Decisive Action Training Environment at the JRTC, Volume XIII

Whole of Government, Interagency, and Engagement

Lessons and Best Practices
Decisive Action Training Environment at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Volume XIII: Whole of Government, Interagency, and Engagement

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Foreword

The Joint Readiness Training Center was established more than two decades ago as a combat training center (CTC) for joint special operations forces (SOF) and light infantry. At the core of those training objectives was the desire to exercise the collective training skills of those forces. The JRTC commitment to that goal has never wavered; it has matured through 15 years of war, absorbing the lessons of sustained combat as a whole-of-government endeavor.

This newsletter looks at the manner, method, objectives, and results of collective training for warfare in the 21st century. It addresses ways to achieve unity of effort on a complex battlefield with numerous players, each with their own mission. Unity of effort is of paramount importance for success. It requires direct attention by the senior Army commander to move disparate organizations not under his control in the same direction to achieve complementary results to a common objective. A quote within this publication effectively describes this, “There was a shared vision of a solution to the challenges ahead, there was a common understanding of counterpart priorities and, most importantly, there was a trust and respect for one another that had grown.”

The 39th Chief of Staff of the Army recently recognized the value of this training as we ready forces for global expeditionary operations. GEN Mark A. Milley told the assembled CTC Huddle that he wanted every brigade commander to benefit from the experience of working through the friction and fog of working under, and with, a country team. To make that experience as real as possible for those brigade commanders, and at the same time beneficial to our future unified action partners, JRTC established itself as a collaborative training center for our whole-of-government partners. JRTC ran its first decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation in October 2012 as Rotation 13-01. That rotation included heavy interagency and SOF integration. Since then, we collected lessons on the interagency to increase the pace of learning across the force and our unified action partners. It is equally appropriate that as the Army considers identifying and clarifying the role of engagement as a potential seventh warfighting function, JRTC established Task Force Engagement as the warfighting function observer-coach/trainers, complete with an end of rotation after action review.
Meanwhile, operations overseas in recent months have reversed flow. When the decision was made to stand down the 162nd Infantry Brigade as the Army’s primary training body for joint security force advisers, JRTC retained the 3rd Battalion, 353rd Regiment as a residual joint security force assistance (SFA) training base under the command of the JRTC Operations Group. Former leaders and advisers, as well as current trainers, offer lessons relevant to both JRTC rotational training and preparations for deployment to active theaters.

MICHAEL F. PAPPAL
COL, AR
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned
# Decisive Action Training Environment at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Volume XIII: Whole of Government, Interagency, and Engagement

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Chapter 1

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC): The U.S. Army’s Center of Excellence for Expeditionary Operations

LTC Joshua Hamilton, Interagency Planner, JRTC Operations Group; and Thomas P. Odom, Center for Army Lessons Learned Liaison Officer

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Strengthening National Capacity — A Whole-of-Government Approach

To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same. Our military must maintain its conventional superiority and, as long as nuclear weapons exist, our nuclear deterrent capability, while continuing to enhance its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats, preserve access to the global commons, and strengthen partners. We must invest in diplomacy and development capabilities and institutions in a way that complements and reinforces our global partners. Our intelligence capabilities must continuously evolve to identify and characterize conventional and asymmetric threats and provide timely insight. And we must integrate our approach to homeland security with our broader national security approach.

We are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly. We are also improving coordinated planning and policymaking and must build our capacity in key areas where we fall short. This requires close cooperation with Congress and a deliberate and inclusive interagency (IA) process, so that we achieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitor operations, policies, and strategies. To initiate this effort, the White House merged the staffs of the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council.

However, work remains to foster coordination across departments and agencies. Key steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination.

— National Security Strategy, May 2010

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Combined Arms and Whole of Government

Whole of government, like combined arms warfare, is not a new concept. The U.S. government has long sought to improve its approach to national security and set interagency coordination and cooperation as a goal. The U.S. military has similarly set combined arms warfare as its ideal. Both concepts hinge on the idea that all means of influence or power taken in total are more than the simple sum of the parts. The Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941 were meant to drive that concept home as the U.S. Army prepared itself for entrance into World War II. General of the Army George C. Marshall Jr. as the Army Chief of Staff, with then-MG Lesley J. McNair, concentrated on a training model that used large maneuvers and live fire to create what they felt was realistic training.
Despite that effort, the U.S. Army would find itself learning from experience on battlefields across the globe. Indeed, military historians would note that the U.S. military had a well-deserved reputation for losing its first battles as it had since the Revolutionary War. In 1973, GEN William E. DePuy established the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to set unit and Soldier standards to achieve what Marshall and McNair envisioned. In the late 1970s, the Army established the National Training Center as the capstone to what Marshall started in 1939. The stunning success of U.S. Army forces in Operations Desert Shield and Storm documented the value of the combat training centers (CTCs) as the Army expanded the CTC program to include what are now the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), and the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP). The U.S. Army has not been alone in its effort to expand unit collective training. The United States Marine Corps runs a collective training center at Twentynine Palms, CA. At the U.S. Air Force Green Flag exercises, units run collective joint training exercises that are fused with the U.S. Army and Marine Corps training efforts. All of these training centers made the “blocking and tackling” of collective combat real; America’s military dropped its tradition of losing first battles in favor of decisive victory.

Unified Training for Unified Partners

But what of the long-term goal of applying a whole-of-government approach to operations? A cursory look at short-notice, long-distance operations and long-term campaigns suggests that the goal — as stated in the National Security Strategy of 2010 — remains but a goal. Whether it be operations in Lebanon in 1958, the Dominican Republic in the 1960s, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1960s, 1970s, or 1990s, whole of government or interdependence was achieved through experience. That same experience-based learning model was applied in sustained campaigns in Southeast Asia and of late in Iraq and Afghanistan. We win the battles, but still muddle through the post-combat transition. We achieve less than optimal results because we have not effectively trained to determine what optimal should look like.

Note also that the national security structure of the United States has been focused without pause on the interagency, with a unique military command structure developed under the Unified Command Plan to establish regional and specialized commands to address global responsibilities. In contrast to the military approach, the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other agencies have long relied on interagency relationships with embassies and consulates under an ambassador as a presidential-appointed chief of mission.

There is no interagency equivalent for U.S. Central Command or U.S. Africa Command. The various unified action partners (UAPs) do maintain capabilities to reinforce their presence abroad based on mission and demand. USAID has the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which specializes in disaster and humanitarian relief using disaster assistance response teams (DARTs). USAID also maintains a limited system of regional offices in key areas. The DOS has sought to expand its expeditionary capabilities in the past decade with the development of provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. The CIA uses specialized teams to boost its capabilities in key theaters. All UAPs maintain a training mechanism for their personnel; some are more institutional than practical. The DOS is largely institutional. The CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation run field training facilities. With certain exceptions, these training and educational efforts are physically and fiscally stovepiped by agency.
Therein lies the issue in achieving a whole-of-government approach to national security. We have various agencies, educational institutions, and think tanks as part of a robust and often bewildering national security apparatus. This apparatus functions somewhat well in the national capital region; however, our interagency approach to distant operations is distinctly 17th century, when an ambassador operates largely on his own. Our military command structure has been steadily modernized since those times. The only time we bring the military command structure and our interagency approach together is when we initiate actual military operations. In short, our whole-of-government learning has been, and still is, experience based.

A Center of Excellence

The implementation of the decisive action training environment (DATE) at JRTC shows great promise in filling the “the blocking and tackling” training gap between the military and our UAPs. As a CTC, JRTC was established as a training center for joint light and special operations forces (SOF); prior to 9/11 those light and SOF training efforts tended to remain separate. Operations since then have made such separation impossible. JRTC has matured in the past 15 years of war, meeting the challenges of training units for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while posturing to meet future challenges. The DATE captures those changes, and challenges conventional and special operations forces to meet them in a triad with the UAPs that support training for global reaction and regional alignment.

Given an uncertain strategic environment and fiscal conservancy, U.S. military forces have turned increasingly toward greater capabilities instead of numbers. The dominant issue pushing that transformation has been, and will most likely continue to be, rapid emergence of security challenges across the globe — challenges that dictate an increased capacity for expeditionary operations. U.S. Army doctrine recognizes the need for expeditionary capabilities and an expeditionary mindset across the force to produce campaign quality forces trained and ready to deploy for an enduring fight. JRTC has long used the motto “Forging the Warrior Spirit” to describe its leader training mission. As the center of excellence (CoE) for expeditionary operations, the JRTC would expand that role to sharing an expeditionary mindset across our UAPs.

According to Mark O. George in *The Lean Six Sigma Guide to Doing More with Less*, a CoE refers to a team, a shared facility, or an entity that provides leadership, evangelization, best practices, research, support and/or training for a focus area. Army doctrine states that expeditionary capability is the ability to promptly deploy combined arms forces worldwide into any area of operations and conduct operations upon arrival. Expeditionary operations require the ability to deploy quickly with little notice, rapidly shape conditions in the operational area, and operate immediately on arrival, exploiting success and consolidating tactical and operational gains. The Army prepares campaign quality forces for unified action with joint forces, government agencies, and nongovernmental and intergovernmental agencies.

Over the course of the past 15 years, JRTC grew in mission, size, and complexity. In 2000, a JRTC rotation was typically 2,300 troops in a brigade combat team (BCT), with two infantry battalions in the box and a third battalion participating virtually. Special operations forces also trained at the CTC, but rarely were conventional or SOF rotations coordinated to affect each other. Mission rehearsal exercises (MREs) in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) grew troop lists to include a full BCT with some 3,800 troops. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) MREs after 2010 expanded the force structure to some 4,500 troops with enablers. Both OIF and OEF saw increased operational support and training with SOF to support projected missions in
theater. Moreover, as operations in both theaters matured, rotations saw an increased play with interagency provincial reconstruction teams and host nation security forces. In 2009, the 162nd Infantry Brigade stood up at the CTC as the U.S. Army and U.S. Department of Defense premier adviser and adviser team training effort. By 2010, JRTC was running MREs with forces twice the size of those participating in 2000, using steady-state operations from fixed forward operating bases (FOBs). OEF MREs nested BCT training as security force assistance (SFA) brigades with SFA team training, and in some cases village stability operations (VSO) under SOF.

The turn toward decisive action (DA) training in full spectrum operations (FSO) at the end of 2010 was a sweeping shift in focus. JRTC conducted the first DA rotation in a decade; lessons from that rotation are still affecting the force. The full-scale tsunami of change was to come in 2013 with the implementation of the DATE. The DATE was revolutionary in its portrayal of expeditionary operations into a sovereign host nation facing the threat of a near-peer enemy. Unified action to achieve joint interdependence among SOF, conventional forces, and other UAPs accurately replicated the challenges facing a global response force (GRF) or regionally aligned force (RAF). The whole of the government began to block and tackle together. Marshall’s vision as Chief of Staff in 1939 was applied to the National Security Strategy of 2010.

Emerging Insights and Issues

JRTC is first and foremost a leader development center. We see that same role in addressing the challenges inherent in a whole-of-government collaborative training effort. One of the key partners in this effort has been, and remains, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Since the CTC turned to DA, CALL and JRTC have published 13 book-length newsletters on the results of training rotations, semi-annual trends, and special projects. These notably include the JRTC and CALL issued Handbook 15-13, Commander’s Guide to Understanding the Interagency, and Handbook 15-15, Unified Action Partners’ Quick Reference Guide. On the subject of trends, JRTC has now collected and collated three years’ worth of interagency training trends. Here are the emerging insights:

- Commanders and staffs must understand complexities of the interagency in an expeditionary environment. This is not a question of enabler integration; the unit integrating with the IA is the enabler. Interdependence with IA and SOF is a three-legged stool.

- Units must approach missions as military tasks that require planning and rehearsals. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are the most striking; the units that train and rehearse NEOs at home station do very well.

- Engagement with the IA and host nation is a green tab task; robust liaison officers (LNOs) (or tailored tactical command posts [TACs]) achieve better results. Security of a consulate is a defensive operation.

- Emerging issues center on clarification of engagement as a warfighting function (WfF) and proponency to develop training tasks for SOF and conventional forces (CF) from institutional to unit in expeditionary operations.
A Seventh Warfighting Function: Engagement

With the experience of three years of DATE and intensive interagency play across conventional and special operations forces, JRTC leaders saw the need to move toward a more formal means of structuring that training, just as we do with maneuver, fires, or any other WfF. Meanwhile, ongoing discussions and doctrinal developments pointed the way toward a seventh WfF — that of engagement. Engagement addresses the tasks and systems associated with influencing the behaviors of people, militaries, and governments.2 In late 2015, the JRTC Operations Group created Task Force Engagement and added an engagement WfF to the list of post-rotation after action reviews (AARs). By doing so, JRTC channeled General of the Army George C. Marshall Jr. and the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers as an operational test bed for the doctrinal evolution of an engagement WfF.

Task Force Engagement provides the BCT with observer-coach/trainers dedicated to the processes and personnel that influence the behaviors of people, militaries, and governments. Their areas of expertise include information operations, civil affairs operations, and public affairs operations. The task force focuses on the interaction between the BCT and UAPs within the JRTC operational environment. The culminating event for the engagement task force is the final AAR provided to the BCT leadership, including subordinate battalion command teams. During this review, the brigade’s leadership is provided feedback on how the unit performed in relation to its training objectives and on its systems and processes for engagement-related activities. In keeping with the spirit of collaborative, collective training, JRTC has opened the audience for the engagement AAR to include UAPs. The creation of Task Force Engagement and an engagement AAR is an evolutionary leap forward in training units for expeditionary operations.

The Joint Readiness Training Center of Excellence for Expeditionary Operations

Let us return to the definition of a center of excellence and consider JRTC as the Joint Readiness Training Center of Excellence for Expeditionary Operations. A center of excellence refers to a team, a shared facility, or an entity that provides leadership, evangelization, best practices, research, support, and/or training for a focus area.3

A Team, a Shared Facility, or an Entity

JRTC and Fort Polk provide the base facilities for the training center. Understand the training area to support the training of conventional, special operations, air, and naval forces extends the common training areas across neighboring states and into the Gulf of Mexico. Shared facilities include the Fullerton Box, Peason Ridge and other training areas, SOF out stations, Barksdale Air Force Base (AFB), Little Rock AFB, and England Airpark Interim Staging Base (ISB). Real world, JRTC makes wide use of railhead operations and port operations. Shared training facilities on Fort Polk include educational facilities under the 3rd Battalion, 353rd Regiment as an SFA and RAF trainer, including mock embassies and villages for use by UAPs. In recent rotations, UAPs like DOS, State Diplomatic Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are using JRTC as a collaborative training facility.

JRTC and Fort Polk make an ideal venue for collaborative training between the Army and UAPs. The light infantry, airborne, air assault, and special operations forces that train at JRTC are typically the first boots on the ground in military operations. They will have the responsibility of initial coordination with IA and foreign partners. Whether the mission is humanitarian assistance, peace and stability operations, or combat against a near-peer competitor, the task will invariably...
fall to those who train at JRTC. These are the forces with the most critical requirement to work with UAPs. These UAPs can include, but are not limited to: DOS Foreign Service officers (FSOs), DOS Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) personnel, U.S. Marine Corps Marine security guards (MSGs), Defense Intelligence Agency defense attachés, FBI agents, USAID officers, and CIA personnel. These agencies and others will benefit from the unique training opportunities at JRTC.

Leadership

As stated earlier, “Forging the Warrior Spirit” has long been the JRTC motto when it comes to developing leaders. DATE at JRTC has broadened that leadership experience to support expeditionary operations. Collaborative training with UAPs like DOS and the FBI means that JRTC is exporting that same leader development across unified action. While the CTC remains focused on the BCT as its training audience, the full implementation of DATE means we are training senior leaders to function and perform at the joint task force (JTF) and joint special operations task force (JSOTF) level. The Leaders Training Program, the staple for preparing a BCT for a rotation since 2000 or an MRE for deployment in the past decade, now offers seminars on IA operations.

Evangelization

Deeds, not words, is an ideal, but not one supportive of broadening understanding. JRTC is working actively to spread greater awareness of the collaborative training opportunities offered in DATE. Critical ideas such as interdependence and mission command must be further analyzed, developed, and then promulgated in doctrine and training requirements for Army Soldiers, units, and leaders. Nothing promotes an idea like expeditionary capabilities for campaign quality better than shared training across the spectrum of expeditionary operations.

Best Practices

A CTC is the embodiment of best practices; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); and doctrine. Since its beginning, JRTC has been a mainstay of lessons learned and best practices back to the force. Since 2000, the CTC has collaborated with CALL to produce some 150 newsletters, trend compilations, and handbooks. Since the first full spectrum operations rotation, JRTC and CALL have produced 13 DATE newsletters. JRTC has done equal work with U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) CoEs and the Asymmetric Warfare Group. DATE has broadened the audience for JRTC products to include sister Services and UAPs.

Research

In terms of better understanding the challenges of expeditionary operations, there is no better laboratory than a DATE rotation at JRTC. Unless you have actually deployed into a country on a DATE-like mission, you have not approached the level of understanding that an 18-day DATE rotation offers to the senior leaders of a JTF/BCT or JSOTF. Understand that in training DATE, JRTC is an organization of subject matter experts (SMEs); those SMEs bridge to include UAPs with active or retired personnel from those agencies. At the same time, and in keeping with the previous discussion of best practices, JRTC serves as a test bed for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) issues applied in the DATE laboratory. For example, DATE rotations applied new rigor to the force structure of
modularity and resulted in significant organizational, doctrinal, and equipment changes. We need more work in this arena; as a CoE for expeditionary operations, JRTC can develop doctrine and training requirements with our UAPs.

Support and Training

The sole function of JRTC is to support and train U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces to support and work with those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. JRTC possesses unique training capabilities and resources that these UAPs do not. The U.S. Marine Corps MSGs currently receive excellent training to secure U.S. embassies and consulates. However, this training would be enhanced by taking place within the context of JRTC’s 200,000+ acres of maneuver space. The world-class opposing force of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 509th Infantry, portrays symmetrical and asymmetrical threats on a size and scale that the FBI, DIA, DSS, and other government agencies could never replicate on their own. While FSOs and USAID officers do receive training to work in a hostile environment, a JRTC training rotation can place them within an enormous combat zone in an immersive environment they would never find elsewhere in the United States. While some personnel from these UAPs have interacted with the military, it is usually within the confines of a table top exercise, focused on the higher operational and strategic levels of conflict. At JRTC, they would work directly with tactical echelons of the Army, an experience they are rarely afforded.

Conclusions

The evolutionary changes in JRTC over the past 15 years have been dramatic. When coupled with the reality of a changing world, the demands for globally responsive expeditionary forces, and the unprecedented realism of the DATE, those same changes have become revolutionary. Sustaining the momentum of that change demands a more formal recognition of the vision for JRTC. Designating JRTC as the U.S. Army’s Center of Excellence for Expeditionary Operations would cement its role in meeting global challenges.

Endnotes

Chapter 2

Increasing Interagency Participation in the Decisive Action Training Environment

LTC Michael K. King, Director, Interagency Training, JRTC Operations Group

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has an ongoing opportunity for short-term training for Department of State (DOS), Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and other interagency personnel. This interagency training, fully funded by JRTC, supports 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and National Security Strategy goals; enhances interagency collaboration and relationship building; and provides participants with a unique opportunity to interact with highly experienced subject matter experts and military personnel in a kinetic decisive action training environment (DATE). JRTC is seeking qualified applicants from diverse agencies to participate in upcoming DATE rotations.

In the second edition of *Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the US Foreign Service*, authors Harry Kopp and Charles Gillespie outline the key changes encapsulated in “Diplomacy 3.0,” the three pillars — diplomacy, defense, and development — of American foreign policy:

- The increasing importance of collaboration between the foreign service and U.S. military in “fragile states threatened by, or emerging from, combat”;
- The rapid growth of USAID’s foreign service and its integration with DOS; and
- Agreement by both the current administration and Congress that, in addition to more people and money, an improved foreign service requires better training.1

The QDDR addresses the interdependency of diplomacy, defense, and development, including as a strategic priority the “building of dynamic organizations” with an agile, skilled workforce that can effectively advance U.S. interests in “a world of complex threats, dynamic opportunities, and diffuse power.” According to the QDDR, such a workforce is “more flexible and diverse, enabling our people to move between positions and agencies, and in and out of government, as needed.”2 DOS and USAID plan to invest in training, diversity, and leadership in order to accomplish this objective, including participation in such programs as USAID’s Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation and long-term training opportunities at Department of Defense (DOD) institutions. Short-term DATE training at JRTC provides employees at DOS, USAID, and other federal government agencies additional opportunities for professional development with a distinctly whole-of-government approach.

Training at JRTC replicates real-world environments, including towns and villages; consulates, embassies, and country teams; villagers; government, military, and police officials; nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations and personnel; and hostile military, insurgent, and opposition elements. Subject matter experts create training scenarios that consist of scripted events and “free play,” both designed to facilitate specific training objectives. A cadre of trained observers monitor all activities to ensure the safe and effective conduct of all events and interaction, also providing valuable feedback to participants about their training-related
actions. Role players include cultural experts and former/retired subject matter experts such as former ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, consular officers, and public diplomacy officers; chiefs of station and case officers; regional security officers; USAID experts; and professionals who have worked abroad with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations, among others.

The JRTC interagency strategy encourages training participants to consider the most effective methods and frameworks for interagency-military engagement. Rotational units work with the interagency to prevent and resolve conflicts, counter insurgencies, and create safe and secure environments for local populations. This training also helps to strengthen participants’ capacity to anticipate crisis and conflict, prevent mass atrocities, and respond to emergency governance problems. It is a proven, time-tested training environment, and those individuals from DOS, FBI, and DS who have participated in previous DATE rotations emphasize the value of the JRTC approach to their professional development. Here are a few comments from those JRTC “veterans”:

- “I have already recommended this program to all my colleagues here at the State Department. It is exactly through this type of experience that we break down the borders between the armed services and civilians.”

- “This would be a valuable experience for someone who had never been to post, as well as serve as a refresher for someone who has.”

- “This training was a fantastic opportunity, and we should aggressively seek ways to get more DS-affiliated people involved, whether or not main State is on board.”

- “I gained invaluable experience in operating in a hostile, complex environment.”

- “The deliberately stressful training environment demanded personal initiative, cooperation, and physical and mental effort. Our participation improved our understanding of what the Army does — a very wide spectrum of responsibilities undertaken by young, hard-working Soldiers.”

Given the clear value of JRTC’s DATE training to both currently serving interagency personnel and their military counterparts, we would like to continue and expand this aspect of the program, developing a pool of qualified personnel to participate in future DATE rotations. The JRTC is committed to enhancing interagency-military cooperation, encouraging military personnel to create lasting relationships with their interagency partners, and facilitating the development of a skilled workforce that can work across agency cultures to achieve U.S. government foreign policy priorities.

As retired General Ray Odierno, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, emphasized, “Army forces do not operate independently, but as a part of a larger joint, interagency, and frequently multinational effort.” Our goal here at the JRTC is to leverage our proven training approach and work closely with the leadership of other federal government entities to build, improve, and maintain robust and effective interagency-military partnerships.

**Endnotes**


As our Army moves forward with the formalization of the concept of interdependence, conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF) will continue to work through the implementation of this activity during joint training and operations. This implementation in training and operations is imperative as the future operational environment demands a seamless unified effort between all U.S. military efforts. Unfortunately, understanding the imperative does not inform the practical application of a concept. So how do CF and SOF execute this concept of interdependence? While there are many aspects to interdependence (such as interoperability of communications platforms, integration of assets, and communication between leaders and staffs), one specific action enables successful implementation of interdependence more than any other — the proper selection and utilization of a liaison officer (LNO). The LNO is the critical link to successful CF-SOF interdependence and is the single biggest factor in enabling operational effectiveness and ensuring consistency in CF-SOF unified action.

Interdependence is defined in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (PAM) 525-8-5, *U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement*, as: “… the deliberate and mutual reliance of one unified action partner (UAP) on another’s inherent capabilities to provide complementary and reinforcing effects. … [Interdependence] applies to both Army units working interdependently and to unified action partners working interdependently with those Army units.” This discussion will focus exclusively on the relationship between CF and SOF forces, but many of the comments and recommendations can be applied further by both CF and SOF in their interactions with other UAPs, whether they are U.S. government (USG) entities, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (IGOs/NGOs), host nation entities, or private groups. While CF and SOF can and will be deployed in unilateral operations in the future, this discussion assumes CF-SOF operation in a shared or adjacent operational environment.

**Bridging the Gap: Making Two Forces One**

The culture that exists in the Army’s CF is different than the culture that exists in SOF. This is not a pejorative statement, nor is it a statement implying quality or righteousness of one culture over the other. It is not an opinion but a statement of observable fact. But it is important — in fact, it is critical to interdependence — to acknowledge the difference in cultures and understand that difference. This understanding is critical because it allows us to bridge that cultural gap, which in turn is the foundation of CF-SOF interdependence. This cultural difference is about systems and processes — how a brigade combat team (BCT) plans versus how a special forces advanced operating base (AOB) plans. It’s about how a special operations task force (SOTF) processes information and how a BCT shares information. It is beyond what we wear and how we wear it — it is a difference in how we conduct our operations. When these two cultures share an operational area, are stakeholders in a non-contiguous or non-adjacent operational area, or are in some other combination of planning or operating with common interests, the most efficient single touch point for those two cultures is the establishment of an LNO (or team). Our doctrine tells us that the nature of military operations is an inherently human endeavor; therefore, it ought to follow that the conduct of military operations and how we execute military operations is
also a human endeavor. Rather than using this to inform our suppositions of the enemy forces, operational environments, and civil populaces, we also ought to allow this principle to inform how we interact with our own military partners. As important as nodes, functions, and systems are to the implementation of the interdependence activity, they cannot replace the genuinely human aspect of putting Soldiers from one culture into the other (and vice versa) to bridge the cultural gap.

**Interdependence as a Requirement of the Future Operational Environment**

TRADOC PAM 525-8-5 discusses the future force requirements for engagement and interdependence in the future operational environment in detail. But what does that look like at the BCT, battalion task force, SOTF, and AOB levels? During the past 18 months, rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, increased emphasis on interdependence between CF and SOF forces. This training is validated by multiple current operations in the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility (AOR) where 1st Infantry Division regionally aligned forces (RAF), from brigade to company level, are working adjacent to or within effects of the 10th Special Forces Group from SOTF to team level. During the JRTC rotations, interdependence validated its relevancy multiple times. The significant highlights of this validation include disparate planning efforts leading to conflicting mission execution, inability to develop common operating pictures, and lack of information sharing. Each of these observations can be analyzed in detail, but proper selection and utilization of LNOs is a common denominator in addressing the solutions. In short, CF and SOF must synchronize and coordinate various activities to ensure the effective accomplishment of the geographic combatant commander’s end state.

Additionally, mission command of Army forces is heavily reliant on a holistic approach to conducting operations and agility and adaptability. As opposed to the old construct of command and control — where the underlying philosophy assumed that with more information and more systems commanders could come close to a perfect description — mission command understands the importance of what we don’t know in addition to what we do know. Three of the six principles of mission command (build cohesive teams through trust, create a shared understanding, and accept prudent risk) are examples of why the mission command construct requires interdependence more so than the outdated construct of command and control.

Mission command’s acceptance of wicked problems inherent in complex, ever-changing, and uncertain operational environments demands that all forces within an operational area or stakeholders in a general geographic area develop a strong relationship to create shared understanding, build the cohesive UAP team, and understand what they don’t know to help better inform their acceptance of risk.

**Building Relationships and Addressing the Cultural Divide**

As stated earlier, systems, nodes, and functions are important. But the interoperability that those networks enable is only a component of interdependence. To truly reap the benefits of interdependence, CF and SOF organizations must build relationships with each other. Employment of an LNO is the most discernible and productive way to build organizational relationships. Commander-to-commander dialogue is more effective but occurs at irregular and lengthy intervals. Additionally, commander-to-commander dialogue oftentimes excludes key
staff. Co-locating or co-basing, while also highly effective, is often not practical due to mission requirements for one or both of the forces. Systematic information exchange is readily available and informing but is far less effective at developing relationships. To get beyond interoperability and integration, units must employ and properly utilize LNOs in the interdependence activity.

“Connectivity gives us the illusion of knowing ... Real connections come when people engage, when there is eye contact, when there is a hand on the shoulder, and when the conversation is not one way.”

– GEN (Retired) Stanley McChrystal, April 2014

In the end, organizational relationships are much like individual relationships. Sending the right LNO to another organization is like looking them in eye and having a fruitful conversation with them, to use GEN McChrystal’s example. Much of the cultural divide stems from familiarity with each force. SOF officers and NCOs are being assessed earlier in their careers than in the past, and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan notwithstanding, CF and SOF units rarely train or operate together. While they may have the same home station or conduct operations in the same operational environment, they rarely train or operate together. All of the discussion below is applicable to both CF LNOs sent to SOF units and SOF LNOs sent to CF units.

Planning Considerations

An excellent example of the difference of cultures is the planning methodologies utilized by each force. The BCT generally uses an in-depth military decisionmaking process (MDMP) methodology that generates mission orders and is sometimes informed by an abbreviated design methodology. Notably, it is the tactical mission and the tactical tasks that they will utilize to accomplish that mission that is driving the brigade’s planning effort. The AOB and SOTF often use a planning effort based on MDMP but is more operational in nature. Considerations such as centers of gravity, target audience analysis, and time and space are weighted much more heavily. While grounded in MDMP and Army doctrine, it can appear to be a mission-tailorable confluence of MDMP, design, and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Special Forces teams are, like their conventional counterparts, conducting tactical tasks in the operational environment; however, unlike their conventional counterparts, the missions are often operational or strategic in nature. This is often what drives the difference in planning process. An LNO that is exposed to and can see the fight at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels can provide irreplaceable perspective to both forces when friction might arise.

Additionally, the planning horizons will often be different between CF planning and SOF planning. In the future operational environment, the seven phases of unconventional warfare (UW) will often drive SOTF planning. CF planning efforts will not start at the same time that SOF planning starts. CF planning will likely not start until Phase V of the UW planning process and employment — if it occurs — will be in Phase VI or later. More significant than the fact that the planning efforts are different is that planners at each force are not familiar with the other’s process and sometimes aren’t aware that a different process even exists. An LNO that is grounded in his parent unit’s planning process and involved in the attached unit’s planning process can provide invaluable insight to both organizations to better inform each planning process.
Lastly, the BCT’s planning process is heavily dependent upon a large staff and leveraging all of the warfighting functions present in that staff. The SOTF’s, and certainly AOB’s, planning process is much less dependent on warfighting functions because of the lack of a robust staff. The effectively employed LNO can help facilitate critical staff-to-staff interaction that helps each element identify and leverage the other’s inherent capabilities.

**Multiple and Alternate Perspectives**

Probably the most important human element an LNO can provide a unit is a different perspective, specifically the perspective of his organic unit. Again, there are several fundamental differences in how SOTFs and BCTs conduct operations. These differences are necessary for each force to accomplish its assigned mission.

One such multiple perspective is the nature of tasks and end states for each force. In general, BCTs will conduct tactical tasks that achieve tactical end states. Historically, brigades operate at the tactical level of war. While modern warfare — molded by the information revolution — has blended the levels of war, brigades still achieve tactical end states in support of a larger headquarters’ operational objectives. The SOTF, on the other hand, often conducts operations directly in support of operational or strategic objectives. Particularly in the conduct of UW, SOF elements operate in a different level of war. Certainly they are still conducting tactical tasks (destroy, seize, neutralize, etc.), but these tactical tasks gain operational and strategic effects by way of operating by, with, and through indigenous forces (at the tactical level) and garnering legitimacy for a shared cause. Partnered units often cannot see the difference of purpose between the two units. One unit might not understand another focusing on something they see as inconsequential while the other unit might not understand the ramifications of targets that they are not tracking. The mature liaison element, grounded in its unit’s modus operandi and adapted to its partnered unit, can provide a different and alternate perspective that helps paint a much clearer picture of partnered unit operations. This perspective can greatly inform planning sessions, the targeting process, and other integrating processes and continuing activities within a force headquarters.

Another area where perspective is important is methods and information sharing. All too often, miscommunication occurs simply because we don’t understand how to transmit. We know what to communicate but get lost in how to transmit information. Sometimes this is a mission command systems issue, sometimes it is a time management issue, and sometimes it is organizational dynamics. Whatever the reason, the most effective method for mitigating these miscommunication mistakes is a quality LNO.

Information sharing is an important consideration in interdependence. Unfortunately, this is an area where units will often harm relationships by either not sharing enough or not handling information accordingly. Appropriate clearances for LNOs is just the beginning. How each force headquarters integrates the LNO into its main command post (MCP) or operations center (OPCEN), and what information they are willing to share is critical to building the relationship.

“It was the idea that we were now part of a team where information became the essential link between us, not a block between us.”

--- GEN (Retired) Stanley McChrystal, April 2014
Alternate control/compensatory measure (ACCM) programs and other need-to-know type operations obviously cannot be violated, but in general, the more information partnered units share the better refinement to each other’s shared understanding of the operational environment. Again, the liaison element serves as the critical link and can be of most benefit to each force by ensuring both comprehensive information sharing and that each unit is responsible and understands sensitivities attached to information.

Each unit is unique. With this uniqueness, each unit develops its own distinct perspectives. From non-standard logistics to the way in which they see the civil environment, a quality LNO can serve as a small investment that can bring an entire organization’s perspective to another unit. This ability to help a partnered unit understand its partner will also help them provide that unit complementary and reinforcing effects on the battlefield.

**Integrating the LNO to Operationalize Interdependence — Recommendations**

Effective integration of liaison officers and teams is — like most everything else in combat — easier said than done. However, one of the key purposes of JRTC is to provide the force with observable practices that enable tactical success for BCTs and SOTFs. As any unit has experienced, just providing a liaison team to another headquarters doesn’t solve anything. We must properly resource and integrate these LNOs so that they may operationalize the concept of interdependence.

**Changing the Meaning of LNO**

The absolute first step in proper integration of liaison teams is a cultural shift in attitude about what the LNO is and what the LNO does. The very term “liaison officer/NCO” carries a tremendous amount of baggage. The assignment is viewed negatively for several reasons. First, you are away from your unit (and your boss and team) working for someone that has little vested interest in your success or failure, other than that tied to his own success or failure. Second, LNOs are rarely provided the detailed resources (specifically commander’s critical information requirements [CCIR], reporting criteria, and daily communication with senior leaders from their organic units) that are required for successful execution of their jobs. Lastly, the term is usually associated with junior officers or NCOs that go to a higher headquarters just to serve as a communications link. It is imperative that we reframe our concepts about what constitutes a liaison team and its mission.

An LNO that successfully operationalizes interdependence really looks more like an area specialist team (AST) from SOF. They embed during planning, integrate themselves into the team, are viewed as part of the team, and work as a part of the staff rather than an outsider just observing or acting as a radio-telephone operator (RTO). Again, this change in perspective is required from both the supported and the supporting unit. A SOTF headquarters that receives a CF LNO and doesn’t integrate him into the staff is just as negligent as a BCT that sends an inexperienced lieutenant with no security clearance to a SOTF. In fact, proper integration and utilization by the supported (receiving) headquarters is probably more important than anything the supporting (losing) headquarters can do insofar as preparation of the liaison team. Reframing our organizational concepts of what an LNO is — at least with regards to interdependence — is critical in the effort to operationalize and effectively execute interdependence.
Operationalizing Interdependence Vignette: Filling the Sangari Vacuum of Power

During a recent JRTC rotation, the CF brigade had successfully repelled the enemy attack and was postured to conduct a brigade attack on the city of Sangari. The brigade realized that this attack would expel the enemy forces from the province, but it was not looking beyond the attack to transition to stability operations. The SOTF LNO understood the SOTF's unconventional warfare operations in the Sangari area. Working with the BCT S9, he coordinated through the offensive MDMP planning sessions and BCT targeting meetings for SOTF-trained and connected guerrilla fighters to assume the vacuum of power. After gaining approval and constantly coordinating between the BCT and SOTF headquarters, they were able to have a plan in place to secure the peace after the BCT’s attack. At the conclusion of the BCT’s attack on Sangari, the BCT commander actually met the guerrilla fighters and effectively transitioned responsibility of the area over to them under the authority of the host-nation provincial government.

Getting the Right Person

Selecting the right Soldier for the job seems self-evident. Organizationally, however, we often select liaison teams as a matter of rank, position, or military occupational specialty (MOS). We limit ourselves to junior officers or mid-grade NCOs, maneuver or intelligence Soldiers, and those around the headquarters staffs. The selection of the LNO ought to be more about personality, interpersonal skills, and intellectual ability than rank, position, or MOS. As discussed earlier, SOTFs conducting UW have different perspectives on the missions and operations to be accomplished. Brigades should consider selecting Soldiers who see the big picture and think in terms of the operational and strategic levels of war. They ought to consider intellectual agile thinkers who can quickly assimilate SOTF-specific terminology and concepts. It is not enough to know what to say; you must understand the meaning behind these terms and concepts as well. SOTFs ought to consider sending those with interpersonal skills that will facilitate their integration into a larger organization; someone who will not get overwhelmed with the friction created by such a large staff and the processes that define it.

And, of course, it should hurt. If the loss of the selected Soldier(s) doesn’t hurt your organization, that is an indicator that you are not doing enough to enable interdependence. Commanders and leaders should remember that the loss of your LNO will be offset by the commensurate abilities brought to the staff by the reciprocal liaison team of your partnered unit. If two organizations exchange quality liaison teams, then they are enabling a far greater understanding of the operational environment, consideration of perspectives, and bridging of organizational cultures than if those Soldiers stayed in the unit. Contrary to the aforementioned misconception that selecting the right Soldier to be an LNO is self-evident, sending an LNO to a supported headquarters that hurts your unit actually helps your unit in the longer term and in the bigger picture. Commanders and leaders invariably come to this realization at the end of each rotation after seeing the many missed opportunities of interdependence.

Commander and Staff Officer Responsibilities

The liaison team is only part of the equation. Supporting (organic) and supported (receiving) headquarters also play a critical role in the proper implementation of LNOs. For supported headquarters, expectations and critical information requirements are absolutely necessary to
enable the liaison officer. While we want to select mature, smart people, none of our LNOs will have the experience or insight into what the commander wants or needs like the commander or his executive staff (deputy command ing officer [DCO], command sergeant major [CSM], executive officer [XO], S3). The commander ought to consider having a thorough discussion with the liaison team to clearly outline requirements. Someone on the commander’s executive staff ought to have an open line of communication with the LNO and establish a daily reporting or communications window. Additionally, the brigade staff officers must know the liaison team’s capabilities and requirements. They must understand where they can leverage the LNO, when they are wasting their time, and when they can assist the liaison team. Much as with a commander, the staff must anticipate their partnered unit’s needs and assist them through either staff-to-staff coordination (facilitated by the LNO) or by leveraging the liaison team. As interdependence is defined as an “activity” of the engagement warfighting function, it is inherently a staff task.

The supported unit has responsibilities as well. The supported unit must integrate the LNO immediately and as much as possible into the unit’s planning and operations. This includes the current operations floor of the MCP/OPCEN, working groups, planning sessions, and tactical command post (TAC) operations, if necessary. The supported unit needs to provide the liaisons with their own information requirements and shape their understanding of the unit and its systems and processes. Additionally, the supported unit ought to be receptive to the contributions of the liaison team. It does no good for the LNO to bring alternate perspectives and attempt to bridge the cultural divide if the supported unit does not consider the team’s input and contributions. Lastly, the supported headquarters staff should leverage the liaison team and work with or through them to leverage the capabilities and resources of their counterparts in the partnered headquarters. The success of the LNO rests as much on the ability of the supporting and supported commanders and staffs as it does on the individuals executing the LNO mission.

