1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

STANLEY A. MCCHRISTAL
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
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Overview: This document is a substantial transition from the previous edition of Joint Publication (JP) 3-29. With advances and changes in how the Department of Defense engages in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations, additional tools are now available to the joint warfighter. These tools in the form of multiple referenced handbooks, manuals, articles and websites are published and utilized by a multitude of US interagency and multinational partners and has brought additional validity to the planning and execution of FHA operations. The new JP 3-29 recognizes these tools as they aid in the success of the US’s World Wide FHA Engagement Strategy. Changes include:

- Identifies the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as the principal agency for US bilateral development and humanitarian assistance.

- Establishes reference to JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*.

- Establishes the use of and reference to the terms and definitions of developmental assistance and security assistance.

- Establishes reference to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3214.01C, *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents*.

- Establishes the reference to JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, and identifies changes to the definition of peace operations.

- Provides figures/tables depicting the interagency coordination flow for FHA operations.

- Identifies and recognizes the key roles of non-US Government participants and organizations.

- Provides figures/tables depicting the civil-military operations center composition and functions.

- Establishes entirely new/revised sections on strategic communications and civil affairs and removes these sections from Chapter II, “Organization and Interagency Coordination,” and places them in Chapter IV, “Execution and Assessment.”

- Provides figures/tables depicting the overarching relief process.
• Provides figures/tables depicting the three FHA operational environments of: permissive, uncertain, and hostile.

• Provides figures/tables depicting the sources of information on the current situation in crisis area, providing political, cultural, economic, military, geographic and topographic, climatic, infrastructure and engineering, health and other essential information.

• Removes the section on manpower and personnel services support from within Chapter IV, “Execution and Assessment,” and disperses significant segments through the rest of the publication.


• Provides a significant revision to the Pacific Disaster Center section in Appendix B, “Department of Defense Foreign Disaster Assistance Tasking and Funding Procedures and Humanitarian Assistance Programs.”

• Provides a significant revision to the USAID information in Appendix C, “Department of State and United States Agency for International Development Organizations.”

• Provides a significant revision to the International Committee of the Red Cross information in Appendix D, “Humanitarian Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations.”

• Provides a significant revision to the Services capabilities: US Navy section of Appendix E, “Health Service Support in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations.”
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Provides an Overview of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations
- Discusses Interagency Coordination, Roles and Responsibilities, and Principal Organizations Related to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
- Describes Planning for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations
- Addresses the Execution and Assessment of All Aspects of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations

Overview

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration, and is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or endemic conditions.

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) consists of Department of Defense (DOD) activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or Department of State (DOS), conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. While, US military forces are not the primary US Government (USG) means of providing FHA, the foreign assistance they are tasked to provide is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation (HN) civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing that assistance.

DOD has unique assets for effective response and can play a key role in foreign humanitarian crises. For example, the US military possesses exceptional operational reach that can be employed to enhance an initial response. Additionally, the US military augments private sector capability and thus limits threats to regional stability. Furthermore, the US military’s unmatched capabilities in logistics, command and control (C2), communications, and mobility are able to provide rapid and robust response to dynamic and evolving situations among vastly different military, civilian, and government entities.

FHA operations require coordination and collaboration among many agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental, with US military forces when tasked in a supporting role. Because DOD will normally be in a
supporting role during FHA, the joint force commander (JFC) may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies. During FHA operations unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount.

**Legal authority and policy.** Statutory authority for USG agencies to provide FHA is contained in the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, as amended, in Title 22, US Code. This legislation provides a blueprint for USG engagement with friendly nations. *DOD Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief*, establishes policy and provides for component participation in foreign disaster relief operations only after a determination is made by DOS that foreign disaster relief shall be provided.

**The following missions are common in FHA operations:**

**Relief missions.** Relief missions include prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims. Potential relief roles for US forces include immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, construction of basic sanitation facilities and shelters, and provision of food and medical care.

**Dislocated civilian support missions.** Dislocated civilian support missions are specifically designed to support the assistance and protection for dislocated civilians. Support missions may include camp organization (basic construction and administration); provision of care (food, supplies, medical attention, and protection); and placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations).

**Security missions.** Security missions may include establishing and maintaining conditions for the provision of FHA by organizations of the world relief community. In some cases, the affected country will not be able to meet the required conditions and may request assistance from US military forces to secure areas for storage of relief material until it can be distributed to the affected population. Other tasks may involve providing protection and armed escorts for convoys and personnel delivering emergency aid, protection of shelters for dislocated civilians, and security for multinational forces,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).

Technical assistance and support functions.

Technical assistance and support functions may take the form of advice and selected training, assessments, manpower, and equipment. Based upon Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and combatant commander (CCDR) guidance, the FHA force commander (CDR) should establish operational procedures regarding technical advice and assistance to the affected country, NGOs, and IGOs as soon as possible.

Foreign consequence management.

Foreign consequence management (FCM) is DOD assistance provided by the USG to a HN to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives attack or event and to restore essential government services. When requested by the lead federal agency (LFA) and directed by SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM operations to the extent allowed by law and subject to the availability of forces.

Military commanders must be cautious not to commit their forces to projects and tasks that go beyond the FHA mission.

Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously with other types of operations, each type has unique characteristics. Military CDRs conducting FHA simultaneously with other operations must develop end state, transition, and termination objectives as well as measures of effectiveness (MOEs) complementary to simultaneous military operations. Such operations may include stability operations, nation assistance operations (humanitarian and civic assistance, security assistance, and foreign internal defense), peace operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations.

The operational context that US military forces conduct coordinated responses in FHA operations is unilateral, where the USG provides FHA without direct involvement by other nations other than the HN, or multinational, where operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

Understanding the operational environment, which encompasses physical areas and factors (the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment, requires a broad perspective, particularly during FHA operations where there are normally no overt adversary military forces, but forces of nature, possibly
covert adversary forces, and nonmilitary personnel, organizations, and systems that combine to complicate joint force operations and influence the application of force choices.

Based on the supported geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) intent, JFCs determine the phased arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to create desired effects and accomplish the assigned mission. Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from one another, but must be planned in support of each other and should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation. Transitions between operational phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command relationships. This challenging environment demands an agile shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks as well as coordination and collaboration with a wider range of other organizations — other government agencies (OGAs), multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs — to provide those capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors.

**Interagency Coordination, Roles and Responsibilities, and Principal Organizations**

*In an FHA operation, interagency coordination is essential for effective policy development and implementation.*

Because of the number of civilian and non-USG actors involved in a crisis, command relationships outside DOD command structures may not be clearly defined and success will depend heavily on effective, timely coordination. Difficulties arise from the fact that many USG agencies, civil and military authorities, foreign governments, the United Nations (UN), NGOs, and IGOs may be conducting assistance activities within the same operational area prior to, during, and after departure of the joint force. Coordination and collaboration are essential in dealing with these organizations. Accordingly, key considerations for JFCs in developing the mission statement include the military role in assisting the UN, NGOs, IGOs, and OGAs as well as security practices and policies.

**Roles and Responsibilities of USG Organizations**

When a disaster strikes, the chief of mission (COM) may send a disaster declaration cable outlining the extent of the
damage, possible needs, and may recommend assistance in the form of funding, material, or technical assistance. When the President, SecDef, and the Secretary of State have determined that a US humanitarian response to a foreign disaster or crisis is required, the National Security Council (NSC) normally directs the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance to convene an **International Development and Humanitarian Assistance NSC Policy Coordination Committee (PCC)** to review all pertinent information and recommend policy and specific actions. The PCC; which consists of senior DOS and DOD representatives, the COM, USAID representatives, and heads of other concerned agencies; concurrently develops a comprehensive strategy for emergency response and develops tasks for each key participant.

**Department of State.** The COM, or assistant secretary of state responsible for the particular area can declare a disaster, providing the event meets three criteria: the disaster exceeds the HN’s ability to respond; the affected country’s government either requests or is willing to receive US assistance; and a response to the disaster is in the US national interest. This declaration is transmitted to the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and DOS to begin possible USG assistance. When a disaster is declared, the DOS geographic bureau of the affected area becomes the key participating bureau. The functional bureau, Political-Military Affairs, is the primary link between DOD and DOS and works with the DOD to provide assistance in the event of natural disasters and other crises abroad.

**US Agency for International Development.** Although a separate agency from DOS, USAID shares certain administrative functions with DOS and reports to and receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. Accordingly, it plays a major role in US foreign assistance policy and a principal role in interagency coordination. **USAID administers and directs the US foreign economic assistance program and acts as the LFA for USG FHA.**

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) coordinates USAID's democracy
programs, international disaster assistance, emergency and developmental food aid, aid to manage and mitigate conflict, and volunteer programs. Within DCHA, OFDA and the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) are key organizations that will interact with DOD during FHA operations. OFDA is the lead office in the USG for facilitating and coordinating USG emergency assistance overseas. It coordinates with USAID offices and others to provide relief supplies and humanitarian assistance (HA), and develops and manages logistic, operational, and technical support for disaster responses. OMA, the focal point for USAID interaction with DOD, addresses areas of common interests between defense and development, with a focus on improving civilian-military field readiness, programs, and coordination.

**Secretary of Defense.** SecDef, working under the guidance of the President, and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, directs DOD support to USG humanitarian operations and establishes appropriate command relationships.

**The Joint Staff.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for recommending military capabilities and appropriate relationships for FHA operations to SecDef. Once these relationships have been established, the **Joint Staff coordinates detailed staff planning under the cognizance of the CJCS.**

**Combatant Commander.** The GCCs direct military operations, including FHA, within their areas of responsibility (AORs). Ideally, this should be done with the concurrence of the COM. In response to a disaster, the supported GCC structures the force necessary to conduct and sustain the FHA operation, typically forming a joint task force (JTF). Two notable advisors to the GCC are the GCC’s DOS foreign policy advisor and USAID senior development officer, who can provide nonmilitary insights, enhancing direct communications and coordination with the affected embassy and country team. Each CCDR has a crisis action or rapid deployment team initially deployed as the immediate responder/assessor for the CCDR. The exact composition of this team and the subsequent follow-on assets will vary depending on the type and
severity of the incident and in some cases, restrictions placed on the COM by the HN.

The supported CCDR may also organize and deploy a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to acquire information required for planning. Once deployed, the HAST, working with the country team, can assess the capability and capacity of the HN government to respond to the disaster; identify primary points of contact for coordination and collaboration, determine the threat environment and survey facilities that may be used for force protection purposes, and coordinate specific support arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies. The supported CCDR may establish and/or be supported by other groups and/or centers depending on the CCDR’s assessment of the situation. These may include: a humanitarian assistance coordination center, established by the CCDR to assist with interagency coordination and planning; a joint interagency coordination group, to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments; a joint logistics operations center, to receive reports from supporting commands, Service components, and external sources and distill information for decisions and briefings, and responds to questions; and/or the Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, which tracks the movement requirement from lift allocation and initial execution through closure at final destination and collaborates with joint deployment distribution operations centers to link strategic deployment and distribution processes to operational and tactical functions. Further, support to the GCC may be provided by a standing joint force headquarters (core element), upon which to build the joint C2 capability for an FHA operation through augmentation, and the joint public affairs support element, which provides a ready, scaleable, equipped, and trained joint capability to augment existing public affairs or serve as a stand-alone capability to support emergent requirements.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency is responsible to lead, direct, and manage security cooperation programs to support US national security objectives that strengthen America's alliances and partnerships through transfer of defense capabilities; international
military education; and HA and humanitarian demining assistance.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency provides direct analytical support for FHA through the LFAs and combatant commands primarily through the deployment of team specialists in response to natural disasters, to include earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and wildfires.

Consequence Management Advisory Team and Joint Technical Advisory Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Element. During a crisis involving CBRN materials, at the request of a CCDR, and in coordination with the Joint Staff, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency may direct the immediate deployment of a supporting consequence management advisory team (CMAT). The CMAT provides task-organized, deployable, doctrinal, and technical consequence management expertise, support, advice, and hazard prediction modeling assistance for DOD and other federal agencies during all phases of CBRN accidents or incidents.

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COEDMHA) is congressionally mandated and assigned to United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). The Director of COEDMHA reports to the USPACOM Deputy CDR. COEDMHA educates, trains, provides consultation, supports military exercises, and produces information for responders.

Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine within the Department of Military and Emergency Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences, is a university-based venture whose mission is to advance the understanding and delivery of disaster medical care and HA worldwide.

The Pacific Disaster Center is an applied science, information, and technology center, working to reduce disaster risks and impacts to peoples’ lives and property.
Key Non-USG Participants and Organizations

**Host Nation.** The HN is the nation receiving the assistance, in whose territory the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations transit or operate. The HN will coordinate all relief efforts within its territory. US forces conducting FHA do so with the permission of the HN under the guidance of formal and informal agreements.

**United Nations.** The UN coordinates its response to humanitarian crises through a committee of all the key humanitarian bodies, chaired by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. Today, the UN is a major provider of emergency relief and longer-term assistance, a catalyst for action by governments and relief agencies, and an advocate on behalf of people struck by emergencies.

**Nongovernmental Organizations.** Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the US military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a CDR would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Working alone, alongside the US military, or with other US agencies, NGOs assist in all the world’s trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed.

**Private Sector.** Increasingly, the resources of the international business community are being utilized to mitigate human suffering associated with disasters. Businesses donate talent or in-kind goods and services to disaster relief and recovery operations in developing countries and wish to ensure that their help is delivered in a coordinated and effective manner. Private/non-government sectors often perform certain functions more efficiently and effectively than government because of the expertise and experience in applying successful business models.

**Private Contractors.** CDRs should be aware that private contractors are employed by a wide range of actors, inside and outside the USG. They are often
employed to provide security, training, technical expertise, and logistical support.

**Joint Task Force Organization**

While the JTF is the most common type of organizational structure used for FHA, a JFC may also opt to create a joint special operations task force, joint civil-military operations task force, or a joint psychological operations task force to assist in operations. **The JFC organizes the JTF staff to provide the appropriate expertise required to carry out the specific FHA mission.** In order to effect close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates, cross-functional collaboration is most commonly achieved by the JFC through the formation of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups and planning teams, and other enduring or temporary organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. Examples of such organizations are joint facilities utilization boards, coalition forces support teams, joint network operations control centers, joint intelligence support elements, joint information bureaus, and joint movement centers.

**Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).** The CMOC is a civil-military operation (CMO) organization that provides operational level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. The structure and responsibilities of the CMOC need to be established as quickly as possible during joint operation planning. While sharing many general characteristics, each FHA operation is unique, and the CMOC structure must be tailored for each emergency. The CMOC serves as the central clearing organization for information and coordination relevant to the JTF operation in support of a FHA mission. It is designed to coordinate military efforts and resources with requirements of the international relief community to achieve overall efficiency and effectiveness.

**Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC).** The HOC is a senior level international and interagency coordinating body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large FHA operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country
Executive Summary

or the UN, or a USG agency during a US unilateral operation.

**There is a significant difference between the HOC and CMOC.** The CMOC is established by and works for the JFC. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the HN government or the UN, or possibly OFDA during a US unilateral operation. Additionally, the HOC operates at senior, national level to coordinate strategic and operational unity of effort, while the CMOC works at the local level coordinating US actions to achieve operational and tactical unity of effort.

**Relationships with NGOs and IGOs are based on multiple factors some of which include a mutual understanding** of each others’ goals and objectives, planned lines of operations and concept of operations (CONOPS), support requirements, coordination procedures, information sharing, capabilities and, most importantly, missions. Relationships with NGOs and IGOs are based on multiple factors some of which include a mutual understanding of each others’ goals and objectives, planned lines of operations and CONOPS, support requirements, coordination procedures, information sharing, capabilities and, most importantly, missions.

**Planning Considerations**

The time available to plan responses to real-time events is short, particularly in the case of disasters requiring an FHA response. **In as little as a few days, the supported GCC and the JFCs and their staffs must develop and approve a feasible course of action (COA), publish the plan or order, prepare forces, ensure sufficient support, and arrange sustainment for the employment of US military forces.** Accordingly, considerations for crisis action planning are emphasized when planning FHA operations.

**The nature of the operational environment obviously impacts the conduct of FHA operations.** Important elements of the operational environment considered during planning and executing FHA operations include the type of disaster involved. The determinants are whether the disaster and consequent emergencies occur suddenly or develop over a period of time, whether the emergency is related to conflict, and the underlying causes. Another factor in understanding the operational
environment is the prevailing host country security environment. Finally, an assessment of the operational environment should consider the system of international relief already at work.

The process of **joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment** (JIPOE) will assist the JFC in understanding the operational environment as it applies to planning and executing FHA operations. JIPOE support during FHA requires a different mindset and different techniques than a JIPOE effort that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily. This analysis identifies a number of nodes - specific physical, functional, or cultural entities within each system. Nodes can include people, transportation infrastructure, sociological and political structure, economic system, potential friendly, neutral, and adversary elements, the information environment, and other components of the operational environment. JIPOE analysts also identify links - the cultural, physical, or functional relationship between nodes.

The primary purpose of **mission analysis** is to understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. A critical task for the CCDR is developing the FHA military mission statement. The mission statement must provide specific direction for achieving the desired end state via clear and attainable military objectives. CCDR consider several factors in developing the mission statement, to include the military force’s role in assisting relief agencies, the operational environment, and security considerations.

*Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief* – “Oslo Guidelines” provide that foreign military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only when the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset, therefore, must be unique in capability and availability. Military assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged "humanitarian gap" between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them.
In developing the CONOPS, phasing assists JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The actual phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the joint operation, as determined by the JFC. While FHA operations may occur during any phase of a larger joint operation, JFCs and component CDRs may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. These sub-phases, designed to focus relief assets and emphasis, should generally follow phase model of the larger operation and include transitions from one phase to the next.

The primary purposes of force planning are to: influence COA development and selection based on force allocations, availability, and readiness; to identify all forces needed to accomplish the supported CCDR’s CONOPS with some rigor; and effectively phase the forces into the operational area.

For the conduct of FHA missions, JFCs may have plans and/or predesignated joint forces. The JFC has a number of available options, including use of a predesignated joint force or an ad hoc joint force, organized and tailored specifically to conduct FHA missions. In FHA operations, the joint force structure must provide for the means to coordinate and communicate with the numerous organizations that are involved in the overall FHA effort.

With regard to force sourcing, force providers review the readiness and deployability posture of their available units through the global force management process before deciding which units to allocate in response to the supported CDR’s requirements. Conventional maritime, air, and land forces, though not structured for FHA purposes, are readily adaptable to perform such missions, with the exception of some aspects of foreign consequence management. Civil affairs (CA) assets are capable of supporting FHA operations in a variety of functional areas through planned civil affairs operations or support to CMO. Psychological operations (PSYOP) units can provide analyses of perceptions and attitudes of the civilian population and effectiveness of ongoing information and FHA operations. PSYOP units can also provide language capability and equipment (radio
broadcasting, print, audio, and audio visual) essential to disseminate necessary information to the populace. In addition, special operations forces can deploy rapidly, have excellent long-range communications equipment, and can operate effectively in austere environments typical of FHA efforts.

**Deployment** planning and execution considerations for FHA missions and other military operations are fundamentally the same. Joint force deployment is predicated on the severity of the humanitarian situation and the perception of US interests. It is important to remember that political factors drive military decisions and planning at every level. Mission analysis, may validate the need for further assessments or the establishment of a lodgment, and in consultation with the component commanders, the JFC determines the deployment priority for all elements of the joint force. Force protection is an important part of this process.

**Execution and Assessment**

In execution FHA operations, challenges regarding deployment and sustainment arise when the operational area has been severely impacted by the incident or disaster and US forces have had no presence or routine access to the operational area. **Emphasis must be placed upon locating logistic bases as close as possible to the relief recipients.** Should relief recipients be located within a major population center, all reasonable measures should be taken when establishing logistic bases that prevent migration of relief recipients from their economic and social areas. FHA operations are logistic intensive and will most likely include significant general engineering requirements. Therefore, **the overall logistic concept should be closely tied into the operational strategy and be mutually supporting.** This includes identifying time-phased materiel requirements, facilities, and other resources; identifying support methods and procedures required to meet air, land, and maritime lines of communication; and establishing procedures and means for coordinating and controlling materiel movements to and within the operational area. Priorities may be established using apportionment systems, providing the CDR with the flexibility to reinforce priority efforts with additional assets.
Command and control. An important aspect of C2 in FHA operations is the necessity to delegate authority to speed decision making and reaction to changes in life-threatening situations faced in many such operations. Although there is no command relationship between military forces and OGAs, UN agencies, NGOs, IGOs, affected country elements, and allied or coalition governments, clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction between participating organizations. Communications are the central system that not only ties together all aspects of joint operations, but also allows CDRs C2 of forces. Therefore, the FHA plan must include procedures to provide interoperable and compatible communications among participants. Direct communications between CDRs and nonmilitary organizations should be established to facilitate effective collaboration and decision-making.

The need for interoperability of communications equipment in FHA operations may also necessitate using unclassified communications means during the operation. US military forces will face great difficulty and challenges in conducting an operation via unclassified means and still keep multinational forces, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs in the loop.

The joint force staff will encounter numerous OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs that produce reports on the operating environment and joint force actions. Despite efforts to maintain accuracy, the proliferation of reports may result in conflicting information. One approach to deconflicting reports is to develop a consolidated report between the joint force and the country team.

The JFC should use the assessment process to evaluate task performance and to measure effects and determine the progress of operations toward achieving objectives. MOEs in FHA operations should be based on impact indicators that measure the change in the lives of the people on the ground, rather than process indicators that calculate USG efforts and their immediate outputs. MOEs may be difficult to develop; the assessment process and related measures should be relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced so there is no false impression of accomplishment. MOEs should also be based upon the US military objectives and end states to ensure that the JFC is
measuring those effects within the joint force's control.

The primary intelligence effort must focus on answering the CDR’s priority intelligence requirements assisting in the accomplishment of the mission. While normally this will involve assessing potential threats to the FHA mission (from forces external and internal to the affected population), the unique aspects of FHA operations may result in significant or even primary emphasis being placed upon logistic, health service support (HSS), or political intelligence and intelligence support to CA and PSYOP. Protecting the force will remain a high priority for intelligence collection. A comprehensive intelligence analysis can help CDRs avoid hostilities during the conduct of FHA missions.

Information sharing is critical to the efficient pursuit of a common humanitarian purpose.

Although many different groups and authorities can (and should) work in parallel, a collaborative information environment (CIE) facilitates information sharing. Constructing a CIE is not an issue technologically. Rather, the challenges are largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational. These impediments can limit and shape the willingness of civilian and military personnel and organizations to openly cooperate and share information and capabilities.

For the joint force, force protection is a high priority.

Even in a permissive environment, the joint force can expect to encounter banditry, vandalism, and various levels of violent activities from criminals or unruly crowds. It is imperative that the joint force be trained and equipped to mitigate threats to US personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information. As in any operation, force protection in FHA is enhanced by establishing effective counterintelligence support and by practicing strict operations security. In addition to force protection, the joint force may also be tasked to provide protection for other personnel and assets. Regardless of the environment, security must be factored into force requirements and support capability. In FHA operations, forces will require a substantial amount of their troops to protect unit and individual property.

Other operations and mission areas have specific considerations in terms of execution and assessment. Among these areas are engineering operations, rules of engagement, legal considerations, liaison requirements,
strategic communications, public affairs, dislocated civilians, health service support, mortuary affairs, religious support, environmental considerations, foreign consequence management, change of mission, transition or termination, and redeployment.

**Engineer operations.**

FHA operations can be extremely engineer-intensive. In such cases, the JFC may opt to establish a subordinate JTF to control extensive engineer operations and missions. Such a JTF may be formed around an existing engineer command or naval construction regiment.

**Rules of engagement.**

Rules of engagement (ROE) define when and how force may be used. For each specific operation the JFC, in conjunction with the operations directorate of a joint staff and the staff judge advocate, develops ROE (as soon as possible after notification of the deployment) within the framework of the standing rules of engagement. When multinational forces are under US control, US CDRs need to ensure that those forces interpret the ROE in the same manner as US forces.

**Liaison**

Direct, early liaison with UN and other humanitarian relief agencies is a valuable source of accurate, timely information on many aspects of the crisis area. A key additional benefit is an opportunity to build working relationships based upon trust and open communications among all organizations. For that reason, ongoing liaison with other multinational forces participating in the operation is equally important.

**Strategic communication.**

The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. Demonstrating US involvement in FHA operations can be extremely valuable to the image of the US supporting the achievement of SC goals as well as those of the GCC’s security cooperation plan.

**Public affairs should be involved at the first indication of potential FHA operations.**

The ability to disseminate public information via the news media during FHA effectively can be critical to operational success. Coordination with the HN via the country team is critical to ensure public information activities do not undermine or conflict with the efforts of the HN.
Executive Summary

FHA operations generate substantial media interest for which the JFC, public affairs officer, and staff must be prepared. Mass distribution of information via the media is critical to creating public awareness of US, allied, coalition, and partner nations’ policies and objectives. Media should have as much access as possible throughout the operation. Information shall be made fully and readily available and shall be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the members of the Armed Forces. The establishment of a joint information bureau at the outset of operations serves as a logistics and information base for the press and facilitates media coverage.

Dislocated civilians.

An FHA operation will often involve dislocated civilians and refugees in particular. Dislocated civilian support missions are specific humanitarian missions designed to support the repatriation or resettlement of these persons. The joint force role in providing for and protecting these groups will depend on the mission. In rare instances, joint forces may be called upon to establish dislocated civilian camps in a HN. In these cases, the JTF must take into account: legal considerations regarding availability and ownership of land for camps; coordination with the HN, OGA, UN, NGOs, and IGOs; logistic factors connected with shelter, food, sanitation, and medical care; and possible contracting requirements for construction.

Health service support forces typically have three missions in FHA operations:

force health protection;

JFCs have overall responsibility for HSS and force health protection for forces assigned or attached to their command. This requires that the JTF have robust preventive medicine assets to perform medical and environmental health risk assessments and identify effective preventive medicine measures to counter the threat to US forces.

care for disaster victims;

Specific to humanitarian missions, medical forces are usually asked to support local military and civilian health systems and often provide direct public health care to include primary medical, dental, veterinary, and other needed care. These missions must always be coordinated.
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and assisting in reestablishing indigenous public health resources and institutions affected by the disaster.

Medical personnel may be called on to assist in reestablishing and supporting indigenous medical infrastructure, particularly those affected by disaster. Improving the medical systems near US and multinational forces fosters self-sufficiency and may contribute to accomplishing the US military mission sooner.

Mortuary affairs.

GCCs are responsible for giving authoritative direction and guidance on providing mortuary affairs (MA) support to all assigned and attached forces within their AORs. Upon notification of a FHA mission, the responsible GCC should task the logistics directorate to develop a staff estimate and provide planning guidance for MA operations based on the overall mission analysis and COAs. In general terms, legal obligations depend on whether the JTF is dealing with a deceased that was simply found within the operational area or if the death was associated with JTF actions. The JTF’s obligations concerning dead or buried bodies found in the operational area derive from the CDR’s responsibility for health and public hygiene of US forces.

Religious support.

Religious support in joint operations includes the entire range of professional duties a joint force chaplain performs in the dual role of religious leader and staff officer. Religion may play a pivotal role in understanding the culture, requirements, attitude, and desires of a population and its government and may have a significant impact on the goals, objectives, nature of support, and CONOPS for the FHA operation. By recognizing the significance of religion, cultural sensitivities and ideology held by the local population, allies, coalition partners, and potential adversaries, CDRs may avoid unintentionally alienating friendly military forces or civilian populations which could hamper military operations. When appropriate, and in coordination with the CMOC, chaplains may serve as liaison to NGOs that have a religious affiliation. Additionally, chaplains may accompany elements of the joint force as they distribute relief supplies or have other interactions (e.g., security patrols) with the local populace. This experience will be useful when advising the CDR and counseling those members of the joint force that may seek the chaplain’s advice.
Environmental considerations. Environmental issues can have strategic, operational, or tactical implications and thus should be incorporated into planning and operations. If not appropriately addressed, environmental issues have the potential to impact negatively local community relations, affect insurgent activities, and create diplomatic problems for the JTF.

Foreign consequence management. FCM is assistance provided by the USG to a HN to assist friends and allies to assess and respond to a CBRN incident in order to mitigate human casualties and to provide temporary associated essential services. Primary responsibility for FCM rests with the HN, unless otherwise stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements. Unless otherwise directed by the President, the DOS is the LFA for USG FCM operations and is responsible for coordinating the overall USG FCM response. When requested by the LFA and directed by SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM operations as appropriate.

Generally, FCM operations will not be conducted during hostile action; however, situations may arise where FCM may be required at the request and in support of the HN. When conditions resulting from any emergency or attack require immediate action, local military CDRs may take such actions as necessary to save lives. When such compelling conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, CDRs or officials acting under the “immediate response authority” may take necessary action to respond to requests from local HN authorities or the COM.

Change of mission. Periodic review of the mission statement will determine whether the force’s actions still support SecDef and supported GCC’s intent. The JFC must also guard against an unintentional change of mission, sometimes referred to as “mission creep.” A clearly articulated end state and appropriate MOEs help the JFC protect against this phenomenon.

Transition or termination. The termination of military FHA operations will normally involve a transition of relief activities to US, intergovernmental, or HN relief organizations. Termination occurs when the relief efforts have been successfully transitioned or when the SecDef directs. Criteria for transition may be based on events, MOEs,
availability of resources, or a specific date. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. The joint force staff should periodically review the transition plan with all organizations that have a part in it. This will help ensure that planning assumptions are still valid, and determine if changes in the situation require changes in the transition plan.

Redeployment planning should be conducted simultaneously with joint force deployment. Redeployment considerations depend upon mission accomplishment and diminished requirements for military support. FHA functions conducted by the joint force should be transferred to the HN, UN, NGOs, or IGOs when the capability exists for transition without support degradation. Redeployment by function is efficient and ensures that each FHA requirement is met or responsibility is assumed by other entities (HN, UN, NGOs, or IGOs).

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing foreign humanitarian assistance operations.
“The earthquake relief effort in Pakistan created a remarkable construct: a relationship between states and peoples significantly improved at every level of society. Flexibility and the ability to quickly build a team from vastly different organizations were the characteristics that enabled mission success. The “soft infrastructure” composed of interpersonal relationships and in-country connections was invaluable. The humanitarian assistance to the people of northern Pakistan set the example for interagency and international cooperation in the face of a complex humanitarian disaster and furthered US goals in the area of operations by facilitating favorable interactions between US personnel and the inhabitants of the region.”

US Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
Keys to Success in Pakistan
Joint Forces Quarterly, 1st quarter 2007

1. General

a. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). FHA consists of Department of Defense (DOD) activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or Department of State (DOS), conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or endemic conditions that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation (HN) civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing that assistance. Although US military forces are primarily designed and structured to defend and protect US national interests, they may be readily adapted to FHA requirements. Military organization, structure, and readiness enable commanders (CDRs) to respond rapidly and effectively when time is of the essence. However, US military forces are not the primary US Government (USG) means of providing FHA. They normally supplement the activities of US and foreign government authorities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). USAID is the principal agency for US bilateral development and humanitarian assistance (HA) to foreign countries. The National Security Council (NSC) coordinates foreign assistance policies and programs among all USG agencies.

b. Historical Perspective. The US military has played a major role in providing FHA. Some notable examples of military support to FHA include: assistance to the islands of Martinique and St. Vincent after a series of devastating volcanic eruptions (1902); the Berlin Airlift (1948); assistance to Iran following a series of earthquakes in northwestern Iran (Operation IDA, 1962); assistance to Bangladesh following a typhoon that killed 139,000 people (Operation SEA ANGEL, 1991); construction and operation of refugee camps and feeding of Kurds in Iraq (Operations PROVIDE COMFORT I and II, 1991-1996); delivery of relief supplies to states in Central and Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet republics, including Russia; medical support in Bosnia; delivery and security of relief supplies to Somalia, Ethiopia, and the former Yugoslavia; support to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda (Operation SUPPORT HOPE, 1994); support to FHA efforts in a number of Central American countries during Hurricane Mitch (Operation FUERTO APOYO, 1998); support during the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and Albania (Operation SHINING HOPE, 1999); flood relief and medical assistance in Maputo, Mozambique (Operation ATLAS RESPONSE, 2000); tsunami relief in Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka (Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE 2005); earthquake relief in Pakistan (2005); and relief to the Republic of Georgia following the Russian invasion (Operation ASSURED DELIVERY 2008).

c. US Military Role in FHA. With the exception of immediate response to prevent loss of life, military forces normally conduct FHA only upon the request of DOS and in coordination with the chief of mission (COM) and USAID. The military normally plays a supporting role in FHA. Typical supporting roles include: providing prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims; making available, preparing, and transporting nonlethal excess property to foreign countries; transferring on-hand DOD stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies; providing funded and space available transportation of humanitarian and relief supplies; conducting some DOD humanitarian demining assistance activities; and conducting foreign consequence management (FCM). DOD has unique assets for effective response and can play a key role in foreign humanitarian crises, for example:

(1) The US military possesses exceptional operational reach that can be employed to enhance an initial response.

(2) The US military augments private sector capability and thus limits threats to regional stability.

(3) The US military’s unmatched capabilities in logistics, command and control (C2), communications, and mobility are able to provide rapid and robust response to dynamic and evolving situations among vastly different military, civilian, and government entities.

d. Unified Action

(1) FHA operations require coordination and collaboration among many agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental, with US military forces when tasked in a supporting role. The term “unified action” in military usage is a broad term referring to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization. Unity of effort in an operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose. During FHA operations unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount.
(2) Because DOD will normally be in a supporting role during FHA, the joint force commander (JFC) may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies. Obstacles to unified action include: discord, inadequate structure and procedures, incompatible communications, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations. Appropriate organization, C2, and most importantly an understanding of the objectives of the organizations involved are all means to build consensus and achieve unity of effort, regardless of role. The reciprocal exchange of information, including the establishment of liaison officers (LNOs), is also a critical enabler in ensuring unity of effort.

(3) The joint force will work not only with interagency partners during FHA operations, but also with multinational organizations including the HN, IGOs, NGOs, partner nations, and the private sector. The tenets of multinational unity of effort (i.e., respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination) applied during an FHA mission cannot guarantee success; however, ignoring them may lead to mission failure.

For further details on unified action, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

e. Related Terminology. The following terms and descriptions are important to form a basis for understanding FHA operations:

(1) Developmental assistance is a USAID function primarily designed to promote economic growth and the equitable distribution of its benefits.

(2) Foreign assistance is assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. US assistance takes three forms - developmental assistance, HA, and security assistance.

(3) Foreign disaster is an act of nature (such as a flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant US foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or to an IGO.

(4) Foreign disaster relief is prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services.
(5) **Security assistance** is a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to further national policies and objectives.

(6) **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Terminology.** US forces conducting FHA as part of a NATO operation should be cognizant of the following NATO terms.

(a) **HA**, as part of an operation, is the use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or specialized civil humanitarian organizations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering.

(b) **Humanitarian operation** is an operation specifically mounted to alleviate human suffering where responsible civil actors in an area are unable or unwilling to support a population adequately. It may precede, parallel, or complement the activity of specialized civil humanitarian organizations.

### 2. Legal Authority and Policy

a. A basic tenet of fiscal law is that expenditure of public funds may be made only when expressly authorized by Congress. The law surrounding FHA is a web of statutes, annual appropriations, policies, regulations, and directives that may be confusing. The staff judge advocate (SJA) should be involved in planning for FHA operations as early as possible.

b. **United States Code (USC).** Statutory authority for USG agencies to provide FHA is contained in the **Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961**, as amended, in Title 22, USC. This legislation provides a blueprint for USG engagement with friendly nations. The FAA designated DOS to provide policy guidance and supervision of programs created within the FAA. These programs are loosely divided into security assistance and development assistance. The joint force has a relatively small supporting role in FHA, which, in this policy, falls under developmental assistance. Various sections of Title 10, USC and Title 22, USC give specific authorizations for various types of military assistance. In addition, the annual DOD appropriations acts provide funding levels for various authorizations. Taken together these provisions are very narrow in scope and generally still require prior coordination with DOS. Other sections of the FAA may provide authorization for expenditures by other government agencies (OGAs) that may involve joint force distribution or coordination. One example is international development accounts, which permit donations of foodstuffs by the US Department of Agriculture on an emergency basis.

c. **DOD Directive (DODD) 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief,** establishes policy guidance for foreign disaster relief operations. Foreign disaster relief is prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Figure I-1
depicts causes of foreign disasters and various types of foreign disaster relief. DOD policy provides for component participation in foreign disaster relief operations only after a determination is made by DOS that foreign disaster relief shall be provided. This policy does not prevent a local military CDR at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from undertaking prompt relief operations in response to requests from the local HN authorities or COM when time is of the essence and when, in the estimate of the CDR, humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so.

![Diagram of Foreign Disaster Relief](image)

**Figure I-1. Foreign Disaster Relief**

d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01C, *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents*, establishes guidance for FCM operations. This instruction applies to DOD support to FCM operations as part of the USG response to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents abroad. The HN retains primary responsibility for response to CBRN incidents. DOS is the lead federal agency (LFA) for USG FCM operations, unless otherwise directed by the President. The DOD will support the LFA in FCM operations. DOS-led FCM operations may occur in a
permissive environment, but the combatant commander (CCDR) is responsible for force protection and requirements for US DOD personnel. This instruction does not apply to the following actions:

(1) Other DOD incident response operations that may occur prior to, concurrently with, or following FCM operations.

(2) Planning and conducting domestic consequence management (CM) operations.

(3) Acts of nature or acts of man that do not involve CBRN materials (including toxic industrial materials).

(4) CBRN incidents that are a direct result of US military operations in a foreign country where DOS does not have an established presence.

e. The US has a responsibility to respond to CBRN events involving US facilities or installations. The DOD retains primary responsibility for response to CBRN incidents that occur and the effects of which are contained on US military installations abroad, unless specifically stated otherwise in applicable international agreements. The Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.18, *Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Response Guidelines* applies to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) incidents on DOD installations.

*See Appendix A, “Legal Issues,” for detailed legal considerations and information.*

3. **Types of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Missions**

FHA missions conducted by US military forces span the entire range of military operations but are most often crisis response and limited contingency operations. The following missions are common in FHA operations: (A single FHA operation may well contain more than one of these missions.)

a. **Relief Missions.** These missions include prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims. Distribution of relief supplies has traditionally been the domain of NGOs and IGOs, because of their charters, expertise, and experience. However, if the relief community is overwhelmed, or the security situation precludes it, US military forces may be tasked to distribute these supplies. Potential relief roles for US forces include immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, construction of basic sanitation facilities and shelters, and provision of food and medical care.

b. **Dislocated Civilian Support Missions.** These missions are specifically designed to support the assistance and protection for dislocated civilians. A “dislocated civilian” is a broad term primarily used by DOD that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an
internally displaced person (IDP), a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. These persons may be victims of conflict, natural, or man-made disaster. Typically, the United Nations (UN) or other IGOs and NGOs will build and administer camps, if needed, and provide basic assistance and services to the population. However, when the US military is requested to provide support, dislocated civilian support missions may include camp organization (basic construction and administration); provision of care (food, supplies, medical attention, and protection); and placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). An important priority for the management of dislocated civilians should be to utilize the services and facilities of non-DOD agencies when coordination can be accomplished as dislocated civilian operations are often long-term and require enormous resourcing normally not immediately available through DOD sources.

c. Security Missions. These missions may include establishing and maintaining conditions for the provision of FHA by organizations of the world relief community. The delivery of humanitarian relief supplies often depends on the affected country having secure serviceable ports, air terminals, roads, and railways. In some cases, however, the affected country will not be able to meet this condition, and may request assistance from US military forces. Once the movement of supplies commences, secure areas will be needed for storage of relief material until it can be distributed to the affected population. Other tasks may involve providing protection and armed escorts for convoys and personnel delivering emergency aid, protection of shelters for dislocated civilians, and security for multinational forces, NGOs, and IGOs.

d. Technical Assistance and Support Functions. An FHA force may, for a short term, support tasks such as communications restoration, relief supply distribution management and delivery, port operations, base operating support, emergency medical care, search and rescue (SAR), and humanitarian de-mining assistance. This technical assistance may take the form of advice and selected training, assessments, manpower, and equipment. Based upon Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and CCDR guidance, the FHA force CDR should establish operational procedures regarding technical advice and assistance to the affected country, NGOs, and IGOs as soon as possible. The technical assistance procedures should clarify what assistance may be provided as well as the source of authority for assistance. Humanitarian demining assistance includes activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war. No member of the Armed Forces of the United States, while providing humanitarian demining assistance, will engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or other explosive remnants of war (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a US military operation); or provide such assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the Armed Forces of the United States.

