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Army Support to Security Cooperation

1. This change corrects the list of key security cooperation funding programs in paragraph 2-23 by removing international military education and training.

2. FM 3-22, 22 January 2013, is changed as follows:

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3. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

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# Army Support to Security Cooperation

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*This publication supersedes FM 3-07.1, dated 1 May 2009.*
Preface

Field Manual (FM) 3-22 provides doctrine for Army support to Department of Defense security cooperation. It explains how Army forces conduct security cooperation, from theater army through brigade level, including support from Headquarters, Department of the Army, functional Army Service component commands, major commands, and direct reporting units. Army modularity allows commanders to add selective capabilities to assist the brigade as it conducts security cooperation activities. The brigade and any additional augmentation required from higher echelons provide the framework for advisors to function and accomplish the mission—building partner capacity and capability—to achieve the desired end state.

This discussion builds on the doctrine in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations. FM 3-22 establishes context for Army missions by explaining how security cooperation activities are an integral component of unified land operations, joint operations, and unified action. It shows how Army support to security cooperation is nested with national strategic direction. FM 3-22 is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine and emphasizes unified action. It uses text and concepts developed with North Atlantic Treaty Organization and American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Program partners.

The principal audience for FM 3-22 is theater army security cooperation planners, division and brigade leaders and staffs, and Soldiers assigned or attached as advisors to brigades that execute security cooperation missions. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

FM 3-22 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-22 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary, and the definitions are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

FM 3-22 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

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The proponent of FM 3-22 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to: Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (FM 3-22), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to: usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
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Introduction

Field Manual (FM) 3-22 provides the conceptual framework for Army support to geographic combatant commander theater campaign plan objectives and Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) end states. It focuses on security cooperation assessment, planning, preparation, and execution. Moreover, it provides the doctrinal guidance and direction for how the Army trains, advises, assists, equips and assesses foreign security forces (FSF). The Army has a long history of conducting activities such as these. For over 100 years, providing advisors or training assistance to partner security forces has been the rule, not the exception for the Army.

Beginning with the Philippine Insurrection in 1899, the Army became heavily involved with training and advising indigenous troops. However, it was not until World War II that the United States began to take an active role in building the security capacity of other nations, assuring access to overseas installations, and providing for a common defense. The focus of Army support to security cooperation has changed as the National Security Strategy has transformed, influenced by major global events and the changing character of modern conflict.

At the height of the Cold War, the Army worked with allied nations and friendly countries to protect themselves against threats to their territorial integrity and internal security, working to strengthen regional and international security and to contain the spread of communism. Army advisors have served around the world, most significantly in China, Greece, Turkey, Korea, and South Vietnam as part of military advisory groups or military groups. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of containment, the U.S. National Security Strategy reoriented to confront a wide range of more ambiguous threats. Consequently, the Army developed deeper relationships with partner security forces such as those of Colombia in order to help curtail drug production and buttress the friendly government's campaign to defeat a violent insurgency.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 further emphasized the threat posed by weak states and ungoverned spaces, while the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the importance of capable partners in multinational operations. The realities drove the Army to focus greater attention on building partner military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. Army forces have participated over the last decade in efforts to rebuild security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously partnering with foreign militaries around the world to improve access, strengthen relationships, and build partner capacity and capability. The Army, with the help of North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners and key Asian partners, began training and advising Afghan, Iraqi, and other security forces to defend their territories and prevent further attacks on shared interests.

Whether providing humanitarian assistance training in Southeast Asia, providing mobile training teams in Africa, or developing interoperability with European partners and regional security organizations, the Army as part of the joint force conducts security cooperation activities to help shape the environment and prevent unstable situations from escalating into conflict in support of combatant commanders, and to achieve national security objectives.

FM 3-22 contains six chapters:

Chapter 1 places security cooperation in a strategic context with national and strategic direction as it applies to unified land operations. This chapter also discusses the Army’s role in supporting national security goals and objectives. It defines security cooperation and related activities of security assistance, security force assistance, internal defense and development, foreign internal defense, and security sector reform. It explains how security cooperation partners organize for unified action and establishes a general conceptual framework for security cooperation.
Chapter 2 provides the legal foundations and authorities for security cooperation. Furthermore, this chapter discusses U.S. and international law and treaties, host-nation law and status-of-forces agreements, and legal constraints commanders need to consider when planning and conducting security cooperation activities.

Chapter 3 discusses integrated planning and assessment considerations for security cooperation activities. It includes theater campaign and campaign support planning, mission analysis, host-nation and multinational support, sustainment, country and country support plans, and country assessments.

Chapter 4 discusses preparation and execution considerations, focusing on functional ways to achieve goals and objectives while conducting security force assistance tasks. It introduces security force assistance mission elements.

Chapter 5 discusses considerations for brigade operations, focusing on activities for deployment, employment, redeployment, and postdeployment.

Chapter 6 addresses considerations for working effectively with FSF. It emphasizes advisors but provides a foundation for how all Soldiers working with FSF can build relationships.

The security environment is complex, competitive, and unpredictable; it will remain so for the foreseeable future. The United States remains the preeminent global power but faces a host of complex relationships with competitors and partners. In supporting security cooperation—

*The Army is globally engaged and regionally responsive; it is an indispensible partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to combatant commanders in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIIM) environment. As part of the joint force and as America’s Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility, and depth to prevent, shape and win.*

2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance

The Army’s contribution to preventing conflict and its support to combatant commanders as they shape the security environment are simultaneous and related requirements. In order to meet the demands of a complex environment, Army forces require capacity and capability to prevent conflict and shape the security environment in partnership with joint and multinational forces. The Army provides enhanced security cooperation capabilities to support the combatant commander’s theater strategic objectives. These include building defense and security relationships and partner military capacity, gaining or maintaining access to secure populations, protecting infrastructure, and strengthening institutions. Achieving these common security interests contributes to preventing conflict and prevailing in war.

The Army contributes to shaping the security environment through the integration of the capabilities of regionally aligned conventional and special operations forces. It can employ small, agile forces and teams that can form partnerships with FSF on matters of common interest. Regionally aligning forces is an expanded approach to the existing Army security cooperation mission and force management process. This improves the force generation support required to meet geographic combatant commander security cooperation requirements in a timely fashion. In addition to decisive action skills that define Army units as the security partners of choice, regionally aligned forces prepare for their missions with language and culture training.


*The Joint Force, Combatant Commanders, and Service Chiefs shall actively partner with other U.S. Government agencies to pursue theater security cooperation to increase collective security skills with a wider range of partners. We seek to facilitate interagency and enable international interoperability before crises occur. Preparation is indispensible when conditions demand collaboration.*

National Military Strategy of the United States of America
In January 2012, the Secretary of Defense issued strategic guidance, which stated—

*U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multinational training exercises. These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence.*

*Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*

In February 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the *Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, making security cooperation part of a key effort: “Expand the envelope of interagency and international cooperation. Promote multilateral security approaches and architectures to deter and if necessary, defeat aggression.”
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Chapter 1

Strategic Context

This chapter begins by defining security cooperation. Then it discusses national strategic direction and guidance that establish context for all security cooperation activities. Next, it explains the Army’s role in support of national objectives. After that, it defines five general types of activities that make up security cooperation. Then, it explains how Army forces and partners organize for unified action. This is followed with an overall conceptual framework and a discussion of mitigating strategic and operational risk.

SECURITY COOPERATION DEFINED

1-1. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22). Security cooperation (also called SC) includes all security assistance programs administered by Department of Defense (DOD) that build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests. Security assistance programs include all international armaments cooperation activities and other security assistance activities.

SECURITY COOPERATION IN SUPPORT OF COMBATANT COMMANDS

1-2. Security cooperation is a common Service function that supports combatant commands. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations and is a pillar of weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation. As the U.S. defense budget decreases, security cooperation programs, activities, and missions that build partnerships and partner capacity are likely to become the primary focus of all geographic combatant commands. Although the Department of State (DOS) leads and provides oversight for security cooperation efforts through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions, security cooperation activities are conducted and coordinated throughout the geographic combatant command area of responsibility (AOR) by, with, or through the theater army to—

- Build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.
- Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

TYPES OF SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMS

1-3. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03 describes security cooperation as “activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.” This directive establishes as DOD policy that security cooperation activities shall be planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other integral DOD activities. DODD 5100.01 establishes policy that the Army is the Nation’s principal land force and promotes national values and interests by conducting military engagement and security cooperation, as well as other activities.

1-4. Examples of Title 10, United States Code (USC) security cooperation programs that build partner capacity include—

- Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid.
- Warsaw Initiative Fund.
- Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.
Ministry of Defense Advisors.
Defense Institution Reform Initiative.
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.
National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program.
Traditional combatant commander activities.
Combatant Commander Initiative Fund.
Joint Combined Exchange Training.

1-5. Examples of Title 22, USC, security assistance programs that build partner capacity include—
- Foreign military financing.
- Foreign military sales.
- International military education and training.
- Peacekeeping operations.
- Excess defense articles.
- Presidential drawdowns.

1-6. Examples of overseas contingency operations funded programs that build partner capacity include—
- Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.
- Iraq Security Forces Fund.
- Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.
- Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund.

(See chapter 2 for a discussion of legal considerations in relation to these programs.)

NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE

1-7. Strategic direction is the processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies (JP 5-0). It is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Army provide strategic guidance. The function of national, strategic guidance is to identify U.S. interests and state policy objectives to allow for the creation of strategic plans that link ends, ways, and applying the appropriate means (resources) associated with acceptable risk. From a military perspective, this guidance should include what constitutes success; DOD and the Services then allocate the appropriate means through planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and the global force management process.

1-8. Strategic guidance from civilian and military policymakers is a prerequisite to develop a theater campaign plan, traditional campaign plans, and contingency plans. National strategic direction and guidance drive all DOD security cooperation. Planning throughout the DOD is based on top-down strategic direction and informed by bottom-up assessment. The high-level guidance Army security cooperation planners must follow includes—
- National Security Strategy.
- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
- Global force management implementation guidance.
- Theater campaign plan.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
1-9. The National Security Strategy (known as NSS) outlines the President’s vision for providing enduring security for the American people. The 2010 National Security Strategy calls for renewed international engagement, deepening cooperation, and an investment in the capacity of strong and capable partners as ways to advance the enduring national and shared interest in an international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT
1-11. The quadrennial defense review (known as QDR) is a congressionally mandated DOD review of strategy, programs, and resources. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that “Within the range of security cooperation activities, the most dynamic in the coming years will be security force assistance (SFA) missions . . .”

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
1-12. The National Military Strategy (known as NMS) gives the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s strategic guidance that the Armed Forces of the United States should follow to support the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. This document describes ways and means to protect the United States, prepare U.S. forces, prevent conflict and surprise attack, and prevail against adversaries who threaten the homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends. The Chairman’s strategic guidance augments the National Military Strategy.

GUIDANCE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE
1-13. Guidance for Employment of the Force (also called the GEF) translates the national security objectives and high-level strategy found in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, quadrennial defense review, and other strategic reviews into DOD comprehensive planning direction for the Military Departments, Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies. The GEF provides the Secretary of Defense’s defense planning and policy guidance to DOD—including security cooperation activities. It also conveys guidance approved by the President for contingency planning and directs combatant commanders to develop theater strategies for the accomplishment of specified global strategic end states. These strategies are translated into integrated steady-state or foundational activities, operationalized through theater campaign plans, and supported by each Military Department’s campaign support plan.

1-14. End states are derived from the higher-level strategic guidance (National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) to ensure complementary direction from the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The combatant command’s GEF end states are designed to support the larger National Security Strategy. They are developed in partnership and collaboration with the DOS and other interagency partners to ensure they complement and support foreign policy objectives developed by DOS—and the broader National Security Strategy.

JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN
1-15. The JSCP is the primary vehicle through which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises responsibility for directing the preparation of joint plans. The JSCP provides military strategic and operational guidance to combatant commanders Service chiefs, combat support agencies, applicable
defense agencies, DOD field activity directors, and the Chief, National Guard Bureau, for preparation of campaign plans and contingency plans based on current military capabilities. It serves as the link between strategic guidance provided in the GEF and the joint operation planning activities and products to accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term military capabilities (see JP 5-0 for more information). The JSCP implements campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture planning guidance reflected in the GEF. The JSCP supports and implements the objectives of the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy through resulting combatant command campaign, campaign support, posture, and contingency plans. The JSCP also serves as a coherent framework for providing military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense and follows, implements, and augments guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense, forwarded in the GEF, Unified Command Plan, and global force management implementation guidance.

**Global Force Management Implementation Guidance**

1-16. Global force management implementation guidance (known as GFMIG) integrates complementary assignment, apportionment, and allocation information into a single global force management document. Global force management aligns force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy, joint force availability requirements, and joint force assessments. It provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of U.S. military resources and provides senior decision makers a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in forces assignment, apportionment, and allocation. (See JP 5-0 for more information.)

1-17. A supported commander’s force requests are allocated in a global force management allocation plan (GFMAP) annex from the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. The joint force provider (known as JFP) publishes an annex schedule to the GFMAP to order forces to deploy. This annex schedule serves as the deployment order for all global allocations. (See JP 5-0 for more information.)

**Theater Campaign Plan**

1-18. The theater campaign plan is the geographic combatant commander’s vehicle for operationalizing the theater strategy. The theater campaign plan provides a framework within which geographic combatant commands conduct security cooperation activities and military engagement with regional partners through cooperative security and development. **Military engagement** is routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence (JP 3-0). The theater campaign plan provides a framework within which geographic combatant commands conduct military engagement with regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Theater campaign plans support U.S. national security objectives and should be aligned with other United States government efforts. This means they ought to be informed by other U.S. agencies’ strategic planning, in particular the DOS and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Wherever practical, theater campaign plans should complement and support DOS’s broader foreign policy objectives. Theater campaign plans have a large security cooperation component, and they differ from the traditional campaign plan (described in JP 3-0) in that they organize and align operations, activities, events, and investments in time, space, and purpose to achieve strategic effect rather than operational effect. A theater campaign plan’s main function is to provide guidance to coordinate phase 0 and steady-state components of contingency planning—or generally “shaping and setting the theater” by conducting security cooperation activities across the AOR. U.S. forces engage in security cooperation for many reasons, not just as a preventive measure, but also more frequently to help other countries’ military forces become more professional, proficient, interoperable, and reliable in burden-sharing.

**The Army Posture Statement**

1-19. Each Military Department is responsible for writing a theater posture plan (known as a TPP). The Army Posture Statement is a summary of Army roles, missions, accomplishments, plans, and programs. Designed to reinforce the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army’s posture and budget testimony before Congress, the Army Posture Statement serves a broad audience as a basic reference on the state of the
Army. The Army Posture Statement lays out the priorities and guiding principles for the year ahead. In the uncertain environment the United States faces, the Army remains central to the Nation’s defense as part of the joint force. No major conflict has been won without boots on the ground. The Army is the Nation’s Force for decisive action and plays three essential roles in national security strategy: prevent, shape, and win.

**Prevent**

1-20. The Army must prevent conflict just as it did during the Cold War. Prevention is most effective when adversaries are convinced that conflict with friendly forces would be imprudent. The Army’s ability to win any fight across the full range of operations as part of a joint force must never be open to challenge.

**Shape**

1-21. The Army must help shape the security environment to enable combatant commanders to assure friends and contain enemies. The Army does that by conducting military engagements with partners, fostering mutual understanding through military-to-military contacts, and helping partners build the capacity to defend themselves. These actions are an investment in the future that the Nation cannot afford to forego. The Army must cultivate positive relationships before they are needed. It must be a reliable, consistent, and respectful partner to others.

**Win**

1-22. The Army must be ready to win decisively and dominantly. Nothing else approaches what is achieved by winning, and the consequences of losing at war are usually catastrophic. With so much at stake, the American people will expect what they have always expected of the Army—decisive victory.

**ARMY ROLE IN SECURITY COOPERATION**

1-23. Title 10, USC, provides the legal foundation for the DOD and the Armed Forces. DODD 5100.01 distills Title 10 into specific responsibilities for the Armed Forces. It spells out responsibilities for DOD and each Armed Force. In common with all of the Services, the Army provides “conventional, strategic, and special operations forces to conduct the range of operations as defined by the President and the Secretary of Defense.”

1-24. Army forces are organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land, in accordance with DOD policy. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned. The Army is the Nation’s principal land force and promotes national values and interests by conducting security cooperation through sustained military engagement; deterring aggression and violence; and should deterrence fail, compelling enemy behavioral change or compliance. The Army shall contribute forces through a rotational, cyclical readiness model that provides a predictable and sustainable supply of modular forces to the combatant commands, and a surge capacity for unexpected contingencies.

1-25. Per DODD 5100.01, each Military Department is directed to plan for and perform common functions to fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the combatant commands. These functions include recruitment, organization, training, and equipping of forces, and providing forces to enhance military engagement and conduct security cooperation to prevent conflict. These actions shall be coordinated with the other Military Departments, combatant commands, United States government departments and agencies, and international partners. The Army provides forces for military missions and detachments for service in foreign countries to support the national interests of the United States, and provides, as directed [meaning with legitimate authority], assistance in training, equipping, and advising the military forces of foreign nations.

1-26. Conventional forces, Army special operations forces (ARSOF), Army generating forces, and the Reserve Component provide the bulk of DOD’s means to support and operationalize theater campaign plan objectives. Executed early enough and in support of broad national interests and policy goals, security
cooperation programs and activities provide an effective means for building relationships, building partner military capacity, and providing access. This, in turn, reduces the risks associated with conflict and promotes stability in regions.

1-27. Regionally aligned forces are those forces that provide a combatant commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, those Army units allocated to a combatant command, and those Army capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. (Figure 1-1 illustrates regional alignment of forces.) Regionally aligned forces (RAF) include Army total force organizations and capabilities that are forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; and prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Combatant command requirements determine regional missions. RAF maintain proficiency in wartime fundamentals, but also possess a regional mission and training focus that includes an understanding of the languages, cultures, geography, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed. RAF must be able to impart military knowledge and skills to others. Units assist partners in developing their individual and unit proficiency in security operations at the tactical level. Army generating forces assist partners in developing their institutional capacity for training, professional education, force generation, and force sustainment. RAF assist partners in developing security sector programs that professionalize and strengthen their ability to synchronize and sustain security operations.

![Figure 1-1. Regionally aligned forces](image)

**SHAPING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

1-28. The Army helps to shape the security environment by creating security conditions more favorable to U.S. and allied interests, even in regions in which the United States is not likely to commit large numbers of forces for major combat operations. The Army helps shape the security environment through security cooperation activities that enable combatant commanders to assure friends, establish trust, foster mutual understanding, and help partners build the capacity to defend themselves and prevent conflict.

1-29. Security cooperation activities that shape the security environment may include rotational deployments for exercises and training; participation at Army institutional training and senior professional
military education; security assistance teams overseas; security force assistance efforts that build partner capacity; civil affairs support for stabilization, reconstruction, and development; foreign internal defense; counterterrorism and support to counterterrorism; smaller-footprint combat operations short of major conflict; foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction. Army forces perform all these activities while still maintaining the capability to conduct unified land operations anywhere globally. Shaping the security environment diminishes regional tensions, enhances stability, and contributes to the security of the homeland. Therefore, as a common Army function, security cooperation is vital to American security interests.

1-30. The Army supports the security cooperation function through the integration of the capabilities of regionally aligned conventional forces and ARSOF. This regional alignment will enhance relationships between planning staffs while improving units’ familiarity with areas in which they will most likely be employed. This ability will be further enhanced by increasing the integration of conventional forces and special operations forces, both for the missions aimed primarily at improving the military effectiveness of partners and U.S. missions such as counterproliferation. Aligning Army forces with regions allows the integration of planning and training for combatant command contingencies, focuses language and cultural training, and provides predictable and dependable capabilities to geographic combatant command and theater army commanders. In addition, the Army will consider how to manage, train and develop Soldiers to support regional alignment and ensure appropriate investments are made in Soldiers and leveraged by the Army.

1-31. Based on the appropriate policy, legal frameworks, and authorities, the Army provides security force assistance in concert with partner units, institutions, and security sector functions to build partner capacity. Army support to security cooperation is derived from DOD policy guidance and helps the combatant commander shape the security environment through three principal ways (listed in paragraph 1-33) to achieve mid- to long-term objectives with partners.

1-32. Shaping the security environment diminishes regional tensions, enhances stability, and contributes to the security of the homeland. Therefore, as a common Army function, security cooperation is vital to United States security interests.

1-33. The United States Government has worked with allies and partners in a security cooperation context for decades, assisting partners through various activities such as exercises, training, equipping, education, conferences, and military staff talks to shape the environment by building their capacity in order to prevent and deter conflict. Examples of exercises include, but are not limited to, Ulchi Focus Guardian, Bright Star, Austere Challenge, Yama Sakura, Cobra Gold, and Flintlock. Therefore, Army support to security cooperation plays a significant role in helping combatant commanders shape the environment by—

- Building defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.
- Developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations in order to prevent and deter conflict.

Developing Defense and Security Relationships

1-34. Developing defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance programs, helps the combatant commander shape the security environment by—

- Influencing more willing to support the United States in military operations.
- Sending a compelling regional and often global strategic communication message of a commitment to threat interdiction.
- Shows U.S. support to host-nation sovereignty.
- Promoting regional stability.
Chapter 1

Building Allied and Friendly Military Capabilities

1-35. Building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations helps the combatant commander shape the security environment. The Army’s primary contribution to building partner military capacity is to lead efforts to collaborate with foreign partners in building security capacity.

1-36. The Army integrates the capabilities of the conventional, generating, and special operations forces to support interorganizational capacity-building efforts on three levels: tactical, institutional, and ministerial. The Army’s contribution—

- Builds institutional capacity in the host nation, which is fundamental to success in such operations.
- Develops the ability of partners to defend against internal and external threats.
- Improves interoperability, making partners more capable of contributing to multinational operations.
- Assists other countries to provide for their own security.

Providing Peacetime and Contingency Access

1-37. Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations helps the combatant commander shape the security environment. The Army contributes to the whole-of-government efforts to gain access. Access is the ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. This helps the combatant commander by—

- Maintaining existing cooperative security locations.
- Facilitating realignment of the U.S. defense posture.
- Providing for the security of the global commons.
- Supporting contingency planning by creating the conditions for access for forward stationing of forces, pre-positioning of U.S. equipment, staging of forces within a country for a contingency, operating as part of a multinational force led by the United States, or granting access or over-flight permissions.

1-38. The three ways addressed above help shape the security environment by enabling partners to develop the capability to provide for internal and external defense, export security capacity-building regionally or globally as appropriate, and expand access in countries or regions by, with, or through those partners where U.S. presence may be unwelcome or impractical.

Theater Campaign Support Plan

1-39. The theater army develops a theater campaign support plan, an annex to the theater campaign plan. The theater campaign support plan serves as the mechanism between planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes by, with, or through the theater army. It is supported by Headquarters, Department of the Army; functional Army Service component commands; Army commands; direct reporting units; and the Reserve Component to resource security cooperation activities that shape the operational environment and achieve theater campaign plan objectives and GEF end states.

1-40. The Army contributes forces through a rotational, cyclical readiness model that provides a predictable and sustainable supply of modular forces to the combatant commands, and a surge capacity for unexpected contingencies. Land forces are typically the dominant military service of partner security forces, and the senior military commander is from their army. As such, the Army has a unique opportunity to partner with these forces at the tactical, institutional, and ministerial level to build trust and achieve greater influence through land security cooperation activities.

1-41. Army support to security cooperation is conducted with a physical presence in close proximity to the partner’s security forces, governmental agencies, and population. For this reason, Soldiers and leaders must have an appreciation for the history, culture, language, laws, and customs of the partner to increase mutual understanding and build and sustain relationships and trust over time. These relationships will contribute to that partner’s willingness to participate with the United States in achieving mutual global and regional security objectives and facilitate access to the region.
SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES

1-42. Security cooperation contributes to the security of the homeland by building security relationships, alliances, partner capability and capacity, and access through a broad range of interconnected and integrated security cooperation activities that include security assistance, security force assistance, internal defense and development, and security sector reform. The capabilities and capacity of partners are directly related to the type of activities that are undertaken. The goals can range from creating a positive relationship that allows freedom of action, to global security interoperability with core partners as well as regional security organizations and alliances.

1-43. The Army provides forces to the joint force to conduct security cooperation, enhance military engagement, and build the security capacity of partner states. Security cooperation is a common Service function that enables combatant commanders. Certain provisions of Title 10 (see chapter 2) authorize military engagement, multinational combined exercises, personnel exchanges, and similar security cooperation activities in order to facilitate the performance of this function. Such activities are organized and aligned as well as possible to support the geographic and functional end states specified for the various combatant commanders in strategic guidance. However, their statutory justification and funding authority typically relate to the training and readiness of U.S. forces. This tension between authorities and intended effects can serve to limit the impact of security cooperation activities that focus on capacity-building and other objectives specified by the combatant commanders. (These tensions between authorities are further addressed in chapter 2.)

1-44. Security cooperation is comprised of multiple activities, programs, and missions, and it is functionally and conceptually related to security assistance, security force assistance, internal defense and development, foreign internal defense, and security sector reform. Army forces may be granted special authorities and called upon to execute tasks in support of these programs that build partner capacity in support of broader national security interests. Security cooperation activities can be executed discretely or in concert with each other across the range of military operations, consolidating many requirements, authorities, and force structures. The definitions of these terms and their associated relationships with each other are explained in paragraphs 1-45 to 1-62.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

1-45. Security assistance is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency (JP 3-22). Security assistance (known as SA) programs are typically focused on the transfer of defense articles and services to eligible foreign governments, the provision of training and education to foreign military personnel, and the sale of construction services in support of partner nations’ military establishments.

1-46. Department of the Army implements Title 22 security assistance programs under the direction of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the overall management of the DOS. Examples security assistance programs include—

- The foreign military financing program (known as FMFP). This is an appropriated program administered by DSCA. The program consists of congressionally appropriated grants and loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training through either foreign military sales or direct commercial sales.
- Foreign military sales (known as FMS) programs. These include the provision of materiel, training, medical, and construction services to a foreign country.
- Foreign military construction services that provide for the construction of requisite military installations and facilities in support of a foreign military activity.
- Leases of defense articles to friendly governments for specified missions and for specific periods up to five years.
• International military education and training (known as IMET) for professional military education.
• Drawdowns that allow for the transfer of excess defense articles from U.S. stockpiles to a foreign military.
• Other special programs and services addressed in this regulation, such as security assistance logistics and production programs.

1-47. In special circumstances, Army forces may be directed to perform tasks related to the training or equipping of partner military forces. Title 10 funds may be expended for this purpose only in exceptional circumstances and consistent with legal authority. (See AR 12-1 for more information.)

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

1-48. Security force assistance is defined as—the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-22). Consistent with DOD policy for security force assistance (known as SFA), the Army develops, maintains, and institutionalizes the capabilities of its personnel to support DOD efforts to organize, train, equip, and advise foreign security forces (FSF) and relevant supporting institutions. Security forces are duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state (JP 3-22). When directed to do so in accordance with appropriate legal authorities, Army forces conduct security force assistance activities in support of combatant commanders’ campaign plans and national objectives.

1-49. Military personnel should avoid confusing security force assistance and security assistance. Security assistance is a set of programs, authorized by law, that allow the United States to transfer defense articles, training, and services to partner nations. Security force assistance often works in conjunction with security assistance programs, but the focus of security force assistance is on building the capacity and capability of FSF and their supporting institutions. Security force assistance encompasses various activities related to the organizing, training, advising, equipping, and assessing of FSF and their supporting institutions, from tactical to ministerial levels. These activities contribute to unified action to generate, employ, and sustain FSF. Foreign security forces are forces, including but not limited to, military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel, that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization’s mission. Security force assistance activities are conducted primarily to assist host nations build the capacity to defend against internal, external, and transnational threats to stability. However, DOD may also conduct security force assistance to assist host nations to defend against external threats; contribute to multinational operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise a nation’s security forces or supporting institutions.

1-50. It is DOD policy that security force assistance is a subset of DOD overall security cooperation initiatives and that security force assistance activities directly increase the capacity or capability of FSF or their supporting institutions. Security force assistance consists of those security cooperation activities tied directly to the security capability and capacity of FSF. Security assistance programs, with their associated resources and authorities, can provide a means to conduct some security force assistance tasks. Other forms of security force assistance—specifically, advising in a hostile environment and other activities geared toward assisting a partner nation engaged in conflict—are performed by U.S. forces using resources and authorities specially provided to DOD for employment in support of combat operations. Global train-and-equip funding to support the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan is a good example.
INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

1-51. Internal defense and development is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). Internal defense and development (known as IDAD) focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Ideally, internal defense and development is a preemptive strategy. However, if an insurgency or other threat develops, it becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. To support the host nation effectively, U.S. forces, especially planners, consider the host nation’s internal defense and development strategy.

1-52. Internal defense and development focuses on building viable institutions that respond to the needs of society. Internal defense and development is a joint doctrinal term; it is not used universally by all countries. Internal defense and development blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization. Finally, internal defense and development involves a cyclic interaction of execution, assessment, and adaptation. As directed, the Army provides support to other United States government departments and agencies focused on internal defense and development of those FSF assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services.

