IV. Final Thoughts

The forthcoming field manual on COIN remains a signal accomplishment: it articulates a modern approach to counterinsurgency while affirming COIN’s enduring but decidedly counterintuitive principles. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the updated doctrine settles the question of how the United States should prosecute its Long War or the smaller counterinsurgency campaigns within it.

In any struggle that ultimately hinges on winning over or neutralizing an ambivalent civilian population, those wielding force must do so with great care. Like it or not, the United States Armed Forces are held to the highest standard with regard to how they fight. Both the military and the broader public that supports them prefer to avoid considering the question of risk tolerance. Yet in counterinsurgency, U.S. unwillingness to assume risk may be the most severe limitation on its COIN efforts. This is as great a challenge to the body politic as it is to the uniformed military, although only the uniformed military can effectively make the case for change in this arena.

The military must look to civilian authorities first, though, when it comes to the nonmilitary aspects of COIN. The U.S. Government as a whole must pony up to the demands of counterinsurgency. It’s become vogue to cite a lack of interagency cooperation and civilian capacity in Iraq and beyond. Yet the prior failing is conceptual. It’s difficult to codify process or build capacity in the absence of a universal doctrinal framework. More narrowly, even the extant military doctrine is on shaky ground when broader governmental assumptions, principles, and requirements remain unknown or ad hoc. Creating a common understanding of insurgency and the demands for defeating it remains a core challenge for the nation. 

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The Leadership Battlebook: A Practical Approach to Leader Self-Development

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...I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress, and grow brave by reflection. 'Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.

—Thomas Paine

Thomas Paine emphasizes several important concepts that leaders need to take to heart—“big minds” develop talents, skills, thoughts, and reasoning and devote time and effort to developing the competencies involved with leading. Leading involves pursuing self-development, seeking excellence, knowing one’s strengths and weaknesses, and taking action.

The Army Training and Leader Development Model features three domains for leader development: institutional, operational, and self-development. Although the institutional domain is paramount to development, most leaders recognize that the bulk of their learning occurs on the job. It is in the operational domain that the leader really hones his unique craft. Staff rides, professional development classes, tactical exercises without troops (TEWT), terrain walks, computer simulations, and myriad other programs develop leaders’ competence in a profound manner. The operational domain is also the place where individual development action plans are produced jointly between leaders and supervisors.

The institutional and operational domains are well structured, well defined in doctrine, and generally well implemented. However, they do not offer enough to allow the leader to realize his full potential. Only by actively seeking self-development can a leader achieve his optimum potential. Yet, of the three domains, self-development is the least well structured, defined, or executed. According to the ATLDP Officer Study Report, “Army training and leadership doctrine does not adequately address it. Army leaders do not emphasize its value, and the Army does not provide the tools and support to enable its leaders to make self-development an effective component of lifelong learning.”

This article looks at why leader self-development is so important and suggests a practical approach to implement and monitor a viable self-development program.

The Importance of Leader Self-Development

Army leaders are servants of the Nation. In times of war, they carry the primary burden for victory or defeat; in times of peace, they are the primary drivers to mission accomplishment. Consequently, Army leaders have an obligation to develop their leadership competencies to the utmost. They accomplish this through disciplined, daily study and reflection, and by seizing every opportunity to better themselves. As President Ronald Reagan once said: “The character that takes command in moments of crucial choices has already been determined by a thousand other choices made earlier in
seemingly unimportant moments…. It has been determined by all the day-to-day decisions made when life seemed easy and crises seemed far away—the decisions that, piece-by-piece, bit-by-bit, developed habits of discipline or of laziness; habits of self-sacrifice or self-indulgence; habits of duty and honor and integrity—or dishonor and shame.”

A leader’s daily life is full of opportunities and choices. What leaders do with these opportunities and choices can help either to optimize their leadership development or to let it languish. Army leaders should care about the daily decisions they make regarding self-development and the development of their subordinates.