For further information regarding humanitarian demining assistance, see Appendix B, “Department of Defense Foreign Disaster Assistance Tasking and Funding Procedures and Humanitarian Assistance Programs.”
e. **Foreign Consequence Management.** FCM is DOD assistance provided by the USG to a HN to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRNE attack or event and to restore essential government services. Primary responsibility for FCM rests with the HN, unless stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements. Unless otherwise directed by the President, DOS is the LFA for USG FCM operations and is responsible for coordinating the overall USG FCM response. When requested by the LFA and directed by SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM operations to the extent allowed by law and subject to the availability of forces. The response may include a number of agencies with specialized capabilities, in addition to forces provided by DOD. The ability of the USG to assist a HN government and its affected population is determined by the nature of the CBRN event, the forces available to provide assistance, and the time required to deploy to the vicinity of the incident. The more rapidly FCM assistance is coordinated and applied, the better the chances of success in mitigating the effects of the CBRN incident.

*For further information regarding FCM, see JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management.*

4. **Related Operations**

a. Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously with other types of operations, **each type has unique characteristics.** For example, FHA operations may be simultaneously conducted with peace operations (PO), but each has its own strategic end state. **Military CDRs must be cautious not to commit their forces to projects and tasks that go beyond the FHA mission.** Military CDRs conducting FHA simultaneously with other operations must develop end state, transition, and termination objectives as well as measures of effectiveness (MOEs) complementary to simultaneous military operations.

b. **Stability Operations.** These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. Many of these missions and tasks are the essence of civil-military operations (CMO). Joint operations must feature an appropriate balance between offensive and defensive operations and stability operations in all phases. Although offensive and defensive operations may be required during an FHA operation, the preponderance of missions, tasks, and activities will be stability operations. Likewise, FHA may be executed to provide humanitarian relief following combat (whether or not US forces were involved in the combat) for example in conjunction with a PO or during the stabilize phase of a major campaign or operation.

*For further guidance on stability operations, refer to DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations.*

c. **Nation assistance (NA) operations** are often connected with FHA operations, but there are very distinct differences. NA refers to civil and/or military assistance
rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. NA programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), other Title 10, USC programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by federal agencies or IGOs. NA generally refers to a long-term commitment to promote sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. Most often, NA will be an important part of rebuilding after the completion of a disaster relief FHA mission.

(1) **Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA).** HCA is assistance to the local populace provided in conjunction with authorized military operations. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities.

(a) Assistance provided under these provisions must promote the security interests of both the US and the HN and the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities. Assistance is limited to:

1. Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.

2. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

3. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.


(b) It is important to understand the difference between HCA and FHA. FHA, as discussed above, focuses on the use of DOD support as necessary to alleviate urgent needs in a HN caused by some type of disaster or catastrophe. By contrast, HCA programs are typically preplanned military exercises designed to provide assistance to the HN populace while also meeting the above requirements to promote operational readiness skills and mutual security. Usually these are planned well in advance and are usually not in response to disasters, although HCA activities have been executed following disasters. When at all possible, the assistance provided in HCA should be designed to increase the long-term capacity of the HN to provide for the health and well-being of its populace.

(c) To avoid possible overlap or duplication and ensure sustainability, HCA projects should be coordinated with the country team (especially USAID) and the HN. For example, school construction should not be undertaken if there is not a sustainable plan by partners to provide teachers and administration, salaries, equipment, and books.

(2) **Security assistance** refers to a group of programs by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by
grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of US national policies and objectives (e.g., foreign military sales).

(3) **FID** involves participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

*For further detail with regard to FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.*

d. **PO** encompass multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. **PO** include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts.

*For further information on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.*

e. **Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)** are conducted to assist DOS in evacuating US citizens, DOD civilian personnel, and designated HN and third country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. Although normally considered in connection with hostile action, evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, a natural or man-made disaster.

*For further information on NEO, refer to JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.*

5. **Operational Context**

a. US military forces participate in **unilateral** or **multinational** coordinated responses. Multinational responses may or may not involve the UN.

b. **Unilateral.** In this type of operation, the USG provides FHA without direct involvement by other nations other than the HN. A unilateral response would normally occur when expediency is essential, such as when a humanitarian crisis or disaster demands an immediate response. A unilateral effort may transition to a multinational operation.

c. **Multinational.** Multinational operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an IGO such as the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). An alliance is a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions are formed by different nations with different
objectives, usually for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations.

For further information on multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

6. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically limited in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific objective in an operational area. They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis or executed as an element of a larger, more complex joint campaign or operation. A limited contingency operation in response to a crisis includes all of those operations for which the joint operation planning process (JOPP) is required and a contingency or crisis action plan is developed. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Included are operations to maintain and improve US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors (e.g., Joint Task Force [JTF] SHINING HOPE in the spring of 1999 to support refugee humanitarian relief for hundreds of thousands of Albanians fleeing their homes in Kosovo). Many such operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. The ability of the US to respond rapidly with appropriate options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, joint operations often may be planned and executed as a crisis response or limited contingency. As soon as practical after it is determined that a crisis may develop or a contingency is declared, JFCs and their staffs begin a systems analysis and determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the anticipated operation. Human intelligence often may provide the most useful source of information.

For further information on the range of military operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

7. Operational Environment

The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the CDR’s decisions. It encompasses physical areas and factors (the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment. Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, legal, and others), which are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding this environment requires a broad perspective during any operation; however, this holistic view is particularly important during FHA operations, where there are normally no overt adversary military forces, but forces of nature, possibly covert adversary forces, and nonmilitary personnel, organizations, and systems that combine to complicate joint force operations and influence the application of force choices.
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For further details on the operational environment, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

8. Mission Transition or Termination

a. Based on the supported geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) intent, the JFC determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to create desired effects to support achievement of objectives to accomplish the assigned mission. This arrangement is broken into phases. A phase can be characterized by the focus that is placed on it. Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from one another, but must be planned in support of each other and should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation.

b. Transitions between operational phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command relationships. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the situation has evolved in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the design of the operational area. This challenge demands an agile shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks; and coordination and collaboration with a wider range of other organizations — OGAs, multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs — to provide those capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors.

c. Termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning and should be a coordinated OGA, IGO, NGO, and multinational effort. Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that achieved military objectives endure. Further, development of a military end state is complementary to and supports attaining the specified termination criteria and national strategic end state. CDRs are cautioned that the end state conditions could change during the operations and that the end state envisioned by other participating organizations may differ.

d. Because FHA is largely a civilian endeavor, with the military in a supporting role, the termination of US or multinational military FHA operations will not necessarily coincide with the termination of international efforts. Normally, military forces operate in the initial stages of disaster relief to fill immediate gaps in assistance; military objectives will be to enable civilian control of disaster relief efforts (HN, international, or USG agency).

e. The transition of humanitarian efforts to HN authorities will not occur by default. Planning of FHA must involve extensive international and interagency coordination from the very beginning in order to ensure a successful transition. FHA efforts by the joint force should focus on restoring the capacity of the HN, as well as enabling the OGAs and IGOs. The goal is to transition all efforts to HN, OGA, IGO, or NGO ownership to permit an orderly reduction of the joint force’s involvement and presence. All MOEs, end state, transition, and termination planning should reflect this goal.
9. **Funding**

The financial impacts of an FHA operation are a major concern of the JFC. Planning for FHA operations must take into account the legal authority, authority limits, and mechanisms that allow US forces to dispense supplies and services. It is important that the JFC coordinate expenditures with the appropriate agency prior to funds being expended, or reimbursement may be denied. Detailed records of expenditures are critical to the reimbursement process.

*Appendix B*, “Department of Defense Foreign Disaster Assistance Tasking and Funding Procedures and Humanitarian Assistance Programs,” provides more information regarding DOD foreign disaster tasking and funding procedures, and record keeping requirements.
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

“The necessary first step in shaping effective interagency groups is making known what skills and resources one brings to the table.”
Admiral P.D. Miller, US Navy
Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command
1 Oct 1993 - 31 Oct 1994

1. Introduction

US military forces should plan and execute FHA operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in accordance with the CCDRs’ mission. The President and SecDef provide guidance and objectives, tasking a CCDR to respond to the crisis. This CCDR is identified as the supported CDR for DOD actions at the strategic level; provides strategic direction and operational focus to subordinates at the operational level; and synchronizes the military instrument of national power in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs toward theater strategic objectives. In an FHA operation, interagency coordination is essential for effective policy development and implementation. This coordination is often highly complex. Within the context of DOD involvement, interagency coordination occurs between elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. This chapter provides information regarding interagency coordination, roles and responsibilities, and principal organizations. This information will assist JFCs and their staffs to understand these organizations and their responsibilities and relationships in FHA operations.

2. Overview

Because of the number of civilian and non-USG actors involved in a crisis, command relationships outside DOD command structures may not be clearly defined and success will depend heavily on effective, timely coordination. The challenge for CCDRs and their staffs is to determine the right place and time to access interagency and other coordination networks. Difficulties arise from the fact that many USG agencies, civil and military authorities, foreign governments, the UN, NGOs, and IGOs may be conducting assistance activities within the same operational area prior to, during, and after departure of the joint force. US military FHA planners must remain cognizant that these various agencies fall outside the military C2 system. Coordination and collaboration are essential in dealing with these organizations. The strategic goals or operating procedures of all concerned may not be identical, or even compatible; however, thorough collaboration and planning with concerned entities everyone can contribute to successful operations in this complex and challenging environment. Presidential and interdepartmental policy and guidance impact mission statements, implied tasks, and plans. The JFC has the critical task of developing the mission statement and intent. These should be clear and identify results that are achievable in a short duration operation. Key considerations in developing the mission statement include the military role in assisting the UN, NGOs, IGOs, and OGAs as well as security practices and policies. Interagency cooperation, coordination, and connectivity at all levels will
better enable key organizations to orchestrate the total FHA effort. Key organizations or elements may include the government of the affected country, DOS, country team, CCDR, multinational forces, NGOs, IGOs, and OGAs, particularly the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) within USAID.

3. Roles and Responsibilities

a. Interagency Process. Immediately after a disaster strikes, the COM may send a disaster declaration cable. The disaster declaration is required for the legal authority to expend funds for FHA. With input from USAID and others at post, this cable outlines the extent of the damage, possible needs, and may recommend assistance in the form of funding, material, or technical assistance.

   (1) When the President, SecDef, and the Secretary of State determine that a US humanitarian response to a foreign disaster or crisis is required, the NSC normally directs the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance (who is also the USAID Administrator) to convene an International Development and Humanitarian Assistance NSC Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) to review all pertinent information and recommend policy and specific actions. The International Development and Humanitarian Assistance NSC PCC participation will generally include:

   (a) Senior DOS and DOD representatives.

   (b) COM.

   (c) USAID representative.

   (d) Heads of other concerned agencies.

   (2) The International Development and Humanitarian Assistance NSC PCC concurrently develops a comprehensive strategy for emergency response and develops tasks for each key participant. Consideration of other elements or organizations that may be involved in the crisis is crucial to the development of sound recommendations. For example, the International Development and Humanitarian Assistance NSC PCC should consider the involvement of UN organizations, other responding nations, NGOs, and IGOs that may already be operating in the crisis area. Interagency coordination (Figure II-1) continues throughout the mission. Successful interagency coordination requires effective interaction among all organizational and functional elements. The NSC may designate another USG agency other than USAID to lead FHA based on multiple sets of conditions and security issues.

   (3) The interagency process often is described as “more art than science,” while military operations tend to depend more on structure and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military C2 can facilitate unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency coordination and different organizational cultures.
Organization and Interagency Coordination

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION FOR FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Figure II-1. Interagency Coordination for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

For more information on the NSC, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I.

b. Department of State. Within the Executive Branch, DOS is the lead US foreign affairs agency. DOS advances US objectives and interests in the world through its primary role in developing and implementing the President's foreign policy. DOS also supports the foreign affairs activities of other USG entities (e.g., USAID, DOD, Department of Commerce); simultaneously, the foreign affairs activities of other executive agencies support the DOS foreign affairs strategies. The primary purposes of DOS include protecting and assisting US citizens living or traveling abroad; promoting US foreign policy objectives to other nations and the US public; assisting US businesses
in the international marketplace; and coordinating and providing support for international activities of other US agencies. DOS is organized into functional and regional bureaus. When a disaster is declared, the geographic bureau of the affected area becomes the key participating bureau. The functional bureaus of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); International Organization Affairs; Political-Military Affairs (PM); Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Public Affairs (PA); Intelligence and Research; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) may also be involved.

(1) When an emergency arises, the COM, or assistant secretary of state responsible for the particular area can declare a disaster, providing the event meets three criteria: the disaster exceeds the HN’s ability to respond; the affected country’s government either requests or is willing to receive US assistance; and a response to the disaster is in the US national interest. This declaration is transmitted to the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and DOS to begin possible USG assistance. Each embassy or USAID mission has a mission disaster response officer (MDRO), normally a collateral duty officer responsible for disaster planning and management as well as maintenance of the mission disaster response plan. The MDRO educates, trains, and exercises mission personnel on the disaster response plan; liaises with government disaster authorities on an ongoing basis to ensure familiarity with disaster risks and organizational response arrangements; serves as the chief operating officer for the embassy’s emergency action committee during all phases of the disaster; and acts as the COM’s coordinator of USG disaster relief operations in country.

NOTE: The composition of a country team varies widely, depending on the desires of the COM, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of US departments and agencies present. The COM is the head of the country team. Other members may include a defense attaché, security assistance officer, political counselor, PA counselor, economic counselor, representatives from USAID, and the Peace Corps. The COM has responsibility for all USG personnel in country and may limit the number and mix of people entering based on current or anticipated conditions. At the initiation of an FHA operation, the GCC should coordinate directly with the country team and offer to send a LNO for coordination purposes.

For more detailed information on the US country team concept, see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

(2) PM is the primary link between DOD and DOS. Among other coordinating functions, the bureau manages humanitarian mine action programs around the world, promotes public-private mine action partnerships, and works with the DOD to provide assistance in the event of natural disasters and other crises abroad.

(3) PRM has primary responsibility for formulating policies on population, refugees, and migration, and for administering US refugee assistance and admissions programs. This bureau will have a lead policy role in refugee crises. PRM has officers overseas in Geneva and Brussels, and regional refugee coordinators in Abidjan, Accra,
Addis Ababa, Amman, Baghdad, Bangkok, Belgrade, Bogota, Cairo, Havana, Ho Chi Minh City, Islamabad, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kampala, Kathmandu, Moscow, and Nairobi.

(4) The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is assigned the responsibility to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.

(5) The Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) is an office within the Bureau of Intelligence and Research with the mission to identify, collect, analyze, and disseminate unclassified information critical to USG decision-makers and partners in preparation for and response to humanitarian emergencies worldwide, and to promote best practices for humanitarian information management.

c. United States Agency for International Development. USAID is an independent agency that provides economic, development, and HA around the world in support of the foreign policy goals of the United States. Although a separate agency from DOS, it shares certain administrative functions with DOS, and reports to and receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. The USAID administrator concurrently serves as the DOS Director of Foreign Assistance. USAID plays a major role in US foreign assistance policy and a principal role in interagency coordination. This agency administers and directs the US foreign economic assistance program and acts as the LFA for USG FHA.

(1) DCHA coordinates USAID's democracy programs, international disaster assistance, emergency and developmental food aid, aid to manage and mitigate conflict, and volunteer programs. Within DCHA, OFDA and the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) are key organizations that will interact with DOD during FHA operations.

(2) The OFDA. OFDA is the lead office in the USG for facilitating and coordinating USG emergency assistance overseas. As part of DCHA, OFDA provides HA to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact of humanitarian emergencies worldwide. OFDA provides technical support to the Administrator, who serves as the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. The office formulates US foreign disaster assistance policy in coordination with OGAs. It coordinates with USAID offices and others to provide relief supplies and HA, and develops and manages logistic, operational, and technical support for disaster responses. OFDA’s criteria for providing assistance in a disaster are: the disaster exceeds the ability of the HN to respond; the US is invited by the HN to respond; and it is in the US interest to respond.
(a) OFDA may deploy a disaster assistance response team (DART) into the crisis area to assist coordination of the FHA effort, and activate an on-call Washington-based response management team. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of the USG response to a foreign disaster. The DART will also work closely with the US military when it is participating in FHA operations. DARTs assess and report on the disaster situation and recommend follow up actions. Figure II-2 provides a visualization of the coordination flow between DCHA/OFDA and DOD when both respond to a disaster relief event. 

For more discussion of DART, see paragraph 13 of Appendix C, “Department of State and United States Agency for International Development Organizations.”

(b) OFDA’s Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response

![Figure II-2. Interagency Coordination Flow]
Organization and Interagency Coordination

(FOG) is an important reference tool for personnel that may be involved in FHA operations. It explains the roles and responsibilities of individuals sent to disaster sites to undertake initial assessments or to participate as members of an OFDA DART. The FOG contains information on general responsibilities for disaster responders, formats and reference material for assessing and reporting on populations at risk, DART position descriptions and duty checklists, descriptions of OFDA stockpile commodities, general information related to disaster activities, information on working with the military in the field, and a glossary of acronyms and terms used by OFDA and other organizations with which OFDA works.

(3) OMA. OMA provides the focal point for USAID interaction with DOD. It addresses areas of common interests between defense and development, with a focus on improving civilian-military field readiness, programs, and coordination. OMA serves as the agency-wide unit for managing the day-to-day aspects of the USAID-military relationship. OMA has assigned senior development officers to each GCC and has received LNOs in return.

d. Secretary of Defense. SecDef, working under the guidance of the President, and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, directs DOD support to USG humanitarian operations and establishes appropriate command relationships. Within DOD, the Office of the SecDef coordinates FHA policy and funding. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) has the overall responsibility for developing military policy for FHA operations. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs) is responsible for foreign disaster relief policy and statutory programs within DOD; policy oversight is executed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Coalition, Peacekeeping, and Multinational Operations; program management and funding of these programs is the responsibility of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).

e. The Joint Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for recommending military capabilities and appropriate relationships for FHA operations to SecDef. Once these relationships have been established, the Joint Staff coordinates detailed staff planning under the cognizance of the CJCS. The Joint Staff Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development has the primary responsibility for the concept review of operation plans (OPLANs) in support of FHA. Through the Logistics Readiness Center, the Logistics Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-4), oversees joint logistic support for FHA operations. The Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate coordinates policy and represents CJCS in interagency forums related to FHA. The Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-3) will also be involved when a military force is deployed to a foreign country as part of a US FHA operation.

f. Combatant Commander. The GCCs direct military operations, including FHA, within their areas of responsibility (AORs). Ideally, this should be done with the concurrence of the COM. GCCs develop and maintain CDR’s estimates, base plans, concept plans (CONPLANs), or OPLANs for FHA operations, including disaster relief, and FCM missions. In response to a disaster, the supported GCC structures the force
necessary to conduct and sustain the FHA operation, typically forming a JTF. Advisors on the GCC’s staff will be in close communications with various advisors and counterparts on the JTF staff. Two notable examples are the GCC’s DOS foreign policy advisor (POLAD), and USAID senior development officer, who can provide nonmilitary insights, enhancing direct communications and coordination with the affected embassy and country team. Additionally, supporting CCDRs may provide necessary support, including transportation, forces, and communications capabilities, as required.

(1) **Crisis Action Team.** Each CCDR has an organization designed to respond to immediate requirements, often called a crisis action or rapid deployment team. The initially deployed team serves as the immediate responder/assessor for the CCDR. The exact composition of this team and the subsequent follow-on assets will vary depending on the type and severity of the incident and in some cases, restrictions placed on the COM by the HN (through a status-of-forces agreement [SOFA], treaties, or informal agreements) in limiting the number of foreign military permitted in country. In all cases, the team must coordinate with the COM and country team prior to deploying. When an FHA operation has been or will likely be directed, the crisis action team can recommend to the CCDR priority issues (water, food, equipment, etc.) as well as how to organize for the most effective response. The crisis action team may form the nucleus of the FHA force headquarters (HQ) or the JTF command element.

(2) **Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST).** The supported CCDR may also organize and deploy a HAST to acquire information required for planning. This information may include an assessment of existing conditions and requirements for FHA force structure. Before deploying, the HAST should be provided the current threat assessment and relevant intelligence; geospatial information and services support; and embassy, DOS, and USAID points of contact. Due to the possibly dangerous nature of the environment at the site of a disaster, the HAST should include medical personnel who can conduct both a vulnerability assessment and an occupational and environmental health site assessment, documenting conditions in the operational area. The DART and USAID mission can provide a great deal of this information to the HAST. Once deployed, the HAST, working with the country team, can assess the capability and capacity of the HN government to respond to the disaster; identify primary points of contact for coordination and collaboration; determine the threat environment and survey facilities that may be used for force protection purposes; and coordinate specific support arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies. The HAST works closely with the DART to prevent duplication of effort. The HAST can assist with the following tasks.

(a) Assess the nature and extent of:

1. available food, water, sanitation, and shelter.
2. casualties and loss of life.
3. injury, illness, outbreak of disease, and access to health services.
4. dislocated civilian population and location (to include security requirements of the population).

5. HN capabilities and capacities to include medical facilities.

6. degree of destruction to property and infrastructure.

7. available logistic facilities for air- and sealift, roads, rail, and bridges.

8. significant actors; the span and depth of their control over territory, resources, and individuals; and their objectives.

9. overall telecommunications infrastructure (ability/capability of the HN and global leadership to receive information from the populous).

10. overall public information infrastructure (ability/capability of the HN and global leadership to transmit HA information to the populous and global responders).

(b) Formulate recommendations for provision of DOD funding, equipment, supplies, and personnel.

(c) Establish liaison, identify information sharing procedures, and coordinate assessment with agencies of the affected country; supported CDRs or their representatives; US diplomatic personnel and USAID, especially the DART; and other relief agencies operating within the crisis area.

(d) In conjunction with US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), arrange for the reception of US personnel, supplies, and equipment.

(e) Be prepared to begin coordinating FHA to relieve suffering and avoid further loss of life, as directed by the GCC.

(f) Determine the threat environment and survey facilities that may be required for self-defense of forces.

(g) Determine the COM’s desires and capacity to support the media in FHA operations and the JTF’s role in media support.

(3) **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC).** The supported CCDR may establish a HACC to assist with interagency coordination and planning. The HACC provides the critical link between the CCDR and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs that may participate in the FHA operation at the theater strategic level. Normally, the HACC is a temporary organization that operates during the early planning and coordination
stages of the operation. Once a civil-military operations center (CMOC) or humanitarian operations center (HOC) has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the CCDR’s staff and crisis action organization for establishing authority. Staffing for the HACC should include a director appointed by the supported GCC, a CMO planner, an OFDA advisor or liaison if available, a public affairs officer (PAO), an NGO advisor, and other augmentation (e.g., legal advisor, a preventive medicine physician) when required. Liaisons from OGAs, US Army Corps of Engineers, key NGOs, IGOs, and HN agencies also may be members of the HACC in large scale FHA operations.

(4) **Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).** The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored in staff location and/or title to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination. The JIACG complements the interagency coordination that takes place at the national level through DOD and the NSC. JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, security cooperation, and other operational planning. They provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of OGAs. The JIACG may play an important role in contingency planning for FHA and in initial interagency coordination prior to establishment of a HACC or other coordination body.

*For more information on the JIACG, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I, and The Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group.*

(5) **Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC).** The JLOC is a current operations directorate within the Joint Staff J-4. The JLOC receives reports from supporting commands, Service components, and external sources, distills information for decision/briefings, and responds to questions. The JLOC coordinates and synchronizes the planning and execution of ongoing combatant command operations, interagency support requirements, and assigns priority movement for selected senior officials.

*For further details on the JLOC, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.*

(6) **Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC).** The DDOC located at USTRANSCOM directs the global air, land, and sea transportation capabilities of the Defense Transportation System to meet national security objectives provided by DOD. The DDOC fuses capabilities of multimodal deployment and distribution operations, intelligence, force protection, capacity acquisition, resource management and other staff functions to collaboratively provide distribution options to the warfighter. C2 of the majority of intertheater lift forces and logistic infrastructure is accomplished
through the DDOC, which tracks the movement requirement from lift allocation and initial execution through closure at final destination.

For additional information concerning the DDOC refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

(7) Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC). USTRANSCOM, as the DPO, through its DDOC, collaborates with JDDOCs to link strategic deployment and distribution processes to operational and tactical functions in support of the warfighter. The geographic CCDRs are responsible for implementing their JDDOC core structure. The JDDOC is an integral organization of the GCC’s staff, normally under the direction of the J-4 and collocated with the JLOC during operations. However, the GCC can place the JDDOC at any location required or under the operational control (OPCON) of other command or staff organizations. The JDDOC can reach back to the national partners to address and solve deployment and distribution issues for the CCDR and can have the capability to develop deployment and distribution plans, integrate multinational and/or interagency deployment and distribution, and coordinate and synchronize the movement of sustainment in support of the CCDR’s priorities.

(8) Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) (SJFHQ(CE)). The GCC’s SJFHQ(CE) is a foundation on which to build the joint C2 capability for an FHA operation through augmentation, or it may be used to augment another HQ staff designated as the JTF for the FHA operation.

For further details on the SJFHQ(CE), refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

(9) Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE). The JPASE provides a ready, scaleable, equipped, and trained joint PA capability to augment existing PA personnel or serve as a stand-alone PA capability to support emergent requirements for CCDRs and JTF HQ. The criticality of PA during FHA will place considerable strain on existing PA staffs; use of JPASE may alleviate this strain during planning and execution of an FHA mission. JPASE can deploy within 48 hours of notification to support a variety of operational requirements including FHA.

g. Defense Security Cooperation Agency. DSCA is responsible to lead, direct, and manage security cooperation programs to support US national security objectives that strengthen America's alliances and partnerships through transfer of defense capabilities; international military education; and HA and humanitarian demining assistance.

(1) The Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action (OHDM) provides direction, supervision, and oversight of DOD HA and humanitarian demining assistance programs. OHDM HA programs provide CCDRs with unobtrusive, low cost, but highly effective instruments to carry out their theater security cooperation strategies. OHDM manages the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation and its sub-activities: HA (including the provision and
transportation of nonlethal excess property), humanitarian demining assistance, and foreign disaster relief and emergency response. Additionally, OHDM provides oversight for the GCC’s HCA projects; manages the Denton Program, the space available transportation program for donor’s humanitarian relief supplies and material; and the Funded Transportation Program, the contract transportation program for both privately donated supplies and DOD nonlethal excess property donations.

(2) **DOD Humanitarian Demining Training Center (HDTC).** The HDTC prepares US military forces for humanitarian missions in mine-affected countries throughout the world. The HDTC directly supports US policy in humanitarian demining assistance through a “train-the-trainer” methodology of engagement. It serves as the USG training and information center for humanitarian demining assistance; researches current worldwide tactics on land mine use and demining techniques employed by both military and civilian organizations; and provides innovative and realistic training tailored to meet DOD and DOS requirements.

**h. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).** The NGA provides direct analytical support for FHA through the LFAs and combatant commands primarily through the deployment of team specialists in response to natural disasters, to include earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and wildfires. The standard production includes initial damage or recovery mitigation assessment derived from imagery and analytical imagery assessments, analytical reporting through NGA intelligence briefs, and geospatial situational awareness products.

**j. Consequence Management Advisory Team and Joint Technical Advisory CBRN Element.** During a crisis involving CBRN materials, at the request of a CCDR, and in coordination with the Joint Staff, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) may direct the immediate deployment of a supporting consequence management advisory team (CMAT).

(1) The CMAT provides task-organized, deployable, doctrinal, and technical CM expertise, support, advice, and hazard prediction modeling assistance for DOD and other federal agencies during all phases of CBRN accidents or incidents. The CMAT may be augmented with specialists in PA, legal counsel, radiobiology, and other fields pertinent to the mission. The CMAT will leverage DTRA's reachback capability across DOD, the federal government, and academia to provide mission critical information to the supported organization. The CMAT can be deployed to support CM events in the homeland and in foreign nations.

(2) When requested by combatant commands, and directed by the SecDef, US Strategic Command can deploy a CBRN CM technical advice and assistance element (known as joint technical advisory chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear element [JTACE]). The DTRA CMAT leads the JTACE and serves as the core element. The JTACE provides technical FCM advice and support to the combatant command HQ or a designated JTF. The JTACE task organizes subject matter experts from across DOD and
leverages DTRA reachback capability, based on the nature of the event and the needs of the CCDR. The JTACE is only used to support FCM events.

j. **The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COEDMHA)** mission is to promote effective civil-military management in international HA, disaster response, and peacekeeping through education, training, research, and information programs. COEDMHA is congressionally mandated and assigned to United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). The Director of COEDMHA reports to the USPACOM Deputy CDR. COEDMHA educates, trains, provides consultation, supports military exercises, and produces information for responders. COEDMHA helps the military and other organizations that are active in the provision of relief or security, to coordinate better, and to learn about the role of the other actors in the humanitarian field so that they may perform their own roles better.

k. **The Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM)** is a DOD organization within the Department of Military and Emergency Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences. CDHAM is a university-based venture whose mission is to advance the understanding and delivery of disaster medical care and HA worldwide. The uniquely positioned academic center is actively developing relationships between governmental agencies, NGOs, and IGOs as a means of improving relief efforts. It is the focal point for medical aspects of disaster relief and HA.

l. **The Pacific Disaster Center (PDC)** is an applied science, information, and technology center, working to reduce disaster risks and impacts to peoples’ lives and property. Established by the USG in 1996, the PDC is congressionally mandated and funded (sponsored through the office of the USD[P]) and is currently managed by the University of Hawaii. PDC also augments its congressional budget by undertaking paid risk reduction projects and consultancies in the Asia Pacific region and around the world. PDC’s mission is to provide applied information research and analysis to support the development of more effective policies, institutions, programs, and information products for the disaster management and HA communities. PDC creates new information products, and supports and facilitates the innovative use of information, technology, and applied research to increase efficiency of operational organizations by introducing novel and appropriately scaled, information resources, tools, and analyses. Central to achieving these objectives is providing unique and valuable geospatial and disaster-related information through web-based data systems for international, regional, national, and local information access and dissemination. Through the use of PDC-developed and PDC-hosted, web-based information systems, disaster managers can develop both situational awareness and appropriate responses before, during, and after disaster events. PDC information technology and communications products and systems support the full range of disaster management needs from the assessment of hazards and risk, to managing risk through mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, and reconstruction.
OPERATION IDA

On 1 September 1962, a series of earthquakes struck northwestern Iran. [The Iranian government requested US assistance,] and on the 3rd of the month the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed United States Army, Europe, to send aid to the victims. Early the next morning the airlift of the 8th Evacuation Hospital with a professional staff drawn from several hospitals in Europe began at Ramstein Air Force Base. With the 8th Evacuation Hospital went helicopter elements of the 421st Medical Company (Air Ambulance), a field maintenance detachment from the 29th Transportation Company, a preventive medicine detachment from the 485th Laboratory (Preventive Medicine), and a water purification unit from the 299th Engineer Battalion. Lt Col. Alexander M. Boysen, 8th Evacuation Hospital commander, assumed command of the entire relief force.

When the Americans arrived in Tehran, Iranian officials instructed them to locate their hospital on the plain of Kazvin, a site near the worst area of destruction but adjacent to a rail line and a hard surface road. Iranian drivers transported the unit, and the Americans worked through the night to become operational by early the next morning. During the day, the Americans established a base camp near Buin, further into the disaster area, to serve both as a first aid station and as a helicopter base. From it, crews flew medical teams into the distressed area and evacuated seriously injured victims to the hospital. On the flight back into the area to pick up the teams, the helicopters brought in food, tents, and other essentials. In all, the choppers flew 404 sorties, delivered 45,000 pounds of supplies, and evacuated 66 patients.

Operations at the 8th Evacuation Hospital where the helicopters brought the casualties did not proceed without difficulties. High winds wreaked havoc on the unit’s tents because pegs did not hold in the sandy soil. After two days’ service, the laundry exploded, badly burning three enlisted men. Supply shortages developed, particularly of items not ordinarily required by a fighting unit — catheters for small children, for example. Finally, the professional staff, drawn from various facilities in Europe, had never trained with the hospital and the resulting confusion hindered operations.

Another difficulty, the suspicion and hostility of the local population, was only overcome through Iranian cooperation and American flexibility. Local government officials and the Shah himself during a visit, urged the people to cooperate. Even with a royal endorsement, however, the 8th Evacuation Hospital’s staff had to make minor adjustments [to accommodate] local customs. Its commander reported: “Many decisions that…were strange to Americans were made because they were not strange to Iranians…When one helps a foreign nation you accept their philosophy in many things, if by doing this it means you eventually gain your objective.”
As it solved its organizational problems and slowly secured the cooperation of the Iranians, the 8th Evacuation Hospital gained its objective in becoming an efficient emergency hospital. Then, by October, the medical and sanitary situation in the area had stabilized and the United States Ambassador approved their withdrawal. When they departed, the Americans left the equipped hospital for the Iranians.

SOURCE: Gaines M. Foster
The Demands of Humanity: Army Medical Disaster Relief
US Army Center of Military History, 1983

4. Key Non-US Government Participants and Organizations

a. Host Nation. The HN is the nation receiving the assistance, in whose territory the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations transit or operate. The HN will coordinate all relief efforts within its territory. US forces conducting FHA do so with the permission of the HN under the guidance of formal and informal agreements. JFCs should become knowledgeable of all bilateral agreements for mutual support, and exercise these agreements to the maximum extent possible. If the necessary agreements are not in place, CCDRs must obtain authority to negotiate (through the Joint Staff) and then actively seek bilateral agreements to support the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) of forces, equipment, and supplies. The country team will be critical to this effort. The US embassy is the primary liaison with the HN government.

b. United Nations. The purposes of the UN, as set forth in the charter, are to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in solving international economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these ends.

(1) The UN coordinates its response to humanitarian crises through a committee of all the key humanitarian bodies, chaired by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. The UN has been relied on by the international community to respond to natural and man-made disasters that are beyond the capacity of national authorities alone. Today, the UN is a major provider of emergency relief and longer-term assistance, a catalyst for action by governments and relief agencies, and an advocate on behalf of people struck by emergencies.

(2) During HA operations in which the UN is involved, the UN will likely form a combination of either a United Nations disaster assessment and coordination (UNDAC) team, an on-site operations coordination center (OSOCC), or a humanitarian operations coordination center (HOCC). These operations centers assist the local emergency management authority of the HN to coordinate international relief efforts. The UN humanitarian coordinator is responsible for establishing and maintaining comprehensive coordination mechanisms based on facilitation and consensus building among actors.
involved at the country level in the provision of HA and protection, including cluster leads.

c. Other IGOs. An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. It is formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the UN, NATO, OSCE, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the African Union. NATO and OSCE are regional security organizations, while the African Union and the OAS are general regional organizations. A new trend toward subregional organizations is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and collaboration. The US maintains formal or informal ties with some of the largest of these IGOs.

d. Nongovernmental Organizations. An NGO is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the US military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They may have a long-term established presence in the crisis area. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a CDR would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Working alone, alongside the US military, or with other US agencies, NGOs assist in all the world’s trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. Whereas the military’s initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces, NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state, which they had no part in determining. In areas of conflict, NGOs’ security is derived only by their absolute neutrality and humanitarian focus. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably.

e. Multinational Units. Other nations may deploy military forces to support the FHA effort. These forces may provide LNOs to the combatant command, the JTF, and the CMOC.

f. Private Sector. Increasingly, the resources of the international business community are being utilized to mitigate human suffering associated with disasters. Businesses donate talent or in-kind goods and services to disaster relief and recovery operations in developing countries and wish to ensure that their help is delivered in a
coordinated and effective manner. Private/nongovernment sectors often perform certain functions more efficiently and effectively than government because of the expertise and experience in applying successful business models. The same is true for foreign disaster response. Many large private sector companies maintain disaster/crisis response teams that can respond and add value to USG operations by providing infrastructure and other supporting services. DOD mechanisms that plan for, train and implement emergency responses to disasters should include the private sector. This should be done through USAID OFDA, which maintains communication with UN agencies and other international organizations and private sector donors to ensure the USG complements rather than duplicates existing assistance programs. In addition to large trans-national corporations, the 'private sector' also includes the local, national, and other companies and organizations which should be considered and engaged through the country team, USAID, or other existing USG channels.

g. **Private Contractors.** While US military contractors are addressed in other sections, CDRs should be aware that private contractors are employed by a wide range of actors, inside and outside the USG. They are often employed to provide security, training, technical expertise, and logistical support. CDRs should be cognizant that contractors are often viewed by the local population as USG representatives and any negative behavior or interaction with the local population on the part of contractors can have an adverse impact on US efforts. CDRs should consider developing guidance for the contractors in the humanitarian zone, and should consider the need to develop PA guidance which takes into account potential issues with private contractors, should they arise.

5. **Joint Task Force Organization**

   a. A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified CDR, or an existing commander, joint task force (CJTF). **The authority establishing the JTF determines the command relationships for the JTF and assigns the missions and forces.** The adaptive nature of the C2 structure, the unique component capabilities, and their ability to deploy quickly to execute a variety of FHA missions makes a JTF ideally suited to perform FHA. A JTF is normally assigned a joint operations area (JOA) in the GCC’s AOR. The JTF normally operates at the operational level; however, there may be instances requiring the CJTF to focus at the tactical level. **While the JTF is the most common type of organizational structure used for FHA, a JFC may also opt to create a joint special operations task force (JSOTF), joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF), or a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) to assist in operations.**

   b. The **JTF organization for FHA is similar to traditional military organizations** with a CDR, command element, and mission tailored forces. However, the nature of FHA usually results in combat support and combat service support forces (e.g., engineers, military police/security forces, logistics, transportation, legal, chaplain, civil affairs (CA), PA, and medical) serving more significant roles than combat elements. The unique aspects of interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and collaboration require the JFC to
be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of US agencies, IGOs, NGOs, affected en route and participating HNs, and multinational partners. The JFC establishes organizational structures, processes, and procedures to consider interagency, IGO, and NGO perspectives and positions into its planning, execution, and assessment process. Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency involvement, the focal point for operational and tactical level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the embassy, the JTF HQ, the CMOC, or the HOC.

*For further details on JTF organization, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.*

c. **JTF Staff Organization.** The JFC organizes the JTF staff to provide the appropriate expertise required to carry out the specific FHA mission. Some staff functions that may require increased support and manning include legal services, security, engineers, PA, health services, psychological operations (PSYOP), CA, financial management, and logistics. Additional staff sections may also be established to complement and emphasize critical functions. JTFs conducting FHA operations may be designated by unique titles. For example, during operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE 2005, the JTF was designated Combined Support Force 536; and for the Pakistan earthquake response in 2005, the JTF was referred to as the Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan.

d. **Cross-functional Collaboration.** Effective joint operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. The most common technique for promoting this cross-functional collaboration is the formation of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams and other enduring or temporary organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. They facilitate planning by the staff, decision-making by the CDR, and execution by the HQ. They mostly fall under the principal oversight of the staff directorates. This arrangement strengthens the staff effort in ways that benefit the JTF and its CDR in mission execution. The following are typical organizations formed by JTFs, during FHA operations, and some of their unique considerations:

1. **Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB).** The JFUB is formed under JTF engineer supervision. When large numbers of US and multinational forces operate within the same geographic area, facility allocation to accommodate requirements is necessary. The JFUB serves as the lead agent to deconflict issues arising from multiple-user demands on limited facilities and recommended courses of action (COAs) to resolve issues. The JFUB addresses multinational force accommodation, ammunition storage points, joint visitors bureau, postal facilities, transit facilities, and other related areas. JFCs can establish a joint civil-military engineer board to execute JFUB decisions and collaborations as required.

*For further details on the JFUB, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.*
(2) **Coalition Forces Support Team (CFST).** The CFST is organized to coordinate activities between participating multinational forces. The CFST focuses on controlling all support and coordination tasks. CFST duties include:

(a) Welcome and orient newly arrived FHA forces.

(b) Designate initial staging areas, provide water, rations, and other support.

(c) Identify sensitivities (historic animosity or religious differences) among multinational forces and the affected populace.

(d) Receive, process, and provide situation update to arriving multinational forces, including a briefing on the legal limits of US support.

(e) Brief rules of engagement (ROE) to arriving multinational forces.

(f) Brief C2 and relief agency relationships.

