10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) the last CJFLCC Iraq

A Series of Thoughts on Transitioning from Combat Operations to Enabling Civil Authority (Iraq)
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Executive Summary

“Winning the peace is harder because wars do not end in peace”
Major General Piatt (10th Mountain Division Commander and CJFLCC-Iraq Commander 2018)

The 10th Mountain Division deployed its Headquarters to Iraq in February 2018 to assume the role of Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command. However, the Division deployed during a period of transition to a new Headquarters construct within the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), and found itself rapidly adjusting to a change of mission once on the ground. The Division staff was instrumental in shaping the new CJTF Headquarters and played key roles in understanding the operational environment and operationalizing the Reliable Partnership plan. The focus of the Division on working with the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) has been fundamental in its efforts to set the theater for Phase IV (stability) and Phase V (enable civil authority).

Conflict resolution and the transition back to civil governance is a difficult task. End states may be clear. However, the reality of obstacles and impediments getting there can be complex and take years to overcome. Examples are numerous; Japan, Germany, the Korean Peninsula, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. Iraq is not different.

This Newsletter focuses on the 10th Mountain Division’s experience dealing with the initial transition of the Army Headquarters and mission in Iraq. Chapter 1 discusses two challenges the division experienced: 1) The overarching Army challenge in Iraq transitioning to phases IV (stabilize) and V (enable civil authority) from its traditional lead role during combat operations; 2) the division’s reorganization of the CJFLCC and CJTF into a single headquarters to support the transition. eight key take aways. Chapter 2, Winning the Peace in Iraq, sets the stage for the newsletter and for the the following series of papers named Hays Horizons, chapter 3-9. These think pieces tackled many of the issues and challenges discussed in the lead paper which the division experienced during its deployment. Thoughts and ideas shared by others outside of the CJTF, including the Precision Information Targeting Team (PITT) and Dr. Basimah Rowe, influenced and shaped many aspects of the lead paper. The names of those that contributed directly to Winning the Peace in Iraq are listed below.

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Winning the Peace in Iraq. Winning the Peace in Iraq, written by the CG of the 10th Mountain Division, is the opening paper in this newsletter. It outlines the impediments and the possibility of peace and prosperity that the Iraq Military has fought hard to provide. As a reliable partner, the U.S. has stood by Iraq assisting in the defeat and expulsion of ISIS and remains resolved to see them through re-establishing their nation as a safe and viable world partner. Finally, this paper pens a framework for Iraq’s way ahead and sets the stage for the other papers in this newsletter.
Hashd al-Shaabi: The Saviours of Iraq, Best Military Advice on Interacting with Hashd al-Shaabi. It was Hashd al-Shaabi that answered the call to arms in 2014 when it looked as if ISIS was moving towards the gates of Baghdad. Hashd al-Shaabi is not a monolithic organization; rather it embodies the fault lines of modern Iraq, divided along religious, ethnic and national identities, state and non-state actors as well as private and foreign interests. This paper broadly defines three focus areas where the Coalition could exert influence within the Iraqi Security Forces. These areas are integration, re-training and employment, and disbanding.

Climbing Mount Olympus: The American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG). In Climbing Mount Olympus, this paper provides a historical example of one of the most successful transitions, the transition of Greece through security sector reforms, a communist insurgency and post-World War II (WWII) reconstruction. This example provides a perspective and a template for a way towards success in Iraq. The success revolved around three major elements; clear policy direction, a unified command that integrated civil and military efforts, and a holistic approach to security sector reform. Very similar to Iraq, the main lines of effort were; economic development, governance, and security force assistance.

Tajikistan: A Case Study in Successful Reintegration. A significant component to resolving any internal social, political or religious insurgency is a successful reintegration of the disenfranchised elements of the population back into its society. There were four key elements to success. First, political settlements created legitimate opportunities and economic enrichment for key leaders. Second, genuine and tangible socio-economic opportunities for fighters and their communities of origin, armed groups became part of the political process. Third, entry barriers were reduced or removed to expedite the process. Finally, unilateral suppression of all opposition to reunification and attempts at spoiling the reintegration process, and in the case of Iraq it was the destruction of ISIS. This paper on Tajikistan’s reintegration efforts illustrates a successful way to implement reintegration policy.

Ibn al Ahir and the City of Broken Hearts. The cost of victory in Mosul was high. The destruction in the city mirrored destruction at the end of WWII. 700,000 residents remained displaced. Essential services were non-existent and the local economy was not functioning. The removal of the war damage, explosive remnants and in some cases human remains was a daunting task. This paper discusses the reconstruction challenges that threaten the fragile stability gained at the end of victory. It also talks to the organizational obstacles which challenge the recovery in Mosul.

A Bottom-Up Approach Preconditions for the One Iraq Policy. The realization of a unified Iraq is in the best interests of the Iraqi people. However, in the immediate future the One Iraq Policy is not achievable. With an emboldened Iraqi Kurdish Region and the Sunni, Shia disenfranchisement there are significant impediments that must be overcome from the bottom up, not the top down. This paper discusses a path the Government of Iraq can take as a bottom up approach to a unified Iraq.
**Qelay, Qal’at, Kalesi Kirkuk.** There must be a wide and holistic view of Iraq. To look at it through the lens of one city or even one region of Iraq misses the complexity of unifying the country. Kirkuk is Iraq’s fourth largest city and like Mosul, it requires comprehensive thought to find a solution to its issues. Kirkuk teeters on an ethno-political edge due to past historical abuses between Arabs (Sunni/Shia) and the Kurds. The Turkmen have also fostered a deep mistrust among the different groups in the region. This paper discusses the issues and impediments to resolving the disputes and offers up solutions as Iraq continues to move towards unification.

**Sharafnama’s Next Chapter: The Future of Iraqi Kurdistan.** Finally, there can be no real conversation of Iraq unification without the consideration of the Kurdish question. Both the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the Government of Iraq (GoI) demonstrated great resolve and unity in coming together to defeat a common enemy, ISIS. However, now that this enemy is defeated, the old divides remain. In this last paper, the gap that exists between the KRG and the GoI is discussed in an effort to help U.S. Forces gain a solid understanding of the Kurdish question.
Chapter 1
Challenges and Key Takeaways
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Challenges and Key Takeaways

Challenges

1. The overarching Army challenge in Iraq is transitioning to phases IV (stabilize) and V (enable civil authority) from its traditional lead role during combat operations.

   In a subordinate role what exactly are the Army’s tasks, purpose and authorities in assisting other U.S. government agencies (OGAs) and international entities like the United Nations? The lines are blurred and the gap goes beyond DOTMLPF-P. To complicate the issue the military is often viewed as the most trusted institution at the end of a conflict. After the expulsion of ISIS from Iraq, the civilian population viewed the Iraqi Military as the only institution that could provide safety and security. However, the problem is the military does not have the inherent skills required to reconstruct economies, reestablish judicial systems, reconstitute local to national governance, reset banking and reestablish the full array of city infrastructure, which provides the kind of safety, security and prosperity people get from legitimate governments. Therefore, getting the people to ultimately have faith in and view legitimate civil authority as the most trusted institution is and should be one of the military’s goals in the process of transitions. Yet there is still potential risk because populations are looking for immediate results in security, food, shelter, utilities and want normalcy restored quickly. If the transition from a military solution to the civil solution lasts too long, then people will likely turn to whomever can provide for their needs, opening the door to bad actors like ISIS, corruption and an illicit black market economy.

   There is a process behind transitions and the Army plays a pivotal role. However, understanding what their role is and how to work with the Department of State (DOS), and other agencies is a challenge. Often the Army is the lead in developing a systematic plan for transitioning from conflict to peace. The problem is the DOS will ultimately be the lead agency but was not part of the planning.

   To address this challenge the National Defense University should develop a course for Senior U.S. Military and State Department Leaders aimed at instructing them in planning and executing phase IV/V transitions.

2. The division’s reorganization of the CJFLCC and CJTF into a single headquarters generated two major challenges: addressing the requirements and purpose of the headquarters, and organizing personnel and sections.

   The 10th Mountain Division Commander and Staff were given the CENTCOM task of not only deactivating the CJFLCC-Iraq but also to combine elements of it into the CJTF. The task appeared simple, combining two Army Headquarters, but in reality, it was a complex
and slow process due to the different echelons and multitude of organizations, all of which had varied interests in the transition to a CJTF. For example there was the CJTF at Corps level, CJFLCC at the division level, Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq (OSCI), the Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), ARCENT and finally, all the multi-national entities. All of these organizations had their established purview and equities making it difficult for them to transition to a CJTF. Additionally, events happened so rapidly that 10th Mountain supporting the task of transitioning from a CJFLCC to a single supporting headquarters was ahead of the guidance from CENTCOM. This added to ambiguity to designing the headquarters.

10th Mountain’s major consideration for the CJTF Campaign Plan during the transition was how the new headquarters would provide support to the Iraqis. 10th Mountain developed a framework, entitled “Reliable Partnership,” that would provide support to Iraqi civil authority along six lines of effort - security, economy, governance, utilities and services, local policing and a judicial system. However, the issue remained on how to organize a single U.S. Headquarters that could exercise mission command from tactical through strategic levels. Ongoing combat operations still required tactical mission command. Attempting to organize the right size headquarters for each level of mission command was exceptionally difficult at the staff levels because as an effect from the transition, staff roles and function were not clearly defined but blurred.

Another challenge was organizing personnel for staffing into sections. The combining of the two headquarters had to go through several iterations at the primary staff, 0-6 level, to find the appropriate mix of personnel and tasks. Directors at all levels and service components were very protective of their people, resources and mission and as a consequence resisted giving these up as a result of the transition. At the deputy director, level the reorganization was somewhat emotional because it became a challenge to refocus staff sections away from combat operations, turn over authorities and responsibilities to their Iraqi counterparts, and shift their focus to supporting civil efforts. Senior leadership was constantly challenged overcoming a bureaucracy characterized by a stakeholder and equities mindset resistant to the CJTF transition.

One way of addressing this challenge is that CENTCOM may have considered forming a Field Army Headquarters. An Army Division or Corps, which are tactical level headquarters, requires augmentation and enablers to interface at the civilian national authority level. Numbered field Armies have historically controlled Corps during combat operations but also maintained the ability to transition to an administrative command capable of supporting civil authority at the end of a conflict. One example is the Eighth Army. During the Korean War, it controlled U.S. and Korean Corps and Divisions. At the armistice, it was able to quickly transition to support the Republic of Korea with advisors to the Army, oversee the demilitarized zone, administer training centers and support the civil efforts. Field Armies are more capable of evolving in response to a peculiar strategic situation. (Pg. 5-13 thru 5-16)

Takeaways

- Designing the headquarters into directorates along lines of effort can help foster unity of effort and staff efficiencies when supporting civil authority. A directorate approach also promotes staff coordination with other government agencies focuses along the same lines of efforts.

- Main Command Post-Operational Detachment (MCP-OD), augmentation was essential from the division’s perspective especially due to 25% reduction headquarters due to Focus Area Review Group II (FARGII). The G3 of the division remained at home station to maintain readiness. The MCP-OD allowed the division to maintain the right mix of staff functions at Fort Drum and forward in theater.

- As a best practice, the division’s pre-deployment education consisted of meeting with all the intelligence agencies in Washington D.C. to gain a better understanding of Iraq. In addition, they also met with the former Ambassador to Iraq and spent time at the U.S. Institute of Peace to get a broader perspective on the future of Iraq.

- Military must understand the economic and governance lines of effort (LOE). The military most often will not directly facilitate these activities but will be in support.

- U.S. Military focused on safety and security tasks creates time and space for the Economic and Governance LOEs by reducing the drivers of instability with in a city or region. Most often military efforts will be advising, assisting and supporting host nation police and military.

- There was an inverse relationship between freedom/transparency and security. Corruption is a significant aspect in Iraq, which threatens that relationship. What the U.S. perceives as corruption the Iraqis see as the price of doing business. U.S. Forces must understand this to ensure the best possible transparency between the government and the people.

- Post-conflict success is dependent on trust and buy-in from the former combatants. Tajikistan accomplished this through political power and economic/monetary sharing agreements. In Iraq, the Iraq Army has emerged as one of the most trusted institutions by the people. The challenge is to transfer the trust from the Iraqi Army to the Government of Iraq.

- Bypassing transitory justice helped buy time for the central government to form and “keep the peace.”
Chapter 2
Winning the Peace in Iraq
Chapter 2
Winning the Peace in Iraq
Major General Walter E. Piatt
Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry)

A shop owner poses in front of his stand in Old Mosul, May 14, 2018.

Iraq won the fight; now can it win the peace? The barriers to peace are immense; however, the ability to overcome these obstacles is within the grasp of the Iraqi people. They have the capacity and the ability to build upon the good will of a country that unified to defeat ISIS. While the caliphate no longer exists and ISIS no longer has the ability to hold territory or conduct conventional attacks, the enduring defeat of ISIS is dependent on the defeat of the ideology.

Peace is possible in Iraq. The Iraqis have won a great victory over ISIS, but winning the peace and defeating the ideology of ISIS will be a much harder task for the Government of Iraq (GOI). The time has come where ISIS is no longer the main threat to stability in Iraq. The threats to peace today are more complicated and will require time and patience to overcome. Countering these threats requires the strength and unity of the Iraqi population. The Iraqis themselves will be responsible for the future of their great nation.
Key Challenges and Opportunities
Hope, Rebuilding Trust, and Governance

**Hope:** Compassion is more powerful than bullets.

Hope and compassion are powerful weapons in the desire to win the peace in Iraq. The people of Iraq can ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS by categorically rejecting its violent ideology. To do so, they must have trust in their government and state institutions, who in turn must show compassion toward the people of Iraq. The methods used to win the fight cannot be the same as those used to win the peace. It will simply create more enemies, not less. To win the fight Iraq, had to destroy; to win the peace, Iraq must build. Hope and compassion are the foundations on which to build lasting peace in Iraq.

**Elections Do Not Create Democracies:** Iraq must do more than form a government; it must govern.

The people of Iraq need the government to govern. They require the return of basic services (provision of water, electricity and medical care), return of the rule of law and functioning justice system, reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, good governance, the rooting out of corruption, ethnic reconciliation and stability. If the GOI does not demonstrate progress in these areas, they risk further disenfranchisement and ultimately the loss of the support of the people. This was clearly
demonstrated by the recent outbreak of civil unrest across the country in July. While the formation of the new government takes time, those who oppose a peaceful solution may fill the power vacuum that has been created. Both the West and regional powers watch eagerly to learn who will rise to the top positions and how this will affect their interests. There is no doubt that regional and world powers will gain and lose influence, yet in the end, the Iraqi people will be the biggest losers if they remain unsupported in their efforts to self-govern.

**Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG): The division in Iraq can only be rebuilt by trust.**

Iraq responded as one nation when the enemy threatened. Now that cities are liberated and ISIS is on the run and in hiding, historic issues that have divided the nation for decades have reemerged. The Iraqi and Kurdish Security Forces (KSF) occupy defensive positions facing one another along the coordination line. The space between them is ungoverned and not secure, providing an opportunity for ISIS to hide and grow. The distrust between the KRG and the GOI is at the highest point in decades and is allowing the very threat they defeated together to survive. The number one threat to Iraq, surpassing ISIS, is quickly becoming the hatred between Iraqis and Kurds. If ‘One Iraq’ is possible, the first step is to build trust and unity within the Kurdistan region.

Following the failed referendum of 2017 and disagreements over policy concerning Kirkuk and the disputed territories, a mutual distrust exists between the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Though these political parties form a strong alliance in Baghdad, they are divided within Kurdistan. For the ‘One Iraq’ policy to have a chance, there must first be a ‘one Kurdistan,’ and that does not seem likely in the near future without help from the international community and the Coalition.

The GOI and KRG have demonstrated that they can work together to defeat a common enemy. Both sides have openly agreed that security cooperation and combined military operations are the foundation that will allow trust to be reestablished. Trust between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and KSF will demonstrate that cooperation is possible at the political level.
**Kirkuk: Iraq’s powder keg waiting to explode.**

Kirkuk is the decisive point for Iraq; it will either unify or divide the country. Disputes over the ownership of Kirkuk remain an enduring issue in Iraqi politics stretching back to the rule of Saddam Hussain. Issues concerning ownership of Kirkuk are further complicated by disagreements over oil revenue. Currently, the provincial government underrepresents and marginalizes ethnic minorities.

Local leaders must demonstrate that the local government serves the will of the people, governs for all, and addresses local issues in a holistic manner that is representative of its population. Effective security measures and the removal of bad actors will further legitimize the GOI while stabilizing the province for future economic development. If the GOI is unable to solve the myriad of issues confronting it in Kirkuk, there may come time when international intervention is required. This may be in the form of advisors, observers, or possibly even peacekeepers under a United Nations banner.

**Mosul Reconstruction: Mosul is where Iraq won the fight; it could also be where it loses the peace.**

It has been over a year since Mosul’s liberation. Yet this ancient city remains in ruins. Water, electricity and medical care and supplies remain in critical short supply and the population is suffering. While feeling euphoric about the defeat of ISIS, the people of Mosul are frustrated at the lack of progress in rebuilding the city. This frustration may lead to mistrust of the GOI, which in turn could alienate the population. Conversely, if the population sees progress made in Mosul they will have their hopes for a brighter future renewed. Reconstructing Mosul brings hope to
the Iraqi people and lays the foundation for winning the peace in Iraq. The Iraqi government needs to address allegations of ineptitude and corruption in Mosul so it can begin to regain its citizens’ trust. This is also critical for gaining vital financial support from the international community to rebuild Mosul. The GOI and international community should prioritize, focus, and facilitate reconstruction operations in a unified fashion that demonstrate small, but measurable change quickly. Failure to do so risks losing the city again. Until Iraq rebuilds Mosul, Iraq cannot move on to the other challenges it faces in western and northern Iraq.

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): The people of Iraq are survivors not victims.**

The people of Iraq need time to heal from the scars of war before they can return home; however, the solution to reducing the vast number of displaced people in Iraq is more complex than simply providing bricks and mortar. The solution requires protection of the population. The physical scarring of the landscape can be repaired; the mental and cultural wounds will take much longer to heal. The Iraqi people have been traumatized by war; in many cases their loved ones have been kidnapped, raped, or have simply disappeared. They have suffered horrific physical and mental abuses. Some have been shunned by their communities because they experienced such crimes, even if they survived them. Over time, the camps meant to protect the survivors of war will begin to treat them like victims, thus slowing the healing process necessary for posttraumatic growth. Protection of this population will prove a key weapon in defeating a noxious and evil ideology.

In order to return to their homes the Iraqi people must feel safe and should feel empowered to develop a sense of community protected by local and federal security forces. Locally empowered security forces are key to establishing the security to protect the survivors of war allowing them to rebuild their communities. This, in conjunction with the efforts of the international community, will start setting the conditions for the return of people to their homes and communities. Healing from the psychological scars of war will take longer than repairing infrastructure, but the physical repairs will facilitate the healing process building more than just buildings. In the end, this approach will build strong communities that will be able to resist the evil ideology of ISIS.
Sunni Disenfranchisement: Sunnis feel they are on the outside of their government.

Many moderate Iraqi Sunni Arabs see themselves as Iraqis and they fought, and died to remove ISIS from their country. However, since the defeat of ISIS many Sunnis feel that they have been marginalized as if they exist outside of their government and the protection and benefits it offers. Sunni tribesmen were integral to the defeat of ISIS in Al Anbar, Salah ad Din, and along the border with Syria. The GOI needs to demonstrate that it is serious about reconciliation; it needs to reintegrate the Sunni’s into the Iraqi political system, administrative apparatus, and provide economic opportunities. Failing to do so risks Sunni Arabs remaining vulnerable to extremist ideologies and influence, setting the conditions for the reemergence of ISIS or a similar terrorist group.

Economy
Resources, Transparency, and Investment

Enticing Investors: Reform is key to Iraq’s economic and regional power.

Iraq has the potential to be a regional economic power with its natural resources, abundant workforce and historical record as a food exporter, if it can create an environment enticing to international stakeholders. Iraq requires investment to modernize and diversify its economy, which has been decimated throughout years of conflict. Infrastructure upgrades could be the foundation for economic growth in Iraq, reinforcing stability by creating jobs and increasing profits. To ensure this happens, Iraq should prioritize fostering a business environment, which is transparent to all vested parties, and quickly address allegations
of corruption. Further reforms aimed at enticing investors are required. These reforms could include streamlining the process for Iraqi business visas, tax reform, and the promotion of privatization. These measures will be critical to be able to build and maintain the confidence of those who invest in Iraq’s future.

**Oil: Foundation for a unified Iraq and future economic opportunities.**

Oil is Iraq’s most attractive opportunity for investment and its revenue has the potential to benefit every province across the country. To capitalize on its vast oil reserves, Iraq needs the ability to upgrade its infrastructure, maximizing output by exploiting new technology that expands profit opportunities from additional petroleum byproducts. Oil revenue sharing arrangements could help Iraq establish fair and equitable wealth distribution across the country.

**Water: Iraq needs water to grow peace.**

Water is a vital resource in winning the peace in Iraq. It affects every Iraqi, and if managed correctly, it will strengthen the country’s agricultural sector. Water used to irrigate crops and produce power is vital for Iraq’s population and industries. Water shortages, lack of water access, and outdated water management systems have created a crisis that could quickly reach catastrophic levels within the nation. Much of Iraq’s water infrastructure is old and in disrepair. The distribution systems are not efficient. Given the opportunity to modernize, Iraq could increase its capacity to provide essential services to its population and regain regional notoriety as an agricultural exporter, further expanding job opportunities. Water, more than any other resource is required for peace to grow. As one protester stated on 17 July:
“Water. I am demanding water. It’s a shame that I am demanding water in 2018 and I have oil fields that feed the world. I’m not asking for a metro or big planes, just water.”

**Unemployment:** If everyone works, no one fights.

The more Iraq invests in employment for its people, the more the people will invest in Iraq. Lack of economic opportunities alienate the population from the government and may make it vulnerable to ISIS’s evil ideology in some areas. The GOI’s best opportunity to countering and protecting against adoption of extremist ideologies is through economic reform, fighting corruption, and eventually reducing unemployment. A working Iraqi population will prove more resilient against extremist ideologies. The people of Iraq are ready to work; the GOI must find them jobs.

**Economic Opportunities**

**Solar Energy:** In a land where the sun is always shining, solar energy should be more prevalent. Iraqis are hesitant to invest in new technologies though, since they will not see an immediate return on investment. Foreign investment in this industry may be the only way to get it off the ground and prove that it is a viable source of energy for the Iraqi people.

**Recycling:** Recycling plants have a low threshold for investment and often turn profits quickly. The clearance of rubbish from roadsides and neighborhoods increases pride and ownership within communities, making them more secure and stable. Other industries (e.g. textile industry) are also associated with recycling and can help reduce unemployment and diversify the economy.
External Actors, Influencers, and Proxies

United States: A reliable partner.

The relationship between the United States and Iraq remains critical as the Coalition moves towards Phase IV operations. The United States has championed the “One Iraq” policy since the signing of the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) in 2008, and has demonstrated resolve and a commitment to establishing and maintaining a stable and secure Iraq. It has led a coalition that has built a military campaign plan that is designed to build the capacity of the ISF and within the higher level of government. This plan aims to set the conditions for Iraq to secure its sovereignty and win the peace that it so richly deserves.

The Coalition rapidly came together to support and enable the ISF to defeat ISIS; that fight is now over. To win the peace the international community and Coalition must devote its combined resources to enable the GOI to rebuild and stabilize the country. As the Coalition starts to transition towards Phase IV, it will remain subordinate to the nation of Iraq. The Coalition governments must offer the GOI the best political advice and harness the efforts of international sponsors and NGOs to start to address the significant challenge that the GOI has. This approach should aim to promote local security arrangements, provide protection, support local government, and support stabilization efforts and critically help the GOI ensure the people of Iraq get guaranteed access to water and electricity. The people of Iraq need basic services now.
Turkey: Iraq needs strong relationships with its neighbors.

Energy and water security are significant issues that could bring Iraq and Turkey closer together or tear them apart. Turkish economic investment has been critical in northern Iraq stabilization efforts. Turkey’s growing control over the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers could generate power and water reserves for both nations, but Iraq must secure water rights from Turkey. This presents a significant challenge to the GOI; however, it provides an opportunity to strengthen economic and political ties between these two nations. A further complication in the Iraq-Turkey relationship is the willingness of other nations to establish diplomatic ties with the KRG. Turkey’s status as a member of NATO, coupled with its views on the Kurdish region, require close consideration in the development of foreign policy and military strategy.

Iran: Strong relationships with Iran are required for peace in Iraq.

Iran may be Iraq’s most important regional partner. Their shared economic and security interests make the two natural partners in the region. Iraq must find ways to continue to collaborate with Iran, while addressing concerns over this partnership from Iraqi minorities. Iran has proven to be an effective counter-terrorism partner for Iraq in the fight against ISIS, but now must work towards a relationship that recognizes and upholds Iraqi sovereignty. This will be politically challenging but, cooperation between Iran and Iraq will benefit both countries in a number of areas including trade, tourism, security, infrastructure, and resource distribution.
Hashd al-Shaabi: The “saviors of Iraq” were crucial for winning the fight, but are disruptive in winning the peace.

Hashd al-Shaabi are considered heroes in the fight against ISIS, but current debate over whether to demobilize or integrate groups further into the ISF is contentious. Hashd al-Shaabi have yet to find their role in winning the peace and the longer they remain without a meaningful mission, their role moving forward becomes more tenuous. This is a problem for the Iraqis to solve. In addition, it is clear that the agendas of some militia groups are beginning to diverge from that of the state. If this continues, the resulting instability will risk the gains made against ISIS.

Syria: Winning the peace in Iraq aids stability in Syria.

The conflict in Syria will take years to resolve, making overall stability in the region dependent on winning the peace in Iraq. Threats to Iraq, resulting from the ongoing conflict in Syria, have the potential to spill across the large border these countries share. Turkey, Russia, Iran, Israel, Syrian Pro-Regime Forces, and Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) will continue to operate in Syria long after CF have completed operations against ISIS remnants. Currently, all the actors are still establishing coordination measures, which should remain a priority to reduce the fog of war and unnecessary spread of the conflict. A secure border between Iraq and Syria is essential in establishing coordination measures and providing a level of security cooperation.
**Iraqi Army: The Heroes of Iraq.**

The Iraqi Army (IA) is the most trusted institution in Iraq today. It won the fight against ISIS and quickly secured Iraq’s borders. Concurrently, the IA resumed training and began to modernize its forces, which further strengthened the professionalism of the organization. The IA must be trained, structured, and resourced to ensure it is prepared to face future threats to Iraq. To protect and stabilize the country, Iraq requires a dedicated, professional, and respected army. The IA is such an army. IA leaders witnessed ISIS almost rip apart their country. They are determined to not let Iraqi security be threatened and will continue to shoulder much of the burden in winning the peace in Iraq. The IA has an important role to play in the integration of all elements of the ISF into a cohesive and mutually supporting force. The ISF must build trust amongst its services and commands to establish a layered and inter-connected security apparatus.

**Iraqi Police: The future heroes of the Iraqi people.**

The Iraqi Police (IP) will be fundamental to rebuilding the hope and trust of the Iraqi people. The IP, in particular the local police, are crucial to providing the local communities with the protection and safety they need to live without fear. The Police need to demonstrate that the rule of law is functioning, transparent and is respectful to human rights. The police lack the numbers, equipment and training to enforce the rule of law. The IP must grow and recover from the impact of the fight against ISIS. This is an essential task for the GOI that must be supported by the Coalition.

**Border Guard Force: Builders of a stable Iraq.**

The nascent Border Guard Force, if properly trained and resourced, will help protect Iraq’s international borders, legitimate trade, and allow commerce to take place. The Border Guard Force will play a major role in the long-term stability of Iraq.
Winning the peace is harder than winning the fight.

ISIS threatened to overtake Iraq, coming very close to the boundaries of Baghdad. This threat unified the country bringing together various religious, cultural, and ethnic groups to defeat a common enemy. Now that ISIS is defeated, the historical grievances and issues that once divided the nation have returned to threaten the security and future of this great nation. Together Iraq won the fight—to win the peace it will require a unified response, by and for the people. If not, then King Faisal’s words will remain true into the foreseeable future.

"In Iraq, there is still—and I say this with a heart full of sorrow—no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever."

King Faisal 1933

Peace in Iraq is possible. The destiny of this great nation is dependent on Iraq’s ability to overcome the devastation of the war and defeat the lingering ideology of ISIS. For Iraq to win the peace, it must overcome these significant challenges, which will be reliant on the hope and will of the Iraqi people. The recent protests across Iraq indicate that the people of Iraq are demanding and expect change now. They want to see their country return to peace; the peace that they so rightly deserve after decades of conflict. The new Iraqi government must deliver. Hope must prevail.
Chapter 3
Hashd al-Shaabi: The Saviours of Iraq
Best Military Advice on Interacting with Hashd al-Shaabi
Hashd al-Shaabi: The Saviours of Iraq

Best Military Advice on Interacting with Hashd al-Shaabi

‘You can criticize any politician or even religious cleric, but you cannot speak against the Hashd and its martyrs.’ - Anon Hashd al-Shaabi fighter in Amarah

The liberation of Mosul in 2017 marked the high water mark for Hashd al-Shaabi in the fight against ISIS. It was Hashd al-Shaabi that answered the call to arms in 2014 when ISIS was metaphorically, if not actually, at the gates of Baghdad, and it is Hashd al-Shaabi that is viewed in the eyes of many Iraqis as the saviours of Iraq. Whilst Hashd al-Shaabi has proven itself as pivotal in the fight against ISIS, its future is less certain. Claims of involvement in illegal activities such as smuggling of weapons, harassment of Sunni’s (at vehicle check points), and other nefarious activities are beginning to reduce the goodwill gained through its contribution to hold force operations and integration with the ISF.

Hashd al-Shaabi is not a monolithic organization, rather it embodies the fault lines of modern Iraq, divided along religious, ethnic and national identities, state and non-state actors, as well as private and foreign interests. The 50 plus organizations that comprise the Hashd al-Shaabi include those loyal to Ayatollah Sistani / Gol aligned groups, Sadrist Militias who are vehemently against the US presence in Iraq, and the Badr Organization which is closely aligned with Iran. Over half of the Hashd al-Shaabi units preexist ISIS and Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwah that spurned their growth or genesis, and the organizations like Badr date back to the Iran Iraq War of the 1980s.

Of the many issues facing the GoI today, one of the major concerns is the level of Iranian influence within Hashd al-Shaabi, in particular the Shia Militia Groups (SMGs). These concerns are shared by Iraq’s neighboring Arab states who view Iranian influence in Iraq as part of Iran’s bid to extend its sway through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

The Coalition in Iraq also faces challenges as it moves inexorably towards phase four operations. If the defeat of ISIS is the raison d’être of the Coalition, one must assume that when

this is complete, the Coalition is likely to shift its main effort. As a result, decisions must be made in regards to Hashd al-Shaabi within the CJTFs limited scope under the Reliable Partnership construct.

This paper will broadly define three focus areas where the Coalition could exert influence within the ISF, and by extension the GoI, in ways of dealing with Hashd al-Shaabi. It is at the behest of the Coalition to provide the best military advice it can to the ISF in order to be a truly reliable partner. However, it must be stressed that the future of Hashd al-Shaabi is an Iraqi issue and therefore will require an Iraqi solution. The three focus areas that will be outlined below are: Integration, Re-training and Employment, and Disbanding. It should be noted that Disarm, Demobilize, and Reintegration (DDR) operations are fraught with peril, since almost all of Hashd al-Shaabi organizations are extensions of various political parties and often serve a very real purpose of protecting their ethnic population or region against a rival organization competing for the same limited resources. Additionally, DDR should be viewed as a political process in which success hinges first and foremost on the political will of all actors involved.4

All parties have a part to play in the process of the stabilization of Iraq, including the Kurds and external actors, such as Iran, Turkey, and the international community. It is not within the scope of this paper to outline the range of potential options available to all stakeholders; however, a comprehensive study has been conducted by the Middle East Research Institute that provides a range of options worth considering.5

Integration

Integration of Hashd al-Shaabi into the ISF has already commenced. PM Abadi’s decision in early 2018 to fully absorb Hashd al-Shaabi into the ISF has provided a short-term solution and is an attempt to gain control over rogue units, as well as dilute Hashd al-Shaabi autonomy. The following actions should be considered in support of integration:

1. **Highlight Hashd al-Shaabi Corruption.** This will marginalize non-compliant Hashd al-Shaabi commanders and groups, and will further legitimize the ISF in the eyes of the Iraqi people. Various social media platforms and local media outlets have begun to report on corrupt activities of certain Hashd al-Shaabi groups, emphasizing these activities could help curb enthusiasms for the most extreme members and organizations, and help the Iraqi Government regain a certain level of control.

2. **De-Claw.** The Government of Iraq should continue the removal of all “heavy” weaponry from Hashd al-Shaabi. This will reduce the capability of Hashd al-Shaabi whilst ensuring they become more reliant on the ISF for weapons and mobility.

3. **Death Gratuity for Martyrs.** Hashd al-Shaabi view themselves, along with the bulk of the Iraqi populace and their political representatives, as the saviours of Iraq. The conflict against ISIS burdened these fighters with very real financial burdens, and in some cases families, without a financial provider. The payment of a death gratuity, much like western nations provide the families of their fallen soldiers, can help ease the financial burden brought by the loss of their loved ones and potentially cement their loyalty to the central government.

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4 Dylan O’Driscoll and Dave van Zoonen, pg 33.
4. **Provide Economic Incentives.** A range of economic incentives could aid in the transition into the ISF. Potential options include the payment of a victory bonus, guaranteed contract periods, direct deposit payment scheme, and reserve status.

**Re-training and Employment**

The re-training and employment of former Hashd al-Shaabi soldiers will form a key component of the stabilization of Iraq. This option should run in parallel with integration into the ISF, as not all Hashd al-Shaabi members will be subsumed into the wider ISF. Opportunities to train former Hashd al-Shaabi members in the areas of infrastructure building is perhaps the most efficient way to provide an alternative to taking up arms. With significant investment, the GoI could provide a trained and paid workforce to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq. This in turn may reduce disenfranchisement, offer alternate employment, and aid the stabilization of the country. The involvement of other agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is vital, as is the requirement to ensure educational and vocational training packages offered correspond with the economic needs and realities on the ground. For an in-depth study of these options, refer to Anthony Cordsman’s paper *After ISIS: Creating Stability in Iraq.*

**Disbanding**

This option is the most risky option and assumes that the security situation would enable such a move. Without a secure environment in Iraq, it will be virtually impossible to convince the plethora of armed militias to lay down their weapons. PM Abadi is unlikely to demobilize a force that has helped him gain in popularity as a perceived strongman after the liberation of Mosul. Additionally, PM Abadi (should he return to power) is unlikely to dilute or reduce anti-Khamenei SMGs, as these will form a power block against Maliki and others seeking influence within the GoI. Any plans for disbanding Hashd al-Shaabi must include components of the options detailed above. Financial restitution, meaningful long-term employment, undertaking actions to stabilize Iraq, and careful IO messaging must be considered in order to disband Hashd al-Shaabi. In addition to the three focus areas outlined above, a range of other options exist to reduce Hashd al-Shaabi influence:

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6 O’Driscoll and van Zoonen, pg 39.
8 Driscoll and van Zoonen, pg 33.
1. **Attempt to increase fracturing of the Hashd al-Shaabi militias.** The groups that comprise Hashd al-Shaabi writ large all have common ancestral ties to a few key larger groups. As an example, Badr Corps became the Badr Organization, which has since subdivided, and in some cases, splintered into smaller less capable groups; although these splintered organizations tend to be more extreme in their ideology and deeds.

2. **Increase regional actor involvement.** The current fractures in Iraq fall along ethnic and religious lines and certain demographics share more in common with Iraq’s neighbors than with their own “countrymen.” Finding and empowering regional actors to responsibly advocate for their ethnic demographic within Iraq can provide a certain level of risk mitigation within the region, and prevent the political instability in Iraq from spilling over into the region.

3. **Increase foreign and nonprofit investment.** For Iraq to survive under its current construct, it will require the increased investment from regional actors and nonprofit organizations to help jumpstart the Iraqi economy, provide services at the local level, and help professionalize certain aspects of the Iraqi government outside of the security sector.

The options available to the Coalition are limited in regards to marginalizing or curbing the actions of Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq. The GoI’s legalization of these militias, incorporating them into their security forces, their religious nature, and Iranian influence are all dynamics that have to be factored into any menu of potential options. The Coalition is well positioned to provide military advice to the ISF on how to deal with Hashd al-Shaabi under the auspices of Integration, Re-training and Employment, and Disbanding. The provision of this advice must take into account all stakeholders and an understanding of the risk in dealing in what is an Iraqi challenge at its heart.
Chapter 4
Climbing Mount Olympus
The American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG)
Climbing Mount Olympus: 
The American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG)

“Transitions from the politics of violence to democratic compromise are always messy.”
~Timothy Garton Ash: British historian, author and commentator

Introduction

One of the most successful historical examples of managing transitions and leveraging a whole of nation approach is the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG). With only a few hundred military personnel, under the control of the American Ambassador, the AMAG successfully helped Greece through security sector reform, a communist insurgency, and post-World War II (WWII) reconstruction.

AMAG’s planning efforts and success revolved around three major elements: clear policy direction, a unified command that integrated civil and military efforts, and a holistic approach to security sector reform (SSR). Understanding the critical elements of AMAG’s success provides relevant and applicable lessons for ongoing stabilization efforts in Iraq.

Clear Policy Direction

AMAG was able to achieve unity of effort through explicit and direct guidance from U.S. President Harry S. Truman, who personally appointed a single and absolute “commander” in Greece, the U.S. Ambassador. President Truman also directly authorized AMAG’s lines of effort (LOEs) as part of its overall campaign plan. The mission was clear: prevent the communist guerillas from assuming control of Greece, and if possible, avoid a political settlement that would bifurcate Greece into two or more states. AMAG’s lines of effort in Greece (see Figure 1 for AMAG’s Campaign Plan):

- Economic Development: toward a “stable and self-sustaining economy”
- Governance: a Greek government that can effectively conduct “public administration” or the ability to manage their economy and security forces
- Security Force Assistance: a Greek military that can “cope with the situation” and “restore authority throughout Greek territory”

The U.S. President’s guidance and the empowerment of the U.S. Ambassador gave AMAG the clear direction and intent that fed all subsequent operations. The AMAG’s Economic Development and Governance LOEs were the most focused and detailed. Both efforts clearly defined and identified subsequent objectives defined over multiple time horizons, which informed decision makers of progress. Security Force Assistance acted in a supporting role that provided the Economic and Governance LOEs time and space to develop and transform stable pockets in Greece.
Unity of Effort

The American Mission in Greece became a unified, mission-oriented organization in two key ways. First, AMAG was more effective by organizing itself in an unconventional manner to ensure that form followed function, rather than following a traditional staff alignment. Secondly, U.S. civilian and military personnel were able to achieve remarkable levels of integration; AMAG placed the right person in the right job at the right time, regardless of which organization they had originally come from.

AMAG chose to structure its headquarters around its operation with the agriculture, industrial, governmental administration, and foreign trade efforts each having an entire division (directorate) within AMAG dedicated to it. Other supporting actions were shepherded by trusted agents from the personal staff of the Ambassador. LTG Van Fleet oversaw all military operations. (See Figure 2)

Staff integration, along with clear guidance, focused the entire enterprise on realistic objectives that mutually supported one another. Each team knew the task prioritization and the reasoning behind it. All assessments were conducted using shared civilian and military metrics and were presented holistically to leadership. Finally, all American agencies in Greece shared the same overarching vision; subordinate leaders and organizations did not create their own. This shared vision helped mitigate competing interests and friction amongst organizations and leaders.
Whole of Nation

Its implementation of a whole of nation approach to SSR directly led to AMAG’s success in Greece. By focusing primarily on the Governance and Economic lines of effort, AMAG was able to foster a stable environment that limited the effectiveness of communist propaganda and provided the population with other alternatives to insurgency.

Economic Development

Economic development focused on industries and sectors that had pre-existed in Greece prior to WWII with the basic infrastructure and know how already in existence. AMAG was able to enhance the effectiveness and profitability of these industries through multi-purpose and quality cost expenditures. AMAG sought numerous dual-purpose projects to include tire plants that supported local industries and military maintenance requirements. AMAG also prioritized road development and reconstruction to facilitate planned military operations. Another example of dual-purpose economic development was AMAG’s provision of the same refrigeration units to local fisheries and to military units in the field.
Governance

AMAG facilitated success along the Governance line of effort through realistic and measurable objectives and by avoiding potential confrontational issues. As an example, AMAG chose to focus on increasing agricultural production, rather than attempting to address land reform. AMAG also chose to avoid addressing how the Greek government involved itself in the selection of church officials, but instead helped draft civil service reform legislation, established rent and inflation control mechanisms, lifted an olive oil embargo, balanced budget proposals, and assisted in the drafting of civil service reform legislation. AMAG’s deliberate decision to focus on legislative matters it knew it could affect helped create momentum within the organization that enabled it to support its economic and military lines of effort.

Security Force Assistance

Military operations focused on planning, advising, divestiture of equipment, and building partner capacity. The single biggest expenditure along this line of effort was the establishment of a National Defense Force that would assume static positions and checkpoints in stable areas, freeing combat troops to engage communist rebels. The addition of embedded advisors also expedited the divestiture of equipment to the Greek military, enabled Greek planning efforts, and the execution of small clearing operations. These smaller victories helped build momentum for further operations and instilled confidence in the Greek security force. An example of this confidence was shown when the Greek’s, with no assistance from the U.S., internally handled another communist insurrection in the summer of 1950, while simultaneously deploying soldiers to the Korean Peninsula in support of the United Nation’s efforts during the Korean War.

Conclusion

The American actions in support of the Nationalist Government in the Greek Civil War in 1947 through 1953 provides a model for future operations. AMAG, by implementing a whole of government approach, successfully enabled the Greek government to suppress a communist insurgency in the aftermath of World War II. The emphasis on the Economic Development and Governance LOEs, as the main effort, brought lasting change within Greece and helped prevent further insurgencies. The military LOE, Security Force Assistance, was complementary and focused on buying time and space for other efforts. AMAG achieved success by unifying its efforts, becoming a mission focused on organization, fostering a shared vision, and inculcating the entire U.S. mission with an ethos of selfless cooperation. This fostered both a holistic view of the problem and the desired end state.

Key Takeaways

- Designing the headquarters into directorates that aligned with lines of effort can help foster unity of effort and staff efficiencies in stabilization operations.
- Having well-developed Economic and Governance lines of effort, AMAG was able to “stabilize” the parts of Greece that were under Nationalist control.
- Military operations created time and space for the Economic and Governance LOEs to reduce drivers of instability in Greece.
Chapter 5
Tajikistan:
A Case Study in Successful Reintegration
Tajikistan: A Case Study in Success in Reintegration

The collapse of Soviet control over the Tajik SSR trigged intense debate over the political future and direction of the state. These debates eventually devolved into civil war (1992-1997) based along ideological, political, regional, and ethnic lines. The reintegration of fighters was accompanied by a comprehensive peace settlement that called for tough compromises amongst the warring factions in the conflict. The stability that followed has lasted decades, but is not without perils, and aspects of it can be applied to future settlements.

There were four key ingredients to success in Tajikistan:
- **Political settlements created legitimate opportunities and economic enrichment for key leaders**
- **Genuine and tangible socio-economic opportunities for fighters and their communities of origin**
- **Armed groups became part of the political process and entry barriers were reduced or removed to expedite this process**
- **Unilaterally suppress all opposition to reunification and attempts at spoiling the reintegration process**

**Political Settlement:** The opposing factions in Tajikistan agreed to strict power sharing agreements that ensured all parties had proportional representation in the new central government, while also providing a set of amnesty measures for all parties involved in the conflict. Simultaneously, the new central government negotiated the resettlement of refugees, in predetermined locales. While resettlement was occurring for the families of the warring factions, a military protocol was developed and implemented that had all paramilitary personnel at predetermined times and locations. Here they registered, underwent medical screenings, and were disarmed. This allowed the central government to accurately integrate entire paramilitary units into the existing security forces. Afterwards, a joint review board provided recommendations for further service, advancement, and command positions. The strategy of preserving original structures helped reduce potential tensions amongst former adversaries and engendered a level of trust in the peace process. Forces that were integrated into the security forces were also able to maintain their regional and ethnic flavors, with serviceable weapons and equipment being returned to the unit commanders in their new command posts and armories.

**Genuine and Tangible Gains:** Given the regional and ethnic flavor of the civil war in Tajikistan, the central government had to make considerable compromises to ensure that the warring factions had a significant stake in the peace process. A central feature was the integration of the armed groups into pre-existing military and law enforcement structures. Most commanders were offered lucrative high ranking positions in the government, while retaining control of their armed groups. More importantly leaders from all sides of the conflict acquired real estate, businesses, and factories as party of the settlement. The central figures of the conflict were now directly invested in both the political and economic future of the country, held the key economic assets in their direct control. This further cemented their pre-existing patronage networks, but also served as a forcing function for the modernization and privatization of the nation’s economy.

This was accompanied by vocational training and educational program for former fighters. Also easing the transition process was the former commanders, now business magnates, directly

Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited
hiring former fighters into their newly acquired businesses. This also helped to focus vocational training towards specific groups, and narrow the options the government had to provide.

**Removal of Political Barriers:** As previously discussed, Tajikistan removed all political and economic barriers that normally accompany reintegration. Negotiated resettlement options and amnesty programs removed the stigma of conflict from both the returning leaders and their fighters. These decisions to seek compromise and inclusion and to suspend transitional justice bought time and helped reinstate the conditions needed to resurrect the Tajik state.