Self-development involves introspective examination of one’s strengths and weaknesses and includes a conscious effort—a choice—to improve certain areas of one’s character and abilities. Leaders who pursue self-development in earnest become more confident, better able to solve complex problems, and more qualified to make decisions against a thinking, agile, and asymmetric enemy in times of uncertainty, fear, and chaos. Self-development empowers leaders, yields greater job satisfaction, develops competencies needed to accomplish missions, and broadens a leader’s vision; thus, it prepares the leader to take on positions of increasing responsibility.

Organizations permeated with self-development programs enjoy higher morale and an increased sense of commitment. They develop a culture that inspires people, sparks innovation, and engenders cooperation; they achieve a level of excellence that makes extraordinary accomplishments possible; and they are able to sustain the pace of change required in today’s dynamic environment.

The concept of self-development is codified in Army policy and doctrine. Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, says Army members are obligated to develop their abilities to the greatest extent possible and to assist subordinates in doing likewise. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, emphasizes that it is every leader’s duty to become competent at his job “through continual training and self-study.” U.S. Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 350-58, The Enduring Legacy—Leader Development for America’s Army, adds that self-development is “a joint effort involving commanders, leaders, supervisors, and subordinates. The individual and his leader structure self-development actions to meet specific individual goals and needs.” Perhaps no one has articulated the self-development imperative more eloquently than General Omar N. Bradley: “For most men, the matter of learning is one of personal preference. But for Army officers, the obligation to learn and grow in their professions, is clearly a public duty.”

The 2000 ATLDP report shows that most Army leaders know self-development is important for professional growth and essential for lifelong learning. However, a study of over 400 captains attending the Combined Arms and Services Staff School in 2002 found that almost two-thirds rated themselves as having performed little to no self-study. This gap between the perceived need for self-development and its actual pursuit indicates a need for command involvement, which can provide the feedback essential to make a self-development program work. Feedback is necessary because we are all somewhat blind to our own behavior and to what others really think about us; we might think we are developing, or we might believe that our boss is pleased with what we’re doing, but we can be wrong. Feedback also provides a means of accountability, encouraging the leader to pursue his goals. In sum, the leader who aspires to self-development needs a leader battlebook.

The Leadership Battlebook

The leadership battlebook is a practical self-development tool for the leader and his chain of command. It can take many forms and can be as simple as a three-ring binder with dividers containing different sections or topics. Whatever form it takes, the battlebook should be divided into topic areas specific to the individual’s development. The following nine topics are given as examples.

Warfighting and training tips. This niche provides a place for the leader to collect information and tips on the Army’s primary business: training and warfighting. Putting this section first enforces the need to strengthen the warrior ethos and maintain a warfighting focus. Leaders can tailor the content of this section to address their personal needs and interests. For example, a combat engineer might want to learn more about rapid repair of roads damaged by explosives, so he would collect the pertinent tactics, techniques, and procedures, and write them down in this section.

Leadership models and theories. To develop a deeper, broader understanding of leadership, Army leaders need to know both Army and civilian leadership models and theories. Nonmilitary leadership models may focus on such subjects as transformation, ethics, teams, situations, skills, traits, styles, or gender, to name but a few. One worthy nonmilitary model to consider here would be Bruce Avolio’s Full-Range Leadership Model, which emphasizes transformational leadership. Avolio’s lessons on transforming the organization through inspirational motivation, individualized consideration, idealized influence, and intellectual stimulation are applicable to most leadership situations.

Each theory, whether nonmilitary or military, will have some relevance in different cases. For example, the Army’s current “Be, Know, Do” model focuses on the values, attributes, skills, and actions of its leaders, thereby providing an effective framework for developing the competencies needed to lead the future modular force. The new Army leadership manual, FM 6-22 (currently in draft), may change the competency framework, but it will still emphasize competencies.

360-degree assessments and evaluations. The ATLDP report declares two leadership requirements—self-awareness and adaptability—to be “metacompetencies”; that is, they are foundations for all other competencies. A self-aware leader knows his strengths and weaknesses, his nature, talents, emotional stability, and capabilities. Self-awareness is a prerequisite to adaptability: Without it leaders do not have the necessary tools to adapt to unforeseen exigencies. Likewise, leaders who are self-aware, but too hidebound or otherwise unable to adapt quickly, become irrelevant to their operational environment and, hence, dangerous to their Soldiers and to the mission. Leaders who are open to candid feedback from a variety of sources and echelons
inside and outside their organization will go a long way toward achieving self-awareness.