(3) **Joint Network Operations (NETOPS) Control Center (JNCC).** The JTF communications directorate may establish a JNCC to plan, manage, and operate all JTF communications systems. The JNCC exercises technical management over communications control centers belonging to deployed components and subordinate commands. It serves as the single control agency for management and operational direction of the joint communications networks and infrastructure. It performs planning, execution, technical, and management functions. The JNCC develops and/or disseminates standards and/or procedures and collects and/or presents communications system management statistical data. The JNCC must be prepared to integrate the communications systems of foreign militaries, IGOs, and NGOs as appropriate, to facilitate collaboration and cooperation.

*For further details on the JNCC, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.*

(4) **Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE).** The JTF will usually be augmented with theater intelligence production resources, which are organized into a JISE or joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) under the supervision of the JTF intelligence directorate. The structure and functions of a JISE or JIOC may differ in an FHA from those of another type of operation.

*For further details on the JISE and JIOC, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.*

(5) **Joint Information Bureau (JIB).** The JIB is the focal point for the interface between the JTF and the media covering the operation. The JIB provides the news media with timely and accurate information about military support to FHA and facilitates media coverage of operations. When operated in support of multinational operations, a JIB may be called a “combined information bureau” or an “allied press
information center.” For longer-term FHA operations, the JIB may also conduct a command information program.

For further details on the JIB, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

(6) **Joint Movement Center (JMC).** The JMC coordinates the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or HNs) to support the concept of operations (CONOPS). This coordination is accomplished through establishment of transportation policies within the assigned operational areas, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by the CJTF. When required, the JMC coordinates with the UN Joint Logistic Centre (UNJLC), which is the logistic hub for the UN and many NGOs and IGOs, and with the JDDOC. Coordination at the JTF level is illustrated in Figure II-3.

![Figure II-3. Coordination at the Joint Task Force Level](image-url)
For detailed information on movement control, see JP 4-09, Global Distribution.

6. Civil-Military Operations Center

The CMOC is a CMO organization that provides operational level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. The JFC may establish a CMOC to coordinate and facilitate US and multinational forces’ humanitarian operations with those of international and local relief agencies and HN agencies and authorities. The CMOC, working closely with the OFDA DART, serves as the primary collaboration interface for the joint force among indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), IGOs, NGOs, multinational military forces, the private sector, and OGAs. Despite its name, the CMOC generally does not set policy or direct operations. Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. In reality, the CMOC may be physical or virtual. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent — flexible in size and composition. A CDR at any echelon may establish a CMOC. In fact, more than one CMOC may be established in an operational area, and each is task-organized based on the mission.

For further details on CMOC operations, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

a. The CMOC monitors military support throughout the operational area and screens and coordinates logistic, security, medical and technical support requests from relevant civilian and coalition stakeholders. The CMOC works with the JTF staff components to identify support capabilities and resources and forwards validated requests to the appropriate CDR for decision. The CMOC will inform the requestor of the decision and its details. Requests for support are normally prioritized by the HN representatives or the lead US agency for the operation. Only in rare instances will the US military prioritize distribution of requested resources. Figure II-4 summarizes CMOC functions.

b. CMOC Tasks. The following tasks may fall under CMOC auspices:

(1) Screen, validate, and prioritize (based on DART or HN advice) NGO, UN, and IGO military support requests.

(2) Coordinate NGO, UN, and IGO military support requests with military components.

(3) Act as an intermediary, facilitator, and coordinator between JTF elements and NGOs, UN, and IGOs.

(4) Explain JTF (military) policies, capabilities, skills, and resources to NGOs, UN, and IGOs and, conversely, explain NGO, UN, and IGO policies to the JTF.

(5) Respond to NGO, UN, and IGO emergency requests.
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CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER FUNCTIONS

- Providing nonmilitary agencies with a focal point for activities and matters that are civilian related
- Coordinating relief efforts with US or multinational commands, United Nations, host nation, and other nonmilitary agencies
- Assisting in the transfer of humanitarian responsibility to nonmilitary agencies
- Facilitating and coordinating activities of the joint force, other on-scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command
- Receive, validate clarity, coordinate, and monitor requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support
- Coordinating the response to requests for military support with Service components
- Coordinating requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support
- Coordinating with disaster assistance response team deployed by USAID/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
- Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers
- Convening follow-on assessment groups

Figure II-4. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions

(6) Screen and validate NGO, UN, and IGO requests for space available passenger airlift (see Joint Travel Regulations for restrictions).

(7) Administer and issue NGO, UN, and IGO identification cards (for access into military controlled areas).

(8) Convene ad hoc mission planning groups when complex military support or numerous military units and NGOs, UN, and IGOs are involved.

(9) Exchange JTF operations and general security information with NGOs, UN, and IGOs as required.

(10) Chair port and airfield committee meetings involving space and access-related issues.

(11) Assist in the creation and organization of food logistic systems, when requested.
(12) Provide liaison between the JTF and HOC.

(13) Explain overall interagency policies and guidelines to the JFC and NGOs.

c. **CMOC Structure.** The structure and responsibilities of the CMOC need to be established as quickly as possible during joint operation planning. While sharing many general characteristics, each FHA operation is unique, and the CMOC structure must be tailored for each emergency. It is usually formed as a standing capability by all CA units from the company level to the CA command levels. CA personnel are routinely trained in skills that make them an optimal choice to form the core of a CMOC team, into which other functional specialists integrate. (NOTE: US Army CA units are organized to provide the JFC the manpower and equipment, to include a communications package, as the standing capability to form the nucleus of the CMOC.) Variables in establishing a CMOC include: the number and expertise of CMOC personnel; the degree of decision-making authority vested in the CMOC director; and the relationship between the CMOC and the rest of the JTF staff. The COM or designated representative will likely play a guiding role in the CMOC structure and operations. The NATO counterpart to the CMOC is the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) center. If NATO conducts an FHA operation, a CIMIC center may be formed and may include US participation. During multinational operations, alliance and coalition partners should be encouraged to help man the CMOC or to provide LNOs. Depending on the size and scope of the operations, the CMOC may establish field teams to interact with the HN populace, NGOs, and IGOs on a geographic basis. Figure II-5 depicts a notional CMOC organization.

d. The CMOC director may work for the operations directorate, the CMO staff element, or directly for the JTF (or JCMOTF) chief of staff, deputy CDR, or CJTF. Even if the FHA mission is the primary or only mission for the JTF, the CMOC should normally not serve concurrently as the joint operations center (JOC) for the JTF. Particularly in the case of an FHA operation, CMOC personnel will usually be fully engaged with the relevant stakeholders and other concerns; a separate JOC permits a dedicated staff element to direct JTF operations allowing the CMOC to focus on collaboration with outside entities.

e. Special consideration should also be given to the relationship between the CMOC and the intelligence staff. CMOC staff must be prepared to address the sensitivity of communications between intelligence personnel and non-USG organizations and individuals. Information gathering to assist the mission is normally acceptable; however, any perception on the part of IGOs or NGOs that the military is using them for intelligence purposes could prove devastating to the FHA mission, and will likely result in immediate cessation of communications with those organizations. NGOs and IGOs frequently request information about the security conditions in an area from the military. Providing this information in an unclassified format and in a timely manner facilitates security and enhances information sharing with NGOs and IGOs.
f. Civil affairs brigades provide civil liaison teams (CLTs) as supporting elements to CMOCs. A CLT provides a limited civil-military interface capability as a spoke for the exchange of information among NGOs and IGOs and has limited capability to link resources to prioritized requirements. The CLT operates as a team and does not merge into other CMOC elements.

g. An OFDA DART representative should coordinate with the CMOC director. DART representatives provide advice to the CMOC and assist in screening and validating requests for military support from the relief community. The CMOC serves as the central clearing organization for information and coordination relevant to the JTF operation in support of a FHA mission. It is designed to coordinate military efforts and resources with
requirements of the international relief community to achieve overall efficiency and effectiveness.

h. Because of the nature of FHA, representation from and continual coordination with the JTF operations and logistics staff and organizations is critical.

*For further details on CMOCs, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.*

7. Humanitarian Operations Center

a. The HOC is a senior level international and interagency coordinating body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large FHA operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or a USG agency during a US unilateral operation. Because the HOC operates at the national level, it will normally consist of senior representatives from the affected country, assisting countries, the UN, NGOs, IGOs, and other major organizations in the operation. US participation should include the COM (leading the US representation), USAID representatives, and representatives from the joint force. The HOC is horizontally structured with no C2 authority and all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries. **There is a significant difference between the HOC and CMOC.** The CMOC is established by and works for the JFC. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the HN government or the UN, or possibly OFDA during a US unilateral operation. Additionally, the HOC operates at senior, national level to coordinate strategic and operational unity of effort, while the CMOC works at the local level coordinating US actions to achieve operational and tactical unity of effort.

b. Close JTF collaboration with the affected country, UN, and other key members of the humanitarian relief community forms the core of FHA operations. Effective collaboration is the key to successful turnover of FHA responsibilities to the affected country or IGOs. The HOC coordinates the overall relief strategy; identifies logistic requirements for NGOs, UN, and IGOs; and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military support to the JTF. The NSC PCC may designate another USG agency other than USAID to lead FHA based on multiple sets of conditions and security issues and this decision will be identified through the PCC and Interagency Management System (IMS).

(1) **During large scale FHA operations**, the country affected by a disaster and in need of HA will normally have a ministry designated as the senior point of coordination for all HA activities. In more developed countries, there may be an organization similar to the US Federal Emergency Management Agency. **Ministries involved could include the ministry of health, ministry of transportation, ministry of defense, or an emergency management office within a ministry.** These ministries will establish the priority needs for their country and solicit international assistance from donor countries and relief organizations, either bilaterally or through the UN.
(2) In a failed state situation where no HN government is capable of coordinating the HA effort, the UN will normally establish overall coordination of the HA effort. **A greater representation of the various relief agencies and donor countries at the HOC results in more coordinated HA efforts.** The structure of a HOC can be formal or informal. HOCs may have political significance and authority when directed by the affected country, or may be less formal if established by the UN. The HOC is normally collocated with the appropriate lead or UN HQ conducting the operation.

c. **HOCs may establish working groups and committees.** These groups and committees discuss and resolve issues including relief material prioritization, medical, sanitation, health, and other related areas.

d. The CMOC, HACC, and HOC are distinct but interrelated organizations. The relationship among these organizations and interagency, international, and HN structures can be complex and challenging. It should not be assumed that the CMOC will be the coordinating center for the operation. For example, during 2005 in East Timor the UN ran the coordination center and the CMOC representative was a participant in the larger center. Figure II-6 contrasts the differences among the HOC, HACC, and CMOC.

e. During HA operations in which the UN is involved, the UN may deploy a UNDAC team under the leadership of the in-country resident coordinator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office. That group will accomplish UN coordination and liaison in-country at the national and ambassadorial level. At the site of a natural disaster, the UN will establish an OSOCC. In complex emergencies, the UN establishes a HOCC. Either of these operations centers assists the local emergency management authority of the HN to coordinate international relief efforts. The OSOCC or HOCC normally reports to the humanitarian coordinator, who renders a field situation report with worldwide distribution. The humanitarian coordinator position is generally held by the UNDP resident representative or until another coordinator is designated. The CMOC and the OSOCC or HOCC should be closely located to synchronize US contributions to the overall international effort. The humanitarian coordinator can be designated in one of four ways:

(1) The functions of the humanitarian coordinator are assigned to the resident coordinator for that country, who, therefore, becomes the resident and humanitarian coordinator. This is the normal practice.

(2) Appoint a separate humanitarian coordinator.

(3) Designate a lead agency for the provision of HA, with the in-country agency head also serving as humanitarian coordinator.

(4) Appoint a regional humanitarian coordinator, when an emergency occurs that involves more than one country at the same time.
f. The humanitarian coordinator coordinates the UN humanitarian agencies in the country and overall management of the OSOCC or HOCC, advocates for the application of humanitarian principles on behalf of the victims and of the humanitarian community, and oversees all in-country aspects of the strategic planning process, including the development and update of a comprehensive contingency plan. The humanitarian coordinator facilitates humanitarian accountability, through the promotion and monitoring of implementation of relevant policies and guidelines and establishes and maintains comprehensive coordination mechanisms to support the work of the UN humanitarian agencies in the country (sometimes referred to as the UN humanitarian country team). Additionally, the humanitarian coordinator develops a comprehensive
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strategic plan for responding to the assistance and protection needs of dislocated civilians and facilitates the provision of common services.

g. The humanitarian coordinator retains overall responsibility for ensuring the effectiveness of the humanitarian response. To the extent possible, cluster leads are accountable to the humanitarian coordinator for ensuring the establishment of adequate coordination mechanisms for the sector or area of activity concerned, adequate preparedness, as well as adequate strategic planning for an effective operational response. The cluster approach demands high standards of predictability, accountability, and partnership in all sectors or areas of activity. The humanitarian coordinator ensures:

(1) Cluster leads, together with other leaders of the UN humanitarian agencies in the country, are consulted closely in developing the overall strategic direction of the humanitarian operation.

(2) Effective coordination and information sharing takes place among the different clusters takes place, and the work of the different clusters is integrated into a coherent, overall response.

(3) Unnecessary duplication and overlap among sectors is avoided.

(4) Cross-cutting issues are effectively addressed in all sectors.

(5) Strategic planning is coherent throughout the country.

(6) Clusters are provided with the necessary common services and tools for effective cross-cluster collaboration.

(7) Cluster meetings are streamlined and supplement, rather than replace, general interagency coordination meetings, to prevent a fragmentation of the humanitarian response.

(8) Support is provided to clusters in advocacy and resource-mobilization efforts to ensure a balanced, comprehensive, and well-prioritized humanitarian response.

8. Nongovernmental Organizations, Intergovernmental Organizations, and Private Sector Partners

Relationships with NGOs and IGOs are based on multiple factors some of which include a mutual understanding of each others’ goals and objectives, planned lines of operations and CONOPS, support requirements, coordination procedures, information sharing, capabilities and, most importantly, missions. Several organizations can facilitate coordination. Although not field based, the American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction) is the largest coalition of US based NGOs with more than 165 members. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is another valuable resource for coordination of
efforts. Due to its regular interaction with NGOs and IGOs, OFDA will be a critical source of help in establishing relationships with these organizations. The following may assist in building unity of effort among these various organizations and the joint force commands.

a. **Increase awareness** and **encourage contact** between the military and NGOs and IGOs through symposia, meetings, briefings, and joint planning sessions.

b. **Incorporate selected NGO and IGO training** into Service and joint training and exercise programs; and conversely, incorporate interaction with military units and personnel into NGO and IGO training.

c. **Review lessons learned** as recorded in both the joint and Services’ lessons learned databases.

d. **Clearly articulate the role of the military to the NGOs and IGOs.** It is imperative that these organizations understand the military mission, the level of support it can provide, and the process to receive support. Explain what service and/or supplies NGOs and IGOs are entitled to from DOD forces (e.g., medical care, force protection, transportation). Explain who determines what priority NGO personnel and equipment will be moved. NGOs desire transparency; which implies openness, communication, and accountability; when dealing with the military. Assets such as the crisis action team, HOC, HACC, CMOC, and LNOs can be used to provide such information.

e. Ensure the joint force understands its support role. While UN and NGO guidelines provide that requesting assistance from the military is a last resort, some NGOs and IGOs may **assume the military has an inexhaustible resource reservoir** and inundate the FHA force with requests for various types of support. Members of the joint force must have a clear understanding of the nature and amount of support they will be authorized to provide. Normally, requests from IGOs and NGOs should come to DOD through DOS at the Executive Secretary level. When the JFC has been delegated the authority to fill certain types of requests from these organizations, the granting of that authority, and guidance on its use, are reflected in appropriate orders. Keep in mind that **equivocal responses**, such as “we’ll try,” can be **misinterpreted as an affirmative response** and establish unrealistic expectations. Failure to meet expectations (real or not) can adversely affect relationships in both current and future operations.

f. Be aware that **not all NGOs and IGOs appreciate military assistance or intervention** into HA operations. Some NGO and IGO charters do not allow them to collaborate with armed forces based on political mandate, neutrality, religious, or impartiality concerns. CDRs need to honor this fact, while still striving for unity of effort.

(1) Most NGOs follow humanitarian principles (i.e., impartiality, independence, humanitarianism, and neutrality) when giving aid; and therefore base aid on need alone. Some NGOs perceive military aid as politically motivated and conditional.
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(2) The USG, NGOs, and IGOs may not share common objectives.

(3) CDRs may find it beneficial to use a third party to establish liaison with NGOs and IGOs reluctant to establish direct contact with military organizations. USAID is critical to this effort.

g. Be cognizant of legal requirements and regulations that apply to relationships between the military, NGOs, and IGOs.

h. Ensure that agreements and memoranda of understanding fully address funding considerations, delineate authority, and define negotiation channels. Agreements may include air and surface transportation, petroleum products, telecommunications, labor, security, facilities, contracting, engineer support, supplies, services, and medical support.

i. Exchange NGO, IGO, and military unit operating procedures and capabilities.

j. Exercise due diligence in dealing with NGOs that do not adhere to accepted professional standards. Most NGOs follow the UN Principles of Humanitarian Assistance and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. Disaster-affected communities have a right to expect those who seek to assist them to measure up to these standards. In maintaining these standards, CMOC officers and all other members of the joint force should not be perceived as favoring a particular relief organization, particularly at the expense of other organizations.

k. Seek the assistance of an individual from the NGO or IGO community to locate with the US force staff and function as an LNO to the NGO/IGO community. This LNO can perform duties such as initial collaboration activities with the humanitarian relief community prior to deployment, representation of the humanitarian relief perspective during planning, and advice to the joint force through membership in the CMOC or other coordinating mechanisms during operations.

l. Provide information for posting on the UN’s ReliefWeb Internet site and other applicable sites. ReliefWeb is a global hub for humanitarian information on complex emergencies and natural disasters. ReliefWeb is widely used by NGOs, IGOs, and other participants in HA operations to share and coordinate information. If established, the humanitarian information center (HIC), is also a site for information as are the bulletin boards at the OSOCC or HOCC location and the NGO websites themselves.

m. Share information with NGOs and IGOs to the greatest extent possible, especially regarding the security environment. Using information and communications technology will allow IGOs and NGOs to plan their response with up to date and accurate information and to integrate into the overall response more efficiently.
n. When working with NGOs in an uncertain or hostile operational environment, the guidelines found in the United States Institute of Peace *Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments*, will help mitigate friction between military and NGO personnel.

o. Identify and collaborate with the first responders to a disaster. While the US military may be the largest organization on the ground in a disaster area, it is critical to understand that the US military will not be the first one on the ground. The NGOs and IGOs that normally operate in the disaster region or those that can respond quickly to a disaster may be there prior to the US military arrival on the ground.

*For further details on coordination and relationships with NGOs and IGOs, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I.*

### 9. Other Joint Task Forces

a. **Joint Special Operations Task Force.** Due to their language proficiency, cultural awareness, familiarity with the operational area, small footprint, and ability to work in an austere environment special operations forces (SOF) may be able to make a significant contribution to the FHA operation. Their ability to liaison with the local populace and assistance organizations and provide timely assessments of conditions in remote locations via their long range communications capabilities provides the JFC with timely information for decision making and additional, viable COAs.

*For further details on JSOTFs, refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.*

b. **Joint Psychological Operations Task Force.** PSYOP forces, organized as a JPOTF, normally serve as a subordinate joint command of a joint force. The JPOTF’s capabilities and products can be tailored to meet specific needs of the joint forces’ FHA efforts. For example, working with the country team, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs messages can be developed and broadcast and pamphlets produced and distributed that provide information on how the local population can obtain aid.

*For further details on JPOTFs, refer to JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations.*

c. **Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force.** A JCMOTF is composed of units from more than one Service, and is formed to carry out CMO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. Although the JCMOTF is not a CA organization, there should be a strong representation of CA trained personnel. Because of their expertise in dealing with NGOs, IGOs, and OGA, they will greatly enhance the opportunity for success. The JCMOTF may be established to carry out missions of limited or extended duration involving military forces’ interface with local civilian populations, resources, or agencies; and military forces’ coordination with OGA, multinational and affected country forces, UN agencies, NGOs, and IGOs. JFCs are responsible to conduct CMO but they
may establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond the capabilities of a CA representative on the staff could accomplish.

For further details on JCMOTFs, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.
1. Introduction

a. This chapter highlights aspects of joint operations planning specific to FHA operations. Joint operations planning encompasses the full range of activities required to conduct joint operations. These activities include planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces.

b. Crisis action planning (CAP) is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process involving the time-sensitive development of joint OPLANs and operation orders (OPORDs) for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to a crisis. CAP is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. The time available to plan responses to real-time events is short, particularly in the case of disasters requiring an FHA response. **In as little as a few days, the supported GCC and the JFCs and their staffs must develop and approve a feasible COA, publish the plan or order, prepare forces, ensure sufficient support, and arrange sustainment for the employment of US military forces.** Accordingly, considerations for CAP are emphasized throughout this chapter, although much of the information is also applicable during contingency planning.

c. The supported GCC begins CAP when the CJCS planning order, alert order, or warning order is received. In urgent situations, CAP may begin even before an order is formally issued. In areas where natural disasters are prevalent or FHA exercises are a key part of the GCC’s security cooperation plan (SCP), CCDRs should have a CDR’s estimate, base plan, CONPLAN, or OPLAN for the affected area for an FHA mission. Multinational planning or exercise results may also be available. Although an existing JOPES product almost never completely aligns with an emerging crisis, it can be used to facilitate rapid COA development. Planning factors found in Appendix F, “Planning Factors for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” incorporate and elaborate many of the topics discussed in this chapter.

d. The CDR should understand the relief process used by the HN and IGOs, as depicted in Figure III-1. This model captures the continuous, cyclic nature of the
overarching relief process. Critical to this process is information sharing among all the parties. The relief cycle is repeated as needs assessments are updated, requirements refined, additional requests for assistance (RFAs) made, and FHA operations continue. While this model conveys the impression of an orderly process, in reality the process is chaotic due to the large number of different organizations with their own missions and sometimes competing agendas.

(1) Needs Assessments. HN/affected state agencies and various HN organizations conduct needs assessments on the extent of the disaster/emergency and the
needs/requirements. Assessments also include determining the capabilities and resources of various relief organizations, including military, if they are part of the FHA effort.

(2) Needs Analysis. Analysis is an essential component of the relief process. Needs assessments and capabilities are analyzed to update and resolve differences, determine outstanding needs/requirements and reasonably anticipated future needs.

(3) Outstanding needs/requirements are then converted into appeals to the international community and donors, and to specific RFAs. The military may receive RFAs to provide immediate life saving supplies, transportation, or security which are subject to the policies of the US Government.

(4) Relief/Donor Action. Humanitarian agencies, donors, and foreign military commands provide relief based on their ability to respond to appeals and RFAs. Foreign government, regional organizations and the UN may make available immediate funds and other resources very early in the relief cycle. UNOCHA administers a Central Emergency Revolving Fund to provide immediate assistance.

Procedures for both contingency planning and CAP are described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures and JOPP is described in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

2. Understanding the Operational Environment

a. The nature of the operational environment obviously impacts the conduct of FHA operations. Important elements of the operational environment considered during planning and executing FHA operations include the type of disaster involved (including underlying causes), the prevailing security environment, and the system of international relief at work. The process of joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) will assist the JFC in developing this understanding and applying it to planning and execution.

b. Types of Disasters. Disasters and consequent emergencies may occur suddenly or develop over a period of time. Speed of onset has important consequences for action that can be taken. Prevention, preparedness, and early warning measures are much less developed for sudden onset disasters.

(1) Slow Onset. Slow onset emergencies include those resulting from crop failure due to drought, the spread of an agricultural pest or disease, or a gradually deteriorating political situation leading to conflict.

(2) Rapid Onset. Rapid onset emergencies are usually the result of sudden, natural events such as wind storms, hurricanes, typhoons, floods, tsunamis, wild fires, landslides, avalanches, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. They also may be caused by accidental or human-caused catastrophes such as civil conflict, acts of terrorism, sabotage, or industrial accidents.
(3) **Complex.** An increasing number of emergencies are related to conflict and have come to be known as “complex emergencies.” The UN defines a “complex emergency” as: “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program.” USAID defines it as “natural or man-made disaster with economic, social and political dimensions. The result is a profound social crisis in which a large number of people die and suffer from war, disease, hunger, and displacement owing to man-made and natural disasters, while some others may benefit from it. Four factors can be measured: the fatalities from violence; the mortality of children under five years of age; the percentage of underweight children under five; and the number of external refugees and IDPs.” Common characteristics include:

(a) Many civilian casualties and populations besieged or displaced.

(b) Serious political or conflict-related impediments to delivery of assistance.

(c) Inability of people to pursue normal social, political, or economic activities.

(d) High security risks for relief workers.

(e) International and cross-border operations affected by political differences.

(4) **Underlying Causes.** Most disasters have underlying causes that may demand changes in human systems and processes (e.g., tsunami alert systems, better food management, weak or failing HN infrastructure or processes, or even civil war). Normally, forces conducting FHA following a disaster are tasked to focus on the event at hand rather than the underlying causes; however, understanding these causes can enhance mission accomplishment and force protection.

c. The operational environment can be characterized by the degree of control HN forces have to support and assist in the operation. As shown in Figure III-2, military forces and OGA may encounter three types of operational environments when providing FHA: permissive, uncertain, and hostile. The type of operational environment will have direct impact on the decision to conduct the FHA operation, as well as many planning aspects. Regardless of the operational environment, force protection will remain of paramount concern to the JFC.
Permissive environment is an operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations. This is most likely to be found in more developed countries following rapid onset disasters.

Uncertain environment is an operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed or receptive to FHA operations, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. An uncertain environment is most likely to be found in less developed countries that have lost government control of an area following disaster, or in areas that traditionally harbor insurgents or terrorist elements that may oppose US presence regardless of the humanitarian mission.

Hostile environment is an operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the FHA
operations. Forces assigned to FHA missions must be prepared to engage a full range of protection issues. A hostile environment is most likely to be found during complex disasters or following a complete breakdown of infrastructure. Hostile factions may use violence in an attempt to stop the FHA effort or banditry may be expected. Lack of an infrastructure in the crisis area, possibly due to natural disaster, civil strife, insurgency, terrorism, or combat between nations, can impede the mission.

(a) The United States Institute of Peace Guidelines for Relations between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments serve as "rules of the road" for how the two entities should operate in hostile environments. They were developed by the working group on Civil-Military Relations in Nonpermissive Environments, which includes InterAction, DOD, DOS, and USAID, and facilitated by the US Institute of Peace.

(b) The guidelines seek to mitigate frictions between military and NGO personnel over access and freedom for humanitarian organizations to assess and meet humanitarian needs. DOD intends to observe these guidelines in its dealings with the broader HA community. These guidelines are not intended to constitute advance endorsement or approval by either party of particular missions of the other but are premised on a de facto recognition that Armed Forces of the United States and NGOs have often occupied the same operational space in the past and will undoubtedly do so in the future. When this does occur, both sides will make best efforts to observe these guidelines, recognizing that operational necessity may require deviation from them. When breaks with the guidelines occur, every effort should be made to explain what prompted the deviation to promote transparency and avoid distraction from the critical task of providing essential relief to a population in need.

d. **Relief System.** An assessment of the situation should include a description of the relief organizations (NGOs, IGOs, HN, and private sector), foreign governments and military forces, UN agencies, or any other pertinent element already involved in the FHA effort, what relationship exists among them, and the effectiveness of the organizations in place. USAID will be critical in mapping this system and identifying key players in multiple organizations. The range of civilian actors and programs is mostly determined by security factors, i.e., whether it is a permissive or non-permissive environment. For example, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies typically work in permissive natural disasters, while the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) works in nonpermissive environments.

e. **JIPOE.** During the JIPOE process, the JFC’s intelligence staff element manages the analysis and development of products that provide a systems understanding of the environment in which the joint force must operate. JIPOE follows a multi-step process to define the operational environment, describe the effects of the environment, evaluate the enemy, and determine enemy courses of action. JIPOE support during FHA requires a different mindset and different techniques than a JIPOE effort that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily. This analysis identifies a number of nodes - specific physical, functional, or cultural entities within each system. Nodes can include people, transportation...
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infrastructure, sociological and political structure, economic system, potential friendly, neutral, and adversary elements, the information environment, and other components of the operational environment. JIPOE analysts also identify links - the cultural, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. As with many aspects of CAP, JIPOE will be continuous throughout the planning and execution process. Due to the complexity of the JIPOE process during FHA, the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) within a JTF may or may not have the requisite support on hand to perform a detailed JIPOE analysis. Therefore, the JTF J-2 should consider requesting support from the theater JIOC.

For further details on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

f. **Assessment Factors.** Assessment factors that may assist in the JIPOE process are found in USAID’s Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response, the Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook for Emergencies, and the DOS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks. **The following are examples of factors that can aid in assessing the situation:**

   (1) What is the status and intent of military or paramilitary forces?

   (2) Who are the relevant governmental and nongovernmental actors in the operational area? What are their objectives? Are their objectives at odds or compatible with the JFC’s objectives?

   (3) What resources exist locally (e.g., government, private sector, and resources that can be procured or rehabilitated)?

   (4) Who are the key communicators (persons who hold the ear of the populace, e.g., mayors, village elders, teachers) within the operational area?

   (5) What is the status of essential public services (water, electricity, communication, sanitation, and transportation, including road, rail, bridge, and seaport and airport conditions and capabilities)? How does the current status compare to predisaster status?

   (6) What is the status of health care providers, firefighters, police, and court systems? Include availability, level of expertise (skilled laborers), equipment, and supplies.

   (7) What relief agencies are in place, what are their roles and capabilities, and what resources do they have?

   (8) What is the physical condition of the civilian populace?
(9) Where are the locations of medical facilities; are they operational, and to what level?

(10) What are the unique shelter, food, and security needs of the people and to what extent is support available from within the affected country?

(11) What facilities and support are available to FHA forces from the affected country?

(12) What unique social, ethnic, or religious concerns affect the conduct of the operation?

(13) What are the legal limitations to US assistance in this case?

(14) What is the local population’s attitude toward who or what is causing their plight?

(15) What is the local population’s attitude toward the presence of US forces?

(16) What are the force requirements to protect the force?

(17) What is the status of the host strategic transportation infrastructure? Are available seaports and airfields in usable condition? What is the status of materials handling equipment? Are connecting roads and railroads usable?

g. Sources of Information. Intelligence estimates, area assessments, and surveys are sources of information on the situation in the crisis area, providing political, cultural, economic, military, geographic and topographic, climatic, infrastructure and engineering, health, and other essential information. Other sources for an initial assessment include the US country team, CCDR country books, recent OFDA situation reports, UN Secretariat assessments, the UN’s ReliefWeb Internet site, PDC’s Asia Pacific Natural Hazards and Vulnerabilities Atlas (http://atlas.pdc.org) and other PDC resources, relief organizations already operating in the area, and SOF personnel (see Figure III-3). A GCC may also choose to deploy a HAST to assess the situation.

3. Mission Analysis

a. The joint force’s mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The primary purpose of mission analysis is to understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. Although some steps occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel processing of information by the CDR and staff, particularly in a CAP situation.
For further details on mission analysis, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

b. **The Military Role.** The aim of the *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief* – “Oslo Guidelines” is to establish the basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in international disaster relief operations.
(1) The USG participated in the development of the guidelines and endorsed their use; however, they are not binding. The USG recognizes that the Oslo Guidelines outline the process for making military or civil-military requests through UNOCHA. NATO military forces may be requested to assist in disaster relief in accordance with the Oslo Guidelines.

(2) The Oslo Guidelines provide that foreign military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only when the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset, therefore, must be unique in capability and availability. Military assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged "humanitarian gap" between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. At the onset, any use of military assets should be limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel. Assistance can be divided into three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with international military resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has been conducted with all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance.

(a) Direct assistance is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services.

(b) Indirect assistance is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.

(c) Infrastructure support involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management, and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

c. National Strategic End State and the Military End State. For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities, the President, Secretary of State, and SecDef typically will establish a set of national strategic objectives. Achievement of these objectives should result in attainment of the national strategic end state — the broadly expressed conditions that should exist after the conclusion of an operation. Based on the strategic guidance, the CCDR will determine the military end state and strategic military objectives, which define the role of military forces. Due to the crisis nature of FHA operations, initial planning may proceed without a formal set of national or theater strategic objectives specific to the operation, using assumed objectives based on existing strategic plans. These objectives are the basis for operational design.

For further details on end state and strategic objectives, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
d. **United Nations Mandate.** The UN normally conducts FHA under the provisions of a resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. Mandates are developed through a political process which generally requires compromise, and sometimes results in ambiguity. The JFC should be cognizant of the provisions of the mandate or resolution; however, as with all military operations, UN mandates are implemented by US forces through orders issued by the SecDef through the CJCS. During such implementation, the political mandates are converted to workable military orders.

e. **Risk Assessment.** CDRs must identify the specific hazards that the joint force may encounter during the mission, and determine the probability and severity of loss linked to those hazards. After assessing these hazards, the staff must develop risk mitigation measures. To assist in risk management, CDRs and their staffs may develop or institute a risk management process tailored to their particular mission or operational area.

f. **Mission Statement Development.** A critical task for the CCDR is developing the FHA military mission statement. The mission statement must provide specific direction for achieving the desired end state via clear and attainable military objectives. The CCDR normally coordinates the mission statement with the LFA. CCDRs consider several factors in developing the mission statement, to include the military force’s role in assisting relief agencies, the operational environment, and security considerations. The mission statement for the USPACOM Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE (2004-2005) is an example: “USPACOM provides assistance to the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and other affected nations to mitigate the effects of the recent earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Conduct of operation is in support of USG lead agency, and in coordination with IGOs, nongovernmental organizations, and partner nations.”

4. **Concept of Operations**

   a. The CONOPS is a verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels.

   *For further details on CONOPS development, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.*

   b. **Phasing of the Operation.** Phasing assists JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The actual phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the joint operation, as determined by the JFC. Plan phases should not be “locked into concrete” and phase timing may be shifted as the situation dictates.

   (1) While FHA operations may occur during any phase of a larger joint operation, they will most often occur in the “shaping” phase of the GCC’s strategic engagement operations, or during the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phase of a major operation.
(2) Within the context of a larger operation, JFCs and component CDRs may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. These sub-phases, designed to focus relief assets and emphasis, should generally follow the six phase model and include transitions from one phase to the next.

(3) The five phases of a civil support operation (i.e., shaping, staging, deployment, civil support operations, and transition) for a FCM operation (i.e., situational awareness and preparation, deploy, assist host nation, transition, and redeploy) may be an appropriate framework for a foreign disaster relief operation. Another useful example is the phases used during Operation SUPPORT HOPE 1994.

### OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE PHASES

**Phase I, Stabilize the Situation in Goma. “Stop The Dying.”** Support life-saving efforts (primarily water production, distribution, and sanitation) in the Goma, Zaire refugee camps. Phase I was to be declared complete when the death rate and refugee deprivation reached predesignated levels and when distribution began to function at an acceptable rate.

**Phase II, Move Refugees Back Toward Rwanda.** Assist in establishing a waystation network from the major refugee centers toward the Rwandan interior. The objective was to assist relief agencies to develop a sustainment infrastructure and distribution system to help return refugees to their homes. Phase II completion criteria required establishment of the waystation support infrastructure and distribution network.

**Phase III, Stabilize the Refugee Situation and Begin Reconstruction in Rwanda.** This phase supported ongoing relief efforts and established preconditions for operational transition to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Phase III was to be declared complete upon initial operational capability of a viable transportation, distribution, and storage infrastructure capable of meeting basic Rwandan needs.

**Phase IV, Turnover Operations to the UNHCR.** This phase begins as UNHCR, third country forces, and various relief agencies developed adequate water production as well as food and medical distribution to sustain recovery. During this phase, joint force operations begin transition to a US liaison element to work closely with the UNHCR. Phase completion involved seamless transfer of ongoing relief operations to UNHCR and other agencies capable of sustained operations.

**Phase V, Redeploy the Force.** The redeployment phase consists of relief operations control transfer to the UNHCR or redeployment of nonessential personnel and equipment.

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For further details on phasing, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

5. Force Planning

a. The primary purposes of force planning are to: influence COA development and selection based on force allocations, availability, and readiness; to identify all forces needed to accomplish the supported CDR’s CONOPS with some rigor; and effectively phase the forces into the operational area. JFCs may have plans and/or predesignated joint forces for the conduct of FHA missions. The JFC has a number of available options, including use of a predesignated joint force or an ad hoc joint force, organized and tailored specifically to conduct FHA missions. In FHA operations, the joint force structure must provide for the means to coordinate and communicate with the numerous military/civilian, US/foreign organizations, that are involved in the overall FHA effort. Effective liaison among these organizations will help reduce organizational conflicts and redundant relief efforts. Personnel trained in political-military skills are valuable in establishing necessary liaison with policymakers and the diplomatic community. Additionally, personnel skilled in multifunctional logistics and security assistance operations should be part of the joint force organization, since FHA operations tend to be logistics’ intensive. There is a high probability that the joint force will be a multinational force, and that some of the multinational forces may require and have received USG approval to be supported with US equipment and sustained by US forces throughout the duration of the operation. This support may include the activation and deployment of Reserve Component (RC) personnel or units to support specific mission requirements, such as CA.

b. Defining capabilities requirements. The supported CDR identifies force requirements as operational capabilities in the form of force packages to facilitate sourcing by the Services, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), USTRANSCOM, and other force providers’ supporting commands. A force package is a list (group of force capabilities) of the various forces (force requirements) that the supported CDR requires to conduct the operation described in the CONOPS. The supported CDR typically describes force requirements in the form of broad capability descriptions or unit type codes, depending on the circumstances.

c. Force Sourcing

(1) Request for Forces and Capabilities. The supported CDR submits the required force packages through the Joint Staff to the force providers for sourcing. Force providers review the readiness and deployability posture of their available units before deciding which units to allocate to the supported CDR’s force requirements. Services and their component commands also determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of non-unit sustainment.

(2) Global Force Management (GFM). The supported CDR will review the sourcing recommendations through the GFM process to ensure compatibility with capability requirements and CONOPS. GFM allows USJFCOM to identify full range support
capabilities and forces, identify the right mix, and bring that mix in to a streamlined and integrated process designed to support combatant command requirements. GFM allows a global view of the requirements and a global view of the availability of the forces to meet those requirements using a collaborative and open environment. The process allows planners to shift their focus of preparation to the most important areas.

d. Service Capabilities for FHA

(1) **Conventional forces**, though not structured for this purpose, are readily adaptable to perform FHA missions, except for some aspects of FCM which require specialized capabilities.

(a) **Maritime Forces.** Maritime forces can provide operational maneuver and assured access while significantly reducing the footprint ashore and minimizing the permissions required to operate from the HN.

1. Forward deployed expeditionary strike groups, with an embarked Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) provide immediate national response in support of humanitarian and natural-disaster relief operations. This includes MAGTF CM teams, platoon-sized elements capable of detecting a wide range of CBRN hazards.

2. Other forward deployed maritime units, including carrier strike groups, individual ships or cutters, and deployed US Naval Construction Force units may provide more limited immediate relief support, including airlift support, personnel recovery, engineering services such as bridging and debris removal, and providing a secure platform for staging or rest and recuperation until a larger force arrives.

3. US Navy ships can provide a safe and accessible location for the JFC HQ, provide seabasing support to the joint force, and have a limited ability to produce and distribute electrical power and clean water. Riverine forces, expeditionary training teams, hospital ships, fleet hospitals (FHs), expeditionary medical facilities (EMFs) and forward deployable preventive medicine units (FDPMUs) are other US Navy assets that can be tailored to support FHA missions.

4. The Marine Corps maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) is a strategic power-projection capability that combines the lift capacity, flexibility, and responsiveness of surface ships with the speed of strategic airlift. Pre-positioned strategically around the world, these ships move to a crisis when needed and offload either in port or underway. Offloaded equipment and supplies are then linked up with Marines and Navy Seabees arriving at nearby airfields. MPF is especially responsive to regional crises that involve HA and disaster relief. These ships also have the capability to purify water and transfer it ashore. Bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants transfer capability is also available. The Army’s afloat pre-positioning ships provide a similar capability to the US Army, but these ships require port facilities.
(b) **Air Forces**

1. Airlift is an important method of moving relief supplies and rapidly moving personnel and equipment such as hospitals and water purification units to support FHA operations.

2. Airfields can quickly be overwhelmed with aircraft transporting relief supplies. Aviation C2 elements, air traffic control elements, and aerial port units can facilitate the effective movement of supplies transported by aircraft. Civil engineering units have the capability to repair damaged runways rapidly.

