COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE - HORN OF AFRICA

From Crisis Action to Campaigning

Lessons and Best Practices

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Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
From Crisis Action to Campaigning
Special Study

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Photo caption and credit: “Senior enlisted leaders (SELs) from the Kenya Defence Forces host a junior enlisted town hall meeting at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, during an SEL engagement 11 FEB 2016.” (Photo by SSgt Kate Thornton, U.S. Air Force)
The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) theater campaign plan (TCP) is a five-year plan intended to set conditions to enable achievement of the command’s regional end states. My primary task as Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was to operationalize the TCP with respect to the line of effort focused on neutralizing al-Shabaab and transitioning security in Somalia to a Somali-led effort. This imperative was a new challenge for CJTF-HOA, requiring fresh approaches, procedures, and ways of thinking about complex problems. Operationalizing the TCP was and is a multi-faceted effort, encompassing the entire spectrum of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. Success in this effort will take years to realize, which makes it more important to build momentum as soon as possible. From the beginning, CJTF-HOA sought to make these processes sustainable, despite high personnel turnover.

Recognizing that we were breaking new ground with many of these efforts, CJTF-HOA asked Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) embedded liaison officers (ELNOs) to examine our mechanisms with a critical eye. We gave the ELNOs complete and unfettered access to all staff processes and personnel, urging them to not only engage within CJTF-HOA, but with our partners and interlocutors as well. During the past year, CALL personnel have systematically interviewed a representative cross-section of the entire staff and many of our assigned subordinate units. Much of their work has focused on the Army’s transition from counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan to this new operating environment with limited authorities and different requirements. CALL personnel uploaded more than 200 observations on every aspect of our mission into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (https://www.jllis.mil) where they can be easily accessed by other commands. In addition to their analytical skills, the ELNO perspective has been invaluable as a means to “see ourselves as others see us.”

I want to take this opportunity to specifically commend the work of the CALL ELNO program to other forward-deployed units. I was first exposed to CALL’s forward collection mechanisms as the Commander, Operations Group, at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The work of the ELNOs, both at our Combat Training Centers and in forward commands, is essential to keeping our tactics, techniques, and procedures current in the face of tremendous change. The ELNOs come from career tracks across the entire Army, Active and Reserve components alike, and bring a wealth of knowledge and expertise. I especially appreciate CALL’s willingness to tap into the United States Military Academy’s Operational Experience Program, which sends senior faculty members to selected billets to refresh their understanding of the challenges facing today’s
Army. The CJTF-HOA ELNOs have improved our lessons learned process and have been valued contributors on the CJTF-HOA staff as leaders and teammates.

Drawing from the work of these ELNOs, this special study examines a significant shift in CJTF-HOA's focus: the transition from a short-term crisis, action-focused organization to a long-term campaigning headquarters. This shift began under my predecessor and will continue to develop under my successor (and probably his successors as well). The shift is the result of a tremendous amount of blood, sweat, and tears by the men and women of CJTF-HOA in coordination with the USAFRICOM staff, the Service components, and our regional embassies.

The specific insights and lessons learned were shaped by the unique environment of East Africa, but the broader techniques and processes have great utility for any command with a security force assistance focus. I encourage Soldiers at all levels to benefit from our hard-won experience.

MG Mark R. Stammer, U.S. Army
Commanding General, CJTF-HOA
April 2015-April 2016
# Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
## From Crisis Action to Campaigning
### Special Study

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Chapter 1

History of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa

LTC Raymond A. Kimball, U.S. Army; and
Capt. Myles N. Morrow, U.S. Marine Corps

Before discussing the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s (CJTF-HOA’s) shift to a campaigning focus, it is worth reviewing the history of the organization for better understanding of past focus areas. History shows that CJTF-HOA’s areas of emphasis have varied among counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, counterpiracy, and security cooperation efforts. The focus at any given time was a function of resources available, authorities granted by higher headquarters, and command focus. Understanding the history of CJTF-HOA puts its current transition to a long-term focus in better context.1

2002 Through 2007: Shaping the Environment

CJTF-HOA was established at Camp Lejeune, NC, in October 2002 in response to the September 11 attacks. The organization was formed around the 2nd Marine Division Headquarters, with the intent of identifying and destroying terror cells and violent extremist organizations in the region. CJTF-HOA sailed for the Gulf of Aden in November 2002 aboard the USS Mount Whitney and arrived in Djibouti in December 2002. CJTF-HOA conducted its operations from the USS Mount Whitney, moored in the port of Djibouti, while negotiations began with the Djibouti government to host a U.S. presence ashore. The former French Foreign Legion outpost at Camp Lemonnier, adjacent to the Ambouli International Airport, was identified as the best candidate for that presence. The U.S. and Djibouti governments signed a land lease agreement for the use of the facility in April 2003. CJTF-HOA transitioned its headquarters, personnel, and equipment from USS Mount Whitney to Camp Lemonnier in May 2003.

Beginning in 2004, CJTF-HOA began placing more emphasis on civil affairs projects such as drilling wells and building infrastructure. The command retained a counterterrorism mission, but these operations primarily were left for special operations forces and national agencies. In 2004, the CJTF-HOA commander likened the situation to “the separation of church and state — they were state and I was church. They did what they did…we stayed on the civil affairs side, drilling wells, building roads, schoolhouses, and churches.” Initially, these projects were heavily focused on Djibouti due to proximity and to sustain the goodwill of the host nation. Over time through 2005 to 2006, civil affairs operations expanded into Uganda, Ethiopia, Yemen, Comoros, Tanzania, and Kenya. In addition to infrastructure projects and vaccination efforts, CJTF-HOA troops were frequently on the front lines of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief when tragedy struck. In January 2006, CJTF-HOA personnel assisted with recovery efforts after the collapse of a four-story building in Kenya, flooding in Ethiopia, a mudslide in Yemen, and a capsized ferry in Djibouti.

The Djibouti government extended the initial one-year lease for Camp Lemonnier in 2003, requesting a single comprehensive agreement for U.S. air, land, and sea access in Djibouti. This effort culminated in the signing of a five-year lease for Camp Lemonnier in May 2006, which also marked the transfer of responsibilities for CJTF-HOA from the Marine Corps to the Navy. The new lease dramatically expanded the size of Camp Lemonnier from 88 to 500
acres, expanding the camp space eastward along the southern boundary of Ambouli Airport. Civil affairs activities continued to be a strong point of emphasis, although they were now nested in a larger “4P” framework (preventing conflict, promoting regional security, protecting coalition interests, and prevailing against extremism). Recognizing the need for deconfliction of civil affairs activities with other U.S. government efforts, which had been a point of friction, CJTF-HOA signed a joint memorandum of understanding with the United States Agency for International Development and the Department of State. Support to counterterrorism remained a core mission of the command, especially as Ethiopia conducted kinetic activities into Somalia to displace the Islamic Courts Union in December 2006.

2008 Through 2011: Ready the Force

Throughout its existence to this point, CJTF-HOA reported to United States Central Command under the aegis of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). With the establishment of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in 2008, CJTF-HOA aligned to the new combatant command but retained authorities and missions related to OEF. CJTF-HOA effectively operated with two combatant commands, having responsibilities on the continent and in Yemen. USAFRICOM’s establishment operation order for CJTF-HOA emphasized an interagency and coalition approach, noting “integration of coalition, allies, and African states is essential to ensure success. Coordination with nongovernmental organizations is encouraged.”

Counterterrorism operations in this period focused on the al-Qa’ida Network (AQN), perceived to be weakened in the aftermath of al-Qa’ida’s defeat in Iraq. The desired strategic effect of counterterrorism operations in the CJTF-HOA area of responsibility (AOR) was an AQN unable to conduct attacks against U.S. interests, with financial, materiel, and personnel support networks disrupted to the point of inoperability for the network or its affiliates. An additional challenge in this domain emerged, as piracy off the coast of Somalia rapidly materialized as a threat to global commerce transiting in the region. CJTF-HOA provided planning; logistics; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to multinational counterpiracy operations such as Combined Task Force 151, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Operation Ocean Shield, and the European Union’s Naval Force Operation Atalanta. This multilateral approach proved successful in eliminating the threat of piracy in the Horn of Africa’s waters. However, conditions for piracy still remain in Somalia.

During this period, civil affairs efforts were de-emphasized in favor of security cooperation and security force assistance efforts. The command attributed this decline to negative publicity that had accompanied some projects, a more formal vetting process through the bilateral country teams, and USAFRICOM’s emphasis on military-to-military engagements instead of direct engagement with civil authorities. The stated aims for these engagements were:

- Development of professional militaries
- Institutionalization of effective oversight and accountability mechanisms
- Contribution to broader African government efforts to counter illicit trafficking

The greater emphasis on bilateral security cooperation required a closer relationship with the U.S. ambassadors in the AOR to coordinate Department of Defense and Department of State funding streams.
2012 Through 2015: Enable Partners

As USAFRICOM continued to evolve, it created a theater campaign plan intended to be a framework for the synchronization of all military operations, exercises, and security cooperation activities on the continent. To implement the plan, USAFRICOM and CJTF-HOA developed the East Africa Campaign Plan (EACP), which focused on enabling East African partners to create a secure environment that promotes stability, good governance, continued development, and respect for dignity, rights, and the rule of law. The EACP was carried out through six lines of effort, encompassing capabilities ranging from countering violent extremist organizations to maritime security to capacity building. The EACP also reinforced a command relationship defined shortly after the establishment of USAFRICOM and supporting Service components: CJTF-HOA’s role as the supported command within the East Africa AOR. Service activities in East Africa nominally fell under the command and control of the CJTF-HOA commander. Implementing this responsibility was an ongoing challenge.