**Spoiling Attempts:** Despite the best efforts of the Tajik central government, a few commanders and their fighters refused to reintegrate. Three reasons stand out as contributing factors in the emergence of spoilers in Tajikistan: foreign influence and control over certain armed groups, perception of being denied their “fair share” of political power and economic assets, and the criminal nature of some groups that emerged during the period of conflict. In response, the central government and the newly reintegrated opposition groups unilaterally conducted operations to stamp out any threat to the new government. This was accompanied by extensive efforts by law-enforcement agencies to collect munitions and armaments from the civilian populace. This was assisted by strong normative pressures from the government and civil organizations that stressed compliance and emphasized by severe repercussions if caught.

**Conclusions:** Tajikistan was able to achieve a remarkable level of stability in the decades following their civil war. Metrics concerning gun violence, clashes amongst armed groups, and employment all indicate that their short term and near term goals have been met. Provisions regarding amnesty, employment, and cohesiveness amongst former adversaries helped foster the peace process. However, Tajikistan’s long term strategies remain in question. The methods and steps that led to immediate success may have long term implications concerning corruption, political transparency, and justice for victims of atrocities during the conflict. Tajikistan provides strategists and planners with a model for success concerning reintegration operations, but also a warning. If left unchecked former combatants can institutionalize a system of corruption, patronage, and acceptance of former and current criminal activity.

**Key Takeaways:**
- There was an inverse relationship between freedom/transparency and security.
- Post conflict success is dependent on trust & buy-in from the former combatants. Tajikistan accomplished this through political power and economic/monetary sharing agreements.
- Bypassing transitory justice helped buy time for the central government to form and “keep the peace”.
- Nonparticipants in the peace process were suppressed, pursued, and eventually defeated by the new central government.
Chapter 6
Ibn al Ahir and the City of Broken Hearts
Ibn al Ahir and the City of Broken Hearts

Mosul is the second-most critical city in Iraq and the longer it takes to clear and rebuild, the greater the threat to stability in the region.

Muslims occupied Mosul in 641 A.D., establishing the most culturally diverse and important commercial hub in the region. Mercantile trade from Persia to the Levant continued to grow, reaching its peak of prosperity in the 12th century A.D., where it cemented its reputation as an economic jewel and regional cornerstone within the region. In 2014, Mosul was conquered and occupied by the false Caliphate of Da’esh. Following the fall of Mosul and much of Ninawa Province to Da’esh, 1.3 million Iraqis fled their homes, becoming Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).¹ Partnered with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Hashd al-Shaabi, Coalition Forces (CF) began operations to retake West Mosul in February 2017. Approximately 750,000 civilians remained in Da’esh-occupied West Mosul at the beginning of the fighting along with 12,000 to 15,000 Da’esh fighters amongst them.² By July 2017, most of Mosul was retaken by ISF with partnered CF and roughly 200,000 Iraqi civilians subsequently returned. Although Da’esh was defeated, the followers of the false caliphate were not destroyed. The cost of victory was extensive, and the failure (or the perception of) to revitalize Mosul gives new life to the resurgence of extremist ideologies, making “time” one of the most valuable and limited resources in sustaining the lasting defeat of Da’esh. Assessments, after major combat operations ceased in Mosul, estimated over 40,000 homes and buildings, 75% of roads, most bridges, and over half of its electrical grid were destroyed, leaving the remaining IDP population of around 822,000 civilians unable to return.³ Although the battle to win back Mosul was hard fought, the most challenging aspects of victory are still on the horizon, stability and reconstruction.

Reconstruction Challenges Threaten Stability

The longer it takes to bring Mosul back to life, the more likely the region will become unstable. Almost a year after Da’esh was driven from West Mosul; the city still lays in ruins. Approximately 700,000 residents are still displaced to either IDP camps or homes of relatives living elsewhere.⁴ Their return is not delayed because of security concerns or fear of Da’esh, but due to everything else. In West Mosul, essential services are non-existent and most infrastructure (government, commercial, and civilian) is unusable. The reestablishment of essential services, rebuilding of infrastructure, and return of IDPs are predicated on the successful and timely removal of explosive remnants of war (ERW), 8 million tons of debris still

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² Ibid
blanketing West Mosul, and thousands of corpses of civilians and Da’esh fighters that are entombed underneath it.\textsuperscript{5} The longer Mosul remains uninhabitable, the displaced civilian population’s faith in the GoI to provide basic necessities continues to fade, leaving room for groups like Da’esh to gain local popularity. Essentially, the success of stability operations is dependent on clearing West Mosul to allow reconstruction efforts to begin.

Efforts to clear West Mosul are further complicated by IEDs and suicide vests (SVEST) that were emplaced or worn by Da’esh fighters, making debris removal or collection of human remains impossible to manage independently. The combination of unexploded ordnance, IEDs, and SVESTS created a confusing environment to conduct ERW removal and blurred the lines between military and humanitarian operations, raising risk levels higher than traditional demining operations.\textsuperscript{6} The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) recently reported removing 27,000 mines from West Mosul, but many more remain.\textsuperscript{7} In the same report, CJTF-OIR Deputy Commander for Strategy and Support, MG Felix Gedney, stated that Da’esh has rigged baby food cans and furniture with explosives, illustrating how complex the ERW environment of Mosul really is.\textsuperscript{8} ISF, U.S. State Department contractors, and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) are all working towards rendering the city safe to rebuild, but variations in risk tolerance and demining authorities differ from organization to organization making it difficult to synchronize or focus efforts.\textsuperscript{9}

As ERW operations progress, the next challenge is removing the monuments to terrorism, represented by the 11 million tons of debris remaining in West Mosul. In addition to government facilities and infrastructure, over 20,000 homes are also destroyed or damaged in West Mosul.\textsuperscript{10} One year after the ISF and CF liberated Mosul, most of the debris is cleared from the streets, but much of the commercial and housing areas remain a labyrinth of concrete brick and rebar. Devastation of this magnitude is similar to the aftermath of the bombing of Dresden, Germany (1945) and the earthquake that leveled Port-au-Prince, Haiti (2010). Both of which, took almost a decade to complete debris removal and begin meaningful reconstruction.

The UNMAS Mosul project manager, Pehr Lodhamar, estimates that clearance operations will also take about 10 years to complete.\textsuperscript{11} Mosul’s clearing efforts are further complicated by funding and donations that are narrow in scope and the destruction of construction machinery during the

\textsuperscript{5} Technical Note: Environmental Issues in areas retaken from ISIL - Mosul, Iraq. United Nations Environment Programme (JUL-AUG 2017)


\textsuperscript{7} Unknown. UN Removes 27 Thousand Mines from Mosul. The Baghdad Post (18 MAR 2018)

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid

\textsuperscript{9} CJ9

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid

\textsuperscript{11} Shankar, Amulya. Clearing Mines and Explosives in Mosul. PRI's The Word (Updated: 18 JAN 2018)
liberation of the city from Da’esh.\textsuperscript{12} Recently, Iraqi Director of the Mosul Cities Directorate (MCD), Abdelsatter al-Hibbu, stated that progress to clear West Mosul is only advancing about 100 meters each month.\textsuperscript{13} He and U.N. Humanitarian leadership are concerned that the slow pace of clearing and reconstruction efforts will reinforce sectarian grievances and violent extremism, threatening the overall stability in the region.\textsuperscript{14}

Sluggish human remains removal continues to affect clearance operations in West Mosul, which is increasing public health hazards. MCD and the Civil Defense Service have removed approximately 2,680 bodies from West Mosul.\textsuperscript{15} The MCD, Iraqi residents, and volunteers are working together to identify family members and clear the remains of Da’esh fighters from the city. Of those bodies, only 1,560 were identified with the remainder destined for mass graves near the al-Sahaji dump.\textsuperscript{16} After 8 months of decomposition, remains identification has become exponentially harder as the dead are almost indistinguishable from the debris around them.\textsuperscript{17} With a lack of forensic training or equipment, civilian volunteers and Mosul residents end up transferring more bodies to unmarked graves opposed to the morgue or to families of the fallen.\textsuperscript{18} Human remains are also being recovered from the Tigris River and along its banks.

Both Mosul and nearby residents of Qayarrah depend on the Tigris river for drinking water, with the limited ground water reserved for agriculture and household work. A UN environmental study indicated that the river and ground water showed high levels of mercury and lead on top of noticeable decomposition taking place in and near water sources close to Mosul.\textsuperscript{19} The result is an increasing public health emergency for a returning population and long-term contamination affecting the surrounding environment. Although progress is evident, there is conflicting reporting on exactly how many bodies remain in West Mosul. As of late April 2018, estimates from media outlets and Mosul city leadership indicate that the number is likely in the thousands.\textsuperscript{20}

**Organizational Obstacles**

Currently, the GoI struggles to synchronize military, ministerial, and NGO efforts to effectively clear West Mosul. ERW, debris, and human remains removal are all funded and managed by separate entities. Although each of these lines of effort have unique challenges, some problems are common to all. Iraqi visa acquisition, Iraqi movement letters, and project funding

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid
\textsuperscript{15} CJ9
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid
\textsuperscript{18} Prickett, Ivor. ‘Here is the Graveyard of DA’ESH’: In Mosul, the Garbage Men Collect Remains. The New York Times (6 MAY 18)
\textsuperscript{19} Technical Note: Environmental Issues in areas retaken from ISIL - Mosul, Iraq. United Nations Environment Programme (JUL-AUG 2017)
\textsuperscript{20} Alhabow, Abdulsattar Khadhar, OSC-I, POL-Human Rights, DART. Mosul City Service Meeting Notes (24APR18)
are the most common. Over the last year, these issues have dramatically limited the GoI’s capacity to efficiently clear and begin reconstruction of Mosul.

International NGOs continue to face difficulties obtaining visas and maintaining movement letters for their personnel. The visa application process was recently streamlined and now allows the NGO to submit directly to the Iraqi Directorate of NGOs. However, visa backlogs are currently five months behind. Once entry into Iraq is granted, movement letters are required to travel throughout. The movement letters are obtained through the Prime Minister’s National Operations Center (PMNOC) and are tied to specific occupants traveling in each designated vehicle. Once the letter is approved, it is valid for three months before it needs to be renewed. Additionally, as employees change over, the current process requires the team to update and resubmit the movement letter before they are allowed to continue operating. The request typically takes one month to get a new movement letter.

The funding process is also hindering progress. United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Funding Facility Stabilization (FFS) is the main revenue vehicle for stabilization activities supported by the international community. The UNDP is able to accept and manage donations, grants, and pledges throughout the international community to focus funding for clearing and reconstruction efforts. Currently, 24 nations and the European Union donate to UNDP’s FFS for Iraq, which is funding over 270 projects in West Mosul, alone. Although UNDP is still funding projects, it is operating in a financial deficit of approximately $570 million in Iraq, which current donations are unable to cover. Revenue allocation is methodically slow due to vetting procedures to ensure that funds are distributed fairly and benefit the greater Iraqi populous. The UNDP’s bureaucratic layers to ensure transparency and fairness and the growing deficit is impeding progress to clear and rebuild Mosul, further increasing the threat of instability.

Long Road to Recovery

There are no easy solutions to quickly clear and begin rebuilding West Mosul; although, there are some efforts that CJTF-OIR could support to fill critical gaps. The highest priority would be to establish an Iraqi international and interagency operations center that is more capable of incorporating all of the entities involved in clearing and reconstruction to better synchronize and focus efforts. The mission of this operations center is to direct, coordinate, and de-conflict relief efforts, similar to a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Incident Response Center. The new operations center does not need to be a new and separate entity, but could be built out from an existing organization reinforced with more augmentation that is international. A prime example could be the expansion of the Ninawa Operations Center. The NOC provides a pre-

Figure 4: Iraqi Forces patrolling West Mosul

21 CJ9
22 CJ9
existing command structure that already integrates Iraqi and Coalition security forces in Ninawa province. Although this command structure would require coordinating authority with the United Nations and international agencies, it would not need to be in command of them. It would better enable these organizations with reliable security forces and a labor pool not previously available. Furthermore, it would give the citizens of Mosul a trusted, central location to give and receive information relating to security and clearance efforts.

Additionally, the GoI could consider providing ISF to Mosul’s relief efforts. The ISF would be able to provide a trained and disciplined labor force that could perform a variety of cross-functional roles and help expedite the relief efforts. This is similar in practice to what FEMA does in the US when it requests National Guard and Active Duty divisions during disaster recovery missions. Historically, even the 82nd Airborne Division was called in to support relief efforts after Hurricane Katrina, since the relief efforts exceeded the capacity of both FEMA and the State. Additionally, the application of Counter ISIS Training and Equip Funds (CTEF) for the use of heavy construction equipment could significantly expedite clearance efforts conducted by ISF. A legal review will likely be required to expand the use of CTEF to include operations and training that supports the “lasting” defeat of Da’esh, but the result would help transition the application of this funding to better support Phase IV operations.

Summary

Based on historic examples of catastrophic destruction of an urban environment, Mosul will take at least a decade to recover fully. The longer it takes to establish an environment conducive to reconstruction, the greater the threat to enduring stability of the region. Iraqi disenfranchisement, sectarian tensions, and faith in a central government hinge on clearance operations that allow IDPs to return and begin fitting the pieces of their lives back together. A unified effort, focused on stability and reconstruction operations, will maintain the peace in the broken city of Mosul, providing the hope its population desperately needs.
Chapter 7
A Bottom-Up Approach
Preconditions for the One Iraq Policy
A Bottom-Up Approach

Preconditions for the One Iraq Policy

‘I want to congratulate our Kurdish citizens in Kurdish. I don’t speak it, but it is to prove that Iraq is one and united.’ - Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi

The national strategic policy driving military strategy in Iraq is poorly defined and lacks a framework that can be implemented to meet the changing situation. Both the U.S. and U.K. see a unified Iraq as the way forward, however, with an emboldened Iraqi Kurdistan Region, continued Sunni disfranchisement, and the fight against ISIS drawing to a close, the ‘One Iraq’ policy is not achievable in the short to medium term. The Government of Iraq (GoI) must implement a bottom-up approach to reconstruction and reconciliation before the ‘One Iraq’ policy can be successfully implemented.

What is the ‘One Iraq’ Policy?

The U.S. Government’s (USG) policy in Iraq is known colloquially as ‘One Iraq’ and it guides the military strategy of the CJTF in Iraq. The 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) between the USG and the GoI formalizes the policy by outlining the cooperation between the two nations through a range of economic, diplomatic, defence, judicial, and cultural agreements. Whilst the term ‘One Iraq’ is not used in the SFA, the preamble outlines the desire for a united country and highlights ‘...the need to support the success of the political process, reinforce national reconciliation within the framework of a unified and federal Iraq....’

The objectives of the SFA are aspirational and provide an exemplar in diplomatic speak. Unfortunately, these objectives seem unachievable due to the current situation in Iraq. In addition, the term ‘One Iraq’ does little to promote inclusivity in such a diverse country as modern Iraq.

The objectives within the SFA are poorly understood and lack a suitable framework for implementation. At the operational level, the Coalition has met security and defence objectives of the SFA through the CJTF-OIR Operation Reliable Partnership order, and the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) Security Sector Reform program. These two areas are a small part of a larger Whole of Government (WOG) effort however, the framework for economic, diplomatic, judicial, and other focus areas is not well known and does not take into account the

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3 SFA, pg 1.
current situation in Iraq today. Before the West can implement the ‘One Iraq’ policy it is vital that internal Iraqi issues are addressed through a GoI led bottom-up approach.

**GoI Bottom-Up Approach**

Iraq now is different to the Iraq of 2008 in which the SFA was signed. The rise and defeat of ISIS has left scars amongst the people, and in some areas the situation is similar to that of 2014 which precipitated the rise of ISIS. Continued Sunni disenfranchisement and an emboldened Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) demand a strategic reassessment. This reassessment is driven by the desire for a unified Iraq whilst acknowledging the need to curb outside actor influence, remove the threat of violent extremist organizations (VEO), and create a stronger national economy. The GoI needs to focus on internal issues before it can be truly unified. Issues such as internal Kurdish unity, Sunni and Shia disenfranchisement, and good national governance demand attention.

**Internal Kurdish Unity**

Both the U.S. and U.K. acknowledge that a unified Iraq includes a semi-autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The KRG has been emboldened in its desire for autonomy and even independence, which was demonstrated by its 2017 referendum. Ongoing political issues have created divisions between the GoI and KRG even before the failed referendum. The U.K. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee reported in 2015 that:

‘The advent of democracy in Iraq has, if anything, entrenched sectarian and ethnic identities in Iraq at the expense of national identity, with a political system that thus far appears to have reinforced rather than healed divisions.’

Notwithstanding the political divisions highlighted above, there is an increasing willingness of the international community to establish diplomatic relations with the KRG. Indeed, the Kurdistan Department of Foreign Relations (DFR) website highlights that 28 countries and seven organizations have established formal ties with Erbil. The importance of international investment in Kurdistan demonstrates the benefit of a stable Kurdish region in Iraq. These economic and political efforts are undermined through the fractured relationship between the GoI and the Kurds, as well as internal Kurdish divisions.

The KRG is racked by internal divisions amongst the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurds have often been their own worst enemies when it comes to plotting a path for self-determination and independence. This was highlighted by the events of October 2017 when the ISF and Hashd al-Shaabi pushed the Kurdish Peshmerga out of Kirkuk leading to a reemergence of long lived KDP-PUK divisions. The KDP has accused the PUK of selling out the KRG by relinquishing Kurdish territory and by making deals to export oil to Iran. In addition, there is growing discontent amongst the people with the leadership of the various factions within the KRG. Until internal divisions are healed the KRG is not in a position to maintain viable self-autonomy, nor is a policy of ‘One Iraq’ achievable. The GoI should focus its efforts in fostering security and

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economic relations with the KRG that are mutually beneficial to both parties, as well as opening up the region for further foreign investment.

**Sunni Disenfranchisement**

Since the American led coalition toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime and ended decades of Sunni Arab dominance in Iraq, the Sunni’s have faced an erosion of their political influence, loss of identity, and economic hardships. A Shia dominated GoI, coupled with the continued presence of Shia Militia Groups (SMG) in Sunni majority regions, has further alienated the population. If the Sunni population is not successfully reintegrated into the Iraqi political system, administrative apparatus, and the economy, then the conditions may exist that drove some Sunni’s into the arms of ISIS in the first place.\(^7\)

One obvious area of Sunni disenfranchisement is the efforts to rebuild cities destroyed by the fight against ISIS. The city of Mosul is an excellent example of the issues facing Iraq today. A significant amount of infrastructure was destroyed in the fighting, yet the majority of residents that were able to leave have not been able to return as most of them have nothing to return to. The slow reconstruction efforts have frustrated Sunni's that feel that the GoI blames them for the rise of ISIS in 2014. Much needs to be done in Mosul through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); however, the longer the reconstruction takes, the further estrangement of Iraqi Sunni’s will continue. The dangers of a maligned Sunni population are obvious. The GoI must make Sunni-Shia reconciliation a priority in conjunction with reconstruction and economic efforts in Sunni majority areas.

**Shia Disenfranchisement**

In addition to the well documented Sunni disenfranchisement, elements of the Iraqi Shia population also demand the attention of the GoI. The early results of Iraq’s 2018 elections have demonstrated a lack of trust in the GoI by many Shia, highlighted by low voter turnout and the success of populist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. His al-Sairoon Coalition (The Marchers) finished first in the vote count, which suggests that Iraq may be tired of the political class that has governed the country since its first parliamentary elections.\(^8\) Michael Knights, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, believes that the pessimism about politicians is endemic of a wider feeling after the defeat of ISIS, and that some Iraqi’s think the country is moving in the right direction in spite of its politicians and not because of them.\(^9\)

The Shia population in the south of Iraq is at risk of becoming maligned. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the situation in Basra. The lack of provision of basic services such as

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\(^9\) Ibid.
electricity, water treatment systems, and poor and degraded infrastructure have led to dissatisfaction with the central government. Further dissatisfaction comes from alleged Iranian pollution of the Shatt al-Arab River, which has devastated sugar cane crops and poisoned drinking water. It remains to be seen on what impact Sadr’s anti-corruption stance will have on the future GoI. Nonetheless, the newly formed GoI must tackle corruption, waste, and an improvement of basic governance across the entire country.

**Good Governance**

The GoI must drive the unification of Iraq. This will be achieved through ethnic reconciliation efforts, restoration of public services, and an inclusive government. A bottom-up model that focuses on regional efforts should drive initial gains before a grand ‘One Iraq’ policy can become a strategic reality. When the new GoI is formed after the 2018 national election, it is unlikely that reference to the defeat of ISIS will continue to resonate with a population that lacks basic services.

A bottom-up regional approach will make small initial gains that will demonstrate the GoI’s willingness to unify Iraq. Small projects, focused on IDPs, removal of IEDs and remnants of war, humanitarian assistance, resumption/repair of public services, Sunni-Shia reconciliation, education, housing, and the provision of security will demonstrate a determination of the GoI to unify the country after the fight against ISIS. The GoI must also look to the economy as a way to curb discontent.

As a result of the fight against ISIS, poor infrastructure, outdated external investment laws, and under-development in the electricity and transportation sectors, private economic activity has not developed. These issues, coupled with high rates of youth unemployment, have led to discontent across ethnic and religious bounds and has further alienated the population from the political elites. The new Iraqi Government must address economic reform and increase spending in the private and public sectors to reduce unemployment and a stagnant economy.

**Conclusion**

The aspirational desire for ‘One Iraq’ is not achievable in the short to medium term. Even if the political and security situation allowed for full implementation of this policy, there is little understanding of the framework on which to build such a strategy. It must be noted however, that in order to implement this policy the GoI must take an active role in setting the conditions for a unified and inclusive country.

The Coalition should continue to focus efforts on Operation Reliable Partnership and Security Sector Reform as the best way of helping stabilise Iraq. The Coalition’s efforts will aid the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in securing the country through the defeat of ISIS, and will enable the GoI to shift its focus on internal governance issues.

The GoI must focus its attention on internal Kurdish unity, Sunni and Shia disenfranchisement and reconciliation, and good national governance if it wants to unify the country. A bottom-up approach at the regional level, if implemented in the near term, provides an opportunity to demonstrate good faith on behalf of the GoI towards its people. It is only then that Iraq can look realistically towards unity and truly become ‘One Iraq.’

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Chapter 8
Qelay, Qal’at, Kalesi Kirkuk
Qelay, Qal’at, Kalesi Kirkuk

“The future of Iraq hinges on finding a resolution to Kirkuk’s status that is mutually tolerable to all parties…. If no side is willing or able to compromise on Kirkuk, then the issue is destined to end in bloodshed.”

Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethno-politics of Politics and Compromise (2009)

Disputes regarding Kirkuk remain at the forefront of present-day Iraq. Kirkuk represents a microcosm of the most significant unresolved issues ranging from territorial disputes, petroleum profit disagreements, and power sharing quarrels between numerous ethno-sectarian populations that all claim the region as home. Iraq’s fourth largest city, Kirkuk bears the scars of historical abuse between Arabs (Sunni/Shia), Kurds, and Turkmen, resulting in a deep mistrust of each other, which has the potential to jeopardize stability of the entire region for the foreseeable future. Currently, the policies designed to rectify and repair Kirkuk are in political stalemate, making this disputed territory vulnerable to escalations of regional violence that could potentially draw Iraq back into a civil war. Coalition Forces will have to continually engage at the operational and strategic level to mitigate the effects of these conflicts, preventing them from unravelling reconciliation efforts within the region.

Modern History of Conflict:

Prior to the 1920s, Kirkuk was a small, ethnically diverse town nestled in the greater Ottoman Empire. In 1927, oil was discovered, attracting large numbers of new residents, who settled in ethnically homogenous neighborhoods around the city center. Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, control of Kirkuk changed hands numerous times, each bringing a new source of ethnic affiliation before Saddam Hussein seized and consolidated power in Iraq. Under Saddam, Turkmen and Kurdish residents were targets of Arabization campaigns, which displaced hundreds of thousands of the multi-ethnic population and replaced them with settlers of Arab descent, intending to alter the demographics of Kirkuk. After Saddam was unseated in 2003, the Kirkuk Arabs suffered a similar fate under Prime Minister Allawi and Maliki, as Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) conducted de-ba’athification operations across Iraq. In 2014, the rise of Da’esh threatened to occupy Kirkuk, as the false caliphate began to advance toward central and northern Iraq. Kurdish military forces (Peshmerga) advanced from Kurdistan and secured the city of Kirkuk, defending the city against the Da’esh offensive and expanding the Kurdish area of control. Kirkuk remained occupied by the Peshmerga until October 2017, following the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) internationally ill-advised referendum for an independent state. In the aftermath of the referendum vote, the ISF and Hashd al-Shaabi forces reoccupied Kirkuk as infighting within the KRG forced withdrawal of Peshmerga. Currently, Kirkuk remains a disputed territory under the control of the Government of Iraq (GoI).

Territorial Disputes and Article 140:

While each political side points to the constitution as a touchstone for resolving territorial disputes in Kirkuk, it has also contributed to the present conflict. In a post-Saddam Iraq, the need to reconcile systemic issues within Kirkuk and other disputed territories was quickly

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2 Ibid.
4 Hanauer and Miller.
recognized. To rectify this, Article 140 of Iraq’s constitution was designed to incorporate the disputed territories under federal authority and make the newly formed government responsible for implementing “normalization” policies to reverse the effects of Saddam-area Arabization operations.\(^5\) Article 140 imposed a three-stage process: normalization, census, and referendum.\(^6\) Normalization was defined as “the assisted return of internally displaced people and the recovery of their property… and the boundaries of the governorate of Kirkuk would be restored to that of pre 1974”.\(^7\) Following these normalization policies, a census and a referendum were required to resolve the status of each disputed territory no later than 31 December 2007. However, the deadline to execute the policies under Article 140 expired, was then extended, and expired again due to inherent ambiguity of the Article’s writing.\(^8\) As of today, Kirkuk and other, similar, disputed territories remain unresolved.

The GoI and Kurdistan blame the other for failing to implement Article 140. In reality, both the GoI and KRG are hesitant to execute normalization policies because each fear the demographic and political transparency that would result from a census and referendum revealing the popular vote.\(^9\) The primary issue with the census was whether to include the identification of ethnicity. Each vested political side is concerned that holding a census would expose the strengths and weaknesses of Kirkuk’s different communities, potentially opening the province to the manipulation of its demography.\(^10\) The KRG stands to gain the most from the execution of a census, as it is the overwhelming majority population and any sort of official recognition of that fact would lend credence to its claim on the territory. The Turkmen and Arabs benefit from delaying the census, allowing the GoI more time to centralize power and develop a more favorable way to disburse revenue and de-conflict land disputes. Because of this mistrust, the most recent census that Iraqis reference and commonly view as accurate, was conducted in 1957.\(^11\)

The opportunity for Kirkuk to vote on a referendum that would align it closer with the GoI or Kurdistan is not the focus of controversy, but rather who is allowed to participate in that vote. Defining who participates in a referendum is a contentious issue amongst Kirkuk communities, and each ethnic population has distinctly different ideas as to who.\(^12\) According to the University of Cambridge’s studies of cities in conflict, the Turkmen consider the majority of the post-Saddam returnees as ineligible to vote, but consent to the usage of the 1957 census as long as the information is only used within the current boundaries, which the Kurds disagree with.\(^13\) The Arab communities consider any person with official documentation issued in Kirkuk to be a citizen of the governorate and are eligible to participate in a referendum vote. However, no official documentation has been issued in Kirkuk since the end of Arabization in 2003.\(^14\) Although there is less unifying consensus within the Kurdish population, the dominant view is

\(^6\) http://www.conflictincities.org/Kirkuk-t.html University of Cambridge (Cited on 3JUN2018)
\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Ferris and Stoltz.
\(^9\) http://www.conflictincities.org/Kirkuk-t.html University of Cambridge (Cited on 3JUN2018)
\(^10\) Ibid.
\(^11\) Ibid.
\(^12\) Ibid.
\(^13\) Ibid.
\(^14\) Ibid.
that the 1957 census, with the inclusion of the Kurdish majority districts of Chamchamal, Kalar, Kifri, and Tuz Khurmatu, should be used to identify individuals who are eligible to vote.\footnote{Anderson, Liam and Gareth Stansfield. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethno-politics of Conflict and Compromise. University of Pennsylvania Press. (2009)}

Each ethno-sectarian group has a valid argument to claim part of Kirkuk as its home, but decades of displacement and dramatic demographic shifts make it difficult to determine who has the right to map Kirkuk’s future. Unfortunately, the authors of Iraq’s constitution addressed these territorial disputes in ambiguous terms, leaving the burden of clarification to future political processes. As a result, no ethno-sectarian group will be able to individually implement the provisions that lead to normalization of Kirkuk on its own and will likely require renewed engagement from the international community.\footnote{Anderson, Scott. The Constitutional Context for Iraq’s Latest Crisis. The Brookings Institute. (7 NOV 2017)}

Petroleum Profit sharing:

Oil is central to Iraq’s future as it currently accounts for over 90% of the government's revenue with an estimated 50 to 200 billion barrels currently undeveloped or undiscovered. The preponderance of Iraq’s oil reserves are located in Basrah, Kurdistan, and the disputed governorate of Kirkuk.\footnote{Xhemaj, Valdrin. Iraq: what happened to the oil after the war? The Conversation (July 8, 2016)} Profits from oil are dependent on a mix of Iraq’s nationalized oil industry and international interests. All of which, continue to operate off the ambiguous framework of the Iraqi constitution and laws dating back to before 2003, leaving it vulnerable to interpretation.\footnote{Aresti, Maria Lasa. Oil and Gas Revenue Sharing in Iraq. Natural Resource Governance Institute (JUL 2016)} As a result, several disputes between the GoI and the KRG have emerged over time around ownership and management of oil extraction in the disputed territories.

The provincial governments and the KRG receive oil profit revenue through Regional Development Program (RDP) transfers, petrodollar allocations, and KRG transfers.\footnote{Ibid} Allocations are based on governorate population and oil production, which makes control of Kirkuk even more valuable. Complicating profit sharing efforts, the only route to export oil produced in northern Iraq is through the Kurdish-controlled pipeline that runs to the Turkish border and then to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. That pipeline begins on the northern end of the Kirkuk oil fields. Furthermore, the KRG has signed petroleum exploration deals with the Turkish government and is selling Iraqi oil on the international market, making the transparency of earned revenue from Iraqi oil difficult.\footnote{Lee, Julian and Elaine He. This Map Shows Why Oil Can Weather Iraq’s Kirkuk Campaign. Bloomberg.com (17 OCT 2017). https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2017-10-17/this-map-shows-why-oil-can-weather-iraq-s-kirkuk-campaign} The absence of an Iraq-wide oil revenue agreement ensures the GoI and KRG will continue to argue over ownership and financial control of oil extracted from Kirkuk for the foreseeable future.\footnote{Ibid.} The lasting impact of this is the decline in international investment in petroleum extraction, as the insecurities of governance in Kirkuk directly translates into economic insecurity and a decline in overall revenue earnings.

Power Sharing Struggles:

The central issue of power sharing is whether Kirkuk should be incorporated into the KRG or the GoI. The Kurds, although not officially recognized, are the population majority in Kirkuk and have historically embraced other minority groups living in predominantly Kurdish held territory. However, if recognized as the population majority, it would validate their self-proclaimed right-to-govern Kirkuk, despite the Turkmens and Arab desires to remain unified
under the GoI.\textsuperscript{22} The issue is closely linked to Kurdish national identity and has become symbolic of the Kurdish struggle and desire to extend the Kurdish autonomous region to incorporate Kirkuk.\textsuperscript{23} The GoI currently has control of Kirkuk, after reoccupying it by force following the Kurdish Independence referendum in 2017. To provide incentive to the KRG, the GoI would have to relinquish control, which is unacceptable to the minority populations of the Arabs and Turkmen. Arabs and Turkmen are vehemently against the incorporation of Kirkuk into the Kurdish Region, preferring power and oil profit sharing agreements. Both minority groups fear the possibility of another majority ethno-sectarian group, like the Shia in southern Iraq, developing a monopoly on power and resources.\textsuperscript{24}

Power sharing should be a solution to resolving many aforementioned problems that encompass Kirkuk, but instead is a problem in itself. The stalemate of Article 140, the conflict with Da’esh, and the recent Kurdistan independence referendum, which would have incorporated Kirkuk into the KRG, are endemic of an unclear path towards resolution. However, if the GoI retains control of Kirkuk, any form of power sharing resolution would require a census, which would recognize Kurds as the majority population and, subsequently, certain rights under the Iraqi constitution. These results are unacceptable to the opposing side and any proposed solution that fails to acknowledge this cannot succeed. Military occupation in Kirkuk, whether it be Da’esh, the Kurds, or the GoI have not endured the test of time and require a political settlement that can provide long-term stability.\textsuperscript{25}

Conclusion:

Each ethno-sectarian group has a legitimate right to remain in Kirkuk. Turkmen, Arabs, and Kurds have all reaped the benefits by having, at one time, the majority population and opportunity to govern, resulting in strong ties to the land and history of Kirkuk. Each ethnic group witnessed power changing hands as empires and dictators ascended and fell. However, the future process to ensure fair governance in Kirkuk, which reconciles territorial and revenue claims, does not exist and is not clearly outlined by the GoI.

Kirkuk will require whole of nation support as it is just as much of a political problem as it is a military security effort. Security operations need to remain a unified endeavor for collective security forces occupying Kirkuk. Coalition Forces will need to continue to partner at the operation centers, focusing on the inclusion and de-confliction of Peshmerga and ISF. There is potential opportunity to leverage ground-up, tactical level Peshmerga/ISF partnership to reinforce or inspire strategic reconciliation efforts. Amendments to the Iraqi National Constitution will need to be revised to eliminate the ambiguity of citizenship and explicitly outline the rights and protections of majority and minority groups.

A Special U.S. or United Nations Envoy is required to engage and coordinate with GoI and ISF leadership to steward reconciliation efforts and provide meaningful incentives that can reinforce compromise between the groups. International investment could act as incentive for the opposing groups to make concessions and compromise their individual narrative for the greater stability of Kirkuk. The Envoy or third party interlocutor could ensure international investment, providing peace of mind, as long as the conditions established for reconciliation are met. The longer that Kirkuk is allowed to languish as a disputed territory, only strengthens the opposing views of each side, making regional stability impossible.

\textsuperscript{22} McEvoy, Joanne and Brendan O’Leary. Power Sharing in Deeply Divided (2013)
\textsuperscript{23} http://www.conflictincities.org/Kirkuk-t.html University of Cambridge (Cited on 2JUN2018)
\textsuperscript{24} http://www.conflictincities.org/Kirkuk-t.html University of Cambridge (Cited on 2JUN2018)
\textsuperscript{25} Sky, Emma. Iraq’s Kurds have overplayed their hand. Now both sides must talk. The Guardian (OCT 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/19/iraq-kurds-overplayed-hand-kirkuk
Chapter 9
Sharafnama’s Next Chapter:
The Future of Iraqi Kurdistan
Sharafnama’s Next Chapter:  
The Future of Iraqi Kurdistan

A Kurd has no friend but the mountain…  
Ancient Kurdish Proverb

The chasm that divides the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the Government of Iraq (GoI) is too great for either side to reconcile decades of broken trust. Both sides need to rebuild a foundation of trust that was subsequently destroyed after the September 2017 Kurdish Independence referendum. Although the failed referendum was the most recent demonstration of Kurdish disenfranchisement, a history of feuds over resource distribution, territorial claims, and Kurdish desire for independence have continually eroded KRG and GoI relations. Despite their differences, both the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Kurdish Security Forces (KSF) worked toward a common goal during the fight against Da’esh, securing key terrain in northern Iraq, liberating Mosul, and providing safe haven for internally displaced persons (IDP) and minority populations.

The KRG and GoI demonstrated their potential to work together against a common enemy. These moments of unified action prove that the KRG and GoI are a stronger nation united and provide hope that resolving the issues between them will support enduring stability in Iraq and the region. Nonetheless, four significant challenges hinder reconciliation efforts between the KRG and GoI, which are the Kurdish historical narrative of victimization, territorial disputes, oil rights/revenue sharing, and Kurdish tribal/political infighting. Unless trust and compromise can mitigate these issues, the KRG and GoI will continue to grow further apart.

Changing the Kurdish Narrative

The Kurdish narrative needs to move beyond victimization to secure their place in the greater history of Iraq. The modern Kurdish narrative began during the rise to power of Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party. Under Saddam, Kurds and other ethnic minorities became targets of Arabization campaigns. Arabization comprised a combination of displacement of non-Arabs, unlawful detentions, and ethnic cleansing. In addition to such atrocities, these operations would transplant loyal Sunni Arabs to historically oil rich Kurdish and minority regions, like Kirkuk, to strengthen ethnic majority control. The Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR) was formed in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, but it wasn’t until the unseating of Saddam in 2003 that the IKR gained greater autonomy and developed government systems and a nascent economy unencumbered by the central government in Baghdad.

Between 2014 and 2017, the KRG capitalized on the ensuing chaos and power vacuum, left in Da’esh’s wake, securing oil rich disputed territories and historic Kurdish lands. Emboldened with the expeditious defeat of Da’esh in 2017, the Kurdish ruling families felt this series of events provided the best opportunity to push for Kurdish independence. Their internationally unsupported referendum on independence was seen as an instant local media success and was overwhelmingly supported by the Kurdish people. However, it resulted in both tactical and strategic losses for the KRG. Now, the IKR boundaries have receded back to pre-2003 lines and revenue shares from Iraq’s oil sales are at historic lows. The memories Iraqi Kurds’ turbulent past are kept alive through their media and political rhetoric, dominating their views on conflict resolution with the GoI. The Kurdish narrative illustrates its people as survivors and victims, excusing moments in history that finds them as aggressors. If the Kurds and GoI continue viewing their respective histories myopically, it will be impossible to
accommodate compromise. Each outlook must change to acknowledge the past, but not be encumbered by it and move towards the future.

**Disputed Boundaries of the IKR**

The ambiguity of the constitutional articles outlining the IKR, do more harm than good. The result has created security gaps between ISF and KSF and exacerbated territorial disputes due to ethnic imbalances and desired provincial control. In 1991, the IKR was formed as an autonomous region in northern Iraq by the U.S. Government and its allies. The IKR includes Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyyah governorates, with additional districts from Ninewa, Salah ad Din, Diyala, and Kirkuk provinces. The bordering provinces that include some districts under Kurdish control are considered disputed territories, as control and ethnic supremacy has ebbed and flowed throughout Iraq’s history. The Iraqi Constitution is unclear regarding the boundaries of the IKR, resulting in a measurable gap between the KRG’s and GoI’s perceived boundaries.

Currently, there is no clear outline of the IKR. The Iraqi Constitution simply recognizes Kurdistan and its “existing authorities” as a federated region, without naming the specific governorates, districts, or defining its territorial boundaries. Further complicating resolution of disputed territories and boundaries, the 2004 Law of Administration for the Transitional Government of Iraq recognizes the KRG as the “official government of the territories that were administered by that government on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of Dohuk, Irbil, Sulimaniyah, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Ninewa.” This definition is more inclusive than the Iraqi Constitution, which acknowledges the Transition Law as its legal foundation. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution was intended to address the permanent resolution of disputed territories, such as Kirkuk. This article dictates “normalization” policies through a process that requires a nationwide census, followed by a referendum that would allow the people of that territory to determine which government (KRG or GoI) they want to represent them. The census was to be completed by 31 December 2007; however, it never occurred.

Until the KRG and GoI compromise on a method of resolution, the status of the disputed territories remains unchanged, enduring as a security vulnerability and point of contention that is driving both governments further apart. Both parties could start addressing concerns for disputed territories by capitalizing on shared security responsibilities, which can serve as a method to begin rebuilding trust at the tactical levels. Joint ISF and KSF operations centers could be established to de-conflict actions against the remnants of Da’esh and secure internal borders, benefiting regional stability. Additionally, an international third party could be granted authority by both the GoI and KRG to arbitrate and incentivize disputed territory negotiations. Both sides stand to gain from the security and economic opportunities of disputed territory resolution if compromises can be reached.

**Oil Rights and Revenue Sharing**

How the disputed territories are resolved has significant economic ramifications for the KRG and GoI, which directly impacts fair distribution of oil revenue. These disputed territories contain some of Iraq’s largest and most productive oil fields, estimated to hold ~20% of Iraq’s known oil and natural gas. This is a challenge shared by all of Iraq since it is a rentier economy, solely based on oil revenue. Estimates state that over 80% of the KRG’s revenue is generated through the sale of oil, with the other 20% being comprised of agribusiness and tourism. These figures are corroborated by the KRG’s governmental website, but details are not made publically available.
Since the KRG is largely dependent on oil revenue, of which a considerable percentage is viewed as illicit by the GoI, its capacity to govern is directly tied to the price of oil and how much it can sell. When oil was 100+ USD a barrel, the KRG chose to add more personnel to the government payroll rather than invest the excess revenue or pursue opportunities to diversify its economy. Since the price of oil has plummeted to ~35 USD per barrel and the GoI has retaken the majority of the oil fields in the disputed territories, the KRG’s budget has been reduced by an estimated 50%. Most significantly, the loss of the Kirkuk oil fields further reduced its budget, according to most estimates. Now, the KRG is reliant on international aide to pay government salaries and cover existing debts. The exact figure of international aid is unknown, however, the USG alone supplies ~750 million USD annually, primarily to cover the operational costs, modernization, and salaries of the Peshmerga.

The GoI and KRG are both heavily invested and responsible for significant portions of Iraq’s oil infrastructure in northern Iraq. If both governments could look at the long-term benefits of joint management and capitol investment, the efficiency and production gains would benefit both sides with much needed revenue. Additional commercial transparency and a unified voice would also be more acceptable to the international community, promoting investment in Iraq’s economic future.

**Internal Tensions**

The current political configuration of the KRG circulates around two political parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These parties are tightly controlled by the families of their founders the Barzanis (KDP) and Talabanis (PUK). These two groups were at the center of multiple climatic struggles over the last several decades, with these two families and their political parties at the forefront of Kurdish struggles, negotiations, and attempts of nation building. Until 1963, the parties were united, but disagreements over a negotiated peace settlement fractured the groups into their modern configuration and relations have devolved, sometimes resorting to open violence. These historic tensions are amplified by the KDP’s and PUK’s regional patrons, with the KDP aligned with Turkish interests and the PUK more closely aligned with Iran. The most notable and recent example of this was in October 2017, when the PUK retrograded their militias from the Kurdish Defensive line after Iranian officials allegedly negotiated an agreement that effectively ceded the disputed territory of Kirkuk back to the GoI.

Despite their historic friction, the KDP and PUK have been able to consistently present a unified front in Iraqi national politics. This has helped the Kurds serve as a king maker in Iraqi national politics and help steer national leadership and legislation on minor issues in their favor. Additionally, there is hope that the next generation of Kurdish leadership will not champion the historic tensions between the KDP and PUK, and they will move beyond the power struggles of the older generations. If this new generation can be influenced and shown the benefits of compromise and cooperation then there is hope that the tensions between the political parties can normalize.

Despite fiscal and internal political challenges the population of the IKR views their government in a positive light. The KRG is viewed as less corrupt and more capable of providing better opportunities for its residents than the GoI; although, there are some indicators that Kurdish approval ratings are shifting, particularly in the 18-25 age demographic. This is directly tied to their views that the older tribal leadership have failed to deliver on promises of independence and prosperity. These types of indicators are often early warning signs for future instability ahead, and unless addressed there could be significant turmoil in the near future.
Conclusion

There is significant distrust between the KRG and the GoI, since the 2017 Kurdish Independence referendum. Feuds continue over territorial boundaries and resource distribution, which are further complicated by entrenched narratives of victimization and internal tribal power struggles. No solution will be without compromise, which should seek to exploit the opportunity to work together against a common enemy and promote the financial benefits of a transparent oil economy. The international community could assist in the process by helping to establish joint coordination centers to reduce security vulnerabilities along the IKR border as well as mediate negotiations between the GoI and KRG. Conflict resolution between the GoI and the KRG will not only provide security and economic benefits, but it is the foundation for enduring stability and winning the peace in Iraq.
Hays’ Horizons

10th Mountain Division (light Infantry)
A Series of Thoughts on the CJTF (Iraq) Way Ahead
Lieutenant General George Price Hays was born in Chefoo, China, where both his parents and maternal grandparents were long-term missionaries. After graduating from El Reno High School and Oklahoma A&M College, he volunteered for military service shortly after the United States entered World War I, and soon afterwards earned the commission of Second Lieutenant. It was in this war that, for unbelievable heroism in action, while establishing communication between units, and having seven horses shot out from under him, he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

Among his duties between World War I and II, he taught military science and tactics at Cornell University and served in many capacities at Fort Sill and other bases in the United States as well as the Philippine Islands. He organized and commanded the 99th Field Artillery Pack from 1940, until shortly before World War II, when he went to Operations Division of the War Department and from there to the Army's General Headquarters, where he was the Operations and Training officer.

He later joined the Second Infantry Division as Commanding General of the Division Artillery. Then later took command of the Tenth Mountain Infantry Division and led it overseas into action in Italy. Following his second war, he served in several occupation and military government positions, finally retiring as a three star general and as the deputy military governor for the U.S. Occupation Zone in Germany.

LTG Hays' actions in World War II showed us that solutions to military challenges cannot always be found in doctrine or by following the “way we have always done it.” Sometimes leaders need to change their perspective and expand their horizon to see that a Ridge is the key to taking the Mountain, and an order to hold needs to be defied in order to win not only the battle, but the war.