment of doctrinal and CALL publications.


Generals Brown and Perkins discuss the concept of multi-domain battle (MDB) and how the Army must innovate and adapt concepts, equipment, and training to deter rivals and achieve victory.

**Five Lessons From Israel’s Wars in Gaza** by Raphael S. Cohen (War on the Rocks, August 3, 2017)

The author, a political scientist with the RAND Corporation, confronts the difficulties of fighting a hybrid adversary in urban terrain, outlining his five top observations. What lessons can we learn from Israel’s challenges in Gaza as we prepare for future conflict/urban warfare?

**Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) Division, Air Force Lessons Learned, and Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) Newsletters**

Below are links to lessons learned newsletters on the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) (CAC login required):

[Air Force]

JMRC also publishes a quarterly newsletter that is posted to JLLIS. The intent of the newsletter is to review top trends observed and deep dive into 3-5 specific tactical issues. These include recommendations, specific interoperability challenges (a focus area at JMRC); best practices; and emerging enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and counteractions.
Combat Training Centers

Joint Multinational Readiness Center

JMRC continues to provide a variety of training support and assistance for United States Army Europe. Observations during decisive action training rotations have revealed many lessons and best practices. For example, one observed trend during engagement area development finds company/troop-sized elements failing to develop, emplace, and integrate manmade target reference points (TRPs) into direct fire plans to enhance coordination and lethality. Units must take advantage of time and resources at home station to assemble manmade visual, infrared (IR), and thermal TRP kits. Effective TRPs can be constructed from pickets, VS-17 panels, camouflage nets, .50 caliber ammunition cans, charcoal, and IR chemlights.

Another trend pertains to battalion-level communications. Successful units incorporate troubleshooting and analysis equipment (such as PRM-34 and PRM-36) into unit maintenance plans prior to deployment. Using these tools at home station allows the S-6 to accurately assess abilities and limitations of primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plans during the military decisionmaking process and improve mission command capabilities during operations.

Another relevant lesson pertains to battalion sustainment operations. The combat trains command post (CTCP) needs to refine analog tracking tools and create map boards with logistics graphics and running estimates. The S-4 and S-1 need accurate and timely systems to track and report vehicle status during operations. Once analog systems are in place, both the CTCP and the battalion tactical operation center can utilize digital systems (Joint Capabilities Release [JCR], Command Post of the Future [CPOF], Battle Command Sustainment Support System [BCS3]) whenever possible to provide the logistics common operational picture (COP) throughout the task force. These digital systems assist with wider dissemination and a clearer understanding of where ambulance exchange points and logistics release points are located during operations.

Challenges

*BCTs fail to define and maintain the COP and to maintain this COP in both analog and digital form.*

- Few BCTs have defined (through standard operating procedure [SOP] or otherwise) the standard for analog and digital COP.
- BCT staffs have neither tasked nor trained personnel in mission command nodes to update this COP.
- BCT reporting procedures do not facilitate the maintenance of an updated COP.

*BCTs fail to develop and rehearse a detailed plan for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of casualties.*

- Poor execution of MEDEVAC leads to a high died of wounds (DOW) rate. In most DOW cases, the Soldiers died because the unit was unable to transport the Soldier to the appropriate level of care in a timely manner. Only a small number DOW due to improper care.
- MEDEVAC planning is an afterthought in the planning process, rarely developed beyond conceptual planning.
- Planners and executors do not understand doctrinal models for MEDEVAC in decisive action.

*BCTs and subordinate battalions struggle to move from conceptual planning to detailed planning.*

- A root cause is a lack of BCT and battalion staff proficiency and confidence in applying the MDMP in a deliberate or hasty (rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process [RDSP]) fashion.
- BCT staffs do not develop complete, detailed courses of action (COAs) to address all warfighting functions (WFF) and integrate all enablers.
- BCT commanders often direct a COA, and the staff adopts this COA but then does little to develop it into a complete COA (a directed course of action is not a complete COA).

Sustains

*Units that develop and practice mission command tactical standard operating procedures (MCTACsOP) are more adaptive in their rotation and less reactive to the challenges of the DATE.*

- SOPs are either the secret to success or the Achilles heel for units from platoon to brigade.
- SOPs allow units to use tested, practiced procedures to operate in a DATE and anticipate transitions inherent in a moving fight.
- COPs start with SOPs.
NTC continues to conduct tough, realistic unified land operations with our unified action partners. A few observations from recent rotations include planning for communications to occupy an assembly area, building a logistics COP, and dismounted observations posts versus mounted.

- Aviation task forces often fail to plan for redundant secure communications requirements necessary to execute a tactical road march and occupy a tactical assembly area (TAA). It is imperative for the staff to rapidly establish a mission command node to battle track current operations and plan future operations immediately upon arriving at a new TAA.

- Battalions are struggling with providing a sustainment synchronization matrix, a sustainment paragraph to the operations order, and a logistics COP. The sustainment synchronization matrix should include categories by class of supply and timeline, be briefed during the sustainment rehearsal, and help build a logistics COP. The sustainment paragraph should be developed with guidance from the battalion commander with the inclusion of both the S-4 and the forward support company (FSC).

- Company fire support teams that emplace in observations posts (OPs) while mounted in their fire support vehicles (FSVs), either the M7 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle or M1131 Stryker FSV, are less effective, both at observation and survivability, than dismounted fire support teams that utilize the AN/PED-1 Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR).

### Lessons Learned Training

All units and organizations must have a lessons learned capability. All brigades and higher (or specialty units/units that deploy and operate separately) must have a formal lessons learned program. We need your after action reports (AARs) and other lessons learned documents to help the Army run as efficiently and effectively as possible!

CALL conducted a Lessons Learned Course 7-11 AUG 2017 at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Six personnel attended the course. This course is an Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) course (00-F5/000-F4 [MC]) and will train your leaders to put a lessons learned program into place. See your unit ATRRS or training clerk to request a seat now!

Unit requests for a lessons learned mobile training team must be submitted through the Training Resources Arbitration Panel (TRAP) process. This process requires a lead time of approximately 220 days from the requested engagement. Plan accordingly!

Below are the CALL Lessons Learned Course dates at Fort Leavenworth:

**FY 17**
- Class 007, 25-29 SEP 17

**FY 18**
- Class 001, 23-27 OCT 17
- Class 002, 4-8 DEC 17
- Class 003, 22-26 JAN 18
- Class 004, 12-16 FEB 18


### JLLIS News

The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) program manager for the DOD system of record has issued/instituted a mandatory 30-day login into your JLLIS account in order to keep it active. ALL JLLIS Accounts that have had no activity after 30 days will automatically change to a locked status. Organization and command lessons managers (CLM) and administrators can update the member’s profile and unlock the user’s account. Accounts that have no activity after 90 days will automatically change to a deleted status. Organizations CLMs and administrators can update the member’s profile to re-activate the account. If your JLLIS administrator is not available, users may also contact the Army Tier Administrator (Mr. Humes) via the CALL request for information line (913-684-2255) or the JLLIS helpdesk at mailto:js.dsc.j7.mbx.jllis-coordinator@mail.mil (757-203-5820) to activate their accounts. Remember, the JLLIS tutorial is located on the JLLIS homepage and units can request JLLIS training through CALL or from the JLLIS helpdesk.
This month’s key insights come from observations made during the 2017 Gainey Cup Competition at Fort Benning, GA. This biennial competition is designed to identify the most competent and versatile scout squad in the U.S. Armed Forces and partnering allies through an extremely challenging contest centered on essential reconnaissance and security tasks and skills. Several of these observations and their recommendations for improvement are applicable to Soldiers in any type unit.

- **Land Navigation** – Competitors were challenged in unaided land navigation across broken terrain. In a six-hour period, only 3 of 24 teams successfully located all three points, and 6 of 24 failed to locate a single point. Mistakes were apparent in G-M angle conversion, intersection, resection, and terrain association. **Recommendation:** While familiarity with Global Positioning System (GPS) and electronic aids are important in today’s operational environment (OE), unit training should attempt to simulate electromagnetic activity-denied environments, a situation which is probable with a modern threat actor. This will serve as a forcing function for Soldier proficiency with basic land navigation skills and tools such as maps, compasses, and protractors.

- **Vehicle Identification** – Competitors were challenged to correctly identify multinational military vehicles. Overall, competitors correctly identified only 18 percent of vehicles presented. **Recommendation:** There are valuable tools available in training vehicle identification, including the Recognition of Combat Vehicles (ROC-V) website (U.S. Government access only). However, it is very common for units to train and evaluate this task solely around gunnery with a quick vehicle familiarization training followed immediately by an evaluation. While this may meet prerequisites, it is simply not enough exposure to the vast amount of multinational military vehicles present in today’s OE. Unit training should incorporate more vehicle identification training repetitions utilizing the ROC-V program, expanding familiarization slide decks, and implementing helpful techniques such as “HATS” (Hull, Armament, Turret, Suspension).

- **Call for Fire** – Competitors were challenged in completing an accurate and timely call for fire. Basic tools such as maps, binoculars, compass, and protractors proved uncomfortable for competitors. **Recommendation:** While Long Range Advanced Scout Systems (LRAS3) and Laser Designator Range-finders (LLDR) are powerful enablers for initiating and receiving precise, accurate, and timely fires, the likelihood of a threat actor spoofing or denying these systems is high. Unit call-for-fire training should balance advanced systems familiarization and proficiency in employing fires using basic tools and utilizing Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-09.30, *Techniques for Observed Fire*.

- **Actions on Contact** – Competitors were challenged to develop the situation upon enemy contact through application of engagement/disengagement criteria during lanes that incorporated OPFOR. Many admitted to not understanding or not having been taught the use of commander’s reconnaissance and security guidance, which were provided in the scenario-based mission orders. **Recommendation:** The commander’s reconnaissance and security guidance is imperative in enabling scouts to turn ambiguity into definitive information by initiating and reacting to contact intuitively. Unit training events, such as situational training exercises (STXs) and live-fire exercises (LFXs), should include training objectives focusing on scout squads correctly implementing the commander’s reconnaissance and security guidance upon contact with the enemy.

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**Social Media**

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