In the aftermath of the 2012 Benghazi attacks, USAFRICOM and other combatant commands developed contingency plans for reinforcing U.S. missions in their AORs that might come under threat. As part of a larger spectrum of response options, USAFRICOM requested and received a force package of a reinforced maneuver company and supporting C-130 aircraft, designated as the East Africa Response Force (EARF). The intent of the EARF was to reinforce East African embassies operating in challenging security environments to continue operations. Only a few months after it was constituted, the EARF was deployed to Juba, South Sudan, to support an ordered departure of some civilians and embassy staff. The EARF maintained forces on the ground in Juba for five months until the security situation calmed sufficiently to permit transfer of authorities to a smaller Marine Security Augmentation Unit. The EARF continues to exercise its readiness to this day through a series of unit rotations, certification exercises, and training ranges in Djibouti.

A growing portion of CJTF-HOA’s focus in this period was consumed by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Although AMISOM was originally established in 2007 around a core contingent of Ugandan forces, this period saw AMISOM grow into a true multinational command encompassing multiple troop contributing countries such as Ethiopia, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone. USAFRICOM and CJTF-HOA supported the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, focusing on building predeployment staff training and Soldier skills necessary for the AMISOM mission. CJTF-HOA placed a small Military Coordination Center in Mogadishu to assist the AMISOM effort, because the U.S. Somalia unit remained in Nairobi, Kenya. The military coordination center synchronized U.S. military support to AMISOM, Somalia security forces, and other international partners.

An Enduring Context

CJTF-HOA has continuously balanced competing demands of counterterrorism, civil-military cooperation, and security cooperation. However, much of the previous focus was aimed at generating short-term effects. The subsequent chapters discuss how CJTF-HOA is evolving staff processes and procedures to take a campaigning, longer-term approach.

Endnote

1. This narrative draws from both the short history included in Center for Army Lessons Learned Observation Report 15-14, Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa Observation Report, and the CJTF-HOA 2014 Annual History written by LTC Alexz Kelly, USAFRICOM.
Chapter 2

The Horn of Africa Supporting Plan to the Theater Campaign Plan

LTC Raymond A. Kimball, U.S. Army

A major step toward a long-term focus for Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was the creation of the Horn of Africa supporting plan (HSP). The intent of the HSP was to implement and operationalize the guidance of the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) theater campaign plan (TCP), which covered the entire continent. This chapter discusses concerns while drafting the HSP, as well as perceived strengths and weaknesses of the plan. This chapter concludes with an examination of how CJTF-HOA sought to keep the HSP relevant during the first year of its implementation.

The TCP laid out a five-year plan intended to set conditions enabling achievement of the 10-year regional end states in the theater strategy. The TCP’s operational approach consisted of five lines of effort (LOEs), each aligned to a TCP end state:

- **LOE 1**: Neutralize Al-Shabaab and transition of the African Union mission in Somalia to the Somali National Army
- **LOE 2**: Degrade violent extremist organizations in the Sahel-Maghreb and contain instability in Libya
- **LOE 3**: Contain Boko Haram
- **LOE 4**: Interdict illicit activity in Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa
- **LOE 5**: Build peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance disaster response capacity of African partners

![Figure 2-1. USAFRICOM TCP operational approach](image-url)
Figure 2-1 on page 5 shows each TCP LOE and its corresponding end state. CJTF-HOA’s primary concerns while drafting the HSP focused on LOE 1, LOE 4, and LOE 5, and the enduring requirement for protection of U.S. personnel and facilities.

Why the Horn of Africa Supporting Plan?

The primary motivating factor for the HSP was the disjointed and unfocused nature of theater security cooperation (TSC) and security force assistance (SFA) efforts in the CJTF-HOA area of responsibility (AOR). CJTF-HOA believed the HSP would build an overarching framework for coordinating and synchronizing TSC and SFA efforts in theater. Because of the lack of a coordinating and synchronizing mechanism, TSC and SFA efforts often were done pursuing narrow objectives without regard to other parallel efforts that might have been duplicative or redundant. In some cases, missions were carried out based on verbal orders and an administrative travel clearance rather than a fragmentary order. The authors of the HSP hoped to provide a systemic means of synchronizing TSC and SFA efforts that would feed the orders generation process and minimize duplicative efforts.

These duplicative efforts encompassed not only the totality of U.S. government activities, such as Department of State train-and-equip programs, but international partners as well. Planners identified a significant amount of overlap among security cooperation efforts conducted by Horn of Africa (HOA) and other countries conducting security cooperation in East Africa. For example, one CJTF-HOA staff officer noted that within one week, HOA, Marine Forces Africa, and British Peace Support Team elements conducted training in the same country on the same general topic. The authors of the HSP saw an immediate imperative for a targeting process that allowed disparate efforts to be identified early in planning, and adjusted accordingly.

CJTF-HOA staff members also were concerned their efforts to build joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) contacts had become an end unto themselves, with no sense of what purpose such engagement actually served. Multiple officers interviewed for this collection identified the concern that the previous East Africa Campaign Plan included a line of operation labeled “build the JIIM team.” Although this effort was founded on good intentions, it quickly became an easy mechanism to justify efforts involving any JIIM component. At its worst, the JIIM team imperative was seen as promoting “military tourism,” one-off visits involving only superficial contact with partner leadership and no follow-on plan for engagement. The HSP authors wanted to make clear to the members of CJTF-HOA that JIIM cooperation was a means to an end, not an end unto itself. Accordingly, the HSP focused on specific, discrete military end states.

The central vision of the HSP espoused a progressive training process intended to build self-sufficient capabilities in partner militaries over time. In addition to the above concern on the JIIM team, the commanding general identified a concern that SFA efforts were unduly focused at the individual Soldier level at the expense of creating sustainable institutional capabilities. Staff members interviewed for this collection agreed with this perception, citing sniper training in Uganda and counter-improvised explosive device training in Burundi as examples of repetitive, skill-level 1 training that did not advance to more complex operations. The establishment of military end states was intended to build sustainable institutional capacity over time. Through the HSP, SFA planners sought to design progressive training approaches that could create deep, sustainable, institutional capabilities over time.
Horn of Africa Supporting Plan Structure and Operational Design

The HSP was written to serve as the primary link among country strategies, the TCP and other plans, and CJTF-HOA’s operations. It specified CJTF-HOA objectives and tasks, focusing on managing instability and shaping underlying conditions in the combined joint operations area. In the same vein as the TCP, the HSP utilized a five-year supporting plan within a larger framework of ten years or more for execution. The HSP was structured around four prioritized CJTF LOEs to achieve a military end state (see Figure 2-2):

- Neutralize violent extremist organizations
- Ready the force
- Enable partners
- Shape the environment

Progress through LOEs were viewed through a series of effects that were assessed for the outcomes necessary to adjust plans, resourcing, authorities, or other pertinent matters.

Figure 2-2. HSP operational approach
The operational design for the HSP was derived from theater campaign initiatives; it reflected the CJTF-HOA commander’s status as the supported commander for USAFRICOM LOE 1 and a supporting commander for USAFRICOM LOE 4 and LOE 5. The design concept centered on the idea that success over time will build African partner willingness and capacity with fewer U.S. resources required over time to maintain stability in the region (see Figure 2-3 for an illustration of this concept). The HSP identified three critical requirements for success: willing partners, including African, interagency, and international; resources, including personnel, authorities, funds, senior leader time, and relationships; and synchronization of activities, as noted in previous paragraphs. The HSP has five primary methods to execute each LOE: SFA; exercises; operations; engagements; and posture, presence, and agreements. The means supporting these methods include funding, personnel, forces, authorities, senior leaders’ time, and international/interagency relationships.

![Figure 2-3. HSP operational design](image)

**Strengths of the Horn of Africa Supporting Plan**

The HSP development team took great care to ensure the HSP was synchronized with the nascent TCP. The USAFRICOM TCP was not yet published when the HSP was in development. Therefore, the HSP development team faced the possibility of creating a plan that would not be coordinated with higher headquarters. To prevent this issue, the HSP development team shared its thinking and products throughout the development process. One practice cited as particularly helpful was the multiple visits to USAFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. These visits were used to meet face-to-face with USAFRICOM planners and share products. This mechanism became a venue for information sharing not only with USAFRICOM, but also the component
commands. As a result, the TCP reflected significant elements of the HSP when it was released. These actions showed the importance of lower-level planners seeking every opportunity to share their products with higher headquarters, even if the products were relatively immature. Lower-level planners also should be resourced with travel funds to meet face-to-face with planners at higher headquarters at key points in the planning process.

HSP developers felt strongly that the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES), combined with design methodology, was an effective mechanism for creating campaign plans when properly resourced and executed. Multiple staff officers interviewed for this collection made comments to the effect that JOPES and the design methodology worked. In this particular case, the plans staff section (J-5) team was able to combine resident expertise in both techniques to create a decision-making process. This decision-making process was broad enough to encompass the multiple domains present in HOA and flexible enough to accommodate new information that emerged during the process. J-5 team members emphasized that they simply followed the JOPES and design guidelines taught in Service schools, albeit over a shorter-than-ideal timeline. Many HOA staff members who participated in the process said it was the first time they ever encountered the full JOPES process from beginning to end. As a result, many HOA staff members required additional training to fully participate in the HSP development process. The HSP process showed the utility of JOPES and the design methodology for complex problems when time allowed for a deliberate planning cycle. The HSP experience underscored the potential need for additional instruction on JOPES for those members of the joint team who were unfamiliar with the program.

Planners and non-planners alike identified the HSP war game, in particular, as broadly inclusive of all equities and effective in understanding. The J-5 team members heading the HSP effort decided to make the HSP war game a thorough, drawn-out, sequestered process. They requested representatives from staff sections across CJTF-HOA instead of relying on the personnel staff section (J-1) or planning staff section (J-5). War gamers were sequestered in a planning room to minimize disruptions during the war game, which ran for five days, 10 to 12 hours per day. Participants consistently cited the war game as a useful mechanism to identify planning gaps and solutions. The warm reception to this approach showed that planners should build in time and space for a thorough war game that allows maximum participation from the staff.

