IRAQ

Provincial Reconstruction Team

Observations, Insights, and Lessons

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Foreword

The government of Iraq is successfully transitioning from combating an insurgency and rebuilding its infrastructure to a strong sovereign state that no longer requires U.S. government assistance. Key to this success is the provincial reconstruction team (PRT).

PRTs were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure and build the capacity necessary for the Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment. PRTs have become an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the lines of security, governance, and economics to the Iraqi people.

As the PRT effort draws to a close and transitions its efforts to provincial governments, it remains vital that new personnel are familiar with the concepts, structure, and management of PRTs and the lessons learned and best practices established by their predecessors.

This handbook focuses on Iraq PRTs. The information contained in this handbook comes from multiple sources inside and outside the U.S. government, with the understanding that the manner in which PRTs operate has changed and evolved over time.

The intent of this publication is to share knowledge, support discussion, and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) publication is not a doctrinal product. The information is written by U.S. government employees for those individuals who will serve in a stability and reconstruction environment.

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assistance in gathering information to share with PRT practitioners in training and in the field. Finally, thanks to members of CALL’s collection teams and theater observers for providing updated field input.

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## Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Team

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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IRAQ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM

Chapter 1

Introduction

A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is an interim civil–military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities. The PRT is intended to improve stability in a given area by helping build the government of Iraq’s capacity and reinforcing legitimacy, effectiveness, and confidence in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. The PRT assists provincial-level governments in meeting the expectations of their citizens. In the post-surge environment of Iraq, there is a synergistic, whole of government approach that encompasses the following objectives for Iraq:

• Sovereign, stable, and self-reliant.
• Committed to just, representative, and accountable governance.
• Neither safe haven for nor sponsor terrorism.
• Integrated into the global economy.
• A partner contributing to regional peace and security.

U.S. national policy focuses on transitioning from military to civilian lead. The relationship with Iraq is becoming one of partnership, enshrined in the Strategic Framework Agreement. The focus of the whole of government approach is to diminish the means and motivations for conflict while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance (e.g., provide basic services, foster economic development, and enforce the rule of law). Success depends ultimately on the host nation and on the interrelationship and interdependence of the ensuing dynamics:

• The legitimacy of the government and its effectiveness as perceived by the local population and the international community.
• The perceived legitimacy of the freedoms and constraints placed on the force supporting the government.
• The degree to which factions, the local population, and other actors accede to the authority of the government and those forces supporting the government.
The U.S. strategy for Iraq identifies the following policy priorities for PRTs:

- Mitigate the risk of a post-election vacuum, military drawdown, budget deficits, authoritarian control, and foreign interference:
  - Help strengthen the capacity of Iraqi governmental and civil society institutions to protect the rule of law, confront corruption, and deliver basic services.
  - Operate under the Provincial Powers Law.
  - Encourage checks and balances, including legislative oversight and an independent judiciary.
  - Encourage government responsiveness to an independent media and civil society.
  - Ensure provincial officials are accountable to the rule of law.
- Serve as an “honest broker” to help contain and mediate ethnic and religious tensions.
- Support elections and referenda.
- Provide a platform for the United Nations and other organizations seeking access to provinces to provide assistance.
- Support efforts on behalf of displaced persons.
- Continue the counterinsurgency effort where necessary through political accommodation and enfranchisement.
- Encourage investment and economic diversification by supporting regulatory frameworks and investment promotion.
- Report the ground truth and provide accurate assessments.

A PRT stabilizes an area through its integrated civilian–military focus. It combines the diplomatic, military, and developmental components of the various agencies involved in the stabilization and reconstruction effort. The PRT is designed to help improve stability by building up the capacity of local governments to govern; enhance economic viability; and deliver public services such as security, law and order, justice, health care, and education. Once the stability objectives have been fulfilled, PRTs can begin to dismantle, and the traditional diplomatic and developmental programs will operate in more conventional roles.
This handbook provides a knowledge base to individuals operating in, adjacent to, or in support of a PRT, enabling these individuals to work effectively as a team to achieve the purpose of the PRT. It also provides PRT members with shared operational guidelines and insights into PRT best practices.
Chapter 2

Concept

The provincial reconstruction team (PRT) concept envisions an integrated civil–military organization expanding the reach of the U.S. government and the wider international community assistance efforts from the environs of the capitol to the provincial level and to the local community. A PRT is generally responsible for covering one province but may have responsibility for two or more provinces or a large segment of a single province.

The PRT seeks to improve the governing capacity of the host nation. PRTs perform a vital role in occupying the vacuum caused by a weak government presence and hence deter agents of instability. The PRT focuses on three elements of stabilization and reconstruction:

- Assists the establishment and improvement of local government—including its connection to the central government and local populace—by advising and empowering stakeholders, legitimate governing bodies, and tribal leadership.

- Increases provincial stability by working closely with the international military presence, and assists in developing nascent host-nation security and rule of law capacity.

- Facilitates reconstruction that begins to:
  - Provide basic services.
  - Provide an economic system that supports the people.
  - Gain popular buy-in for change and support of the representative government.
  - Ensure popular expectations for international assistance are met or abated.

The PRT’s role is to ensure international efforts are in line with the host nation’s development intentions and, in doing so, assess and, if possible, mitigate the constraints to development. As the security environment improves, the PRT is intended to phase out as stabilization and reconstruction programs shift to longer-term development programs. The PRT ceases to exist when normal development operations can be carried out without its assistance. This evolution in execution of the PRT mission requires a change in focus and an increased number of civilians with core
competencies to address the development aspects of stabilization and reconstruction.

**Purpose**

Operations are dynamic and may not progress in a linear manner. Different parts of a country may require different combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability operations to transition from violent conflict toward stability and ultimately to peace. Full-spectrum operations involve simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability operations.

The components of full-spectrum operations are not considered phases. Commanders consider the concurrent conduct of the components of full-spectrum operations in every phase of an operation. As the operational focus shifts from predominantly offensive and defensive to predominantly stability tasks, operational gaps can exist that prevent the development of an indigenous capability and capacity that supports the country’s transition to peace and stability. Areas of the country can get “stuck” in instability, and the danger exists that they may “slip back” into open hostilities if security forces are removed. Ideally, stability operations in these areas lay the groundwork for long-term transformational development efforts designed to ensure the area does not slip back into instability or violent conflict (see Figure 2-1).

The inability of most actors, other than the military, to operate in unstable areas can contribute to operational gaps that lead to an area getting stuck in instability. In order for the military to transfer responsibility for an area (i.e., exercise its exit strategy), it must deliver some level of stability. Moving these areas further along is more appropriately conducted by civilians. While such expertise does reside in diplomatic and development agencies, many of these agencies are unable to operate in these areas using their traditional delivery mechanisms because of the instability. Exceptions would be some nongovernment organizations (NGOs) that traditionally operate in unstable security environments.

PRTs were devised as a mechanism that could solve this problem. Because of the combined capabilities of the diplomacy, military, and development components, PRTs are able to stabilize these areas. When the capabilities brought by the military component of the PRT are no longer needed, the military component can withdraw, and the diplomatic and development components can revert to more traditional means to pursue their aims. This process is gradual. PRTs in more unstable areas may require the capabilities of the military component for longer periods of time. In stable areas, where security is sustainable by the local government and civilian agencies are capable of accomplishing their tasks without military assistance, PRTs can and should begin to draw down their military component.
The PRT is an interim structure designed to help improve stability by building up the capacity of the local government to govern; enhance economic viability; and deliver public services such as security, law and order, justice, health care, and education. Once the PRT stability objectives have been fulfilled, its mission is complete, and the PRT structure can be dismantled.

PRTs are extremely expensive in terms of personnel, maintenance, and activity costs. Therefore, it is incumbent on the embassy country team, military chain of command, troop-contributing nations, participating agencies, and PRT leadership teams to keep PRTs focused on their ultimate goal and avoid all activities that do not directly contribute to accomplishing their mission.
Intent

Once the PRT is established, the leadership must gain access to local power centers and assess the environment to determine the issues the PRT should address, as well as the challenges and obstacles impacting on these issues. A PRT develops plans to achieve desired effects within the environment. The civil–military team, using the core competencies provided by Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, and other agencies, should complete both assessment and strategy developments. The PRT develops an implementation plan guided by the provincial stability strategy, based on a realistic time frame, for the anticipated tenure of the PRT and the dynamics of the area of responsibility (AOR).

Successive PRT leaders continue to adjust the implementation plan based on the changing nature of the AOR. The PRT’s plan should take into account other development strategies at work in the AOR. Those strategies might include work by other U.S. government-affiliated groups, international organizations, and efforts of the host government. The plan should also attempt to leverage, rather than counter, reconstruction and development efforts in adjacent provinces or regions.

The optimal situation is to have a plan, owned and at least in part drafted by the PRT’s local interlocutors, that supports a local strategy for the province. The civil–military team reviews the assessment, strategy, and implementation plan at regular intervals. This process of active review ensures that the civil–military team achieves a common operating picture of the AOR and a common vision on how to affect the environment, which in turn provides for unity of effort within the PRT and with other PRTs. The PRT determines its resource needs based on the assessment and the subsequent plan it develops. PRT leaders should identify issues that are beyond their capacity to successfully affect and request assistance, as necessary, from the embassy country team, higher military headquarters, or both. PRT leaders should review how their plan will support or enhance national programs.

Principles

The primary activities of the PRT are to conceive, plan, coordinate, and execute reconstruction and initial development projects and programs. Though PRTs are not development institutions per se, PRTs should adhere to the following principles to the extent possible.
Focus on stability

The missions and objectives of the PRT are based on the environment in which the PRT is operating. However, stability must be a key aspect of any PRT mission statement. Though context and constraints of the environment remain dynamic, only by achieving a specific level of stability will the PRT be able to “exit” and more traditional actors take its place.

Fill the gaps

PRTs were created because of the lack of local capacity within government and traditional governing bodies. As local governance structures, traditional authorities, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the private sector, and other entities gain capabilities and effectiveness, the responsibilities of the PRT will shift and potentially shrink to mentoring, advising, and training. The PRT will do everything that is not being done by these other entities to advance stability, short of being the government. It is extremely important to link all PRT actions to governing bodies and local institutions as much as possible. Balance is the key; it may be preferable to have a local solution that is less optimal than a PRT solution.

Coordinate and integrate

The PRT should seek to create conditions that allow these other entities to continue to increase their capacity, effectiveness, and presence. To do this effectively and efficiently, the PRT should coordinate and integrate with the goals, plans, strategies, and activities of all stakeholders at all levels of government, civil society, private sector, traditional governance structures, IGOs, and NGOs. At times, this process may conflict with the desire to achieve quick results and successes. As host-nation governing bodies gain capacity and effectiveness, the PRT should cede responsibility for what has to be done.

Focus on effects, not outputs

As with any diplomatic, defense, or development institution, there is a danger that PRTs may fall prey to pressure to deliver immediate but inappropriate proxy indicators of progress, including number of projects completed or quantity of funds expended. Perhaps what is not so clear is that some indicators that are considered effects within the development community are really only outputs for a PRT. For example, the development community may consider an increase in literacy or a decrease in child mortality to be an effect.
Unity of effort

Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among government departments and agencies, with NGOs and IGOs, among nations in any alliance or coalition, and with the host nation. Unity of effort in an operation occurs vertically and horizontally for all involved chains of command. Its source is the nation’s will, and it flows to individuals at the point of activity. Without unity of effort, the probability of success for any endeavor is diminished and the chance resources are wasted.

Within the PRT there are often various agencies with differing mandates that are generally comfortable with their way of doing business. There is considerable potential for friction and competing agendas. If not directly addressed and managed by the PRT leadership and its higher management authority, the results may hinder the process, delay completion of objectives, or contribute to total failure of the mission.

The integration and alignment of civilian and military efforts are crucial to successful stability and reconstruction operations. PRTs must focus on supporting the host nation’s local governments and the populace across the stabilization and reconstruction sectors. This support requires balancing an emphasis on nonmilitary programs with the measured use of force.

Political, social, and economic programs are most commonly and appropriately associated with civilian organizations and expertise. However, effective implementation of these programs is more important than who performs the tasks. Civilian organizations bring expertise that complements that of military forces. At the same time, civilian capabilities cannot be employed effectively without the security that military forces provide.

Effective PRT leaders understand the interdependent relationship of all participants—military and civilian. PRT leaders must orchestrate their efforts to achieve unity of effort and coherent results. If adequate civilian capacity is not available, military forces may be required to fill the gap. Reconstruction programs for political, social, and economic well-being are essential to achieving stability and developing the local capacity that commands popular support. To effectively work together, PRT planners should consider the following:

- Know the roles and capabilities of the United States, NGOs, IGOs, and the host-nation government.
- Include other participants, particularly host-nation partners, in planning at every level.
• Support civilian efforts, including those of NGOs and IGOs.
• Conduct, facilitate, or participate in political, social, informational, and economic programs.

**Continuity of operations**

Continuity of operations is the degree to which there is continuous conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a mission. It includes the functions and duties of the team leader as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by members of the team.

PRTs can require a significant amount of time to effect change within an area or province. The various agencies involved in providing team members must ensure there are not gaps in functional coverage or a wholesale turnover of personnel over long deployments. Either of these will result in the PRT losing valuable understanding of the environment and could affect relationships with the local government and the people as a whole. Try to avoid rotating leadership positions (team leader and deputy team leader) at the same time. Have their changeovers scheduled by their parent department or agency to ensure continuity of interface with local leaders.

**Flexibility**

The components of a PRT are adaptable to any situation, from immediate post conflict with no governance structure (PRTs will not act as a government structure) to an unstable but developed structure requiring assistance. This flexibility is essential for PRTs to be effective across the full spectrum of potential situations requiring interagency and multidisciplinary coordination and cooperation. Flexibility in the PRT framework facilitates scalability of management and response activities.

**Guiding Ideals**

• **Ownership.** Build on the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people.
• **Capacity building.** Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies.
• **Sustainability.** Design programs to ensure their impact endures.
• **Selectivity.** Allocate resources based on need, host-nation goals, local commitment, and foreign policy interests.
• **Assessment.** Conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions.

• **Results.** Focus resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focused objectives.

• **Partnership.** Collaborate closely with provincial and local governments; communities; donors; local representatives of NGOs; local representatives of IGOs; and any other economic, agricultural, or entities.

• **Flexibility.** Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency.

• **Accountability.** Design accountability and transparency into systems, and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption.

**Objectives**

Execution of the mission should be designed around reaching the objectives. Key steps are understanding designated tasks and the intent provided in higher-level direction. In general, most objectives will require efforts across multidisciplinary programs. For instance, achieving a desired effect may require: (1) political leverage on the government (local and/or central); (2) economic or development projects to mitigate the impact of a desired outcome; or (3) increased U.S. government security presence or support to host-nation forces to deter potential violence. Given the integrated capacity of a PRT, they are well-situated and should be fully resourced to achieve the following objectives:

• **Improve stability.** Determine the causes and means of conflict, including resource competition, tribal/ethnic clashes, insurgency, criminal elements, and political instability; identify the triggers or opportunities to instigate conflict; determine ways to affect the causes and triggers; identify ways to mitigate or resolve the conflict; increase capacity of civil society and legitimate traditional processes to adjudicate and deter conflict.

• **Increase local institutional capacity.** Build individual, organizational, and structural capacity to provide public safety and basic services such as sewage, water, electrical, trash–health. Where relevant, tie legitimate, informal governance (traditional) leaders to nascent formal government organizations and tie appropriate reconstruction and stability projects to legitimate governing bodies.
• **Facilitate reconstruction activities.** Develop job creation programs for infrastructure activities; provide microlending as soon as practicable; tie road improvements to commercial as well as political integration; and create value-added facilities to improve agriculture and natural resource capabilities within the local absorptive capacity.

• **Execute a strong strategic communications program.** Expand local information dissemination capacity, especially by local institutions (remember that actions speak louder than words); take advantage of face-to-face communication (where traditional and expected); encourage provincial leaders and authorities to visit the district population and traditional leaders; tie reconstruction activities to legitimate governing bodies.

**Imperatives**

As a PRT works to its objectives, those in general outlined above and those established based on the environment of the situation, it should keep the following imperatives in mind:

• Focus on improving stability.

• Operate as an integrated civilian–military organization.

• Lead from behind, ensuring host-nation ownership. Promote host-nation primacy and legitimacy. However, at times, it may be necessary to illustrate that the United States is doing something for the people (remember and respect that the operational pace will be that of the host nation).

• Actively engage with the governor, host-nation central government officials, the local communities and population through provincial councils, provincial development committees, and other established and traditional bodies.

• Facilitate the visibility of the host-nation government’s presence in the province by assisting official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., transportation and communications).

• Promise only what you can deliver; manage expectations (under promise and over deliver). Never promise unless the money or assets are in hand. Even interest in a topic or project can be interpreted as a “promise.”

• Plan sustainability at the outset.
• Ensure that interventions at the provincial level support the host-nation’s national processes and development plan or strategy.

• Lay the foundations for long-term sustainable changes.

• Be committed to consulting and/or working with international partners, such as IGOs and NGOs.

• Be aware of and respect civil–military sensitivities—lives may depend on it.

End State

Usually the end state of a PRT occurs when the host-nation’s provisions for security and public safety are sufficient to support traditional means of development and political stability is sustainable after the withdrawal of international forces. In Iraq, the end state is time-based; PRTs will operate until the summer of 2011. The PRT should design measures of effectiveness that delineate the perception of safety, the reduction of security incidences that impact daily life, the capacity of the government to provide basic services and rule of law, and the popular acceptance of legitimate formal and informal organizations and leaders by both the majority of the population and disaffected elements of the population. These measures will provide an accurate measure of progress in either a time- or conditions-based environment.
Chapter 3

Strategic Guidance, Operational Interagency Guidance, Agency Guidance, and Operational Guidance

Overarching Interagency Strategic Guidance

In the U.S. government, senior officials provide strategic guidance through cabinet-level principals’ committees or deputies’ committees. The committees are chaired by the National Security Council and reflect the strategic goals as laid out by the president. In turn, the principals’ committee or deputies’ committee may task existing interagency policy coordinating committees or country reconstruction and stabilization groups to develop implementation based on the strategic guidance.

In the field, operational guidance normally runs through the relevant combatant command to a joint task force or other appropriate formation on the military side and through the chief of mission (where there is an existing U.S. embassy) or presidential envoy on the civilian side. Whichever department has the lead, all efforts at the field level should integrate the directives from both the supported and supporting departments. The geographic combatant command’s strategic plan should delineate the agreed stability and political conditions necessary to shift the military from a supported command to a supporting command, where the chief of mission will assume lead for U.S. government efforts. Certain circumstances may result in the recognition of a joint civilian–military command, preserving unity of effort if not unity of command.

The National Command Authority may designate a specific U.S. government department as the lead agency. In a situation where active combat is expected or underway, the Department of Defense (DOD) may be the lead with other agencies in a supporting role. Where the environment is clearly post conflict and instability has diminished, the lead shifts to the Department of State (DOS), which is responsible for coordinating the efforts of other civilian departments and agencies.

Operational Interagency Guidance

Operational interagency guidance is the implementing glue between overarching strategic goals and local execution. This guidance delineates the separate agency areas of responsibility (AORs). The guidance should
tie national/sector development programs with the stability objectives and activities of the provincial reconstruction team (PRT).

Although PRTs mostly focus on the operational and tactical level, the interagency nature of their structure and activities cuts across any number of sectors (security, governance, and economy) and must be aligned with corresponding national and sector efforts. Any discontinuity or gaps in these local efforts is likely to manifest itself as difficulties in achieving unity of effort within the PRT’s AOR. Therefore, PRTs play an important role in informing and refining operational guidance from intermediate or higher headquarters and ensuring the local objectives are effective, attainable, and aligned with operational and strategic goals.

Agency Guidance

Each agency active within the PRT provides appropriate implementing guidance to its respective agency elements deployed in the PRT. Depending on the actual makeup of the PRT, the relevant agencies are likely to include DOD, DOS, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and others—including the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Justice. Drawing on the integrated operational guidance developed at the embassy/joint task force level, each agency provides a framework for its PRT personnel to identify key issues, priorities, timelines, and possible measures of effectiveness.

It is vitally important the PRT leadership ensures the guidance coming in from multiple agencies is carefully coordinated and mutually reinforcing, and that they report to higher headquarters when there are inconsistencies or when difficulties occur. The PRT is an important “ground truth” check on interagency coordination at higher levels; if differing guidance cannot be integrated at the PRT level, it may well be indicative of disjointed coordination or planning at the regional or national level. The PRT’s activities are then developed through a common assessment of the situation and integrated implementation plan.

Operational Guidance

The concept of the PRT resulted from a joint initiative between Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I)/DOD and U.S. Mission Iraq/DOS. The intent was to transition the lines of operation of governance and economics at the provincial level from the military to the PRT. PRTs take on the task of developing the political and economic environments within the province.
Mission statement of PRTs in Iraq

The PRT program is a priority joint DOS/DOD initiative to bolster moderates, support U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation, shape the political environment, support economic development, and build the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to hasten the transition to Iraqi self-sufficiency.

In the post-surge environment, PRTs are now almost exclusively led by the United States in Iraq. The DOS serves as the lead agency for all PRTs except Dhi Qar, which is led by Italy.

The focus of PRTs is the provincial government and provincial-wide effects. At the national level, the United States has several agencies engaged, including DOD, DOS, and others. Below the provincial government, at the district/city government level, the maneuver commander takes the lead. In the spring of 2007, embedded PRTs were assigned to brigade/regimental combat teams to facilitate maneuver commanders’ interactions at the district/city government level in the Anbar, Baghdad, and Babil provinces. At this same time, all PRTs, with the exception of the Babil PRT, were paired with a brigade/regimental combat team or division/force headquarters.

PRTs in Iraq focus on coaching, teaching, and mentoring Iraqis in governance and economics. The PRT structure is modular in nature, with a standard core structure tailored to each province. The DOS takes the lead for PRTs, supported by DOD and other civilian agencies.
Chapter 4

Implementing Strategy: Planning, Developing Goals and Objectives, and Measuring Effectiveness

Planning

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have used a variety of formal and informal planning processes as well as a short- and long-term focus throughout their existence. However, a consensus is emerging that PRTs are most effective when they develop a multiyear plan of action based on their mission analysis and shaped by their analysis of what is driving instability and conflict in their area. The PRT plan should be:

• **Driven by its mission guidance and directed tasks.** In addition to the PRT’s own plans, the PRT needs to interface with and help implement other plans. There may be multiple documents (host nation, U.S. government, international [e.g., United Nations or North Atlantic Treaty Organization]) that should be acquired and understood. Some U.S. planning documents may be classified, so the PRT may need to work with contacts, usually at the embassy, to learn what strategies are relevant. Although the responsibility for coordinating these various frameworks falls at a higher level than the PRT, to be fully effective, the PRT leadership needs to be cognizant of all relevant strategies and the degree to which the PRT will interface with each strategy. Whether the environment is counterinsurgency, post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction, or capacity building, the PRT must ensure that its strategy, plans, and actions support and further those overarching objectives.

• **Shaped by a full understanding of the area assigned to the PRT.** As described below, the plan should be developed following an assessment of the threats to stability in the PRT’s area of responsibility (AOR), including factors that increase and decrease the likelihood of conflict. The assessment should strive to determine the key impediments to achieving mission success. There may be instability based on tribal competition, conflict perpetrated by criminal or insurgent activities, or weak local institutions that prevent effective extension of the national government. This assessment provides a common operational picture for all U.S. government actors in the province that will shape, sequence, and focus their efforts towards achieving the mission of the PRT.
Multi-year. PRT members understand that achieving success in their AOR will take many years, even though they are often deployed for no more than a year. Rather than a series of one-year plans, it is important to develop a multiyear (three to five) strategy that promotes continuity of effort. The strategy should include: (1) Key strategic interventions that are necessary to address the causes of instability and conflict; and (2) A long-term end-state goal and the required objectives to achieve sustainable stability sufficient to provide an environment where normal development programs can flourish. The strategy can and should be reviewed and routinely revised, particularly before unit rotations or large personnel turnovers or as guidance or conditions change. The strategic objectives provide the basis for a multiyear implementation plan that should cover a time frame of at least two years to facilitate continuity.

Interagency. The PRT is an interagency team and needs to plan as a team. Ideally, the PRT’s planning team should include functional, regional, and planning experts representing all the agencies active in the PRT. There may be a tendency for each agency to want to perform separate assessments and then build separate action plans based on those assessments. Institutional culture, personal expertise, rotation cycles, and separate reporting chains can all push PRT members in this direction. But without a joint assessment, strategy, and implementation plan, the PRT will lack a common understanding of the situation, making it hard to agree on where resources should be focused and prioritize and integrate each agency’s efforts.

Integrated assessment

PRTs are deployed to foster stabilization and support U.S. national goals. A PRT’s actions, projects, and programs should all support these goals. To do this, PRT members need to assess and understand the factors that cause instability and conflict in their area to develop a multiyear strategy.

The local causes of instability and conflict may be similar to those driving the national conflict, but there likely will be additional complexities and local aspects of the problem (e.g., local resource issues and relationships among local actors, tribes, sects, or groups). The PRT’s job is to understand what is causing the instability and conflict in its area so that its interventions can reduce conflict and promote a more stable environment.

While the complexity of a PRT’s area of operations cannot always be fully analyzed by specific doctrine or any one methodology, there are several
good conflict assessment frameworks that can form the basis for a PRT’s expanded assessment process:

- Conflict is frequently conceptualized and assessed in terms of sources/causes, parties, actors, “drivers,” and potential triggers. The sources and root causes of conflict can be described in terms of stakeholders’ frustrated needs and grievances.