3. In addition to the major functions of airlift and airfield development, air forces may also support FHA through personnel recovery, airspace control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).

4. Helicopters have become a critical asset during FHA operations. When roads, bridges, and railroads have been damaged by a disaster, helicopters may be the only method to deliver relief supplies and transport relief workers to the operational area.

(c) **Ground Forces**

1. Ground forces can provide surface transportation, engineering capabilities, supply, distribution, base camp support, material handling, water purification, inspection of facilities, and personnel recovery to fill critical gaps in the humanitarian response.

2. Ground forces will also be instrumental for providing protection for the joint force and security for civilians, both victims and relief workers, as well as for OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs.

(2) **Civil Affairs.** CA assets are capable of supporting FHA operations in a variety of functional areas through planned civil affairs operations (CAO) or support to CMO. CDRs and their staffs assess the type and nature of CMO and CA support required by the CONOPS. This support includes six broad categories of CA functional specialty areas — rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. CA core tasks include support to civil administration, populace and resources control (PRC), FHA, NA, and civil information management. CA assets can prove extremely valuable as the JFC’s advisor on the impact of military activities on the civilian sector. CA assets assess infrastructure damage, assist in developing and managing temporary shelters, and are trained to operate within and coordinate activities with the CMOC. In the CMOC, CA personnel serve as liaison between military, diplomatic, and NGO participants in FHA operations.

(a) **Selection of CA Forces.** The functional composition of CA varies with mission, availability, and qualifications of CA. Active Component (AC) Army CA are considered SOF and as such are provided by USSOCOM. RC Army and Marine Corps CA
forces and US Navy (both AC and RC) CA forces are considered conventional forces and are provided by USJFCOM. C2 for CA forces should be clearly established in the deployment order and/or execute order.

(b) The early deployment of CA in the operational area can be a force multiplier, setting the stage for the introduction of follow-on forces into an environment that has benefited from specialized interaction with the local population.

(c) CA should be assigned as a JTF staff element. Additionally, CA should be assigned to support the CMOC, the J-3, or JTF subordinate units, including a JCMOTF, if established.

(d) As the majority of CA are provided by the RC, mobilization of RC CA must be a consideration during predeployment planning.

(e) Following the rapid deployment of active duty CA and initial CA assessments that either validate or invalidate the original CMO estimate, a plan is developed that articulates the specific functional skills required to support the mission. The results of this assessment and recommended task organization flow from the supported CCDR to the Joint Staff for validation, feasibility assessment, and eventual resourcing. Resourcing will generally be provided by the regionally aligned CA commands found in the US Army Reserve, if available and the mission so dictates. Concurrently, requests for the Presidential Reserve Call-up (if required) or other authorities for mobilization are initiated through the Joint Staff and DOD. When authorized, reserve CA elements are mobilized and deployed.

(f) As with all aspects of a FHA operation, JFCs should make every effort to transition operations to civil control through the interagency community, the HN, and NGOs and IGOs. Early transition will support the possible reduction of the US forces committed to the FHA operation and allow those forces to be employed, if necessary, in support of other emerging contingencies.

(g) Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. CA or other assets (e.g., engineer, medical, military police/security forces, HN or multinational organizations, unmanned aircraft systems, interagency partners, or intelligence systems) can conduct civil reconnaissance. The focus of collection in the JFC’s operational area is the daily interaction between civilians and US forces. This results in capturing contacts and data points. In coordination with the CMOC, CAO, and CMO planners integrate civil reconnaissance into the overall supported CDR’s plans and orders.

See JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, which provides specific guidance on planning and executing CAO.

(3) Psychological Operations. PSYOP constitute a systematic process of conveying messages and themes intended to have an impact on selected target audiences. The objective is to influence behavior and attitudes favorable to the United States and its
PSYOP units can provide the CJTF with analysis of perceptions and attitudes of the civilian population and effectiveness of ongoing information and FHA operations. PSYOP units provide language capability and equipment (radio broadcasting, print, audio, and audio visual) essential to disseminate necessary information to the populace. For example, during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (April-July 1991 multinational relief effort in Eastern Turkey and Northern Iraq), PSYOP units disseminated information on relief camp procedures, organization, and food preparation. Tactical PSYOP teams were considered the best force to control crowds and disseminate information. Videos informed distant population groups of camp existence and assistance resource locations.

(a) During FHA operations, PSYOP units assist in managing dislocated civilians. PSYOP units can provide health and safety messages, disseminate locations of shelter and food distribution points, warn of restricted or danger areas, and disseminate security information. For example, PSYOP units were employed successfully during Operation SAFE HAVEN (September 1994-March 1995 migrant camp operation in Panama). PSYOP units provided a critical capability in disseminating information throughout the migrant camps established during that operation.

(b) The following considerations are provided for use of PSYOP in FHA operations.

1. PSYOP must be coordinated with information operations (IO) core, supporting, and related capabilities to ensure that their complementary capabilities are integrated into synergistic plans that are fully coordinated and executed, and that consistent themes and messages are communicated. PSYOP and PA staffs should coordinate and deconflict activities to preclude any possible negative impact of one operation on the other, including information being disseminated by civilian HA organizations. The PA and CMO staffs must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff, typically through IO cell meetings, to ensure a consistent message while maintaining operations security (OPSEC). Although messages that support PA, IO, CA, and PSYOP are different, they must not contradict one another or credibility may be lost. PSYOP information delivery capabilities can be used to disseminate public information products produced by PA in addition to messages developed by PSYOP. Similarly, PA can highlight PSYOP efforts, when appropriate through PA efforts such as facilitating media coverage of successful PSYOP programs and actions (preventive medicine programs, reconciliation programs, show of force, rebuilding of symbolic infrastructure, public address by spokesperson, etc). As open sources to foreign countries and the United States, PA channels can be used to disseminate international information of a truthful nature and to counter propaganda directed against the operation and the United States.

2. PSYOP units should either deploy with organic transportation or be provided adequate, dedicated vehicles for necessary mobility.

3. PSYOP staff positions should be integrated into the JTF joint manning document to insure integration into JTF planning from its onset. PSYOP
staff ensure the entire staff understands the importance of integrating psychological operations into the overall plan to achieve the mission. An important aspect in early PSYOP planning is establishing the proper priority for PSYOP capability to flow into the operational area.

4. DOD humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) are printed with “A Food Gift from the People of the United States of America” on the packaging. There is intrinsic value in distributing goods unilaterally or with coalition partners. Cultural expectations, inferences, and taboos are considered prior to deciding on whether or not to include written PSYOP messages on relief products. PSYOP planners balance any written message against the value of distributing useful or essential goods with implicit rather than explicit messages. The marking of aid packages should be consistent with USAID branding and marking guidelines.


(4) SOF. There are several reasons why SOF are well-suited to FHA operations. They are adaptable, can deploy rapidly, have excellent long-range communications equipment, and can operate effectively in austere environments typical of FHA efforts. Perhaps the most important capabilities found within SOF for FHA are their geographic orientation, cultural knowledge, language capabilities, and the ability to work with local, ethnic groups and civilian populations to provide initial and ongoing assessments.

For further details on SOF employment, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

6. Predeployment and Deployment

a. Supported and supporting GCCs are responsible for coordinating with US embassies within their AORs to ensure that necessary overflight and transit en route agreements/arrangements are negotiated to permit transit to operational areas for forces necessary to conduct and sustain FHA operations to reach their operational areas. DOS coordinates overflight and landing rights, diplomatic clearances, and visa and passport requirements for all deployment operations. Supporting GCCs are responsible to ensure appropriate overflight, transit, and staging agreements/arrangements are in place to support operations in other AORs, when appropriate.

For more information on current overflight/transit requirements, see the DOD Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide (https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil); and for guidance on negotiating agreements, see DODD 5530.3, International Agreements.

b. Deployment. Deployment planning and execution considerations for FHA missions and other military operations are fundamentally the same. Joint force deployment is predicated on the severity of the humanitarian situation and the perception of
US interests. It is important to remember that political factors drive military decisions and planning at every level. Mission analysis, may validate the need for further assessments or the establishment of a lodgment, and in consultation with the component commanders, the JFC determines the deployment priority for all elements of the joint force. Force protection is an important part of this process.

(1) **Movement.** The joint force will obtain **strategic lift allocations and constraints** from USTRANSCOM via the CCDR. The **time-phased force and deployment data** for the operations must be developed to remain within these guidelines. USTRANSCOM provides **movement schedules** for deployment requirements in the sequence, or as near as possible to that requested by the joint force. The joint force staff should continually update all subordinate commands on deployment scheduling, situation, or mission changes. Such changes may require significant shifts in force deployment. Consideration should also be given to any deployment support requested by OFDA DART and OGA, the UN, NGOs, and IGOs.

(2) **Priority of Deployment.** Initial deployment for an FHA operation generally requires only critical **C2, communications systems; security; CMOC(s); PA, and logistic capabilities** (e.g., initial theater opening capability). Follow-on forces deploy as capabilities expand and requirements are better defined. However, US forces often conduct FHA operations in austere locations where airport and seaport facilities may be limited or inadequate. If the affected country has insufficient port offloading facilities, US personnel and equipment needed to establish or augment this capability, should arrive prior to the primary force packages. In some cases, it may be necessary to expand existing facilities or construct new facilities to accommodate essential transshipment or the flow of forces into the country.

*For more information see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.*

7. **Other Planning Considerations**

a. **Simultaneous Operations.** The US military often will be engaged in several types of joint operations with different end states, simultaneously across the range of military operations. Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose, such as disaster relief; however, others will have multiple purposes and will be influenced by a fluid and changing situation. Branch and sequel events may require additional tasks by the joint force (e.g., Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE, 1992-1993, peace enforcement operations evolved from FHA efforts, which challenged the command with multiple missions). Furthermore, a crisis response or limited contingency operation may be initiated separately or as part of a campaign or major operation (e.g., the 1991 NEO in Somalia during Operation DESERT SHIELD). Foreign CBRN incidents may require the CCDR or JFC to plan for multiple, concurrent operations including, FHA, FCM, NEO, and forensics that will require coordination with different elements of the foreign emergency support team (FEST), US embassy, and HN. Joint forces must strive to meet such challenges with clearly defined objectives addressing diverse purposes.
b. **Interagency Planning.** Integrating the interagency community effectively can be vital to successful military operations, especially during the stabilize and enable civil authority phases of an operation when JFCs may also operate in support of OGAs. JFCs and their staffs must consider how the capabilities of the joint force can be leveraged to accomplish the broader national strategic objectives by assisting the LFA. During planning, JFCs should coordinate directly with interagency representatives within their operational areas to ensure appropriate agreements exist that support their plans (such as working with US embassies to secure overflight rights with other nations). While supported CCDRs are the focal points for interagency coordination in support of operations in their AORs, interagency coordination with supporting CDRs is just as important. At the operational level, subordinate CDRs should consider and integrate interagency and international capabilities into their estimates, plans, and operations. A supported CDR is responsible for developing annex V, (Interagency Coordination), for each OPLAN. For interagency partners, annex V should specify not only the capabilities that military planners have determined the military may need, but also the shared understanding of the situation, and common objectives required to resolve the situation. Care should be taken to effectively communicate the contents of annex V with the non-DOD agencies, preferably in a collaborative process, recognizing that the CCDR does not have any tasking authority over any non-DOD entity, and that the information is provided to the other agencies to assist them in their planning to achieve greater unity of effort. This would enable interagency planners to plan their efforts in concert with the military more rigorously, to suggest other activities or partners that could contribute to the operation, and to identify any support requirements they may request from the military.

c. **Multinational planning.** Joint forces should be prepared for operations with forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition under US or multinational leadership. Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in multinational and national channels. Coordination of these separate planning channels occurs at the national level by established multinational bodies or coalition member nations and at the theater-strategic and operational levels by JFCs, who are responsible within both channels for operation planning matters. US doctrine and procedures for JOPP also are conceptually applicable to multinational problems. The fundamental issues are much the same for both situations. For more specific guidance on NATO planning and execution see appropriate publications within the doctrine hierarchy.

d. **Canada-US Civil Assistance Plan.** The Canada-US Civil Assistance Plan is a five-phase plan enabling US military forces to support Canadian military forces engaged in civil support operations. It provides collaborative planning for the deployment of US forces to support Canadian military forces, establishes a C2 construct for placing US forces under tactical control (TACON) of Canada Command, and provides that operations will be conducted in accordance with the HN’s civil support plans (i.e., Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations).

e. **Global Area Reference System (GARS).** GARS is an area referencing system which reaches all areas of the globe and can be used as a tool in synchronizing operations
across multiple applications. Establishing a common reference system early in planning will enhance operational execution by mitigating confusion in geographic coordination.

*For further information, refer to JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.*
1. Introduction

This chapter highlights aspects of joint force execution and assessment related to FHA operations.

2. Deployment

The capability to deploy forces to the operational area and rapidly integrate them into the joint force as directed by the JFC is essential. The joint deployment process consists of four phases: planning; predeployment activities; movement; and JRSOI. JRSOI can be the most challenging phase in FHA operations. Supported GCCs are responsible for JRSOI within their AORs. This includes all actions required to make arriving units operationally ready and integrated into the joint force. Challenges arise when the operational area has been severely impacted by the incident or disaster and US forces have had no presence or routine access to the operational area. HN, multinational, and contractor support may not be feasible during the initial stages of an FHA operation but they normally are available to support JRSOI.

More detailed information may be found in JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

3. Sustainment

a. Logistic and health service support (HSS) planners estimate assistance requirements and assess organic, theater support, and affected country capabilities to meet the forecasted need. Inherent risks and logistic objectives should also be identified. Emphasis must be placed upon locating logistic bases as close as possible to the relief recipients. Should relief recipients be located within a major population center, all reasonable measures should be taken when establishing logistic bases that prevent migration of relief recipients from their economic and social areas. All potential supply sources should be considered, including affected country, commercial, multinational, and pre-positioned supplies. Lessons-learned indicate that logistics and the associated support facilities and infrastructure necessary to sustain an FHA operation are frequently underestimated. FHA operations are logistic intensive and will most likely include
significant general engineering requirements. Therefore, the overall logistic concept should be closely tied into the operational strategy and be mutually supporting. This includes the following:

(1) Identifying time-phased materiel requirements, facilities, and other resources. Remote and austere locations may require deployment of materials handling equipment and pre-positioned stocks.

(2) Identifying support methods and procedures required to meet air, land, and maritime LOCs.

(3) Establishing procedures and means for coordinating and controlling materiel movements to and within the operational area. Priorities may be established using apportionment systems, providing the CDR with the flexibility to reinforce priority efforts with additional assets.

b. For the FHA operation to succeed, the CDR must be able to fulfill priorities through adequate resource control. Logisticians, in conjunction with operational planners, must consider which equipment and supplies may be left behind at the completion of the mission. Supplies and equipment cannot be arbitrarily left behind and donated to the HN. Supplies and equipment left behind as a result of HA support operations must be in accordance with all applicable Federal laws and statutes relating to the donation or transfer of military articles and supplies. Consult legal counsel prior to any release of supplies and equipment. It should also be noted that planning for security of materials and supplies is imperative.

c. Logistic Database Information. Commodity tracking systems (CTSs) used in FHA include the following:

(1) Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System (DALIS). DALIS was designed by the US Army to enhance the operations of one or more logistic coordination centers supporting multiple worldwide FHA operations.

(2) Commodity Tracking System. CTS is a computer program developed by the UNHCR as a warehouse and logistic management tool. CTS uses DALIS for its basic design.

(3) Global Transportation Network (GTN). GTN is a standardized DOD system that provides access to transportation data inputs from a wide variety of in-transit visibility systems. Users can query the GTN database to track cargo and passengers from origin to destination, anywhere in the Defense Transportation System.

d. Contracting Support. Integrating contracting and contractor management functions into military planning and operations is a complex and very challenging process. Multiple joint and Service component organizations are involved in this process including CDRs and the primary and special staffs at the CCDR through major tactical
force levels. Additionally, numerous contracting organizations from inside and outside the operational area play a vital role in contracting and contractor management planning and contract execution. Finally, developing the contracting support plans and conducting the associated contractor integration planning, crosses most joint force and Service component primary and special staff lanes; yet most of these staffs are very unfamiliar with the contracting process and associated contractor integration challenges. Contracting support may be obtained from within or outside the affected country. Military forces should not compete for scarce civilian resources. To avoid competition for similar support and to promote economy of contracting effort, contracts for logistic support must be coordinated through the designated J-4 or lead agent for logistics joint contracting support board or center. Logisticians should be thoroughly familiar with contracting options available through the Navy’s global contingency construction and Services contracts, the Army’s logistics civil augmentation program, and the Air Force contract augmentation program. All three of these contracting options are designed to be flexible in order to address emergent requirements worldwide which can aid the economy of the affected country and facilitate the subsequent transfer of responsibility to the affected country, NGOs, or IGOs.

DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces provides comprehensive DOD policy on the subject of contractor personnel management in contingency operations and JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, provides common contracting and contractor management doctrine principles.

e. Cluster Management and Support. A cluster is a group comprising organizations and other stakeholders, with a designated lead, working in an area of humanitarian response in which gaps have been identified. These areas include some traditional relief and assistance sectors (i.e., water and sanitation, nutrition, health, emergency shelter); service provision (i.e., emergency telecommunications, logistics); and cross-cutting issues (i.e., camp coordination, early recovery, protection). Clusters are organized at both field and global level. In more traditional terminology, clusters may be termed as "sectors," "sectoral groups," and "sector leads" (or in some cases, "working groups," or "thematic groups"). Clusters provide a framework for organizing the humanitarian response in a similar manner as lines of operations define the orientation of the joint force in time and space or purpose in relation to an objective.

Appendix D, “Humanitarian Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations,” contains more information on the cluster approach.

f. The World Economic Forum advocates that as global corporate citizens, the private sector must do more than simply fund relief organizations and that business should proactively participate in a multi-sector effort to prevent and mitigate the effects of disasters. The World Economic Forum established the Disaster Response Network (DRN) – a point of contact and coordination for companies that want to provide support to disaster management efforts in developing countries.
(1) The DRN is a network of engineering and transportation companies who are committed to assist humanitarian organizations with their disaster relief efforts by providing infrastructure-related and transportation services. The mission of the DRN is to leverage the resources of the international business community to mitigate human suffering associated with disasters. The vision of the DRN is to make it easier for businesses to offer talent or in-kind donations of a good or service for the emergency response phase of disaster relief and to ensure that corporate donations are delivered in a coordinated and effective manner.

(2) Airport Emergency Team (AET). When disasters occur, it is critical to transport relief supplies to the affected area quickly and effectively. Airports soon become overrun with shipments of emergency equipment, staff and supplies. Inexperience and lack of coordination on the ground can create unnecessary delays. To help remedy this, the DRN assembled a team of 60 volunteer logistics experts and heavy equipment operators. Based in Dubai, the AET is positioned to deploy immediately to any disaster site in the region. Equipped with two all-terrain forklifts and subsistence supplies (food, clothing, water, tents, cooking equipment) for seven to ten days, the AET offers essential services to relief workers on the ground. The AET will be deployed at the request of the UNDAC team through its joint logistics centre.

4. Command and Control

a. FHA operations must include responsibility for air, land, maritime, space, and special operations. It is especially necessary to delegate authority to establish supply or transportation priorities. Delegation speeds decision making and reaction to changes in life-threatening situations faced in many FHA operations. Although there is no command relationship between military forces and OGAs, UN agencies, NGOs, IGOs, affected country elements, and allied or coalition governments, clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction between participating organizations.

b. Communications. Effective communications systems are vital to planning, conducting, and sustaining successful FHA operations. Operations, logistic, and intelligence functions depend on responsive communications. Communications are the central system that not only ties together all aspects of joint operations, but also allows CDRs C2 of forces. Therefore, the FHA plan must include procedures to provide interoperable and compatible communications among participants. Commercial telephone networks, military satellite channels, and conventional military C2 systems will support communication of directions, orders, and information. Commercial communications systems can be used to coordinate with other US agencies, disseminate meeting schedules, deconflict resource movement, and track logistic flow. Direct communications between CDRs and nonmilitary organizations should be established to facilitate effective collaboration and decision-making. Peer to peer networks - desktop software designed to facilitate collaboration and communication among small groups - are also used by NGOs. Information protection for nonsecured communications must be implemented. Additionally, communications systems planning
must consider the termination or transition of US involvement and the transfer of responsibility to other agencies such as the UN or NGOs. Frequency management will help allocate finite frequency availability. The HN government (if functioning) may control frequency management. FHA forces may not have exclusive use of frequencies.

c. **Interoperability.** Identify communications equipment interoperability among all participants. It is likely that civilian USG agencies, HN agencies, and multinational forces will have their own communications networks. These may include commercial leased circuits and satellite services as well as high frequency radio equipment. It is also critical that CMOCs are equipped with communication equipment that facilitates collaboration with all participants. The need for interoperability of communications equipment in FHA operations may also necessitate using unclassified communications means during the operation. US military forces will face great difficulty and challenges in conducting an operation via unclassified means and still keep multinational forces, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs in the loop. US military forces will receive correspondence by different classified modes that have to be further transmitted in one form or another. The use of classified and unclassified modes of communication are both necessary, as classified modes are routinely used for operational information. **Write for release should be used to the greatest extent possible at all levels.** Write for release techniques include portion marking, the use of "tearlines," and sanitizing sensitive text.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some of the communications lessons learned from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Obtain adequate communications equipment to provide basic mission essential service;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Employ additional equipment and reconfigure connectivity to provide direct routing to principal destinations;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Add equipment to provide multiple routes to prevent site isolation;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have sufficient equipment to support airborne capabilities, respond to new missions, and avoid critical shortages; and</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Build in redundancy.</td>
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d. **Reporting.** USG agency reports will be consolidated into normal country team reporting procedures and structures with increased frequency as directed. In more complex situations, DOS will activate a ‘crisis action task force’ which will establish reporting procedures that will likely be via a share point portal so that all USG reports are consolidated in one location. The JFC should expect to coordinate on reports on in country activities with the country team. This is in addition to any DOD or GCC directed reporting requirements. The joint force staff will encounter numerous OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs that produce reports on the operating environment and joint force actions. The COM’s cable, the USAID representative’s reports, and OFDA DART reports are
reviewed by the DOS and OGAs. Additionally, other elements of the country team produce reports on the same issues about which the joint force staff reports. Despite efforts to maintain accuracy, the proliferation of reports may result in conflicting information. One approach to deconflicting reports is to develop a consolidated report between the joint force and the country team. Such consolidated reporting will also serve to reduce administrative overhead while reducing opportunities for conflicting information to surface. As an additional consideration, information provided by NGOs and IGOs should not be identified by organization on reports that may be seen outside the USG. To do otherwise would jeopardize the organization’s standing and possibly their staff’s safety.

e. **Operational Areas.** Particularly when the JOA is large, the JFC may organize the FHA JOA into areas of operations in consultation with NGOs, IGOs, OGAs, and in consideration of the organization already established by the affected country. In establishing boundaries, planners should consider existing political subdivisions, ethnic or traditional tribal boundaries, political affiliations, relief agency areas, political and cultural acceptance of other nations’ forces, and contiguous areas with forces assigned. If possible, a CMOC should be established within each operational area capable of working with agencies in the area as well as the HOC (through the joint force HQ). The JFC will also normally designate an area of influence and an area of interest (AOI).

More detailed information on operational areas may be found in JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

5. **Assessment**

a. The JFC should use the assessment process to evaluate task performance and to measure effects and determine the progress of operations toward achieving objectives. MOEs assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment. MOEs in FHA operations should be based on impact indicators that measure the change in the lives of the people on the ground, rather than process indicators that calculate USG efforts and their immediate outputs. Measures of performance (MOPs) measure task performance. MOPs are generally quantitative, but also can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment. Well-devised measures can help the CDRs and staffs understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects. MOEs assist the CDR in determining when the situation has been returned to pre-disaster conditions.

b. **Developing MOEs.** There is no single all-encompassing checklist for MOEs for FHA operations. MOEs will vary according to the mission and the effects desired by the JFC. However, CDRs and staffs should keep certain factors in mind when developing and using MOEs in FHA operations. MOEs may be difficult to develop; the assessment process and related measures should be relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced so there is no false impression of accomplishment. MOEs should also be based upon the US military objectives and end states to ensure that the JFC is measuring those effects within the joint force's control. While the military objectives support the national
objectives, tying military MOEs to tasks to be accomplished by others does not accurately reflect progress towards completion of the military mission.

c. Possible MOEs. MOEs in FHA operations could include:

(1) Drops in mortality rates in the affected population, below a specified level per day.

(2) Increase in water available to each disaster victim per day to various levels established for human consumption, to support sanitation measures, and for livestock consumption.

(3) Decrease in population of dislocated civilians in camps to a level sustainable by the affected country or non-US military organizations (Another aspect of this MOE is the increase in the number of persons per day returning to their homes).

(4) Decrease in incidence of disease to an acceptable or manageable level.

(5) An increase in the presence and capabilities of NGOs and IGOs.

(6) It is normally appropriate to base MOEs for FHA on The Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. The Sphere Project, developed by IGOs and NGOs involved in HA, recommends key indicators for

### MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE

During Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the joint force tracked several specific measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to ascertain when it had accomplished its assigned mission. These MOEs included:

- The refugee population in Goma dropped from 1,200,000 on 26 July 1994 to 575,000 on 26 August 1994 (Numbers of refugees were estimates only);

- The estimated mortality rate in Goma camps, based on bodies buried per day, dropped from 6,500 per day on 27 July 1994 to less than 500 per day on 1 August 1994;

- Cargo capacity at Kigali airfield increased from virtually zero on 30 July 1994 to 300-600 tons per day on 26 August 1994; and

- The number of United Nations agencies and nongovernmental agencies, represented in Kigali grew from 6 on 22 July 1994 to over 60 on 26 August 1994. This increase represented adequate nonmilitary capability to provide humanitarian assistance.
provision of water, sanitation, food, health, shelter, and non-food items in disasters, and establishes voluntary minimum standards for each sector. However, there are no signatories to the Sphere Project or its Charter. For more detail, see Appendix F, "Planning Factors for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations."

d. The impact of FHA cannot be measured only in terms of supplies shipped; the ultimate test comes from judging whether lives have been saved and communities revived. This is a complex and long-term process, and to find answers, USAID has developed the following four areas for assessing performance.

(1) **First, the structure for responding to disasters and to the needs of countries in crisis and transition must be in place.** Before crises occur, USAID — in close coordination with other agencies of the USG, multilateral agencies, and local authorities — will ascertain the following:

   (a) Have supplies been stockpiled and service providers identified? Are supplies secure from loss and theft? When USAID moves to deliver goods and services, will they go to the right place in the right amount with the intended effect?

   (b) Have the prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities of USAID anticipated needs and are they effective? Have local communities and businesses been enlisted for planning, prevention, and response?

   (c) Do proposed shipments of supplies match and maximize local skills and capacities? In view of past disasters locally and regionally, are preparations commensurate with likely needs?

   (d) Are the partnerships and relations with the UN (including the World Food Programme [WFP]) understood by all? Are mechanisms in place to coordinate supplies, donations, and offers of skilled labor and ensure that they are delivered where and when they are needed?

(2) **Second, actual delivery of supplies and services must be timely and effective.** During crises, USAID and its partners will determine the following:

   (a) Do disaster relief supplies and services reach their intended destination in time to make a difference? Are all forms of emergency relief supplies readily available and accessible to the intended beneficiaries, including women, children, the elderly, local peoples, refugees, and members of minorities?

   (b) Do specific programs intended to save lives or reduce malnutrition, such as emergency feeding programs, have the intended impact?

   (c) Are profiteering and misuse effectively controlled? Are food and other relief supplies distributed so as not to discourage local production or distort local prices and markets?
(d) Do programs of disease control and emergency medical services (including immunizations, child survival interventions, and maternal and reproductive health care) have access to necessary supplies and are they coordinated with food and nutrition interventions?

(3) Third, in transitional and crisis situations, assistance must target the institutions and needs critical to the resumption of sustained development, civil life, and democratic governance. USAID and its partners will determine the following:

(a) Has the response to countries in crisis and transition been appropriate to their needs, political situation, and indigenous capacities?

(b) Have national and local political institutions been strengthened? Have key elements of the infrastructure, such as housing, communications, basic transportation, and financial services been reinforced? Are the specific needs of IDPs and refugees being addressed?

(c) Has food security increased throughout the country? Do farmers have greater access to seed, fertilizer, and appropriate technology? Has local food production increased significantly and are more people able to acquire the income needed to purchase food?

(d) Has there been measurable progress toward national reconciliation and invigoration of the mechanisms of conflict resolution, as indicated by fair and open elections, constitutional conventions, new legal codes, reintegration of combatants, etc? Is there evidence of decreased disorder in cities and in the countryside? Is there increased respect for human rights?

(4) Fourth, follow-on mechanisms, after relief and rehabilitation, must be in place to help prevent cycles of crisis and to permit countries to cope with their own natural disasters and political crises. After the crisis stage has passed, USAID and its partners will determine the following:

(a) In conjunction with local authorities and communities, and multilayer institutions, is USAID developing and implementing long-term development programs that measurably enhance the ability of countries to anticipate and manage disasters? Are the economic, political, environmental, social, and institutional causes of man-made disasters being addressed?

(b) Have countries in crisis and transition made measurable progress toward a political and economic transformation?

(5) Ultimately, HA activities must be measured by simple, yet profound standards; do these activities prevent human misery that is avoidable? Do they provide relief for human misery that is not avoidable? Does this assistance help countries that
have suffered natural or man-made disasters and crises return to the path of sustainable development?

6. Intelligence

   a. **Intelligence and information gathering in FHA operations should be broadly focused** and include collection concerning political, military, paramilitary, ethnic, religious, economic, medical, environmental, geospatial, and criminal indicators. The primary intelligence effort must focus on answering the CDR’s **priority intelligence requirements (PIRs)** assisting in the accomplishment of the mission. While normally this will involve assessing potential threats to the FHA mission (from forces external and internal to the affected population), the unique aspects of FHA operations may result in significant or even primary emphasis being placed upon logistic, HSS, or political intelligence and intelligence support to CA and PSYOP. All available means of intelligence sourcing should be fused into tailored data useful to operational personnel for deployment planning, mission requirements, and other unforeseen taskings as they arise. As soon as practical after it is determined that a crisis may develop or a contingency is declared, JFCs and their staffs begin an analysis and determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the anticipated operation. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is often the primary source of information. However, crises may occur with little or no warning and in regions with very few or even no HUMINT sources. Airborne and space-based ISR sensors, though, can provide information in those regions with limited HUMINT presence or in cases where human assets are insufficient to satisfy intelligence requirements, i.e., geospatial information.

   b. **Protecting the force will remain a high priority for intelligence collection.** Collection should not be equated with hostile penetration of a country’s internal affairs; in fact, open sources may be an excellent means to determine agendas and patterns of operation and to identify factional territory. A comprehensive intelligence analysis can help CDRs avoid hostilities during the conduct of FHA missions. Intelligence operations during FHA operations are generally conducted in the same manner as in any other military operation.

   c. **An intelligence architecture for the operation will be required** to enable the CDR to fuse all-source intelligence in a timely manner, enhancing visualization of the operational environment. Normal tasking and reporting channels should also be used. Provisions will have to be made for working with governments for which no previously established intelligence agreements exist and for exchanging security-related information with NGOs and IGOs. Consideration must also be given to the use of, and growing dependency on, **imagery assets** to enhance information gathering and intelligence collection. **National, theater, and tactical collection systems** and related production agencies, such as NGA can be tasked to provide current **imagery** of the crisis area. Examples of how imagery can be used include determining the status of an area’s transportation network following an earthquake or flooding and locating large groups of dislocated civilians.
d. Because of NGO and IGO sensitivities regarding negative perceptions generated by working with military organizations, the term “information” instead of “intelligence” must be used. Those organizations must not have the perception that their neutrality is compromised by providing intelligence to the military. Finally, consideration should also be given to answering the intelligence requirements of adjacent task forces as well as theater- and national-level requirements. Classification and releasability standards for intelligence and sensitive information should be determined early in the planning process and reviewed as the operation proceeds.

e. Foreign disclosure procedures should be put in place and utilized to the maximum extent feasible.

(1) In order to share critical intelligence information with allies and coalition partners efficiently, US intelligence information should be written for release at the lowest possible classification level and given the fewest possible dissemination restrictions within foreign disclosure guidelines. The J-2 must establish procedures and methods for separating intelligence from sources and methods. Intelligence production agencies often print highly classified reports in such a manner that compartmented information is separated from intelligence that can be widely disseminated by a “tear line” (the J-2 and component intelligence staff officers keep information above the tear line and disseminate the intelligence below). Having intelligence production agencies use such tear lines will greatly facilitate intelligence sharing.

(2) The joint force J-2, or delegated representative, obtains all the necessary foreign disclosure authorization from Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), national agencies, and other originators of controlled classified information as soon as possible to allow for the seamless transfer of information to foreign partners engaged in joint operations. The efficient flow of intelligence will be enhanced by the assignment of formally trained personnel who are knowledgeable of foreign disclosure.

7. Information Sharing

a. Information sharing is critical to the efficient pursuit of a common humanitarian purpose. Although many different groups and authorities can (and should) work in parallel, a collaborative information environment (CIE) facilitates information sharing. Constructing a CIE is not primarily a technology issue — effective, low-cost, network equipment and data management systems exist today, and more are being developed. Rather, the challenges are largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational. These impediments can limit and shape the willingness of civilian and military personnel and organizations to openly cooperate and share information and capabilities.

b. The components of civil-military coordination consist of information and task sharing and collaborative planning — all of which depend on communications and management of data and information. The following issues, however, often complicate effective civil-military coordination:
(1) lack of understanding about the information culture of the affected nation.

(2) Suspicions regarding the balance between information sharing and intelligence gathering.

(3) Tensions between military needs for classification (secrecy) of data, versus the civilian need for transparency.

(4) Differences in the C2 style of military operations versus civilian activities.

(5) The compatibility and interoperability of planning tools, processes, and civil-military organization cultures.

c. The sharing of information is particularly critical because no single responding entity—whether it is an NGO, IGO, assisting country government or host government—can be the source of all of the required data and information. Making critical information widely available to multiple responding civilian and military elements not only reduces duplication of effort, but also enhances coordination and collaboration and provides a common knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analyzed, compared, contrasted, validated, and reconciled. Civil-military collaboration networks need to be designed to dismantle traditional institutional stovepipes and facilitate the sharing of information among civilian and military organizations.

8. Protection

a. For the joint force, force protection is a high priority. Even in a permissive environment, the joint force can expect to encounter banditry, vandalism, and various levels of violent activities from criminals or unruly crowds. It is imperative that the joint force be trained and equipped to mitigate threats to US personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information. All deploying members should be provided with threat and force protection briefings prior to and throughout the duration of the operation.

b. As in any operation, force protection in FHA is enhanced by establishing effective counterintelligence support and by practicing strict OPSEC.

Counterintelligence support will be conducted in accordance with JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (classified document).

c. In addition to force protection, the joint force may also be tasked to provide protection for other personnel and assets. If not clearly stated in the mission, the extent of this security should be addressed in the ROE, to include protection of:

(1) Forces of other nations working jointly with US forces in a multinational force.
(2) USG, NGO, and IGO personnel and equipment.

(3) HA recipients.

(4) Affected country personnel and assets.

(5) Humanitarian relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes.

(6) Relief distribution centers.

(7) Stocks of HA supplies.

(8) Ports and airfields.

(9) Hospitals and medical clinics.

d. Nonlethal Weapons. Nonlethal weapons provide an additional tool for force protection that may be particularly useful during FHA operations in which the use of lethal force may jeopardize strategic objectives.

e. When an FHA operation occurs in an area torn by war or civil strife, security operations may include removal of booby-traps, mine-clearing, and other ordnance disposal efforts. For example, during Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia), US Joint Forces provided explosive ordnance disposal teams to clear unexploded ordnance (remnants of war) and destroy captured enemy ammunition. A program instituted for a short period called “Food for Arms” proved to be dangerous due to locals bringing unexploded ordnance into aid stations to exchange for food – creating a dangerous environment for both the Somali people and UN forces.

f. Regardless of the environment, security must be factored into force requirements and support capability. In FHA operations, sustainment forces will require a substantial amount of their troops to protect unit and individual property.

9. Engineer Operations

a. FHA operations can be extremely engineer-intensive. In such cases, the JFC may opt to establish a subordinate JTF to control extensive engineer operations and missions. Such a JTF may be formed around an existing engineer command or naval construction regiment. Engineer forces could be placed under OPCON, TACON, or in a supporting role. The engineer assets attached to the subordinate JTF will normally be made up of a mix of engineer assets drawn from the entire force’s engineer resources. If the subordinate JTF is to provide a common support capability, it will require a specific delegation of directive authority from the CCDR for the common support capability that is to be provided.
b. In addition to USG agencies, the joint force engineer and staff may have to coordinate engineering activities with NGOs. NGOs may have unique engineering capabilities that can be leveraged as part of the overall operational effort. One example of great interest to engineers is their ability to conduct humanitarian demining operations. These organizations may also request extensive military engineer support for their activities and programs. It is critical to establish an effective engineer liaison in the CMOC to coordinate and execute engineering support with these organizations.

c. Typical engineer missions for FHA include:

(1) Training.

(2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

(3) Well drilling.

(4) Clearing debris.

(5) Construction of relief centers and camps for dislocated civilians.

(6) Sanitation.

(7) Potable water production and distribution.

(8) Emergency power and lighting.

(9) Restoring public facilities and transportation routes.

(10) Reestablishing rudimentary utilities.

(11) Support to urban SAR.

(12) Construction of temporary facilities.

(13) Specialized underwater services to include clearing of obstacles, survey of port facilities, and salvage of vessels.

d. The level of assistance can vary from limited, highly specialized teams to complete engineer units. Limited teams are used to assess damage or estimate engineering repairs and can assist in specialized support such as power supply and distribution, utilities repair work, water purification, and well drilling operations. In large FHA and disaster relief operations, engineer units provide essential general engineering support including facility construction, structural repair, and camp construction for deployed forces. Initially, US military forces may be the only organization in the JOA capable of providing assistance, and military engineers will normally be tasked to provide
extensive cleanup and construction services. Requests for military support, including engineering support, should be initiated and coordinated through the CMOC.

For additional information on engineer operations, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

10. Rules of Engagement

ROE are the directives issued by competent, military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. **ROE define when and how force may be used.** CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces* (classified document), provides ROE that apply to US forces during all military operations, unless directed otherwise by SecDef. **For each specific operation the JFC, in conjunction with the J-3 and the SJA, develops ROE** (as soon as possible after notification of the deployment) **within the framework of the standing rules of engagement (SROE).** The ROE should specifically address nonlethal force options and employment considerations. The proposed JTF ROE must be forwarded to the Joint Staff for SecDef review and approval prior to promulgation. In many situations, the mission may require specific ROE measures in addition to the basic SROE. Supplemental measures in the SROE enable the CDR to obtain or grant those additional authorities or restraints necessary to accomplish the mission. The JFC must submit the changes through the appropriate approving official. **When multinational forces are under US control, US CDRs need to ensure that those forces interpret the ROE in the same manner as US forces.** When multinational forces not under US control are involved, US CDRs should request that those forces adopt or agree to ROE similar to or compatible with those in effect for US forces. As a minimum, US CDRs must understand the differences in the various participating countries’ ROE and the impact on operations.

*Appendix A, “Legal Issues,” further discusses ROE.*

11. Legal Considerations

Many aspects of FHA operations require scrutiny by legal experts. Key members of both the planning and operations staffs and SJA should review and assist in preparing SOFAs, ROE, OPLANs, OPORDs, and especially any agreements or memoranda of understanding established between US forces and the affected country or nonmilitary organizations involved in FHA operations.

12. Liaison

Direct, early liaison with UN and other humanitarian relief agencies is a valuable source of accurate, timely information on many aspects of the crisis area. OGA, UN, NGO, or IGO involvement is likely to precede that of US or multinational forces and presents an opportunity to enhance early force effectiveness significantly. A
Chapter IV

key additional benefit is an opportunity to build working relationships based upon trust and open communications among all organizations. For that reason, **ongoing liaison with other multinational forces** participating in the operation is equally important. Early in the operation FHA planners should ensure that sufficient, competent linguists be available for translation and interpretation requirements by the HN and the multinational forces. Regionally aligned CA personnel are well suited for liaison tasks.