1-53. The country team (addressed later in this chapter), in concert with the combatant command and the host nation, synchronizes the internal defense and development program with the theater campaign plan, but ultimately, the internal defense and development program is the responsibility of the host nation. Security cooperation activities, whether conducted through foreign internal defense or security force assistance, support the host nation’s internal defense and development policy and program. If the internal threat to the nation is primarily political and nonviolent, foreign internal defense activities may or may not be required to support the nation’s internal defense and development program. Although always an important (and frequently critical) part of a nation’s internal defense and development strategy, foreign internal defense may be one of the smaller programs within the internal defense and development strategy in terms of funding, focus, facilities, and the number of personnel committed. The Army supports DOD efforts to create conditions whereby interagency efforts can comprehensively operate to remove the root causes behind the problems of deteriorating security conditions.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1-54. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22).

1-55. Security force assistance and foreign internal defense (known as FID) have much in common in that both enable partners’ capacity to provide for their own security, with a collective goal of contributing effectively to broader regional or global security challenges in support of U.S. policy and interests. However, security force assistance is not the same as foreign internal defense, but the actions to organize, train, equip, rebuild, build, and advise—elements of security force assistance—may take place in conjunction with foreign internal defense activities. At operational and strategic levels, both foreign internal defense and security force assistance focus on preparing FSF to combat lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, terrorism, and other internal threats to their security; however, security force assistance also prepares FSF to defend against external threats and to perform as part of an international force.

1-56. Security force assistance activities support foreign internal defense efforts by increasing the capacity and capability of partner security forces. Foreign internal defense direct support activities that involve organizing, training, equipping, advising, and assisting FSF to combat internal threats also constitute security force assistance. The tasks performed by U.S. forces to generate, employ, and sustain FSF are always security force assistance, whether they are executed in a foreign internal defense context or to confront internal threats. However, security force assistance can also assist in preparing conventional FSF to defend against external threats and improve interoperability when conducting operations as part of a multinational force.

1-57. Foreign internal defense includes indirect support, direct support (not involving U.S. combat operations), and combat operations. Foreign internal defense can occur across the range of military
operations. Army foreign internal defense activities may be conducted unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort or may support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts. Foreign internal defense under Army decisive action may be conducted to defeat an enemy or to establish conditions necessary to achieve the national strategic end state. Foreign internal defense is a unified action, the synergistic application of all instruments of national and multinational power.

1-58. Foreign internal defense includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces. Foreign internal defense activities may employ the indirect use of military instrument along with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. Foreign internal defense is a whole-of-government approach that nurtures partners towards democratic governance and military deference to civilian rule. Foreign internal defense principles intend to preclude the need to deploy large numbers of U.S. military personnel and equipment. Foreign internal defense involves the support of a host-nation standing government and its military or paramilitary forces. Foreign internal defense is a key supporting component of a host nation’s internal defense and development program. The focus of all U.S. foreign internal defense efforts is to support the internal defense and development program to build capability and capacity of the host nation to self-sufficiency. Foreign internal defense has been and remains an ARSOF activity and an Army task that supports the range of military operations. The relevance of foreign internal defense in the current operational environment continues to grow. (See JP 3-22 and FM 3-05.2 for a detailed discussion of foreign internal defense. See FM 7-15 for the tasks associated with foreign internal defense.)

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

1-59. Security sector reform is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07). The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public.

1-60. Security sector reform (known as SSR) is an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament; demobilizations and reintegrations; or reduction of armed violence. The Army’s primary role in security sector reform is supporting the reform, restructuring, or re-establishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the range of military operations. (See ADRP 3-07 for further discussion on security sector reform.)

1-61. With the support of the host nation, U.S. and partner military forces collaborate with interagency representatives and other civilian organizations to design and implement security sector reform strategies, plans, programs, and activities. DOS leads and provides oversight for these efforts through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions. Security sector reform facilitates security cooperation and security force assistance activities that build partner capacity. Security sector reform involves reestablishing or reforming institutions and key ministerial positions that maintain and provide oversight for the safety and security of the host nation and its people. Through unified action, those individuals and institutions assume an effective, legitimate, and accountable role. Security force assistance activities help provide internal and external security for their citizens, under the civilian control of a legitimate state authority. Effective security sector reform enables a state to build its capacity to provide security. The desired outcome of security sector reform programs is an effective and legitimate security sector firmly rooted within the rule of law.

1-62. Security force assistance is a vital component of security sector reform when security sector reform includes U.S. assistance to FSF. The military role in security sector reform is normally limited to helping reform host-nation defense establishments and security forces.
ORGANIZATION FOR UNIFIED ACTION

1-63. **Unified action** is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other United States government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations (such as the United Nations), and the private sector to support national interests. Unity of command, within the military instrument of national power, supports the national strategic direction through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.

1-64. Unified action may require interorganizational efforts to build the capacity of partners to secure populations, protect infrastructure, and strengthen institutions as a means of protecting common security interests. Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and sustained military engagements over time that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. The Army integrates the capabilities of the operational and generating forces, to include special operations forces, to support capacity-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation activities.

1-65. Unified action enhances the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions exemplifies security cooperation activities that build long-term partner capacity. Effective unified action requires Army leaders who can understand, influence, and cooperate with partners. The Army depends on its joint partners for capabilities that do not reside within the Army, and it cannot operate effectively without their support. Likewise, government agencies outside the DOD possess knowledge, skills, and capabilities necessary for success. The active cooperation of partners often allows Army leaders to capitalize on organizational strengths while offsetting weaknesses.

1-66. Unified action may require interorganizational efforts to build the capacity of partners to secure populations, protect infrastructure, and strengthen institutions as a means of protecting common security interests. Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and sustained military engagements over time that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. The Army integrates the capabilities of the operating and generating forces, to include special operations forces, to support capacity-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation activities. (See ADP 3-0 for more information.)

ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR UNIFIED ACTION IN SUPPORT OF SECURITY COOPERATION

1-67. In October 2012, the Army published updated operational doctrine in ADP 3-0. It describes building partner capacity as the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and military engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. ADP 3-0 describes unified land operations as the Army’s contribution to unified action. **Unified land operations** is—how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and creates the conditions for favorable conflict resolution (ADP 3-0). In unified land operations, Army conventional forces and ARSOF synchronize and integrate security cooperation activities in concert with unified action partners throughout planning, using cross-functional working groups to support the combatant commander’s theater campaign plan and contingency plans across the range of military operations to prevent and deter conflict.

1-68. **Operational art** is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Unified land operations incorporates the principle that operational art is the connection between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Operational art provides a common construct for organizing military operations to achieve those strategic objectives. This unifying principle also connects the various security cooperation activities that help shape the security environment and support combatant commanders’ efforts to assure friends, establish
trust, foster mutual understanding, and help partners build the capacity to defend themselves and contain enemies. Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing the security cooperation activities of conventional forces, ARSOF, generating forces, and Reserve Component forces with strategic objectives is essential.

**Theater Army Support**

1-69. The Army normally executes its Title 10 responsibilities to organize, train, and equip operational Army units through the theater army to support combatant commander objectives. The theater army sets and maintains the theater for the conduct of unified land operations. A set theater includes the posture of Army forces and conducting security cooperation activities that shape the operational environment and prevent conflict. Setting the theater shapes the environment and produces the conditions necessary for the joint force commander, when directed, to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and assure freedom of action. Sustained military engagement requires a combination of integrated regionally aligned conventional forces and ARSOF. Military engagement, along with intelligence gathering and assured access, is critical to enabling the force to win decisively. Maintaining the theater includes theater opening; port and terminal operations; conducting reception, staging onward movement, and integration; force modernization and theater-specific training; Army support to other services; as well as common user logistics to Army, joint, and multinational forces operating in the theater.

**Generating Force Support**

1-70. The primary mission of generating force organizations is the long-term generation and sustainment of operational Army capabilities, as well as the development of partner defense and security establishments in support of the theater army requirements. This mission and generating force capabilities to execute it are more fully described in the Army War College publication, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*. The generating force also possesses operationally useful capabilities. However, the Army does not organize generating forces into standing organizations with a primary focus on specific operations. Rather, when generating force capabilities perform specific functions or missions in support of and at the direction of joint force commanders, it is for a limited period. Upon completion of the mission, the elements and assets of those generating force capabilities revert to their original function.

1-71. All elements of the Army, whether generating force or operational Army, perform functions specified by law (table 1-1). The practical distinction is that the execution of these functions and others implied by law constitutes the primary purpose of generating force organizations. Title 10, USC, is not the only statute that governs the generating force, nor is the list of functions in table 1-1 exhaustive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1-1. Title 10, United States Code, functions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Recruiting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Organizing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Supplying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Equipping (including research and development.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Training.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Servicing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Mobilizing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Demobilizing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Administering (including morale, welfare, and recreation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maintaining.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Construction, outfitting, and repairing military equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Constructing, maintaining, and repairing buildings and structures.</td>
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</tbody>
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1-14  FM 3-22  22 January 2013
1-72. The future security environment requires employment of Title 10, USC, generating force capabilities to support of broader Title 22, USC, objectives. Security cooperation missions suitable for generating force capabilities include—

- Developing multinational partners’ security forces and defense establishments across the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).
- Repairing, developing, and managing infrastructure that supports security cooperation programs as well as stability operations.
- Adapting U.S. conventional forces across the domains of DOTMLPF to shape the environment.

1-73. Generating forces often can perform these types of missions with great effectiveness and efficiency. Generating forces can perform Title 10, USC, functions either in generating and sustaining the operational Army, or for supporting ongoing operations. Similarly, operational Army planners should reach back to Army institutions to take full advantage of generating force capabilities. Those capabilities are assembled, exercised, and employed on a regular basis to ensure they effectively support operations when required.

1-74. As with any military capability, the formal designations of organizations and capabilities as operational Army or generating force are less important than the Soldiers’ understanding of the shared mission and their will to accomplish it. All participants in the process of developing, maintaining, and allocating Army capabilities for operations, whether they are part of the operational Army or generating force, should understand that Army capabilities are most effective when they integrate the Army’s capabilities into security cooperation planning.

SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

1-75. Several agencies and organizations play a role in executing the multiple facets of security cooperation. The Army supports combatant commanders while DOS leads the diplomatic relations in support of U.S. national interests. A security cooperation organization is all Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance/cooperation management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions. (JP 3-22). Security cooperation management functions fall under Section 515 of Title 10, USC. The chief of a security cooperation organization (known as SCO) is responsible to four authorities:

- Ambassador, United States diplomatic mission.
- Senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT).
- Geographic combatant commander (known as GCC).
- Director, DSCA.

1-76. The security cooperation organization does not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities, such as mobile training teams, mobile education teams, or operational units conducting security cooperation activities.

1-77. Security cooperation organizations, associated security cooperation programs, and funding vary from country to country depending on the relationship with each country. Countries with large security cooperation programs and those in which the United States has key strategic interests generally have larger security cooperation organizations. In developing countries where security cooperation programs are small, usually because of limited funding, security cooperation programs often take on a more prominent role. On the other hand, in developed countries, the host country may be largely self-sufficient in both its financing and management of security cooperation, so the role and responsibilities of the security cooperation organization will take on a different tone. However, the importance of a program compared to its size may be relative. In some countries, a small program can be as meaningful and as politically influential as larger programs in other countries. In summary, the size of the security cooperation organization, the relationship with the host-nation military, and the scope and volume of current programs, all combine to produce a unique working environment.
1-78. Roles and relationships among United States government agencies and organizations; DOD; state, tribal, and local governments; and the U.S. chief of mission and country team in a U.S. embassy overseas must be clearly understood. Security cooperation organizations traditionally respond through two chains of command: one through the embassy country team and the other through the combatant command. The examples in figure 1-2 illustrate those organizational relationships and the synergy of DOD country planning to achieve shared interests and objectives.

![Diagram of Synergy of Department of Defense country planning](image)

**Figure 1-2. Synergy of Department of Defense country planning**

**HOST COUNTRY AND HOST NATION**

1-79. A *host nation* is a nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory (JP 3-57). A *host country* is a nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders (JP 1-02). When government representatives or agencies are permitted to operate in a country, and military forces are not participating, *host country* is the preferred term.

1-80. DOD personnel in a foreign country who are not under the command of a U.S. area military commander shall be under the authority of the chief of mission in that country. By law, this includes security cooperation organization personnel, even though they are assigned to a geographic combatant command. However, a formal directive delegates responsibility to one military officer in each embassy for all DOD actions and DOD personnel in that country. The directive gives each SDO/DATT coordinating authority over DOD elements under the direction and supervision of the chief of mission.
AMBASSADOR, UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC MISSION

1-81. The U.S. diplomatic mission includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically present in the country. The U.S. ambassador (chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission), often referred to as the chief of mission (or COM), is the principal officer in the embassy. This person oversees all United States government programs and interactions with and in a host country. The ambassador derives authority and responsibilities from the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-465), Section 207.

1-82. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President and the Secretary of State and reports to the President through the Secretary of State. The chief of mission ensures all in-country activities best serve U.S. interests, as well as regional and international objectives. Depending on the size or economic import of a country, the United States may maintain only an embassy and no consular offices. However, the United States may maintain one or more consular offices in some countries. Typically, Army elements conducting security cooperation activities coordinate with embassy officials, even in nations with a consular office. Relationships with consular offices are determined on a case-by-case basis. The same basic entities and offices existing in the embassy are present or liaised at the consular offices.

COUNTRY TEAM

1-83. The country team is the point of coordination within the host country for the diplomatic mission. The members of the country team vary depending on the levels of coordination needed and the conditions within that country. The country team is usually led by the chief of mission, and it is made up of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of mission. The team may include the SDO/DATT, the chief of the security cooperation organization, the political and economic officers, and any other embassy personnel desired by the ambassador.

1-84. The country team informs various organizations of operations, coordinates elements, and achieves unity of effort. Usually, the primary military members are the SDO/DATT and the chief of the security cooperation organization. Military engagement with a host country is conducted through the security cooperation organization. However, several other attachés and offices may be integral to security cooperation activities, programs, and missions as well. The country team provides the foundation of local knowledge and interaction with the host country government and population. As permanently established interagency organizations, country teams represent the single point of coordination, integration, and synchronization of security cooperation activities supported by combatant commands and the theater army.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL/DEFENSE ATTACHÉ

1-85. The senior defense official is the defense attaché (referred to as the SDO/DATT) and the principal DOD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The SDO/DATT is the chief of mission’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and serves as the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The SDO/DATT is the key figure within the embassy and the combatant command for establishing and fostering the security cooperation relationship with the host country. This is best accomplished through influence, advice, and expertise—and not necessarily through established authority.

1-86. DODD 5105.75 assigns the responsibilities for the operation of the DOD elements at U.S. embassies. This directive creates the position of SDO/DATT as the principal DOD official in U.S. embassies. The SDO/DATT is the diplomatically accredited defense attaché and chief of the security cooperation organization. Joint responsibility for the oversight and management of the SDO/DATT is delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [USD(P)] and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [USD(I)].
1-87. Establishing a good relationship begins with a sharing of interests and ideas. The SDO/DATT should recognize that there is a common foundation upon which to build rapport with host-nation military counterparts, namely the responsibility to provide for internal and external security and be a responsible member within the existing regional security architecture. The problems of DOTMLPF are common to the armed forces of all nations. The successful SDO/DATT will take a sincere personal interest in the host nation’s culture, history, customs, and religion, and likewise will cultivate both personal and professional relationships with local counterparts, which often forms the basis of life-long contacts and friendships.

**GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND**

1-88. In accordance with the Unified Command Plan (known as UCP), geographic and functional combatant commands are established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Geographic combatant commanders are assigned AORs and work in support of, and in close coordination with, U.S. embassies within their AORs in order to achieve U.S. national interests and global end states as detailed in the National Security Strategy and other guidance documents. This operational relationship is primarily related to the security cooperation organization’s execution of the geographic combatant command’s theater campaign plan with the host country’s military. The geographic combatant command and the ambassador ensure that the SDO/DATT does not receive conflicting guidance, instructions, or priorities. If conflicting guidance occurs, the SDO/DATT must seek clarification or resolution. While the SDO/DATT chief is in the occasionally difficult position of responding to two masters, this person is also uniquely able to understand both the geographic combatant command and the ambassador, balance their respective priorities, and leverage their resources. A key challenge for the SDO/DATT is to respond to the direction of the ambassador while at the same time satisfying coordination and support requirements from the combatant command.

1-89. DOD’s strategic end states support the larger National Security Strategy to ensure they complement and support foreign policy objectives. As part of theater campaign planning, geographic combatant commands develop country plans that align with each ambassador’s goals within the AOR because the activities and investments typically occur at the country level. Combatant commanders with geographic responsibilities shall exercise authority for force protection over all DOD personnel (including their dependents) assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in the combatant commander’s AOR, except for those for whom the chief of mission retains security responsibility. This force protection authority enables combatant commanders to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce force protection measures for covered forces. Combatant commanders also provide directive authority over forces conducting exercises in that AOR.

**DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY**

1-90. DSCA is established as a separate agency of the DOD under the direction, authority, and control of the USD(P). It is important to understand that the USD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. USD(P) authority derives from Section 134 of Title 10, USC; other responsibilities are detailed in DODD 5105.75. DSCA responsibilities include, but are not limited to—

- Establishing overall requirements, criteria, and procedures for the selection and training of personnel engaged in security cooperation or security assistance activities.
- Administering and supervising security assistance planning and programs.
- Coordinating with the geographic combatant command to establish appropriate agreements and procedures to provide guidance to and ensure oversight of SDO/DATTs in discharging security cooperation or security assistance programs in accordance with applicable law, regulations, and directives. Such agreements and procedures include appropriate security cooperation or security assistance and international armaments cooperation training.
- Conducting periodic reviews to ensure that Military Service, inter-Service, and interagency training available for security cooperation and security assistance personnel are adequate. This includes the periodic curriculum review and update of Defense Institute of Security Assistance
Management courses, the Security Cooperation Management Overseas Course, and the Security Assistance Management Executive Course.

- Conducting international logistics and sales negotiations with foreign countries.
- Serving as the DOD focal point for liaison with U.S. industry with regard to security assistance activities.
- Administering assigned security cooperation programs.

(See DODD 5105.65 for more information about DSCA.)

SECURITY COOPERATION FRAMEWORK

1-91. This doctrine is intended to provide strategists and planners with a conceptual framework to describe the application of means and ways to employ them in order to achieve geographic combatant command objectives and DOD strategic end states. The Army design methodology is particularly useful as an aid to conceptual thinking about vague, unfamiliar and abstract problems such as security cooperation. The Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). Successful conduct of military operations requires commanders to thoroughly understand and appreciate the changing nature of the variables within an operational environment, which includes an understanding of the capability and capacity of host-nation militaries and institutions. Commanders and their staffs use the Army design methodology, operational variables, and mission variables to analyze an operational environment to determine problems and achieve a desired end state. (See ADRP 5-0 for further discussion on Army design methodology.)

1-92. Theater army planners plan and integrate security cooperation activities and articulate how those activities fit within the broader context of an operational environment and achieve combatant commander objectives. Security cooperation planners work in concert with combatant command planners to—

- Set meaningful objectives with defined conditions and tied to a clearly defined role.
- Ensure objectives are measurable, attainable and aligned with combatant command objectives.
- Ensure objectives are realistic based on a 3- to 5-year planning horizon.

ENDS AND WAYS

1-93. DOD policy specifies three main objectives for security cooperation:

- Build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.
- Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

Campaign Planning Priorities

1-94. The GEF also groups nations and organizations, as appropriate, into the categories of regional partnerships, key supporting partnerships, and actors of concern. Table 1-2, page 1-20, outlines characteristics of those partnerships.
Table 1-2. Categories of partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical regional partners are countries or organizations that—</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Are direct recipients of U.S. security cooperation resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cannot achieve one or more end states without engagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reflect a deliberately select group of countries or organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• May be in current relationships or desired for future relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are able to pursue partnerships during the life of current guidance (two years).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key supporting partners are countries or organizations that—</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Assist a command in achieving one or more end states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• May or may not be from the region under consideration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide capabilities that complement or supplement United States capabilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors of concern are countries or organizations that—</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• May or may not be potential adversaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Affect security cooperation and shaping (phase 0) activities designed to solve problems or influence behavior, counter negative influences, or set the conditions for operational success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pose a direct and immediate problem to a region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Depending on the context, a country or organization can fall into one or more category.

1-95. Combatant command theater campaign, functional campaign, and contingency plans specify the objectives by which DOD will achieve end states in the theater. Security cooperation focus areas are the ways to achieve theater campaign plan objectives and end states.

Operational Capacity and Capability Building

1-96. Army security cooperation activities develop the ability of partner countries to defend against internal and external threats, contribute to multinational operations, and assist other countries to provide for their security. The examples in figure 1-3, page 1-21, illustrate a way to view security cooperation tasks, objectives, and desired strategic effects.
Figure 1-3. Operational capacity building example
Human Capacity and Human Capital Development

1-97. Army security cooperation activities develop the ability of partner country civilians, officers, and noncommissioned officers as capable leaders that understand the proper role of the military in society, promote human rights, and respect the rule of law.

Institutional Capacity and Security Sector Reform

1-98. Army security cooperation activities develop the ability of partner country headquarters and institutional support organizations to conduct threat analysis and strategic planning, administer defense finances, exercise internal oversight and enable public accountability, manage human resources, develop basic military capabilities, sustain military capabilities, and manage military justice and policies.

Support to Institutional Capacity and Civil Sector Capacity Building

1-99. Army security cooperation activities develop the ability of partner country civil sector organizations to provide services to their populations, respond to humanitarian disasters, and improve the living conditions of their populations.

Multinational Operations Capacity, Interoperability, and Standardization

1-100. Army security cooperation activities develop the ability of partner countries to operate with U.S. and allied military forces across the warfighting functions (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, mission command, and protection).

Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action

1-101. Army security cooperation activities facilitate realignment of the U.S. defense posture, provide for the security of the global commons, and support contingency planning.

Intelligence and Information Sharing

1-102. Army security cooperation activities foster the development of information and intelligence sharing agreements, enable a common understanding of the threat environment, support information sharing on disaster response issues, and establish procedures necessary to prevent the compromise of sensitive information.

Assurance and Regional Confidence Building

1-103. Army security cooperation activities reduce the potential for interstate conflict, expand the community of like-minded states, build trust among states and international organizations, develop a common understanding of threats, and demonstrate U.S. resolve to fulfill defense commitments.

International Armaments Cooperation

1-104. Army security cooperation activities reduce acquisition costs, increase interoperability, and improve interoperability between the United States and partner countries in developing, producing, and supporting weapon systems.

MEANS

1-105. Four categories of means support this planning framework:

- Individuals and units.
- Capabilities.
- Programs.
- Equipment.

Other resources (such as money, time, technology, and information) necessary to employ these means are inherent within each category.
1-106. A theater army derives requirements for these means from its campaign plans and requests them through processes that validate, prioritize, and direct their provision by Headquarters, Department of the Army; Army commands; and direct reporting units. (See AR 11-31 for Army policy on security cooperation.) Figure 1-4 illustrates the security cooperation ends, ways, and means framework with examples of programs, focus areas, and end states.

![Security cooperation ends, ways, and means framework with examples](image)

**Figure 1-4. Security cooperation ends, ways, and means framework with examples**

**MITIGATING STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL RISK**

1-107. Effective security cooperation activities involve mitigating and managing strategic and operational risk from force generation to mission employment. Risk mitigation does not rely on the maturity of the force or supporting institutions as a whole but is focused on the foreign element in question. Conditions determine when to use an element of FSF. Commanders and staffs use the assessments obtained from Army forces to determine objectives and requirements for mitigating and managing risk. Risk applies to how well FSF, United States government agencies, and other host-nation and partner organizations can tolerate changes in the operational environment, as well as the challenges and conditions inherent to the operation. Leaders of U.S. forces and FSF assess the risk associated with employment and mitigate that risk as much as possible.
STRATEGIC RISK MITIGATION

1-108. Security cooperation activities in one country can have an effect on the regional and global security environment. Security cooperation can complicate relationships with other regional partners, especially when there is tension between states within a region. Commanders and their staffs should be aware of the possible strategic risks of security cooperation to inform decisionmakers and to mitigate the risk where possible. This could affect the planning and execution of security cooperation in other countries in the region.

OPERATIONAL RISK MITIGATION

1-109. Operational risks are those associated with the Army’s ability to execute strategy successfully within acceptable human, materiel, financial, and strategic costs. Consideration of operational risk requires assessing the Army’s ability to execute current, planned, and contingency operations in the near term. Key issues that pose risk to Army security cooperation activities in the near term include limited security force assistance authority, limited ability to work with forces outside the ministry of defense, and partner will.

1-110. As a foreign security force capability matures, and FSF successfully complete more autonomous operations, the echelon and degree of partnering may decrease depending on the relationship with a particular country and the strategic objectives. While effective coordination is always required and initial efforts may require completely fused efforts, the objective is to build the capability and capacity of FSF to conduct all efforts autonomously. Operations and plans are always at risk of compromise, and prudent operational security and foreign disclosure precautions should be taken when sharing information and intelligence.

1-111. Risk reduction measures identified in security cooperation planning add to the plan’s flexibility during execution. A flexible plan can mitigate risk by partially compensating for a lack of information. Security cooperation planning requires a thorough, comprehensive approach to analyzing and agreeing upon risk reduction measures. Each security cooperation activity is distinct based on context and changes over time. There is a risk of focusing security cooperation efforts in one area or type of relationship at the expense of others based on short-term goals. To mitigate this risk, security cooperation activities should be regarded as the providing means and ways to achieve meaningful mid- to long-term objectives with partners as well as the global end states. During the Cold War, security cooperation primarily focused on interoperability programs with core partners and less frequently on building military capabilities of a weak and fledgling nation. In light of the events of September 11, 2001, coupled with the future security environment, the security cooperation focus is shifting towards building partnerships and partner capacity.
Chapter 2
Legal Considerations

This chapter first discusses the general legal foundation and authorities for security cooperation. It then discusses host-country law and status-of-forces agreements. Finally, it presents legal constraints commanders need to consider when conducting security cooperation activities.

GENERAL LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR MILITARY ACTIONS

2-1. Law and policy govern the actions of U.S. forces in all military operations, including security cooperation. For U.S. forces to conduct operations, a legal basis must exist. This legal basis profoundly influences many aspects of an operation. It affects the rules of engagement (ROE), how U.S. forces organize and train foreign forces, the authority to spend funds to benefit the host nation, and the authority of U.S. forces to detain and interrogate. Under the Constitution of the United States, the President is the Commander in Chief of U.S. forces. Therefore, orders issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense to a combatant commander provide the starting point in determining the legal basis. Laws are legislation passed by Congress and signed into law by the President and treaties to which the United States is party. Policies are executive orders, departmental directives and regulations, and other authoritative statements issued by government officials. Following is a summary of key laws and policies that bear upon U.S. military operations in support of security cooperation. This summary does not replace a consultation with the unit’s supporting staff judge advocate.

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

2-2. U.S. forces participate in security cooperation according to a number of legal authorities, most of which are codified in Titles 10 and 22, United States Code (USC) and in provisions of the annual National Defense Authorization Acts. All security cooperation activities must be conducted according to and comply with these authorities, and the chief of mission must approve all security cooperation activities conducted in a foreign country.

2-3. Title 10, USC, authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the host nation. In such situations, U.S. forces may be granted status as administrative and technical personnel based on a formal agreement or an exchange of diplomatic letters with the host nation. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations. Assistance provided to police by U.S. forces is permitted but, generally, Department of Defense (DOD) does not serve as the lead government department. Without receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. forces may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve security assistance.

HOST-COUNTRY LAW AND STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENTS

2-4. After considering the type of baseline protections represented by fundamental human rights law, the military leader must be advised in regard to the other bodies of law that leader should integrate into planning and execution. This includes consideration of host-nation law. Because of the nature of most international missions not involving armed conflict, commanders and staffs must understand the technical and pragmatic significance of host-nation law within the area of operations.
2-5. Status-of-forces agreements and other forms of agreements frequently exist. They are essentially contractual agreements or treaties between two or more nations that establish the legal status of military personnel in foreign countries. Topics usually covered in a status-of-forces agreement include criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries. In the absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the host country, DOD personnel in foreign countries may be subject to the host country’s laws. Commanders ensure that all personnel understand the status of U.S. forces in the area of operations and are trained accordingly.

LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON MISSIONS

2-6. U.S. law and regulation play a key role in establishing the parameters by which military forces may conduct missions. These parameters tend to constitute constraints on the activities of military units. They range from the ROE in combat situations to the authority to spend government funds in furtherance of a training or support mission.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

2-7. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). Often these directives are specific to the operation. If there are no operation-specific ROE, U.S. forces apply standing rules of engagement. When operating with a multinational force, commanders must coordinate the ROE thoroughly and consider the laws of the host country.

2-8. ROE are a critically important aspect of military operations overseas. ROE contribute directly to mission accomplishment, enhance protection, and help ensure compliance with law and policy. While ROE are ultimately commanders’ rules to regulate the use of force, judge advocate general personnel nonetheless remain involved in ROE drafting, dissemination, interpretation, and training. (See FM 1-04 for further discussion on ROE.)

AUTHORITY FOR SECURITY COOPERATION AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

2-9. DOS has the primary responsibility, authority, and funding to conduct foreign assistance on behalf of the United States Government. Foreign assistance encompasses any and all assistance to a foreign nation, including security assistance (assistance to the internal police forces and military forces of the foreign nation), development assistance (assistance to the foreign government in projects that will assist the development of the foreign economy or their political institutions), and humanitarian assistance (direct assistance to the population of a foreign nation). The legal authority for DOS to conduct foreign assistance is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195).