**Conclusion: The LNO as an Operational Imperative**

The contemporary operating environment continually demonstrates to our Army the necessity for forces to work closely with other forces. Gone are the days when operations and missions in one unit’s area of operations (AO) or another district or province did not impact another unit operating adjacent or near another force. The future operational environment — at least the understanding, prediction, and evidentiary prognostication that we have of it — further necessitates functional relationships between forces operating in, around, and near each other. Most importantly, the implications of failure in our interconnected global commons compel us to find ways to work better as a team. There are many ways in which units can further interdependence and tasks to accomplish this activity. But none of these tasks or methods are as valuable as establishing a quality and effective liaison team to build the organizational relationship. This concept — that organizational relationships are what really matter in interdependence — is what drives the importance of the LNO. It is the LNO’s ability to enable operational effectiveness and ensure CF-SOF unity of effort that truly makes them the critical link in CF-SOF interdependence.
Notes

1. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5, *U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement*, dated February 2014, is the most comprehensive and authoritative articulation of interdependence to date. It lists interdependence as the fourth of four key activities of engagement, the seventh warfighting function. It broadly outlines the concept of interdependence and discusses force requirements.

2. TRADOC PAM 525-8-5, page 18, para 2 and 3.


5. GEN (Retired) Stanley McChrystal at TEDx event, published 7 MAY 2014, accessible at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9jRkACywckE.
Chapter 4

Pre-Rotation Video Teleconferences (VTCs) Between Interagency and the Brigade Combat Team

Thomas P. Odom, CALL Liaison Officer, JRTC Operations Group

After three years of decisive action training environment (DATE) rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), interagency (IA) observer-coach/trainers (OC/Ts) and subject matter experts can predict with great accuracy how a brigade combat team (BCT) and a special operations task force (SOTF) will do in the rotation based on their initial video teleconferences (VTCs). All too often BCT commanders and staffs, as well as subordinate battalion commanders, fail to capitalize fully on the IA VTCs in the road to war for a DATE rotation at JRTC.

Typically the IA community offers two VTCs with the BCT, configured according to the specific rotational scenario. Usually the U.S. ambassador to Atropia, as chief of mission (COM) in U.S. Embassy Baku (at North Fort Polk), introduces his mission to the BCT leadership. Quite often the U.S. Ambassador to Gorgas and his staff participate, as well as participants at the intermediate staging base (ISB) (at Alexandria, Gorgas) and the SOTF headquarters (also at Alexandria). The U.S. consul general at Dara Lam (in the box) may or may not participate in this initial VTC.

The Initial VTC

The first VTC often goes something like this. The ambassador to Atropia and deputy offer their concerns and requirements to the BCT commander and his staff. Mission personnel are cordial and their delivery is understated. Notable concerns usually include:

- Status of Atropia as a sovereign nation.
- Atropia’s invitation of U.S. forces to assist with security and protection of U.S. citizens to deter Arianian aggression.
- Capabilities of the U.S. BCT to assist the mission, especially the consulate in Dara Lam.
- Noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) plans and capabilities to support evacuation of American citizens (AMCITS) and designated third country nationals (TCNs).
- Entry operations information plan.
- Size of the entry force.
- Proposed rules of engagement (ROE).
Given the above list of concerns, the COM will usually levy some requirements. The COM is cordial and his delivery is understated, almost as if he is asking for a favor. Here are some requirements presented during past rotations:

- In regard to Atropian sovereignty and invitation to U.S. forces, the ambassador requires that any and all incidents involving Atropian nationals and use of force be reported immediately.

- The ambassador asks for a capabilities brief regarding the BCT’s capacity to secure the area around Dara Lam, conduct NEOs, and assist U.S and international efforts to avert a humanitarian crisis.

- The ambassador requires that all public diplomacy efforts be coordinated through the U.S. Embassy and consulate. He specifically asks for the BCT plan regarding disclosure of the BCT arrival in Atropia.

- The ambassador emphasizes he wants close and continuous communications and liaison between the BCT and the consulate general.

- The ambassador warns against U.S. force involvement in simmering sectarian disputes inside Atropia.

- Overall, the COM seeks full justification for the size and the stated mission of the BCT, especially anything beyond NEOs and providing increased security.

Here are some typical BCT responses in the first VTC:

- The U.S. BCT commander introduces himself and the battalion commander who will have responsibility for securing Dara Lam and the consulate, and conducting the NEO.

- The commander acknowledges the requirements set forth by the ambassador and promises to address them in the follow-on VTC scheduled in 72 hours.

- He also promises to provide a full-time liaison officer to the consulate general.

- The ambassador endorses that plan and accepts that he will receive a complete backbrief regarding his issues.

Occasional notable developments include:

- Special operations forces (SOF) participation in the first VTC is partially scenario dependent. If there is heavy SOF-CF (conventional forces) interaction, a SOF element should be included in the VTC with the IA and BCT. Too often SOF does not participate in the VTC regarding operations already in progress or planned operations in the BCT’s expected area of operations.
The role of the U.S. ambassador in Gorgas varies according to scenario. Usually COM Gorgas echoes the concerns expressed by the U.S. COM in Atropia. He also points out that given the BCT was inside Gorgas at the ISB, that he and his mission were prepared to assist as desired. What does not vary is that the ISB is under the authority of COM Gorgas.

The Second VTC

The second VTC generally takes place three days later as the BCT wraps up its planning and prepares to execute its joint forcible entry (JFE). The IA community includes the U.S. ambassadors to Atropia and Gorgas at their missions and the U.S. consul general and staff from the consulate in Dara Lam. What makes the second VTC different is that the consul general is the lead with the two COMs observing and interjecting as they see fit.

The consul general usually opens with an introductory overview of the situation in Dara Lam. As part of this introduction, the members of the consulate also introduce themselves and offer insights as appropriate.

At this point, the BCT commander and staff offer their plans, views, and requests for information. In three years of DATE, the interaction between the BCT and the IA predict how future interactions go. Here are some past results:

- The boss is busy. The BCT began the brief by stating that the commander was engaged in sustained airborne training. The BCT S-3 and the battalion commander who would have Dara Lam security hosted the brief.

- What the BCT briefs is not what the COM asked for in VTC 1. The BCT S-3 essentially briefed the concept of the operation for the JFE; he offered nothing on capabilities as asked for by the ambassador.

- Liaison officer bait and switch often occurs. In the first VTC, a BCT commander said that a lieutenant colonel (LTC) would lead the liaison officer (LNO) section. The LTC was not present in the first or second VTC. The BCT S-3 in the second VTC said that a captain (also not present) and a sergeant (present) would replace the LTC.

- We got this. The S-3 explained that two military police (MP) company commanders, whom he described as very experienced in NEO, were planning the NEO. He did not amplify on that experience and the MPs were not present.

- We are on our own schedule. The battalion commander laid out his plan to secure the consulate at first light the day after the JFE. He described his security and operations concept for the consulate and the adjacent hotel as the evacuation control cell.

- Initiative gets recognized. In one rotation, the BCT analyzed the NEO mission and came up with a more efficient plan to reduce wait times using rotary backhaul to the ISB.

- Planning occurs in a vacuum. In one case, a BCT decided to remove a weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) threat in its entry operation, but the WMD belonged to the host country the BCT was supposed to reinforce.
The consul general’s inputs and takeaways from the VTC:

- Get here, yesterday. In one rotation, the BCT planned to move into Dara Lam at first light. One of its key tasks was to secure the mission as soon as possible.

- The NEO is ours. More than one BCT has approached NEO as a sideline task to be addressed as convenient in a way that the BCT sees fit. Department of State owns NEO as a mission.

- Chief of mission applies to the BCT. The COM is not just a partner; he is the supported commander.

- Liaison officer versus command. A BCT that commits a key officer to liaison signals that the commander recognizes that support to the IA is a command function. A BCT that sends its S-9 or an attached civil affairs team as its representative does not grasp that relationship.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, here are some specific and general recommendations:

- All operations start with authorities. The U.S. ambassador, as the COM, represents the U.S. President. A BCT commander cannot opt out or miss a VTC with two ambassadors.

- The acronym LNO does not stand for “least needed officer.” The LNO is the commander’s voice to the COM. A captain is not the best choice as an LNO to a four-star general.

- A U.S. diplomatic mission is an IA machine with multiple capabilities a BCT cannot hope to match.

- Nothing beats direct observation and face-to-face contact. If, as played in the scenario, the ISB in Gorgas is 60 miles from Dara Lam in Atropia and the two are friendly countries, face-to-face interaction before D-Day is not just possible, it is recommended.

- The two VTCs are intended to establish initial contact. There is nothing wrong — again it is recommended — with a BCT contacting the senior defense officer at the target mission to discuss issues before and after the VTCs. The same can be said for key staff contacts with the IA community.
Chapter 5

Interagency Trends

LTC Michael King, Director, Interagency Training; and Thomas P. Odom, CALL Liaison Officer; JRTC Operations Group

Rotation 13-01 in 2012 was the first decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Since that time, the interagency (IA) team and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) liaison office have cooperated to develop trends. This chapter offers the IA trends as submitted for the 3rd and 4th quarters of fiscal year 2015; in truth, they mirror what we have seen since Rotation 13-01 took place.

SUSTAINS

Sustain TREND 1

SUBJECT: Pre-insertion coordination with the diplomatic mission

OBSERVATION: Successful brigade combat teams (BCTs) place a high priority on a series of video teleconferences (VTCs) with the U.S. diplomatic mission in the target country.

DISCUSSION: To complete the pre-mission military decisionmaking process, the BCTs participate in two VTCs with the U.S. diplomatic mission in Atropia. During the first VTC, the U.S. ambassador and staff brief the BCT commander, staff, and key leaders. They outline the ambassador’s concerns on operations within the host nation, while providing contact information for the country team members. At the second VTC, the ambassador should receive a backbrief from the commander to ensure that the BCT’s plan accounts for the ambassador’s priorities.

Typically, the scenario is outlined by the ambassador and country team as follows:

Faced with a growing threat from long-term regional rival Ariana, the government of Atropia has requested U.S. assistance in Atropian military operations to check the threat. As tensions escalate along the border, so do internal problems in the Dara Lam area, creating an escalating threat against diplomatic operations at the U.S. Consulate. The situation is further complicated by a general collapse of control throughout the province. The ambassador requests U.S. military assistance in securing the consulate and conducting noncombatant evacuation operations of American citizens still in the province. The consulate has already executed an ordered drawdown, and the ambassador pledges that the U.S. flag will continue to fly in Dara Lam. To achieve the greatest effect and speed of insertion, the BCT plans for joint forcible entry and air land operations on the Dara Lam airfield. The local situation is complex, with a number of ethnic and sectarian background issues coming to the forefront.

The ambassador provides specific guidance to the commander: Stay out of local disputes whenever possible. In addition, the U.S. Embassy Baku and the U.S. Consulate in Dara Lam have lead for public affairs. Defer to the embassy and the consulate, and coordinate all communications.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Successful BCTs attend VTCs with all commanders and key staff. They come prepared to ask relevant questions and listen to key guidance. The intent of the VTC is to convey urgency, change, and especially the role, authority, and responsibility of the ambassador and the country team. In a few instances, the BCT staff has failed to understand the rank of the ambassador and his executive-level staff, and focused inappropriately on detail questions that would have been better suited to staff-to-staff interaction after the VTC.

Army Tactical Task (ART) 7.6.2, Conduct Limited Interventions (Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1-03, The Army Universal Task List)

Sustain TREND 2

SUBJECT: BCT relationship with the consul general

OBSERVATION: Successful BCTs work hard at partnering and interoperability with IA partners (Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other government agencies) and elements of the host government and international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

DISCUSSION: Commitment toward this effort has varied significantly from one BCT to the next. Some BCTs have begun the rotation with only modest partnering efforts, but later increased their priority of engagement and ended the rotation with strong relationships. Some have started strong with their partnership activities, but allowed their efforts to dwindle and lapse during the course of the rotation. A few have both started and finished their rotations with strong and effective unified action partnerships.

The BCT’s level of engagement is invariably measured by the personal involvement and interest of the brigade commander, who by leading through example sets up staffs and subordinate commanders for success. Successful BCT commanders meet personally on an almost daily basis with the consul general and key staff. If the commander is not available, he will appoint a person of authority and rank to be his delegate at important meetings with the country team and the host nation officials. Successful commanders involve themselves or their senior staff daily and personally with key Atropian leaders.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Relationships involve not just meetings, but personal discussions of substantive issues such as security, interoperability, and engagement in planning for transition. In successful civil-military relationships, brigades support civilian programs, and civilian agencies support the brigade’s operations.

Operational cohesiveness was fostered by the successful brigade(s) through the commander’s guidance and involvement with the consulate, U.S. government agencies, and international organizations and NGOs. Successful BCTs quickly assemble a cell within the country team and assign a liaison officer (LNO) to work directly with the consulate staff. For most of the successful rotations, these officers are an active participant in consulate and unified action partner (UAP) planning and operations.
Information sharing on security, combat operations, and media usually begins weak and tends to improve within the first few days of force-on-force operations. When BCT commanders actively involved themselves with the consulate and its regional affairs (RA) and political (POL) sections, they were able to obtain information that may have otherwise been lost within the realms of the BCT staff(s). BCT commanders on several occasions requested guidance and advice from the consul general and RA chief to prepare for upcoming operations and also to discuss ways and means to approach and work with senior host nation officials. Fostering a close relationship with the host government will often lead to positive messaging and successful security operations; however, not every BCT displays the initiative and effort required to build the rapport and relationships necessary to succeed.

ART 5.15.8 Provide Interface or Liaison Among Military and Civilian Organizations

Sustain TREND 3

SUBJECT: Civil affairs (CA) unit integration

OBSERVATION: The integration of civil affairs company and teams in the first 48 hours with the IA, international organizations, and the BCT tends to be the initial focus upon contact with the country team.

DISCUSSION: The BCTs rely heavily on their civil affairs assets in dealing with the country team. The BCT commanders clearly emphasize the role of the S-9 in the IA and international organizations arena. The S-9 is most often the logical choice for BCT commanders in establishing liaison with the country team. However, many recent BCTs have not been sufficiently resourced within the S-9 staff to handle the full role and responsibility of liaison with the varying offices and areas of concern within the country team. When BCTs have CA units attached, they often supplement the S-9 efforts. The CA units are often placed within proximity to the country team to affect better coordination and usually become the face of the BCT at the NGO cluster meeting.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The CA unit and BCT S-9 integrate with the consulate and establish operations at the earliest opportunity, particularly when offered the ability via secure video teleconference (SVTC). Civil affairs integrates with the USAID lead as well as the United Nations (UN) and NGO community. Working through attached CA elements is always challenging and is not as effective as working through assigned BCT S-9 staff. When a non-patch wearer is attached, integration is more challenging, especially during the initial 48 hours. Attachment is an art. The attachment and the gaining unit must work together to fuse their efforts quickly in such an operation. There is no time for the relief in place or transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) units were accustomed to in Iraq or Afghanistan. Relationships must be established and cemented quickly. Attached CA units are not an ideal choice to represent the BCT at the U.S. Consulate.

ART 5.15.8, Provide Interface or Liaison Among Military and Civilian Organizations
Sustain TREND 4

SUBJECT: Special operations integration with the consulate

OBSERVATION: The special operations forces (SOF) advanced operations base (AOB) generally establishes contact with the U.S. Consulate through the regional affairs officer (RAO) and his assistant within the first 24 hours of the operation.

DISCUSSION: Initial communication with the consulate usually comes through the RAO and assistant RAO (A/RAO) concerning contact with an ill-defined pro-Atropian government militia in the south of the province. The RAO and A/RAO backbrief the consul general and defense attaché (DATT) on their planned operations in support of the U.S. government strategy for Atropia. Members of the AOB, through a series of senior leader engagements, usually develop operational information that is passed through their liaison on the country team to the RAO and to the conventional BCTs.

The AOB commander and operational detachment-Alpha (ODA) intelligence specialist, with the RAO and A/RAO present as active participants, brief the consul general on the SOF operations. Usually, the briefings are professional and frank; the SOF leaders say what they know and identify what they do not know. They receive guidance from the consul general and RAO regarding long-term goals and history of the fighting factions, as well as sectarian/ethnic factors at work with the group. The SOF leaders also confirm their relationship with the BCT, that they have briefed the BCT leadership, assuring the consul general that the U.S. ambassador’s guidance is being followed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: SOF leaders made the necessary contacts to share knowledge and deconflict operations. Moreover, the SOF leaders followed U.S. diplomatic guidance and briefed key U.S. and Atropian leaders. In a sense, the SOF team provided a model to the BCT for establishing close relationships at the proper level and with the right people.

Advanced operations base operations and SOF operations, and exercising the interoperability of these elements with the brigade, were major aspects of the exercise. As this concept continues to be exercised, with the inclusion of U.S. government (USG) civilian agencies and the international organization and NGO communities, coordination has improved. The AOB personnel quickly became involved with and learned from nongovernmental, international organization and U.S. Consulate personnel. Successful AOB commanders also shared their in-depth knowledge of the various players and entities in the Atropian resistance, which is very useful to the country team working toward USG strategy for Atropia.

ART 5.15.8 Provide Interface or Liaison Among Military and Civilian Organizations

Sustain TREND 5

SUBJECT: Consular officer: noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO)

OBSERVATION: Overall, NEOs tend to go well, with only minor issues along the way. After more than two years of DATE rotations, most BCTs have realized that a NEO is a mission that can be planned and executed like other tactical missions. In fact, most BCTs usually dedicate specific training and conduct a rehearsal prior to actual execution of the NEO.
DISCUSSION: The BCTs conduct the NEO per Joint Publication (JP) 3-68 *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, and Department of State (DOS) procedures (Foreign Affairs Manual [FAM] 7 and Foreign Affairs Handbook [FAH] 12). Most BCTs’ conduct, manner, and professionalism throughout the NEO are noteworthy, and they are able to work through myriad issues presented for them to test their planning and reaction.

The BCTs tend to treat each evacuee with respect, care, consideration, and empathy at each stage of processing, taking into account that these were people going through (or having gone through) a traumatic experience. The BCT commander who sees the NEO as a critical task is the commander that puts the required assets into place to quickly and efficiently complete the operation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Planning and preparedness of the NEO. Success of NEO operations is due to effective planning by the BCT commander and staff prior to arriving in the Republic of Atropia and the leadership of the commander given responsibility for execution of the NEO. Successful NEOs require, prior to arrival, understanding the processes involved for NEO (JP 3-68) and an understanding of DOS procedures for emergency evacuations to include the emergency action plan (EAP), tripwires, authorized departure, ordered departure, travel warnings, the warden message system, and the F-77 (Report of Potential Evacuees). BCTs are provided the EAP for Dara Lam to include the F-77 well before deployment.

BCTs coordinate closely during the execution of the NEO and rely heavily on the expertise of the country team in executing the operation. The country team often engages with the BCT in order to get information on the progress of the evacuation. The BCTs find that their principal counterparts on the country team for the execution of the NEO are the consular affairs officer (CAO) and the regional security officer (RSO). If the BCT places a member of the S-2 shop inside the consulate, that action is often rewarded with the unit receiving accurate, timely information on the environment and its operations in support of the NEO.

Setting up the evacuation control center (ECC) and processing evacuees. The BCTs are expected to effectively meet the three guiding principles of a NEO:

- **Accuracy**: Account for all American citizens.
- **Security**: Safeguard evacuees and the evacuation force from all threats.
- **Speed**: Process evacuees quickly and efficiently. The BCTs accurately annotate the F-77 (updated by the CAO each night), prepare manifests, and effectively track all American citizens and third country nationals leaving on evacuation flights.

ART 7.6.2.1, Perform Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
**IMPROVES**

**Improve TREND 1**

SUBJECT: Location of BCT main command post (CP)

OBSERVATION: The location of the brigade main CP or tactical CP (TAC) is critical to effective IA cooperation.