*For further details concerning LNOs, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, and Field Manual (FM) 5-01.12, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-1B, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 5-02, and Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP [I]) 3-2.21, JTF LNO Integration, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Officer Integration.*

13. Strategic Communication

a. The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. SC’s primary communication capabilities are coupled with defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) and military diplomacy activities to implement a holistic SC effort.

b. Demonstrating US involvement in FHA operations can be extremely valuable to the image of the US supporting the achievement of SC goals as well as those of the GCC’s SCP. Activities that support SC inform affected populations about on-going efforts and assist in achieving JTF objectives. Communication activities are also key in achieving strategic objectives in the region by reinforcing themes and messages regarding US goodwill evidenced by ongoing FHA operations. Care must be taken not to raise expectations about the speed or amount of assistance that may be provided, as US involvement in an operation may automatically result in unrealistic expectations of assistance among the population. Unrealistic expectations may result in suspicion, resentment, and mistrust of HA providers.

c. Effective coordination and collaboration among all the SC capabilities are necessary to ensure unity of effort and consistency in the information being disseminated.

d. **Information Operations.** When conducting an FHA mission, generating goodwill for the services rendered and departing with a favorable impression of US activities becomes a secondary objective. Effective employment of two of the five IO core capabilities is important in FHA operations:

   (1) PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US activities to influence foreign audiences directly through the use of radio, print, and other media. To be effective, peacetime military PSYOP are conducted in accordance with DODDS S-3321.1, *Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War (U)*, and require interagency coordination and authorization at the national level.
(2) **OPSEC.** JFCs provide OPSEC guidance and identify command-critical information to all supporting commands, subordinate commands, other agencies, and appropriate PA offices. JFCs also coordinate OPSEC measures and their execution with other commands and agencies of those activities.

e. **Synchronization.** Synchronized planning of IO, PA, and DSPD is essential for effective SC. Interagency efforts provide and promote international support for nations in the region and provide an opportunity to advance our regional and global partnerships. JFCs should ensure that their IO, PA, and DSPD planning is consistent with theater strategic objectives and overall USG SC objectives. Since PA and IO support the dissemination of information themes, and messages to their respective audiences, their activities must be closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure consistency and to avoid loss of credibility by the joint force and other USG PA spokespersons.

14. Public Affairs

"JPASE [joint public affairs support element] teams were an essential part of our mission in Pakistan following the earthquake that devastated that country. They explained our mission to both Pakistani and International audiences, and above all, communicated our commitment to help the people of Pakistan. Their ability to get our messages was a top factor in the overall success of the mission."

Rear Admiral Mike LeFever
Commander, US Navy
US Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan
April 2006

a. **Overview.** PA should be involved at the first indication of potential FHA operations. The ability to disseminate public information via the news media during FHA effectively can be critical to operational success. Keeping domestic and international audiences informed of US support for FHA can also assist in SC and security cooperation goals; however, publicizing assistance efforts should not impede relief operations. Coordination with the HN via the country team is critical to ensure public information activities do not undermine or conflict with the efforts of the HN. The PA staff performs the following functions:

(1) Provides advice to the CCDR and staff on the public implications of potential and actual FHA operations.

(2) Identifies force structure, equipment and logistics requirements for PA support to specific operations.

(3) Evaluates the need for JPASE support and facilitates requests.
(4) Establishes liaison with PA counterparts (i.e., country team, HN, NGOs, IGOs) in the operational area.

(5) Participates in planning.

(6) Plans and synchronizes US military public information strategies and resources in order to communicate timely, factual, unclassified information about FHA operations.

(7) Provides media support/operates the JIB.

(8) Conducts analysis and assessment of public communication efforts.

b. Organization. The size and organization of the PA staff for FHA will depend on mission and operational requirements, and the anticipated media interest. Generally, the PAO and staff located in the JFC HQ, while the JIB is located in a secure area that is both convenient to the media and has good connectivity and access to JFC HQ PA staff. There may be existing media centers set up by other agencies with opportunities for partnerships.

c. Public Information. FHA operations generate substantial media interest for which the JFC, PAO and staff must be prepared. Mass distribution of information via the media is critical to creating public awareness of US and allied, coalition, and partner nations’ policies and objectives. Explaining what the US intends to achieve and why it is important helps gain public understanding and support for the operation and also counters efforts to portray US and partner activities and intentions in a negative light.

(1) The press will endeavor to get to the scene of relief activities as soon as possible and cover operations. Supporting their efforts supports the JFCs public information mission. Media should have as much access as possible throughout the operation. Information shall be made fully and readily available and shall be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the members of the Armed Forces. If access is not available, the media will turn to the military for imagery of operations; therefore it is critical that the joint force have a robust combat camera capability. Imagery from combat camera should be shared throughout the country team when possible.

(2) The establishment of a JIB at the outset of operations serves as a logistics and information base for the press and facilitates media coverage. The JIB staff manages media requirements and conducts the following functions:

(a) Establishes ground rules for press coverage of operations.

(b) Provides credentials to the media.

(c) Coordinates media logistics requirements.
(d) Escorts media.

(e) Coordinate PA requirements for combat camera imagery with J-3.

(f) Provides operational updates.

(g) Coordinates interview requests.

(h) Conducts press briefings.

(i) Collaborates with HN, NGOs, and IGOs on media operations.

(j) Disseminates news releases.

(k) Posts information about relief operations on DOD and relief web sites as appropriate.

(l) Provides media training as required.

(3) In the interest of NGO and IGO safety, permission must be obtained to publish their participation.

d. **Command Information Program.** Keeping military personnel informed of operations is key to their understanding of the mission and the value they place on their contribution to operations. At the outset of operations, the PA staff will provide the same information being disseminated publicly to the command for internal consumption. A more formal command information program may be established if the length of the FHA operation warrants and the PA staff is sufficient to support the endeavor.

e. The JFC and staff should expect and prepare for extensive media coverage during FHA operations. Visual media in particular can significantly influence public opinion. Positive press coverage serves as a force multiplier; therefore, media coverage of improved conditions will help sustain public support and also increase morale. Some images may have negative connotations for the media if they are not used to cover FHA operations. For example, barbed wire used to maintain a secure area to keep groups of dislocated civilians segregated from each other and the local population could be perceived as concentration camps by media not familiar with FHA operations. Therefore, the reasons and problems associated with this should be explained to the media.

*Refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for additional information.*

**15. Dislocated Civilians**

a. **An FHA operation will often involve dislocated civilians and refugees in particular.** Dislocated civilian support missions are specific humanitarian missions designed to support the repatriation or resettlement of these persons. International law
prohibits the forcible return of refugees to their country of origin or to any country where life or freedom would be threatened based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. The joint force role in providing for and protecting these groups will depend on the mission. In rare instances, joint forces may be called upon to establish dislocated civilian camps in a HN. In these cases, the JTF must take into account: legal considerations regarding availability and ownership of land for camps; coordination with the HN, OGAs, UN, NGOs, and IGOs; logistic factors connected with shelter, food, sanitation, and medical care; and possible contracting requirements for construction. If called upon to establish and operate camps, the joint force can refer to Air Force Handbook 10-222, Volume 22, Refugee Camp Planning and Construction Handbook, UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Migrant Camp Operations as excellent references. The general policy of the UN is that where refugees are present, the affected country will provide security, safety, assistance, and law and order. Additionally, military forces are not normally present in camps run by UNHCR. UNHCR will, upon government request, normally provide material assistance and protection to refugees. The ultimate goal is to return dislocated civilians to their homes. Although typically involved in the early response to a crisis involving dislocated civilians, US forces may be tasked to provide any portion of this assistance. Note: The term dislocated civilian is unique to DOD and not used by DOS, NGOs, or IGOs. These organizations use the term “IDPs” for civilians displaced within their country and “refugee” for people who flee their country of origin and cross an international border. See specific definitions below.

b. The following distinctions exist among the various categories of dislocated civilians.

1. **Displaced persons** is a term used to refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively.

   a. **Returnees** are displaced persons who have returned voluntarily to their former place of residence.

   b. **Resettled persons** are a subset of displaced persons – civilians wishing to return somewhere other than their previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement.

2. **Evacuees** are civilians who are removed from their places of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. Note: The term evacuee is unique to DOD and not used by DOS (except for NEOs), NGOs, or IGOs.

3. **IDPs** are any persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or place of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.
(4) **Migrants** are persons who, belong to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries, or have fled their native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution. Migrants travel to escape economic stagnation and poverty. This is in contrast to refugees, who travel to escape persecution, conflict, and perhaps death.

(5) **Refugees** are any persons who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality and are unable or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. It is important to understand the differences among refugees and other categories because of associated legal ramifications. Refugees are entitled to special protection because they can no longer avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality. (DOS provides guidance as to what groups of people are classified as refugees. This description is provided as general guidance.) DOD personnel should request specific DOS guidance when involved in operations that require the classification of groups of displaced persons.

(6) **Stateless persons** are civilians who either have been denationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish their right to the nationality claimed.

c. While the following are not categories of dislocated civilians, they are categories of civilians with whom military members may come in contact in an operational area and should be part of this discussion for FHA.

(1) **Trafficking victims** are persons subjected to sex trafficking (i.e., recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act) in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjecting to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. Simply stated, trafficking in persons (TIP) is modern-day slavery, involving victims who are forced, defrauded, or coerced into labor or sexual exploitation.

(a) DOD opposes prostitution, forced labor, and any related activities that may contribute to the phenomenon of TIP as inherently harmful and dehumanizing. TIP is a violation of US law and internationally recognized human rights and is incompatible with DOD core values.

(b) CDRs should deter activities of DOD Service members, civilian employees, indirect hires, contract personnel, and command-sponsored dependents that would facilitate or support TIP, domestically and overseas.
(c) CDRs provide support to HN authorities involved in the battle against TIP. CDRs and military police should meet periodically with NGOs to review TIP-related issues and prevention initiatives.

(d) CDRs incorporate anti-TIP and TIP-protection measures for vulnerable populations, in particular for women and children, into post-conflict and humanitarian emergency assistance programs.

(2) **Vulnerable persons** are persons who may not have equal access to HA because of physical, cultural, or social barriers, (e.g., women, children, elderly, disabled, ethnic minorities, and people living with an incurable virus or disease). While this is not a legal distinction, it is important to describe this population, as it is the most vulnerable with often the greatest needs.

*Appendix A, “Legal Issues,” provides additional information regarding the legal aspects of dislocated civilians.*

d. PRC assists HN governments in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder mission accomplishment. PRC measures seek to reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten FHA operation success.

(1) FHA operations can be disrupted by:

(a) Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of frightened civilians.

(b) Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians conducting legitimate activities.

(c) Illegal or illegitimate activities such as insurgent operations or black-market activities.

(d) Uncontrolled outbreak of disease among dislocated civilians.

(2) PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control.

(a) **Populace control** provides for security of the populace, mobilization of human resources, denial of personnel availability to the enemy, and detection and reduced effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement. Dislocated civilian support operations are a subset of populace control.

(b) **Resources control** regulates the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources
control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (e.g., roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

(3) Normally these controls are a responsibility of indigenous civil governments. PRC measures implemented by a joint force are necessary when HN civil authorities or agencies are either unable or unwilling to undertake that responsibility. They are further defined and enforced during times of civil or military emergency.

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**OPERATION SHINING HOPE**

In the spring of 1999, Serbian aggression in the Balkans forced hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians to flee their homes in Kosovo and seek refuge in neighboring countries. US European Command established Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE to support refugee humanitarian relief. Planning, design, and construction of three camps in southern Albania capable of supporting 60,000 refugees began almost immediately. US Air Forces in Europe civil engineers, using contractor support through the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program and along with US Navy Seabee forces, completed one 18,500-person camp in just 51 days with two additional camps well underway. Lessons learned from this experience stress the importance of early, active, and continuing involvement of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, US Agency for International Development, and the nongovernmental organizations who will eventually operate the camp. This is essential to appropriately balance and incorporate the needs of the refugee population to be supported.

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**VARIOUS SOURCES**

More detailed information may be found in JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, which provides specific guidance on PRC.

16. **Health Service Support**

   a. Medical forces typically have three missions in FHA operations: force health protection, care for disaster victims, and assisting in reestablishing indigenous public health resources and institutions affected by the disaster. Medical planning should be integrated into overall response early and prior to deployment.

   b. JFCs have overall responsibility for HSS and force health protection for forces assigned or attached to their command. FHA operations may place US forces in situations that may substantially increase the risk of disease; food, water, blood products, high levels of industrial pollution, stress, fatigue, and indigenous diseases combine to provide a high-risk environment for all assigned personnel. This requires that the JTF have robust preventive medicine assets to perform medical and environmental health risk assessments and identify effective preventive medicine measures to counter the threat to US forces.

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c. Specific to humanitarian missions, medical forces are usually asked to support local military and civilian health systems and often provide direct public health care to include primary medical, dental, veterinary, and other needed care. These missions must always be coordinated closely with the HN medical authorities, NGOs and IGOs. Primary consideration must be given to supporting and supplementing existing medical infrastructure. **The JFC must ensure that no operation is considered that could have the effect of supplanting the existing medical infrastructure.** If authorized, US forces may also provide health care to foreign civilian populations on an urgent or emergent basis (within resource limitations) and return them to their national health systems at the earliest opportunity or when services can be provided by other agencies and organizations; such operations, however, pose the greatest risk for supplanting the existing medical infrastructure.

**HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT DURING THE 2005 PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE**

During the Pakistan earthquake relief effort in 2005, two US military medical units treated tens of thousands of patients, conducted nearly 500 surgeries, and administered over 10,000 immunizations. Following the earthquake, the US had its first relief supplies on the ground within 24 hours of the initial quake. However, it took 16 days before the first medical unit was fully operational. Some assets were not fully operational until 40 days after the initial earthquake.

With no international health specialist or medical planning guidance from Combined Disaster Assistance Center – Pakistan (CDAC-PAK), the standard of care for the theater was not determined or published until weeks into the operation. CDAC-PAK medical units provided a quality of care in excess of the pre-earthquake host nation capabilities and, unfortunately, this direct medical assistance negatively impacted local economies.

Without realizing the negative impact that it would have, CDAC-PAK medical units continued seeing patients for almost five months after there were no more victims with wounds resulting from the earthquake. Free medications undermined local pharmacies and created a pharmaceutical black market in the local towns. Local physicians and pharmacists lost patients and closed their offices/shops and left their local communities due to the presence of the no-cost US medical care.

Source: Condensed from: Lt Col William A. Mosier and Walter H. Orthner, *Military Medical Support for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Lessons Learned From the Pakistan Earthquake Relief Effort* Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal, June 2007


d. Medical personnel may be called on to assist in reestablishing and supporting indigenous medical infrastructure, particularly those affected by disaster. Improving the medical systems near US and multinational forces fosters self-sufficiency and may contribute to accomplishing the US military mission sooner. Care must be taken to
ensure that reestablished health care standards are appropriate for the local population and at a level that can be maintained by the existing HN medical infrastructure.

e. US military medical personnel do not routinely care for dislocated civilians unless specifically authorized. The joint force surgeon should develop medical engagement protocols and standards of care prior to deployment and ensure all providers understand the circumstances under which urgent and non-urgent patients should be evaluated, evacuated, and treated in military treatment facilities. UNHCR normally coordinates the care of refugees by NGOs.

f. In some FHA missions, HSS may be the primary capability employed. During an FHA mission, a hospital or medical command may be the principal unit deployed, and the CDR also may be the CJTF.

*For additional considerations for providing HSS in FHA operations, see Appendix E, “Health Service Support in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations.”*

### 17. Mortuary Affairs

a. GCCs are responsible for giving authoritative direction and guidance on providing mortuary affairs (MA) support to all assigned and attached forces within their AORs. They designate a Service component to serve as the lead Service for the theater MA support program at the AOR level and as necessary, designate a lead Service at selected subordinate JFC-levels and assign responsibilities, tasks, assets, and organize commands as necessary to execute the lead Service MA mission. GCCs assume lead responsibility and coordination for fatalities occurring within the command’s AOR and assign tasks, assets, and organize commands as necessary to execute the MA mission. They establish a joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO) to provide oversight of MA support within their AOR and provide MA support to other combatant commands when appropriate. It is the responsibility of unit CDRs sustaining losses to recover the human remains and evacuate them to the nearest MA collection point. Every effort will be made to identify human remains and account for unrecovered human remains of US military personnel, government employees, government contractors, their dependents, and others who die in military operations, training accidents, and other multiple fatality incidents.

*More detailed information may be found in JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.*

b. Upon notification of a FHA mission, the responsible GCC should task the J-4 to develop a staff estimate and provide planning guidance for MA operations based on the overall mission analysis and COAs. During the analysis phase, the staff officer should contact the J-4 of the Joint Staff to determine if any cooperation agreements exist between the supported foreign government and multinational partners. During this phase, the GCC’s J-4 logistic planners should coordinate with subordinate and supporting commands to determine their MA force structure and capabilities.
c. **Joint Task Force-Mortuary Affairs Office (JTF-MAO).** If determined necessary, the GCC may delegate MA support authority to the subordinate JFC which will allow the CDR to designate a lead Service component (usually the Army) to handle MA for the command. Additionally, the subordinate JFC (i.e., CJTF) may direct the J-4 to establish and operate a JTF-MAO. If established, the JTF-MAO should:

1. Provide guidance to facilitate the conduct of MA programs.

2. Maintain data pertaining to the recovery, identification, and disposition of all US deceased and missing in the designated operational area.

3. Serve as an MA liaison between the CJTF, the Service component MA offices, and the theater JMAO.

4. Serve as the central clearing point for MA-related information.

5. Monitor the deceased and missing personnel personal effects program.

6. Perform planning, execution, technical, and management functions.

7. Develop/disseminate standards/procedures and collect/present MA management statistical data.

8. Assist in developing appendix 3 (Mortuary Affairs) to annex D, (Logistics) to plans and orders, providing the overall concept of mortuary support to the operation (in close coordination with the combatant command JMAO). This appendix should be developed using the format in CJCSM 3122.03B, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats*. In addition to procedures for handling indigenous deceased, this appendix should include procedures for search, recovery, and evacuation of all JTF personnel.

d. **Considerations**

1. In general terms, legal obligations depend on whether the JTF is dealing with a deceased that was simply found within the operational area or if the death was associated with JTF actions. The JTF’s obligations concerning dead or buried bodies found in the operational area derive from the CDR’s responsibility for health and public hygiene of US forces. An example of this is contamination of water supplies from mass graves, or bodies washed from shallow graves, constituting a health hazard. In this consideration, reinterment should be facilitated. Reinterment of remains should be conducted following local religion and culture to the extent possible. Sufficient information must be maintained to identify burial sites and, where possible, the names of persons reinterred. Upon termination of reinterment operations, records should be turned over to the affected country government representatives. The death of a person associated with JTF actions requires an in-depth investigation. Processing of these remains will be in accordance with guidance provided by the SJA. Deaths of persons
under the care of the JTF, such as dislocated civilians seeking help at a site under JTF control, create other obligations, such as medical certification and recording of death. In countries where a governmental infrastructure is in place, death records should be registered with that government. Where there is no government, the JTF should maintain appropriate records for later disposition. The JTF-MAO is responsible for maintaining these records.

(2) In a FCM or nonpermissive situation, casualties may have died as a result of infectious or weaponized agents, or might be booby-trapped, regardless of the apparent cause of death. In order to prevent further casualties among those caring for the deceased, mortuary facilities should be designed with these possibilities taken into account when planning for casualty flow procedures.

(3) The JTF should attempt to coordinate with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the return of deceased local nationals to local governmental control. These organizations can provide invaluable assistance in locating the next of kin of the deceased.

(4) Multinational partners and other non-US dead will be processed in accordance with international agreements or guidance from the supported CCDR. In cases of foreign nationals or relief organizations requesting MA support, the JTF-MAO will coordinate with the DOS representative through the CMOC or HOC in the affected area.

18. Religious Support

a. Religious support in joint operations includes the entire range of professional duties a joint force chaplain (JFCH) performs in the dual role of religious leader and staff officer. Religious support is dedicated to meeting the personal, free exercise of religion needs of members of the joint force and providing CDRs with professional advice regarding the dynamic influence of religion and religious beliefs. Military CDRs are responsible to provide opportunity for the free exercise of religion.

b. Religion may play a pivotal role in understanding the culture, requirements, attitude, and desires of a population and its government and may have a significant impact on the goals, objectives, nature of support, and CONOPS for the FHA operation.

c. By recognizing the significance of religion, cultural sensitivities and ideology held by the local population, allies, coalition partners, and potential adversaries, CDRs may avoid unintentionally alienating friendly military forces or civilian populations which could hamper military operations. CDRs and their staffs may also consider religion, other cultural issues, and ideology while developing schemes of maneuver and ROE or planning CMO, PSYOP, IO, and PA activities. CDRs must weigh the benefit of working with organizations that provide conditional aid vis-à-vis the risk of alienating the population.
d. Chaplain involvement during the planning process ensures that the religious needs of US forces are met. The JFCHs may assist the staff in developing an engagement strategy by providing advice within the scope of their expertise on these organizations and the influence of religion in the operational area. In a religiously diverse operational area, the JFCHs may provide relevant information on the religions of multinational partners and the adversary, which includes issues of national, regional, and sect or group religious customs, traditions, organizations, communities, symbols, facilities, and sensitivities.

e. When appropriate, and in coordination with the CMOC, **chaplains may serve as liaison** to NGOs that have a religious affiliation. The USG supports faith-based organizations, but USG policy strictly states that USG assistance must be distributed based on need, not based on religious affiliation or for the purpose of influencing the religious beliefs of a population. Reports of USG assistance being distributed in violation of this policy should be reported to the embassy, DOS, and/or USAID. Additionally, chaplains may accompany elements of the joint force as they distribute relief supplies or have other interactions (e.g., security patrols) with the local populace. This provides an opportunity to expand or enhance community outreach and allows the chaplain to evaluate and experience first-hand the operational environment and its impact on the morale of the unit and individual service members. This experience will be useful when advising the CDR and counseling those members of the joint force that may seek the chaplain’s advice.

f. In coordination with CA personnel, chaplains may provide **pastoral support to dislocated civilians** only when directed by the JFC after consulting the SJA. In such cases, it is critical to avoid any activities which may be construed as proselytizing among dislocated civilians for one particular faith. The chaplain pastoral mission generally is limited to US military and DOD civilian personnel and, if required by the circumstances, to fulfill any obligation the JFC may have to protected persons under international law.

*For more detailed information on religious support, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations.*

19. **Environmental Considerations**

a. Environmental issues can have strategic, operational, or tactical implications and thus should be incorporated into planning and operations. Natural resources protection can be a key strategic mission objective, important to HN reconstruction. Failure to recognize environmental threats can result in significant health risks to the JTF, adversely impacting readiness. If not appropriately addressed, environmental issues have the potential to impact negatively local community relations, affect insurgent activities, and create diplomatic problems for the JTF.

b. **Joint Environmental Management Board (JEMB).** The CCDR or subordinate JFC may establish a JEMB to assist in managing environmental requirements. The JEMB is a temporary board, chaired by the combatant command or subordinate joint
force engineer, with members from the joint force staff, components, and any other required special activities (e.g., legal, medical, and CA). The board establishes policies, procedures, priorities, and the overall direction for environmental management requirements in a JOA. The JEMB will coordinate its activities with the combatant command or subordinate joint force engineering staff. The JEMB also provides guidance on development of annex L, (Environmental Considerations) of plans and orders, and, if appropriate, assumes responsibility for preparation and updates of this annex.

c. **Environmental Support Operations.** The intent of environmental support operations is to minimize adverse environmental impact, ensure the safety and health of personnel, and reduce post-deployment environmental cleanup. While deployed engineering units may have the capability to provide environmental support, the use of contractors is usually required for long-term or large-scale projects. Typical environmental support operations include:

1. Initial environmental baseline surveys.
2. Site surveys to determine environmental and cultural conditions.
3. Integration of environmental considerations into plans.
4. Recommendations for nontoxic, environmentally benign material substitution.
5. Emergency response plans, training and initial actions.
6. Establishment of solid and liquid waste disposal systems.
7. Establishment of hazardous materials distribution centers.
8. Establishment of hazardous waste collection, long-term storage, and shipment center.
10. Closure environmental baseline surveys and removal of wastes and excess supplies.

*For additional information on environmental considerations, refer to Appendix D, “Environmental Considerations,” in JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.*

20. **Foreign Consequence Management**

a. FCM is assistance provided by the USG to a HN to assist friends and allies to assess and respond to a CBRN incident in order to mitigate human casualties and to provide temporary associated essential services.
b. The JFC responsible for FCM focuses on mitigating the consequences of the CBRN incident. Understanding the effects of CBRN on the populace and the infrastructure is essential for the JFC to apply the right resources at the right time. Even prior to being formally tasked to assist, the JFC should strive to develop full situational awareness with respect to the incident’s cause to understand the event’s impact better and to prevent further injury or harm to the civilian populace or the responding joint force. In suspected or known adversary attacks, situational awareness is especially important for force protection consideration and to assess possible concurrent operation requirements such as disaster relief. Situational awareness may be gained through the deployment of a survey and assessment team (SAT) to the US embassy of the affected nation.

c. Primary responsibility for FCM rests with the HN, unless otherwise stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements. Unless otherwise directed by the President, the DOS is the LFA for USG FCM operations and is responsible for coordinating the overall USG FCM response. When requested by the LFA and directed by SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM operations as appropriate. The response may include a number of USG agencies with specialized capabilities, in addition to forces provided by DOD. The ability of the USG to assist a HN government and its affected population is determined by the nature of the CBRN event, the forces available to provide assistance, and the time required to deploy to the vicinity of the incident. Rapid FCM assistance and coordination is directly proportional to the success in mitigating the effects of the CBRN incident.

d. DOD support to USG FCM operations is a series of coordinated efforts in response to requests from the LFA to support a HN. FCM may require specialized capabilities to include but not limited to hazardous materials handling, decontamination, urban SAR, public health and medical care, and public notification efforts beyond the scope or scale of traditional disaster relief efforts to manage the impacts of CBRN hazards. Additionally, DOD, through the supported CCDR, will provide representation to the DOS-led FEST/CM support team to support USG FCM operations, as requested by the DOS and directed by SecDef. DOD will retain C2 of all DOD assets (personnel, infrastructure, and equipment) supporting the LFA in USG FCM operations.

e. Foreign Consequence Management Operations

(1) USG and national agencies, allied nations’ military and civilian agencies, IGOs, and NGOs perform roles in FCM operations, if requested by the HN. While each entity might maintain a unique capability, coordination of requested assistance and the overall response effort is the responsibility of the HN. The DOS retains responsibility for coordination among USG entities.

(2) Generally, FCM operations will not be conducted during hostile action; however, situations may arise where FCM may be required at the request and in support of the HN. For example, insurgents commit CBRN incidents against a new government. The new government may request response assistance from US and multinational forces.
The USG may direct the US military to secure the area around the incident to establish the most permissive environment possible to facilitate coordinated response efforts.

(3) **Immediate Response.** When conditions resulting from any emergency or attack require immediate action, local military CDRs may take such actions as necessary to save lives. When such compelling conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher HQ, CDRs or officials acting under the “immediate response authority” may take necessary action to respond to requests from local HN authorities or the COM. They must advise higher HQ of assistance being provided by the most expeditious means available, and seek approval or additional authorizations as needed. The GCC will notify the affected COM at the time of higher HQ notification. Activities conducted under immediate response authority are not considered FCM operations, however, the JFC responsible for the FCM operation should consider the further utilization of forces providing assistance under immediate response authority.

f. **Foreign Consequence Management Planning Considerations**

(1) FCM plans should include support related to essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services may include transportation, communications, CBRN reconnaissance, public works, fire-fighting, information planning, care of mass casualties, resources support, essential and routine health and medical services, urban SAR, hazardous materials mitigation, food preparation and distribution, and energy generation and distribution. Additionally, FCM response may require specialized hazard material handling, and decontamination planning efforts to enhance foreign disaster relief efforts.

(2) US forces will conduct FCM operations in support of the LFA, to mitigate the effects of a CBRN incident in the HN. All DOD support to the HN will be coordinated by DOS through the responsible COM and country team. The DOD recognizes that FCM operations may involve military assets and these assets may be the earliest USG assistance to arrive and may constitute the largest USG contribution. Additionally military assets deployed initially for FCM activities may be directed by the President or SecDef to remain in support of FHA tasks under separate authorities.

g. **Foreign Consequence Management Phases.** FCM operations are composed of five phases and are scoped by tasks to be accomplished. The phases, while sequential, may overlap in execution. Prior to an FCM event and during Phase 0 (Shaping), DOD is organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to support USG efforts in a FCM environment. Engagement and interagency coordination are key tasks of this phase as plans development and constant monitoring for a developing crisis. The DOD will assist DOS in shaping the environment through theater security cooperation, IO, and support to DOS efforts in an effort to prevent or avert a CBRN incident.

(1) Phase I (Situation Assessment and Preparation). Transition to Phase I occurs on reliable indications and warnings of a CBRN event or upon notification an event has occurred. Phase I includes those actions required to conduct situation
assessment and preparation, including the timely and accurate assessment of the CBRN situation, preparation for deployment and the deployment of selected advance elements. This may include, but is not limited to the GCC’s SAT. Phase I ends when the nature and scope of the CBRN situation and initial response force requirements are defined. Additionally, any limited initial response to a CBRN incident conducted by DOD CDRs operating under immediate response authority would likely occur during Phase I.

(2) Phase II (Deployment). Phase II begins with SecDef approved CJCS deployment or execute order designating the intermediate and forward staging bases and establishing formal command relationships (i.e., supported and supporting CDRs). The order serves as the formal authority for the deployment of forces. Phase II ends when all forces have completed movement to the designated incident location and supporting locations.

(3) Phase III (Assistance to HN Authorities). Phase III begins with the arrival of required military assistance at the incident location and supporting locations and ends with the determination that DOD support is no longer required or appropriate. CDRs begin planning immediately for transition to HN and civilian agencies, including USG, other governments, donors and NGOs, and should identify the necessary or minimum conditions to initiate transition to other agencies.

(4) Phase IV (Transition to HN and Other Agencies). Although planning for transition of FCM begins as soon as practical following the initial response, Phase IV begins with the formal implementation of the transition plan for those tasks and responsibilities being accomplished by DOD and ends when directed by SecDef or HN has assumed full responsibility for CM activities.

(5) Phase V (Redeployment). Phase V begins with the redeployment of US military forces involved in the FCM operations, or the formal transition of those forces to a purely FHA mission. Phase V is complete when all forces have returned to their previous military posture, or other missions.


21. Change of Mission

Periodic review of the mission statement will determine whether the force’s actions still support SecDef and supported GCC’s intent. The JFC must be prepared to react to a change of mission during an FHA operation, as directed by the chain of command. The JFC must also guard against an unintentional change of mission, sometimes referred to as “mission creep.” A clearly articulated end state and
appropriate MOEs help the JFC protect against this phenomenon. Other organizations involved in the operation may have differing views of the end state, and request support from the joint force that falls outside the stated mission. Although these requests may seem logical and within the joint force’s capabilities, the JFC must be pragmatic when dealing with these organizations’ attempts to change the joint force’s mission without SecDef direction.

22. Transition or Termination

a. The termination of military FHA operations will normally involve a transition of relief activities to US, intergovernmental, or HN relief organizations. Termination occurs when the relief efforts have been successfully transitioned or when the SecDef directs. Planning for transition should be incorporated as early as possible in all aspects of operational planning for FHA.

b. Criteria for transition may be based on events, MOEs, availability of resources, or a specific date. Examples of events that may be included in termination criteria include: restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area; an acceptable drop in mortality rates; or a certain percentage of dislocated civilians returned to their homes. When other organizations (such as OFDA, UN, NGOs, and IGOs) have marshalled the necessary capabilities to assume the mission, US forces may execute a transition plan.

c. Transition may occur between the joint force and a variety of elements, such as the HN, the UN, or other nations’ forces. A detailed plan addressing the various FHA functions and to whom they will transition will greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. When transitioning to nonmilitary organizations, an unclassified transition plan written in easily understood terms, not loaded with military jargon, is required. Organizing the plan by specific FHA functions, humanitarian clusters or sectors (such as provision of food, restoration of facilities, and medical care) also enhance the transition. The joint force staff should periodically review the transition plan with all organizations that have a part in it. This will help ensure that planning assumptions are still valid, and determine if changes in the situation require changes in the transition plan.

d. Termination plans should cover transition to post-disaster or emergency activities and conditions as well as disposition of military forces. Operation and termination plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the deployment plan, with the termination plan serving as a supporting plan to the OPLAN.

e. Mission transition planning will be continuous and will be accorded equal priority with execution planning. At the outset, the joint force will work in close cooperation with the HN and other participating agencies to define the desired end state of the involvement of US military forces in these FHA and disaster relief operations. Universally understood and accepted MOEs will be developed that indicate achievement
of each element of the end state and provide the basis for timely and orderly redeployment of the joint force, while preserving continuity in the long-term relief operations.

f. Concept of Transition. Mission transition planning will be continuous throughout the operation. Specifically, it identifies the functions and tasks being performed by the joint force and determines which functions may be terminated when either the requirement no longer exists or is transferred to the HN or others. The transition plan consists of four phases: Phase A – Assessment, Phase B – Observation and Orientation, Phase C – Integration and Phase D – Handover.

g. Phasing the Transition

(1) Phase A — Assessment

(a) Concept. The assessment phase consists of a review of the functional tasks being performed by the joint force and determines whether these tasks can be terminated or transferred. This process is conducted in conjunction with, and with the concurrence of, the DOS through the COM. This phase also identifies the organizations and agencies (e.g., HN, NGOs, IGOs), most capable and willing to assume the functional tasks performed by the joint force. This phase is complete when all functional tasks have been identified for either transfer or termination and the HN, NGOs, and IGOs have been identified and accept responsibility for performing that functional responsibility.

(b) Intent. The purpose of this phase is to review the functional tasks performed by the joint force and determine which long-term tasks will be handled by the HN, NGOs, and IGOs. The method is to identify functional tasks for either transition or termination. Once determined for transition, the appropriate HN agency, NGO, or IGO is identified to assume that functional responsibility. The end state is achieved once the long-term transfer tasks have been identified and affiliated with the agency or organization willing to accept responsibility.

(2) Phase B — Observation and Orientation

(a) Concept. This phase builds on the analysis and agreements obtained in Phase A. The organizations identified for transfer duties will observe the functional tasks that the joint force is currently performing. The objective is to accomplish a seamless transfer of functional tasks from the joint force to transfer organizations without any loss of support or international commitment. This phase is complete when transfer organizations have their required assets in place in accordance with the timeliness previously agreed upon. Care should be taken during this phase to ensure that the nonmilitary audiences involved do not perceive joint force efforts as a way to impose military procedures on their own time-tested approaches. In some cases, joint force elements may be performing civilian tasks because of a lack of civilian resources.
(b) **Intent.** The purpose of this phase is to orient and familiarize transfer organizations with the functional tasks being performed by the joint force. When necessary for use, the method is to educate, orient, and train or familiarize the HN, NGO, and IGO leadership on the functional tasks and methods employed by the joint force. The end state is the alignment of the HN or appropriate NGO or IGO with the component of the joint force currently performing the assigned function.

### (3) Phase C — Integration

(a) **Concept.** Integration is defined by participation of the HN, NGOs, or IGOs in functional tasks supporting the HN, not by the integration of the HN, NGOs and IGOs into the joint force. The integration phase initiates the direct involvement of the HN, NGOs, IGOs in the functional tasks being performed by the joint force that will require long-term continuation. The objective is to increase HN, NGO, and IGO levels of support (within their capabilities) until they assume full responsibility for the functional support. Progress is quantified by the percentage of functional task support provided by each agency over time. This phase incrementally increases the level of involvement by the HN, NGOs, or IGOs while proportionately decreasing the level of involvement by the JTF. The use of universally understood and mutually accepted MOEs will facilitate integration of the HN, NGOs, and IGOs by building mutual support for the functional tasks. This phase ends when all functional elements performed by the joint force are capable of being transferred to properly trained, equipped, and capable organizations.

(b) **Intent.** The purpose of this phase is to initiate and progressively increase the level of support provided by the HN, NGOs, and IGOs until they are capable of sustained operations in a designated cluster or humanitarian sector. Critical to this integration is the continual monitoring of the MOEs to ensure no lag or loss of support to the HN. The method is to progressively increase levels of HN, NGO, and IGO involvement in performing joint force-run functional tasks. The end state is realized when all functional tasks are being performed by non-joint force organizations, fully trained, equipped, and capable of performing sustained operations.

### (4) Phase D — Hand Over

(a) **Concept.** The hand over phase culminates with the end of joint force direct involvement in humanitarian support to the HN. The objective is a seamless transfer of responsibility for functional tasks from the joint force to the HN, NGOs, and IGOs. These organizations must also be fully trained, equipped, and capable of assuming their functional tasks over the long term. These organizations must also be perceived by the public as being credible and capable of performing their designated functional tasks. Progress is marked by the hand over of specified functional tasks to non-joint force organizations. This phase ends when all functional areas performed by the joint force have been successfully assumed by either the HN, NGOs, or IGOs.

(b) **Intent.** The purpose of this phase is to hand over all functional tasks performed by the joint force to either the HN, NGOs, or IGOs. The method is to train
capable HN agencies, NGOs, and IGOs, incrementally increase their involvement, then disengage when they reach a mission-capable state. The end state is realized when all functional tasks are being performed by non-joint force organizations without the presence of the joint force.

h. Incremental Transition. While the four phase transition model may be appropriate in most FHA operations, the operational environment may drive a more incremental transition. A gradual transition may occur with a shrinking military footprint across both geographical areas and humanitarian clusters.

**OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE: TSUNAMI TRANSITIONS**

Military-to-civilian transition planning was challenging, and determining when military assistance was sufficient and complete was particularly difficult. Because of the unfamiliar operating environment, deciding when to transition relief efforts from military to civilian forces initially boggled military planners’ minds. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) participation in the planning process was particularly valuable. NGO and IGO representatives were impressed that we were developing a transition plan early in the operation. Planning for transition involved two steps: mission analysis and course of action (COA) development.

Mission analysis. The transition was actually a continuous operation, moving from military assistance to international response efforts to a final long-term host nation (HN) effort. The United Nations (UN) representative emphasized that the transition would not move from a well-defined military structure to a well-defined, centrally controlled civilian structure, but more likely flow outward from the military structure to numerous NGOs and IGOs and HN governments. The transition would be quite different from the usual battle handover familiar to military planners and not at all like the detailed process joint doctrine describes. The UN planner recommended transferring stored supplies to other organizations for distribution (to prevent waste) and identifying incomplete tasks to be handed over on transition. Two transitions occurred, one from military to international assets and the other from international to HN assets. The handovers occurred not at specific times, but in windows or periods of transition during which relief providers performed simultaneous, overlapping missions in their areas of operation. HN approval of the transition plan was also critical.

COA development. While mission analysis went fairly smoothly, the Combined Support Force (CSF) had a difficult time formulating COAs. COA development for a transition that was somewhat ambiguous led planners to develop just one COA—a rough list of tasks for the subordinate elements to complete or pass on to other agencies as the CSF slowly shrank and eventually redeployed. The transition occurred in three phases: assessment, transition, and disengagement. Identifying the desired effects for the transition and then developing a process to
measure the CSF’s progress were critical steps in determining when the transition could begin. CSF commanders did not develop an effects list because they did not want to commit the force to effects that might eventually prove to be unrealistic or too costly. The CSF bogged down in discussion because there were too many different sets of standards (e.g., Sphere, number of requests for assistance [RFAs]) that could be applied. The CSF directed that the military footprint would slowly shrink when RFAs for military assistance decreased or were passed to aid agencies.

The end of military operations does not mean the end of relief operations; it only means that civilians are in control. The CSF was able to leverage into its transition plan the wealth of knowledge and experience NGO and IGO aid workers and partner nations brought to the operation. In the end, gaining civilian and partner-nation perspectives on the transition plan was key to the CSF’s successful transition and redeployment.

Source: Adapted from Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE: Tsunami Transitions 
Lieutenant Colonel James Daniel, US Army 
January-February 2006, Military Review

23. Redeployment

Redeployment planning should be conducted simultaneously with joint force deployment. Redeployment considerations depend upon mission accomplishment and diminished requirements for military support. FHA functions conducted by the joint force should be transferred to the HN, UN, NGOs, or IGOs when the capability exists for transition without support degradation. Redeployment by function is efficient and ensures that each FHA requirement is met or responsibility is assumed by other entities (HN, UN, NGOs, or IGOs). CDRs should continually evaluate mission requirements and redeploy unnecessary forces as soon as possible. Personnel rotation plans should also be considered for operations conducted over extended time periods.

OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE REDEPLOYMENT

What was noted on several occasions was also the duration of stay – military forces came in, performed their tasks and departed – thus fulfilling one maxim for perceived success - “leave whilst the audience is still applauding.”