Many assessment tools are available to help leaders achieve greater self-awareness. The officer evaluation report is one, as is the newly mandated individual development plan (IDP) each officer is required to create. The Army is also piloting a 360-degree assessment meant to identify a leader’s five main strengths and five weaknesses. Other assessment tools, such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and the Adaptive Skills Inventory, should also be maintained in this section. These tools help the leader understand how he learns, how he interacts with people, how he relates to the outside world, and how he processes information, thereby helping him become a better leader who can interact with and motivate his subordinates more effectively.

This section lets the leader compare his self-assessments with the assessments of his peers, subordinates, superiors, coaches, and mentors. Such comparisons help leaders deduce trends regarding their strengths and weaknesses. Armed with this knowledge, leaders can determine their developmental needs, then plan and execute a successful self-development program.

**Goals.** Self-awareness leads to self-regulation; that is, the desire to act on the knowledge of personal strengths and weaknesses gained through self-awareness. Self-regulation is an extension of self-awareness; it helps leaders set goals to correct leadership deficiencies and become more innovative, adaptable, and flexible. Goals define a desired end-state that leaders envision for their self-development program, so that they can set a proper azimuth to take them from self-awareness to that end-state. Hence, leaders must have clear goals to help them determine self-development plans.

Leaders should take care to link their goal-setting with the assessments and evaluations from the previous section. Areas needing improvement or weaknesses identified in the previous section are certainly good places to start. Leaders should also specify goals as either short, intermediate, or long term to ensure a natural progression in achieving them. Specificity counts; the more specific the goal, the more likely it is to be achieved.

Finally, leaders should devise a list of actions to be taken to turn goals into achievements. The list should include a timetable as well. **Leadership, leader, and command philosophies.** This section contains the individual’s personal leadership, leader, and command philosophies. Leadership philosophy is the leader’s personal philosophy; it includes values, priorities, how he leads, and other leadership items important to him. The leader philosophy builds on the leadership philosophy by applying the latter to the leader’s assigned organization. The command philosophy is the leader’s personal philosophy; it requires him to describe, among other things, his vision for how the organization will achieve its desired end-state.

As a leader matures and his responsibilities change from direct to organizational to strategic level, each of the three philosophies of leadership are also likely to change. Hence, these philosophies should be reviewed frequently and the leader’s values and priorities reaffirmed. Putting his philosophy into words will help the leader decide who he is and how his core beliefs relate to his organization. It will help him think through his values, expectations, and priorities. Personal leadership, leader, and command philosophies serve the organization well because they establish the leader’s more enduring intent.

**Book reviews.** Professional reading has long been recognized as key to the Army leader’s development. Thus, it comes as no surprise that there are many professional reading lists available, including one from the Army Chief of Staff. Unlike the average reader, the leader must focus his reading if he seeks self-development. He also has to digest and capture what he reads, so he needs a format for reviewing books, one that addresses what the book is about, why he is reading it, what lessons he might learn from it, and any memorable quotations it might contain. To aid in reviewing and retention, he should take notes while he reads. A paper folded in thirds and inserted in the book provides an easy way to take notes; it will assist the leader in retrieving references, quotations, and lessons learned from the book.

**Mentoring tips.** Although the Army has no formal or mandatory mentorship program, Army leaders clearly recognize that mentorship, when applied appropriately, is a great way to develop and improve leadership. Every leader should find one or more mentors for self-development and in turn act as a mentor for other leaders. Mentoring relationships don’t necessarily have to be between a senior officer and a junior; they can be between officers and NCOs or retirees or anyone the leader thinks can help his professional development.

This section of the battlebook provides a place for the leader to record questions he might ask his mentor and the subsequent answers or advice he receives. The leader can also record advice he gives to someone he is mentoring, as well as contact information for his mentors and those he advises.