2-10. All training and equipping of foreign security forces (FSF) must be specifically authorized. Military and civilian personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations should typically provide only an incidental benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Examples include the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund. Moreover, the President must give specific authority to DOD for its role in training and equipping FSF. For example, in 2004, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36 (note—this publication is referenced strictly for historical context). This made the Commander of United States Central Command—under policy guidance from the chief of mission—responsible for coordinating U.S. government efforts to organize, train, and equip Iraqi Security Forces, including police. Absent such a directive, DOD lacks authority to take the lead in assisting a host nation to train and equip its security forces.
2-11. Title 10, USC, funds may be appropriated to DOD by Congress and managed by combatant commands to conduct military-to-military exchanges and traditional commander’s activities. This does not provide the authorities for U.S. forces to train or equip partner nation militaries. These programs support cooperative military engagement, and fund material support for the following:

- Humanitarian and civic assistance projects
- Participation in exercises
- Traditional commander activities, such as conferences, seminars or military to military exchanges

2-12. Operations and maintenance funds are provided by the combatant command for support of the DOD or combatant command security cooperation programs other than security assistance in the country. These are DOD funds traditionally provided for the purpose of operating and maintaining U.S. forces such as salaries, exercises, training, operations, and overhead costs.

**General Prohibition on Assistance to Police**

2-13. Historically, DOD is not the lead government department for assisting foreign governments. DOS is the lead when U.S. forces provide security assistance—military training, equipment, and defense articles and services—to host-nation governments. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police forces except within specific exceptions and under a Presidential directive. When providing assistance to training, DOS provides the lead role in police assistance through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The President, however, may delegate this role to other agencies, such as when NSPD 36 granted the Commander of United States Central Command authority to train and equip Iraqi police. (For more information on police assistance, see ATTP 3-39.10.)

**Authority for Training and Equipping Foreign Forces**

2-14. Title 22, USC, authorizes the transfer of defense articles and services (including training) by the United States Government to friendly foreign countries in furtherance of the security objectives of the United States and in consonance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. All training and equipping of FSF is specifically authorized. U.S. laws require Congress to authorize expenditures for training and equipping foreign forces. The laws of the United States also require the DOS to verify that the host nation receiving the assistance is not in violation of human rights. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of man-hours and materiel requested from the DOS under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

2-15. Defense articles and services shall be furnished or sold solely for internal security; legitimate self-defense; preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such weapons; permitting the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements consistent with the Charter of the United Nations; or supporting economic and social development activities by foreign military forces in less developed countries. As such, all training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. The President may authorize deployed U.S. forces to train or advise host-nation security forces as part of the mission in accordance with the provisions of the War Powers Act and other U.S. law. Consultation with a staff judge advocate or legal advisor early in the mission planning process will help commanders ensure that any planned effort to train or equip foreign forces are funded and executed in a manner consistent with the law.

**Authority for Foreign Internal Defense**

2-16. Without receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. forces may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve foreign internal defense. If the Secretary of State requests and the Secretary of Defense approves, U.S. forces can participate in foreign internal defense. The request and approval go through standing statutory authorities in Title 22, USC. Title 22 contains the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and other laws. It authorizes security assistance, developmental assistance, and other forms of bilateral aid. The request and approval might also occur under various provisions in Title 10, USC.
2-17. Title 10 authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the host nation. In such situations, U.S. forces work as administrative and technical personnel as part of the U.S. diplomatic mission pursuant to a status-of-forces agreement or pursuant to an exchange of letters with the host nation. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations. Assistance to foreign police forces by U.S. forces is permitted but not with the DOD as the lead government department.


**FUNDING CONSTRAINTS AND PROGRAMS**

2-19. Commanders and staffs planning any security cooperation mission must consult a staff judge advocate. Security cooperation programs are governed by U.S. statute and require knowledge of the USC. With limited exceptions, DOD may not train FSF under Title 10. All training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. DOD has limited ability to build the capacity of security forces not part of the ministry of defense. The primary laws of concern are the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and various sections of Titles 10 and 22, USC.

2-20. The Leahy Amendments prohibit the United States Government from providing funds to a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if DOS has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. The provisions restrict funding until the Secretary of State determines and reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice. In the event the security forces include members suspected of human rights violations, the law restricts funding until the Secretary of State determines and reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.

2-21. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. U.S. funds used for weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22. Provisions of Title 10 may also authorize amounts of money for these purposes. Standing funding authorities are narrowly defined and generally require advance coordination within DOD and DOS.

2-22. Effective foreign forces need training and equipment. U.S. laws require Congress to authorize such expenditures. U.S. laws also require DOS to verify that the host nation receiving the assistance is not in violation of human rights.

**Key Security Cooperation Funding Programs**

2-23. There are numerous funding sources and authorities for security cooperation. Programs funded under Title 10 that build partner capacity include but are not limited to—

- Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund.
- Joint combined exchange training.
- Humanitarian and civic assistance.
- The Developing Country Combined Exercise Program.
- Traditional commander activities.
- Multinational support funds.
- National Guard State Partnership Program.
- Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies.
- Senior Service colleges and professional military education.
- Military academy student exchanges.
- United States Army Sergeants Major Academy.

2-24. The Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (known as CCIF) authorizes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide select levels of funding to combatant commanders for combined exercises, select equipment, military education and training of foreign military and related defense civilians, and the personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs.

2-25. The joint combined exchange training (known as JCET) program (Section 2010 of Title 10, USC) is conducted overseas to fulfill U.S. forces training requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between U.S. forces and host-nation counterparts. Joint combined exchange training includes the deployment by U.S. special operations forces with the dual purpose of training themselves and foreign counterparts. This funding can be used for the training of the foreign counterpart, expenses for the U.S. deployment, and, for developing countries, the incremental expenses incurred by the country for the training. Joint combined exchange training is carefully followed by Congress because of concerns about inadequate civilian oversight and fears that such training might benefit units or individuals who have committed human rights violations.

2-26. Humanitarian and civic assistance (known as HCA), during military operations, authorizes military forces to carry out humanitarian and civic assistance projects and activities in conjunction with military operations. The primary purpose of the program must be to train U.S. armed forces and it should complement other forms of social or economic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Section 401 of Title 10, USC, and funded under separate authorities.

2-27. The Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (known as DCCEP) (Section 2010 of Title 10, USC) authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with DOS, to pay for incremental expenses by a developing country as a direct result of participation in combined exercises.

2-28. Traditional commander activities (known as TCA) are typically referred to as military-to-military contacts. Traditional commander activities authorize the combatant commander and theater army commander to conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of partner countries. In the course of this authorization, the geographic combatant command can designate traveling contact teams, military liaison teams, exchange of military and civilian personnel, seminars, and conferences within the geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility (AOR). Funding for the traditional commander activities is provided by the Military Departments that serve as executive agents.

2-29. Multinational support funds are used to reimburse countries for logistical, military, and other expenses incurred while supporting U.S. operations.

2-30. The National Guard State Partnership Program (known as SPP) links states with partner countries for supporting the objectives and goals of the geographic combatant command and the U.S. ambassador. The state partnership program actively participates in training events, emergency management, environmental remediation exercises, fellowship-style internships, educational exchanges, and civic leader visits.

2-31. International military education and training programs support theater campaign plan objectives by—

- Fostering mutual understanding and relationships between forces.
- Familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other.
- Enhancing cultural awareness.

These programs may have long-term implications for strengthening democratic ideals and respect for human rights among supported governments. They help strengthen foreign defense establishments through U.S. military education with exposure to democratic values necessary for the functioning of a civilian-controlled, apolitical, professional military. The desired strategic effect of these programs is to improve security cooperation and interoperability between the United States and other nations. Examples include programs conducted by DOD regional centers for security studies, senior Service colleges, and military academy student exchanges.
2-32. Five DOD regional centers for security studies help communicate U.S. foreign and defense policies to international students. They provide a means for countries to give feedback and communicate their policies to the United States. The regional centers’ activities include education, research, and outreach.

2-33. Senior Service colleges and professional military education include the United States Army War College and the United States Army Command and General Staff College. These institutions host senior and field grade foreign officers for academic study.

2-34. By international agreement, the military department secretaries each may authorize up to twenty-four students annually to participate in the reciprocal exchange of cadets to attend the appropriate military academies. The United States Army Sergeants Major Academy also host foreign cadets at each academy class.

2-35. Security assistance programs that build partner capacity, funded under Title 22, include but are not limited to—

- Foreign military financing program.
- Foreign military sales.
- International military education and training.
- Economic support fund.
- Peacekeeping operations.
- Excess defense articles.
- Drawdowns.

2-36. The foreign military financing program (known as FMFP) authorizes the President to furnish grant nonreimbursable military assistance to friendly foreign countries or international organizations for the purchase of defense articles or services through either foreign military sales or direct commercial sales.

2-37. Foreign military sales (known as FMS) programs allow eligible foreign governments to purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States Government, administered by Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

2-38. International military education and training authorizes the President to furnish military education and training on a reimbursable basis to military and civilian personnel of foreign countries. The education and training may be paid for with partner nation funds or U.S. grant assistance.

2-39. The Economic Support Fund (known as ESF) program advances U.S. interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs. In other words, the primary function is to build the governance capacity of a foreign country.

2-40. Peacekeeping operations (known as PKO) authorize assistance to friendly countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States.

2-41. The excess defense articles (known as EDA) program authorizes the President to transfer certain defense articles designated as excess to U.S. government requirements to eligible countries on a grant basis. This program was used during Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom. EDAs are sold in “as is, where is” condition.

2-42. Presidential drawdowns authorize the President to provide U.S. defense articles, services, and training (up to a specified threshold) to friendly foreign countries and international organizations at no cost during times of crisis. Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the president to provide U.S. government articles, services, and training to friendly countries and international organizations at no cost, to include free transportation. This program was used during Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. Drawdowns are grants executed without a letter of acceptance.

Special Foreign Assistance Authorities

2-43. In addition to the aforementioned authorities, Congress has passed a number of special foreign assistance authorities through the National Defense Authorization Act that are not made permanent law within the USC, but rather are stand-alone authorities contained in annual authorization and appropriation
acts. These special authorities often contain “dual-key” or co-approval provisions that grant a certain foreign assistance authority to Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of Secretary of State (or in some cases, with the concurrence of the appropriate chief of mission). Examples include—

- Section 1206, also known as Global Train and Equip and Building Partner Capacity of Foreign Militaries.
- Global Security Contingency Fund.
- Special Operations Forces Support.
- Commander’s Emergency Response Program.

2-44. The Global Train and Equip and Building Partner Capacity of Foreign Militaries was initially authorized by National Defense Authorization Act, FY (fiscal year) 2006, Section 1206. Section 1206 authorized the Secretary of Defense (with the concurrence of the Secretary of State) to build the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces. The purposes are for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations or participate in or support military and stability operations in which U.S. forces are participating. It is also to build the capacity of a foreign country’s maritime security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations.

2-45. Global Security Contingency Fund (known as GSCF) is a pilot program that will operate for three years (starting in fiscal year 2012) to deliver security sector assistance to contingency countries through a process jointly managed by DOS and DOD. The Fund will explore how to approach building a security sector from a holistic perspective. It will approach the entire system rather than using specific authorities to target separately the system’s components. It will be applied in cases where emergent challenges or opportunities arise that cannot be adequately met through existing resources. This approach will take immense coordination and cooperation, primarily between DOS, USAID, and DOD. Coordination and cooperation also must include other U.S. government agencies, combatant commands, and country teams, as well as other contributing nations and multilateral organizations. As a pilot, the program will focus on national-level priorities to prove the concept of a pooled fund and to develop the new business practices that reflect the principles of joint formulation and shared responsibility. The Fund will be available to the combatant command and country teams to develop and deliver security sector assistance in a coordinated fashion. The Fund will focus on national-level priorities and draw on expertise at agencies, combatant commands, and country teams to develop comprehensive plans that span military, security, and justice sectors.

2-46. Special operations forces support, originally Section 1208, is often referred to as “Section 1208 funds.” This authorization is the special operations forces equivalent of “Section 1206.” Its purpose is to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing operations by United States special operations forces to combat terrorism.

2-47. The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (known as CERP) authorizes U.S. military commanders to carry out small-scale projects designed to meet urgent humanitarian relief requirements or urgent reconstruction requirements within their AORs.

2-48. Many different funding sources may be required for small segments of any activity, such as transportation or lodging for participants. Determining which funding sources should be used for various activities is challenging. Army units can avoid funding problems through early identification of and application to funding sources for specific activities. This is essential for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution. (See AR 11-31 for Army policy on security cooperation. In addition, visit the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management’s Web site at http://www.disam.dsca.mil, and click the publications link for the Institute’s textbook, The Management of Security Cooperation [known as the Green Book].)
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Chapter 3
Planning and Assessment Considerations

This chapter discusses security cooperation planning and assessment considerations, including theater campaign and campaign support planning, mission analysis, host-nation support, multinational support, sustainment, country and country support plans, and country assessments.

THEATER CAMPAIGN PLANNING

3-1. U.S. national, defense, and military security strategy provide the basis for the global, regional, and functional strategic end states specified in the Department of Defense (DOD) Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). For each strategic end state, combatant commands must establish intermediate military objectives—goals the commands expect to achieve through their campaigns—as milestones to measure progress toward achieving directed end states. Geographic combatant commands develop theater campaign plans and contingency plans to achieve those end states.

3-2. Theater army and functional Army Service component command headquarters (ASCC) staff organizations play a critical role in the theater campaign planning process. Theater army and functional ASCC staff organizations should be included in operational planning teams and planning conferences and tasked through a planning order or tasking order to develop supporting plans and participate in the combatant command development and implementation of those documents. This includes conveying Service and DOD functional equities to the combatant command and conveying combatant command equities to their Service, assisting with concept design (especially tasks and activities supporting theater-level intermediate military objectives), and with determining the resources required to execute identified steady-state activities, and developing a synchronization plan for these activities.

3-3. The theater campaign plan differs from more traditional operational campaign plans as discussed in JP 3-0 in that theater campaign plans are intended to organize and align operations, activities, events and investments in time, space and purpose to achieve strategic effect rather than operational effect. While theater campaign plans have a large component related to security cooperation, they also address posture, ongoing combat operations where applicable, and the phase 0 component of the combatant command’s contingency planning—or generally “setting and shaping the theater” where the theater army plays a significant role. The actions and objectives in each area will affect the others and will need to be balanced carefully to ensure actions and objectives in one area do not accidently undermine those of another. Theater campaign plans that do not integrate all of these areas, instead treating them as distinct and unconnected areas of planning risk that one area of endeavor will undermine another. Such an eventuality could have adverse consequences at both the operational and strategic levels of war.

3-4. This “strategy-centric” planning drives a proactive cooperative security approach to prevent conflicts from emerging in the world, with contingency plans to react to deviations from the plan. The intent of the theater campaign plan is to “operationalize” the combatant commander’s theater strategy. The Army, through the theater army and supported by functional ASCCs, major commands, and direct reporting units, plays an integral role in resourcing and sustaining the security cooperation activities. The theater campaign plan identifies steady-state force and resource requirements, and identifies those likely deviations from desired steady state that may have to be The theater campaign plans are intended to accomplish the following:

- Integrate shaping activities (in phase 0) directly in support of particular contingency plans with broad shaping and security cooperation activities.
- Ensure combatant commander’s strategic communications are comprehensively integrated to convey clear messages to partners, friends, and adversaries.
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- Connect posture changes to DOD’s global and regional strategies and provide a vehicle for continuously reassessing posture needs, refining those needs, and updating DOD and regional posture plans accordingly.
- Enable DOD to synchronize all geographic combatant command theater strategies with current priorities to appropriately allocate resources addressed through branch plans (contingency plans).

3-5. During traditional campaign or contingency planning, the joint force commander (JFC) establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases are designed to be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary and operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions. (See JP 3-0 for further discussion on phasing joint operations. See JP 5-0 for more on joint planning and phases.) Figure 3-1 illustrates the level of effort required to support a theater campaign plan versus the level of effort required over the phases of a campaign and contingency described in JP 3-0.

![Figure 3-1. Theater campaign plan and joint campaign and contingency plans](image-url)
THEATER CAMPAIGN SUPPORT PLANNING

3-6. The GEF directs the combatant command to write theater campaign plans, and each of the Services to develop campaign support plans. Theater armies develop a theater campaign support plan, an annex to the theater campaign plan. The theater campaign support plan serves as the mechanism between Army planning, programming, budgeting, and execution by, with, or through the theater army and supported by Headquarters, Department of the Army, ASCC; Army command; direct reporting unit; and National Guard Bureau plans. The purpose is to resource security cooperation activities that shape the operational environment and achieve theater campaign plan objectives and GEF end states.

3-7. The Army’s overarching framework for exercising mission command is the operations process—the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation (ADP 5-0). Theater army security cooperation planners use the fundamentals and processes described in ADRP 5-0 and incorporate guidance from the geographic combatant command they support as a point of departure for theater campaign support planning. Planners focus their efforts on the broader theater campaign planning objectives that: 1) build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, 2) build allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and 3) provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

3-8. For every operation, commanders gain a detailed situational understanding of the operational environment, including a thorough understanding of the partner capacity and capability. Commanders then visualize a desired end state and craft a broad concept for shaping the current conditions toward that end state. Thorough conceptual design coupled with mission analysis provides the “big picture” and focuses the planning efforts thereafter. Successful mission analysis is crucial to developing well-formed objectives and establishing their causal relationship to particular theater strategic end states. Thorough, well-conducted mission analysis provides the security cooperation planners answers to the following questions:

- What has the combatant command been tasked to accomplish, and how does the theater army support and resource those requirements?
- What specific results are desired, and what is the desired strategic effect?
- Where and when must the combatant command achieve these results?
- Why was the combatant command given this task?
- What limitations, i.e. authorities, have been placed on the combatant command, and why have they been placed on it?

3-9. Theater campaign support plans provide an important link to the resources necessary to implement the commander’s strategy. Because combatant commands control only a very small portion of the DOD resources in any given area of responsibility (AOR), combatant commanders rely on the theater army, the theater special operations command (TSOC), the generating force and Reserve Components to undertake the majority of activities that create the real world effects they are trying to achieve. Theater campaign plans, enabled by theater campaign support plans, provide the mechanism to underpin the interactions with other U.S. government agencies in order to coordinate activities. Theater campaign plans also provide clear direction on the combatant commanders strategy as a way to establish guidance and accountability with regard to activities conducted in the AOR.

MISSION ANALYSIS

3-10. The theater army should coordinate with its geographic combatant commander to determine the objectives for which the theater army has primary and supporting responsibilities. Those responsibilities should be specified in a geographic combatant command task order or other directive document that is the authoritative basis for resourcing. The theater army’s objectives are the basis of the theater campaign support plan.

3-11. Commanders develop a comprehensive, situational understanding of their operational environment, which also includes a thorough understanding of the partner capacity and capability. Mission analysis helps commanders define the problems that must be addressed during planning and execution. Commanders then visualize a desired end state and craft a broad concept for shaping the current conditions toward that end
state. Thorough mission analysis should provide the “big picture” and focus the planning efforts thereafter. Successful mission analysis is crucial to developing well-formed objectives and establishing their relationship to particular theater strategic end states. Thorough mission analysis provides the security cooperation planners answers to the following questions:

- What exactly has the combatant command been tasked to accomplish, and how does the theater army support it?
- Where and when must the combatant command achieve the desired results?
- Why was the combatant command given its task?
- What limitations—such as what authorities—constrain the combatant command, and for what reasons?
- What conditions define the end state for the theater army’s mission, what are the strategic objectives supported, and what are the capabilities (resources) required to accomplish the mission?
- How does the theater army sustain the security cooperation activities, and what Army executive agent responsibilities are associated with that sustainment?

**Operational Environments**

3-12. An *operational environment* is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders at all levels have their own operational environments for their particular operations. An operational environment for any specific operation is not just isolated conditions of interacting variables that exist within a specific area of operations. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (for example, politics and economics) that impact on conditions and operations there. Thus, each commander’s operational environment is part of a higher commander’s operational environment. Likewise, operational environments of commanders at all levels are part of the overall strategic environment, which encompasses general conditions, circumstances, and influences throughout the world that can affect all operations. (See ADRP 3-0 for a discussion of operational environments.)

3-13. Security cooperation and the associated programs, activities, and missions play a key role in understanding and shaping the operational environment. Effective security cooperation planning and assessments allow commanders to gain situational understanding of their operational environment, including the region and specific countries—including existing defense relationships, partner military capacity and capabilities for internal and external self-defense, and peacetime and contingency access—all of which are critical to planning unified land operations and achieving combatant commander’s objectives and GEF end states. Commanders strive for a clear understanding of the conditions that make up the current situation, including the relevant population, foreign security forces (FSF), and other factors. From this understanding, commanders visualize desired conditions that represent a desired end state. The host nation or regional security organization helps to determine desired conditions associated with the FSF. After envisioning a desired end state, commanders then design and conceptualize how to influence the current situation to achieve that end state.

3-14. The changing nature of each operational environment affects the execution of security cooperation programs, activities, and missions. When considering the operational environment, a key planning factor for security cooperation is the foreign defense establishment’s capabilities and capacity to support and participate in multinational operations where interoperability is essential to success. This includes a thorough understanding of the regional security organizations, the history, the culture, the language as well as the host-nation leadership, political, economic and social dynamics. The conditions of the operational environment can rapidly change, and those planning and those executing security cooperation activities must assess these changes continuously. They must measure and evaluate the effectiveness of programs that prevent and deter and determine whether further means should be applied towards meeting the combatant commander’s objectives. Two types of environments underpin the operational environment.

3-15. A *permissive environment* is an operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist security cooperation operations that a unit intends to conduct (JP 3-0). Under this condition, maximum support of the host
country to security cooperation operations is expected, and thus the operation would require little or no assembly of combat forces in country. In such an environment, a land force commander can expect the hosting nation concurrence and possible support. The land force commander’s primary concerns may be logistic functions involving emergency medical treatment, transportation, administrative processing, and coordination with Department of State (DOS) and other agencies involved in the evacuation. While a minimum number of security forces may be used, prudent preparations should be in place to enable the force conducting Security Cooperation operations to respond to threats as required. Land force commanders should anticipate resource scarcity, language barriers and reluctance to adopt, more disciplined, professional practices being the major barriers to continued progress.

3-16. An uncertain environment is an operational environment in which the hosting government security forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area (JP 3-0). An uncertain environment is most likely to be found in less developed countries that have lost government control of an area following a disaster, or in areas that traditionally harbor insurgents or terrorist elements that may oppose U.S. presence regardless of the humanitarian mission. Because of the uncertainty, the land forces commander may elect to reinforce the evacuation force with additional security units or a reaction force. Approved rules of engagement (ROE) are disseminated early to ensure that the land force has knowledge of and is sufficiently trained and proficient in application of the ROE. Planning for security cooperation operations conducted in an uncertain environment should take into consideration the possibility for escalation to a hostile environment. In an uncertain environment the land force may anticipate opposition from insurgents, warlords, criminal gangs, outside forces, or others desiring instability. Usually, a military show of force is sufficient to maintain control of the situation. Prudent employment of military information support operations can prevent the degeneration of a permissive or uncertain environment into a hostile environment.

3-17. Security cooperation activities have often been regarded largely as shaping activities during times of peace to prevent conflict. However, the Army supports security cooperation across the range of military operations.

OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

3-18. Army planners describe conditions of an operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment but also the population’s influence on it. Army planners analyze an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). Operational variables are those broad aspects of the operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect campaigns and major operations. Depending on the relationship with a given country, situations may exist where a country may be a good partner and share similar interests, but access is not granted for the purpose of training and equipping FSF.

3-19. Commanders must be aware of the specific constraints, such as authorities, and capabilities of the forces of participating nations, and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. Throughout the operations process, commanders (supported by their staffs and subordinate commanders) seek to build and maintain situational understanding. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking (ADRP 6-0). Building situational understanding includes establishing context—the unique surrounding circumstances that influence and help clarify the meaning of an event or situation. Each context provides a different interpretation or frame of reference in which commanders develop and communicate their understanding and make decisions.

Political Considerations

3-20. Because of the complexity of relationships between formal and informal political actors, operating forces may lack sufficient knowledge to understand the political dynamics within partner nation institutions.
affecting a given operation. Generating force organizations provide analyses of political institutions, actors, issues, and dynamics at the local, regional, and national level in the operational area. The range of such analyses can run from the entire operational area to a single urban area or region within it. These analyses address not only formal and tangible factors but also the underlying social and cultural attitudes that confer or deny legitimacy to systems for the exercise of political authority.

3-21. Important political considerations include—
- What are recent changes in the nature of U.S. bilateral and multilateral security relations with nations and international organizations in the region?
- What international and acquisition agreements exist?
- Do they support access, sustainment and freedom of movement?
- How important is national security to the state compared to economic and social issues?
- What does the regional security architecture look like—regional security organizations and country relationships?
- What are the desired regional outcomes, what are the external drivers, and was there a change in the security environment?
- What is the dominant political party in the area?
- Is the government effective at influencing the people? Do the people support it? Is there a shadow government in place, and is it the source of power?

Military Considerations

3-22. The military variable explores the military capabilities of all relevant actors in a given operational environment. Army forces seek to thoroughly understand the evolving defense and security capabilities of partners and adversaries. The Army’s joint and multinational partners may accurately describe their capabilities without being fully aware of the implications for landpower. Additionally, partners continuously adapt their capabilities. The Army must analyze the resulting implications.

3-23. Important military considerations include—
- What is the balance of military power in the region, and what are the security relationships between regional neighbors?
- Are appropriate authorities in place to facilitate training and equipping FSF?
- What FSF operate in the area of operations?
- What are the foreign security force’s capabilities, and what are the requirements associated with internal and external defense?
- What are the institutional capabilities with respect to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities?
- Does the foreign security force being advised have jurisdiction?
- What is the division of labor between civil, police, and military units in the area of operations?
- Have insurgents or militia infiltrated the FSF and other partners in the area?
- What are the insurgents’ lines of communications and support?
- What threats exist, including “insider threats,” and how will they infiltrate and fight both multinational and FSF?
- What multinational units operate in the area of operations, what are their capabilities, and what can be expected from them?

Social Considerations

3-24. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment. Understanding the social factors of a society or a group within a society can significantly improve the force’s ability to accomplish the mission. Culture is the lens through which information is transmitted, processed, and understood. However, Army units’ knowledge and understanding of cultures in their areas of operations tend to be relatively limited due to the time needed to develop that knowledge and understanding. The Army’s generating force can help Army units develop their understanding of foreign
cultures, based on its own expertise and access to significant analytical capability and capacity from DOD and other sources outside the DOD. The uncertainty surrounding the outbreak of future conflicts and the long lead-time associated with developing a useful degree of cultural understanding cause the Army’s knowledge of foreign cultures to be relatively limited.

3-25. Understanding the sociocultural aspects of a particular society or group within a society can significantly improve the force’s ability to accomplish the mission. Important social and cultural considerations include—

- How popular is the military institution amongst the society?
- What is the human context based on the country’s history, culture (shared beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors), and language(s)?
- Is there a tribal network in the area of operations?
- Who leads or manages the families and tribes?
- Does the presence of women and children in the streets indicate stability, or merely the perception of it?
- Is there a dominant religious or ethnic group, and, if so, from where does it get support?
- What is the ethnic composition of neighborhoods or villages?
- Where do the sectarian fault lines exist?
- Who are the powerful individuals and groups within the area of operations? Who are the civilian decisionmakers (such as sheiks, imams, political leaders, military leaders, teachers, or police)?
- Are Soldiers restricted from interacting with any people in the area of operations without government approval?

**Economic Considerations**

3-26. An economic system encompasses individual behaviors and aggregate phenomena related to the production, distribution, and consumption of resources. Successful conduct of operations depends, in part, on understanding the economic aspects of an operational environment.

3-27. Important economic considerations include—

- What does the economic architecture consist of, in terms of regional security organizations and regional economic organizations?
- What are the relationships between the countries in the region?
- Do international agreements exist that facilitate access and freedom of movement?
- What is the extent of poverty in the area of operations?
- What is the primary source of income for most civilians?
- What criminal activities exploit the area of operations (such as corruption, prostitution, extortion, illegal fuel sales, or bombmaking)?
- What collective job opportunities exist to employ the young and disenfranchised?
- What role do FSF currently have regarding corruption within the economic arena in the area of operations?
- What corruption is best left alone in the interest of mission accomplishment?

**Information Considerations**

3-28. This variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information environment relevant to a specific campaign or major operation typically extends beyond the joint operations area. Adversaries and enemies establish their information operations capabilities in sanctuaries in neutral countries. They attempt to conduct information operations against the United States worldwide, making the defense of enterprise network capabilities relevant to the ongoing joint operations.
3-29. Important information considerations include—

- What regulations guide intelligence and information sharing (foreign disclosure requirements by country, category of information, and classification level)?
- What is the state of communications management and media relations? How does this relate to intelligence and information sharing capabilities?
- Are there any local news media in the area?
- How do the people receive their news?
- What is the state of social media used to turn communication into interactive dialogue?
- How can Army forces effectively use inform and influence activities?
- What is the enemy using to influence information in the area of operations?
- What are the FSF doing to promote a positive perception of security?
- What are the FSF or partner units doing that detracts from promoting a positive perception of security?

Infrastructure Considerations

3-30. The infrastructure system is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society. A stable, functioning civil society requires adequate infrastructure. It is likely that Army forces will be employed in areas where infrastructure is inadequate, damaged, or destroyed. Important considerations include—

- What is the state of public transportation, utilities, sustainment, health care, and communications facilities?
- What is the current assessment of sewage, water, electricity, and trash pickup services in the area of operations?
- What projects must be supported by the FSF?
- What projects require multinational support?
- Is the area of operations more urban or agrarian, and what effect does the geography have on an insurgency?
- What are the road conditions?
- Are there any political offices, sensitive sites, or otherwise restricted areas?