Source: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 
Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami- Affected Countries Evaluation 
Findings - Sri Lanka -
ANNEX A
LEGAL ISSUES

Annex A Humanitarian Principles in the Law Of War

1. General

Significant and complex legal issues that surround FHA operations make it important that the JFC understand international and domestic legal principles associated with the mission. Issues involving international law include the law of war, the law of the sea, the status of persons encountered during the mission, ROE, and HN law while domestic legal issues include such subjects as fiscal law, military justice, claims, and intelligence oversight. These topics are discussed in this appendix. CDRs should consult their SJA on addressing these complex and interrelated issues.

2. Law of War

DOD policy is to apply law of war principles in every military operation, regardless of how that operation is characterized in accordance with DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program. In the context of FHA, perhaps the most important principle is the duty to “respect and protect” civilians and other noncombatants. Thus, responsibilities associated with armed conflict that may directly influence FHA operations include physical care for civilians and other noncombatants, property issues, and law enforcement responsibilities. Law of war principles for the treatment of civilians and other noncombatants should be considered as minimum standards, regardless of the nature of the operation or level of conflict. However, the laws and rules under which FHA forces operate may be significantly more restrictive than law of war standards, particularly relating to the use of force and combatant immunity for military personnel.


3. Laws and Jurisdictions of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Forces and the Host Nation

Members of FHA forces remain subject to national laws, policies, and regulations of their own nations, including military criminal codes. All US military personnel remain subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. JFCs are responsible for the discipline and administration of personnel assigned to the joint organization, and may be delegated courts-martial authority by the SecDef. In addition, a CCDR may prescribe procedures by which the senior officer of a Service assigned to the HQ element of a joint organization may exercise administrative and nonjudicial punishment authority over personnel of the same Service assigned to the same joint organization. CDRs have only limited administrative and disciplinary options for civilians who accompany the FHA.
Appendix A

force, which may result in difficult issues relating to both HN law and good order and discipline within the force. Absent international agreement provisions to the contrary, members of FHA forces both military and civilian, and activities of the FHA force, are most likely subject to HN law and jurisdiction. For example, the FHA force might be subject to HN import laws; duties and taxes; procurement laws; prohibitions or restrictions on carrying and use of weapons; and health, safety, and labor laws. Members of the FHA force are subject to actions in HN criminal and civil courts, unless a SOFA or other international agreement limits HN jurisdiction.

More detailed information may be found in JP1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and the Manual for Courts-Martial.

4. Status-of-Forces Agreements

A SOFA defines the legal status of a military force when deployed in the territory of a friendly state. A SOFA does not itself authorize the presence or activities of those forces. The purpose of a SOFA during FHA operations is to define how the sending and receiving states will share their sovereign prerogatives. SOFAs seek to define the rights, immunities, and duties of the force and its members. If no treaty or SOFA exists with the affected country, DOD must become involved in establishing the status of US forces. Authority to negotiate and conclude SOFAs must be obtained from DOS under its Circular 175 Procedure (US Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 11—Political Affairs, chapter 720). These agreements/arrangements should be in place in each country where forces will transit and or stage in support of FHA operations. In cases where time or circumstances do not permit the negotiation of a full SOFA, adequate protection for US forces may be obtained by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the United States and the HN. The DOS will have the lead for this action.

DODD 5530.3, International Agreements, provides guidance regarding the negotiation and conclusion of SOFAs and the DOD Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide provides current requirements for DOD personnel to enter and exit each nation.

5. Legal Status of United Nations Staff and Volunteers

UN staff members are entitled to legal protection under the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN. This provides protection from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the HN, and some other HN laws. When supporting a UN mission, US personnel might be entitled to expert-on-mission status, with some protection under the convention. United Nations volunteers (UNVs) are not UN “staff” members and as such are not subject to UN staff rules and regulations. These are persons performing functions or assignments for the UN under a contract of employment and are considered “agents” of the UN. UNVs are immune from legal process for their official acts. The UNDP resident representative is responsible for all arrangements relating to the security and protection of UNVs under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.
6. Legal Status of Nongovernmental Organizations

No legal regime governs the status and activities of NGOs. They are generally subject to HN laws and jurisdiction. Except for a regionally oriented Convention of the Council of Europe, no international treaty grants NGOs legal personality or authority. NGOs may have a national, legal status corresponding to the country in which each was established and is recognized. Their national government may be a source of protection for them and their personnel.

7. International Human Rights Law

Human rights law is the principal source of international law that obligates governments to recognize and protect fundamental rights of people within the territory or control of the government. Customary, international law, multinational treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and regional treaties provide a broad framework of protections for individuals. This body of law guarantees a series of rights applicable to situations experienced by victims of natural or man-made disasters. These vary from negative rights (e.g., that no one shall be subjected to torture, arbitrary interference with family, home, or privacy, or arbitrary property deprivation) to affirmative rights, such as an adequate standard of living, liberty, and personal security. CDRs should be aware that interpretations of human rights law vary from country to country. For example, countries who are parties to the European Convention on Human Rights have a body of human rights law that may oblige its forces to react differently than US forces in a particular situation.

8. Internally Displaced Persons

In the absence of specific treaties, human rights law is the principal source of protection for IDPs. Unlike refugee law, which only applies when victims cross a country’s border, human rights law proclaims broad guarantees for the fundamental rights of all persons. Although human rights law provides a basis for protecting and assisting IDPs, it does not address some situations such as forcible displacement and lack of access to HA. During armed conflict, the law of war applies for protection of IDPs. The Geneva Conventions reaffirm that during armed conflict those not directly participating in the hostilities shall be treated humanely. Violence, hostage-taking, and outrages upon the dignity of noncombatants are prohibited. As noted previously, the United States applies these principles to all military operations, including FHA. Additionally, Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions provides that forced civilian displacement during internal armed conflicts may be undertaken legally only when the civilian’s safety or military necessity require it. If civilians have to be moved for either of these two reasons, their evacuations must be under protected, hygienic, and humane conditions. (Note: The United States is not a signatory to Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.) Relevant factors that may be used in classifying IDPs include external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order.
9. Refugees and Asylum Seekers

Customary international law defines a refugee as a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. States may be subject to legal consequences for failing to respect the principle of “nonrefoulment” (that no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution or danger to life or freedom) or for failing to return refugees to states under certain conditions. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees remain the principal international instruments benefitting refugees. The United States Refugee Act of 1980 accepts the definition of refugees offered by the 1951 Conventions and 1967 Protocol, and makes provision for annual intakes of refugees from groups of specific humanitarian interest to the United States, DOS grants political asylum, not DOD. DOD grants temporary refuge status.

DODD 2000.11, Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge, provides more information regarding this issue.

10. Civilian Detainee Procedures

The detention of civilians during FHA operations will normally be an issue only when HN law enforcement capabilities do not exist. In non-conflict FHA operations, CDRs are likely to have extremely limited authority to detain non-DOD personnel. When detention is authorized, CDRs must be prepared to control, maintain, protect, and account for all categories of detainees in accordance with applicable domestic law, international law, and policy. DODD 2310.01E, Department of Defense Detainee Program establishes the overarching DOD detainee policy and directs that all detainees, regardless of the status of the detainee or the characterization of the conflict, shall be treated humanely at all times while in the care, custody, or control of any member of the DOD components. Furthermore, US forces are responsible for ensuring that non-DOD personnel participating in detention operations with detainees under DOD control adhere to DOD policies, practices, and procedures. Civilian internees are civilians who are interned during an international armed conflict or belligerent occupation for security reasons, for protection, or because they have committed an offense against the detaining power.

For more details concerning detainee operations, refer to JP 3-63, Detainee Operations.

11. Eligibility for Medical Care

A determination of eligibility for care in a US medical treatment facility (MTF) must be made by the CCDR’s surgeon in conjunction with the supporting SJA and in accordance with the law of war. This authority may be delegated to the JTF level. Each category of personnel who might seek emergency or routine treatment (such as DOD
contractors, USG civilian employees, allied, coalition, or HN forces, and others) in a US theater MTF should be determined prior to initiation of the operation and updated as required. During FCM operations, the demands for military medical support to civilian populations may be so substantial that at the beginning of the operation the GCC must establish the scope of care to be rendered to civilian populations.

12. Claims

JTF elements should investigate and adjudicate claims according to established directives and regulations consistent with the terms of a SOFA or other international agreement that includes claims provisions. A single-Service component may be assigned responsibility for processing claims against the USG. Unless otherwise stated in CJTF guidance, unit level CDRs are responsible for investigating incidents of foreign property damage and personal injury or death to foreign nationals alleged to have been caused by JTF personnel. JTF legal personnel should be appointed to the foreign claims commission(s) with authority to adjudicate and pay foreign claims. Responsibility for adjudicating such claims is assigned to the Military Departments by DODI 5515.08, Assignment of Claims Responsibility. The supported CCDR may assign interim responsibility for resolving claims in countries where such assignment has not been made under the directive.

13. Environment

As a rule, US environmental laws have no application overseas; however, US personnel are to follow pollution control standards of general applicability in the HN or jurisdiction. Where country specific final governing standards (FGSs) apply, abide by them. In a foreign nation where the designated DOD environmental executive agent has not established FGSs, applicable, international agreements, HN standards, and the Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document (OEBGD) govern. Particular attention should be paid to the disposal of hazardous waste. However, FGSs and OEBGD apply only to installations and facilities. They do not apply to off-installation operational deployments. Such off-installation activities are governed by applicable, international agreements and environmental annexes to operation plans and orders. Executive Order 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, and DODD 6050.7, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department of Defense Actions, provide policy guidance regarding environmental planning when major federal actions have significant effect on the environment outside the United States and its territories.

14. Law of the Sea

a. Customary, international law, as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), authorizes each nation to claim as national territory and airspace measuring no more than 12 nautical miles from where their land borders generally touch the sea. UNCLOS also confirmed each nation’s freedom of navigation rights through international airspace and the right to transit international straits and archipelagic seas without requiring an aircraft diplomatic clearance from any nation.
Appendix A

While the US has not signed UNCLOS, USG policy is to adhere to the agreement, since it codifies what was previously considered international custom and practice. Therefore, USG policy is that all DOD aircraft entering the legally recognized sovereign territory of another nation will first receive an aircraft diplomatic clearance signifying the HN’s permission to enter.

b. US embassies become involved when HN challenges USG policy that all nations can fly through international airspace unchallenged. Some countries claim airspace beyond the 12 nautical mile limit while others claim that the flight information regions that they have designated require both an air traffic control clearance and an aircraft diplomatic clearance. As long as DOD aircraft remain in international airspace, they do not require a diplomatic clearance.

c. The duty to rescue those in distress at sea is firmly established in customary and conventional international law (Article 98, UNCLOS). Asylum seekers have been escaping by sea for many years. Several options are open to the state where those rescued arrive: it may refuse disembarkation and may require ships’ masters to remove them from the jurisdiction, or it may make disembarkation conditional upon satisfactory settlement guarantees. The state may also require care and maintenance to be provided by the flag country, by the asylum seekers’ country or state of registry, or by international organizations. A categorical refusal of disembarkation cannot be equated with a breach of the principle of nonrefoulment or refuge through time (because of state sovereignty) even though refusal results in serious consequences for asylum seekers.

15. National Sovereignty

a. National sovereignty issues can impact FHA mission planning from operational, legal, and fiscal perspectives.

b. In addition to recognition of national sovereignty of territory under UNCLOS, the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (also known as the Chicago Convention) codified airspace “rules of the road” for the international community and established the principle of international sovereignty for aircraft similar to sovereignty of naval vessels passing through international seas and foreign waters. Specifically, the Convention created the International Civil Aviation Organization to govern civil aviation practices and procedures; identified in Article I that each nation has sovereignty over its own airspace and that no other nation’s aircraft could enter that airspace without receiving permission; and identified in Article III that “state aircraft” were exempt from the provisions of the Convention. It included military aircraft in the types of aircraft that are considered “state aircraft” and are, therefore, exempt from the payment of certain fees.

c. US military aircraft as sovereign instrumentalities are: exempt from duties and taxation; immune from search, seizure, and inspection; and immune from exercise of jurisdiction by a HN (boarding) without prior approval. US policy, consistent with international custom and practice, is that flights or aircraft operated by sovereign states in
or through another state will: not be required to pay navigation or overflight fees; not be required to pay landing or parking fees at government airports; but will pay reasonable charges for services requested and received, whether at governmental or nongovernmental airports. The USG is willing to pay landing and parking fees at commercial airports, if required to do so. In many countries, bilateral agreements or other arrangements explicitly provide that US state aircraft are not charged fees at either governmental or nongovernmental airports. Every effort should be made not to disturb these arrangements. US embassies are directed to reject billings for overflight and navigation fees, charges for aircraft operating in international airspace, and parking and landing fees assessed at government airports.

d. DOD often contracts commercial aircraft to perform airlift or other missions. The USG has consistently taken the position that DOD contracted commercial aircraft do not qualify as military or other state aircraft unless the USG specifically designates them as state aircraft. DOD contracted commercial aircraft are not subject to the same exemptions of sovereign instrumentalities that are provided to military aircraft.

For additional information, see DOD Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide, and DOS message 011542ZAUG07, Subject: US Government Policy on Aviation-related Fees.

16. Rules of Engagement

a. ROE are not strictly a legal matter, but a C2 tool. They are the CDR’s rules for the use of force (RUF). The sensitive political and international nature of FHA operations requires that ROE be established and coordinated with other forces involved in the operation. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, provides fundamental policies and procedures for US CDRs. It is US policy that ROE never limit a CDR’s inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense of the unit or other US forces. ROE for FHA operations will commonly be characterized by restraint. Whenever possible, all allied and coalition nations operating within a humanitarian relief area should do so under a commonly established ROE. This is essential to assure consistency of response for all participating forces.

b. In addition to force protection concerns, ROE must address actions to be taken when in observance of looting, rioting, or other criminal conduct in the relief area. Such actions may interfere tactically and strategically with the FHA mission. Under the guidance of the SOFA planners must incorporate such concerns into ROE, and other international agreements, to ensure clarity for all personnel involved in FHA operations.

c. Ideally, ROE should provide a quick process to request ROE amendments in response to FHA requirements. The use of joint fires, the ability to act in defense of non-US persons, and the use of riot control agents (RCAs) should be specifically addressed in the ROE. As stated in CJCSI 3110.07C, Guidance Concerning Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense and Employment of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides (U), the use of RCAs is restricted to US bases, posts, or US controlled
portions of foreign installations where the authority to approve peacetime employment of RCAs resides with the CCDR. Use of RCAs outside of these parameters requires SecDef approval. Additionally, authority for the use of RCAs may be obtained pursuant to Enclosure I to CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*.

d. The use of force, especially lethal force is normally a measure of last resort. When time and circumstances permit, forces committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions. Employment of PSYOP assets and capabilities and nonlethal weapons should be considered toward this end. However, the availability of nonlethal weapons and PSYOP assets and capabilities shall not limit a CDR's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense. Neither the presence nor the potential effect of nonlethal weapons shall constitute an obligation for their employment or a higher standard for employment of force than provided for by applicable law. In all cases, the United States retains the option for immediate use of lethal weapons, when appropriate, consistent with customary international law.

e. ROE should be coordinated in detail and may change as the operation evolves. Early and frequent coordination between the JFC and the embassy COM will be essential to proper ROE development. Changes to ROE must be rapidly disseminated to all personnel. CDRs at all levels may request changes to the ROE through the chain of command. Figure A-1 is provided as a sample ROE card, which summarizes ROE applicable to the individual. These example ROE were established for forces conducting FHA operations in an uncertain or hostile environment. All personnel may carry such a card for reference.

f. In limited circumstances, RUF may apply instead of ROE. RUF generally apply to DOD law enforcement and security duties within US territory or installations. However, RUF may be appropriate for FHA operations in countries with an established US military presence. See CJCSI 3121.01B *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces* for guidance.

17. Intelligence Oversight and Operational Law

Intelligence oversight regulations should be reviewed for applicability, especially with regard to relationships between intelligence personnel and American citizens who work for NGOs and IGOs. A legal review should be conducted prior to the initiation of intelligence operations to ensure that there is no unforeseen impact upon the mission from the conduct of planned intelligence or information gathering operations.
Legal Issues

SAMPLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CARD

Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your rights to take appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit.

- You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack
- Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop hostile acts
- When US forces are attacked by hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat
- You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission
- Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense

REMEMBER

- The United States is not at war
- Treat all persons with dignity and respect
- Respect local customs and traditions of the host nation
- Use minimum force to carry out the mission
- Always be prepared to act in self-defense

Figure A-1. Sample Rules of Engagement Card

18. Fiscal Law

a. The basic fiscal law principles that apply to all military operations also apply to FHA operations, however, the authorizations applicable to FHA missions are very specific with respect to purpose and are often funded at relatively low levels, often making the funding of FHA missions particularly problematic.

b. It is a basic tenet of fiscal law that all expenditures in an FHA operation must be for an authorized purpose, must be made within applicable time periods, and authorized and appropriate amounts. Congress has provided authority for DOD to conduct OHDACA operations, but authorizations are normally narrowly focused and appropriations can be very limited. As a result, it can be difficult to find the correct authorization and appropriation from which to fund an FHA mission legally. When conducted at the request of DOS, all costs incurred by DOD arising from the conduct of FHA operations will be reimbursed by the supported federal agency. These reimbursing funds will not be available if US forces act prior to receiving the request.

c. It is essential that the SJA be involved with FHA mission planning from the outset to ensure funding is handled correctly.
For information on authorizations that may be applicable to FHA operations, refer to Appendix B, “Department Of Defense Foreign Disaster Assistance Tasking And Funding Procedures And Humanitarian Assistance Programs.”

19. Terrorist and Insurgent Abuse of Charities

a. Protecting charities from terrorist abuse is a critical component of the war on terrorism. Charities provide essential services, comfort, and hope to those in need around the world. Unfortunately, terrorists have exploited the charitable sector to raise and move funds, provide logistic support, encourage terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support terrorist organizations and operations. This abuse threatens to undermine donor confidence and jeopardizes the integrity of the charitable sector, whose services are indispensable to the world community. The charitable sector is one that has consistently faced a high risk of abuse from terrorists and terrorist organizations. Charities operating overseas in areas of high risk are especially vulnerable to this abuse. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has designated several charities worldwide as supporting terrorist activity. A list of these charities can be found at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement. In addition, the United States has designated several foreign terrorist organizations that have operated under various names that appear as potential fundraising front organizations for terrorist activity.

b. Terrorist and insurgent abuse of the charitable sector can take many forms, including:

   (1) establishing front organizations or using charities to raise funds in support of terrorist organizations.

   (2) establishing or using charities to transfer funds, other resources, and operatives across geographical boundaries.

   (3) defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to divert funds to support terrorist organizations.

   (4) leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to recruit members and foster support for terrorist organizations and their ideology.

c. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, and those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). OFAC acts under Presidential wartime and national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze foreign assets under US jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based on UN and other international mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments.
1. General

The international law of war regulates the conduct of states and combatants engaged in armed hostilities, and is often referred to as the law of armed conflict. The law of war is essentially inspired by the humanitarian desire of civilized nations to diminish the effects of conflicts. It protects both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering, and safeguards the fundamental rights of civilians, prisoners of war, and the wounded and sick. The law of war also attempts to prevent degeneration of conflicts into savagery and brutality, thereby facilitating the restoration of peaceful relations which must, at some point, follow the conclusion of hostilities.

2. Basis

Much of the law of war has been codified by the 1907 Hague Convention and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Hague Convention prescribes rules regarding the methods and means of warfare and establishes humanitarian requirements, with some exceptions, such as notification of civilians before bombardment. The Geneva Conventions define and prescribe the treatment of the wounded, sick, shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war, and civilians. Some of the law of war has never been incorporated in any treaty or convention to which the United States is a party. Yet the United States, like other nations, is bound by the customary rules of international law. Evidence of customary law arises from the general consent and practice of states under the belief that the practice is required by law. Countries may disagree on the application of customary international law. For example, there are two 1977 protocols to the Geneva Conventions that pertain to international and internal armed conflicts, respectively. While the United States has not ratified either of these protocols, it agrees with and follows those portions that are believed to reflect customary international law.

3. Minimum Standards

The law of war represents minimum standards of civilization. Humanitarian considerations underlie the law of war. For example, the requirements of uniforms and markings exist not only to assure combatants that enemy targets, and not their own, are being attacked, but to reinforce the protections secured to civilian populations and civilian objects. The law seeks to protect prisoners of war, wounded and sick, and the civilian population, to the maximum extent possible. The international community has sought to identify situations in armed conflict in which humanitarian principles can be invoked to minimize collateral damage while allowing appropriate attacks on military targets without sacrificing material military advantages.

4. Legal Principles

The principles of the law of war are: necessity, distinction, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering. The principle of military necessity provides for the right for armed forces to use an appropriate degree or means of force that is not specifically forbidden, necessary to achieve the objective sought. The principle of distinction requires that
combatants be distinguished from noncombatants, and that military objectives be distinguished from protected property or protected places. Parties to a conflict shall direct their operations only against combatants and military objectives. The principle of proportionality requires that incidental injury or damage must not be disproportionate to the legitimate military advantages secured by the use of force. The principle of proportionality requires a balancing of the anticipated military advantage of conducting the attack (military necessity) with the risk of civilian casualties or damage to civilian property, as such. The law of war only prohibits those attacks in which the collateral damage exceeds anticipated overall military advantage. The principle of unnecessary suffering requires a military force to minimize unnecessary suffering. It is forbidden to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. The prohibition of unnecessary suffering constitutes acknowledgement that necessary suffering to combatants is lawful, and may include severe injury or loss of life.

5. Cruelties and Atrocities

The armed forces of a state act on behalf of its government and its citizens; cruelties and excesses during armed conflicts may weigh heavily on the conscience of governmental leaders and citizens. Moreover, every nation is sensitive, to some degree, to the reaction of others to its policies; the good will and support of other governments and peoples are important in the overall conduct of foreign policy and achievement of national goals. Reciprocity is a critical factor. If a state fails in the first instance to ensure respect for basic humanitarian rights, its conduct may provoke violations by an adversary. Moreover, international standing to complain of violations by an adversary is seriously compromised. Civilian loyalties may be at stake and compromised by excesses and cruelty. History demonstrates also that the successful negotiation or termination of hostilities may be prolonged or complicated by antagonisms and alienation heightened by atrocity violations.

6. Training

CDRs have a responsibility to ensure that their subordinates understand the principles of the law of war. Even the appearance of improper behavior by US military personnel can have a significant impact on military operations and may cause a loss of international and domestic support. The command SJA should be tasked to conduct training in accordance with DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program and CJCSI 5810.01C, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program, for all personnel within the command in order to ensure full compliance with the law of war.

7. Individual Responsibility

Every Service member is responsible for compliance with the law of war. To avoid violations of the law of war, CDRs must ensure that its principles and requirements are known and understood by all subordinate personnel.
1. General

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Global Security Affairs and DSCA execute a number of assistance programs. This appendix provides a brief overview of these programs and authority for their implementation in support of FHA operations.

2. Approval Authority

Except in cases of emergencies where the on-site commander (OSC) determines immediate response is required (see paragraph 6, “Immediate Response”), DOD components will participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after the affected country requests assistance and DOS or USAID determines that assistance will be provided. The Office of ASD for Global Security Affairs is the normal approval authority for DOD resource and services commitment to foreign disaster relief. The DOD lead for management of budget allocations in this area is the DSCA. The main point of contact for the Joint Staff is the J-4 JLOC.

3. Responsibilities

DOD provides supplies and services from the most expedient source, which normally is the CCDR. The CCDR, when directed, assumes the primary coordinating role for provision of DOD supplies and services. For disaster relief/medical supplies for use during FHA, CCDRs should first source from excess property warehouses managed by DSCA before purchasing from DOD/Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) stock (See paragraph 7, “Excess Nonlethal Supplies [Excess Property Program]”). The Joint Staff, USTRANSCOM, and DSCA, if excess property is transported, coordinate transportation requirements. The Military Departments and Joint Staff support the designated CCDR by coordinating interdepartmental approval and funding processes with ASD for Global Security Affairs, DSCA, and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD[C]). If items requested are not available in the combatant command, ASD for Global Security Affairs and DSCA will locate resources through DLA, the Services, or a supporting CCDR.

4. Procedures

Requests for DOD assistance come from USAID and are normally routed from OFDA through DOS to the Office of ASD for Global Security Affairs in an executive secretary memorandum. Upon approval, the request is routed to the Joint Staff J-4 for action. J-4 may activate a J-4 crisis action team (24/7) response team, which may be augmented by USTRANSCOM and DLA liaison elements. J-4 provides coordination among combatant command, Service, and defense agency response cells or teams, as appropriate.
5. **Funding**

a. DOD activities associated with foreign disaster relief may be sourced using OHDACA appropriation funds, service operations and maintenance funds during immediate response (see paragraph 6, “Immediate Response”) or under some specific legal authority (e.g., drawdown authority), the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF), funds from other agencies, or a combination of these, depending on the nature of the operation.

b. USTRANSCOM calculates transportation system shipping costs (normally, using the DOD rate), and conveys that information to ASD for Global Security Affairs and DSCA and the Joint Staff J-4. ASD for Global Security Affairs and DSCA forward cost information to USAID (OFDA) and other agencies, as required.

c. After cost acceptance by the appropriate agencies (e.g., DOS, USAID, Office of ASD (Global Security Affairs), and OUSD[C]), formal approval to commit DOD materials and services is forwarded from the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities) (ASD[SO/LIC&IC]) to the Director, Joint Staff. This approval contains funding and billing information (including, if possible, fund cites), as well as resource disposition instructions. Fund cites should be provided for each DOD support item. The Joint Staff then forwards the fund cites and other relevant information to the affected Service(s), agency supplier, or USTRANSCOM for each action at the time of request. J-4 (or J-3, as appropriate) develops tasking messages, which should contain fund cites, funding limits, billing addresses, and Joint Staff points of contact, if possible, for each DOD element tasked. Tasking messages will require tasked units to provide clear text itemized billing information and the tasked unit point of contact. The messages should also advise tasked elements that approval must be obtained before exceeding the funding limit; that agencies, such as OFDA, will only reimburse for those items or services requested; and that all bills must be submitted in the next monthly billing cycle following completion of the service or activity.

d. In the event military units and personnel are required to deploy, the Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resource and Assessment assists OUSD(C) in obtaining rough order of magnitude cost estimates from the CCDR or Service(s). Following receipt of funding approval from the Office of ASD for Global Security Affairs, the Director of Operations, Joint Staff prepares a CJCS deployment order for SecDef approval.

e. **Economy Act.** The Economy Act provides agencies the authority to provide services to, or secure the services of, another Executive agency for in house performance or performance by contract where there is no other statutory authority. The head of an agency or major organizational unit within an agency may place an order with a major organizational unit within the same agency or another agency for goods or services if the agency has available funds; the order is in the best interests of the USG; the agency filling the order can provide, or acquire by contract, the ordered goods or services; and
the ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract as conveniently or cheaply (See Title 31, USC, Section 1535[a]).

(1) The FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation] Subpart 17.5 and the DFARS [Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement] Subpart 217.5 govern use of the Economy Act. It can be a valuable tool if used correctly; however, misuse can lead to criminal violations of the law.

(2) The regulations require two primary documents. The first is a determination and findings that establishes the Economy Act as the authority for the transaction. The second document is the order constituting the agreement between the requiring and servicing agencies on the statement of work, payment for supplies or services, and related terms and conditions.

6. Immediate Response

A CDR in the immediate vicinity of a foreign disaster may undertake immediate relief operations when time is of the essence to prevent human suffering and loss of life. The OSC should report the action taken at once and request guidance. Reimbursement of funds expended under these circumstances is not assured. It is particularly important to avoid mission creep in this scenario. The more time that passes, the less likely that the assistance will be deemed immediate response. Responding elements must track incremental costs incurred by maintaining detailed records of expenditures, and provide detailed billing information to support their reimbursement efforts. The DOD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 12 and DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, contain guidelines for DOD elements to bill for cost reimbursement for supplies and/or services provided in support of foreign disaster relief.

7. Excess Nonlethal Supplies (Excess Property Program)

This DOD program makes excess nonlethal DOD property (property that is not a weapon, ammunition, or other equipment or materiel designed to inflict serious bodily harm or death) available to foreign recipients for humanitarian relief. The property must be transferred to DOS, which is responsible for its distribution within the recipient country (Title 10, USC, Section 2557). Items such as clothing, tents, medical equipment and supplies, heavy equipment, and vehicles are available through this program. Requests for excess property are forwarded through the COM, who in turn forwards requests to DOD for approval and funding authorization. Excess property may also be provided as part of disaster relief operations. DSCA administers DOD HA excess property warehouse operations.

8. Drawdown of Defense Articles and Services

a. Increasingly, FHA is provided through the drawdown of defense articles from existing stocks. This drawdown authority is provided in Title 22, USC, Section 2318(1)(a). Because drawdown authority is limited to the use of existing defense articles,
CDRs must be sensitive to the fiscal limitations involved (for example, no new contracts for goods or services may be made using drawdown funds). All expenditures for FHA operations should be subjected to legal review to ensure compliance with fiscal law.

b. The FAA authorizes the President to direct transfers of on-hand DOD-stock defense articles and services (as well as articles and services from the inventory and resources of any agency of the USG) and military education and training to foreign countries and IGOs in response to unforeseen military emergencies, humanitarian catastrophes, peacekeeping needs, or counternarcotics requirements. Except for transportation and related services where new contracts would cost less than providing such services with DOD assets, no new procurement is authorized and no new funds may be placed on existing contracts unless otherwise provided by law. Drawdowns are usually precipitated by an emergency in a foreign country or region. In emergency drawdowns, DOD, DOS, and the NSC coordinate the USG response. This interagency process determines which existing statutory authority applies and identifies which articles and services should be provided. Potential contributing agencies (e.g., DOD, Department of the Treasury, Department of Justice) and the military services furnish valuation and availability (V&A) data to the DOS indicating the estimated value of the articles and services proposed for the drawdown. The V&A data and the scope of support form the basis for the Presidential determination that authorizes a specific maximum dollar value authority for the drawdown. Emergency drawdowns may begin execution within 24-48 hours, but more commonly take place within 1-2 weeks.


9. Funded Transportation Program

a. The Funded Transportation program is conducted under Title 10, USC, Section 2561, which provides DOD the authority to transport HA material. The funded transportation program permits transportation of cargo and DOD nonlethal excess property worldwide for NGOs and IGOs. This authority provides for the actual cost of transportation and the payment of any associated administrative costs incurred.

b. While the statutory authority permits transportation via any mode and for any cargo that could be defined as humanitarian, the interagency community has established policy that imposes limits on the program due to the austere level of funding available. These policies are:

(1) transport is limited only to surface modes (much less expensive than air).

(2) the cargo is limited only to that which addresses basic humanitarian needs (e.g., medical, food, shelter, clothing).
(3) the minimum cargo needed to use the program is one 20 foot shipping container, or 1,100 cubic feet.

c. Requesting organizations submit their application to the DSCA program manager at http://dentonfunded.ohasis.org for processing.

d. The DSCA OHDM staff works with the donor, DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and the DOD shipping agent to facilitate the process. Once the application is approved, DSCA arranges all inspection and transportation requirements, tracks the shipment to its final destination, and provides weekly updates on all shipments. OHDM verifies invoice data for payment of transportation costs.

10. Space Available Transportation Program

a. DSCA coordinates the overall execution of transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries (Title 10, USC, Section 402, commonly referred to as the Denton Program). Under this authority, DOD transports millions of pounds of privately donated humanitarian cargo from the United States to destinations overseas on a space available basis. Donors coordinate this support through OFDA, USTRANSCOM, and DSCA. Supplies transported under this section may not be distributed, directly or indirectly, to any individual, group, or organization engaged in a military or paramilitary activity. Transportation of this cargo may not be conducted unless the SecDef determines that:

   b. The transportation of such supplies is consistent with foreign policy of the United States.

   c. The supplies to be transported are suitable for humanitarian purposes and are in stable condition.

   d. There is a legitimate humanitarian need for such supplies by the people for whom they are intended.

   e. Adequate arrangements have been made for the distribution of such supplies in the destination country.

11. Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Assistance

a. Humanitarian demining assistance is the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, including activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war. DOD humanitarian demining assistance is authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 407. The USG humanitarian mine action program assists countries in relieving the suffering from the adverse effects of uncleared land mines and other explosive remnants of war while promoting US interests. DOD humanitarian demining assistance is a critical component of the overall USG mine action
DOD humanitarian demining assistance concentrates on training HNs in the procedures of land mine clearance, mine risk education, and victims’ assistance, as well as providing unique training and readiness-enhancing benefits to US forces while advancing the GCC’s theater security cooperation strategies. DOD may also provide supplies, equipment, and services to participating HNs. Significant benefits accrue to DOD as humanitarian demining assistance provides access to geographical areas otherwise not easily available to US forces. It also contributes to unit and individual readiness by providing unique in-country training opportunities that cannot be duplicated in the US. For example, US military forces hone critical wartime, civil-military, language, cultural, and FID skills.

b. US forces carry out humanitarian demining assistance when the assistance will promote either the security interests of both the United States and HN or the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities. Humanitarian demining assistance must be approved by DOS and shall complement, and may not duplicate, any other form of social or economic assistance which may be provided to the country concerned by any OGA.

c. Within DOD, the Office of DASD for Stability Operations Capabilities is the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) lead agency for providing policy oversight of DOD humanitarian demining assistance. Guidance and direction are provided through CJCSI 3207.01A, Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Operations. GCCs plan, coordinate, and execute humanitarian demining assistance in their assigned AORs as approved by the SecDef. The GCC’s SCP is the planning document used to plan and prioritize humanitarian demining assistance efforts within the assigned AOR.

d. No member of the Armed Forces, while providing humanitarian demining assistance will engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or other explosive remnants of war (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a US military operation); or provide such assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the Armed Forces.

e. A nation desiring assistance must make a formal request through the US embassy to the DOS. Selected members of the USG PCC Sub-group on humanitarian mine action conduct assessment visits to determine the HN’s capabilities and needs. The PCC then approves/disapproves each nation to be a part of the assistance program and tasks the Sub-group members to formulate a program to help the country neutralize the land mine and explosive remnants of war problem.

f. Expenses incurred as a direct result of providing humanitarian demining assistance to a foreign country only may include:

1. Travel, transportation, and subsistence expenses of DOD personnel providing such assistance.
(2) The cost of any equipment, services, or supplies acquired for the purpose of carrying out or supporting the humanitarian demining activities, including any nonlethal, individual, or small-team equipment or supplies for clearing land mines or other explosive remnants of war that are to be transferred or otherwise furnished to a foreign country in furtherance of the provision of assistance. Further information may be obtained from CJCSI 3207.01A, Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Operations, Appendix F, “Humanitarian Mine Action” in JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, DOD Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Homepage: http://www.humanitariandemining.org, and the United Nations Electronic Mine Information Network: http://www.mineaction.org.

12. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program

   a. The Title 10, USC, Section 401 HCA Program is administered by the GCC directly, with coordination and approval authority vested in the Office of ASD for Global Security Affairs and DSCA. The goal of this program is to promote regional security objectives by providing basic HCA. In contrast to other HA programs discussed in this appendix, HCA activities are authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 401 in conjunction with authorized military operations of the Armed Forces if they serve:

      (1) The security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out.

      (2) The specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.

   b. Any assistance provided under this program must first undergo legal review by the GCC.

      (1) Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.

      (2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

      (3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

      (4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

   See DODD 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, for more information on the HCA program.

   b. HCA activities performed under this section will complement and may not duplicate any other form of social or economic assistance provided to the country.
concerned by any other USG agency or department. HCA may not be provided under this section to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity. Under Title 10, USC, Section 401, HCA expenses must be incidental to the associated military operation and are paid for from funds specifically appropriated for such purpose (service operation and maintenance funds).

13. Combatant Commander Initiative Fund

The CCIF supports unforeseen contingency requirements critical to CCDR’s joint warfighting readiness and national security interests. The strongest candidates for approval are initiatives that support CCDR’s activities and functions, enhance interoperability, and yield high benefits at low cost. Initiatives support authorized activities such as: force training, contingencies, selected operations, C2, joint exercises, HCA (to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance), military education and training, personnel expenses for bilateral or regional cooperation programs, force protection, and joint warfighting capabilities. CJCS may give priority to the provision of funds to be used for urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance, particularly in a foreign country where the armed forces are engaged in a contingency operation.

See CJCSI 7401.01C, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund, for more information on CCIF.

14. Humanitarian Daily Rations

HDRs provide a low cost, easily delivered, daily ration for use in foreign countries to alleviate hunger after disasters and to replace use of more expensive US military meal, ready to eat (MRE) rations in disaster situations. It was designed to provide a full day’s sustenance to a moderately malnourished individual. The HDR is less costly (approximately 80 percent) than the MRE which was used previously for disaster relief. The HDR’s nutritional content is tailored for people who are near starvation or fleeing from catastrophe and need to eat en route to a safe haven. It is culturally sensitive and contains no animal products, alcohol, or alcohol-based products and is adequate for the widest range of cultural or religious dietary restrictions. HDR will maintain the health of moderately malnourished recipients until conventional relief programs or targeted feeding can be established. If required, the HDR may be airdropped, but this requires significant planning. HDRs are stored in the United States, Germany, and Kuwait and delivered, as needed, by aircraft or ship to locations in need and are pre-positioned in a region in anticipation of an emergency or natural disaster. HDRs are purchased with OHDACA funds, managed by DSCA Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action and are requested through the GCCs as needed to support FHA requirements.
15. Pacific Disaster Center

a. PDC provides applied information research and analysis in support of the disaster management and HA communities and related efforts, creating new information products and supporting innovative applications of information and communications technologies. PDC’s core technical competencies center on the application of geospatial and geophysical information and analytical models to support hazard assessment and risk reduction activities. In addition to new products and services for a specific set of circumstances and needs, PDC might create a number of products or use mature products already available.

b. While the PDC continues to play an important role in the support of disaster management in the Asia Pacific region, PDC is also assisting the United States and the international community in support of humanitarian relief activities. PDC can create a web-accessible, data-and-knowledge base for use by the United States and the international community in the planning for HA and reconstruction. Decision makers can utilize PDC’s web site as a situational awareness capability for analysis of information on refugee site locations, populations at risk, transportation infrastructure, supply depot locations, and tracking of resources. Through this program, the PDC is enhancing society's ability to plan for, survive, and recover from natural and human-induced disasters for safer communities and sustained development in Asia, the Pacific and beyond.

c. PDC’s premier web-based collaboration system for disaster management activities is the Disaster All-Hazard Warnings, Analysis, and Risk Evaluation system (DisasterAWARE). DisasterAWARE increases the capacity for disaster managers to synthesize multiple data streams for critical early warning and quick decision support. DisasterAWARE is a customizable decision support system capable of quickly determining whether incoming information warrants attention, and to what degree. Information pertinent to the user community is automatically processed and supplied through DisasterAWARE’s Hazard Listing and Automated Hazard Map web pages as maps or model output associated with hazard events. DisasterAWARE’s database stores information whether it triggers a hazard message or not. The system integrates data from a variety of sources into an enterprise geospatial application for collaboration and analysis.

For more detailed information on PDC, visit www.pdc.org.

16. Asia-Pacific Area Network

Asian-Pacific Area Network (APAN) is a World Wide Web portal (http://www.apan-info.net) offering information resources and a collaborative planning environment as a means to greater defense interaction, confidence-building, and enhanced security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. APAN is hosted by USPACOM, Camp Smith, Hawaii. USPACOM maintains an unclassified web-based information sharing and collaboration network to enhance interoperability and
multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. APAN exploits web-based technology to help meet USPACOM's regional security cooperation initiatives. APAN integrates information to increase multilateral planning effectiveness and interoperability; links disaster centers and data sources to speed the flow of crisis information; strengthens best practices for cooperative efforts; provides technically simple means for the user to access and share information; and finds paths to existing information sources.

17. HARMONIEWeb

HARMONIEWeb is an internet web site for the exchange of unclassified information across the civil-military boundary associated with military support to SSTR or FHA operations. This site allows DOD organizations to share information with OGAs, multinational partners, HN, IGOs, NGOs and the private sector. HARMONIEWeb improves DOD’s ability to exchange timely, relevant information with non-DOD organizations, particularly in the critical early stages of an operation, synchronize DOD and NGO efforts, and accelerate successful mission completion.

For further information refer to www.harmonieweb.org.