**Leadership journals.** Here, the leader can record his thoughts on leadership. Generals George S. Patton and Omar Bradley and German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, among others, captured their thoughts in journals. One way to begin a journal is for the leader to reflect on his career and identify defining moments in his leadership development. These might take the form of lessons learned from his own decisions (good or bad) or from his observations of another’s leadership. They might also include lessons learned from movies, his children, lectures, news articles, or any activity or random thought. This advice about journals comes with a caveat: If the leader sees this section as a drill in journal keeping, it is doomed to failure before it begins.

**Other.** The last section functions as a catch-all for other leadership concepts or ideas. The 2004 study Leadership Lessons at Division Command Level lists several areas that could fit in this section, among them interpersonal skills, team building, improving command climate, and coaching and counseling. Additional topics might include ethical decisionmaking or the role of faith in leadership. A list of websites could be also placed here.

**The Bottom Line**

Leaders who would guide the future modular force to full-spectrum dominance in current and emerging operational environments
can no longer pass on self-development. Nor can their organizations, since self-development programs achieve their best results when organizations are actively involved. Leaders, in fact, have an obligation to make their own development and the development of their subordinates a priority. By doing so, they augment the developmental efforts made in the institutional and operational domains to benefit the individual and the organization.

A leadership battlebook can be a useful tool for leaders serious about self-development. Again, a three-ring binder and a few dividers are all one needs to get started. If some sections aren’t currently needed, then populate them later; if additional ones are needed, just add them. Whatever form it ultimately takes, the battlebook can be an effective means by which leaders and organizations discharge their responsibility for a vitally important but often ignored program.

**NOTES**

6. Ibid.
10. FM 22-100, 5-25.
11. ATLDP, OS-17.
14. FM 6-22, Army Leadership (draft) (replaces FM 22-100).
18. Ulmer, and others, 9.

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**MR Classics Revisited**

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. David Galula, reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Terence J. Daly, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired

When reading *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* for the first time, most people have what could be called the Galula Moment: “That’s it! He gets it!” French Army Lieutenant Colonel David Galula’s book, first published in 1964, is quite simply the definitive work, the primer, of classic counterinsurgency doctrine.¹ It is the one book on counterinsurgency that everyone, from policymakers to fire-team leaders, should read and understand.

Galula’s globe-trotting military career gave him numerous opportunities to study war, conventional and unconventional, close up. During World War II he fought in campaigns in North Africa, Italy, and Germany, became a military attaché, and then, in the immediate post-war period, served as an observer. He would later work as an assistant military attaché in China during that country’s civil war and as a UN observer in Greece during the Greek civil war. Posted to Hong Kong on attaché duty, he developed and maintained contact with officers fighting insurgencies in Indochina, Malaya, and the Philippines. In 1956, Galula was assigned to the 45th Colonial Infantry Battalion, with which he spent the next two years fighting Algerian rebels, first as a company commander and then as an assistant battalion commander.

With all this experience under his belt, Galula was sent to Harvard’s Center for International Affairs in 1962. While participating in a RAND Corporation symposium on counterinsurgency, he made such an impression that he was asked to write a treatise about his experiences in Algeria. The ensuing work was published in 1963 as *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-58*.² The following year, Galula produced his seminal *Counterinsurgency Warfare*. He died in 1967.

We know that Galula’s main claim—you defeat an insurgency by controlling the target population—works. It worked for Galula when he commanded an understrength French infantry company in the harsh terrain of the Kabylia in Algeria, and it worked for the U.S. 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3d ACR) in Tal Afar in Iraq.

The 3d ACR was required to read *Counterinsurgency Warfare* before it deployed. The book’s lessons were suitably modified for the conditions the regiment was about to face, and then used to inform the planning and execution of their successful campaign to subdue the insurgency in Tal Afar. Currently, Galula’s ideas pervade the new counterinsurgency manuals that are being developed for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.

**The Basics**

Galula’s basic insight into insurgency (which he terms “revolutionary war”) is that “Revolutionary war is political war.” The objective of the counterinsurgent must therefore be to win the population’s support. According to Galula, French and American traditions stipulating that “military” activities should be handled only by Soldiers and Marines and “civilian” activities should be handled only by politicians and bureaucrats is