- The “drivers” of conflict are the dynamics of how those frustrations and grievances are expressed and manipulated. Triggers are often thought of as shocks to the system (e.g., a drought) or key events (e.g., an election) that spark conflict.

- The PRT needs to assess the potential drivers of instability and conflict in its AOR. These may include resource competition, sectarian animosity, ethnic violence, lack of meaningful economic opportunity, and culturally sanctioned vendettas. This assessment entails mapping the social, cultural, political, and economic networks the population lives with daily. The mapping is not a doctoral dissertation, but it should touch on the key aspects of the environment that impact the level of conflict.

Assessment tools:

There are several common conflict assessment tools that can be used by the PRT:

- Interagency conflict assessment framework (ICAF) is a U.S. government interagency process. ICAF is a strategic-level process that draws on existing conflict assessment procedures (e.g., tactical conflict assessment framework [TCAF]) used by U.S. government departments, agencies, and bureaus as well as some procedures used by international organizations. ICAF organizes all these assessments into a common framework that is used by the U.S. government to gain a common understanding of the country or region and conduct and coordinate planning.

- U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) TCAF designed for the strategic and operational level and developed to inform tactical level planning and program design.

Performing a conflict assessment:

Listening to and engaging with the local population, including different levels of society and the various groups in the PRT’s area, are keys to a good assessment. Typical steps in a conflict assessment include:
• Collecting data (through interviews, observations, field-based activities, or secondary sources). Data should include information on background factors and underlying risks, such as stakeholders’ interests/needs; opinion leaders’ motivations/means; potential triggers; potential “spoilers”; and international or regional actors or factors.

• Describing the dynamics (conflict “drivers”), which are factors that contribute to escalation of the conflict.

• Prioritizing the “drivers” according to the degree they contribute to escalation of the conflict.

• Identifying conflict mitigation and resolution mechanisms.

Maturity model for Iraq:

This is an internationally recognized tool for assessing and tracking the progress of major change management programs. The assessment will be completed by reading generic statements (provided as Appendix E to this handbook) and making an objective assessment of where your local government organization best fits the descriptions.

Mitigate conflict and build local capacity

In the follow-on planning phase, PRT planners decide how to mitigate the dynamics that drive the conflict and strengthen the dynamics that mitigate or defuse the conflict. Factors that demonstrate local and regional capacity usually contribute to mitigation of the conflict. These factors include the legitimacy and effectiveness of the host government; its political, social, economic, and security institutions; and the resilience of civil society.

In most interventions in countries in crisis, the U.S. government goal is to achieve a sustainable peace where the host government is able to meet the fundamental needs of its citizens for security, social well-being, just governance, and economic livelihood. In many reconstruction and stabilization environments, this institutional capacity is limited or absent. Identifying the areas of need, mentoring key individuals, facilitating training, and focusing intervention are all potential tools.

Building governmental capacity above the provincial level is clearly beyond the scope of the PRT and is the responsibility of the national-level program; however, the PRT is best positioned to understand the specific needs within the province, district, or regional area within its responsibility and use the information to design local programs and inform national-level planning. While every situation is different, local governments often need help
developing processes for citizen input, prioritizing government programs and projects, implementing budgeting processes, and establishing public security capabilities. Keep in mind that not all institutions are governmental; building the capacity of traditional governing mechanisms and civil society (religious groups, business institutions, and political parties) may also be required.

Figure 4-1 below provides a visual summary of planning process goals (to increase the capacity of local institutions to respond to local needs and wants, while reducing the drivers of conflict).

![Figure 4-1](image)

**Developing Long-Term Objectives**

Once the PRT has assessed local needs, identified key drivers of conflict, and built connections to local institutions, it needs to develop intervention strategies to be implemented through an action plan. For example, if the two major tribes in a PRT’s area are engaged in ongoing, low-level hostilities over historic grievances and competition for scarce water resources, the PRT may decide it needs a strategy for a peace-building process supported by a water management strategy to address this underlying source of
conflict. Taken together, the major mission elements or objectives should be:

• Developed from an assessment of the causes of conflict and instability.

• Necessary to achieve the goal and succeed.

• Sufficient to achieve the overarching objectives or goal.

• Stated as measurable, realistically ambitious objectives.

• Integrated across agency stovepipes when necessary to achieve the goal.

• Able to help identify cross-sector issues that may be overlooked by the bureaucracy.

The PRT may not have the resources and tools to address larger and more complex issues. In these cases, the PRT should flag these parts of the plan for consideration by the embassy and higher military headquarters. For example, the PRT may identify a corrupt and poorly trained police force as a significant factor undermining local support for the national government. Police training likely needs to be conducted as part of a national program and should be raised with the embassy. However, setting up a public safety commission to represent citizen interests in interactions with police authorities might be something the PRT could help with at the local level.

The Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) established the following required objectives for emphasis by all PRTs throughout Iraq:

• All PRTs will emphasize reporting via front channel cables. PRTs and their partnered military units have extensive contact networks including government, religious and tribal, business, and political leaders.

  ○ PRTs will mine those resources to provide timely early warning of possible signs of instability and to identify potential political, economic, and security targets of opportunity for exploitation.

  ○ This reporting/early warning function becomes increasingly vital as the number of U.S. forces is reduced. PRT leaders will use all U.S. government resources in their provinces and on their teams as appropriate to ensure reporting reflects the most accurate picture and analysis of issues in the province.
• PRTs will focus their messaging to achieve progress on U.S. strategic interests in their provinces. Most provinces have active local and regional media who are receptive to PRT interviews and releases.

  ○ Robust outreach enables the United States to channel key messages and themes through PRTs to local media and through public forums throughout Iraq. This is important for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the degree to which the positions of Iraqi national leaders are shaped by local discussions.

  ○ PRTs will continue to provide ready, personal access to an extensive and diverse array of political, religious, and tribal leaders throughout Iraq. This level of personal contact is crucial in enabling the United States to bring to bear at the right place and time appropriate levels of diplomatic, economic, or other pressure in an effort to mitigate drivers of instability.

  ○ PRTs will continue to provide a physical presence at local events to serve as a balance to other international actors and to show the United States’ determination and resolve to stand with the Iraqi people.

• Public diplomacy becomes increasingly relevant as security gains present new and exciting opportunities for public diplomacy initiatives.

  ○ This point was made dramatically when a large delegation of Iraqi provincial officials accompanied government of Iraq officials to Washington, DC, for an investment conference. Near Eastern Affairs–Iraq (NEA–I) was able to expand the agenda for the provincial officials’ portion of the trip to include trips to Washington museums, the Capitol, the Maryland Statehouse, and the government offices in Anne Arundel County, MD.

  ○ As a result of that effort, half of the Iraqi provinces are now under the leadership of people who have seen a vision of a future Iraq in a free, democratic, market-driven society operating as an ally of the United States. Similarly powerful impressions are being pursued in International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) candidates throughout Iraq.
Public diplomacy officers need to maintain their close relationships with Iraqi local and regional media; provide training to the Iraqi media; provide books, computers, and other educational materials to Iraqi students; and provide Americans with information on how the United States is making progress in Iraq and how the lives of Iraqis are improving.

- Democracy is developing in Iraq. PRTs will continue to support the election process.
  - PRTs will assist the local governorate elections offices (GEOs) as they struggle to deal with the aftermath of national elections when the GEOs are subject to ridicule by the election losers.
  - PRTs will also help the GEOs deal with the complexities of the local elections ballot. PRTs will continue to identify, recruit, and support nongovernmental organizations to support political participation by vulnerable populations, women, and minorities.
  - The considerable strain of the national elections in 2010 are likely to be followed by the first elections for sub-provincial governments, which will finally bring democracy up close and personal in every village in Iraq as neighbors vie for seats on local councils. These local efforts will present unique challenges for PRT political and governance advisers.

- As a politically and economically emerging state, Iraq remains vulnerable to those determined to siphon public funds to feed powerful political patronages that would ultimately destroy democracy in Iraq by undermining public oversight and the legitimate checks and balances on corruption and inefficiency.
  - Iraq has limited time before the full potential of its great oil wealth is realized. Without proper systems of accountability in place at the provincial levels, those funds will absolutely corrupt the political system.
  - It is crucial that PRTs in every province continue daily engagements with their Iraqi partners to put in place the most acceptable systems of accountability, including transparent budget development processes; budget processes that allocate funding to strategic capital projects rather than toward sectarian or personal interests; effective legislative
oversight capabilities to reduce government corruption and inefficiency; budget processes that are open to the media; computerized budget management and tracking systems (e.g., Governorates Accounting and Project Tracking Information System); and trained Iraqi project management staff to include project managers, engineers, legal staff, and accountants.

- PRT engineers will focus on advising and assisting in the planning and development of the public infrastructure essential to support private investment, including the planning and construction of transportation, communication, water, and sewage networks. PRT engineers will expand their level of assistance in development of scientifically based master plans and advise and assist municipalities throughout Iraq as they struggle with the design and maintenance plans for major public works improvements.

- The new national government will present challenges for provincial governments as old lines of communication between provincial officials and national ministries are lost. PRTs will work diligently throughout the six-to-nine-month period following the seating of the ministries to reestablish those relationships. This is especially important in those Sunni or Kurdish provinces that are less likely to have strong allies in key ministries. It is also important in those less affluent Shia provinces, whose voices are often lost in the sands around Baghdad.

- Each PRT will use all available U.S. government resources to map out key provincial leaders and the networks by which they are connected to national leaders and leaders in other provinces.

- PRTs remain on the forefront as the guardians of human rights. They frequent courts, detention centers, prisons, police stations, and communities throughout Iraq.
  - The United States cannot allow the Iraqis to lose the vital human rights aspect of the struggle or Iraq will become a forum for revenge.
  - PRTs will continue by their actions to remind the Iraqis that Iraqi sacrifices, pain, and struggle have a higher moral purpose, and that purpose justifies further sacrifice to avoid revenge inspired by those who seek to dehumanize the struggle.
○ PRTs will continue to respond diligently, sincerely, and promptly to allegations of prisoner abuse, unfair treatment of minorities, and government neglect in order to assure the people that the world is watching and those guilty of human rights abuses will be held accountable for their actions.

• Private investment remains the key to a successful Iraq:

○ PRTs will continue their training and mentoring of public officials in the appropriate role that government must play in attracting the high quality investment necessary to build a strong and diverse economy capable of serving the needs of the Iraqi people.

○ Iraqi officials too often look upon private investors as prey rather than as valuable partners in the development of a strong community.

○ PRTs will support Chambers of Commerce, trade associations, business round tables, bankers associations, and other groups who educate and cooperate with public officials.

○ PRTs will continue their support for the Provincial Investment Commission (PIC) in the PIC’s role as the business development arm of the provincial government.

○ Transfer of agricultural technology will remain a major objective for each PRT. Agriculture remains the number one private sector employer in Iraq.

    * Agriculture in Iraq has a track record of over 5,000 years; however, the agricultural technology in Iraq is over 5,000 years old.

    * There is a tremendous demand among the Iraqis for the advice and assistance provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture PRT agricultural advisers.

    * The success of the greenhouse, pivot irrigation, and other initiatives are readily apparent from the air and in the market stalls. Those initiatives began as PRT/brigade combat team-initiated training seminars in agricultural extension offices throughout Iraq.

• PRT rule of law advisers will continue to work in every province as part of the nationwide network of rule of law advisers under the direction of the office of the rule of law coordinator. Only through
such a comprehensive, nationally coordinated effort can the United States achieve the major changes necessary to:

○ Unite the Iraqi judges and police as an effective crime-fighting team.

○ End traditional reliance on interrogations-based confessions.

○ Elevate the judiciary to a co-equal branch of government; improve legal education for judges, attorneys, and the police; and garner the necessary public confidence in the judiciary.

PRT discretionary objectives:

In addition to these OPA-directed priority objectives required for all PRTs, each PRT will also engage in those discretionary objectives that both support the joint campaign plan and are appropriate to that province. PRTs will not engage in any activity inconsistent with the U.S. government goals outlined in the joint common plan (JCP).

**Develop an Implementation Plan with Tasks, Activities, and Actions**

The implementation plan consists of the major mission elements or operational objectives the PRT has identified and the tasks, activities, and actions the PRT should undertake to achieve them. In the example involving competition over water resources, the PRT may want to seek input from a hydrologist. The hydrologist might recommend a regional solution, which might be expensive and need to be referred for higher-level action. The hydrologist might also identify smaller local projects that would improve lives in the short term and provide space for the peace-building process to proceed. The completion of these projects might be identified by the PRT as essential tasks. Essential tasks should be:

- Necessary and, taken together, sufficient to achieve the major mission element (MME)/objective.
- Stated as measurable outcomes.
- Managed by implementing agencies or PRT members.

The action plan should identify which agency or PRT member has the lead for a specific program or action and the source of funding. However, not all the essential tasks involve expending program funds; some may involve diplomatic, political, or other initiatives undertaken by the PRT’s leadership and advisers. The plan’s time frame varies according to the circumstances, the nature of U.S. involvement, and the overall strategic plan, but should
be at least two years long to provide continuity of PRT personnel. While actions and programs for the current year will need to be identified, the MME/objectives will likely be multiyear.

The PRT constantly needs to balance conflicting goals. Is effective direct intervention in local disputes more important than efforts to increase the capacity of local security forces? Should limited reconstruction funds be used to build necessary government infrastructure or to increase the general population’s general welfare?

There will always be tradeoffs in the planning process, including staffing and budgetary cycles, limits on uses of funds, national versus provincial imperatives, different time frames for achieving immediate security requirements versus stability, and other constraints that will affect what can be done. But a good planning process and framework leads to the best use of resources within the inevitable constraints.

Given the changing nature and stability dynamics of the AOR, the implementation plan should also identify triggers for contingency plan activation to support local and national government response. For instance, natural disasters significantly strain nascent government capacity. The ability of the local government to respond to natural disaster can reduce resulting instability and impact the population’s perception of government legitimacy. A PRT work plan with goals, objectives, and action officers to support provincial government response can help the provincial government address short-term stability requirements while also addressing long-term capacity building.

**Measuring Performance (Metrics)**

PRTs will be asked to assess their progress and report on it. This assessment will probably include the development of indicators or metrics as part of a process called performance monitoring. Performance monitoring involves the repeated review of reported information to inform decision making. The reported information is a combination of metrics, other information gathered, and the review and analysis of that information. The purposes of performance monitoring are to gather and present systematic, analytic information for the PRT’s own use in assessing the impact and effects of its efforts; to inform decision makers up the chain of command; and to report to Congress and the public. The best time to consider how the success of the PRT’s plan will be measured is while the plan is being developed. Note that there will also be demands from higher agency levels for assessments that may or may not track those of the PRTs.

Impact assessment can be difficult in a reconstruction and stabilization context—the full impact of a PRT’s activities may not become clear for
some time, and public databases that might track changes in indicators over
time may not exist or be reliable. Nonetheless, it is important that the PRT
assess its output—the immediate effect of its activities—and the short- and
long-term impact of these activities. Ultimately, the impact is what matters.
Output is usually easiest to measure (e.g., number of wells drilled, schools
built, and police trained), but it does not measure the effects the PRT is
trying to achieve. Outcomes or intermediate effects (e.g., how many have
access to clean water, growth in school enrollment, and public perception of
police) and longer-term impacts of activities on the overall situation (e.g.,
impact of wells on local power structure, perception of education’s impact
on social values or economic prospects, impact of police training on public
security, and support for the government) may require more creativity. A
few clear, insightful measures are better than many indirect or less obvious
ones. Examples of indicators include:

- **Impact indicator.** Overarching goals are achieved:
  - Functioning economy that provides tax revenue and facilitates licit economic activity:
    - Percent of country’s economy that can be taxed by the federal government.
    - Relative personal income rates across key identity groups.
  - Government that ensures the rule of law and protects civilians:
    - Polling on “how safe citizens feel” across identity groups.
    - Human rights assessments.
  - Political processes that are seen as legitimate and credible:
    - Participation in political processes by major groups or factions.
    - Civil/political rights assessments.

- **Outcome indicator.** Measures the effect of activities on achieving
  broader objectives:
  - Increase in employment.
  - Shorter pretrial detention periods.
Increase in participation in political processes by former combatants.

While output indicators can help PRTs track their efforts, when U.S. government planners and policymakers use the terms “performance” or “results,” they are referring to those objectives nearer the top—at least at the outcome level.

**Continuity process**

In the time-based conditions for PRTs in Iraq, at a certain point the long-term plans will be incorporated into work plans that will reach to the summer of 2011 time frame. Continuity will become much less important, and transitioning to the provincial governments will become more important. However, some of the principles of the continuity process will still apply.

PRT staff is subject to a high rate of turnover. Civilians generally serve 12 months but often have gaps between assignments, while core military members serve 12 months and often have assignment overlaps. However, some military members may only serve six months. Unfortunately, changes in personnel often result in changes in PRT direction, objectives, and programs. Without a long-term plan, new arrivals are left to improvise their own programs, drawing on their own expertise, which results in choppy and ineffective PRT programming that wastes time and resources.

A long-term common operational picture and strategic implementation plan assists with continuity. During their predeployment training, PRT members should strive to understand the specific area analysis and implementation plan provided by their predecessors. The new PRT should be aware of the causes of instability and conflict; strategies and implementation interventions, programs, activities, and measures of effectiveness as they relate to its work; the objectives of the maneuver brigade and other PRTs in the particular region; and the longer term U.S. government provincial goals and objectives. In addition to forwarding the planning documents, PRTs and military teams should complete the following tasks during the last month of deployment:

- Capture their experiences (both lessons learned and good practices) and present them to the incoming PRT, maneuver commanders and staffs, and implementing partners.

- Send materials from briefings to military and civilian PRT training units in the United States to update training materials.
• Attend and assist with the training of incoming teams and overlap with their successors, if possible.

• Highlight particularly valuable lessons learned on how to work in the environment, how to be a team player with civilian/military teams, how to engage the local community appropriately, and how to alter programming based on local input while making it complementary to the PRT’s and the maneuver commander’s goals.

**Funding Guidance and Authorities**

Funding for activities within the PRT AOR will likely come from several sources, although country- and regional-specific circumstances preclude a definitive list. Examples include economic support funds (ESF) (Department of State [DOS]/USAID); quick response funds (DOS); overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid (Department of Defense [DOD]); Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) (DOD); and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) (DOS).

In many cases, such as ESF, quick response funds, and INCLE, the PRT is likely to play an oversight or supporting role. In Iraq and Afghanistan, CERP provides military commanders with funds they can directly program and disburse. Legal restrictions on the use of certain funds and the existing sanctions on the country in question require the separate management of these funds by the organization responsible for their expenditure. In addition, constraints, including prohibitions on certain uses of the funds, must be taken into account in planning how and whether the PRT will undertake specific activities.

In cases where a PRT leader has discretionary authority in funding, PRT leadership must be fully aware of the guidelines and authorities that are attached to each funding source and determine the best use of these funds. This responsibility includes which funds are best used for specific projects. Balancing this multitude of considerations is an essential task of the PRT’s interagency leadership to ensure an effective, efficient, and sustainable work plan.
Chapter 5

Management Structure

This chapter will cover the management of a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) from strategic level to the operational/tactical level. It will also provide an overview of the construct of a PRT as well as delineate what positions are in each PRT within Iraq. It must be understood that the actual PRT structure will be dependent on the environment because the environment is fluid in Iraq. Personnel assigned to work on a PRT are encouraged to contact the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) and the team to which they will be assigned to determine structure and additional information.

Strategic Level

Guidance for PRTs emanates from the president’s direction on stabilization and reconstruction on post-conflict countries. This direction receives further refinement through mechanisms within the National Security Council (NSC) and the individual departments and agencies.

At the interagency level, direction starts with the principals’ committees and deputies’ committees, where guidance flows to the reconstruction and stabilization interagency policy committee (IPC) of the NSC. The IPC is the day-to-day forum for interagency coordination of national policy on reconstruction and stabilization. The IPC has working groups that generally focus on various activities affecting Iraq. The primary working group for Iraq PRTs is the Iraq Policy and Operations Group (IPOG), which is chaired by the Office of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs–Iraq (NEA–I). This working group refines direction from the IPC to an implementing form for the IPC. Once the IPC approves this more definitive guidance, the guidance is passed on to department and agencies by its various members. This guidance is also passed on to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and, in particular for PRTs, to the OPA by NEA–I.

For individual departments/agencies, secretaries/directors provide additional guidance based on presidential direction. Within each department/agency, interdepartmental committees and/or groups usually chaired by the regional or desk office for Iraq will act on this guidance and reformulate it based on departmental/agency strategies and input provided by the NSC. Normally, guidance will then flow to the department’s/agency’s mission chief in country from the regional or desk office for Iraq. However, guidance for the Department of Defense (DOD) flows also through U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) to U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF–I) and through the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and its Transatlantic Division to the Gulf Region District and Gulf Region South District (collectively referred to as GRD).

Legend:
AAB: Advise and assist brigade  
BCT: Brigade combat team  
JCP: Joint common plan  
MOA: Memorandum of agreement  
MSP: Mission support plan  
SFA: Status of Forces Agreement  
UCP: Unified common plan  
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development  
USEMB: U.S. Embassy

Figure 5-1

Operational Level

It must be noted that participating agencies maintain primary control of the capacity and programs they allocate to PRTs because of fiduciary responsibilities.

Operational guidance comes from the separate departments/agencies to elements within the PRT through their individual mission chiefs. However, the Iraq chief of mission has directed U.S. assistance be coordinated through the U.S. Embassy country team, with PRT direction emanating from the joint PRT steering group (JPSG). The JPSG serves as the
interagency executive body responsible for approving or confirming policy and programmatic priorities for the provinces. It is headed by the deputy chief of mission and USF–I deputy commanding general. All department/agency mission chiefs work in concert through the JPSG in executing their departmental/agency guidance and contributions to the mission support plan (MSP).

USF–I coordinates support for PRTs through the joint common plan and the unified common plan. The JPSG executes its day-to-day operations of PRTs through the OPA.

**Department of State (DOS)/Department of Defense (DOD) Memorandum of Agreement on Iraq PRTs (22 February 2007)**

The chief of mission, through OPA, provides the political and economic direction of PRTs and embedded PRTs. Thus, the PRTs have the lead for political and economic development; rule of law; and capacity building at the city, district, and neighborhood levels. The PRTs also support the brigade combat teams (BCTs) on security issues.

USF–I, through the BCTs and advise and assist brigades (AABs), has the lead for security and movement issues. The BCTs also support PRT operations by providing logistics, communications, housing, and assistance in political and economic development.

Following is a discussion of the major operational players, OPA and USF–I, as well as two of their primary associates—the GRD and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

**Office of Provincial Affairs**

The OPA is a civil–military organization established by a joint DOS and DOD initiative under the operational guidance of the JPSG. The OPA’s task is to coordinate the deployment and supervise the civil–military operations of the PRT capacity-building program. The OPA director is the chairperson of the joint PRT working group (JPWG).

The JPWG is subordinate to the JPSG and provides recommended guidance, coordination, and oversight for the development of a joint strategy provincial policy and programs. The JPWG coordinates relationships to sharpen the provincial development focus; identify key relationships at the national, ministerial, and local levels; and ensure appropriate controls are in place to achieve unity of effort.
United States Forces–Iraq

USF–I is the successor military command to Multi-National Forces–Iraq (MNF–I). MNF–I was led by the United States, which was responsible for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Operation New Dawn as of 1 September 2010). MNF–I replaced the previous force, Combined Joint Task Force 7, on 15 May 2004 and was later itself reorganized into USF–I on 1 January 2010.

The media in the United States generally used the term “U.S.-led coalition” to describe this force, because the vast majority of the troops were from the United States. MNF–I was significantly reinforced during the Iraq war troop surge of 2007.

As of August 2009, all non-U.S. coalition members had withdrawn from Iraq. As of September 2009, there were 11 BCTs deployed to Iraq, three of which were AABs. AABs are built around combat brigades but have received special training in host-nation security force assistance and stability operations. AABs are also augmented with some specialty competencies, and therefore normally have a higher percentage of senior noncommissioned officers and field grade officers.

By August 2010, all U.S. combat operations in Iraq ceased, and it is planned that all combat brigades will be AABs.

Gulf Region Division

The GRD is a joint team comprised of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, civilians, contractors, and Iraqis. Activated on 25 January 2004, the GRD and its three districts (north, central, and south) provided engineering expertise to coalition and U.S. forces and contract construction management services to the government of Iraq.

As part of the responsible drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, the GRD began its transformation by consolidating two of its three districts, the Gulf Region North and the Gulf Region Central, and established the Gulf Region District. Furthermore, on 23 October 2009, the GRD deactivated, and the two remaining districts were placed under the command of the Transatlantic Division.

GRD continues to provide full-spectrum construction management to the USF–I, U.S. Embassy–Baghdad, and the Government of Iraq. As of March 2009, GRD has completed more than 4,500 projects valued at nearly $7 billion. Currently, GRD has 340 ongoing projects valued at $1.9 billion.
U.S. Agency for International Development

USAID has been a major partner in the U.S. government’s reconstruction and development efforts in Iraq. Since March 2003, USAID has invested $7.5 billion on infrastructure and programs designed to stabilize communities; foster economic and agricultural growth; and build the capacity of the national, local, and provincial governments to represent and respond to the needs of the Iraqi people.

USAID works closely with a variety of U.S. government agencies; international institutions such as the United Nations and World Bank; Iraq’s national, provincial, and local governments; and a network of partners that includes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local community groups, and Iraqi citizens to implement a variety of development programs. USAID’s efforts focus primarily on supporting the political, economic, and security conditions necessary for a stable and prosperous Iraq.

Provincial Reconstruction Team Management

To succeed, a PRT must become a truly integrated civil–military structure and not just an organization with “embedded” advisors or bifurcated organizations with two separate components (military and civilian) that operate separately from one another. A PRT is a civilian–military partnership. Each PRT should seek to achieve unity of effort. Without unity of effort, a PRT will be unable to harmonize the diplomatic, economic, and military lines of operation and will fail to achieve its mission.

PRT structure

As a result of many discussions and agreements, Iraq PRTs have a structured makeup (see Figure 5-2) under a chief of mission-appointed team leader. These agreements also not only achieve a unity of effort but also a unity of command that allows for single direction for PRT operations. The structure of a PRT is a composite of military and civilian elements and is based on unity of effort, clear coordination, and good communications. Decisions on the size and nature of each PRT are determined based on the factors within the province, such as the security situation; the status of reconstruction and development; the effectiveness of governance institutions; and the presence of other intergovernmental organizations and NGOs.
Roles and responsibilities

Though the actual numbers of people assigned and the positions filled may change from PRT to PRT, the responsibilities should remain the same as delineated below:

- **Team leader:**
  - Responsible for implementing the DOS-led joint coalition PRT initiative at the provincial level of government; responsible for a multiagency, multidisciplinary team comprised of military, civilian, and locally employed staff.
  - Senior U.S. civilian representative in the province. He is usually, but not always, a senior foreign service officer with leadership experience in a foreign government environment.
  - Assigned by the chief of mission to provide assistance when required and answer questions that may arise from the president through the chief of mission or the Iraqi government.

- **Deputy team leader:**
  - Senior military leader on the PRT. This officer is a lieutenant colonel from the civil affairs branch or otherwise qualified by
education or experience in a discipline that is helpful to the PRT mission. Examples of this experience or education could include language and Iraqi cultural training or an advanced degree in engineering, public administration, or law.

○ May be a Reserve Component officer who has civilian-acquired skills such as experience in local and state governments, federal agencies, or business or commercial markets.

○ Ensures the synchronization and synergy with supporting military organizations such as BCTs or AABs.

○ Responsible for assisting the team leader in implementing the DOS’s PRT initiative at the provincial level of government. The deputy team leader is the team leader’s chief of staff and directs the coordination of the multiagency, multidisciplinary team.

○ When acting as the chief of staff, manages and plans the day-to-day operations and coordinates the scheduling of internal and external events. The deputy team leader is the senior military representative for the USF–I commander and the approving authority for the security of PRT movement and off-site operations.

• **Iraqi provincial action officer (IPAO):**

  ○ Responsible for reporting on the provincial atmospherics, including political reporting on the progress toward self-reliance and governance capacity. The IPAO may also report on public affairs.

  ○ In consultation with the team leader, interfaces with local officials and private citizens in support of the PRT public diplomacy work plan to advocate U.S. and chief of mission policy and collect political information through engagement and observation. The IPAO is responsible for crafting weekly executive summaries and analyzing Iraqi political events and for routine political and economic reporting.

• **Public diplomacy officer:** The public diplomacy officer broadens understanding of American values and policies. The public diplomacy officer explains the breadth of American foreign policies to ensure that U.S. positions are understood and misrepresentations
are corrected. The public diplomacy officer also performs the following:

- Communicates with and through a variety of media to promote U.S. interests overseas.
- Manages cultural and information programs.
- Explains to foreign audiences how American history, values, and traditions shape U.S. foreign policy.

• **USAID officer:** The USAID officer is the senior development adviser to the PRT who provides expert analysis and technical advice. He also performs the following functions:

  - Serves as the activity manager for all USAID activities in the province.
  - Serves as a point of contact for all requests related to USAID programs from the PRT, U.S. government, donor community, and provincial and local officials.
  - Coordinates USAID programs and efforts with the PRT and provincial leaders; synchronizes the Local Governance Program (LGP) through the development of the PRT work plan.
  - Monitors and reports on USAID programs, and implements partner’s performance against established work plans.
  - Trains and coaches members of the PRT on the principles and important points of the LGP; explains the USAID and LGP to the provincial leaders to gain support for training provincial leadership and local government employees.

• **Security:**

  - For the majority of PRTs, security is provided by the nearest USF–I brigade. This support consists of military units trained and equipped for security missions.
  - For PRTs that do not have USF–I support, a specially trained and equipped protective team (protective security detachment or personal security detail [PSD]) of private security contractors is assigned to provide the personal security of PRT members.
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* PSD team or section leaders assist in convoy security, route and site reconnaissance, and site security.

* PSDs may also coordinate with and augment the security detail for visiting officials and dignitaries.

- **Civil affairs liaison team (CLT):**
  - Provides expertise in specific functional tasks such as planning, coordination, and project management.
  - Provides technical expertise in warfare, training, and engineering.
  - Augments the PRT specialists with both military- and civilian-acquired skills.
  - Provides military and security information (within classification limitations) and assessments of the operational area.

- **Military support element (MSE):** Provides planning, administrative, organizational, and logistics resource capabilities.

- **Bilingual bicultural adviser (BBA):**
  - The BBA program provides professional-level advisers who are expatriate Iraqis with U.S. or coalition citizenship and who can help bridge the gap of understanding between U.S. government agencies and their Iraqi counterparts. BBAs possess bachelor’s degrees (or equivalent) or higher and speak fluent English, Arabic, and sometimes Kurdish.
  - The BBA’s field of expertise may include economic development or commerce; rule of law; criminal justice; civil justice; agriculture; economics; public administration; medicine, and media journalism.
  - BBAs function as a key interface between PRT members and provincial-level government officials and should be integrated into the PRTs in areas where their backgrounds and education will be of most use.
  - BBAs can provide valuable analysis, insight, and recommendations of Iraqi political and socio-economic issues and culture.
• **Engineer officer:**
  - Trains, coaches, and mentors his Iraqi engineer/reconstruction counterparts on all aspects of project and reconstruction development and management.
  - Ensures the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council is capable of performing engineering assessments, designing scopes of work, conducting quality assurance and quality control, accomplishing construction processes, and managing projects.
  - Advises the team leader and deputy team leader on the daily situation and changes to reconstruction efforts and activities in the province.

• **Specialists:** Development specialists have a comparative advantage in understanding governance, economic, health, rule of law, and agriculture aspects of instability and insecurity. The development officer has a comparative advantage in the planning, design, and implementation of capacity building and developmental activities in support of politically derived objectives (regardless of funding source). Development specialists are chosen by PRT leaders based on the needs of the province and may include the following personnel:
  - **City management specialist:**
    * Mentors Iraqi counterparts in the supervision of day-to-day operations of all city departments and staff, directly and through department heads.
    * Has oversight of all hiring and firing actions, discipline, and suspensions.
    * Prepares, monitors, and executes the city budget, which includes submitting each year to the council a proposed budget package with options and recommendations for its consideration and possible approval.
    * Acts as main technical adviser to the council on overall governmental operations.
* Conducts public relations, such as meeting with citizens, citizen groups, businesses, and other stakeholders (the presence of a mayor may alter this function somewhat).

* Operates the city with a professional understanding of how all city functions operate together to their best effect.

* Attends all council meetings, but does not have any voting rights.

* Performs additional duties that may be assigned by the council.

* Responsibilities may vary depending upon charter provisions and other local or state laws, rules, and regulations.

○ Industrial specialist:

* Advises the provincial government on issues affecting major industries to help increase production and resolve barriers to distribution, including security and accountability.

* Helps develop, monitor, evaluate, and report on the local capacity of major industries, and suggests strategies and appropriate new technologies to develop local industries in the province.

* Advises the provincial government on capital projects and infrastructure investment and maintenance.

* Prepares and submits appropriate documents such as analytical reports, briefing materials, decision memoranda, correspondence, and others related to the specific areas of assignment.

* Advises the provincial council and its industry-related entities on current national-level plans, policies, and priorities.

* Provides mentoring to counterpart Iraqi officials to build capacity in project identification and assessment, prioritization, development, execution, monitoring, and evaluation.
○ Governance specialist:

* Assists in the development of sub-national governments that are self-sufficient; transparent; accountable; and capable of identifying, prioritizing, and servicing the needs of their citizens.

* Responsible for election support, training for “get out the vote” initiatives, and election monitoring.

* Facilitates capacity development training to operate, maintain, and manage public works infrastructure (e.g., water, power, and heavy construction).

* Mentors officials in procedures, planning, and public relations.

* Promotes legislative oversight mechanisms, supports media training, and facilitates public and media access to local government.

○ Banking and finance adviser:

* Serves as a senior banking and finance adviser, with responsibility for providing a broad range of expert technical and advisory services in support of the U.S. mission in Iraq.

* Supported by an OPA economic officer, who serves as the main point of contact and liaison with other embassy offices and agencies.

* Key member of the PRT, working actively with the PRT leader and representatives of various U.S. government agencies and the military, as well as aid organizations and the Iraqi government, to build Iraqi capacity and self-reliance.

○ Budget specialist:

* Provides technical assistance in provincial government budget planning, development, and execution.

* Trains Iraqi counterparts on the advantages of the Governorates Accounting and Project Tracking Information System.
○ Economic development officer:
  * Serves as the technical lead for economic development; focuses on new programs such as the stabilization strategy.
  * Position may be filled with a specialist from any of several civilian U.S. government agencies.

○ Public health adviser: Health has been identified as a crucial area of need in Iraq. The public health adviser may be a Department of Health and Human Service specialist, university professor on leave, or have other public health experiences and an extensive background in program development and project management.

○ Rule of law coordinator:
  * Responsible for coordinating rule of law initiatives at the provincial level, focusing on public law enforcement; a fair civil and criminal judicial system; citizens’ equal access to the Iraqi justice system and legal representation; and a humane corrections system, as well as a range of issues that will assist Iraq in transitioning into an effective rule of law society.
  * Helps to develop both civil and criminal law and assist police, judicial, and detention institutions by coordinating with Iraqi governmental structures. Provides support to the civic sector, such as law faculties, lawyer associations, and other rights-based institutions, both government and nongovernment.

○ Agriculture specialist: Agriculture consistently has been identified as a key growth area in the provinces. The agriculture specialist may be a Department of Agriculture specialist. The agriculture specialist’s function is to enhance the PRT’s ability to work with local governments to develop policies and programs that will support this vital economic sector.

• Host government representatives:
  ○ Some PRTs may have host government representatives. The existence of the PRTs is predicated to a large extent on the premise that local government lacks capacity at the institutional and individual levels.
○ The host government representative may not have the capacity to do more than assist the PRT in better understanding the environment, including friendly and enemy forces, and provide advice on how to engage and build local structures and capacity.

• Local support staff:

○ Each PRT has some mix of local support staff who have the responsibility of assisting in running the PRT in areas from labor to translation to representation.

○ The roles and responsibilities of other civilian U.S. and international civilians (such as contractors) are dependent on the mission of their agency or program and the authorities negotiated with the PRT program or agencies involved.
Appendix A

Provincial Reconstruction Team Size, Locations, and History

Figure A-1. Provincial reconstruction team (PRT) staffing by location templates (excludes bilingual bicultural adviser, translators, major subordinate command, and deputy team leaders)

Large PRT Footprint

Anbar, Baghdad, Basra, Diyala, Erbil, Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Salah Ad Din

- Team leader.
- Political reporting officer.
- Rule of law adviser: Civil lawyer.
- U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) adviser.
• Governance:
  ○ Governance adviser.
  ○ Budget adviser.
  ○ Urban planner/Program manager.

• Economic development:
  ○ Economic development officer.
  ○ Business development/Banking/Finance officer.
  ○ Agricultural development adviser.

• Infrastructure:
  ○ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) civilian engineer.
  ○ Program manager.

• Public diplomacy officer.

Medium PRT Footprint

Babel, Maysan, Najaf, and Wasit

• Team leader.

• Political reporting officer.

• Rule of law adviser: Civil lawyer.

• USAID adviser.

• Governance:
  ○ Governance adviser.
  ○ Budget adviser/City manager.

• Economic development:
  ○ Economic development/Business development officer.
  ○ Agricultural development adviser.
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- Infrastructure:
  - USACE engineer (civilian).
  - Program manager.
- Public diplomacy officer.

Small PRT Footprint

Dhi Qar, Diwaniyah, Karbala, and Muthanna

- Team leader.
- Political reporting officer.
- Rule of law adviser: Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training or 3161 (State Department) civil lawyer.
- USAID adviser.
- Governance: Governance adviser.
- Economic development:
  - Economic development officer.
  - Agricultural development adviser.
- Infrastructure: USACE engineer (civilian).
- Public diplomacy officer.

Historical Background on PRTs

PRTs were first established in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2002, and as of 2010, PRTs operate there as well as in Iraq. While the concepts are similar, PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq have separate compositions. The common purpose of the PRTs is to empower provincial governments to govern their citizens more effectively. In 2004 the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, with his experience in Afghanistan, envisioned PRTs as a way to vastly improve the ineffectual reconstruction programs in Iraq.

The PRT program was inaugurated in Iraq in November 2005 with the establishment of PRTs in the provinces of Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Babil. In the next year more PRTs were established, resulting in a total of 10 PRTs.
in Iraq. As part of the Iraq war troop surge of 2007, the number of PRTs was expanded to cover every province in the country. Additionally, smaller embedded PRTs were established to work with the sub-provincial levels of government. By 2010 there were 26 PRTs, including 15 embedded PRTs, located throughout Iraq.

PRTs have made major contributions to Iraq. Ten major achievements are listed below.

- PRTs supported the Iraqi Company for Bank Guarantees (an Iraqi corporation that was created by the USAID Tijara Program). In addition, all of the small business development centers that PRTs worked with were directly established or trained and supported by the Tijara Program.

- Microfinance lending has been established by USAID programs with PRTs in all 18 provinces. The current loan portfolio consists of nearly 55,000 outstanding loans totaling over $115 million—with a 96 percent payback rate.

- Nearly 70 veterinary clinics have been established that serve five million animals and 135,000 animal breeders. Over 570,000 sheep have been vaccinated against brucellosis. The Inma Agribusiness contribution to the agriculture sector and coordination with PRTs is generating gross sales of $178 million. PRT activities with Inma have included joint efforts in training, farmer association strengthening, and increased productivity involving two large fish farms, 10 beef and lamb feedlots, five forage sites, two packing sheds, six feed mills, an olive factory, 10 strawberry farms, 20 farmer associations, over 500 greenhouses, and four melon farms. These activities over the course of the last three years have generated more than 30,000 full-time and part-time jobs in the areas where PRTs are operating. Inma has trained more than 5,400 people in improved agricultural production, processing, and marketing and in the business skills needed to sustain their farming livelihoods.

- The Local Governance Program (LGP) has trained 2,000 council members (15 percent women), 28 governors, 42 deputy governors, 420 directors general, and key staff in 380 Iraqi ministries and departments to increase capacity to manage and execute budgets in a transparent and sustainable manner. USAID/Tatweer focuses on 10 key service ministries and since 2008 and has focused training on provincial-level directors general in all 18 Iraq provinces. Tatweer also works with the president, prime minister, and the Council of Ministers as well as the National Civil Service Commission. Tatweer has enrolled over 90,000 civil servants in training programs.
All training is now being led by the government of Iraq. *Tatweer* engages in seven main training activities:

- Leadership and communication.
- Human resources management.
- Project management.
- Strategic planning.
- Information technology.
- Budget management.
- Anti-corruption.

- PRTs have helped establish or rebuild 16 governorate councils, 96 district councils, 195 city or sub-district councils, and 437 neighborhood councils. Elections for governors, mayors, and local councils have been organized. A primary focus of phase III of the LGP is to implement the Provincial Powers Act, defined in detail in the constitutional powers that provincial councils enjoy. These include legislative oversight, budgetary, and other powers associated with representational institutions. This is USAID’s flagship political decentralization program in Iraq.

- The Community Stabilization Program has achieved the following:
  - More than 51,900 long-term jobs created.
  - More than $78.6 million in grants approved for nearly 10,300 businesses.
  - Nearly 41,500 Iraqis graduated from vocational training courses.
  - Awarded 9,930 apprenticeships.
  - Reached 339,000 young people through sports and arts programs.

- Over 1,400 community associations have been established in all 18 provinces by USAID and PRTs. More than two million days of employment and 33,000 long-term jobs have been created. Additionally, over $276 million has been made available for 5,930 projects, to which Iraqi communities have contributed more than $73 million.
• Iraq government funds have shifted to provinces. The Ninewa PRT, for example, has assisted the provincial government in executing $241 million of Iraq reconstruction and infrastructure improvement funds.

• The Baghdad PRT has worked with the governor in this most critical province to improve essential services and, with the Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committee, awarded 42 construction projects valued at $81 million. Embedded PRTs have projected governance and rule of law programs to the district level.

• The Anbar PRT launched projects worth $450,000 for university and provincial institutions and pioneered the “helicopter engagement” initiative, which is reconnecting Anbar’s far-flung cities and towns with the provincial government.

Specific Examples of PRT Activities in Iraq

Reporting:

• PRTs develop and mine extensive networks of government officials, religious and tribal figures, businessmen, political leaders, and others.

• PRTs provide timely, front-line reporting on political, economic, security, social, and other issues.

Representing U.S. strategic interests:

• Provide a constant “out-of-Baghdad” presence in all 18 provinces.

• Provide a U.S. civilian presence at public gatherings to counter malign influences.

• Generate dialogue on national issues with local members of national parties and tribes.

• Carry the U.S. official message to all provinces to reinforce major U.S. initiatives through an extensive array of local and regional media.

• Provide the embassy with ready, personal access to an extensive and diverse array of political, religious, and tribal leaders throughout Iraq.
Political development initiatives:

• Promote popular political participation.

• Monitor and report to ensure fair treatment of political parties and candidates.

• Support for civil society organizations (CSOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that promote popular political participation.

• Maintain an open dialogue with minority parties and officials.

Election support:

• Support CSOs and NGOs involved in “get out the vote” initiatives.

• Provide logistical support for election monitors.

• Provide logistical and training support for the governorate elections office (GEO).

• Initiate post-election contact with elected officials.

• Enhance political participation by vulnerable groups (e.g., women and minorities).

• Operate women’s centers throughout Iraq as a venue for political dialogue.

• Support CSOs that promote political participation.

Governance:

• Encourage Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems.

• Provide provincial council mentoring and support.

• Conduct daily engagements with elected officials to provide mentoring in democratic practices and procedures.

• Assist in the development of capital budgets that address the needs of the population and promote private investment.

• Develop effective legislative oversight capabilities to reduce government corruption and inefficiency.

• Encourage timely publications of provincial gazettes to promote transparency in the legislative process.
Governor mentoring and support: Conduct frequent engagements with the provincial governor to maintain relationships, exchange information, and obtain support and guidance for PRT-based initiatives.

Capital budget execution:

- Provide comprehensive assistance in the execution of the provincial capital budget with emphasis on development of mechanisms of accountability and effective execution, including:
  - Training on computerized budget management and tracking systems.
  - Training for Iraqi project management units: engineers, legal staff, accountants, and managers.

- Promote use of private engineers and architects in the design and cost estimates.

Public services delivery:

- Organize and support technical training programs to enhance effective delivery of essential services.

- Develop effective government and private oversight and reporting mechanisms to encourage effective delivery of services.

Strategic planning:

- Support Geospatial Information System implementation and training.

- Facilitate strategic planning initiatives.

- Assist in the development of professionally developed, detailed, and scientifically-based strategic plans.

Transparency initiatives:

- Support media access to government meetings.

- Facilitate training for Commission on Integrity offices.

- Facilitate effective dialogue between different levels of government (national, provincial, and local).
Education:

- Facilitate establishment of cooperative/sister school relationships between Iraqi and U.S. universities.
- Provide books, computers, and other educational materials.
- Refurbish schools and related facilities.

Health:

- Facilitate medical training and mentorship for Iraqi health-care providers.
- Refurbish medical care facilities.

Reconciliation initiatives:

- Promote human rights initiatives.
- Visit Iraqi detention facilities to monitor for signs of prisoner abuse.
- Respond promptly to allegations of unfair treatment of minorities.
- Arrange emergency medical care in disasters (bombings).
- Promote public dialogue on human rights.
- Monitor and encourage internally displaced person integration.
- Monitor and encourage Sons of Iraq integration and payment.
- Monitor detainee integration.

Economic development initiatives: Advise and assist in the planning and development of infrastructure essential to support private investment, including the planning and construction of transportation, communication, water, and sewage networks.

Encourage private sector development:

- Facilitate trade and business seminars.
- Facilitate business and government integration/lobbying initiatives through support for trade and business associations, business to government conferences, discussion groups, and seminars.
- Facilitate provincial visits by international investors.
• Promote U.S. foreign direct investment.

• Support local participation in regional and international trade conferences.

• Support small business development centers.

• Provide support and training to enable the Provincial Investment Commission to serve as the primary government interface and assistant for all private investors.

• Assist in developing provincial investment plans.

• Develop provincial marketing materials.

Banking:

• Establish and support bankers associations to promote public use of banks, checking, and electronic funds transfer.

• Support vocational technical training for youth and women.

• Provide micro-grants and lending for women and other vulnerable populations.

• Support agricultural extension offices, directors general of agriculture, and university programs in the development of drought-resistant crops, soil-testing labs, water-efficient irrigation systems, greenhouse farming, herd development, no-till farming, improved harvesting techniques, beekeeping, and fish farms.

• Assist in the development of and provide financial support for agricultural cooperatives.

• Support development of cooperative ventures in cold storage, feed lots, silos, and other key components of the value chain.

Rule of law:

• Enhance the legal profession.

• Support the development of bar associations.

• Facilitate the development of law school curricula and standards.

• Conduct classes in comparative law, constitutional law, and commercial law.
• Support continuing legal education initiatives.

• Promote computerized legal services.

• Improve law enforcement practices and capacities.

• Facilitate police training in investigative techniques, evidence collection, constitutional law, and forensic evidence.

• Develop appropriate relationships between the police and investigative judges.

• Monitor trials and detentions for signs of legal corruption, intimidation, or favoritism.

• Facilitate the installation and training on computerized case management systems.

• Fund improvements of courthouses.

• Fund safety training and improvements for courts and judges.

• Monitor detention facilities to promote timely processing of the accused.

• Support training for provincial offices of Commissions on Integrity.

• Support the development of anti-corruption task forces.

• Support pro bono legal centers for women and criminal defendants.

• Maintain a close relationship with judges to monitor problems in the judicial system and to elevate the standing of the judiciary.

• Conduct public awareness campaigns in support of the rule of law.

Public diplomacy:

• Support public education through the distribution of books, laboratory equipment, and gym supplies.

• Facilitate International Visitor Leadership Programs in all provinces.

• Provide media training in investigative journalism and general operations.

• Provide local media with a briefing on U.S.-funded projects and programs.
• Provide local media with access to U.S. officials and statements.

• Provide youth outreach support for recreation centers, youth leagues, and after-school programs.

• Sponsor plays, concerts, and other cultural activities.

• Support historic preservation initiatives.

• Support public libraries.

• Support computer training in schools.
Appendix B

National and Provincial Data for Iraq

Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq was occupied by Great Britain during the course of World War I. In 1920, it was declared a League of Nations mandate under United Kingdom administration. In stages over the next dozen years, Iraq attained its independence as a kingdom in 1932. A “republic” was proclaimed in 1958, but in actuality a series of strongmen ruled the country until 2003. The last was Saddam Hussein.

Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war (1980-88). In August 1990, Iraq seized Kuwait but was expelled by U.S.-led, United Nations (U.N.) coalition forces during the Gulf War of January–February 1991. Following Kuwait’s liberation, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) required Iraq to scrap all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles and to allow U.N. verification inspections. Continued Iraqi noncompliance with UNSC resolutions over a period of 12 years led to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime. U.S. forces remained in Iraq under a UNSC mandate until 2009 and under a bilateral security agreement thereafter to help provide security and support the freely elected government.

In October 2005, Iraqis approved a constitution in a national referendum and, pursuant to this document, elected a 275-member Council of Representatives in December 2005. After the election, Ibrahim al-Jaafari was selected as prime minister; he was replaced by Nuri al-Maliki in May 2006. The Council of Representatives approved most cabinet ministers in May 2006, marking the transition to Iraq’s first constitutional government in nearly a half century. On 31 January 2009, Iraq held elections for provincial councils in all provinces except for the three provinces comprising the Kurdistan Regional Government ([KRG] Dohuk, Erbil, and Suleimaniah) and in Kirkuk province.

Demographic and Government Information

Population of Iraq: 28,945,657 (July 2009 estimate)

Age structure:

0-14 years: 38.8% (male 5,709,688/female 5,531,359)
15-64 years: 58.2% (male 8,529,956/female 8,310,164)
65 years and over: 3% (male 408,266/female 456,224) (2009 estimate)
Median age:
Total: 20.4 years
Male: 20.3 years
Female: 20.5 years (2009 estimate)

Population growth rate:
2.507% (2009 estimate)
Country comparison to the world: 32

Birth rate:
30.1 births/1,000 population (2009 estimate)
Country comparison to the world: 49

Death rate:
5.03 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 estimate)
Country comparison to the world: 188

Net migration rate: Not applicable (2009)

Urbanization:
Urban population: 67% of total population (2008)
Rate of urbanization: 1.7% annual rate of change (2005-10 estimate)

Sex ratio:
At birth: 1.05 male(s)/female
Under 15 years: 1.03 male(s)/female
15-64 years: 1.03 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 0.9 male(s)/female
Total population: 1.02 male(s)/female (2009 estimate)

Infant mortality rate:
Total: 43.82 deaths/1,000 live births
Country comparison to the world: 60
Male: 49.38 deaths/1,000 live births
Female: 37.98 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 estimate)
Life expectancy at birth:
Total population: 69.94 years
Country comparison to the world: 144
Male: 68.6 years
Female: 71.34 years (2009 estimate)

Total fertility rate:
3.86 children born/woman (2009 estimate)
Country comparison to the world: 48

HIV/AIDS – adult prevalence rate:
Less than 0.1% (2001 estimate)
Country comparison to the world: 154

HIV/AIDS – people living with HIV/AIDS:
Fewer than 500 (2003 estimate)
Country comparison to the world: 148

HIV/AIDS – deaths: Not applicable

Major infectious diseases:
Degree of risk: Intermediate
Food or waterborne diseases: bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever.

(Note: Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza has been identified in this country; it poses a negligible risk with extremely rare cases possible among U.S. citizens who have close contact with birds [2009].)

Nationality:
Noun: Iraqi(s)
Adjective: Iraqi

Ethnic groups: Arab 75%-80%; Kurdish 15%-20%; Turkoman, Assyrian, or other 5%

Religions: Muslim 97% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%); Christian or other 3%

Languages: Arabic; Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions); Turkoman (a Turkish dialect); Assyrian (Neo-Aramaic); Armenian
Literacy:
Definition: Age 15 and over can read and write
Total population: 74.1%
Male: 84.1%
Female: 64.2% (2000 estimate)

School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education):
Total: 10 years
Male: 11 years
Female: 8 years (2005)

Government
Conventional long form: Republic of Iraq
Conventional short form: Iraq
Local long form: Jumhuriyat al-Iraq
Local short form: Al Iraq

Government type: Parliamentary democracy

Capital:
Name: Baghdad
Time difference: Universal Time Code+3 (8 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)

Administrative divisions:
18 governorates or provinces: Al Anbar, Al Basrah, Al Muthanna, Al Qadisiyah, An Najaf, Erbil, As Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Babil, Baghdad, Duhok, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Karbala, Maysan, Ninawa, Salah al Din, and Wasit
1 region: KRG

Independence: 3 October 1932 (from League of Nations mandate under British administration).
(Note: On 28 June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi-controlled government.)

(Note: The government of Iraq has yet to declare an official national holiday but still observes Republic Day.)
Constitution: Ratified on 15 October 2005 (subject to review by the Constitutional Review Committee and a possible public referendum).

Legal system: Based on European civil and Islamic law under the framework outlined in the Iraqi constitution; has not accepted compulsory International Court of Justice jurisdiction.

Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal.

Executive branch:

Chief of state: President Jalal Talabani (since 6 April 2005); Vice Presidents Adil Abd al-Mahdi and Tariq al-Hashimi (since 22 April 2006).

(Note: The president and vice presidents comprise the Presidency Council.)

Head of government: Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (since 20 May 2006); Rafi al-Issawi (since 19 July 2008).

Cabinet: 36 ministers appointed by the Presidency Council, plus Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and Deputy Prime Ministers Barham Salih and Rafi al-Issawi.

Legislative branch: Unicameral Council of Representatives (consisting of 275 members elected by a closed-list, proportional representation system).

Elections: Last held 15 December 2005 to elect a 275-member Council of Representatives; next elections to be held on 18 January 2010. The Council of Representatives elected the Presidency Council and approved the prime minister and two deputy prime ministers.

Election results, Council of Representatives: Percent of vote by party: Unified Iraqi Alliance, 41%; Kurdistan Alliance, 22%; Tawafuq Coalition, 15%; Iraqi National List, 8%; Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, 4%; Other, 10%.

Number of seats by party (as of November 2007): Unified Iraqi Alliance (including the Sadrist bloc with 30 and Fadilah with 15), 130; Kurdistan Alliance, 53; Tawafuq Front, 44; Iraqi National List, 25; Fadilah, 15; Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, 11; Other, 12.

Judicial branch: The Iraq constitution calls for the federal judicial power to be comprised of the Higher Judicial Council, Federal Supreme Court, Federal Court of Cassation, Public Prosecution Department, Judiciary Oversight Commission, and other federal courts that are regulated in accordance with the law.
Political parties and leaders:


(Note: The Kurdistan Alliance, Iraqi National List, Tawafuq Front, Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, and Unified Iraqi Alliance were only electoral slates consisting of the representatives from the various Iraqi political parties.)

Political pressure groups: Sunni militias; Shia militias, some associated with political parties

International organization participation:

Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa; Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development; Arab Monetary Fund; Council of Arab Economic Unity; Food and Agriculture Organization; Group of 77; International Atomic Energy Agency; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank); International Civil Aviation Organization; International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; International Development Association; Islamic Development Bank; International Fund for Agricultural Development; International Finance Corporation; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; International Labor Organization; International Monetary Fund; International Maritime Organization; International Olympic Committee; International Organization for Standardization; International Telecommunication Union; Nonaligned Movement; Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries; Organization of the Islamic Conference; Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; Organization of

**Diplomatic representation from the United States:**

Chief of mission: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill

Embassy: Baghdad

Mailing address: APO AE 09316

Telephone: 1-240-553-0589 ext. 5340 or 5635 (Consular Section)

**Flag description:** Three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black. The *Takbir* (Arabic expression meaning “God is great”) in green Arabic script is centered in the white band. The Council of Representatives approved this flag as a compromise temporary replacement for the Ba’athist Saddam-era flag.

![Flag Image](image-url)
U.S. Department of Agriculture Information on Iraq

Iraq is an important country in the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) portfolio, both in terms of capacity building and agricultural trade. The renewal of the trade relationship with Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime has seen U.S. exports of wheat, rice, and poultry grow to reach $1 billion in fiscal year 2008. Iraq is currently the fourth largest market for U.S. rice and the fifth largest market for U.S. wheat and poultry. USDA’s agricultural strategy for Iraq is aimed at developing a dynamic food and agricultural system that is characterized as competitive, sustainable, and globally integrated. These objectives are partially achieved by the placement of USDA agricultural advisers in Iraq’s Ministry of Agriculture and USDA agricultural advisers on provincial reconstruction teams and through technical assistance.

Major U.S. agricultural imports: Food, medicine, manufactured goods, and refined petroleum products

Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita: $3,600

Agriculture: 95% of GDP

Agricultural production: Wheat, barley, rice, vegetables, cotton, dates, cattle, and sheep

Major agricultural exports: Crude oil, crude materials excluding fuels, food, and live animals

Provincial Data

Al Anbar is the largest province in Iraq geographically. Encompassing much of the country’s western territory, it shares borders with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Al Anbar is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim Arab. Its capital is Ar Ramadi; other important cities include Fallujah and Haditha. The province was known as Dulaim until 1962, when it was changed to Ramadi. In 1976 it was renamed Al Anbar. Much of Al Anbar province consists of the Syrian Desert. The region’s geography is a combination of steppe and true desert characterized by a desert climate, low rainfall, and a large variation in temperatures between day and night. Summer temperatures rise to 42 degrees Celsius, while the winter average lows reach 9 degrees Celsius. The northwesterly and southwesterly winds sometimes amount to a maximum speed of 21 miles per hour. Average rainfall in winter is 115 millimeters. The most important agricultural crops in Al Anbar are wheat, potatoes, autumn barley, maize and vegetables, and fodder. There are also a large number of orchards, and the province has 2.5 million palm
trees. Agriculture depends on perfusion or through the rivers, wells, and rains. Most of the inhabitants are Sunni Muslims from the Dulaim tribe.

Provincial capital: Ramadi

Area: 138,228 square (sq) kilometers (km) (32% of Iraq)

Population: 1,485,985 (5% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 48%; Urban: 52%

Population by district: Al-Kaim 137,567; Haditha 78,656; Al-Rutba 30,066; Heet 129,004; Ana 21,865; Al-Ramadi 540,474; Falluja 529,598; Raw 18,756.

**Basra** province, or **Al Basrah** province, is a province in southern Iraq bordering Kuwait to the south and Iran to the east. The provincial capital is Basra city. Other major cities include Al-Qurnah, Az Zubayr, and Umm Qasr near the Persian Gulf. In 1920, after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the United Kingdom combined the former Ottoman vilayets of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul to form the British Mandate of Mesopotamia. The mandate was succeeded by the Kingdom of Iraq in 1932. A proposal to join Basra with the neighboring governorates of Dhi Qar and Maysan to form a southeastern state in an eventual Iraqi federation is currently under discussion. A new law, passed by the Iraqi Parliament in 2006, allows for the merger of two or more provinces as of April 2008. Currently, there is movement calling for a referendum on making Basra an autonomous region like the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq. The province was formally transferred to full Iraqi control on 16 December 2007, making it the ninth such province to be transferred. In September 2009, three districts of Basra province were declared disaster areas as a result of Iran’s construction of new dams on the Karun River. The new dams resulted in high levels of salinity in Shatt Al-Arab, which destroyed farm areas and threatened livestock. Civilians in the area were forced to evacuate.

Province capital: Basrah

Area: 19,070 sq km (4.4% of Iraq)

Population: 1,912,533 (6% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 21.8%; Urban: 78.2%
Population by district: Basrah 951,655; Al-Midaina 160,420; Al-Qurna 194,216; Shatt Al-Arab 104,089; Abu Al-Khaseeb 162,740; Al Zubair 320,523; Fao 18,890

Al Muthanna or sometimes simply Muthanna, is in southern Iraq, bordering Saudi Arabia. Its capital is Samawah. Prior to 1976 it was part of the Diwaniya province, which also included present-day Najaf province and Al-Qādisiyyah province. Muthanna also includes the ancient Sumerian ruin of Uruk, which is possibly the source of the name Iraq. On 13 July 2006, British, Australian, and Japanese forces handed over security responsibility for Muthanna province to Iraqi forces in the first such transfer of an entire province. Having suffered from chronic underdevelopment since the 1980s, Muthanna consistently fares poorly according to humanitarian and development indicators. Poverty and female illiteracy are widespread. Connection to the general water network is poor compared to the rest of Iraq, but electricity supplies are relatively reliable. The poor infrastructure and lack of urban centers mean that Muthanna has a relatively low number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Although the governor was assassinated in August 2008, the security situation remains calm.

Province capital: Samawah

Area: 51,740 sq km (11.9% of Iraq)

Population: 614,997 (2% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 56%; Urban: 44%

Population by district: Al-Samawa 255,215; Al-Rumaitha 257,117; Al-Salman 6,520; Al-Khidhir 86,145

Al-Qadisiyyah (Al-Diwaniyah) is in the center of Iraq. Its capital is ad-Diwāniyyah. Before 1976, it was part of the ad-Diwāniyyah province along with Al Muthanna governorate and Najaf governorate. The governorate is named for the historic town of Al-Qadisiyyah, site of the Battle of Al-Qadisiyyah, where in 636 CE (Christian Era) the Caliph Umar defeated the forces of the Persian Sassanid Empire, bringing Islam to all of modern Iraq and Iran. Al-Qadisiyyah became the tenth of Iraq’s 18 provinces to reach provincial Iraqi control on 16 July 2008. In so doing, it reverted to its former name of Al-Diwaniyah. In spite of poor infrastructure and limited job opportunities, almost half (47 percent) of Al-Qadisiyyah’s IDP population wish to settle in their current location. Three-quarters (77 percent) of IDPs in the governorate were displaced from Baghdad. The number of security incidents per month dropped by 85 percent in Qadissiya between June and December 2008. Levels of violence are now among
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the lowest in the country. Al-Qadisiyyah, like neighbouring Muthanna, performs poorly according to many humanitarian and developmental indicators. Poverty is widespread in all districts except Diwaniya.

Female labor force participation is low except in Diwaniya, and female unemployment is high in all districts. Electricity supply from the main network is poor outside Afaq, with most households in Al-Shamiya and Hamza also unable to access an alternative source. Water and sanitation infrastructure is poor outside Diwaniya. Illiteracy and poor education are severe among men and women in Al-Shamia and Hamza and also among women in Afaq.

Provincial capital: Diwaniya

Area: 8153 sq km (1.9% of Iraq)

Population: 990,483 (3% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 48%; Urban: 52%

Population by district: Al-Diwaniya 440,927; Afaq 142,623; Al-Shamiya 230,974; Al-Hamza 175,959

Najaf province is located between Anbar and Muthanna. Prior to 1976 it was part of the Diwaniya province, which also included present-day Al Muthanna governorate and Al-Qadisiyyah governorate. On 20 December 2006, the Najaf governorate was the third governorate in Iraq to be handed over by the occupying coalition forces to Iraqi control. The capital is the city of Najaf, which is 160 km south of Baghdad. It is one of the holiest cities of Shia Islam and the center of Shia political power in Iraq. The other major city is Al Kufah. Both cities are holy to Shiite Muslims, who form the majority of the population. Najaf’s IDP population is of average size compared to other governorates. Approximately 85 percent of Najaf’s IDPs are originally from Baghdad and almost all are Shia. However, 95 percent wish to return to their homes. The security situation in Najaf remains calm. Najaf district (which contains the governorate capital) performs well according to many humanitarian and development indicators. However, the areas outside Najaf perform relatively poorly. Access to electricity is relatively reliable in Najaf and average elsewhere. Relatively few households outside Najaf have access to a secondary source of electricity for times when the normal network fails. Sanitation and access to safe water are poor in Al-Koufa and Al-Manathra. However, levels of chronic malnutrition are low across the governorate. Also, labor force participation is high among men in all districts and among women outside Najaf.

Province capital: Najaf
Erbil province is located in the north of the country. It derives its name from the city of Arbil, which is also its capital. Erbil is largely populated by Kurds but has a small minority of Assyrians. The governorate is a part of the Kurdistan autonomous region. The region’s economy is largely agricultural with some oil production and was badly affected by the conflict between Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Kurds. On 30 May 2007, Erbil was handed over to local Iraqi authorities by coalition forces as part of a three province handover. Erbil hosts a considerable number of IDPs, who mostly come from Baghdad and Ninewa. Few of Erbil’s residents are among Iraq’s poorest, but the province does not perform well according to many other humanitarian and developmental indicators. Illiteracy rates in the governorate are generally above average. Female labor force participation is also low. Infrastructure is poor across the governorate: the vast majority of households in all districts except Koisnjaq suffer from prolonged power cuts, with few able to access an alternative electricity source. Sanitation is poor in all districts except Erbil, Dushty Howleer, Koisnjaq, and Makmurm. Most households in Shaqlawa, Juman, and Mergasur are not connected to the water network.

Province capital: Erbil

As Sulaymaniyah province is a province within the Iraqi Kurdistan region. Its capital is a city of the same name, As Sulaymaniyah. The province is surrounded by mountains (Goyzha, Azmir, Glazarda, and Piramagrun). When it was established under the Baban (1649-1850) dynasty in 1781 during the reign of Mahmud Pasha Baban, it was known by its former name “Namo” (later changed to Sulaymaniya). During the Iraq war, the province
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was occupied by U.S.-led coalition forces. On 30 May 2007, Sulaymānīyah was handed over to local Kurdish authorities by coalition forces as part of a three province handover. Few of As Sulaymaniyah’s residents are among Iraq’s poorest, but the governorate performs poorly according to many other developmental and humanitarian indicators. Education levels are generally below average: illiteracy is particularly severe among women in all districts apart from Sulaymaniyah and Halabja and for men in Penjwin, Sharbazher, and Pshdar. There are also widespread infrastructural problems, with all districts suffering from prolonged power cuts. Penjwin, Said Sadik, Sharbazher, and particularly Kardagh experience poor access to the water network.

Province capital: Sulaymaniyah

Area: 17,023sq km (3.9% of Iraq)
Population: 1893617 (6% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%
Geographical distribution: Rural: 30%; Urban: 70%

Population by district: Al-Sulaimaniya 751,459; Kardagh 13004; Shahrzour 61,845; Said Sadik 99,455; Halabcha 95,552; Penjwin 57,347; Shahrabazar 46,308; Pishder 121,971; Rania 200,826; Dokan 73992; Darbandikhan 45,169; Kalar 192,474; Kifri 52961; Chamchamal 183,758

Kirkuk province is located in the north of the country. From 1976 to mid-2006, it had been called At-Ta’mim (Kurdish: Kerkûk), which means “nationalization” and refers to the national ownership of the very rich oil and natural gas reserves. Prior to 1976 it was called Kirkuk Governorate and was a larger area that also included parts that were then added to the neighboring As Sulaymaniyah, Diyala, and Salah ad Din provinces. Since mid 2006 the original pre-Ba’ath name was restored, and the province is now known as the “Kirkuk province,” but without any alteration in the boundaries back to the pre-1976 area. The provincial capital is the city of Kirkuk. Kirkuk is a very ethnically diverse province, with a significant minority of Arabs, Turkomans, and Assyrians. Kurdish people consider Kirkuk to be their holy place. The U.S. Army estimated in 2009 that Kurds comprised 52 percent of the population, Arabs 35 percent, and Turkoman 12 percent. Kirkuk is at the center of a political controversy—a referendum on the province joining the Kurdish autonomous region. Kirkuk province performs well compared to the rest of Iraq according to most humanitarian and development indicators. Daquq district is the least developed area in the province, with below average education levels, a high poverty rate, and poor infrastructure. Significant numbers of the population in Kirkuk district suffer from chronic disease.
Province capital: Kirkuk
Area: 9,679 sq km (2.2% of Iraq)
Population: 902,019 (3% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%
Geographical distribution: Rural: 31%; Urban: 69%
Population by district: Kirkuk 572,080; Al-Hawiga 215,193; Daquq 75,279; Dibis 39,467

**Babil** province is located in central Iraq. The provincial capital is the city of al Hillah. The city of Al Musayyib and the ancient ruins of Babylon (Babil, after which the region is named) are also in the province. Before 1971 it was known as Hilla province. The ancient city of Babylon in present-day Babil province was the capital of the Old Kingdom of Babylonia situated on the Euphrates River south of modern Baghdad, Iraq. The city was occupied from the third millennium B.C. but became important early in the second millennium under the kings of the First Dynasty of Babylon. The sixth king of this dynasty was Hammurabi (1792-1750 B.C.), who made Babylon the capital of a vast empire and is best remembered for his code of laws. This period was brought to an end by the Hittites, when in 1595 B.C., Babylon was sacked by King Mursili I. The city then had a mixed history until the Neo-Babylonian period of the 7th to 6th centuries B.C. It once again achieved pre-eminence when Nebuchadnezzar II (605-562 B.C.) extended the Chaldean Empire over most of Western Asia. Babylon fell to Cyrus the Great of Persia in 539 B.C.; occupation continued in the Achaemenid period. The city was taken by Alexander the Great in 331 B.C. More than five years after the start of the Iraq war, governance of Babil province was returned to Iraq on 23 October 2008. The ceremony took place between local representatives, representatives from Baghdad, and the U.S. Army. Babil performs on an average level according to most humanitarian and development indicators but poorly according to some. Poverty and access to safe water are major problems in all districts except Hilla. Electricity supplies are poor in all districts. However, female labor force participation and employment are well above average outside Hilla.

Governorate capital: Hilla
Area: 5,119 sq km (1.2% of Iraq)
Population: 1,651,565 (6% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%
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Geographical distribution: Rural: 53%; Urban: 47%

Population by district: Al-Hilla 682,783; Al-Mahawil 256,811; Al-Hashimiya 375,947; Al-Mussyab 336,024

Baghdad province contains the main city of Baghdad, its suburbs, and adjacent towns, which includes Al-Mada’in, Taji, Al Mahmudiyah district (in the so-called “triangle of death”), and Abu Ghraib district. The governorate is the smallest of the 18 governorates of Iraq but the most populous. Baghdad governorate is considered one of the more developed parts of Iraq, with a better infrastructure than much of Iraq, though heavily damaged from the invasion in 2003 and continuing violence today. It also has one of the highest rates for terrorism in the world, with bombs, suicide attackers, and hit squads operating in the city. Baghdad has at least 12 bridges spanning the Tigris River that join the east and west areas of the city. The Sadr City district of the capital is the most densely populated area in Iraq. Baghdad is governed by the Baghdad Provincial Council. Representatives to the Baghdad Provincial Council were elected by their peers from the lower councils of the administrative districts in Baghdad in numbers proportional to the population of the various districts that were represented. Most households in Sadr City, Al Resafa, Adhamiya, Karkh, and Kadhmiyah have infrequent or no connection to the electricity network. Mahmudiya, Sadr City, Al Resafa, and Adhamiya have significant levels of chronic disease.

Provincial capital: Baghdad City

Area: 4,555 sq km (1.5% of Iraq)

Population: 7,145,470 (24% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 13%; Urban: 87%

Population by district: Al-Resafa 1,312,052; Al-Kadhmiyah 832,759; Al-Adhamiya 842,310; Mahmoudiya 496,053; Al-Sader 1,316,583; Abu-Ghraib 326,626; Al-Karkh 1,624,057; Al-Tarmia 62,147; Al-Mada’in 332,883

Duhok (also spelled Dahuk, Dihok) province, Iraq’s most northern governate, is located on the border with Turkey. Prior to 1976 it was part of Ninawa governorate, which was called Mosul province. Its capital is Duhok city. It also includes the city of Zakho, which has at various times served as a checkpoint for the border with Turkey. Along with Erbil and Sulaymaniya, Dahuk makes up the area administrated by the KRG. Much of Dahuk’s landscape is dominated by mountains. The governorate
is Iraq’s least populated. IDPs constitute a large proportion of Dahuk’s population. In spite of Dahuk’s poor infrastructure, an unusually high proportion (58 percent) of Dahuk’s IDPs intends to integrate into the host community. Almost all originate from Ninewa and Baghdad. The security situation in Dahuk remains calm. Dahuk performs poorly according to most humanitarian and development indicators. Education levels are below average in all districts. Over 90 percent of households in all districts apart from Al-Shikhan and Aqraa have more than 11 hours of power cuts daily.

Provincial capital: Dahuk

Area: 6,553 sq km (1.5% of Iraq)

Population: 505,491 (2% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 27%; Urban: 73%

Population by district: Duhouk 160,569; Sumel 63,211; Zakho 137,238; Al-Amadiya 24,069; Al-Shikhan 20,672; Aqra 31,472; Bardah Resh 21,638

Dhi Qar province is located in southern Iraq. The provincial capital is Nasiriyah. Prior to 1976 the province was known as Muntafaq province. Dhi Qar was the site of the ancient civilization of Sumer, and the ruins of Ur, Eridu, Lagash, and Ngirsu are present here. Dhi Qar governorate includes the towns of Al-Riţa’, Qal at Sukhar, Al-Shatra, Al-Gharraf, Suq al-Shoyokh, and Al-Chibayish. The province was notorious in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s era of dictatorship as one of the most troublesome spots for the Ba’ath government. In 1991 the governorate fell to Islamist groups as part of a wider uprising that failed to topple the Saddam Hussein government. An Nasiriyah witnessed some of the heaviest fighting and some of the stiffest resistance against invading U.S. forces in 2003. Dhi Qar was the second Iraqi province to be handed over to the Iraqi Security Forces. The province achieved provincial Iraqi control on 21 September 2006 from Italian forces in a ceremony presided over by Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki. Dhi Qar performs poorly according to many humanitarian and developmental indicators. Poverty is widespread in the governorate, with the populations of the Marshland districts of Al-Shatra and Al-Chibayish experiencing the highest poverty rates. Unemployment is almost double the national average for both men and women, with Al-Shatra experiencing the highest levels. Illiteracy and poor education are major problems for women outside the Nasiriyah district, and low female labor force participation is prevalent in all districts. The quality of electricity supply is generally very good, with the exception of the Riţa’i district, where it is extremely poor. Water access is extremely poor outside Nasiriyah. Acute malnutrition among children in Al-Shatra is triple the national average.
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Province capital: Nasiriyah

Area: 12900 sq km (3% of Iraq)

Population: 1,616,226 (5% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 42%; Urban: 58%

Population by district: Al-Nasiriya 593,735; Al-rifai 336,156; Suq Al-Shoyokh 255,789; Al-Chibayish 64,277; Al-Shatra 366,269

**Diyala** province extends to the northeast of Baghdad as far as the Iranian border. Its capital is Baqubah. A large portion of the province is drained by the Diyala River, a major tributary of the Tigris. Because of its proximity to two major sources of water, Diyala’s main industry is agriculture, primarily dates grown in large date palm groves. It is also recognized as the orange capital of the Middle East. The Hamrin mountains are in this governorate. The Kurds form the majority in Kifri and Khanaqin districts and Sunni Arabs in the rest of the governorate. Shi’a Arabs exist mostly in the villages of Kharnabat, Al Abarrah, Zaganiya, and Al Howaider. In 2003, Diyala was comprised of about 80 percent Sunni Arabs, with 16 percent Feyli Kurds, 2 percent Turkmen, and 2 percent Shi’a Arabs and others. Seventy-five percent of the population of Diyala is in the major cities of Baqubah, Muqaddamia, and Khanaqin. The Diyala province also boasts the Diyala Media Center, which has one of the Middle East’s tallest radio and television antennas at 1,047 feet. The Diyala Media Center was built under contract by a Japanese architectural firm in 1989. It is one of Iraq’s few independent radio and television stations that offer local television and radio news coverage as well as rebroadcasting of state-run television. With the exception of the Baladrooz district, Diyala performs well according to humanitarian and development indicators. Baladrooz has severe problems with poverty and unreliable electricity supplies. A high number of the population in both Baladrooz and Al-Khalis suffer from chronic disease. Connection to the water network is poor outside Ba’qubah and Al-Khalis.

Provincial capital: Ba’qubah

Area: 17,685 sq km (4.1% of Iraq)

Population: 1,560,621 (5% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 59%; Urban: 41%

Population by district: Ba’quba 135,291; Al-Muqaddamia 248,575; Al-Khalis 319,332; Khanaqin 179,191; Baladrooz 627,489
Karbala province is situated between Anbar, Babil, and Najaf in south-central Iraq. It is one of the country’s smallest and least populated provinces. The capital city of Karbala, a holy city for Shi’ite Muslims, houses the shrine of Imam Hussein, a revered figure who attracts many pilgrims from Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Karbala’s relatively calm security situation and predominantly Shia population have led many Shi’a fleeing the violence in Baghdad and Diyala to seek refuge there. Karbala is also the eighth of Iraq’s 18 provinces to be handed over by coalition forces to full Iraqi government control. Karbala performs at an average level according to most humanitarian and development indicators. The percentage of households connected to the water network is relatively high. However, poverty is a severe problem throughout the governorate. Female labor force participation is generally low, particularly in Ain Al-Tamur.

Province capital: Karbala

Area: 5,034 sq km (1% of Iraq)

Population: 887,859 (3% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 35%; Urban: 65%

Population by district: Karbala 632,755; Ain al-Tamur 24,558; Al-Hindiya 230,546

Maysan is a province in southeastern Iraq that borders Iran (see Figure B-16). The provincial capital, located beside the Tigris, is Al Amarah. The second settlement is Majar Al-Kabir. Prior to 1976 the province was known as Amara province. Maysan is a majority Shia province. Its population suffered greatly during the Iran–Iraq War, during which it was a major battlefield, and subsequently post the 1991 Shia Uprising. The province is traditionally home to many Marsh Arabs and also contains part of the Marshlands, which have been an important source of support for Shia political movements in southern Iraq. Once an important agricultural and industrial center, Maysan’s economy has declined due to crumbling infrastructure and poor access to resources. The security situation in Maysan remains relatively calm in spite of a renewed outbreak of violence in October 2008. Even though the governorate’s infrastructure is poor, Maysan hosts a large number of IDPs, the vast majority of whom come from Baghdad. Maysan performs poorly—and often worst—according to many developmental and humanitarian indicators. Lack of access to safe water supplies and poor sanitation are coupled with the high prevalence of diarrhea and fever in most districts. All districts except Al-Maimouna also suffer poor access to electricity. Illiteracy is above average for both men
and women outside Amara, and education levels are very low in all districts except Amara and Al-Mejar Al-Kabir. Female labor force participation is far below average in all districts except Ali Al-Gharbi. Poverty is high outside Amara, particularly in Ali Al-Gharbi, Al-Maimouna, and Al-Kahla.

Province capital: Amarah

Area: 16,072sq km (3.7% of Iraq)

Population: 824,147 (3% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 35%; Urban: 65%

Population by district: Al-Amara 437,817; Ali-Al-Gharbi 45,779; Al-Maimouna 92,919; Qalat Saleh 175,959; Al-Mejar Al-Kabir 110,835; Al-Kahla 50,543

Ninawa province is located in northern Iraq on the Syrian border. Its chief city and the provincial capital is Mosul, Iraq’s third largest city, which lies across the Tigris River from the ruins of ancient Nineveh. Tal Afar is also a greater city within the region. Prior to 1976, Ninawa was called Mosul province and also included the present-day Dahuk province. Its two main cities endured the 2003 invasion of Iraq and emerged relatively unscathed. In 2004, however, Mosul and Tal Afar were the scenes of fierce battles between U.S.-led troops and the Iraqi insurgency. The insurgents had moved to Ninawa after the Battle of Fallujah in 2004. Security worsened during the second half of 2008, with ethnic tensions leading to the displacement of 13,000 Christians from Mosul to surrounding areas. Although most of these families have returned and violence has decreased, the situation remains tense, particularly in Mosul city. Telafar, Sinjar, Al-Ba’aj, and Hatra districts have among the worst rates of connection to the general water network in Iraq. All districts apart from Hatra have prolonged power cuts or are not connected to the general electricity network. Poverty is a significant problem in all districts except Al-Ba’aj.

Province capital: Mosul

Area: 37,323 sq km (8.6% of Iraq)

Population: 2,811,091 (9% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 39%; Urban: 61%
Population by district: Al-Mosul 1,620,259; Telafar 382,050; Al-Hamdaniya 143,462; Al-Shikhan 49,396; Tildaif 190,403; Al-Hatre 55,157; Sinjar 237,073; Al-Baaj 133,291

**Salah al Din** (or **Salahuddin**) province is located north of Baghdad. The capital is Tikrit; the province also contains the significantly larger city of Samarra. Before 1976 the governorate was part of Baghdad governorate. Salah al-Din’s population is one of the most rural in Iraq. The February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari mosque in the city of Samarra triggered a new wave of sectarian violence and displacement that lasted until 2007. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization launched a project to restore the Shi’a shrine following a subsequent attack in June 2007. The governorate capital of Tikrit was the birthplace of Saddam Hussein. Salah al-Din has been one of Iraq’s more unsecure governorates since 2003. Salah al-Din as a whole performs on an average level according to many developmental and humanitarian indicators, but with wide variation between districts. Illiteracy is generally below average but is a major issue in Al-Fares and Samarra. Female labor force participation is high in Samarra and Al-Fares yet low in Tikrit, Tooz, and Bayji. Unemployment is low in some areas but double the national average among women in Tooz. Water access and sanitation facilities are good in Tooz, Balad, and Bayji, yet well below average elsewhere. Electricity supplies are very poor in Tooz, Balad, Al-Daur, and Al-Fares.

Province capital: Tikrit

Area: 24,075sq km (5.6% of Iraq)

Population: 1,191,403 (4% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 54%; Urban: 46%

Population by district: Tikrit 172,119; Tooz 160,690; Samarra 205,664; Balad 223,354; Bayji 158,335; Al-Daur 53,983; Al-Shirqat 141,142; Al-Fares 76,1169

**Wasit** province is situated on Iraq’s eastern border with Iran. Its name comes from the Arabic word meaning “middle,” as it lies along the Tigris River about midway between Baghdad and the Basra. Its major cities include the capital, Al Kut, and Al Hai. Prior to 1976 it was known as Kut province. Another city in this province is Wassit. The province is an important trade route for goods being shipped north to Baghdad or south to Maysan along the Tigris River. Wassit hosts a large number of IDPs, most of which were displaced from neighboring Baghdad and Diyala. Clashes between local militias and Iraqi Security Forces persisted during the second
half of 2008. In spite of the continuing violence and underdevelopment, an unusually large proportion of Wassit’s IDPs (two-thirds) intends to settle permanently in the governorate. Wassit performs well according to some humanitarian and development indicators, but lags behind in many key areas. Wassit’s electricity supplies are reliable compared to the rest of Iraq. However, all districts apart from Badra and Al-Suwaira suffer from high poverty levels. Illiteracy is above average for both men and women in almost all districts. Badra and Al-Suwaira suffer from lack of water network access, poor sanitation, and chronic malnutrition.

Province capital: Kut

Area: 17,153 sq km (3.9% of Iraq)

Population: 1,064,950 (4% of total); Gender distribution: Male: 50%; Female: 50%

Geographical distribution: Rural: 48%; Urban: 52%

Population by district: Al-Kut 387,350; Al-Na’maniya 143,981; Al-Hai 163,696; Badra 22,498; Al-Azezia 243,256; Al-Suwaira 347,425
Appendix C

North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Assistance to Iraq

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) does not have a direct role in the international stabilization force that has been in Iraq since May 2003, the alliance is helping Iraq provide for its own security by training Iraqi military personnel, supporting the development of the country’s security institutions, and coordinating the delivery of equipment. All NATO member countries are contributing to the training effort either in or outside Iraq through financial contributions or donations of equipment.

Aim of the Operation

NATO is involved in training, equipping, and technical assistance—not combat. The aim is to help Iraq build the capability of its government to address the security needs of the Iraqi people.

Policy Evolution

At their summit meeting in Istanbul on 28 June 2004, NATO heads of state and government agreed to assist Iraq with training its security forces. A training implementation mission was established on 30 July 2004.

In a letter sent to the NATO Secretary General on 22 June 2004, interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi requested NATO support to his government through training and other forms of technical assistance. Alliance presidents and prime ministers responded positively, offering NATO’s assistance to the government of Iraq with the training of its security forces. They also encouraged member countries to contribute to the training of the Iraqi armed forces.

The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s senior decision-making body, was tasked to develop, on an urgent basis, the modalities to implement this decision with the Iraqi interim government.

Training Implementation Mission

On 30 July 2004, these modalities were agreed on, and a NATO Training Implementation Mission was established in Iraq. Its goal was to identify the best methods for conducting training both inside and outside the country. In
addition, the mission immediately began training selected Iraqi headquarters personnel in Iraq. The first elements of the mission deployed on 7 August 2004.

Expanding NATO’s assistance

On 22 September 2004, based on the mission’s recommendations, the North Atlantic Council agreed to expand NATO’s assistance, including establishing a NATO-supported Iraqi training, education, and doctrine center in Iraq. In November 2004, NATO’s military authorities prepared a detailed concept of operations for the expanded assistance, including the rules of engagement for force protection. On 9 December 2004, NATO foreign ministers authorized the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to start the next stage of the mission.

The activation order for this next stage was given by the SACEUR on 16 December 2004. The order paved the way for an expansion of the mission to up to 300 personnel deployed in Iraq, including trainers and support staff and a significant increase in the existing training and mentoring given to mid- and senior-level personnel from the Iraqi Security Forces. The activation order also changed the mission’s name from NATO Training Implementation Mission to NATO Training Mission–Iraq. By the time of the NATO summit meeting in February 2005, the new mission was fully staffed and funded.

Who is in charge?

The NATO mission is distinct under the political control of NATO’s North Atlantic Council. It is coordinated with the U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF–I).

The commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq is also the commander of the NATO effort. He reports on NATO issues up the NATO chain of command to NATO’s SACEUR and, ultimately, the North Atlantic Council.

USF–I provides a secure environment for the protection of NATO forces in Iraq. The NATO chain of command has responsibility for close area force protection for all NATO personnel deployed to Iraq or the region.

National Defense University, set up by NATO, comes under the authority of the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, which establishes the framework of training matters for all Iraqi military schools.
Appendix D

Work Plans Directive

Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA)

OPA Directive 003: PRT Work Plans

1. Purpose. This directive provides direction and guidance to the OPA, the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and regional reconstruction teams (both referred to as PRTs), and embedded PRTs for the completion and submission of the quarterly PRT work plans. This memorandum replaces the work plan guidance issued in OPA Directive 002. The guidance in OPA Directive 002 that pertains to the maturity model assessment is still valid.

2. Action. All PRT leaders are responsible for the submission of quarterly PRT work plans for their assigned province. PRT leaders will incorporate relevant embedded PRT input in their overall PRT work plans. Embedded PRTs are not required to submit a separate work plan to OPA. OPA desk officers are the team’s main points of contact for work plans. OPA plans and assessment will serve as the coordinating office.

3. PRT work plan information. PRTs shall utilize the PRT work plan as a PRT management tool, a guide to discussion and formulation of the team’s strategy, and a means to ensure all team activities are in support of the joint common plan (JCP). To facilitate weekly reporting, the work plan format attached at Enclosure 1 mirrors the general format of the PRT weekly report (situation report). All PRT members should review the JCP to ensure the work plan development process is guided by the intent to further the objectives stated in the JCP.

4. PRT work plan and the maturity model. The primary purpose of this directive is to de-link the work plan from the maturity model. If it chooses to do so, a PRT can still complete the work plan as part of the maturity model assessment process. The maturity model is a statement of the PRT understanding of Iraqi civil capacity in specified areas. That information can in certain instances assist the PRT to determine appropriate PRT activities.

5. Link to quick response funding. Quick response funds will not be approved for any project not listed in the work plan of the PRT requesting funds.
6. Responsibilities.

a. Team leaders:

(1) Prepare and submit work plans in accordance with the quarterly schedule.

(2) Follow the instructions for completing the work plan (Enclosure 1). Team leaders may depart from the format of the template if they retain the components embedded in the example. The OPA plans office is the approval agency for clearing work plan format derivations.

(3) Ensure their paired military units (brigade combat teams/advise and assist brigades) receive a copy of the PRT work plan and are consulted for suggested input.

b. OPA desk officer:

(1) Understands the work plan and its relation to the JCP.

(2) Ensures each PRT completes a quarterly work plan review and changes are submitted to OPA in accordance with Enclosure 1.

c. OPA plans and assessments staff. The staff is responsible for monitoring work plans to ensure they support the JCP and OPA director’s guidance.

d. OPA program finance staff. The staff ensures any projects for which a PRT is requesting quick response funds are listed in the PRT’s work plan before approving funding.

GRETA HOLTZ
Director
Office of Provincial Affairs

Enclosure 1: Work Plan Template
Enclosure 1: PRT Work Plan Template

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Objective/ Discretionary Objective</th>
<th>Activity/ Project/ Task/ Description</th>
<th>Outcome Desired</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Outcome Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This format is a departure from the previous OPA work plan format in which PRTs provided possible resolutions to all items indicated in the maturity model analysis as areas where the Iraqis were less than “self-reliant.” While the maturity model remains a valuable analytical tool for the PRTs, the PRT mission in each province must be shaped not by a single analytical tool but by the JCP, existing security situation, Iraqi willingness to cooperate, PRT resources, and other events on the ground in each province.

The primary benefit of any work plan is the process by which it is generated. PRTs will be encouraged to make the quarterly work plan development process one of deliberation and cooperation by the entire interagency, including paired military units. The “outcome achieved” section of the work plan will be completed at the end of each quarter to provide the team and the interagency with a better understanding of the costs and benefits of the PRT program.
Appendix E

Provincial Reconstruction Team
Maturity Model (Iraq Model)

Each provincial reconstruction team (PRT) assesses its province in five areas that are referred to as lines of activity (LOA): governance, political development, economic development, political reconciliation, and rule of law. The five LOAs and key objectives are derived from the joint campaign plan and mission plan the PRTs/embedded PRTs are tasked to assess:

- **Governance.** Assist in the development of sub-national governments that are self-sufficient; transparent; accountable; and capable of identifying, prioritizing, and servicing the needs of their citizens.

- **Political development.** Promote the development of an engaged local population and effective political parties, institutions, representatives, and officials that respect the rights of individuals and groups; promote pluralism; and peacefully transfer power.

- **Economic development.** Help sub-national governments and the private sector establish and implement broad-based and comprehensive economic development strategies that promote equitable and sustainable growth.

- **Political reconciliation.** Help conflicting parties resolve their differences by engaging in direct and peaceful dialogue to identify and pursue shared aims and interests.

- **Rule of law.** Enhance the quality of justice enjoyed by the populace by improving the accountability, effectiveness, and consistency of services administered by policing, corrections, judicial, and other legal institutions.

Security is the responsibility of the relevant military units operational within the each province.

**Maturity Model Assessment**

This section explains how to use the maturity model to make an assessment of your provincial council or other institution. Worked examples and blank templates that can be copied are provided.
The maturity model is an internationally recognized tool for assessing the progress of major change management programs. The assessment will be completed by reading generic statements and making an objective assessment of where your local government organization best fits the descriptions.

For example, when considering the development of governance in your area, you may decide that the statement “Provincial Distribution System (PDS) delivered on an ad-hoc and limited basis” best fits the description of the delivery of services. If so, then place an “X” in the box marked “Beginning.” Continue on throughout all of the key objectives, making your assessment as you move along.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maturity Model</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ELEMENTS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of Essential Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure E-1. Maturity model assessment statement (Beginning)**

Referring to Figure E-2, if the best description that fits the legal institution is “Traditional systems support legal process through legal institutions with occasional intervention,” then place an X in the “Sustainable” box as shown. Importantly, provide some concise statement of evidence to support the assessment—in this case, supporting the improvement in performance from ”Developing” to “Sustainable.” Note that the red X is the previous rating and the green X is the current rating. The evidence statement can be added on a separate sheet attached to the maturity model.
In Figure E-2, three of four areas have shown improvement (three of the areas are the completed assessments for the component elements of the maturity model and can be used as a basis to adjust the PRT’s work plans).
Figure E-3 is an example of the maturity model for the governance LOA.

![Maturity Model](image)

**Figure E-3**
Figure E-4 is an example of the maturity model for the political development LOA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity Model</th>
<th>POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT</th>
<th>Provincial Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Development</strong></td>
<td><strong>Beginning</strong></td>
<td><strong>Developing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engaged local population</strong></td>
<td>Almost no participation in political process</td>
<td>Participation in some political process, while showing signs of progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effective Political parties</strong></td>
<td>No political process and parties. Few political parties essential to a social role with no political process</td>
<td>Political process is limited, with political parties becoming more visible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual freedoms</strong></td>
<td>Inability to exercise freedoms without repercussions</td>
<td>Limited freedoms, but still some limit to overall freedoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representation</strong></td>
<td>Greasy dispositions</td>
<td>Limited representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peaceful transfer of power</strong></td>
<td>Significant violence during transfer of power</td>
<td>Violence limited to centers of local government during transfer of power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Photo: Figure E-4
Figure E-5 is an example of the maturity model for the economic development LOA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity Model</th>
<th>ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</th>
<th>Provincial Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>Beginning</td>
<td>Developing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comms Infrastructure</td>
<td>Deteriorated transport and other comm networks</td>
<td>Transport and other communication networks begin extended and improving logistic and other functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Growth</td>
<td>No clear and functional supply chain supporting the private sector</td>
<td>The supply chain only works for specific sectors, but is still inconsistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and State-Owned Enterprises</td>
<td>Limited access to retail goods and services</td>
<td>Shops tend to open and close due to security situation or violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>High unemployment rates</td>
<td>Short-term job opportunities created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>Limited or non-existent retail banking</td>
<td>State banks opening but only one or two in major centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited business access to credit</td>
<td>Business credit only available to a minimum of businesses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure E-5
Figure E-6 is an example of the maturity model for the political reconciliation LOA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity Model</th>
<th>Political Reconciliation</th>
<th>Provincial Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resolve Differences between conflicting parties</strong></td>
<td>Establish the view that reconciliation with trends is not what Iraqis need to do; they need to reconcile with their enemies</td>
<td>Ensure GoI seen as representative of both sides, despite Sunni boycott of election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Establish a genuine desire to reconcile through peaceful dialogue</strong></td>
<td>Create, through current and emerging examples, a desire to establish security and economic sustainability via reconciliation</td>
<td>GoI take (and make) decisions and policies that cross the sectarian divide, and IO emphasize this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sectarian enclave communities move toward truly mixed, and reconciled intra-Shia/Sunni communities</strong></td>
<td>Create a desire to live in harmony</td>
<td>Sunni engage fully in governance of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate methods of returning IDPs to original neighborhoods</td>
<td>Differences are not seen as Sunni vs. Shia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Produce strong IO on small successes of returned IDPs emphasizing the security and economic benefits</td>
<td>Combined Tribal Councils provide non-sectarian governance at sub-provincial (local) level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Desire to return to own neighborhood and ability to return, so strong that inertia and momentum create own initiatives without GOICF intervention</td>
<td>Establish long-term security and economic sustainability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure E-6**
Figure E-7 is an example of the maturity model for the rule of law LOA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity Model</th>
<th>RULE OF LAW</th>
<th>Provincial Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning</td>
<td>Tribal rules</td>
<td>A recognition that due process of law and legal institutions have primacy, but local networks still</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>Legal institutions operating but with limited effect and the population has not trust.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable</td>
<td>Legal institutions operating, but is not affective.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing</td>
<td>Tribal leaders actively supporting the legal processes and institutions and very rarely.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Reliance</td>
<td>Tribal leaders do not interfere in negatively influence operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi Police</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning</td>
<td>Lack of professional training and staffing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>Local police chief actively attempting to purge corrupt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable</td>
<td>Police apply laws majority of time and fewer instances of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing</td>
<td>Internal police systems茫茫 and corrupt officers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Reliance</td>
<td>Increasing respect by the police for all citizens.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Judges</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning</td>
<td>Judges targeted and assassinated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>Judges ordered to retire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable</td>
<td>Judges working but still under threat of tribal, police influence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing</td>
<td>Judges exercising increasing independent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Reliance</td>
<td>Judges with full ownership of law and public capacity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Courts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning</td>
<td>Courts are not convening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>Courts are convening and trials held in an absolutely public manner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable</td>
<td>Courts are convened, trials established and scheduled but not being held in a timely manner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing</td>
<td>Courts are convened, trials progressing in orderly manner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Reliance</td>
<td>Courts are convened, trials progressing in orderly manner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prisons, Corrections</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning</td>
<td>No proper facilities and no admission accountability.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>Facilities being built and prepared, but not yet staffed and operational.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable</td>
<td>Prisons facilities starting to open although internal process and back of staff prevent them being.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing</td>
<td>Prisons and organized prison facilities with above minimum standards keeping.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Reliance</td>
<td>Prisons that meet acceptable standards on human rights for treatment of prisoners.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After a PRT assesses its provinces for all five LOAs, it summarizes the results in an overview chart called the behavior statement (see Figure E-8).

- Assessments for both the maturity model and the behavior statement fall within five capacity levels: beginning, developing, sustainable, performing, and self-reliant.

- Provide brief comments about each objective that describe how the province is performing. If necessary, highlight any resource issues that for example would enable the objective to be moved towards self-reliance or major blockers to achieving an upward trend.
IRAQ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity / Objective</th>
<th>Beginning</th>
<th>Developing</th>
<th>Sustainable</th>
<th>Performing</th>
<th>Self-Reliant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political development</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure E-8**

Figure E-9 is a sample of a PRT assessment cycle calendar. Depending on information requirements and other factors, the PRT may have a different assessment reporting cycle from the reporting cycle of the military unit in the operational area.

**Figure E-9**
Appendix F

Engagement With the Media

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have an important role to play to ensure that progress is being made and the benefits are communicated to local communities, to the Iraqi people as a whole, and to international audiences. Having an Iraqi face associated with success is key to building the legitimacy of local governance, which greatly assists in building and maintaining public understanding, acceptance, and support for the work of the United States, international community, nongovernmental organizations, the government of Iraq, and U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF–I)—both in Iraq and more widely. Without this support, both in Iraq and among the international public, PRTs cannot achieve operational success. The media is the primary conduit to both these audiences. The key to success is to know and follow the latest U.S. Embassy press guidance.

To help convince people that PRTs and the coalition are making a real difference, it is essential that PRTs are able to identify examples of success; develop these into useable media products; and disseminate the information through local, regional, and international media outlets as well as through face-to-face contacts with key local leaders and influencers. This procedure requires close coordination with key delivery partners and developing excellent relationships with the media through regular, personal contact at a senior level, which also help associate PRTs with positive outcomes.

While a proactive approach to media relations is important, so is the ability to counter negative coverage of U.S. military activities. PRTs should monitor media outlets or use other U.S. government assets to monitor and maintain effective situational awareness of media reporting trends and be prepared to rebut inaccurate reporting promptly when necessary. Interpreters and locally employed civilians can be used to assist in this regard, but such statements must be in keeping with the U.S. public affairs policy.

Provincial Reconstruction Team Media Guidelines

The policies, programs, and practices of U.S. Embassy–Baghdad are the continuing focus of intense worldwide news media coverage. The public affairs section has the lead in this effort and has authority over the public affairs function of all embassy elements under chief of mission authority.
General guidance

All inquiries, requests for comments, or interviews from the news media directed to the embassy and embassy personnel should be referred to the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad press office (e-mail: BaghdadPressOffice@state.gov). The press office will research, coordinate, and clear responses.

The ambassador is the primary on-the-record speaker for the embassy. After the ambassador, the Counselor for Public Affairs, the spokesperson, and other embassy officers are sometimes designated for a specific purpose to speak for the embassy. This designation is neither automatic nor permanent. Officers may be asked to provide information on the record, attributable to the embassy and the spokesperson by name; on background, attributable to a U.S. official; or off the record, not attributable.

The public affairs section compiles all media guidance for the embassy. Press releases, fact sheets, Web content, and media talking points produced by any embassy element for dissemination to the Western public or Western press must be authorized by the public affairs section after being cross-cleared with other concerned sections.

For clearance of press items, including articles for State Magazine or hometown newspapers, the author should contact the public affairs section at BaghdadPressOffice@state.gov to obtain clearance through the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs.

Articles and imagery created by embassy employees for external publication always require pre-publication clearance in Washington, DC. The public affairs section is available to assist in obtaining such clearances. If the subject matter relates to official duties, the public affairs section will generally consult the employee’s supervisor prior to clearing the article or imagery.

Types of interviews

- **On the record.** All that is said may be quoted directly and attributed to the official by name and title.

- **On background.** What is said can be reported but not attributed. The official’s remarks may be quoted directly or paraphrased and are attributed to a “State Department official” or “administration official,” as determined by the official.

- **On deep background.** The source cannot be quoted or identified in any manner, not even as “an unnamed source.” The information is
usually couched in such phrases as “it is understood that” or “it has been learned.” The information may be used to help present the story or gain a better understanding of the subject, but the knowledge is that of the reporter, not the source. No information provided may be used in the story. The information is only for the reporter’s background knowledge.

- **Off the record.** The information is provided to provide a confidential explanation, not for publication. Nothing of what the journalist is told may be used in the story. The information is meant only for the education of the reporter.

### Specific guidance for interviews

All PRT personnel are reminded that all official contacts with the press must be approved in advance by the public affairs section. All calls from any media representatives should always be referred immediately to the public affairs section without providing any additional comment.

Any interview—whether on-the-record, on background, or off the record—must be approved in advance by the public affairs section. For any approved interview, the public affairs section can provide a press officer to sit in and tape the actual exchange to ensure accurate reporting.

- Interviewees, whether on the record or on background, should avoid being drawn into commenting on policies or subjects outside their immediate area of responsibility.

- Journalists are always “on duty.” Be aware that a journalist may well draw on any exchange, even those that take place in an informal setting.

- In general, avoid making “off-the-record” comments to the news media unless you have specific instruction. Never e-mail “off-the-record” comments in any case.

- Journalists are not U.S. government employees and are not entitled to see or receive classified or administratively controlled information.

### Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Other Offices under the Office of Provincial Affairs

Field offices of the embassy under the Office of Provincial Affairs will also engage with the media. These field posts should contact the public affairs section for instructions if they are asked for an interview or comment by the
U.S. and significant international media or if the media contact is likely to result in embassy involvement later on. PRT media engagement with local Iraqi media is at the discretion of the PRT leader and the public diplomacy officer and does not need to be referred to U.S. Embassy–Baghdad if the subject to be discussed is PRT specific. Specific questions from field posts regarding media relations may be addressed to the public affairs section PRT Regional Coordinator for Public Diplomacy.

Department of Defense Public Affairs

All questions from the media on matters related to Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I, currently designated as USFOR–I) operations should be referred to the MNF–I press desk at 240-553-0581, extension 3747 (DSN: 318-239-3747) or e-mail mnfipressdesk@iraq.centcom.mil. Specific guidance regarding embedded media is available from the Combined Press Information Center press or e-mail mnfi.mediaembed@iraq.centcom.mil.

U.S.-Based Outreach

If employees are contacted by their hometown media while on duty in Iraq, all of the policies above apply. Requests to give interviews to hometown media will generally be favorably considered, but the requests must be submitted to/through the public affairs section and the appropriate office in the State Department’s Public Affairs Bureau for approval. Such approval must be sought well in advance. When approved, the interviews should focus on personal experiences and not on policy recommendations or topics outside of the employee’s expertise.

For more information or guidance on a specific request, please contact the public affairs section at BaghdadPressOffice@state.gov.
U.S. Agency for International Development Programs

Local Governance Program

The Local Governance Program (LGP) supports Iraq’s efforts to establish local government that is transparent, accountable, and responsive to its constituents. The LGP, which began in April 2003, operates under a contract from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The LGP was expanded in 2005 to include a new phase of support for local governance programs in Iraq.

Under terms of its contract, the LGP:

• Supports Iraq’s efforts to improve the management and administration of local, municipal, and provincial governments.

• Provides technical assistance and training to local elected officials concerning the roles and functions of local government officials and agencies.

• Assists in establishing a legal framework for a democratic, representative, and participatory form of decentralized government in Iraq.

Since May 2005, the LGP has been training and mentoring provincial councils elected in January of that year in the roles, responsibilities, and authority of the provincial councils and also providing similar training to Iraq’s network of local councils.

The LGP’s earlier work in Iraq (June 2003–April 2004) included supporting the establishment of more than 700 local government councils. During that time, an in-country team of nearly 3,000 Iraqis and more than 220 international development specialists worked throughout Iraq’s 18 provinces on a wide range of locally selected priorities. These priorities included such varied topics as increasing access to basic utilities and health care and establishing and training local governing councils. The work with Iraqi civil society focused on empowering women, youth, businesses, farmers, and others to organize, advocate, and work for a democratic and tolerant Iraq.

The LGP supports the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) effort in nine provinces across the country by providing technical advisors in areas related to governance, policy reform, and economic development. From its
headquarters in Baghdad, the LGP oversees operations of its regional hub offices in Irbil, Hillah, Basra, and Baghdad, serving all 18 Iraqi provinces.

**Local Governance Program III (January 2009–June 2011)**

The LGP III supports implementation of Iraq’s new Law for Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region (also known as the Provincial Powers Act). The project builds the capacity and strengthens the performance of local government institutions to represent citizen priorities and creates a more responsive public administration through planning for public investment in the provinces, executing the provincial budgets, and holding service providers to account.

The specific objectives of the LGP III are to define, strengthen, and facilitate the operation of recognized local government bodies in relation to Iraq’s prescribed governance systems by:

- Enabling aspects of democratic representation in local government bodies.
- Engaging recognized local government bodies in sub-national planning processes.
- Promoting the constructive, informed involvement of local government bodies in budget formulation and budget execution processes.
- Enhancing oversight functions of local government bodies.

The LGP III will focus on standing up the new provincial (governorate) and district (qada) councils and local executives as set forth in the new Provincial Powers Act. Specifically, the project will focus on developing the councils’ powers of legislation and regulation as well as their role in planning for the provinces, formulating and executing a budget, and carrying out effective public outreach and their enhanced role in supervising and holding local government to account.

The LGP III interventions will be confined to supporting the provincial councils and the district councils and their corresponding executives. The LGP III will provide technical assistance to provincial governorates to strengthen their capacity in the planning, design, delivery, and oversight of services such as water, sewage, roads, street lighting, and electrical distribution.
Activities under the LGP III will include the following in the project’s eight focus provinces:

- Further development and implementation of Provincial Development Strategies and Plans.
- Budget-formulation/execution and strategic planning and management training.
- Capacity building for newly elected provincial and district councils to represent citizen concerns and provide oversight on the delivery of services by the executive branch.
- Enhancing financial management and reporting of capital investment by the provinces to improve accountability.
- Information systems for project management and financial accounting.
- Planning for public investment in the province through further development and use of:
  - Geospatial Information System applications.
  - Governorate Accounting and Project Tracking System enhancement.
  - Developing public outreach, women’s leadership, and reconciliation.
  - Monitoring, supervision, and improvement of service-providers’ performance.
  - Supporting professional and membership associations.

The LGP III will engage with USAID representatives and PRT local governance specialists on the PRTs to ensure they benefit from the experience, policy analysis, and training materials produced for the LGP focus provinces: Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basrah, Diyala, Dhi Qar, Diwaniyah, Karbala, Kirkuk, Mayasan, Muthana, Najaf, Ninewa, Salah al Din, and Wasit.

**Tatweer Program**

Known by its Arabic name *Tatweer*, which means “development,” USAID’s National Capacity Development Program for public management works closely with the government of Iraq to strengthen and expand the
professional skills, qualifications, and capabilities of public servants. USAID’s capacity-building activities center on delivering three results:

- Improving the skills of public administration managers.
- Improving functions in 10 key ministries, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Deputy Prime Ministers’ Offices, the Council of Ministers’ Secretariat, and the Presidency Council.
- Improving and expanding the government of Iraq’s training capacity.

To achieve these objectives, Tatweer enlists a cascading “training-of-trainers” approach to build capacity within the government of Iraq. The training concept leads to exponential growth in the number of public servants and government of Iraq staff trained. Teams of advisers embedded in the ministries provide coaching and more direct hands-on training and technical assistance, with a focus on advancing capital budget execution. An additional program component of Tatweer targets anti-corruption institutions in the government of Iraq, while the subject is woven throughout all training courses. In addition, Tatweer sponsored a scholarship program for graduate or advanced studies in public management in exchange for four years of service in the government of Iraq through placement services by the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation.

**Tijara Program**

The Tijara (meaning “trade” in Arabic) Program is a private sector development project. It expands and diversifies the non-oil economy. Tijara does micro-finance and small business lending. It operates in all 18 provinces providing micro-loans. To date over 185,000 Iraqis have received loans totaling nearly $425 million with a 99 percent repayment rate. The average loan is $1,400 over one year with 12–18 percent interest rate. This is less interest than what many Iraqi banks are charging, which is upward of 33 percent. The project works with Iraqi institutions, the banking systems, loan guarantee companies, and lending capital businesses at competitive rates. It is also assisting Iraq with World Trade Organization (WTO) accession.

**Social Safety Net Program**

Launched by the Iraqi Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and USAID, the Social Safety Net Program is aimed at providing benefits to the most vulnerable citizens of Iraq and facilitating their integration into the country’s economic development.
Inma Agribusiness Program

Inma (meaning “growth” in Arabic) Agribusiness Program is a $124 million, three-year (2007–2010) effort to promote employment and increased agricultural revenue in Iraq by providing technical assistance, training, improved genetic material, access to markets, and credit. The goal of Inma is to increase the capacity of private agribusiness to create jobs and wealth by concentrating assistance in value chains where high-value markets are favored by Iraqi competitive advantages. Inma focuses on three core value chains:

- Beef and lamb.
- Aquaculture and poultry.
- Horticulture.

Through March 2010, Inma has generated $178 million in gross sales and created 31,950 full-time and part-time jobs in areas where PRTs are working.
Appendix H

Best Practices

Best practices are actions that provincial reconstruction team (PRT) members have employed to overcome situation-specific obstacles and achieve a desired outcome. These actions should not be interpreted as “one-size-fits-all” solutions or doctrine. What works in one place and time may not work in another place and time. Rather, these are actions that have been effective in the past and that should be considered by future PRT members. Deployed personnel must use their own discretion to determine whether such actions or suggestions would be useful in their particular circumstances.

This appendix is separated into two sections: lessons learned and a summary of best practices.

Lessons Learned

This section covers the following lessons learned topic areas:

• Developing, encouraging, and influencing local leaders.
• Engaging government officials under difficult conditions.
• Key leader engagements.
• Dealing with corruption.
• Assisting in building medical capacity.
• Assisting in building a competent building contracting and labor force.
• Communicating to the populace with local media.
• PRT relations with the embassy.
• Sharing information among the PRT staff.
• Long-term planning.
• Managing projects.
• Coordinating capacity building with other units/organizations in the province.
Lesson Learned: It is difficult for the PRT to develop/influence/encourage leaders at the provincial government to practice good governance and to accelerate capacity building and development.

Observations and Insights:

The challenges faced by the provinces are complex; multifaceted; and varied due to religious, historical, political, and geographical contexts. A PRT strategy to address these challenges and support the provinces to the path of development should be diverse. What works in one province does not necessarily work in another, though there are some governance principles and key elements the PRT will find in common:

- Legitimacy of and trust in state institutions.
- Political will and committed leadership.
- Security.
- Delivering basic services.
- Rule of law.
- Transparency and accountability.
- Civil society.

Provinces often lack enough qualified people to fill positions in the provincial government. The basic executive, managerial, and technical skills required for provincial ministerial director positions often need to be developed on the job. As a result, the PRT must build the needed institutional capacity within the existing provincial government.

PRTs can address this problem by emphasizing the mentorship program in the Local Governance Program (LGP), phase III. Program managers can be selected from both the PRT and provincial government staffs to shape the LGP III mentorship program and scope the main objectives. The PRT must conduct an assessment to link the lessons learned with new, long-term objectives.
Suggestions:

Develop the scope of the program, select your team, and gain provincial government buy-in:

- **Select a program manager.** Select a program manager early within the PRT to shape the program and guide its initial launch. Although the PRT leader should provide his intent and shaping guidance, he should not take the lead on this project.
  
  - Launching and running a successful program will require significant effort that will likely conflict with the PRT leader’s other activities. Ideally, the PRT leader will have a staff of advisers who are subject-matter experts and who will work directly with the relevant directors general and provincial council members to effect change and capacity building.
  
  - A counterpart within the provincial government should co-lead the program. This could be the governor, the chief of administration, or one of the governors or provincial council deputies.

- **Assess internal resources (talent inventory).** Assess internal resources to determine available skill sets. Consider personnel outside the PRT organization by expanding the screening process to collocated maneuver and support units or nearby forward operating bases. Rely on local hires when access to local leaders is difficult.

  “The hardest part for us was interacting with Iraqis on a day-to-day basis. Sometimes getting out was difficult. The amount of time you had with them was limited. Sometimes what they would tell you was limited, so you depended a lot on these locally hired Iraqis who worked for us to fill in the gaps and help explain things to us.” (U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], Basra, Fall 2009)

- **Gain provincial government buy-in.** This program requires “top-down” support from the provincial governor and key ministry directors. However, the program manager and PRT leader should understand their available resources and skill sets before approaching the provincial governor with this program. Using output from the skills inventory, a detailed understanding of available PRT and maneuver unit staff, will allow the PRT to set realistic expectations and help guide the subsequent matching of mentors with appropriate provincial staff. This initial analysis supports the first discussions and manages expectations of the governor and key
provincial government staff on the scope of the mentoring program and level of expertise available at the PRT and nearby military units.

- **Assess provincial government and key staff.** When making this assessment, the program manager should consider both the available staff and the province’s critical needs. Assessing the critical needs of the province includes key directors general and their respective capacities.

- **Launching the program.** Once the provincial government agrees with the scope, approach, and goals of the program, implementation of the mentorship program can begin.

- **Kick-off meeting.** Launching the program with clear direction and a robust plan increases the likelihood of success. It is important to ensure the program objectives are clear and shared, roles are defined, and both mentors and counterparts understand the processes for interaction.

- **Initial meetings.** Matching mentors with the appropriate counterparts is a key initial task. As the host country has a specific type of society, culture, and education level, consideration should be given to matching mentors with appropriate counterparts. Matching a younger Soldier or staff with a much older counterpart is unlikely to be effective. Key relationships would be better positioned from the outset as supporting or technical-skills-transfer relationships rather than as management-mentor relationships.

- **Coordination with the governor.** Throughout the entire process, the PRT coordinates all efforts with the provincial government to ensure unity of effort. Additionally, the PRT can use this event as a teaching and mentoring tool to show the provincial government that local leaders can solve key issues of importance to the provincial government and the local people.

- **Ongoing collaboration.** One approach is to focus the collaboration around a specific project. However, the mentor should resist the urge to take over doing the work. The mentor should help his counterpart develop and consider options for solving problems.

- **Program evaluation and internal reviews.** The program manager should set out a system to evaluate progress against established and agreed-to criteria. Effectiveness of the mentor-counterpart relationship is assessed by the provincial governor, PRT leader, provincial government, and PRT program manager.
• **Transition plan.** Ideally, mentor–counterpart relationships should be transitioned to incoming PRT and maneuver units based on an internal assessment of the people on the new team (see “Assess internal resources” above). Priority should be to cover the key positions in the provincial government, as significant benefits come from continuity in coaching provincial government members to be better managers. Specific technical subject-matter expertise for mentoring line ministry skills may not be available in the next PRT. The PRT should maintain awareness of other experts within the wider community (other PRT staffs, U.S. Forces–Iraq, and personnel in the interagency community). However, the main focus of the mentoring program involves the transfer of basic management skills. As this basic mentoring does not require specific subject-matter expertise, it should be possible to match incoming staff with current provincial government staff counterparts for continuity of key relationships.

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**Lesson Learned:** It is difficult for the PRT to advance its long-term mission of enhancing good governance when the current key leaders are corrupt and/or ineffective. The PRT must influence better behavior and performance.

**Observations and Insights:**

The reality on the ground is that some provincial officials will not act in the people’s best interest due to corruption, incompetence, or both and, at times, may be uncooperative. The goal is to enhance good governance and encourage transparency. Although the PRT would prefer to avoid associating with corrupt, ineffective government leaders, in the short term the PRT is required to maintain a professional level of engagement with the existing government. A principal PRT mission is to influence good governance, assist in building institutional governance capacity, and support strategic reconstruction in its area of responsibility (AOR). To accomplish this mission, the PRT needs to engage continually with the provincial leadership and increase access to other ministry directors to build institutional capacity.

Provincial leaders must be determined to fight corruption to free resources for economic and political development. PRTs must emphasize the importance of fighting corrupted institutions that negatively impact growth and development. Corruption can have the following negative effects:
- Reduce public revenue and increase government spending, hence contributing to large fiscal deficits and making it more difficult for a government to run a sound fiscal policy.

- Reduce investment and the productivity of public investment and infrastructure.

- Increase income inequality by allowing those in influential positions to take advantage of government activities at the expense of the rest of the population.

- Distort markets and the allocation of resources. Corruption interferes with the government’s ability to impose necessary regulatory controls and inspections to correct market failures, thereby reducing the fundamental role of government (i.e., the provincial government cannot enforce payment of taxes on property).

One way to address this problem is by maintaining a working relationship with the governor and Provincial Council Head of the Security Committee while simultaneously engaging the provincial government at multiple levels across key provincial line ministries. Regardless of the quality of key provincial leaders, PRTs need to continually engage with key leaders while expanding knowledge and relationships across the government. The PRT must employ practical techniques to build government capacity:

- Use access to wider provincial government contacts to communicate (re-emphasize) coalition policy on corruption and counter narcotics; deliver similar messages in public forums.

- Diplomatically deliver consistent messages in private forums, reminding government officials of their duty to uphold the rule of law and govern in the interest of the people.

- Always maintain a dialogue for information-sharing on security matters and reconstruction planning. Avoid reconstruction support unless controls are in place. (See “Life cycle project management” below.)

- Provide assessments of key leaders through command channels to influence the central government to make changes in the key provincial leaders.

Suggestions:

- Assess the provincial government (line directors and staff). In most cases, some line ministry directors are ready to work with the PRT.
Department of State (DOS) representatives can help maintain the relationship map of provincial officials. Use available resources (e.g., time, Commander’s Emergency Response Program [CERP] funding, quick response funding, and associations) to influence and reinforce good behavior:

○ **CERP/Quick response funding projects.** Work with provincial government line ministry staff to address projects that can provide timely impacts and be visible to the people. Provincial government directors who are ready to work transparently and to the benefit of their constituents are rewarded with follow-on funding for projects of similar merit. Look for opportunities to engage with less-effective provincial government staffs during the process. Encourage the provincial government staff to participate in the progress. Closely manage possible obstacles to progress. The long wait on CERP approval can negatively impact the PRT’s commitment in economic development. If CERP is mentioned, the caveats of CERP approval should be mentioned as well.

○ **Developing institutional capacity.** Collaborating on a specific project or program with a line ministry director and staff can be an effective vehicle for building capacity. Mentoring programs can help build skills with other provincial government members after gaining buy-in from the governor and line directors to work with their staffs.

○ **Consider phased development/investment to control funds.** Phased project execution allows the PRT to invest in projects that are being managed with transparency and effectiveness. Involving local leaders in shaping projects and creating local work crews can yield the optimum economic benefits while putting in place good project controls for CERP funds. This phased approach also allows adequate time for teaching.

- Update assessment of provincial government staff and progress. As the PRT continues to engage the provincial government, subsequent assessments should be made periodically. These assessments should be based on the criteria established in the original assessment of the province.
Lesson Learned: Not all personnel assigned to the PRT possess the tools and skills necessary to successfully engage the people, tribal leaders, local government officials, or the provincial governor.

Observations and Insights:

The PRT leader constantly stresses the importance of being security conscious while still being aware of properly interacting with the local population. Although no formal training process has been established, keeping the purpose of the mission at the forefront of most discussions makes Soldiers take this into consideration during mission planning and execution. Ensuring that everyone on the mission knows what they are going to be doing helps all to understand their parts. Force protection Soldiers should be rotated through the tactical operations center (TOC) and missions outside of the wire to get a better appreciation for what the PRT is doing and to gain an understanding of the nation’s people and culture.

Suggestions:

- **Leader meeting.** The PRT leader holds a leader meeting where the commander engagement concept is outlined. The PRT is to keep security on the forefront of all planning; however, adverse risk is not going to be an option. Steps are taken to ensure that a friendly appearance is presented when possible. Examples of this behavior are (1) reducing vehicle speeds when driving through town and waving to the people; and (2) taking off armored vests and helmets when meeting with local leaders in their homes or offices, or even at some venues, provided they are safe and secure locations. Additionally, the posture military PRT personnel take with their weapons when on patrols is dictated by the perceived anti-coalition militia threat in the area.

- **Conduct informal training.** Because PRT operations are often new to many Soldiers, on-the-spot corrections are common; however, covering this during mission briefs keeps it on the forefront of their minds. Additionally, the PRT works to get everyone involved in local engagements on a routine basis. This means occasionally getting force protection personnel out of their vehicles during an engagement to attend a shura or a local meal as a participant rather than a security element. PRTs also rotate personnel through the TOC to gain a better understanding of mission planning.
 IRAQ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM

• **Conduct formal training.** The PRT intends to develop some formal periods of instruction that will put everyone on the same level of knowledge on the following areas:

  ○ PRT mission. This is more than just the standard mission. Each PRT member’s mission should be covered in detail, including techniques for successfully interacting with the local populace. This instruction might even cover some of the common operational picture (COP) data the PRT is looking to collect while performing its everyday missions.

  ○ Risk avoidance versus risk mitigation. It is possible for a PRT to get into the habit of reducing the amount of time it leaves the wire because of risk avoidance. If PRT members do not leave the wire, they are not able to engage with the provincial government and the local people; therefore, they cannot conduct their mission. Risk mitigation is taking steps to reduce potential security hazards to continue to accomplish the mission.

  ○ Government structure. Lessons on how the government was formed, how provincial government officials are elected or selected for positions, and information on the background of the constitution are important. Understanding these subjects is critical to avoiding embarrassing errors.

  ○ Religious practices and the mullahs. Understanding the religious practices of host nationals helps Soldiers figure out why locals make certain decisions. Many people do not understand how mullahs can be so influential in the provincial government’s decision-making process. Working with cultural experts, reading material about Islam, and talking with local citizens can help Soldiers gain a better appreciation of the local culture.

• **Adopting a local village.** After getting to know the local people, some PRTs have adopted a local village. Donors from the United States send items that Soldiers can share with the local population. This is an effective way to create a bond with little effort or expense.

• **Sporting events.** Because many of the local kids like to play soccer, one PRT set up a challenge against a local soccer team. The national police provided security for the event, which turned out to be a great success. Members of the provincial government may attend the event and present an award at the end.
• **Teaching culture.** One PRT helped its local guards improve their English skills. The PRT had several of the guards talk about life in their country and their religion with Soldiers. Many of the local guards are close in age to the young PRT members. Because of the relationship the PRT members already have with these guards, hearing about the local life and culture from them will have more of an impact than from an instructor the PRT members do not know.

• **Transitioning practice to the next PRT.** Members of the PRT should share their experiences with new arrivals to reduce their anxiety level. Ultimately, anything PRT members can do to help the next PRT understand the local population will help.

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**Lesson Learned:** It is difficult to communicate the positive aspects of the PRT’s work to influence and build relationships with the key communicators of a province.

**Observations and Insights:**

Focus on tribe leaders:

• Tribal leaders are often respected members in the communities. In the Shiite province, the top Shiite cleric is respected, but his strength comes from tribal leaders. Depending on the region where a PRT is located, tribal leaders may have influence over policy decision making. Therefore, it is important the PRT establishes a good relationship with the tribal leaders. Political gridlocks are becoming a norm in Iraq, and tribal leaders may assist in resolving political disputes. The PRT’s role will be as a mediator on political reconciliation.

• In Iraq, sheiks have greater influence than religious leaders. However, in some areas of the country, sheiks have been pushed out of the political process. There are tribes that do have influence, and it is important to sustain an engagement. The PRT has the best opportunities to build relationships with the sheiks. If a sheik is important in the PRT’s area of operations (AO), then the sheik can be instrumental as a facilitator with the provincial government officials.

The PRT can engage key populace groups by using religious leaders. Religious leaders are key members of society and can influence the actions and opinions of the local population. The provincial government and the
PRT need to engage this group in a forum to understand their perceptions, build trust, improve perceptions, and proactively respond to their concerns.

Religion is an important factor in the modern culture. Although religion is important to many in our society, it is usually quite separate from our government and educational systems. To truly understand some cultures, one must fully grasp the importance religion plays in almost every aspect of life. Religious leaders hold positions of power, are much respected, and have the ability to heavily influence their followers’ lives. Building a good relationship with them in your province is essential for the coalition. The PRT is in the best position to establish this relationship in conjunction with the provincial government. Failure to understand and respect the religious culture could have serious repercussions (e.g., an act, intentional or not, that might be repugnant to Muslims could be mitigated if there is a good relationship with the mullahs in your province). By building relationships with religious leaders, the PRT can understand their perceptions, build their trust, positively influence their perceptions, and proactively respond to their issues. It is important to involve the provincial government when interacting with religious leaders. This involvement will encourage both the provincial government and religious leaders to participate in civil society by reaching out to the local population.

Building relationships with religious leaders can provide a variety of positive effects for the PRT. Including religious leaders in the reconstruction decision-making process can positively focus their energies and give legitimacy to the projects. Additionally, relationships will improve with the religious community and consequently with the populace. These relationships will increase the awareness of the PRT on sensitive religious issues. Once good relationships have been established with these leaders, the PRT’s influence with those that wield the most power in the community will increase. Good relationships encourage all parties, the PRT, the religious leaders, and the provincial government to consider all the issues.

The provincial government needs to engage religious leaders and draw them into civil society activities:

- Invite the religious community in the province to a meeting called by the governor. By having the provincial government invite them, religious leaders are protected from the perception that they are collaborating with the coalition. It is important to clearly identify your audience and where they come from regionally. Knowing your audience is important to any successful engagement.

- Attend the meetings with a minimum number of military and U.S. government personnel. Use one scribe so the PRT leader can maintain maximum eye contact and gauge the crowd. Bring
interpreters to the meetings to catch sidebar conversations. Do not have the interpreters or other PRT members take photographs, because religious leaders often think the U.S. military is taking pictures for intelligence-collection purposes.

- Use the initial forum to explain coalition objectives and review reconstruction activities while reminding the group of the positive contributions the coalition reconstruction efforts are making.