18. United States National Guard State Partnership Program

The National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) establishes partnerships between foreign countries and United States of America states and is an important contribution to the DOD’s security cooperation programs conducted by the CCDRs and COM programs implemented outside of DOD.

a. The SPP mission is to build genuine state partnerships which mobilize the entire social fabric of American support to democracy abroad. Capitalizing on the unique role of the National Guard citizen-soldiers and the ability to reach into our communities, this program engages at home and abroad to promote stability by strengthening democracy and free market economies. The SPP assists in the construction of democratic institutions and the social infrastructure necessary to sustain countries. Partnerships will create long-term personal relationships based on openness, confidence, and trust.

b. The SPP provides a reach-back capability not just to the GCCs but also to each COM for those civil aspects of our National Security Strategy. The SPP has proven to hasten and expedite USG response to humanitarian crisis through this reach-back capability. The SPP does not unilaterally implement or execute these activities but supports the CCDR and COM needs in a most expeditious manner. The SPP’s build enduring military-to-military, military-to-civilian, and civil security cooperation relationships that enhance long-term international security while building partnership capacity across all levels of society.
1. Department of State

   a. The **mission of DOS** is to create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community. American diplomacy in the 21st century is based on fundamental beliefs: our freedom is best protected by ensuring that others are free; our prosperity depends on the prosperity of others; and our security relies on a global effort to secure the rights of all. Millions of the world’s poor have not yet benefited from globalization, increasing their risk of alienation. Furthermore, transnational threats have emerged from globalization, spreading disease via the most mobile population in history. Famines and civil conflicts have erupted in countries steeped in poverty or constrained by autocratic rulers, creating waves of refugees and swelling the ranks of internally displaced populations.

   b. DOS and USAID will work with US NGOs, institutions of higher learning, and private sector partners who share USG objectives and help leverage our resources. By providing vital links to the American people and to counterpart organizations and institutions overseas, DOS’s US partners help represent the best in America’s technical, humanitarian, and management skills.

   c. In meeting their strategic objectives and goals, DOS and USAID are committed to protect US national interests and advance peace, security, and sustainable development. DOS will work with USAID and other agencies to ensure US resources support our goals of saving lives, safeguarding people’s health, and advancing regional stability. The United States is committed to find longer-term solutions to food insecurity and working in partnership with developing countries to address this global problem, which affects millions of people. Viable, early warning systems and assessments will help mitigate disasters and increase preparedness and response.

2. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

   a. The **core mission** of CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. Failing and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day, threatening vulnerable populations, their neighbors, our allies, and ourselves. Struggling states can provide breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire region. Experience shows that managing conflict, particularly internal conflict, is not a passing phenomenon. It has become a mainstream part of our foreign policy. Until now, the international community has undertaken stabilization and reconstruction operations in an ad hoc fashion, recreating the tools and relationships each time a crisis arises. To ensure that countries are set on a sustainable path towards peace, democracy, and a market economy, new, institutionalized foreign policy tools are required that can influence the choices countries
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and people make about the nature of their economies, their political systems, their security, and indeed, in some cases about the very social fabric of a nation.

b. CRS is a DOS office, but it is interagency in both character and function. Representatives from agencies throughout the USG staff it to build upon and draw on existing skills and expertise, and more easily reach back to interagency partners. CRS staff is comprised of representatives from DOS, USAID, DOD, Joint Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, Army Corps of Engineers, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, USIFCOM, and the Department of the Treasury. The success of the USG in reconstruction/stabilization will depend heavily upon the ability to plan early and to develop an integrated, interagency approach to deal with the interdependent civilian and military responsibilities on the ground. The US Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation pamphlet presents a USG interagency planning process for reconstruction/stabilization and conflict transformation operations.

c. Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix. The matrix is an important tool describing the full spectrum of tasks that might need to be performed by the international community in a post-conflict environment. This analytical framework is available at: http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm.

d. Civilian Response Corps (CRC). The CRC is a group of civilian federal employees and, eventually, volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments, who will be trained and equipped to deploy rapidly to countries in crisis or emerging from conflict, in order to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance. They are diplomats, development specialists, public health officials, law enforcement and corrections officers, engineers, economists, lawyers, public administrators, agronomists and others – offering the full range of skills needed to help fragile states restore stability and the rule of law, and achieve economic recovery and sustainable growth as quickly as possible. Because no single government entity has all of the relevant expertise, the CRC is a partnership of eight departments and agencies: DOS, USAID, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Department of the Treasury. Pilot Active and Standby components of the CRC within DOS have deployed members to Sudan, Chad, Haiti, Lebanon, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan to assist with conflict prevention and mitigation.


PRM has primary responsibility for formulating policies on population, refugees, and migration, and for administering US refugee assistance and admissions programs. PRM coordinates US international population policy and promotes its goals through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. It works closely with USAID, which administers US international population programs. PRM also coordinates US international migration policy within the USG and through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. PRM administers and monitors US contributions to NGOs and IGOs to assist and protect
refugees abroad. PRM also oversees admissions of tens of thousands of refugees to the US for permanent resettlement. The USG funds protection and life-sustaining relief for millions of refugees and victims of conflict around the globe; PRM is central to these efforts.

4. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

   a. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is the principal link between DOS and DOD. PM provides policy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade.

   b. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) creates local, regional and international conditions conducive to peace, stability, and prosperity by curbing the illicit proliferation of conventional weapons of war such as light automatic weapons, rocket propelled grenades, and by removing and destroying others, such as persistent land mines and abandoned stocks of munitions, that remain and pose hazards after the cessation of armed conflict.

      (1) WRA develops, implements, and monitors; policy, programs, and public engagement efforts that further US foreign policy goals through the development and implementation of comprehensive solutions to the harmful humanitarian effects caused by the existence of public hazards from conventional weapons following cessation of armed conflict. WRA works closely with OGAs as well as NGOs, IGOs, and private enterprises.

      (2) WRA serves as the lead organization in coordinating US humanitarian mine action activities worldwide.

      (a) The USG humanitarian mine action program assists selected countries in relieving human suffering and in developing an indigenous mine action capability while promoting US interests. The program provides increased humanitarian mine action assistance to countries suffering from the presence of persistent land mines, which maim and kill innocents, obstruct emergency assistance activities, hamper economic development, and impede free movement of citizens.

      (b) WRA develops and implements country-specific humanitarian mine action programs and oversees the interagency strategic planning and policy development processes supporting US global demining activities. It directly supports the work of the PCC Subgroup on Humanitarian Mine Action.

   c. The Office of International Security Operations is the primary interface between DOS and DOD on operational military matters. Specifically, it:

      (1) Initiates and coordinates exceptional requests from DOS to DOD for the provision and transport of HA in the event of disasters or pressing humanitarian crises
abroad. Requests may be on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis and are normally conveyed through Executive Secretary channels.

(2) Coordinates DOS review and approval of DOD excess nonlethal supplies donations, HCA, and certain other types of HA overseas. The Office ensures assistance proposals are consistent with US foreign policy and meet relevant statutory requirements regarding HA.

(3) Ensures assistance proposals are consistent with US foreign policy and meet relevant statutory requirements regarding HA.

(4) Coordinates DOS review of Denton Program applications to ensure that they are consistent with US foreign policy objectives.

(5) Reviews applications for the Funded Transportation Program to ensure that they are consistent with US foreign policy.

d. The Office of Security Negotiations and Agreements facilitates the worldwide deployment of US military forces and protects current or former Service members from surrender to the International Criminal Court (ICC) without the consent of the USG. It negotiates SOFAs, defense cooperation agreements, burden-sharing agreements, and Article 98 agreements. The first three types of agreements support the deployment of US forces abroad while Article 98 agreements address the ICC. Article 98 agreements are bilateral non-surrender agreements protecting American citizens from the ICC.

e. Office of the POLAD Coordinator (PM/POLAD) supports the community of POLADs to the US Service Chiefs and principal US military CDRs in the US and overseas. The POLADs are senior DOS officers (flag/general office-rank equivalent) detailed as personal advisors to leading US military leaders/CDRs to provide policy support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the CDRs' military responsibilities. The Office of the POLAD Coordinator also supports DOS’ participation in the DOS-DOD Officer Exchange Program. In addition, PM/POLAD supports DOS representatives in JIACGs at select military commands.

5. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

a. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) is responsible for managing a broad range of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and arms control functions. ISN supports efforts of foreign partners to respond to the use of WMD by terrorists.

b. Within ISN, the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism develops policy and plans, directs initiatives, and coordinates partner capacity building activities to prevent, protect against, and respond to the threat or use of WMD by terrorists. The office will coordinate USG support to manage and mitigate the consequences of incidents
occurring in foreign jurisdictions that involve the use of CBRN contaminants. Key functions include:

1. Supporting the needs of FCM missions.
2. Collaborating with other elements of the USG to provide diplomatic support for FCM responsibilities and activities.
3. Coordinating USG engagement with foreign governments and IGOs regarding FCM planning and capacity building.
4. Improving the USG's management architecture for FCM support.

c. FCM provides a critical element in a layered defense in depth against WMD terrorism. The Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism is responsible for the security policy framework that integrates FCM activities of the USG into a strategic architecture for planning and response. In this capacity, the office carries out the following activities:

1. Cooperates with foreign governments in their planning, capabilities, and response development.
2. Negotiates international FCM cooperation and planning agreements with foreign governments.
3. Provides FCM expertise and support to the DOS FEST and appropriate DOS task forces.

6. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

   a. The mission of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism is to develop and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all the instruments of statecraft: diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law enforcement, and military. Within the Office, the Operations Directorate leads and maintains the FEST.

   b. The FEST is the USG's only interagency, on-call, short-notice team poised to respond to terrorist and other incidents worldwide. The FEST is a rapid-response interagency team sent to support the COM.

   c. The FEST’s mission is to advise, assist, assess, and coordinate. Specifically, the FEST provides the COM, HN leaders, and incident managers guidance concerning US capabilities to mitigate the consequences of an incident/attack. The FEST brings unique FCM assistance capabilities not normally available at an affected US mission.
7. **Humanitarian Information Unit**

   a. HIU serves as a USG interagency center to identify, collect, analyze, and disseminate unclassified information critical to USG decision-makers and partners in preparation for and response to humanitarian emergencies worldwide, and to promote best practices for humanitarian information management.

   b. To accomplish this mission, the HIU performs the following tasks:

      (1) Identifies key sources of geospatial and georeferenced data best suited to meet the information requirements of its consumers.

      (2) Collects timely, verifiable, and relevant data utilizing an extensive network of information partnerships.

      (3) Analyzes data using multi-agency expertise and applying proven technologies to determine significant trends and relationships.

      (4) Disseminates information of value to all levels of consumers, from national-level policymakers to operational field managers.

   c. The HIU is part of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and receives oversight from a USG interagency executive steering committee. Its staff is composed of personnel from DOS, USAID, DOD, and NGA.

8. **US Agency for International Development**

   a. USAID plays a vital role in promoting US national security, foreign policy, and the war on terrorism. It does so by addressing poverty fueled by lack of economic opportunity, one of the root causes of violence today. As stated in the President’s National Security Strategy, USAID’s work in development joins diplomacy and defense as one of three key pieces of the nation’s foreign policy apparatus. USAID promotes peace and stability by fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing emergency HA, and enhancing democracy in developing countries. These efforts to improve the lives of millions of people worldwide represent US values and advance US interests for peace and prosperity.

   b. USAID provides assistance in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Near East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Eurasia. With HQ in Washington, D.C., USAID’s strength is its field offices in many regions of the world. The agency works in 100 developing countries and in close partnership with NGOs, IGOs, IPI, universities, American businesses, other governments, trade and professional associations, faith-based organizations, and OGAs. USAID has working relationships, through contracts and grant agreements, with more than 3,500 companies and over 300 US-based NGOs.

*For more information on USAID, see USAID Primer.*
c. Within USAID, DCHA provides technical leadership and expertise in coordinating USAID's democracy programs; international disaster assistance; emergency and developmental food aid; aid to manage and mitigate conflict; and volunteer programs. DCHA provides technical leadership, support, and advice in developing policy and programs to assist countries transitioning out of crisis and administers disaster assistance, preparedness, and mitigation. DCHA also provides capacity building for US NGOs and aid to American schools and hospitals abroad. DCHA provides technical advice and support to the USAID Administrator, regional bureaus, field missions, and other offices with regard to these programs.

(1) OMA addresses areas of common interests between defense and development, with a focus on improving civilian-military field readiness programs and coordination. Program areas of common interest include, but may not be limited to, HA, counterterrorism, SC, conflict prevention and mitigation, counterinsurgency, post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization, and transformational development. OMA serves as the agency-wide unit for managing the day-to-day aspects of the USAID-military relationship and consists of two divisions.

(a) The **Planning Division** serves as the overall coordination unit for managing the day-to-day aspects of the USAID-military relationship, and for planning and developing effective operations. This includes developing a joint information network; prioritizing requests for participation in events, exchanges, and exercises; and overseeing program planning and development for priority regions and countries. It coordinates USAID civilian-military planning and analysis with DOD, DOS CRS, and OGAs. It manages training programs for selected military and civilian audiences; develops guidance on USAID and NGOs for use in the civilian-military context; and develops and manages staff, budgets, contracts, grants, and other mechanisms required to perform division duties, including program development, planning, training, and exercises. Finally, the Planning Division serves as the base for USAID personnel trained in the war colleges or other DOD institutes.

(b) The **Operations Division** serves as the lead unit to develop operational readiness, leadership and coordinated response capacity for field operations requiring joint USAID-military action. Its functions include developing a network of contacts in the military as needed for operational readiness; supporting combatant commands during major operations; and conducting liaison with the Planning Division to develop a joint planning capacity within the combatant commands. It develops and leads the implementation of annual work plans with geographic and functional combatant commands; develops and maintains at least two rapid deployment teams that manage emergency responses; and develops a common logistics platform with OFDA, field missions, and DOD for reconstruction and stabilization initiatives. It keeps USAID bureaus informed of pending and ongoing field operations involving the US military; works with NGO and military personnel and organizations to strengthen field coordination; and develops a leadership training program, including long-term and short-term modules.
(2) **Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)** supports local partners to advance peace and democracy in priority conflict-prone countries. At the request of and in coordination with the Congress, DOS, and the appropriate in-country US ambassadors and USAID field missions, OTI seizes critical windows of opportunity to provide on-the-ground, fast, flexible, catalytic short-term assistance that promotes movement toward political and social stability and democracy. OTI programs in such countries should continue until reasonable stability is established and an effective hand-off is completed to longer-term institutional development efforts.

(a) The **management and program operations team** enhances and facilitates OTI activities worldwide by contributing to OTI's strategic plan and managing OTI's policy formulation; monitoring and evaluation of activities; internal communications and public outreach; budget formulation; tracking and reconciliation; procurement planning and processing; and general operations support and administrative services.

(b) The **field operations team** develops and oversees OTI country programs, including country strategies, program design, implementation, and donor coordination; and conducts liaison with USAID bureaus, field missions, and OGAs to ensure policy compliance and coordination.

(3) **Office of Food for Peace (FFP)** provides leadership, coordination, and operational support for international food activities. It develops USG policy, formal positions, and funding levels for grants and cooperative agreements to the WFP, NGOs, and in selected instances governments, implementing food programs. It provides assistance for emergency operations and support for USAID food security and developmental objectives. FFP implements legislation and policies governing the donation of US agricultural commodities. FFP manages a budget of over a billion dollars annually, and also oversees the procurement and shipping of over two million metric tons of food annually. The Famine Early Warning System is also part of FFP.

d. **OFDA** coordinates and ensures that the needs of disaster victims are met by providing all forms of relief and rehabilitation. OFDA provides technical support to the Administrator, who serves as the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. OFDA formulates US foreign disaster assistance policy in coordination with OGAs. OFDA works with national and international foreign affairs agencies, DOD, DOS, UN agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector in disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and rehabilitation. OFDA funds and procures relief supplies and administrative support for short- and long-term disaster situations and provides humanitarian relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance to foreign disaster victims. There are three divisions within OFDA.

(1) The **Disaster Response and Mitigation Division** coordinates with USAID offices and others to provide relief supplies and HA. It plans for the level of response needed for an emergency and implements and manages USG disaster relief and rehabilitation programs worldwide. It devises, coordinates, and implements program
strategies for the application of the most current science and technology to prevention, mitigation, and national and international preparedness for a variety of natural and man-made disaster situations. It evaluates the impact of previous disaster response initiatives/programs and ensures the integration of this information into future planning and response activities. It coordinates with other USAID geographic bureaus’ donor organizations, UN agencies, and NGOs.

(2) The **Operations Division** develops and manages logistical, operational, and technical support for disaster responses. It identifies sources for procurement of relief supplies and manages the stockpiling and transportation of those supplies. It maintains readiness to respond to emergencies through several mechanisms, including managing SAR teams, maintaining the operational status of the ground operations team, and developing and maintaining the capability to field DART and response management teams in Washington. It develops and maintains OFDA’s relationship with the DOD, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, DOS, and the Department of Energy.

(3) The **Program Support Division** provides programmatic and administrative support, including budget/financial services, procurement planning, contract/grant administration, general administrative support, and communication support for both OFDA Washington and its field offices. It supports the OFDA mission by providing centralized control of funds, resources, and procurement to facilitate the time-sensitive delivery of relief assistance. It also maintains and develops administrative and programmatic policy as it relates to OFDA programs.

(4) Each fiscal year, DOS releases a cable, “Subject: USAID/DCHA Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance's Guidance for Disaster Planning and Response FY XXXX.” This cable provides guidance to all posts concerning support from USAID/DCHA's OFDA before, during, and after the occurrence of natural and complex disasters abroad in Fiscal Year XXXX. USAID/OFDA's mission, capabilities, and support capacities in coordinating and managing USG assistance in response to disasters are also outlined. Procedures highlight the need for both continuous USAID/OFDA and USAID mission collaboration in the planning process for disasters as well as regular and sustained communication between MDROs and USAID/OFDA regional advisors and coordinators to ensure timely, appropriate, and effective USG emergency assistance. The guidance provided in the cable should be used in conjunction with Automated Directives System 251 on international disaster assistance. This is an important reference for planning FHA operations.

9. **Disaster Assistance Response Team**

   a. The DART was developed by USAID’s OFDA to provide rapid response to foreign disasters as mandated by the FAA. A DART provides a variety of trained specialists to assist US embassies and USAID missions with managing the USG response to foreign disasters. DART activities vary according to the nature, magnitude, and complexity of each disaster and are staffed accordingly.
b. **Immediate Action.** During the initial onset of disasters, the DART focuses upon:

1. Coordinating needs assessments.
2. Recommending USG response.
3. Managing USG on-site relief activities, including SAR and air operations.
4. Managing receipt, distribution, and monitoring of USG-provided relief supplies.
5. Liaison with NGOs and IGOs.

c. During long-term, complex disasters, the DART focuses upon:

1. Collecting situational and general data on the disaster.
2. Monitoring effectiveness of USG-funded relief activities.
3. Reviewing relief proposals for potential funding by OFDA.
4. Recommending follow-on strategies and actions to OFDA Washington.

d. During either type of disaster response, DARTs coordinate their activities with the affected country, NGOs, IGOs, other assisting countries, and deployed US military resources, including HASTs formed by the CCDR.

e. **Structure.** The DART is structured according to the size, complexity, type, and location of the disaster as well as the needs of the affected country. DART staffing is based upon personnel numbers and skills needed to carry out the strategy and meet mission objectives. The DART is designed as a highly flexible, mobile organization capable of adapting to changing disaster requirements; therefore, the DART structure will vary considerably from operation to operation.

f. **Functional Areas.** The DART operates in five functional areas.

1. **Management.** Manages overall DART activities including liaison with the affected country, NGOs, IGOs, other assisting countries, and US military. Develops and implements plans to meet strategic objectives.

2. **Operations.** Manages DART operational activities, including SAR activities, technical support, medical and health response, and aerial operations coordination. This function is most active during the initial onset of a disaster.

3. **Planning.** Collects, evaluates, tracks, and disseminates disaster information. Reviews activities, recommends actions, and develops its operational plan.
(4) **Logistics.** Supports OFDA and DART personnel by managing supplies, equipment, and services. Orders, receives, distributes, and tracks personnel and USG-provided relief supplies.

(5) **Administration.** Manages team fiscal activities and DART cost accounting, contracts, and procures OFDA DART-required goods and services.

g. **Organization.** Decisions related to DART activation, composition, and mission are made at an OFDA disaster response planning meeting in Washington, DC, by the OFDA Director. An OFDA-selected team leader organizes and supervises the DART. The OFDA Assistant Director for Disaster Response (or designee) delegates authority to and supervises the team leader. The delegation lists DART objectives, priorities, constraints, and reporting requirements. Based on this list and in conjunction with the assistant Director for Disaster Response and Operations Division, the team leader identifies other positions needed.

h. **Coordination with the USAID Representative to the Embassy.** Prior to departure, the team leader will contact the USAID representative in the affected country to discuss the situation, review DART objectives and capabilities, and obtain additional instructions or authority. While in the affected country, the team leader advises and may receive directions from the USAID representative. Directions will be followed to the extent that they do not conflict with OFDA policies, authorities, and procedures. The team leader maintains direct communications with OFDA to coordinate policies, authorities, and procedures. The team leader maintains direct LOCs with OFDA Washington throughout the operation.

i. **Coordination with the JFC.** Neither the DART nor JFC is subordinate to the other; a successful relationship is based upon close coordination and mutual understanding of each element’s respective mission. Both have a common purpose and, accordingly, have much to gain through close coordination and unity of effort. In some cases it will be appropriate to have a DART member attached to the JTF HQ. Although the DART represents OFDA, which is the lead USG agency for the FHA response, the CJTF should be aware that the COM is in charge of all USG activities in the disaster-affected country.

j. **Duration.** The DART leader and OFDA Washington will review the disaster situation and DART progress in achieving mission objectives. The DART leader and OFDA Washington set the duration of the DART accordingly.

*For more information on the DART, see USAID Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response.*
10. Interagency Management System

The **IMS** for stabilization and reconstruction is designed to assist policymakers in the management of complex stabilization and reconstruction engagements by ensuring coordination among all USG players at the strategic, operational and tactical/field levels. The IMS is designed for high priority complex crises and operations, which may require military operations, and where multiple USG agencies will participate. Although IMS is primarily a system for interagency coordination in support of SSTR, parts of the system may be used during an FHA operation due to the interagency nature of FHA.
1. General

By nature, responses to humanitarian emergencies are difficult to manage. Many actors - governments, NGOs and IGOs - seek to respond simultaneously to complex emergencies. Creating a coherent framework within which everyone can contribute promptly and effectively to the overall effort is a daunting task. The UN is the major provider and coordinator of HA around the world. The UN has strengthened cooperation with other organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, and has taken actions to speed its emergency response capability. US military personnel will most likely operate with some of the primary IGOs and NGOs described in this appendix.

More detail is provided in JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I and Volume II.

2. The United Nations

a. Since it first coordinated humanitarian relief operations in Europe following the devastation and massive displacement of people in the Second World War, the international community has relied on the UN to respond to natural and man-made disasters that are beyond the capacity of national authorities alone. Today, the UN is a major provider of emergency relief and longer-term assistance, a catalyst for action by governments and relief agencies, and an advocate on behalf of people struck by emergencies. The UN follows the principles of HA: neutrality, impartiality, and humanity. This section provides information regarding UN organizations and programs that have worldwide HA mandates that a CDR may encounter during FHA operations.

b. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The mission of UNOCHA is to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors to: alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies, advocate for the rights of people in need, promote preparedness and prevention, and facilitate sustainable solutions. As the UN focal point for civil-military coordination of HA activities within UNOCHA, the Civil Military Coordination Section ensures the effective use of military and civil defense assets in disaster relief and HA operations, establishes civil-military coordination mechanisms to facilitate interaction and cooperation, and upholds humanitarian principles in support of humanitarian coordinators and UNOCHA’s mandate.

c. UNDAC is a stand-by team of disaster management professionals who are nominated and funded by member governments, UNOCHA, UNDP, and operational humanitarian UN agencies such as WFP, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Health Organization (WHO). Upon request of a disaster-stricken country, the UNDAC team can be deployed within hours to carry out rapid assessment of priority needs and to support national authorities and the UN resident coordinator to coordinate international relief on-site. The team is responsible for providing first-hand information on
the disaster situation and priority needs of the victims to the international community through UNOCHA.

d. The OSOCC, run by the UNDAC team, assists local authorities with coordinating international response teams during disasters. In addition, an internet-based virtual OSOCC facilitates information exchange between responding governments and organizations throughout the relief operation. Establishing an OSOCC is one of the functions an UNDAC team will frequently be asked to perform. The size and functions of the OSOCC will vary in each emergency. However, its basic structure is described in the *UNDAC Handbook*. The UNDAC team should modify this to suit the requirements of the situation.

(1) An OSOCC has three main objectives:

(a) To provide a system for coordinating and directing the activities of an international relief effort at the site of a disaster/emergency; this is especially the case in an earthquake scenario to coordinate the activities of international urban SAR teams.

(b) To provide a framework/platform for cooperation and coordination among the international humanitarian entities at a disaster/emergency site.

(c) To act as a link between such entities and the affected country’s authorities.

(2) An OSOCC is designed to facilitate the coordination of the international relief community in a disaster/emergency. The emergency management principles behind the OSOCC’s scope, structure, and procedures make the OSOCC a valid tool in any sudden-onset disaster involving international relief resources. The OSOCC system is designed as a rapid response tool. To be effective, it should be initiated in the immediate aftermath of a disaster/emergency and before, or simultaneously with, the arrival of international relief resources. It is expected that an OSOCC in some form would be operational during the relief phase of an emergency until the national/local authorities or the traditional UN structure can cope with the coordination of international resources or until the international relief resources meeting emergency requirements have been withdrawn.

e. The *UNDAC Handbook* is a reference guide for the use of members of the UNDAC team undertaking an emergency mission. The handbook contains a variety of useful information, checklists, and a description of coordination structures in the field. It has been designed and written in the form of a typical UNDAC mission cycle with chapters commencing with the UNDAC members' preparation prior to a mission, through various stages of a mission until the termination of the mission and debriefing. It also attempts to assist UNDAC members in accomplishing any of the various tasks they may be expected to perform on missions. These include a range of issues such as staffing an OSOCC for urban SAR teams during an earthquake, to working with military contingents in humanitarian emergencies. It also contains useful data for everyday use on a mission such as composition of medical kits, security precautions, and characteristics of operating in different climatic
conditions and terrain. The handbook has been compiled utilizing information from a wide spectrum of acknowledged sources.

f. **ReliefWeb** is the world’s leading on-line gateway to information (documents and maps) on humanitarian emergencies and disasters. An independent vehicle of information, designed specifically to assist the international humanitarian community in effective delivery of emergency assistance, it provides timely, reliable and relevant information as events unfold, while emphasizing the coverage of “forgotten emergencies” at the same time. ReliefWeb is administered by UNOCHA.

g. **HICs** aim to ensure that individuals and organizations at field and strategic levels have access to the benefits of information management tools to assess, plan, implement, and monitor HA. HICs are an inter-organizational resource, reporting to the humanitarian/resident coordinator, whose products and services are available to the entire humanitarian community. HICs provide surge capacity to the humanitarian community, and particularly to the coordination function, usually (but not exclusively) in the context of complex emergencies.

h. The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) is a global network of more than 80 countries and disaster response organizations under the UN umbrella. INSARAG deals with urban SAR related issues and aims at establishing standards for international urban SAR teams and methodology for international coordination in earthquake response. The INSARAG Search and Rescue Directory provides an overview of INSARAG member countries and their urban SAR teams in the INSARAG regional groups Africa/Europe, Asia/Pacific, and the Americas.

i. **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.** UNHCR is mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. UNHCR’s primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. In its efforts to achieve this objective, UNHCR strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, and to return home voluntarily. By assisting refugees to return to their own country or to settle permanently in another country, UNHCR also seeks lasting solutions to their plight. As a humanitarian, nonpolitical organization, UNHCR has two basic and closely related aims – to protect refugees and to seek ways to help them restart their lives in a normal environment. Increasingly, UNHCR has provided assistance to some groups of IDPs.

(1) The great majority of today's refugees would prefer to return home willingly once the situation stabilizes. In these circumstances, UNHCR encourages voluntary return by providing transportation, financial incentives, and practical help such as seeds, farming equipment, and building materials.

(2) Sometimes, when it is impossible for civilians to go home, UNHCR helps them either to integrate in countries where they first sought asylum or to go to one of 16 states that regularly accept refugees for permanent resettlement.
j. World Food Programme. WFP’s objectives are to establish international procedures for meeting emergency food needs and emergencies inherent in chronic malnutrition; assist in preschool and school feeding programs; and implement food-for-work pilot projects in support of social and economic development. WFP’s primary task is to furnish food in support of economic and social development projects in developing countries. In addition, substantial resources may be provided to meet emergency food needs. WFP purchases and ships food needed in emergencies on behalf of donor governments, UNOCHA, or the affected countries. WFP staff may assist, when required, in coordinating the reception and utilization of food aid received from all sources. The WFP can be regarded as the de facto logistic arm of the UN in disaster situations. The WFP also hosts the Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWSweb). HEWSweb (www.hewsweb.org) is an interagency partnership project aimed at establishing a common platform for humanitarian early warnings and forecasts for natural hazards. The main objective of HEWSweb is to bring together and make accessible in a simple manner the most credible early warning information available at the global level from multiple specialized institutions.

k. United Nations Joint Logistic Centre. The UNJLC is an interagency humanitarian common service. Its mandate is to provide logistics information management support and services. This involves providing an information platform for the gathering, collating, analysis, and dissemination of logistic information as well as commodity tracking and prioritization services. UNJLC operates under the custodianship of WFP which is responsible for the administrative and financial oversight of UNJLC. When deployed, the mission of the UNJLC, will be to optimize and complement the logistics capabilities of cooperating agencies within a well-defined crisis area for the benefit of the ongoing humanitarian operation. This includes the option to establish satellite joint logistics centers dispersed at critical locations in the theatre of operations. The UNJLC will provide logistics support at operational planning, coordination, and monitoring level. Unless specified otherwise, the UN agencies and other humanitarian bodies, which are established in the area, will continue to exercise their normal responsibilities. UNJLC responsibilities will be defined per the requirements on a case by case basis and will be specified in the terms of reference. In general, the main responsibilities will be:

(1) Collectively identifying and eliminating logistic bottlenecks of common interest to the humanitarian community to avoid duplication and wasteful competition among agencies. Related to this task, the UNJLC plans, prioritizes, and deconflicts relief movements when available infrastructure capacity is limited. When operating air assets for common use, UNJLC will be in charge of the planning and prioritization. Through this process, the UNJLC advises on the most efficient transport modes and performs movement advisory functions.

(2) Accomplishing logistic related policy issues affecting humanitarian logistic operations. These include the negotiation of facilitation measures with local customs to expedite the transit and import of relief commodities and the investigation of possible fuel shortages which would affect humanitarian relief operations.
(3) Coordinating and deconflicting humanitarian movements with military authorities.

(4) Making detailed assessments of roads, bridges, airports, ports and other logistics infrastructure and recommending actions for repair and reconstruction.

(5) Acting as a platform for gathering, collating, analyzing, and disseminating information required by agencies to optimize logistics planning and management. This involves two basic information categories: pipeline/commodity tracking, including agency stock positions; and logistics support information, such as humanitarian logistics installations and assets, status of corridors and border crossings, customs and infrastructure assessments. The UNJLC has geographic information system and mapping capabilities. A variety of dissemination mechanisms are employed, including interagency meetings, bulletins, and compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM). A generic website is maintained, housing general reference and deployment-specific materials.

1. United Nations Children’s Fund. UNICEF is mandated to advocate for the protection of children's rights, to help meet their basic needs, and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential. UNICEF responds in emergencies to protect the rights of children. In coordination with UN partners and humanitarian agencies, UNICEF makes its unique facilities for rapid response available to its partners to relieve the suffering of children and those who provide their care. UNICEF uses materials from emergency stockpiles in the UNICEF warehouses in Copenhagen to meet emergency requirements. UNICEF can also procure relief supplies on behalf of other UN agencies and relief organizations. In the first six to eight weeks following the outbreak of a crisis with its national UN and NGO partner organizations, UNICEF will work to:

(1) Assess, monitor, report, and communicate the situation of children and women: conduct a rapid assessment, including determination of severe or systematic abuse, violence, or exploitation; and report through the appropriate mechanisms.

(2) Provide vaccination, essential drugs, and nutritional supplements: vaccinate children between 6 months and 14 years of age against measles; providing vitamin A supplementation as required; provide essential drugs, basic and emergency health kits, oral rehydration, fortified nutritional products, and micronutrient supplements; provide post-rape-care kits, including post-exposure prophylaxis for human immunodeficiency virus, where appropriate; and provide other emergency supplies such as blankets and tarpaulins.

(3) Provide child and maternal feeding and nutritional monitoring: with the WFP and NGO partners, support infant and young child feeding, therapeutic, and supplementary feeding; introduce nutritional monitoring and surveillance.

(4) Provide safe drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene: emergency water supply and purification, provision of basic family water kits, safe disposal of feces, and hygiene education.
(5) Assist in preventing the separation and facilitate the identification, registration, and medical screening of children separated from their families: ensure family tracing systems are put in place and provide care and protection; and prevent sexual abuse and exploitation of children and women.

(6) Initiate the resumption of schooling and other child learning opportunities: set up temporary learning spaces and reopen schools, start reintegrating teachers and children (with a focus on girls), and organize recreational activities.

m. **UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).** With most communities dependent on agriculture and related enterprises for their food security and livelihoods, FAO’s expertise in farming, livestock, fisheries, and forestry is crucial in emergency response and rehabilitation efforts. In responding to an emergency, FAO collaborates with many partners, including governments, other UN organizations, and humanitarian groups. During these crises, assistance is required to restore local food production and reduce dependency on food aid, an essential part of the recovery process. This is where FAO plays a vital role. The Emergency Operations Division of the Technical Cooperation Department of the FAO, working jointly with the WFP, sends missions to the affected areas to assess the crop and food supply situation. During these missions, experts consult closely with the farmers, herders, fishers, and local authorities. Once the assessment mission is finished, FAO designs a relief and rehabilitation program and mobilizes funds for its implementation. In response to emergencies, FAO distributes material assets, such as seed and fertilizer, fishing equipment, livestock, and farm tools.

n. **World Health Organization.** The WHO’s Emergency Response and Operations Group is responsible for developing health action in crisis’s operational and logistic capacity in support of countries in acute crises as well as for developing standard operating procedures for emergencies, to ensure a uniform approach across WHO to crises that demand an immediate response. The group is also responsible for assessing, tracking, and reviewing organizational performance and health outcomes in response to crises.

(1) WHO's key functions in a crisis are to:

(a) Promptly assess health needs of populations affected by crises and measure ill-health, identifying priority causes of ill-health and death.

(b) Support member states in coordinating action for health.

(c) Ensure that critical gaps in health response are rapidly identified and filled.

(d) Support restoration of essential public health functions.

(e) Revitalize health systems and build up their capacity for preparedness and response.
(2) WHO's mobile response teams bring together expertise in epidemic response, logistics, security coordination, and management. They are combined with mobile teams provided by the UN as a whole. They will empower the UN organizations in the affected country to better address the health aspects of crises.

o. United Nations Development Programme. Following disasters and armed conflict, UNDP assists national governments and communities to lay the foundation for sustainable development. UNDP’s expertise and resources focus on several areas; however, early recovery will be the initial effort. Early recovery focuses on restoring the capacity of national institutions and communities after a crisis. Early recovery begins in a humanitarian relief setting, immediately following a natural disaster or armed conflict. Guided by development principles, the early recovery phase aims to generate self-sustaining, nationally-owned processes, to stabilize human security and address underlying risks that contributed to the crisis. Early recovery encompasses a wide range of areas such as governance, livelihoods, shelter, environment, and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations.

p. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch extends UNEP's work in areas of the world where the environment is impacted by conflicts and disasters, or where the environment is a factor contributing to conflicts and disaster impacts. Because conflicts and disasters are so closely intertwined with the environment, proper environmental management and governance is essential for long-term peace, stability, and security in any conflict- or disaster-prone country. It conducts environmental assessments in crisis affected countries and strengthens national environmental management capacity through institution building, promoting regional cooperation, technical legal assistance, environmental information management, and integrating environmental concerns and risk reduction measures in reconstruction programs. Field-based assessments are conducted to identify the impacts of a conflict or disaster on environmental systems and the possible, indirect impacts on human health. UNEP delivers technical support for environmental clean-up or to mitigate environmental risks caused by disasters or conflicts, including those posed by chemical contamination or severe environmental damage to human health or livelihoods.

3. International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

a. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are made up of the ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the 185 individual national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. The mission of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being, particularly in times of armed conflict and other emergencies, to work for the prevention of disease and for the promotion of health and social welfare, to encourage voluntary service and a constant readiness to give help by the members of the movement, and a universal sense of solidarity towards all those in need of its protection and assistance. Each component of the movement is independent, although all act in accordance with the fundamental principles of the movement for unity of effort and cooperation. The seven
fundamental principles of the movement are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.

b. **International Committee of the Red Cross.** ICRC is an impartial, neutral, and independent organization with an exclusively humanitarian mission to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. During conflicts, it directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the movement. It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian principles.

(1) Its specific tasks applicable to FHA include:

(a) Visits and interviews, without witness, to prisoners of war and detained or interned civilians.

(b) Search for missing persons.

(c) Transmission of messages between family members separated by conflict, including from prisoners of war and detained civilians.

(d) Reunification of dispersed families.

(e) Provision of basic health care services.

(f) Provision of urgently needed food, water, sanitation and shelter to civilians without access to these basic necessities.

(g) Monitoring compliance with and contributing to the development of international humanitarian principles.

(h) Spreading knowledge of international humanitarian principles.

(2) The ICRC mandate has two sources of authority, the Geneva Conventions and the ICRC’s statutes, which encourage it to undertake similar work in situations of internal violence, where the Geneva Conventions do not apply.

(3) The ICRC receives its funding from voluntary contributions from governments, other IGOs, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and private sources.

c. **International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is the world's largest humanitarian organization, providing assistance without discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions. The International Federation comprises 185 member Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, a Secretariat in Geneva and more than 60 delegations strategically located to support activities around the world. The Red
Crescent is used in place of the Red Cross in many Islamic countries. The additional emblem of the Red Crystal now has the same status as the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

(1) The vision of the International Federation is to strive, through voluntary action, for a world of empowered communities, better able to address human suffering and crises with hope, respect for dignity, and a concern for equity.

(2) Its mission is to improve the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing the power of humanity. Often, these are victims of natural disasters, poverty brought about by socio-economic crises, refugees, and victims of health emergencies.

(3) The Federation carries out relief operations to assist victims of disasters, and combines this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member national societies. The Federation's work focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care.

(4) The Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief represents a huge leap forward in setting standards for disaster response. It is being used by the International Federation to monitor its own standards of relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to set similar standards. The Code of Conduct is voluntary and applicable to any NGO; and lays down 10 points of principle which all NGOs should adhere to in their disaster response work, and goes on to describe the type relationships with donor governments that agencies working in disasters should seek.

(5) Emergency response units (ERUs) are self-contained teams of specialist professionals and pre-packed sets of standardized equipment. The personnel guarantee to be available within 48 hours, and the full unit aims to be operational on site within one week. ERUs were developed to improve the speed and efficiency with which the Federation is able to respond to disasters. ERUs reduce the burden on a National Society and Federation delegation facing a major disaster. They can also move rapidly into a disaster area where no Federation delegation or national society structure is present. There are five types of ERU, each offering a different specialist activity: basic health care; logistics, water, and sanitation; referral hospital facilities (field hospitals); information technology and telecommunication; and relief (assessments).

(6) The International Federation has developed the field assessment and coordination teams (FACTs) concept. The methodology has been developed in close cooperation with UNOCHA, and the assessment and coordination systems are compatible with UNOCHA's UNDAC system.

(a) A core group of experienced Red Cross/Red Crescent disaster managers from within the Federation and from the national societies with different expertise in relief, logistics, health, nutrition, public health and epidemiology, water and sanitation, finance, administration, psychological support, as well as language capabilities, have become members of FACT, and are able to support national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies...
in major disaster response. They are ready to participate in a FACT deployment with 12-24 hours notice for 2-4 weeks anywhere in the world.

(b) In the case of a humanitarian emergency, the national society in the affected country may request assistance from the International Federation. In this case, FACT members all over the world are alerted using automated systems and their availability within 12-24 hours is requested. The Operations Support Department, in consultation with the Regional Department at the Secretariat, composes a team that is deployed to the disaster area immediately. The FACT works with counterparts from the local national society, and with members of regional disaster response teams, members of the Federation regional or country delegation, and the ICRC.