Much of the HSP targeting process was built around effects-based targeting. Many staff members felt that previous SFA efforts were largely unfocused and unclear in their objectives. The HSP attempted to address this issue with effects-based targeting, using indicators for every effect nested in an end state. Participants felt effects-based targeting was more focused and easier to assess than the previous system. They recommended that comparable staffs consider effects-based targeting as an option for nonlethal efforts. The effects-based targeting process is discussed at length in Chapter 3, The Effects Tasking Order Process as Non-Kinetic Targeting.

The assessment process for the HSP incorporated both the traditional political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) assessment and an assessment of military end states. During the development of the HSP, staff members were divided on whether to assess outputs from HSP activities using PMESII or against the military end states of the plan. The commanding general argued for the use of PMESII-based metrics to more readily synchronize with higher headquarters’ assessments. The HOA assessments team countered that PMESII did not readily fit the military end states devised as outcomes of the HSP. Ultimately, the commanding general chose to use both, with the understanding that different assessments would be most useful for different audiences. Although assessment using PMESII remained the
To show the emphasis on specific aspects of the campaign plan over time, HSP planners used a unique graphic to clearly convey shifts in focus. The J-5 created a “wave chart” showing the changing emphasis for specific aspects of SFA over time (see Figure 2-4). Participants felt this chart was particularly helpful in illuminating how emphasis would shift, more so than a spreadsheet would have been. Multiple participants stated they felt it allowed them to more effectively visualize when they needed to commit a specific set of resources in support of a particular end state. The author of the chart stated he had not seen a similar product used in military planning; he learned about the chart from civilian project management. Wave charts may be useful as a best practice to illuminate changing priorities in a fluid operational environment.

![Figure 2-4. HSP wave chart](image)

**Limitations of the Horn of Africa Supporting Plan**

When authoring the HSP, HOA recognized military power was highly limited in its ability to effect change in the strategic situation. The HOA supporting plan was predicated on the idea that the U.S. government has a limited capacity to address many of the systemic problems in East Africa. These issues include corruption, political instability, and long-standing ethnic grievances. As a result, the HOA supporting plan was deliberately limited in its objectives at the strategic level. The plan primarily focused on achieving U.S. national security interests without worsening local conditions. The plan was intended to shape a five-year approach, nested in a ten-year USAFRICOM TCP. U.S. organizations should be conscious of their limited ability to effect...
change in African countries at the strategic level. U.S. strategic planning should be limited in scope and clearly focused on U.S. interests.

Another significant limitation was that much of the information for assessing and progressing toward end states of the HSP came from sources without direct U.S. validation. Many of the sources for validating progress toward the HOA supporting plan’s military end states were not validated by U.S. forces or authorities. For example, one desired condition of the HSP involved the growth in capability of the East African Standby Force (EASF). The U.S. had no authorities to work directly with the EASF in training, mentoring, equipping, or information sharing. CJTF-HOA’s information and influence on the EASF was through intermediaries such as a British liaison officer. The same situation exists with respect to Somalia, where the U.S. has no diplomatic presence and is extremely constrained in boots-on-the-ground numbers. Planners and assessors emphasized the need to be cognizant about the shortcomings of their information sources and evaluated them for bias. Wherever possible, TSC and SFA organizations should validate secondary sources with primary inputs such as trusted country liaison officers.

The planning team also identified certain personnel specialties as crucial for successful planning of the HOA support plan. HOA currently operates under a joint manning document (JMD) derived from a joint table of distribution, last updated in fiscal year 2011. As a result, many specific skill sets required by the HSP were either not explicitly authorized in the HOA JMD or were not properly filled. Multiple participants identified the presence of an Army strategist (Functional Area 59 [FA 59]) as crucial to the success of the HSP effort. The FA 59 competency in the joint planning process was used in creating and implementing the design methodology for the HSP. Under the most current FA 59 manning document, FA 59s are generally not authorized at the two-star level. However, the breadth and depth of HOA’s responsibilities make an FA 59 presence vital. Additionally, the comptroller’s officer required an individual with competencies in foreign military sales and SFA funding planning. USAFRICOM’s comptroller had an authorization for this skill set, but the section had only one such individual who split time between HOA and the rest of the continent. CJTF-HOA is now working on authorization for an FA 59 in the HOA J-5 and recoding one billet in the HOA comptroller to reflect the requirements for SFA funding knowledge.

Moving Forward With the Horn of Africa Supporting Plan

Recognizing the fluid nature of the operational environment, the HSP development team recommended a process of continuous improvement rather than a fixed rewrite schedule. J-5 planners originally intended to set a fixed date for a review and rewrite of the HSP after publication. Timelines for this review included suggestions for three- and six-month reviews. Instead, the HSP, as implemented, opted for a system of small, incremental improvements to the plan suggested by the working-group level and implemented by the joint directors. This was seen as more reasonable for staff processes and a more effective means of addressing the fluidity of the operational environment. One significant change to this plan was generated by the actual publication of the TCP approximately four months after the publication of the HSP. HSP Change 1 was completed in approximately one month to reflect differences in terminology and the emphasis that emerged from the TCP’s final publication. The HSP development team strongly recommended building in a mechanism for continuous improvement rather than fixed-interval rewrites.
Looking forward, CJTF-HOA planners realize that multinational and interagency support requires significantly longer lead and coordination times than military support. Participants in the HSP development process identified multiple areas that required significantly longer lead times for coordination than was the norm in most military processes. Any expansion of authorities in African countries requires top-down agreement from both the U.S. government and the host nation, with the highest levels of government giving authority to all force levels to cooperate with U.S. efforts. In the same manner, coordination for the multiple funding streams present in SFA requires two to three years of lead time. Therefore, planners must identify needs early in anticipation of desired end states. Bringing a broad perspective into the planning process early is the best means of anticipating needs. To do so, planners must ensure that political-military views, funding, and resource management perspectives are included in planning for SFA efforts.

Finally, the high turnover of HOA personnel necessitates a constant retraining effort to ensure knowledge of the HSP is not lost. Members of the HSP development team voiced concern that much of their hard work on the document could be lost if tacit knowledge of the HSP is not passed on to new personnel. With the 150 percent annual turnover rate for personnel at HOA, all participants on the HSP were gone from the staff within six months. This high turnover rate will continue until HOA transitions from Overseas Contingency Operations funding to baseline funding, which will not happen until fiscal year 2018, at the earliest. To combat the potential loss of knowledge, the J-5 created HSP training, which is conducted as part of the staff newcomers brief every two weeks. The training is designed to describe the HSP processes and effects without getting too detailed in any one area. The training allows participants to return to their staff sections and ask questions about specific elements that are missing or unclear. After complex planning efforts are complete, staffs must create mechanisms at the headquarters level to ensure they can share valuable knowledge of the plan.

Once the HSP was approved and published, staff processes were put into place to institutionalize its effects targeting and assessment methodologies. These processes and how they function are discussed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3
The Effects Tasking Order Process as Non-Kinetic Targeting
LTC Raymond A. Kimball, U.S. Army

As noted in Chapter 2, a non-kinetic targeting process focused on generating effects in support of the Horn of Africa supporting plan’s (HSP’s) desired conditions is central to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s (CJTF-HOA’s) transition to a campaigning perspective. This chapter describes the design of the effects tasking order (ETO) process, insights on the functioning practice of the ETO process, and areas CJTF-HOA staffers identified as potential concerns and fixes.

Effects Tasking Order Process Design

Members of the staff interviewed for this collection largely shared the same vision of the purpose and reasons for the ETO process. Participants agreed the process was meeting its stated objectives. Although the wording varied, participants agreed the primary purpose of the ETO was to synchronize CJTF-HOA activities in support of the desired conditions identified in the HSP. Participants used phrases such as “screen ideas and projects and judge them on their merits,” “operationalize the HSP,” and “align and task resources to meet requirements.” All participants agreed the ETO process was meeting the intent, although many suggested changes or adjustments.

Figure 3-1. Template for a CJTF-HOA target nomination
The ETO process functions through a series of working groups and boards, beginning with a nomination (see Figure 3-1 on page 13 for the nomination template) that originates in the military end state working group (MESWG). Once the nomination is approved by the working group, it moves through a series of boards culminating in final approval and publication in the ETO (see Figure 3-2 for an extract from an actual ETO). After completion of mission planning, backbriefs, and execution, the effects on the target are assessed. The assessment results in further actions in the working groups. A diagram of the entire process at the CJTF-HOA level is laid out in Figure 3-3 on page 15. A description of the working group and boards is shown in Table 3-1 on page 16.

| 1) (U) Purpose. CJTF-HOA supports African states and regional organizations so that they possess the will, capability, and capacity to combat transnational threats, are able to execute effective peace operations and respond to crises, and are able to promote regional stability and prosperity. |
| 2) (U) Method |
| a) (U) Sharing of best practices with the Rwanda Defense Force |
|   i. (U) NLT OCT 2015 CJTF HOA J44 provide the US Embassy Kigali, Rwanda with Expeditionary Base Planning information (FOB in a Box) via email for dissemination to the Rwanda Defense Force. |
|   ii. (U) Supports HSP effect 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3 and 1.1.6 |
| b) (U) COR assessment and execution of HA projects in Tanzania |
|   i. (U) As required CJTF HOA J-44 Country Engineers and CA BN representative’s travel to Tanzania in order to support COR assessments and execution of approved HA projects. |
|   ii. Approved HA projects include; 7 schools, a Vector Borne Lab and Veterinary Clinic and 4 water catchments in Tanga, Tanzania, 2 schools in Pemba, Tanzania, and a Tanzania Defense Intelligence College and a Medical Clinic in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. |
|   ii. (U) Supports HSP effect 3.3.1. |
| c) (U) Djibouti Dental Civic Action Project (DENCAP) |
|   i. (U) O/A Q4 FY 15-Q3 FY16 CJTF HOA CA Team, with Dental capabilities conduct DENCAP at rural dental clinics in Ali Sabieh, Arta, Tadjoura/Obock, and Dikhil Djibouti in order to assess the ability of the rural dental clinics ability to provide basic dental care. |
|   ii. (U) Supports HSP effects 3.1.1 and 3.1.4. |
| d) (U) Djibouti Preventative Medicine and Community Health Workers Support |
|   i. (U) O/A OCT 2015 CJTF-HOA CA BN travel to Djibouti Poste de Sante’ clinic in Obock in order to conduct an exchange of best practices with Community Health Workers and improve access and perceptions with vulnerable populations. |
|   ii. (U) Supports HSP effect 3.1.5 and 3.3.1. |

**Figure 3-2. Extract from a recent CJTF-HOA ETO**
Figure 3-3. Complete CJTF-HOA targeting process
Table 3-1. Description of the working group and boards of the CJTF-HOA ETO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Conditions Working Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: various CJTF-HOA staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs: country execution matrix, status of projects, priority effects list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose: define priorities, coordinate target nominations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs: target development, revised priority effects list, key leader engagement suggestions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Condition Lead Synchronization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: combined joint targeting officer (CJ-37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs: effects packages, recommended priority effects list, recommended commander’s guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose: conduct effects analysis and validate task assignments on target nominations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs: draft priority effects list, draft target nominations, revised key leader engagements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Activities Coordination Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: combined joint operations staff officer (CJ-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs: draft priority effects list, draft target nominations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose: colonel-level approval of target nominations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs: validated priority effects list, validated targets, validated key leader engagements, draft effects tasking order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Activities Decision Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: commanding general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs: priority effects list, targets, key leader engagements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose: provide additional targeting guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs: guidance and decisions, approved priority effects list</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effects Tasking Order Practice

The existence of “legacy” programs, instituted prior to the creation of the HSP, was an ongoing challenge. These were requested by CJTF-HOA, offices of security cooperation (OSCs) in the area of responsibility (AOR), and other U.S. government agencies prior to the creation of the HSP. Due to the long lag time in security cooperation and humanitarian assistance funding, many projects were a year or two old when they came before the working groups as funded programs needing execution. Working-group leaders struggled to match legacy programs with the HSP’s military end states. One participant did not feel comfortable rejecting legacy programs because of fears it would threaten the relationship with the owning agencies. Working-group leaders are now examining old nominations in the programs pending funding decisions to assess which should be continued or halted. Working groups had to examine likely “legacy” channels for pending projects that may not mesh with HSP objectives. Funded legacy projects that did not meet current Horn of Africa (HOA) objectives required open dialogue with the owning agency to
assess if the funds could be reprogrammed for other objectives in line with the HSP. The working groups functioned best as collaborative bodies that represented multiple views to gain consensus on the viability of considered projects. Working-group leaders sometimes struggled with the dual requirements to seek consensus and adjudicate which projects to move forward.

Both leaders and staff directorate participants agreed the working-group construct worked well overall; it was most successful when group members viewed consideration of nominations as an iterative and consultative process. Leaders noted that, because of the collaborative imperative, they sometimes struggled to serve as both facilitators of collaboration and arbiters of which nominations to move forward to the joint activities working group. One leader described himself as “balancing between a gatekeeper and a champion.” One means of dealing with this dual imperative was to appoint a secretary or facilitator of the MESWG. This individual moderated MESWG deliberations, freeing the MESWG lead to serve as impartial arbiter.

Some working-group leaders voiced concern about having inconsistent representation from units and directorates with equities on topics. Some leaders also noted participation was uneven among participants, with some reluctant to engage in the working group. Leaders acknowledged they did not always have representatives from all units with equities present at their deliberations. One leader noted that having four working groups and ten country groups made it challenging for units to attend every meeting. Another leader countered that space and size were real considerations, noting a growing working group can become unwieldy very quickly. One leader voiced concern over country personnel participants in his group who were the primary engagers, while others remaining mostly passive. For their part, staff directorate participants felt their directorates were adequately represented and had many opportunities to voice their views. One participant described his directorate as a “flex member,” and called in when needed. Leaders continually evaluated the required and recommended participants in their groups to ensure the proper equities were represented. Lateral coordination among groups was necessary to avoid overtasking small units or directorates. Finally, leaders had to engage non-participants in private to better understand any barriers to their participation.

When it came to understanding who could disapprove a nomination in the ETO process, staff members gave significantly varying answers. Some participants stated group leads could disapprove nominations; others stated group leads could direct a rework of a nomination, but could not kill the nomination completely. One group lead noted a severe limitation on the authority when projects came in that had already received funding (for example, legacy projects). Other participants stated that group leads could disapprove, but the disapproval was appealable. Still, other participants stated the joint activities coordination board (JACB) had the authority to give the final “no.” One participant reserved the authority for a final “no” for the commanding general, and all others only having the authority to send the nomination back for rework. Therefore, CJTF-HOA sought to clarify the authorities for directing rework on a nomination versus disapproving it completely.

CJTF-HOA staffers had varying views on what level could give final approval to nominations. Participants were mixed on whether final approval authority rested at the JACB or the joint activities decision board and under what circumstances. Some participants stated the operations staff officer (J-3) alone, who chairs the JACB, can approve a project, while others indicated it required a consensus of the colonels sitting at the JACB. In some cases, participants believed the commanding general had delegated decision authority for specific types of nominations to the JACB, although they were unable to state the criteria for the nomination. Other participants stressed the commanding general was the sole decision authority for nominations, with levels
below him providing review and approval. CJTF-HOA, likewise, worked to clarify the decision authority for approving nominations and whether specific categories of nominations required higher-level approval.

**Effects Tasking Order Concerns and Recommended Changes**

A few participants voiced concern that the guidance and direction given at the JACB should have been incorporated earlier in the process. Specifically, staff members noted a recent emphasis emerged on tailoring nominations to what can be done in one to two years, as opposed to long-term efforts. Some staff members were frustrated this guidance emerged at the JACB rather than communicated to working-group leads, where it could have been incorporated into group deliberations. These participants suggested the weekly working-group leads’ meeting as the ideal place to communicate guidance. Senior members of the ETO process were encouraged to use the MESWG leads’ meeting to communicate guidance on the targeting process in advance of the monthly board cycle.

An ongoing and pervasive concern in the ETO process was circumvention. Although staffers agreed the majority of security force assistance activities were being properly vetted in the targeting process, they noted some individuals were still trying to circumvent the process. The most common mechanism was “piggybacking” travelers on another approved event that exceeded the scope or intent of the event. The most effective mechanism for stopping piggybacking was insisting on orders production prior to completing the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System requests or travel approval in the Defense Travel System. One participant noted that the pending move of travel chits from its current database to a system of record would also facilitate this process. Finally, the creation of an administrative and logistics approval section of the targeting and travel process provided oversight for short-notice missions. CJTF-HOA continued the practice of creating fragmentary orders for each nomination approved through the targeting process and using this order as a benchmark for approving travel.

A lack of interaction among OSCs and Defense attachés (DATTs) limited the effectiveness of some working groups. Several leads noted that OSCs and DATTs rarely participated in the targeting process. These individuals had significantly more longevity and institutional knowledge than personnel stationed at CJTF-HOA. As a result, they were much more aware of the complexities and motivations behind specific efforts, and frequently had insights into component command activities of which CJTF-HOA was unaware. Participants stated, ideally, that they would have OSCs or DATTs participate by video teleconferencing, but scheduling and availability of secure video teleconferencing resources often made it impractical. One working group had a CJTF-HOA embassy liaison officer (LNO) participate by video teleconferencing during its deliberations. Working-group leaders were encouraged to actively seek OSC and DATT participation in the appropriate sessions. When the OSC and DATTs were unavailable, CJTF-HOA LNOs were invited to participate in MESWG sessions, either by secure video teleconferencing or All Partners Access Network/Defense Connect Service video teleconferencing, as appropriate. These LNOs, in turn, worked to remain actively apprised of OSC and DATT activities impacting the HSP’s objectives.

One aspiration of the targeting team was to move the current ETO process beyond the review of currently funded activities to the generation of new efforts that required external support. One participant voiced concern that the ETO process was still wholly focused on review of existing activities or internally funded activities needing integration into the HSP. In this view, working
groups should be actively seeking to identify areas for improving effects that go beyond CJTF-HOA’s resourcing and funding abilities. CJTF-HOA pushed to integrate its targeting process with the process set up for implementation of theater campaign plan (TCP) Line of Effort (LOE) 1. As a result, CJTF-HOA was designated as the executive agent for implementing LOE 1 and charged with designing a targeting process. The LOE 1 targeting process is described further in Chapter 6, *United States Africa Command Line of Effort 1 Synchronization*.

The creators of the ETO process voiced concern about losing the institutional knowledge gained in creating the ETO process as they transitioned out of CJTF-HOA. All staffers noted the importance of passing on lessons learned to their successors. One new participant stated that the CJTF-HOA newcomers’ training was helpful in communicating the specifics of the ETO process and how it operationalized the HSP. CJTF-HOA instructed on the ETO process during the newcomers’ training and ensured information accurately reflected the current process. The ETO process will continue to be refined over time.

Although much of CJTF-HOA’s attention is shifting to long-term efforts, it still retains requirements for crisis planning and response. Chapter 4, *Decision Support Planning and Tools: Planning to Support Decision Making*, discusses the innovative use of decision-point tactics to support operations.
Chapter 4

Decision Support Planning and Tools: Planning to Support Decision Making

CPT Gary Klein, U.S. Army; and CPT Alan Hastings, U.S. Army

As the Army increases its focus on decisive action, more units are emphasizing decision support templates and matrices as part of the planning process. Unfortunately, these tools have only minimally impacted tactical decision making and mission outcomes, because leaders are using these tools as another synchronization tool rather than focusing on decision points. When used correctly, decision support tools link directly to the information collection (IC) plan, facilitate the creation of branch plans prior to execution, and assist the commander’s decision making.

All leaders strive to support decision making, so what are the challenges to accomplishing this? One is the sequence of decision support planning within the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). Staffs create friendly decision support tools late in the planning process, during course of action (COA) analysis, according to doctrine. Given time constraints at this point, staffs often create these tools hastily, focusing on routine synchronization triggers instead of anticipating significant transitions or branch plans. Additionally, the sequence of IC planning and decision support planning creates a frequent disconnect between these two plans. To overcome these challenges, staffs should develop decision points earlier in the planning process and practice MDMP more to recognize when and how to deviate from doctrine. We will recommend one such technique to alter existing doctrine and enable decision support planning.

We will start by reviewing the current doctrine that outlines decision support planning and a case study describing its typical, doctrinal execution. This review will explore the aforementioned challenges regarding decision support planning. Then, we will review a foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) contingency plan as a case study. That case study will demonstrate potential adjustments to decision support planning. Finally, we will summarize some of the advantages and disadvantages to the recommended adjustments to decision support planning.

Doctrinal Review of the Decision Support Template and Matrix

When seeking doctrinal information about planning, MDMP, decision support matrices (DSM), and decision support templates (DST), leaders typically reference Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 MAY 2012; and Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 05 MAY 2014. ADRP 5-0 is the U.S. Army’s primary reference for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing. It states that a decision support template is:

This chapter is printed with permission as an excerpt of an article pending publication in ARMOR Magazine. The perspectives in this chapter are derived from the authors’ observations as observer coach/trainers at the Joint Readiness Training Center and National Training Center, respectively. CPT Klein also served at Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and performed as an assistant operational planning team leader during the El Niño contingency planning effort.
A combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of wargaming. The decision support template depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action (Joint Publication [JP] 2-01.3). Part of the decision support template is the decision support matrix. A decision support matrix is a written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision points and associated actions at those decision points. The decision support matrix lists decision points, locations of decision points, criteria to be evaluated at decision points, actions that occur at decision points, and the units responsible to act on the decision points.3

FM 6-0, the U.S. Army’s primary reference for MDMP and plans formats, references DSTs as a result of wargaming that “portray[s] key decisions and potential actions that are likely to arise during the execution of each COA.” These descriptions summarize DSTs and DSMs and what they contain. However, to find more details or an example, planners must follow the reference in ADRP 5-0 to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), 21 MAY 2014, and its Army equivalent, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (IPB), 10 NOV 2014. The IPB and JIPOE manuals present decision support tools within the larger intelligence planning process. They begin their description with the four steps of IPB, when staffs create a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), threat COA(s), and an event template (EVENTEMP), which depicts key differences in the threat COAs. After completing these IPB estimates, the staff creates an IC plan to answer intelligence gaps and narrow the range of possible threat COAs, both of which influence the commander’s decision making.

The staff creates these four products (the MCOO, threat COA[s], EVENTEMP, and IC plan) during mission analysis and will use the EVENTEMP later to develop the decision support plan. However, friendly decision points and decision support tools are not created until COA analysis according to doctrine. This gap in time between IC planning during mission analysis (see Figure 4-1, star 1) and decision support planning during COA analysis (see Figure 4-1, star 2) creates a potential disconnect between these two plans, especially since units initiate IC prior to beginning decision support planning.

Figure 4-1. The MDMP planning process and IC planning and execution align as they occur sequentially and simultaneously. Note the gap in time between when a unit initiates its IC and when the staff develops its decision support plan.
The doctrinal planning sequence may be suitable when friendly branch plans are slight adjustments to a well-formulated plan based on minor differences in the threat situation. However, plans rarely survive first contact with the enemy, so leaders should emphasize decision support planning to enable more flexible plans.

**Case Studies in “Non-Traditional” Decision Support Planning**

The following CJTF-HOA FHA case study and summary of decision point tactics (DPTs) will show that staffs can develop decision points during mission analysis or COA development. Developing decision points earlier will ensure IC plans answer the commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) and monitor the criteria related to the commander’s decision points.

In the fall of 2015, CJTF-HOA stood up an operational planning team (OPT) to develop an FHA contingency plan to address anticipated El Niño floods in Eastern Africa. The OPT used the joint operation planning process as a foundation, but significantly adjusted the traditional planning sequence when developing its IC plan, friendly COAs, and decision support tools. The OPT developed decision points in between mission analysis and COA development, when mission analysis revealed substantial and insurmountable unknowns that made it unfeasible to create a suitable, continuous COA that progressed to the desired end state.

Given the uncertain and ambiguous situation, the staff addressed the problem by using an approach similar to the Army’s design methodology. It framed its current situation and desired end state during mission analysis while simultaneously identifying key challenges. By deliberately identifying challenges during mission analysis, the staff framed the problem sufficiently to develop assumptions and related CCIRs and requests for information, which would turn its assumptions into facts. The staff identified the primary challenge to be that no one knew what, where, or when CJTF-HOA would be asked to provide humanitarian assistance. By acknowledging and studying these unknowns, the staff focused its planning to generate COAs based on informed assumptions.

To help understand “what,” the staff—with the support of the 415th Civil Affairs Battalion—began analyzing the problem by studying previous FHA cases. It studied the U.S. government (USG) and international response to the 1997 and 2006 Somalia floods, the 2010 Pakistan floods, and the 2014 Western Africa Ebola outbreaks. The staff identified two potential “whats” from these case studies. The first was the need to coordinate the international response through a civil military operations cell (CMOC). The second was the requirement to provide the military’s unique aerial mobility, both fixed and rotary, to deliver humanitarian aid.

With these two assumptions, the staff began to study “where” it would conduct these operations. The intelligence section and meteorological and oceanographic cell’s mission analysis defined an area of operations based on those areas that faced the highest threat of flooding. Simultaneously, the sustainment and air operations cells studied the airfields and lines of communication that could be used to reach these threatened areas. This helped develop a concept for where the CMOC might set up and potential lines of communication that could be used to deliver logistics support.
Recognizing the difficulty in predicting the weather, the primary threat in this situation, the hardest assumption to validate was “when” this operation would take place. Oceanographers were predicting significant El Niño rainfall based on higher than average ocean temperatures, but this indicates seasonal trends, not daily or weekly weather patterns. So, immediately upon planning initiation, the staff developed CCIRs to monitor rainfall and river levels to anticipate disastrous flooding. These CCIRs helped anticipate the physical environment, but the staff had to predict the conditions under which the USG would get involved as well.

To further define “when,” the 415th Civil Affairs Battalion and OPT planners studied the 2010 Pakistan floods to understand a typical USG response and develop friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) to anticipate potential USG action. These FFIRs were based on the conditions that would cause the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to issue a flash appeal for assistance, a U.S. Embassy Chief of Mission to declare an emergency, and the Joint Staff and United States Africa Command to order an FHA mission. Once the staff identified these FFIRs, it began communicating with OCHA and the embassies to understand the interagency decision points.

Now that the staff had determined what CJTF-HOA’s responses might be (implied tasks), where it might operate, and when (decision points), the staff assembled and sequenced these pieces into a composite COA it called a “decision point COA.” This name reflected the fact that the COA proposed a series of branches that could be executed singularly or in combination, based on how the situation unfolded and the associated decision points (see Figure 4-2 on page 25). Linking decision points and branch plans is not unique, but the planning sequence was unique. The staff developed decision points in between mission analysis and COA development, when the branch plans were still implied tasks.
Figure 4-2. CJTF-HOA’s decision support template from an El Niño foreign humanitarian assistance contingency plan
If the CJTF-HOA staff had not adjusted the doctrinal planning process, it would have likely spent more time on mission analysis trying to gain greater fidelity on the mission variables, rather than progressing to COA development. There were simply too many unknowns for the staff to plan a traditional COA from start to finish. Instead, based on informed assumptions, the staff developed potential responses, or branch plans, tied to sequential decision points, which collectively formed its COA. Whereas a typical staff creates decision points and branch plans during COA analysis, the CJTF-HOA staff developed decision points in between mission analysis and COA development.

**Adjusting Decision Support Planning within MDMP**

As the CJTF-HOA FHA case study proved, decision points can be proposed prior to COA analysis. The El Niño OPT proposed decision points in between mission analysis and COA development. Based on these observations, the outputs of the MDMP steps could be adjusted so that potential decision points are recommended during mission analysis and initial decision support tools are created during COA development (see Figure 4-3 on page 27)."
Figure 4-3. The recommended changes to the doctrinal planning process are highlighted in red. Instead of waiting until COA analysis to begin decision support planning, potential decision points should be proposed during mission analysis, and initial decision support tools should be developed during COA development.

There are two benefits to these recommendations. The most obvious benefit is that by developing decision points earlier in the planning process, the staff will now develop an IC plan that considers the commander’s decision points. This is a critical flaw in the current MDMP planning sequence and the recommendation to conduct decision point planning earlier has the potential to overcome this. Even though staffs will continue to refine decision points through COA analysis, proposing decision points during IC planning will increase the linkage between the IC and decision support plans. The second benefit is that by developing decision points earlier, units are more likely to conduct decision support planning, thereby enabling adaptive plans that account for changes in the environment.
The benefits of planning decision points earlier are significant, but leaders must be mindful of two challenges this will create as well. The first is the challenge of identifying potential decision points during mission analysis. Admittedly, it is easier to develop decision points after mission analysis, when the staff understands the mission variables better. However, initial decision points can be anticipated from collaborative terrain analysis and development of enemy COAs, both of which happen during mission analysis. In fact, leaders often anticipate decisions already when they start thinking about potential COAs during mission analysis. This is an example of the tension between adhering to a systematic doctrinal process versus following an intuitive thought process.

The second and more difficult challenge is the requirement for staffs to develop several branch plans and link them together using decision points and decision support tools. Some staffs struggle to develop even a single synchronized COA. Leaders should overcome this challenge by conducting rigorous staff training and strictly enforcing planning timelines. Spending more time on decision support planning might add some risk by not focusing on a single synchronized COA, but it will mitigate tactical risk by developing a more flexible plan. A composite COA with multiple branch plans enables the greatest chance of success by seeking exploitable weaknesses regardless of the enemy’s COA.