Physical Environment Considerations

3-31. The physical environment consists of the physical circumstances and conditions that influence the conduct of operations throughout the domains of air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. Key factors of the land domain are complex terrain, including urban settings (supersurface, surface, and subsurface features), weather, topography, hydrology, and environmental conditions.

3-32. The structural complexity of the physical environment requires capabilities to assess, repair, maintain, and even develop infrastructures. Important considerations include—

- How can Army forces mitigate environmental hazards, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards?
- How can Army forces provide essential services?
- How can Army operations enhance the legitimacy of partner governments?

Time Considerations

3-33. Time considerations influence military operations within an operational environment in terms of the decision cycles, operating tempo, and planning horizons. Time also influences endurance or protraction of operations since any actor in a conflict may exhaust its resources over time.
3-34. Important time considerations include—
- Is there a sense of urgency from the people in the area of operations?
- How does the host-nation culture or cultures view time?
- What time constraints do multinational partners have?
- What time constraints do the FSF have?

MISSION VARIABLES

3-35. Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, Army leaders filter relevant information categorized by the operational variables into the categories of the mission variables used during mission analysis. They use the mission variables to refine their understanding of the situation. The mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables with METT-TC ensures Army leaders consider the best available relevant information about the mission.

ANALYZING HIGHER GUIDANCE

3-36. Planners analyze higher-level guidance from the theater campaign plans, which is derived from the GEF and the JSCP. The GEF translates global security objectives and priorities established in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and other national guidance into planning guidance for the combatant commands, Military Departments and their Services, and other DOD components. The JSCP translates broad GEF guidance into specific strategic and operational planning directives to combatant commanders. Both the GEF and the JSCP link strategic guidance and the joint operation planning activities and products that implement the guidance.

3-37. DOD planning guidance for theater campaign plans include, among other things, theater strategic end states, major assumptions, and country of emphasis designations for security cooperation focus areas. Additionally, the GEF provides direction for preparing theater campaign plans and contingency plans for review and assessment. Theater army resource security cooperation activities shape the operational environment to achieve theater campaign plan objectives and end states.

3-38. Planners should also recognize the role played in the AOR by key interagency partners, especially DOS and USAID. Planners should review applicable DOS regional and country goals, which are outlined in its bureau strategic resource plans and integrated country strategy.

Bureau Strategic Resource Plan

3-39. A bureau strategic resource plan (known as BSRP) covers geographic regions similar in scope to geographic combatant command AORs and outlines DOS key foreign policy goals and the resources necessary to achieve them. A bureau strategic resource plan identifies the principal U.S. government agencies and programs involved in advancing U.S. interests, and lists the key countries where U.S. government efforts are focused. Bureau strategic resource plans describe DOS and USAID bureaus’ most significant foreign policy and management goals, as well as the resources required to achieve those goals.

Integrated Country Strategy

3-40. The integrated country strategy (known as ICS), formerly referred to as the mission strategic resource plan (MSRP), is the country team’s strategy, budget, and performance document. Security cooperation planners nest security cooperation activities with lines of effort to help the commander visualize how the activities achieve combatant commander objectives and GEF end states. It is the interagency country team’s initial step in establishing an annual planning and budget formulation process and multiyear forecast for both DOS operations and foreign assistance funding.
IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES TO THEATER STRATEGIC END STATES

3-41. Mission analysis should involve identifying and describing threats and opportunities associated with the theater strategic end states. Planners should identify political, military, economic, or other factors in the region that facilitate or hinder progress toward the achievement of theater strategic end states such as key audience perceptions and reactions.

3-42. Commanders must be aware of the specific constraints and capabilities of the forces of participating nations, and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. Building situational understanding includes establishing context—the unique surrounding circumstances that influence and help clarify the meaning of an event or situation. Each context provides a different interpretation or frame of reference in which commanders develop and communicate their understanding and make decisions.

3-43. Each operational environment comprises an interactively complex system of systems, in which changes to any one variable may cause cascading changes to other variables and their relationship to one another. Understanding a conflict’s military system requires understanding the other related systems and variables that expand beyond U.S. interests to the partner nation. Security cooperation planners should also consider how the national interests of countries both in and outside the AOR compete with or support U.S. objectives in the AOR and determine shared interests. Furthermore, security cooperation planners should take into account the global challenges found outside the AOR that can affect the achievement of theater strategic end states, such as transnational threats (such as weapons of mass destruction proliferation and illicit trafficking).

IDENTIFYING KEY ASSUMPTIONS

3-44. Security cooperation planners will never have all the information they need for planning. All planning is based on imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future. Planning cannot predict exactly what all the effects of the operation will be. Therefore, plans cannot remain static. During preparation, assumptions made during planning may be proven valid or invalid. Plans must adapt to changing circumstances, and they must take into account how current operations will affect future operations.

3-45. To ensure that planning can continue under rapidly changing circumstances, planners need to fill in their knowledge gaps with explicit assumptions. Assumptions should be both valid (Is the assumption plausible?) and necessary (Is it impossible to continue planning without the assumption?). They can span a wide range of topics, including the political conditions in the region or in priority countries, the military capabilities of critical partners or actors of concern, and the timelines of events.

IDENTIFYING RESOURCES AVAILABLE

3-46. Before planning begins, security cooperation planners should have an understanding of the resources available to support the implementation of the theater campaign plan. One of the main objectives is to identify and articulate resource requirements to execute the steady-state activities needed to implement the combatant commander’s theater strategy. A thorough understanding of the types and quantities of resources available should inform, but not constrain, concept design and mission analysis. Security cooperation resources are a key planning consideration in mission analysis. Theater armies must coordinate with their geographic combatant command for funding with the authority to support capacity-building activities that train, equip, and build infrastructure.

3-47. Steady-state authorities and funding are typically associated with DOD security cooperation programs. These programs enable combatant commands to conduct certain types of activities (from seminars to formal security assistance training), and to pay for certain expenses associated with executing these activities. Finally, theater campaign planning, theater campaign support planning, and country planning should not be limited by resource availability. Rather, such planning should identify the resource requirements (whether at the theater or country level), with emphasis on prioritization of activities should resources be limited.
3-48. DOD resources that support steady-state activities generally fall into the categories of forces, authorities, funding, and posture. (For allocated rotational forces, planners should consult AR 525-29.)

3-49. Significant resources that support theater campaign plan implementation are also found outside DOD. A large portion of these resources are provided by other U.S. government agencies. For example, DOS security assistance programs, such as foreign military financing grants, international military education and training, and Global Peace Operations Initiative directly support efforts to build the capacity of and strengthen relationships with allies and partners. Foreign military financing and international military education and training requirements are developed each year through a process managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

3-50. Global defense posture—the forces, footprint, and agreements and treaties that support current operations, security cooperation and other steady-state activities—is managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. The process includes the development and submission of combatant command theater posture plans as an integral part of the theater campaign plan. Theater posture plans outline the current theater posture and proposed combatant command posture initiatives over the near, mid, and long term.

IDENTIFYING INTERMEDIATE MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND FOCUS AREAS THAT SUPPORT GEF END STATES

3-51. Conducting theater-wide operations without connecting them to strategic objectives leads to uncoordinated programming and ineffective campaigns. An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed (JP 5-0). The process of translating theater strategic end states into intermediate military objectives and further decomposing those objectives into tasks is complex. Decisionmakers and planners at all levels must understand this process to ensure successful integration of a wide range of activities, from large scale exercises to capacity building training initiatives, into theater campaign plans.

3-52. The United States Government allocates resources to DOD to achieve strategic objectives. These objectives form the backdrop against which theater campaign plans are planned and implemented. Defining clear objectives at each level is critical to translating national strategic objectives into effective theater campaign plan implementation. An iterative process of strategy formulation between levels can mitigate the risk of misunderstanding or confusion. This is important to ensure that all needs and concerns are communicated appropriately prior to final approval of guidance. An iterative process provides the Services, through the component commands, the ability to articulate their priorities and rationale for Service-centric activities within the AORs and harmonize those activities with the combatant commander’s overall strategy implementation objectives.

3-53. As part of theater campaign plan development, the GEF tasks geographic combatant command planners to identify intermediate military objectives, coupled with the associated security cooperation tasks required to support the achievement of theater strategic end states. They are referred to as “military” objectives because they represent the military’s unique contribution to the achievement of an end state. Some GEF end states are not purely “military” in nature. In such cases, robust interagency involvement and support may be critical to making progress toward or maintaining the conditions outlined by end states. However, as the term “military” suggests combatant command planners should focus on and document what needs to be accomplished by DOD components. This does not mean that such efforts must rely exclusively on DOD resources. It is entirely possible to have a “military objective” that depends heavily (or entirely) on DOS—or other government agency—resources. It is also possible for DOD efforts to complement those of other government agencies that are working toward the same goal.

3-54. To ensure the theater army can measure its progress, intermediate military objectives and associated security cooperation tasks need to be specific and achievable. Intermediate military objectives, therefore, should have a higher level of fidelity than the end state they support. The mnemonic “SMART” (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound), outlines a useful construct that can help planners develop well-written intermediate military objectives.

3-55. First, well-written objectives need to be specific. An objective is specific if it is well-defined, unambiguous, and describes exactly what is expected.
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3-56. Second, intermediate military objectives should be measurable. An objective is measurable when success is defined with specific targets or bounds, and a reliable and affordable system is in place to assess the degree to which the objective has been achieved. Supporting tasks should facilitate the development of measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

3-57. Third, an intermediate military objective should be achievable. Supporting tasks should take into account the constraints and restraints of both the United States and the partner country. A constraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action. A restraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action.

3-58. Fourth, an intermediate military objective should be relevant and results-oriented. An objective is relevant and results-oriented if the achievement of the objective contributes to reaching theater strategic end states and it is expressed in terms of what should be accomplished as opposed to what should be applied (inputs). Supporting tasks should be supportable with resources that are available or can be coordinated through the geographic combatant command.

3-59. Finally, objectives should be time-bound. An objective is time-bound if its accomplishment is required within a reasonable time frame. Supporting tasks should state the time frame by which the effect is to be achieved.

ASSESSING THEATER STRATEGIC END STATES AND INTERMEDIATE MILITARY OBJECTIVES

3-60. Planners conduct two assessments. One assessment determines what constitutes success—or sufficiency—in achieving an end state. The second determines where the combatant command stands initially in relation to achieving the end state—the “baseline.”

3-61. The sufficiency assessment revolves around achieving an end state. In this analysis, the planners must “unpack” an end state and deconstruct it into a complementary set of supporting objectives. The cumulative effect of achieving these objectives should be substantial progress toward achievement of the end state. To derive these objectives, planners determine what constitutes “good enough” in achieving an end state. This, in turn, requires planners to understand the requirements, characteristics, conditions or attributes essential in realizing this end state. Developing a clear picture of the end state is critical to developing the security cooperation activities that will support it.

3-62. Given clarity with what constitutes successful achievement of the end state, the combatant command is ready to develop a baseline from which progress can be measured. The baseline involves developing a thorough situational understanding of the operational environment (“where one is right now with respect to achieving the end state”). With a goal or end state as the future target, a combatant command must know where it stands in relation to achieving that target.

3-63. The baseline assessment has broad implications for the theater campaign plan. First, this assessment provides the commander with an understanding of its operating environment. Second, it plays an important role in post-implementation assessments. From this baseline, the combatant command establishes a basis of comparison for charting progress that stems from the activities, events, operations and investments it conducts.

3-64. Combatant commands conduct assessments for each intermediate military objective they establish. Well-written intermediate military objectives will clearly delineate what constitutes success. Once the goal is determined, the planners should then establish the baseline—where it stands with respect to achieving an objective. Objectives could focus on capability building, access or freedom of action, or relationship building.
INTEGRATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

3-65. DOD conducts security cooperation with unified action partners to meet mid-term and long-term objectives. Army forces support theater strategic objectives through multiple security cooperation programs, activities, and missions. Army forces conduct security cooperation activities discretely or in concert with partners. Security cooperation activities help establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations, which requires the close integration of conventional forces, Army special operation forces, civil affairs, U.S. interagency partners, and the host country. Integration challenges can be many. The faster Army forces become effective in a region, the fewer the integration challenges will be.

3-66. A common approach to plan development is the establishment of an operational planning team (known as OPT) composed of representatives from the theater army staff under the leadership of the organization or office with primary responsibility (known as an OPR) for developing the plan. The office most suited for leading operational planning teams is ideally the strategy and plans division of the theater army, which is comprised of planners with an educational background in strategic planning. Given the broad scope of a theater campaign support plan, the composition of an operational planning team requires the participation of the rest of the staff. This includes offices responsible for security cooperation programs, resource management, assessments, ARSOF, civil affairs, sustainment, intelligence, and interagency coordination. Representatives from these offices can assist with mission analysis and concept design, including integrating phase 0 objectives, developing supporting objectives, understanding resources available to resource theater campaign support plan execution, identifying lines of effort or focus areas, and describing the role of steady-state activities.

Conventional Forces and Army Special Operations Forces Integration

3-67. In multinational operations, the effective integration and synchronization of available assets toward the achievement of common objective requires unity of effort. Disparate (and occasionally incompatible) capabilities, ROE, equipment, and procedures must be overcome. Army conventional forces and special operations forces establish minimum capability standards and a certification process to reduce disparities among participating forces. Identified shortcomings should be satisfied by either bilateral or multilateral support agreements (formal or informal) prior to the deployment of forces to the operational area.

3-68. The theater army commander is the Secretary of the Army’s senior Army representative to the combatant commander. Conventional force or special operations force commanders are both ideally suited for conducting security force assistance. The supported commander conducting operations may be either a conventional force or special operations force commander. Subordinate commanders and staffs of both conventional and special operations forces may act in the supporting role to a joint force commander or the U.S. ambassador, depending on the operational environment. The security cooperation organization or the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) at the U.S. embassy oversees the security cooperation programs and activities during phase 0 activities operations that support theater campaign plan objectives.

3-69. The theater special operations command (TSOC) normally has operational control of all special operations forces in the theater and has primary responsibility to plan and execute special operations forces operations that support foreign internal defense. Army special operations forces (ARSOF) units assigned to a theater fall under the command authority of the combatant commander. The geographic combatant commander can exercise combatant command (command authority) (known as COMCOM) through the commander of the TSOC or the theater army commander (see JP 1 for more information about COMCOM). There may be instances where certain planning requirements establish a supported and supporting relationship between the theater army commander and theater special operations commander. This requires ARSOF to have tactical control of supported Army units conducting security cooperation activities in an operational area. Conversely, in situations such as joint exercises and combat operations, the ARSOF and TSOC commanders support the theater army commander when the theater army commander is tasked as the joint task force commander for small-scale contingency operations.

3-70. Conventional forces and ARSOF avoid integration issues by becoming effective—able to achieve common objectives—within a region very quickly. Difficulties of integration do not necessarily arise from differences in missions of each organization. Coordination between the TSOC commander and the theater army is essential for effective management, sustainment, and transition of security cooperation missions,
such as joint and multinational exercises, mobile training teams conducting security force assistance tasks, and foreign internal defense. In the case of the theater army, the commander integrates and synchronizes security cooperation through cross-functional working groups, which should be designed to include membership from the across the warfighting functions, and liaisons from the TSOC and other unified action partners outside the headquarters. Functional working groups can include, but are not limited to, planning, assessment, security cooperation and strategic communication. Integrating cells conduct the operations process and enable the integration and synchronization of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. Representatives from all warfighting functions meet regularly to develop a coherent, unified theater army operation plan. The integrating cells and all the other warfighting functional cells are under the staff supervision of the G-3 (assistant chief of staff, operations) to enable the synchronization and integration in the area of operations. (See FM 3-93 for a detailed discussion of functional working groups and integrating cells.)

3-71. ARSOF support operational preparation of the environment through a wide range of activities that directly support unified land operations. ARSOF assess and shape operational environments by, with, or through host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations in a culturally attuned manner that is both immediate and enduring. Coordination and integration between conventional forces and ARSOF support theater objectives and unified action to prevent and deter conflict or prevail in war. Operational preparation of the environment includes activities that enhance or enable intelligence preparation of the battlefield and develop operational infrastructure as a pre-established architecture from which to conduct operations. ARSOF capabilities help the theater army commander and conventional forces gain situational understanding; conduct inform and influence activities; train FSF, partners, and allies; and support U.S. combat operations. These activities provide a strategic bridging capability that supports U.S. interests. ARSOF and conventional forces continuously work with friendly governments through a wide range of activities that enhance the overall security posture of forces, nations, and regions.

3-72. When conducting mission analysis, planners determine how best to integrate conventional forces and ARSOF to achieve theater strategic objectives. This requires considering host-nation and U.S. policies. Planners integrate and coordinate conventional forces and ARSOF with assigned tasks based on capability requirements to achieve theater objectives. They determine the best skill sets available among conventional forces and ARSOF trainers and advisors. Planners leverage skill sets by integrating and coordinating conventional and special operations units with assigned tasks. Assessment of the FSF to be trained often suggests a two-phased, incremental approach to training. Such an approach involves a transition to the FSF by either conventional or special operations forces using basic training in the first phase, and advanced training in the second. The type of training depends on the needs of the FSF being trained. Planners adjust the approach as requirements change. Integrating the advisor may be a phased process using either conventional or special operations forces as the initial advisor. This method lends itself to the classic “crawl-walk-run” approach to assisting FSF.

Civil Affairs Integration

3-73. The civil affairs command is theater-aligned and provides theater-level staff augmentation to the geographic combatant command and theater army. Augmentation includes support for liaison and coordination, education and training, and civil affairs assessments.

3-74. Army civil affairs forces are trained and educated in foreign language and culture. They can help commanders shape their operational environments across the range of military operations. Army civil affairs forces provide the means to interact with civilian organizations, institutions, and—most importantly—individuals. Commanders shape the civil aspects of their operational environments using civil affairs forces’ social, cultural, religious, and economic expertise. Using that expertise helps integrate military operations as part of a whole-of-government approach.

3-75. Designated Army civil affairs forces provide specialized support to combatant commanders by, with or through theater army commanders. Army civil affairs forces are organized, trained, and equipped to support combatant commands. Civil affairs representation on the theater army staff is integrated with the plans division and security cooperation division of the movement and maneuver cell, the G-9 (assistant chief of staff, civil affairs) of the mission command cell of the main command post, and the civil affairs division of the mission command cell of the contingency command post. The mission of the G-9 is to
conduct military engagement and influence the civilian population by planning, executing, and assessing civil affairs operation in support of the theater army. The civil affairs section coordinates, synchronizes, and integrates civil-military plans, programs, and policies with external organizations. The civil affairs section provides advice and analysis to the staff on civil affairs. It conducts cultural relations training as required. Lastly, the civil affairs section develops civil affairs estimates, plans, and orders in support of theater army operations and informs security cooperation assessments.

**INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION**

3-76. Security cooperation planners should gain an understanding of DOS and USAID planning processes and coordination procedures for planning. Promoting and protecting U.S. interests abroad rests on the three pillars of diplomacy, development, and defense (the three Ds), which are represented, respectively, by DOS, USAID, and DOD. Although each organization has unique roles and responsibilities, all provide the greatest value when their actions are mutually reinforcing. Theater campaign plans and country plans articulate how defense strategy is to be implemented at the regional and country level. These plans represent a significant portion of DOD’s contribution to theater planning. Therefore, the development and implementation of these plans should be coordinated with the plans, policies, and activities of DOS, USAID, and other government agencies.

3-77. DOD can be both the supported and supporting U.S. government agency. It often is the lead executive agency for sustaining security cooperation activities. When tasked to provide military support to other U.S. government agencies, Army forces perform a supporting role. Sustainment forces may be tasked to support the U.S. ambassador that, as the President’s representative, serves as senior U.S. government officer in a country. Whether supported or supporting, close coordination is the key to efficient and effective interagency operations. In the absence of a U.S. embassy, or during operations in austere environments or remote locations, the advising unit may be the only organization able to provide sustainment of supplies (including force protection). More typically, during the early stages of the advising unit deployment, the unit may find the U.S. embassy to be the primary source of supplies, services, and life support.

3-78. Security cooperation planners coordinate plans with the country team. The country team normally is the focal point for interagency coordination during country plan development. At the country level, DOD is in a supporting role to the chief of mission (typically an ambassador). While the chief of mission or DOS does not have formal review or approval authority over a combatant command’s country plans, the plans should be consistent with the objectives and priorities of the chief of mission and align with the country plans of DOS, USAID, and other government agencies working in that country. Some key government agencies with which security cooperation planners coordinate include—

- DOS.
- USAID.
- Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
- Department of Justice.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- Central Intelligence Agency.
- Department of Homeland Security.
- Department of Energy.
- Department of the Treasury.
- Department of Agriculture.

3-79. Within the Executive Branch, DOS is the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency. The Secretary of State is the President’s principal foreign policy advisor, though other officials or individuals may have more influence on foreign policy decisions. DOS advances U.S. objectives and interests in the world through its primary role in developing and implementing the President’s foreign policy.
3-80. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead United States government agency, responsible to the Secretary of State, for administering civilian foreign aid and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. USAID often works in concert with DOD when Soldiers are forward deployed. It can supplement civil affairs activities that DOD conducts to win the friendship of local populations. USAID usually is networked to international and nongovernmental organizations. It sometimes and provides financial assistance to help them offer technical assistance in developing countries.

3-81. DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law (INL) Enforcement Affairs advises the President, Secretary of State, other bureaus in DOS, and other departments and agencies within the United States Government on the development of policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime. INL programs support two of the Department’s strategic goals: (1) to reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States, and (2) to minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens.

3-82. Department of Justice (DOJ) leads international legal assistance and implements some criminal justice and rule-of-law programs in conjunction with the Department and USAID. DOJ also works with the Department on extradition and to combat transnational crime and narcotics trafficking, including training programs for foreign police forces. DOJ is typically networked to other international and nongovernmental organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

3-83. Federal Bureau of Investigation is an agency of the Department of Justice. It serves as both a federal criminal investigative body and an internal intelligence agency (counterintelligence).

3-84. Central Intelligence Agency is a civilian intelligence agency of the United States government. It is an executive agency and reports directly to the Director of National Intelligence, with responsibility for providing national security intelligence assessment to senior United States policymakers.

3-85. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinates intelligence and law enforcement activities and programs that help protect the United States from terrorist and other threats. DHS leads immigration, naturalization, repatriation, border and transportation security, and biodefense efforts. It is typically networked to international and nongovernmental organizations that work with human rights and refugees.

3-86. Department of Energy sponsors many nuclear nonproliferation programs, including the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which the Department helps to implement.

3-87. Department of the Treasury (DOT) leads money-laundering and asset-seizure activities and monitors export controls. DOT co-chairs a committee on proliferation financing. DOT chairs, and USAID participates in, the Terrorist Finance Working Group of the Counterterrorism Security Group’s Technical Assistance Sub-Group. DOT is typically networked to other international and nongovernmental organizations such as the World Bank Group, the Internal Monetary Fund and the United Nations Capital Development Fund.

3-88. The Department of Agriculture is the U.S. federal executive department responsible for developing and executing U.S. government policy on farming, agriculture, and food. It aims to meet the needs of farmers and ranchers, promote agricultural trade and production, work to assure food safety, protect natural resources, foster rural communities and end hunger in the United States and abroad.

3-89. The United States Institute of Peace (known as USIP) is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress to increase the nation’s capacity to manage international conflict without violence. USIP is transforming approaches to international conflict. USIP draws on a variety of resources in fulfilling its congressional mandate: staff, grantees, fellows, research, education, training, innovation, outreach, publications, and national and international partnerships.

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

3-90. Commanders may be required to spend time with officials of other nations. This should be done in close coordination with the country team in the host nation (ambassador, senior defense official/defense attaché, and office of security cooperation chief).

3-91. Commanders consider how agreements between the United States and a host nation (and other nations if the United States participates as a member of a multinational organization) affect military operations outside the continental United States. International agreements address a wide range of issues
from legal jurisdiction involving crimes committed by U.S. personnel to the hiring of host-nation personnel to support an operation. International agreements can also influence the extent that Army forces use contracting in support of military operations and activities, since agreements determine a contractor’s tax status, freedom of movement, immunities, and customs requirements. These are all important considerations when deciding whether to employ contractors.

3-92. Commanders also consider how host-nation support and local procurement provide sustenance, operational support, and tactical support for Army forces. Host-nation support agreements to facilitate access and fulfill the command requirements for support must be pre-negotiated between DOS and the host nation. Such support arrangements are integrated into the distribution plan and coordinated with joint, allied, and multinational partners to prevent competition for resources and ensure high priority requirements are met. Host-nation support may include functional or area support and may involve host-nation facilities, government agencies, civilians, or military units. Pre-established arrangements for host-nation support can reduce the requirement for early deployment of U.S. assets and can offset requirements for early strategic lift by reducing requirements for moving resources to the theater of operations.

MULTINATIONAL SUPPORT

3-93. Multinational support may consist of support provided from one multinational partner to another. One or more of the following organizational and management options facilitates multinational support:

- National support elements provide national support.
- Individual acquisition and cross-servicing agreements provide limited support.
- A lead nation provides specific support to other contributing nation forces.
- A role-specialist nation provides a specific common supply item or service.
- A multinational integrated sustainment unit provides limited common supply and support.
- A multinational joint sustainment center manages common-user logistic support.

SUSTAINMENT TO ENABLE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL REACH

3-94. Sustainment enables strategic and operational reach, and by extension, the Army’s ability to gain or maintain access, and conduct security cooperation missions that build partner capacity. Operational reach is a necessity in order to conduct decisive operations. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). Force sustainment support allows the generation, projection, and employment of personnel, materiel, and equipment in support of the theater campaign support plan or during the conduct of a contingency operation. The generating force provides the theater army its sustainment capabilities directly to operating forces.

3-95. Sustainment provides Army forces with the transportation lift, materiel, supplies, health services, and other support functions necessary to sustain operations for extended periods of time. Army forces require strategic sustainment capabilities and global distribution systems to deploy, maintain, and conduct operations anywhere with little or no advanced notice. Extending operational reach is essential to enable commanders conducting security cooperation activities, and serves to enhance that reach in terms of maintaining access and freedom of maneuver. To achieve the desired end state, forces must possess the necessary operational reach to establish and maintain conditions that define success. (See ADRP 4-0 for more information about sustainment.)

3-96. Security cooperation planners should be familiar with the sustainment concept of support and sustainment estimates that outline the responsibilities and requirements for maintaining access and setting the theater where U.S. military presence is forward stationed or deployed. Setting the theater and includes executing theater opening; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; common user logistics; Army support to other Services; DOD executive agent requirements; and other sustainment-related support in the AOR. The theater army executes these responsibilities through the theater sustainment command (TSC) during steady-state operations. During contingency operations, the TSC executes these responsibilities through the forward-deployed command post, the expeditionary sustainment command.
3-97. A TSC, in most cases, is assigned to a combatant command. A supporting-supported relationship is established between the TSC (and, by extension, the expeditionary sustainment command) and the operational Army forces in theater. The TSC is the supporting command, and the Army forces in the area of operations are the supported commands. Sustainment brigades are tailored to the mission, task-organized under the expeditionary sustainment command (normally attached). It is placed in either general support of the force on an area basis or in direct support of a specific command or group of forces. (See FM 4-94 for more information on the TSC.)

3-98. Sustainment functions require United States Army Materiel Command (USAMC) support through the aligned Army field support brigade (see ATP 4-91), contracting support brigade (see FM 4-92), and logistic civil augmentation program. These organizations and programs provide national sustainment, operational and theater contracting, and added sustainment support, respectively. USAMC plays a significant role in the transfer of excess defense articles and presidential drawdowns. Contracting is a key source of support for deployed forces across the range of military operations. Because of the importance and unique challenges of operational contract support, the commander and staff need to fully understand their role in planning for, integration, and managing of contracts and contract personnel in the operational area. This includes understanding the types of contracted support, contract management, contractor management, and contract close out.

3-99. Contractor management is managing and integrating contractor personnel and their equipment into military operations. Contractor management includes planning, deployment and redeployment preparation, in-theater management, force protection and security, and executing government support requirements. Multiple organizations are involved in this process including commanders, their primary and special staffs (at the theater army, down to and including battalion levels) and the supporting contracting organizations.

3-100. Contracts for theater of operations support provide support to deployed forces under prearranged contracts or contracts awarded from the mission area. They do so through contracting officers assigned to the contracting support brigade. Contractors for theater of operations support acquire goods, services, and minor construction support, usually from local commercial sources, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders. Units conducting security cooperation activities coordinate with the theater army to identify and coordinate funding requirements in advance with the supporting resource management staff element to secure the correct amount and type of contract funding associated with the mission. (See ADRP 4-0 for more information on contractor management.)

3-101. Dependent upon the analysis of the operational and mission variables, contracted support may be either, system support, theater support, external support or a combination of such. Systems support contracts are contracts awarded by the acquisition program offices. These contracts provide technical support, maintenance support and, in some cases, support contracts are awarded by contracting officers assigned to the area that provide goods, services, and minor construction support, usually from local commercial sources, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders. External support contracts are awarded by contracting organizations whose contracting authority does not derive directly from the theater head of contracting activity or from systems support contracting authorities. External support service contracts provide a variety of logistic services, other services not related to combat, and supply support. (See ATTP 4-10 for more information on system, theater, and external support.)