- Allow religious leaders to vent their grievances; at the same time use the forum to encourage them to act.

- Maintain follow-up contact and begin to develop an actionable plan to address possible negative perceptions. For follow-on meetings, use an agenda that includes both the coalition’s and mullahs’ topics to help guide and control the length of the meeting.

Suggestions:

The PRT should enlist the help of provincial government members (e.g., the provincial governor and the director from the Ministry of Religious Affairs) to convene the meeting. Encourage participation of all key religious leaders in the province. Work with the provincial director of religious affairs to plan the event and agenda format. Ensure the agenda is circulated among invitees prior to the event. Remember that meetings often get off track and will go longer than anticipated if you do not have someone controlling the meeting. Select a secure venue, preferably a local government site and not the PRT or U.S. military site. It is polite to serve refreshments or lunch for all attendees. To transition this to the next PRT, set up a meeting of the primary attendees and introduce the new PRT during the relief-in-place (RIP) process. It is important to relay as much information as possible about the religious leaders to the incoming PRT members.

PRTs should introduce incoming commanders and/or civil–military operations center chiefs to the provincial government. Provide background on the provincial government (can use DOS profile). It is important to transition working relationships to the incoming team.

Lesson Learned: Given the prevalence of corruption, PRT personnel must recognize this challenge and determine—on a case-by-case basis—the appropriate incentives and practical techniques to influence the local leaders to mitigate the overall problem and encourage greater levels of transparency.
Observations and Insights:

Corruption is deeply rooted in Iraq and Afghanistan. PRT members often encountered corrupt officials in the course of their duties. One interviewee stated, “In many cases people’s complaints about corruption are really, ‘His corruption is interfering with my corruption.’” Even local officials who wanted to improve conditions in their communities had to work within an environment that viewed patronage as acceptable. One interviewee stated, “They’re working in an atmosphere where corruption is part and parcel of how things get done.” A DOS employee who has worked in both Afghanistan and Iraq relayed, “If the tribes are on board with this idea of building a provincial government that can provide patronage, because it is essentially a patronage society, you are going to succeed. But if they oppose you, you are going to fail.”

- Several interviewees observed that corruption undermined the legitimacy of local and national governments. Often the contact that most locals had with the government was negative: “The closest contact they have with their government is the police: the poorly paid, untrained policemen, whose job it is to just take bribes from them; that’s their daily contact with their government.” Working with local officials who are perceived as corrupt also undermines U.S. or coalition credibility. Said another interviewee, “The longer we are linked with corrupt officials, the more we are thought to be corrupt as well, because it is incomprehensible to [locals] who understand all of the stuff that we don’t, that we don’t understand all of the stuff that they do about who these officials are.” Interviewees also noted it is difficult to remove corrupt officials. Even when PRT members made efforts to report corrupt officials to American and coalition leaders and remove the officials, “Nothing ever came of it. It was never engaged with the [host] government; it was never made an issue with the people who make the appointments. Only a handful of sub-governors were removed or replaced for ineptitude or corruption.”

- Over the last eight years, the United States and the international community have made a significant investment in fighting corruption in Iraq and Afghanistan, but progress remains limited at best. Iraq’s ranking in the 2009 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index was 176 out of 180 countries. Efforts to fight corruption include proposed strengthening of anti-corruption laws by the government of Iraq and recent attempts to hold senior government officials accountable for corruption.
Despite these efforts, corruption remains a very serious problem in Iraq. The government of Iraq’s efforts to address corruption issues are ongoing but not yet sufficiently effective. The U.S. rule of law coordinator in Iraq has supported a series of efforts to combat corruption and promote transparency. Nevertheless, according to most of the interviewees, these programs have been largely ineffective.

Suggestions:

The following suggestions were discussed by interviewees as possible mechanisms to address the problem of corruption:

- **Identify and mentor local “credible” officials.** Find official or unofficial leaders who are well respected in their local community, and advocate to the relevant U.S. and host government officials for these individuals to fill official roles. Provide more funding, and increase mentorship of these leaders.

- **Withhold funding and remove local corrupt officials.** PRT leaders and members in the field should have a greater say in the assessment of local officials. If local officials are corrupt or incompetent, designated PRT personnel should be able to withhold funding and then recommend removal if necessary.

- **Increase and improve oversight of funding.** Local officials often lack the capacity to prevent corruption on their own. The international community must assist with oversight of international funding to ensure that it is not wasted.

Lesson Learned: PRTs can assist the provincial government in building sustainable medical capacity in the province.

Observations and Insights:

Everything from the way the PRT conducts its medical and public health outreach program to the sourcing of medical supplies can have a positive or negative effect on how quickly medical capacity is built in the province. Two areas that have a particular impact are:

- Sub-practice 1: How the PRT works with provincial health officials and existing host-nation facilities to build in-situation capacity.
Sub-practice 2: How the PRT plans, sources, and purchases medical supplies, equipment, facilities, rehabilitation, and training to support its medical capacity building in the province.

The PRT needs to assess the need to use quick response funds to purchase medical supplies that provide support to host-nation clinics and augment collaborative medical outreach events. Medical supplies are hard to source through U.S. channels. However, hasty local sourcing of medical supplies presents a number of risks and could lead to negative effects. Negative effects include temporary shortages of medicine and/or increases in prices at local pharmacies. Other risks include sourcing of poor quality products (e.g., not meeting required quality specifications or medicine past the expiration date).

One PRT addressed this problem by developing a process to mitigate risks and successfully source frequently demanded medical supplies/products through local distribution channels. Its process included the following steps:

- Plan projects well in advance and aggregate the purchasing volume into one sourcing event. The sourcing process could take up to 45 days.
- Build requirements based on input from multiple sources.
- Assess input from demand from previous events.
- Develop the technical specifications for required products.
- Develop a “request-for-quote” process that includes the quantities, service level (e.g., delivery time), and packaging requirements.
- Screen and qualify potential vendors from approved vendor lists compiled by the Joint Contracting Command.
- Inspect the product thoroughly upon receipt, preferably by qualified or trained personnel.
- Properly store all medicines.

Suggestions:

Implement the following steps to build sustainable medical capacity in the province:

- **Determine requirements.** Assess current and future demand for medical supplies. The PRT should estimate the number of village/
towship medical outreaches and collaborations with clinics or medical civic action programs that are planned over a longer time horizon and summarize the intermediate requirements for three to six months.

• **Develop a list of potential suppliers.** Screen potential suppliers in the province and beyond. Develop a long list of suppliers/distributors capable of supplying products and services of the required quality in the quantities needed.

• **Screen for potential suppliers/distributors in the province and beyond.** Use available contacts in the province to identify sources of supply. These contacts include provincial directors, USAID, and other aid agencies working in the province. Make it clear that you are just certifying the suppliers. Develop information profiles for potential vendors for future purchases. Collect this information in a standard format.

• **Refine criteria selection requirements.** Refine requirements, supplier market coverage, distribution range, and order lead time.

• **Prepare a request for proposal.** Develop a clear request for proposal that sets out the plan.

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**Lesson Learned:** The PRT can help create and encourage a viable workforce in the province to overcome a shortage of building trade skills and competent contractors.

**Observations and Insights:**

• Contractors need to be trained as a team outside a formal classroom setting. More trained and qualified contractors will accelerate the pace of quality construction and build a foundation for the provincial construction trades industry. Skilled training is needed to meet long-term reconstruction goals and maintenance standards and provide quality construction. The provincial government needs to train host-nation workers to build reconstruction and development projects to improve building capacity and help meet current and future demands for skilled labor.

• The way a PRT can address the shortage of competent contractors is by creating a workshop devoted to training its regular contractors on good construction techniques. U.S. Army engineers can train national army engineers on quality building trade practices.
appropriate for a developing country. The national army engineers will then instruct the contractors.

- The course of instruction is the same course work given to the national army engineers. The contractors may bring along up to three workers each to receive the instruction. A set of good tools should be provided to students upon graduation. Graduates would receive a certificate of completion and a wallet-sized identification card saying they have completed the course. The provincial government can be represented by the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development and the provincial engineer.

- The next step is to conduct the class again and upgrade the skills taught to returning attendees. The end result of implementing these practices is to create a small pool of trained employees who will be able to find local jobs. Having trained builders will increase the quality of construction in the province as the provincial government works towards self-sustaining systems.

Suggestions:

Implement the following steps to establish a builder’s workshop and improve building trade skills:

- **Coordinate the concept:**

  - Select a program manager. To ensure that a coordinated effort is possible, the PRT should select a volunteer to lead the program. The program manager can be a civil affairs team (CAT) leader who works directly with U.S. engineers.

  - Provincial government interest. The PRT leader and the program lead should meet with the provincial engineer and the national army leadership to get buy-in on the concept. The meeting should be a basic concept discussion.

- **Conduct a provincial assessment:**

  - Construction quality. Assessments of provincial construction projects may not always be up to the quality standards required for projects to last. It has been suggested that projects constructed by host nationals are often of a lower quality than those built by workers from another country because of the skills gap. Sometimes all of the contractors may come from outside the province. For the training to be
truly effective, the PRT should require that at least 75 percent of workers hired for projects come from the local district.

○ Existing vocational trade schools. There may not be any trade schools existing in the province to teach proper construction techniques.

○ Job opportunities. Each contractor should bring three attendees with him. The thought behind this is that the attendees who are not contractors may be able to start their own construction business as a result of this training.

• Create the workshop:

○ School location. This can be treated much like a U.S. conference. The PRT is going to provide the attendees with lodging and food to ensure as much as possible that students attend the entire six days of instruction.

○ Develop a curriculum. The CAT/PRT can choose to utilize the Inter-Service Builder Apprentice Training (A-710-0010) and Inter-Service Building Apprentice Training Phases A, B, and C (A-710-033 Army). Using these curricula will ensure that host-nation army trainers and contractors will have a good base of instruction.

○ Equip the school. The PRT/CAT can order quality tools from vendors. Part of the problem with local construction is that the tools often break and are not of good quality. Some of the contractors may be interested in becoming tool distributors.

○ Coordinate with the provincial government. Throughout the entire process, PRT members should coordinate all efforts with the provincial government to ensure unity of effort. The provincial engineer should be heavily involved in developing the plan. The provincial engineer could be a guest instructor during the workshop. He will provide the continuity necessary to continue the program.

• Transition the school to the provincial government:

○ The provincial government provides classroom location.

○ The provincial government provides all classroom equipment.
○ The provincial government provides the graduation basic tool kits.

○ The provincial government provides local instructors and pays them.

Lesson Learned: The PRT must reach the populace in the province with targeted messages that build awareness and support local government and U.S. government efforts.

Observations and Insights:

• The challenge is that there may be little in the way of established communications systems and media. It is important to engage with local government officials and allow them to deliver a message of progress to the people.

• The PRT leader and others should be able to engage the local media in their field of expertise along with the guidance of the public diplomacy officer. Roundtable discussions and joint sessions with military leadership work well.

• Although information operations may attempt to reach multiple audiences (e.g., U.S. citizens, the international community, deployed coalition forces, and locals), the PRT’s primary audience is the provincial populace. However, there are limited resources provided to the PRT to reach that audience effectively. A local newspaper that focuses mostly on stories of national-level interest and stories that promote coalition efforts should be engaged.

• Some regional content can be introduced to provide news and targeted public information in the province. There may be a dearth of local language content available for public information. In the end, the people may have little information about their local government at a time when the government needs to build awareness and engage its people in the civil processes of a democracy. The PRT leader needs to reach out to the local audience. He can do this by contacting the state-run television station operating in the provincial capital.

• Take a state television station’s camera crew to an event to have local media document the engagements and provide commentary for the event. This practice shows the people of the province that their local government is working toward providing better services
for its people and explains how the government is accomplishing this enormous task. The coverage should be balanced and fact-based when discussing the challenges the country faces. If the government is not doing a good job, the news report should show that as well. Because the engagements involve the local government and do not revolve around the direct actions of the PRT, this practice helps to dispel many of the myths about coalition forces.

- A videotaping of a governor’s meeting with religious figures where the PRT leader is also in attendance can receive a lot of attention. The PRT should continue to work with the local government on the concept of providing public service messages. The end result of implementing this practice is the creation of media coverage that will promote the provincial government’s activities and provide public service information.

Suggestions:

Implement the following steps to use the local media to communicate with the population:

- **Coordinate the concept:**
  
  ○ Select a program manager. To ensure that a coordinated effort is possible, the PRT should select its CAT leader to monitor this program.

  ○ Provincial government interest. The PRT leader and the program manager should meet with the governor and the director of communications to propose, refine, and agree upon the idea being proposed. At the meeting, present the basic concept and review the media capabilities in the province. The provincial government should agree that the people have a great interest in what goes on in the province and that a more aggressive plan on managing the message could help the people understand how their government is supporting them. The communications plan could also help in the area of public service messages by addressing such issues as health.

- **Conduct a provincial media assessment:**
  
  ○ Types and location of media assets. The program manager should work with the director of communications to agree upon a basic coverage concept of the current media facilities and develop a broad vision of where the provincial
government wants to expand its current resources. The PRT AOR may have state-run television and radio as well as private television stations that reach a large part of the populace due to high population densities in several key areas. Every type of media is usually represented in the province and can be part of a media engagement plan.

○ Capabilities of the local television station. The PRT can approach state-run television stations and invite them to cover and record events, such as project groundbreakings, grand openings, village medical outreaches, and provincial government-sponsored religious meetings. The television station may be interested in covering these events but lack basic audio/video equipment. The PRT can purchase a small portable video camera and basic video equipment and give it to the station. The station can then send a cameraman out with the PRT to cover key events occurring in the province.

• Work with the state-run television station:

○ Basic media training. The program manager should work with the local media to help improve their presentation techniques for taped segments. The PRT can encourage the television station to interview members of the provincial government as part of the film clip introduction. The cameraman can also interview people attending key events to capture their impressions of the event or efforts of the provincial government. Covering these events leads to more provincial government involvement and brings a local perspective to the events.

○ Preparing the message for radio and print. Another benefit of helping the television station create content is that the same content can be used for radio (audio) scripts and played on the radio across the province. The scripts can also be used for print media.

• Involve the provincial government:

○ Public service messages. The PRT should work with the director of communications and/or the state-run television station to help it package ideas and promote positive public service messages to the province. One planned campaign idea could be sponsored by the director of health to combat a local epidemic that is a common cause of mortality (e.g., the public service message could help dispel the myth that giving more
water to infants with dysentery results in their death due to dehydration). The PRT can also help the communication director or television station make radio and TV spots.

- Expand media coverage. Current coverage may be limited. The provincial government has a plan to increase coverage but needs assistance in financing the hardware upgrades. The station could consider selling airtime to businesses for advertising or to nongovernmental organizations to air information and outreach programming (e.g., farm extension programs and teacher training). The PRT could consider buying airtime for public information campaigns highlighting public health and safety issues or for promoting events such as village medical outreach events.

- Radio distribution. The PRT should have money to distribute radios to areas the signal covers but where people do not have radios. This will maximize the efforts of getting information to the people.

- Transition practice to the next PRT. The PRT must understand that the provincial government controls many of the media resources. The PRT should monitor the provincial government’s usage of the systems and suggest modifications to the process when it identifies areas where the provincial government could benefit.

- Transition practice to the provincial government. The director of communications should develop a media campaign to keep the people informed by having the PRT maintain a good relationship with the director of communications and assist in getting the governor to understand the importance of this communication tool.

Lesson Learned: Greater coordination, communication, and logistical support is still needed between PRTs, the embassy, and the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA).

Observations and Insights:

- Several PRT members commented about the lack of coordination and communication about long-term goals between the embassy, OPA, and PRTs operating in the field. Comments suggested that
while OPA and the military have been great at communicating short- to medium-term goals, they fall short communicating larger strategic goals.

• One Baghdad PRT member voiced frustration, stating: “I think overall…the PRTs, even the Baghdad PRT—where we lived with embassy people but did not work with them—are so separated from the embassy and the mission as a whole. Across the board almost every single person you can talk to—foreign service officer, contractor, team leader, Iraqi local hire—will tell you the biggest problem is there is not enough communication between the mission and the PRTs...even under the worst of times, there was really no excuse for the complete lack of broader communication coming from the top down to us.”

• Without such communication and coordination, the PRTs often took it upon themselves to learn and share what other PRTs in country were doing. Many interviewees describe how PRT staffers chose to share among themselves because they feared their efforts would fall on deaf ears in the embassy: “And a lot of times there were e-mails going back and forth across PRTs. I would be e-mailing Kirkuk, Kirkuk would be e-mailing Najaf, Najaf would be e-mailing Salah ad-Din and asking, ‘Hey, do you think that the embassy’s interested in X, Y, Z?’ We were asking each other because when we would ask the embassy, it just went into this never-never land, and you never got an answer. So, we would collectively come up with an answer, but that’s not much of a way to do it...”

• Finally, several interviewees commented about the systemic problem of a high level of disconnect between those in the embassy who logistically support PRTs and the PRT members. The dynamic that flows from the interviews is that those operating in the embassy are convinced they are doing quite a bit to support the logistical side of PRTs. But PRT members disagree, pointing out that embassy staff have rarely (if ever) traveled and communicated directly with the PRTs in the field. Most interviewees felt the support mechanisms were not sufficient and communication with support elements was lacking. They cited lack of BlackBerry phones, functioning Internet systems, and other basic logistical elements: “I was disappointed that the State Department did not take more care in making sure that we had office supplies, communications, and the living conditions…there should be a minimum standard for living and working conditions.”
**Suggestion:** Build personal relationships with OPA counterparts in the embassy. Keep open and clear communication channels to the OPA and other embassy sections.

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**Lesson Learned:** The PRT must share information from many sources with its own staff and members.

**Observations and Insights:**

The PRT requires practical information collection and display tools to provide a common understanding of the situation in the province. Current information graphically displayed enables better operations planning and reconstruction and development. Lack of transition data by RIP units causes a need to collect data about the province. PRTs use different methods for collecting and displaying data:

- Ensure the PRT has a weekly conference call with the desk officer to stay connected. Is important for OPA to provide the PRT staff updates on future plans and policy changes. If OPA provides the PRT with the opportunity to offer suggestions, the PRT staff will feel it is contributing to the program. Information from these staff calls should be made available to other PRT members for impact or situational awareness.

- Another approach is for OPA to organize periodic conference calls among PRT staff and advisers on specific topic areas such as governance, rule of law, public diplomacy, agriculture, or public health to facilitate understanding of embassy direction, latest national-level information, and sharing best practices. Information from these staff calls should be made available to other PRT members for impact or situational awareness.

- The PRT needs a system for collecting and storing data that makes the information available to different members of the team. The COP is the visual display that results from setting priority information requirements, developing workable processes for collection, and updating the graphic display to summarize information.

**Suggestions:**

- **Select a program manager.** The PRT civil affairs liaison team operations officer/planner is a good choice. The key to a successful COP is to include all members of the PRT.
• **Gain provincial government interest.** Teaching the provincial governor about the usefulness of having a reconstruction and development COP would be beneficial; however, based on limitations in technology in the province, using maps and overlays is probably the best implementation method of this practice.

• **Develop the parameters of the COP:**
  
  ○ Decide what data to collect. The PRT S-2 should hold a meeting with USAID, DOS, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Private Trans-Atlantic Telecommunications, and any other member of the PRT who has an interest in data collection. An assessment sheet should be developed from this meeting that synchronizes the collection efforts of all PRT members.

  ○ Determine what system to use to display the collected data. With today’s technology it is possible to collect data in a database and display that information using graphical overlays on a basic set of maps. The old-school method of using a map with overlays can be effective; however, it is not as easy to query the data that is collected in reports created in Microsoft Word.

  ○ Use a shared drive and establish a standard naming convention. Rather than storing data under a personal logon, PRTs are setting up naming conventions for storing documents and keeping them on shared drives that can be backed up weekly. Standardizing this practice should be considered by higher headquarters. This standardization will help with retaining information that seems to be constantly lost as personnel depart the theater.

  ○ Use of Microsoft SharePoint. Through SharePoint, PRTs are able to use specific domains to manage PRT information while having the ability to collaborate with other PRTs and the mission. The centralized information technology services management ensures one-time investment in technology and effective manning of the service from one location. Connectivity to this service should be made available to all PRTs.

  ○ Visual techniques:

    * PRT website. Data can be put on this website for others to see. The data can be updated weekly or
bi-weekly. It is difficult to collect data based on the available resources for each PRT. Some PRTs do not have a large expatriate or local staff to do this task.

* Falcon View. This program allows the PRT to create multiple overlays and digitally lay them over a standard set of maps. The system requires each piece of data to get plugged in with a Global Positioning System (GPS) grid but does not allow the user to query the system to see trends.

* ARC View. Similar to Falcon View, but this program allows for categorizing data, which enables the user to develop trend maps to see key relationships between events. One PRT is currently using this technique with great success. This system requires having users who know how to categorize the data make it useful to a decision maker. The key to success with this system is consistent data entry.

* WebTAS. This system is currently under development. One PRT is serving as the test site for implementation. WebTAS allows the PRT to create standard assessment forms that store information and allows the user to create multiple overlays and digitally lay them over a standard set of maps. The system requires each piece of data to get plugged in with a GPS grid, but does not allow the user to query the system to see trends. Bandwidth is a limitation for using WebTAS.

* Digital Battle Captain. This system is probably going to be the most useful COP program once it is fully developed. It includes daily event data collected from multiple sources across the operational area. However, the bandwidth at many locations will be a limitation.

* Maps and overlays. Although this is a basic system, it gets the point across by using a limited number of overlays and color codes. In the absence of any other visual capability, this is a great option.

* Microsoft PowerPoint. This is a low-tech way of displaying limited amounts of data. However, with the “build” feature, you can show what was done in the past, present, and future. You can also display information about key personalities and make
personality cards that Soldiers can carry with them on patrols. Once the baseline charts are created, PowerPoint is easy to update. It does not have any query capability.

* Microsoft Word documents. This is the most used but least preferred method because it only creates a large amount of text data that cannot be easily queried. It forces new arrivals to read through all the data to pick out what they think is useful, which takes a lot of time to gain operational knowledge of the province and tends to cause the loss of data over time.

○ Limitations:

* External hard drives. The amount of storage space required is extremely large when using better types of software. External hard drives are also very useful for PRTs to backup their data rather than trying to do it on CDRs. Storing map sets on external hard drives can help with bandwidth issues.

* Bandwidth. Many of these data systems require data to be maintained at locations with limited amounts of bandwidth. As a result, the practical use of these automated systems is reduced, if not totally diminished, because it takes too long to get the data.

* Plotters. Currently, PRTs do not have the equipment needed to print large-scale copies of their COP, even if they have the software to create copies. Some PRTs have started requesting production of their large-scale products off-site; however, this is often very time consuming. One PRT has a Geospatial Information System (GIS) section working at the PRT with a plotter and appropriate software. They can produce almost any product within hours of a request. An investment in a GIS section and plotter would be a worthwhile investment.

* Software. Based on the large number of software packages available and the cost involved in buying them, it would be extremely beneficial if the combined joint task force or geographic combatant commander would pick a standard package and purchase it for everyone. Training and technical support are required
to support the system. Feedback from the field is necessary to keep the system relevant.

* Operators. There are limited numbers of trained operators on the useful software packages described above. Without a dedicated trained operator, expectations of the actual usefulness of these systems are not realistic. Standardized data collection is the key to making these systems work. Without trained personnel, it is often better to just fall back on less technical methods of collecting and displaying data. However, the long-term usability and scalability of these low-tech methods is limited.

- **Involve the provincial government:**
  - Collect data from the provincial government. It is essential that the PRT has a copy of the provincial development strategy. These data points should be put on a map to show how the province will progress in the future. Historical reconstruction and development data is important to allow the provincial government to see progress and for PRTs to see what has been accomplished in the past.
  - Share the COP with the provincial government. Developing a reconstruction and development COP and sharing it with the provincial government and other donors is essential because the military has the best map-making equipment in the country. Often, the lack of maps (or the use of different maps) causes the provincial government and donors to misunderstand each other because the actual location of a reconstruction and development project is not known.

- **Transition practice to the next PRT:**
  - Ensure during the RIP that new PRT members are trained on the system used to develop the COP and they fully understand how to maintain the data and why it is important. This common reference is essential to keep things running smoothly as well as to ease future transitions. Good historical files should be built to assist new PRT members during their transition into their specific jobs.
  - The system can be shared during predeployment site surveys to allow incoming PRT elements to start training on the system and have relevant data before they arrive in theater. It
also helps for new arrivals to have a basic understanding of their AO.

Lesson Learned: Coordinated long-term planning is critical to the success of PRTs, but most PRT metrics and performance evaluations do not credit planning.

Observations and Insights:

- Civilian–military strategic planning appears not to be taken seriously: “There was this formal process that was supposed to be done as civil–military planning. But I’ll tell you that the PRT and everyone in the province regarded this as a box to check to get the people above them off their backs and then we were going to go about our daily business.”

- Metrics value performance over planning: “Every time a new commander comes in, he’s got to have his fitness report, and he’s going to do a lot of things to drive the numbers. He can’t just say, ‘I made this governor a better governor.’ He’s got to say, ‘I built this many schools, I built this many miles of roads.’ Metrics, metrics, metrics.”

- Civilian–military planning cells only work well if they feed directly into operational planning.

- Civilian–military planning must be balanced between civilians and military, otherwise the “civilian voice [is] drowned out.”

- Civilian–military planning is a challenge for two main reasons. First, it is difficult to coordinate strategies of civilian and military personnel. Second, planning for medium- and long-term projects is difficult when personnel regularly are rotating out and on different timelines.