Regardless of the sequence used to plan, leaders should remember that the MDMP is iterative and that assumptions and tools, including IC plans and decision support tools, must be reassessed periodically. As the understanding of the situation changes, these plans and products must be adjusted to ensure units collect the information most pertinent to decision making. Additionally, leaders should remember that the appropriate planning sequence depends on the situation. In instances like the CJTF-HOA contingency plan and DPT, leaders will benefit from changing the order that they conduct decision support planning.

Conclusion

Current planning doctrine gives a perceived low priority to decision support planning by waiting to introduce it until COA analysis. Leaders should place a higher priority on decision support planning by starting it earlier during mission analysis and COA development. Developing decision points earlier in the planning process will help units link IC and decision support plans, which assist the commander’s decision making.

Finally, leaders are well versed in the science of planning, but often under practiced. There is an abundance of instructors, observer coach/trainers, field manuals, and other resources that emphasize the science of planning. However, commanders and staffs must increase the frequency of MDMP training to enable the art of adjusting MDMP to particular situations and constraints. Additional repetitions on MDMP will enable adaptive planning to maximize success during mission execution. Ultimately, military operations consist of a series of decisions, so the unit that anticipates transitions and the associated decision points will likely be the most successful. If leaders delay or neglect developing decision points, how will this affect the outcomes of our plans and operations?

Endnotes

1. Decision support templates and matrices are designed to aid in decision making, so we will collectively refer to them as decision support tools.

3. Ibid.


Chapter 5

The East Africa Multilateral Planning Group

LTC Raymond A. Kimball, U.S. Army

This chapter focuses on the East Africa Multilateral Planning Group (EAMPG), Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s (CJTF-HOA’s) premier mechanism for multilateral coordination in its area of responsibility (AOR). The EAMPG has the potential of being the starting point for a strong coalition to synchronize East African security cooperation efforts (see Figure 5-1 for the countries and multilateral efforts currently covered by the EAMPG). Similar mechanisms may have utility for other joint task forces charged with security force assistance. This chapter reviews the fundamentals of how the EAMPG functions, discusses CJTF-HOA’s work within the EAMPG, and reviews potential concerns for EAMPG work.

Figure 5-1. Country and multilateral efforts covered by EAMPG
East Africa Multilateral Planning Group Fundamentals

CJTF-HOA has been engaged with the EAMPG from the start. Staffing its EAMPG team with allied officers from the beginning has paid great dividends. Although the EAMPG was nominally formed in the fall of 2013, it did not truly function until its terms of reference were signed in April 2015. CJTF-HOA deliberately staffed its EAMPG team with staff officers from coalition partners as well as U.S. personnel. The leader of the CJTF-HOA EAMPG team was the senior U.K. officer on the CJTF-HOA staff who provided both a multinational perspective and sufficient standing for staff actions.

CJTF-HOA planned to sustain the multinational staffing of the EAMPG team within CJTF-HOA. When the terms of reference for the EAMPG were codified in April 2015, they included three working groups (see Figure 5-2 on page 33 for a representation of working group timelines). Working Group 1 focused on producing a common operational picture (COP) for all security efforts in East Africa. This working group was tasked to United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), which, in turn, delegated it to CJTF-HOA. Working Group 2 was tasked with synchronization of allied and partner efforts. This group was tasked to the U.K.’s permanent joint headquarters (PJHQ). Working Group 3 was assigned to logistics synchronization with USAFRICOM. Participants felt that tasking CJTF-HOA with Working Group 1 helped quickly produce a usable product that could build momentum for other EAMPG efforts. Both CJTF-HOA team members and external observers voiced concerns about uncertainties surrounding the restructuring of responsibilities for Working Groups 2 and 3. Participants were concerned the restructuring was happening without sufficient participation from the entire EAMPG, which could greatly diminish ownership of these efforts. CJTF-HOA sought to sustain the practice of an operational-level headquarters such as having CJTF-HOA and the British Peace Support Team serve as executive agents for EAMPG working groups. CJTF-HOA is working to ensure that any efforts to revise the terms of reference for the working groups have the maximum level of transparency possible to preserve partner ownership.
Within CJTF-HOA, the mission of the EAMPG was clearly understood, although there was some confusion about a focus on Somalia. CJTF-HOA personnel interviewed for this collection clearly understood that the EAMPG’s focus was twofold: gaining a better understanding of allied and partner security cooperation efforts in East Africa, and eventually synchronizing efforts to eliminate redundancies and fill gaps. One participant felt the effort primarily focused on Somalia and the efforts to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). Others stated that capacity-building activities in East Africa, regardless of focus, were considered under the EAMPG umbrella. This confusion can be due to CJTF-HOA’s current emphasis on capacity building and countering violent extremism in Somalia. CJTF-HOA EAMPG leaders are now emphasizing that EAMPG activities encompass all security force assistance efforts in East Africa, not just those focused on AMISOM TCCs.

**Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa East Africa Multilateral Planning Group Initiatives**

CJTF-HOA’s immediate contributions to the EAMPG involved the All Partners Access Network (APAN), which provided an ideal online space for EAMPG activities, and allowed for coordination among widely distributed entities (see Figure 5-3 on page 34). CJTF-HOA’s previous use of APAN for coordination with non-Department of Defense (DOD) entities made it a natural choice, considering fusion action cell personnel could leverage their expertise in the platform to quickly create a space accessible by all EAMPG members. The most useful assets of APAN for EAMPG use included the ability to use unclassified video teleconferences for routine communication during quarterly face-to-face meetings, easy access for individuals using non-U.S. email accounts, and flexible system architecture that easily accommodated plug-ins similar
to Google Earth and Google Forms (both discussed below). Positive feedback from partners led CJTF-HOA to sustain the open nature and flexible data architecture of the APAN system.

The next major contribution by CJTF-HOA to the EAMPG was the creation of an APAN-based COP for security cooperation (see Figure 5-4 on page 35 for a snapshot of the COP). The EAMPG COP was a useful initial success, although some CJTF-HOA participants voiced concerns about the level of data accuracy. CJTF-HOA answered the EAMPG mandate for a COP by building a Google Map construct within the EAMPG APAN spaces using layers to provide different levels of granularity on partner activities. Any member of the EAMPG space can add or remove layers, although only the space administrators can edit the content of the layers. Both outside observers and CJTF-HOA team members felt the COP represented a “quick win” that helped sustain momentum of the EAMPG effort. Administrators voiced concern because Google Maps links information to a single point. Therefore, the COP may be giving an undue impression of specificity for what were, in fact, generalized locations (e.g., putting a specific effort in Nairobi when the report only specified Kenya). EAMPG team members are now working to identify the next “quick wins” that can help sustain partner interest and momentum. The APAN administrators are looking at Google Maps coding options that display color schemes for generalized versus specific locations.
To lessen persistent data synchronization errors, EAMPG APAN administrators implemented a Google Forms entry area for security cooperation activities. When CJTF-HOA began efforts to build the COP, data entry was initially done by submission of spreadsheets in standardized formats from EAMPG participants. This practice quickly ran into challenges with version control and inconsistent formatting of data entries. The APAN administrators moved instead to data entry using Google Forms’ pre-formatted, drop-down boxes (see Figures 5-5 and 5-6 on page 36 for the form design.) This implementation allowed reduction of version control problems and data inaccuracies that had to be corrected by hand. Administrators noted some members of the EAMPG were still submitting spreadsheets, despite being asked to use the Google Forms data entry. CJTF-HOA pressed the EAMPG leaders to adopt Google Forms entry on APAN as the standard for all EAMPG submissions involving assessment data or information on capacity building efforts.
Figure 5-5. EAMPG APAN data entry form

Figure 5-6. EAMPG APAN data entry form (continued)
In addition to the visualization mechanism, the EAMPG COP included a political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) assessment (see Figure 5-7 for a sample EAMPG assessment and six-month forecast). The assessment mechanism of the EAMPG COP was functional, but did not have a mechanism to account for differences of opinion among members. This assessment system was designed from the existing Horn of Africa (HOA) PMESII assessment, but was modified at the request of partners from a three-point to five-point scale. Assessment data was contributed every three months by all members of the EAMPG, and the assessments reflected average ratings. CJTF-HOA team members reported relatively little dissent among the rankings, with the ratings varying, at most, by plus or minus one. However, because the system was an average, significant differences of opinion among partners might not have been captured. CJTF-HOA is considering adding a mechanism to reflect any “outlying” assessments and the reasoning behind them.

Overall, outside observers characterized CJTF-HOA’s role in the EAMPG as dynamic and helpful. These observers specifically mentioned the command’s emphasis on the EAMPG in external engagements, as well as CJTF-HOA’s leaders of Working Group 1 as being key elements of EAMPG’s success to date. CJTF-HOA leaders continue to emphasize both the EAMPG’s value and potential in key leader engagements.
Future Concerns

Outside organizations feel they are unable to match the amount of manpower CJTF-HOA puts into the EAMPG. Other organizations participating in the EAMPG noted they appreciated CJTF-HOA's efforts, but voiced concern they were unable to match with commitment. The organizations were primarily concerned that their inability to match CJTF-HOA's contributions would lead them to being marginalized in the EAMPG effort. CJTF-HOA personnel did acknowledge this concern, but organizations prioritized what was most important to them. An organization’s unwillingness to put minimal resources against the EAMPG was reflective of the organization’s lack of commitment to the effort. CJTF-HOA team members also pointed out that most of the products implemented for EAMPG work, such as the APAN space and the PMESII assessment framework, were standing CJTF-HOA products and not purpose-built for APAN use. CJTF-HOA and USAFRICOM continue to look for meaningful contributions to the EAMPG process that can be realistically performed by allied and partner nations. Participants are urged to use pre-existing mechanisms or tools that require minimal change for EAMPG use.

Several staff members identified potential new member or observer countries for the EAMPG. They noted having the U.S.-U.K. relationship as the foundation for the EAMPG was a helpful start, but membership must continue to expand to avoid a perception of being a “Big Brother” effort. The current membership of the EAMPG is France, Italy, Turkey, U.K., and U.S. Observers include Germany, Canada, and the European Union. Participants noted Denmark and the Netherlands would be logical candidates for observer status because of their participation in the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. Other participants stated the EAMPG will eventually have to encompass the AMISOM TCCs, although they acknowledged that the assessment piece could then become problematic. As more EAMPG functions become regularized, CJTF-HOA is advocating for additional members who participate in capacity-building efforts like ACOTA.

CJTF-HOA team members and external observers questioned whether all EAMPG partners were truly committed to the effort. Several interview participants noted some partners repeatedly sent different representatives to EAMPG sessions, often without knowledge of what happened in the previous sessions. One country was identified as consistently sending its Defense attaché to the country hosting the meeting, rather than sending a permanent action officer. Some participants saw this type of action as doing the bare minimum of participation instead of actively contributing. CJTF-HOA ultimately made some success in regularizing participation.

In parallel with attempts to synchronize the efforts of the international community in East Africa, CJTF-HOA worked to coordinate and deconflict DOD activities in its AOR. Chapter 6, United States Africa Command Line of Effort 1 Synchronization, discusses the USAFRICOM Line of Effort 1 process put in place to support this effort.
Chapter 6

United States Africa Command Line of Effort 1 Synchronization

LTC Raymond A. Kimball, U.S. Army; and
Capt. Myles N. Morrow, U.S. Marine Corps

As United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) finalized and published its theater campaign plan (TCP), it appointed Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) as the lead agency for coordinating Line of Effort 1 (LOE 1) focusing on countering violent extremism in Somalia. CJTF-HOA created and implemented a process to synchronize LOE 1 activities among the four Service component commands, multiple country teams, and the USAFRICOM staff. This marked a significant shift in activities and focus for CJTF-HOA, although the effort largely drew on pre-existing authorities. This chapter discusses the creation and sustainment of this process, the largest single step in CJTF-HOA's evolution to a campaigning headquarters.

Creating the Process

Participants understood the purpose of USAFRICOM’s LOE 1 process was to synchronize U.S. efforts in East Africa to achieve the end states of the TCP, although each viewed the process through a lens shaped by their own office. For example, one participant saw the process as a means to maximize the three Ds (defense, diplomacy, development) in a whole-of-government approach in East Africa to achieve the TCP end states. Many participants cited the TCP as a driving force behind the process, commenting on the need to operationalize the TCP and translate the USAFRICOM commander’s intent into practice. Beyond the TCP itself, internal and external participants saw the LOE 1 process as a long overdue effort to gain visibility of all Department of Defense (DOD) activities in East Africa to avoid duplicative and redundant efforts. Participants appreciated that the equities of the various Service components were incorporated with CJTF-HOA’s equities (see Figure 6-1 on page 40 for the LOE 1 joint priorities as of March 2016).
Given that CJTF-HOA started to implement its supporting plan when the TCP was published, USAFRICOM elected to take advantage of CJTF-HOA’s unique authorities and positioning, and tasked CJTF-HOA with leading the LOE 1 process. Participants were largely satisfied with this decision, because it allowed faster implementation of the process and a greater emphasis on the commander’s main effort. For its part, CJTF-HOA felt its greater manpower for application to the problem made it a logical choice to spearhead the new LOE process and lead the combatant command’s shift to a long-term focus. CJTF-HOA chose to have both the working group and decision board chaired by flag officers (the deputy commander and the commanding general, respectively) to decide and act on behalf of the USAFRICOM commanding general. CJTF-HOA modeled the process after its targeting cycle, adding in requirements for a USAFRICOM task order and TCP assessment of LOE 1 (see Figure 6-2 on page 41). Participants agreed that close coordination between Horn of Africa (HOA) and USAFRICOM was essential to making the process work. Additionally, CJTF-HOA’s strategic use of flag officers as board leaders enabled the LOE 1 process and fostered compliance across the components.
CJTF-HOA leaders felt the importance of building enduring mechanisms to the people leading the process was more important than building something intuitive. Given the high turnover at CJTF-HOA, it was important to bring in many sets of eyes to build a process that fit within the schema of leaders at multiple levels. One leader stressed the system had to “outlive me…it has to be our way, not my way.” CJTF-HOA staff aggressively pursued mechanisms to expand the LOE 1 process beyond the targeting cell (J-37) with primary proponency. CJTF-HOA sought to bring in the plans staff section (J-5), future operations cell (J-35), and current operations cell (J-33) as a means of maintaining focus on activities throughout their life cycle, from inception through execution to assessment. Outside participants agreed with this focus, and stressed activities also should be closely linked to the country cooperation plans and TCP information management officers. Specifically, one participant noted the “1-to-N” prioritization of security cooperation activities should be linked to a specific milestone (see Figure 6-3 on page 42). One accepted exception to this imperative was the recognition that some programs were implemented strictly to build or maintain bilateral relationships and did not necessarily have a direct link to the TCP. Participants at all levels saw these “relationship-building” programs as unavoidable and represented less than 10 percent of the whole. Significant planning and coordination were used to design and implement the new LOE 1 targeting process, while participants understood it remained a fluid process subject to improvements.

Figure 6-2. HOA effects and LOE 1 processes
Giving CJTF-HOA primary responsibility for LOE 1 was a great means to bring a regional perspective to a process normally dominated by country perspectives. Participants pointed out that all security force assistance and security cooperation efforts were submitted on a country basis, and were normally rank-ordered only to blend country priorities with little regard for their regional effects. One participant noted during the Strategy-to-Activities Working Group (STARWG) (see Figure 6-4 on page 43 for a discussion of the STARWG’s role in USAFRICOM programatics), LOE 1 participants looked at the country cooperation plans individually, looked at activities, and then matched them with resources. While doing so, the constant test of applicability to regional objectives was considered throughout, which helped make these programs more competitive when placed against country programs elsewhere on the continent. Participants noted regional efforts often allowed cooperation that could not be done bilaterally due to country restrictions. For example, one country had a ban on in-country training imposed by the ambassador, but training could still be done in Somalia because of the country’s participation in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Participants found this approach was not meant to bypass the ambassador’s prerogatives, but ensured regional objectives could still be attained despite bilateral setbacks. CJTF-HOA and participating components should continue operating the LOE 1 process in a way that sustains a regional, rather than bilateral focus, and look for opportunities to use regional authorities and overcome bilateral obstacles.
In order to rapidly implement the LOE 1 process, USAFRICOM elected to use existing authorities under Operation Octave Shield. This, in turn, allowed USAFRICOM to designate HOA as the lead agency for LOE 1 under HOA’s Octave Shield authorities. Through this mechanism, CJTF-HOA directed operations in its purview and drafted orders for USAFRICOM implementation. CJTF-HOA personnel voiced concern that although the LOE 1 activities began in October 2015, as directed by the combatant commander, the LOE 1 operation order (OPORD) was not formally signed and published by USAFRICOM until March 2016. This led to confusion among components about the extent of CJTF-HOA’s authorities in the process and whether the Octave Shield authorities had been supplemented with other personnel. To date, USAFRICOM is seeking to formalize lessons learned in the LOE 1 process through a revision of the LOE 1 OPORD.

Participants agreed the CJTF-HOA commander’s emphasis on making the LOE 1 process sensible and executable helped it become ingrained in the battle rhythm of external participants. Participants noted the significant time the commander spent on engaging individual leaders, discussing the process in USAFRICOM forums such as the commander’s update brief and conference, and working with decision-board participants to communicate his vision. Participants felt such emphasis built the necessary “muscle memory” in organizations to give the LOE 1 process a chance to succeed. Nevertheless, organizations voiced concern that the process was fragile and might not survive without having emphasis from the new commander. Participant perspectives on how long it would take the process to truly take root varied; some felt three to four months under a new commander would be sufficient because individuals would see the
process as enduring rather than idiosyncratic of a particular commander. Others felt it might take as long as two to three years, given the staying power of organizational inertia. It was clear that continuity among commanders will remain a point of contention in the foundation and longevity of the LOE 1 process.

Participants cited multiple factors in expressing optimism over the success of the LOE 1 process. They noted for the first time that USAFRICOM and CJTF-HOA have visibility and increased synchronization of all DOD activities in East Africa. The ability to look at programs holistically and see an operational effect was also cited as useful. Other participants observed the LOE 1 process was significantly more effective at the STARWG than the other LOEs, crediting the better organization and process of LOE 1. Other participants noticed greater communication between CJTF-HOA and the Service components, as well as among the Service components themselves. They also cited a better understanding of the TCP and its objectives through the use of the LOE 1 process. Some participants voiced concern that 100-percent success was unclear or unlikely, noting the relatively slow nature of the programmatics process and the dynamic relationships with East African countries. As the LOE 1 process continues to gain in participation and familiarity, the campaign and desired end states must be periodically reassessed to ensure they match USAFRICOM’s objectives and the realities on the ground.

Sustaining and Improving the Process

CJTF-HOA personnel stressed the LOE 1 process as still in a nascent stage, with more time needed before major decisions could be made to change the process. One individual believed the process was still sorting through and gaining visibility on years of past activities, while simultaneously seeking to understand programs for the current and future fiscal years. This participant emphasized that, unlike kinetic targeting that generates immediate effect, security force assistance effects take time to manifest. Another leader noted a useful benchmark will be the regional synchronization working group (RSWG) at the end of 2016. Ideally, the ongoing LOE 1 process should have already identified the majority of programs needed to be discussed and ready to shape at the RSWG. If not, changes may need to be made in the process itself. Participants did agree on the importance of avoiding significant changes in the LOE 1 process until it has an opportunity to generate effects.

Internal and external assessments of CJTF-HOA's effective coordination with other organizations varied widely, with many observers offering suggestions on ways to improve. One specific point of agreement between internal and external observers of the LOE 1 process was the importance of CJTF-HOA providing value to participants. An internal participant stressed the importance of showing CJTF-HOA's value to others participating in the process, such as showing participants how they fit into the strategic vision of the process. Doing so can lead to better products that support activities in theater. One external observer agreed he would more likely invest time to build a relationship with a HOA staff member, even if on a relatively short assignment, as long as this staff member saw value in the engagements. Some participants voiced concern that CJTF-HOA quickly overwhelmed other staff members working on LOE 1 because of the long hours of deployed personnel. These participants stressed the importance of understanding work cycles of partner organizations, such as Service components and embassies, to allow enough time for effective staffing of products. CJTF-HOA must constantly look for ways to demonstrate the value of the LOE 1 process and be aware of the competing demands of partner organizations.
Although participants agreed CJTF-HOA had effectively started the LOE 1 process, views differed on whether CJTF-HOA should remain in charge. CJTF-HOA staff members stated they felt comfortable running the LOE 1 process and it should remain in their hands. Several external observers disagreed, citing aspects of HOA that were mismatched with the LOE 1 process. A common concern was that joint task forces are doctrinally supposed to be operational headquarters, while the LOE 1 process required a strategic perspective to function effectively. Another concern was the predominantly Naval Reserve makeup of CJTF-HOA as being ill-suited overseeing what was essentially a ground campaign (as of March 2016, Naval Reservists comprised the largest portion of the CJTF-HOA headquarters at 29 percent of total manning). These observers suggested LOE 1 should run from USAFRICOM, similar to the other LOEs. As the LOE process and operational environment matures, it will be important to evaluate whether CJTF-HOA should remain the appropriate lead agency for LOE 1.

External participants voiced concern that LOE 1 processes and products differ from those of other LOEs. CJTF-HOA participants emphasized these deviations were due to the unique authorities of CJTF-HOA compared to the rest of the continent. LOE 1 operated differently from the other LOEs, including the meetings and outbriefs (see Figure 6-5 for an example agenda from an LOE 1 decision board). Although external participants acknowledged that having an operational headquarters manage an LOE can inevitably introduce differences, they noted having to reconcile different products at the USAFRICOM level could produce friction. Many of the components had relatively small staffs compared to CJTF-HOA, so managing multiple formats was an additional burden. CJTF-HOA LOE leadership acknowledged this challenge, but stressed the unique authorities of CJTF-HOA should mandate specific differences in products, such as a flag officer reconciliation before products go to the USAFRICOM staff. CJTF-HOA stressed sharing its products with USAFRICOM staff, who have chosen not to use the formats. CJTF-HOA continues to look for opportunities to synchronize LOE 1 products with those of other LOEs as it matures and standardizes its processes across USAFRICOM components.

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<tr>
<td>• MG Stammer Opening Comments (5 mins)</td>
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<td>• Joint Targeting Priorities (2 mins)</td>
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<td>• Last 30/Next 30 (5 mins)</td>
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<td>• FY17 Proposal Prioritization Approval (10 mins)</td>
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<td>• Linda Rhino – AAF (5 mins)</td>
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<td>• Cutlass Express AAR – NAVAF (5 mins)</td>
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<td>• Questions/Discussion (15 mins)</td>
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<td>• Closing Comments (5 mins)</td>
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Figure 6-5. Typical agenda for the LOE 1 decision board
The USAFRICOM headquarters, Service component headquarters, and CJTF-HOA were spread across two continents, three countries, and five cities. As a result, much of the coordination for the LOE 1 process was done by phone, email, and secure video teleconference. Participants at all levels agreed the lack of face-to-face engagement made it more difficult to build understanding and acceptance of the process. Several participants said the East African Security Synchronization Conference (EASSC), hosted by CJTF-HOA, was a major step forward because it brought many of the key players in the LOE 1 process together for the first time. The participants believed the LOE 1 decision board for that month at the EASSC allowed useful and candid exchange of ideas. The ideas suggested by participants included:

- Periodically holding the LOE 1 working group or decision board at one of the Service component locations, such as U.S. Army Africa headquarters in Vicenza, Italy
- Maximizing the use of CJTF-HOA LNOs at embassies to help educate Offices of Security Cooperation and Defense attachés about the LOE 1 process and how to facilitate it
- Getting more CJTF-HOA personnel into the actual countries to better understand the conditions on the ground and the personalities at the embassies

As resources and manning permit, the LOE 1 process will seek to implement the above suggestions to improve face-to-face engagement.

Participants agreed timely and accurate assessments were fundamental to the LOE 1 process. Specifically, the assessment process identified areas requiring additional or different resources to meet the commander’s priorities and TCP objectives (Figure 6-6 on page 47 contains one such exercise assessment). Participants observed the long lead times for programs (at least one year and sometimes two to three years), which often meant the operating environment changed in the interim, making it difficult to assess which changes were due to specific programs. Others saw difficulty obtaining accurate assessments given the meager authorities for boots on the ground in East Africa. One participant voiced concern over CJTF-HOA using its own sources for assessments, described as “grading your own homework.” Another participant suggested that the assessment process needed someone at USAFRICOM to incorporate and normalize the various component and headquarters assessments, while taking into account country differences and various perspectives. CJTF-HOA assessors explained the reason for the lack of component inputs was due to lack of synchronization in East Africa. CJTF-HOA could not assess the activities components failed to identify in the systems of record. Assessment sharing highlighted holes in the process and stressed the importance of coordination. Although synchronization will continue to be an on-going challenge, the coordination of efforts and information exchange will increase the validity of the LOE 1 assessments.
Figure 6-6. Sample exercise assessment

The success of the LOE 1 process shows that with the proper command emphasis and procedures, CJTF-HOA is capable of overseeing components of a campaign plan. The LOE 1 process will continue to evolve over the coming months and address issues about synchronization with the other LOE efforts. Chapter 7, Conclusion, summarizes persistent themes and challenges of the CJTF-HOA processes.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

LTC Raymond A. Kimball, U.S. Army

This special study examined the slow and steady evolution of CJTF-HOA from crisis action to a campaigning lens. This change was the result of command pressure and necessity driven by an evolving operational environment. As such, the change in focus was not so much “right” or “wrong,” but simply a reflection of the combatant commander’s needs and desires. It is by no means a given this evolution will continue. As the historical summary in Chapter 1 showed, CJTF-HOA has frequently swung back and forth on a pendulum between short- and long-term focuses. This chapter looks at two factors that can either impede or facilitate a continued emphasis on long-term security cooperation.

Overseas Contingency Operations Funding

The greatest factor currently shaping CJTF-HOA’s manning, resourcing, and areas of emphasis is its reliance on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding outside of the base budget. The continued flow of OCO funding means CJTF-HOA has been largely unaffected by the severe resource constraints imposed on the Services by budget cuts and sequestration. This fact makes CJTF-HOA potentially more attractive as a resource provider and executive agent for tasks Service components may be too overwhelmed to take on. The provision of OCO funding also means the CJTF-HOA staff will be manned in the near future by individual augmentees, mostly drawn from the Reserve component for varying tour lengths. The negative impacts of this reality on predeployment training, engagement with partner nations, and staff section expertise were discussed in CALL Publication 15-14, CJTF-HOA Observation Report, and will not be discussed in this special study.

Shifting CJTF-HOA from OCO funding to the base budget would better support a long-term security cooperation focus, but would likely prompt significant short-term turbulence. Base budgeting would allow for standardization of tour lengths (ideally at one year) with the possibility of unit rotations to support specific staff needs. It would also provide a greater capability to match the command’s needs to existing expertise within the force across all components. However, the Services’ willingness and ability to absorb such a requirement remains as an open question. U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command, through Navy Forces Africa, currently provides base operations support and communications integration, as well as senior airfield authorities for Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. Doing so consumes a significant portion of the Navy’s military construction budget. In the short-term, a shift to the base budget would almost certainly entail severe resource constraints for the command until funding relationships normalized.

Country Expertise

The high turnover rates of personnel exacerbate an underlying problem: the lack of East African county expertise within the U.S. Armed Forces. The “economy-of-force” realities of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and the Service components means there is a relatively small bench of personnel to draw from having either prior service on the continent or expertise
in the subject. Foreign area officers (FAOs) are a scarce commodity worldwide, as are their counterparts in the other Services such as the U.S. Air Force’s International Affairs Specialist Program. The challenge is exacerbated in Africa by the requirement to man 54 Defense attaché and Office of Security Cooperation positions, many of them with unique concerns drawing on low-density skill sets. CJTF-HOA is in direct competition for scarce expertise with U.S. Embassies in Africa as well as the USAFRICOM and Service component headquarters. Civil affairs personnel can and do provide country expertise, but do not necessarily have the level of country-specific cultural and language expertise as FAOs. Any increase in CJTF-HOA’s country expertise will likely be resourced through a combination of FAO and civil affairs personnel.

Increasing the level of country expertise within CJTF-HOA is essential to any long-term focus, but is a long-term endeavor. CJTF-HOA, along with other Africa-focused commands, have to establish a demand for African expertise. This demand, in turn, has to be met with Service resourcing and schooling efforts, which may take years or even decades to put in place. While this laborious process runs, CJTF-HOA has to grow its own expertise through a combination of temporary duty schooling, knowledge management, and participation in local efforts.

CJTF-HOA has taken important steps to shift its focus from short-term crisis response to long-term security cooperation. This effort began with the drafting of a supporting plan to the theater cooperation plan that accounted for the nuances and complexity of the operational environment. The supporting plan was then implemented through a doctrinal targeting process that emphasized a broad array of staff inputs to appropriately synchronize security cooperation efforts. This process quickly expanded to encompass USAFRICOM and Service component efforts in support of the command’s main effort. At the same time, CJTF-HOA sought to harness existing international authorities and efforts to coordinate allied and partner efforts into a synergistic whole. Although CJTF-HOA retained some crisis response requirements, it was overwhelmingly focused on protection of U.S. persons and facilities and enabling partner humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts. CJTF-HOA’s emphasis on partnering, collaboration, and synchronization are a real and meaningful manifestation of USAFRICOM’s motto “Forward, Together.”
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From Crisis Action to Campaigning

Lessons and Best Practices