3-102. Theater support contracts are the most common type of support to small scale, phase 0, security cooperation missions. Typically, uniformed logistic support does not deploy during phase 0, security cooperation missions, and whenever possible, this support is procured through local commercial vendors. These contracts, generally less costly and easier to arrange than external support contracts, can be used to foster greater local cooperation in that they generally involve local national employees and infuse money into the local economy. Care must be taken, however, to avoid inflating local prices or monopolizing key goods and services.

3-103. Security force assistance may require significant foreign military sales systems support contracts, especially for equipment maintenance and training. Additionally, external support contracts can include construction contracts and, in some cases, major training contracts. USAMC accomplishes this support through United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC).
3-104. USASAC manages Army security assistance, providing total program management, including planning, delivery, and life-cycle support of equipment, services, and training to and coproduction with U.S. multinational partners. USASAC negotiates and implements coproduction agreements, serves as proponent for Army security assistance information management and financial policy, and provides logistic procedural guidance to the Army security assistance community. USASAC ensures transfer of defense articles and services to international and friendly foreign governments to promote the sharing of common burdens and build allied capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. For additional information, see AR 12-1 and AR 12-7.

3-105. Defense Logistics Agency (known as DLA) provides logistics connectivity to the national supply system.

3-106. United States Army Corps of Engineers (known as USACE) provides expertise in water security, hydrology, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, environment, geospatial research and development, and civil engineering to combatant commanders. USACE also provides military-to-military assistance and humanitarian response for foreign partners through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Arms Export Control Act (Section 2769 of Title 22, USC, Foreign Military Construction Sales).

COUNTRY PLANS AND COUNTRY SUPPORT PLANS

3-107. The GEF, coupled with the theater campaign plan, provides guidance for country-level planning. The requirements and insights generated from country-level planning inform the development of the Theater campaign support plans and supporting functional ASCC support plans. Depending on the country, the defense attaché office (sponsored by the Defense Intelligence Agency) or the security cooperation organization (sponsored by DSCA) is the focal point for security cooperation country planning. These two outlets for security cooperation with a country require a broad knowledge and skill baseline of the very different international programs that are initiated, funded, and managed from throughout the DOD, its agencies, and the Military Departments.

3-108. In its most simplistic form, DOD’s approach to planning is guided by the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense. That is to say, planning in DOD starts with the National Security Strategy issued by the White House and expanded upon in overarching DOD guidance documents: the National Defense Strategy influences the GEF, which provides the parameters for combatant commands to develop their theater and functional campaign plans, which include direction for the development of country plans. The theater campaign plans and country plans generally do not contain specific personnel or other resource requirements. The theater army, through the theater campaign support plan, supports geographic combatant command theater campaign plan objectives and end states. Figure 3-2, page 3-20, depicts where objectives overlap between the country plan, the integrated country strategy and the theater campaign plan.
3-109. Geographic combatant commands have the primary responsibility for developing country plans in coordination with the security cooperation organization. The development and revision of country plans and associated country support plans should occur in parallel with the development of the theater campaign plan and theater campaign support plan. This allows planners to nest the objectives of country plans with those theater campaign plan objectives, being informed by the higher-level discussions between the joint force and steady-state actors. Theater campaign plans and the integrated country strategy developed by the country team, discussed below, should be referenced directly. The example in figure 3-3, page 3-21, illustrates geographic combatant command country plans and their relationship to the theater campaign plan and integrated country team’s integrated country strategy.
3-110. Country plan objectives should be consistent with those in the theater and regional campaign plans and should reflect an understanding of end states and how it may be applied to the country. Country plans focus on establishing country objectives that support the specific theater campaign plan and associated subordinate regional and functional campaign plans.

3-111. The geographic combatant command develops lines of effort, often using security cooperation focus areas to inform them. The command nests key security cooperation activities and tasks with those lines of effort to achieve integrated country strategy objectives. It is important to note that security cooperation programs, activities, or operations may support multiple lines of effort and objectives.

3-112. Depending on the country, the defense attaché office or the security cooperation organization is the focal point for security cooperation country planning. These two outlets for security cooperation with a country require a broad knowledge and skill baseline of the very different international programs initiated, funded, and managed throughout the DOD, its agencies and the Military Departments.

3-113. In its simplest form, DOD’s approach to planning is guided by the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense. Planning in DOD starts with the National Security Strategy, issued by the White House. Overarching DOD guidance documents expand on the National Security Strategy: the National Defense Strategy influences the GEF, which provides the parameters for combatant commands to develop their theater and functional campaign plans, which include direction for the development of country-level plans. The theater campaign plans and country-level plans generally do not contain specific personnel or other resource requirements. The theater army, through the theater campaign support plan, supports...
geographic combatant command theater campaign plan objectives and GEF end states. Table 3-1 depicts a way to integrate country planning with theater campaign planning. The elements of a country plan vary among geographic combatant commands. Table 3-1 is not prescriptive and only provides a sample format for a country plan.

Table 3-1. Country plan format example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. GCC task #1</td>
<td>GCC task: The security cooperation activity or task nested with line or lines of effort to achieve an objective or objectives and strategic effect or outcome.</td>
<td>GCC task #1: Develop land forces NCO professional military education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Assessment</td>
<td>Assessment: Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0).</td>
<td>Assessment: Country X land forces lack a NCO professional military education system, management structures, and doctrine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Objective #1.a.</td>
<td>Objective: The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed (JP 5-0).</td>
<td>Objective #1.a.: Country X land forces establish a professional military education system for NCOs by 1 January 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Task #1.a.(1)</td>
<td>Task: A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations.</td>
<td>Task #1.a.(1): Familiarize country X land forces with the United States NCO professional military education system by January 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Activity #1.a.(1)(a)</td>
<td>Activity: A function, mission, action, or collection of actions (JP 3-0).</td>
<td>Activity #1.a.(1)(a):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Task #1.a.(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- What: Five-day NCO professional military education military-to-military contact event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Activity #1.a.(2)(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- When: October 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Objective #1.b.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Task #1.b.(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Activity #1.b.(1)(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Activity #1.b.(1)(b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. GCC task #2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND:**
GCC – geographic combatant commander  
JP – joint publication  
NCO – noncommissioned officer
COUNTRY SUPPORT PLAN

3-114. Theater armies develop country support plans, when required by the geographic combatant command, to support each of the geographic combatant command’s country plans. The geographic combatant command theater campaign plan, geographic combatant command country plan, country support plan, and integrated country strategy should all be synchronized to achieve the same objectives. Each geographic combatant command and theater army—supported by functional ASCCs—should coordinate a process whereby geographic combatant command planners and country team officials review and concur with the theater army’s needs assessment. To ensure proper nesting, country support plans include—

- An overview of the country environment (including the theater security environment).
- A broad mission statement.
- A broad concept.
- Intermediate military objectives and tasks.
- Coordinating instructions.
- A discussion of resources.
- An assessment of conditions (conducted annually for comparison).

3-115. An overview of the country environment consists of an assessment of the current theater security environment and relevant geostrategic trends. It includes a discussion of critical partners, alliances (including regional security organizations), and actors of concern in relation to the country’s land component and institution.

3-116. A broad mission statement, in narrative form, is derived from mission analysis of theater campaign plan, the geographic combatant command country plan, and direction from the GEF, the JSCP, and other higher guidance. This narrative should outline supporting Army objectives and how these objectives are nested with geographic combatant command intermediate military objectives to achieve GEF end states.

3-117. A broad concept, based on operational design, outlines the commander’s operational approach. It broadly describes the actions the theater army and joint force need to take to achieve theater objectives. Finally, it should describe priorities for relationships, capacity building and steady-state operations, and access supporting U.S. partners.

3-118. Intermediate military objectives and tasks describe specific categories of activities for which subordinates and supporting organizations are responsible. They address regional or sub-regional objectives. Objectives and tasks should describe the level of effort directly related to the priorities outlined in the theater campaign plan.

3-119. Coordinating instructions address issues affecting the plan’s design and execution. Examples include authorities and operating constraints, strategic communication themes, and military information support operations considerations.

3-120. A discussion of resources, especially forces and funding, covers resources allocated to and required by the combatant command to implement the theater campaign plan. This discussion should address the impact of resource shortfalls—in terms of operational or strategic risk—on the achievement of theater objectives. It should also outline how such risks might be mitigated.

3-121. An annual assessment outlines how conditions have changed over the year relative to objectives. This assessment is based on measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

INTEGRATED COUNTRY STRATEGY

3-122. The integrated country strategy, formerly referred to as the mission strategic resource plan (or MSRP) is the country team’s strategy, budget, and performance document. The annual submission by a U.S. mission abroad to the DOS which summarizes mission foreign policy priorities provides measures of progress towards select goals, establishes forward planning performance targets, reports on results achieved, and identifies DOS operations and foreign assistance budget requests and U.S. direct hire position requirements related to the budget cycle. It is prepared utilizing a Web-based software application
3-23. Based on mission scope and complexity, the integrated country strategy comprises some of or all of the following components:

- Joint mission goals.
- Diplomatic strategy.
- Security and justice strategy (as necessary).
- Development strategy (consisting of the USAID country development cooperation strategy, DOS programs, and other agency programs, as necessary).

3-124. In the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), DOS directs the chief of mission to lead implementation of the integrated country strategy. The integrated country strategy requires a coordinated and collaborative whole-of-government planning effort, with involvement by mission personnel from DOS, USAID, and other U.S. government agencies operating at the missions. The integrated country strategy serves as the foundation and framework for mission resource planning and for the analysis and review of the annual mission resource request, reflecting each mission’s efforts to project the regional strategy within that country. The integrated country strategy integrates annual objectives defined in the multiyear strategies of the joint regional strategy. The joint regional strategy is a three-year strategy developed collaboratively by DOS and USAID regional bureaus to identify the priorities, goals, and areas of strategic focus within a region.

**COUNTRY OBJECTIVES**

3-125. Planners work in concert with the country team to assess the desires, objectives, and vision of partners in an effort to work towards alignment and compatibility with U.S. objectives. Identifying objectives are a key element of country planning. Country objectives should focus on the role that the United States wants the partner or allied nation to play in achieving theater objectives. Country objectives should be derived from and prioritized in accordance with higher-level guidance. Ideally they should also be informed by and—at a minimum—consistent with the objectives and priorities of DOS (as articulated in integrated country strategy) and other U.S. government actors. However, because a country plan describes a bilateral partnership between the United States and a partner or allied nation rather than unilateral U.S. actions, the security priorities and interests of the partner or allied nation need to be taken into account.

3-126. Planners should identify concrete near-term (one to two years), mid-term (three to five years) and long-term (over five years) objectives for the country that progressively contribute to the achievement of overarching country or theater objectives. These country objectives should be expressed in terms that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound.

3-127. Near-term objectives would be resource constrained because budget and execution year resources were already largely allocated. Mid-term objectives would be resource-informed because the combatant command would have ample time to work with program managers and the Services in influencing security cooperation related investments and determining what investments are feasible. Long-term objectives will be relatively unconstrained because resources were neither planned nor programmed beyond five years into the future. Objectives should not focus solely on building or sustaining partner capacity.

3-128. Country objectives related to gaining access and maintaining relationships should be clearly articulated. Moreover, in addition to security cooperation objectives, goals tied to applicable strategies and setting conditions for contingency plans, global campaign plans, and crisis action plans should also be considered.

3-129. The theater army provides a regionally oriented, long-term Army presence for military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and limited intervention operations. It provides support to joint and Army forces operating in joint operational areas within the geographic combatant command AOR. Army organizations assigned to the theater army provide capabilities necessary to perform operational-level tasks, as well as to assist and augment subordinate tactical organizations.

3-130. The theater army coordinates and provides the resources “means” and sustainment required to support security cooperation activities, specifically those efforts focused towards building partner capacity.
as directed by the combatant commander. The theater army provides the geographic combatant command with regionally aligned forces (RAF) and specially trained forces with competence in languages, cultures, history, governments, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and threat knowledge in areas where conflict is likely to occur. These Army forces enable combatant commanders to shape the operational environment by developing relationships with partner-nation governments and their security forces. Theater armies direct the activities of theater-assigned forces and RAF to achieve country objectives.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT

3-131. Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Country support plans begin with a country assessment. Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. Assessments are conducted throughout the range of military operations, and therefore require continuous monitoring and evaluation from planning through execution to measure the overall effectiveness to help commanders and their staffs understand the current situation and its evolution during operations.

3-132. Assessing security cooperation activities is a critical part of the operations process. It requires a comprehensive analysis of the operational environment and a focus on broader tasks, effects, and objectives such as the development of FSF capacity and capability. Security cooperation activities by themselves are not likely to achieve an objective. However, conducting multiple security cooperation activities over time are required to make progress towards an objective. Assessments are performed in close collaboration with the U.S. country team, the host-nation government, and other multinational partners. Therefore, it is important that security cooperation planners become involved in assessment working groups to help determine whether security cooperation activities are achieving an objective or should be reconsidered.

3-133. Country assessments serve as the baseline for identifying needs—including critical shortfalls that inform the development of country-level objectives—and measuring progress. Security cooperation planners should attempt to understand each objective from such authoritative sources as multinational standardization agreements, partner country doctrine, or U.S. Army doctrine, depending on the agreed standard for achieving the intended effect or capability. Furthermore, security cooperation planners should maintain assessments of the partner country that include force development in terms of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities related to the objective through estimates and in-country visits. A capability provides the means to accomplish a mission or task decisively. Capability comes from organizations comprised of well-trained people with superior equipment, led by competent leaders employing sound doctrine. Lessons learned, after action reviews, training assessments from security assistance teams, U.S. embassy cables, civil affairs assessments, and intelligence community reports can be valuable resources to support this assessment.

3-134. While every situation differs, commanders and staffs consider numerous factors throughout planning, preparation, and execution of the operation, as well as the strategic context in which planning is being conducted. Considerations include—

- Regional security environment and organizations.
- Civil considerations of the operational environment.
- Role the United States desires the country to play in the region.
- Estimate of country’s past or ongoing security cooperation programs.
- Country team’s integrated country strategy objectives and efforts.
- Objectives and efforts of other Services and United States government agencies.
- Resources, capacity, and capability of FSF; capability gaps of the country; and national resources available to cover gaps.
- Methods, successes, and failures of FSF.
- State of training, a mission-essential task list assessment, at all levels, and the specialties and education of leaders.
- Equipment and priority placed on maintenance.
- Foreign disclosure.

3-135. When assessing FSF and the defense establishment capacity and capability to provide for its own internal and external security, DOTMLPF provides a good framework:

- **Doctrine**—doctrinal principles related to intelligence, sustainment, leadership, irregular warfare, and counterinsurgency.
- **Organization**—organizational personnel and equipment requirements. Develop proposed organization, as well as its mission and functions, and authorizations to meet the required mission capabilities related to force structure, baseline force availability, higher headquarters, units, number and type of weapon systems, and any capability shortfalls.
- **Training**—Mission-essential task list assessment, at all levels, individual training, collective training, combined arms training.
- **Materiel**—foreign security force capacity and capability gaps in intelligence collection and weapon systems, force development and integration, acquisition and budget, and interoperability.
- **Leadership and** education—noncommissioned officer professional military education, sergeants major academy, officer professional military education, and policy planning and strategy development.
- **Personnel**—limitations of personnel, military and defense civilian personnel requirements, and authorizations.
- **Facilities**—training centers, leadership and education institutions, sustainment, medical health institutions, quality of life, and morale, welfare, and recreation facilities.

Table 3-2, page 3-27, illustrates an example of a FSF intelligence institution assessment using this framework.
### Table 3-2. Example of DOTMLPF foreign security forces intelligence institution assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Interim (2–5 years)</th>
<th>End state (5–10 years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Doctrine</strong></td>
<td>2015 objective force document devoid of MI; DMI has clearly defined MI proponency role</td>
<td>DMI and G-2 or J-2 developing and validating doctrine based on inputs from foreign donors</td>
<td>FSF DMI and G-2 or J-2 operating using indigenous doctrine interoperable with regional, multinational, or peacekeeping forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization</strong></td>
<td>FSF G-2 or J-2 structured under G-3 or J-3. Extremely limited MI capability in mission critical units No resident MI capability in training centers</td>
<td>FSF G-2 or J-2 structured under J-3. Limited MI capability in mission critical units, MI included at training centers</td>
<td>G-2 or J-2 coequal with G-3 or J-3. Sufficient MI capability in mission critical units MI integral in training centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td>No organized individual or collective MI training in the GS office of primary responsibility, training centers, or mission critical units</td>
<td>Organized individual and collective MI training, conducted or funded by foreign donors (GS office of primary responsibility, training centers, mission critical units)</td>
<td>Individual and collective MI training conducted and funded by the host nation (GS, training centers, and mission critical units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Materiel</strong></td>
<td>No training materials in the MI office of primary responsibility in the GS Reliably C2 between GS and mission critical units necessary for functioning of MI reporting chains</td>
<td>FSF MI personnel using MI material provided by foreign donors, including C2 linking GS and mission-critical units</td>
<td>FSF sourcing or funding for its own MI and C2 equipment, with limited foreign advice and assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership and education</strong></td>
<td>DMI and GJ2 relationships currently being defined—with one another, with G-3 or J-3, with training centers, with civilian intelligence agencies</td>
<td>DMI and G-2 or J-2 relationships clearly defined—with one another, with J-3, with training centers, with civilian intelligence agencies</td>
<td>DMI and G-2 or J-2 relationships—with one another, with J-3, with training centers, with civilian intelligence agencies—stable and functional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel</strong></td>
<td>No MI qualified faculty in training centers Extremely limited qualified MI personnel in the GS, training centers, and mission critical units</td>
<td>Limited qualified faculty in training centers, minimal qualified MI personnel in the GS, training centers, and mission critical units</td>
<td>Self-sustaining qualified faculty in training centers, adequate qualified MI personnel in the GS, training centers, mission critical units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facilities</strong></td>
<td>Adequacy of DMI and G-2 or J-2 offices UNK. MI school to be built</td>
<td>Adequate DMI and G-3 or J-3 offices. MI school under construction</td>
<td>Adequate DMI and J-2 offices, MI school fully furnished and operational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND:**
- C2 – command and control
- DM – director of military intelligence
- FSF – foreign security forces
- G-2 – assistant chief of staff, intelligence
- G-3 – assistant chief of staff, operations
- GS – general staff
- J-2 – intelligence directorate of a joint staff
- J-3 – operations directorate of a joint staff
- MI – military intelligence
3-136. Assessment is continuous; it precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Broadly, assessments consist of, but are not limited to—

- Monitoring the situation to collect relevant information.
- Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.
- Recommending actions for improvement.

(See chapter 5 of ADRP 5-0 for a discussion of assessments).

Monitoring and Evaluating

3-137. Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation. Monitoring within the assessment process allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that information about the current situation that can be compared to the forecasted situation described in the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Progress cannot be judged, nor effective decisions made, without an accurate understanding of the current situation. Assessments evaluate and measure progress of security cooperation tasks toward the end state.

3-138. Evaluating is using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. Evaluation is at the heart of the assessment process where most of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps commanders determine what is working and what is not working, and it helps them gain insights into how to better accomplish the mission.

3-139. As the commander and staff continue to assess changes in the environment and the progress of FSF and other focus areas of security cooperation, they must continually challenge their original framing of the situation to ensure the operation is meeting the stated objectives and end state. Further, they must assess whether the envisioned objectives continue to be appropriate to meet the end state. Finally, they must know if the intended end state still makes sense. While measures of effectiveness and measures of performance help assess effectiveness and performance of the plan, it is critical to assess the strategic objectives and end state. The assessment working group informs the commander’s decisions by evaluating and re-evaluating the stated objectives and end state against other possibilities and outcomes.

Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance

3-140. Criteria in the forms of measures of effectiveness and measures of performance aid in determining progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. Measures of effectiveness help determine if a task is achieving its intended results. Measures of performance help determine if a task is completed properly. Measures of effectiveness and measures of performance are simply criteria—they do not represent the assessment itself. Measures of effectiveness and measures of performance require relevant information in the form of indicators for evaluation.

3-141. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). Measures of effectiveness help the commander determine if the force is “doing the right things,” if the FSF are capable of performing the tasks, and what was the “return on investment.” By determining the relative “return on investment,” security cooperation planners can help determine how resources might be better allocated and expended across the plan. In this regard, this aspect can be especially useful in identifying how resources could be redistributed to mitigate the most serious risks associated with plan shortfalls.

3-142. Measures of effectiveness help measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. Measures of effectiveness are commonly found and tracked in formal assessment plans. Security cooperation divisions use measures of effectiveness in execution matrixes and estimates to track completed security cooperation tasks to help inform the formal assessment. Table 3-3, page 3-29, gives an example of developing measures of effectiveness for security cooperation.
### Table 3-3. Example of security cooperation measures of effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Security cooperation focus areas</strong></th>
<th><strong>Measure of effectiveness</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational capacity and capability building</td>
<td>Increased in units certified for a specific mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human capacity and human capital development</td>
<td>Increased number of training opportunities for desired skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional capacity and security sector reform</td>
<td>Decreased reports of corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to institutional capacity and civil-sector capacity building</td>
<td>Increased ability of local agencies to prepare for and respond to local crises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization</td>
<td>Increased usage of multinational forces in operations, exercises, or other activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational access and global freedom of action</td>
<td>Reduced restrictions for access as identified in the status of forces agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and information sharing</td>
<td>Increased shared intelligence reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assurance and regional confidence building</td>
<td>Increased maneuver notifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International armaments cooperation</td>
<td>Increased acquisition of foreign technologies and cost-sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International suasion and collaboration</td>
<td>Increased positive media reporting of security cooperation events</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-143. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 3-0). Measures of performance answer questions such as “Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks completed to standard?” A measure of performance helps confirm or deny that a task has been properly performed. Measures of performance focus on the friendly force. However, measures of performance can be just as effective in evaluating FSF to determine if they are performing well enough. Measures of performance and effectiveness can help determine what tasks FSF are performing and whether they are doing them correctly. In general, evaluating task accomplishment using measures of performance is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes or no answer.

3-144. Security cooperation divisions use measures of performance in execution matrixes and estimates to track completed security cooperation tasks, which informs the formal assessment. Headquarters Department of the Army, theater armies, and generating force organizations use software tools such as the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (known as TSCMIS) and Army Global Outlook System (known as ARGOS). These tools have the capability to facilitate assessments of security cooperation activities (See AR 11-31 for Army policy on security cooperation.) Table 3-4 shows an example of measures of performance for security cooperation.

### Table 3-4. Example of security cooperation measures of performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Security cooperation focus areas</strong></th>
<th><strong>Measure of performance</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational capacity and capability building</td>
<td>Training event conducted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human capacity and human capital development</td>
<td>Education course conducted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional capacity and security sector reform</td>
<td>Advisor embedded in partner country general staff?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to institutional capacity and civil-sector capacity building</td>
<td>Crisis management tabletop exercise conducted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard agreement adopted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational access and global freedom of action</td>
<td>Status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) signed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and information sharing</td>
<td>Multinational network provided?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assurance and regional confidence building</td>
<td>Hot-line communications in service?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International armaments cooperation</td>
<td>Armaments coordination agreement conducted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International suasion and collaboration</td>
<td>Major annual regional security conference conducted?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Chapter 4
Preparation and Execution Considerations

This chapter discusses preparation and execution considerations, including functional considerations for achieving goals and objectives, security force assistance tasks, and security force assistance elements.

FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ACHIEVING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

4-1. Security cooperation activities include security assistance, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security sector reform. The tactical doctrine in this field manual emphasizes conducting security force assistance tasks because of their relationship to other security cooperation tasks and strategic goals and objectives. U.S. forces may achieve regional security through partnerships with a particular country, by building its capability and capacity to provide for internal and external defense. Actions that provide a particular country with an internal and external defense capability contribute to the goal of maintaining stability in a region. On the other hand, creating an offensive capability may be counterproductive and actually destabilize the region. The ultimate goal of security force assistance is to create foreign security forces (FSF) that are competent, capable, committed, and confident (see table 4-1) and that have a security apparatus that supports U.S. policy related to achieving regional stability.

Table 4-1. Security force assistance goal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. forces strive to develop foreign security forces that are—</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capable and sustainable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Committed</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confident</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4-2. While few foreign defense establishments and FSF are organized in the same manner as U.S. forces, they are likely to have organizations and forces that fulfill the functions of executive direction, the generating force and the operating force. In many FSF, the same organization tasked with executive direction will fulfill functions in the operational force as operational and tactical headquarters, and operating forces will be organized to fulfill the organization’s generating requirements. The security cooperation planner requires some knowledge of how both their own executive direction, operating forces, and generating forces work in order to recognize what capabilities are required to conduct those tasks that will support development of specific foreign security force capabilities.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

4-3. All security forces apply some level of executive direction, which empowers a generating and an employing or operating function. Those activities direct, develop national policy for, and resource FSF. Executive direction justifies, authorizes, and directs the parameters for generating and employing FSF. Basic executive direction functions include advising political leadership, developing and implementing policy, conducting strategic planning, assessing readiness, conducting current and future capability review and analysis, and forecasting and budgeting current and future requirements.

GENERATING FORCES

4-4. U.S. generating force capabilities can help FSF develop essential generating force capabilities. Foreign defense establishments must be able to fulfill requirements similar to the Title 10, United States Code (USC), functions shown in table 1-1, such as recruit, organize, train, maintain, and equip. These capabilities also include support to—

- The development of current and future force concepts and doctrine.
- The design of organizations to meet operational requirements.
- Capability development and integration.
- Materiel requirements.
- Leader development needs and education.
- Personnel policies.
- Experimentation, research, and systems analysis.
- Force development policy.
- Budgeting and resourcing.
- Installation management and the building and maintaining of facilities and infrastructure.
- Other functional area expertise designed to support development of capabilities in the operating force.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

4-5. U.S. conventional forces employ capabilities through application of the joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) to complete tasks and achieve assigned objectives. Conventional forces have some inherent capabilities to support development of operational capabilities in others. However, conventional forces have limited capability to train and sustain themselves as related to their operational role—training and sustainment depend on generating force capabilities. This means U.S. conventional forces are more suited to develop FSF and capabilities than they are to develop generating force capabilities.

OPERATIONAL APPROACHES

4-6. Depending on the operational environment and U.S. national objectives, the Army operational approach to supporting the larger Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation effort is direct or indirect in either noncombat or combat roles across the range of military operations. While the operational environment and national objectives determine the approach, it is possible that approaches are combined in order to best meet U.S. objectives, expedite host-nation capability and self-sufficiency.

4-7. The operational approach conceptualizes the commander’s visualization for establishing the conditions that define the desired end state. Some operations are conducted among the people, where military interaction with the local populace is inherent to the mission.

Indirect Approach

4-8. Indirect approach activities involve the U.S. supporting a nation with security cooperation programs, given legitimate authorities, designed to enhance its capability and capacity. Indirect approaches are appropriate for environments where direct U.S. involvement is not required or may be counterproductive. The indirect approach focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic, military, and
other capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. The security force assistance tasks that fall under the indirect approach are organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise. Programs and activities typical of the indirect approach include—

- Foreign military sales and financing.
- International military education and training.
- Multinational and joint exercises and exchange programs.
- Peace operations.
- Antiterrorism and counterdrug assistance.

Direct Approach

4-9. In the direct approach U.S. forces assist the host nation by conducting operations for the mutual benefit of the host-nation and U.S. interests. These operations either provide a capability that the host nation does not possess or increase the capacity of the host nation to conduct the operation. Direct approach operations are normally conducted when the host nation is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its handling capability. In the case of direct support, the geographic combatant commanders use Soldiers in roles that typically assume more risks than indirect support. The security force assistance tasks that fall under the direct approach are advise and assess. Activities typical of the direct approach include—

- Civil affairs operations, including sociocultural efforts.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Intelligence and information sharing.
- Logistical, transportation, and maintenance support.
- Military information support operations.

Combat Operations

4-10. When the United States is authorized to conduct combat operations, security cooperation activities continue across the range of military operations. Direct and indirect activities enable the host nation to effectively conduct combat operations either unilaterally or as part of a multinational operation. The use of U.S. forces in a combat role in security cooperation serves as a temporary solution until the situation is stabilized and host-nation forces are able to provide security for their populace. In all cases, U.S. combat operations support the host nation’s ability to provide for its internal security and external defense.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE TASKS

4-11. General developmental tasks are organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and assess (known as OTERA-A). These functional tasks serve as security force assistance capability areas. Each element of these tasks can be used to develop, change, or improve the capability and capacity of FSF. By conducting an assessment of the FSF through the lens of U.S. interests and objectives, coupled with shared interests of multinational partners, U.S. forces can determine which area or areas within the OTERA-A construct to use to improve the FSF to the desired capability and capacity. Planners should determine what is in the best interests of the multinational partners involved, or “what is good enough” to achieve shared objectives. In essence, U.S. forces conduct assessments of the FSF against desired capabilities and then develop an OTERA-A plan to help FSF build capability and capacity. Planners avoid trying to create a mirror image of U.S. forces.

4-12. Organize refers to all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit and organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and manning.

4-13. Train refers to all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include the development and execution of programs of instruction, training events, and leader development activities.
4-14. Equip refers to all activities to create, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management. This may include new equipment fielding, operational readiness processes, repair, and recapitalization.

4-15. Rebuild and build refers to all activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities. This may include physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.

4-16. Advise and assist refers to all activities to provide subject matter expertise, mentorship, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising occurs under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups.

4-17. Assess refers to all activities for determining progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective using measures of effectiveness and measures of performance to evaluate foreign security force capability. Once an objective is achieved, the focus should shift to sustaining it.