DISCUSSION: Placement of the BCT main CP is often within a short driving distance of the country team after execution of the joint forcible entry (JFE). Prior to the JFE, the BCT main CP is not in a convenient location to allow for daily face-to-face interaction, and the BCT must rely on either SVTC or VoSIP phones. The BCTs participate in at least two SVTCs prior to their JFE; the BCTs with better intergovernmental relations sustain their dialogue between SVTCs. Very rarely will a BCT ask to pre-position a liaison element with the country team prior to the JFE, even though this is a feasible course of action to gain and maintain momentum with the country team. The BCTs often become consumed with internal operations and fail to maximize the abilities of the country team to assist in their JFE by providing introductions to the host nation and clarifying the conditions on the ground.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: There is no school solution on this issue, but if the BCTs were willing to risk exposure to keep the TOC near the initial JFE site, it would be better to move it closer to Dara Lam. Locating the TOC closer to Dara Lam would allow greater cooperation with the consulate, as well as host nation and international organizations. This location would also improve cooperative defense of Dara Lam; in any open conflict, both Atropian and U.S. diplomatic facilities would be attacked. The BCTs tend to accept tactical risk for logistical convenience. Locating the TOC away from the consulate also creates diplomatic and interagency frictions when closer coordination and proximity to Dara Lam would be possible and advisable.

ART 5.15.8, Provide Interface or Liaison Among Military and Civilian Organizations

**Improve TREND 2**

SUBJECT: Information sharing

OBSERVATION: Information sharing is at times problematic, and misunderstandings result in short-term friction that can lead to long-term difficulty for the BCTs.

DISCUSSION: A recent example of this observation was the mutual misunderstanding between the consul general and BCT commander regarding increasing the military presence inside the consulate prior to the major enemy attacks. Often, BCTs station forces within the confines of the consulate building, assuming this is acceptable if the RSO is aware of their presence. However, they fail to realize that being within the confines of the diplomatic building places them under different rules of engagement (ROE) with additional restrictions.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Relationships involve not just meetings, but personal discussions of substantive issues such as security, interoperability, and planning for transition. In successful civil-military relationships, brigades support civilian programs and civilian agencies support the brigade’s operations.

ART 5.15.8, Provide Interface or Liaison Among Military and Civilian Organizations

Improve TREND 3

SUBJECT: Host nation (HN) partnership

OBSERVATION: The BCTs rarely exert effort to integrate Atropian forces into their operations.

DISCUSSION: Partnership begins with close and continuous contact with all unified action partners (UAPs). That includes HN government and security forces. Contact must include sustained close communications across the board. Brigade coordination with Atropian forces during the early phases of the exercise, and up to the defensive operations phase, is usually unreliable. The Atropian forces lack secure communications capability to share information with the BCT forces and must rely on liaison efforts.

Advanced operations base and tactical psychological operations (PSYOPS) elements working in support of the operations often find that they are not nested within the BCT commander’s vision and often do not understand the concept of shaping the BCT operational environment. This coordination generally tends to improve if the AOB and PSYOPS teams work in closer proximity to the BCT main CP and are included in the BCT planning processes as part of mission command. Similarly, the upward trends observed continue to improve and the situation appears to stabilize more for the BCT as it transitions to the defensive phase of the operation. Usually, the BCT culminates with a final attack with better coordination and planning among the UAPs, focused on achieving a common goal. The BCT usually begins to understand nongovernmental cooperation with the AOB and BCT; at this stage BCT leaders need direct guidance to the commander from the country team. In these instances AOB and BCT forces concurred that information on activities could have been notified and shared more efficiently.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Several efforts could significantly improve the U.S.-Atropian integration:

- Assign a field grade officer (Atropian) to the BCT as an LNO. This officer must be permanently assigned to JRTC to develop competence and value as an LNO.

- Joint Task Force (JTF) 21 should order, in writing, the BCT to accept attachment or tactical control (TACON) of the Atropian unit. Unwritten guidance to “partner” or “put an Atropian face on it” is not sufficient.

- The Atropian unit, usually portrayed by National Guard forces, must be set up for success. The role-playing unit must be provided detailed information on Atropia, and given a fully functional fleet of vehicles, weapons, and secure communications, in order to replicate a capable and valuable HN force.
• The Atropian unit must be covered by observer-coach/trainers to ensure the Atropians and the opposition force (OPFOR) strictly adhere to exercise rules of engagement. If or when the OPFOR perceives that the Atropian unit is the weak point in a defense, the OPFOR will inevitably target that weak point. This will only reinforce the negative perceptions that BCTs have of foreign forces.

ART 5.15.8, Provide Interface or Liaison Among Military and Civilian Organizations

Improve TREND 4

SUBJECT: Regional security officer and BCT coordination

OBSERVATION: During the battle for Dara Lam, the BCT that takes “secure and defend the consulate” as a tactical mission performs better than the BCT that sees the task as more administrative and a distraction to its main objective of fighting the enemy.

DISCUSSION: Brigade combat team shortfalls in the Dara Lam offense fall into three categories:

Mission analysis and planning: Units fail to see the mission as a defense, particularly one that includes infantry defensive tasks and integration with UAPs. This lack of understanding of the critical terrain element of the consulate and what the target value is invariably results in the loss of the consulate to what otherwise would have been easily defeated enemy forces.

Inadequate and incorrect force structure: Over the course of several rotational observations, BCTs tend to allocate what they perceive to be an adequate amount of force to securing the consulate, without gaining actual requirements from the country team and the RSO. Often the BCTs allocate a minimal amount of forces that will not detract from their ability to conduct tactical missions with which they are more familiar. Force allocation for protection of the consulate generally begins with a squad- to platoon-size element that more often than not receives little support from BCT enablers to actually achieve a “defense” of the consulate.

Inadequate mission command: As a “hey you” task, command of the security element dispatched to the consulate often falls to a junior officer or noncommissioned officer, usually non-infantry. As the situation evolves, so does the leadership. Units rotate commanders of the security element when the current commander is needed back at the BCT headquarters. The RSOs may be forced to work with a series of leaders as the commander, rather than developing and sustaining a partner.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The security of the consulate is a BCT-specified task that should be a priority for the BCT commander.

Mission analysis and planning: Planning should begin as part of the BCT military decisionmaking process, and continue through small unit (company/platoon) troop leading procedures.

Consulate defense: Consulate defense is a platoon or company defensive mission that calls for a coordinated strong point defense tied in with Atropian forces.
**Single point of contact for consulate security:** Close cooperation between the RSO and the unit with exterior defense should be sustained. Name a commander and keep that commander in place until threat conditions abate rather than rotate commanders as personnel demands in higher headquarters operations change.

ART 5.1.1, Plan Operations; ART 5.15.8, Provide Interface or Liaison Among Military and Civilian Organizations

**Improve TREND 5**

**SUBJECT:** Consular officer: noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)

**OBSERVATION:** Although NEOs tend to go well, issues with airlift coordination and mission priorities do arise.

**DISCUSSION:**

**Airlift.** Generally, BCTs struggle with coordination with the air liaison officers (ALO) for aerial evacuation of evacuees. During the course of recent rotations, BCTs struggled with tracking availability of flights and resourcing/planning the use of flights — both U.S. Air Force fixed wing and U.S. Army rotary. Brigade combat teams should rehearse and plan the coordination necessary with external assets, in addition to their rehearsal of internal ECC operations.

**Delays to mount rescue operation:** One area of concern is the willingness and prioritizing of rescuing American citizens. American citizens who are isolated and need assistance in getting to the ECC are presented during rotations. The BCTs struggle with planning for securing the isolated American citizens and balancing that requirement with other tactical security missions. Isolated American citizens often wait for an extended period of time before they are recovered, and the country team has to become more involved with the BCT to encourage prioritization of this recovery and evacuation.

**TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:** Brigade combat teams coordinate closely with and rely heavily on the expertise of the country team in executing the NEO. Often the country team engages with the BCT in order to gain information on the progress of the evacuation. The BCTs find that their principal counterparts on the country team for the execution of the NEO are the CAO and the RSO. If the BCT elects to place a member of the S-2 shop inside the consulate, it finds it receives receive accurate, timely information on the environment and operations in support of the NEO.

**Setting up the ECC and processing evacuees:** The BCTs are expected to effectively meet the three guiding principles of a NEO:

- **Accuracy:** Account for all American citizens.
- **Security:** Safeguard evacuees and the evacuation force are from all threats.
- **Speed:** Process evacuees quickly and efficiently. The BCTs accurately annotate the F-77 (updated by the CAO each night), prepare manifests, and effectively track all personnel leaving on evacuation flights.
Airlift: Including rock drill airlift requirements in the combined arms rehearsal should be a priority. A primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan for evacuation, much like aerial and medical planning for medical evacuation should be developed.

Rescue: A NEO on a good day proceeds without hiccups. Plan for bad days. Consider out of sector missions as be prepared to, or even on-order missions, for both BCT and SOF.

ART 7.6.2.1, Perform Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Chapter 6

Engagement as a Functional Concept

MAJ Eric Sibley, Task Force Engagement, JRTC Operations Group

“The last 12 years of sustained combat operations between Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have demonstrated the need for considering human factors and their effects on a strategy. In both theaters, the United States and its allies have blended counterinsurgency and counterterrorism approaches, with successes and shortcomings. The common denominators have been people and culture. Anticipating such human factors in war and strategy is nothing new. Clausewitz defines war as ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.’ War is a battle for influence, sometimes by physical force. The human domain has been and will continue to be a complex yet critical aspect in warfighting. Success in future and uncertain operating environments will be determined by how well we are able to understand, influence, and, in some cases, counter a movement before it escalates to direct combat actions.”

In order to address the human domain and its effect on strategy, the Army published Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (PAM) 525-8-4, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement. This publication addresses four imperatives for the future Army force: both Army and partnered forces’ capabilities will need to be leveraged in future operations; influence in a country or region will require an understanding of human factors by Army forces; the methodology of “by, with, and through” will facilitate host nation capabilities; and support to the joint force commander will require Army conventional and special operations forces (SOF) to work in concert.

I will focus on the imperative to understand human factors to wield influence in a country or region. The Army defines the human domain as “the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military operation or campaign depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts.”

The human domain is a complex and complicated sphere of knowledge and activity. Because of this complexity, brigade combat teams (BCTs) and supporting units will never control the human domain. However, those BCTs and supporting units can establish a framework to better understand the human domain to further influence and exercise control within their boundaries.

Understanding Human Terrain

Understanding the human domain is not a new concept; however, the emphasis that has now been placed on it through training scenarios at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has illuminated just how much BCTs struggle with it. Because the human domain is a relatively new focus area, not enough data exists to provide lessons learned or effective tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, key observations have been documented that predict how other BCTs will fare.
Rotational training units at JRTC consistently struggled to develop their understanding of the human domain. This in turn had second- and third-order effects as BCTs were challenged to effectively apply tasks and systems to influence the population and build relationships with unified action partners (UAPs). BCTs must use a more doctrinal planning effort, and consistent command emphasis is necessary if the BCTs are to better understand the human domain to influence and exercise control within their boundaries. We have observed some common obstacles that limit understanding of the human domain:

- Failure to thoroughly analyze and describe the operational environment.
- Failure to develop and maintain single display of relevant information at the brigade level (human domain overlay or update).
- Lack of a clear assessment plan to help evaluate progress.

These key observations have been consistent throughout previous rotations and have caused rotational units to react to numerous anti-American demonstrations, negative news and social media reports, and politically driven pressure from Department of State leadership. Negative battlefield consequences can potentially be averted or better controlled by addressing these three areas:

- Analyze the operational environment.
- Create and maintain a common operational picture (COP) at the brigade level.
- Conduct near continuous assessments.

Build and Maintain Situational Understanding

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process, states: “Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available information and knowledge. As such, commanders and staffs seek to build and maintain situational understanding throughout the operations process. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking (ADP 5-0). Building and maintaining situational understanding is essential to establishing the situation’s context, developing effective plans, assessing operations, and making quality decisions throughout the operations process. Commanders continually strive to maintain their situational understanding and work through periods of reduced understanding as the situation evolves.”

Analyze the Operational Environment

At the BCT level, Army leaders plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations by analyzing the operational environment in terms of the operational and mission variables political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). “The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”
Table 6-1. Operational variables.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical environment</td>
<td>Includes the geography and manmade structures, as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an operational environment, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the operational environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This process is critical in understanding the operational environment; it is often overlooked or left up to the brigade S-2 to develop. The BCT’s understanding of the human domain is initially derived from this analysis. This analysis, however, is not just an intelligence-fed process; all other warfighting function input is needed to provide the commander a “whole picture” of all influences that affect the human domain. Ideally, as staff components collectively analyze these variables, they would begin to see connections between systems that have impacts within the human domain. These impacts would then be utilized to help the commander visualize his efforts to achieve effects within the human domain.
Assess the Operational Environment

In order to effectively influence, control, and maintain understanding within the human domain, a continuous assessment plan is vital to the BCT. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, *The Operations Process*, states: “Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0).” Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also involves continuously monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine what changes might affect the conduct of operations.

Developing and employing an assessment plan has proved to be challenging to BCTs and subordinate units. The problem is found at both the brigade and subordinate levels. Often commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) do not address priorities or collection efforts within the human domain. The inability to address these priorities or efforts can be traced back to members of the brigade staff conducting weak mission analysis and not providing recommended CCIRs to the commander. Lack of command emphasis then filters down to battalion level, where battalion commanders often do not see the importance of how their actions have “cause and effect” within the human domain. Staff components at all levels throughout the brigade do not develop evaluation criteria or indicators to accurately measure effects within the human domain.
“Criteria in the forms of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) aid in determining progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. MOEs help determine if a task is achieving its intended results. MOPs help determine if a task is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria — they do not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant information in the form of indicators for evaluation.”

Observer-coach/trainers see a lack of assessment as a systemic problem in the BCTs. The lack of evaluation criteria often renders the brigade’s inform and influence operations useless and leaves the unit wondering if the desired effect was ever achieved.

**Maintain a Graphic Running Estimate**

Finally, the development of a human domain overlay or update would provide the brigade and its subordinate units with a brigade-wide shared understanding of the human aspects in the operational environment. Unfortunately, many BCTs struggle with developing and maintaining all warfighting function overlays. The root of this issue can be traced back to the aforementioned lack of an assessment plan. Subordinate units within the BCT often fail to feed information back into the operations process and fail to update and maintain unit-level common operational pictures. Brigade-level understanding is then hindered because bottom-up feedback is not being executed. A good reference to use in developing a human domain overlay or update is Field Manual (FM) 3-13, *Inform and Influence Activities*.

“The combined information overlay gives the commander and planners a visual depiction of the ways in which information affects the area of operations. Similar to the modified combined obstacle overlay, which the G-2 (S-2) develops during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield [IPB], the combined information overlay is a simplified depiction of numerous interconnected variables. The combined information overlay is a tool to visualize a collection of inputs that can never be completely synthesized. As such, it is never a final product; it is often updated as new information arises and as time and staffing permit.”
Conclusions

Engagement, while new as a functional concept, has timeless roots. War is severe human interaction; understanding human terrain requires a systematic approach, just like any other warfighting function. That understanding begins with thorough analysis and continuous assessment. It is evident that many basic planning and synchronization fundamentals have atrophied over the years we have been at war. However, a doctrinal foundation does exist that will allow brigade planners and leaders to succeed. It is critical as BCTs prepare to plan, synchronize, and achieve effects that the human domain is considered and analyzed.

Endnotes

2. TRADOC PAM 525-8-5, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, 24 FEB 2014, p. 34.
9. ADRP 5-0, p. 5-2.
Chapter 7

Cultural Reconnaissance

LTC Josh Hamilton, Interagency Planner, JRTC Operations Group

One of the main critiques of our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been our lack of cultural knowledge. We, as an Army, are excellent at taking and securing terrain. We know tactics and logistics. We can shoot, move, and communicate. But, we are a definite “Needs Improvement” when it comes to understanding and working with foreign cultures.

For the future, we do not know where the next war will be fought or what it will look like. However, it is a near certainty that it will require interacting with foreign people. The mission will take place in a foreign country and it will require training, advising, fighting against, fighting alongside, or assisting human beings born and raised in a culture different from ours. Understanding how these people think and act will, in large part, decide success or failure of the mission.

This chapter outlines a methodology for effectively preparing U.S. Army units to understand and interact with the diverse cultures they will experience. It shows how U.S. Army units should go deeper, past the “Wikipedia level” of foreign country information briefs. It provides tools to prepare for interaction with people of foreign cultures, to improve communication and cooperation. Finally, it makes recommendations as to how to integrate this methodology into the Army’s collective competence.

This is a compilation of cultural study data and training methodology used during pre-deployment training for combat advisers, civil affairs Soldiers, and regionally aligned forces deploying overseas to the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Pacific Command regions. In addition, this information has been used to train both foreign-born and American-born role players at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). This training has been highly useful toward enabling these role players to better replicate the foreign environments in which our Army will operate.

Engagement as a Proposed Warfighting Function

In February of 2014, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published TRADOC Pamphlet (PAM) 525-8-5, U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, describing the radical change in Army doctrine that came with the concept of engagement as a proposed seventh warfighting function. This publication specifies that Army leaders must engage and work with interagency partners, nongovernmental organizations, and partner-nation forces. TRADOC PAM 525-8-5 includes numerous specified and implied tasks that are relevant to this chapter:

- The engagement warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that influence the behaviors of a people, security forces, and governments.¹

- This will require Soldiers to be sufficient in language, culture, customs, and regional orientation.²

- Recent global operations illustrate the need for future Army leaders to develop the capacity to assess diverse cultures, ethnicities, and vulnerable populations.³
• Future cultural training, education, and experience will enable leaders and Soldiers to determine key audiences and develop the most effective means of communicating with them.4

• Future Army forces must recognize political considerations, religious beliefs, and ethnic differences that may affect a mission’s success. Understanding the power residing in human interaction, social constructs, language, culture, behavior, and other human variables will provide the construct for future Army forces to influence the operational environment.5

• The concept discusses why knowledge, along with an understanding of the behavior of security forces, governments, and people, greatly increase opportunities for the Army to achieve its objectives of prevent, shape, and win.6

• Future Army forces require the capability to work through and with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations in a culturally attuned manner, within the operational environment, in support of unified action.7

Bottom line – the Army must get smarter about other cultures. This chapter provides a method of how to do so. This is intended to enhance, not replace, other cultural studies and training methods by adding a comprehensible, quantitative analysis of the subject.

What Is Culture?

There is no universally accepted definition of culture. Usually, the focus is on tangible manifestations such as customs, clothing, dance, food, and religion. While this data is easy to identify, it only shows the signs, not the root causes, of group behavior. In addition, while language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) is useful to describe a broad category of training requirements, it can be misleading. While culture is influenced by language, ethnicity, and regional geography, it is not synonymous with any of these identifiers.

The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy defines culture as “the set of distinctive features of a society or group, including but not limited to values, beliefs, and norms, that ties together members of that society or group and that drives action and behavior.” This somewhat wordy definition can be simplified as “how groups of people think and act.” Culture is group behavior and group thought. Cultural groups can be defined by international borders, by internal regional divisions, by ethno-linguistic groups, by religions, and by a host of other delineations.

Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, provides a good level of detail as to what culture is and is not. Chapter 1, “Operational Environment in Counterinsurgency,” Section V, describes “cultural competence.” Cultural competence includes descriptions of cultural dimensions and cultural manifestations that differentiate one society from another. Primarily, these descriptions are based on the research and writings of Geert Hofstede and Edward T. Hall.

The following sections will describe two commonly cited theories for understanding other cultures. While these are by no means the final authorities on the subject, the comparative cultural evaluations contribute to understanding how groups of people think and act.
Hall’s Cultural Manifestations

Edward T. Hall is considered one of the fathers of modern cultural studies, specifically intercultural communications. His research and writings include *The Hidden Dimension* and *Beyond Culture*. In these books he describes several useful cultural dimensions or cultural behaviors that vary greatly from one culture to another. These dimensions and behaviors can be used to understand how persons from different cultures act and react differently from each other. Hall’s cultural behaviors include:

**Proxemics.** Proxemics is the study of personal space and distance. People in some cultures are comfortable standing and talking closer to each other in social settings, while others are comfortable at a greater distance. The U.S., Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, and China are “long-distance” cultures, preferring social engagement occur at least at arm’s length. Arab, African, and Latin cultures tend toward “close-distance” communication, feeling comfortable at roughly half that distance. When persons with differing concepts of proximity are communicating, one will tend to stand closer than the other. This dynamic frequently leads to those with long-distance proxemics perceiving close-distance proxemics people as aggressive and invasive. Conversely, those who prefer close-distance communication perceive the people from long-distance cultures to be rude, cold, and standoffish.

**Context sensitivity.** Context sensitivity explores how much of the message is explicit or implicit. That is, is the meaning in the words that are stated, or is it within the context, body language, emotion, or volume of speech? Cultures can be described as high context or low context. In a low context society, such as in the United States, the meaning is in the words that are spoken; there is less implied subtext. While Hall did not quantify the context ratings, there is a definite ability to compare and contrast the levels of context sensitivity between different cultures, as shown in Figure 7-1 on page 44.
Chronic orientation. Chronic orientation, also known as chronemics, classifies cultures as monochronic or polychronic. That is, do many things happen at once, or one at a time? Does an 8 a.m. meeting start at 8 a.m., or at some point in the morning? Are schedules fixed or easily changeable? In a polychronic society, such as Latin America or the Middle East, many things happen at once. Meetings will constantly include conversations with multiple people, interrupting is frequent, and it is not unusual for cellphones to be ringing. The United States is considered a very monochronic culture, as illustrated in Figure 7-2 on page 45.
Haptics. Haptics assesses the use of touch in communication. How much touching is considered appropriate? Cultures vary greatly in their use of touch. For example, in Japanese culture, little to no physical contact is made outside of intimate relationships. On the other hand, Arab cultures make great use of physical contact, even between casual acquaintances. It is not uncommon to see two men or two women holding hands while walking. Long-distance cultures, in general, tend to be “low contact” while close-distance cultures tend to use and allow more contact in communication.

Hall’s cultural manifestations have been researched greatly over the past few decades. There is more than enough data available on any country to which our Soldiers would deploy. Incorporating this data into country briefs and assessments is not difficult, and will greatly enhance Soldiers’ ability to understand how foreign people think and act.

Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions

Another pioneer of cultural studies is Geert Hofstede, whose research while working in international business is one of the most enduring and comprehensive quantifiable assessments of different cultures. While Hall’s manifestations show how groups of people act, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions describe patterns in how they think. His books *Culture and Consequences* and *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* have been repeatedly revised and updated, most recently in 2010. His Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation conducts ongoing studies into the subject.
One clarification is that Hofstede’s cultural variables apply to national-level group cultures, but not necessarily at the individual level. That is, one can expect large groups of people from a particular country to behave in a manner consistent with his findings. But, this does not mean that all individuals from that country will consistently act and think that way.

Hofstede evaluated many of the world’s different cultures and produced numerical assessments of each, on a scale of 1 to 100. His institute has data available on virtually any country in which our forces could operate, organized into what he refers to as the “cultural dimensions.” He refers to cultural dimensions as “an aspect of a culture that can be measured relative to other cultures.” His dimensions include:

**Power distance index (PDI).** To what degree do subordinates accept or question the greater authority and power of their superiors. That is, are the boss’s decisions final, or are they open to question? In a low PDI society (such as the United States) authority is shared, responsibilities are delegated, and subordinates are free to think for themselves. In high PDI societies, such as Iraq, subordinates do not question their leaders. Also, a person’s station in life is generally fixed; upward mobility is severely limited. Figure 7-3 shows how this level varies throughout the world.

![Power Distance Index](image)

**Figure 7-3. Power Distance Index.**
Individualism. The opposite of collectivism, individualism concerns how much a person’s identity and rights are valued above, or below, that of the group. In an individualist culture, there is a greater sense of privacy, and people are expected to be more self-sufficient. In collectivist cultures, peoples’ identities are tied closely to their family, ethnic, and religious groups. People rarely change jobs and there is a greater sense of public property and public business. It should be noted that researchers have drawn clear links between collectivistic cultures, high context communication, and polychronic behavior. Likewise, individualistic cultures tend to use low context communication and exhibit more monochronic behavior. On the chart below (Figure 7-4) higher numbers (such as the United States) indicate more individualistic cultures, while lower numbers (such as Afghanistan) are more collectivistic.

![Individualism Chart]

Figure 7-4. Individualism.
**Masculinity.** Masculinity is a measure of how much a culture values achievement and competition, as opposed to feminist cultures that put greater value on quality of life, nurturing, and caring for others. Japan is a highly masculine society; personal comfort is less important than efficiency and achievement, and leaders are expected to be directive and assertive. In more feminine societies, more time and resources are allowed for leisure and time with one’s family. More masculine cultures such as Japan have higher scores while more feminine cultures such as Russia have lower scores.

![Masculinity](image)

**Figure 7-5. Masculinity.**
Uncertainty avoidance. How much do people avoid or embrace change and uncertainty? How rigidly do they adhere to traditions? Do they prize security and stability, or freedom of innovation? Iraq is a society with a very high uncertainty avoidance rating; there is less tolerance for unorthodox change. Dissent is generally discouraged and there is a rigid code of behavior and belief.

Figure 7-6. Uncertainty Avoidance.
**Pragmatism.** Are the “norms” or accepted behaviors fixed or flexible? How much does a society tend to change its norms to fit the situation? Are actions that would normally be condemned considered acceptable when they are deemed necessary? In the opposite, a normative culture, people are focused more on an absolute truth that is less susceptible to change. Normative cultures such as Egypt have lower scores while more pragmatic cultures such as Japan have higher scores. The United States is considered relatively normative, meaning that our concepts of right and wrong, as well as our rules for acceptable conduct, are more fixed and rigid.

![Figure 7-7. Pragmatism.](image)

**How to Make it Useful – the Comparative Method**

Reconnaissance is generally thought of as gathering information about physical terrain and/or enemy activities. For Army studies and reports on the human population of a given area, the “reconnaissance” usually produces data such as ethnicity, language, and religion. Most of this information can be found on Wikipedia and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook. While this information is easy to obtain, it provides little toward understanding true cultural behavior dynamics.

On occasion, the concepts of cultural dimensions and cultural behaviors are taught, with varying results. Soldiers may learn what PDI is, or how to understand collectivism and individualism, but still leave without truly useful information. This is most likely why Army leaders frequently dismiss cultural training in favor of more mission-specific, hard skills. Commanders at most levels frequently support bare minimum cultural instruction only. Many feel that there is little tangible value in what is taught.
Discussing cultural dimensions without providing concrete data is not true reconnaissance. The cultural environment is not being described, nor are its effects. This is akin to discussing the concepts of ground elevation, annual rainfall, vegetation, or urbanization without providing any specific information about the operating environment. Without country-specific data, a country cultural brief is not very useful.

A more effective approach is to present quantifiable, cultural research data based on the studies of Hall, Hofstede, and others. Show that Iraq has a PDI score of 95 and an individualism rating of 30, etc. In addition, make comparisons between other cultures that students are already familiar with. For example, show how the PDI rating of Iraq is 95, while Afghanistan’s is 55, France is 58, Japan is 54, while Germany and the United States are rated at 35.

This comparative approach allows students to internalize both the concept and the data, while allowing them to put the information into the context of their own experiences. Using a comparative approach also illustrates which cultural dimensions are the greatest points of contrast between their own and that of the country to which they are deploying. Providing awareness of the cultural environment in both the target country and the student’s own country makes the information truly useful.

**Cultural Tools and Training**

One of the most effective methods of imparting cultural intelligence to students, both military and civilian, has been the use of actual cultural data from Hofstede’s and Hall’s research, graphically depicted in a comparative format.

Graphics such as these should be incorporated into the country “smart cards” provided to Soldiers before deployment. These smart cards should include data on the target country, other countries in the region, some countries that the Soldiers are already familiar with, and, of course, the United States. Inclusion of our own cultural data is critical, in order to give Army personnel a context within which to understand other cultures. That is, a Soldier deploying to Iraq will see that, while we are very “monochronic” and “low context,” the target country is very “polychronic” and “high context.”

Teaching raw data alone, however, is not useful. The quantification of cultural data must be supported by concrete examples of visible behavior that support the assessment. In addition to the cultural data above, it is very useful to include specific behaviors and anecdotes from the target country. Below are some examples:

The Afghan need for “tea time” prior to discussing business is a manifestation of a high context culture. Establishing a context and a relationship between communicators has to be done in order for any effective communication to take place. This scenario is difficult to comprehend for low context culture people like Americans. But, understanding why it is an inherent part of the thought and behavior process of Afghans is a key step toward working across cultural gaps.

Japan has a much higher uncertainty avoidance rating than the United States. This high rating is part of the reason for Japan’s comparatively slower rate of change in both political and military practices. Whereas our culture accepts the risk and uncertainty that come with change, the Japanese tend to have a greater need for the security and stability of traditions. The Japanese cultural concept of “Kaizen” illustrates this point. Kaizen literally translates as “good change” or “change for the better.” In practice, however, it can best be described as “continuous, gradual
improvement.” This viewpoint can be contrasted with the “build a better light bulb” philosophy of America. While Americans appreciate bold innovation, Japanese support continuous refinement, again directly related to the much higher uncertainty avoidance found in Japanese culture. Understanding this difference is critical for Army officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who will deploy to train with the Japanese military.

The Iraqi culture’s PDI is one of the highest in the world, while that of the United States is much lower. In Iraq, leaders tend to be autocratic, delegate little, and make decisions on their own. An Iraqi’s place in the socio-economic structure is more “fixed,” and there is a very clear order to the society. Americans see each other as more “equal,” even among people of different ranks. Power is more often delegated, and Americans are more vertically mobile in society. This important cultural difference is the most likely reason why the U.S. Army’s attempt to professionalize the Iraqi NCO corps was not very successful. The U.S. Army’s system of officer-NCO relations works because it is compatible with American culture. The same system is not as compatible with Iraqi society. A more successful system would take into consideration Iraq’s cultural dimensions and be developed to fit Iraq, not the United States.

After teaching that the United States has one of the highest individualism ratings in the world (91), this point can be reinforced by showing how our Constitution was one of the first in the world to codify individual rights. Also, in our Army, we continually reward individual performance much more so than group success. In American culture, the smaller nuclear family is the focus of a person’s life, and the extended family is usually far behind in importance. Countries with more collectivistic cultures, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, tend to have much stronger ties to extended families.

How to Make Culture Part of the Army’s Collective Competence

Information is useful only if it is used. Cultures should become as familiar to Army leaders as terrain analysis and climate data. Army leaders should be able to read a country’s “cultural map” as well as they can read a 1:50,000 scale military map. The following are recommendations to achieve this goal:

First, cultural reconnaissance should be taught in depth at the Army’s Military Intelligence (MI) School at Fort Huachuca, AZ. This subject should be taught to all MI officers and to NCOs in relevant military occupational specialties (MOSs) such as all-source intelligence. These intelligence professionals should become proficient at researching cultural intelligence and producing useful cultural products for their units.

In addition, mobile training teams (MTTs) could instruct a train-the-trainer course throughout the operational Army. These MTTs would provide a five-day course to teach commanders and their staffs how to create and use cultural reconnaissance products. Every Army battalion should have multiple trained “cultural reconnaissance scouts” capable of producing useful products for any culture.

Second, a basic familiarization with the cultural dimensions should be taught to all Army officers, starting with Basic Officer Leader’s Course and continuing at the Captain’s Career Course, Intermediate Level Education, and the Army War College. The Army should consider teaching this familiarization course to NCOs, starting at the Warrior Leader Course.
Third, cultural reconnaissance should become part of all intelligence assessments and briefings. Alongside terrain and weather analysis, a brief cultural analysis should be included in every description of the operating environment. The current operational environment (OE) description method uses the model of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). Within this OE, the social paragraph should include analysis of cultural variables. Every PMESII-PT description should include, at a minimum, the cultural dimensions and cultural manifestations analysis detailed above. In addition, the next revision of Army doctrinal manuals and related publications should include cultural variables as part of the analysis of the area of operations.

Finally, culture should be a significant planning consideration for any plan or operation that involves interacting with foreign peoples. Whether the mission calls for direct combat, advising, training, or humanitarian assistance, cultural reconnaissance should inform every course of action. A commander’s decision as to which course of action to approve should, in part, be based on cultural considerations.
Example Iraq Cultural Analysis
(Example for PMESII-PT Operational Environment Assessment, Paragraph 4, “Social”)

Basic cultural norms and values

Iraq, like most Middle Eastern countries, is a close proxemic culture. Iraqis tend to be more comfortable with closer physical contact than Americans. Iraqis favor high context communication, meaning that messages are usually implied, rather than stated, and that disagreement is usually in a diplomatic, indirect manner. This form of communication is heavily dependent upon personal relationships which must be built and maintained in order to communicate effectively. Communication in a high context culture cannot take place out of established relationships.

Like most Middle Eastern societies, Iraq is a highly polychronic culture. Timelines and agendas are flexible and easily changed. Meetings and other gatherings generally have multiple conversations occurring at once, with participants frequently interrupting each other. This polychronic orientation to time is generally found in collectivistic cultures that also favor high context communication.

Iraq’s cultural values are dominated by its high PDI, rated at 95 of 100 by the Hofstede Center, making it one of the highest in the world. Subordinates do not question superiors, a person's station in life is largely fixed, and initiative in subordinates is rarely rewarded. Relationships between officers and NCOs is strikingly different in Iraq than in the U.S. Army, in line with our much lower PDI rating of 40.

With an individualism rating of just 30, Iraq is a highly collectivist society, meaning that the rights and identity of the group greatly overshadow that of the individual. Interpersonal relationships are very important, long lasting, and pervade every aspect of Iraqi culture. A person’s allegiance to tribe, family, and ethnic and religious groups is much more powerful than in the relatively individualist American culture, which is rated at 91.

Iraqi society also shows a high level of uncertainty avoidance (85 out of 100), with a resistance to change, an aversion to risk, and an inherent need for security. Traditions are less likely to change; persons in this type of culture have a strong need for rules and regulations. Iraqis are much less accepting of risk and change than Americans, with our avoidance rating of 46.

Cultural Implications for Working in Iraq

Be prepared for closer conversations and more physical contact. Understand that the Iraqis are not being “rude.” Practice being more comfortable with close contact communication. Also, practice developing patience with long, indirect conversations. Take more time to build interpersonal relationships. Spend more time making “small talk,” eating together, and generally socializing. Get to know Iraqi counterparts and constantly look for the “implied message” in what is said. Also, take care that what is said to Iraqis is not too blunt or rude. Criticism should be made in a more diplomatic, implied manner, and only after interpersonal relationships are established.

Be cognizant of rank and status. Manage expectations of how much Iraqi commanders will delegate to subordinates, especially NCOs. U.S. Army NCOs and officers should demonstrate respect and deference to superior Iraqi officers, especially when offering advice or criticism.

Avoid trying to completely “reinvent the wheel.” Rather than trying to change Iraqi methods to completely match American methods, try to effect more nuanced, gradual change. Look at the Iraqis’ methods and work with counterparts to improve and refine those processes.

Conclusion

The mission of the U.S. Army is “to fight and win our Nation’s wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of combatant commanders.” Achieving land dominance includes killing and destruction. It also includes interacting with people from foreign cultures. This interaction is a critical skill
gap that has significantly affected our mission accomplishment in Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and other theaters of operation.

Foreign cultures are part of the operational environment. Ignoring cultural differences is akin to ignoring weather or terrain elevation. These physical environmental factors will continue to greatly affect our mission accomplishment, and so will culture.

Endnotes

2. Ibid., p. 9.
3. Ibid., p. 10.
4. Ibid., p. 15.
5. Ibid., p. 17.
6. Ibid., p. 21.

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Chapter 8

The Leader’s Regional Advise and Assist Course (LRAAC): Preparing Leaders to Win in a Complex World

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“The Army cannot predict who it will fight, where it will fight, and with what coalition it will fight. To win in a complex world, Army forces must provide the joint force with multiple options, integrate the efforts of multiple partners, operate across multiple domains, and present our enemies and adversaries with multiple dilemmas.”


Today our Army faces as much uncertainty as at any point in time since the close of the Korean War. Our senior leaders are working to address a multitude of threats from Afghanistan to Africa to Eastern Europe, even, it seems, as these threats transform before us. At the same time, the U.S. Army faces a dwindling budget and reduced force structure which could increasingly limit the resources available to meet these threats. At the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA, we understand that one of the best ways to hedge for an uncertain future is by investing in leader development. The Army Leadership Development Strategy (ALDS) states that “developing leaders is a competitive advantage the Army possesses that cannot be replaced by technology or substituted with advanced weaponry and platforms,” so it follows that it is during times such as these when we most need to invest in our junior leaders at the brigade and below.

Currently our conventional forces are distributed across the globe, executing a broad array of missions. For example, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) alone currently has units regularly engaged in over 150 countries. You can find our Soldiers committed to operations ranging from brigade-level deployments in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) to small-team and individual deployments in the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) AOR. Regardless of where you search out our formations, you will find leaders engaged with the full range of joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners. Furthermore, as budgets shrink, this trend can only increase. The new Army Operating Concept, Win in a Complex World, calls for the Army to engage regionally to shape security environments and set the theater of operations as part of its core competencies. The ALDS nests within that goal, placing regional engagement at the top of the list of “near-term” priorities for leader development. ALDS states that “leaders must understand the strategic environment, be able to think critically and creatively, visualize solutions, and describe and communicate crucial information to achieve shared understanding, collaborate, and build teams.” It stands to reason that as resources dwindle, leveraging the full capabilities of our partner organizations only becomes more important to the successful execution of unified land operations (ULO). Leaders who can successfully engage, leverage, and synchronize partner efforts will be of great value to any formation.
With these thoughts in mind, the JRTC Operations Group developed a training curriculum to help commanders prepare their leaders for the complexities of the present and future operating environment. The Leader’s Regional Advise and Assist Course (LRAAC) is a weeklong, immersive training event designed to provide leaders at the company and battalion level the cognitive foundation for operating in a complex foreign environment. Observer-coach/trainers (OC/Ts) from the 3rd Battalion, 353rd Regiment, deliver a doctrinally grounded curriculum that provides students both a conceptual foundation to shape the lens through which they view human interaction and hands-on scenario-based training exercises to develop and hone their interpersonal engagement skills. Taken in full, the course helps leaders better understand and engage with their interorganizational and multinational partners. The final result is a leader more capable of accommodating cultural differences, tolerating ambiguity, building relationships, and leveraging the strengths of others.

Core Curriculum

As presently taught, LRAAC consists of three fundamental components. The first and the foundational component of the course consists of six “core” classes. These classes help build skills essential to the successful execution of all security cooperation missions. As the 3rd Battalion transitioned from the 162nd Infantry Brigade into the JRTC Operations Group, it aggregated and collated training and reference materials which conventional U.S. Army advising cadre, including the 162nd Infantry Brigade, had developed and maintained for nearly a decade. As such the core curriculum draws on the U.S. Army’s experience from over 13 years of war as refined by a cadre of security force assistance and foreign area specialists. The curriculum is based on current Army doctrine and is the foundation for every course the 3rd Battalion teaches, whether it be LRAAC for a unit assigned to the AFRICOM AOR, the Joint Security Force Assistance Course (JSFAC) for an individual advisor heading to an Afghan ministry, or the Security Force Assistance Course (SFAC) for a brigade deploying as advisory teams to work with an Afghan Army Corps. The six courses in the core curriculum teach a basic set of engagement skills for conducting security cooperation missions anywhere in the world. See Table 8-1 on the following page.
Cross Culture Communications
“Advisors derive their effectiveness from their ability to understand and work with foreign counterparts from another culture. They must understand enough of their own culture and their counterpart’s culture to accurately convey ideas, concepts, and purpose without causing counterproductive consequences.” (FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance) This class explains social systems, operational environment, factors affecting communication, non-verbal communication, cultural taboos, and culture shock. The class helps students shape effective communication across varied cultures.

Human Behavior and Rapport
“Rapport comprises understanding, respect, and trust. No amount of resources or firepower can compensate for a lack of rapport between advisor and FSF counterpart. It must be honest, genuine, and heartfelt. Mutual understanding, respect, and trust are the building blocks to success.” (FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation) This class combines the Human Needs Hierarchy by Dr. Abraham Maslow with culture, environmental effects, and personalities to equip leaders with solid techniques for building rapport.

Influencing and Negotiations
This class explains methods for influencing others using Dr. Robert Cialdini’s six principles of influencing and provides six additional techniques for influencing. The class also provides students with a 10-step model as an example of a way to influence a counterpart. Part 2 of the class explains distributive and integrative approaches to negotiations, interest based negotiations, and counter-negotiations.

Use of Interpreters
The “Use of an Interpreter” class instructs the students on proper techniques to use an interpreter before during and after a planned and impromptu engagement with foreign security forces (FSF), media, civilians etc. This class explains how to choose an interpreter and rehearse planned engagements. It provides the student guidelines for employing interpreters during impromptu engagements.

Mutual Perceptions and Insider Threat
Originally based on requirements for joint advisors serving in Operation Enduring Freedom, this class distills the fundamental principles for defending against inside threats to U.S. personnel and applies them to other operational environments. The class covers the latest techniques to prepare, deter, detect, and respond to insider threat.

Team Survivability
This class focuses on preparing individuals, teams, and small units for deployment to a foreign country. The class covers the Code of Conduct, Guardian Angel/Team Force Protection, evasion plans of action (EPA), personnel recovery, personnel recovery frameworks, isolated personnel responsibilities, evasion, survival, and recovery. This class is designed and instructed by Level C Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE-C) certified personnel for the resident training program.

Regionally Focused Curriculum
Building on the core curriculum, the second component of LRAAC consists of five courses which prepare leaders for operations as part of a regionally aligned force. This segment of the LRAAC focuses on the historical and cultural nuances of a specific country or region while building the student’s understanding of the U.S. interagency, media engagement, and regional foreign security forces. See Table 8-2, on page 60, for these course descriptions.
### Table 8-2. Course descriptions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Security Cooperation</strong></td>
<td>This class gives leaders an overview of security cooperation (SC) and security assistance (SA). Course focuses instruction on the differences in SC and SA and ties in security force assistance (SFA). Course further explains basic differences in authorities between Title 10 and Title 22 missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region/Country Orientation</strong></td>
<td>This class discusses regions and countries of interest focusing on issues that impact U.S. forces deploying to the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media Engagement</strong></td>
<td>This class explains how effective public affairs strategy helps internal and external audiences understand the operation and engender confidence in the force. The class also explains how media reduces the fear, suspicion, apprehension, and misunderstanding which degrade operational effectiveness and how media interaction can help achieve strategic goals and how poor media interaction can erode established relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Security Forces (FSF) Training Management</strong></td>
<td>This class outlines considerations and techniques for training FSF. It covers understanding, advising, and mentoring the FSF; understanding traditional beliefs and their influence on the mission and training; understanding the physical environment and socio-economic challenges of training FSF; and identifies steps to successfully train and advise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Embassy Operations</strong></td>
<td>This class provides an introduction to the Department of State (DOS), U.S. policy, DOS goals, U.S. embassy organization, and protocol. The class will prepare the deploying Soldiers to engage and coordinate with interagency personnel working in the area of operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Nonstandard Weapons Familiarization**     | This class utilizes foreign and nonstandard U.S. weapons that students will come into contact with in the area of operations. Course is limited to weapons on hand: Avtomat Kalashnikova (AK-47) Dragunov Sniper Rifle (SVD) Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) Ruchnoy Pulemyot Kalashnikova (RPK) Pulemyot Kalashnikova (PKM)  
Course will include characteristics, assembly and disassembly, loading/unloading, and functions check of the weapon (No Live Fire). This class is only available during the resident course. |

### Lane Training Scenarios

The third and final component of the LRAAC curriculum consists of engagement lane training exercises (LTXs) that challenge students to bring together all they have learned in immersive scenarios. These exercises are built upon the same fundamental principles as any training lane designed to teach and test tactical skills. Students are evaluated by certified OC/Ts who employ video recording to deliver instrumented after action reviews (AARs) throughout the course. Based upon their own training objectives and their unit’s anticipated mission set(s), unit commanders can tailor the course by choosing which LTXs the cadre will employ from a menu of available scenarios. Common scenarios are listed in Table 8-3 on page 61.
Table 8-3. Common LRAAC scenarios.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meet Host Nation Commander</td>
<td>Utilizing cultural role players, this lane rehearses probable circumstances surrounding introductions and rapport building with FSF and FSF leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet Senior Defense Officer/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT)/Office of Security Cooperation Chief</td>
<td>This lane reinforces understanding the role of SDO/DATT and Office of Security Cooperation. The lane also reinforces understanding of resident military roles in the embassy and around the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet U.S. Ambassador/Deputy Chief of Mission</td>
<td>This lane rehearses a meeting with a senior DOS official at the embassy. Scenario covers different issues that typically arise when DOD and DOS interact. The lane reinforces understanding of the DOS and other agencies that can be found in foreign countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train Foreign Security Forces (FSF)</td>
<td>This lane reinforces understanding of issues involved with training FSF. Scenarios present problem sets typically encountered when training FSF across varied cultures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Scenario</td>
<td>Lane training exercises (LTXs) to enforce situational awareness and understanding of threats and reaction procedures contained in theater/country threat briefings and other force protection documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Entry</td>
<td>This lane rehearses entering a permissive foreign country as a noncombatant. The LTX presents typical and specialized problem sets for Soldiers to work through including loss of baggage, improper entry documentation, corrupt customs officials, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The LRAAC 5-Day Program

The LRAAC is delivered as a 40-hour course. Days generally consist of classroom instruction in the morning followed by a practical exercise/scenario-based LTX in the afternoon. The chart on page 64 depicts a typical weeklong LRAAC. It begins with the basic elements of the core curriculum. Each day closes with practical exercises in which the students employ the skills they have learned that day. The following morning begins with an instrumented AAR of training events conducted the previous day in order to prime students for the material ahead, and the final day consists of a series of LTXs built around the unit commander’s requirements.
Table 8-4. LRAAC 5-day program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Day 1</th>
<th>Day 2</th>
<th>Day 3</th>
<th>Day 4</th>
<th>Day 5 STX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0900-1000</td>
<td>Region / Country Orientation</td>
<td>0900-1000</td>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>0900-1000</td>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>0900-1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1100</td>
<td>Human Behavior and Rapport</td>
<td>1000-1100</td>
<td>Use of Interpreter</td>
<td>1000-1100</td>
<td>Media Engagement</td>
<td>1000-1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1200</td>
<td>Embassy Operations</td>
<td>1100-1200</td>
<td>Cross Culture Communications</td>
<td>1100-1200</td>
<td>FSB Training</td>
<td>1000-1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>1200-1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1430</td>
<td>Security Coop Orientation</td>
<td>1300-1430</td>
<td>Influence and Negotiations</td>
<td>1300-1430</td>
<td>Nonstandard Weapons Familiarization</td>
<td>1300-1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430-1700</td>
<td>A-Group (30)</td>
<td>1430-1700</td>
<td>B-Group (30)</td>
<td>1500-1700</td>
<td>A-Group (30)</td>
<td>1500-1700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B-Group (30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B-Group (30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Observer Controller/Trainer (OC/T) Cadre

Instruction for LRAAC primarily comes from OC/Ts in the 3rd Battalion who are certified through the JRTC OC/T Academy, the Army Basic Instructor Course, and certification processes specific to the 3rd Battalion’s own internal training program. Many of the battalion’s cadre have lived and worked abroad and/or served as advisors on previous tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Classes involving force protection and insider threat are developed and instructed by the battalion’s SERE-C qualified cadre, and many of the OC/Ts are graduates of regionally focused courses such as those provided by the DOS Foreign Service Institute and the Asian Pacific Center for Security’s Asian Pacific Orientation Course (APOC). Finally, all the development of regionally focused curriculum is supervised by foreign area officers (FAOs) resident in the JRTC Operations Group.

Taken in comparison with recent decades, the operational environment of the future promises unprecedented complexity, and our present trajectory suggests that the Army will be asked to accomplish more tasks with fewer resources. In this environment, leaders who can leverage the talents and capabilities of partner organizations and nations are much more likely to find quicker, more efficient paths to mission success. At JRTC we recognize and embrace this operational dynamic; subsequently we have developed LRAAC as one vehicle for preparing Army leaders to overcome challenges as part of a joint, interorganizational, and multinational team. Culturally aware and adaptive leaders will never ensure mission success, but one can be certain that they are a necessary element to future solutions.

Notes


Chapter 9

Where Does Force Protection Begin for Advisers?

MAJ Richard W. Duncan, 3rd Battalion, 353rd Regiment, JRTC Operations Group

Real force protection for advisers means more than a well-trained security detail; basic pistol training; or online survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE-100) training. Such basics fulfill some security considerations, but are only one aspect of the security plan. At Fort Polk, the Joint Security Forces Assistance (JSFA) Course features an extensive training program for advisers that goes beyond basic concepts. The course has focused on individual advisers deploying to Afghanistan, but this program could easily be adopted to any advising mission to include regionally aligned forces or Iraq. The plan begins with individual training well before an adviser goes into theater. There are three major aspects to this training program that are important building blocks for success:

- Advanced weapons training
- Survival training
- Language skills

Advanced Weapons Training

A good security plan begins with trained advisers who can protect themselves; they form the first layer of security for self-protection. Rank does not matter. The higher in rank, the greater target an individual becomes for the enemy and training becomes even more important. The first task an adviser must focus on is weapons proficiency.

Self-protection with your personal weapon is very important; it may be the first layer of defense against an insider threat. Most advisers do not have a combat arms military occupational specialty (MOS) background, so training with weapons may have been limited to basic pistol marksmanship or basic rifle marksmanship. This may amount to shooting only 40 rounds for qualification. This level of weapon proficiency is insufficient for advisers going down range to Afghanistan, Iraq, or anywhere else.

The joint course developed a shooting program which builds confidence and proficiency with personal weapons systems. First, with the M9 weapons system, all advisers are taught basic pistol fundamentals, followed by basic qualification at a pop-up target range. The second stage of training takes advisers to the next level of shooting – drawing the weapon and engaging. The standard qualification range does not require you to be able to quickly draw an M9. In the case of an insider attack, quickdrawing is required.

Quickdrawing was identified as a shortcoming in the Joint Readiness Training Center’s (JRTC) previous program of instruction, so the unit reached out to the Asymmetric Warfare Group for train-the-trainer classes to meet mission requirements. The course teaches advisers the proper draw techniques through a five-step process. There is a large amount of dry fire to live fire, which is about seven dry to three live. Advisers will shoot over 200 rounds with the M9.
The repetition of the process builds the muscle memory and confidence necessary for proficiency. Advisers build their confidence and proficiency with the weapons system, so when engaged by a threat, they will be able to react quickly and effectively.

Before, advisers considered the M9 as “forward operating base (FOB) fashion,” versus a lethal weapon, but it has been demonstrated the weapon can be your primary means of protection. The challenge many units have will be allocating enough 9 mm ammunition to execute training.

**Survival Training**

Survival training, or personnel recovery, is another area the Army lacks in deployment training. On a good day, advisers work in austere conditions. On a not so good day, they could easily become separated from the main element. Advisers must be able to survive in isolation for a short period of time until they are recovered. Online classes will not adequately prepare Soldiers, Airmen, or Sailors for this situation.

The Army worked to resolve training deficiencies with online training like the SERE-100 class. Unfortunately, regular units cannot send everyone to SERE-C at Fort Rucker to receive in-depth training; they could, however, send a handful of Soldiers who could then develop a training program for the unit. The joint course identified this as a deficiency; advisers disliked and dismissed traditional PowerPoint classes.

The solution was to send select noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to Fort Rucker to receive training and subsequently develop survival lane training. Upon their return, they developed a new program that focused on basic survival skills based on unclassified field manuals. The program developed was a two-day model approved by the Army Training and Doctrine Command Personnel Recovery Component. The first day consisted of classroom instruction. The second day featured lane training focused on developing the skills required to procure water, build a shelter, navigate, move through a village, and evade the enemy. The training developed at Fort Polk received a great deal of praise, especially from Navy pilots who mentioned it as a good refresher.

**Language Training**

The JSFA Course also suffers from limited language training. Language is an important part of being an adviser and the Army has become too reliant on linguists to communicate with counterparts. Once again, the Army assumed that handing out a compact disc or conducting a two-hour basic language class will prepare advisers for deployment.

You may think language is not part of force protection, but it is. For instance, language helps build rapport with counterparts and is good for force protection. If there is a threat your counterpart knows about and your rapport is strong, he is more likely to warn you to ensure your protection. At the joint course, the Afghanistan/Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands program (a cadre of financial management Service members and civilians with language and cultural training focused on regions in Pakistan and Afghanistan) solved the problem through extensive language training, and it has been visible during training lanes. Knowing the language benefits your rapport and the mission. The AFPAK Hands program sends advisers to language school, and these advisers have excelled at building rapport. The rapport they build increases force protection because
their counterparts care about their safety. Units need to focus on language training by working through the Defense Language Institute to build a more extensive language training program for wherever they may go to advise.

Conclusions

The JSFA Course developed robust weapons training and personnel recovery training programs for advisers going to Iraq. The course struggles to teach a more robust language program, but is looking for a way to solve this issue. The shooting program goes above and beyond what most units do to prepare for deployment. Units can easily establish a survival lane training course similar to the one established by JSFA to better prepare individual Soldiers and advisers for deployment. These skills are not just applicable to advisers in Afghanistan, but also to advisers who may be regionally aligned elsewhere.
Chapter 10

A Strategy for Future Victory: Institutionalizing SOF-CF Interdependence

COL Michael R. Fenzel and COL Joseph G. Lock

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Sun Tzu suggested that although it was easy to see the tactics by which he conquered armies, it was substantially more difficult to see the strategy from which his victories evolved. The tactical success of our special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces (CF) are chronicled by Green Berets and conventional Soldiers alike through well over a decade of continuous conflict from Iraq to Afghanistan. An honest appraisal of where the most significant progress in warfare was made during this unprecedented period in our military history would mark the close interaction between our two warrior communities as one of the largest leaps forward. We conclude that achieving success in future conflicts will demand an interdependent strategy. Yet despite the clear need to move in this direction, there is a growing institutional tendency to return to our “tribes” and train together infrequently as the current wars come to an end. The tactics that are individually applied in combat by both communities must give way to an institutionalized strategy to leverage the other’s inherent strengths and promote SOF-CF interdependence beyond the requirements of our current fight. Continuing this evolution of collaboration demands a more concerted and structured effort.

In late summer of 2013, an opportunity to forge that variety of cooperation was presented to the Army with a rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA. The 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division (3/82 BCT) from Fort Bragg, NC, and the 4th Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Special Operations Task Force [SOTF] 54) deployed to JRTC from 29 July to 02 September 2013 to execute JRTC Rotation 13-09. This rotation was a Chief of Staff of the Army-directed exercise designed to test “SOF-CF interdependence in a complex weapons of mass destruction (WMD) scenario” against an adversary that possessed near-peer capabilities, including weaponized WMD, robust air defense systems, rotary wing aviation, significant artillery assets, organic ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), mechanized/armor units, and employed a complex array of asymmetric threats. In short, a scenario that made it next to impossible to address effectively without SOF and CF heavily depending upon one another.

The 3/82 BCT and SOTF 54 achieved measurable success during this JRTC rotation and defeated the well-trained opposition force in every phase of the rotation. Reflecting upon the lessons learned during this time together revealed just how much our own collective approach and commitment to interdependence contributed to this success. Our experience during this rotation highlights three imperatives we feel are necessary to institutionalize interdependence between our communities:

• Habitual relationships between SOF and CF units must be established to make opportunities to train together routine.

• Interdependent training opportunities at the Combined Arms Maneuver Centers (JRTC, National Training Center [NTC], Joint Multinational Readiness Center [JMRC]) must be expanded to further test interdependence concepts.
• Broader and more sweeping commitment must be made to change SOF and CF cultures and create institutional expectations for close and functional cooperation.

The Inescapable Importance of Relationships

The story of JRTC Rotation 13-09 is one where the key personalities meshed well in advance of execution. Three months before the rotation began the SOTF 54 and 3/82 BCT commanders were strangers. Before completing the initial staff estimate, 3/82 BCT contacted SOTF 54 leadership requesting an in-person coordination meeting at the SOTF headquarters at Fort Campbell, KY. The initial meeting between the commanders of SOTF 54 and 3/82 was several hours long and began with a verbal commitment to cultivate the relationship. As it happened, the trust developed through this process would become a powerful weapon throughout the training rotation at JRTC. The initial investment of time and lengthy discussion laid the groundwork for all the collective success that would be enjoyed three months later. Investing in the relationship from the start is a step that cannot be skipped on the road to functional cooperation.

During the few months that preceded the start of the JRTC rotation, 3/82 BCT and SOTF 54 continued the process of integration and collaboration at increasingly lower staff levels. Relationships developed between SOTF 54 and the multiple other battalion formations organic to 3/82 BCT for the combat training center rotation. Planners were cross-leveled during staff exercises, there was joint participation in the JRTC-led Leader’s Training Program (LTP), and there were numerous joint planning conferences that built relationships at the operator level. The end result was what should be identified as a key characteristic of true interdependence: a deep and common understanding of counterpart missions and the attending plans to accomplish those missions.

By the start of the rotation, both units had moved well beyond just being acquainted with one another. There was a shared vision of a solution to the challenges ahead, there was a common understanding of counterpart priorities and, most importantly, there was a trust and respect for one another that had grown. This early commitment, developed in advance of experiencing our “fog of war,” established a foundation of confidence and created a culture of interdependence throughout both units. The momentum that was carried into the start of the JRTC rotation grew through each phase of the subsequent training operation. This momentum facilitated our ability to translate this intangible interdependence into tactical action.

Within the construct of our JRTC scenario, SOTF 54 was already forward deployed on the ground within a friendly partner nation. This scenario was very realistic in that SOF are currently forward deployed throughout the world conducting theater security cooperation and building the capability of host-nation forces in dozens of countries at any given time. Special Forces elements are often on the ground in many places long before a conflict erupts and frequently have developed relationships with the U.S. Embassy country team, host nation, and other friendly actors. Special Forces elements may also have a firsthand, nuanced understanding of both the enemy and friendly tactical situation. JRTC replicated this type of scenario extremely well by providing an embassy staff that consisted of role players who had previously served as ambassadors, defense attaches, and chiefs of station. Host-nation role players, partner force military, and well-manned guerrilla units were well resourced and accurately represented the dynamic personalities and stressors present in a multinational/multicultural environment.
As a result of the deliberate and shared effort to build a strong SOF-CF relationship prior to arriving at JRTC, once the JRTC rotation began there was a clear picture of how 3/82 BCT and SOTF 54 hoped integration with one another would proceed. There was an exchange of liaison officers (LNOs) that embedded in each other’s operations and targeting directorates. A detailed and redundant system of communications was developed that included cross-leveling a number of SOF-specific secure communications devices. While not perfect, these mechanisms provided a secure and dependable voice method of communication in the event that our primary systems failed. Indeed, it was the concerted effort to develop such a system that was as important as the system that was chosen. It was a tacit demonstration of organizational commitment. We agreed upon supported and supporting roles during the different phases of the operation, created a battle rhythm of regular communication, jointly developed a deception plan, engineered a nuanced nonlethal targeting matrix, and then divided the responsibilities for engaging host-nation leadership.

The establishment of these staff systems coupled with a commitment to achieve interdependence enabled both units to leverage our counterpart’s inherent strengths. The 3/82 BCT’s ability to quickly mass ground forces, hold terrain, employ devastating indirect fire, control the airspace, and move an impressive amount of troops and equipment across the battlespace was complemented by SOTF 54’s ability to operate undetected behind enemy lines, disrupt enemy forces, provide real-time intelligence on enemy disposition, and conduct foreign internal defense by advising partner-nation forces.

This commitment to enable interdependence largely succeeded throughout the rotation. However, the complexity of the scenario also exposed some shortcomings. Much of the pre-rotational training focused on integrating staff functions, developing joint plans, and designing a communications plan that would enable a common operating and intelligence picture. As the rotational scenario morphed beyond our initial plans, the ability of our tactical elements to synchronize actions became more limited due to a mutual unfamiliarity with the other’s tactical battle drills.

When two tactically offensive-focused elements are maneuvering in the same battlespace, the opportunity for fratricide is always high. Our lack of prior on-the-ground training together did not enable “on-the-fly” integration and forced us to institute restrictive control measures that effectively divided up the battlespace but prevented our ability to truly reinforce one another. While our pre-rotational plans largely succeeded in a deliberate defense, the complex battlefield geometry in the offense outpaced our ability to integrate and exposed our mutual unfamiliarity with counterpart systems. Real success in combat operations and achieving ingrained trust between our organizations would have required much more than 90 days of staff and command collaboration.

**Aligning Conventional Divisions and Special Forces Groups**

One strategy that would create greater opportunity to rehearse tactically and to enable the development of long-term relationships would be through the establishment of formal partnerships between specific conventional force divisions and Special Forces Groups. As the Army experiments with the establishment of regionally aligned BCTs, the opportunity also exists to select and focus conventional BCTs that are geographically collocated with already regionally aligned Special Forces Groups. Special Forces Groups have long enjoyed the benefit that comes from near continuous presence in and focus on specific regions. Advanced foreign language capability, deep cultural understanding, and years of building relationships all result
from the ability to remain focused on a specific region. Special Forces officers and NCOs often spend most of their careers deploying to the same region and remaining focused on the same area of operations. Committing specific conventional divisions and the BCTs that comprise them in the same manner and codifying established partnerships between BCTs and the battalions that comprise Special Forces Groups would help create unit-level relationships that would endure well beyond specific commanders or JRTC rotations and create efficiencies in areas where ramp-up for BCTs would otherwise be cost prohibitive.

If there is one lesson learned from our experience together at JRTC, it is that interdependence between two such different professional cultures must always begin well in advance of the fight, whether that is a training fight or a combat deployment. If a habitual relationship is already established, then coordination is made easier because trust already exists between the organizations and there is already foundation for the mutual support necessary to succeed in a hybrid threat environment. When the expectation of cooperation is inculcated in both communities, the major obstacles to operational synthesis are removed.

Making the time in busy schedules to cultivate a strong relationship is the first step to breaking through the stasis of inaction and moving beyond the inherent limitations associated with being unfamiliar with our counterpart’s operating systems. Establishing an identity for the partnership and forecasting the opportunities to work together at the subordinate level have the potential to break down the natural barriers that exist in both the SOF and CF communities. The forcing function for SOTF 54 and 3rd BCT was a JRTC rotation between two commanders who both wanted to win. The rotation facilitated a formal commitment to further collaboration through numerous face-to-face coordination meetings and precursor training events, all in advance of the focal event at Fort Polk. Both teams felt the desire to win at JRTC and so there was common ground built into our coordinated efforts. By creating long-term partnerships between conventional force divisions/BCTs and Special Forces Groups/battalions, we can formalize, codify, and expand the opportunities for increased partnerships.

Testing Interdependence at the Combined Arms Maneuver Centers

Regardless of how we develop habitual relationships upstream of the next fight, the way to test these concepts is undoubtedly best done at combined arms maneuver centers like JRTC in the uneven terrain of Louisiana, NTC in the desert of southern California, and JMRC in the forests of Bavaria. There is simply no other equally effective way to create a training environment with the scale and complexity necessary to truly stress interdependent systems. Beginning in 2012, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command created a training program with focus on what they called the decisive action training environment (DATE). This program completely revamped the approach the training centers took toward testing rotational units. Rather than focusing on pre-mission training for deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, the DATE incorporated a much broader hybrid threat consisting of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal challenges.

No longer focused on previously known deployment locations, DATE rotations represent a much more realistic environment that is applicable in equal parts for the SOF and CF communities. Best of all, it forces the rotational units to leverage one another’s strengths in order to succeed. The free-play environment evolves in cadence with the decisions made by the participating communities. Flexibility and agility are rewarded, and overly rigid and
micromanaged plans are quickly exposed. It is a training environment with a well-resourced complement of role players and opposing forces that creates a high degree of realism, which enables truly interdependent units to excel.

Within the context of this DATE, JRTC continues to evolve the training scenario to include greater joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIM) involvement, better reflecting the operating environment that exists outside of current fights. JRTC has also begun the process of codifying lessons learned in this interdependent environment and formalizing these into more formal interdependence doctrine. Pairing Special Forces battalions with BCTs during decisive action combat training center rotations will help to define the systems, nodes, and functions that must complement strong relationships in order to succeed.

**Changing Institutional Cultures and Creating Collaborative Expectations**

There is little question that interdependence is maximized when the right personalities are in place. The objective of our efforts must be to transcend the vagaries of personal relationships to ensure interdependence is achieved as a military imperative in all future operations. Command climates that foster initiative, reward humility, and discourage parochialism are the best insurance policies to ensure interdependence is consistently achieved at all levels and in both cultures. Even through JRTC Rotation 13-09 and despite the close relationship of the two lead commanders, the fragility of the link between SOF-CF forces was on display. Cultural differences exist that must be bridged on an institutional level in order to achieve real and enduring interdependence.

Regardless of one’s personal feelings toward institutionalizing SOF-CF interdependence, future conflicts will require a cooperative approach to defeat those as yet undefined adversaries. There are core competencies within both enterprises that cannot be effectively replicated by the other. Now back in garrison, we have begun to return to our “tribes” in a quiet but apparent effort to work alone until we are thrust together again in exigent circumstances. This seems a terrible way to proceed since there will be so much at stake when the call does come to work together. If action is not taken now to bridge this growing divide, the risk to both the mission and the Soldiers in both communities will continue to grow. We must resolve to increase our interaction before that call to fight comes so that our relationships are well established, roles and responsibilities are clearly delineated, and the full power of that cooperation is unleashed.

Ironically, there are corners of the Army that are concerned that we leave too much of the success of interdependence to relationships. These doctrinaires believe that we need more structure so that very little is left to the cooperative spirit. From the perspective of this rotation, both 3/82 BCT and SOTF 54 determined that effective interdependence was most facilitated by command influence and command culture: leadership that continually sought opportunities to amplify mission success of the other unit based upon the inherently unique capabilities possessed by each partner.

The capacity within both communities to pursue closer relationships should be left to promotion and command boards that will select leaders who inherently understand their importance. Indeed, the foundation of interdependence is, at its root, about trust. Relationships are what make interdependence work, and leaders from both worlds must cultivate these relationships whenever they are afforded the opportunity. Effecting a position of familiarity in advance of conducting
combat operations is what we must work toward in both warfighting communities. Formalizing the emphasis on structure is admirable and necessary, but if relationships are bad then structure will not ever salvage the situation.

Interdependence between 3/82 and SOTF 54 began with an initial afternoon-long brainstorming session with both commanders where the mission and intent of each unit was shared. This effort culminated three months later with a highly successful JRTC rotation that demonstrated the synergy that is achievable when true interdependence is pursued. This type of success can be replicated with a commitment from both the SOF and CF communities to prioritize these training opportunities (particularly at the combined arms maneuver centers), develop habitual relationships between SF Groups and BCTs, and continue to seek opportunities to practice this approach outside a theater of war. As operations in Afghanistan draw to a close, the opportunities for SOF-CF integration will invariably be reduced without a strong commitment from senior leaders on both sides of the operational coin. We cannot afford to return to the days where deep cultural divides exist in our formations and attitudes of distrust prevail.

If there is one thing the last 13 years of continuous combat operations has achieved, it is to break down the barriers between SOF-CF communities, unite our tactical and operational efforts, and create a healthy environment of interdependence on the battlefield. This commitment from both communities is what must be sustained in the future. In an era of diminishing resources, we simply cannot afford to endure a roll back in the progress we have achieved through the last decade of counterinsurgency operations. All of these lessons learned were on full display through JRTC Rotation 13-09. This example is one piece of tangible evidence that pursuing true interdependence is a strategy that will lay the groundwork for both greater combat readiness and lead to success on the battlefields of the future. We must move beyond all parochial opinions about tactics that we think will lead to future success inside our own narrow warfighting communities to develop a sustainable strategy from which those future victories will evolve — a strategy that routinely brings us together on the training field before we step onto the next battlefield.
Chapter 11

The 75th Ranger Regiment Post-OEF: Adapting Training and TTP Following 13 Years of War

MSG Marcus Branch, CPT Christopher Greer, and CPT Jonathan Kingsley, Special Operations Training Detachment, JRTC Operations Group; and MAJ Vincent Kuchar, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment

“The 75th Ranger Regiment is a lethal, agile, and flexible force, capable of executing a myriad of complex, joint special operations missions in support of U.S. policy and objectives. Today’s Ranger Regiment is the Army’s premier raid force.”

The Special Operations Training Detachment (SOTD) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) provides relevant and realistic training for special operations forces (SOF), including the 75th Ranger Regiment. The JRTC’s training environment allows SOF elements to refine their skills along the special warfare-surgical strike continuum envisioned in Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 2022. Recently, JRTC Rotations 14-10 and 15-06 met Ranger training objectives including surgical strike; SOF/conventional forces (CF)/joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) interdependence, integration, and interoperability (I3); and SOF mission command.

Thirteen years of fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has ingrained an Iraq/Afghanistan mindset in all JRTC rotational training units (RTUs) in terms of planning and conducting operations. Likewise, Ranger units training at JRTC have had to adapt to a complex environment in which they lack the resources they have become accustomed to during GWOT operations. The unique challenges and friction of JRTC allow Ranger units to refine their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) while responding to an adaptable enemy.

During GWOT, the 75th Ranger Regiment developed remarkable skills in close quarters battle (CQB) raids, the regiment’s typical mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, with the drawdown of major combat operations, the 75th Ranger Regiment must reestablish its ability to execute the basics well to respond to unknown threats of the future operational environment (OE). The Rangers must remain the subject matter experts on infantry doctrinal tasks of Training Circular 3-21.10, Infantry Rifle Company Collective Task Publication, to meet ARSOF 2022/ARSOF Next requirements while keeping abreast of best practices in an ever-changing geopolitical environment. The 75th Ranger Regiment may be among the first units tasked with combat operations in a future campaign.

In support of these objectives, JRTC provides a vehicle for the Rangers to transform their combat experiences into an enduring set of TTP in preparation for short-term expeditionary or extended combat operations. Particularly useful for commanders are the situational awareness and external feedback that JRTC provides. JRTC’s superb collective training environment allows the 75th Ranger Regiment and other surgical strike SOF units to preserve the lessons of combat, cement the doctrinal fundamentals, cultivate I3, and practice new TTP in response to an ever-changing OE.
Evolution of the Ranger Regiment during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF)

The proficiency of Ranger units is a function of the quality and quantity of training, and Ranger leaders say the best training is combat. During a typical combat deployment to OEF, a Ranger element could expect to conduct 130 raids in a continuous find/fix/finish/exploit/analyze (F3EA) targeting cycle over a four-month period. The Rangers removed thousands of insurgents from the battlefield. Combine this high combat operating tempo (OPTEMPO) with junior leaders who took every opportunity to refine their skills, and the result was a level of proficiency that was arguably unmatched by previous generations of Rangers.

Of particular note, the Ranger Regiment is the Department of Defense (DOD) leader in casualty survivability, with zero preventable combat deaths. Factors such as dedicated rotary wing medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) during operations, detailed planning and rehearsals, medical training (such as Ranger First Responder), and quantity and distribution of medically trained personnel in Ranger units led to the Ranger Regiment’s remarkable survival record of combat wounded.3

Prior to GWOT, the focus of the 75th Rangers was to be the premier light infantry unit, with unparalleled joint forcible entry (JFE) capability. The Rangers specialized in airfield seizures and air assault raids within a 24-hour recall. Going into GWOT, the Rangers were the best at the basics. Consequently, they evolved into a combat-hardened force that became expert in dealing with the unique challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan.

This scope of operations led to many changes over the GWOT timeframe. In 2006, the regiment added mobility training to the original “Big Four” training tasks: marksmanship, physical training, medical training, and small unit tactics.4 Also, during this period OIF deployments refined Rangers’ CQB abilities, while OEF deployments cultivated an unprecedented level of competence in Ranger weapons squads and mortar sections.

Figure 11-1. Army Rangers conducting a raid in Iraq.
Learning from GWOT to Prepare for the FOE

GWOT allowed the Rangers to enhance CQB expertise, the F3EA cycle, and air assault proficiency, among other skills that laid the groundwork in preparation for any number of threats the future OE may present. Like many conventional units — and despite their traditional use as a unilateral force — the 75th developed a limited capacity to train international forces in a geographically confined area. However, ARSOF 2022 places the 75th Ranger Regiment firmly on the surgical strike end of ARSOF’s critical capabilities spectrum. Thus, the Ranger Regiment likely expanded its mission set toward special warfare at a cost to surgical strike proficiency.

Like mission creep, a decline in combat operations may have caused a decline in direct action proficiency, according to Ranger leaders. Meanwhile, budgetary constraints reduce the opportunities for privately contracted training, causing the Ranger Regiment to face the challenge of sustaining its elite force using internal and “Big Army” resourced training. Fortunately, the competitive environment in the 75th Ranger Regiment fosters in leaders at all levels an intrinsic desire for mastery, and these leaders demand the same from the men they lead. Thus, the unit itself is capable of developing and executing highly effective training without relying on the private contractors of the past, especially if the 75th incorporates low-cost, high-yield collective training opportunities like those JRTC provides.

Collective Training Post-OEF

The 75th Ranger Regiment can no longer solely focus on the CQB raids and the airborne and air assault operations of the past decade in Iraq or Afghanistan. Instead, the regiment faces varied regional threats in the future OE. Thus, an important question for Ranger leaders is, “How do the Rangers continue to remain the elite infantry force in this unpredictable threat environment?” One Ranger officer’s answer was simple: “Preserve quality though training and repetition at places such as JRTC.” JRTC offers a resourced, immersive training environment that the Rangers are unable to replicate at their home station.

As much of the Army draws down in Afghanistan and units across the Army become regionally aligned, the Ranger Regiment remains a global response force and must prepare for a wide range of threats in anticipation of the next conflict. While senior leaders refine the Ranger mission essential task list (METL), the “Big Five” will remain fundamental to Ranger training. Combat training centers such as JRTC will continue to provide the Ranger Regiment a unique venue to sustain and improve its marksmanship, medical skills, physical endurance, tactics, and mobility skills.
In addition to the Ranger “Big Five,” elements from the 75th accomplish a variety of other ARSOF 2022 training priorities at JRTC. These include executing the fundamental infantry patrolling tasks and battle drills of Field Manual (FM) 3-21.10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*, and the *Ranger Handbook*, that will ensure the Rangers can adapt to any environment. Additionally, Rangers must shape the operational environment through an organic F3EA process. Training at JRTC is multi-echelon, from fire team to mission command. Units operate within fully developed human terrain, facing realistic threats that they must discriminate from necessary interaction with the civilian population. Thus, JRTC’s scenarios allow SOF like the Rangers to train ARSOF 2022 priorities, light infantry skills, and CF/SOF/JIIM I3 tasks throughout their rotations.
Recent Ranger rotations 14-10 and 15-06 commenced with company live fires where Rangers employed and synchronized direct and indirect fires as well as air assets for fire support and MEDEVAC. Following company live fire, the Rangers conducted compressed timeline planning for force-on-force (FOF) in the decisive action training environment (DATE). During rotation 15-06, Rangers executed an airborne infiltration followed by an all-night movement to conduct a raid and detainee transfer. Next, they established company area ambushes with decentralized platoons for 36 hours.
Figure 11-4. Rangers from D Co., 2/75th Rangers, prepare to infiltrate by static-line parachute onto Geronimo Drop Zone (DZ).

Figure 11-5. D Co., 2/75th Rangers, patrolling en route to a precision raid.
To make matters more challenging, the JRTC scenario forced the Rangers away from the Iraq/Afghanistan model of conducting missions from a secure forward operating base (FOB). Instead, Rangers had to secure their own command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) element while conducting sustained offensive operations. The JRTC field conditions and scenario are arguably as mentally and physically intensive as any, apart from combat itself.

Figure 11-6. 3rd Ranger Battalion establishes a tactical operations center and security perimeter on Geronimo DZ.

Best Practices Observed at JRTC and Recommendations

JRTC not only provides the best venue for tactical-level training the Rangers need, but also provides Chief of Staff, United States Army (CSA)-directed I3 opportunities. At RTC, the Rangers train as they will fight: side-by-side or in close coordination with joint, interagency, CF, and other SOF. Thus, the Rangers practice the SOF truth, “most special operations require non-SOF assistance,” while implementing the charters of the 26th CSA GEN Creighton W. Abrams, and the 38th CSA GEN Raymond T. Odierno, by sharing Ranger standards, doctrine, TTP, and esprit de corps with the Army.9

In real time, JRTC requires Rangers and CF to establish interoperability to exchange information between diverse systems.10 Rangers and CF must also create interdependence by maximizing the complementary and reinforcing effects of one another’s capabilities.11 Finally, they must integrate by synergizing their respective support activities and operations to ensure a unified purpose and effort.

During rotations 14-10 and 15-06, 2nd Ranger Battalion and 3rd Ranger Battalion leaders leveraged pre-existing relationships with the 82nd Airborne Division to synchronize logistics, operations, targeting, and information sharing. Hasty establishment of the battalion and company command post (CP) was a key factor that contributed to mission success. It facilitated communication with CF and the SOTF and set the conditions for a successful F3EA targeting process. Placing an experienced Ranger liaison officer with the conventional brigade main CP further advanced these and other SOF-CF I3 training objectives.
The challenges of JRTC demonstrate that doing the basics well in an austere environment is difficult even for elite forces. However, doing the basics better than the enemy is an effective strategy; the Rangers in recent rotations adapted quickly and inflicted significant losses on the enemy. While understanding the capabilities of other SOF units is important for I3, the Rangers do not need to be experts in special warfare tasks like foreign internal defense or unconventional warfare. Instead, the Ranger Regiment can preserve its elite strike capability by continuing to focus on the “Big Five” and light infantry fundamentals. A limited mission scope allows the Ranger Regiment to be the best light infantry, with precision CQB capability, fully prepared for the next direct action or JFE mission the Nation calls on it to conduct.

Conclusion

Overall, JRTC can meet the 75th Ranger Regiment’s annual collective training requirements and can provide a venue to certify Ranger collective training tasks. JRTC can support an entire Ranger battalion, training with assets it might have in combat, such as the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. JRTC can also support complex, full-spectrum operations including mission rehearsal exercises and multilateral airborne training to validate Concept Plan 300. With the staffed and supported live-fire and force-on-force training at a single venue, JRTC allows the Rangers to focus on their mission tasks rather than rotational training unit (RTU) support.

Ultimately, Ranger leaders who demand excellence make the 75th Ranger Regiment the Army’s premier infantry force. High training standards translate to effectiveness in combat. Such was the case with the Rangers for rotations 14-10 and 15-06. The Rangers maximized the JRTC collective training opportunity, while cementing lessons from 13 years of combat in the minds of the younger generation. Rangers from the 2/75 and 3/75 adapted the basics to defeat an evolving enemy threat. If Ranger leaders continue to inculcate the value of adaptive solutions and realistic training — like JRTC provides — the 75th will remain the Army’s premier raiders and force of choice for surgical strike.

Endnotes

6. Interview with D Co., 2/75th Company Commander, MAJ Vincent Kuchar, 10 APR 2015.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
12. During rotation 15-06, D Co., 2/75 had a 50 percent enemy casualty rating, in contrast to the conventional Army unit’s 6 percent. This rating measures the ratio of enemy killed to the number of friendly forces deployed. In the case of rotation 15-06, for every 100 Rangers conducting combat operations, they inflicted 50 enemy casualties.
Chapter 12
Relearning Communications Discipline During Unconventional Warfare Training

MAJ Joseph D. Ruhl

“The sun was setting on 7 July 1944 at Harrington Air Base some fifty miles north of London. Captain Bill Dreux, a thirty-one year old lawyer from New Orleans, like his two partners, was weighted down by a .45 caliber pistol, carbine, ammo, binoculars, money belt, escape kit, flashlight, tobacco, and map case and could barely move. Over all this equipment, each man wore a camouflaged body-length smock. Dreux felt wrapped like a mummy and had trouble getting out of the station wagon. Finally, after the driver had assisted each out of the vehicle, the three tightly wrapped men waddled slowly in short, jerky steps toward a black-painted B-24 Liberator. The absurdity of the situation was not lost on the bomber’s U.S. Army Air Corps crew, who succumbed to laughter. After a last cigarette, Bill Dreux, his partners, and the crew scaled the B-24 and took off for Brittany. Dreux and his two colleagues were Jedburghs ...

Jedburghs were volunteers specially trained to conduct guerrilla warfare in conjunction with the French Resistance in support of the Allied invasion of France. Bill Dreux and his two partners survived their mission. Their story has already been told, however, and with some skill, in one of the few published Jedburgh memoirs. This paper will examine the role of the eleven Jedburgh teams parachuted into northern France in the summer of 1944 whose story has not been told. These eleven teams, like Dreux’s, worked mostly with French teenagers and the few Frenchmen not drafted into German labor organizations or prisoners of war in Germany. Many Jedburgh teams had difficulty radioing London, and some that did contact London doubted that their reports were acted upon. After the Jedburgh operations in France concluded, the teams’ after-action reports reflected a sense, not of failure, but rather of frustration … ”

“Team Claude accompanied the ill-fated British 1st Parachute Division into the Arnhem airhead on 17 September. The team lost its radio set during the drop and hence had no communications with Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ). It fought as infantry at the Arnhem bridge. One Jedburgh managed to exfiltrate back to the Allied lines. Team Clarence accompanied the U.S. 82d Airborne Division to Groesbeek, Holland. The team lost its radio in the drop but managed to pass information to Team Edward via Dutch telephones. The team performed liaison work with the Dutch Resistance until late September when it returned to London. From 3 October to the end of the year, Team Stanley II trained and organized Dutch volunteers into conventional infantry companies in the Nijmegen area.”

The Jedburghs and the special forces (SF) detachments in the European theater of operations struggled with the parallel and often intertwined issues of communications capabilities, communications security, and liaison across confusing lines of authority that crossed conventional and unconventional boundaries. As we move away from near steady-state operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we see many issues that the Jedburghs, as early SF pioneers of unconventional warfare (UW), encountered in the summer of 1944.

As SF refocuses on UW after 13-plus years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, we find ourselves relearning lessons the Jedburghs encountered. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) defines UW as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency
to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. During UW operations, SF will most likely face a technologically advanced enemy in terms of communication detection systems. This enemy, whom SF has not had to contend with in Iraq or Afghanistan, requires SF to practice communication discipline and communication discipline starts in training.

For SF to conduct the strategic and politically sensitive mission of UW, SF units must have secure communications systems and practice disciplined communication procedures. Bad practices and undisciplined use of any devices in a training environment can and will result in compromise during real-world missions. Providing secure, safe, reliable, and redundant means of communications has been, and will always be, critical to how we as a military train and prepare for missions. Trying to change mindsets, habits, and expectations from the past decade of COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is a challenge for SF commanders, operators, and communicators. Units became accustomed to robust, reliable, redundant, and real-time communications in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, they became accustomed to fighting an enemy far inferior to the U.S. in terms of communications and communication detection systems. In this chapter, we will look at:

- Communications discipline observed over a year’s worth of special operations forces (SOF) rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).
- The reasons why multiple SF units demonstrate the same communications discipline.
- The consequences of poor communications discipline.
- Recommendations to mitigate and reduce communications frictions and failures.

A Year of Cellular Compromises

There is some irony in realizing that one of our most effective tools in COIN operations in Iraq was exploitation of cellular communication vulnerabilities. The unrestricted use of cellphones while in the UW scenario and an unwillingness to use high-frequency radios are the two most prevalent ways SF units demonstrated poor communications discipline. Cellphone usage has become commonplace in our personal and professional lives; however, open and unrestricted use of cellphones cannot become commonplace in a UW scenario. Technology and its ease of use/access are dictating SF operations.

This desire for access and ease of use leads directly to an unwillingness to use high frequency (HF). High frequency is slow and cannot be accessed in real time because it requires communications windows. It is not easy to use and just establishing communications becomes its own operation. For example, a split team needs to move a certain distance away from a base camp, set up the antenna, and then receive information that is most likely about 24 hours old. It is tempting to forgo all of this and just use a cellphone. Truly immersing units into a UW training exercise, and not using the cellphone “crutch” that everyone has come to rely on, is difficult. However, units from operational detachment-Alpha (ODA) to the special operations task force (SOTF) level are missing out on clandestine communications training opportunities and building bad habits of cellphone reliance.
‘Everybody Does It’ Is Not an Excuse

Special forces units are not inherently undisciplined. Therefore, understanding the root causes of poor communications discipline will help restore communications discipline appropriate for a UW environment. The first reason is tied to experience. The “it must be OK because we used cellphones during our last deployment” rationale only holds value for time travelers. Special operations forces units (actually all Army units) became accustomed to the equipment used and the enemy faced over the past 13-plus years of COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cellphones were prevalent and cellphone usage was accepted, even at the highest levels of U.S. military leadership. SF units became accustomed to using cellphones, and now some SF Soldiers or support Soldiers assume that cellphone usage is accepted in all operational settings.

The next reason for lack of communications discipline is higher headquarters’ real or perceived need for immediate information. Jedburgh veterans expressed angst decades later that they doubted anyone was listening. Today everyone has become accustomed to real-time communications, so the patience needed for communicating within communications windows is a lost art. SOTFs or advanced operating bases (AOBs) demand information from the ODAs and are not disciplined enough to wait for communications windows or to work through a cumbersome clandestine communications primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan. Therefore, a well-meaning staff officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) dials his buddy on his cellphone to get the information. Similarly, the ODAs and AOBs assume that the SOTF is demanding the information immediately. They fear being the unit that did not provide an important piece of information in a timely manner and resort to the cellphone.

The next two reasons are tied to training units not wanting to “throw off the timeline of the scenario.” Combat training center (CTC) rotations are short duration compared to real UW operations. Units do not make communications a training priority because they do not want slow communications during an already short training window. The scenario timeline should not be a concern of the training unit. The CTCs exist for units to work through complications. Also, observer-coach/trainers (OC/Ts), scriptwriters, and planners have multiple means of keeping the scenario moving.

There are risks associated with the actual compromise of an AOB or ODA while conducting UW, and there are risks associated with the potential for compromise. Compromise during UW could result in the death or capture of SF Soldiers and resistance force members. Compromise could result in embarrassment to the U.S. government. Finally, compromise could result in a reluctance for resistance forces to work with the United States. The potential for compromise is the real or perceived view that interagency and joint partners have of SF. If the interagency and joint partners do not trust that SF can execute UW with minimal risk of compromise, then policymakers will not view UW conducted by SF as a viable option to solve strategic and politically sensitive problems.

Communications Discipline Required at Combat Training Centers

Communications must be a training objective at the CTCs and severe consequences must be in place for Soldiers using cellphones in unauthorized situations during rotations. If units do not include communications as a training objective of their own accord, then it should be mandated by USSOCOM and enforced by the Special Operations Training Detachment (SOTD). For example, during the planning process the SF unit should explain its communications plan to SOTD, and if that plan does not meet specific criteria (i.e., use of PRC-137) then the SF unit
must alter its communications plan. As for cellphones, the easy answer is to ban their use. However, there are reasons for SF units to have cellphones, both in the scenario and for real-world emergency reasons. To train units with poor communications discipline, the CTC scenario needs to have mechanisms in place that OC/Ts can implement if Soldiers use cellphones to circumvent the military communications systems. Mechanisms can range from providing portions of an SF unit’s plan to the opposition force to allowing SF camps to be overrun.

Unconventional warfare is an important mission for SF to train on, and the CTCs offer the most realistic training environment. For policymakers to seriously consider UW, they must have confidence in SF. Special forces units can build confidence in their own abilities and the confidence of national-level policymakers by prioritizing communications training and practicing good communications discipline. The inability to communicate undetected and/or poor communications discipline will lead policymakers to not even consider the option of SF conducting UW, or even worse, lead to fatal or strategic consequences during the conduct of UW operations.

**Endnotes**


2. Lewis, S.J., Chapter 7, *Communications: Allied Special Operations: Jedburgh Teams, Summer 1944*, Dr. Samuel J. Lewis; Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939, Dr. Roger Spiller, Combat Studies Institute, p. 55.
Chapter 13

The Need to Expand Training and Education on Nonstandard Logistics

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The U.S. Army Special Operations Command is focusing its efforts on meeting the future national security objectives and has published Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 2022, which outlines the ARSOF vision and priorities. In line with this vision is a return to ARSOF’s roots in unconventional warfare (UW).

UW is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” A denied area may be defined as a foreign nation in which ARSOF activities are semipermissive or nonpermissive. This means that ARSOF cannot operate openly and all activities must be conducted secretly.

Conducting UW operations in a denied area presents a complex, multifaceted environment that changes depending on the region, partner nations involved, and level of activity. Conducting UW in a sovereign nation that is surrounded by U.S. allies and contains forward deployed conventional force brigade combat teams is much different than a hostile nation that is partially surrounded by unwilling nations that do not permit U.S. embassies or a U.S. footprint whatsoever.

Because this global need changes depending on the operational environment, UW operations and systems will not be one-size-fits-all solutions. One of the key components to this flexibility in UW is nonstandard logistics (NSL).

Defining NSL

NSL may be defined as the use of existing logistics systems in support of special operations in a known capacity or the use of unique nonmilitary logistics systems in support of special operations. Although the doctrinal definition for NSL is still in development, one common theme in all its unofficial definitions is the use of common and uncommon systems and mechanisms tailored to meet special operations.

NSL is a thought process of how to execute logistics operations that are fundamentally different from conventional force logistics. Similar to UW as a whole, successful NSL is not a cookie-cutter solution; rather, it is a collection of tried and true principles and methods.

Recognizing the complex and important nature of NSL, we must be clear about the gravity of its success. Poor NSL can be the single point of failure in UW operations and can lead to loss of life and assets as well as a tactical and strategic mission failure with national security ramifications.
UW Training and NSL

With the understanding that NSL is a critical subtask of UW, we can pull out several main lessons from recent ARSOF training exercises. At the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, the Special Operations Training Detachment (SOTD) has created a complex and joint UW environment in which ARSOF units can train.

The SOTD has enabled ARSOF units to operate at the team, company, and battalion or task force levels in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment. Many of these exercises are conducted through interdependent operations with a brigade combat team of conventional forces.

With special operations task forces (SOTFs) conducting UW exercises in 2013 and 2014, SOTD observer-coach/trainers and JRTC role players have gathered critical lessons learned in the realm of conducting NSL in a sovereign nation.

ARSOF units conducting home station training and SOTFs training at JRTC tend to lean toward kinetic operations and away from less glamorous activities such as NSL. This is understandable given ARSOF Soldiers’ familiarity with kinetic operations, but it can be a pitfall to understanding the important symbiotic relationship between actions on an objective and all of the supporting efforts that enable that action.

Nothing is exclusive; all UW activities are bound together in a mutually supporting success-or-failure relationship. This inclusion of leaders and planners at all levels and the use of JIIM partners in conducting both UW and NSL must become a cultural and doctrinal habit that the ARSOF community teaches, trains, and executes in order to be successful.

As rotational training SOTFs learn how to conduct UW more effectively during JRTC exercises, SOTD has the unique ability to gather lessons learned and facilitate an educated dialogue across ARSOF about the future of UW and NSL.

Lessons Learned

During the JRTC rotation 14-05 in-progress review held at Fort Bragg, NC, SOTD facilitated a conversation about the future of UW and NSL with JIIM partners and leaders from every corner of ARSOF. With command guidance and ARSOF 2022 in mind, this in-progress review produced many tangible lessons for improving ARSOF as a UW force.

One of the most important and prevalent lessons learned while observing SOTFs executing UW and NSL in a UW environment was that the right people need to be involved both horizontally and vertically in planning and executing NSL. Although the sustainment warfighting function is normally relegated to only a few staff members and forgotten about, it is important to remember that in a UW environment NSL is, in essence, a tactical mission that also involves logistics.
This means that both ARSOF logisticians and senior and expert ARSOF Soldiers need to partner at all levels in planning and executing NSL. This fusion of operational experience, resistance network building and use, and the planning and resourcing of logistics is critical in ensuring that all logistics operations maintain operational security.

Although normal logistics methods place speed and efficiency as king, in the UW environment, security and effectiveness are the crux of success. In this nonpermissive environment, any signature or evidence of an ARSOF operation can lead to strategic failure and drastic consequences.
During a recent UW exercise with a “routine” logistics push of a small item to an ARSOF team in denied territory, the operation was not fully planned and vetted. The failure enabled the package to move forward from one sovereign nation into a nonpermissive sovereign nation without being properly sterilized of all U.S. markings. This exposed the team that was deployed forward conducting UW. The team had to abandon its mission and evacuate to a friendly area to avoid capture.

This lesson was learned at JRTC, but had it occurred in real sovereign nations the consequences would have been catastrophic. Whether this error was because of a lapse in supervision or lack of fusing the right people to plan operations, it underscores that conducting NSL is a zero-defect game in the UW environment. It must be planned with the same level of detail, command oversight, and inclusion of key SOTF personnel as would be used in a nighttime high-altitude, low-opening infiltration.

**Expanding NSL Training**

Another shortfall observed was the need for a periodic gathering of ARSOF experts and leaders to share, learn, and discuss NSL operations in a UW environment. A semiannual or annual seminar that focuses on the planning and execution of NSL in an UW environment would fulfill this need.

This seminar should include senior and expert ARSOF leaders who are adept at resistance network building and use. Including leaders from the team, company, and SOTF levels would provide a shared understanding throughout the planning and execution phases of NSL.

ARSOF logisticians should also participate to add knowledge of logistics operations, both conventional and nonstandard. All members of the ARSOF community should be invited since all members contribute to UW operations.

It must be understood that this course is for planners, leaders, and individuals who execute NSL operations. Recognizing the importance of including all three of these participants is critical to successful horizontal and vertical integration.

This seminar would not be a course to certify attendees in the execution of NSL. Instead, it would be a valuable knowledge-sharing opportunity that would allow a diverse, expert, and professional collection of JIIM partners to lay the groundwork for doctrine, training, and future operations.

This seminar would provide Army Special Operations Command leaders with actionable guidance for creating and improving a formal course on NSL. Figure 14-2 provides a list of topics that have been observed through training rotations and discussions with ARSOF leaders. These subject areas could be used as seminar topics or to develop a program of instruction for NSL.

Currently the ARSOF team only briefly discusses NSL during small blocks of training in particular courses. There is a critical need to expand on the current discussion and facilitate an educational dialogue that will enable all attendees to understand the fundamentals of NSL. Incorrectly packaging and shipping an iridium phone into denied territory can be just as deadly as a false reading on an altimeter gauge during freefall.
Chapter 14

Decisions at the Lowest Level: Targeting in Unconventional Warfare

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The targeting process must involve all staff elements. Targeting within the unconventional warfare (UW) fusion cell allows a special operations task force (SOTF) commander to allocate resources to his subordinate operational detachment-Alphas (ODAs) in a UW environment and ensure they meet his intent. At the same time an ODA commander decides how best to achieve effects in his assigned sector.

Targeting is indispensable to the UW fusion cell in coordinating lethal and nonlethal effects among the SOTF, an advanced operations base (AOB), ODAs, interagency, and conventional forces (CF). A SOTF staff in UW targeting provides the commander’s intent, deconflicts planned ODA effects, and provides material resources and intelligence. Due to the decentralized nature of UW, the commander should empower ODAs to plan and execute their own effects.

The targeting process allows the UW fusion cell to synchronize all effects in the operational environment (OE). Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Targeting, defines targeting as “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.” Because UW aims to achieve an end state by means of an indigenous resistance force, UW targeting “identifies gaps, and builds and strengthens friendly networks in the execution of UW,” according to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-05, Special Operations. Because targeting can employ different means (lethal and nonlethal) to achieve a desired effect, it requires various subject matter experts to understand the OE and determine appropriate methods for each effect. Some may argue that the targeting process is separate from nonstandard logistics and nonstandard communications, and should therefore be conducted separately from these UW-specific functions. Splitting staffs replicates efforts and strains staff members. Streamlining a common understanding of the OE through a single UW fusion cell is far more efficient and centralized. Therefore, UW targeting belongs in the nexus of all SOTF UW activities: the UW fusion cell.

The role of the SOTF in UW targeting is to provide the commander’s intent and to deconflict and provide resources for ODAs. It is a commander’s responsibility to communicate clearly his intent to his entire organization. This intent, together with resources, “guides subordinates’ actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative” per Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command. This responsibility is more important in UW, where nonstandard communications limits the frequency of interaction between the commander and his ODAs. Army Techniques Publication 3-60, Targeting, notes that deconfliction is a key aspect of the targeting process. In any OE, a commander and his staff must ensure that subordinate units do not engage in fratricide or attempt to affect the same target without proper coordination. Deconfliction is even more important in UW targeting because ODAs engage their targets by means of a resistance force. ODA commanders can visualize their resistance-counterpart sector commander’s OE, but may not fully understand another sector. It is therefore the SOTF’s responsibility to deconflict various ODA and resistance efforts by ensuring that one sector command is not achieving effects detrimental to another. Lastly, a SOTF must provide the necessary resources, whether material or intelligence, to the ODAs to support their proposed
effects. As resources are finite, the commander and his staff must determine what resources are available, each ODA’s requirements, and how to prioritize and best resource each ODA. Although ODAs have a unique ability to gain situational understanding in their respective sectors, the SOTF staff must augment this understanding with a robust intelligence support element. Hence, it is not a SOTF commander’s role to decide which effects his subordinate ODAs will achieve. Rather, the commander’s responsibility is to provide intent, deconflict ODA effects, and resource ODAs to achieve desired effects.

Since the SOTF does not dictate to the ODAs which effects they will achieve in the targeting process, it is the ODA commander’s responsibility to decide what effects he will achieve, based on his relationship with the resistance force. This understanding of UW targeting is in line with UW doctrine, since units engaging in UW must operate in a decentralized manner. UW is by nature decentralized. ODA commanders have the ability to visualize what is happening within their sector. Furthermore, ODAs must be able to operate with a high degree of autonomy due to the need for limited, nonstandard communications. Leaders who are empowered by their higher headquarters to make decisions will provide the best possible results in a UW environment. Although ODAs must still submit planned effects to SOTF for commander’s intent validation, deconfliction, and resourcing, it remains an ODA commander’s responsibility to develop that planned effect.

Through the use of the targeting process in UW, a SOTF commander should decide how to allocate resources to his ODAs in a UW environment and ensure ODAs meet his intent. An ODA commander should have power to decide how to best develop a particular sector. UW targeting is an efficient method for coordinating lethal and nonlethal effects between the SOTF, AOB, ODAs, and adjacent conventional units within the context of the UW fusion cell. The role of a SOTF staff in this targeting process is to provide the commander’s intent as well as to deconflict and resource the ODAs. Empowered by the SOTF, ODAs can then proceed to develop their own plans to achieve effects. Decisions are not always best made at higher echelons. Sometimes, particularly in the complex environment of UW, these decisions are most clearly made by the right leaders at the lowest level.
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CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) <http://www.apd.army.mil> or the Central Army Registry (formerly known as the Reimer Digital Library) <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

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FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil>.
Military Review (MR)
MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)
TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA at <https://atn.army.mil/media/dat/TRISA/trisa.aspx> (CAC login required).

Combined Arms Center-Capability Development Integration Directorate (CAC-CDID)
CAC-CDIC is responsible for executing the capability development for a number of CAC proponent areas, such as Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations, among others. CAC-CDID also teaches the Functional Area 30 (Information Operations) qualification course. Find CAC-CDID at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cdid>.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)
JCISFA’s mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>.

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