- Although there are civil–military planning cells, some interviewees regarded these as impractical activities that did not result in true coordinated or long-term planning and did not drive resource or funding allocation. Instead, most projects are short-term projects that can be completed within single deployments and have measurable effects (e.g., miles of roads and number of schools), even if these are not the most critical programs needed.
• This situation is largely due to the quick personnel turnover (9- to 12-month deployments), incentive mechanisms to show measurable improvements within individuals’ deployments, inability to access funding and logistic support on a long-term basis to support long-term projects, and the inability to maintain oversight of the long-term projects that are recommended by the local population within a particular AO.

• The lack of long-term planning is part and parcel of the criticism that PRTs are fighting “one-year wars” instead of having a sustained, continuous effort to build capacity in their AOs.

**Suggestion:** Combining country agency offices related to PRTs (e.g., DOS, Department of Defense, USAID, Department of Justice, and USDA) under one roof may help alleviate some of the problems associated with planning and resourcing.

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**Lesson Learned:** The task of managing multiple projects to support capacity building and development in its AOR is challenging for a PRT.

**Observations and Insights:**

• CERP will not play an important role in Iraq as we enter a new fiscal year and the anticipated drawdown of U.S. troops. The provinces are moving towards a liberal market-oriented economy whereby provinces are requesting foreign direct investment. In Diwaniyah, the Provincial Investment Commission is the local entity in charge of private investment. Many provinces do not have actual data to collect that will support the proper development of economic projects. PRT experts can assist with the data collection. It is important that Iraqis are involved up front and the PRT monitors the process of private investment that will lead to economic growth.

• The PRT’s effort should focus primarily on capacity building and ensuring the Iraqis take ownership of their tasks and have all the support to complete processes end to end.

• The PRT staff must efficiently and effectively manage available resources, including delivering projects at the desired quality levels, building project management capacity on the provincial government staff, and building capacity in host-country enterprises.
• One PRT addressed this problem by viewing CERP project management as an end-to-end process, from the project formation/generation phase through project closeout and post-delivery monitoring. PRTs are to consider other sources of funding besides CERP, such as quick response funds. It would be best to incorporate similar methodology, although funding sources may be different. USAID’s International Road Assistance Program proved to be of great resource, as the PRT could utilize the Defense Agency Initiative to manage and monitor complex projects that required frequent visits to the sites.

• The PRT has organized a project delivery cell with defined roles and a mix of technical project management and control skills.

Key supporting processes:

• Project generation and nomination process. (See “Collaborative reconstruction planning with provincial and local governments” below.)

• Standard design for projects. USAID and the United Nations Office for Project Services have standard designs that use simple construction techniques and local materials. One PRT keeps an archive of all standard designs for a range of possible projects (e.g., schools, basic health care clinics, and micro-hydroelectric plants).

• Pre-bid supplier conference. Use the conference to describe the project, the expected skills required to deliver, and quality expectations. Set expectations and describe the way PRTs work, progress payments, and the quality dispute process.

• Bidders’ conference. One PRT expands the pre-bid conference into a training session. The PRT developed a training manual that is distributed at the pre-tender bidders’ conference. Attendance at the course qualifies the contractor to bid on CERP projects. The certification course aims to orient potential contractors, set their expectations, and prepare them for successful performance on CERP projects.

• Supplier information management. Provide a contractor/supplier profile with a picture for positive identification. Maintain records on each supplier to include previous work performed and references from other work. Assess and record the previous level of performance and capabilities (e.g., trades covered and geographic scope of operations).
- Build a detailed request for a proposal/quote. State quality expectations in bid documents so the cost of quality can be reflected in the contractors’ pricing. Communicate the quality expectations in the request-for-proposal/quote document. Reinforce the message again during the certification course.

Suggestions:

Implement the following techniques to manage multiple projects:

- **Organize the project delivery cell:**
  
  - Develop project documents. Plan project documents in adequate detail to support clear communication with potential bidders (i.e., provide contractors with the scope and requirements for the project). These documents can be used to support the bidders’ conference and the core of the bid package.
  
  - Plan and hold a bidders’ conference. Organize and hold the conference. Rehearse the presentation of the bid documents with the interpreters to ensure requirements are clearly communicated. Leave enough time for clarifying questions from the contractors. Answer all contractor questions in public, allowing the entire group to hear all questions and the same answers. Explain the ground rules for bids and who is on the selection committee.
  
  - Gather and manage project and supplier information. In most provinces, some line ministry directors are able to work effectively with the PRT. Assess the provincial government line directors and their staffs to determine their willingness to work transparently with the PRT. Use DOS representatives to help assess the current provincial government staff and maintain the influence-relationship map of key provincial officials.

- **Use available resources (e.g., time, CERP/quick response funding, and associations) to influence and reinforce good behavior:**
  
  - CERP/Quick response funds projects. Work with provincial line ministry directors to assess the province’s needs and develop a prioritized development plan that emphasizes primary needs first (e.g., electricity and water). Encourage provincial line ministry directors and other provincial
government officials to follow their prioritized development plans. Build sustainable systems by thinking through the resources for construction as well as the operating costs to maintain the system. Lack of focus on the sustainability and operations capacity of the host nation may result in the development of assets, which while undoubtedly sorely needed, cannot be staffed, equipped, or utilized.

○ Develop institutional capacity. Collaborative project work and mentoring programs can help build skills with other provincial government members. After gaining buy-in with staff collaborations from the governor and key line ministry directors, form the appropriate working team to develop and manage projects. Ensure the governor and key line ministry directors are kept informed through open progress meetings. By inviting larger participation from the line ministries, the provincial government can develop greater knowledge and experience in project development and management.

○ Consider phased development/investment to control funds. Phased project execution allows the PRT to invest in projects that are being managed with required transparency and effectiveness. Involving local leaders in shaping projects and creating local work crews can yield the optimum economic benefit while allowing good project controls of CERP/quick response funds. This phased approach also allows adequate time for teaching.

Lesson Learned: To maximize all available assets and capabilities that exist in a province, the PRT coordinates capacity building and development activities with other units.

Observations and Insights:

- PRTs require practical information collection and display tools to provide a common understanding of the situation in a particular province. Graphically displaying current information enables better operations planning and reconstruction and development. Lack of transition data by the RIP unit causes a need to collect data about the province.

- Within the combined joint operational area, maneuver units own the entire PRT operational environment. Lines of command can
become blurred without higher headquarters clearly defining who is in charge. In instances where the PRT and a maneuver unit are collocated, the maneuver commander is the senior commander. In most of these instances, the PRT operates at a reduced level of manpower because it is collocated with a maneuver element.

• The difference in missions between the two units can make both parties ineffective without properly coordinating operations. If the PRT is not collocated with a maneuver element and has its full complement of force protection, it is still essential to know what other operational elements are doing in the province.

Suggestions:

Ensure the maneuver element S-3 hosts a weekly meeting that includes the PRT and any maneuver elements in the AO. The meeting is essential because it allows all elements to deconflict their operations over the next week as well as provide support when something happens that requires emergency assistance. The meeting also allows all parties to share information that others might find irrelevant; however, since attendees may be working in different parts of the province and/or working with different people, they ultimately will have information to share that all will find important. The meeting also allows units to find gaps and seams that can be mitigated to help share limited resources. Some future steps in this process would be to include the host government security force so it can learn how to conduct such a meeting and synchronize data sharing. This can all be integrated back into the emergency operations center.

Coordinating the concept:

• Selecting a program lead. The PRT S-3 is the best person to be the program lead. The CAT-A team leader might want to attend to gather information firsthand from the meeting.

• Provincial government interest. This meeting has no primary use to the provincial government; however, information from it could be used by the maneuver element and the PRT to assist them at the provincial security coordination body.

• Conducting the meeting. The maneuver S-3 hosts the meeting at his location and sets the weekly agenda. Attendees include the maneuver S-3, PRT S-3, embedded training team, and any other coalition force representatives in the province. All invitees must be able to review their missions and patrols for the next two weeks so a COP of events can be determined and deconflicted. When the maneuver element and the PRT are collocated, more time should be spent
coordinating missions and patrols because the maneuver element must provide force protection for the PRT to accomplish its mission. This requirement for force protection can be greatly impacted if the maneuver commander has a different plan and is relying on these same limited resources.

- Transitioning practice to the next PRT. Review the meeting agenda with the new personnel and cover the due-outs for the next meeting. Also, provide historical meeting notes to show the intent of the meeting and its usefulness.

Lesson Learned: The PRT must reach to outlying or remote districts within its province.

Observations and Insights:

- By design, PRTs are located close to the provincial capital. As security improves, the PRTs are able to travel to villages more frequently. It is important the PRT focus its new strategy on the local villages and most vulnerable outside the provincial capital. The PRT will play a key role in bringing the local issues from the bottom to the top.

- One PRT established three remote patrol bases within the province to help project the presence and impact of the PRT. The patrol bases are located in safe houses and guarded full time by hired security forces or collocated on a national police compound. The patrol is commanded by a major with approximately a 20-person organization that is staffed with other PRT skill sets as required. The patrol leader constantly engages the local population and collects information for the PRT.

- The remote patrol base concept allows relationships to form and grow with the local population. It also allows the PRT to make regular assessments and conduct quality control checks on remote projects. PatROLS stay out for about three weeks at a time and then return to the PRT site for resupply. The same people return to their remote patrol base to ensure relationships are maintained with the locals. Because many of the remote locations are snowed in during the winter, the PRT shuts down the patrol bases except for the local security force. The PRT also reduces its staff in the winter months when the location of the remote bases is not trafficable.
Suggestion: The selection of remote patrol base locations should be based on where the base can have the most impact on the local population.

Lesson Learned: A dangerous security environment is a key impediment to the success of a PRT. It prevents PRT members from regularly meeting with local officials and overseeing projects. A poor/deteriorating security environment also reduces the population’s confidence in the effectiveness of its central and local government institutions.

Observations and Insights:

- A majority of interviewees commented that the security situation often made movement difficult for civilian members of the PRT. One USDA PRT member operating in Iraq said, “Movement was the one thing that was most difficult. [There was] competition for security among the PRTs. On ground moves, I had four MRAPS [mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles] with up to 16 armed guards.”

- Another theme resonating in the interviews was that a poor security situation limits improvements in governance and development and damages the local community’s connection with the government. One Navy PRT commander in Afghanistan stated, “The worsening security situation hampered development efforts and efforts to advance governance. The decrease in security was causing the government to lose its connection with the people of the province, and this was a significant concern.”

- A PRT member in Iraq noted similarly that, “Unless there is a secure environment, improvements in governance are going to be limited. And how can you have true economic development? Security will remain the top issue. On the other hand, heavy security and military presence may lead to less flexibility and less ability to interact with the local officials.”

- It is also critical that PRT members are viewed to be sharing the same risks as the population they are supporting. A PRT member in Iraq stated, “Part of the problem for PRTs like us that were wholly dependent on the military for security is that the military has just about zero flexibility to deviate from their template. And a number of Iraqis in Karbala would say, ‘Why do you do this? Karbala’s safe...”
now. You don’t have to do this anymore.’ Our military guys would agree with us, but we can’t make an exception, even if we wanted to.”

- According to the most recent DOD report on stability and security in Iraq, security incidents remain at the lowest levels in more than five years, and progress in the security environment remains generally steady but uncertain.

Suggestions:

- Civilians should participate in all stages of mission planning to ensure civilian missions are viewed as a priority. All members of the PRT must recognize that interacting with local officials in the field is the primary PRT mission. “I was at virtually every meeting that we had with the commander. Usually I sat in the command center and that’s what I would recommend for people like me going out: sit in the command center.”

- Clearly communicate mission and requirements to security personnel: “We actually did owe these young soldiers much more information, better briefings about what exactly we were doing, because I think it helped. And they appreciated when we would take the time to say, ‘We’re going to a meeting with the governor, we’re going to a meeting with the head of this nongovernmental organization, and this is what it’s about, this is what’s at stake.’”

- Reduce the visible security footprint: When the security situation permits, PRT members must be prepared to share risk with the local population they are working with. When appropriate, risk can be mitigated with unmarked vehicles, perhaps utilizing private security.

Summary of Best Practices

This section covers the following areas of best practices:

- Interaction with locals.
- Planning.
- Funding.
- Civil–military relations.
- Continuity of effort.
Summary of Interaction with Locals Best Practices

• Rely on local hires when access to local leaders is difficult. “The hardest part for us was interacting with Iraqis on a day-to-day basis. Sometimes getting out was difficult. The amount of time you had with them was limited. Sometimes what they would tell you was limited, so you depended on a lot of these locally hired Iraqis who worked for us to fill in the gaps and help to explain things to us.” (USAID, Basra, Fall 2009)

• Develop local community groups to build buy-in. “I would form farmers’ associations, a loosely knit group of farmers who wanted to work with us, and just followed up with them. I would start out with five or six in this group, and those groups would multiply to 50 members. We used these associations to provide training on how to use greenhouses, tractors, etc. Then I gave each farmer’s association five greenhouses, and what we did as a group, we put names in a hat and we picked out five names, and they got the first five greenhouses, and then they in turn paid back a percentage of their profit to the farmer’s association, who would buy more greenhouses for other farmers. So it was an ongoing process.” (USDA, Ninevah, Winter 2009)

• Mentor and support Iraqis, but do not do it for them. “The number one lesson that I would say is to observe before you act. An American answer for an Iraqi problem is not an answer. We have to develop Iraqi solutions for Iraqi problems. Mentor and guide and support them. Don’t do the job for them. One of the things that I endorse a lot is that it is better for an Iraqi to do a job halfway and learn than for you to step in and do it perfectly, because the Iraqi will let you work yourself to a frazzle.” (USDA, Ninevah, Winter 2009)

• Get a letter of consent, a substantial agreement, from Iraqis to sustain projects initiated by Americans. “Actually we used to make sure before we even started any project to get a letter of consent, a buy-in letter, and a promise that they would sustain the project and man it. If we were building schools, the school wouldn’t function if they didn’t put teachers in it.” (DOS, Muthanna, Winter 2009)

• Hire Iraqi-Americans to work for the United States in Iraq. “My relationship was perfect, because I was born in Iraq. Actually they still write me e-mails now, all of them, from the governor to the investment commissioners, and I respond to them. It was absolutely incredible. I had a different approach and knew how to deal with the issues.” (DOS, Muthanna, Winter 2009)
• Contract locally-engaged staff to facilitate PRT interactions with the community. “[We] had the ability to contract locally engaged staff, $1,500 a month for someone who’s living in the community, and the amount of work that we got out of them was absolutely phenomenal, because they could go out and do everything for us—as arrange meetings, give us grid coordinates for buildings, transact deals for us, etc… One committed local person is worth 10 or 15 well-meaning, well-motivated but ultimately not as effective Americans or folks from other parts of the world who are trying to negotiate the system.” (DOS, Karbala, Fall 2009)

• Bring U.S. personnel of some status to meetings to show respect for Iraqi counterparts. “We would have a fair number of, not really high-level VIPs, the division commander or brigade commander, come in, or somebody from Baghdad—such as the ambassador’s special representative for southern Iraq—and we would take them on a normal round of appointments with the governor and Provincial Council chairman and others.” (DOS, Karbala, Fall 2009)

• Make formal appointments to see the governor instead of barging in unannounced. “They started to require that we have appointments, which I thought was a brilliant thing, because we used to just go marching into the governor’s office and monopolize the space and use up his time. It just seemed more respectful that if we wanted to meet with the governor, we should have an appointment. So things became more formalized over time, less so with members of the council, but at least with the governor.” (USAID, Anbar, Fall 2009)

**Summary of Planning Best Practices**

• Train Iraqis in strategic planning. “We were pretty quick to train the Iraqis in strategic planning. Some of that strategic planning that we trained the Iraqis on actually stuck and made a difference. Iraqis tend to be mathematicians and engineers, not great planners. But they were intrigued with the idea of setting objectives, trying to be honest in terms of what they thought they could influence at their level, and then trying to measure in some way what they had achieved. That all made a lot of sense to them. That was a discipline that they seemed to appreciate.” (USAID, Anbar, Fall 2009)

• Use good ideas from other provinces and modify them to work in your area. “My main focus during the whole year was to build an agriculture board—we call it the Maysan Ag Advisory Committee. I got the idea from our agriculture adviser in Hillah at the Babil
PRT…I used what they did in Babil as a template and modified it.” (USDA, Maysan, Winter 2009)

• Focus on systematic and process reforms instead of merely building and infrastructure projects. “We had several systems projects in which we helped them install a project tracking system that tied together their financial department, their engineering department, and political leadership so they could all track them. USAID had a contract where they developed a database written explicitly for the provincial level where you could simply enter information about the contractor, status of the contract, the payments, the budget—stuff that, for us, you wouldn’t even dream of going forward without, but at a lot of provincial levels it didn’t exist at all. That was one thing that we consider a success, if they ever in fact use it, because it takes them from this ad hoc ‘Let’s just build something’ to a much more systematic approach. ‘How are these projects doing? What contractors are working out? What contractors aren’t?’ Really, just financial and management controls that didn’t exist. We found that going after systems ultimately had a bigger potential payoff than just simply going in and building a school or a particular project without addressing the systemic ways of staffing and budgeting, etc.” (DOS, Karbala, Fall 2009)

• In general, avoid big-ticket “legacy” projects without appropriate planning. “The Iraqi officials would tend to get irritated with the PRT, because we were trying to move toward much smaller projects, looking at systems and so on, and then they would say, ‘But where’s the new electric power plant? Where’s the new canal? What you guys really need to do is build a huge school or a big factory, a legacy project, just like the British did.’ And we actually did a lot of those projects in 2004 and 2005 and which right now are sitting empty or half-completed, because again, no planning went into them and no thought of how to maintain or finish them or how they’re going to fit in. And we can’t afford those legacy projects.” (DOS, Karbala, Fall 2009)

Summary of Funding Best Practices

• Use alternative sources of funding beyond CERP and quick response funds. “One of the big things I was trying to get them (PRTs) to draw upon more was the Japanese common fund for PRTs. To level the playing field, any PRT can apply for funds from this fund and it’s quite extensive, $10 million or something, and I helped a lot of the Americans, an even in one case a non-American, on the PRTs to gain access to this.” (DOS, Baghdad, Fall 2009)
• Promote more micro-development projects that are typically easier to fund. “If you are really looking at trying to do meaningful projects like business development, they could use micro-purchases. What I was trying to do with civil society development was trying to find a worthwhile project that you could do for under $25,000...anything above the $25,000 was a grant. There was one that I tried to do, but I wasn’t successful.” (3161, Baghdad, Fall 2009)

• CERP is only useful if it is accompanied by properly trained PRT members who can provide project management and oversight. “We said, ‘Absent that, if you don’t have that capability, we can’t turn this amount of money over to the Iraqis and think that they can do that themselves, because they’re not at that level yet. We’re just going to be building a lot of crappy, empty buildings.’ And there was a lot of pushback and eventually it ended up, at least for our PRT, that the Army Corps of Engineers agreed to provide us with a qualified engineer for much longer than they had planned, because we said we didn’t want any of this CERP money otherwise. Without the professional ability to manage it, we’re violating our trust with the American taxpayer if we put all these projects in the pipeline that we know no U.S. government eyes will be able to supervise.” (DOS, Karbala, Fall 2009)

Summary of Civil–Military Relations Best Practices

• Work your travel schedule into the military’s patrol schedule. “We still asked to go to lots of places, but we tried to say, ‘Here’s where we’d like to go. You tell us when you’ve got your regular patrol going in that direction, here’s what we want to do.’ And so they worked it into their patrol schedule, and that was pretty much how we did it.” (DOS, Salah ad Din, Fall 2009)

• Be resourceful to solve problems, such as assisting the military to find location coordinates. “Sometimes [military counterparts would] say, ‘We can’t go there; we don’t have the grid coordinates or something.’ You have to say, ‘Well, actually, you do have the grid coordinates.’ There were many missions where I would get Google Earth out, and I would go to Karbala and guide them down the street: ‘This is where we’re going.’ And then we’d print out the Google maps and they’d convert that to a military grid. That’s how you did business.” (DOS, Karbala, Fall 2009)

• Communicate with officers and even enlisted personnel about what you are doing and why you are doing it. “We did realize we had been falling down on this; we actually did owe these young soldiers
much more information, better briefings about what exactly we were doing, because I think it helped. And they appreciated when we would take the time to say, ‘We’re going to a meeting with the governor, we’re going to a meeting with the head of this NGO and this is what it’s about, this is what’s at stake.’ As opposed to their just driving us to a building where we went into the building for a meeting and came out, and they had no idea what the meeting was about, why we were there, or anything. I think they appreciated the extra couple of minutes…We did try to do a briefing for the young officers, like the lieutenants and the captains and the senior noncommissioned officers—who had what portfolio, what our overall objectives were, what we were trying to accomplish in the province—just so they could tell their soldiers.” (DOS, Karbala, Fall 2009)

- Learn from the military and let them learn from you. “I think we learned something from each other. We [civilians] learned the value of trying to do some strategic planning so that you have some vision and some way forward that you can be held accountable for and can try to manage. They [the military] learned the futility of trying to do that in an absolutely blueprint way from us. There was mutual learning going on between us civilians and the Marines. I think it was frustrating for both of us because of those very different worldviews...They are not used to building democratic institutions. They don’t do it... They started to learn about that from us, and we started to learn about the intricacies of fuel distribution and things like moving money from the banks. There was a little bit of cooperation there.” (USAID, Anbar, Fall 2009)

- Be thankful for the support you get from the military. “Thankfully, we had the military as an anchor. At the end of the day, the basics were taken care of. We had a place to sleep. We had security. We had food and water. If left to our own devices, a lot of us would have died of thirst in the desert, I am sure. Having the military to fall back on, to be our guarantor, made it all possible. As you are probably aware, this drawdown of the troops now brings into question the ability to continue to support the PRTs in Iraq, because we are 100 percent dependent upon them. That’s just the reality.” (USAID, Anbar, Fall 2009)

- A good relationship between civilian and military leaders results in better civil–military cooperation at the staff level. “As for the ambassador and the commanding general, you really couldn’t see a point of daylight between them...you had the two people at the top, they were together. I assume that the ambassador didn’t like
everything the military was doing, and I assume the military didn’t like everything the State Department was doing, but you never knew. At the top, you didn’t know there was any discontent between the two of them. So that made everybody below behave better.” (3161, Baghdad, Fall 2009)

• Establish good relations with the PRT commander. “When I got down to Hawijah, I got really a great deal of military support and I felt very integrated. It was a function of putting in the time with them, to go to their briefings, figuring out what they’re going to be doing, as well as being a resource for them in the room.” (3161, Kirkuk, Fall 2009)

Summary of Continuity of Effort Best Practices

• Try to ensure overlap with replacement personnel so that the incumbent can introduce the replacement to local leaders.

  ○ “Fortunately, I had sufficient overlap with the political officer who was there. Even though she focused mostly on reporting and I worked on programs, we’re both political officers. She had already been there three, four months when I left, so she’ll take my replacement under her wing and introduce him to all the main contacts.” (DOS, Karbala, Fall 2009)

  ○ “I was blessed to have my predecessor there, the guy whose portfolio I took; we had an overlap of about seven weeks. Since strictly speaking I wasn’t really filling his position, he didn’t have to go when I came, although informally I took over the position… [He] had a wide range of contacts and a very large portfolio. We were out five, six days a week, every single day, sometimes twice a day, and that was really the best way to get integrated very quickly, to know who’s who. So by the time he left, I knew all the key players, almost all of the key issues, so as new PRT members came aboard I felt I could give them a much better brief, because it doesn’t take long until you’re the senior guy on the block, the expert.” (DOS, Karbala, Fall 2009)

• Advise the new person but then step back and get out of the way as he asserts himself in the job. “With these changing positions, you usually have about a week or so of overlap. At the end of the day, we all have different backgrounds, different training, and different views of the world. You don’t want to tell your successor what to do or what to expect. You lay out the portfolio. You lay out the issues
that you are working on. You make the introductions. Then you step away and say, ‘Call me if you have any questions or problems.’ It usually works out.” (USAID, Anbar, Fall 2009)

• Maintain clear files and contact information to enable a sudden or speedy replacement. “I went through all the projects. By this time my partner and I had developed a list of contacts. There was actually something in the file cabinet, there were files and things that I walked him through: ‘Here are people you can call. Here’s a list of phone numbers.’ When I started, there wasn’t even a scrap of paper with a phone number.” (DOS, Salah ad Din, Fall 2009)

• In cases where direct overlap is not possible, send copious notes in advance to the next person. “What I did was, knowing that we weren’t going to see each other, long before he arrived, we started sending him the weekly situation report, which was a rollup of everything we did as a PRT. I wrote him a couple of long memos telling him where we were on certain projects, who to turn to, that sort of thing, at the embassy in Baghdad, and who our primary contacts were. So I think he was happy with the amount of information he got.” (DOS, Karbala, Fall 2009)

• Talk to longer-serving U.S. personnel and locals to get up to speed. “What I would do is spend a lot of time talking to the people who had been there longer than I was and understood what was going on, reading the cable traffic going back to Washington, and then talking to a lot to Iraqis.” (USAID, Anbar, Fall 2009)

• Learn from foreign nationals working in the embassy. “In Baghdad, we hire Iraqi citizens to work with us at USAID. So we have mostly young Iraqi men and women who are university educated, bilingual obviously, who live in the city, either in Baghdad or Ramadi, and are plugged into what is going on. I would spend a lot of time talking to them to understand the politics.” (USAID, Anbar, Fall 2009)
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