4-18. The first two tasks correspond to the idea of “do it for them,” and the next two tasks correspond to the idea of “do it with them,” while the last two tasks are performed across the range of military operations. Given a legitimate authority, Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) and Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) are two recent examples of security cooperation organizations created to accomplish these tasks given legitimate authority. MNSTC–I developed, organized, trained, equipped, and sustained the Iraqi Security Ministries (ministries of defense and interior and Iraqi security forces. CSTC–A is a multinational military formation. Its primary role is the training and development of Afghan security forces such as the Afghan National Army. The Army integrates the capabilities of the operating, institutional, and special forces to support security cooperation on two levels: tactical and institutional. These tasks are explained in greater detail in paragraphs 4-19 to 4-74. Figure 4-1 illustrates the security force assistance tasks as building blocks to achieving security force assistance goals.

THE ORGANIZE TASK

4-19. Organization of FSF includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit or organization design, mission command and staff processes, and methods and policies for recruiting and manning the FSF.
4-20. The United States provides a capability that a foreign defense establishment does not have the ability to provide on its own. Assistance can be provided at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in permissive and uncertain environments. In some cases, the United States provides assistance as a bridging solution until the host nation organizes and develops the capability on its own. The United States can provide assistance until U.S. objectives are met, or until the foreign defense establishment develops the capability shortfall. In other instances, the United States may provide assistance to meet specific U.S. and foreign defense establishment requirements without the intent of organizing that capability within that nation’s foreign defense establishment. In these cases, an enduring foreign defense establishment capability is neither required, nor is it in the best interest of the United States.

Organize Tactically

4-21. The United States provides combat power and enablers in support of a foreign defense establishment to enable the accomplishment of U.S. and foreign defense establishment goals. Tactical assistance can be provided in all environments—permissive and uncertain. In noncombat roles, U.S. assistance enables other security cooperation tasks, such as training or advising. U.S. assistance also helps accomplish noncombat objectives, such as demining, search and rescue, or logistical support. In combat roles, U.S. assistance supports foreign defense establishment objectives to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other treats to security. Examples of U.S. tactical assistance in combat roles include close air support, air defense, intelligence analysis, and medical evacuation. Examples of U.S. tactical assistance in noncombat roles include mine clearing, search and rescue, and security provided in conjunction with a natural disaster.

Organize Institutionally

4-22. The United States provides the institutional capability to enable force generation for a foreign defense establishment and to support the development of the foreign defense establishment’s ability to generate forces, through the establishment of processes, institutions, and infrastructure. The United States performs institutional assist tasks at the service headquarters level, the training and doctrine development level, and the proponent or branch level. The United States provides institutional assistance as part of a comprehensive security cooperation plan that includes equipping, training and advising to develop foreign defense establishment capability.

4-23. The United States provides assistance for force management. Force management assistance includes, but is not limited to, force development, force integration, capabilities integration, budgeting, and personnel management. U.S. assistance for training and doctrine includes, though is not limited to, development of doctrine and processes, training support packages, course design and development, instructor qualification criteria, and professional career development. At the proponent or branch level, The United States provides assistance in branch specific capabilities development and integration, using the framework of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).

4-24. Finally, the institutional assist task enables the United States to provide engineering and logistical support to the foreign defense establishments. This support can include the repair and development of infrastructure, power generating networks, telecommunications networks, and water management and treatment facilities; environmental engineering support; real estate management; and transportation of troops and materiel.

THE TRAIN TASK

4-25. The train task of FSF includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and institutional levels. This may include the development and execution of programs of instruction, training events, and leader development activities.

4-26. At the tactical level train tasks focus on individual and collective tasks. At the operational level, the train task focuses on planning and interoperability. At the strategic level the train task focuses on planning and force generation. While performing security cooperation train tasks U.S. forces train themselves, train
FSF, and train the interoperability and capacity of U.S. and FSF to work together. The three aspects of the train task are represented by the statement “Train them, train us, and train together.”

4-27. Due to legislative and funding constraints, the source of funding determines who receives the greater training benefit. For example, Title 10, USC, joint combined exchange training must primarily benefit U.S. forces, while Title 22, USC, missions associated with foreign military sales and foreign military forces must primarily benefit the purchasing nation. Some training activities conducted in a steady-state, phase 0 environment may have an incidental benefit to the capacity or capability of the partner forces, but they generally cannot be conducted for this primary purpose.

**Train Foreign Security Forces**

4-28. Training FSF includes individual training, collective training, staff training, and institutional training.

**Individual Training**

4-29. U.S. forces train FSF on military occupational skills appropriate to their organization and equipment. While some training may be conducted using equipment and techniques common to U.S. forces, the U.S. forces conducting the training must integrate U.S. objectives. U.S. forces should develop tailored programs of instruction that are appropriate for the FSF. They should include a comprehensive assessment of the FSF being trained. In some cases, U.S. forces will train on the use and care of equipment the United States has sold to the host nation. Conversely, there may be a requirement for U.S. forces to train FSF on foreign weapons, such as the AK-47 (*Avtomat Kalashnikova*). U.S. forces conducting this training must integrate the training program of instruction with other instruction that normally accompanies equipment sales.

**Collective Training**

4-30. U.S. forces train FSF on collective tasks at the battalion level and below. Similar to the conduct of individual training, U.S. forces must ensure that training programs of instruction are appropriate for the organization and equipment of the FSF. Collective training programs of instruction must be developed in support of U.S. objectives and foreign security force requirements. The level and extent of the collective training should be based on an assessment of the FSF to be trained. In many cases, appropriate venues for collective training are not available and must be developed by the FSF and the U.S. forces conducting the training.

**Staff Training**

4-31. U.S. forces train the staffs of FSF in their staff functions. This function encompasses staff training from company level troop leading procedures through military decisionmaking at the task force level. This type of training can be the most difficult for U.S. trainers to prepare because of the preparation required to adapt the U.S. military decisionmaking models to foreign force requirements. Trainers can combine U.S. and foreign force staff training or train the foreign force staff in isolation.

**Institutional Training**

4-32. U.S. forces train the staff of the foreign nation’s force generation structure and ministerial or departmental staff. In many cases, this task will overlap with the Advise task as foreign force institutional structures mature and assume responsibility of force generation for their own forces. Institutional training will often focus on force generation, budgeting, and oversight.

**Train United States Forces**

4-33. U.S. forces increase their capability to train foreign forces by training foreign forces. In the process of training foreign forces on individual, collective and institutional tasks, U.S. forces gain insights on foreign force training and increase their ability to train other foreign forces at other times and places. As an additional benefit, the foreign forces receiving training increase their capability and capacity at the same time.
Train Together

4-34. As the capacity and capability of FSF increase, U.S. forces conduct combined training to develop the capacity for foreign force and U.S. force interoperability. The goal of combined training is to develop partners with the capacity to function as part of a combined force with multinational objectives. Combined exercises familiarize both forces with the capabilities and shortfalls of other force and develop procedures to leverage capabilities and mitigate shortfalls. Training exercises are conducted at all levels of command, from tactical units to large-scale combined task forces.

THE EQUIP TASK

4-35. Equip is a security cooperation task, and given legitimate authority by Congress, is conducted using formal contracts or agreements between U.S. government and an authorized foreign purchaser. Security assistance enables the Equip task and authorizes the United States to build the capacity and capability of a partner nation as well as improves interoperability. Security assistance is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (known as FAA) of 1961, P.L. 87-195, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (known as AECA) of 1976, P.L. 90-629, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

Equip Tactically

4-36. The majority of the programs and activities related to equipping fall outside the responsibility of operational Army, however there is a tactical element to the equip task. For the distribution of military procured equipment, sometimes U.S. forces may assist in the physical distribution, accountability and delivery of hand receipts and how to account for and sustain the equipment.

Equip Institutionally

4-37. United States Army Materiel Command (USAMC) is the Army’s provider of materiel readiness—technology, acquisition support, materiel development, logistics power projection, and sustainment—to the total force, across the range of military operations. USAMC manages the Army’s multibillion dollar foreign military sales of Army equipment and services to partners and allies of the United States. It negotiates and implements agreements for coproduction of U.S. weapons systems by foreign nations. USAMC also handles the majority of the Army’s contracting including a full range of contracting services to forward deployed units, supplies and common-use information technology hardware and software. It delegates management of Army security assistance (equipping) programs to the United States Army Security Assistance Command (known as USASAC), a major subordinate command of USAMC, which provides total program management to include planning, delivery, and life-cycle support of equipment.

4-38. USASAC manages Army security assistance and provides planning, delivery, and life-cycle support of equipment, services, and training to, and coproduction with U.S. multinational partners. USASAC negotiates and implements coproduction agreements and provides logistic procedural guidance to the Army security assistance community. USASAC ensures transfer of defense articles and services to international and friendly foreign governments to promote the sharing of common burdens and build allied capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.

4-39. USASAC uses the United States Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization (known as USASATMO) to plan, prepare, and deploy security assistance teams (based in the continental United States) to execute security assistance missions abroad in support of the Army Security Assistance Enterprise. USASATMO can provide the legal expertise on foreign military sales to support forces deployed abroad by working to keep Title 10 and Title 22 case issue overlap legal. The security cooperation organization is required to monitor security assistance team and host-nation activities to ensure that the stated mission is accomplished, and that the security assistance team is not diverted from its specified mission for activities or purposes outside the specific terms of the letter of agreement, governing statutes, or other legal agreements. The security cooperation organization is responsible for coordinating the teams’ activities to ensure compatibility with other DOD elements in or directly related to other ongoing in-country activities. The security cooperation organization ensures compliance with directives.
and keeps the combatant commander informed of security assistance team activities and progress. The security cooperation organization will identify problems and recommend solutions to the USASATMO. (For additional information, see AR 12-1 and AR 12-7.)

Equipping

4-40. The task of equipping is synchronized by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in conjunction with the security cooperation organization at each embassy, the geographic combatant command, and the theater army. Equipping is executed by contractors, DOD civilians, and in some instances military personnel. Contractors support the equipping process for short-term and lower-end items such as tactical radios, night vision goggles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. DOD civilian personnel, organized as security assistance teams, can be stationed in a foreign country to train and provide advice on the operation, maintenance, and tactical employment of weapons systems and support equipment or in other special skills related to military functions. The security assistance teams consists of military, civilian, or contractor personnel, deployed to a foreign country on temporary duty less than 180 days or permanent change of station or temporary change of station more than 179 days status. For example, a temporary duty security assistance team could teach a two-week warrior leader course, while permanent change-of-station security assistance team missions could support the equipping process for M1A1 (Abrams) tanks or Apache helicopters.

Acquisition Support

4-41. Including in the security cooperation task of equipping there is the additional need for acquisition support. USAMC and Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA[ALT]) provide life-cycle program management. This encompasses conceptualization, initiation, design, development, contracting, production, deployment, logistic support, modification, and disposal of weapons systems and other systems supplies or services.

Sustainment

4-42. Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology also provides logistic support to host-nation security forces. This can be accomplished through the sustainment civil augmentation program and is accompanied by the development of foreign defense establishment national-level sustainment capability.

THE REBUILD AND BUILD TASK

4-43. The rebuild and build task refers to all activities to related to restoring and developing foreign security force capability, capacity, and supporting infrastructure. The specific tasks vary according to the mission’s goals and objectives and the host nation’s needs, which must be carefully assessed. This task often involves construction and protection of facilities. In addition to assessment, effectiveness depends on long-range planning and allocation of sufficient resources by the host nation.

THE ADVISE AND ASSIST TASK

4-44. Advising FSF refers to all activities to provide subject matter expertise, mentorship, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out the mission assigned to the individual, unit, or organization being advised. Advising will take place across the range of military operations, at the executive direction, generating force, or operating force levels, and in support of individuals or organizations. Advising FSF is a core competency Army forces, typically at the battalion level and below. The cumulative scale and scope of such efforts occasionally exceed special operations force capacity, especially with regard to large-scale development efforts such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. In such cases, the Army may have to expand advisory capabilities from existing resources, accepting risk with regard to alternative capabilities.

4-45. Advising is an integral component of all security force assistance tasks. Various techniques for advising, often referred to as teaching, coaching, or mentoring, are situation-dependent based on the needs and capabilities of the FSF. The advisor, or advisory group, mentors and guides FSF by presenting options
and methods that FSF can accept, reject, or modify to meet the needs of the FSF. Attributes common to successful advisors are described in detail in chapter 6.

4-46. In the advise task, U.S. forces interact with FSF and defense establishments in a coordinated effort to increase the capability of the FSF in a manner consistent with U.S. strategic goals. U.S. forces advising FSF must coordinate their efforts with the geographic combatant command and country team in order to ensure that the United States presents clear and consistent themes and messages to the FSF.

4-47. U.S. forces can advise FSF in both permissive and uncertain environments. In each of these capacities, the advisor does not participate directly in activities, but advises in the form of providing mentorship, guidance, and council. However, this does not preclude U.S. forces from also performing the security force assistance tasks of train and assist in conjunction with their advise task. An example of this simultaneous task assignment is the advisor who provides mentorship and guidance to foreign forces while simultaneously training those forces and assisting them by calling in fire support.

4-48. The United States provides advisors for tactical-, institutional-, and governmental-level positions. The tactical level refers to military units. The institutional level refers to Service-level interactions with a foreign security organization (such as an army, border patrol, or defense department headquarters or academic institution). The governmental level refers to government departments or ministries not responsible for security.

**Tactical-Level Advising**

4-49. At the tactical level, U.S. advisors provide sound tactical advice on the conduct of individual and collective tasks and operations conducted by the FSF. In many cases, U.S. advisors live and work with the FSF, exposed to the same risks that the FSF face.

4-50. U.S. advisors may be required to provide defense capabilities to the FSF. They will require additional personnel and equipment to accomplish the mission. Depending upon available resources, only a portion of the foreign security support needs will likely be met. Rarely will resources be available to meet all the support needs so advisors must build a plan to maximize available resources and mitigate shortfalls. Examples of common collective tasks are—

- Fires and fire support coordination.
- Sustainment.
- Communications.
- Close air support.

**Fires and Fire Support Coordination**

4-51. FSF may not have dedicated fire support and may not be able to use multinational fires without the appropriate communication package or skills. When given appropriate authority, advisors can provide access to these fires and coordinate their effective use.

**Sustainment**

4-52. FSF may need to use multinational transportation assets, such as aircraft, vehicles, equipment, or resupply that is beyond their capability or capacity. The advisor team can be the link to provide assets. However, advisors must refrain from becoming the sustainment planners and coordinators for their counterparts. The advisor’s effectiveness decreases when forced into this role.

**Communications**

4-53. The advisor may have communications equipment that the FSF do not have. The advisor’s ability to communicate with the FSF increases the effectiveness of the unit. However, over-reliance on advisors for communications support should be avoided, as this can turn them into glorified radio operators if they are not properly augmented.
Close Air Support

4-54. FSF may not have the capability to provide close air support or provide terminal air control of close air support. If the advising team is tasked to fill this role, it must be trained or augmented to perform the task.

Institutional-Level Advising

4-55. Institutional-level advising is aimed at providing mentorship, guidance, and counsel to foreign security force establishments at the department level, the service headquarters level, the training and doctrine development level, and the proponent or branch level. Within these foreign security force organizations, institutional advisors aim to develop institutional capability.

4-56. The United States provides advice for force management to include force development, force integration, capabilities integration, budgeting, and personnel management at the service headquarters level. The United States advises on development of doctrine and processes, training support packages, course design and development, instructor qualification criteria, and professional career development. The United States provides advice in branch-specific capabilities development and integration. At the proponent or branch level, the advisor provides mentorship, guidance, and counsel on other subjects pertinent to the foreign security defense establishment. Subjects are those that support U.S. objectives and shared interests among multinational partners.

Governmental-Level Advising

4-57. The advise task for the governmental level is aimed at advising a foreign government’s high-ranking personnel at their national, federal, departmental, or ministerial level. U.S. agencies outside the DOD provide nonmilitary advice. The advise task at the governmental level must involve a whole-of-government effort integrating U.S. agencies such as the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice.

4-58. DOD initiated the Ministry of Defense Advisors (known as MoDA) program to forge long-term relationships that strengthen a partner nation’s defense ministry. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) contributes to training. According to USIP, the Ministry of Defense Advisors program, documented by—

...train advisers for institution-building activities in Afghanistan... has incorporated lessons learned by former advisers and emphasized four principles originally developed for a USIP training course: supporting local ownership; designing for sustainability; doing no harm; and demonstrating respect, humility, and empathy. ...It has since evolved into an intensive seven-week preparation program for senior civilian professionals deploying to Afghanistan as senior strategic advisers to officials in Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. Once the advisers are trained, MoDA deploys its advisers for up to two years to help partners improve ministerial capacity. MoDA matches civilian experts with partners and funds temporary backfills for those civilian experts’ organizations so that the advisers’ positions are available for them when they return.

Nadia Gerspacher, Special Report 312: Preparing Advisors for Capacity-Building Missions, United States Institute of Peace, © August 2012

(For more information about the Ministry of Defense Advisors program, visit the program’s Web site at <http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0211_moda/>.)

Military Engagement

4-59. Military engagement (see definition in paragraph 1-18) is a long-term investment in developing access and building partner relationship through interactions with specific foreign militaries. Army forces conduct sustained military engagement to develop and foster defense relationships, which may lead to improved access in the form of security agreements, further increase partner security capacity, and contribute to combatant commander theater campaign plan objectives. The term military engagement should not be confused with the term engagement, which refers to units engaged in combat.
Preparation and Execution Considerations

4-60. A myriad of activities and programs fosters military engagement. Some of these formal programs are administered by U.S. agencies and funded and authorized specifically by law. Other military engagements are less formal and often in the form of planned Soldier and leader engagements where U.S. forces interact militarily with host-nation security forces.

4-61. Sustained engagement is particularly important in developing the capabilities that take the most time to mature such as fires, sustainment, and protection. While sustained engagement may require brigade or larger units when the host nation is threatened, smaller units and teams down to individual advisors conduct the majority of sustained engagement activities. Three general types of military engagements are Soldier and leader engagements, traditional commander activities, and formal programs.

Soldier and Leader Engagement

4-62. U.S. forces will often be required to coordinate with foreign leaders directly. Often referred to as key leader engagements, the leader that the U.S. force is interacting with is likely to be a member of FSF, an institution such as a ministry of defense, a village elder, a school teacher, a religious leader, or a business owner. Soldier and leader engagements should be carefully planned and coordinated by the staff to achieve a desired effect. Before meeting with a key leader, Soldiers should fully understand they represent the United States. In addition, they should understand—

- The objective(s) for meeting.
- The geographic combatant command’s objectives.
- Strategic communication messages.
- U.S. national security interests.

Traditional Commander Activities

4-63. The combatant commander and theater army commander are authorized to conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of partner countries. In the course of this authorization the geographic combatant command can designate traveling contact teams, military liaison teams, exchanges of military and civilian personnel, seminars, and conferences within the geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility. Funding for the traditional commander activities is provided by the Military Departments that serve as executive agents.

Formal Programs

4-64. A variety of formal programs contribute to advising FSF. Two general categories are international armaments cooperation programs and programs managed by DSCA.

International Armaments Cooperation Programs

4-65. The Army engages in a number of activities under international armaments cooperation, including international cooperative research, development, and acquisition; information and data exchanges; engineer and scientist exchange programs; and senior-level bilateral and multilateral forums and meetings such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Army Armaments Group (known as NAAG) and the Senior National Representative (Army) meetings. The Army lead for international armaments cooperation is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation, within Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.

Programs Managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency

4-66. Formal programs designed to build rapport by interacting between the U.S. military and other nations’ security forces are managed by DSCA. These include Regional Centers, Warsaw Initiative, Combating Terrorism Fellowship, Regional International Outreach, Defense Institution Reform Initiative, Stability Operations Fellowships, and other programs. All of these have their core the principle of interacting with military leaders of other nations to build long-term relationships. (See chapter 2 of this FM, AR 11-31, and the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management’s security cooperation textbook, The Management of Security Cooperation for more information on these programs.)
4-67. The assess task is not limited planning, preparing, or executing. Assessment is ongoing throughout the operations process. Assessments of FSF have often been overlooked in security cooperation planning. However, the previous ten years have provided useful insights that are essential in improving a theater army commander’s situational understanding of the operational environment, specifically as it pertains to assessing the capability and capacity of FSF. Before conducting security cooperation activities with a foreign nation, theater army security cooperation planners conduct assessments to determine the capabilities and capacity of the foreign defense establishment required to achieve the objectives and end states defined in the theater campaign plan and country plan. These assessments should be part of a continuous process that incorporates input from the geographic combatant command, subordinate component commands, appropriate country team, agencies outside DOD, and post-mission reports from previous U.S. military operations and training missions.

4-68. Assessments of FSF are driven from the top down, and informed from the bottom up. From an Army perspective, the theater army is best suited to conduct an assessment of FSF before executing a security cooperation activity. Regionally aligned forces (RAF), given knowledge of culture and language, will be best situated to assess FSF or institutional capability during and after the security cooperation activity. The RAF provide a current evaluation of FSF and feed this evaluation to the theater army to measure the progress towards achieving the objectives of the theater campaign support plan. This assessment enhances a theater army commander’s situational understanding and informs development of theater campaign plans and associated theater campaign support plans and country support plans.

4-69. Assessments of foreign defense establishments serve to inform both U.S. forces and the foreign defense establishments themselves. For U.S. forces, regional and country assessments of foreign defense establishments inform the design and development of theater campaign plan and theater campaign support plan. Assessments conducted for foreign defense establishments serve as a guide for identifying areas that require development.

4-70. Assessments should be conducted to evaluate the status of FSF capabilities and capacity. Each assessment establishes a measurement at a particular time and can be compared to other assessments to observe differences and progress attributable to security cooperation activities. Assessments evaluate the effectiveness of the theater campaign support plan. In some cases, the assessment may be sensitive, so Army units consider providing a generic assessment to the foreign defense establishment.

4-71. The FSF assessment enables the RAF to establish the right developmental objectives. Assessments of individual units allow for the alignment of feasible developmental tasks. Collectively, the comprehensive FSF assessment provides a thorough understanding of the FSF and presents a baseline in capability requirements within the operational environment. The FSF assessment task flow consists of five steps. Figure 4-2, page 4-13, illustrates the supporting and detailed task workflow of the FSF assessment.
4-72. While every situation differs, theater army and brigade leaders assess the following factors throughout planning, preparation, and execution of the operation:

- The operational environment (including civil and sociocultural considerations).
- Legal authorities (see chapter 2).
- The core grievances and potential threats (possibly including the prerequisites of insurgency).
- FSF elements (force generation, employment, sustainment, and transition).
- Methods, successes, and failures of FSF security efforts.
- State of training at all levels, and the specialties and education of leaders.
- Equipment and priority placed on maintenance.
- Sustainment and infrastructure structure and their ability to meet the force’s requirements.
- Laws, regulations, and doctrine governing the FSF, and their relationships to national leaders.

4-73. Continuous FSF assessment provides measurable feedback in terms of measures of effectiveness and measures of performance of the developmental progress for a specific force and collectively across the FSF. The assessment measures how well FSF are performing individual and collective training tasks. When assessing tasks, RAF identify what the FSF must do, how well they must be able to do it, and what factors are impeding the FSF from accomplishing their objectives.

4-74. Security cooperation planners, together with advisors conducting security force assistance tasks within a particular country, apply this foreign security assessment workflow methodology as a developmental tool when conducting assessments of security cooperation activities designed to achieve theater campaign plan objectives. An assessment of FSF is critical to aiding the commander’s situational understanding of the operating environment and informs the development of theater campaign and campaign support plans.
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE MISSION ELEMENTS

4-75. The elements of a security force assistance mission are force generation, employment, sustainment, and transition. These elements serve to identify and synchronize the DOD and interagency actions with partner nation efforts to achieve the desired campaign objectives. Table 4-2 shows a logical breakdown of the major security force assistance actions within mission elements required to achieve the commander’s objectives. Integrated in the security force assistance elements are the security force assistance tasks (organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and assess). The task to advise the partner nation FSF occurs throughout all lines of effort to support the campaign plan.

Table 4-2. Security force assistance mission elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force generation</th>
<th>Force employment</th>
<th>Sustainment</th>
<th>Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formulate policies and programs</td>
<td>Roles, responsibilities, and authority</td>
<td>Force protection</td>
<td>Validation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present and justify the force’s positions on policies, programs, and plans</td>
<td>Assessment</td>
<td>Sustainment organization</td>
<td>Operational deployment and advisory program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement policies, program, budgets, and instructions</td>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>Force modernization</td>
<td>Multinational and host-nation combined operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure efficient generating and operating functions</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Military infrastructure</td>
<td>Independent host-nation operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure the generating force fulfills current and future operating force requirements</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>Budget and funding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate and coordinate with other departments and ministries to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration, and eliminate duplication</td>
<td>Secure the populace continuously</td>
<td>Contract support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervise and control force intelligence activities</td>
<td>Secure critical infrastructure</td>
<td>International donations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counter crime (organized and petty)</td>
<td>Antigraft and anticorruption programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure host-nation borders, air and seaports</td>
<td>Leadership training and education</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security force intelligence organization</td>
<td>Host-nation security ministry development</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police information and intelligence</td>
<td>Materiel acquisition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collection methods and systems</td>
<td>Civil service deployment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissemination</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5
Considerations for Brigade Operations

This chapter discusses activities related to, deployment, employment, redeployment, and postdeployment of Army brigades. It provides tactical-level considerations in support of strategic security cooperation goals and objectives.

DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

5-1. Deployment is the movement of forces to an operational area in response to an order. It encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, including predeployment events and intracontinental U.S., intertheater, and intratheater movement legs. Effective and efficient redeployment avoids operational pauses and contributes to the sustainment of land power capabilities of U.S. forces and foreign security forces (FSF) over the long term. Deployment and redeployment are similar, iterative and planning is critical to execution success. Redevelopment may involve transfer to support another requirement in the same operational area.

5-2. This combination of dynamic actions supports the combatant commander’s concept of operations for employment of the force. It consists of four distinct phases:

- Predeployment activities.
- Home station to port of debarkation.
- Port to port.
- Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

5-3. The generating force’s primary roles in deployment are to—

- Support operational Army commanders in predeployment activities.
- Plan for and coordinate unit movement from home station to port of debarkation.
- Provide capabilities to United States Transportation Command to operate ports.
- Provide capabilities to combatant commanders for conducting reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

5-4. The deployment and redeployment process does not change under security cooperation. However, there may be cases that require the process to react within 180 days to meet combatant commander country requirements. United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) has overall responsibility for the deployment of capabilities based in the continental United States to a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR).

5-5. Security cooperation is conducted in both permissive and uncertain operational environments, in which U.S. forces are guests of the host nation or partner organization. Units deploy into the operational area by following their deployment standing operating procedures and the operation plan. This information, however, does not obviate the need for extensive standing operating procedures and an operation plan.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY

5-6. The predeployment site survey unit aims to report accurately to its parent unit the analysis of the existing security cooperation situation using the mission variables—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). It also establishes in-country mission command, support, protection, and sustainment relationships for the follow-on unit’s mission execution. The site survey coordinates the in country reception of forces. This coordination mitigates risk during the handoff, and requires all units—outgoing and incoming—to apply a comprehensive approach at all levels of command.
ADVANCE PARTY DEPLOYMENT

5-7. An advance party deploys to the host nation or partner organization area of operations after the unit completes its mission planning and the proper commander representative declares it deployable. The advance party conducts predeployment activities and coordinates necessary travel documentation and country clearances. The advance party reviews the rules of engagement (ROE) and any status-of-forces agreements before deploying. If applicable, the proper staff provides an updated threat briefing to the unit. The brigade logistics staff officer (S-4) coordinates out-loading in the unit area. The unit places all supplies and materials on pallets beforehand and prepares the load manifest.

5-8. Upon arrival, the advance party processes through customs and immediately notifies the higher headquarters of its arrival and status. Often the higher headquarters provides point of contacts to the advance party. These contacts help the advance party obtain the proper identification, documentation, and weapons permits.

5-9. The advance party establishes contact with all U.S. entities, the country team and tactical unit commanders to conduct final pre-mission planning activities. The advance party procures secure working, storage, and living areas for the unit and reconnoiters and prepares the training sites. The advance party coordinates for special support equipment to unload heavy supplies and transport the supplies and personnel to the training site.

MAIN BODY DEPLOYMENT

5-10. The unit deploys after completing its planning and the appropriate commander declares the unit ready. The unit follows the same procedures performed by the advance party. Members of the advance party meet the main body on its arrival and brief the main body on any required changes to the operation order.

5-11. After arriving in country, the unit processes through customs and immediately notifies the higher headquarters of its arrival and status. The unit obtains the proper identification, documentation and weapons permits from the U.S. country team or other sources, if applicable. Often the security assistance organization provides to the unit the necessary point of contacts that expedite this process.

5-12. The unit off loads equipment and personnel onto vehicles for movement to the training site, or it stores the equipment in a secure area until the processing is completed. The host nation may provide a physical security site for the equipment, but the unit provides security because the commander is accountable for the security cooperation support member’s physical and personal security. Sustainment personnel may assist with the equipment transportation, storage, and security.

IN-COUNTRY PREPARATION

5-13. Upon arrival, the commander and brigade operations staff officer (S-3) brief the higher headquarters on the planned execution of the mission and reconfirm the required command relationship. Local conditions may require the unit to confirm or establish its in-country and external mission command, support, and sustainment relationships from outside its operational area upon arrival. The unit establishes direct working relationships with its next higher in or out of country supporting element to—

- Determine the limits of the available support and expected reaction time between the initiation of the support request and its fulfillment.
- Confirm or establish communications procedures between the supporting element and the unit, to include alternative and emergency procedures for mission command, all available support, and medical evacuation.

5-14. The unit establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronization. The unit—

- Identifies the locations and contacts of the relevant agencies, of the United States and the host nation.
- Contacts the concerned agency to establish initial coordination.
- Exchanges information or intelligence according to with Army Foreign Disclosure policy and combatant command guidance.
- Confirms or establishes other coordination protocols as necessary.
- Incorporates the newly established or changed procedures into the plans for mission execution.

5-15. The unit immediately establishes operations security and protection procedures to support its mission execution and identifies contingency plans incorporated into its defensive, evasion, and personnel recovery plans.

5-16. After receiving a detailed briefing and further guidance from the advance party, unit personnel continue to develop effective rapport with the host-nation military counterparts. They also assess their working, storage, and living areas for security and verify the location of the training site, communications center, dispensary area, and host-nation military areas. In partnership with the host-nation military leadership, the unit commander—

- Establishes rapport.
- Conducts introductions in a professional business style, congenial manner.
- Briefs on the unit’s mission, its capabilities, and any restrictions and limits imposed by the higher U.S. commander.
- Ensures all unit personnel are fully informed and firmly support security cooperation goals. Requests counterpart linkup be made under the mutual supervision of the host-nation military commander and the unit commander.
- Explains current unit plans are tentative and that assistance is needed for adaptation and finalization.
- Deduces or solicits the actual estimate of unit capabilities and perceived advisory assistance and materiel requirements.
- Recommends the most desirable courses of action while emphasizing how they satisfy present conditions, achieve the desired training, and meet advisory assistance goals.
- Informs the higher in-country U.S. commander and country team of any significant changes in the unit’s plan to assist the host-nation military.

5-17. The brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) supervises the dissemination of intelligence and other operationally pertinent information within the unit and, as applicable, to higher, lower, or adjacent units or agencies. The S-2 also—

- Monitors the implementation of the intelligence collection plans to include updating the commander’s priority intelligence requirements, conducting area assessment, and coordinating for additional intelligence support.
- Establishes liaison with host-nation intelligence and security agencies (within the guidelines provided by applicable higher authority). Assesses the intelligence threat and resulting security requirements, including coordination with the S-3 on specific security and operations security measures.

5-18. Through the S-2, the commander’s priority intelligence requirements (known as PIRs) are based on the latest information available and requirements for additional PIRs that arise from modified estimates and plans. The S-2 also—

- Analyzes the foreign unit’s status to finalize unit plans for advisory assistance. These plans can include task organization of unit with counterparts, staff functions for planning security cooperation activities, and advisory assistance required for executing activities.
- Explains analysis to counterparts and encourages them to help and participate in analyzing, preparing, and briefing the analysis to the foreign unit commander.
- Prepares and briefs the plans for training and advisory assistance.
- Helps the foreign unit inspect the available facilities to identify deficiencies. If the unit finds deficiencies, the S-2 prepares estimates of courses of action for the host-nation commander to correct deficiencies.
- Supervises the preparation of the facilities with their counterparts and informs unit and host-nation commanders on the status of the facilities.
5-19. The unit ensures its security is based on the present or anticipated threat. Some recommended actions the unit may take include—

- Hardening its positions based on available means and requirements to maintain low visibility.
- Maintaining unit internal guard system with at least one Soldier who is awake and knows the locations of all other unit personnel. The guard reacts to an emergency by following an internal alert plan and starting defensive actions.
- Maintaining communications with all subordinate unit personnel deployed outside the immediate area controlled by the main body.
- Establishing plans for immediate defensive actions in the event of an attack or a loss of rapport with hostile reaction.
- Discussing visible security measures with foreign counterparts to ensure understanding and to maintain effective rapport. Unit personnel do not divulge sensitive information for the sake of possible rapport benefits.
- Encouraging the foreign unit, through counterparts, to adopt additional security measures identified when analyzing the foreign unit’s status and inspecting its facilities.
- Coordinating defensive measures with the foreign unit to develop a mutual defensive plan. Unit personnel obtain from counterparts a current internal defense plan. They encourage the foreign unit to conduct mutual full-force rehearsals of defensive plans. If unsuccessful, the unit conducts internal rehearsals of the plans.

**ARMS FORCE GENERATION**

5-20. Army force generation (known as ARFORGEN) is the structured progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of the geographic combatant commander and other Army requirements. Army force generation is the Army’s core process for force generation, executed with supporting-to-supported relationships, that cycles units through three force pools: RESET, train/ready, and available. Each of the three force pools contains a balanced force capability to provide a sustained flow of forces for current commitments and to hedge against unexpected contingencies. Army force generation establishes the basis to plan and execute Army-wide unit resourcing. The conduct of brigade operations in support of security cooperation missions is initially affected by the unit selected. Some brigades may be regionally aligned, assigned to a geographic combatant command, located in the AOR, and already conducting focused language and cultural training. Other brigades may be designated from FORSCOM. Effective and efficient redeployment avoids operational pauses and contributes to the maintenance of landpower capabilities and partnerships with FSF over the long term. (See AR 525-29 for more information on Army force generation.)

5-21. FORSCOM trains, mobilizes, deploys, sustains, transforms and reconstitutes conventional forces, providing relevant and ready landpower to combatant commanders and theater army commanders in defense of the nation both at home and abroad. FORSCOM serves as Army force provider in the global force management process. It recommends sourcing solutions that include generating force capabilities to combatant commander capabilities requirements. FORSCOM configures assigned operational Army forces for employment, and prepares them for the specific operational environment and mission in which they will be employed, to include the planning and execution of mission readiness exercises and mission rehearsal exercises, as well as the maintenance and employment of an exportable training capability.

5-22. Units in the Army force generation train/ready force pool increase training readiness and capabilities given resource availability to meet established readiness goals. Units in the train/ready force pool may be deployed, and Reserve Component units may be mobilized for deployment.

5-23. Units in the train/ready force pool perform the following activities:

- Perform individual and collective training tasks.
- Complete professional military education.
- Conduct mission analysis to identify personnel and equipment capability shortfalls in order to meet theater army requirements.
- Receive new personnel and equipment.
Considerations for Brigade Operations

- Provide institutional support.
- Conduct mission rehearsal exercises.
- Perform other activities as directed.

Commanders must ensure the continuous medical and dental processing and readiness of all Soldiers assigned.

5-24. Units in the train/ready force pool provide operational depth by retaining the capability to perform decisive action (offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities) tasks or respond to theater army and geographic combatant command security cooperation requirements.

5-25. United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) recruits, trains, and educates Soldiers; supports training in units; develops doctrine; establishes standards; and builds the future Army. TRADOC provides this support to operating forces even while they are conducting operations. TRADOC assists operating forces in integrating new capabilities and in adapting to their operational environment, as well as transitioning successful adaptations to the rest of the Army. TRADOC also supports theater army security cooperation activities and security force assistance, including force design for those forces and their supporting institutions. TRADOC support is provided primarily through its major subordinate commands and field operating agencies.

OPERATION PLAN

5-26. The S-3 disseminates the operation plan or order to unit staff and subordinates. The S-3 ensures predeployment training for Soldiers, to include preparation for training host-nation military forces and rehearsals for movement. The S-3 reviews the program of instruction for tasks whether they be train, advise, assist, equip, or assess, to include getting approval from the commander and higher headquarters, if necessary.

5-27. Commanders normally initiate the military decisionmaking process upon receipt of or in anticipation of a mission. Commanders and staffs often begin planning in the absence of a complete and approved higher headquarters’ operation plan or operation order. This requires active coordination with the theater army that issued the plan or order, and parallel planning between FORSCOM and the division as the plan or order is developed. (See ADRP 5-0 for further discussion of the operations process.)

TASK ORGANIZING

5-28. Brigades may require additional augmentation to provide capabilities not organic or habitually assigned. Brigades identify any capability shortfalls and coordinate support with their higher headquarters, FORSCOM and the theater army during military decisionmaking process. Ideally, through global force management and Army force generation, FORSCOM will tailor the brigade to meet theater army requirements prior to deployment, however may subsequently task organize the brigade or elements of the brigade upon arrival. These capabilities and units include Army aviation, civil affairs, military information support teams, additional military police, linguists, or additional officers and noncommissioned officers as either advisors or instructors in professional military education. These units or individuals should arrive before the conduct predeployment training.

5-29. Brigades conducting security cooperation missions will normally be task organized into smaller rotational teams for execution. These teams should be focused on training, advising or assisting a specific partner unit or activity. These teams include, but are not limited to, infantry battalion advisory teams, brigade advisory teams. Specialized teams may also be required for partner sustainment, engineer, or police units.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

5-30. Security cooperation activities may require support or augmentation from civil affairs. Therefore, brigade planners work in concert with the theater army security cooperation division and civil affairs operations section (S-9) to determine civil affairs capability shortfalls.
Chapter 5

5-31. Civil affairs commands, brigades and battalions are organized, trained and equipped to enable geographic combatant command and theater army to achieve unified action by working the civil populace by planning, preparing for, executing, assessing, and transitioning civil affairs operations. Each theater army has a civil affairs brigade aligned with it. A civil affairs battalion is normally attached to a division and attaches its civil affairs companies to brigades. The battalion provides a civil affairs planning team to the division G-5 (assistant chief of staff, plans) to assist in planning.

5-32. The civil affairs section typically supports many elements of the theater campaign plan, the theater campaign support plan, and contingency plans. At the strategic and operational levels, especially during the implementation of these plans, the timely application of civil affairs operations can mitigate the need to apply other military operations such as security cooperation activities or in response to contingency planning. Civil affairs determine the need to establish one or more civil-military operations centers, civil liaison teams, civil information management architecture, and supporting networks as early as possible to facilitate communication and coordination with the nonmilitary agencies in the operational environment.

5-33. The civil affairs section ensures the operations plan minimizes how operations affect the civilian population and addresses ways to mitigate the civilian impact on military operations. Civil affairs operations also ensure the operation plan discusses coordination with any augmenting actors. These actors might include civil affairs forces, provincial reconstruction teams, or United States Agency for International Development project officers in the operational area. During predeployment training, Soldiers receive training, materials, and briefings on the operational area. This training can cover the history, culture, religion, language, tribal affiliations, local politics, and cultural sensitivities as well as any significant nongovernmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations operating in the operational area.

PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES AND TRAINING

5-34. Upon receipt of a security cooperation mission, brigades continue detailed predeployment activities no different from any other operation. Commanders, staff, and leaders prepare plans and orders and conduct rehearsals. Commanders and staff obtain supplies, equipment, and training materials and prepare for overseas movement. Personnel and units become proficient in individual tasks, collective tasks, and mission-essential tasks. They conduct an extensive familiarization and orientation with the country’s political, military, and civil factors (such as sociocultural, religious, and language aspects).

5-35. The priority of training for brigades assigned security cooperation missions such as security force assistance training is to become proficient in decisive action tasks of offense, defense, and stability so they are prepared to train FSF to accomplish those tasks. Following that, brigades should prioritize their training toward becoming proficient in the specific theater army requirements that support the geographic combatant command country plan. Soldiers receive training, materials, and briefings on the operational area. Training should emphasize the host-nation culture and language and provide cultural tips for developing a good rapport with foreign partners. Training can cover history, culture, religion, language, tribal affiliations, local politics, and cultural sensitivities as well as any significant nongovernmental organizations operating in the operational area. Interpersonal communications, cultural awareness, and abiding by host-nation laws are absolutely critical to mission success. Most security cooperation missions take place in countries where a majority of the FSF do not speak fluent English and will not be able to furnish interpreters. Employment of contract linguists as interpreters is a viable way to facilitate communication between the advisors and the FSF.

5-36. Combined training centers and security force assistance training organizations play a critical role toward ensuring U.S. forces are proficient in training and advising FSF. For brigades assigned to support security cooperation missions such as security force assistance, the first priority is to become proficient in decisive action (offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities) tasks. Theater army security cooperation requirements vary from country to country. However, all predeployment training for security cooperation missions should include training on security force assistance tasks (organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and assess), stability tasks (civil security, civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development) and counterinsurgency tasks, following the training principles described in ADP 7-0 and FM 7-15. The
following tasks (paragraphs 5-37 to 5-39) are derived from FM 7-15 and should not be considered as all-inclusive because requirements vary from one country to another.

Decisive Action Tasks

5-37. Decisive action tasks are—
   ● Offense.
   ● Defense.
   ● Stability: civil security, civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development.
   ● Defense support of civil authorities.

Movement and Maneuver Tasks

5-38. Movement and maneuver tasks are—
   ● Conduct tactical maneuver.
   ● Conduct five forms of maneuver.
   ● Employ combat formations.
   ● Employ combat patrols.
   ● Conduct tactical troop movements.

Sustainment Support Tasks

5-39. Sustainment support tasks are—
   ● Provide maintenance support (focused on preventive maintenance of combat vehicles).
   ● Provide transportation: convoy operations and unit movement.
   ● Provide health support such as medical evacuation planning and execution, combat lifesaver, preventive medication, casualty care and emergency first aid, and first responder.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS

5-40. Security force assistance considerations include—
   ● Advisor training and characteristics.
   ● Culture and language (Army Language and Cultural Enterprise).
   ● Vehicle operator training.
   ● Counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures.
   ● Conducting negotiations.
   ● Conducting an assessment using measures of effectiveness and measures of performance (often called metrics).
   ● Instructor training (staff, military decisionmaking process, warrior leader course, troop leading procedures, small unit tactics, military occupational specialty, airborne operations and jumpmaster training, air mobility operations, weapons, range, and safety).
   ● Counternarcotics training.
   ● Counter-improvised explosive device tasks.
   ● Anticorruption training.
   ● Gender perspective training.
   ● Range operations (individual and crew-served weapons qualification and employment).
   ● Fire support planning and terminal control of supporting arms (such as surface-delivered fires and close air support).
   ● Tactical communications.
   ● Media training.
   ● Law of War and ROE training.
5-41. In all cases, before deploying to conduct security force assistance missions, personnel must receive training in—

- Foreign disclosure, so that Soldiers understand information that can or cannot be shared. Processes and procedures to accomplish this are instrumental in establishing and maintaining a productive work environment with foreign partners.
- Survival, escape, evasion, and resistance (SERE), level A.
- Theater and Service force protection and level 1 antiterrorism training.
- Current SERE, level C, mandatory for advisors identified as high risk of isolation or high risk of capture.
- A country brief from theater army that includes, but is not limited to country plan with current assessment and objectives, strategic communication messages and themes, travel briefing, visa requirements and coordination, transportation (cooperative security locations, aerial ports of departure [APODs], and seaports of departure [SPODs]), medical health support, and communications.
- Medical vaccinations.

5-42. Based on the higher commander’s training guidance, unit commanders assign missions and approve the draft mission-essential task list that supports security cooperation activities. The staff plans, conducts, and evaluates training to support this guidance and the approved mission-essential task list for security cooperation missions. Commanders prioritize tasks that need training. Since there is never enough time to train in every area, commanders’ focus on tasks essential for mission accomplishment.

5-43. Once commanders select tasks for training, the staff builds the training schedule and plans on these tasks. The staff provides the training requirements to the commander. After approving the list of tasks to be trained, the commander includes the tasks in the unit training schedule. The staff then coordinates the support and resource requirements with the S-3 and S-4. Finally, commanders, through their sergeants major and noncommissioned officers, ensure standards are enforced during training.

5-44. Unit training objectives are for developing capabilities to conduct internal defense and development activities for tactical operations, intelligence operations, military information support operations, populace and resources control operations, and civil affairs and advisory assistance operations in the host-nation language. Units identified for security cooperation support begin intensified training immediately upon deployment notification.

5-45. After deployment to the host nation and before commitment to operations, the unit may receive in-country training at host-nation training centers or at designated training locations. This training helps personnel become psychologically and physically acclimated to the host nation and operational environment. This training also allows commanders and staffs some time to coordinate and plan within their own command and with civilian, military, joint, and multinational organization partners. After commitment, training continues and is emphasized between operations, using needed improvements identified in operations as the basis for further training.

EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

5-46. Once the unit has deployed and arrived in country, it begins employment. Employment is the conduct of security cooperation activities in partnership with the host-nation military. Planning and coordination, of indirect and direct support approaches with the host nation are multinational endeavors. Employment includes foreign counterparts in the mission planning (preparing the FSF for the activities, missions or operations) to increase the capability and capacity of the host nation’s internal defense and development.

COMMANDER

5-47. Preceding a mission or operation, the U.S. commander advises and assists the foreign security force commander. The foreign counterpart issues planning guidance for the execution of the mission and clarifies the commander’s intent to emphasize or de-emphasize certain aspects of the mission. The U.S. commander advises and assists the foreign commander in the mission command of tactical operations. The U.S. commander explains the methodology of mission command with intention of creating a more thorough
understanding of the operational environment and of the problems to be addressed. He or she articulates that mission command enables subordinate commanders to build teams and establish themes and messages to drive processes and procedures. Mission command enables an operationally adaptive force that anticipates transitions; accepts risks to create opportunities; informs friendly, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners; and influences neutrals, adversaries, and enemies. By accompanying the host-nation commander when the mission is received from higher headquarters, the U.S. commander assists any subsequent missions. The U.S. commander monitors how FSF understand the commander’s intent and all specified or implied tasks.

5-48. During execution of the mission, the U.S. commander helps the foreign unit commander exercise mission command during operations. After monitoring the tactical situation, the U.S. commander recommends changes to the courses of action to exploit the situation. After monitoring the flow of information, the U.S. commander recommends improvements to use intelligence collection assets and to keep subordinates reporting required information.

STAFF

5-49. Before the mission, the advisor staff advises and assists the foreign counterparts in preparing estimated courses of action for essential tasks. The staff helps write tentative plans based on the planning guidance and unit’s standard operating procedures. These plans include primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans.

5-50. During execution, the staff helps foreign counterparts coordinate the execution of the tasks. They disseminate portions of their plans to other personnel, senior and subordinate staff sections, and supporting elements. They help notify higher, lower, or adjacent staff sections of modified estimates and plans. Finally, the staff—with the S-2 and the S-2 counterpart—helps update the commander’s critical information requirements with the latest information and requirements that arise from operations.

Executive Officer

5-51. The executive officer performs the organizational analysis of the unit’s coordinating staff sections to ensure efficiency during the planning process according to initial planning guidance. With the foreign counterpart, this officer directs foreign staff sections as they develop estimates and plans. The executive officer monitors the liaison and coordination with host-nation military higher headquarters, recommending changes to improve efficiency.

Manpower and Personnel Staff Officer

5-52. The manpower and personnel staff officer (S-1) provides advice, assists, and makes recommendations to the foreign counterpart for conducting human resources. This includes monitoring the maintenance of foreign unit strength, accountability of casualties, unit morale, and postal activities. This may also include concerns with the foreign pay system, leave procedures, and casualty pay procedures.

Intelligence Staff Officer

5-53. The S-2 advises the intelligence counterpart on the intelligence process. The S-2 monitors security cooperation activities to protect classified and sensitive material and operations. The S-2 advises in the examination of captured adversarial documents or materiel. The S-2 advises in the development of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support plans to include the brief and debrief of patrols operating as a part of reconnaissance and surveillance activities. Finally, the S-2 advises on dissemination, the integrating and sharing the intelligence that was processed to help his foreign counterpart update situation maps and overlays.

Operations Staff Officer

5-54. The S-3 helps the foreign counterpart to prepare tactical plans using estimates, predictions, and information. The S-3 monitors command and communications nets, assists in preparing all orders and plans, and helps to supervise the training and preparation for operations. Finally, the S-3 monitors the
planning process and makes recommendations for consistency with internal defense and development goals.

**Sustainment Chief**

5-55. The sustainment chief advises on sustainment activities and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. This includes those tasks associated with sustainment, personnel services, and health service support.

**REDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES**

5-56. Redeployment is the return of forces and materiel to the home or mobilization station. Before redeployment, a unit conducting security cooperation activities inventories all supplies and equipment to be passed on to the relieving U.S. unit. These actions ensure all items are accounted for and the custody chain for property and equipment is unbroken. The outgoing unit also—

- Prepares a final evaluation report showing its estimate of the foreign unit’s capabilities and giving an opinion of its future employment.
- Discusses the foreign unit’s performance with its commander. The unit submits a copy of the foreign unit’s final evaluation to the next higher host-nation military commander.
- Passes custody of training schedules, lesson plans, foreign operational records, and the foreign unit’s final evaluation to the foreign unit and relieving U.S. unit.
- Presents debriefings, after action reviews (AARs), and the foreign unit’s final evaluation to the higher in-country U.S. commander and country team.

5-57. A foreign disclosure officer (known as FDO) ensures that the requirements of the commander and staff to disclose military information and technology are understood by country, category, and classification level and that the authorities and procedures are in place to affect these disclosures.

5-58. The outgoing unit commander supervises the redeployment. This commander approves prepared redeployment plans or, as necessary, directs changes to the redeployment plans. The commander and operations officer assess and select alternatives or changes to the present redeployment courses of action based on the intelligence officer’s intelligence estimate. They develop and disseminate a fragmentary order for selected alternatives or changes.

5-59. Unit personnel prepare all accompanying supplies and equipment for shipment. They brief ground support personnel on equipment handling procedures, routes, convoy procedures, and actions to take if a terrorist or insurgent incident occurs. They load personnel and equipment for movement to the departure airfield or airport following the load plan in the unit’s operation order. They maintain accountability for all their personnel, supplies, and equipment.

**RELIEF-IN-PLACE TRANSITION OF AUTHORITY AND MISSION HANDBOFF**

5-60. During long-term continuous Army support to security cooperation, commanders may elect to replace teams, elements, detachments or units for a variety of reasons. Time is not the only governing factor. Changes in the host-nation political or military dynamic may require reshaping force packages as situations or notional operation plans change, for better or worse. Security cooperation programs often transcend all plan phases: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. In addition, internal administrative concerns might prompt or support a commander’s decision to rotate teams or units. For example, new equipment may be fielded to an incoming unit that the outgoing unit lacks. Regardless of the reason, mission handoff is necessary and is defined as the process of passing an ongoing mission from one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity.

5-61. Relief in place and transition of authority (often referred to as RIPTOA) begin with the commander ordering the change. The authority for determining the mission handoff lies with the incoming commander since he assumes responsibility for the mission. RIPTOA may affect the conditions under which the mission continues. In security cooperation, this may not entail an in-country relief transition of authority. During small-scale security cooperation activities, virtual meetings, video teleconferences, or—preferably—commander and staff meetings between transitioning teams or units can help achieve
Considerations for Brigade Operations

5-62. The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander on the tentative handoff process and the assumption of the mission directly or through a liaison. If this advice conflicts with the mission statement or the incoming commander’s intent and design and the conflict cannot be resolved with the authority established for the incoming commander, the commander ordering the relief resolves the issue.

5-63. If the incoming Army unit or the host-nation unit is in direct-fire contact with insurgents or another internal threat during the handoff, the advisory team or unit immediately notifies the higher headquarters ordering the exchange. If the incoming unit commander has not assumed responsibility, his unit immediately comes under operational control of the outgoing unit and is absorbed into that unit position. (Possible exceptions include a rapidly evolving noncombatant evacuation operation or the underlying crisis that triggers it.) The outgoing unit commander and his host-nation counterpart control the operation. If the outgoing unit commander has passed responsibility to the incoming unit commander, the outgoing unit comes under the operational control of the incoming unit, and the host-nation unit coordinates its movements with the new unit. Army units conducting security cooperation that involve direct support including combat operations may need to follow these same procedures.

**TERMINATION OF OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES**

5-64. Security cooperation activities are adaptable and occur across the range of military operations, various operational environments, and types of military operations ranging from stability operations to foreign internal defense. Security cooperation activities can be used to create an environment that enables campaigns and larger operations to be terminated. A poorly conducted termination of security cooperation activities must be avoided because it can have a long-term impact on U.S. relations with the host nation, the region, and, potentially, in more than one region. Some level of security cooperation activities or programs normally continues well after intensive support has ended. The operational and tactical closure may differ from strategic closure.

5-65. In security cooperation, objectives are determined in a collaborative setting that includes the host-nation leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state that is mutually beneficial. The termination criteria for a conflict help define the desired military end state, which normally represents a period in time or set of conditions beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve the remaining national objectives. Termination of security cooperation operations typically involve analyses of the participating nations to determine if objectives have been met and that these nations can assume responsibility for the defense and continued interdiction of threats. Specified standards are approved by the President or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a security cooperation activity or operation can be concluded or transitioned to a less intensive level of support. Small-scale security cooperation exercises, fellowship programs and assistance may continue through Army support.

**POSTDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES**

5-66. The unit commander debriefs to provide an overview of the mission and all relevant information subsets. Topics can range from military geography, political parties, and military forces to insurgents, security forces, and ongoing agency operations.
5-67. Redeployment is not the end of the mission. Upon arrival at the redeployment location, the unit undergoes an extensive debriefing. The S-2 typically organizes and conducts the debriefing. The S-2 coordinates with higher-level intelligence organizations to take part in the returning unit’s debriefing, particularly if other organizations tasked the unit to obtain information. All deployed personnel, to include attachments, must be available for the debriefing.

5-68. After the debriefing, the unit commander and staff prepare three documents—an AAR, a report of lessons learned, and an assessment.

**After Action Review**

5-69. An AAR describes the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the operation. It is a permanent record of the major activities of the unit from receipt of mission to debriefing. As such, it is an extremely important template on which past missions may be compared and future missions planned. Within 48 hours of being debriefed, the unit normally submits an AAR through command channels to the higher command. The intelligence and operations officers at each echelon keep copies of unit AARs.

5-70. Shortly after completion of the AAR, or simultaneously with its submission, the unit submits a report of lessons learned (discussed in further detail below). This report documents the commander and staff’s reflection of the operation and recommendations for the future. Units often prepare the lessons according to the elements of combat power: mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, leadership, and information. This method addresses what worked and did not work during the operation, why it did or did not work, and what changes or substitutions are needed for existing tactics, techniques, and procedures in the unit.

**Lessons Learned**

5-71. Lessons learned validate knowledge and experience derived from observations and the historical study of military training, exercises, and combat operations. Lessons learned, when further validated, eventually lead to a change in behavior at the tactical level (such as tactics, techniques, and procedures), the operational level, or the strategic level, or in one or more of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. Shortly after completion of the AAR, or simultaneously with its submission, the unit submits a report of lessons learned. This report documents the commander and staff’s reflection of the operation and recommendations for the future. Units often prepare the lessons according to the elements of combat power: mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, leadership, and information. This method addresses what worked and did not work during the operation, why it did or did not work, and what changes or substitutions are needed for existing tactics, techniques, and procedures in the unit.

5-72. As security cooperation programs are implemented, it is critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander to modify the security cooperation program to fit special circumstances and environments. Lessons learned provide valuable data that informs the assessment of not only the brigade conducting the mission, but also of partner security forces.

5-73. AR 11-33 directs that commanding generals of all Army commands, Army Service component commands, and direct reporting units will direct assigned units, brigade-sized or larger (except in the case of specialty units which operate or deploy separately at the platoon, company, or battalion levels), to submit unit-level AARs and other lessons learned to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (known as CALL) for review, analysis, dissemination, and archiving, according to the following guidelines. First, AARs will be submitted to Center for Army Lessons Learned (Combined Arms Center) no later than 90 days after returning to home station after participating in an Army, joint, or combined (multinational) military operation. Second, AARs will be submitted to Center for Army Lessons Learned no later than 60 days after returning to home station after participating in a major Army, joint, or joint combined (multinational)
exercise training or security cooperation mission. Units completing Combat Training Center rotations may submit a copy of the relevant portions of their “take-home package.”

5-74. As a minimum, the lessons learned report is forwarded to the appropriate theater army and the Service and joint lessons learned agencies to allow integration into subsequent unit training and leader education. Units submit comprehensive AARs focusing on the specifics of security cooperation activities such as joint exercises to gather lessons learned information as soon as possible after mission execution. They submit reports to the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Center for Army Lessons Learned Web site (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp) allows users to either access a database of lessons learned or submit a request for information. The Center for Army Lessons Learned Web site also maintains links to other lessons learned databases and centers, to include the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, which is accessible to all Services.

Assessment

5-75. Brigades are required to conduct a comprehensive assessment using measures of effectiveness and measures of performance (determined by the theater army) of all security cooperation activities conducted with FSF. Brigades submit assessments to the theater army being supported upon completion of the mission. These assessments are critical in helping the combatant command and theater army assess those activities to determine progress towards achieving theater campaign plan objectives. The assessment should also be shared with the U.S. forces transitioning to assume responsibility.

5-76. In all operations, units assess the short-term, mid-term, and long-term success of FSF. Success is normally defined within the context of these three periods. In the short term, FSF make steady progress in fighting threats, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces. In the midterm, FSF lead fighting threats and provide security, have a functioning government, and work towards achieving economic potential. In the long term, FSF are peaceful, united, stable, and secure. They are integrated into the international community and a full partner in international security concerns.

Consolidation of Gains

5-77. The standards for host-nation military individual and collective tasks will differ due to conditions. Differing materiel conditions may exist in the host nation, requiring specific standards for equipment not originating from U.S. forces. Cultural conditions could involve adaptive standards for the organization and leadership. It is imperative to document host-nation tasks, missions, operations, and capabilities at brigade level and below to assist in developing and recording levels of proficiency specific to host-nation standards. The documentation will ensure consistency during intermittent security cooperation operations. The documentation should include recommended measures of performance for advisors to develop training and evaluation criteria for individual and collective tasks. Advisors use recommended measures of performance as a basis from which to develop standards of performance for the specific host-nation unit under the given specific conditions.

Transfer of Activities

5-78. The direct and indirect approaches to security cooperation intend to change the security environment by enabling the host nation to effectively provide its own internal defense and development. This leads to strengthening regional security through mutual defense goals, in synchronization with U.S. priorities established in the mission performance plan. The transition of all activities to the host nation occurs incrementally on multiple levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) over time, but success is ultimately defined by acceptable host-nation sovereignty to include self-sufficient defense and security.

5-79. Security cooperation supports strategic goals and objectives. It is analogous to a continuum of sustained military engagements with episodic periods of inactivity. The continuation of programs promotes specific U.S. security interests and provides U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. During periods of inactivity in security cooperation programs, the Army provides reduced support to the host nation in the form of training and equipping during the initial performance of security cooperation tasks. Tasks are practiced with expert assistance, followed by the subsequent performance of self-defense by the host nation without assistance. Security cooperation aims to establish a relationship and
build mutual trust with a professional Army in support of mutual defense. In addition to mutual defense, the expert assistance promotes the broader standards of professionalism, democratic values, human rights, internal development, and civil-military relations. The continuum of Army force projection in support of security cooperation operations build defense and security relationships to assure allies and partners, dissuade potential adversaries, deter aggression, and counter coercion or defeat.
Chapter 6

Considerations for Working Effectively With Foreign Security Forces

This chapter discusses considerations for working with foreign security forces, including the significance of building relationships. It describes the types of skills all Soldiers need to work effectively with foreign security forces. It explains the importance of the advisor.

 RELATIONSHIP BUILDING

6-1. Building relationships can lead to partnerships, and is central to security cooperation whether conducting military engagement with a foreign partner in Europe and Asia, or conducting Soldier and leader engagements with foreign security forces (FSF) during operations that may include counterinsurgency. It is essential for the Soldier, particularly the advisor, to place a considerable amount of time and energy in establishing solid relationships among U.S. forces and FSF. By its very nature, the advisor mission forces its members out of their traditional roles. An advisor must purposefully look to build solid relationships between U.S. and foreign security force commanders, staffs, and the defense establishment, as well as a variety of governmental and nongovernmental entities.

RAPPORT

6-2. Since Soldiers conducting security cooperation missions that include security force assistance are in a unique military position, they establish rapport with their foreign counterparts. This position is one in which the leader has no positional authority over the actions of their foreign counterparts. This lack of authority means that the doctrinal view of leadership is modified to emphasize interpersonal relationships and deemphasize authoritarian roles. Soldiers use their interpersonal skills to build rapport. Soldiers cannot simply order a specific action; instead, they use interpersonal skills to positively affect the actions and decisions of their foreign counterparts and work toward shared goals. The measure of effective rapport is whether Soldiers can inspire foreign counterparts to take the desired action and guide them to succeed.

6-3. Soldiers obtain certain knowledge before establishing effective rapport. First, they study Army leadership doctrine (see ADP 6-22 and ADRP 6-22) to enhance their leadership knowledge for understanding human nature and motivation. They then incorporate information specific to the culture and society of their counterparts. To further enable rapport, Soldiers must develop a genuine interest in other people. They must smile often. They must remember and use people’s names, encourage others to talk about themselves, listen to others, discuss what the other person is interested in, and make the other person feel important. Through this type of interaction, Soldiers and FSF develop mutual or shared interests on which to base their relationships and developmental goals. These mutual or shared interests are the foundation upon which rapport is built. It is important to remember that genuine rapport is developed slowly, but it can be ruined in an instant.

6-4. Rapport comprises understanding, respect, and trust. No amount of resources or firepower can compensate for a lack of rapport between advisor and FSF counterpart. It must be honest, genuine, and heartfelt. Mutual understanding, respect, and trust are the building blocks to success. All the components of rapport are two-way streets: counterparts are more likely to share about their culture, language, and experiences if Soldiers are willing and able to share also. Building this type of rapport may require Soldiers to establish a personal level of understanding, respect, and trust with their counterparts.

6-5. Understanding begins before deployment and may include foreign cultural studies, language training, and equipment and doctrine familiarization. Once in country, Soldiers continue to broaden their
understanding by observing and asking questions. It is not necessary to accept others’ beliefs or values, but Soldiers need to understand others’ ways of thinking and operating. Knowing their own culture and understanding why they believe and value what they do help Soldiers find a common cause.

6-6. Respect is a reciprocal commodity. Ideally, the foreign counterpart will grow to respect Soldiers—what they know and how they perform. Soldiers should look for characteristics they respect in their counterparts as soon as they make their acquaintance. Counterparts will possess traits deserving respect, and more will become evident as the relationship matures. Mutual respect grows through shared experiences and shared dangers. Soldiers should live, eat, and, if authorized, fight with their counterparts. By sharing their hardships and dangers, coupled with respecting a different culture, Soldiers build respect.

6-7. Trust grows gradually from understanding and respect. Building trust needs to begin on day one, but it will not mature until later in the relationship. Soldiers should begin by showing they are reliable and should do everything they say they will do. They should be in the right place at the right time. Two things can enhance this growth. First, the unit should start out with confidence-building missions. Early success builds self-confidence and trust. Second, Soldiers should not promise any support they might not be able to deliver. Mutual trust unites a diverse set of decision makers with whom advisors interact and try to influence.

LANGUAGE

6-8. Advisors should make every effort to learn to communicate effectively in their counterpart’s language. Generally, advisors that can converse directly with their counterparts are more effective. If language proficiency is not an option, learn to work with an interpreter. It is still essential to learn enough of the language for basic items like greetings. It helps for Soldiers to have enough of an understanding to catch the basic direction of conversations, even those between the interpreter and the counterpart. The advisor should attempt to improve his or her language proficiency over time, as this will be a well-received gesture of respect.

BODY LANGUAGE AND GESTURES

6-9. Body language and gestures are more powerful than verbal language. Subtle movements of the body may indicate that a person understands the message that is being conveyed. Likewise, conflicting messages may be sent by unintentional body language or gestures.

LOCAL CUSTOMS

6-10. Respecting local customs goes a long way in building effective rapport. In every culture, refusing invitations is seen as a slight. This is extreme in some cultures. The advisor must be prepared to accept many forms of unfamiliar hospitality. Eating local food, unless there is a documented medical threat, should be the order of the day. Participating in cultural ceremonies also helps build rapport. At some point, however, there is a level of activity where it is necessary to draw the line. The advisor must be prepared to be able to deal tactfully with issues that are out of bounds.

Uniform and Grooming Standards

6-11. Advisors should adhere to their Services’ grooming and uniform standards. This will establish a level of expectation in respect to other standards such as training or maintenance.

Expertise

6-12. Expertise develops from one’s knowledge and experience. Soldiers must repeatedly demonstrate expertise by making sound judgments and keeping promises. Bad advice and failing to keep promises can destroy credibility. If credibility is lost, an advisor will fail to build rapport.

Limits

6-13. Building rapport has its limits. Soldiers need not “go native” in order to truly understand the host nation and its challenges. In the military, it is appropriate to assume enough of the customs common to the
operational area to be effective. Advisors who are close to their counterparts can often provide their higher headquarters with valuable insights into local perspectives, from a grass-roots level. However, an advisor that begins to pursue the agenda of the FSF to the detriment of the United States or the multinational campaign plan has effectively stepped over the line.

Political Discussions

6-14. Soldiers should avoid initiating lengthy lectures about political philosophy. However, FSF should know about the current situation in the host country and likely preconceived notions about the United States. When the topic of politics does arise, Soldiers should remain ready to discuss U.S. history, difficulties in establishing peaceful democracies, minority rights, and other positive aspects of the U.S. democratic political system. They should reinforce their counterparts’ national pride and ask about their national traditions and history.

TYPES OF SKILLS NEEDED

6-15. Soldiers need to possess a variety of skills to perform their assigned mission. These skills can be divided into two categories: hard skills and soft skills. Hard skills are the foundational skills upon which basic competencies are based. Hard skills include military occupational specialty training and proficiency, warrior skills, tactical experience, and subject matter expertise. Soft skills are the specific sociocultural skills that Soldiers learn throughout their life. Soft skills include, but are not limited to, social skills, ability to build rapport, ability to influence, ability to negotiate, interpreter use, cultural awareness, and language ability.

HARD SKILLS

6-16. Soldiers participating in security cooperation may initially be selected on the basis of hard skill expertise. However, military occupational specialty or tactical proficiency does not necessarily make a Soldier effective in a security cooperation task. Within security cooperation, Soldiers must be able to teach, advise, assist, equip, and assess foreign forces. To do this they must be knowledgeable and proficient in tactics, techniques, and procedures, and have the skill to impart knowledge effectively. They may also be required to train, assist, or advise foreign forces in the areas of intelligence, communications, operations, and logistics. Some Soldiers may be required to call in U.S. supporting arms (such as artillery, close air support, or air medical evacuation). Since these skills may be critical due to the isolated and independent nature of a mission, Soldiers should refresh them during predeployment training.

6-17. As a group of Soldiers forms a team, they must practice their warrior tasks, organize to cover the warfighting functions associated with any team, and familiarize team members with their duties and responsibilities. Some hard skills are refined before deploying, and others are learned in-country.

SOFT SKILLS

6-18. Soft skills build on the hard skills of Soldiers and contribute to the methods of teaching, coaching, and advising. Soldiers use these skills to develop the capabilities of the FSF. Soldiers have to operate effectively within cultural settings that can be very different in behavior and language from their own. Soft skills help Soldiers to better understand these environments and human behavior, to communicate across cultures, to build rapport, to influence, and to negotiate. Successfully employing these skills sets the conditions for Soldiers to move forward with their mission.

6-19. Leaders will make an initial assessment to determine the foreign unit’s proficiency to determine the appropriate method with which to start. If the ability level of the FSF is low then leaders focus their approach on teaching the FSF basic skills and task. Once the ability level of FSF increases the leaders can shift their method to coaching and help guide the FSF to a high level of proficiency. As the FSF reach a high level of proficiency, leaders once again shift their focus to advising and allow the FSF to take the lead. In this role, the advisors provide options and suggestions to continue to improve the ability level of FSF. Throughout this process trust between the Soldiers and FSF becomes the major factor in enhancing the abilities of the FSF. If there is little trust then Soldiers cannot accomplish their task and FSF will be less
receptive, despite their level of knowledge or expertise. It is imperative that Soldiers build trust hand in hand with proficiency of the FSF in order to become successful.

**Teaching**

6-20. Teaching includes training and education. Methods of teaching can include classroom lectures, seminars, hands-on training, training exercises, and simulations.

**Coaching**

6-21. Coaching relies on guiding to bring out and enhance capabilities already present. Coaching refers to the function of helping someone through a set of tasks. Those being coached may or may not have appreciated their potential. The coach helps them understand their current level of performance and instructs them how to reach the next level of knowledge and skill. Coaching requires identifying short- and long-term goals and devising a plan to achieve those goals. The coach and the person being coached discuss strengths, weaknesses, and a course of action to sustain or improve the goals.

**Communication**

6-22. Communication is the transfer of messages from one person to another. Messages may be passed along verbally, in writing, or by signals (such as gestures and body language). The sender encodes the message and the receiver decodes it. The type and style of encoding used is influenced by the sender’s personality, culture, and motivations (wants and needs).

6-23. The receiver decodes messages, influenced by lifestyle, group membership, status and role, world view, language, and social norms. Communication is a two-way process in which the encoding and decoding methods can affect both sending and receiving. Effective communication occurs when the message is perceived and responded to in the manner the sender intended. Ineffective communication can occur from poorly chosen words, flawed timing, a confused mix of verbal and nonverbal signals, poor listening skills, or a failure to take culture and individual dynamics into account.

6-24. Soldiers working with FSF should consider how certain dynamics are thought to affect communication significantly. These can determine how or why a specific method, way, or topic of communication is being conveyed. Certain dynamics are believed to be relatively constant over long periods of time and across very different cultural contexts. These dynamics are—

- Personality.
- Culture.
- Motivation (wants and needs).

**Personality**

6-25. The study of human personality can give insights that enhance Soldiers’ communication skills. If advisors can identify a few critical aspects of the personality of the people they are working with, they may be more effective in selecting techniques to influence them. While there is a commonality between all people, no two people are exactly alike. Often groups are thought to act and think alike under similar circumstances, but this is a false impression. Soldiers should avoid stereotyping. Two biological brothers could be raised in the same house under the same conditions and have completely different personalities. At the very least, personality factors may help to explain the activities of individuals when they act differently than their needs or culture might predict.

**Culture**

6-26. The study of the cultures they are working with helps Soldiers gain insights that enhance their communication skills. While definitions of culture vary, its elements include the set of opinions, beliefs, values, norms, and customs that define the identity of a society. Culture includes social behavior standards (such as how men relate with women and how children relate with adults), language (standards of speech), and religion (standards on how man relates with his mortality and creation). Culture is learned, adaptive,
and in a constant state of change. Army sociocultural research and analysis capabilities can be used to facilitate sociocultural understanding and to update knowledge about the population.

6-27. Communication is shaped by culture. For example, some cultures value clearly stating issues and problems and working toward resolving them in a straightforward and efficient manner. This is sometimes referred to as “low-context” communication. Other cultures place a premium on building relationships, maintaining harmony, and helping everyone “save face.” Communication for solving problems may seem more slow, indirect or behind-the-scenes, and informal. This is sometimes referred to as “high-context” communication. Another approach to analyzing cultural factors that shape communication includes preferred levels of formality and directness, perceptions of time and the individual’s relationship to the group, and norms for displaying emotion.

6-28. Quickly and effectively identifying a society’s preferences is a key to effectively conveying information between the advisor and the host-nation population. Soldiers working with FSF should strive to develop the highest possible skill level in cross-cultural communication. This means ongoing study to enhance their awareness and knowledge. (For more information on cross-cultural communication, refer to TC 31-73.)

6-29. Consistent with the Department of Defense’s Ministry of Defense training, developed by the United States Institute of Peace, advisors should have a foundational knowledge of and be able to distinguish—

... between cultural adaptability training generally and imparting knowledge about a specific country’s cultural norms and habits. Information about the environment in which the trainees [advisors] are preparing to work should paint a picture of the current situation and cover the following areas:

- introduction to the history, culture, politics, and economics of the country
- the structure of the multinational command, if any
- other parties involved in the effort
- the organizational structure of the ministry within which the adviser will work
- who holds what positions in the ministry
- the nature and scope of plans to develop the ministry
- the progress made in training the military and the police to tackle corrupt practices and strengthen weak systems
- the ability of the ministry to deliver services to the population
- the failures and successes of previous advisers
- the reputations those predecessors acquired
- local perceptions of internationals in general
- the security situation and the conflict context
- spoilers and other threats to security and reform


**Motivation**

6-30. The study of human motivation can help Soldiers communicate more effectively. It is important to understand the motivations driving people to act. This helps with anticipating what a person is likely to do, and why. Personal motivation can be a driving force behind why a counterpart is communicating with a Soldier about a particular topic. A popular theory expresses common, hierarchical needs that motivate all people. The most basic needs, such as security, must be satisfied before higher needs.
Cross-Cultural Negotiation

6-31. The principal form of negotiation is likely to be cross-cultural negotiation. Cross-cultural negotiation brings special challenges and requires specialized approaches and techniques. Culture fundamentally affects language and behavior. It also significantly affects the way people handle conflict.

6-32. Negotiation among members of the same culture can be stressful; negotiation with members of other cultures can be exceedingly difficult. The ability to work with members of other cultures is a basic skill for the Soldier and an absolute requirement when acting in an advisory role. Understanding the components, perspectives, roles, and outcomes will help minimize the difficulty of cross-cultural negotiation. (See TC 31-73 for a discussion of cultural dynamics as they affect negotiation.)

THE ADVISOR

6-33. Advising is a combat multiplier that boosts supported unit capability. Advisors have experience in particular areas in which they are advising, but are not required to have similar backgrounds. Advisor relationships are not based on superior to subordinate relationships. Advisors provide an expert opinion, advice, and counsel by focusing on both personal development (interpersonal and communication skills) and professional development (technical and tactical knowledge). Advising develops mutual trust and respect.

6-34. Advisor teams have limited positional power and depend on interpersonal skills to positively influence FSF through teaching, coaching, and advising. Advisor team members often work with people of higher rank or grade than themselves. Advisors should remember the foreign unit’s experience and capabilities and carefully choose opportunities to inject or impart knowledge. Foreign units are most receptive to advisor teams that teach unobtrusively. Foreign units most value those who are subtle in their teaching, coaching, and advising. Those advisors who master the ability to create a climate in which FSF feel they are teaching themselves often prove the most effective.

6-35. Advisors play a significant role in security cooperation missions such as security force assistance. They live, work, and sometimes are required to fight with their partner FSF. The relationship between advisors and FSF is vital. Advisors are not liaison officers, nor do they command foreign security force units, but they are a necessary element to understanding the human dimension, specifically the managing relationships and mitigating risk between the U.S. forces and FSF, across the range of military operations.

6-36. Advising FSF is an extension of U.S. assistance to other nations. The assistance may be bilateral between the United States and a foreign nation, part of an internationally sponsored effort, or the United States may use multiple methods to assist other nations in maintaining or achieving stability. The keys to success at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels require advisors to coordinate with related efforts in a given operational area that includes a comprehensive approach of working with U.S. civilian interagency partners, multinational partners, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in unified action to achieve unity of effort.

6-37. Advising FSF is required across the range of military operations from steady-state, phase 0 security cooperation missions and relative stability, such as in Europe, to major combat operations that may include a counterinsurgency, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, with any combinations in between.

6-38. All planned operations must be conducted by, with, or through the FSF and defense establishment. The measure of an effective advisory effort is the amount of personal responsibility the FSF take for their own operations. Civilians must see that their FSF can provide for their internal security and external defense while promoting the legitimacy of the host-nation government and its capacity to build trust and confidence. Advisors maintain a subtle and ongoing influence, their presence being as constant and unobtrusive as a shadow.

ADVISOR CHARACTERISTICS

6-39. An untrained advisor in a foreign country is effectively blind, deaf, and armed. Without the common reference of history, culture, language, and social systems, advisors have the daunting task of translating and interpreting every perceived cue through their own cultural lens and making decisions that could have
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strategic consequences. Beyond this, the way in which an advisor interacts with the host-nation population and FSF can directly (negatively or positively) affect the relationship between U.S. forces and FSF or even the advisor’s personal safety. Culture plays an extremely important role in this process. For instance, a trivial event or action to an advisor can be construed as a grievous offense by the host-nation populace or FSF.

6-40. An effective advisor mitigates these factors by combining their inherent strengths with their trained competencies, and an understanding of culture. The advisor then applies them toward mission accomplishment by working by, with, and through counterparts in the FSF. Advisors must be able to observe, listen, and understand their environment, counterparts, and the situation and apply various advising techniques where required. This means that the daily activities of advisors are subjective in nature and dependent on multiple factors, planned and unplanned. Advisors accomplish their mission by building relationships and rapport with FSF, motivating and influencing them to accomplish tasks, and set the conditions for further U.S. engagement with FSF.

6-41. Not every Soldier is well suited to perform advisory functions; even those considered to be the best and most experienced have failed at times. Effective advisors are only the most capable individuals. Advisors are Soldiers known to take the initiative and who set the standards for others; however, they are also patient and personable enough to work effectively with FSF. Recognizing that not all Soldiers are capable of performing as advisors, leaders should immediately remove advisors who do not exhibit these qualities.

6-42. The United States Institute of Peace outlines types of knowledge that should be included in advisor training.

Trainees who have not served as advisers before—and even some who have—need to be taught how to function effectively in a post-conflict environment and how to transfer their expertise to local actors, whether that expertise is in logistics, procurement, budgeting, production and processing, personnel management, or any field from which advisers are recruited. They also need to understand the various dynamics, obstacles, traps, and opportunities that typify a reform environment, as well as the relationship-building tools required to develop an effective professional exchange with local actors.

Nadia Gerspacher, Special Report 312: Preparing Advisors for Capacity-Building Missions, United States Institute of Peace, © August 2012

Because advisors operate in very subjective environments, it is difficult to establish objective criteria by which to assess potential advisors. However, research and experience indicate that several personality traits greatly enhance the advisor’s ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture. These traits include—

- Tolerance for ambiguity.
- Realistic when setting goals and tasks.
- Open-mindedness.
- Ability to withhold judgment.
- Empathy.
- Communicativeness.
- Flexibility.
- Curiosity.
- Warmth in human relations.
- Motivation of self and others.
- Self-reliance.
- Strong sense of self.
- Tolerance for differences.
- Perceptiveness.
- Ability to accept and learn from failure.
- Sense of humor.
- Patience.
ADVISOR ROLES

6-43. The military advisor has three roles involving different responsibilities. First and foremost, advisors are members of a U.S. military organization with a well-defined chain of command and familiar responsibilities. Second, advisors embed themselves with their counterparts. Third, advisors are interpreters and communicators between U.S. forces and their foreign counterparts.

6-44. As members of military organizations, advisors receive and execute the orders of superiors. These orders may conflict with the orders their counterparts receive. Among other duties, advisors must act unobtrusively, but nonetheless positively, much like an observer controller at a combat training center—often observing, evaluating, and reporting on the performance of counterparts and their assigned unit. Secondly, advisors live, eat, and work with the officers and soldiers of their partner units. Often, advisors begin to regard themselves as one of them. The sharing of common hardships and dangers forges potent emotional ties. The success and good name of their units typically become matters of prime and personal importance to the advisor. Finally, advisors are interpreters and communicators between U.S. superiors and foreign counterparts. Advisors must introduce and explain one to the other; they must help resolve myriad problems, misunderstandings, and suspicions that arise in any human organization, particularly when people of very different cultures approach difficult tasks together. Advisors with quick and easy access to influential counterparts can sometimes be the best possible means of communicating.

6-45. To be effective, advisors obviously must gain their counterparts’ trust and confidence. This relationship, however, is only a prelude to the advisor’s major objective: inspiring and influencing a counterpart to effective action. In pursuing this goal—constantly, relentlessly, and forcefully, yet patiently, persuasively, and diplomatically—advisors must recognize conditions that can benefit or handicap their cause.

EVALUATION OF ADVISOR EFFECTIVENESS

6-46. It can be extremely difficult to identify performance measures the effectiveness by which to gauge a Soldier’s success during security cooperation missions, particularly for advisors in security force assistance. For instance, it is possible that Soldiers who place a high priority on rapport-building activities and interacting with their counterparts may not achieve short-term goals. Conversely, Soldiers showing little or no respect toward their counterparts’ culture or interests may fully meet short-term mission requirements and appear successful. However, they may have damaged not only their credibility, but also, more importantly, the ability of the United States to achieve long-term goals, thus resulting in a negative strategic effect. In comparison, Soldiers who build rapport and display awareness are setting the conditions for achieving long-term goals in a mutually beneficial environment.

6-47. However, it is useful for leaders and their teams to evaluate their performance as advisors, to assess their effectiveness. Through continual assessment, leaders and teams can ensure they are focused on setting conditions for long-term success. Table 6-1, pages 6-9 to 6-11, provides an example of an advisor assessment tool. Commanders can use a tool such as this to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their security force assistance teams and to tailor training plans to prepare their security force assistance teams for deployment.
### Table 6-1. Example of advisor assessment tool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Key tasks</th>
<th>T/P/U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Understanding human nature</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Understands hierarchy of human needs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Understands cultural beliefs, values, and attitudes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Understands the five factors of personality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Building rapport</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Advisor and counterpart understand each other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Advisor and counterpart respect each other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Advisor and counterpart trust each other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Influencing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Determine a goal and who needs to be influenced and motivated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Determine individuals cultural attributes and compare to predominate cultural attributes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Determine susceptibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Determine and apply tactics and techniques</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Check measures of effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiating</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Determine both sides of a position</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Determine both sides interests and priorities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Determine both sides best alternative to a negotiated agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Determine agenda for meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of an interpreter</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Advisor maintains eye contact with counterpart</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Advisor speaks to counterpart as if interpreter is not there</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Advisor keeps statements short enough to allow easy translation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Advisor plans breaks or rotates translators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Advisor rehearse with interpreter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security force assistance team internal functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Function</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Key tasks</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission command</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Team has defined command and support relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Team defines succession of command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Team defines communication networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Team established PACE plan for each network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Team establishes reporting frequency and formats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Team collects information of potential intelligence value from FSF and conventional forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Team sorts and processes data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Team analyzes information to determine if it meets FSF or conventional forces PIRs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Team disseminates Information to FSF or conventional forces adhering to FDO requirements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Team recommends updates to FSF or conventional forces priority intelligence requirement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Movement and maneuver</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Team assesses FSF capabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Team develops plan to build FSF capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Team prepares resources required to execute plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Team executes capacity building plan and reassess</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6-1. Example of advisor assessment tool, continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fires</th>
<th>1. Team decides what effects conventional forces can assist FSF in achieving (field artillery, close air support, close combat attack, information engagement, civil affairs, electronic warfare)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Team detects where these effects can be achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Team coordinates with conventional forces for delivery of effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Team assesses effects achieved and reports to conventional forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>1. Team develops base defense plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Team develops guardian angel plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Team develops personnel recovery plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>1. Personnel systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Logistics systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Medical plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Maintenance and recovery plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Security force assistance skills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Key tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission command</td>
<td>1. TOC Receives, distributes, analyzes, and displays red/blue/green information feeds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. TOC integrates and synchronizes resources and makes recommendations to the commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. TOC establishes communication networks and PACE plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. TOC establishes reporting frequency and formats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>1. S-2 collects data meeting PIR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. S-2 sorts and processes data into usable information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. S-2 analyzes information to produce an intelligence product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. S-2 disseminates product higher and lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. S-2 updates priority intelligence requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement and maneuver</td>
<td>1. S-3 conducts assessment of the operational environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. S-3 plans what effects must be achieved by whom, where, and when</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. S-3 ensures resources are prepared to support operations and combined arms rehearsals are conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. S-3 monitors execution of plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fires</td>
<td>1. Fire support officer decides what effects will be achieved (field artillery, close air support, close combat attack, information engagement, civil affairs, electronic warfare)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Fire support officer plans how locations for effects will be detected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Fire support officer coordinates for delivery of effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Fire support officer assesses effects achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>1. Base defense plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Counter IED plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Counter IDF Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Personnel recovery plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. TCP and ECP SOPs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6-1. Example of advisor assessment tool, continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainment</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Personnel systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Logistics systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Medical plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Maintenance and recovery plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Combat skills**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Key tasks</th>
<th>T/P/U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mounted patrolling</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Team produces CONOPS for patrol and receives trip ticket</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Team conducts PCC/PCI and patrol brief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Team develops SOPs for vehicle configuration and OOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>React to contact</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>React to direct fire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>React to indirect fire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>React to IED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>React to visual contact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>React to civil disturbance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish security</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>On the base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>On the move</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>At the halt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>During counterpart engagements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuate casualties</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Conducts treatment under fire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Conducts tactical field care</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>9-Line MEDEVAC request</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Prepares vehicles for CASEVAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Conducts tactical evacuation care</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ external assets</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Field artillery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Close air support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Close combat attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Quick-reaction force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND**

- CASEVAC – casualty evacuation
- CONOPS – concept of operations
- ECP – entry control point
- FDO – foreign disclosure officer
- IED – improvised explosive device
- FSF – foreign security forces
- MEDEVAC – medical evacuation
- OOM – order of movement
- PACE – primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency
- S-2 – battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
- S-3 – battalion or brigade operations staff officer
- SOP – standard operating procedure
- T/P/U — trained/practiced/untrained
- TCP – traffic control point
- TOC – tactical operations center
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Source Notes

These are the sources quoted in this publication. They are listed by page number.


1-1 “activities undertaken by the Department of Defense . . .”: DODD 5132.03.


1-5 “conventional, strategic, and special operations forces . . .”: DODD 5100.01. Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. 21 December 2010.


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The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 3-22 is the proponent publication are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

### SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>after action review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army doctrine reference publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSOF</td>
<td>Army special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service component command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army techniques publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTP</td>
<td>Army tactics, techniques, and procedures publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSF</td>
<td>foreign security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>United States Army Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>public law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>regionally aligned forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>battalion or brigade operations staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>battalion or brigade logistics staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO/DATT</td>
<td>senior defense official/defense attaché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>training circular</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION II – TERMS

activity
A function, mission, action, or collection of actions. (JP 3-0)

Army design methodology
A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. (ADP 5-0)

assessment
The determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

foreign internal defense
Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

*foreign security forces
Forces, including but not limited to, military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel, that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization's mission.

host country
A nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders. (JP 2-01.2)

host nation
A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 3-57)

internal defense and development
The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

measure of effectiveness
A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)

measure of performance
A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

military engagement
Routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (JP 3-0)
objective
A clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. (JP 5-0)

operational art
The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs-supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment-to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

operational environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operational reach
The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 1-02)

operations process
The major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. (ADP 5-0)

permissive environment
An operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist security cooperation operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JP 3-0)

*regionally aligned forces
Those forces that provide a combatant commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailored capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, those Army units allocated to a combatant command, and those Army capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions.

rules of engagement
Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-04)

security assistance
A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (JP 3-22)

security cooperation
All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22)

security cooperation organization
All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance/cooperation management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions. (JP 3-22)
security force assistance
The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-22)

security forces
Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state. (JP 3-22)

security sector reform
A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 3-07)

situational understanding
The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. (ADRP 6-0)

strategic direction
The processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. (JP 5-0)

uncertain environment
An operational environment in which the hosting government security forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. (JP 3-0)

unified action
The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

unified land operations
How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. (ADP 3-0)
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