(c) In coordination with local authorities, UN organizations and NGOs, the FACT carries out an assessment of the situation and identifies the most urgent needs. The team compiles an assessment report, a plan of action that recommends the most appropriate Red Cross/Red Crescent intervention, and drafts an appeal, which is then launched by the Federation Secretariat in Geneva to the member national societies and other donors.

(d) The FACT also facilitates and coordinates the start-up of relief activities. It may request ERUs and coordinate their deployment, advise on and request other human and material resources, and coordinate the assistance provided by the Red Cross Movement in response to the disaster.

(e) After assisting in the implementation of the plan of action, the FACT hands over the relief operation to the host national society, the delegation, and the delegates who have been recruited to support them.

d. **National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies form the basic units and constitute a vital force of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in nearly all countries. National societies act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief, health, and social programs. During wartime, national societies assist the affected civilian population and support the army medical services where appropriate.

4. **International Organization for Migration**

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the principal IGO in the field of migration. IOM is dedicated to promoting humane and orderly migration for the benefit of all. As an intergovernmental body, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants. It does so by providing services and advice to governments and migrants. IOM works to help ensure the orderly and humane management of migration, to promote international cooperation on migration issues, to assist in the search for practical solutions to migration problems and to
Humanitarian Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations

provide HA to migrants in need, be they refugees, displaced persons or other uprooted people. IOM works in the four broad areas of migration management: migration and development, facilitating migration, regulating migration, and addressing forced migration. IOM works closely with governmental, IGO, and NGO partners. With offices and operations on every continent, IOM helps governments and civil society through:

a. Rapid humanitarian responses to sudden migration flows.

b. Post-emergency return and reintegration programs.

c. Assistance to migrants on their way to new homes and lives.

d. Facilitation of labor migration.

e. Assisted voluntary return for irregular migrants.

f. Recruitment of highly qualified nationals for return to their countries of origin.

g. Aid to migrants in distress.

h. Training and capacity-building of officials.

i. Measures to counter TIP.

j. Migration medical and public health programs.

k. Mass information and education on migration.

l. Research related to migration management and other services for migrants.

5. **Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit**

a. The Euro-Atlantic disaster response unit (EADRU) was created by NATO to coordinate disaster relief efforts for the member countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in case of a natural or technological disaster in the EAPC geographical area.

b. EADRU is located at NATO HQ in Brussels, Belgium, and is headed by the Director Civil Emergency Planning with additional staff from NATO and Partner Countries. The EADRU is also open to representatives from the UN and the NATO Military Authorities. In close consultation with the UNOCHA, the EADRU is responsible for coordinating the response of EAPC Countries to a disaster occurring within the EAPC geographical area.

c. EADRU is a non-standing, multinational mix of national civil and military elements (qualified personnel of rescue, medical and other units, equipment and materials, assets, and
transport) which are volunteered by EAPC countries. The EADRU can be deployed in case of a major natural or technological disaster in an EAPC country upon request from the stricken country or in support of a relevant international organization. The composition and size of this multinational EADRU will be determined by the requirements based on an international assessment of each particular disaster. National elements will remain under national control while deployed in the stricken country as an asset of the local emergency management agency. The area of deployment of the EADRU will be limited to the EAPC member countries. In exceptional circumstances, should there be a RFA for a stricken non-EAPC country; political guidance will be obtained as a matter of urgency before initiating any disaster response via the EADRU.

6. American Council for Voluntary International Action

   a. InterAction is the largest coalition of US-based international NGOs focused on the world’s poor and most vulnerable people. Collectively, InterAction’s more than 165 members work in every developing country. Based in Washington, DC with a staff of 40, InterAction’s member agencies are large and small, faith-based and secular, and are headquartered across 25 states.

   b. InterAction exercises leadership in conflict prevention, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and peace building initiatives in post-conflict situations. InterAction members respond to natural disasters all around the world.

   c. InterAction leverages the impact of US private support by advocating for the expansion of USG investments and by insisting that policies and programs are responsive to the realities of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable populations.

   d. InterAction brings the values and experience of the NGO community into the broader development and HA community through strategic alliances with key partners around particular issues and objectives.

   e. InterAction’s work is guided by the following priorities:

      (1) Promote a bold agenda to focus US development and HA on improving the conditions of the world’s poor and most vulnerable.

      (2) Demonstrate and enhance NGO accountability and impact in development and humanitarian action. Focus on aggregating the contributions of the NGO community towards achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals, on broadening compliance with the Sphere Project *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*, and on aligning with other key global frameworks that advance development efforts and enable humanitarian action.

      (3) Be the voice and prime representative of US international NGOs in building alliances and common agendas with NGO networks around the world and with other strategic partners.
7. European Community Humanitarian Aid Department

The European Union as a whole (i.e., the Member States and the Commission) is one of the world's main humanitarian aid donors; the European Community Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) is the service of the European Commission responsible for this activity. The European Union’s mandate to ECHO is to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union. The aid is intended to go directly to those in distress, irrespective of race, religion, or political convictions. ECHO’s task is to ensure goods and services get to crisis zones fast. Goods may include essential supplies, specific foodstuffs, medical equipment, medicines and fuel. Services may include medical teams, water purification teams and logistical support. Goods and services reach disaster areas via ECHO partners.

8. Other Organizations

a. Pan American Disaster Response Unit (PADRU). The mission of the PADRU is to prevent and relieve the suffering caused by natural and man-made disasters in the Americas, following the fundamental principles and policies of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The PADRU is the focal point for response preparedness and response; its goal is to increase coherence of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in the region through appropriate coordination and planning; strengthening capacities to face a crisis during a disaster. The role of the PADRU is to ensure high quality Red Cross assistance to vulnerable people affected by disasters in the Americas by reinforcing the capacity of national societies and the Federation Secretariat to provide timely, bold, and professional disaster response services before, during, and after emergencies. PADRU is designed to support the efficient and effective response to disasters by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as a whole. It provides support to national societies in coordination with the regional delegations through coordination, personnel, logistical support, and leadership, as appropriate.

b. The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) serves the Caribbean Community. CDERA’s main function is to make an immediate and coordinated response to any disastrous event affecting any participating state, once the state requests such assistance. Other functions include:

1. Securing, collating, and channeling comprehensive and reliable information on disasters affecting the region to interested governmental and NGOs.

2. Mitigating, or eliminating as far as possible, the consequences of disasters affecting participating states.

3. Establishing and maintaining on a sustainable basis, adequate disaster response capabilities among participating states.
Appendix D

(4) Mobilizing and coordinating disaster relief from governmental and non-governmental organizations for affected participating states.

c. Reuters AlertNet (www.alertnet.org) is a humanitarian news network based around a popular website. It aims to keep relief professionals and the wider public up to date on humanitarian crises around the globe. It provides operation-critical information to relief charities worldwide; encourages relief charities to swap information with one another; and raises awareness of humanitarian emergencies among the general public. AlertNet focuses its resources on covering fast-moving humanitarian emergencies and on the early warning of future emergencies.


a. The cluster approach has created a greater "spirit" of working together – beginning to put in place the coordination and decision-making structures for genuine UN/non-UN partnership. The aim is to enhance humanitarian response capacity, predictability, accountability, and partnership. There are nine clusters and each cluster has a designated lead, responsible to the emergency relief coordinator (global) or humanitarian coordinator (country level). See Figure D-1.

b. The cluster approach aims to strengthen overall response capacity as well as the effectiveness of the response in five key ways:

(1) The approach aims to ensure that sufficient global capacity is built up and maintained in all the main sectors/areas of response, with a view to ensuring timely and effective responses in new crises.

(2) The approach ensures predictable leadership in all the main sectors/areas of response.

(3) The approach is designed around the concept of partnerships (i.e., clusters) between UN agencies, other IGOs, and NGOs.

(4) The approach strengthens accountability.

(5) The approach should help to improve coordination and prioritization in specific sectors/areas of response by placing responsibility for leadership and coordination of these issues with the competent, operational agency.

c. At a global level, the aim is to strengthen preparedness and capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies by ensuring leadership and accountability in all main sectors.

d. At a country level, the aim is to ensure a more coherent and effective response by mobilizing groups of agencies, organizations, and NGOs to coordinate, share information, and respond in a strategic manner. At the country level, sectors and sectoral groups have always existed and they will continue to exist. In the past, however, it was usually the case
that only a limited number of sectors had clearly designated lead agencies accountable to the humanitarian coordinator. The cluster approach aims to rectify this by ensuring that, within the international humanitarian response, there is a clear system of leadership and accountability for all the key sectors or areas of humanitarian activity. The cluster approach is intended, therefore, to strengthen rather than to replace sectoral coordination under the overall leadership of the humanitarian coordinator, with a view to improve humanitarian response in emergency situations.

e. Cluster lead organizations are responsible to:

(1) Facilitate the coordination between the cluster members.

(2) Encourage joint working.

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**Figure D-1. Sector and Cluster Leads**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Sector Leads:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture – FAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education – UNICEF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food – WFP</td>
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<td>Refugees – UNHCR</td>
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<th>Cross-cutting Issues:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Camp Coordination and Management:</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- Conflict - UNHCR</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- Disaster - IOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Early Recovery - UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection:</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- Conflict IDPs - UNHCR</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- Disasters and Non-IDP Civilians in Conflict – UNHCR/UNOCHR/UNICEF/UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<th>Technical Issues:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Shelter:</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- Conflict - UNHCR</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- Disaster - IFRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health - WHO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nutrition - UNICEF</td>
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<td>Water and Sanitation - UNICEF</td>
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<th>Common Services:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Telecommunications:</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- Owner - UNOCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Data Service - UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Security - WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics - WFP</td>
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</tbody>
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**LEGEND**

- FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
- IDP: internally displaced person
- IFRC: International Federation of the Red Cross
- IOM: International Organization for Migration
- UN: United Nations
- UNDP: UN Development Programme
- UNHCR: UN Office of High Commission for Refugees
- UNICEF: UN Children’s Fund
- UNOCHA: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- UNOCHR: UN Office of High Commission for Humanitarian Relief
- WFP: World Food Programme
- WHO: World Health Organization
(3) Ensure that responses are in line with existing guidelines and standards.

(4) Collate and share information.

(5) Identify gaps in the response.

(6) Stand in as the ‘provider of last resort’ when there are no other options.

f. The following organizations are designated as global cluster leads:

(1) Technical areas:
   (a) Nutrition: UNICEF
   (b) Health: WHO
   (c) Water/Sanitation: UNICEF
   (d) Emergency Shelter: from conflict - UNHCR; disaster situations - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Convener)

(2) Cross-cutting areas:
   (a) Camp Coordination/Management: from conflict - UNHCR; disaster situations - IOM
   (b) Protection: from conflict - UNHCR; Disasters/civilians affected by conflict - UNHCR/OHCHR/UNICEF
   (c) Early Recovery: UNDP

(3) Common service areas:
   (a) Logistics: WFP
   (b) Emergency Telecommunications: UNOCHA/UNICEF/WFP

*More detailed information may be found in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response.*
1. General

In addition to providing HSS for the deploying force, a CJTF may be tasked to serve the affected population in an FHA crisis. This appendix lists considerations for providing such HSS, if it is part of the mission. Essential tasks for this mission generally include the following:

a. Coordinating actions to prevent or control disease outbreak.

b. Evacuating or temporarily hospitalizing sick, wounded, and injured persons, and coordinating their return to civilian facilities or the parent nation.

c. Distributing supplies and equipment.

d. Assisting in reestablishing indigenous health sector resources and institutions. Primary consideration must be given to supporting and supplementing any existing medical infrastructure exists. No operation should be considered that may supplant the existing medical infrastructure.

Comprehensive guidance and information regarding the provision of HSS is provided in JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

2. Medical Concept of Operations

a. Based upon the mission requirements and medical and operational situation, the joint force surgeon and staff will develop a medical CONOPS that will (if possible) combine the efforts of the military HSS forces, NGOs, and the existing medical infrastructure.

b. Following a disaster, there are generally three waves of medical assistance: trauma, control of disease and infection, and support to rebuilding HN medical capabilities. Initial responders, including forward deployed military forces that can be diverted, may assist in managing trauma, but most US HSS support will be involved in the second and third waves. The JFC must ensure US forces augment HN capabilities, rather than replace or supplant them.

c. During an FHA operation, the highest priority should be given to preserving the health of the forces deployed in support of the operation. This is accomplished by an intensive medical intelligence analysis and a vigorous preventive medicine program, emphasizing medical surveillance activities.

d. Consistent with the mission and the CDR’s intent, the combatant command surgeon, should ensure that the level of care provided meets the minimum international standards for HA and health care support. Once approved by the JFC, the JTF staff should initiate planning and action required to support the standard of care. Upon
execution, if a joint force surgeon thinks that modifications should be made to the standard of care, a request may be made through the supported combatant command surgeon. The WHO has recommended that health care support include nutrition, sanitation, water standards, pre- and post-natal health care, disease treatment, prevention and control related to locally endemic diseases, immunization, and health education.

e. The senior deploying CDR of a HAST should ensure that a predeployment vulnerability assessment has been conducted. These assessments should include an HSS member qualified to evaluate the safety and vulnerability of local food and water sources, perform an epidemiological risk assessment, evaluate local medical capabilities, perform a vector/pest risk assessment, determine adequacy of hygiene of local billeting and public facilities, and perform an environmental risk assessment. Assessments provide the necessary background data for sizing the force protection package required, thus reducing the threat to DOD force personnel and assets.

f. The HAST should include preventive medicine personnel that are trained to perform a detailed occupational and environmental health site assessment of the operational area that documents the conditions found at a site (base camp, bivouac site or outpost, or other permanent or semipermanent basing location) beginning at or near the time it is occupied initially. The assessment includes site history; environmental health survey results for air, water, soil, and noise; entomological surveys; occupational and industrial hygiene surveys; and ionizing and non-ionizing radiation hazard surveys, if indicated. Its purpose is to identify hazardous exposure agents with complete or potentially complete exposure pathways that may affect the health of deployed personnel.

3. Planning and Execution Considerations

a. The JTF should anticipate that the health care delivery infrastructure will be austere to nonexistent. NGOs and IGOs may be able to compensate for some of the shortfalls. The following factors merit consideration when providing health services to the affected population.

b. **Coordination and Collaboration.** Effective coordination and collaboration is a key element that is central to HSS provision.

   (1) The USAID medical representative and DOS regional medical officer are valuable sources of regional medical information and coordination. Additional sources of regional medical information are UNOCHA and the WHO.

   (2) Contact OGA, HN, NGO, and IGO medical personnel before commencing the operation. Early identification of needs and cooperation by all or most of the parties involved will increase efficiency and reduce redundancy.

   (3) The JFC should establish some type of central point or organization for collaboration of medical requirements with nonmilitary organizations. The HOC or CMOC is a logical place for this collaboration to occur. The differing policies and
cultures of individual NGOs and IGOs, military capabilities and procedures, and affected country requirements require a dedicated collaboration element to encourage and help enable unity of effort among all participants. The civil medical affairs C2 should be established within the greater CMOC.

c. **Communications.** Effective operations require a constant effort to avoid gaps in services and redundant services. Uninterrupted communications between military elements, NGOs, IGOs, and affected country personnel will help eliminate unnecessary suffering and apply resources to the operation more effectively.

d. **Cultural Aptitude.** Health experts with foreign language, cultural competency, and interagency experience will be very valuable in a FHA operation.

e. **Demographics.** The population mix is an important factor in the medical effort. Three specialties that are not typically included in a JTF deployment, but may be needed during an FHA operation, are: obstetrics and gynecology, geriatrics, and pediatrics.

f. **Preventive Medicine.** In any FHA operation, preventive medicine is a critical consideration. Individual personal hygiene practices and procedures are key elements of a sound, preventive medicine program. The provision of adequate food service sanitation, potable water supplies, vector control, disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI) prevention, and waste disposal facilities all contribute to the maintenance of a healthy and fit force. FHA operations may place US forces in situations that may substantially increase the risk of DNBI. Exposure to foreign civilian populations potentially carrying endemic diseases as well as disease outbreaks as a result of a natural disaster are all factors increasing the DNBI risk. DODD 6490.2, *Comprehensive Health Surveillance*, and DODI 6490.3, *Deployment Health*, mandate that DOD monitor and identify both long- and short-term health effects of US forces during deployments. This requires that the JTF have robust preventive medicine assets to perform medical and environmental health risk assessments and identify effective preventive medicine measures to counter the threat to US forces. In addition, the significant roles that public health and communicable disease control play in FHA missions further support the need for robust preventive medicine assets.

g. **Disease Prevention.** Natural and man-made disasters frequently give rise to substantial increases in endemic disease. While no parts of the world are immune to increases in diseases, some regions of the developing world are more susceptible to disease than others, and are impacted at devastating levels. Contributory factors in spreading disease to epidemic proportions during disasters include disruption of sanitation services, food and water contamination, and increased rodent and arthropod breeding habitats.

h. **Disease Control.** The risk of communicable diseases is increased in a post-disaster environment due to overcrowding, poor environmental conditions, and poor public health. For example, there is a close association between malnutrition and the effects of communicable disease, particularly childhood diarrhea. Expert advice should
be obtained for communicable disease control and management of epidemics. Some communicable diseases have a seasonal pattern and timely measures must be taken to prevent a rapid increase in cases. The following are central to disease control:

(1) Water supply and soap.
(2) Proper disposal of sewage and refuse.
(3) Vector control (pest control).
(4) General public health education and awareness.
(5) Medical surveillance.

i. **Patient Evacuation.** The combatant command J-4 should advise and assist the combatant command surgeon in matters pertaining to patient evacuation from the operational area and help develop a plan to meet patient movement requirements. Considerations should include, but are not limited to:

(1) Eligibility criteria.
(2) Sponsorship guidelines, (i.e., secretarial designation).
(3) Available evacuation resources and routes.
(4) Reimbursement procedures.
(5) Capabilities of medical treatment facilities within (and adjoining) the operational area to receive evacuees requiring all levels of care.

j. **Immunization.** There are strong reasons, both medical and practical, to resist pressure for an immediate mass immunization program. The most common causes of disease and death are generally infections, often aggravated by malnutrition, which cannot be prevented by immunization effectively. Immunization programs must be staffed with adequate numbers of workers to supervise and manage refrigerated vaccines. Though not difficult, these programs may not represent the best use of resources. The importance of specific immunizations will be dependent on the health threats and HN medical capabilities. The HN, WHO, UNICEF, or another NGO or IGO will implement the program and coordination must be made to support the implementing agency or organization. Immunizations may be conducted in conjunction with HCA HSS missions.

k. **Primary Care.** Primary care may be provided from fixed facilities or during remote medical missions by multinational forces. As above, coordination with appropriate HN organizations and NGOs must be accomplished to avoid unnecessary duplication and to ensure coordinated long term capacity building is accomplished. Women’s and children’s care is the biggest piece of this primary care and must take
special planning to ensure the right mix of providers and medications are available including the gender of both providers and interpreters depending on the mission. Missions must involve US forces and HN providers which gives bidirectional legitimacy to all involved. Often during disasters, the first wave of patients is trauma care, and the second wave is disease control.

1. **Veterinary Support.** Many societies where joint forces will operate are rural and their economies and personal health are often dependent on their domesticated animals. Capacity building exercises, public health, and direct treatment of animals can make as big an impact on the economy of a struggling country as the health of the animal’s owners. Veterinary missions must also involve local animal health providers and the herdsmen themselves.

m. **Health System Capacity Building.** In addition to the training and improved government outreach within the above programs, the medical and veterinary systems themselves can be assisted. One of the first assistance tasks should be to help health systems near US and multinational forces to improve their self-sufficiency and decrease reliance on multinational facilities and eventually contribute to redeployment of US forces. Assessments must be done of the training and health systems periodically to determine their status and effectiveness of previous joint forces and HN and NGO capacity building efforts. Once assessments have been made targeted improvements, closely coordinated with the JTF capabilities, CMO, and surgeon, must be accomplished. A good example of this is training physicians to use ventilators, which then permit the transfer of patients from MTFs to HN hospitals. Care must be taken to ensure that reestablished health care standards are appropriate for the local population and at a level that can be maintained by the existing HN medical infrastructure.

n. **Funding for Medical Humanitarian Assistance Activities.** To pay for the above programs, resources must be managed in accordance with congressional and GCC guidance.

4. **Medical Intelligence**

Medical intelligence is the end product of the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available general health and bioscientific information for a given nation or operational area. Medical intelligence addresses the medical aspects that are significant to military planning in general and to HSS planning in particular. In addition to preparing CDRs to protect their own forces from medical and environmental risks during an operation, medical intelligence also assesses the general health of the population, which is a significant factor in planning for FHA operations. Additionally, information related to affected country health care capabilities is important in assessing whether there are medical care shortfalls for which US, NGOs, IGOs, or third NA must compensate. Sources of this information include the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, the National Center for Medical Intelligence, DIA, and established civilian organizations with long standing resources in the operational area. Medical intelligence
should include awareness of cultural differences that can impact medical care such as hygiene and religious norms.

5. **Nongovernmental Organizations Medical Providers**

   a. In emergencies, urgent outside assistance in the health sector is almost invariably necessary. This is because the immediate and specialized attention needed represents a burden that existing local structures are not designed to bear. Local health services will almost never have the needed reserve capacity in terms of staff at all levels, infrastructure, medical supplies and technical expertise. This capacity can be developed over time, with the support from the HN and other UN agencies.

   b. NGOs must be chosen with care and this is usually done by the HN. However, it is also the responsibility of the UN to advise the government on which organizations have proven competence in emergencies. Some agencies have experience in long-term situations but less in emergencies; others may be too narrow in focus, preferring to do purely curative work to the exclusion of public health, prevention, sanitation, etc. Small NGOs, especially those created in response to a specific situation, should demonstrate appropriate competence before being engaged in the emergency phase.

   c. During the early stages of an emergency it is essential that the numbers of NGOs involved should be kept to the minimum necessary, and that those chosen should be professional, capable of deploying experienced personnel, and with proven past experience in collaborating with both governments and UN in the effective management of an emergency.

6. **Service Capabilities**

   a. **US Navy**

      (1) **Hospital Ships.** Two hospital ships operated by Military Sealift Command are designed to provide emergency, on-site care for US forces deployed in war or tailored for other operations, such as FHA missions. The United States Naval Ship (USNS) Mercy (T-AH 19) and USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) have a maximum capacity of 12 operating rooms, and up to 1,000 beds within the MTF that can be tailored to meet expected patient throughput and variable lengths of stay based on the intensity of required care. Capabilities include: digital radiological services, invasive angiography, a diagnostic and clinical laboratory, a pharmacy, an optometry lab, a computerized axial tomography scan, two oxygen producing plants, and a blood bank. Both vessels have a helicopter deck capable of landing large military helicopters, as well as side ports to take on patients at sea.

      (2) Some amphibious class ships have modern HSS facilities, second only to the Navy’s hospital ships. HSS facilities include four main and two emergency medical operating rooms, three dental operating rooms, x-ray rooms, a blood bank, laboratories, and patient wards. Additionally, casualty collecting and triage areas are located on the
flight deck, medical spaces, and can be set up on the well deck. When augmented with additional HSS personnel and resources, they are capable of providing preventive, first responder, and forward resuscitative capabilities of care for up to 60 inpatients and numerous outpatients. They can provide sustained HSS to patients brought aboard ship during humanitarian missions, while still providing ongoing HSS to crewmembers and embarked staff at the same time.

(3) **Fleet Hospital (FH) and Expeditionary Medical Facility**: FHs and EMFs are a standardized, modular, flexible combat HSS capability that provides HSS to an advanced base environment throughout the full range of military operations. While initially conceived and developed as war reserve facilities to provide HSS during intense combat operations, EMFs can also be used in protracted low-intensity conflict scenarios and humanitarian operations, with design changes. EMFs are transportable, modular, medically and surgically intensive, and employable in a variety of operational environments. They are prepositioned in various CONUS and OCONUS locations, or deployed on MPF enhanced ships. Once transported to the desired location, they can be assembled and operational in a minimum of 10 days provided all components have been delivered to the site and the operational CDR has completed site preparations by the EMF’s assigned staff. Time frame for assemblage varies with the size and/or capability of the EMF. EMFs, depending on size, can provide theater hospitalization capability and capabilities similar to those on a hospital ship; however, they are not light and have a large footprint. Due to the size associated with some EMF platforms, significant logistical support is required to relocate these assets once assembly and activation have occurred. Smaller, task-organized EMFs are easier to relocate, post-activation, with much less logistical support.

(4) The FDPMU is a level three force health protection capability with the primary mission of identifying and controlling health threats in a theater of operations. The FDPMU employs a state of the art suite of field portable analytical and diagnostic equipment to support health risk assessment and evidence-based health risk management. The FDPMU consists of 12 unit type codes. This allows FDPMU personnel and equipment packages to be scaled to meet to specific mission support to requirements, including HCA.

b. **US Air Force**

(1) The humanitarian relief operation operational capability package (HUMRO OCP) is an innovative, stand-alone humanitarian medical package to support contingency disaster-response efforts. HUMRO OCP is designed to provide immediate on-the-scene medical care for the local population in an area hit by a natural disaster. It is a stand-alone, self-sufficient “off the shelf” package designed for quick deployment (within 24 hours) anywhere in the area of operations, regardless of the proximity of an air base. HUMRO OCP includes complete diagnostic and surgical capability in a 25-bed facility with all required base-operating support built in. Approximately 90 medical staff and 150 support Airmen - security forces, civil engineers, base services, and other support personnel, are required to operate the facility. Upon arrival, medical providers can begin
Appendix E

seeing some patients almost immediately. Basic capability is to be established within 12 to 24 hours, and full operational capability within 36 hours.

(2) The US Air Force International Health Specialist (IHS) program serves combatant and component command surgeons by providing medics with proficiency in a second language, regional and cultural expertise, medical planning, medical diplomacy, CA, knowledge of IGOs and NGOs. IHS personnel have specific training in HA and disaster response as well as other medical stability operations. IHS teams are assigned to combatant commands and can also serve on a joint force surgeon’s staff, work at the strategic and operational levels to help plan, monitor, and guide FHA operations.

(3) The **preventive and aerospace medicine (PAM) team** consists of aerospace medicine specialists, public health, bioenvironmental engineering, flight medicine personnel, and independent duty medical technicians. The team oversees basic education and training to prevent disease and briefs CDRs on actual threats, safety issues, current illness, and current health trends. The PAM team leader should be considered the functional expert in casualty prevention. The team consists of three unit type codes, which can deploy both in phases and simultaneously.”

c. US Army

(1) A **combat support hospital (CSH)** can rapidly deploy an 84-bed hospital in support of FHA operations. Additionally, another 164-bed “slice” is in reserve and may be deployed as required by the mission. The CSH facility is the deployable medical system, which consists of TEMPER (tent, extendable modular personnel) tents and International Organization for Standardization shelters. It is composed of an emergency medical treatment section with a dispensary, one operating room (with two tables), two intensive care units each composed of 12 beds, three intermediate care wards each composed of 20 beds, one central materiel services section, laboratory with limited testing capabilities, blood bank, radiology with portable x-ray capability and digital processing, and a pharmacy.

(2) A **medical deployment support command, medical command, or medical brigade** can deploy worldwide in support of FHA operations to provide C2 of assigned and attached medical forces.
APPENDIX F
PLANNING FACTORS FOR FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

1. General

   a. Lessons learned during previous FHA operations can provide valuable insight for CDRs and staffs preparing for a similar operation. The following factors include some of the key lessons from FHA operations, and highlight areas that FHA forces have found to be extremely important.

   b. Is the mission stated in terms of working towards restoration to preemergency status? Is mission success stated in terms not strictly defined by US or western standards? Is the situation at end state sustainable by the affected country and organizations remaining in the operational area?

   c. What is the legal authority for the operation? Do plans include SJA personnel and assets? What is the legal and fiscal authority to conduct civil action projects? Is there a SOFA in effect? If not, should a SOFA, or some other type of international agreement, be negotiated or implemented?

   d. What coordination and collaboration is required with the supported CCDR, supporting CCDRs, subordinate joint force commands, COM and country team, multinational partners, NGOs, IGOs, and OGAs? What are the command, coordination, and collaboration relationships?

   e. Have civilian agencies involved in the operation been encouraged to contribute their valuable expertise and assistance? Have US forces recognized these agencies for their efforts in this regard?

   f. What restrictions exist regarding the sharing of information (sensitive or otherwise) with other agencies and organizations?

   g. What are the liaison requirements? Are LNOs positioned in both higher and subordinate HQs as well as OGAs, medical facilities, NGOs, and IGOs, as required?

   h. Is sea port and aerial port infrastructure, to include road and rail access to the ports, in place before forces begin to arrive? Has USTRANSCOM been consulted as to transportation feasibility? Has the use of ports been deconflicted with HN, NGOs, and IGOs?

   i. Are interpreters available for the JTF, GCC, and other US agencies?

   j. Is adequate communications equipment available for essential basic services? Is additional equipment or connectivity reconfiguration needed to provide direct communications routing to principal destinations?

   k. What is the communications plan for communicating with NGOs, IGOs, and multinational forces? Do these entities require equipment augmentation?
1. Are briefing formats appropriate for use in CMO? Do they emphasize conditions, activities, and population support requirements? Are other participants in the FHA effort (OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs) included in the briefings?

m. What are the information gathering and dissemination requirements? Has PSYOP been brought into the planning process?

n. During the planning process, has the joint force surgeon identified the CDR’s critical information requirements, PIRs, and named AOIs pertaining to the health threat in the operational area and submitted requirements to the supporting intelligence element?

o. Have supplemental measures to the SROE been identified, approved, and published prior to deployment? Do multinational forces understand the ROE? Are they using the same or compatible ROE?

p. Are planned actions within the budgetary limitations of the operation?

q. Has a finance officer been identified and deployed early in the operation?

r. Have Service contracting teams been identified and deployed early in the operation?

s. What logistic requirements are needed to support the operation, and what mechanism is in place to continually monitor logistic resources to ensure that urgent needs are met?

t. Has a PAO and necessary staff been identified and deployed early in the operation?

u. Has PA guidance been developed and passed to all members of the joint force?

v. Has a JIB been established to support the media?

w. What means are available to provide information to the affected population about FHA operations?

2. Sphere Project

a. Sphere is based on two core beliefs: first, that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict, and second, that those affected by disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance. Sphere is three things; a handbook, a broad process of collaboration, and an expression of commitment to quality and accountability.
b. The aim of Sphere is to improve the quality of assistance to people affected by disaster and improve the accountability of states and humanitarian agencies to their constituents, donors, and the affected populations.

c. Sphere represents a unique voluntary initiative, and reflects the collective will and shared experience of a broad array of humanitarian actors. The community of these actors includes NGOs, IGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, donor agencies, host governments, and representatives from affected populations.

d. The *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* handbook is designed for use in disaster response (www.sphereproject.org). While not a policy document, it is applicable in a range of situations where relief is required, including natural disasters as well as armed conflict. It is designed to be used in both slow- and rapid-onset situations, in both rural and urban environments, in developing and developed countries, anywhere in the world. The emphasis throughout is on meeting the urgent survival needs of people affected by disaster, while asserting their basic human right to life with dignity. Despite this focus, the information contained in the handbook is not prescriptive. Minimum standards and key indicators have been developed using broad networks of practitioners in each of the sectors. Most of the standards, and the indicators that accompany them, are not new, but consolidate and adapt existing knowledge and practice.
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The development of JP 3-29 is based upon the following primary references.

1. **Public Law**
   
   a. Title 10, US Code, Sections 166a, 182, 401, 402, 404, 407, 2557, and 2561.
   
   b. Title 22, US Code, Chapter 32.
   
   c. *Uniform Code of Military Justice*.

2. **Presidential Directives**
   
   
   

3. **Department of Defense Issuances**
   
   a. DODD 1300.22, *Mortuary Affairs Policy*.
   
   b. DODD 2000.11, *Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge*.
   
   c. DODD 2000.12, *DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program*.
   
   d. DODD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*.
   
   e. DODD 2010.9, *Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements*.
   
   
   g. DODD 2310.01E, *The Department of Defense Detainee Program*.
   
   h. DODD 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery*.
   
   i. DODD 2311.01E, *DOD Law of War Program*.
   
   
l. DODD 3003.01, *DOD Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR).*

m. DODD 3150.5, *DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents.*

n. DODD 3150.8, *DOD Response to Radiological Accidents.*

o. DODD S-3321.1, *Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime (U).*


q. DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief.*

r. DODD 5525.1, *Status of Forces Policies and Information.*

s. DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements.*

t. DODD 6050.7, *Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department of Defense Actions.*

u. DODD 6200.04, *Force Health Protection (FHP).*

v. DODD 6490.02E, *Comprehensive Health Surveillance.*

w. DODI 2000.21, *Foreign Consequence Management (FCM).*

x. DODI 2200.01, *Combating Trafficking in Persons.*


z. DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany US Armed Forces.*

aa. DODI 5515.08, *Assignment of Claims Responsibility.*

bb. DODI 6490.03, *Deployment Health.*


d. DOD 4715.5-G, *Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document.*


4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives

   a. CJCSI 2120.01A, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.

   b. CJCSI 2300.01C, International Agreements.

   c. CJCSI 3110.05C, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2006.

   d. CJCSI 3110.07C, Guidance Concerning Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense and Employment of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides (U).

   e. CJCSI 3110.16A, Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive Consequence Management Operations.

   f. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the use of Force for US Forces.

   g. CJCSI 3207.01A, Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Operations.

   h. CJCSI 3214.01B, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents.

   i. CJCSI 5810.01C, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

   j. CJCSI 7401.01B, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund.

   k. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I Planning Policies and Procedures.

   l. CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution).

   m. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II Planning Formats.

5. Joint Publications

   a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

   b. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.
c. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.


g. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.


i. JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.

j. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.

k. JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.

l. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

m. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.

n. JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism (FOUO)*.


p. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*.

q. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments*.


t. JP 3-14, *Space Operations*.


w. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*.

x. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.
y. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.


aa. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management.

bb. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.


d. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

ee. JP 3-63, Detainee Operations.


gg. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

hh. JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).

ii. JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

jj. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

kk. JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

ll. JP 4-09, Global Distribution.

mm. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

nn. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

oo. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

6. Service and Other Military Publications


e. FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations.*

f. FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.*

g. FM 4-20.147, *Airdrop of Supplies and Equipment: Humanitarian Airdrop.*

h. FM 5-01.12, MCRP 5-1B, NTTP 5-02, AFTTP (I) 3-2.21 *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Officer Integration.*


j. GTA 41-01-003, *Civil Affairs Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Planning Guide.*

k. GTA 41-01-006, *Working with the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance.*


n. NAVENVIRHLTHCEN NOTICE 3501, *Concept of Operations for the Forward Deployable Preventive Medicine Units (FDPMU).*

o. NTTP 4-02.6, *Hospital Ships.*

p. NWDC TACMEMO 3-07.6-06, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations Planning.*


r. *Operational Law Handbook,* The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School.


7. **US Government Publications**

   a. *Federal Acquisition Regulation.*


e. *US Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 11—Political Affairs*.

f. *USAID Primer*.

g. *USAID'S Strategy for Sustainable Development: an Overview*.


8. **United Nations Publications**


e. *General guidance for interaction between United Nations personnel and military and other representatives of the belligerent parties in the context of the crisis in Iraq*, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.


g. *Guidelines for Assessment in Emergencies*, Inter-Agency Standing Committee Emergency Shelter Cluster.


l. Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

m. Essentials for Emergencies, World Health Organization.


o. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Orientation Handbook, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.


s. Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan - Guidelines for UNAMA Area Coordinators and other UN personnel, UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan.


v. Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (Discussion Paper and Non-binding Guidelines), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.


a. AJP - 9, NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine.

b. AMEDP - 15, Military Medical Support in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief.

c. NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations.
d. *Standing Operating Procedures for the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.***

10. **Other Selected Publications**

   a. *The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.*


   c. *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response,* the Sphere Project.


APPENDIX H
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: CDR, USJFCOM, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Force Trainer - Doctrine, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the J-4.

3. Supersession


4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: DA WASHINGTON DC//G35-SSP//
   INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-7-JEDD//
   CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP//

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to CDR, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Force Trainer – Doctrine and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), Joint Education and Doctrine Division via the CJCS joint electronic library (JEL) at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

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5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications


   b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

   c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.
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<td>Active Component</td>
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<td>AET</td>
<td>airport emergency team</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF(TTP(I)</td>
<td>Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction)</td>
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<td>AOI</td>
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<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>ASD(SO/LIC&amp;IC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMOTF</td>
<td>joint civil-military operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDDOC</td>
<td>joint deployment distribution operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEL</td>
<td>Joint Electronic Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEMB</td>
<td>joint environmental management board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCH</td>
<td>joint force chaplain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFUB</td>
<td>joint facilities utilization board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>joint interagency coordination group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>joint information bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JISE</td>
<td>joint intelligence support element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLOC</td>
<td>joint logistics operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMAO</td>
<td>joint mortuary affairs office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>joint movement center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNCC</td>
<td>joint network operations (NETOPS) control center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>joint operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPP</td>
<td>joint operation planning process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPASE</td>
<td>joint public affairs support element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPOTF</td>
<td>joint psychological operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRSOI</td>
<td>joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-MAO</td>
<td>joint task force-mortuary affairs office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>lead federal agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>mortuary affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCRP</td>
<td>Marine Corps reference publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDRO</td>
<td>mission disaster response officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>maritime pre-positioning force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>meal, ready to eat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTF</td>
<td>medical treatment facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>nation assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTTP</td>
<td>Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWP</td>
<td>Navy warfare publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEBGD</td>
<td>Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFAC</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Assets Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>other government agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHDA</td>
<td>Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHDM</td>
<td>Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Office of Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>on-site commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSOCC</td>
<td>on-site operations coordination center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSD(C)</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PADRU</td>
<td>Pan American Disaster Response Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAM</td>
<td>preventive and aerospace medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>public affairs officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>policy coordination committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>Pacific Disaster Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>peace operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>policy advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>populace and resources control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (DOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>riot control agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFA</td>
<td>request for assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>rules for the use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAT</td>
<td>survey and assessment team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>strategic communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>security cooperation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJFHQ(CE)</td>
<td>standing joint force headquarters (core element)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>state partnership program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SROE</td>
<td>standing rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>stability, security, transition, and reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>trafficking in persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAC</td>
<td>United Nations disaster assessment and coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations development programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations environment programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNJLC</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Logistic Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS</td>
<td>United States Naval Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V&amp;A</td>
<td>valuation and availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRA</td>
<td>Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (DOS)</td>
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</table>
PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions found in the glossary. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for these terms and definitions.

civil-military operations center. An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called CMOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57)

consequence management. Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-28)

dislocated civilian. A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called DC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

displaced person. A broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57)

excess property. The quantity of property in possession of any component of the Department of Defense that exceeds the quantity required or authorized for retention by that component. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-29)

foreign assistance. Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. US foreign assistance takes three forms: development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

foreign disaster. An act of nature (such as a flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or to an intergovernmental organization. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-29)
foreign disaster relief. Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services.  

foreign humanitarian assistance. Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA.  

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Also called HCA.  

humanitarian assistance coordination center. A temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning. A humanitarian assistance coordination center operates during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations by providing the link between the geographic combatant commander and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations at the strategic level. Also called HACC.  

humanitarian demining. None.  

humanitarian demining assistance. The activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war.  

humanitarian mine action. Activities that strive to reduce the social, economic, and environmental impact of land mines, unexploded ordnance, and small arms ammunition - also characterized as explosive remnants of war.  

humanitarian operations center. An international and interagency body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a US Government agency during a US unilateral operation. Because the humanitarian operations center operates at the national level, it will normally consist of senior representatives from the affected country, assisting countries, the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and other major
organizations involved in the operation. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**indigenous populations and institutions.** A generic term used to describe the civilian construct of an operational area to include its populations (legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called *IPI.* (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57)

**infrastructure.** All building and permanent installations necessary for the support, redeployment, and military forces operations (e.g., barracks, headquarters, airfields, communications, facilities, stores, port installations, and maintenance stations). (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-35)

**internally displaced person.** Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**migrant.** A person who (1) belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries, or (2) has fled his or her native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-29)

**natural disaster.** An emergency situation posing significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-29)

**refugee.** A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**resettled person.** A refugee or an internally displaced person wishing to return somewhere other than his or her previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**returnee.** A displaced person who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place of residence. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**stateless person.** A person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-29 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**Step #1 - Initiation**
- Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program Directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**Step #2 - Development**
- LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC Joint working group

**Step #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**Step #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature
