Turning Victory Into Success
Military Operations After the Campaign

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General Editor

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Turning Victory Into Success:
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Dr. Lieutenant Colonel Brian M. De Toy
General Editor

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The second annual military symposium took place at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas from 14 to 16 September 2004. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) sponsored the event and the US Army Combined Arms Center’s Combat Studies Institute (CSI) served as its host. The symposium brought together civilian historians and military officers for the purpose of discussing a variety of historical case studies and the ways in which they can illuminate current military issues and operations.

As the title and subtitle of the symposium indicate, the topics addressed the purpose behind military operations—winning the peace. The US military and its coalition allies have proven themselves adept at achieving military victory in short, decisive, major combat operations. The critical nexus, then, is how battlefield victory translates into political success. The panelists and audience discussed the nature of war, cultural awareness, terrorism, stability operations in the Philippines, Latin America, Lebanon, and Vietnam, as well as operations in Iraq. Without exception, the presenters were thought-provoking and their presentations elicited lively discussion among the attendees.

This volume contains most of the presentations given at the symposium. The presentations can also be found at http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/CSI/research/Conference-04/ConfAnnouncement.asp, the CSI website for the conference. The entire symposium program can be found in Appendix A of this collection. In addition, we have included some of the material from the question and answer periods following selected presentations.

The second annual military symposium was of great benefit to those who attended, and we hope the readers of this volume will find the experience equally advantageous. We at Fort Leavenworth would like to thank TRADOC’s Futures Center, specifically Major General David Fastabend and Colonel Michael Starry, US Army (Retired) for providing the support that made this conference possible.

Thomas T. Smith
Colonel, Infantry
Director, Combat Studies Institute
Introduction

The second annual military symposium, held at Fort Leavenworth, brought together military history scholars, political scientists, and active and retired military and political officers. The title of the 2004 symposium was “Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign,” and it was selected in the belief that we needed to focus on the critical tasks of “Phase IV” (or stability and reconstruction) operations. These operations—occurring both simultaneously with and after high-intensity conflict (“decisive” combat operations)—are critical to achieving the desired political endstate.

The US military and its international allies have demonstrated their ability to wage modern war and achieve decisive results on the battlefield. Less successful, perhaps, have been the planning efforts, resourcing, training, and interagency coordination required of the arguably more difficult stability and reconstruction operations. Without a doubt, winning the peace is an integral part of winning the war.

I believe you will find the presentations made at this symposium both challenging and stimulating. I encourage you to read through the papers in the order they were presented at the conference. Opening-day speakers presented challenging thought-pieces that examined the entire construct of the nature of conflict and postwar planning and execution. For the most part, second-day speakers provided historical case studies, from the Philippines in the early 20th century to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) today. The speakers on the final day addressed OIF, in particular, with presentations from Soldiers on the ground at platoon level up through the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. The results of the entire three-day symposium are impressive and will go far to assist those civilians and military officers charged with this daunting, yet imperative mission.

William S. Wallace
Lieutenant General, US Army
Commanding
Acknowledgements

The second annual TRADOC/CSI military symposium, and the publication of its proceedings, would not have been possible without the tremendous efforts of a number of individuals. First, I wish to thank TRADOC Futures Center, and specifically Major General David Fastabend, for their support. Without their resources this symposium would not have been held. Second, I would like to recognize those leaders at Fort Leavenworth who provided support and guidance throughout the process—Colonel Lawyn C. Edwards, Director of the Command & General Staff College, Colonel Thomas T. Smith, Director of the Combat Studies Institute, and Dr. William G. Robertson, the CAC Command Historian and Deputy Director of CSI. Third, the other members of the CSI Research & Publications Team performed yeomen’s service in ensuring the symposium went off without a hitch. Dr. Lawrence Yates, Mr. Ken Gott, Ms. Robin Kern, Mr. John McGrath, and Ms. Patricia Whitten assisted in all aspects of preparation and execution of a really first-class conference.

I was also very fortunate to have the expertise of two CSI editors. Mr. Phil Davis provided the technical editing for this collection and Ms. Catherine Shadid Small completed its layout and finishing touches; they have done a superb job. In addition, I was blessed to have found an absolutely first-rate transcriptionist in Ms. Lorna Frojd. Finally, a humble thanks to all who contributed in every way to making the second symposium a resounding success—administrative staff, audio-visual personnel, conference presenters, and audience members who asked the tough questions.

Dr. LTC Brian M. De Toy
General Editor
Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won

Conrad C. Crane

Actions in Iraq since March 2003 have highlighted the importance and complexity of what military planners categorize as “Phase IV Operations,” activities conducted after decisive combat operations to stabilize and reconstruct the area of operation. This phase is often described as “postconflict operations,” but that is a very misleading term. Phase IV usually starts very soon after the advent of combat in Phase III, and the two overlap. Additionally, as in Iraq, there can be significant fighting in Phase IV. “Transition operations” is probably a better descriptive term, as military forces try to position the area of operation to move back to peace and under the control of civilian government.

Historically, American commanders have often conducted detailed planning for Phase IV while Phase III was ongoing, such as in World War II, but with modern warfighting concepts such as “Rapid Decisive Operations” and schemes of maneuver designed to speedily defeat adversaries, such an approach is no longer wise or feasible. Even the separate phasing itself might be worth rethinking, as the construct can stovepipe planning and hamper the holistic vision necessary to properly link combat to the end state that accomplishes national political objectives. Planning, as well as execution of Phase III and Phase IV must occur simultaneously, not sequentially. And we should also train that way. Too often exercises ignore Phase IV operations or conveniently delay them until the conclusion of major combat operations. Real life is not that neat or simple.

When Lieutenant General John Yeosock took command of Third Army in Operation DESERT STORM, he could get no useful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like hospital beds, prisoners, and refugees, complaining later that he was handed a “dripping bag of manure” that no one else wanted to deal with.¹ Neither the Army nor the Department of Defense had an adequate plan for postwar operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies were even more unprepared. The situation was only salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineers and civil affairs personnel and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian government.²

Some of the deficiencies in postwar planning for DESERT STORM can be attributed to the fact that Third Army was the first American field army in combat since the Korean War. Postconflict planning has historically been a function of headquarters at echelons above corps, and continuing problems with more recent operations are at least partly attributable to the generally small scale of American interventions. Difficulties also result from the fact that for at least the latter half of the 20th century, US military leaders and planners focused predominantly on winning wars, not
on the peacekeeping or nation building that comes afterward. The unpleasant result of the war in Southeast Asia magnified this shortcoming, as the services developed doctrines, force structures, and attitudes designed to fight major conventional war and avoid another experience like Vietnam. But national objectives can often be accomplished only after the fighting has ceased; a war tactically and operationally “won” can still lead to strategic “loss” if transition operations are poorly planned or executed. The ironic truth about Phase IV operations is that the American military would rather not deal with them, or would like to quickly hand them off to other US government agencies or international organizations, who in turn argue that the tasks associated with nation building are rightfully within their sphere of responsibility. However, while there is universal agreement about who should ideally be rebuilding states, the harsh historical reality is that the world’s greatest nation-building institution, when properly resourced and motivated, is the American military, especially the Army. And as much as military forces would like to quickly win wars and go home, there has rarely been any accomplishment of long-term US policy goals from any conflict without an extended American military presence to ensure proper results from the peace.

**Historical Overview of American Occupations**

The United States has had much experience with postconflict or transition operations since its founding. In the 19th century the Army had such missions in Mexico, the post-Civil War South, and the American West. These experiences were generally extremely unpleasant and helped motivate military reformers at the end of the 19th century who focused on building an American military establishment worthy of a great power that was designed to win major conventional wars. They agreed with the philosophy of the influential Prussian general and theorist Count Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who believed that the primary role of the modern military was simply to successfully conclude major combat operations once the diplomats had gotten the nation into war, and then quickly withdraw while the diplomats resolved the aftermath.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the United States has conducted generally successful efforts with reconstruction and nation building in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Germany, Italy, Japan, Austria, South Korea, Panama, and Kuwait. Some successes were the result of good planning like in World War II; others came from adept scrambling as after DESERT STORM. Notable failures of nation building and stabilization occurred in Haiti, Nicaragua, Somalia, and Vietnam. Ongoing efforts continue in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Recent history provides a number of useful examples to illustrate the missions and challenges involved in postconflict operations. Though recent cases have more often involved restoring regimes instead of changing them, there are still many
valuable insights to be gained from careful analysis.

Panama

Operations in Panama leading to the overthrow of the General Manuel Noriega regime have been touted as a model use of quick and decisive American military force, but postconflict activities did not go as smoothly. The crisis period was exceptionally long, beginning with public revelations about Noriega’s nefarious activities in June 1987 and culminating with the execution of Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989. Planning for military intervention began as early as February 1988. When Noriega annulled the election of May 1989, sent his paramilitary thugs to assault opposition candidates, and increased his harassment of Americans, the United States executed Operation NIMROD DANCER. This show of force, executed by US Southern Command, was designed to demonstrate further American resolve in the hope that it would pressure Noriega to modify his behavior. When there was no obvious modification, the president directed the execution of Operation JUST CAUSE. A textbook example of the quality of the new armed forces and doctrine developed in the United States, it encompassed the simultaneous assault of 27 targets at night.

Due to a focus on conducting a decisive combat operation and not the complete campaign, the aftermath of this smaller-scale contingency did not go as smoothly, however. Planning for the postconflict phase, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, was far from complete when the short period of hostilities began. Missions and responsibilities were vague, and planners failed to adequately appreciate the effects of combat operations and overthrowing the regime. Though guidance from SOUTHCOM on posthostility missions was fairly clear, tactically oriented planners at the XVIII Airborne Corps in charge of the joint task force carrying out the operation gave postconflict tasks short shrift. For instance, the plan assigned the lone MP battalion the responsibility for running a detention facility, conducting security for all of the numerous convoys, and providing security for many key facilities, as well as for being prepared to restore law and order. Though the battalion was mainly concerned with a relatively small geographic portion of the country, it was quickly overwhelmed by its responsibilities.

With the elimination of the Panamanian Defense Forces, the task of restoring law and order became particularly demanding, as looting and vandalism spread throughout the country. This is a common occurrence in situations where national security forces are removed, thus creating instability and a security vacuum. Chaos reigned as American forces scrambled to restore some semblance of order. Military policemen trained in law and order missions did not perform well in unfamiliar combat operations, and were inadequate in numbers to deal with the problems they faced in the aftermath. They also could not handle all the POWs
and refugees for whom they were now responsible. Similarly, there were not enough civil affairs personnel or engineers for the rebuilding effort. This seems to be a common occurrence in American transition operations. Personnel deficiencies were exacerbated by slow and disorganized Reserve call-ups relying on volunteers. Political-military interagency cooperation was also poor, as many agencies were excluded from DOD planning and the embassy was severely understaffed.11

Senior commanders admitted afterward that they had done poorly in planning for postconflict operations and hoped the Army would remedy that situation in the future.12 Despite these deficiencies, the United States Military Support Group, activated in January 1990 to support the growth of independent Panamanian institutions, could be deactivated just one year later in a much more stable country, though whether it or Panamanian leaders deserved most credit for this success was unclear to observers.13

Haiti

Like Panama, this was another smaller-scale contingency in response to a long-festering crisis. It began with the military overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras in September 1991. On 1 April 1993, the JCS sent the first alert order to CINCUSACOM to begin planning for contingency operations in Haiti. Planning for active intervention intensified in October of that year after armed protesters in Port-Au-Prince turned away a ship loaded with UN peacekeepers. During the next year, international pressure on the military leaders of Haiti increased and was intensified even further by obvious American preparations for an invasion. The decision of the Haitian government in September 1994 to return President Aristide to power was to a large extent because they knew Army helicopters and 10th Mountain Division soldiers aboard the USS Eisenhower, along with elements of the 82d Airborne Division deployed from Fort Bragg, were heading for Haiti.14 In fact, General Cedras did not begin to negotiate seriously with the American diplomatic delegation until he had confirmed that the 82d Airborne contingent was in the air. The overwhelming force deployed in the initial occupation and the soldiers’ professional and disciplined conduct and appearance in continuing operations did much to deter and control the actions of potential troublemakers.15 Generally, it is always better to begin occupations with a very strong and pervasive ground presence to control and intimidate looters as well as potential resistance. This was not the case in Iraq in 2003. Even Ambassador Paul Bremer has conceded that “we never had enough troops on the ground” there to adequately control the postwar environment.16

The long lead time between the beginning of the crisis and actual military intervention, combined with lessons learned from operations such as those in Panama and Somalia, greatly facilitated planning for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.17
USACOM prepared operational plans for both forced and unopposed entry, while the DOD conducted extensive interagency coordination. Its Haiti Planning Group, with the assistance of other government agencies, prepared a detailed “Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services.” The lead agency for all major functional areas was USAID, with DOD support (mostly from Army units) in re-establishing public administration, conducting elections, restoring information services, assisting the Department of Justice with setting up and training a police force, disaster preparedness and response, running airports, and caring for refugees. Military units did have primary responsibility for security measures, such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), protecting foreign residents, and demobilizing paramilitary groups. These were mostly Army functions, and that service provided 96 percent of deployed military forces.

These plans and their execution were affected by the desire of military leaders to avoid getting involved with “nation-building” missions such as those that had led to so much grief in Somalia. Army lawyers wrestled with interpreting humanitarian requests for reconstruction to classify them as related to the mission or as nation building. Those requests that fell into the former category were approved, while those interpreted as nation building were denied. Medical units were told to focus on supporting the JTF and not humanitarian assistance, as leaders were concerned about not replacing the medical facilities of the host nation. This reluctance to embrace peacekeeping or nation building had its most regrettable result on 20 September 1994, when restrictive rules of engagement prohibited American forces from intervening as Haitian police killed two demonstrators. The next day, American officials expanded the rules of engagement to allow more military involvement in restoring and maintaining law and order.

Such “mission creep” should be expected, and it has been a part of virtually all American involvement with complex Phase IV operations. Similar expansion of Army roles and missions happened in most other areas of the restoration efforts in Haiti. The attorneys eventually rationalized that any action that made Americans look good lessened security risks and could therefore be approved as mission-related. Other government agencies were slow to arrive or build up resources, so the military picked up the slack. Generally, the other departments had not done the detailed planning that DOD had and often wanted more support than DOD had expected to provide. A typical example was when the ambassador to Haiti asked for military advisers to help new government ministries get established until efforts from USAID and the State Department could be established. The result was the hasty deployment of a ministerial adviser team from the 358th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade, “The first large scale implementation of a civil administration effort since World War II.” The scope and pace of CA missions increased so rapidly that they threatened to get out of control and raised fears that such actions would only
heighten Haitian expectations that US forces could fix all the nation’s problems and thus set the people up for great disappointment later.27

These expanded missions caused many other problems, to some extent because CA units are relatively small organically and require considerable support from other organizations. Engineer planning, equipment, and personnel were inadequate for their required civil affairs and reconstruction projects. Soldiers had to develop new policies and procedures to help set up internal security forces and expend funds. This often required “working around” Title 10, US Code, restrictions. They assumed expanded roles in maintaining law and order, including manning and operating detention facilities and developing new crowd control techniques. Items such as latrines and police uniforms were in short supply. Doctrine and personnel were not available to establish proper liaison with the myriad civilian organizations working in the country. Intelligence assets were severely taxed, and the force in Haiti had to rely heavily on theater and national intelligence assets to make up for deficiencies.28

However, the military in general, and the Army in particular, received much praise for its performance in Haiti. Nonetheless, once the last American troops left the island in April 1996, the situation there deteriorated to conditions approaching those in the early 1990s. Without long-term military involvement, most US policy goals were frustrated. The civilian agencies that replaced military forces did not have the same resources available, and persistent flaws in the Haitian economy, judicial system, and political leadership obstructed reform. American officials decried the results of subsequent elections, and admitted the failure of their policies. Even the secretary general of the UN recommended against renewing the mission there.29 One key lesson from that frustrating experience is that the redeployment of military forces should be predicated on the achievement of designated measures of effectiveness and not based on time limits. Another is that follow-on civilian agencies must be capable of maintaining those standards as well as achieving new ones.

The Balkans

The US Army has picked up its usual predominant load of postconflict tasks, requiring several thousand troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, and seems resigned to a long-term commitment in the region. Rotational schedules have been prepared through 2005, and there have been discussions in Washington about establishing a “permanent presence” there.30

Current American operations in the Balkans again reveal how force and mission requirements change during the postconflict phase. Eighteen months after the signing of the agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav Army over Kosovo,
US Army troops there were still engaged in “peacekeeping with an iron fist.” They were primarily focused on establishing a safe and secure environment under the rule of law, with patrols backed by armored vehicles and detention centers to control troublemakers. The UN-NATO justice system has been heavily criticized, and a Judge Advocate General Legal Assessment Team found the UN mission in Kosovo so severely short of facilities and personnel to establish the rule of law that it recommended teams of 15 Army lawyers be rotated through the country to reinforce the UN effort. Additionally, the resentment of impatient Kosovars has grown against a UN presence that seems to be making little progress toward a transition to local control.31

Efforts in Bosnia are more advanced, and the environment more secure and peaceful. Deployed Army task forces have become lighter with every rotation and have moved from immediate security concerns toward enhancing long-term stability. By late 1997 it became apparent to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) that a large disparity existed between the ability of military forces to achieve their initially assigned tasks of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and that of their less-capable civilian counterparts to meet their own implementation requirements. SFOR realized it could not disengage with such a large “GFAP gap” remaining and expanded its mission to “assist international organizations to set the conditions for civilian implementation of the GFAP in order to transition the area of operations to a stable environment.” US military leaders on the scene recognized they were moving into the area of nation building but saw no alternative if SFOR was ever going to be able to withdraw or significantly reduce its commitment without risking the peace.32

As the nature of the stability operations and support operations in Bosnia evolved, so did the requirements of the peacekeeping force. It needed fewer combat troops and more engineers, military police, and civil affairs personnel. Intelligence requirements changed and expanded. After-action reports highlighted many shortfalls in the Balkans force structure and peacekeeping policies, many of them common to previous smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs). Army lawyers again proved adept at “thinking outside traditional fiscal rules and applications” to support operational requirements.33 The roles of military policemen expanded to include performing as maneuver battalion task forces and working with international law enforcement agencies.34 Difficulties with tactical MPs trying to perform law and order missions reappeared.35

There were problems again with shortages and recall procedures for Reserve Component engineer, military intelligence, and civil affairs augmentation.36 The massive engineering requirements for Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD especially highlighted branch deficiencies with command and control,
construction unit allocations, and bridging. A split-based logistics system trying to meet requirements in the Balkans and back in the Central Region of Europe required considerable augmentation but still strained combat support and combat service support assets considerably. Liaison officers were in great demand, not just as Joint Commission Observers with the Entity Armed Forces, but also to coordinate with the myriad nongovernmental organizations and other civilian agencies. There were shortages of linguists throughout the theater, which especially exacerbated problems with intelligence. MI doctrine was completely inadequate for supporting peace operations, and understaffed intelligence units had to adapt as best they could for the complex “multi-service, multi-agency, and multi-national” situation further complicated by a host of treaty requirements.

A Defense Science Board study concluded that Balkan operations revealed many shortcomings in psychological operations, as well, especially in planning and resources to support engagement and postconflict activities for all the geographic combatant commanders. Even with all these problems, Army units in Bosnia have continued to compile a superlative record of accomplishments. However, the “GFAP gap” remains, with recurring UN problems coordinating and directing civilian agencies. Recent elections were dominated by continuing political divisiveness, reflecting the limited progress in changing people’s attitudes. However, while American military leaders have complained about having the troops remain in the Balkans, the fact that decisions about their redeployment have been based on achieving measures of effectiveness and not on reaching a time limit has at least ensured stability in the region.

The world has changed a great deal since the massive occupation efforts that followed World War II, and wars and SSCs since the end of the Cold War are generally the best source for insights about contemporary Phase IV operations. However, there are a number of important guidelines that can also be obtained from analyzing the major American wars of the 20th century.

The Philippines

In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States began a long occupation of the Philippine Islands that officially ended with their independence in 1946. This very lengthy transition to self-government is not typical of American experiences with occupation, and the most useful insights are to be gleaned from the early years, when American forces were trying to subdue resistance and establish control in the former Spanish colony.

The Philippines example reinforces the point that “postconflict” operations are a misnomer. To be successful, they need to begin before the shooting stops, and will be conducted simultaneously with combat. Appropriate planning must be
completed before the conflict begins, so military forces are prepared to begin immediately accomplishing transition tasks in newly controlled areas. All soldiers will need to accept duties that are typically considered in the purview of CA detachments. There will never be enough CA troops to go around, and immediate needs will have to be met by whoever is on the scene. Even in the midst of combat, leaders and their soldiers must keep in mind the long-term goals of peace and stability and conduct themselves accordingly.43

In the Philippines, both military and civilian officials recognized that the best agent for local pacification was the military leader on the spot. Considerable decentralization was required for a situation where village attitudes and characteristics varied widely. Officers had great discretion and were not closely supervised, though they also had clear directives from higher headquarters providing guidelines. The requirement for local familiarity meant that soldiers could not be rotated quickly. In village societies personal relationships are important and take considerable time and effort to establish. Even one-year tours in a tribal society such as Iraq are probably too short. The Army in the Philippines had to accept some decline in the combat efficiency of their units in order to keep them in lengthy occupation duties. Troops had to be aware of the cultures they were in and not try to force American values. Knowledge of the Koran and local customs were important for everyone. Even John J. Pershing could spend hours talking to local imams about religion. This does not lessen the requirement to achieve the right balance of force and restraint, but the long-term consequences must be considered for every action. General Leonard Wood’s predilection for punitive forays in response to even minor incidents such as theft did cow many Moro chiefs, but he also undermined many alliances and relationships painstakingly established by local commanders. Instead of quieting small disturbances, Wood’s expeditions often created larger problems by driving pacified or neutral villages into joining more rebellious ones and made it more difficult for his subordinates to gain local trust.44

Germany

The United States has been involved in the occupation of Germany twice in the past century. At the conclusion of World War I, 200,000 American troops moved to positions around Coblenz, preparing for the possibility that the Germans would not sign the peace treaty. When they agreed to the Versailles Treaty in the summer of 1919, the occupation force rapidly diminished, numbering only 16,000 a year later. By the end of 1922, that figure was down to 1,200, and all left the next year.45 Though the bulk of responsibility for the details of the occupation and regime change fell on other Allied governments, occupying American troops did find themselves in charge of a million civilians. The US Army and government had not really accepted the administration of civil government in occupied enemy
territory as a legitimate military function after the Mexican War, Civil War, or Spanish-American War, and the officer in charge of civil affairs for the US military government in the Rhineland after World War I lamented that the American army of occupation “lacked both training and organization” to perform its duties.46

As World War II approached, Army War College committees went back to the World War I reports and developed formal doctrine for military government. In the spring of 1942, a School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia, and thinking began there about postwar reconstructions of Germany, Japan, and Italy.47 By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailed Allied planning for the occupation of that nation had been ongoing for two years. All staff sections at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces and Army Group headquarters invested considerable resources in developing what became Operation ECLIPSE. The plan correctly predicted most of the tasks required of the units occupying the defeated country. Within three months, those formations had disarmed and demobilized German armed forces, cared for and repatriated 4 million POWs and refugees, restored basic services to many devastated cities, discovered and quashed a potential revolt, created working local governments, and reestablished police and the courts.48

Before any Allied armies entered Germany, planners designated specific military governance units to follow combat forces closely. The first civil affairs detachment in the country set itself up in Roetgen on 15 September 1944, only four days after US troops entered Germany. Once the Third Reich surrendered, small mobile detachments were sent out immediately to every town in the US occupation zone. Typically, unit commanders confronted mayors with a number of demands: a list of local soldiers and party members, the turn-in of all military and civilian firearms, and housing for American troops. Detachment leaders also imposed curfews after dark and immobilized the population. They also had the authority to replace uncooperative mayors.49

The regime in Germany was changed from the bottom up. Throughout history this has been the best approach to rebuilding states. Local elections and councils were allowed to function, and responsibility was shifted to local authorities as quickly as possible. State governments were next in priority, and only after they were working effectively were national elections considered. At the same time, political life was strictly controlled to prevent any resurgence of radicalism, although public-opinion polls were conducted on an almost weekly basis to monitor what the German people thought about occupation policies. The German legal profession was totally corrupted by the Nazis, and each occupying ally took a slightly different approach in reestablishing courts. The British used many old Nazi lawyers and judges, while the Americans tried to reform the whole system, a
slow process. The best solution was probably the one the Soviets applied, whereby they found educated and politically loyal people and gave them six weeks of legal training. Their system built around these “lay judges” got criminal and civil court systems working very quickly.\(^{50}\)

One of the most vexing problems for occupation authorities was how to dismantle the Nazi Party and its security apparatus while retaining the skills of some members who performed important functions. This was accomplished by having all adult Germans fill out a detailed questionnaire about their associations. There were heavy penalties for lying or failing to answer questions. A board of anti-Nazi Germans and Allied representatives reviewed the “\textit{Fragebogen}” (German for questionnaire) and determined which people had held leadership positions and deserved to have their political and economic activities curtailed for the occupation. By the time the Nazis were allowed to regain their rights, democratic Germans were so solidly established that a Nazi revival was impossible.\(^{51}\) This approach also allowed occupation authorities to clear key administrators and technicians along with some security forces to remain at their posts to assist in the reconstruction efforts. Most commentators agree that the most critical mistake made in the occupation of Iraq was the total disbanding of the Iraqi army and extensive purging of Baathists without any similar attempt at discriminatory screening.\(^{52}\)

\textit{Japan}

The occupation force for Japan, a country slightly smaller than Iraq, included almost 23 divisions amounting to more than 500,000 soldiers in 1945. Because of uncertainty about how occupation forces would be received, General Douglas MacArthur decided an overwhelming force was the best insurance against unrest. Most ground forces were American, though allies were used in some sensitive areas, such as British and Australian units in Hiroshima.\(^{53}\) While there had been ongoing interdepartmental deliberations in Washington about occupying Japan since the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the actual planning in the Pacific for Operation BLACKLIST did not begin until May 1945.\(^{54}\) Within two years, most Japanese soldiers had been disarmed and repatriated (except from Soviet-controlled areas), a “purge” list of persons restricted from political activity had been completed, basic services were restored, police reform programs were implemented, the economy was restarted, land reform was begun, and the nation adopted a new democratic constitution that renounced war as an instrument of national policy.\(^{55}\)

In October 2002, reports emerged that the Bush administration was looking at the Japanese occupation as a model for achieving democratization and demilitarization in Iraq. The administration quickly withdrew from that position, and many experts have highlighted the important differences between the scenarios. The Japanese surrendered unconditionally after total defeat, and the whole world
acknowledged the legality and necessity of Allied occupation. Millions were dead, cities were in ashes, and the populace was destitute and cowed. Their more homogeneous culture did not feature the ethnic, tribal, and religious divisions so evident in Iraq, and the Japanese were conditioned to obey the command of the emperor to accept defeat and submit to their conquerors. They also had some experience with limited democracy, though it can be argued that Iraq had some similar experiences during their earlier history this past century. Another major difference is that Iraq is much richer in natural resources than Japan, providing another set of opportunities for occupying powers.56

However, Operation BLACKLIST does provide useful insights about purging undesirable political elements and on how to design the insertion of military forces into a situation where the possibility of armed resistance remains ambiguous. There are also similarities between the way Americans viewed the Japanese in 1945 and the way they perceive Iraqis today, as a totally foreign and non-Western culture. John Dower, who has written the seminal work on the American occupation of Japan, argues strongly that it does not provide a useful model for Iraq, with the important caveat that it should give a clear warning to current policy makers, “Even under circumstances that turned out to be favorable, demilitarization and democratization were awesome challenges.”57

**General Observations**

Along with the insights emphasized in the previous section, there are some others that deserve mention. Detailed long-term interagency planning for occupation is important and can considerably smooth transition. MacArthur’s staff managed to develop Operation BLACKLIST in just over three months, but analysis for such a course had been going on for years back in the United States, it required little interagency coordination, and the Far East Command staff made many adjustments on the fly during the early years of occupation. The ideal approach is exemplified by the interagency planning for Haiti, which produced a detailed list of post-crisis tasks and responsibilities well in advance of any possible combat. That operation eventually failed, however, because civilian agencies proved incapable of completing the mission once military forces left, due to inadequate resources or inflated expectations. The primary problem at the core of American deficiencies in postconflict capabilities, resources, and commitment is a national aversion to nation building, which was strengthened by failure in Vietnam. US leaders need to accept this mission as an essential part of national security and better tailor and fund the military services and civilian governmental organizations to accomplish it.

In the past, no part of postconflict operations has been more problematic for American military forces than the handover to civilian agencies. Ideally, the allocation
of effort and process of shifting responsibilities should proceed as depicted in Figure 1. But in reality it normally looks more like Figure 2, where the handover is given directly to the local government.
A number of possible structural solutions are available to the Army to improve its performance in Phase IV operations. These range from internal reorganizations to relying more on civilian agencies.

**Forming Specialized Peacekeeping Units**

Some commentators have recommended that the Army establish constabulary units focused exclusively on peacekeeping duties. While this has certain training and organizational efficiencies, it is a bad idea for a number of reasons. At the beginning of Phase IV, strong warfighting skills are essential, and no progress is possible without peace and security. The overall conventional deterrent value of today’s relatively small Army will be significantly reduced if some units are perceived as having more limited capability for offensive and defensive operations, unless these constabulary units are an addition to the existing force structure. They will also be of only marginal utility in meeting the requirements of the current national military strategy with acceptable risk. Whether created as new organizations or from modifications of existing ones, these specialized units would probably be inadequate to meet future demands for their skills, anyway, since Center for Army Analysis (CAA) projections based on data from the 1990s predict the United States will face 25 to 30 ongoing SSCs every month. And that does not include the increased operational tempo resulting from the Global War on Terror. One alternative to deal with this approach would be to structure Reserve and National Guard units to perform stabilization phase functions. After active combat units have had time to provide a secure environment, deployment of such specialized RC/NG forces might be appropriate. Their performance in the Balkans has drawn rave reviews from many civilian administrators who like the different attitudes those units bring to stabilization phase operations. But there would need to be many of these units to prevent excessive deployments, and these same attitudes that please civilian observers will draw the Army even more into nation-building tasks.

**Creating More Multipurpose Units**

This option makes more sense, considering the realities the Army will face. The service’s transformation initiatives are very relevant for this solution. The new medium brigades will retain some armored punch with more infantry. They will have augmented intelligence capabilities. They will be more mobile and versatile. The Army would need to invest in multipurpose technologies, such as platforms equally suitable for mounting lethal weaponry for combat or carrying relief supplies for humanitarian missions. This solution will require more than just new organizations or technology, however. There will have to be a recognition and acceptance throughout the Army of the likelihood and importance of Phase IV operations, and that they require a different mind-set and training than decisive combat operations do. Army schools at all levels will have to prepare soldiers better to meet
this challenge, and units will have to adjust mission-essential task lists (METLs) accordingly.

**Increase Active Component CS/CSS Force Structure**

A common theme in mission after-action reports, observations from civilian administrators, and exercise analyses is that the Army has serious shortfalls in providing the required CS/CSS support for Phase IV. Some of these shortfalls are the result of having theater-level elements in the reserve components that might be a late follow-on in normal force flows in war plans. This is the case with some engineer organizations. Some deficiencies are the result of elements that are almost exclusively in the reserves and have just become overextended by the unaccustomed demands of recurring deployments. In other cases, the force does not exist anywhere, sometimes because of the lack of reliable historical experience or planning data to determine requirements. This is a factor in the shortfalls in military police assets to conduct internment and resettlement functions with EPWs and refugees. The complicated multinational and multiagency environment of Phase IV has also created a host of new requirements not foreseen by planners used to combat operations.

Some deficiencies can be handled by training and equipping CS/CSS units to be more versatile, but most fixes to this problem are not that easy. To effectively increase its CS/CSS personnel and assets available, the Army will have to invest in that force structure, particularly providing more active component assets for theater or echelon above corps tasks. Utilizing scenarios included in the DOD Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance, the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 determined that the Army needed 230 new CS/CSS units to be able to conduct contingencies for 60 days without RC augmentation. The list covers many of the shortages revealed by recent AARs and would be a good place to start to determine expanded requirements. Ongoing GWOT operations have revealed even more CS/CSS needs.

**Strengthen Civilian Agencies**

Though this is not something the Army can do directly, it is often a solution presented by those who believe the service should not be involved in any nation building, as well as by departmental secretaries and officials advocating the roles of their organizations. In some form this solution needs to be adopted anyway and supported by the military, though there is an obvious threat that reductions might be made accordingly in the DOD budget. But nothing in Phase IV can be accomplished without establishment of the secure environment on the ground that only military forces, and primarily the Army, can maintain.

The lack of quick response capability of civilian agencies and problems
coordinating them will ensure that the military will bear the brunt of all essential tasks in rebuilding and reorganizing a failed or war-torn state for a long time in any Phase IV. For instance, a representative from the Justice Department specializing in setting up police forces has stated that even with proper funding and commitment, it takes at least nine months to have a viable force, and recent experiences show that to be an optimistic estimate. The implication for the Army is that there is no foreseeable future reduction in the nation-building or nation-assistance roles that Phase IV operations will demand from it. Some relief from this burden could result from practices that have developed to contract services to companies such as Brown and Root, but these activities have recently come under fire from the GAO for their costliness and inefficiency, and suffer from the same limitations as operations by other civilian agencies.

Recently the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness told a group of defense correspondents that to prevent future wars the US military is in the nation-building business to stay, and its leaders need to accept that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines so engaged believe it is an important mission. His assertion is supported by anecdotes from the field. For example, soldiers interviewed in Nova Brdo, Kosovo, emphatically expressed their support for nation building. One of them announced, “With every plate of glass we replace in a window, with every door we install, we’re helping these people get back on their feet.” He also described the importance of patching a child’s broken arm and giving a mother blankets to keep her children warm. He concluded, “With every town that we help, we’re helping the nation get stronger.” While the incoming Bush administration initially expressed resistance to employing the US Army in nation building, recent history demonstrates it will occur anyway. Being prepared to conduct such operations will avoid a sense of “mission creep” when they inevitably have to be performed.

Dag Hammarskjöld once said, “Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.” The same might be true for nation building, especially during the earliest stages of Phase IV before a safe and secure environment has been established and civilian agencies have been able to build up their resources. Accepting nation building or increased nation assistance as a mission has major implications for military involvement in Phase IV operations, but it would also bring service attitudes, doctrine, force structure, and training into line with the reality of what is happening in the field. This adjustment also probably will require congressional action to carefully alter legal and fiscal constraints about such military activities.

The Army especially is developing a set of leaders with experience in Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They understand the importance of Phase IV
in accomplishing national policy objectives. Almost always, most military missions in these situations will be the responsibility of ground forces. The US Army has been organized and trained primarily to fight and win the nation’s major wars. Nonetheless, the service must prepare for victory in peace as well.
Notes

1. John J. Yeosock, remarks in “What We Should Have Done Differently,” Part II of In the Wake of the Storm: Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm (Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000), 25.


4. Combat operations were conducted superbly and quickly in a complex situation (with difficult terrain, many civilians, and restrained rules of engagement) that required intricate joint planning and execution.


7. Fishel, 29-63.


11. Cavezza Interview; Fishel, 38, 58-59.

12. Cavezza Interview. Lieutenant General Cavezza expressed doubt, however, that he could have trained his unit adequately for the Mission Essential Task List required for war and for the complexities of the postconflict operations he faced.

13. Fishel, 63.


15. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System entries 10451-37950 and 10754-92362, USACOM CD-ROM.


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18. AAR, 2-9, USACOM CD-ROM.


20. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Karl Warner by COL Dennis Mroczkowski, JTF-190 Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY AAR, 266-267, USACOM CD-ROM.

21. Interview of Colonel Gerald Palmer by Major Christopher Clark, JTF-190 Operation Uphold Democracy AAR, 269, USACOM CD-ROM.

22. Chronology, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, USACOM CD-ROM.

23. This expansion of missions is evident from the Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Logistics Support Operations briefing from the USACOM CD-ROM.

24. Warner Interview, 267.

25. JULLS entry 10829-67459, USACOM CD-ROM.


27. JULLS entry 11566-55234, USACOM CD-ROM.


34. Ibid, 9-36.


36. Operation Joint Guard, 4-5, 5-18. Problems were so acute that the AAR asked for both the Reserves and National Guard to realign their units and specialties for peacekeeping missions.


39. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Joint Military Commissions: Lessons Learned From Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, May 1996. The large requirement for military liaison with the myriad agencies involved in such contingencies was a key point of discussion at a Post Conflict Strategic Requirements Workshop conducted by the Center for Strategic Leadership at the US Army War College 28-30 November 2000.


43. Most of the ideas in this section on the Philippines were developed in conjunction with Dr. Brian Linn of Texas A&M University. He is the author of The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000).


47. Ibid, 6-8.


50. The ideas in this paragraph were provided by Professor James Corum, of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL.

51. Corum.


55. For more complete descriptions of these reforms, see Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, and Willoughby.


57. Dower, “Lessons”.

58. This depiction was developed by Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, and first appeared in Conrad Crane, *Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001), 34.


60. Reserve Component Employment Study Group, *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 Study Report* (Washington, DC: DOD, 1999), 1, 12-13, Annex E. The study group recommended against these changes mainly because of the cost to develop new force
structure and because giving the AC this capacity to conduct SSCs independent of the RC would take away the Army’s “political check and balance” to prevent the Executive Branch from committing substantial troops to an SSC without a debate in Congress on mobilization. The latter rationale seems a questionable usurping of the president’s prerogative and could have the result of limiting Army utility and increasing response time. The policy has also contributed to the RC strains mentioned in this study and has not produced much congressional discussion about the large numbers of reservists and National Guardsmen deploying to the Balkans. It can therefore be criticized for its effectiveness as well as its constitutionality.

61. It took almost a year and a half for UN civilian police and Italian Carabinieri to relieve American troops of some of their law enforcement duties in Kosovo, and a local police force is still being formed. Bosnia has a working indigenous force, but six UN policemen frustrated with its corruption had to resign after “exceeding their authority” and acting on their own to liberate women forced into prostitution. Gregory Piatt, “KFOR Soldiers’ Roles Changing In Kososvo,” *European Stars and Stripes*, 27 November 2000, 3; Colum Lynch, “Six UN Officers In Bosnia Resign After Unauthorized Raid,” *Washington Post*, 30 November 2000, 20. A GAO study examining the lack of progress in reforming the Bosnian law enforcement and judicial systems concluded, “Senior Bosnian officials have not demonstrated the will to address the problem of crime and corruption and work toward a society based on the rule of law.” USGAO, *Bosnia Peace Operations: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement*, GAO/NSIAD-00-156, July 2000.


Question: I have a problem with mirror imaging. We’ve done mirror imaging in Russia. Now we seem to have done the same with Iraq.

Answer: We tried to avoid the problems of mirror imaging. Our study group had people from the Middle East and regional experts. And they talked about using what was already there, making sure the Iraqis were involved, and using whatever types of institutions—and institution is a fairly broad term—using whatever kind of institutions were on the ground to build on, understanding the religious and tribal realities of being over there. You’re right that overall planning seemed to make some bad assumptions based on mirror imaging. But the flaws also resulted from the problems with the conflicting intelligence different groups were providing. A lot of the planning was based on what Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress was passing on. There were a lot of different truths floating around.

Question: You mentioned the problem of information operations, which I think is very important. I’ve also been running around telling people that I thought our information operations were very poor. And particularly that we’d done a very bad job of getting our story out to the American people and to our soldiers and to the rest of the world, and so forth. The response that I’ve been getting frequently is that the Army doesn’t do information operations directed at the American people. I can see some validity in that statement. Especially when you’ve got some people saying they fear the Army’s going to lose its ability to “check the president” if it abandons the Abrams Doctrine, which is one of the scariest things I heard in your presentation. So, how do we balance the need to get our story out, basically to be doing information operations, with the desire not to be attempting to manipulate American democracy through information operations?

Answer: Here’s an example of how I think we can do better getting our story out. I had a Wall Street Journal reporter talk to me before he went to Iraq. I said, “You’ve got to go up to Mosul and see [Major General] Dave Petraeus, [Commander, 101st Airborne Division], and what he’s doing up there.” So, the reporter got over to Baghdad and tried to get transportation to Mosul. Nobody would give him a helicopter to go. So he never got to Mosul. He spent all his time writing about all the problems in Baghdad. We should have given him a helicopter to get him up there. That’s a story we really wanted to get out.

Question: That story is out. Petraeus was followed all through combat and into Mosul. There have been other reporters who have been putting that out on a regular basis.

Answer: But they didn’t come out at the time, early in the operation. They’ve
come out later. Rick Atkinson wrote a book about it, but it came out a year later. The example I gave was right when things were first kicking off at the beginning. We needed to shape the information battlefield early with that story, before the negative stories from Baghdad dominated the airwaves. As another example of our difficulties in this area, I was talking with someone working in CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) on the budget for information operations for the new Iraqi government. One problem over there is that we didn’t pay people enough money to get the good journalists. The good journalists all went to work for the Iranians and the Egyptians. And this guy was trying to get the Iraqi information budget cranked up so they could hire the better people, and they wouldn’t do it. I just think there are little things we could do to emphasize the importance of information operations. Try to get the best local journalists to write for our side. Try to help people go where the good stories are. We’ve recovered from most of our early miscues. But, for instance, it took us six months to get our television station up in Baghdad. And, in the meantime, the Iranians are swamping the airwaves. Not to mention Al Jazeera. But, the bottom line is, we’ve just got to plan for information operations better right from the start and understand how important they are. Perception quickly becomes reality. We’ve got to understand how important it is to shape these early perceptions of any operation we conduct.

**Question:** John Fishel, NDU. Just a quick correction to one of the minor points that you made. Max Thurman’s guidance downward on postconflict operations, in his own words, was not what he would have chosen to do. He told me directly that his one regret from the entire operation was he didn’t pay enough attention to his Blind Logic plan.

**Answer:** I’m sure he considered the guidance he gave inadequate, especially considering the result, but what guidelines he did set down were pretty much ignored, anyway.

**Question:** I haven’t heard any mention of, for example, the reconstruction of Japan while MacArthur was there. MacArthur’s powers were far more expansive and even absolute than what your recommendations were. Why didn’t you look at Japan? Why not use that as a model, where you have a full military proconsul?

**Answer:** Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Smith. Iraq is a completely different situation than Japan. You had a homogenous society there, for one thing. It was also clearly a defeated nation; there was no insurgency that came about. And, too, the Japanese gave MacArthur absolute power with very little resistance because the emperor acquiesced. I don’t think you can compare them. You can’t recreate that situation again. I would agree with you, though, that the combatant commander should have overall responsibility. He wouldn’t be another MacArthur. I mean,
there aren’t any other MacArthurs around. For good and bad. General [John] Abizaid, though, should have more power than he does. If you’re going to put in Ambassador Paul Bremer and the CPA to do reconstruction, you should have put them under the combatant commander. I just think the command structure should have been organized differently. In some ways you’re right about creating a sort of military pro consul. I think the combatant commander needs a lot more power than he’s got in these situations.

**Question:** Major Jim Brown from the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. I was on Colonel Benson’s staff as one of the CFLCC civil-military planners. I can tell you that our planning did take into account that we were going to build on the existing structures that were already there. But we were kind of overruled in that when CFLCC turned over during the transition of authority to JTF-7 and V Corps. So, that piece of the plan, at the operational level, did include building on the existing structures all along. And we did do things like instead of having a separate Phase IV, we had Phases IIIA and IIIB, and went through an unbelievable number of planning sessions on how we were going to do the actual stabilization part of this. Another thing I would like to talk about and address is your point about every soldier is a civil affairs soldier. There’s another side to that. And that’s that your civil affairs soldiers are advisers. They do not have a monopoly on civil-military operations. From my perspective, that’s one of the big problems we’ve had in the past year or so in Iraq. “Hey, that’s a civil affairs guy’s problem. Let them handle it.” Civil-military operations (CMO) require an integrated staff approach to everything. There’s an engineer piece, there’s a logistics piece, there’s a transportation piece, there’s a public health piece. All the staff elements, not just the civil affairs guys, need to contribute to the CMO plan. I think that’s been one of our main problems right now.

**Question:** Colonel Bailey, National Ground Intelligence Center. I would say that we also need to look at the political effect of individual soldier actions.

**Answer:** That’s the old “strategic corporal” argument. Some private can make a tactical mistake on the ground, and it can have serious implications all the way up to the strategic level. What you do in the local restaurant and what you do on the street can be important; you’re always on parade. We have to realize that. This applies to all soldiers in these situations, but especially Americans.

**Question:** The study you co-wrote with Andy Terrill on reconstructing Iraq; could you talk about the origins of it, the audience it was designed for, and the impact it had or didn’t have?

**Answer:** Okay. In October 2002, the commandant of the Army War College, Major General [Robert] Ivany, visited the Army G3, I think it was Lieutenant
General [Richard] Cody at the time, and they decided that a war with Iraq was probably on the horizon and that we needed to be prepared for what military responsibilities we would have at the conclusion of the combat phase. I was given the mission to organize our study team that month. In November, I went to a conference at the National Defense University, which was dealing with some of the same things. I went around the audience and asked selected people if they would participate in our working group. Andy Terrill was the Middle East expert in the Strategic Studies Institute. At the same time, he was gathering Iraqi experts to talk about a more regional look. I did a historical overview, and I started to develop a mission matrix based on the Haiti interagency reconstruction plan. Then, in December, we called up the people in our working group and met for two days at the War College in the Center for Strategic Leadership. What we came up with was a very good regional assessment of Iraq, I thought. We came up with a very good mission matrix to reconstruct Iraq, which defined 135 tasks. We had them in three categories. Thirty-five were in the top “critical” category, 32 were in the next “essential” category, and the remaining 68 were labeled as “important.” We figured out who would do each of those missions in each of the four pieces of transition I talked about, and who we would hand them off to, whether it was State Department, AID, Justice Department, the UN, World Health Organization, and so forth. We had everything from medical support to transportation to security for the borders to protecting historical artifacts. We covered all the things that needed to be done and who was going to do them.

I know Colonel Kevin Benson’s planners saw at least some drafts of that. We also provided copies of the report to Army G3 on 29 January 2003. We gave a copy to Lieutenant General [David] McKiernan, and ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance) had copies. I was at a session with ORHA in mid-February with Ambassador George Woods, who was their top civilian, and he made the point of standing up and saying, “This [study] is not our plan.” That was pretty obvious from the way things turned out. But I know our study got around. I know within the Army people had it. I know the Joint Staff had it. I know a number of people who have come back from the theater and said, “We saw your stuff. We tried to implement some of it, but we just either didn’t have the resources or weren’t allowed to do all the things we wanted to do.”

I know that when USAREUR got our study they concluded CENTCOM was going to need MP support. And they offered an MP brigade. They were actually going to form an MP brigade—I think it was 4,500 or 5,000 MPs—to provide for security and follow-on forces for the guys going into Iraq. EUCOM would have needed augmentation from the Germans to restore those positions, and also a reserve call-up to fill up holes. The proposal got to Washington and it was killed for those reasons. So, the MP brigade was never formed or sent.
The study was not as important as we hoped it would be. We concluded that General [Eric] Shinseki’s opinions about the number of US troops it was going to take to occupy Iraq were shaped, to some extent, by the study. Because we think he read it.

**Question:** I was, at that time, in Advanced War Fighting and Strategic Campaign Planning. We spent several weeks at it. The interesting thing about that exercise was, instead of doing Phase I through IV in campaign planning, and especially in the war-gaming piece, we kind of spent one day on I-III and we spent the next eight days on the IV piece. So, that was very different for the planners in there and the combat arms officers in there. It was really hard to do. It was very difficult. When you had already built the TPFDL (time-phased force and deployment list), you already had your movement under way, and now you’ve got to wrestle with these resources that you need for Phase IV, which are somewhere in the stack back there, you’re not going to get them on time.

**Answer:** And the study is available at the Strategic Studies Institute website. If you go to it, you can download it. There’s actually a short version, which is basically the matrix with a short explanation, and a longer version, which includes all Andy Terrill’s stuff. They’re both on the SSI website.

**Question:** Colonel Dave Sutherland, Center for Army Tactics. In your recommendations, or your proposals, you listed things like larger staffs, larger organizations, but I didn’t notice, or I didn’t see any discussion of education systems—to integrate this material more fully into the education system, especially the officer education system. Would you touch on that a little bit?

**Answer:** That’s an excellent point. Each school’s got to handle that as best it can. At the War College, they’re starting to do more. I mean, we had a whole day on Phase IV operations last year. That’s an increase from the past, and there will be more this year. Some seminars are doing more with it than others. There actually is a transition operations elective that people can now take, as well. There have been more presentations on the subject at every school and more people are thinking about it. I did a presentation at the Joint Forces Staff College about three weeks ago, and they’re adding it into their curriculum as well. I’m sure they’re doing similar things here at Leavenworth. But it’s hard to get the message out. Again, I think that what we’ve got is a whole generation of majors and lieutenant colonels who have lived through these operations, who understand why they’re important. Maybe that’s going to be where the real changes come in; when these officers all become generals, and they start to revise the education system to match the reality that they’ve experienced. Lenny Wong has a new study he just did for the War College, which is on the War College website this month, September [2004]. The main point he emphasizes is that, in Iraq, we’ve created a bunch of junior leaders
who have been given a lot of leeway and done a lot of innovation and have been developing new ideas as they go. Now we’re going to bring them back to a training environment where they might not have that same amount of flexibility. And the dilemma is, how do we maintain this atmosphere of innovation and freedom in the current training environment? That’s another challenge for the education system, as well.

**Question:** Shane Story from the Center of Military History. You’ve really been looking at the operational problems of peacekeeping. I’d like to ask you to elevate it just one level higher to strategic problems, and specifically what we’re talking about before Iraq. What I see is a fundamental contradiction in the planning and the assumptions and the intent of liberation with minimal forces, followed by a very quick draw down which was on line in early May. This is contradictory to what subsequently became the policy after de-Baathification and disbanding the army. So, on one hand the commitment was to a minimal force, but total success was expected with little resistance. In early May we didn’t necessarily know who the enemy was. But by late May, the enemy was all Baathists and the former military training thousands of opponents to the US vision for Iraq. How do you reconcile those competing visions?

**Answer:** The insurgency over there is very complicated. There are a lot of pieces to it. The US dilemma going in was the sense that we didn’t want to go with a big footprint because that would create more Iraqi antagonism. We wanted to keep troop strength to a minimum. I understand the reasons why they wanted to keep the footprint small. There was a sense the Iraqis wouldn’t accept a large number of our troops there. At the same time, it’s always better in these situations to go in heavy and then draw down quick. So, it’s a dilemma. My sense is it’s always better to have too much than too little.

**Question:** I had a few eaches that I wanted to share with you, but it’s not a critique of a great product. One is, I think that in your examples you end up with too dark a picture of Iraq; in part, because you have too light of a picture of these other insurgencies and comparable operations that we’ve been through. The impression you have from your slide on Germany, for example, suggests that our problems were over in about three months. I don’t think you intended to communicate that, but Germany was a big problem for a long time. As was Japan.

**Answer:** One example I should point out is that Germany and Europe took up between 3 and 4 percent of our GNP for four years after the Marshall Plan began. Yes, it was a problem for a while.

**Question:** As you look over the 20th century and some of the 19th, what’s happening to us in Iraq right now isn’t really a Category V mess. It’s a Category II or III.
I mean, it’s a mess, but as things go it could come out okay. The second point I’d like to make is that you focus a lot on what I would call a lack of vision, a lack of appreciation of all the counterinsurgency requirements. I’m not sure that completes the story. I think if you were to take any of the general officers involved and give an interview in a room, if you were to talk to Petraeus or you talked to Schwartz, any of them would be able to tell you, with pretty good fidelity, the kinds of imperatives you’ve traced out in your recommendations. They know what’s supposed to happen. I think a problem exists with respect to execution. And a subset with respect to execution is the turnover, the changing of horses. And the most dramatic was changing from whatever was before Garner to Garner, and from Garner to Bremer, and from Bremer, and each time you had this change you lost a lot of traction. But within the organization you were cycling people through for three months and six months and you have contractors doing important jobs and they’re there for two months. This lack of personnel stability is a big issue.

The only ones who were staying any length of time were the soldiers who were there for a year. And a collateral point I’d make with respect to the vision, in the big picture of what went right; you kind of zipped through that because it wasn’t your subject. But I think one thing in particular should be emphasized, when you said there was no humanitarian crisis. A huge preoccupation of the prewar planning was to make sure the bombing and the war fighting were discreet enough and discriminate enough that you had no big movement of refugee populations. You didn’t want to have millions of people on the road. In the immediate aftermath, there was a great fear there was going to be a food shortage and there was going to be a crop failure. So, your first civil affairs activities that mattered went into reconstructing the irrigation ditches and the agriculture. This effort succeeded. Less successful were the electricity and the oil, but they’re coming around.

**Answer:** We made overly optimistic statements early about what we were going to accomplish.

**Question:** That’s right, about how fast it was going to go. So, my comment, and I’d like to hear your response, would be that the leadership on the ground knows what is supposed to happen. It’s trying to make that occur, but it’s facing impedances to execution. It’s those sources of friction that need to be addressed more so than failures with respect to initial planning.

**Answer:** OK. I’ll say one thing as an explanation for glossing over my slide on our many successes in Iraq. If I’m giving this talk to a more civilian audience, what I see as a more hostile audience than a military one, I spend a lot of time on that “what went right” slide. But for this audience, I feel I need to talk more about what went wrong.
Question: And you want to goad us a little bit.

Answer: Yes, that’s true. I think the big problems were … again, as you mentioned, resources. I just think we needed more stuff in many categories. We might not have required more combat guys, but we did need more of other types of units. You’re right, a lot of people had the right ideas, but you just didn’t have all the pieces to make it happen. So, resources are key. I had an interesting discussion with a CENTCOM planner a couple of weeks ago. He was saying that what happened in CENTCOM headquarters was people didn’t understand how complicated the war was, how complex a war like this could be. He said that on the CENTCOM staff, planning the war sapped our energy, sapped our resources, and sapped our people. He said we just didn’t have anything left to put into the post-conflict effort. So, that goes back to this issue of headquarters resources, as well. He said, “You know, we knew this was important. But it’s kind of like the marathon runner who hits the wall at mile 20. We knew we had to get that last 6 miles. We couldn’t get there.” So, again, I think part of why we are making progress intellectually is because we’ve got a generation of leaders who have grown up in these environments, and they know how important they are. We’ve just got to get an institutional commitment all the way up through DOD about how important these things are and to allocate the resources required. So, yes, there are great signs of progress.

The bottom line is that we’re making progress. Resources are the major issue, though planning is, also. We’ve still got to plan better for these operations. But, yes, a lot of things went right. And again, we are still the best scrambling organization in the world to do these missions. In contrast, I’m just very skeptical that we can change civilian culture when somebody in the Senate says, “We’re going to create an Office of Reconstruction in the State Department and they’re going to take this responsibility away from the military.” A congressional staffer drafted such legislation and sent it to me for comment. I told her, “Lorelei, let me give you my concerns about this. Number one is where are the resources going to come from to do this? And how are you going to revamp State Department culture to do this kind of mission?” For me, this reform is in the “too hard to do” box. It’d be nice, but I just don’t see it happening.

Question: Bill Flavin, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. I’d like to build from what you said is the civil side of the problem. Transition operations must be a harmony of military and civilian agencies. Military involvement is necessary but is not sufficient by itself. But how do you bring in the other civilian players? This is not a DOD issue. The office of Ambassador Pascal, the new office that’s been created in the State Department, shows some thought about this problem. But, indeed, it’s an issue. I talked with our ambassador who was in charge of Brcko, in the Balkans, Ambassador Ferrin. He told me, “You know what a State
Department ambassador does? He takes a message from his president, walks down the hallway and gives it to another president. Who ever thought I knew how to run a city?” The question to address is, what’s the last country Bremer ran? I don’t mean to be flippant, but really, what is the capacity, the training, and the ability of all of those other civilian agencies to coordinate with each other and accomplish these kind of missions? There’s talk about solutions, but that’s an issue that’s just moldering out there. With that capability gap, of course, it falls to the military to fill it. For example, remember the helicopter pilot in CPA who was given charge of fixing the rail lines because he had a model train. He was a good man who tried his best, but he just did not have the right skills. Military people are much better at scrambling than their civilian counterparts, and have more resources.

**Answer:** I think we’re always going to end up having to do these transition operations, and we should be ready to do them again. Mission creep is often self-inflicted. We have got to be ready, but it’s a sad commentary on our interagency process.

**Question:** Sir, Major Todd Plotner, SAMS. Sir, you mentioned that you see signs of hope in the US military from the way the education system regards transition operations. Perhaps you’ve answered this already, but increasingly we recognize that we can’t succeed in transition ops without healthy interagency cooperation. Do you see any signs of hope in the way other US agencies and departments regard transition operations?

**Answer:** Yes, Bill Flavin, from the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, who just spoke, has been working on some of those issues. You know, people in other agencies are talking the talk. They’re just not walking the walk. And again, it seems to me that there are some basic things that have to change. I don’t understand why the State Department can’t say, “By God, you’re going to Baghdad for a year.” Or, “You’re going to Afghanistan for a year.” And I don’t know how they pick their people. I’m on a seminar teaching team at the War College with a State Department exchange instructor who is a personal friend of Ambassador [Zalmay] Khalilzad, knows Hamid Karzai as well, has spent years in Afghanistan, wants to go there to help, and nobody in the State Department has even approached him to do it. I guess I’m pessimistic. I don’t see the required motivation for change out there.

**Question:** I think, you know, in the military we’re used to thinking about how we’ve got constrained resources and we can’t do everything we have to do. You haven’t seen really constrained resources until you go to the State Department. I mean, they do not have, in general terms, the personnel to do the things required of them, especially if we’re going to start getting them involved in these kinds of
operations. And I think what this drives to is the larger problem that we are still operating as though we were fully at peace in terms of the way we are staffing and resourcing the agencies responsible for foreign policy and defense in this country. Even as we are fully engaged in the most complicated military struggle we’ve been engaged in probably since the Second World War. You know there’s a myth out there that says if you want organizations to change, put resource pressure on them. My study of bureaucratic change tells me that the exact opposite is true. If you actually want organizations to change, you need to make resources not an issue, because as long as the main issue is, how are we going to pay the people we have, nobody is going to be thinking about change. Until we can find a way to break this resource logjam, I don’t think there’s very much prospect of having any significant change in this area. Whatever they do to the DCI.

Just something quickly. It’s always fun to pick on the State Department. God knows I’ve done it myself. But let’s look at some of the other successes that have occurred with some of the other agencies. For example, one eye opener for me was in Afghanistan, where, in the same room talking to each other (a miracle in itself), you had representatives of the NSA, CIA, FBI, all the services, and different elements of special operations. They actually were sharing information freely with each other when the pressure was great for a specific series of operations. So, there is some hope the interagency process can work if the resources are there, and if they’re forced to look each other in the eye about a significantly important mission. So, maybe there is even hope for the State Department someday.

Answer: I’ve heard a lot of good reports about USAID, both out of Iraq and out of Afghanistan. They’re trying.

Question: Edward Peck. I’m here as one of your lecturers this afternoon, having spent 32 years in the State Department but still able to employ active verbs. One of the things you ought to know about the State Department is that it is small. You know, in the kind of macho, stud-muffin language we use in the Foreign Service, it’s itty bitty. To put this into context … there are 1,300 more full-time members of vocal and instrumental musical groups in the Defense Department than Colin Powell has diplomats. We are very, very thin on the ground. So, it’s hard to do a build up. Colin Powell arrived and one of the first things he said to the assembled people there was, “What’s the float factor in personnel?” And they all said, “What’s a float factor?” There wasn’t one, as you may know. In the State Department we try to minimize underlaps when you have transfers because when you go off to training, the chair sits empty until somebody comes back. Now Colin Powell is trying to put a float factor in.

Answer: I agree. The more and more I get a sense of the resource problems
in other agencies, I just don’t know where the resources are going to come from to fix them. Again, that’s why I just say I think the military needs to be prepared to suck it up for transition operations because we’re going to be fated to do them. But maybe there’s a long-term solution out there with Ambassador Pascal’s office. They’re talking about the interagency process. They’re trying to staff his requirements. They’re trying to develop a plan of interagency headquarters with interagency people connected to different theater commanders. But it’s going to be a long row to hoe.

**Question:** My name’s Mike Hochlich. I’m with the University of Kansas, where I teach in the law school. I specialize in the legal basis of empire, older ones than this one. I’m really rather interested that in your presentation and in the questions, you haven’t considered the fact that an imperial army is a very different thing from an army which is episodic and campaign oriented. And in all sorts of ways, imperial structures are far different. For instance, on education. If you look not at the second British empire in the 19th century, but at the first British empire at the end of the 17th and the 18th centuries, they created a whole college, Haileybury College, to train colonial administrators. And it mixes both military and civilian people. And it hires the best possible people, such as Thomas Malthus, to teach them economics. You find civilian administrators such as Sir Edward Jones, who goes to India and sits down in Madras. And, by the way, the first British empire in India has a lot of lessons to teach folks. They understood about the Northwest Frontier very well. And again, what you find is they are applying a very different model about insurgency, which they had plenty of. I think that when you’re going to look at models, if you’re looking at models in the 19th and 20th centuries, and only doing that, (and I assume you’re not), you really need to look back at a different model, which is a transitional imperial one that requires a very different relationship between civilian authorities and military authorities. And a different mind-set in both. You mentioned the influence of von Moltke on the American military mind-set and you’re absolutely right. There’s also Lieber, who influenced von Moltke, and all of them were studying the Roman empire. Indeed, one of the things that has been very important recently among legal historians, of which I’m one, is the influence of General Orders 100, written by Lieber in the Civil War. But if you read General Orders 100, he is citing my stuff. He’s citing Roman Imperial law. This is important if you want to talk about history helping you with strategy, particularly not so much the military strategy but the structural and bureaucratic strategy. As an outsider, but as a historian and a lawyer who listens to this stuff in a different way, I think you’re talking about issues that have been around for centuries. I know you’ve read the 20th-century stuff, I’ve read the 18th-century stuff. I’ve read the 6th-century stuff. The same discussions are going on, about the same kinds of problems, the same lack of resources, the same problem of extended
supply lines, the same problem of integrating tribal society into a more modern technological society. There were many innovative kinds of things that were done; for instance, the manipulation of citizenship rights, which I’ve heard no one discuss in the Iraqi context. We should consider the notion of citizenship as a tool for integration. I really do think you need to have a somewhat broader view. The British, when they confronted their imperial destiny, recognized that they had to look at another empire, the Romans. The Romans looked back to Alexander. Like it or not, we have an imperial destiny. The road is there and we’ve stepped on it. And we are looking for lessons in a period when we explicitly rejected an imperial model, which is the 19th and early 20th centuries. I think that is the wrong place to look.

**Answer:** When this administration came into office, nation building was a bad word. Now empire is a bad word. But during one of our working group discussions, one of the participants came up with a solution for our continual problem with transition operations and said, “What we need to fix all this is an American colonial office.” That didn’t go over well. That was not a recommendation we put forward any further. You need to bring in Skip Basevich to talk about the dangers of empires. That’s a slippery slope, and there are a lot of serious implications for the Army if you think that is exactly where this nation is heading.
I’m very pleased that TRADOC and CSI are putting on a conference on this topic, which I think is enormously important. I think there is little better that we can do right now than to continue to focus the Army’s attention on this and then continue to try to focus the national leadership’s attention on this incredibly important problem.

I teach the Military Art course at West Point. We just finished our annual reading of the chapter on the Battle of Long Island out of *America’s First Battles*, which is a wonderful little book. For those of you who aren’t familiar with it, it studies the first battle that American armies fought in each of the wars from the Revolution through Vietnam, and the thesis of the book is really fairly simple: that, with the exception perhaps of the Ia Drang, all of those battles have a common thread, namely that we lost them. And the focus of this book, which was written in the late 1970s [and early 1980s], was that in the future, we might not be able to afford to lose the first battle and then come back and achieve victory as we had in the past. Therefore, we must put all of our effort into winning the first battle. And I think recent events have shown we have done that. DESERT STORM reversed the trend. We won the first battle. In fact, we won all of the battles. And in ENDURING FREEDOM, such battles as we fought, we won. And in IRAQI FREEDOM, we won the first battle, and we won all of the battles. But as I was reading this chapter and thinking about what the book was about, it occurred to me that perhaps we have succeeded too well; perhaps we have created an organization that is superbly qualified and able to win the first battle of every war but is not able to actually win the war.

What do I mean by that? Well, I want to get from there into the question of what is war, and what is war about? And how do military operations fit into war, which I think is the single most important question we need to consider today.

For reasons that I do not understand, some graduate student in Germany wrote a little bio on me; I think it was in *The Frankfurter Allgemeine*, based mainly on an article I had published, “War and Aftermath,” in *Policy Review*. I mention this because it gave me the best epithet that I’ve ever had in my life or ever expect to have. The title of it was, “Frederick W. Kagan, *Clausewitzianer.*” And it just doesn’t get better than that as a military historian and a military theorist, right? But the question is, what do you take from Clausewitz? Clausewitz is the most quoted source and the least read, and I think in the case of the Army, we have a tendency to quote one part of Clausewitz and implement another part. We will always talk about how war is an extension of politics by other means, and, yes,
he did really say that. I know there is an argument about that, but, yes, he did say, “War is an extension of politics by other means.” But that’s not actually the part of Clausewitz that the Army likes. In my experience and study, the part the Army likes is the one that says the way you win is to find the enemy’s army, attack it with your army, crush it decisively, and move on to the next thing. Pursue the strategy of overthrow, and you will achieve whatever it is that you want to achieve. Now, if you think about it for a minute, those two propositions are not necessarily even equivalent, and they may not even be compatible, because if the situation is such that the simple military overthrow of the enemy’s army will not lead you directly to achieving the political goal, then it may not be the right strategy to pursue. In fact, it’s unlikely to be the right strategy to pursue.

What I have noticed is that in recent years, more and more, not just the Army, but the entire Defense establishment has moved in the direction of accepting a Clausewitzian simplification of war that says the only important target is the enemy’s armed forces and that once you have destroyed the enemy’s armed forces, political success will inevitably follow. I think recent events have shown that to be absolutely not true. And I think if we once reflect on the fact that we can’t accept that shortcut, then we have to rethink in a fundamental way how we conceive of war, how we’re organized for war, for planning, for execution, and we have to recognize that the very term Phase IV is going to lead us into wrong thinking because it implies that the accomplishment of the political aim is something that happens after the enemy’s army has been defeated, and that won’t do.

I don’t think this is a new problem. I think that we have spent a lot of time in the Army and the Defense community talking about how 9/11 changes everything and talking about all the problems that are created by 9/11. I don’t think this is a new problem at all. I think if you go back over American history, you will see that we have frequently failed to plan adequately for achieving our political aims, even as we have been planning superbly for defeating the enemy’s armed forces. I think sometimes it’s worked out okay. Sometimes it hasn’t worked out at all. But it has been a common problem in the American military.

I guess I should have introduced myself up front. My name is Cassandra, and I am up here to tell you in my opinion all the things that are wrong with the American military. That doesn’t mean I don’t think there are a lot of things right with the American military. There certainly are. But one of the characteristics of Cassandra is that she’s always right. And what’s disturbed me is that, as over the past few years I’ve made pessimistic predictions about things that would happen, they’ve mostly come true. And so as I was looking at the unfolding of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, I was writing at the time, saying, “We’re not going to achieve our political objective here because we went in with a military plan that was going
to undermine the possibility for ultimately achieving our political goal.” And the slide that Conrad Crane just put up and lots of other evidence make it very clear that that is true. There are some good things that are happening in Afghanistan, but there are many more bad things that are happening in Afghanistan. One thing not happening in Afghanistan is the development of a clear, stable, central political authority that actually controls the country. And if that doesn’t happen, we will not have achieved our political aims there. In Iraq, I said at the time, and I have argued subsequently, the way we fought the war set us up to have maximum difficulty in pursuing our political objectives during the peace.

[General Eric] Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army, was right to press for larger forces in the initial phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He should have made the point sooner. Others should have made it with him, and it should have been generally accepted. When you talk about a “small footprint,” what was the small footprint for? The small footprint was for the forces that would be necessary to defeat the Iraqi army. But the defeat of the Iraqi army, with all respect to the complexity of the operation, was never in doubt. I don’t think any serious person imagined there was a chance that the Iraqis would defeat us. We could talk about more or fewer casualties. The truth was that objective military evaluations of the situation suggested to me and others that it was even unlikely the Iraqis would be able to hurt us very badly, even if we went in with a fairly stupid plan. The hard part was always going to be what happens afterward.

But the main point I want to make to you today is that what happens afterward is powerfully affected by what happens during the war. And that seems like a really obvious point, but I think we’re having a hard time getting our hands around it and what to do about it. You do not fight a war for the purpose of defeating the enemy’s army. You fight a war for the purpose of achieving a discrete set of political objectives. Those objectives should guide every aspect of campaign planning. You should never ask the question, what is the minimum number of forces we need to achieve victory in the combat operations, and let’s minimize our footprint and then end the discussion there. Because achieving victory in combat operations is not the objective. The question is, what are the forces that will be necessary to achieve our political goals? A part of which may be, but is not necessarily, the full defeat of the enemy’s armed forces. So what I’m suggesting is that we are in fact doing our planning exactly backward. First, we do Phases I through III, then we do Phase IV. If you understand and really have internalized the idea that war is an extension of politics by other means, it should be the other way around. You plan Phase IV first. And the questions you ask should be, what do we want this state to look like when we’re done? What do we want the region to look like when we’re done? What will be the obstacles that we will face, and how will we have to overcome them? And, of course, one of the obstacles is going to be the enemy’s army, and we’re going to
have to deal with that. But the truth of the matter is, especially from a grand strategic and a strategic perspective, that is a secondary consideration. And our best planning should be going into how to achieve our political goals. And only then how to fit military operations into that.

*Audience question: Are you talking from a military perspective or a US Government perspective?*

I’m talking from a military perspective and from a US Government perspective at all levels. Everyone has to internalize this. And I know your next sentence, “The military understands that and people have been doing that.” Right?

*Audience question: No. I think your target audience is not us. We’re constrained by resources. One of those is time.*

I understand. But if you’re not doing it, it’s not going to get done. If what you want to do is fence off the combat operations and say this is what we do, and we don’t have the resources to do anything else, you run the risk of winning the war and losing the peace. You run the risk of designing combat operations that do not support the ultimate political goal.

Let me be a little bit more specific about this. My favorite example is ENDURING FREEDOM, because in IRAQI FREEDOM, it’s a little more complicated. And also we’re being a lot more successful in Iraq than we’re being in Afghanistan, in my opinion. ENDURING FREEDOM had the characteristic that we had virtually no forces on the ground in the theater during most of the most significant combat phase of that war. We went in with the lightest conceivable footprint, primarily special forces troops, who were mainly serving as liaison with indigenous armies that we were renting for the purpose and served as target designators for our crushing air power superiority. It was a very well-run campaign in a certain sense, however well planned it was militarily. But it had the following results. It meant that we had absolutely no control over how the situation on the ground developed when the Taliban broke. And that meant the following things. [To begin with,] it had been a political desideratum not to allow the forces of the Northern Alliance to take Kabul, because we were fearful that—and did not think that, and rightly did not think that—the Northern Alliance would be able to form a stable government that could hold power. We were fearful that, if we let them into Kabul, we would not be able to get them out again, and they would thereupon insist upon a much greater share in power than we might want to give them. But we could not prevent that from happening because we had no forces with which to occupy Kabul in theater. That created a vacuum. When the Taliban broke and ran, Kabul was open, and the Northern Alliance went in. We told them not to, and they went anyway, and that was the end of the story. And that, frankly, has compromised our ability to set
up a stable government there ever since. We knew we would need ground forces to support the air power. We didn’t want to send our own. So we rented the indigenous forces by giving a lot of money to warlords. Those warlords have now used that money to set up their own private armies and their own private palatinates all throughout the country, and the major problem Karzai faced after being elected, or selected, was the problem of getting control of the regions that the warlords were controlling with money we had given them. That’s not a success.

Another problem we had, another major objective, was to capture and destroy all of the al Qaeda forces in theater, if at all possible. And al Qaeda did us an enormous favor in Afghanistan. Rather than continuing to exist as a shadowy terrorist organization that’s very hard to track down, they actually concentrated a significant number of fighters in a combat unit and stationed it north of Kabul. That gave us the opportunity, if we had been able to insert even relatively small forces into the theater, to cut off and destroy and capture or kill all of those guys, but it didn’t happen. Instead, as the bombing campaign broke the front line, most of those soldiers filtered away, and we have ever since been chasing them around the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan trying to get control of the problem, where we had a much better chance of getting control of it if we had pursued a different military strategy from the one that we did. In other words, the way we fought the war in Afghanistan, I believe, created a series of problems or exacerbated a series of problems that a different campaign plan might have mitigated or minimized.

I think you can make an argument that similar things happened in Iraq. We did not make it a priority to seize and control the territory of Iraq as we were fighting. We made it a priority to destroy Saddam’s military power. We were hoping to do that with air power—didn’t work—came in with ground power and rolled over them in a very successful military operation that took them down in very little time. But as a result of the campaign plan, which had not made a priority of seizing control of the country, the last area that we occupied was the Sunni Triangle. And I’m open to correction. There are many people who are more expert on this campaign than I, but from what I could see, it looked to me like there was an entire Republican Guards division up there that we did not destroy and that was largely able to melt into the countryside and begin the process of organizing itself for an insurgency to follow. That could have been mitigated or minimized if we had made it a priority from the outset to occupy the entire country and especially that area which was likely to be the biggest problem. The way we fought the war created very serious problems for the sort of peace we wanted to be able to establish there.

Now, you can make the argument that a lot of what’s going on in Iraq was based on bad intelligence. Chalabi was certainly feeding us a lot of moonshine that
we were buying for a variety of reasons, which tended to reduce our focus on the need to do all of this stuff. But that’s not the point I’m trying to make. The point I’m trying to make is that we fought the campaign in a certain way that was very successful in terms of destroying the enemy’s combat power but was not very successful, or at least not as successful as it could have been, in laying the groundwork for achieving the political goals we wanted to achieve when the fighting was over. And I do think you are very much the audience that needs to hear this, because if the political objectives are not driving the military campaign plan, then you run the risk of having divergence between the two. And that, I think, is part of the problem we have going on. Now, I think this is being very strongly reinforced, and to some extent even driven, by problems at the level of the National Command and especially DOD. And I think that if you look at—and this is the thrust of my article—if you look at the transformation program that Rumsfeld brought with him into the Pentagon and has been pursuing single-mindedly ever since, you will see that it is a program designed to increase the cleavage between military operations and the achievement of political goals, because it is a transformation program that focuses almost exclusively on creating the capability to destroy the enemy’s armed forces as rapidly as possible in the minimum time, with a minimum footprint—which means relying to a maximum extent on air power. And you get wonderful comments from Air Force officers saying things like, “In the next war, we won’t ever have to have anybody leave CONUS.”

If that’s all you’re interested in, then you can fight the next war without ever leaving CONUS. We can absolutely disaggregate the armed forces of just about any major power in the world. We can do that. If we give ourselves a long enough time and enough missiles, and we’re prepared to get into a real, very one-sided attrition war, we can destroy anybody’s armed forces right now. But that’s not the goal. And the problem is that destroying enemy armed forces from the air leaves you in no control over the situation on the ground. And the Air Force likes to argue, and has been arguing ever since DESERT STORM, but especially after OIF, that they can now control the ground. And they talk about air patrols over regions that they were using to control this and that, which is not a new concept. Hugh Trenchard, the British chief of the Air Force in the 1920s, had the Royal Air Force take over the mission of imperial policing in Iraq and relied, so it is said, exclusively on air power. Now, it’s not true. He actually had armored cars on the ground that he was running as though he was an army commander and without which he wouldn’t have been very effective. But he said, “We can do this mission.” They policed it, and ever since, we’ve had this model that air policing can actually work. Well, it depends on what you’re trying to do, and it depends on what else is going on. In Iraq, we need to remember that the British actually had a colonial infrastructure that was running the show politically. And Trenchard was supporting
that. When we went into Iraq today, we didn’t have anything like that. We had to rebuild. And before you rebuild, you have to transition. And before you transition, you have to lay the groundwork for the transition. And this “backward” planning has to guide the way you think about military operations from start to finish, and it must be seamless. It must be seamless, and it must be integrated, and it can’t be done as Phase I, Phase II, Phase III, Phase IV.

As the point was made earlier, if the TPFDL (Time-Phased Force and Deployment List) is not going to get the troops necessary for Phase IV into theater until six months after the war is over, then you’re not going to succeed. But even more than that, think about it this way. Think about it at the micro level. When an American military unit goes into a region in Afghanistan or Iraq and destroys the local military organization and thereby frequently also the local police—because in most countries in the world, we would be fighting the police or paramilitaries that we are not going to be happy just to leave around—what have you just done? Now you own that little region. What are you going to do from that moment that is going to support your Phase IV objectives? Well, you can just hold it for a little while, and people will allow you to do that as long as you actually hold it. But if you just smash it and move on, you’re running a big risk, because nature abhors a vacuum and the local population will work immediately to start filling that vacuum with indigenous structures if you don’t do it for them and if you don’t control the area. Because someone’s got to run life around there. And that means that by default, the local leaders, the natural leaders, will pop up and start taking control. If you let them do that for a week, two weeks, two months, while you’re finishing combat operations and thinking that you’re then going to come back and do Phase IV over there, you will find—as we found in Afghanistan—that a lot of those local leaders will be so entrenched by the time you turn around and try to deal with them that you will not be able to do anything except deal with them, and you will have given away a lot of options and a lot of opportunities that you might have had if you had been in positive control of the situation.

So the key point there, again, is that the combat operations must be focused entirely from start to finish on creating the preconditions for the political objectives, and even during combat operations, we must begin the process of directly working to achieve those political objectives.

Now, I wanted to toss out some points quickly, and we can address this more. I think this is going to require fundamental intellectual and cultural shifts in the military. I think we are very eager as an organization to separate these things, not just because we like to stovepipe things, but because we find involvement in politics to be difficult and uncomfortable, which is perfectly understandable. But I think we have to get over that, and the military has to learn to embrace the fact
that it is a direct political instrument, and it cannot try to pretend that politics are “echelons above us.”

I think we need to move beyond jointness. There are, of course, still limitations in the degree to which jointness works, as the current transformation debate shows. But as we work to solve those problems, we are also going to have to work to solve the interagency problem. As we do that, we’re going to find that other agencies are not necessarily resourced adequately and have to undergo their own cultural transformations to make this work. But we, the military, which will have always, I think, the primary responsibility for this task, have to be reaching out and working as hard as possible to integrate with other agencies. To be fair; I think we do that on the whole. I think that the Army, especially, is the best at this.

I think it’s critical that as we think about transformation, we not forget the Army’s uniqueness as an organization. The more we allow transformation to pull us in the direction of being another set of equipment that can put precision-guided munitions down range, the more we lose sight of the unique element the Army brings to joint warfighting, which is the ability to control terrain and to work from the very beginning to achieve political objectives, without which political success cannot be accomplished.

I think we need to recognize that it is essential to preserve both people and technology, and the trade-offs that I think we’ve seen in recent years, as Army leadership has been effectively preserving technology at the expense of maintaining a force that I think is of adequate size, should give us pause. Because technology will never provide the solutions to the problems you need to solve in order to achieve political successes of this variety; only the Army’s people can do that, and if we don’t have enough of them, it won’t be done.

One last thing that I want to throw out—here’s my grenade, and then I’m going to duck behind the table. I’m not sure that the military should be in command even of the war. Unless the military can really turn its cultural biases around and place political goals at the center of everything it does, I don’t really think it’s qualified to do this. I think it can do that, and I think in many respects, it would be the best if it could, but otherwise we run the risk of continuing to have wars where we win all the battles and start losing the peace. Thank you very much.
What War Should Be, What War Really Is
John A. Lynn

Turning battlefield victory into political success at the start of the 21st century will require us to re-examine the very nature of war itself in an age of globalization, Islamic extremism, and terrorism. The American military is apt to search for technological solutions to the challenges before it. Certainly, weaponry, vehicles, aircraft, and other tools of war matter a great deal; however, such hardware is ultimately less fundamental today than is the “software” of thought. Soldiers often say that an army fights the way it trains, which is true, but it also trains the way it thinks. Preparation begins with conception.

Neither the struggle against terrorism nor the conflict in Iraq conform to traditional American military definitions and expectations. We may want war to conform to the heroic dimensions of World War II, but that is not what war really is today. Back then, Americans embraced a clear and just cause, confronted an easily identified enemy, conducted large-scale military operations, and fought battles against the uniformed armed forces of the enemy. Now, our adversaries, whether al Qaeda terrorists or resistance fighters in the Sunni triangle are elusive, intermix with the civilian population, employ the weapons of terror, and require us to respond more with patrols than with divisions. The ghost of George Patton cannot help us much when our main task morphs from the Battle of the Bulge into house-to-house searches in Baghdad.

This paper proposes a theoretical model concerning the interrelationship between conception and reality in warfare as developed in the recently published second edition of my book, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*.¹ Some of the theory’s underlying assumptions derive from cultural history, although these pages will try to avoid the arcane language and convoluted ideas so typical of that field. The model’s essential claim is easy to grasp: Throughout history, different cultures have held different ideas about war, these ideas have affected the way they fought, and such ideas have also been shaped by the evolving realities of conflict. The model was crafted with a broad audience in mind, not targeted at academics alone.

Before going further, permit me a personal declaration. Pundits who proclaim their certainties about war and politics abound; such authorities succeed to the extent that they implant their version of the truth in the minds of those who hear or read their words. They offer a quick and easy path to knowledge—simply agree with them. I am no pundit, nor do I ever wish to be. What appears on these pages may be the product of a lifetime of study but the length of time I have been a military historian does not guarantee that my arguments are correct. They are not intended as shortcuts to knowledge but as food for thought. My model is of value only if it makes
sense to an active reader, a reader who must bear the responsibility of making his or her own judgments.

**An Overview of the Model**

This theory differentiates between the “reality of war” and the way a culture conceives of war, forming a “discourse on war.” These seem destined to be quite distinct, the one not matching the other. Despite my disdain for the language of cultural theory, I have found it convenient to borrow the term “discourse” for the conceptual pole of the model. Here, the term signifies the complex of assumptions, perceptions, expectations, and values on a particular subject. Many cultural historians include those practices that reinforce values, and so forth, in the definition of discourse, but I would like to keep action separate from conception for the purposes of this argument. It is also necessary to point out that a single society can harbor several discourses on war that vary by class, gender, and profession—the last an important differentiation with the emergence of a professional military. Thus, aristocrats might think of war very differently than did peasants, men than did women, and soldiers than did civilians.

The value of the cultural model proposed here derives from its exploration of the relationship between discourse and reality. The fundamental principle of the model contends that there is an essential feedback loop between them. In the diagram of the model in Figure 1, this basic feedback appears graphically as the main, bold, arrows. Cultures try to change or control reality to fit conception, while reality modifies the cultural discourse to better match the objective facts of combat. Essential to classical Greek warfare, for example, was the way in which contending city states, *poleis*, agreed on conventions that determined the timing and character of combat. This imposition of conventions upon combat provides a strong example of how discourse shapes reality. In the other direction, reality can compel a cultural discourse to modify itself so that it better represents the way things really are. The physical losses and psychological shock suffered by armies, governments, and peoples in World War I due to outmoded notions of combat forced the discourse to change.

![Figure 1](image_url)
The model becomes more complex and interesting when factors interfere with the basic feedback loop of the model. Consider first the left of the model, as discourse imposes itself on reality. Should cultural needs for special forms of combat be great enough and reality unable to adjust to them, a society may go so far as to replace reality in whole or in part with a “perfected reality,” which more closely adheres to ideals within the discourse. Such was the case during the Middle Ages with the creation of the tournament.

Now consider the right side, which stresses reality as the actor and discourse as the object. At times, a form of real violence is so at odds with the discourse, and the discourse is so inflexible, that the violence in question cannot be incorporated within the discourse. Such rejection follows two paths in the model. The first can create an “alternate discourse,” which can then justify a more “extreme reality” of conflict. Things move to extremes because the formalities and limitations that often circumscribe war within the dominant discourse disappear in the alternative discourse. Such occurred in World War II between American and Japanese combatants, when little mercy was expected or given.

The model registers a second form of rejection—one so complete that a culture refuses to recognize the violence as war in any sense. Such a “refusal to consider as war” has apparently shown itself in recent events in Iraq, where some American officers have regarded the combat that continued after the defeat of Sadaam Hussein’s regular forces as something basically different from war. Unlike “extreme reality,” the kind of combat affected by the refusal to consider as war might be sharply limited in scale or constrained by rules of engagement, and it is precisely these limitations that cause soldiers to see such operations as aberrations that need not be incorporated into doctrine and training.

The Model in Detail

The Discourse on War

Having sketched the primary distinctions within the model, let us probe them more deeply, beginning with the discourse on war. We must recognize that because organized armed conflict fundamentally and comprehensively affects society at many levels, different segments of society generate their own discourses. As a result, a culture has no single discourse on war. Rather a number of distinct discourses encompass the values, expectations, and so forth, of varied groups that harbor potentially very different, and at times opposing, interests and points of view. Consequently, the conception of war contains a multiplicity of attitudes and expectations. Any generalizations about these conceptions must be specific to class, gender, and—in societies with strong racial divisions—race as well. To emphasize class, gender, and race is de rigueur among historians today; however, my au courant colleagues are likely to overlook the fact that geography and borders can create
important cultural distinctions as well. Moreover, profession is a relevant category, particularly when command and planning become the province of military professionals.

Variety of interest and opinion within a single people is great enough that it is dangerous to make easy assumptions about how a culture regards armed conflict. It is also fair to say that one group’s opinions about war may matter much more than do another’s. The discourse on war is a discourse on power in the traditional sense, and in such matters not all segments of a society are equal. In decisions as to whether to fight or not, and when, where, and how to combat an enemy, elites usually weigh in far more heavily than do segments of society with less status.

Social, political, and military elites—often, but not always, the same as in Western societies—think of warfare in ways markedly different than do lower strata. Medieval and early-modern European aristocrats could view violent martial activity as an end in itself, as a necessary proof of prowess and courage and a validation of noble status, as well as a source of wealth. But often geography draws lines between elites. Even in an era with an international aristocracy, there remained differences, so the late-medieval French held different principles regarding violence and military participation than did their Italian counterparts. And, of course, European peasants who had no need to justify themselves through war viewed it as an unqualified disaster leading to misery and death. Of course, even here there are exceptions, as in the case of the Swiss, who provided the most important mercenary market at the close of the Middle Ages.

Spiritual and religious communities can oppose fighting through moral codes banning violence, or at least violence directed against coreligionists. At least until Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085), the papacy condemned warfare and war makers. However, it seems that all great religions come to accept warfare on certain levels and some produce military religious orders, such as European Catholic Templars or the armed Japanese Buddhist monks. There certainly have been religious leaders, such as Mohandas Gandhi, who eventually opposed all violence, but more common were those like the German preachers who insisted Gott mit uns or the American chaplain at Pearl Harbor who shouted encouragement to those resisting the attack on Sunday, 7 December 1941, “Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition!”

Expansion of political participation multiplied the number of those whose attitudes toward war and peace had to be taken into consideration. At the same time that the public sphere expanded, modern military professionalism took root. To the extent that war became an affair defined and directed by military professionals, opinions held by the general public toward the technical conduct of war mattered
less, even if public commitment to a particular war as a whole became increasingly important. A professional military develops its own discourse on war. In earlier ages this was not particularly systematic, but the rise of general staffs and war colleges in the 19th century, generated formal doctrine. For a number of reasons, professionally generated doctrine can have a great impact on society and culture; one need look no further than the consequences of military practice at the onset of World War I. As is clear from the American experience, different branches of the military services also develop their own distinct military cultures, which incorporate differing attitudes, assumptions, and values.

Gender is a complicated and unpredictable variable. Modern attitudes might well expect that the historical record would reveal that women resisted war and military values, while men promoted them. And at times this has been the case, as in such movements in the United States as Mothers Against the War during the Vietnam era. However, even when women have not participated directly in the fighting, they usually endorsed it through praise of warriors and condemnation of cowards. Spartan women admonished their sons to either come home bearing their shields (well and victorious) or on them (dead but having been resolute in battle). Medieval women adored the knight of proven prowess, and ladies of Louis XIV’s court sought the attentions of brave officers. And even before our modern age of women in uniform, women commonly served as washerwomen, seamstresses, cooks, and amateur nurses with the men at the front.

The discourse on war often glorifies martial action. Cultures may praise martial prowess for various reasons: social values require masculine military performance; the consequences of victory or defeat in war are of great importance to a society; and cultural tastes generate romantic notions of valor. Concern with glory need not be foolish or ignorant. During some historical eras, societies bestowed accolades on warriors precisely because the people of those societies knew grimly, often firsthand, about the labor, suffering, and danger of war. Such certainly was the case in Greek poleis. And even idealized notions of war can encompass appalling brutality, as did Nordic sagas or codes of chivalry.

*The Reality of War*

The reality of war rarely if ever matches the discourse on war. If nothing else, the variety of discourses within a single society ensures that no one reality could match the diversity of conception. But there are other factors driving a wedge between conception and reality, and they are not necessarily implied by the definition of discourse.

Different peoples can have dissimilar conceptions of war as it should be, and when they clash in battle, the fact that they are fighting by different rules creates a
reality that neither adversary expected. Opponents can have different principles about the value of human life, the acceptability of surrender, the fate of prisoners, and the inflicting of civilian casualties. It is argued that certain Native American communities engaged in combat designed more to capture than kill the enemy, and when they confronted the more bloodthirsty conquistadors, the discourse on war among these Native American warriors simply did not fit what they had to deal with. Similar statements are used to explain the victory of the French over Italian condottieres at the close of the 15th century and the start of the 16th.

Technical factors can also cause the real to diverge from the conceptual. Logistics provides a most important example of this, as the necessities of supply shaped the conduct of war and the behavior of armies. For most of history, armies have not been able to carry all that they needed to support themselves in the field, particularly fodder and food. Consequently, they largely lived off the country and committed theft, destruction, rape, and murder, as soldiers who foraged to find what they needed also took what they wanted. Therefore, even when wars were conceived of as righteous ventures, armies often acted like marauding bands who preyed on friend and foe alike. To keep soldiers and their horses fed, ideals of war had to be sacrificed, pious statements of monarchs and ministers notwithstanding.

During eras of military change, when even military elites and professionals cannot predict the full effect of innovations, war can be different than expected. In such circumstances, memories of past conflicts, particularly those tinged with nostalgia, may fail to guide a military, and they certainly mislead civil populations. New weapons and tactics can change the character of warfare before professionals and the public realize it. The longbow of the Hundred Years’ War and the rifle in the American Civil War altered conflicts with deadly results, but the impact of modern weaponry during World War I provides the most disastrous example of a lag between the reality of killing power and the discourse on war. Then, many military professionals knew and accepted the deadly effects of modern weaponry, but more did not, and the civilian discourse on war hardly understood it at all.

But there is another side to the coin, at least by the 20th century. At times, a discourse on war expects technological progress and assumes that the power and accuracy of weapons is certain to increase. Such rising expectations can create a discourse that outstrips reality. The American military, and to a large degree the American public, believed in precision bombing in World War II, but the shortcomings of bomb sights and the difficulties imposed by weather and combat made such precision illusory. Precision bombing of factories gave way to area bombing of cities in contradiction of dominant conceptions of warfare.

Beyond the more obvious questions of technique and technology, dynamics of
war defined by Carl von Clausewitz also compel real war to differ from warfare as it should be. One such influence is the role of friction, which among other things involves the importance of chance and the unexpected. Some modern military theorists speak of the non linearity of warfare. They insist on the unpredictability of warfare and attack assumptions that war is linear in the mathematical sense, for instance that inputs yield predictable outputs. Nonlinear theorists experiment with notions of chaos theory, the “new science,” and complexity theory. Projections concerning war based on linear assumptions must be frustrated in a non-linear world. Another aspect of war explored by Clausewitz is the tendency of warfare to escalate toward an absolute form, free of limitations. If one’s definition of a discourse on war is an expectation of what war should be, Clausewitz would argue that it almost necessarily will be overturned by the forces implicit in real war.

The Model in Detail: Imposing the Discourse on Reality

For the reasons indicated above, and for still others, the discourse on war differs from the reality of war. But while the two differ, they are not independent of each other, because discourse imposes itself on reality and vice versa. Cultural dictates can be so powerful that they shape the life and death confrontation of combat, and the imperatives of reality can force cultures to rethink their ideas of warfare. Often there is a tension between conception and reality that drives a dynamic of change.

A fundamental assertion of cultural history is that human communities impose cultural constructions upon reality, that they make the actual fit the conceptual. Cultural historians sometimes insist that reality is simply what is perceived, and thus culturally constructed. Such an attitude in war is fatal, in the literal sense of the word. But avoiding foolish intellectual excess, this principle applies to the cultural history of war within limits set by the objective facts of armed conflict.

There is a great deal of truth in arguing that human communities have tried to shape combat to fit principles imagined by the dominant discourse. In fact, this process has a long and honored history in the West. From the 7th to the 5th centuries, B.C., classical Greek poleis tacitly or expressly agreed to a number of conventions concerning what weapons would and would not be used, what tactics would be employed, and when and where combat would take place. These conventions ensured an essentially heroic form of combat that led to quick and decisive battles. Such agreements did not, however, limit bloodshed, because when Greek phalanxes clashed, the fighting was particularly brutal.

Western warfare has usually not conformed to conventions as all-encompassing as those accepted by the classical Greeks; however, military forces usually do follow certain conventions. Consider the taking and treatment of prisoners. During the
early modern era captured officers won their release on their word that they would not rejoin their army until formally exchanged. It was quite literally a gentlemen’s agreement. That was a more polite age, but 20th-century European conflicts between major states have usually been fought with rather elaborate standards of behavior toward prisoners of war. Although breached, these rules have remained and spread. The Geneva Conventions represent an attempt to make war as it really is rise to the standards of war as it should be. In fact, the existence of laws of war demonstrates an important and enduring attempt of conception to master reality. Rules of engagement are modern examples of the same impulse—conventions designed to tailor violence to circumstance. Most commonly, they set limits designed to constrain troops for political and humanitarian reasons.

So adamantly can a society, or part of it, desire to force warfare into accepted patterns that the society may replace real war with a perfected reality that more completely conforms to the relevant discourse on war. War itself cannot always be modified, and if the wall between reality and discourse is too high, then a culture may need to create an artificial and idealized form of violence. Never has such an alternate reality been more apparent than during the Middle Ages, when codes of chivalry led to the creation of tournaments as a surrogate for war. By aristocratic standards the tournament was a chivalric ideal, as only properly certified nobles displayed their prowess before fellow warriors and their ladies in a properly regulated but still dangerous environment. Days of danger could be followed by evenings of comfort at banquets that allowed knights to enjoy the attention of women.

While the tournament represented the ultimate replacement of a real with a more perfect form of combat, it was not unique. The common and enduring practice of dueling in early modern Europe did much the same, particularly the form of duel fought by groups rather than individuals. For elite males, dueling fulfilled many of the same purposes as did war, demonstrating courage and prowess in the name of establishing and defending honor. Both war and the duel provided stages upon which a man could display his courage.

It may seem a bit far-fetched, but modern militaries preserve practices that could be seen as replacing the reality of today’s warfare with elements conforming to ideals of what war should be. Drill, ceremony, and parades project a dated but tidy and gallant image that presents the military in an artificial light that sanitizes war. Sport, particularly American football, might even be analyzed as perfected war; the American military often employs the metaphor of football and football the terminology of war. Both provide theaters of conflict for values of courage in the face of discomfort, pain, and danger.
Imposing Reality on the Discourse

If lack of correspondence between the discourse on war and the reality of war can stimulate an attempt to make reality more like the concept, the reverse is even more likely; the discourse on war must change to take into account the evolving character and conduct of war.

The force driving such change in the discourse would seem to be the overwhelming need to recognize and adjust to the reality of war to survive. This survival is physical, in that recognition of reality allows armed forces to deal with and exploit changes in weaponry and military practice, and psychological, in that by accepting reality one is less likely to be unhinged by it. Adjustment can come rapidly, particularly when a military is prepared and organized to analyze and adapt. During World War I, so often used as an example of a costly misperception of trench warfare, the German army radically changed tactics in 1917 as a result of correctly re-examining reality and producing a new doctrine, or professional discourse, and new tactics. Much the same can be said for German development of armored warfare between the wars or US development of amphibious warfare and naval air power.

But discourse can also lag when elements of it are closely bound to social or political principles. Aristocratic military elites of medieval Europe may have been slower to appreciate the shifting realities of war because their aristocratic privileges were tied to their expertise in a particular kind of combat; consequently, a change in the style of fighting might threaten the very justification of elite status. William the Conqueror’s victory at Hastings (1066) resulted from a combination of arms that took advantage of non-aristocratic archers and of aristocratic heavy cavalry, but the elite interpreted the battle as a victory of the knight and as evidence of the impotence of infantry in the face of chivalry. During the Hundred Years’ War, French chivalry fell victim at Crécy (1346) to new English tactics that took advantage of the peasant longbow in defensive positions that supported dismounted knights. A decade later the French responded at Poitiers (1356), not by confronting the problem posed by English longbowmen but by mimicking the English knights and dismounting. It was as though they could only interpret their earlier defeat as being wrought by their social equals, the English knights. The result was that the longbowmen enjoyed even better targets. Sixty years later, at Agincourt (1415), the French repeated their aristocratic mistake.

There are also cases in which the difference between reality and discourse is so fundamental that an adjustment in the dominant discourse on war is not possible. This could involve either some specific aspect of a conflict or its essence. Such an impasse leads to the rejection of the conflict as what the culture defines as proper
war. Such rejection can take two forms, either the creation of an alternative discourse on war or the somewhat different response of a refusal to consider as war.

Because an alternate discourse probably lacks the limitations implicit in the dominant discourse on war, the alternative discourse justifies a more extreme reality of combat. When greatly exaggerated, contempt for the enemy can drive combatants to abandon crucial constraints embedded in their discourse on war. The treatment of Native Americans by settlers and soldiers in North America certainly qualifies as this kind of situation, leading to wholesale massacres of Native Americans. Much has been written concerning US Marines and Army troops in the Pacific during World War II, who came to regard the Japanese more as animals than as men. The result was a rejection of the usual US restraints on treatment of the enemy. This may not have changed US strategy, but it justified the refusal or reluctance to take prisoners and the barbaric abuse of enemy prisoners, wounded, and dead. That part of the conflict had slipped outside the discourse on war and become a new extreme reality.

Throughout much of history, fighting against rebels, guerrillas, and partisans has often rejected the discourse on war. To consider internal rebels as soldiers and their cause as a war may be unacceptable because it would seem to legitimize them. For example, the torture of prisoners by the French in Algeria certainly qualifies as outside the discourse on war, as may also the mutilation of French prisoners by Algerians, although native practices of fighting were traditionally cruel by Western standards. Even within a normal war, certain conduct can stand alone.

Each of these cases brings up another factor in driving an extreme reality. When different cultures that embrace contrasting discourses on war fight, there is no common ground of military practice. Each side sees the other as violating sacred principles and retaliates by abandoning restraints. Therefore, the danger of going to extremes is particularly great in cross-cultural wars.

Refusal to consider as war is another form of rejection. In this case, the military does not form an alternative discourse to fit a new situation or enemy but simply dismisses the notion that the kind of violence at hand qualifies as war in any sense. The response may be simply to meet the situation with ad hoc measures to deal with a situation the military has no intention of accepting as something it will have to deal with in the long term. The ad hoc responses relied upon will not be enshrined in doctrine, for instance the professional discourse; instead, they will be abandoned and forgotten as anomalous, as not the real business of the military.

Iraq has witnessed such refusal to consider as war. In December 2003, Mark Danner reported on the form of combat after President Bush’s premature “mission accomplished” speech. He quoted the pointed analysis of Lieutenant Colonel William
Darley: “What we have here is basically a constabulary action. We’ve seen almost nothing above the squad level. Basically this is not a real war.” Interviews with American officers led Danner to conclude: “Most of these men I found deeply impressive: well trained, well schooled, extremely competent. What joined them together, as the war grew steadily worse for American forces, was an inability, or perhaps a reluctance, to recognize what was happening as a war.” In the language of the model, they were refusing to consider this as war, refusing to incorporate it within the discourse. They would cope with the situation and do the best they could, but it was not what they went there to do. So Bush was reflecting a conception of war, not simply jumping the gun on victory—the “real war” was over. But in this troubled time, “real war” does not really encompass the full variety of war; the discourse must be broadened.

Unlike extreme reality, refusal to consider as war does not drive combat toward unbridled brutality. The kind of operations rejected as “real war” today are often small-scale operations circumscribed by formal and extensive rules of engagement. In fact, it is these necessary limits on violence that make the operations seem like something other than war.

Stupidity or Destiny?

The model presented here suggests that what is often condemned as military stupidity is, in fact, cultural destiny. Intellectuals are prone to accuse soldiers of being hidebound, dull, or even dumb. Comedian George Carlin used to bring down the house with his monologue about oxymoronic language: “The term Jumbo Shrimp has always amazed me. What is a Jumbo Shrimp? I mean, it’s like Military Intelligence—the words don’t go together, man.” One of the most common digs, charging the military with being retarded in the literal sense of the word, asserts that “generals are always preparing to fight the last war.”7 George Clemenceau, the adamant premier of France during World War I, pronounced another famous condemnation of the narrow military mind when he declared, “War is too important to be left to the generals.” However, what many perceive as rigidity or sheer lack of brain power should be recognized as the power of the discourse on war.

It is natural and inevitable that militaries try to shape the reality of war to fit their conception of what that war should be. Of course, reality is not always so obliging as to fit the prescriptions of military planners, so deadly mismatches occur. In any case, discourse is destined to play this role, and there is great force to the professional discourse on war, enshrined in theory and doctrine.

The trick is to escape the confines of currently accepted discourses on war, to question and if necessary, to change them. This demands intellectual courage, to be sure, but it also requires imagination. The 9/11 Commission Report hit on something
fundamental when it charged that one major failure explaining American inability to counter the al Qaeda plan was a lack of imagination. Phrases like “thinking outside the box” have trivialized a valuable principle. Particularly at times of transition, it is essential that militaries think outside the discourse; after all, lives are at stake.

The Need to Construct a New Discourse on War

If we are faced with a new reality of war, then to respond to it, we must change our discourse, or discourses, on war. Certainly the military must reconsider its own assumptions, but so must the political leadership and the citizenry. In Battle Ready, written by General Anthony Zinni and Tom Clancy, Zinni puts it in no uncertain terms: “The truth is that military conflict has changed and we have been reluctant to recognize it. Defeating nation-state forces in conventional battle is not the task for the twenty-first century. Odd missions to defeat transnational threats or rebuild nations are the order of the day, but we haven’t yet adapted.” I would say that we need a new discourse on war, but his words are more direct. In a speech he delivered in September 2003, Zinni criticized the usual path of American military reform and appealed for a new vision; he was talking precisely about turning victory into success:

What strikes me is that we are constantly redesigning the military to do something it already does pretty well. I mean.. breaking the organized resistance in Iraq, even though it may not have been the greatest army in the world, was done extremely well. We’re very proud of our troops and very proud of the way that was executed and led. But it wasn’t enough. At the end of the third inning we declared victory and said the game’s over. It ain’t over. It isn’t going to be over in future wars. If we’re talking about the future, we need to talk about not how you win the peace as a separate part of the war, but you’ve got to look at this thing from start to finish. It’s not a phased conflict; there isn’t a fighting part and then another part. It is nine innings. And at the end of the game, somebody’s going to declare victory. And whatever blood is poured onto the battlefield could be wasted if we don’t follow it up with understanding what victory is.

In Battle Ready, Zinni comments on habits of thought among the American military that still would cast war in the mold of World War II. To posit war in such terms, and to organize, equip, and train for large-scale maneuver warfare leaves us ill prepared for current reality. Memory of past success can be a poor guide for the future. General William Westmoreland exemplified such a classic misapprehension
of lessons learned when he gave his formula for victory in Vietnam: “We know how to do this war. We’re going to put massive firepower down on our targets because that’s the way we did it in World War II and Korea. That’s the American way of war.”

To turn victory into success, we will have to recognize that war as we want it to be differs sharply from war as it really is. How might we need to reshape the discourse on war? Conrad Crane made an important point that echoes Zinni, by arguing that perhaps Phase IV planning should really be our first concern, not a tag-along to the clash of maneuver elements. In an environment that dictates state building after a victorious campaign, state building, not defeating the conventional forces of a second-echelon foe, will be the most difficult and most essential part of military operations. Should we not, then, plan other aspects of armed operations with regard to the outcome we desire in Phase IV? To take Phase IV as the starting point for planning is a significant change in the professional discourse.

If we must accept that state building is not an unwanted encumbrance to “real war,” but the very essence of present and future warfare, we need to restructure forces to discharge this task better. Such a restructuring will probably require shifting resources and manpower away from maneuver units to strengthen other forces better suited to state building and peacekeeping. The fastest growing segment of military forces in the world today is what Sunil Dasgupta terms “paramilitary” forces, by which he means regular, sanctioned, military units created exclusively for interior security roles. Both India and China maintain paramilitaries manned by about a million troops. To the casual observer, such forces as India’s Border Security Force (which patrols Indian Kashmir), look like the army; however, they are organized, armed, and trained for constabulary duties. Similar constabulary forces, but meant not for internal security but for state-building operations, are worth considering, although in the American political-military environment they would probably be defined as light infantry battalions within the Army and Marine Corps. At present, such units lie outside the American discourse. Yet the most fundamental need for the US Army today may not be to increase our rapid deployment capabilities but to alter the nature of the troops we deploy.

Terrorism poses another threat that obliges us to re-examine the discourse on war. In this case, it is not enough that the military rethinks its values and preparation, although this is a critical matter. In a democratic state, the politically active segments of society must confront the issue, and even if a single consensus is impossible, positions should emerge that provide the basis for public debate and a majority will. This stands as a fundamental task of the decade. Political and military responses will be guided by how we as a society come to see this war against terrorists.
One fundamental aspect of this emerging discourse on terrorism must be the realization that the fight against Islamic terrorists will not be uniquely, or even predominantly, military. The struggle will continue for a long time, and it will vary in form and intensity. As a national and international intelligence effort, it cannot flag at any time; security depends upon vigilance. When enemies and threats are identified, responses must fit the circumstance. Often counterterrorist action should be the responsibility of police and security agencies, and their actions must be in accord with law. Sometimes, clandestine units, including special-operations personnel from the armed services, must meet the challenge. Less commonly, regular military forces will conduct bombing raids meant to punish, preempt, or decapitate terrorist groups. Special forces and larger units will be detached to aid regimes battling Islamic terrorist groups in their own countries. On rare occasions, the confrontation with terrorists could take the form of conventional warfare.

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of this necessary discourse on war will be a redefinition of victory. Douglas MacArthur believed that this term meant the complete surrender of the enemy and thus the end to any threat he might pose. Such a goal is meaningless in the context of terrorism, because it is a tactic that can be used by small cells or even isolated extremists who require only limited resources to do their work. Ultimately terrorism is a problem that cannot be eliminated but only managed. For some time to come, the United States will be the target of extreme Islamic terrorist groups, and if and when they subside, there may be others who turn to terrorism. Every death is tragic, but we may have to learn to tolerate a certain amount of loss. Surely this does not mean being callous about the lives of men, women, and children, but rather being resolute in continuing on course in the face of terrorist attacks.

Turning victory into success is no simple matter. Continued combat and casualties in Iraq demonstrate that we did not prepare for the kind of resistance we would face after the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s army. This failure was not one of force, but of conception. We won the war we wanted but risk losing the reality we did not foresee. At some level—military, political, or both—we became captives of our inertia, dupes of our desires, and victims of our expectations. To get it right—if that is still a possibility—we have to realize that we thought it wrong.
Notes


2. For the story of the famous line by chaplain Howell Forgy, aboard the U.S.S. *New Orleans*, see http://my.execpc.com/~dschaaf/praise.html.


5. Ibid.


7. If one doubts how often this line is used, do a search on the internet and see how many hits come up. It is almost certainly the most commonly voiced criticism of military planning.


Question: Your proposal seems to hinge on changing the military’s way of thinking. Most military personnel are concrete, sequential-type thinkers. You’re proposing more of a random, analytical way of thinking and adaptation. That would require a major change in thinking and training. What are your proposals for doing that?

Answer Kagan: I’m very excited that you asked that question because it was actually something that I wanted to get to, but I ran out of time. I think that’s an overgeneralization. I’ve met officers who are sequential thinkers, and I’ve met officers who are incredibly complex, chaotic thinkers. There are lots of different people in the military. But we do have a cultural bias and a cultural stereotype toward linear, sequential thinking, and I am part of the problem here in a certain sense. At least my institution is a big part of the problem. Because, if you come to West Point, we will beat into you the engineering mind-set, and we will beat into you linear, rational, logical, sequential thinking until your ears are falling off your head. And we’ll do it for four years. I think we need to change that. I think we’ve made some moves in the direction of changing that, but I think they’re woefully inadequate. I look at the Mil Art (Military Art) course, which now talks almost exclusively about war and operational military history. (You can tell, obviously, I’m not speaking on behalf of West Point right now.) I have been fighting for 10 years to try to incorporate more political history and political background and international relations in that course, and I’m failing. As long as I continue to fail, we will continue to turn out generations of cadets who believe that Mil Art is all about warfighting and that politics is what other people do. As long as we continue to have a curriculum that is very heavily weighted toward, not science, because science isn’t necessarily the problem, but toward hard quantitative physical-engineering sciences, we’re going to continue to reinforce that mind-set. I continue to be horrified every day that there is no biology department at West Point. In my opinion, we should be studying biology. We should be rethinking the way we think about education in the country, but especially in the Armed Forces. In other words, I think there are a whole host of things that we could do at every educational level that could help us break out of this cultural mind-set. It’s going to take 30 years and more. If we got it perfect today, it would take 30 years and more before we had general officers running around who were thinking in the way we wanted them to on a regular basis. But I think this is primarily an educational problem. And I think we can take steps to solve it.

Answer Lynn: I know you guys in this room often say that an Army fights the way it trains, but I believe an Army trains the way it thinks. To say the problem is insoluble or imply that it’s insoluble is a really pessimistic thing here. Because if
you don’t change the way you think, you’re just going to keep on doing the same
damn thing. The fact is that the military officers I tend to run into are really impres-
sive men and women, and I don’t put it beyond them to look at the facts and think
about it and come to new conclusions. But I really do think it is a huge task. And
again, I don’t think it’s just a military one. In the most immediate sense, sure. But
you know, the military doesn’t elect the president. The American population elects
the president. And corporations help out. And you can’t just work on the military
view of . . . one of the reasons why I think [General Anthony] Zinni [USMC, Re-
tired] has a real big role here, he isn’t just speaking to the military. He’s speaking
way beyond that audience.

**Question:** Dr. Kagan, this is first for you. You addressed five points that need
to be changed. Things we need to change culturally. Doesn’t operational art and
the nine elements of operational design out of Field Manual (FM) 3.0 or the 14
out of Joint Publication 5.02 do just that? Isn’t it more of a problem of application
and education than it is of changing these things? My perspective is that’s what the
elements of operational design do.

**Answer Kagan:** Well, over the years, I’ve had the opportunity to watch the
development of FM 100-5 and then into FM 3-0 and watched the change in its ver-
biage, watched it have an extremely trivial impact on how the Army actually does
anything, which I think is very unfortunate. I do think there is a lot of good stuff
being written in the doctrinal community. I think it’s going to be very important
to operationalize it and to get it into the planning staffs and the execution staffs
so that it actually has an impact. I agree with you that some of the intellectual
groundwork is being laid for this. I think the problem is that we still have a cultural
block against simply saying that in war the political goals are preeminent, they are
always preeminent, they can never be placed behind specific military operational
goals. Because to do that means you are elevating the simple defeat of the enemy
to a position of prominence beyond achieving political goals. We can write that in
doctrine from now until Armageddon (although it’s not now written in doctrine, at
least not that I’ve seen). We can write that in doctrine all we want to. But we have
to attack the cultural bias that says, “That’s not our job. This is not what we do.
This is what we have the State Department for.” And above all, I think it’s worth
taking this on directly. Why do we all rebel at this—or some of us rebel at this?
Because when people are fighting, lives are on the line. As soon as lives are on
the line, our natural humane and human and morally right reaction is to say that
there’s nothing more important than protecting those lives. There’s nothing more
important than designing operations that will achieve their goal at minimum cost to
the lives of our soldiers. In a certain sense that’s true, but in a certain sense we have
to recognize that it’s false. Because if we minimize casualties and fail to achieve the
objective, the political goal, then all of those casualties were in vain, which I find a
morally less defensible position. But I think this is a cultural block and an emotional block that we’re going to have to get over as an institution if we’re going to be able to think and act well to ensure that everything we do is aimed at achieving the political objective of military operations.

**Question:** I was at a conference talking about military ethics one time, and I was getting beat up by a bunch of civilian educators about how we taught ethics at West Point. And Bart Bernstein stood up in the back and said, “You know, you’re asking the wrong guy this question. You should be asking ’What are they teaching you about military ethics at Harvard Business School and Yale Law School’ because they are the people making the decision whether we put people in harm’s way.” So as we talk about these views of war, and we talk about what the military can do better, my question for academia, especially for John Lynn who is in the middle of it, is how do we, in an environment where people aren’t taking military history, they’re not even taking diplomatic history at most schools, how do we get the civilian leadership we must answer to also to be knowledgeable of the very things we’re talking about today?

**Answer Lynn:** You don’t want to get me going on this. It’s a very disturbing world. I look at the way history is taught in the United States right now at major campuses, and I’m terribly upset. I have this feeling like I’m holding the fort, and I would just have to hold it as long as I can. So my revenge is to never retire. I think things are crazy enough right now that they’ll be self-adjusting somewhere down the road. But right now we’re at a period where certain kinds of, for want of a better term, politically correct approaches to the past are absolutely dominant, terribly self-righteous, and gaining ground. But pretty soon, some bright, young pennies who are not 60 years-old and making their own career are going to say, “This is all bullshit, and we really have to stop this.” But it isn’t there yet. I think right now I’m more pessimistic than I’ve ever been about when we’re going to get back to some sort of balance. The things being taught right now absolutely need to be taught. No doubt about it. It’s a question of balance. It’s gone way too much on the other side.

**Answer Kagan:** I agree entirely with John’s pessimism. And I’m not at all convinced that there’s going to be a corrective in any reasonable period of time. This is a major problem for the Army because it means that, on the whole, as you get to senior levels of civilian officials, you are talking to people who have no idea what war is. And it’s a major crisis in a nation that is now talking about how we’re a nation at war and going to be at war indefinitely. That’s fine, but if the electorate has no comprehension of war, then how are we going to choose leaders one way or the other? This is a major crisis in American democracy, in my opinion. What does it mean for you? It means that, in my opinion, the onus on the military to help
educate America’s political leadership in every way possible, not about I want you to do this policy or I want you to do that policy, but about this is what war is, is greater than it ever has been. That means the senior military leaders have to be interacting with their civilian colleagues in a way that is not simply partisan—this is what I want—but is also helping them gently to understand what’s going on, which I recognize, with many civilian leaders, can be almost impossible. About like if the civilian leaders started trying to educate generals about what diplomacy is all about. But, that is something we have to do. And I would suggest one of the ways that we can be more successful at that is, again, by embracing the terms within which the political debates are cast and avoiding at all costs allowing ourselves to be seen only as technical experts in the art of breaking shit and killing people. Because the more you do that, the more you allow yourselves to be portrayed, and the more you portray yourselves to yourselves, simply as technical experts in that art, the less effective you will be at helping your civilian counterparts understand the things they need to understand to make the right decisions.

**Question:** I have a comment and a question for Dr. Kagan. To follow up on the point you just made, I think it’s a very good point in the sense that what we want is generalists, and one of the problems of professionalization, not just in the military but in our whole society, is that professionalization is specialization. If you’re a doctor, you’re not just a doctor. You’re a gynecologist. Or you’re a heart surgeon or something. If you’re a heart surgeon, you only do heart surgery. You don’t do anything else. This is a military, but also a societal-wide issue. In some ways, the 19th- and early 20th- century armies, which were less professional in some senses, might have been somewhat more flexible and adaptable for doing the types of things that you want to see them doing because that professionalism we have today was still in its infancy, comparatively. But that ties into another question, which has been touched upon by other folks.

While we’re harping on the Army as an institution or the Department of Defense as an institution, the problems really are much broader than that, because the Army does not dictate policy. That is not its function. We have politicians who do policy. Our whole society from the start was based on a premise of separation of military and civil. We came from a background of not wishing to repeat the Cromwellian experience of the military taking over the state. The idea of a professional soldier doing anything in the civil realm in the 18th, 19th, and much of the 20th centuries—even though they quite often did do it—but if you went to the average person on the street and asked him, “Should the military be making policy on political matters?” he would have thought you were insane. The American public would not have stood for such a thing. Someone mentioned the School of Military Government and the reaction to that. It was seen as training militarists who would have control of policy. And all the civilian bureaucracies fought very much against
it because they, as they quite often do, failed in the early occupations of Africa and Europe. By default, the military took on that role, and that survived. But one of its legacies was that the School of Military Government pretty much focused on technicalities of military government and civil affairs. How do you repair a sewer system? How do you do infrastructure? The political aspects of that were stripped out because it was too politically sensitive.

The American public would not stand for that. American politicians would not stand for that. We saw the same thing in the 1960s. While John F. Kennedy liked to beat up on the Army and harp about how the Army needed to change and reorient to counterinsurgency, we found also that the civilian bureaucracies—the State Department, USAID, other agencies—were very resistant to those types of things, very resistant to the military having more of a say, more of an input into political matters, crossing into their bailiwicks. The military was reluctant to do this, but the civilians were not keen on it either. In fact, many of the problems that Kennedy pointed out were really problems system-wide in the government. He formed a special group (counterinsurgency), which was designed to pull the military, but it was also in a large part to beat the civilians over the head because they weren’t following through. When they did a 1965 multi-agency study, government wide, of counterinsurgency in the government, they decided that the Army had done the most in creating doctrine, training institutions, disseminating information on counterinsurgency. The Marine Corps was second, and the Navy and Air Force, forget about it. And civilian agencies—State, USAID, etcetera—far behind. Virtually every officer who has been posted to command in a civil-military role, whether it was the Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrection, the interventions in Russia, has been crying for political guidance, has been crying for something he could act on so he could know he could make those types of plans and act accordingly. But time and time again, politicians have refused to provide that guidance, either because they just want the flexibility to deal with things as they evolve, or they don’t know themselves how they want to go about doing it. The type of guidance that you [Prof. Kagan] were trying to seek to make that Phase IV plan first and then plan the war back from that, well, it sounds like a wonderful ideal. My question really is how, in the realities of American society, culture, politics, and the system of government, are you ever going to create a system where you can get that type of guidance firm enough, clear enough, and supposedly non-changing enough—because if something changes during the context of the war, that whole political plan may change—how are you ever going to achieve that type of guidance?

**Answer Kagan:** I think that you’re never going to achieve political guidance that is firm and unchanging about what is supposed to happen any more than if I asked you as a military officer to commit, in advance, to a plan for the entire campaign
that would be unchanging. Political objectives may well shift over the course of the conflict, and it is the duty of the military to change its plans and operations to support them. The goal should not be seeking a firm and unchanging political goal that allows the military subsequently to exclude political considerations from operations. The goal must be to see military operations as intimately interrelated with political objectives and political operations from start to finish. I recognize that there may be considerable resistance to the idea of military involvement in political decision making on the part of the political leadership itself. But the question is not so much trying to get the military more involved in political decision making. It is trying to get the military to include political considerations throughout its own military decision making.

Question: Dr. Kagan, my question concerns an interpretation you’d made of the measure of success we have had or have not had in Afghanistan. If I understood you correctly, you stated that we went in with a light footprint, and you stated that there was a relation between that and having subsequently lost control of the warlords that emerged. I wanted to offer a somewhat different interpretation, a historically based one, and get your reaction to it. That, as an additional objective, the United States was looking back at previous histories in the Third World, particularly in places such as Latin America, and that the intention in strengthening those warlords was to place in power individuals who would be hostile to the Taliban, to al Qaeda, and that, in the interest of placing them in power, we were willing to accept certain compromises between the type of Afghanistan they wanted and our idealized version that would repeat a pattern of supporting authoritarians and warlords in many other areas of the world well back into the 19th century. And if that interpretation is valid, then indeed would not a light footprint aimed at putting a new group of people in power, in fact, represent a rather decent coordination of military tactics with political objectives?

Answer Kagan: Well, it would have. I wasn’t involved in the policy decisions and I haven’t seen the memos, so I don’t think either one of us can say definitively what the objectives were or weren’t. Based on what’s come out, it seems pretty clear to me that that absolutely was not the objective. There was a lot of concern being put out at the time—and people such as Bob Woodward have gone back and interviewed a lot of people about what they were talking about—seemed to have showed that there was no intention at all to fragment Afghanistan in this fashion or to establish independent warlords. On the contrary, the intention was very much to help Afghanistan form a unified, centralized state that would be stable, precisely because we were afraid, and rightly so, that if that didn’t happen, it could continue to be used as a base for terrorists because of the terrain and a variety of other things. So I really do think there’s some evidence to show that our objective was to create a stable, unified entity with its capital in Kabul. Going in with a light footprint
was one of the things that compromised that. Lack of planning was another. If our objective was to break Afghanistan up into a bunch of chaotic warlordships that are fighting one another and creating the conditions for terrorists to return if ever we leave, then we’ve succeeded brilliantly, but I can’t imagine why we would ever have aimed at doing that.

**Question:** It occurred to me that what is needed at virtually every level of command are the skills and abilities of a Marshall and an Eisenhower. At some point in the process, the integration of military into political factors has to be accomplished. In the past, it was done at much higher levels of command, while most of the people within the Army, within the military, focused on the core competencies of their organization. But what we face now seems to be a situation where that integration has to take place at a much lower level, which means that much more of the force has to be effective at doing it. Part of the preparation of Eisenhower and MacArthur and Marshall, to be able to do that, was the fact that they spent a lot of time interfacing in the National Guard, in political affairs, dealing with these things. And they had an intellectual construct, Fox Conner and others, who provided them a framework to be these kind of people. But today there is a tendency for the Army to be inwardly focused rather than allowing this opportunity for interface with broader intellectual pursuits. How do you think it’s possible that we can continue to bring expanded intellectual consideration to the lowest levels, captain, major, lieutenant colonel level of command?

**Answer Kagan:** I think you’ve put your finger on an incredibly important point. I would propose a radical solution of a different variety. Do we need to have State Department representatives on battalion staffs? I’m not sure that we don’t. I think when you look at the sorts of issues that we are dealing with, I think we certainly need to push interagency interaction down to lower echelons, which would help with the problem of this interface. We do need to constantly be seeking out opportunities to have officers interfacing, and not only for the officer’s benefit. It’s also a way for the officers to help educate civilian colleagues at lower levels in the problems and techniques and issues of war. I think the more that we can do that, and the more we can find ways to do that at every level of an officer’s career, the better we’ll be. I think the point was made earlier about the problem of professionalization and the attack on generalism that comes as a force professionalizes. I’m really impressed by the number of capabilities we’re increasingly saying all officers, all soldiers, need to have. We’re way beyond the “strategic corporal.” Now we’re talking about every soldier as a civil affairs officer. On the other hand, Iraq also shows every soldier has to be a war fighter, has to be a warrior. There is no “rear area” in this war. So the transportation guys also need to be steely eyed killers. Do we need to rethink the branch structure? Do we need to rethink the way we do training and promotion? Do we need to be willing to reconsider fundamental ways the
organization is designed right now that tend to create and strengthen professional stovepipes, especially early on in an officer’s career when an officer’s mentality and mind-set is being formed? I think maybe we do. This isn’t a 9/11 thing. This isn’t something where the world has suddenly changed and now this is a problem. I think this was always a problem. I think current events bring it into high relief. And I really think we owe it to ourselves to be willing to ask questions and answer them honestly about to what extent the organization might need fundamental change, not because organizational change will solve the problem, but because we need to be creating leaders of the right variety with the right background and the right skill set and the right mind-set to prosper at various levels.

**Question:** Just a follow up to that last point. Your point of training in a variety of skills at a variety of different levels is well done. We might have to rethink the entire idea of the 20-year career, however, to pack all of that in one particular package. I mean, you have to be joint. You have to be combined. You have to learn this. You have to learn that. You need to have this ticket punched, that ticket punched. Well, there’s not enough time to do everything and make you a skilled soldier/diplomat at the same time. So there needs to be some fundamental rethinking of every level of education from commissioning through to the end point, whatever that end state might be.

**Answer Kagan:** Absolutely, and we’ll have to make sure there’s a strong dose of reality and that we don’t just list all the things and not pay attention to what kind of time is available, of course.
The Critical Role of Cultural Orientation

Edward L. Peck

I have been asked to speak on the subject of culture, and the title I have chosen is “The Shock of Foreign Cultures—Especially Yours.” Yours may seem as strange to them as theirs may seem to you. No surprise there, but think about cultures and subcultures for a second. In my terminology, they are the result of multiple inputs on groups of people over a period of time. You learn, in the home, the neighborhood, the military, the State Department, as an American, as an Ethiopian, whatever, how it is you’re supposed to behave.

Let’s just take religion. Religious beliefs will impact on the way you and your subculture see things. This is an important point to bear in mind. If there are 4,321 recognized religions in this world—and you should be aware that most, I think it’s about 86.213 percent, verbalized statistics are made up on the spot—if there are 4,321 recognized religions, then 4,320 of them are wrong. Because they can’t all be right, can they? Well, mine is and yours isn’t. Religion is going to make a difference.

How about history? Think about Iraq for just a moment. The British occupation ended in 1932, which means that there are living Iraqis who remember what an occupation is. And don’t forget that they were occupied for almost 400 years before that by the Turks. So they’ve been there; this has been done to them. When you talk about occupation to those folks, they know what you’re talking about. It’s part of their cultural history, which is why our president, a year ago, apologized for using the word “crusade” in talking about our activities in the Middle East. Out there they know what that is, even though it was 1,000 years ago. In the Crusades, as some of you may remember, the Christians came down from Europe and killed every Muslim and Jew they could lay their hands on, plus any Christians that weren’t Christian enough.

Now, the people of the Middle East have not forgotten. If you go down to Birmingham or Savannah, they will talk to you, very heatedly, about something they call the War of Northern Aggression. That was 150 years ago, but they have not forgotten it. And it has an impact on how they see things, because history, even though it didn’t happen to you personally, is one of the things that affects your view of things.

How about languages? The word jihad in Arabic means “struggle.” It does not mean holy war. You can call it holy war, but that’s not what the word means. How about the political system? Whether it’s a titular head, whether it’s a king, whether it’s a democracy. How about the economy and how you’re living?
How about such things as prejudice? Now, this is not a dirty word, you understand. It merely means making a decision before you have all the facts. Anyone guilty of that over the last 48 hours raise your hand. Prejudice is going to color how people see things. So will class structure, or the lack thereof. So will education, or the lack thereof. All of these things, and the family, and geography, affect how cultures interact—their attitudes, their values, their behavior. These things are terribly important when you go to really different cultures.

Cultural behavior is learned. Nobody teaches you this stuff. How come we all do the “V” for Victory this way? How come you don’t do it palm in? Because you learned to do it palm out. Winston Churchill brought us this gesture in World War II, and the reason he did it palm out is that, in the United Kingdom doing it palm in is an obscene gesture. You don’t need to know that; everybody does it the same way, and only that way. It’s a cultural thing.

My oldest son has lived in Tokyo for 20 years. He says, “It’s not my skin or eye color or face that makes me remember I’m a foreigner, Dad. It’s more that I will never, ever know when to bow, how deeply, or how many times.” There’s no book for that, you just know it. It’s learned and it’s unconscious. You grow up that way.

How many of you have been to Algeria? At birth, every Algerian male is taken to the maternal village, where his smile muscles are cut. Have you ever seen a smiling Algerian? They don’t smile.

Now, go down to Charleston, South Carolina, like I did a couple of months ago. I’m walking through the park there, a lovely, sunny day and all the kids from the College of Charleston are out playing Frisbee and soccer and all of that. I’m walking up the path, with two very striking young women coming toward me. They give me a big smile, and say a few nice words, and I think, “Wow, I’ve still got it.” Then I realized that in Charleston everybody smiles and speaks to everybody: black, white, young, old. On their license plates it says, “Smiling faces, Beautiful places.”

Those same two girls shouldn’t try that approach on the streets of New York City. One, it’s not going to work because no one’s going to make eye contact. But, if anybody does, they’re going to make assumptions about what those two girls are up to. It’s a cultural thing. It’s pervasive. Everybody does it like that. In Denmark, you smile, in Algeria, you don’t, but next door in Tunisia you do. Cultural behavior is pervasive, it’s accepted, and it’s slow to change.

A brief digression about change. In America, we believe that not only is change possible, but it is good. There are other cultures in this world where you don’t change things because God decreed them that way: “It is written.” If you’ve got a child with a clubfoot and you’re really religious, you don’t take the child to an
orthopedic surgeon because God gave him that foot. As you know, in Hinduism, if you live properly you come back in the next life as a Brahmin; if you don’t, you come back as a dung beetle.

Change is not something everybody accepts as being great, as we do. It’s not a question of right or wrong, it’s a question of cultural perception. Culture reflects every aspect of group behavior, of what’s important to that culture—their beliefs, their attitudes, their behavioral norms, their outlook, and their acceptance of both change and differences.

Now, the point of all this is not to say that one culture is good and another is bad, but when cultures come into contact with each other, there can be problems in communications and behavior. But if one culture is attempting to impose itself on another, the problems are magnified greatly.

Let’s just talk briefly about cultural generalizations. Everybody eats. That is a universal function. Some people eat out of a group bowl. If you’ve never done that, it’s quite an experience. Somebody in the dim light of a tent out in the desert hands you part of a sheep that you’re quite certain you’ve never eaten before, and may never even have seen before.

Some people use a knife, fork, and spoon. Some use chopsticks or fingers. There is kosher for Jews, and halal, the same thing, but for Muslims. No meat, or no meat on Friday. Very hot spices in Thailand, or rotted fish in Norway. You get family style, adults first, fast food. Everyone should accept that people may eat differently, but they don’t because the right way is their way.

You can only see 10 percent of a culture, the part that’s visible. The problems, the potential problems, are in the 90 percent that you cannot see. You can see how people dress—a bikini, an abayah, a skullcap, whatever. You can see their gestures (which can be highly misleading), facial expressions, public behavior, leisure activities, and so much more. This is all visible, but you may not really understand what you see.

I was living in Baghdad when the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power. Shortly after that, we got this telegraphic CIA assessment that said specialists had been watching the Ayatollah on TV, and it was clear that he was dying and would not be around long enough to worry about. They knew this because they saw no changes in his facial expression and no noticeable body movement: he just sat there. But that’s the way Ayatollahs behave, in a very calm and motionless manner, and if you don’t know that you can leap to the conclusion that he’s dying. Well, he may well have been, but that isn’t how you tell. The folks making the report did not understand the cultural implications of being an Ayatollah.
How about Islamic headdress? Some women will wear the really severe covering, which looks like what nuns traditionally wear, and for the same reason: to cover all the hair. Islamic headdress can also be merely a scarf, a kerchief that looks very much like the babushka women wear in Russia, or Spain, or Argentina. It reflects how the wearer interprets what the Koran says.

You cannot see, for example, concepts of leadership. How a leader is expected to behave depends on the culture. Is he supposed to be exactly like you, or does he get all kinds of deference and respect because he is the leader? You can’t have a real understanding of how a leader is expected to behave in a foreign culture. It can be significantly different from what we expect. How about the implications of history? I don’t need to go into any details here, but if you’re fooling with the Middle East, where almost every country has been colonized, several of them more than once, they have a different perspective.

How about the importance of family? In the US, T-shirts say, “Be kind to your children. They will select your retirement home.” In some other societies, you care for your parents until they die in your arms. We don’t do it that way here, but it is not a question of good or bad, right or wrong, it’s just different. In the Middle East, for example, family is everything because of their cultural orientation. They do things for their extended family that Americans don’t even consider to be useful, let alone important.

How about superior-subordinate relations? People understand, in their cultures, how that’s supposed to be done, whether collegially or by a direct order. That’s also personality driven, of course. But you cannot see how it is they’re supposed to behave. I went once to hear the president of Algeria make a speech on a hillside, and saw that policemen kept the crowd back by using three-foot sticks with three-foot knotted leather thongs. They kept the pressure off the people standing in the front rows by smacking people in the rows farther back right across the face. You would not want to try that in societies that are not accustomed to that sort of thing.

How do you define justice? It depends. Should it be a slap on the wrist or 30 lashes? Do you cut off the head or use an electric chair? And what constitutes a really serious crime? You have no way of knowing, because you cannot see that part of a culture.

How about the work ethic? We always laugh because, in some parts of the world, people don’t seem to be working as hard as Americans do. We’ll come to some of that in just a moment. But you can’t see it. What’s the definition of achievement? In America, it’s the big house on the hill, the big car, the swimming pool. Or is it inner peace and nirvana, or the love of your family? What constitutes being successful? Whatever it is, you cannot always see it.
Let’s go back up to the approach to problem solving. How many of you have been in Thailand, where they all seek consensus? I have gone to Malaysia and to Thailand several times over the years, to teach courses for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs on Effective Multilateral Negotiations using detailed role-play scenarios.

In Kuala Lumpur it worked well, in part because the population is diverse; roughly 1/3 ethnic Chinese, 1/3 Indian, and 1/3 Malay. They are therefore good at role-playing and behave the way their instructions tell them to, so there is no way they can resolve the problems laid out in the game. (That’s done on purpose, to make a point.) In Bangkok, where quiet, gentle people are all pretty much of the same ethnicity, they quietly work on the problems and resolve them without contentious debate or raised voices.

IBM set up a special school in Armonk, New York, brought in IBMers from all their various countries to train an international team that could go anywhere to work problems out. They had them engage in all sorts of team-building activities, and they discovered that it didn’t work well because when they’d go to work on problems, culture kicked in: Brazilians, Americans, Swedes, and Germans would argue their positions, but Japanese and Thais would sit quietly, because in their cultures you don’t behave that way.

Religious issues can be key determinants for behavior. Look at the role they’re playing in American domestic—and foreign—politics right now. A number of the topics we perceive quite differently are basically religious questions.

How about appropriate behavior? There’s a tough one. Queen Victoria’s ambassador to Siam, going to the palace to present his credentials, was accompanied by the chief of protocol. They came around a corner of the road, and there, across the field, bathing in a stream, were a bunch of women with no clothing on. His excellency turned to the chief of protocol to ask if it wasn’t considered rude for women to bathe naked in public. The reply was that it was considered rude to look at women who have taken off their clothes to bathe naked in public.

How about the handling of emotions? Is it okay to cry? Is it okay to scream? Is it okay to yell and shriek? You can’t really tell what the person’s feelings are unless you understand what the rules are in that culture for handling and displaying emotions.

How about competition versus cooperation? When I went to Officer Candidate School, just after World War II, there were a lot of veterans in the class. They told us rookies there were two ways to get through this school, eliminate or cooperate, and that we were going to cooperate. Some people don’t see it like that and conclude that if they can get rid of another, they have a better chance.
How about the meaning of friendship? What does it really mean? How about such critical issues as rules for gender interaction? You don’t know if it’s really a foreign culture. I was part of the training team for a federalized National Guard brigade getting ready to go to Iraq. A number of officers who had been in Iraq were there to help prepare the new guys, and they repeatedly stressed the importance of never, never touching the women—unless you’re a woman. Otherwise you leave indelible scars because you break key cultural taboos without even thinking about it.

If you’ve been there, you know that Brazilians prefer to stand closer to each other than Americans do. So you’ll see people at parties slowly moving around the room, as the Brazilian tries to get closer and the American tries to get farther away. It’s like a slow dance.

How about notions of modesty? Can you picture high school boys in Saudi Arabia saying, “Man, did you see the earlobe on that girl?” An earlobe, compared to what happens here. Which is more demeaning to a woman, to require her to cover herself completely or to put her photograph in a magazine in a position that’s usually reserved for gynecologists? It’s a question of culture.

How about status? You’ve got to understand that overseas, in other parts of the world, and even in some parts of our own country, these things make a real difference, and you can’t see it. At the National Foreign Affairs Training Center two months ago, a young student came up to say that she had just been assigned to Baghdad. She asked what she would have to do to really understand the importance and relative standing of families and tribes there. I told her that was easy: all you have to do is be born and raised there. Otherwise, you’re never going to know where to place a Brahimi or an Aduri. Age can give a person a great deal of status in a society, so it may not be a good idea to push old folks around.

These are issues about which you know nothing, really. Situations may arise in which you can make major, unfortunate mistakes without knowing any better. Culture controls perception. Your culture, without you necessarily even being aware of it, is what determines how you perceive things. And perception controls everything else. You know this. Everything you do in your life is based upon your perception of what is the right thing to do. It doesn’t mean you’re going to be right; you may be wrong. You can also be afraid, and you can be coerced. But perception determines what you will do.

Perception is how you choose a hairstyle, a car color, a necktie, a spouse. Somebody else comes along and asks why in the world you picked that necktie—or spouse. Their perception may be different from yours. But perception is reality; all you have to work with is what you perceive. That is largely a function of the culture in which you were born, in which you were raised, or in which you are working.
You know, verbal exchanges can cause problems, because there are different meanings in languages. You have misconceptions and/or false cognates. Those of you who speak Spanish know that the word *embarasada* means pregnant, not embarrassed. And you get unfortunate connections, when you turn to your Indian colleague and say, “Why that company is a real cash cow.” There are subjects that you just do not raise.

Here is the result of a very massive series of studies that were done by people who know far more about this business than I do. And they came up with five categories of issues to think about culturally.

![Structure and Power](image)

The first one is Structure and Power in the culture, as seen in Figure 1. On the left, you have low dependence needs, inequality is minimized, and you don’t need/want much structure. You can see where the United States fits. Hierarchy is useful in a military organization, for example. Superiors are accessible. People have equal rights, and you get change by evolution. Now, at the other end of the scale there are high dependence needs where inequality is accepted, and hierarchy is needed/wanted. One of the things the culture wants is somebody in charge who tells people what to do. Superiors are inaccessible. Power equals privilege. Change is done through revolution.

Here is a scale from low at left, high on the right. Look where the United States is in terms of these issues. Here’s Iraq and there’s Malaysia all the way to the right. There’s a big difference in the way Americans as a cultural group perceive these
issues as compared to Iraqis—or Malaysians. They are far more comfortable with strict leadership than we are. They accept—this is all relative you understand—that power gives privilege. We accept it much less willingly. This is where cultural issues can become serious, for example, when it involves military actions and occupation.

**COLLECTIVISM VS INDIVIDUALISM**

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<td>'WE' CONSCIOUS</td>
<td>'I' CONSCIOUS</td>
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<td>RELATIONSHIPS VALUED OVER TASK</td>
<td>PRIVATE OPINIONS ACCEPTABLE</td>
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<td>GROUP OBLIGATIONS</td>
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<td>LOSE FACE; SHAME</td>
<td>LOSE SELF RESPECT</td>
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<td>PAKISTAN</td>
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**Figure 2**

Let’s take a look at the very important second set of issues seen in Figure 2: Collectivism versus Individualism. On the left is collectivism, where people are “we” conscious. They value relationships over task completion. They’re concerned about group obligations, so that you lose face and you’re ashamed if you have failed to do something. On the right is Individualism, the “I” conscious. Guess where we fit? In our country, it’s “I,” and over there, in Thailand for example, it’s “we.” In the United States, private opinions are acceptable. And we have obligations to the self, to the individual. You lose self-respect, which is different from shame, if you fail. On the scale, there’s Iraq and there’s America, with major differences in how the two cultures perceive collectivism and individualism. It makes a difference in the way people behave and a big difference in the way they interact.

The third category, Task and Achievement (Figure 3), will interest you, I think. Quality of life and service are important to the people who are on the left side. They strive for consensus and work in order to live. Small and slow is good, and there is sympathy for the unfortunate. Men’s and women’s roles overlap. On the right side, task orientation and ambition to excel is the goal, and that’s much more important than it is on the other side. You live in order to work. Big and fast
is good. Admiration for the achiever, men’s and women’s roles are separate. So here is the scale. You won’t be surprised to see Japan out there at the right end. And Iraq and the United States are not that far apart in this particular category of orientation.

![TASK AND ACHIEVEMENT](image)

Uncertainty Avoidance is the fourth category (see Figure 4). This is a major cultural issue, folks. On the left, we see that hard work by itself is not necessarily a virtue in a situation in which people are fairly relaxed in terms of uncertainty avoidance. Emotions, you don’t show much. You get a lot more passive expressions. Competition is good. They will accept dissent, and they are willing to take risks. Few rules are needed. On the right side, you’ve got an inner urge to work. You’re prepared to show emotions. Conflict is considered threatening. You have a need for consensus. You try to avoid failure; you have a need for rules and laws. Once again, the United States and Iraq are not that far apart. Singapore is very low and Greece is at the high end. It’s interesting, if you’ve been to those two countries, to keep this in mind when you deal with their people.

The fifth facet is Confucian Dynamism and is seen in Figure 5. They never completed this particular part of the study in the Arab world, but it’s nonetheless interesting. On the left you have a belief in absolute truth, a pragmatic approach, and planning for the near term. You accept change and you expect results. You spend for today. On the other side, you’ve got many truths, traditionalism is more important than pragmatism, you plan long-term, stability is wanted, you persevere, and save for the future. And there is the scale.
The thing you might want to bear in mind, at this stage, is to understand that in every culture or subculture, its members believe strongly that theirs is the best one, the right one. When they have contact with other cultures, they still believe that theirs is the right one, the best one. And if they’ve had extensive contacts, they
know that theirs is the best one and the right one. And from time to time, they may undertake efforts to convince others, one way or another, that theirs is the right one. It’s called ethnocentrism and merely means that people tend to see things that way because they’re part of that culture.

Now, cultural awareness. You know, cultures may create differences. Some of these differences are really very critical. Some of them are discernible. You can see them, you’re aware of them. Others you are unaware of, even though they may be significantly more important and meaningful. Some are predictable. Awareness helps to reduce or avoid problems and to increase benefits.

Now, let’s talk a little about Iraq in general terms. The individual and the family are far more important there because they haven’t had a nation for very long (see Figure 6). And it consists of significantly diverse ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, which have not developed yet the feeling of nationhood that we have here. But think back to the time when a man named Robert E. Lee said, “I am forced to give my sword to Virginia.” That’s the way it was here only 150 years ago. You fought for the state. And that’s what the War of Northern Aggression was all about, in a sense. The idea of fighting for a state is probably a little less prominent today than it was in the days of the Civil War.

In this same category, it is useful to remember and consider the fact that the Koran, unlike the Bible, covers every aspect of life: social, cultural, political, and economic. Second, no one has ever welcomed an occupation. What’s the difference
between a liberator and an occupier? It kind of depends on which side you’re on. We are liberators, but some people in Iraq see us as occupiers. The difference is perception, strictly, only, always.

Figure 7

Perception is everything. If you lose sight of that, so much of what we want to do in the world, as individuals and as a nation, is going to become infinitely more difficult to accomplish. There is no requirement that you change a policy, or abandon a policy, or modify a policy. But the point is this: If you choose to pretend that other people may not have differing perceptions, or worse, if you choose to ignore that they clearly do, you are merely making it that much harder to get to wherever you’re trying to go, that much harder to achieve your objective. Awareness of differing perceptions is something that isn’t always as necessary within the culture as it is cross-culturally, especially when you’re a liberator or occupier. We know without equivocation that our way is the best way, but other people may not agree. That does not make them right, but it helps explain what’s going on.

In the mid 80s, I was the deputy director of the Reagan White House Cabinet Task Force on Terrorism. This was in the days of the Achille Lauro, TWA 847, the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Red Army Brigades, the Sendero Luminoso, all kinds of terrorism all around the world.

We met with Vice President George H. W. Bush, the task force chairman, to get our marching orders. He said we had carte blanche to go into every aspect of terrorism—except one: “Don’t worry about causes.” You could feel the atmosphere
in that room change. And that is exactly where we are today.

Today we are told, endlessly, that they hate us because we have freedoms. I personally find that an insult to my intelligence. Why in the world would anybody hate us because we have freedoms? There are a lot of people out there who envy our successes, and some of them may resent our excesses. But nobody is going to kill and die for that. There are some people, however, who are prepared to consider killing or dying because, from their perception, we are responsible for their people dying and being killed, indirectly in Palestine for the last 50 years, and directly in Iraq for the last 14. And they don’t like it. It doesn’t make them right, but that’s the problem. If you want to deal with terrorism you must, however painful, consider what some of the causes might be to determine whether or not something could or should be done. And our nation still refuses to do it.

In November 1990, after the United Nations passed the Iraq embargo resolution, President Bush said, “The embargo will remain in place until the people of Iraq get rid of Saddam Hussein.” That’s what it was for, to make life so intolerable for the Iraqi people that they would rise up against Saddam. Two problems with that. One is that they couldn’t: marches on the palace in Baghdad are extremely short, and you’re only around for one. Second, many people didn’t want to because they considered Saddam to be an OK guy.

Think about this: No leader in the world has ever been as loved, admired, revered, and respected as he liked to think he was; no leader in the world has ever been as hated, despised, and detested as his enemies liked to think he was. Proof, the day before September 11th, President Bush had an approval rating of 54 percent. Twenty-four hours later it was at 96 percent. What had happened? When the nation is under attack, you rally behind the leader, even if you don’t like him. And that didn’t happen in Iraq? You bet your life it did.

Leslie Stahl went to Iraq with her 60 Minutes crew in May 1996, four months before the Oil for Food program went into effect, when the embargo was still total. One of the things the Iraqis could not import was chlorine, the vital ingredient in sewage treatment and water purification. In addition, we had destroyed the Baghdad power grid in 1991, rendering the sewage treatment plants and water purification plants inoperative, so raw sewage flowed directly into the Tigris and came right out again into the water distribution system.

And the people of Baghdad, in the millions, were drinking seriously contaminated water. A bad case of simple diarrhea can kill a child, but the children in Baghdad, suffering from massive gastro enteric infestations of a violent, virulent kind, were dying in droves. Stahl talks to British, UN, French, and American doctors, then
she comes back to New York and interviews American Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright.

Stahl then says, “We have heard that a half a million children have died. That’s more children than died in Hiroshima. Is the price worth it?” Albright’s answer, “I think this is a very hard choice. But the price, we think the price is worth it.”

That’s the coldest thing you ever heard in your life. The death of a half-million children is worth it. It is not a slip of the tongue, because she then goes on and explains why it’s worth it. This interview was shown in this country once. But it has been shown overseas hundreds of times, especially in the Middle East. And if you’ve never seen it, then it’s more difficult to understand why some people are unhappy with our policies. If you don’t think that got some people pretty upset with us, then you don’t understand human nature.

I went to El Salvador with two members of the Terrorism Task Force Working Group, where four Marine guards had been killed a couple of months before. We were standing across the street from the embassy, and the embassy’s security officer said, “Ambassador Peck, gentlemen, the embassy you see there is invulnerable to an attack by anything less than a field army.” I turned to the Navy SEAL, a captain, and I said, “Lou, your job is to get the American Ambassador, and we’ve just found out the embassy is invulnerable. What’re you going to do now, big guy?” He said, “Gosh, I guess we’ll have to wait until he comes out.” And the Marine colonel said, “In the meantime, which way is the American school?”

You want to play games with terrorists, homegrown or otherwise? There’s no way in the world you can totally defend yourself against them. What you need to consider is what we might be doing to generate this kind of problem. If there are such things, the question is whether you can or want to do something to fix it. If we choose to ignore the evidence that’s laid out before us, or should be laid out before us, then we will be left facing the consequences.

Let me ask two questions, quickly. Peace and security, my definition, means that the parties to the dispute, whatever it is, are sufficiently satisfied with the resolution of that dispute and that any small groups which are not satisfied (and you can’t please all of the people all of the time) are either marginalized or, at a minimum, not supported. Now, on the basis of that definition, raise your hand if you agree with me that the world in general, and the Middle East in particular, will be a better place when Israel and her neighbors are living in peace and security. OK, raise your hand again if you are of the opinion that the current policies of the Israeli government will lead that nation to peace and security among her neighbors. And there’s the problem: you can’t talk about this, despite the fact that everyone recognizes that you cannot get there from here. It’s not going to work.
It distresses me when I hear people saying, “What we’re doing in Iraq is going to lead to a spread of democracy all over the region.” Yeah, unless you stop to think that there are two democracies actively at work in the Middle East, busily violating every precept of law and rule that they insist is important: the United States in Iraq and the Israelis in Palestine, with our extensive help. Our actions there are not going to leave people fully satisfied with the way we behave.

They don’t hate us; they hate our policies. In the same way, we bombed and killed Iraqis, not because we hated them but because we didn’t like Saddam’s policies. But America is not the problem: it’s not who we are that they reject, but what we do. And over there, we are doing a lot. That does not mean that we are wrong or evil. From our cultural perspective, from our government’s perspective, we’re doing the right thing. But that perception is not the same on the other side. This causes problems.

As the global hyperpower, we can do whatever we want, wherever we want to do it, and whenever. And we cannot be stopped, even if they work together. But there are small groups, and it doesn’t take many, who will look around for ways to make us sorry we did it. They have, and they can, and they are, and they will. And I hope I’m wrong. So, I’ll take questions.
Peck Question and Answer Session

**Question:** Mr. Ambassador, I would gather that one of the canards, one of the most recent canards, is that everything has changed since 9/11. The world isn’t the same as it was. I would assume you would argue that, to the contrary, our perceptions of the world have changed. The shock of 9/11 has just changed our perceptions of the world. Is that accurate?

**Answer:** I think that certainly is part of it. You know, the horror of 9/11, the real horror of it, was that we could see it. December the 7th we saw afterward. So 9/11 went down, and the nation was justifiably horrified and shocked and stunned. And you look around for some way to strike back at the people you’re going to go after. And the world changed largely because we decided it was going to.

I’m now stepping into the realm of politics, for which I apologize in advance. If you have ever read Program for a New American Century, the document written in the 90s by the people who now run the government, you know it says that with the demise of the Soviet Union, it’s now time for us to run the world. Anyway, they all signed this document and are in positions of responsibility now. (By the way, it’s on the web at NewAmericanCentury.org if you’re interested in that kind of thing.)

And it says in there that you start the process in Iraq, which becomes the base from which we accomplish three objectives: control the flow of oil, guarantee Israel’s security, and start a program of regime change throughout the region. Now that last part is guaranteed to generate respect and admiration by our friends in the Middle East. Regime change, right.

If we had contented ourselves with Afghanistan, the world would not have changed so dramatically. But you just invaded Iraq for no reasonable reason that anybody’s been able to produce, and you’re in there doing things to the Iraqis that they don’t appreciate. I was on CNN a couple of months ago, and one of the moderators asked what I would do in Iraq. I said I would get out, and he said, “You can’t get out. There would be chaos.” I waited a moment and asked, “What do you have now? Chaos with us killing them and them killing us. Every day you stay it’s going to get worse, because they’re not going to accept it.” How do I prove this to you? Northern Ireland. And they’re all Christians up there. How long has that been going on? 200 years? Hey, you don’t do it like this. It doesn’t work, history shows you, without equivocation. Unless you kill them all.

Colonel [David] Hackworth (USA, Retired), writes good books, novels. He and I were on television once, and he said, only partially jesting, “The solution for Iraq is simple. Kill them all, make it a parking lot. Problem solved.” I said, “Okay,
two conditions. One, you better make damn sure you’ve killed them all. Second,
you better make absolutely certain you’ve killed everybody who is unhappy that
you killed them all. Then your problem is solved, not before.” You just cannot do
it like that.

**Question:** Sir, in the past, and it seems in the present as well, Americans have
conceived of nation building frequently in ethnocentric terms. I wondered if you
could comment. Do you think it’s possible for Americans to do nation building
without ethnocentrism, and what might a nation building program...if it’s possible
to do...what might it look like?

**Answer:** Those are powerful, heavy questions. Let me see. I was down in
Sarasota, Florida, talking to 600 people in the Institute of Lifelong Learning.
Somebody asked, “In your opinion, how long will it be before Afghanistan has a
fully functioning democratic government?” And I had one of those podium epipha-
nies. I said, “How many of you in this audience, you’re all well-to-do, you’re all
retired, you’re all educated people, how many of you are fully comfortable using
a cell phone?” Fifteen hands went up, several of them slowly. I said, “Think about
this. A cell phone is a piece of hardware which you can hold in your hand, and it
comes with a beautifully detailed instruction book that tells you precisely how to
make it work. But you’re not comfortable using it because you’re not used to it.
People of my generation look at a cell phone with the same level of comprehen-
sion a squid looks at a nuclear submarine. When I use my cell phone, when I remember
to take it with me—and remember to turn it on, I do it with my index finger, and
my kids laugh because you’re supposed to do it with your thumb.

Now, democracy is not a piece of hardware. There is no instruction book. It’s
psychological, it’s historical, it’s philosophical, it’s experiential. How long will it
be before the Afghanis have a functioning democracy? It could be days. They don’t
even know what you’re talking about. And further, here is a key point to consider:
Who says that that’s the best way to do things? Who says it’s the only way to do
things? Think about this. Democracy has become our nation’s secular religion. We
are prepared, if necessary, for conversion by the sword. You will be democratic.

Ladies, gentlemen, by definition, you cannot impose democracy. An imposed
democracy is a dictatorship. You can’t force people into a democracy. To think so
is ethnocentrism carried to a high degree, in the sense that we know that democ-

racy is the best way. It works for us, but that’s our way. It doesn’t mean that they
have to go for this. And remember that, in Islam, the church is the state. The Koran
covers all of this. So, when we come running in, pushing for separation of church
and state, they say, “Whoa, whoa, God says this is the way it’s supposed to be, and
you’re bringing us something that human beings have created. We’ll take God’s
way first.” So I think that this is massively ethnocentric.

We want the Palestinians, for example, to have new elections because we do not accept the guy they elected. On 24 June 2002, the President of the United States said the Palestinians have to have new elections and choose anybody they want, except Arafat. What kind of democracy is that? Can Saddam run in Iraq? Absolutely not.

We are dealing with issues that are so far beyond our canon, our experience, that it’s difficult to understand. Americans, unless you’re a Native American, you all came from somewhere else, and you left behind your village hatreds and memories. Americans don’t understand why people butcher each other for possession of some stony hillside with a couple of trees on it—because that was my great-great-great grandfather’s until his great-great-great grandfather took it away, and now we’re going to get it back. How can you tell the difference between a Bosnian and a Croatian or a Serb? They know, they can tell, because they live there.

Question: Mr. Ambassador, I’ve enjoyed your talk very much, and there’s a great deal you’ve said that I agree with, but there are a couple of points that are troubling me. One is that you’ve really implied rather strongly that the major causes of terrorism directed against the United States are our actions in the world. I have a little bit of a hard time fully accepting that, because having read a little bit, and I’m much less of an expert than you are I’m sure, but having read a little bit in the writings of Zawahiri and some of the things that Khomeini has written, these people were identifying us as the Great Satan and the seducer of the Muslims, and the epitome of all that is evil, and something that needs to be targeted and attacked. And, in Sayad Kudib’s case, long before we had anything like the sort of dramatic impact and footprint in the Middle East that we’ve had now. In Khomeini’s case, not primarily in response to the sorts of things you had been describing, but primarily, I think, in response to what we had been doing in Iran. I’m not going to hold that up as something that was extremely praiseworthy, but I am going to say that the situation seems to me a little bit more complicated than that we support Israel, and Israel does bad things to the Palestinians. We invade Iraq, therefore these guys don’t like us and otherwise it would be okay. Because there does seem to be a rather well developed strand of ideological thought that has played a powerful role in generating these terrorist movements against us and in supporting them as they continue. It’s not clear to me that that would go away if we simply stopped doing the things that they complain about. And a couple of things in there that bother me. First of all, the French, who have been steadfastly opposing us at every turn and attempting to mitigate our influence in the Middle East and generally supporting the Palestinians and not supporting the Israelis, nevertheless had two reporters taken hostage and threatened with beheading because they imposed a ban
on headscarves in France. And this leads me to the question, it may be that things that we do are going to bother these people, but can we really afford to allow their prejudices and desires to edit what we do in the world to such an extent, because after all, they are representative of a tiny fringe as well? That’s the main question I want to pose to you, but I want to tack one other thing on. As a member of the project of the New American Century group that put that report together, I think you’ve simplified it a little bit; and I would also like to clarify that virtually none of the people in senior positions in the administration today played any significant role in the formation of that document. Some of them signed it, but virtually none of them played any important role, and virtually none of them, in fact, came to any of the meetings. So it is absolutely a myth. By the way, neither did they implement about 99 percent of the things that were proposed in that report. It is absolutely a myth that that report has been the blueprint that the neocon conspiracy took into Washington and that has guided all of our actions ever since.

**Answer:** You may be entirely correct. Three things, Dr. Kagan. Returning the compliment, I was very impressed with your presentations. And I was grossly oversimplifying. We only have a little bit of time here. If I had a whole college course, I could do a better job. And I’m trying to lay out some points. Let me start with something else. It is perfectly clear to me that there are in all kinds of groups—what’s the medical phrase?—“nut cases” who are prepared to do nasty things to someone because of something that his group has done. This is in the field of religion, surely. The Iranians have some feeling that we may have had a hand in getting rid of the people and putting the shah back on the throne. And, yes, it turns out that we did. And the Iranians remember this. The Iranians remember the CIA’s involvement in the overthrow of Mossadegh and putting the shah in power and why we did that. It was because of oil . . . they say. So they remember this.

I was on NBC with Tom Brokaw one night, and he said to me, “Why would the Iraqis launch this unprovoked scud-missile attack on Israel?” And I said, “Well, whatever else it may be, it is not unprovoked.” He said, “What do you mean?” I said, “Well, 10 years ago, Israel bombed the reactor in Baghdad. Now, we may have forgotten about that, but the Iraqis haven’t. Because it happened to them. I’m not justifying it. You can call it retaliation, but it’s not unprovoked because they were already bombed. And Americans have forgotten about this.

So, if you look at the Middle East, where we have been propping up harsh regimes, where we have been participating in the suppression of an occupied people in Palestine, providing the arms and the money, they don’t like that. And their reaction is, why are those people doing that to our people?

Nobody’s attacking Ecuador, as far as I’m aware. People are not launching
bombs on Australia. But the Americans are out there doing things, directly and indirectly, to the residents that those residents perceive as being hostile. And maybe even hostile to their religion. You know, a person who wraps himself in the flag of Islam and goes and blows himself up is violating Islam, if you’ve read the Koran. But, we are on the verge, I’m afraid, of making this into a religious war. And if you do that, and you bear in mind that there are a billion and a half Muslims in this world, things do not bode well for peace, harmony, justice, and the growth of free trade and free-market economies.

**Question:** I wonder if there’s a phony dichotomy between who we are and what we do. Because at the point where people take up arms against you and become suicide bombers, they have been committed to a position that isn’t going to be changed by reform. The only thing that’s going to change them is elimination. But there will continue to be people recruited into that, in the long run, if there are not reforms. Consequently, you have to have a long-term policy of reform, a short-term policy of restraint toward these populations, and then a focused ruthlessness on those who are attacking you. I don’t see any other alternative than that. People who are that committed do, indeed, hate you for who you are. It has become an issue of their form or their distortion of Islam. It’s there in the writings. I don’t know how you deny that. On the other hand, how in the world can you turn off the spigot that turns out these people without the kinds of reforms that you’re talking about and that I particularly would feel are essential.

**Answer:** Not too long ago, this Palestinian woman blew herself up in one of the little seaside cities in Israel. She blew herself up. She was a lawyer. The people in Jenin told us about her. She lost her husband and her brother in the Israeli incursion. They were killed. Six or seven weeks afterward, her aged father, who lived with her, had a heart attack, and he died at the checkpoint as she tried to get out of the city to the hospital. Because the people wouldn’t let her through. I’ve got to tell you, if you had to go through those checkpoints several times a day, you’d be a little steamed. But this woman lost it all. Essentially she said, “You’re going to die for this.” And she didn’t attack the people who did this to her; she attacked the people she could get to, which is what folks do in this kind of business.

I do not want anything bad to happen to the state of Israel. I don’t want bad things to happen to us, but I think they will. That’s part of it. So if you look carefully at the situation, you might decide that, well, maybe we shouldn’t be doing this. But if you don’t want to look at the issues, then you can’t even consider the question of continuing or changing a policy.

In the Middle East, they see us as hostile and they have proof of it all through the area—now in Iraq and in Palestine. That’s going to motivate some people to
become aberrational—that’s the word we’d have to use. These people are worthy of being gotten rid of, if you can figure out who they are beforehand. But you can’t.

**Question:** I’d like to compliment you on most of what you’ve said today. I think the emphasis on cultural differences is extremely valuable. But I think it needs a couple of caveats. I’ve always held as a principle that facts never speak for themselves. There’s always a ventriloquist. And, in part, we see, especially in an age of media-driven demagoguery, that certain aspects of culture can be emphasized. Milosevic was one of the prime examples. You had very considerable inter-marriage among Serbs, Croatians, Bosnians, Muslims, Christians within Bosnia, et cetera. You had a society that was moving in one direction, and Milosevic playing on one part of the culture helped to push it very hard in another direction. Let me suggest, also, that our own experience in the American south, things that were seen as immutable in American southern culture vanished within an amazingly short time, in part thanks to political leadership, in part thanks to media, in part thanks to education, in part thanks simply to the pressures of cold reality. So I think one of our real tasks is to almost understand the prayer of St. Francis, to know what cannot be changed, but also to know what can be changed, and how to do it.

**Answer:** I agree with you totally, sir. Yet, there are some people who are die-hards who don’t let go. That’s why this idea of let’s find these people and take them out . . . Who are they? Some of them are just growing up. You remember what one Serb said when they accused him of killing all these little Croatians in Bosnia. He said, “Kill them when they’re young. It’s much easier. They don’t get a chance to grow up.” This is bloody stuff. Americans have a hard time understanding it. How can they possibly feel that way? They do, and they’re driven by things which may not even be anything more than class hatred or ethnic hatred. We, on the other hand, are doing physically measurable, discernible things, which I do not think are in our interests.

In closing, I do suggest that the cultural differences I started with are so vast, and so profound, and so serious that you ignore them at your peril. Now, some of you guys in uniform are still doing what I used to do. I enjoyed that trip very much. My years in the Army and my years in the civilian service of my country. I envy you your opportunities to go on down this path. I’ve already completed the trip. Enjoy it. Thank you very much for your attention.
Leonard Wood, John J. Pershing, and Pacifying the Moros in the Philippines: Americans in a Muslim Land

Charles A. Byler

As Americans are now learning in Iraq, the military occupation of another land can be an extremely difficult task, especially when significant religious and cultural differences exist between the occupiers and the local population. Such was the case a century ago when the United States made its first attempt to govern a large Muslim population. The Muslims in question—known as the Moros—resided in the southern Philippines, which the United States had won from Spain following the Spanish-American War. Between 1899 and 1913, the US Army had the assignment of establishing American control over the area. The army had considerable success in reducing the Moros’ resistance to that control as a result of an approach that combined a “policy of attraction,” designed to persuade the Moros of the advantages of US rule, with a readiness to use force against those who defied American authority.

The American officials most responsible for the success were two of the Army’s rising stars—Generals Leonard Wood and John J. Pershing. Both held the position of governor of the Moro Province, Wood from 1903 to 1906 and Pershing from 1909 to 1913. An examination of the records of the two governors reveals some noteworthy similarities in how they went about the tasks of pacifying the area and encouraging its economic and political development. Both men, for instance, thought the Moros incapable of self-rule but recognized the necessity of using Moro leaders as instruments of the provincial government’s authority. Aware of the US government’s desire to avoid violent clashes in the Philippines, both usually relied first on diplomacy to resolve disputes with the Moros, yet both also believed that the Moros would respond to diplomatic overtures only if the Army demonstrated its willingness to use its superior military power against them. The experience of both governors also shows that Moro resistance became extensive only after the provincial government imposed changes that the Moros perceived as threats to their way of life—for example, Wood’s decision to abolish the traditional system of laws and Pershing’s efforts to disarm the population.

There were also important differences in how the two men handled their assignment. Lacking Pershing’s patience and his respect for the Moros, Wood was more likely to push aggressively for the transformation of Moro practices and to respond with force when the Moros resisted. Pershing, in contrast, became a student of Moro culture and was more inclined to follow the path of persuasion and conciliation in his dealings with them. Partly as a consequence of this method, Pershing had fewer violent clashes with the Moros during his time as governor.
than did Wood. In fact, Pershing’s period in office might have passed without much bloodshed at all had he not departed from his usual course of patience and gradualism in pursuing the disarmament of the Moros.

When the United States acquired the southern Philippines following its victory over the Spanish in 1898, it assumed sovereignty for the first time in its history over a significant Muslim population. The Moros made up most of the population of the Sulu Archipelago and the southern half of the large island of Mindanao. They belonged to 13 different cultural-linguistic groups, but their Islamic beliefs gave them a sense of common identity and a history of conflict with Christian Filipinos to the north. As the Spanish had discovered over centuries of warfare with them, the Moros were fierce fighters. Moro culture emphasized the warrior virtues of honor and courage, and many Moros preferred to fight to the death rather than submit to the enemy. Despite numerous military campaigns in the southern Philippines, the Spanish had never achieved much more than nominal control over them.1

When American soldiers first arrived in the southern Philippines in the spring of 1899, the United States was embroiled in fighting Filipino nationalists in the northern islands. Told by the War Department to do all they could to keep the southern Philippines quiet, American commanders in the Moro lands faced the challenge of trying to establish American sovereignty without the kind of assertion of authority that might provoke the Moros into armed resistance. As a consequence, the commanders generally kept American soldiers in their posts and relied on the datus—hereditary Moro chieftains—to maintain order. Under the Bates Agreement of 1899, the Sultan of Sulu had governing authority in the Sulu Archipelago in return for his recognition of American sovereignty.

This system of indirect American rule proved satisfactory in some respects. The Moros generally accepted the American presence, especially after US officials made it clear they had no intention of interfering with the practice of Islam. Fighting between the Moros and American troops rarely occurred; one volunteer regiment that had been stationed for over a year on Mindanao returned to the United States in 1901 without having fired a shot in battle.3

Indirect rule had its frustrations, however. US officials were irritated by the continual fighting among groups of Moros and by Moro attacks on non-Moros, including American soldiers on occasion. Army officers condemned as ineffectual the efforts of local leaders, the Sultan of Sulu in particular, to halt the violence. In addition, the practice of slavery among the Moros rankled many of the officers and proved to be a source of embarrassment for the government in the United States, where anti-imperialist critics attacked the McKinley administration for permitting its continuation in the Philippines.4
For those US officials who were determined to remake the Philippines along American lines, the Moros presented a frustrating obstacle. Such Americans found it increasingly difficult to agree with the notion that Moro culture should remain untouched and that the responsibility for day-to-day government should stay in the hands of Moro leaders. An officer’s catalog of the undesirable characteristics of the “strange and fanatical” Moros represented the negative views of many Americans in the region: “[The Moro] is a polygamist, has no moral sense, is tyrannical, vain, fond of show . . . treacherous, and for his religion commits the worst of crimes—murder—with no compunction.” Influenced by the prevailing ideas regarding racial hierarchies, inherited character traits, and Anglo-Saxon superiority, many soldiers were loath to deal with people that they held in such disdain. The idea of Moro fanaticism, a characteristic the Americans often associated with Islam, made many officers skeptical that diplomatic efforts would accomplish much. They grew impatient with tedious negotiations with Moro leaders, a type of work many officers were unprepared for by training and unsuited for by temperament. “The Moro is a great talker,” complained one officer, “practically nothing of consequence can be obtained from him in conference, and the less of him the better.” Another officer noted in his diary that a week of negotiations had severely tried his patience. “Have wrangled with Moros about stolen rifles and pistols until I am ready to kill them,” he wrote.5

By 1903 the United States had decided to abandon the system of indirect rule. With the end of major fighting between Americans and Filipino nationalists, more troops were available to help establish direct control over the Moros. The government created the Moro Province and, anticipating the necessity of military action against recalcitrant Moros, decided that the position of governor should be reserved for a high-ranking army officer. Although officially acting under the direction of the Philippines Commission, the governor would have considerable independence. As the chief civil and military authority in the province, he would supervise the district governors and other civil officials as well as command all US forces there. Since most of the appointments to important civil government positions went to army officers, the responsibility for running the new province rested almost entirely with the Army.6

To fill the governor’s seat and oversee the challenging task of instituting direct rule, President Theodore Roosevelt chose a good friend, Major General Leonard Wood. Already well known in the United States as the former commander of the Rough Riders and the military governor of American-occupied Cuba, Wood brought to the job abundant energy, excellent political connections, and an enthusiasm for reform. He also brought a desire for quick results—he anticipated that he would only be in the province briefly before moving up to command the Army’s Philippine Division. Wood planned to use a combination of diplomacy and coercion in his
dealings with the Moros. Although he was willing to talk with Moro leaders and urged his subordinates to do the same, he believed that the Americans had to prove their readiness to impose their will through force. He anticipated that a single decisive blow would be enough to convince the Moros to submit. “I think that one clean-cut lesson will be quite sufficient for them,” he wrote to President Roosevelt, “but it should be of such a character as not to need a dozen frittering repetitions.”

Under Wood’s guidance the new order took shape. Although the Americans assumed more responsibility for governance, Wood recognized that on the local level the United States would have to continue to exercise its authority through the datus. Eventually he formulated a system of appointed “headmen,” most of whom were datus loyal to the government. Wood also worked to develop policies intended to promote the “benevolent assimilation” that President William McKinley had earlier announced as the central goal of the United States in the Philippines. By taking steps to expand commerce, increase education, and improve public health, Wood hoped to show Moros the benefits that the provincial government could provide and thereby win support for American rule. Wood’s government accelerated the building of roads, port facilities, and schools, established cooperative markets, and instigated campaigns to improve sanitation and reduce disease.

Those actions caused little controversy, but many Moros were disturbed by Wood’s efforts to alter aspects of Moro culture that he and other American officials considered deleterious to the preservation of morality and order. Wood’s passion for reform—a characteristic he had shown in Cuba and would later exhibit as the Army’s chief of staff—made him impatient to launch his program of cultural transformation. His most notable reform was the new law banning slavery in the province. At Wood’s urging, the province’s legislative council (a body made up almost entirely of American officials) passed the law shortly after his arrival. Wood also moved quickly to discard the traditional Moro legal code in favor of a new set of laws closer to the American model. To help pay for the new court system as well as the internal improvements he had initiated, he restored the cedula, an unpopular Spanish-era tax on all adult males in the province.

In the case of each of those reforms, some of Wood’s subordinates advised against taking action until the Moros had gained more confidence in American rule, but Wood wanted to move ahead. Although he expected that many Moros would object to the measures, he hoped to avoid stirring resistance by implementing the laws only gradually. Here he miscalculated. Regardless of his intention to move slowly in enforcing the new laws, word of their existence spread rapidly, and Moro leaders reacted with anger. Since the elimination of slavery and the traditional legal code struck directly at the power of the datus, some of them decided to take-up arms against the Americans. Some Moros chose to resist for religious
reasons—despite the assurances of Wood and other officials, they feared that the Americans would eventually demand their conversion to Christianity. The cedula intensified that concern because many Moros viewed it as a form of tribute to a non-Islamic government.¹⁰

Wood might have faced less of an uproar if he had done more to educate the Moros about the changes he desired before enacting legislation. For instance, he might have consulted more closely with Moro leaders about revisions to the legal code rather than simply announcing its replacement. A major campaign to encourage the Moros to emancipate slaves voluntarily in return for compensation would not have ended slavery, but such an effort might have made the Moros more accepting of an eventual anti-slavery law.

The Moros’ armed resistance took several forms. Some Moros, especially on heavily forested Mindanao, practiced guerrilla warfare. They raided American encampments for weapons and set ambushes on jungle trails. From the American standpoint, the most unnerving form of Moro resistance was the juramentado, a Spanish term for a devout Moro who had taken an oath to carry out a suicidal attack on non-Muslims. A juramentado would seek to reach paradise by slaying as many nonbelievers as possible before being killed himself. Although such attacks were not common, they happened often enough to keep the Americans on edge. Usually, however, Moro resistance was more defensive in nature. Resisting Moros would enter a fortification known as aotta—a structure constructed of logs, earth, and stone—and hope that the strength of their position would discourage their enemies from attacking.¹¹

The Moros faced some definite disadvantages in confronting the Americans. For one, their weapons were far inferior to those used by the US soldiers. Although some Moros had managed to obtain American or Spanish rifles, more typically Moros armed themselves with swords and spears, weapons that were effective only at close range. Even more troublesome for the Moros was the fragmented nature of their resistance. They were divided into tribal groups such as the Tausug or the Marannao, each with its own language and customs, and further divided into the multitudes of clan-based groups headed by the datus. These leaders were frequently at war with one another, and no Moro leader emerged to unite the factions and provide overall direction to the fight against the US forces. As they had in earlier wars against the American Indians, Army officers used long-standing hostilities among the Moro groups to their advantage. In going to war against a datu, the Americans often received help from other datus eager to bring about the downfall of a rival.¹²

Wood soon took to the field to direct American forces against obstinate Moros.
He led major expeditions on the island of Jolo in 1903 and into the Taraca River area of Mindanao in 1904. Drawing upon the army’s experiences in fighting Indians and Filipino nationalists, Wood’s troops developed some effective tactics. Since the Moros usually avoided tangling with large columns of American soldiers, the Army learned to send out smaller patrols designed to lure the Moros into combat. The soldiers then used their superior firepower to shoot down the Moros before they could draw close enough to use their swords and spears. One officer described how the Americans, well supplied with ammunition, “developed” the enemy by firing freely into brush that could conceal Moro fighters. The Americans used mountain howitzers to bombard the cottas of hostile leaders. On occasion the artillery barrages caused the Moros to flee from their strongholds. More often the Moros stayed put in hopes of surviving the attack, but the artillery blasted holes in the cotta walls and inflicted casualties on the defenders, thereby making the cotta easier to assault with infantry. The American advantage in firepower produced lopsided casualty rates on the two sides. In the campaign on Jolo, for example, the Americans had only 17 dead and wounded compared with Moro losses of at least 500.13

As one Army officer noted, Wood went after the Moros “with a rough hand.” His troops killed hundreds of Moros and burned their houses and crops. Wood’s comments on the Taraca campaign in his diary reflected his approach. Since the Moros of that area had been intractable for generations, he observed, he had “decided to go thoroughly over the whole valley, destroying all warlike supplies, and dispersing and destroying every hostile force, and also to destroy every cota [sic] where there is the slightest resistance.” As those comments suggested, Wood cast a wide net in his campaign against resisting Moros. He directed his forces to attack not just offending leaders but their followers as well, and not just Moro outlaws but the communities that harbored them. “When a crime is committed,” he wrote, “the offender must be surrendered or the punishment must be promptly applied.”14

Wood and other officers expressed satisfaction with the results of these campaigns. “It has been a very busy day’s work and I think has given the Moros a very wholesome lesson,” Wood remarked after a day in which his command had killed around 150 of them. In another officer’s opinion, the punishment of one group of Moros had an intimidating influence on the others. He noted that groups that had formerly been “lukewarm and hostile” were now inclined to submit to the Americans. On Mindanao in particular, Wood’s campaign effectively ended large scale resistance by the Moros.15

The punitive campaigns no doubt caused many Moros to abandon their struggle against American rule, but in some cases the campaigns may have actually undercut the pacification effort. Contrary to Wood’s confident assertion in 1903
that “one clean-cut lesson” would suffice to quiet Moro opposition, the fighting continued. As one friendly datu noted in 1906, one uprising followed another during Wood’s time as governor:

After the fight with Hassan I thought there would be no more fighting in Jolo. After Hassan, Lakamasa Usap sprang up; when he was fought, I thought that would be a lesson; and after he was fought, Peruska Utig and Pala sprang up, and after they had been done away with the Dajo people sprang up.\textsuperscript{16}

The death and destruction that Wood’s harsh campaigns produced may, in fact, have stimulated opposition from some Moros. The killing of women and children by the Americans, a result of the indiscriminate firing by the soldiers and the Moro practice of taking their entire families into the cottas when troops moved against them, angered many Moros. One rebellious Moro leader took-up arms against the Americans following the death of his daughter in an attack on a cotta. The punitive expeditions, which left in their wake people without homes or food and clans without leaders, contributed to the breakdown of the Moro social order in certain regions of the province.\textsuperscript{17}

The gathering of hundreds of displaced, fearful, and angry Moros in the fortified crater of a dormant volcano known as Bud Dajo on Jolo indicated how Wood’s methods could help create the very disorder he wanted so badly to eliminate. Moros had fled to the mountain in 1905 following an attack by Wood on some nearby datus and their followers. By early 1906 the original group of refugees inside the crater had been joined by other disaffected Moros. Some were there because their homes had been destroyed by the American attack, some because they feared the soldiers, some because they wanted to escape the authority of their datus, and some because they had refused to pay the cedula and feared the consequences. American officials tried unsuccessfully over several months to persuade the Dajo Moros to return to their homes.\textsuperscript{18}

At the Americans’ request, some prominent Jolo datus ascended the mountain to demand that the resisting Moros leave, but the datus’ commands were ignored. The datus blamed this turn of events on American policies. As they pointed out, the imposition of a new legal code and the willingness of American officials to overturn the datus’ judicial rulings had caused an erosion of the datus’ authority over their own people. The new code had also ended the ability of the datus to levy fines on their people—such fines had been a major source of the leaders’ wealth and power. The Bud Dajo episode revealed a contradiction in Wood’s policy regarding Moro leaders. On one hand, he believed that the preservation of order in the province required the United States to rely on the authority of the datus. On
the other hand, he wanted to end many of the practices that gave the datus their prestige and strength. The reality was that Wood never fully accepted the notion of ruling through the indigenous leaders, especially since those leaders gained their positions through birth and, in Wood’s view, used their powers arbitrarily. As Wood put it to a British friend, the British “are quite content to maintain Rajahs and Sultans and other species of royalty, but we, with our plain ideas of doing things, find these gentlemen outside of our scheme of government . . . . Our policy is to develop individualism among these people little by little, teach them to stand upon their own feet independent of petty chieftains.”

As the months passed with the Moros still living on Bud Dajo, the Americans became more concerned. Reports that some Moros were using the mountain as a base from which to steal cattle and commit other crimes heightened those concerns, but above all officials worried about the Dajo group’s defiance of authority—both of the Americans and of the datus. They feared such defiance might be contagious. The danger, one officer warned, was that the people of Jolo might come to see the malcontents as “patriots and semi-liberators of the Moro people.” Recently appointed commander of the Philippine Division and eager to depart for Manila, Wood decided to halt the negotiations and use force to remove the Moros. “This is a ridiculous little affair from every standpoint,” he wrote to a subordinate, “and should be brought to an end.” Rejecting the advice of a subordinate to take the intermediate step of besieging the crater, Wood ordered US troops to Bud Dajo with the purpose of “cleaning up the place.” Wood was on hand to observe the assault on the fortified crater, an effort that lasted three days. At the cost of 15 dead, the American force eventually overran the fiercely defended Moro positions. In the aftermath the troops found over 600 dead Moros, including women and children.

To Wood’s surprise, his conquest of Bud Dajo brought more excoriation than praise from Congress and the press. A newspaper correspondent in Manila had somehow learned that the death toll included a significant number of women and children and reported that in his dispatch. For the next several weeks, the battle became the subject of controversy in the United States. Anti-imperialists and Democratic opponents of the Roosevelt administration questioned the necessity of the attack and accused Wood and his soldiers of carrying out a ruthless slaughter. Some asked why Wood’s report mentioned 600 dead Moros but none wounded—had the soldiers killed the wounded or left them to die? One member of the House mocked Wood with a satirical poem titled, after Tennyson, “The Charge of the Wood Brigade,” part of which read:

Chased them from everywhere
Chased them all onward,
Into the crater of death
Drove them—six hundred!
‘Forward the Wood brigade;
Spare not a one,’ he said
‘Shoot all six hundred!’

The Roosevelt administration, no doubt fearing a repeat of the political storm that had followed the revelation four years earlier of atrocities by American soldiers in the war against Filipino nationalists, moved to dampen the outcry. Asked by Secretary of War William Howard Taft about the allegations of “wanton slaughter,” Wood defended himself vigorously. The soldiers had not intended to kill women and children, he argued, but the Moro women had been fighting alongside the men and were inevitably shot down in the confusion of battle. That assertion at least was corroborated by other participants in the fight, unlike his dubious claim that the children were killed because Moro warriors used them as shields. Despite the holes in Wood’s case, he weathered the crisis. President Roosevelt and the Republican press had given him solid support, and strong public interest in the matter never developed. As Asians, Muslims, and practitioners of slavery, the Moros were not natural subjects of American sympathies, and many in the United States had grown tired of issues regarding the Philippines. Wood moved on to command the Philippine Division and then to serve as the Army’s chief of staff.

Wood’s successor as governor of the Moro Province, Brigadier General Tasker Bliss, experienced far less resistance from the Moros than had Wood. In part this was because Wood’s aggressive actions had already eliminated those Moros who were most likely to revolt. Bliss’s policies also contributed to the more peaceful condition, however. He stopped Wood’s practice of using punitive expeditions against communities in favor of a policy that emphasized the punishment of individual wrongdoers. “Our effort is to make the natives understand that when one or several of their number commits an outrage,” he stated, “we do not seek revenge by harassing the whole countryside, but that we will go after the culprits alone and the other people will not suffer.” Bliss also acted to reduce the potential for clashes between Moros and American soldiers. He complained of overly belligerent officers, including one whose “disposition seemed to be to kill a Moro on sight.” A partial solution to the problem, Bliss believed, was to use native troops—members of the Philippine Constabulary and the army’s Philippine Scouts—to do most of the patrolling and arresting. Bliss kept the American soldiers, whose relations with the Moros were so fraught with fear and cultural misunderstanding, on posts near the towns as a reserve force. Under Bliss the fighting between Moros and Americans diminished noticeably. “The Moros as a rule are quiet and peaceful because we interfere with them to the least possible degree,” Bliss reported to his commander, General Wood. Wood, however, was not overly impressed with Bliss’s performance
as governor and privately criticized him for being too passive.24

In 1909 Bliss was replaced by a veteran of Moro affairs, Brigadier General John J. Pershing. Between 1899 and 1903 Pershing, then a captain, had served on Mindanao and developed there an impressive reputation for dealing effectively with the Moros. Unlike most of his fellow officers, he had a strong interest in Moro culture and worked assiduously to learn about it. According to an Army colleague, Pershing put his knowledge of the Moros to good use—“By associating with them and studying them [he] won their confidence and admiration. He became, in fact, very influential with them locally.” In Pershing’s opinion, successful relations with the Moros required tremendous patience and a willingness to treat them with respect. It also required the readiness to strike militarily at those Moros who, after repeated attempts to persuade them otherwise, still refused to accept American rule. Indeed, Pershing first gained notice in the United States not for his diplomatic efforts but for his successful attacks on the cottas of recalcitrant Moros in the Lake Lanao region of Mindanao.25

Unlike Wood, Pershing had the benefit of being able to build on the work of his predecessors in the province. He continued many of the policies already in place, including that of using local Moro leaders to help govern (although he differed from Wood in believing that the United States should not try to break down the authority of the hereditary chiefs). Pershing also followed his predecessors in devoting much of his effort to developing the “policy of attraction;” under his leadership such projects as road building, the promotion of public education, and the improvement of agricultural practices continued.26

Although Pershing, like Wood, considered the Moros savages, he believed them to be reasonable people. More so than Wood, he had confidence that he could persuade them to adhere to American policies by appealing to their self-interest and even to their religious principles. Like Bliss, Pershing emphasized conciliation and tried to keep fighting between Moros and Americans to a minimum by using military force only against individual Moro wrongdoers and not entire communities. “[W]e shall not molest your rights, families, property, or any of your affairs,” he told a group of datus, “and if any bad Moro injures us or other Moros we shall seek him only.” In practice, Pershing admitted, this policy sometimes meant that the government chose to let a Moro criminal go unpunished rather than pursue him into a community that might rally to his defense and thereby precipitate a battle. Pershing thought, however, that Bliss had gone too far in seeking to avoid conflict by concentrating his troops close to the major posts. In so doing, Bliss had lost an opportunity to use the presence of the soldiers to generate greater support for American rule. “We must branch out and let all the people in the Moro Province know there is a government which is looking after them and which proposes and
intends to encourage and protect them.” To make the government more visible to the Moros, Pershing divided his forces into smaller units and distributed them around the province.27

Pershing’s tenure as governor might have passed relatively peacefully but for his decision to disarm the population, a policy that infuriated many Moros and opened a new period of conflict. Although the idea of disarmament had been around for some time, higher authorities, fearful of a violent reaction by the Moros, declined to approve its implementation. Interestingly, one of its chief opponents was Leonard Wood, now chief of staff. As governor of the Moro Province, Wood had not hesitated to take decisive action against slavery and the Moro legal code, but he balked at trying to take the Moros’ weapons. Such a move would only enrage the Moros, he argued, and they would simply hide their best weapons. In 1911 the disarmament issue re-emerged following the killing of an Army lieutenant by a juramentado. The killing provoked condemnations in the press of the “lawlessness” in Moro Province, and Pershing decided the time had come to push for disarmament. In September of that year, he announced the new law—it required Moros to surrender their firearms and forbade them from carrying edged weapons. Many Moros, for whom weapons were precious possessions, refused to give them up, and fighting broke out between some of them and the troops sent to enforce the order.28

In December 1911, about 800 defiant Moros fled to the old battleground of Bud Dajo to make a stand. Pershing’s handling of this development differed significantly from that of Wood in the earlier episode on the mountain. With enough patience, Pershing maintained, the confrontation could be ended without violence. His explanation of this approach to a superior suggested his disapproval of Wood’s methods. “It is not my purpose to make any grandstand play here and get a lot of soldiers killed and massacre a lot of Moros, including women and children.” Pershing’s restraint was appreciated by his superiors, including Wood—with the 1912 election drawing near, they wanted to avoid the kind of controversy that had followed the attack on Bud Dajo in 1906.29

Pershing succeeded in dispersing the Dajo Moros with few casualties. Acting quickly before the Moros could gather provisions, he had his soldiers surround the mountain to cut the Moros off from their sources of supply. He then sent cooperative Moro leaders to the mountaintop to negotiate on his behalf. They convinced most of the people to leave Bud Dajo and surrender their weapons. His soldiers fought off an attempt by the remaining Moros to break through the siege lines, and eventually the holdouts were captured. The operation resulted in the deaths of only 12 Moros compared with the 600 killed there five years before.30
Pershing’s handling of another case of strong resistance also showed his desire to avoid heavy casualties, whether American or Moro. In 1913 thousands of Moros moved to the fortified crater of Bud Bagsak in eastern Jolo to defy the disarmament order. Pershing again pondered how to deal with the disaffected Moros without bloodshed. His policy had been to “disarm them by any means except by fighting,” he informed the Governor-General of the Philippines. Noting that a large majority of those on the mountain were noncombatants, he made it clear that he would not “rush in and attack them while they are surrounded by women and children.”

Pershing believed that if the Americans were patient, the Moros on Bagsak would eventually drift back to their homes. In this he was partially correct. Negotiations resulted in an agreement to allow the Moros to leave the mountain, weapons still in hand, to plant their spring crops with the understanding that they would surrender their weapons later. When the time came to give up those weapons, however, most refused to do so and remained ready to return to Bud Bagsak should American soldiers move against them.

Unwilling to accept such open defiance and under pressure to end the insurGENCY, Pershing developed a plan to take Bagsak with a minimum of casualties among the noncombatants. He issued orders that left the impression American forces were withdrawing to their posts, then secretly sent troops to launch a surprise attack on the mountain before the Moros in the surrounding area could reassemble there. After five days of intense fighting, the soldiers captured the mountain stronghold, which was occupied by about 500 Moros. Fifteen members of the government’s force lost their lives in the battle. Pershing’s men killed almost the entire group of Moros, including as many as 50 women and children. Although Pershing failed to end the resistance on Bud Bagsak bloodlessly, he deserved credit for taking steps to ensure the far larger group of Moros that was originally on the mountain did not gather there again—the death toll could have been much higher. Still, it seems possible that a siege similar to the one he conducted at Bud Dajo in 1911 might have resulted in the defeat of the Bagsak Moros with even fewer deaths.

Bud Bagsak represented the last major case of Moro resistance to American rule. Fighting between Moros and government forces virtually ceased, in part because the disarmament policy had removed thousands of weapons from the province. When Pershing left in 1913, his replacement as governor was a civilian, and native troops replaced most American soldiers. The Moros had at least outwardly become less hostile to American control. One possible reason for that development was that prosperity had increased in the province due to such improvements as new roads and public markets. The success of the provincial government in halting warfare between Moro groups benefited the economy as well. The Moros also became more supportive of the Americans as the prospect for independence for the
Philippines increased; they realized that independence would probably result in their lands falling under the control of the hated Filipino Christians and preferred to remain under the Americans.34

The experiences of Wood and Pershing in seeking to stabilize and develop the Moro Province yield several possible lessons. First, the efforts of the governors to produce substantial improvements in the daily lives of the Moros—road building and better medical care, for example—helped increase support for US rule. Second, the attempts of both men to bring about dramatic changes in Moro culture—however well intentioned—tended to create more opposition. The province was relatively tranquil until the imposition by the Americans of laws prohibiting slavery, scrapping the traditional legal code, and banning weapons stirred many Moros into armed resistance. As desirable as those changes may have been, the generals could have done more to persuade the Moros of the virtues of the reforms before making them the law of the land. Finally, the employment of force by Wood and Pershing against Moros who challenged American control succeeded in reducing active opposition in the province. As several of Wood’s punitive campaigns demonstrated, however, the sweeping and indiscriminate use of force had the potential to increase rather than diminish disorder.
Notes


13. Bullard to Adjutant of Jolo Expedition, 23 November 1903, container 1, Bullard Papers; Scott to Adjutant General, 31 March 1906, container 57, Scott Papers; Wood to Adjutant General, 11 December 1903, RG 94, file 520125-3617, National Archives.

14. Bullard Diary 8 October 1903, container 1, Bullard Papers; Wood Diary, 4 and 7 April 1904, container 3, Wood Papers; Wood to Adjutant General, 15 April 1904, container 32, Wood Papers.

15. Wood Diary, 16 November 1903, container 3, Wood Papers; Bullard Diary, 19 April 1904, container 1, Bullard Papers.

16. Transcript of interview with Moro leaders, 13 April 1906, container 3, Wood Papers.

17. Transcript of interview with Moro leaders, 17 August 1904, container 56, Scott Papers.

18. Transcript of interview with Moro leaders, 13 April 1906, container 3, Wood Papers; Scott, *Some Memories*, 380; Reeves to Secretary of Moro Province, 31 March 1906; Scott to Langhorne, 5 December 1905, container 37, Wood Papers.

19. Transcript of interview with Moro leaders, 13 April 1906, container 1; Wood to Strachey, 6 January 1904, container 33, Wood Papers; Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 146.

20. Reeves to Langhorne, 1 March 1906 and Wood to Langhorne, 17 February 1906, container 37; Wood to Bliss, 2 March 1906, container 38, Wood Papers; Willcox to McCoy, 28 February 1906, container 11, McCoy Papers; Duncan to Adjutant General, 10 March 1906, container 278, John J. Pershing Papers, Library of Congress.


29. Pershing to Bell, 16 December 1911; Pershing to Warren, 9 February 1912, container 371, Pershing Papers; Thompson. “Governors of the Moro Province,” 201-205.

30. Pershing to Adjutant General, 31 May 1912, container 371a, Pershing Papers.

31. Pershing to Forbes, 28 February 1913, container 76, Pershing Papers.

32. Smythe, *Guerilla Warrior*, 186-204.

33. Forbes to Pershing, 4 February 1913, container 76; Pershing to Adjutant General, 15 October 1913, container 371a, Pershing Papers; Smythe, *Guerilla Warrior*, 198-204.

From Military Victories to Political Stalemate: The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1917

Irving Levinson

The Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917 and the involvement of the United States in that struggle constitute a case where military success did not lead to the full realization of the American government’s postconflict objectives. My review of this period consists of four parts. First, I will summarize the causes of the three civil wars that wracked Mexico during these seven years. Then, I will examine the objectives and methods employed by President William Howard Taft in response to the outbreak of fighting. The third and lengthiest part concerns the very different efforts of his successor, Woodrow Wilson. Finally, I offer my conclusions.

Let us begin at the beginning. In 1910 Porfirio Diaz served in his 33rd year as president of Mexico. He maintained control of that nation using a combination of staged elections, compliant and corrupt courts, press censorship, extensive patronage, and an unaccountable and brutal national police force of less than 10,000 men known as rurales. Estimates of the size of Diaz’s army range from 15,000 to 20,000 troops. Although this apparatus of repression remained a pale imitation of the more totalitarian forms of government experienced in later phases of the 20th century, Diaz nonetheless could repeatedly bring critical force to bear when challenged.

The dictator retained the admiration of many leading foreign statesmen as well as a minority of his countrymen. His administration had brought order to a nation long wracked by civil strife. With this framework, industrialization and the urbanization accompanying such growth proceeded apace. However, this development proved unsustainable for several reasons.

First, industrialization brought about the rapid growth of an educated middle class as well as literate and politically active coalitions of factory workers. The absence of a participative political system fed their frustration. Simultaneously, the great majority of Mexicans lived in rural areas and experienced falling living standards and lowered levels of individual freedom during the Diaz era.

In an effort to foster the growth of commercial agriculture and the development of natural resources, the regime allowed domestic and foreign investors to declare any land not being used for such production as vacant and subject to sale. In this manner, Diaz’s government seized 27 percent of all the land in Mexico, amounting to 134,547,885 acres. This included much of the nation’s best agricultural land. The resulting polarization of wealth and power proved so extreme that in the northern state of Chihuahua, the estates of one extended family, the Terrazas,
exceeded in size the combined territory of Belgium and the Netherlands. US Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson observed:

Perhaps 80 percent of the population of Mexico were without an abiding place except by sufferance and took no more than a nominal part in the affairs of the country.

Inevitably, the transfer of land titles from independent owners of small farms and from villages that once held their territory in communal ownership to the new landlords reduced millions of economically and socially independent Mexicans to the status of poorly paid laborers.

Finally, the heavy extent to which the Diaz government’s industrialization program relied upon foreign capital created a situation where foreigners owned the majority of the oil, mining, and railroad industries as well as more than 100 million acres of land. This massive external presence inexorably led to the accumulation of nationalist resentments. That hostility came not only from employees who resented the often arrogant conduct of the foreigners, but also from the most affluent and educated of Mexicans citizens, who found themselves unable to compete with foreign capital or technology.

Following Diaz’s 1910 announcement that he would soon retire at the tender age of 80, the nation’s first truly contested presidential election campaign in more than three decades began.

As his chosen successor, the dictator endorsed General Bernardo Reyes. The opposition forces coalesced around Francisco Madero, a successful industrialist who also owned numerous ranches in northern Mexico. The challenger campaigned on a platform calling for a complete set of civil and political liberties. His advocacy of that cause became the focal point of his campaign. Although Madero’s movement proved to be national in scope, his refusal to emphasize the return of the confiscated lands alienated millions of potential supporters in rural Mexico who hoped for a restoration of the property and independence that they considered to be theirs. Yet, as the campaign wore on the threat of intimidation became so intense that Madero fled to the United States to avoid imprisonment on criminal charges manufactured by Diaz. He arrived in America convinced that only violent means would achieve reform.

The call to arms came not from within Mexico, but from the self-exiled Madero and some of his supporters, then sheltering in San Antonio, Texas. Declaring himself to be president of Mexico, the ex-candidate called for a national day of uprising on 20 November 1910. This civil war thus began not with a single confrontation, but with hundreds of small encounters in Mexico’s towns and villages. The rebel groups coalesced into bands and then into companies and occasionally
into brigade-size forces. Three factions thus emerged. The first swore allegiance to Madero and derived substantial support from Mexico’s more affluent and educated citizens in both urban and rural areas as well as from many other Mexicans in the northern half of the country, who hoped for a restoration of their lands.

The second faction emerged in the nation’s major centers of industrial production and received the support of organized labor. Although these Mexicans shared Madero’s goal of dismantling the Diaz regime’s apparatus of repression, their objectives also included the seizure and redistribution of a substantial portion of the nation’s industrial wealth. In spirit and often in name, these groups most properly could be termed socialist. Their major organization, based in Mexico City, was the Casa de los Obreros (House of Workers).

The third force consisted primarily of poor and frequently illiterate villagers and peasants in central and southern Mexico. Above all else, they sought the annul-ling of the land confiscations of the Diaz era. Emiliano Zapata emerged as the most powerful of their leaders and waged war from his base in the state of Morelos, just to the south of the national capital. He and his followers identified primarily with their localities and did not build a coordinated national resistance movement.

President Taft confronted the challenge of responding to this course of events. Unlike many of his countrymen, he had never accepted the veneer of stability that Diaz so carefully applied to his regime. Writing in 1909, Taft declared: “There will be a revolution growing out of the selection of his [Diaz’s] successor.”

The president set two policy goals and directed his application of military force solely toward those objectives. First, he sought to prevent the wave of violence engulfing Mexico from spilling over the frontier into US territory. Also, he intended to limit the involvement of American citizens in the revolt. To these ends, he sent 16,000 troops to the border. Broadly stated, the deployment:

Would strengthen the forces for law and order in Mexico and would put both parties on notice in the Republic that we were ready to defend our rights if the occasion arose. I concluded that it would have a very healthful effect with reference to the care which might be exercised in respect of American citizens and property, and that the presence of troops near at hand might have a very healthful effect all along the border in stopping the cross-ing and recrossing of filibustering expeditions which make their field of action in both countries and supply the insurrectors with ammunition.

He qualified that commitment by setting two limitations on the use of force. First, he stated: “The assumption…that I contemplate intervention on Mexican soil
to protect American lives or property in Mexico is of course gratuitous because I seriously doubt whether I have such authority under any circumstance and if I had, I would not exercise it without strict Congressional approval.”8 As his secretary of state subsequently acknowledged:

This government does not undertake to furnish police protection for the lives and property of its citizens who reside in foreign countries. Our inability to discharge such an obligation in respect to such a country as Mexico over whose vast area are scattered tens of thousands of American citizens engaged in divers and disconnected occupations is obvious.9

Having thus limited the space in which the United States Army would operate to the US side of the border, Taft promptly obtained the permission of the United States Congress to prohibit the export of arms: “Whenever the President shall find in any American country conditions of domestic violence which are promoted by the use of arms or munitions procured from the United States.”10

Taft’s policy merits mention because of its narrow scope and its success. Given that the forces under Madero’s command never totaled more than 17,500 men, the presence of the 16,000-man US force served as an ample deterrent to any Mexicans contemplating military action near the United States border.11 Indeed, in May 1911, Madero ordered that an assault on Diaz’s forces in the city of Ciudad Juarez be halted for fear that some shells might land on the neighboring city of El Paso, Texas. The subsequent assault took place with great care being exercised to avoid any injury to American citizens and their property on the north side of the Rio Grande.

Also, the deployment probably served to deter those Americans in the border region sympathetic to the rebel cause. Brigadier General J.W. Duncan of the Texas Department reported that such sympathies were widespread and Taft sought to address that issue.12 President Taft confined his objectives to securing his own nation’s borders and restricting the participation of US citizens in the conflict. He succeeded in both regards. Meanwhile in Mexico the course of war flowed on.

Exactly two weeks after the 11 May 1911 fall of Ciudad Juarez, an ailing President Diaz resigned his office and left for exile in Spain. Madero, accompanied by his victorious generals Francisco (Pancho) Villa and Pascual Orozco, entered Mexico City. During a six-month transitional period, the Mexicans held a free election and Madero took office on 6 November 1911. Although that moment marked the end of the first civil war of the Mexican Revolution, the peace proved to be of very short duration as the victors promptly fell out among themselves.

During Madero’s first month in office, Emiliano Zapata declared himself in rebellion. Claiming that the new national government did not intend to restore lands
formerly held by in communal ownership, Zapata’s Plan de Ayala called for the seizure and immediate redistribution of one-third of all land in Mexico to the poor. His guerrillas soon controlled much of the state of Morelos and parts of the nearby states of Guerrero, Tlaxcala, Puebla, Mexico, and the Federal District itself.

In December 1911, a second rebellion erupted as General Bernardo Reyes ended his exile in the United States and raised the standard of rebellion, seeking support from those Mexicans who believed that their nation required the services of a strong leader in the tradition of Diaz. A detachment of rurales soon captured him, and the would-be ruler arrived in Mexico City as a prisoner.

Then in March 1912, one of Madero’s two senior commanders, General Pas- cual Orozco, announced from his headquarters at Ciudad Juarez that he too was rebelling on the grounds that Madero had betrayed the cause of the revolution. His Plan Orozquista called for the nationalization of the largely American-owned railroads, granting land titles to anyone who had resided on a property for 20 years, seizing and redistributing all estate lands not under cultivation, and instituting a range of labor laws. His force rapidly grew to 8,000 men, only to be defeated by another of Madero’s generals, Victoriano Huerta, in October 1912.

In the same month that Orozco’s rebellion ended, Felix Diaz, the nephew of the former dictator, landed at Veracruz with a small expedition. Troops loyal to Madero promptly reduced this force to a party of one. Like Reyes, the would-be conqueror of the capital entered it as a prisoner.

In the northern state of Chihuahua, General Francisco Villa began gathering an army. He funded this particular effort and the administration of the state he now governed by expropriating without compensation substantial estates owned by both Mexicans and foreigners. Those seizures began in December 1912. In summary, by the end of that year, Madero had faced five rebellions, several of which continued into the new year.

One month later, the United States inaugurated a new president, Woodrow Wilson. He did not share Taft’s strict constructionist perspective of executive powers. More important, the new chief executive believed the obligations of his nation extended far beyond its boundaries. He declared: “We are, in spite of ourselves, the guardians of order and justice and decency on this Continent. We are, providentially, naturally, and unescapably charged with the maintenance of humanity’s interest here.”13 While Taft had acted as the watchful steward concerned primarily with matters inside the territorial limits of his own nation, Wilson stood as the stern archangel with mighty and righteous impulses to be exercised beyond the national boundaries.

In terms of Mexico, he defined those goals as encouraging legitimate business
interests, bringing about a constitutional settlement of the issues relating to land ownership, and creating a “secure foundation for liberty” that included free elections and a full range of civil liberties.14

The principal difference between Wilson’s objectives and those of his predecessor lay in the extent to which they stood divorced from military goals. While Taft’s policy focused on the traditional and military-centered objectives of securing the territory of the United States and regulating a frontier, his successor’s goals focused on objectives in which successful military action became not an end, but a means. The distinction proved crucial.

Wilson scarcely had finished his first month in office when events took an unexpected turn. On 9 February 1913, General Manuel Mondragón led a small force that released the imprisoned Diaz and Reyes. After their liberator fell while charging a machine gun on horseback, the two former prisoners barricaded themselves and their troops in the centuries-old Ciudadela, a thickly walled fort in the heart of Mexico City. From there, they launched artillery rounds at Madero’s forces based around the national palace. The Mexican president retaliated. For nine days, the city became a battleground.

At the invitation of US ambassador Henry Lane Wilson (no relation of the president), the two rebel generals journeyed to the US embassy for a meeting with the commander of Madero’s forces, General Victoriano Huerta. Wilson later wrote that his objective in convening the conclave was to have the opposing commanders “enter into an agreement for the suspension of hostilities and for the joint submission to the Federal Congress.”15 Yet he had objectives that extended well beyond ending the deadly fighting slowly destroying Mexico’s capital.

The ambassador shared no common ancestry or ideology with his nation’s new president. Henry Lane Wilson deemed democracy a form of government wholly unsuited to Mexico and argued that, “When it is understood that of the fifteen million Mexicans, over ten million are illiterate and wholly without the training to fit them for the responsibilities of intelligent citizenship, some idea may be formed of the situation which will result from the adoption of universal suffrage.”16 The ambassador’s low estimate of Mexicans extended to Madero, whom he thought “could not govern his unruly people; [and] that his government could not keep its promises, and was fast leading the country to the verge of ruin.17 Thus, Wilson thought that Mexico needed a dictator in the national palace and he took this opportunity to further that objective.

He convinced the opposing generals to conclude an agreement by which “General Huerta was to be the provisional president and General Diaz was to be free to pursue his candidacy for the presidency.”18 Years later, Wilson expressed no regret
about his role in ending the rule of a freely elected president. On 18 February 1913, Madero and his vice president, Adolfo Pino Suarez, were placed under arrest. Three days later, both men were shot while being transferred from the national palace to a federal penitentiary.

In response to this turn of events, Venustiano Carranza, a former Maderista commander then serving as governor of the state of Coahuila, declared himself the successor to Madero. From his base in the neighboring state of Coahuila, Villa too issued a declaration of rebellion. In Morelos, Zapata declared his intent to wage against Huerta the war he had waged against Madero.

Fighting spread across Mexico as Huerta rapidly ended the vestiges of democracy in areas under his control. When the Mexican Senate refused to suspend its inquiry into the assassination of one of their members who had been shot soon after criticizing the new dictator, he dissolved both chambers of the federal legislature and arrested a majority of their members. In November 1913, President Wilson decided to force Huerta from office. The options considered at the White House included the withdrawal of diplomatic representation, raising the arms embargo to allow the rebels (now known as Constitutionalists) to import arms, blockading Mexico’s ports, and invading.

An invasion of Mexico and march upon the national capital would have been no light matter. According to a memo prepared by Henry Skillman Breckenridge some months earlier, a minimum of 40,000 troops would have been needed for that particular expedition and that number could have been landed at Veracruz only on 25 days’ notice. Plans for the taking of Veracruz had been drafted earlier.

On 2 January 1914, the president’s special envoy to Mexico, former Governor John Lind of Minnesota, reported that, “If given time, he [Huerta] will extricate himself from his present embarrassment sufficiently at least to prolong his rule indefinitely.” In response, Wilson issued instructions on 15 January 1914 allowing 10,000 Krag-Jorgensen rifles and an unspecified amount of ammunition at San Francisco be identified as cargo bound for China and then surreptitiously shipped to a port on Mexico’s Pacific coast. Barely a month later on 13 February 1914, Wilson lifted the arms embargo against the Constitutionalists. Despite this, Huerta still survived.

Fortunately for Wilson, a causus belli surfaced barely two months later. On 10 April 1914, a Huerista general at the port of Tampico arrested a US Navy officer and seven crewmen from the whaleboat of the cruiser U.S.S. Dolphin. The men were taken into custody after they wandered into a restricted dock area. Although the Mexican commander offered a conditional apology, the United States demanded a full apology and a 21-gun salute to the Stars and Stripes. The Mexicans
in turn agreed on the condition that the US Navy similarly render honors to the national banner of Mexico. Since this could have been interpreted a recognition of the Huerta government, the United States refused. The Mexican commander then withdrew his settlement offer.

On 20 April 1914, Wilson asked Congress for authority to defend the national honor, and the House of Representatives obliged with a 337-37 vote. The Senate passed the resolution after including Senator Henry Cabot Lodge’s amendment identifying the protection of American lives and property as an additional objective. One day later, the United States seized Mexico’s principal port of Veracruz. Any Americans who expected to be welcomed met with disappointment. Despite an order from their commanding officer to withdraw, many Mexicans remained on the waterfront to fight. After 12 hours of shooting that cost 129 Mexican lives and 19 American lives, the United States took control of the city.

Carranza protested the assault. Despite such protests, his cause benefited handsomely from the US seizure of Veracruz. For in response to the invasion, Huerta decided that he must reinforce his deployments in the central region of Mexico and consequently withdrew or drew down his forces in other areas. As Huerta executed these changes, both Carranza and Villa moved their troops into the territory vacated by the withdrawal of their opponent’s forces.

Simultaneously, factors not visible to a civilian observer such as Lind contributed to a weakening of Huerta’s army. The new dictator had assumed that a larger army would be a more potent army. By the use of forced drafts of recruits with marginal military potential and the commissioning of inadequately trained officers, he expanded the size of his army from 50,000 to 250,000 in scarcely six months. As always proves to be the case, a greater quantity of military chaff turned out to be far less useful than a much smaller amount of wheat. His army began to desert in droves. The tide of battle turned.

On 19 July 1914, Huerta announced his resignation, publicly blaming Woodrow Wilson for this decision. Less than one month later, Carrancista General Álvaro Obregón marched east from the city of Guadalajara and entered Mexico City on 15 August 1914. Huerta fled the country. Thus ended the second civil war of the Mexican Revolution.

The uneasy unity between revolutionary factions lasted only until the convention to draft the new constitution met at Aguascalientes on 10 October 1914. Each of the major armed factions sent delegates in direct proportion to the number of troops they had fielded in the final phase of the campaign against Huerta. Irreconcilable plans soon emerged. The Villistas called for seizure of haciendas for which the current owners would receive no compensation. In Villista-controlled territory,
seizures of estates had been going on for several years. The Zapatistas’ demands proved similar. By contrast, Carranza displayed no enthusiasm for such agrarian schemes and believed the leaders of Mexico’s industrial and financial community ought not to be threatened. He preferred the company of educated professionals to that of men such as Villa and Zapata. The Carrancista delegates soon recognized that the combined opposition (known as Conventionists) could outvote them. Following their opponents’ success in electing General Eulalio Gutiérrez as provisional president of Mexico, Carranza ordered his followers (known as Constitutionalists) to withdraw from the deliberations at Aguascalientes. On 10 November 1914, the newly elected Gutiérrez responded by declaring the departed leaders to be in rebellion. For the third time since the revolution began, Mexico would go to war with itself.

Carranza’s forces headed eastward toward Veracruz as the numerically superior Conventionists of Villa and Zapata entered Mexico City in mid-May. The United States now faced the choice of standing aside or of supporting one side. On the one hand, Villa’s and Zapata’s previous seizure of foreign property without compensation, their plans for taking yet more land, the many excesses attributed to them, and their general demeanor troubled the Americans. By contrast, during his pre-revolutionary political career as interim governor of Chihuahua and in his service in both chambers of Mexico’s federal legislature, Carranza had caused the United States no great troubles. His successful management of his family’s haciendas, the eloquence that was a product of his training at Mexico’s finest preparatory school, and the manner in which he represented himself convinced the Americans that their interests would be better served if his Constitutionalists emerged as the victors. The favor of the United States now proved to be of critical consequence.

During the occupation of Veracruz, the Americans had shipped some 4,500 crates of armaments to that port. These materials filled three unusually large structures, each of which was 57 yards square and 21 feet high. Within that space, the United States deposited modern artillery pieces and shells, machine guns, barbed wire, radios, trucks, rifles, pistols, and millions of rounds of ammunition.26 Only a very short time before Carranza’s forces entered Veracruz, American officers left the keys to the warehouses with that city’s chamber of commerce, boarded their ships and sailed for home with their soldiers. Carranza’s commanders took possession of the new equipage, familiarizing themselves with appropriate tactics, and then advanced westward under the command of Obregón.

In April 1915, their newly strengthened army met Villa’s forces at Celaya. The Carrancistas prepared for the battle by constructing a strong defensive position. Making considerable use of barbed wire, interlocking fields of fire provided by state-of-the-art machine guns, substantial indirect artillery fire, and a series of
trenches, General Óbregón awaited Villa’s attack. His opponent responded with the tactic that had proven so effective throughout his career in the north of Mexico: the massed cavalry charge. In his official report, Obregón listed Villa’s Celaya losses at 4,000 dead, 5,000 wounded, and 6,000 taken prisoner. He set his own losses at 138 dead and 247 wounded. By all accounts, Villa lost at least 50 percent of his forces at this one engagement. Successive defeats at Aguascalientes and León reduced his army to a mere 6,500 troops. Given the turn of events, the United States granted official diplomatic recognition to Carranza and the Constitutionalists during October 1915.

In November of that year, Villa approached the US border with the intention of taking Agua Prieta and thereby acquiring a base from which he might illicitly purchase arms. The apparently easy task of capturing the city’s small garrison turned into a disaster when Mexican forces transported across US territory via Brownsville, Texas launched a surprise counterattack. They routed the Villistas and seized much of their remaining equipment.

To retaliate, Villa decided to attack the United States. Although wounded, he ordered that a strike be made against US troops in Columbus, New Mexico. As proved to be the case at Celaya, the foe proved far stronger than he thought would be the case. On 9 March 1916, his column attacking Columbus suffered 100 dead in return for inflicting 19 fatalities on the defending US Army garrison. By 1600 that day, the commanding general of the US Army’s Southern Department, Frederick Funston, received orders to organize a force under the command of Brigadier General John J. Pershing to counterattack. Secretary of War Newton Diehl Baker stated: “The work of these troops will be regarded as finished as soon as Villa’s bands are known to be broken up.”

There was a method to Villa’s madness. By bringing about a US invasion, he confronted the Constitutionalists with the choice of either resisting the forces of a militarily superior nation or of passively accepting a loss of sovereignty by permitting a foreign expedition to operate on Mexican soil. As Pershing’s force of 6,675 men proceeded southward, Mexican opinion hardened. On 15 April 1916, US Special Representative James Rodgers told Secretary of State Robert Lansing: “Every high official of the de facto government insisted upon immediate withdrawal of American troops. . .General Obregón and Carranza are determined to secure withdrawal at once.” Two days later, Pershing firmly noted rapidly hardening attitudes in Mexico and pointed out that if the pursuit of Villa were to continue, the US Army would have to occupy rather than merely pass through Mexican territory as well as take over the operation of the railroad supplying his forces. In the event that his civilian superiors could not read between those lines, General Hugh Lennox Scott thoughtfully sent them additional text:
With Villa hiding very small chance exists of finding him in a population friendly to him and daily becoming more hostile to us. Realizing that first course [staying in Mexico] cannot be considered, General Funston and I recommend the second course [withdrawing].

However, Wilson did not wish to budge. He believed that until the US frontier with Mexico was secure, Pershing ought to remain in Mexico. The deaths of several Americans at the hands of cross-border raiding parties following the Columbus attack strengthened this position. Carranza proved just as adamant in demanding that the Americans depart forthwith. Both sides threatened war. On 18 June 1916, Wilson authorized the mobilization of the 125,000 militia of the 48 states and sent the Mexican government a note stating that his administration’s objectives consist only of protecting its own border from the incompetence of a government that cannot control its own territory.

On 21 June 1916, two US patrols under the command of Captain Charles T. Boyd requested that the commander of Mexican forces in the town of Carrizal, Chihuahua, General Felix U. Gómez, permit Pershing’s forces to pass. The Mexican refused and Boyd ordered an advance. In the ensuing melee, Boyd and 13 other Americans died while 25 troopers were taken captive. The Mexicans lost 30 dead and suffer 43 wounded. War now seemed closer than ever.

By 3 July 1916, tempers on both sides of the border cooled as the reality of the military situation reasserted itself. Carranza knew that he did not possess the resources to wage war against a nation with almost eight times Mexico’s population, a far more advanced economy, and a full treasury. Conversely, the Americans proved sensibly leery of being drawn into the occupation of a nation of some 761,000 square miles. Also, the prospect of US entrance into World War I meant that any conflict in Mexico well might involve the United States in a two-front war. Following seemingly interminable negotiation, the last of Pershing’s men crossed back into US territory on 5 February 1917. At this point, the United States could claim a victory in the campaign against Villa. As of mid-April 1916, Pershing’s force had killed more than 100 of their foe’s men and driven their chief prey some 400 miles south of the Rio Grande. Villa never again troubled the US border.

During this period, Carranza began violently consolidating his control of Mexico. The Casa de los Obreros first felt his wrath. Although their leadership had supported the new leader of Mexico because his vision of an urban and industrialized nation seemed more relevant than the agrarian world of the Villistas and Zapatistas, that union’s decision to stage general strikes in 1915 and 1916 provoked a violent response. Carranza used troops to break their strikes, seize their
headquarters, and then dissolve their union.

The turn of the Zapatistas came next. In late 1916 and early 1917, Carranza sent 30,000 of his soldiers into Morelos with orders to destroy Zapata’s forces. Using forced reconcentration of civilians and widespread destruction of villages, these invaders reaped only defeat and they withdrew some months later. Carranza then bided his time and fell back on an ancient technique: assassination. At a 10 April 1919 truce negotiation, a federal honor guard leveled its rifles at Emiliano Zapata and shot him to death.

In the north, Villa waged a guerrilla war against Carranza for several more years. Yet even he eventually tired of life in the saddle and lay down his arms in return for amnesty, a substantial hacienda and pension. On 20 July 1923, a 12-man squad assassinated him. Thus ended the Mexican Revolution. I offer these conclusions.

First, the US armed forces emerged as the military victors in each of three separate missions. The troops posted along the US frontier by President Taft deterred the revolutionaries from raiding American territory and also convinced all Mexican factions that even the slightest damage inflicted upon US citizens residing peacefully on their own nation’s soil would prompt massive retaliation.

Also, the Veracruz landing proved a success by any measure. The occupation of the city forced the Huerta government to shift some of its dwindling forces away from the opposing armies of Mexicans, thereby enabling the soldiers of Carranza and Villa to advance. By their continued presence, the American forces inflicted a humiliation upon a dictator who could no longer claim the ability to defend the national territory. Perhaps most important, the ships at anchor and the soldiers and marines ashore served as a shield behind which the United States established and maintained a massive supply base for potential allies. Similarly, General Pershing’s forces successfully completed their mission as originally defined by their civilian superiors. From the day that the Punitive Expedition left Mexico, Pancho Villa never again troubled the border.

But American military successes did not bring about the change in Mexican society sought by President Wilson. As noted earlier, the commander in chief defined those goals as the encouragement of legitimate American business interests, a constitutional settlement of the issues relating to land ownership, and creating a “secure foundation for liberty” that included free elections and a full range of civil liberties.

The United States did not achieve its first objective. That failure became very evident in the constitution adopted by the victorious Carrancistas in 1917. Article
27 of that document claimed as the property of the nation all natural resources both on land and on the continental shelf. With this one declaration, Mexico asserted its claim not only to the American-owned oil fields of eastern Mexico, but to the massive copper mining complexes of the north as well as to the coal reserves. While some of the nationalizations took place over a period of decades rather than at once, these industries remain closed to foreigners as of this day. Although some observers frequently cite these nationalizations as evidence of the essentially socialist nature of the Mexican Revolution, I beg to differ.

While this particular clause of the constitution certainly appealed to powerful leftist sentiments within Mexico, its wording also promised and subsequently delivered employment and business opportunities to more affluent Mexicans who did not possess the capital or the technical expertise to compete with foreigners. The playing field now tilted sharply in favor of Mexican industry and industrialists. In the nationalization of foreign oil concession that took place throughout Latin America during the Great Depression, this pattern would be repeated.

Further, the new constitution banned foreigners from owning any land within 100 kilometers of Mexico’s international frontier or within 50 miles of its coast. In the others areas of the country, non-Mexicans could buy land if and only if they allowed themselves to be treated as Mexican citizens and to refrain from appealing to their embassies for assistance in the event of disputes. Also, any commercial stock company, be it Mexican or foreign, could no longer acquire, hold, or administer rural properties. As in the case of the nationalization of the oil industry, this process took place over a period of decades rather than a period of years. In both cases, the outcome did not meet with Washington’s approval.

Similarly, Wilson’s goal of establishing a democratic Mexico with a full range of civil liberties did not come to fruition. While a substantial set of freedoms existed on paper as per the constitution of 1917, the reality proved far different. Under Carranza and his successors, the government organized labor unions, employers’ associations, development banks, and federal companies as part of a seamless whole under the control of the dominant national political organization, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Defiance of the party could jeopardize one’s job and position in the community. When the PRI deemed violence necessary for the sake of order, force was applied. Although the killing of some 400 activists at the Tlatelolco Massacre of 1968 remains the best known of these repressive acts, the government did away with a number of dissidents during the 1920-1992 period. The PRI also employed less severe tactics, such as bringing criminal charges under the social dissolution laws of Mexico.

Similarly, the Mexican government took full advantage of constitutional provisions
giving the government power to set a national curriculum in primary and secondary
schools and to close the religious counterparts of those educational facilities. Two
generations of Mexicans would be raised with official party versions of Mexican
history.

Only in the last decade of the twentieth century did a functional multi-party
system come into existence on a national basis. It did so not as a result of foreign
pressure, but as the result of the cumulative effects of a banking collapse, hyper-
inflation, and a flight of Mexicans to the United States unparalleled since the most
violent days of the Revolution. In both cases, some 10 percent of the population
fled to the United States. Thus, Wilson did not achieve his objective of transform-
ing the structure of Mexican politics.

By contrast, the president’s second objective of settling the land question by
constitutional means did come to fruition. However, this occurred within a frame-
work determined by Mexicans rather than by Americans. The new constitution
set forth the methods by which land would be seized, valued, and redistributed.
Article 27 voided any concession for the sales of lands, waters, and forests issued
later than 30 November 1876 if that transaction encroached upon communally held
lands. American investors consequently lost tens of millions of acres and did not
receive compensation they considered adequate.

To summarize, US military successes during the Mexican Revolution did not
lead to the emergence of the type of post-revolutionary Mexico sought by President
Woodrow Wilson. That failure is attributable to several factors. Most important,
the American president failed to distinguish between an ally with parallel objec-
tives as opposed to one with identical objectives. While both Wilson and Carranza
sought to drive Huerta from power and to keep the more radical Villa and Zapata
from succeeding him, the American president did not share or even recognize his
Mexican ally’s strong nationalism. For even though Carranza arguably owed his
success to US aid, he did not recognize an obligation to repay that assistance.

Also, Wilson erred in assuming that the values of his industrial and predomi-
nantly North Atlantic culture would readily and rapidly transplant to another po-
litical environment. For centuries, Mexico’s rulers divided the nation by various
criteria of wealth and ethnicity and, in the process, established bitter chasms within
their society. To remedy the traditional division between those above and those
below, aggrieved Mexicans sought to restore that which they once had rather than
to substitute the foreign alternative of a free market. For Mexican villagers whose
identity, social network, and economic sustenance rested upon their possession of
a piece of land, the goal of regaining that territory held far higher priority than the
creation of an economy in which investors, both foreign and domestic, could bid
for the property.

Similarly, the most affluent and powerful of the post-revolutionary Mexicans lived in a nation where governments had granted legally sanctioned commercial advantages since the early days of the Spanish Empire. This situation continued for centuries and arguably does so today. In the end, we are left with a crucial distinction.

Military victory consists of successfully applying force to break a hostile foe. By contrast, restructuring a society requires the participation and consent of those whose existence is to be altered. Through the application of direct as well as indirect military force, the US Army could have influenced the course of the Mexican Revolution. However, such influence did not extend to nonmilitary objectives.

Woodrow Wilson never abandoned his faith in the capacity of the United States to remake the world. During the Mexican Revolution and World War I, he sought to influence not merely the military outcome, but also the shape of the peace. In each case he failed. There are times when force, even when victorious on the field of battle, has its limits.
Notes


5. Although they wrote this proposal in San Antonio, Madero and his supporters named their plan after the last major city in Mexico from which he spoke before fleeing to the United States. This particular labeling spared him possible difficulties in terms of violating American neutrality laws.


11. Madero’s forces are discussed at somewhat greater length by Howard F. Cline, *The United States and Mexico* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 122.


25. Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1927), 279. In the summer of 1913, President Wilson recalled the ambassador and requested his resignation, which the latter promptly tendered.

36. Henry Lane Wilson, May 23, 1911 Letter to Secretary of State Knox, Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929, Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, 812.900.

47. Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1927), 240.

58. Ibid, 281.

69. The ambassador wrote: “After years of mature consideration, I do not hesitate to say that if I were confronted with the same situation under the same conditions, I should take precisely the same course.” Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1927), 282.


24. Isidro Fabela and Josefina E. Fabela, editors, Documentos Historicos de la Revolución Mexicana: Periodo Constitucionalista (Mexico City: Fonda de Cultura y Economica y Editorial Jus), 2:357: “The invasion of our territory, the stationing of American troops in the port of Veracruz, the violations of our rights as a sovereign, free, and independent state could provoke us to an unequal but just wear, which we wish to avoid.”


28. Newton Diehl Baker to Woodrow Wilson, March 10, 1916, Enclosure III sent with


32. Considerable disputes about the source of these mini-raids persist. One interpretation argues that a handful of Mexican highwaymen crossed the border in search of prey. A second school holds that the raiders were Carrancista soldiers assigned to convince the Americans that they would enjoy no peace on the border until they left Mexico. Neither camp believes that Villa ordered the mini-forays.


35. Ibid, 11.
On 15 July 1958, elements of a US Marine battalion landing team stormed ashore across beaches south of the Lebanese capital of Beirut. Clad in combat gear and heavily armed, the leathernecks staked out their positions and dug in as sunbathers, soft-drink and ice-cream vendors, casually dressed vacationers, and denizens of a nearby village looked on. The surreal atmosphere heightened the uncertainty many troops experienced as to what exactly would happen now that they were in Lebanon. Most were aware that the country was in turmoil, and some probably had heard that the pro-West government of Iraq had been overthrown in a bloody coup d’etat the previous day. The battalion’s officers had orders to seize Beirut’s international airport during the landing operations and to proceed north to the city itself after that. What would happen then was anyone’s guess. Most marines assumed, however, that there were armed and malevolent forces at work in the country, and that unless those hostile groups were subdued, the United States would suffer a serious reversal in the Cold War.

At the time of the US intervention in Lebanon, the Cold War had been the dominating feature in world affairs for just over a decade. Initially just a struggle between the Soviet Union and its erstwhile Western allies over the political/ideological composition of post-World War II Europe, the conflict had, by the early 1950s, spread to the Far East and, by mid-decade, to the Middle East. In response to what American officials perceived as the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union and, after 1949, the People’s Republic of China, the US government had adopted a policy of containing communism. In the late 1940s, that general approach translated into such concrete measures as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all designed to fortify friendly European governments vulnerable to Soviet military threats, subversion, and psychological warfare. In 1950, less than a year after mainland China fell to Mao Dezong’s Red army, the United States led UN forces in a “police action” to stop the extension of communism to the Republic of South Korea. By the time an armistice ended the Korean War in 1953, Washington had concluded formal alliances with South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan, thereby institutionalizing the containment policy in the Far East.

That same year saw the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, whose successors in the Kremlin moved to adopt more flexible tactics in the Cold War. Seeking to acquire friends and clients, not satellites, through the expansion of Soviet influence, not control, the new leadership made offers of economic and military aid to
developing countries, thus ushering in a new, more competitive phase in the Cold War. One region targeted by this change in Soviet tactics was the Middle East.

It was only during World War II that the United States began to look upon the Middle East, given its oil reserves and geopolitical position, as an area vital to the country’s national security. At war’s end, the presence of Soviet troops in northern Iran and the Kremlin’s pressure on Turkey for territorial and strategic concessions helped contribute to the onset of the Cold War, but both issues were resolved relatively quickly, permitting Washington to focus, as noted, on the threat of communist expansion in Europe and, soon thereafter, Asia. In the mid-1950s, though, as Stalin’s successors turned their attention to the Middle East, the United States felt compelled to follow suit.

When Dwight D. Eisenhower succeeded Harry Truman as president in 1953, America’s position in the region did not appear all that bleak. In the Arab world, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Libya had governments considered to be friendly to the West. Egypt had recently changed regimes, with the pro-West King Farouk being ousted in a nearly bloodless coup d’état by a group of “Free Officers,” but the new leaders initially expressed a willingness to maintain amicable and productive relations with the United States. In Iran, where a nationalistic leader had been threatening British and American oil interests, a CIA-backed coup in 1953 placed the pro-West shah in power. Still, when Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, visited the region that year to gain support for, among other anticommunist measures, a regional defense pact modeled on NATO that would include Arab countries, he found an area in flux, with many Arab leaders more concerned about Zionism and Western imperialism than America’s Cold War fixation. The Eisenhower administration subsequently scaled back its plans for a defense pact, restricting it to the “Northern Tier” states of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The president also made it clear that the United States would pursue more “evenhanded” policies with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and in dealing with the remnants of imperialism in the region, represented primarily by the French in Algeria and the British bases in Egypt and throughout the Gulf.

In 1954, as the Soviet Union undertook to woo Middle Eastern governments with offers of foreign assistance and with open support for the anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist positions of many prominent Arab leaders, Eisenhower and Dulles feared that the Kremlin would “leapfrog” the Northern Tier and establish its influence deep in the region. To counter Soviet appeals, Eisenhower attempted to make good on his pledge of evenhandedness, hoping at first to work with the new Egyptian strongman, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This initiative seemed to bear fruit in 1954, when the United States assisted in bringing about an Anglo-Egyptian agreement that would remove British troops from their bases in Egypt (although not British
control over the Suez Canal).

When the Eisenhower administration also tried to enlist Nasser in arranging an Arab-Israeli settlement, the result was less satisfying. The desired peace agreement never materialized, in some part because Nasser, a very charismatic leader who saw himself as the spokesman for the Arab world, recognized that concessions to Israel would jeopardize his ambitions, which he sought to further by espousing a secular program of Pan-Arab nationalism. The Arab world, Nasser proclaimed, represented a single nation by virtue of common language, history, territory, and religion. That the “nation” was not united but divided was the doing of the Western imperialists who had exploited the region economically and had arbitrarily drawn the boundaries of most current Middle Eastern states. Moreover, in 1948, as another blow to Pan-Arab nationalism, the imperialists had created the Western “colony” of Israel within the Arab homeland. Arabs, if they hoped to realize their national destiny, needed to unite, remove the remnants of Western imperialism from their midst, adopt a new social order to alleviate the plight of the poor, and insist on a position of neutrality in the Cold War. Furthermore, “reactionary” Arab rulers who did not embrace these sentiments but who continued to cooperate with the West needed to be removed from power.

Nasser’s anti-Western rhetoric, his appeal to the Arab “street” as well as to many Arab leaders, his shrill verbal assaults upon Iraq for being the only Arab state in 1955 to join the Baghdad Pact (a modified version of the Northern Tier defense organization), his denunciation of other pro-West Arab governments, and his neutralist sentiments all set off alarm bells in Washington. Neither Eisenhower nor Dulles thought the Egyptian a communist, but they both believed that Soviet leaders would use him to ensconce their influence firmly in the Middle East. The next three years seemed to confirm that assessment, as Nasser continued his objectionable rhetoric; mounted propaganda campaigns aimed at stirring up unrest in such countries as Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan; received arms from the Soviet bloc (after the United States balked at his requests for American weapons); and recognized the People’s Republic of China. In 1956, the Eisenhower administration demonstrated its growing aggravation with Nasser by withdrawing an offer it had made to help Egypt build a dam at Aswan. Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal. This move, in turn, prompted Israel, France, and Great Britain—each operating from its own motives—to take military action against Egypt in a war that had the ironic effect of putting the Eisenhower administration in diplomatic opposition to two of its NATO allies and the Israeli government. The threat of US sanctions forced all three countries to relinquish the territory they had seized, but it was Nasser and the Soviet Union who received the bulk of the credit for this victory over “imperialism.”
Washington perceived that Great Britain’s humiliation in the Suez crisis had created a power vacuum in the Middle East that the Soviet Union would fill if the United States failed to act. Consequently, the US Congress in March 1957 passed a resolution, popularly known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, that pledged American aid and support, including military intervention, to any Middle Eastern country “requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.” The doctrine was intended to deter Soviet adventurism, but also to bolster those pro-West governments through which Eisenhower hoped to isolate Nasser. Of the countries in the region, only Lebanon wholeheartedly embraced the Eisenhower Doctrine, and as events turned out, only Lebanon would benefit from it.5

In the year that followed passage of the congressional resolution, the US position in the Middle East seemed to deteriorate even further, Nasserism seemed to be attracting even more adherents, and the Soviet Union seemed to increase its influence, especially in Egypt and Syria. In February 1958, those two countries merged into the United Arab Republic (UAR), a move that many in the Middle East saw as the first step toward realizing the ideal of a truly Pan-Arab political entity. Once formed, the UAR intensified Nasser’s vituperative propaganda campaign aimed at toppling pro-West regimes in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. The royal family in Iraq and the officials that governed in its name were not all that popular but did not seem in imminent danger. The same could not be said of young King Hussein in Jordan, who had barely weathered a domestic crisis in 1957. As for Lebanon, it was also in the throes of a political crisis and seemed highly vulnerable to Nasserite pressures from within and outside its borders. In spring 1958, it was the turmoil in Lebanon that had the Eisenhower administration most concerned.6

On a rudimentary level, the principal players in Lebanese politics were organized along confessional, geographical, and family lines; they included Maronite and Greek Orthodox Christians, the Druze, Sunni, and Shia Muslims, and smaller groups representing other denominations. These groups were broken into subgroups, each generally led by a prominent family patriarch, or zaim (loosely translated as boss). In 1958, the status and power of these zuama in the country’s political structure were still based on the National Pact of 1943, which mandated that the Lebanese president be a Maronite Christian—the largest confessional group in Lebanon during the post-World War I mandate period; the prime minister a Sunni, and the president of the parliament a Shiite. But changing demographics, combined with the appeal of Nasser’s Pan-Arab nationalism, caused several Muslim groups by the mid-1950s to desire a greater role in Lebanese politics. Conversely, the country’s president, Camille Chamoun, embraced the Maronites’ traditionally pro-West orientation and sought to stave off the Nasserite challenge. His failure to denounce England and France during the Suez crisis angered Muslims throughout
the Middle East. A year later, several of his prominent critics were defeated in Lebanon’s parliamentary elections—elections that, the losers rightly charged, had been fraudulent. In addition to these divisive events, many powerful zauma, including some Christians, were outraged at Chamoun’s machinations to amend the constitution in order to seek a second term as president.

In May 1958, after a left-wing, anti-Chamoun journalist was murdered, many in opposition to the president took up arms to redress their grievances. Chamoun requested US intervention at that time, invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine, but Washington was not yet ready to take such a drastic step. By mid-year, the violence subsided, and many observers concluded that the immediate crisis was under control. But then, on 14 July 1958, a group of Iraqi officers apparently sympathetic to Nasserism overthrew the country’s government, murdering the royal family and various government officials in the process. Eisenhower and his advisers quickly convened a series of emergency meetings in Washington, as they envisaged a similar scenario playing out in Lebanon and Jordan. To save two of the few remaining pro-West governments in the Middle East, Eisenhower ordered American troops into Lebanon, while the British intervened in Jordan. The next day, US marines, who had been sailing off Lebanon earlier in the crisis, returned to the area and entered the country.

During the year leading up to the American intervention in Lebanon, US military planners and their British counterparts had been working on contingency plans for putting troops from both their countries into the Middle East. Since the planners could imagine hundreds of scenarios that might require Western intervention, the completed plans remained vague regarding the kinds of operations the troops might actually have to perform. The planners focused instead on identifying which units would be sent, how they would get to their objective, and what critical ground and facilities they would seize upon arrival. In the case of Lebanon, as noted, the plan called for establishing a beachhead south of Beirut, seizing the international airport nearby, and moving on to the capital itself. What would follow would be anyone’s guess.7

At the time he ordered the intervention on 14 July, Eisenhower himself had little idea of what the troops would be required to do. Nor did he have any idea when they would leave the country. The important thing, from his point of view and that of his national security advisers, was to get the troops in. To do nothing, they were convinced, would allow Nasser to dominate the Middle East, to the advantage of the Soviet Union and to the detriment of the West. Inaction would also have serious global, as opposed to regional, ramifications, the president believed: the United States would lose credibility among friends and foes alike, leading the former to doubt whether they could rely on American commitments and tempting
the latter to take risks that could end in a superpower confrontation no one wanted. As Secretary Dulles concluded, the Cold War losses America would suffer from doing nothing were bound to be worse than the consequences of taking action. Consensus on this point held, even after both Secretary Dulles and his brother, CIA director Allen Dulles, made it clear that it would be easier to send in the troops than to get them out, and that no one knew how the situation might develop once the troops deployed. Thus, with no clear idea of what US forces would be called upon to do, and with no clear idea of when or under what conditions the troops would be withdrawn, the president had ordered the intervention.8

The US Marine and Army units arriving in Lebanon could not be expected to know what the president himself did not. As the commanding general of the Army forces told one group of infantrymen deploying from Europe, “At this time I cannot tell exactly what our future mission may be.”9 Most suspected that they were there to support the pro-West Lebanese government, and they expected that this would require combat operations, but against whom, they could not say. Perhaps they would have to fight the rebels who were holding the government in Beirut under siege; perhaps they would have to take on the Syrian army, rumored—falsely, as it turned out—to be in Lebanon supporting the rebels. What the first marines ashore did know was that they were to march overland to the capital city just north of them. If they were apprehensive about what might happen along the way, they had reason to be. As things turned out, the move to Beirut precipitated a confrontation that came close to disaster.

The setting for the near debacle began to take shape as soon as the marines established their beachheads on the 15th. When the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Hadd, came ashore, he was greeted in quick succession by two emissaries from the American embassy sent by US Ambassador Robert McClintock. The first to arrive, a naval attaché, bore instructions from the ambassador to have the marines reboard their ships and sail north to the port of Beirut. McClintock was concerned that the planned march overland toward the city might be opposed as a matter of honor by the Lebanese army. In the ambassador’s view, a firefight between the two forces would destroy what chances the US intervention had for restoring some semblance of stability to the country. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd, however, refused to reembark his troops, and his immediate superior backed him up. McClintock was furious and let the State Department know it. An agreement between the department and the Pentagon, reached well before the intervention, stated that “In case of difference between the military commander and the local United States diplomatic representative in regard to political matters relating exclusively to Lebanon, the views of the latter shall be controlling.” The ambassador believed Hadd was in violation of this agreement, while the lieutenant colonel, relying on his orders, was completely unaware that it existed.10
The next day, the marines, having seized the international airport during their initial landings, assembled for the move to the capital city. En route, as the ambassador feared, they encountered elements of the Lebanese army deployed for a fight. Only the timely, albeit last-minute arrival of McClintock, Admiral James Holloway (the commander of US forces in the intervention), and the Lebanese army commander averted a firefight. The three men huddled together on the scene in an impromptu conference and hammered out a compromise agreement whereby the Lebanese soldiers would escort the marines to Beirut. With that decision, the stage was set for US forces and the Lebanese army to work together as partners in a collaboration that would determine the role US troops would play during the remainder of the intervention. One can only speculate on the course events would have taken had the marines and the Lebanese engaged in battle.

It would take almost a week to work out the details of the “partnership.” In the meantime, there was no shortage of advice as to what US forces should do and concerns over what they would do. McClintock, for his part, urged caution, fearing that if the Americans became involved in fighting with Lebanese rebels, the spectacle of US soldiers killing Muslims would set the whole of the Middle East on fire. Chamoun, on the other hand, demanded that the troops not only stabilize Lebanon but eliminate through military action the threats emanating from Iraq, Egypt, and Syria as well. Upon hearing this, Dulles let it be known that the United States would not engage in “preventive war” to stamp out Nasserism and communism in the Middle East, but would employ “patience” in seeking to resolve the crisis in Lebanon. Then there was the counsel of Vice Admiral Charles Brown, commander of the US Sixth Fleet, who, after visiting Beirut, advised Washington to have US forces, so far confined to the area around the capital, fan out to other key areas of the country. Admiral Holloway, together with McClintock, immediately let Washington know that Brown’s unsolicited advice contained “counterproductive” recommendations.11

After a key meeting on 21 July, the Lebanese and US commanders reached agreement on a division of labor between their two forces.12 According to a plan that went into effect on the 24th, US forces were assigned the task of ringing Beirut (with marines north of the city, Army units in the south). For its part, the Lebanese army would provide a buffer between US troops and the main concentration of rebels in an area of the capital known as the Basta. What was not immediately determined, however, was the fate of the rebel force. Chamoun, McClintock, and Holloway all wanted the Lebanese army commander, General Fuad Chehab, to clear the Basta, by force if necessary, but Chehab adamantly refused, fearing that his army would disintegrate along confessional lines should it be ordered to attack the mostly Muslim rebel force. A frustrated Holloway informed Chehab that, should the rebels attack US forces, he would order American troops to clean out
the Basta. The threat was not a bluff, although the admiral and the general both realized that the negative ramifications of such action would likely intensify the crisis, not settle it.13

While the discussions to determine the role of American troops in Lebanon were taking place over the first week of the intervention, Robert Murphy, a special envoy for President Eisenhower, arrived in Beirut. Initially sent to smooth out the friction that purportedly existed between the American embassy and the US military commanders, he quickly found that McClintock and Holloway had established a genuine rapport and were cooperating with each other fully. That freed Murphy to address the more important issue of Lebanon’s internal crisis. In a flurry of talks with Lebanese leaders representing all the contending parties, the seasoned diplomat acquainted himself with the troubles afflicting the country. As a British colleague observed, “Mr. Murphy after 24 hours here is beginning to hold his head in his hands at the intricacies of the Lebanese situation.” What Murphy found was that, once he assured the various rebel factions, both Muslim and Christian, that the US military was not in Lebanon to keep Chamoun in power and that it was not an occupying force, the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the crisis brightened, so much so, in fact, that on 19 July, he advised Washington that it should eschew military action in favor of a political settlement. Eisenhower and Dulles, both concerned about the decline of America’s prestige in the Arab world, readily concurred.14

In Murphy’s assessment, the essential first step toward a peaceful outcome was the immediate election of a new president. The Lebanese parliament was scheduled to meet later in the month, so there was little time in which to find a candidate acceptable to all parties. The breakthrough came when Chamoun not only agreed to step aside, but also pledged to throw his support behind his rival, General Chehab, a man whose family background, religious affiliation (Maronite), and experience in commanding a Muslim-Christian army qualified him more than most for the presidency. Chehab’s election took place on 31 July, but he did not take office until 23 September. In the interim, several crises threatened to derail the settlement, but Murphy and McClintock plied their diplomatic skills to see that the agreement held.

The American military intervention, despite all the risks it entailed, turned out to be critical to the successful diplomacy conducted by the two senior US diplomats on the scene. For over three months, the joint American force surrounding Beirut engaged in a variety of activities and performed a number of tasks, none of which approximated what they had anticipated upon their arrival. There were, in other words, no truly combat operations. Rather, the troops contributed to the successful negotiations simply by being present, mounting patrols, manning checkpoints, and
displaying the power at their disposal. In short, they provided a show of force
to which Murphy or McClintock could point, when need be, to persuade some
recalcitrant Lebanese official or zaim to behave more responsibly. At times, the
troops became the targets of small-arms fire from the rebel area, but the threat was
sufficiently low and the force sufficiently protected so that only one US soldier out
of a force of over 14,000 died from hostile fire.

The final threat to a peaceful outcome arose when Chehab announced that his
cabinet would contain several former rebels. This development infuriated Cham-
oun and the Christian Phalangists, not to mention the CIA, and the former president
and his followers threatened a general strike and military action. McClintock saved
the day, using his good offices to find a formula that Chehab used to reorganize his
cabinet in a more balanced way. At this point, the Eisenhower administration had
already begun withdrawing some of the US force. By the end of October 1958, all
American troops had left Lebanon.

The intervention had been successful, in that patience, diplomacy, and a show
of force provided the means to resolve the local crisis. Lebanon, despite its sectar-
ian divisions, would remain at peace for 17 years. Furthermore, soon after the cri-
sis, Nasser fell out with the new Iraqi leadership, the Soviet Union, and his Syrian
partner in the UAR, all causing him to seek better relations with the United States.
The Eisenhower administration, for its part, extended diplomatic recognition to
the new Iraqi government and accepted the fact that, since the United States could
not destroy Nasserism, it should reach an accommodation with it. With both sides
receptive to a rapprochement of sorts, US-Egyptian relations improved throughout
the remainder of Eisenhower’s second term and into the 1960s. The Cold War, of
course, continued unabated until the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 brought a general
lessening of tensions that survived the Vietnam War and two Arab-Israeli wars in
the Middle East (1967 and 1973).

The point to be made here, though, is that the US military and the Eisenhower
administration had not planned for all this at the time American troops intervened
in Lebanon on 15 July 1958. Those troops, as they themselves quickly discov-
ered, had no clear mission; nor could they refer to any plan for withdrawing them,
what in today’s parlance would be called an “exit strategy.” Yet, by adjusting to
the situation as they found it, however unconventional and daunting it turned out
to be, and by working closely with American diplomats on the scene, the troops
provided the “muscle” that encouraged the contending factions to reach a negoti-
ated solution.
Notes


2. Eisenhower’s policies toward the Middle East are covered in Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). The documentary record of these policies can be found in the appropriate volumes of US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS] (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office).


4. Once the USSR realized that the United States opposed the British, French, and Israeli military actions, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev threatened to rain rockets on Paris and London. The threats were empty but served to enhance the Kremlin’s status among the multitudes of Nasserites throughout the Middle East.


6. For an overview of the Lebanese crisis, see Sandra Mackey, Lebanon: Death of a Nation (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1989), 105-27. Mackey’s book provides a very readable introduction to the history of Lebanon and the background and events surrounding the crises of 1957-58 and 1975-1990. See also Chapter 13 in Peretz, Middle East Today.

7. For an account of the planning for possible US intervention in a Middle Eastern country, see Roger J. Spiller, “‘Not War But Like War’: The American Intervention in Lebanon, Leavenworth Paper No.3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1981).

8. For the deliberations of President Eisenhower and his advisers prior to the decision to intervene in Lebanon, see the relevant material for 14 July 1958 in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Lebanon and Jordan (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992). The crisis in Lebanon was a topic of high-level discussion within the administration from April 1958 through the intervention. After one particular meeting in June, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Eisenhower’s ambassador to the UN, sent a message to John Foster Dulles, expressing some concerns over the possibility of a US intervention in Lebanon. Among the questions raised by Lodge were the following: “How our we going to get our troops out once we have got them in? How long shall they remain? What will the formula be for getting them out? What will the formula be for holding elections in Lebanon while our troops are there? What happens if the elections should go definitely against us?” To these and other issues, Dulles responded that the “hard questions” Lodge raised were being given a great deal of thought.
As noted in the text of this essay, the administration had not come up with any answers three weeks later. Ibid., 168-69.

9. The general’s speech can be found in U.S. Army, 24th Infantry Division, After Action Report for Operation GRANDIOS, 15-31 July 1958, 5 November 1958. A copy is located in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


11. The views cited concerning how US forces might be employed are contained in various documents for the early period of the intervention and can be found in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI.


13. Practically every key US official on the scene started out by demanding that Chamoun relieve Chehab of command for the latter’s refusal to clean out the Basta. Over time, virtually every one of these critics came to accept the wisdom of Chehab’s position. In the Great Civil War that began in Lebanon in the mid-1970s, the Lebanese army did get involved and, in the process, disintegrated along confessional lines.

14. For details of the Murphy mission, see Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), Chapter 27; entries in FRUS, 1959-1960, Vol. XI, for the period of Murphy’s stay in Lebanon. The observation regarding Murphy’s endeavor to learn about Lebanese politics is quoted in Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 240.


16. Seven years after the United States intervened militarily in Lebanon, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration sent American troops into the Dominican Republic. In very broad terms, that intervention was quite similar to the one in Lebanon: the troops went in on short notice; the plan available to them discussed the units to be used, the means to get them into the country, and the critical terrain to be seized, but not the kinds of operations they might have to perform; the mission was vague; and, at the outset, there was no plan for withdrawing the troops. Yet, as in Lebanon, even without a clear mission, an “exit strategy,” and with plenty of “mission creep,” the Dominican intervention was considered a success.
Vietnamization: An Incomplete Exit Strategy
James H. Willbanks

By the fall of 1968, US involvement in Southeast Asia had reached a pivotal point. The Communist forces had been defeated decisively on the battlefield during the Tet Offensive earlier that year, but in the process they had reaped a tremendous psychological victory. Although US troop levels were at an all-time high and much had been said about the “light at the end of the tunnel,” the sheer scope and ferocity of the Communist attacks had been startling, and the cries to get out of Vietnam reached a new intensity. A shaken Lyndon Johnson announced that he would not run for re-election. Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon squared off in a fight for the soon-to-be-vacated White House.

During his campaign, Nixon made the war in Vietnam a major element of his platform, promising “new leadership that will end the war and win the peace in the Pacific.” He proclaimed: “The nation’s objective should be to help the South Vietnamese fight the war and not fight it for them. . . .If they do not assume the majority of the burden in their own defense, they cannot be saved.” Despite his later protestations to the contrary, such pronouncements gave many voters the impression that Nixon had a “secret plan” for ending the war, and this no doubt was a factor in his victory at the polls in November.

On 20 January 1969, Richard Milhous Nixon was inaugurated as the 37th president of the United States. Once elected, Nixon faced the same problems in Vietnam that had confronted Lyndon Johnson. Escalation and commitment of increased numbers of American troops had not worked; the Tet Offensive had demonstrated that fact only too clearly. The resultant stalemate was unacceptable not only for those clamoring for a US pull-out, but also for an ever-increasing sector of the American people who would no longer tolerate a long-term commitment to what appeared to be an unwinnable war. The only answer was to get out of Vietnam, but the problem was how to devise an exit strategy that would allow the United States to withdraw gracefully without abandoning South Vietnam to the Communists.

On his first day in office, Nixon immediately set about to find a solution, issuing National Security Study Memorandum 1 (NSSM 1), titled “Situation in Vietnam,” which was sent to selected members of the new administration, requesting responses to 29 major questions and 50 subsidiary queries covering six broad categories: negotiations, the enemy situation, the state of the armed forces of South Vietnam, the status of the pacification effort, the political situation in South Vietnam, and American objectives. The memorandum was sent to, among others, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US Embassy in Saigon, and Headquarters Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). The memorandum, according to Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security adviser at the time, was designed “to sharpen any disagreements so that we could pinpoint the controversial questions and the different points of view.” Chief among the new president’s concerns were the viability of the Thieu government and the capability of the South Vietnamese to continue the fight after any US withdrawal. If Nixon wanted divergent views and opinions on the war, he certainly found them in the wide range of responses to what became known as the “29 questions.” Kissinger and his staff summarized the responses to NSSM 1 in a 44-page report, which revealed that there was general agreement among most respondents that the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) could not in the foreseeable future defend against both the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (or more accurately, PAVN, the People’s Army of Vietnam). In the same vein, most respondents agreed that the government of Vietnam (GVN) probably could not stand up to serious political competition from the National Liberation Front (NLF) and that the enemy, although seriously weakened by losses during the Tet Offensive, was still an effective force capable of being refurbished and reinforced from North Vietnam.

Despite agreeing on these points, there was disagreement among the respondents about the progress achieved to that point and the long-range prognosis for the situation in Southeast Asia. There were two opposing schools of thought in this matter. The more optimistic group, best represented by the MACV response and shared by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. (commander in chief, US Pacific Forces), held that the North Vietnamese had agreed to peace talks in Paris because of their military weakness, that pacification gains were real and “should hold up,” and that the “tides are favorable.”

Although the MACV opinion emphasized that significant progress was being made in modernizing the ARVN, it warned that the South Vietnamese could not yet stand alone against a combined assault, stating that “the RVNAF simply are not capable of attaining the level of self-sufficiency and overwhelming force superiority that would be required to counter combined Viet Cong insurgency and North Vietnamese Army main force offensives.” Accordingly, General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., MACV commander, stressed in his response that any proposed American troop withdrawal had to be accompanied by a concurrent North Vietnamese withdrawal.

Differing strongly with the MACV report and definitely representing a decidedly more pessimistic view were the responses from the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and civilians in the Defense Department, all of which were
highly critical of Saigon’s military capabilities and US progress to date. The Defense Department went so far as to say that the South Vietnamese could not be expected to contain even the Viet Cong, let alone a combined enemy threat, without continued and full American support. These respondents agreed that pacification gains were “inflated and fragile” and that the Communists were not dealing from a position of weakness on the battlefield and had gone to Paris only for political and strategic reasons—to cut costs and to pursue their aims through negotiation—rather than because they faced defeat on the battlefield.

Thus, there existed two divergent opinions about the long-term projection for the future of South Vietnam and its military forces. What had been designed as a means to clear the air on the Vietnam situation and assist in developing a viable strategy had only served to obfuscate things further for the new president. Henry Kissinger wrote, “The answers [to NSSM 1] made clear that there was no consensus as to facts, much less as to policy.”8 Thus, Nixon faced a serious dilemma. He had promised to end the war and bring the troops home, but he could not, as Kissinger later observed in his memoirs, “Simply walk away from an entire enterprise involving two administrations, five allied countries, and thirty-one thousand dead as if we were switching a television channel.”9 The new president had to devise an exit strategy to get the United States out of Vietnam, without “simply walk[ing] away.” While the survival of South Vietnam remained an objective, it manifestly was not the prime goal, which was to get the United States out of Vietnam. Nixon and his advisers began to consider how the US could disengage itself from the conflict and at the same time give the South Vietnamese at least a chance of survival after the American departure. It was acknowledged that this would not be easy and might even prove impossible in the long run.

Despite the uncertainty involved in trying to strengthen the South Vietnamese armed forces, the president and his closest advisers, particularly Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and Secretary of State William P. Rogers, agreed that this was the only feasible course of action if the United States was ever to escape from Vietnam. Nixon ordered American representatives to take a “highly forceful approach” to cause President Thieu and the South Vietnamese government to assume greater responsibility for the war.10 Unspoken, but still clear to all involved, was the implication that an assumption of greater combat responsibility by the RVNAF would precede a resultant withdrawal of American forces, which by this time totaled 543,000.

To get a better sensing for the situation on the ground in Southeast Asia, Nixon directed Laird to go to South Vietnam to conduct a firsthand assessment. On 5 March 1969, the secretary of defense, accompanied by General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, arrived in Saigon. There they were briefed by senior MACV
officers, who emphasized the view that significant improvements were being made in the South Vietnamese armed forces. Laird instructed General Abrams to speed up the effort so that the bulk of the war effort could be turned over to the Saigon forces as soon as possible. Abrams repeated his earlier warning that the South Vietnamese were not prepared to stand alone against a combined threat. Nevertheless, Laird, citing political pressures at home, directed Abrams to improve the RVNAF and turn over the war to them “before the time given the new administration runs out.” As historian Lewis Sorley points out, this was not a new mission for Abrams; he had been working on this effort since his days as Westmoreland’s deputy in Saigon. However, the urgency was a new factor.

Despite Abrams’ warning, Laird returned to Washington convinced that the South Vietnamese could eventually take over prosecution of the entire war, thus permitting a complete US withdrawal. A former Republican congressman with 17 years in the House, Laird was anxious to end the war because he realized the traditional grace period afforded a new president by the public, the press, and Congress following his election victory would be short-lived. Anti-war sentiment on Capitol Hill was growing, and Laird knew that Nixon would feel the brunt of it if he did not end the war quickly. Moreover, if the war in Vietnam continued much longer, Laird reasoned that it would weaken American strength and credibility around the world in places far more important to US security than Southeast Asia. He believed that any effort to prolong the conflict would lead to such strife and controversy that it would seriously damage Nixon’s ability to achieve an honorable settlement. Therefore, according to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jerry Friedheim, Laird was “more interested in ending the war in Vietnam rather than winning it.”

Laird told Nixon he believed the president had no choice but to turn the entire war over to the South Vietnamese to extricate US forces and placate both the resurgent anti-war movement, as well as the ever-growing segment of the American population who just wanted the war to go away. He proposed a plan designed to make the South Vietnamese armed forces capable of dealing not only with the ongoing insurgency, but also with a continuing North Vietnamese presence in the south. Laird argued that the large US presence in country stifled South Vietnamese initiative and prevented them from getting on with taking over the war effort. He told Nixon that he believed the “orientation” of American senior commanders in Vietnam “seemed to be more on operations than on assisting the South Vietnamese to acquire the means to defend themselves.” Laird wanted the senior US military leaders in South Vietnam to get to work on shifting their focus from fighting the war to preparing the South Vietnamese to stand on their own. Accordingly, he recommended withdrawing 50,000-70,000 American troops in 1969.

In a National Security Council meeting on 28 March, the president and his
advisers discussed Laird’s recommendations. In attendance was General Andrew Goodpaster, then serving as General Abrams’ deputy in Saigon. He reported to the president that substantial improvement in the South Vietnamese forces had already been made and that MACV was in fact close to “de-Americanizing” the war. According to Henry Kissinger, Laird took exception to Goodpaster’s choice of words and suggested that what was needed was a term like “Vietnamization” to put the emphasis on the right issues. In very short time, this term was adopted as the embodiment of Nixon’s efforts to turn over the war to the South Vietnamese.  

Laird later described the objective of the new program before the House Armed Services Committee as “the effective assumption by the RVNAF of a larger share of combat operations from American forces” so that “US forces can be in fact withdrawn in substantial numbers.” Such statements were clearly aimed at selling the new policy to Congress and the American public. Alexander M. Haig, then a member of Nixon’s National Security staff, later described Laird’s plan as a “stroke of public relations genius” but pointed out that it was “a program designed to mollify American critics of the war, not a policy for the effective defense of South Vietnam.” Nevertheless, Laird, according to Henry Kissinger, had convinced himself that Vietnamization would work and it became his top priority. 

Nixon was quickly won over by Laird’s arguments, later writing, “It was on the basis of Laird’s enthusiastic advocacy that we undertook the policy of Vietnamization.” It may not have taken very much to convince the president to endorse this approach; Haig maintains that Nixon had begun talking about troop withdrawals shortly after his inauguration and Laird’s Vietnamization plan provided the rationale he was looking for. It would enable the president to initiate a phase-down of combat operations by US troops with the ultimate goal of complete withdrawal. However, Nixon realized that American forces could not be pulled out precipitously. Although the situation was improving in South Vietnam, there was still a significant level of fighting. Time was needed to make the RVNAF sufficiently strong enough to continue the war alone. Thus, American forces would have to continue combat operations to gain the necessary time to build up the South Vietnamese forces.

In early April 1969, Nixon issued planning guidance for the new policy in National Security Study Memorandum 36 (NSSM 36), which directed “the preparation of a specific timetable for Vietnamizing the war” that would address “all aspects of US military, para-military, and civilian involvement in Vietnam, including combat and combat support forces, advisory personnel, and all forms of equipment.” The stated objective of the requested plan was “the progressive transfer...of the fighting effort” from American to South Vietnamese forces.

Nixon’s directive was based on a number of assumptions. First, it was assumed
that, lacking progress in the Paris peace talks, any US withdrawal would be unilat-
eral and that there would not be any comparable NVA reductions. This was a
significant change from previous assumptions, because it meant that the South
Vietnamese would have to take on both the NVA and the VC. Second, the US
withdrawals would be on a “cut and try” basis, and General Abrams would make
periodic assessments of their effects before launching the next phase of troop re-
ductions. Third, it was assumed that the South Vietnamese forces would willingly
assume more military responsibility for the war. Based on these three assumptions,
the American troop presence in South Vietnam was to be drawn down eventually
to the point where only a small residual support and advisory mission remained.

Thus, the Nixon administration, despite assessments from a wide range of
government agencies that agreed that the RVNAF could never combat a combined
VC-NVA threat, devised a program to prepare the South Vietnamese to do just that,
instructing the American command in Saigon to develop plans for turning over
the entire war effort to Saigon. All that was left to institute the new strategy was a
public announcement.

On 8 June 1969, President Nixon met with South Vietnamese President Nguyen
Van Thieu at Midway and publicly proclaimed for the first time the new American
policy of “Vietnamization.” Nixon stated that there would be a steady buildup
and improvement of South Vietnamese forces and institutions, accompanied by
increased military pressure on the enemy, while American troops were gradually
withdrawn. He emphasized that the ultimate objective was to strengthen RVNAF
capabilities and bolster the Thieu government such that the South Vietnamese
could stand on their own against the Communists. Before closing, Nixon an-
nounced he was pulling out 25,000 troops and that at “regular intervals” thereafter,
he would pull out more. According to the president, this withdrawal of US forces
was contingent on three factors: 1) the progress in training and equipping the South
Vietnamese forces, 2) progress in the Paris negotiations, and 3) the level of enemy
activity.22

Privately, President Thieu was not pleased with the American president’s
announcement. According to Nixon, Thieu, realizing what the end state of US
withdrawals meant, was “deeply troubled,” but Nixon later claimed he “privately
assured [Thieu] through Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker that our support for him
was steadfast.”23 Thieu and many of his generals were upset with another aspect of
“Vietnamization” and that was the word itself. The South Vietnamese leaders took
exception to the whole concept and the connotation that the ARVN were “finally”
stepping up to assume responsibility for the war. To the South Vietnamese who had
been fighting the Communists since the 1950s, the idea that the war would now be
“Vietnamized” was insulting. As one former ARVN general wrote after the war,
“It was after all our own war, and we were determined to fight it, with or without American troops. In my opinion, Vietnamization was not a proper term to be used in Vietnam, especially when propaganda was an important enemy weapon.”

Despite the sensitivities of the South Vietnamese, Henry Kissinger recorded that “Nixon was jubilant. He considered the announcement a political triumph. He thought that it would buy him the time necessary for developing our strategy.” A later memorandum revealed that Nixon hoped his new policy of Vietnaminizing the war would demonstrate to the American people that he “had ruled out a purely US solution to the problem in South Vietnam and indeed had a plan to end the war.”

To solidify the new strategy, Nixon met with Laird and General Wheeler upon his return from Midway. The purpose was to discuss a mission change for General Abrams. The current mission statement, which had been issued by President Johnson, charged MACV to “defeat” the enemy and “force” his withdrawal to North Vietnam. As a result of the discussions following the Midway announcement, a new order to Abrams that would go into effect on 15 August directed him to provide “maximum assistance” to strengthen the armed forces of South Vietnam, to increase the support to the pacification effort, and to reduce the flow of supplies to the enemy down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. With this order, the effort had begun by General Abrams when he assumed command of MACV became official White House policy. Nixon’s new strategy hinged on transferring the responsibility for fighting the war to the South Vietnamese, while Henry Kissinger worked behind the scenes in Paris in an attempt to forge a cease-fire and subsequent peace agreement. Thus, Nixon hoped to extricate the United States from Southeast Asia and achieve “peace with honor.”

The Vietnamization effort would be implemented in three phases. In the first phase, responsibility for the bulk of ground combat against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces would be turned over gradually to the RVNAF. During this phase, the United States would continue to provide air, naval, and logistic support. The second phase consisted of developing capabilities in the RVNAF to help them achieve self-reliance through an increase in artillery, air, naval assets and other support activities. The second phase proceeded simultaneously with the first phase, but it would require more time. Even after the bulk of US combat forces were withdrawn, US forces would continue to provide support, security, and training personnel. The third phase involved the reduction of the American presence to strictly a military advisory role with a small security element remaining for protection. It was assumed that the advisory and assistance presence would be gradually reduced as South Vietnam grew in strength, but the new strategy, at least as it was described initially, always included leaving a small residual force in South Vietnam “for some time to come,” as Laird told a House subcommittee in February 1970.
The South Vietnamese took statements such as this and many more like it as evidence of a promise that the United States would not desert them. As the cries for complete US withdrawal increased in volume, the idea of a residual US force in Vietnam would eventually be abandoned and this change would have a devastating impact on the fortunes of South Vietnam.

While the United States continued to conduct combat operations with American forces, the new Vietnamization policy focused initially on modernizing and developing the South Vietnamese armed forces. This effort was not a new initiative, but during the earlier years of US involvement in Vietnam, particularly during the period of American buildup (1965-1967), it had been of secondary importance as US military leaders focused on the conduct of operations by American units in the field. With the election of Richard Nixon and his subsequent emphasis on Vietnamization, the effort to strengthen and modernize the South Vietnamese forces became a top priority for MACV.28

When Nixon met with President Thieu at Midway in June 1969 and announced the initiation of the Vietnamization policy, Thieu expressed significant concerns about the capabilities of his forces in light of the inevitable US troop withdrawals. Abrams was told to work with the South Vietnamese to develop a recommendation on how to further improve the force structure and fighting capability of the RVNAF. The subsequent improvement program, which became known collectively as the “Midway increase,” was approved by Laird on 18 August 1969. At the same time, Laird directed MACV and the Joint Staff to review all ongoing and projected programs for improving the RVNAF, telling them to consider not just force structure and equipment improvements, but also to look at new ways to improve leadership, training, and to develop new strategy and tactics best suited to South Vietnamese capabilities.

On 2 September, Abrams responded to Laird’s guidance, pointing out in very clear terms that, in his opinion, proposed modernization and improvement programs, even with the Midway increase, would not permit the South Vietnamese to handle the current combined threat. Citing poor leadership, high desertion rates, and corruption in the upper ranks of the RVNAF, Abrams reported that he thought the South Vietnamese forces could not be improved either quantitatively or qualitatively to the extent necessary to deal with a combined threat; he clearly stated that he thought what the secretary of defense wanted simply could not be done in the timeframe expected and with the resources allocated.29

Laird could not accept Abrams’ assessment, because if he did, it meant that he would have to admit that the United States could never gracefully exit South Vietnam, particularly in light of the increasingly obvious fact that the North Vietnamese
were not going to agree to a bilateral withdrawal of US and PAVN troops from South Vietnam. On 10 November, he directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to come up with a new plan that would, one way or the other, create a South Vietnamese military force that could “maintain at least current levels of security.” He told the military planners to assume unilateral US withdrawals that would reduce American military strength first to a “support force” of 190,000-260,000 troops by July 1971 and then to a much smaller advisory force by July 1973. He was effectively telling the planners for a third time to come up with a viable Vietnamization program but with the new caveat that they were not to assume a significant residual US support force.

It appears that Abrams and his staff, realizing that despite their great misgivings, the dye was cast with regard to eventual US withdrawal and they attempted to devise the best plan possible given Laird’s adamant directives. To comply with the secretary’s orders, the military planners assumed a reduced Viet Cong threat and a declining PAVN presence in South Vietnam, while virtually ignoring Hanoi’s forces based just outside the borders of South Vietnam. Based on these somewhat questionable assumptions, MACV submitted its new recommendations at the end of December. In January 1970, the Joint Chiefs included them in the Phase III RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan, which called for an increase in RVNAF strength to 1,061,505 over a three-year period (mid-1970 to mid-1973) and the activation and equipping of 10 new artillery battalions, 24 truck companies, and six more helicopter squadrons.

Laird and his staff thought this plan was finally a step in the right direction, but they were concerned that MACV planners still had not accepted that there would be no large residual American support force and suspected that the military was trying to stall the withdrawal process. Accordingly, in mid-February 1970, Laird flew to Saigon to meet with Abrams and Thieu to impress upon them the urgency of the situation. He voiced disappointment about what he perceived as the lack of any new or fresh approaches from MACV regarding the implementation of the Vietnamization program. While in Saigon, he met separately with senior South Vietnamese generals who expressed concern with the Phase III plan and reiterated earlier requests for additional artillery, to include long-range 175-mm artillery pieces and air defense artillery, and again asked for financial assistance to improve the lot of their soldiers.

When Laird got back to Washington, he ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to re-evaluate the proposed Phase III plan in light of the South Vietnamese requests and to come up with a more comprehensive plan. Two months later, the Joint Chiefs submitted the revised plan, which became known as the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan, or CRIMP. This plan, which covered the
1970-1972 fiscal years, raised the total supported South Vietnamese military force structure to an even 1.1 million.\textsuperscript{32}

CRIMP had a significant impact on the entire RVNAF. As in the past, the ARVN got the largest share of the improvements, eventually receiving 155-mm and 175-mm long-range artillery pieces, M-42 and M-55 antiaircraft weapons, M-48 tanks, and a host of other sophisticated weapon systems and equipment. By the end of 1969, the United States had supplied 1,200 tanks and armored vehicles, 30,000 machine guns, 4,000 mortars, 20,000 radios, and 25,000 jeeps and trucks. The new equipment and weapons received in the two years following the approval of CRIMP enabled the ARVN to activate an additional division (3d Infantry Division), as well as a number of smaller units, to include 25 border ranger battalions, numerous artillery battalions, four armored cavalry squadrons, three tank battalions, two armored brigade headquarters, and three antiaircraft battalions. By the beginning of 1972, the South Vietnamese army strength would increase to 450,000 and consist of 171 infantry battalions, 22 armored cavalry and tank squadrons, and 64 artillery battalions.\textsuperscript{33}

The territorial Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) also benefited greatly from CRIMP. As Vietnamization gained momentum, MACV and Washington planned to fill the gaps left by departing US divisions with an expansion of the RF/PF, which would hopefully be able to take over the major share of territorial security and support of the pacification program. This expansion effort involved a significant increase in numbers and improved equipment. Under CRIMP, the RF and PF received newer, more modern weapons, including M-16 rifles, M-60 machine guns, and M-79 grenade launchers; all were vast improvements over the hodgepodge of older cast-off weapons with which they previously had been armed. The influx of new 105-mm howitzers enabled the Joint General Staff to activate eventually a total of 174 territorial artillery sections to provide support for the RF, PF, and border ranger forces, thus vastly improving the fire support available to the territorial forces while reducing the burden on the regular artillery forces, who could then focus on supporting the regular maneuver battalions in their combat operations.\textsuperscript{34} In addition to the new equipment, the manpower strength of the Regional and Popular Forces was increased to get more government troops into the countryside to support the pacification effort. The command structure of the Regional Forces was improved and several RF group commands were formed.

The ground forces were not the only beneficiaries of CRIMP. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) also received a windfall, growing from 17,000 in late 1968 to 37,000 by the end of 1969, and ultimately to 64,000 by 1973. Along with this increase in the number of personnel, there were also significant upgrades in aircraft and command-and-control capability. The VNAF’s older propeller-driven aircraft
began to be replaced by A-37 and F-5A jet fighter-bombers, thus vastly increasing ground-support capability. VNAF’s cargo hauling capability was also improved with the upgrading of the C-47 fleet to C-119 aircraft initially, and eventually to C-123 and C-7 aircraft. The helicopter fleet (unlike the US arrangement, where most of the troop-carrying and attack helicopters belonged to the Army, VNAF controlled all the helicopters in the South Vietnamese inventory) was greatly enlarged and improved as US Army aviation units began to redeploy, turning over their aircraft and equipment to newly activated Vietnamese helicopter squadrons. Late in 1972, as the United States prepared for total withdrawal, VNAF, under the provisions of a special program called Enhance Plus, received 32 C-130A four-engine cargo planes and additional C-7 cargo planes, F-5A fighter-bombers, and helicopters.

During this period, the Vietnamese Air Force grew to six times its 1964 strength and, by 1973, operated a total of 1,700 aircraft, including over 500 helicopters. By then it had six air divisions, which included a total of 10 A-37 fighter-bomber squadrons, three A-1H attack helicopter squadrons, three F-5E fighter-bomber squadrons, 17 UH-1 helicopter squadrons, four CH-47 helicopter squadrons, 10 liaison and observation squadrons, three C-7 squadrons, four AC-47, AC-119, and EC-47 squadrons, and other additional training units. In terms of equipment, VNAF, by the time of the US withdrawal in 1973, would be one of the most powerful air forces in Southeast Asia.

The Vietnamese Navy (VNN) also underwent significant expansion during the Vietnamization period. The navy numbered only 17,000 in 1968, but it would reach 40,000 by 1972. To increase the capability of the VNN and to meet the goals of the Vietnamization program, MACV instituted two new programs in 1969. The first was called the Accelerated Turnover of Assets (ACTOV), which was designed to rapidly increase naval strength and training and, at the same time, accelerate turnover of ships and combat responsibility from the US Navy to the South Vietnamese Navy. The second program was called the Accelerated Turnover of Logistics (ACTOVLOG), which was aimed at increasing naval logistic support capabilities.

The VNN received two small cruisers in May 1969. Shortly thereafter, the US Navy Riverine Force began to turn over its vessels and river-patrol responsibilities to the VNN. By mid-1970, over 500 US brown-water navy boats had been transferred to the South Vietnamese. In September of that year, the VNN took over the ships and mission of the Market Time coastal interdiction program. By 1972, the Vietnamese Navy operated a fleet of over 1,700 ships and boats of all types, to include sea patrol craft, large cargo ships, coastal- and river-patrol craft, and amphibious ships.
In terms of the sheer volume of materiel and modern equipment, Vietnamization worked. By 1970, South Vietnam had made a quantum leap in terms of modernization and was one of the largest and best-equipped military forces in the world. Unfortunately, however, equipment and sheer numbers were not the only answers to the problems facing South Vietnam as it prepared to assume ultimate responsibility for the war. The fighting ability of the South Vietnamese armed forces had to be improved. To do this, MACV increasingly placed more emphasis on training and the advisory effort, which had been ongoing since the earliest days of US involvement in Southeast Asia. US advisers were found in essentially three areas: they advised South Vietnamese combat units, served in the training base, and worked in the province pacification programs.

MACV Headquarters provided the advisory function to the Joint General Staff (JGS), the senior headquarters of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. However, only a part of MACV Headquarters staff personnel actually served in a true advisory capacity. In 1970, only 397 out of 1,668 authorized spaces in MACV’s 15 staff agencies were designated officially as “advisers” to the GVN and the JGS. Nevertheless, as the war continued and more US forces were withdrawn, the MACV staff agencies became increasingly more involved in purely advisory functions.

Just below the JGS level were four South Vietnamese corps commanders who were responsible for the four corps tactical zones (later, military regions) that South Vietnam comprised. Initially, their US counterparts were the senior US field force commanders in each of the corps tactical zones. In this capacity, the senior US commander was assisted by two deputies who worked directly with the South Vietnamese forces. His deputy for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) was the principal adviser to the ARVN corps commander in the area of pacification and development. Additionally, the senior US commander had another deputy, who served as the senior adviser to the corps commander and was actually the chief of the US Army Advisory Group attached to the ARVN corps headquarters. As such, he and his staff provided assistance, advice, and support to the corps commander and his staff in command, administration, training, combat operations, intelligence, logistics, political warfare, and civil affairs.

Later, as additional US units and the senior American field-force headquarters were withdrawn, the advisory structure changed. During 1971-1972, four regional assistance commands were established. The regional assistance commander, usually a US Army major general, replaced the departing field-force commander as the senior adviser to the South Vietnamese corps commander in the respective military regions. The mission of the Regional Assistance Commander was to provide assistance to the ARVN corps commander in developing and maintaining an effective military capability by advising and supporting RVNAF military and paramilitary
commanders and staffs at all levels in the corps in military operations, training, intelligence, personnel management, and combat support and combat service support activities. To accomplish this, the Regional Assistance Commander had a staff that worked directly with the ARVN corps staff. He also exercised operational control over the subordinate US Army advisory groups and the pacification advisory organizations in the military region. As such, he and his personnel provided advice, assistance, and support at each echelon of South Vietnamese command in planning and executing both combat operations and pacification programs within the military region.

Below the senior US adviser in each military region, there were two types of advisory teams: province advisory teams and division advisory teams. Each of the 44 provinces in South Vietnam was headed by a province chief, usually a South Vietnamese Army or Marine colonel, who supervised the provincial government apparatus and also commanded the provincial Regional and Popular Forces. Under the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program initiated in 1967, an advisory system was established to assist the province chiefs in administering the pacification program. The province chief’s American counterpart was the province senior adviser, who was either military or civilian, depending on the security situation of the respective province. The province senior adviser and his staff were responsible for advising the province chief in civil and military aspects of the South Vietnamese pacification and development programs. The province senior adviser’s staff, which was made up of both US military and civilian personnel, was divided into two parts. The first part dealt with area and community development, to include public health and administration, civil affairs, education, agriculture, psychological operations, and logistics. The other part of the staff dealt with plans and operations, and focused on preparing plans and assisting with the direction of military operations by the territorial forces within the province.

The province chief exercised his authority through district chiefs. To provide advice and support to the district chiefs, the province senior adviser supervised the district senior advisers, who each had a staff of about eight members (although the actual size in each case depended on the particular situation in that district). The district level advisory teams assisted the District Chief in the military and civil aspects of the pacification and development program. Additionally, the district team (and/or assigned mobile assistance training teams) advised and trained the RF/PFs located in the district. By the end of 1967, a total of 4,000 US military and civilian personnel were involved in the CORDS advisory effort. When Vietnamization was officially declared in 1969, total US Army advisory strength stood at about 13,500, half of which were assigned to CORDS organizations. This increase was due to the expansion of the pacification program following the 1968 Tet Offensive. In
addition to CORDS advisory teams, there were also advisory teams with RVNAF regular forces. In January 1969, MACV, in an attempt to upgrade the capability of the regular ARVN divisions, initiated the Combat Assistance Team (CAT) concept. Under this plan, the emphasis was on reducing the number of tactical advisers in the field and changing their mission from “advising to combat support coordination” at the ARVN division level. The Division Combat Assistance Team’s mission was to advise and assist the ARVN division commander and his staff in command and control, administration, training, tactical operations, intelligence, security, logistics, and certain elements of political warfare. The division senior adviser was usually a US Army colonel, who exercised control over the regimental and battalion advisory teams.

Each ARVN division usually had three infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, and several separate battalions, such as the cavalry squadron and the engineer battalion. The regimental advisory teams were normally composed of from eight to 12 US Army personnel (they were eventually reduced in strength as the drawdown of US forces in country gradually reduced the number of advisers assigned) and were usually headed by a US Army lieutenant colonel and included various mixes of officers and noncommissioned officers. The separate battalion advisory teams usually consisted of one or two specialists who advised the South Vietnamese in their respective functional areas; for example: cavalry, intelligence, engineering, etc.

Elite ARVN troops, such as the airborne and ranger units, were organized generally along the same lines as regular ARVN units, but the highest echelon of command in these units was the regiment. Each of these regiments was accompanied by an American advisory team, which was headed by a colonel and was similar, but somewhat larger than those found with the regular ARVN regiments. The advisory structure for the Vietnamese Marine Corps was similar to the ARVN, but the advisers were US Marine Corps personnel.

US advisers did not command, nor did they exercise any operational control over any part of the South Vietnamese forces. Their mission was to provide professional military advice and assistance to their counterpart commanders and staffs. The idea was that these advisory teams would work themselves out of a job over time as the ARVN and VNMC began to assume more responsibility for planning and executing their own operations.

In addition to the US advisers assigned to the CORDS effort and those serving with South Vietnamese combat units in the field, there were also a significant number of advisers assigned to support the RVNAF training base in an effort to increase the training of the South Vietnamese forces. By the end of 1972, South Vietnamese
would have one of the largest and most modern military forces in Southeast Asia, but even vast amounts of the best equipment in the world were meaningless if the soldiers, sailors, and airmen did not know how to use it or did not have the leadership and motivation to put it to good use in the field against the enemy. Training the Vietnamese had, in theory, received high priority throughout the war, but in practice too little attention had been given this critical function before the initiation of Vietnamization. Even with the new policy in place, improving South Vietnamese training proved to be an uphill battle.

The ARVN training system consisted of 56 training centers of various types and sizes. There were nine national training centers (not including the airborne and marine divisions, which had their own training centers) and 37 provincial training centers. This extensive system of schools and training facilities was under the control of the RVNAF Central Training Command (CTC), which had first been established in 1966. This command was advised and supported by the MACV Training Directorate, which was responsible for providing advice and assistance in the development of an effective military training system for the RVNAF. As such the training directorate provided US advisers at the RVNAF schools and training centers, where they assisted RVNAF commandants in the preparation and conduct of training programs.

At first glance, the RVNAF training system of schools and training centers in 1968 was an impressive arrangement, but deeper investigation revealed that it was less than effective in producing the leaders and soldiers necessary to successfully prosecute the war. MACV had made numerous proposals to the Vietnamese Joint General Staff and Central Training Command for improving the personnel capacity and effectiveness of the South Vietnamese training facilities, but these recommendations received little attention from the RVNAF high command. As the MACV Command Overview stated, “Despite CTC and MACV efforts, little progress was made in 1969 in these areas due to the complex personnel changes required, JGS reluctance to give the program a high priority, and refusal by RVN field commanders to release experienced officers and NCOs [noncommissioned officers] from operational responsibilities.”

By early 1970, the US authorities were so disturbed by this situation that the Army chief of staff dispatched a fact-finding team to Vietnam led by Brigadier General Donnelly Bolton, to tour RVNAF training facilities, to provide an objective assessment of the training capabilities of the South Vietnamese, and to examine the state of US training assistance. This team found the efforts of both South Vietnamese and the US military training advisers in Vietnam to be less than adequate. The MACV Training Directorate, responsible for providing advisers to RVNAF training facilities, was at only 70 percent of assigned strength, and all the
US training advisory detachments in the field were likewise under strength. The quality of advisory personnel assigned to train the South Vietnamese at the RVNAF schools was also an issue, since it appeared to the team that often those deemed unfit to serve in more prestigious operational and staff positions were placed in the RVNAF training billets. Colonel (later Major General) Stan L. McClellan, a member of the Bolton team, wrote, “It was clear that top professionals were not being assigned to training advisory duties.”

General Abrams agreed with the findings of the Bolton team and urged Bolton to recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon his return to the Pentagon that they send more and better training advisers to Vietnam. He was very concerned with filling the ranks of his advisory teams with personnel at their authorized grade level (for instance, lieutenant colonels in positions authorized lieutenant colonels, and so forth), thereby reducing the number of low-ranking advisers with little or no combat experience. Abrams told Bolton, “It’s time that they [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] recognize in Washington that the day of the US fighting force involvement in South Vietnam is at an end. All we have time for now is to complete the preparation of South Vietnam to carry on the task.”

At the same time Abrams was trying to convince the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the critical importance of the advisory mission in South Vietnam, he was bringing pressure on the RVNAF high command to make improvements to their training system. In a March 1970 letter to General Cao Van Vien, chief of the Joint General Staff, Abrams urged senior South Vietnamese commanders to get behind the training effort. He wrote, “Arrangements for support of CTC activities must be widened and accelerated. As a first order of effort it is essential to enlist the personal interest and assistance of corps, divisional tactical area, and sector commanders each of whom...is a user of the product of the training system, and should contribute to improving the quality of the product.”

Due in large part to Abrams’ urging and the realization that US forces were in fact going to be withdrawn, the RVNAF high command began to put more emphasis on improving their training system. The fact that the United States contributed $28 million to expanding and improving the South Vietnamese facilities also helped. Eventually there would be a total of 33 major military and service schools, 13 national and regional training centers, and 14 division training centers. By 1970, the South Vietnamese leaders began to transfer experienced officers and NCOs to the training centers. Although field commanders only reluctantly gave up their veteran small-unit leaders, by the end of 1971 nearly half of the South Vietnamese training instructors were men with combat experience. Also by this time the number of US training advisory personnel was increased and by the end of 1971 there were more than 3,500 US advisers directly involved in training at most
of the training centers and major RVNAF schools.\textsuperscript{44}

Even as the South Vietnamese began to realize the necessity of upgrading their training programs, the quality and quantity of US advisers remained an issue. This was true of not just the advisers in the training centers, but also the advisory personnel at all levels, both with field units and with CORDS advisory teams. In December 1969, as the Vietnamization policy began to gather momentum and the above-cited changes in force structure, equipment, and training were instituted, Secretary Laird, realizing the criticality of the advisory effort to the Vietnamization process, asked the service secretaries to look at what could be done to upgrade the overall advisory effort.\textsuperscript{45} Before this time, service as an adviser was seen by many in the US Army as much less desirable than field command with a US unit, and many officers and NCOs avoided advisory duty. More often than not, the selection process for determining who would become an adviser was largely due to who was available for overseas duty when advisory billets became vacant due to rotation or casualties.\textsuperscript{46}

For those selected to become advisers, the training program was limited to a six-week course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, followed by eight weeks of Vietnamese language training at the Defense Language Institute. Thus, many assigned as advisers had neither the experience, the training, or the inclination to be an adviser. Laird set out to change the situation; he wanted to put the best people in as advisers. He did not get much help initially from the Army; Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor said he would continue to study the problem but did not offer any useful solutions.\textsuperscript{47} The Army was trying to deal with severe personnel problems. The demands of the war resulted in Army officers and noncommissioned officers returning to Vietnam for multiple tours, some separated by less than a year and the demand for advisers only exacerbated the strain on the personnel system. Nevertheless, Abrams continued to urge that more emphasis be placed on assigning qualified combat experienced officers to advisor duty. He demanded “guys who can lead/influence...the business of pacification,” officers who “feel empathy toward the Vietnamese...appreciate their good points and understand their weaknesses;” he wanted advisers who “can pull ideas and actions out of the Vietnamese” in pursuit of two major goals: “pacification and upgrading the RVNAF.”\textsuperscript{48}

Laird agreed with Abrams in demanding that the advisory posts be filled and ordering the service secretaries to send “only the most highly qualified” personnel to be advisers. Eventually the message got through to the services and by the end of 1970, there was “an infusion of top-flight military professionals into South Vietnam’s training advisory effort.”\textsuperscript{49} The advisory effort also benefited from the US troop drawdown because as more American units departed, the number of available combat assignments declined, thus freeing up for advisory duty large numbers of
those officers who would have gone to US units. During 1969, the overall strength of the field advisory teams increased from about 7,000 to 11,900 and then to 14,332 in 1970.

While Abrams focused on improving the advisory effort, President Nixon and Secretary Laird continued to push for more and faster troop reductions. Nixon had announced the first US troop withdrawal at Midway, but he and Laird were given new motivation to expand their withdrawal plans by former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford. In June 1969, he published an article in *Foreign Affairs* that urged the unilateral withdrawal of 100,000 troops by the end of the year, and of all other personnel by the end of 1970, leaving only logistics and Air Force personnel. Nixon, never one to shrink from a challenge, stated at a press conference that he could improve upon Clifford’s schedule. This statement received a lot of attention in the press and effectively committed the United States to a unilateral withdrawal from South Vietnam, thus removing the promise of troop reductions (or the pace thereof) as a bargaining chip for Kissinger in his dealings with the North Vietnamese in Paris. This would have serious consequences for peace negotiations and the efficacy of the eventual cease-fire agreement.

The first redeployment of 25,000 US troops promised by President Nixon was accomplished by 27 August 1969 when the last troops from the 1st and 2d Brigades of the 9th Infantry Division departed the Mekong Delta. In the months following the Midway announcement, there were continuing discussions about the size and pace of the US withdrawal. Laird had come up with several options for the rest of 1969 that ranged from withdrawing a total of 50,000 troops, at the low end, to 100,000 at the high end; in between were a number of different combinations of numbers and forces. In a memorandum to the president, Laird cautioned him to be careful about withdrawing too many troops too quickly as this would have serious consequences for the pacification program. Laird’s warning proved timely. On 6 August, as soldiers from the 9th Infantry Division prepared to depart South Vietnam, there was a Communist attack on Cam Ranh Bay. Five days later, the Communists attacked more than 100 cities, towns, and bases across South Vietnam. An official North Vietnamese history of the war revealed that the politburo in Hanoi had concluded after the Midway announcement that the United States had “lost its will to fight in Vietnam” and thus the Communists, believing they were in a in a position to dictate the degree and intensity of combat, launched the new round of attacks.

When Nixon had made his announcement in June about the initial US troop withdrawal, he emphasized that one of the criteria for further reductions would be the level of enemy activity. These new Communist attacks clearly went against Nixon’s conditions, and accordingly, he announced he was delaying a
decision about additional troop withdrawals. This caused an uproar in Congress and the media. On 12 September, the National Security Council met to discuss the situation. Kissinger reported that “a very natural response from us would have been to stop bringing soldiers home, but by now withdrawal had gained its own momentum.”

Kissinger had sent the president a memorandum two days before the meeting, expressing concern about the administration’s “present course” in South Vietnam. He warned that, “Withdrawals of US troops will become like salted peanuts to the American public; the more US troops come home, the more will be demanded. This could eventually result, in effect, in demands for a unilateral withdrawal...The more troops are withdrawn, the more Hanoi will be encouraged.”

Kissinger would be proven right, but during the NSC meeting, he was the only dissenter to the decision to go ahead with the scheduled troop reductions. On 16 September, Nixon ordered a second increment of 35,000 American troops to be redeployed by December. According to Kissinger, the withdrawals became “inexorable...[and] the President never again permitted the end of a withdrawal period to pass without announcing a new increment for the next.”

On 15 December, Nixon ordered a third increment of 50,000 to be redeployed before April 1970. On 20 April 1970, he announced that even though 110,000 US troops had been scheduled to be redeployed during the first three increments, a total of 115,000 had actually departed Vietnam. The second phase of the withdrawal, from April 1970 to April 1971, would reduce the total US strength by a further 150,000. By the end of 1970, only about 344,000 US troops remained in South Vietnam; the 9th Infantry Division, the 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, the 1st Infantry Division, the 3d Marine Division, two brigades of the 25th Infantry Division and the entire 4th Infantry Division had been redeployed. As these US forces prepared to depart, they suspended combat operations and the RVNAF took over responsibility for their respective operational areas.

From the initial announcement of US troop withdrawals in June 1969 to the end of November 1972, the United States brought home 14 increments, reducing total US strength in Vietnam from a peak of 543,400 to a residual force of 27,000. Once the initial departure of US forces began, the RVNAF was forced to assume more responsibility for the war, regardless of the progress of Vietnamization and pacification. This was the situation that confronted General Abrams. Faced with a war that continued to rage, he had to increase the efforts to prepare the RVNAF to fill the void on the battlefield left by the redeploying US forces. He was essentially fighting for time.

When Abrams assumed command of MACV in 1968, he knew that something had to be done to improve the combat capabilities of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Even before President Nixon had announced Vietnamization as the new
US policy in South Vietnam, General Abrams had taken measures to increase the effectiveness of the RVNAF training base. However, this had not historically been the focus of MACV’s efforts. Abrams had inherited the long-standing US mission of closing with and defeating the Communists to force them to withdraw from South Vietnam. With Nixon’s announcement of the Vietnamization policy and the receipt of the new mission statement, Abrams was directed “to assist the Republic of Vietnam Armed forces to take over an increasing share of combat operations” and focus on (1) providing “maximum assistance” to the South Vietnamese to strengthen their forces, (2) supporting the pacification effort, and (3) reducing the flow of supplies to the enemy.56

General Abrams, although continuing to have serious misgivings about the accelerated US troop withdrawals, understood his marching orders and stepped up measures to improve the combat capabilities of the South Vietnamese units. This was not a new problem for Abrams; since his assumption of command, he had been concerned that the United States and South Vietnamese forces were essentially fighting two different wars. Abrams had sought to end the division of roles and missions between American and South Vietnamese combat forces by the adoption of a single combined allied strategy, thus eliminating “the tacit existence of two separate strategies, attrition and pacification.”57 Abrams described this “one war” concept as “a strategy focused upon protecting the population so that the civil government can establish its authority as opposed to an earlier conception of the purpose of the war—destruction of the enemy’s forces.”58 This approach had already effectively been instituted by Abrams but was formalized in the MACV Objectives Plan approved in March 1969 and was eventually adopted jointly by the US and Saigon as the Combined Strategic Objectives Plan, which specified that the “RVNAF must participate fully within its capabilities in all types of operations...to prepare for the time when it must assume the entire responsibility.”59

As soon as the new plan was signed, Abrams set out to make sure that MACV forces fully accepted his “one war” concept, forever eliminating the division of labor that too often had fragmented allied efforts. Thus, Abrams was already shifting the focus of MACV when he received the official change of mission from President Nixon. Armed with the new “one war” combined strategy and urged by his commander in chief to Vietnamize the war, Abrams hoped to bring the combat situation under control while at the same time shifting the preponderance of the responsibility for the war to the South Vietnamese as American troop withdrawals increased in size and frequency. One way that he wanted to do this was to have the ARVN fight side by side with the American troops in the field in combined operations.

American and South Vietnamese units had conducted combined operations
prior to the adoption of the “one war” policy, but during earlier operations, the South Vietnamese troops usually filled a secondary, supporting role on the periphery of the main action. Many American combat commanders were reluctant to operate with South Vietnamese units and typically regarded the ARVN as no more than “an additional burden” that had to be taken in tow, more “apt to cause problems...than be helpful.”60 Although this situation changed somewhat for the better after the 1968 Tet offensive, Abrams, faced with the urgent task of Vietnamizing the war, ordered closer cooperation between the American and South Vietnamese forces. The hope was that American units would serve as models for Saigon’s soldiers by integrating the operations of the two national forces more closely together. This had worked very well in South Korea and had eventually improved the fighting abilities of the Republic of Korea armed forces. Abrams and his advisers manifestly hoped that the Korean model would also work with the South Vietnamese.

Although the effort to integrate the South Vietnamese troops into the main battle effort would prove to be uneven and varied from corps tactical zone to corps tactical zone, several new programs were instituted in accordance with Abrams’ directives. In I Corps Tactical Zone, Lieutenant General Richard G. Stillwell, the US XXIV Corps Commander, worked very closely with the ARVN commander, Major General (later Lieutenant General) Ngo Quang Truong, integrating the South Vietnamese units into operational plans as a full partner. Under what was essentially a US/ARVN combined command, the South Vietnamese forces operated closely with the US 3d Marine Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), and the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.61 After Stillwell was replaced by Major General Melvin Zais later in 1969, the new commander continued Stillwell’s emphasis on combined operations and other US forces in I Corps stepped up their cooperative efforts with the ARVN. Abrams was extremely pleased with the performance of the ARVN forces in I Corps; and later in 1969, he ordered the US 1st Cavalry Division south, reoriented remaining American combat forces in the region toward area security, and eventually sent home one of the two American marine divisions there.

In II Corps Tactical Zone, US commanders also pursued combined operations but with less success. General William R. Peers, commander of I Field Force and his counterpart, Lieutenant General Lu Lan, commander of ARVN II Corps, jointly established the “Pair Off” program, which called for each ARVN unit to be closely and continually affiliated with a US counterpart unit. Operations were to be conducted jointly, regardless of the size unit each force could commit, and coordination and cooperation were effected from corps to battalion and districts. Under this program, the US 4th Infantry Division and the US 173d Airborne Brigade joined forces with the ARVN 22nd and 23rd Infantry Divisions. During the period follow-
ing the initiation of the Pair Off program, three significant combined operations were conducted in II Corps, and each achieved a modest level of success. However, this approach did not work as well as the combined operations in I Corps for a number of reasons. First, the two corps-level headquarters, unlike those in I Corps, were not co-located, and this made coordination more difficult. Additionally, the ARVN field commanders in II Corps were not as enthusiastic about working with US forces as were Major General Truong and his fellow ARVN commanders in I Corps. Consequently, the motivation to learn from the Americans was not present, and this affected coordination and cooperation between the two national forces.

In III Corps Tactical Zone, US II Field Force Commander Lieutenant General Julian Ewell and his counterpart, Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, commander of ARVN III Corps, instituted a program called “Dong Tien” (Progress Together). The three major goals of this program were: (1) to increase the quantity and quality of combined and coordinated joint operations; (2) to materially advance the three major ARVN missions of pacification support, improvement of combat effectiveness, and intensification of combat operations; and (3) to effect a significant increase in the efficiency of utilizing critical combat and combat support elements, particularly Army aviation assets. This program called for the close association of ARVN III Corps and US II Field Force units on a continuing basis. Under this concept, as an ARVN battalion reached a satisfactory level of combat effectiveness, it was to be phased out of the program and returned to independent operations. The Dong Tien program had a positive effect on ARVN units throughout III Corps. The 1st US and 5th ARVN Infantry Divisions worked very closely together, and the repetitive combined operations prepared the ARVN division to assume the American unit’s area of operation when it was redeployed in 1970. When the 5th ARVN Division moved its command post to Binh Long Province and assumed control of the old “Big Red One” area, a major milestone in the Vietnamization process had been passed.

Although these combined operations were not all successful, they were instrumental in most cases in increasing the battlefield proficiency of the RVNAF units. Thus, they helped pave the way for the South Vietnamese commanders and troops to assume new responsibilities as more US forces began to withdraw. Unfortunately, however, these programs could not eliminate many of the long-standing problems that haunted the RVNAF and would ultimately be one of the contributing factors to the downfall of the South Vietnamese regime. The expanding RVNAF suffered from a lack of technical competence, weak staff officers, inexperience at planning and executing large-scale combined arms operations, and a number of other serious maladies. Leadership, particularly at the senior levels, lay at the root of all RVNAF weakness. This problem greatly concerned General Abrams and his senior commanders as they tried to prepare the South Vietnamese to assume
responsibility for the war. Programs such as Pair Off and Dong Tien were designed to help bolster RVNAF leadership and combat skills, but they could not fully repair long-term ills in the South Vietnamese system.

By the end of 1969, Vietnamization had made progress in several areas. The modernization effort had resulted in the equipping of all ARVN units with modern equipment. The advisory effort had received new emphasis, and the RVNAF training system was improving. The redeployment of US troops had forced the RVNAF to assume more responsibility for the war, as the number of battalion-size operations conducted by the South Vietnamese almost doubled between 1968 and 1969. Still, combat performance of the South Vietnamese was uneven at best. Some units, such as the 51st ARVN Infantry Battalion, did very well against their Communist opponents, while others, such as the 22d ARVN Infantry Division, were largely ineffective in the field (the 22d had conducted 1,800 ambushes during the summer months of 1969 and netted only six enemy killed).63

The MACV Office of Information publicized the increased participation of RVNAF emphasizing that, in time, the South Vietnamese forces would be able to stand on their own.64 Despite these claims, many advisers felt that the South Vietnamese were still too dependent on US forces for support and worried about their ability to carry on the war by themselves after the United States withdrew. The MACV public relations statements were correct in one sense—it was clear that time would be necessary before the South Vietnamese could stand on their own against the North Vietnamese. The key question for many was whether there was enough time left before all US units were withdrawn.

Vietnamization received its first test in the spring of 1970 when Nixon ordered an attack into the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. This was a combined attack that involved 32,000 American soldiers and 48,000 South Vietnamese troops. The main attack into the “Fishhook” region was made by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, 25th Infantry Division, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. At the same time, South Vietnamese forces conducted an attack into the “Parrot’s Beak” region. Both attacks went very well, and the allied forces located and destroyed numerous large Communist base camps, capturing an impressive array of supplies and material, to include 16 million rounds of various caliber ammunition; 143,000 rockets; 22,892 individual weapons; 5,487 land mines; 62,000 grenades; 14 million pounds of rice; and 435 vehicles.65

The South Vietnamese forces, most of whom were under the command of Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, supported by US artillery, tactical air, and helicopter gunships, performed well, accomplishing all assigned missions. Nixon announced that the South Vietnamese performance in Cambodia was “visible proof
of the success of Vietnamization.”

The truth of the situation was somewhat less than Nixon wanted to believe. Many of the South Vietnamese units that had participated in the incursion were mostly from elite units, rather than the mainstream of South Vietnamese troops. In addition, there had been no intense fighting in the ARVN sector because most of the Communist soldiers there fled when the allied forces launched the invasion. Nevertheless, South Vietnamese artillery continued to demonstrate an inability to provide support for their own troops, so the ARVN commanders continued to rely heavily on US fire support. Therefore, the picture of South Vietnamese capabilities that Nixon attempted to paint was somewhat misleading.

The significant shortcomings that still existed in the RVNAF were amply demonstrated the following year when operation LAM SON 719 was launched as part of a continuing effort to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and deny the North Vietnamese sanctuaries: the specific objective of the attack was a series of base areas along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos just adjacent to Military Region I. This time, although US air support would participate in the operation, American ground troops were prohibited from crossing the border, so the South Vietnamese forces would attack by themselves without US units or American advisers. The attack along Highway 9 into Laos kicked off at 0700 on 8 February and went reasonably well at first. The South Vietnamese secured their initial objectives, but then became bogged down along the highway. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had rushed reinforcements to the area, and a major battle ensued that lasted for another month. While some South Vietnamese soldiers fought valiantly, many more fought poorly or fled in panic. The operation ended with ARVN units fleeing back across the border in disarray. US sources listed South Vietnamese losses as 3,800 killed in action, 5,200 wounded, and 775 missing. Nixon tried to put the best face on the situation, but the truth was that the South Vietnamese had performed very poorly on their own. With no US support on the ground and without their American advisers, the South Vietnamese were not able to handle the North Vietnamese regulars in pitched battle.

LAM SON 719 demonstrated that Vietnamization had not been the success that Nixon had previously proclaimed. US and South Vietnamese military officials worked hard to bolster the morale and confidence of the ARVN after the debacle in Laos. Training programs were intensified and new equipment was issued to replace that which had been lost during the LAM SON operation. At the same time, the US troop withdrawals continued unabated. By January 1972, only 158,000 Americans remained in South Vietnam, the lowest number since 1965.

The North Vietnamese watched the US withdrawals closely and decided that it
was time to put Vietnamization to the final test. Acknowledging that Nixon’s Vietnamization policy had begun to increase the combat capabilities of the South Vietnamese, they nevertheless believed that the US did not have enough combat power left in South Vietnam to prevent a South Vietnamese defeat if Hanoi launched a new offensive. Accordingly, the politburo in Hanoi ordered a massive invasion of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese attack began on 30 March 1972 when three divisions attacked south across the Demilitarized Zone that separated North and South Vietnam toward Quang Tri and Hue. Three days later, three more divisions moved from sanctuaries in Cambodia and pushed into Binh Long Province, the capital city that was only 65 miles from Saigon. Additional North Vietnamese forces attacked across the Cambodian border in the Central Highlands toward Kontum. A total of 14 NVA infantry divisions and 26 separate regiments (including 120,000 troops and approximately 1,200 tanks and other armored vehicles) participated in the offensive, which was characterized by large-scale conventional infantry tactics, supported by tanks and massive amounts of artillery fire and rockets. This was a scale of warfare that the South Vietnamese had seldom experienced. At first, they were almost totally overwhelmed. South Vietnamese forces in Quang Tri fled in the face of the North onslaught, abandoning the city and fleeing south. At An Loc and Kontum, the ARVN soldiers fared better but suffered horrendous casualties during the North Vietnamese attacks. The battles raged all over South Vietnam into the summer months. US advisers and American air power enabled the South Vietnamese to hold on and eventually prevail, even retaking Quang Tri in September.

Nixon declared Vietnamization a resounding success. There was all kinds of evidence to the contrary. The South Vietnamese had indeed withstood the North Vietnamese onslaught, but it had been a near thing that could have gone either way. The South Vietnamese had fought well in many cases, but in others they had not. General Abrams stated that “American airpower and not South Vietnamese arms” had caused the North Vietnamese defeat. Nevertheless, Nixon and his advisers trumpeted the idea that the South Vietnamese victory demonstrated that Vietnamization had been a success. Jeffrey Kimball writes, Nixon “needed Vietnamization to succeed, and because he did, he wanted to believe it could.” Thus, for better or worse, Vietnamization was officially validated and the South Vietnamese victory became one of the underlying rationales for complete US withdrawal and Nixon’s “peace with honor.”

While the fighting continued in South Vietnam, Henry Kissinger had been striving to hammer out a peace agreement in Paris. By the fall of 1972, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, the lead North Vietnamese negotiator, were close to an agreement but by December were at an impasse again. When the North Vietnamese walked out on the talks, Nixon launched what became known as the “Christmas bombing.”
Beginning on 18 December and for the next 11 days, US B-52s, F-105s, F-4s, F-111s, and A-6s struck targets all over North Vietnam, dropping over 40,000 tons of bombs. Shortly thereafter, the North Vietnamese negotiators returned to the table in Paris. Kissinger and Tho finally reached an agreement and at 0800 Sunday morning Saigon time on 28 January, the cease-fire went into effect.

Under the terms of the cease-fire agreement, the United States agreed to “...stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam” and remove remaining American troops, including advisers, from South Vietnam within 60 days. US forces departed South Vietnam as agreed, with the last troops leaving Saigon on 29 March 1973. That day, the last 61 American POWs known to be held by the North Vietnamese were released. Vietnamization was over once and for all. America was out of Vietnam.

Unfortunately for the South Vietnamese, the Paris Accords did not address an estimated 150,000 North Vietnamese troops inside the borders of South Vietnam. The cease-fire was short-lived and combat returned as both sides tried to grab as much territory as possible. For the rest of 1973 and most of 1974, the North and South Vietnamese fought each other all over South Vietnam.

Nixon had coerced Thieu into acquiescing to the Paris Accords, promising that the United States would come to the aid of the South Vietnamese if North Vietnam tried another major offensive. With this in mind and using weapons and equipment stockpiled during 1972, the South Vietnamese initially held their own against the North Vietnamese. However, as these stocks began to wane, Thieu had no one to turn to for support. Nixon, reeling from the impact of the Watergate investigation, was fighting for his political life and was unable to generate any interest in the plight of the South Vietnamese. On 9 August 1974, Nixon resigned from the Presidency. Thieu and his countrymen had always relied on Nixon’s promises to intervene if the North Vietnamese violated the cease-fire. Now Nixon was gone. Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford, promised that “the existing commitments this nation has made in the past are still valid and will be fully honored in my administration.”

This was a commitment that Ford could not keep given the prevailing sentiment in Congress. When the North Vietnamese decided to test the South Vietnamese with a limited attack against Phuoc Long Province, the ARVN fought poorly and the North Vietnamese routed the defenders, killing or capturing 3,000 soldiers, took control of vast quantities of war materiel, and “liberated” the entire province. The United States did nothing.

Both Saigon and Hanoi were shocked. Thieu finally realized that his forces had been relegated to fighting a “poor man’s war” while the North Vietnamese, still being resupplied by China and the Soviet Union, got stronger every day. The
North Vietnamese decided that the time was ripe for a knockout blow. Believing the United States would not or could not intervene, they planned a two-year strategy that called for large-scale offensives in 1975 to create conditions for a “general offensive, general uprising” in 1976.72

The North Vietnamese launched their offensive on 10 March 1975 with an attack on Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands. They overran the city in two days and then turned their attention on Pleiku and Kontum. The South Vietnamese, realizing they were on their own without any hope of US support, fell back in panic. When Thieu decided to shorten his lines by withdrawing his forces out of the Highlands, supposedly to concentrate his forces for a major effort to retake Ban Me Thuot, the retreat rapidly turned into a rout. While the Communist forces in the Highlands attacked toward the sea, additional Communist troops in the northern provinces drove southward from Quang Tri. One by one, the coastal cities and bases fell. The Communists drove rapidly down the coast and on 30 April 1975, their tanks crashed through the gates of the Presidential Palace in Saigon and the war was over. The demoralized South Vietnamese forces had collapsed in less than 55 days; Vietnamization had failed its ultimate test.

In the final analysis, Vietnamization provided a suitable (at least from the American perspective) cover for the withdrawal of the United States from South Vietnam, but it was an incomplete strategy that failed in its stated objective, which was to prepare the South Vietnamese to defend themselves after the departure of US troops. That objective had always been predicated on continued US support, and America’s failure to honor that commitment led to the downfall of South Vietnam.

Whether Nixon and Laird were only looking for a “decent interval” as some have suggested or really thought that Vietnamization would actually succeed in preparing the South Vietnamese to defend themselves is subject to debate. Both Nixon and Kissinger have written after the fact that they believed the strategy would have worked had not Congress cut off aid to the South Vietnamese. Jeffrey Kimball challenges such pronouncements and writes that Nixon’s policies “unnecessarily prolonged the war, with all of the baneful consequences of death, destruction, and division for Vietnam and America.”73

When one contemplates what could have been, there are, as Lewis Sorley suggests, “too many what ifs.”74 However, it is clear the performance of the South Vietnamese forces in 1975 demonstrated that Nixon’s exit strategy had been tragically flawed, at least in its execution. Once the North Vietnamese began their attack in December 1974, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, which had wavered but ultimately held under tremendous pressure with US support in 1972, found themselves abandoned by the United States and performed abysmally in a
fight that turned out to be for the very life of their nation. The war was clearly lost on the battlefield by the South Vietnamese, but that does not absolve the United States of its large share of the responsibility for the debacle. Despite gains made in preparing the South Vietnamese to assume responsibility for the war, the United States rushed to sign the Paris Peace Accords, which left more than 150,000 North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Later, when the North Vietnamese attacked and the United States failed to live up to the commitment made by Nixon, this doomed the armed forces of South Vietnam.

The army that had become so dependent on US firepower and support lost its will and was unable to fight on its own when the promised support was denied it. Despite all the time and treasure expended in getting them ready to defend themselves, they proved woefully inadequate for the task when abandoned by the United States. Arguably, the situation may have been different had the United States demanded that North Vietnamese forces be withdrawn from South Vietnam in 1973 and continued to provide the promised long-term support as it had to the Republic of Korea forces, but such was not the case. And in the end, Vietnamization, when coupled with the flawed Peace Accords and the failure of the United States to honor promises made by two presidents, proved to be an incomplete exit strategy. It extricated the United States from Vietnam but failed to ensure the continued viability of its ally in Saigon. In the end, Nixon’s strategy achieved neither peace for the South Vietnamese nor honor for the United States. The final result was that the United States lost the first war in its history, and the Republic of South Vietnam ceased to exist as a sovereign nation.
Notes


5. In December, Nixon had seen an intelligence assessment made by the CIA that was very critical of the Thieu government and the capabilities of the RVNAF. This assessment is contained in Message, Wheeler JCS 14581 to Abrams 12217 Dec 68, subject: RVNAF capabilities, Abrams Papers, US Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.


7. Ibid.


15. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 272. By all accounts, “Vietnamization” became the accepted term for Nixon’s new policy at this meeting. However, Abrams biographer Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt*, 254-56, maintains that Abrams started the process of helping the South Vietnamese armed forces become more capable when he assumed command
from General Westmoreland in 1968 and that Nixon and Laird merely adopted the “Viet-
manization” label and formalized it as administration policy (accompanied by US troop withdrawals). Nixon said virtually the same thing earlier in *No More Vietnams* (New York: Touchstone, 1990), 105.


23. Ibid.


28. Even before Nixon assumed office, plans had been developed to increase the size of the RVNAF. Under what became known as the May-68 Plan, MACV had instituted a program to increase and modernize the South Vietnamese armed forces. This program focused on developing the RVNAF into a balanced force with command, administration, and self-support capabilities to continue the fighting successfully after the withdrawal of US and NVA troops. However, It is important to note that at no time during the discussion and implementation of the May-68 Plan did anyone, including MACV, ever consider the “prospect of a unilateral American withdrawal that would leave South Vietnam facing a combined Viet Cong and North Vietnamese threat.” This was to change under Nixon and Laird.


34. Ibid, 42.


36. This was not true in IV Corps, where there was never a corps-level US headquarters; in that region, a designated US major general served as the senior adviser. In I Corps, the III Marine Amphibious Force commander served as the senior adviser.

37. The exception to this was Military Region II, where John Paul Vann, a civilian, was in charge. He could not technically command, so his headquarters was designated Second Regional Assistance Group, rather than a command. His military deputy, an Army brigadier general, exercised command on behalf of Vann.

38. Ibid, 7-8, 10.

39. Eventually however, the airborne brigades and marine regiments would form an airborne and marine division respectively.


41. Ibid, 54.


43. Fulghum and Maitland, *South Vietnam on Trial*, 56.


46. This was the author’s personal experience; advisory duty was not seen as “career enhancing.” The author, as a newly promoted captain with two years in the Army and not even having commanded a company, was assigned in late 1971 as an adviser to a South Vietnamese infantry regimental commander. Before departing for Vietnam, I attended the Military Assistance Training Advisor course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, followed by a Vietnamese Language course at the Defense Language Institute (Southwest Branch) at Fort Bliss, Texas.


49. Fulghum and Maitland, *South Vietnam on Trial*, 56.


55. Ibid.


61. Ibid, 117.


63. Lipsman and Doyle, *Fighting for Time*, 70.


66. Nixon, *Public Papers, 1970*, 536. In a memo from Nixon to Haldeman, on 11 May 1970, the president said that he wanted him to devise “...a positive, coordinated administration program for getting across the fact that this mission has been enormously successful.”

67. The North Vietnamese did not come off unscathed and suffered heavy casualties, many of them inflicted by the US air support. It would take the North Vietnamese another year to crank up the next offensive.

68. Clarke, *Advice and Support*, 482.


71. Letter, Ford to Thieu, 10 August 1974, White House Central Files, Gerald R. Ford Library.


Planning For Post-Conflict Panama: What it Tells Us About Phase IV Operations

John T. Fishel

As I write this it has been 15 years since Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY were executed in Panama. And it has been 12 years since I finished my study of what are now called Phase IV operations in Panama. Since that time I have published studies of postconflict operations in Kuwait, Northern Iraq, and related operations in Somalia and Haiti. In the last decade the United States has also conducted stability operations and support operations in the guise of peacekeeping in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Haiti again. All this is, of course, in addition to the occupation of Iraq and its follow-on (continuation) stability operations in the wake of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. With all of these Phase IV operations, we should have become quite expert at postconflict restoration and reconstruction. The fact that we have had significant difficulty achieving clear success in Iraq prompts this essay. In it, I propose to examine what we did right—and wrong—in Panama in terms of a series of issues I believe are relevant to the Iraqi case. While I do not plan to be explicitly comparative as I develop these issues, I will return to relevant lessons for the future in the conclusions. Finally, this essay focuses primarily on planning and only to the extent absolutely necessary on execution.

Issue: Planning for Conflict

Planning for what became Operation JUST CAUSE began in early February 1988 as soon as the commander in chief (CINC) of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) returned from Washington, DC, having been informed in the office of the assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs that the de facto dictator of Panama, General Manuel Noriega, had been indicted by two Florida grand juries on charges of drug trafficking. General Fred Woerner immediately directed his plans division to begin planning for operations in defense of the Panama Canal and US military bases in which the Panama Defense Force (PDF) would be hostile. At the same time he requested the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct him to develop plans for conflict with the PDF. On 28 February 1988, the JCS issued the planning order.

Under the Joint Operations Planning System extant, the plans division, in the crisis action planning (CAP) mode, developed a four-phase operation order. When the planners briefed it to General Woerner, he asked where Phase V—postconflict—was. It had not been drafted, so Woerner directed that it be done by 1700 that very day (which happened to be Sunday). As a result, the two senior members of the four-man civil affairs branch were called in and drafted a skeletal plan on butcher
paper that they briefed to the CINC at 1700. This resulted in the activation of planning elements, primarily from the CAPSTONE civil affairs reserve unit, the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade, arriving in Panama in increments every 30 days throughout the winter and spring of 1988 to flesh out the plan for postconflict operations. Initially, this was Phase V of the plan known as Elaborate Maze, but later the JCS directed that the phased plan be deconstructed and issued as a series of separate plans, known as the Prayerbook, that could be executed independently, simultaneously, or in sequence.

As is evident from this discussion, the source of all planning guidance was the CINC. General Woerner had recognized, the moment he was informed of Noriega’s indictment, that the situation in Panama had changed. The PDF no longer was a difficult ally (or at worst a neutral party); it had become the adversary. Thus, the CINC ordered his staff to begin planning for a contingency operation targeted on the PDF. When the draft operation order was presented to him lacking any concept for postconflict operations, Woerner ordered the staff to develop this phase. His interest, focus, and insistence that Phase V not only be part of the operation but that it be under the CINC’s personal control illustrated how seriously he treated postconflict operations.

**Issue: Linear Bias**

One often hears criticism of the linear bias in the American military planning system—JOPES, which replaced the JOPS in effect at the time (both are alleged to have the linear bias). This is due to the concept of phasing—one phase follows the previous phase. Although this critique is logical, we must consider the guidance that General Woerner gave his planners for the phases of Elaborate Maze. They were to plan to execute each phase independently, concurrently, or in sequence with any other phase. Thus Woerner clearly recognized and specifically addressed the potential for a linear bias in the phased plan that he directed. It was clear to him that the circumstances in Panama were such that all of the possibilities he envisioned for execution were almost equally likely, as was the contingency that nothing would be executed.

By the summer of 1988, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had concluded that it would be better if Elaborate Maze were deconstructed into a family of related plans, perhaps reflecting concern about the potential for linear bias. As a result, the Prayerbook came into being. Post Time was the plan for force augmentation or build up; Klondike Key addressed a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in both permissive and nonpermissive environments; Blue Spoon was the plan for combat operations that combined Phase III (defensive operations) and Phase IV (offensive operations) of Elaborate Maze; and Krystal Ball focused on postconflict reconstruction operations. Within six months Krystal Ball was renamed Blind Logic.
With the establishment of the *Prayerbook*, General Woerner reiterated his guidance for each phase of the operation in terms of each of the separate plans—each plan was to be capable of being executed independently, concurrently, or in sequence with any other *Prayerbook* plan. Coupled with the separation of the phased plan this guidance clearly overcame any potential linear bias. The interesting question, however, is whether there was any linear bias in *Elaborate Maze*. Our experience was that Woerner’s guidance essentially prevented the development of a linear bias. Indeed, that was the case both under the phases of *Elaborate Maze* and the separate plans of the *Prayerbook*.

**Issue: Synchronization of Plans at Different Levels**

By the late summer of 1988, plans were in existence and only needed regular updating. At the same time, the Panama “crisis” quieted down. While the SOUTHCOM plans division was updating and maintaining *Post Time*, *Klondike Key*, and *Blue Spoon*, the officers responsible for *Blind Logic* were four Active Guard/Reserve officers who made up the command’s Civil Affairs section. In addition to being responsible for *Blind Logic* planning, they had day-to-day operational responsibilities. They were also in a different joint directorate from plans. Moreover, with the completion of the *Blind Logic* plan the Reserve augmentees from the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade returned to the United States and were not replaced, leaving the four civil affairs officers to plan and execute all civil affairs activity.

In May 1989, Woerner and his staff principals realized that *Blind Logic* needed to be revisited. The civil affairs officer who was in charge of *Blind Logic* began to prepare a decision briefing for Woerner regarding the future of the plan. First, he coordinated with me—at the time, I was chief of Policy & Strategy in the J5. Although I was not a civil affairs officer, I had served as co-chief of the branch among other SOUTHCOM assignments and had related civilian experience. What he was requesting was that *Blind Logic* be transferred back to the J5 because of the relative qualifications of J5 personnel required for its execution and the ongoing relationship between the J5 and the 361st. I agreed and raised the issue with my superiors, who concurred up through the director. The J3 also concurred.

As a result, on 18 May Woerner agreed to the transfer of *Blind Logic* back to J5 where it fell under policy and strategy. He also authorized limited Reserve augmentation to establish a workable planning cell. The cell consisted of three other Reserve officers—two from the 361st and one from another unit who had worked on the plan the previous year. In addition, I also had the assistance of a fourth Reserve officer on a part-time basis.

*Blind Logic* had been developed as a plan on two separate levels. The higher level was the SOUTHCOM plan, which would be integrated with the other plans.
for execution. This would involve identifying forces required to execute, getting them included on the troop list, coordinating execution with the other plans, and so forth. The lower level was the plan to be executed during the operation. This involved identifying the tasks, sequencing them, and assigning them to organizations and units. General Woerner had decided at the beginning that the postconflict plan was the most important and politically delicate of all the contemplated military actions. Therefore, he had assigned the execution of *Blind Logic* to his J5 where nearly all his foreign area officers were assigned and where, until the end of 1988, the civil affairs section had been located. The J5 had the capability to provide language and culture competent officers to conduct postconflict operations.

When we began our review of the *Blind Logic* plans, we quickly discovered that the plan for execution by the J5 (called the COMCMOTF—Commander, Civil-Military Operations Task Force plan) did not need much work. The SOUTHCOM-level plan, however, needed to be relooked from its assumptions through its coordination with all the other plans at that level and with the several execution plans. First, there was a need to make certain that all the SOUTHCOM level *Prayerbook* plans were fully coordinated. This really meant making sure that SOUTHCOM’s *Blue Spoon* combat plan was not in conflict with *Blind Logic*. Minor conflicts were rapidly reconciled.

There were, as well, *Blue Spoons* to be executed by SOCSOUTH, JTF-Panama, and later, the XVIII Airborne Corps as JTF-C, and subsequently, JTF-South. Critical areas for deconfliction were the possible use of SOCSOUTH assigned/attached units in the execution of *Blind Logic* and the conditions for handing off responsibilities from the JTF to COMCMOTF. We coordinated with SOCSOUTH, JTF-Panama, and JTF-C during June and July and, we believed, successfully resolved any conflicts among the several plans. We also reconsidered our assumptions, particularly those relating to a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) and developed two contingencies for executing *Blind Logic* without a PSRC. Then, on 20 July, Washington announced that General Woerner would retire on 30 September and be replaced by General Maxwell R. Thurman. The result was that whatever had been coordinated with the corps as JTF-C was no longer operable from their point of view—something that we, in SOUTHCOM did not know.

The critical lesson here is the importance of the emphasis that the CINC placed on *Blind Logic*, both in terms of his personal interest and control in the event of execution. If General Woerner had not taken such personal interest in postconflict operations, there is no way that the staff elements responsible for *Blue Spoon* would have devoted any time to the necessary coordination with *Blind Logic*. Even more critical was that his command emphasis forced coordination with the Corps when it was brought on board as execution planner for Blue Spoon. As we found
out later, the moment Woerner’s retirement was announced, the corps planners lost all interest in Blind Logic.

**Issue: Divorce of Phase III (Blue Spoon) from Phase IV (Blind Logic)**

In a previous section I discussed the issue of the alleged linear bias in phased planning. In this section, I want to comment on the other side of the coin—what happened when the joint staff, in an apparent effort to counter linear bias, directed that *Elaborate Maze* be broken down into a family of individual plans.

As long as General Woerner remained the CINC, the change from a phased plan to the *Prayerbook* family was merely cosmetic. Woerner did not accept that his phased plan had a linear bias and had taken steps in his guidance to the planners to make sure that such bias did not creep in. As that guidance was reiterated many times directing that each phase—and later each plan—be capable of execution independently, simultaneously, or sequentially with any other phase/plan, there was little danger that the planners would succumb to any linear bias.

Unfortunately for the concept for the execution of *Blue Spoon* and *Blind Logic*, General Woerner was forced to retire. From the end of July until 17 December 1989, the planners from the corps and the new CINC focused almost exclusively on the combat plan, *Blue Spoon*. This focus by General Thurman played a role in the fact that he was never briefed on his postconflict plan, *Blind Logic*. The consequences of this combat emphasis in the planning escalated over the six months from July to December.

General Thurman and the corps changed *Blue Spoon* from a plan that relied on the deliberate buildup of massed forces and their planned commitment against major PDF targets in sequence to one that relied on the surprise and shock of hitting the 27 PDF targets simultaneously. This change should have had the effect of causing changes in *Blind Logic* that clearly would have affected the “handoff” from the corps to COMCMOTF. At the very least, coordination with the *Blind Logic* planners would have raised a warning flag that what had previously been deconflicted might, once again, be in conflict. The revised *Blue Spoon*, however, was never coordinated with the *Blind Logic* planners with predictable results.

On 17 December 1989, when President Bush directed DOD to remove General Noriega from power, it triggered an execute order from the secretary of defense through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Thurman for *Blue Spoon* (renamed Operation JUST CAUSE). At that point the SOUTHCOM staff “discovered” *Blind Logic*. For two days there was frantic activity to coordinate and deconflict *Blind Logic* and *Blue Spoon*. The joint staff formally approved *Blind Logic* (renamed Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY) on 20 December, several hours
after General Thurman ordered its execution by the SOUTHCOM J5 as COMCMOTF.

It is important to note that the execution of Blind Logic, while it involved much improvisation, was made significantly easier because the plan existed in a form that could be modified under the changed circumstances. Nevertheless, the fact that it had not been coordinated at all with the revised Blue Spoon before President Bush made his decision resulted in serious disconnects between the two concurrent operations and the organizations carrying them out. Thus, this issue, as the previous ones, highlights the criticality of command interest and control of postconflict planning. That General Woerner had left his successor workable post-conflict plans was a gift that General Thurman appears to have appreciated after the fact. The direction to change from a phased plan to a “family” of independent plans, when coupled with the change of command, left SOUTHCOM scrambling to coordinate what should have been subject to continuous coordination and modification all the while Blue Spoon was being revised.

**Issue: Manifestations of Instability During Regime Change Operations**

From the moment SOUTHCOM began planning for postconflict operations in March 1988, analysis focused on the conditions in Panama City in the wake of combat operations. From General Woerner to the most junior planner in the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade, all concerned were well aware that the 18,000-member PDF was primarily a group of police forces, not an army. Thus the primary assumption of the planners was that, as a result of combat operations against the 3,500 soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen of the regime, the remaining 14,500 cops would simply go home and wait to see what transpired. The outcome would be a security vacuum that would be characterized by looting, riots, and chaos in the streets.

Central to the planning at both the SOUTHCOM and COMCMOTF levels in 1988 and 1989 was the effort to address the anticipated security vacuum. Throughout the 1988, planning both Blue Spoon and Blind Logic anticipated US military government of Panama for a period of about 30 days followed by a reconstitution of Panamanian government institutions including a purged and reformed PDF. The congruence between Blue Spoon and Blind Logic was stronger in 1988 than it would be a year later and significantly more so before JTF-C was activated. As noted in the previous section, when the change of command was announced in late July 1989, Blind Logic disappeared from the corps’ coordination radar scope.

What began to happen with Blue Spoon planning in the summer of 1989 (about the time that revision of Blind Logic was being completed) was the change from sequential to simultaneous combat operations. Although this change began under Woerner and was greatly accelerated by General Thurman. Neither Thurman nor
his J3, Brigadier General William Harzog (who was responsible for *Blue Spoon*), gave much thought to the impact the changes would have on the postcombat environment. Of course, as noted above, there was no coordination of any of this with the *Blind Logic* planners before 17 December.

General Woerner’s plan for sequential combat operations was to have begun with an assault on the PDF headquarters in downtown Panama City with operations flowing eastward toward the airport through the major commercial and residential areas of the city. Thus combat operations would have provided security throughout the city in a way that would have made the handoff to the forces responsible for postconflict operations (*Blind Logic*) appear relatively seamless. Simultaneous strikes against 27 separate PDF targets, on the other hand, meant that major areas of the city would be left unoccupied by any forces, and therefore, without security. Compounding this geographical vacuum was the fact that Noriega’s paramilitary militia—the so-called Dignity Battalions—would be left to fill some of the unoccupied spaces. The result was the predicted looting, riot, and chaos in the streets.

There are several lessons to be learned with respect to this issue. First, in the wake of combat there will most likely be a security vacuum. If the victorious forces do not fill it, then looters, rioters, criminals, and paramilitary militias will. In some cases this will happen spontaneously; in others it will happen in accordance with planned resistance. In Panama it was primarily spontaneous. In Iraq, while the looting and rioting were initially spontaneous, the resistance became more planned than improvised over time. In both cases, the power vacuum was filled, initially at least, by forces inimical to the goals of the United States. Thus, the plan for Phase IV operations needs to be inextricably linked to that for Phase III—combat. This had been the case under *Elaborate Maze* as well as the *Prayerbook*—so long as General Woerner was CINC. This, of course, leads to the second lesson.

As with the previous issues, command interest and control of postcombat operations planning is essential for success. In planning for conflict in Panama, General Thurman, unlike General Woerner, did not take ownership of *Blind Logic* until he was directed to execute *Blue Spoon* as Operation JUST CAUSE. Thurman’s failure to take ownership of *Blind Logic* until the last minute greatly increased the emerging disconnects between combat and postconflict planning.

What largely saved the situation in Panama and limited the damage to the security situation resulting from looting, rioting, and Dignity Battalion activities, was the existence of *Blind Logic* as plans at both the SOUTHCOM and COMCMOTF levels. The SOUTHCOM plan provided alternative blueprints for force structure and command and control of post-conflict operations. The COMCMOTF plan provided checklists of things that would need to be done by those forces to restore
a functioning government to Panama. This is not to say that either plan could be executed without modification (after all, as the old saying goes, no plan survives the line of departure), but rather that there existed plans and checklists that could be and were modified to meet the developing situation. The mere existence of the *Blind Logic* plans was not what made for ultimate success. Rather, it was the fact that General Thurman embraced them and ordered their execution *on his authority* essentially concurrent with the execution of *Blue Spoon*. That is, he did not wait for the CJCS to execute the order but executed when he felt it was necessary. Thurman took the advice that is often attributed to him, “When in charge, take charge.”

**Conclusion: Applicability of Panama Lessons to Iraq**

One common theme appears throughout the issues addressed in this essay—the criticality of command interest and emphasis on postconflict operations. The lesson of Panama, in this regard, is that the commander’s ownership of *all phases* of the plan—especially the postconflict phase—is essential to mission, operational, and strategic success. CINC emphasis clearly overcame any linear bias of phased planning with General Woerner’s specific execution guidance. Changing to a “family” of plans made no difference as long as Woerner was CINC. It did impact on the issue when General Thurman took command and focused exclusively on the combat plan for three months. In retrospect, Thurman understood the importance of postconflict planning when he said that he should have been more focused on his postconflict plan.

How relevant are these lessons to what happened in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM? In an article that appeared in the *Washington Post* on Christmas Day 2004, Thomas Ricks quotes a paper by US Army Major Isaiah Wilson III as saying, “‘There was no Phase IV plan’ for occupying Iraq after the combat phase….” At the panel where I presented an early version of this essay, I argued in a similar vein that I could find no evidence that a Phase IV plan had been developed by the US Central Command (CENTCOM). My fellow panelist, Colonel Kevin Benson, who had been responsible for Phase IV planning at the CFLCC, indicated that the CENTCOM plans shop was very much engaged in Phase IV planning.

If he was correct, and I have every reason to believe he was, then what had gone wrong to make it appear that there was no Phase IV plan? In addition, we all knew that there had been a great deal of effort focused on postconflict planning in the US government, especially in the State Department and retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) within DOD. However late in the game ORHA was created, it was well ahead of the last-minute resurrection of *Blind Logic* on 17 December 1989! Indeed, ORHA appears to have learned lessons from the Kuwait task force created for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM in that it was in constant coordination with CENTCOM,
according to General Tommy Franks.  

Again, what went wrong? A review of the Phase IV planning indicates that it was taking place in State Department, ORHA, CENTCOM, and CFLCC. Moreover, there was coordination among ORHA, CENTCOM, and CFLCC. But which plan took precedence? Which plan drove the others? Who was in charge of Phase IV at the operational level? In his book, General Franks comments on a memo he sent to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz that bears quoting in some detail:

> My concern was prompted in part by America’s recent warfighting history. During the Vietnam War, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and his Whiz Kids had repeatedly picked individual bombing targets and approved battalion-sized maneuvers. That was not going to happen in Iraq. I knew the President and Don Rumsfeld would back me up, so I felt free to pass the message along to the bureaucracy beneath them: *

> You pay attention to the day after and I’ll pay attention to the day of*.

The italicized portion provides the answer to these questions. General Franks did not accept ownership of Phase IV; he sought to make certain that the OSD bureaucracy, especially ORHA for execution, owned Phase IV.

The lesson of Panama not learned by the commanders was that there is only one place for Phase IV directive planning and that is in the regional combatant command. This is implicit in the chain of command and command relationships prescribed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Unfortunately, it is a lesson that has been only partly learned.
Notes

1. Unless otherwise noted, this and all other references are to my study, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*, SSI, USAWC, (Carlisle, PA, April 1992) and reprinted in a slightly revised manner in my *Civil Military Operations in the New World* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).

2. Plans, between 1987 and 1989, migrated from the J5 to the J3 and back. Meanwhile, at the end of 1988 the CA section moved from J5 to J3, where it remained throughout the crisis and Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY.

3. I do not mean to suggest here that General Thurman bears all, or even most, of the blame for this omission. As the principal planner, I should have tried much harder to get on his calendar, as should my superiors, the deputy J5 and the J5 himself. There is plenty of blame to go around. To his immense credit, General Thurman accepted responsibility for this omission. In an interview, he told me that he should have put much more emphasis on his postconflict plan, *Blind Logic*.


6. Ibid, 441.
This paper is drawn from my memory of the opening period of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM when I served as the CFLCC, C5. I kept a journal of that time, as well as sending a daily report to the Commanding General. I drew on these sources in the development of both my presentation for the Combat Studies Institute symposium and this paper. Any errors in fact and certainly the opinion contained herein are solely my own and in no way represent any official position of the US Army.

The Combined Force Land Component Command, CFLCC, planners began serious work on the post-hostilities phase of the central command (CENTCOM) campaign plan in July 2002. Initially, this effort was focused on refining the already articulated Phase IV portion of the major operations plan then being developed. The CFLCC C5, Colonel Kevin Benson, directed that three officers from within the C5 staff element begin framing at least the skeleton of a broader plan for the reconstruction of Iraq and the restoration of basic security in that country. At this time the focus of main effort at both CFLCC and CENTCOM was the crafting of the CENTCOM campaign plan and the supporting CFLCC major operations plan for the opening phases of the war.

The development of the CFLCC major operations plan was done in parallel with the CENTCOM campaign plan, 1003V. The planning effort consisted of five major efforts on essentially five different plans over the course of 18 months (see Figure 1). The planning effort was initially held at the Top-Secret level as a compartmented
In June 2002 the planning effort was downgraded from Top Secret to SECRET/originator controlled. This kept a close rein on access to the overall plan, but did make it somewhat more of an inclusive effort. The effort on educating higher headquarters and decision makers in Washington about the requirements for a total campaign remained focused on what combat power would be necessary to start the campaign and defeat the existing Iraqi armed forces.

Given this focus, it was difficult to retain the attention of decision makers on how we would conclude the campaign. This is not a criticism; it is a statement of fact and one that planners and operators in the future will have to come to grips with as we move toward the way of war that places much emphasis on a very violent and short lethal operations portion of the campaign. This fact of our way of war means that the conclusion portion of future campaigns will have to be crafted to deal with putting countries back together and establishing a secure enough environment for the people of the country to determine their new path in the community of nations. This demands that future planners expand their understanding of the country in which they will conduct war, popularly called cultural awareness now, but much more than that in reality. An example of this cultural preparation of the battlefield is knowing the demographics of the country in which you will fight.

![Overview Demographics](image)

Figure 2

The major point all planners took to heart, and one with implications for PH IV planning, was the realization that the bulk of Iraq’s male population came to young manhood after the first Gulf War (see Figure 2). This means that the youth of Iraq,
by and large, believe what Saddam and the Baathists told them, that Saddam had won the first war. He was, after all, still in power. It also means that success depended upon getting angry young men to work quickly. This realization drove a great deal of our effort at CFLCC and within LTG (Ret) Garner’s Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) as we all tried to develop guidance for programs that would employ these “angry young men.” The CFLCC efforts, though, were focused on a transition from the CFLCC to a follow-on headquarters, one that would have the mission of concluding the campaign.

The CFLCC mission statement remained the same from September 2002 until May 03, when COBRA II was completed and ECLIPSE II began. The CFLCC mission was derived from the staff and commander’s interpretation of the CENTCOM tasks given to CFLCC in the CENTCOM campaign plan, 1003V. The campaign plan stated that there would be a relief in place after some period of time in campaign plan PH IV wherein CFLCC would be relieved of responsibility for operations in Iraq by a successor headquarters, initially unnamed, then in succession CJTF-IV (for PH IV) and finally CJTF-7.

**The CFLCC Mission**

When directed, CFLCC attacks to defeat Iraqi forces, to control the zone of action and to secure and exploit designated sites, and removes the current Iraqi regime. On order, CFLCC conducts post-hostilities stability and support operations; transitions to CJTF-4.

Lieutenant General McKiernan’s intent statement for the major operation, COBRA II, remained the same as well. This materially aided understanding of the plan and what was important. It was also the first guidance for the PH IV planning team regarding the “rolling transition” to PH IV.

**CFLCC Commander’s Intent**

**Purpose:** Overthrow Saddam’s regime.

**Key Tasks:**

1. Control/isolate the regime (Baghdad is the center of gravity for the regime) by fracturing Saddam Hussein’s ability to C3 (author note: C3 is command, control, communicate) his sources of power, by defeating military that chooses to fight the coalition (influencing neutrality or capitulation of remainder of RA/RGFC forces), and by controlling the civilian population to not impede our attacks. Focus kinetic and non-kinetic effects on regime targets located in Baghdad early and continuously to maintain constant pressure on the regime.

2. Simultaneous, multidirectional, continuous effects using combined-arms maneuver, operational fires, and information operations that are synchronized with CFSOCC, CFACC, and OGA effects. Exploit tactical and operation success at every
opportunity. The high tempo of operations will require mitigating actions for the single greatest concern of operational risk—CSS supportability over extended LOCs, both north and south. Logistics must support the depth and momentum of operational maneuver.

(3) Control as we go (LOCs, SSE, formations, infrastructure, and population). Conduct a “rolling” transition to post-hostility stability and support operations, initially in southern Iraq even while combat operations continue in central Iraq/Baghdad. Balance effects of control (population) and destruction (military support to regime’s defense).

Endstate: Operational endstate is removal of key regime leadership, coalition forces physically controlling Iraq, RA/RGFC forces defeated or capitulated, and vital infrastructure to provide life support to the Iraqi population sustained. Expect SSE to continue well after cessation of hostilities. Conditions established to effect CFLCC battle handover to CJTF-4.5

CFLCC Concept of Stability Operations

COBRA II included stability tasks to V Corps and I MEF. The rolling or blurred transition to PH IV post-hostilities tasks demanded that CFLCC forces control the zone of advance. The best way to do that was the simultaneous execution of combat and stability tasks. The plan also envisioned a possible branch called regime collapse. Regardless of the outcome, the stability tasks remained the same during all PH III operations. These were:

- Unity of military command.
- Unity of effort with Coalition Government Agencies (CGAs)/IOs/NGOs through HOC/HACC/CMOC structure.
- Utilization of existing Iraqi organizations and administration.
- Before Regime collapse V Corps and I MEF exercise military authority in the wake of combat operations. MSCs engage with and utilize existing Iraqi Provincial administration.
- Following Regime collapse an interim authority is established that interfaces with Iraqi Ministries.
- Initially, stability operations are conducted within CFLCC zones. After Regime removal, the battlespace is reorganized to include the whole of Iraq.

Phase III Endstate

Figure 3 represents the CFLCC situation at the end of April 2003. CFLCC Phase III was complete when Baghdad was isolated. The CENTCOM Phase III transition to PH IV was to occur at the completion of the removal of the Saddam
regime. CFLCC chose to end its Phase III when Baghdad was isolated. The CFLCC appreciation of the regime was all the means of control emanated from Baghdad. Once the city and thus the regime apparatus were isolated in the city, transition to PH IV could begin throughout the country, with a major task being completion of regime removal.

**Phase IV Challenges and Assumptions**

The CFLCC PH IV planning team derived the challenges listed below that had to be addressed during the totality of PH IV in the campaign plan and supporting major operations plan.

- EPW (repatriation/reintegration)
- WMD (site control, removal, transport)
- Dislocated civilians (internal and external)
- Iraqi military (demobilize and control)
- Oil infrastructure triage (refineries, pipelines, and storage)
- Separatist intentions
- Lawlessness
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Force Protection

During this effort the planning team came to the conclusion that PH IV of COBRA II was growing in complexity to the point where we needed to write a separate plan as opposed to a continuation of COBRA II. This was true even if the
The endstate of CFLCC operations was the establishment of a secure enough situation with critical repairs done on vital civilian infrastructure that would lead to the handover of the mission to the yet-to-be-named CJTF-4. On 17 March 2003, the C5 went to the CFLCC CG and recommended that in light of the growing complexity of PH IV, based on wargaming, that PH IV be considered a sequel planning effort to the CENTCOM 1003v. CFLCC C5 would need to write an entire new plan for PH IV. The planning team recognized that there would be internal and external threats to both coalition forces and to the new Iraqi regime. Figure 4 is a representation of these threats and one used to inform the CFLCC command group. Since there was a need for a new plan, the planning team also developed new assumptions that would assist in the planning.

The assumptions the planning team made were hotly debated, both within the team and within the leadership of CFLCC. The assumptions listed below were also shown to the Army G3 and VCSA and the JCS J3, J5. The CFLCC C5 wanted to state the first assumption up front to ensure everyone knew CFLCC understood that policy guidance would change over time with a corresponding effect on coalition forces in theater.

- Policy guidance and endstate will evolve.
- Asymmetric threats to CFLCC forces will exist in PH IV.
- Non-DoD agencies (DoE, DoJ, DoS) will contribute to Iraq recovery operations.
- Some essential infrastructure (rail, airports, power generation, bridges) will

![Phase IV – Flash Points & Threats to Coalition Forces](image)

**Figure 4**

The assumptions the planning team made were hotly debated, both within the team and within the leadership of CFLCC. The assumptions listed below were also shown to the Army G3 and VCSA and the JCS J3, J5. The CFLCC C5 wanted to state the first assumption up front to ensure everyone knew CFLCC understood that policy guidance would change over time with a corresponding effect on coalition forces in theater.
be damaged due to combat operations.

- IO/NGO will request CFLCC support with at least force protection, CSS, and HA supply distribution.
- Coalition will participate in PH IV.
- The TPFDL flow (modified) will continue until completion.
- IO/NGO is already operating in IZ, but some will cease activities by A-day.

The only assumption that did not hold true was the RFFs stopped flowing shortly after 1 May. CFLCC C5 and CENTCOM J5 planners argued strongly for a continuation of the force flow and for the position that no one goes home until 1 September. We argued this to keep the pressure on the enemy. Our cases were made to our respective command groups and received well. Subsequent decisions made later on in April and May 2003 concerning the battle handover and the stopping of the flow of combat forces were made based on information other than that which was provided by either the CFLCC C5 or the CENTCOM J5.

**CFLCC Mission for ECLIPSE II**

The CFLCC mission statement for ECLIPSE II was developed based on a continuing analysis of the expected situation coalition forces would encounter in PH IV. Our focus was on security and stability as necessary preconditions for battle handover to a follow-on headquarters. At the time we did not think this headquarters would be Third US Army and then almost immediately V Corps. The mission statement, as seen below, was simple and direct:

When directed, CFLCC controls Iraq through stability and support operations to establish conditions for mission transition to CJTF-7.
Figure 5 outlines our initial proposal for corps zones of operation. Over time the MEF zone was taken over by two multi-national divisions, one led by the British and the other by the Poles. Following regime removal and the isolation of Baghdad, the V Corps and I MEF expanded their areas of operation to encompass all of Iraq with V Corps repositioned in northern Iraq and I MEF repositioned in southern Iraq. CFLCC C5 also recommended that the forward CFLCC headquarters move to a position inside Baghdad and that the responsibility for Baghdad province be given to a separate combat element under CFLCC control. This recommendation was made to maintain a special focus on the city and its importance to the overall perception of success in the campaign.

**CFLCC PH IV Objectives**

Since the initial focus of ECLIPSE II was on ensuring stability to meet CENTCOM PH IV conditions, these were the CFLCC objectives stated in ECLIPSE II:

- Establish and sustain the conditions for mission handover to CJTF-7.
- Conduct/transition CMO activities to IO/NGO/HN.
- Ensure WMD capabilities are destroyed, removed, or transitioned to competent authority.
- Detain terrorists and war criminals and free individuals unjustly detained under the IZ regime.
- Refine CFLCC force structure for PH IV operations as required.
- Maintain law and order.
- Complete capitulation of IZ military.
- Protect coalition forces and IO/NGO.

The commander, CENTCOM and his staff derived a series of decision points, (DPs), which would be informed by CFLCC to begin reorganization of the battlefield framework and the transition of command and control (C2), from CFLCC to CJTF-IRAQ or CJTF-7. Events accelerated these DPs and associated decisions being made. In May of 2003 the commander, CENTCOM decided to name CFLCC as CJTF-7 and put CFLCC in control of operations in all of Iraq. The main effort of operations in country at this time was stabilization and critical infrastructure repair, along with the defeat of remaining regime elements.

Iraq is a country bigger than California. The task of establishing a secure enough environment for the series of transitions envisioned in the CENTCOM campaign plan was daunting, but from the middle of May through the end of June it appeared feasible throughout the country. The CFLCC/CJTF-7 C5 did a “troop to task analysis,” a standard effort involved in military planning as a means of continuing the analysis of the mission CFLCC set for itself in OPLAN ECLIPSE II. This troop to task analysis was done to identify a minimum level of forces needed
to exert some control over the populated areas of the country. Based on the planning groups collective peace-keeping/peace enforcement operations experience in Bosnia and Haiti we decided to use a standard reference for “troops” as a start point for analysis.

Our start point was equating the number of troops to the number of police and security forces in California. The planning group used open source information from web searches on the state of California’s web sites, along with the major cities in California. The result of our analysis is shown in Figure 6. We chose to focus on the cities due to the limited number of troops available to CJTF-7 as the bulk of the population of Iraq lived in the cities listed. Secure cities would begin to establish the conditions for a return to normality throughout Iraq, and gain the time needed for a series of battle handovers from US forces to coalition forces entering Iraq, the British-led Multinational Division, South and the Polish-led Multinational Division Center-South.

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<th>PHASE IV – TROOP TO TASK ANALYSIS</th>
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Figure 6

CFLCC Endstate Conditions

The CENTCOM campaign plan envisioned a number of transitions within Phase IV of the campaign, based on the wargaming done between the CENTCOM and component staffs. Shown in Figure 7 are the endstate conditions that were derived from war gaming and formed the conditions for a CFLCC and CENTCOM decision point to end PH IV and begin battle handover to a successor HQ. The decision to name CFLCC CJTF-7 materially changed the plan as no transition was needed since the headquarters that developed ECLIPSE II was remaining in Iraq.
The challenge was then handing over the mantle of CJTF-7 to V US Corps. This was done on 15 June 2003.

CFLCC used Figure 8 as a means of communicating the existing conditions on 15 June 2003. This chart, among many others, was shown to the assembled V Corps commanders and principal staff officers during the handover presentation. The CFLCC C5 briefed the chart to LTG Sanchez and his commanders.7
In the aftermath of the handover of responsibility for operations in Iraq, there have been many questions and assertions about the state of planning for PH IV or post-hostility operations, stability, and support operations. In this paper, I attempt to put to rest the question of whether or not there was a post-campaign plan to deal with lawlessness, guerrilla operations, and the general security situation. The CFLCC C5, along with the planning staffs of V US Corps and I MEF, and guided by input from the command group of CFLCC, developed a plan called ECLIPSE II that was a sequel to COBRA II. ECLIPSE II outlined operations to conduct stability and security operations. In the course of the development of ECLIPSE II, the CFLCC planning staff talked about an insurgency as one of the potential enemy courses of action but did not rate it very likely. The consensus of opinion, based on our analysis of available intelligence, was that it was more likely that there would be continued resistance from former regime loyalists as they had everything to lose with Sad-dam gone from power. The CFLCC planning group also developed ECLIPSE II with the assumption that we would be allowed to recall the Iraqi regular army and certain lower level Baath-party members.

The CFLCC plan was developed in the same manner we developed COBRA II, through a series of meetings with the V Corps, I MEF, and CENTCOM planners conducted before and during the conduct of combat operations. We also included in the development process the people who worked for LTG (Ret) Garner’s ORHA. ORHA expected to assume responsibility for operations in Iraq as the security situation improved and the coalition, in accord with a fledgling Iraqi government, moved toward complete handover of the country to Iraqi control.

War is a human endeavor. The first lesson any planner learns is that just as the coalition forces enter a war planning on being victorious, so too does the enemy enter a war with the thought of victory, and will do just about anything to achieve victory. Did CFLCC expect the sort of opposition that has since arisen in the aftermath of the handover of Iraq operations? The answer is no; we felt there would be a continued resistance to our forces, but we also felt that the Iraqi army would be recalled, the Iraqi police would return to duty, and coalition forces could begin a withdrawal from the country over some time schedule linked to the ability of the Iraqi army and security forces. The planning group figured there would be remnants of former regime loyalists who would be left with no option but to fight. We did consider an insurgency, but it was rated as less likely. We also expected that fanatics (al Qaeda, Ansar al Islam, Wahabi sects, etc.) would also try to come into Iraq to kill Americans. We could not have foreseen, in my mind, the depth of the resistance we face now. We expected to be able to recall the Iraqi army. Once CPA took the decision to disband the Iraqi army and start again, our assumptions for the plan became invalid.
Moltke the Elder stated that no plan could look with confidence beyond initial contact with the enemy’s main body. This dictum remains true today. A great deal of planning took place before, during, and after the conclusion of Phase III of the CENTCOM campaign plan 1003V and CFLCC OPLAN COBRA II. War, as planners also know and understand, is an extension of policy by other means. The enemy gets a vote and policy will change as a result of that interaction with the enemy. War is and will remain a human endeavor. It is a contest of will. The side with the stronger will, as well as the best weapons for the task, will ultimately prevail.
Glossary

• A-Day = day air combat operations begin
• AO = area of operations
• BCT = Brigade Combat Team
• BDE = Brigade
• BN = Battalion
• C3 = command, control, communications
• CFC = Coalition Forces Command (also known as CENTCOM)
• CGAs = coalition government agencies
• CJTF = Combined Joint Task Force
• CMO = Civil Military Operations
• CMOC = Civil-Military Operations Center
• COMCENT = Commander, Central Command (GEN Franks)
• COMCFLCC = Commander, Combined Forces Land Component Command
• CPA = Coalition Provisional Authority
• CSS = Combat Service Support (supply & logistics)
• DC = Displaced Civilians, District of Columbia
• DoD = Department of Defense
• DoE = Department of Energy
• DoJ = Department of Justice
• DoS = Department of State
• DP = Decision Point
• EPW = Enemy Prisoner of War
• G-Day = Day ground combat operations begin
• HA = Humanitarian Assistance
• HACC = Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
• HN = Host Nation
• HOC = Humanitarian Operations Center
• HOC-IZ = Humanitarian Operations Center – Iraq
• HVT = High Value Target
• IA-DART = Inter-Agency-Disaster Assistance Response Team
• IOs = international organizations or information operations
• ISG = Iraq Survey Group
• IZ = military short hand for Iraq, IR is Iran
• JSOA-N = Joint Special Operations Area – North
• KDP = Kurdish Democratic Party
• LOC = Line of Communication
• LOGCAP = Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
• LSA = Logistics Support Area
• MeK = Mujahadin e’ Khalq, Iraqi backed anti Iranian group based in Iraq
• MSC = Major Subordinate Commands
• NBC = Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
• NGOs = non-governmental organizations
• NIC = New Iraqi Corps (the project to rebuild the Iraqi Army)
• OGA = Other Government Agencies
• OPLAN = Operations Plan
• PUK = Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
• RA = Regular Army (Iraqi)
• RFF = Request for forces
• RGFC = Republican Guard Forces Command (Iraqi ground forces)
• SCIRI = Supreme Committee for the Iranian Revolution in Iraq (Iranian backed Shia group that opposed Saddam)
• SF = Special Forces
• SOF = Special Operating Forces
• SRG = Special Republican Guard (elite unit of the Republican Guard with personal loyalty to Saddam)
• SSE = sensitive site exploitation
• SSO = Special Security Organization (Iraqi secret police)
• TPFDD = Time phased force deployment data
• TPFDL = Time phased force deployment list
• UXO = unexploded ordinance
• WMD = weapons of mass destruction
Notes

1. The initial team of officers focused on PH IV planning for CFLCC was Lieutenant Colonels Glen Patten and Winston Mann and Major Willie Davis. In January 2003 the team was reinforced with the addition of Majors Wayne Grieme, Bryan Sparling, and Bill Innocenti, and British Major Nick Elliott, MBE. In March 2003 Lieutenant General, LTG, Mckiernan, Commanding General of CFLCC, named British Major General Albert Whiteley, as the Deputy Commanding General for PH IV. From March 2003 until plan handover to the CFLCC C35, Future Operations in May 2003, the CFLCC C5 and plans group worked under the direction of MG Whiteley.

2. CFLCC planners chose the name ECLIPSE II because we wanted to link Third US Army history to our second reconstruction and PH IV campaign, the first being ECLIPSE in Germany in 1945. This was the same logic used to select the name COBRA II for our first major operations plan.

3. All figures used in this paper were presented during a Combat Studies Institute symposium, held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 14-16 September 2004. These figures were originally developed during the course of planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and were declassified by Central Command in 2003.

4. A compartmented effort at the Top-Secret level is the most difficult level for planning. No one in a headquarters, save those with a “need to know” are allowed to be “read on” to the compartment, which literally means people involved in planning must possess a Top-Secret clearance and sign off on papers acknowledging the vital security interest involved in the planning effort. The number of people allowed to be “read on” to any compartment is strictly controlled.

5. See the Glossary for a complete list of acronyms and what they mean.

6. There is acknowledged controversy over the number of troops a range of people felt were necessary to provide a secure environment in Iraq. This figure represents what the CFLCC C5 was asked to produce, the minimum number of troops, US, coalition, etc., we felt were needed to establish a secure environment for the restoration of Iraqi control and free operation of non-governmental organizations, the UN, etc. We had fewer troops than Governor Schwarzenegger has police.

7. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez assumed command of V US Corps on 14 June 2003 and became Commander, CJTF-7 on 15 June 2003. The CFLCC staff worked with the V Corps staff from 1-14 June 2003 on the handover of tasks to ensure as smooth a handover as possible. The CFLCC C2, under the direction of MG James Marks, prepared chart 19 as well as others in the intelligence situation portion of the handover briefing.
Fishel and Benson Question and Answer Session

**Question:** My question is for Colonel Benson. When you all were trying to determine the ethnic, tribal, and religious boundaries, what was your source of expertise? Were you just looking it up in the encyclopedia, or did you have somebody actually with good knowledge in your headquarters?

**Answer Benson:** Within our C-9, the civil-military affairs element, there was a level of regional expertise. Also, thank God for the Internet because we were actually doing the Google search to get as much information as we could. And there were other sources of information that we were able to draw from as well.

**Question:** It was mentioned briefly in the last session about the foreign area officer community. Cultural awareness, of course, is key to this. My question is, during all phases of this—your preplanning, the execution, etcetera—what were the lessons learned for policy makers, senior military leaders, and foreign officers on the use, non-use, and misuse of the foreign area officer community? This is for both of you.

**Answer Fishel:** The first thing I would say to you is that I’m obviously very much a partisan of General [Frederick] Woerner, who was the senior in the Army at the time and clearly had a sense of the culture of Panama and the entire region. His decision to put the post-conflict planning in the hands of the J-5 was predicated on the fact that that was where his foreign area officers (FAOs) were. It wasn’t just that his civil affairs section was there, but it was the location of his entire FAO capability. When it came time to execute, that FAO community, the entire division of the J-5, became the nucleus of the civil-military operations task force until the civil affairs guys came down. The guys who did the planning in both 1988 and 1989 came from the unit that was regionally focused; it’s now the 350th Civil Affairs Command. At the time, it was the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade. Some of its officers were also FAOs, as well as civil affairs officers. But, they were all regionally focused.

One of the best FAOs was not an FAO at all. The J-3 of SOUTHCOM, later the commander of US Army South (USARSO), then Brigadier General, Major General, finally Lieutenant General Marc Cisneros, probably had more cultural awareness in his little finger than half the Latin American FAOs in the business. So, merely the fact of training is not the only way you get that kind of experience. But the core of it was that we were FAOs. And that General Woerner was supportive of the FAO community. I can’t speak to General [Max] Thurmond’s views because he sent mixed signals about his feelings about FAOs. In some cases, he was very pro-FAO, and in other cases he was very opposed to what he perceived as the negatives. In the
end, however, he ended up relying on the expertise of that same FAO community, and relying on it, I think, in appropriate ways. So, the commander’s sense of how to use them is obviously one of the critical factors.

**Answer Benson:** Marty Stanton is a very good friend of mine. He was our C9, and he had a tremendous understanding of the area, of the variety of the cultures. One of the guys was initially, very early in our planning process at least, my impression was that he wanted us to hold hands and sing Kumbaya. I was not interested in the subtle nuances of the Arabic culture. I wanted to know how to kill them more effectively. I wanted to know how to separate the insurgents from the people. I wanted to know what buttons to push to get the people to help us so our information operations would be more effective. If you can drive the handholding Kumbaya guys from the FAO corps, that would help because we’re at war. That’s a paid political announcement.

The FAOs we had were tremendous. They really helped us. Now, did we make mistakes? Sure. Were there things that we did not know, or things that were there that we just didn’t recognize until too late? Of course, because we were under a lot of pressure to get a plan out, to refine it. General Franks says in his book that he was engaged in an education process with people in OSD. And it truly was that. Well, this has nothing to do with FAO, but those guys were involved. They were invaluable. And Marty was invaluable. I would wring their heads to get as much as I could. But our focus was on who do we have to kill to be successful. How do we send messages so the Iraqi army doesn’t fight? How do we make sure those are successfully received and understood? That was the thrust of it for us. We have to be better at that. We have to be more sophisticated.

**Question:** Kevin, this question is for you. Knowing what we know now, seeing what we’ve seen now, and if you could keep this somewhat short, what would you do differently, either in organization or use of operational-planning design aspects?

**Answer Benson:** I would have made a much stronger case to my CG that he should have been more involved with Phase IV planning during Phase III execution. If I had it to do all over again, that’s what I’d do differently. [Lieutenant] General [David] McKiernan, to his credit, recognized that he only had so much energy because we were all getting really tired. He felt he needed to get through Phase III before we got into Phase IV. He delegated responsibility, or authority, for Phase IV planning to another major general on the staff—Major General Albert Whitley of the UK army, with whom he’d had a good working relationship during Bosnia planning. And I made what I thought was a strong case that, “No boss, you can’t shut me out. I’ve got to have access to you.” He just said, “Look, I can’t.” If I had it to do all over again I’d have made a stronger case. Because I think there
were some things that we really screwed up.

**Question:** This is for Colonel Benson. I come from a community that, if they were looking at Phase IV, they wouldn’t know to call it Phase IV. What they would say is there were riots and lootings in Baghdad. There have been constant attacks on American troops and on the Iraqis themselves by dissident groups or what have you. They would call what they don’t know is Phase IV a failure. How would you answer that? At the time, was there a sense that we needed more troops for a successful Phase IV, which is what we’re hearing constantly through the media.

**Answer Benson:** I’ll start with what I knew at the time and then add a personal opinion. First of all, the looting that was going on, I saw that same guy carrying that same vase over and over and over again. The people weren’t knocking down the walls to get to Jalid’s store and loot the groceries and all the sundry items. They were looting Baath party headquarters and Saddam’s palaces. Secret police headquarters, precision strikes. You may have heard on CNN *Inside the War Room*—one of the funnier lines attributed to General Whitley was it was “redistribution of wealth.” But, it wasn’t until a lot later that some savvy Iraqis realized that the Americans would buy the copper from them to repair power lines and so, why don’t we just go knock down the power lines and sell it back to the Americans. You know, that was kind of unconstrained capitalism as well.

The looting, you know everyone’s beat us up about the looting, oh, the looting. Well, what do we do? Shoot them? We’ve been telling them in our information operations that we’re not here to fight the Iraqi people. We’re here to fight the Baath party and the Saddam regime. We may well have set the conditions for, “Hey, let’s go loot the palace because the Americans won’t care.” I don’t know. That’s pure conjecture. Now, I’ve been asked this question before. I would say that this is a human endeavor. This is war. The enemy always gets a vote. Did we make some mistakes? Did we not kill enough people. I don’t know. It may have taken that. But that’s all moot. Because it would be just conjecture. We used the people we had as best we could, the looting and the lawlessness, we recognized that there was going to be some of that. Mostly the lawlessness. We tried to articulate in looking at the country itself and the cities and the flashpoints of where we would get the most effect for use of the forces we had. And that’s how we targeted the forces in the terms of the specified tasks we gave to the Corps and subsequently to the multinational divisions.

You know, there was probably a moment…now this is Benson’s personal opinion…there was a moment where some of my Arab friends told me that if we’d have kept the lid on we probably wouldn’t have had these problems. OK, conjecture. How do we keep the lid on? Well, we continue the force flow. We don’t stop. We
leave everyone in place because there was a moment from about the middle of May until the middle of June where, last time I walked around Baghdad, I had my hard hat on and my flack vest. But the biggest problem we had was folks trying to sell us booze on the corner. There weren’t people shooting at us there. There were some sullen looks by young guys, but we were kind of thinking, “We just kicked your ass, man, and you’re scared of us.” We probably needed to keep them scared a little longer. But, it’s a human endeavor. The enemy’s going to sense weakness, or perceive weakness, and come after us.

**Question:** Did we need more troops?

**Answer Benson:** I don’t think so. I don’t think so. I don’t disagree with what General Schinseki said, because the number I came up with was pretty much what he said. Remember, I showed you my minimum “troop to task” analysis was 100,000 to 125,000 combat soldiers with attendant combat support and service support. It brought us to around 250,000 to 300,000 folks. But, you know, whether or not we needed more troops is an irrelevant argument. We’re the soldiers of a republic. When the duly constituted constitutional and authorized leadership tells us this is what we have to do the job, if we have the opportunity to make our case and they listen to us and then they make decisions, we move out.

**Question:** But I suppose we’re saying that they looked at your forces you thought you needed, turned you down, in essence, so their decision…maybe the staff work was impeccable, but their decision, then, was faulty because they did not provide you the forces you said you needed to maintain law and order in Phase IV Alpha.

**Answer Benson:** Remember where I was, too. We made our position known to Central Command. I was not present at any of those other decisions. So, I do not know. I do not know.

**Answer Fishel:** I don’t know that the … I obviously wasn’t there, one of my colleagues at NDU was there and worked for Jay Garner. As best as I can discover, there was very little, if any, planning at the Central Command level for the Phase IV operations. You had planning going on in Washington, as you did in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. You had planning going on at CFLCC, but there seems to be little at the level of the combatant commander. Please, somebody correct me if I’m wrong, but it struck me that this is the place where it has to be. This is the guy, whether his name is Franks or Abizaid or Thurman or Woerner or Paul David Miller, he owns it. It isn’t as Colin Powell is alleged to have said and didn’t say, “Mr. President, you own it.” No, it’s “Combatant Commander, you own it.” Or whomever the President puts in charge.

**Question:** Kevin, it’s probably going to go more to you. You mentioned that
Dave McKiernan said he didn’t have time to look at Phase IV until Phase III was done. Phase IV is the goal, win the peace. Therefore, everything else ought to be backed up from that, you know, planning done backwards, and it’s got to be intertwined and together. Did we mess it up by not making it all just planning, rather than Phase III planning, Phase IV planning, and separating it out?

**Answer Benson:** That’s a great question. The year that I spent at MIT was very instructive. Before I left MIT, I had a chance to talk to Ken Pollock, who had just written a *Foreign Affairs* article, “Next Stop, Baghdad?” I had beat him up because he talked about the easy part, the combat. He didn’t even touch what I knew to be Phase V [stabilization and retrograde operations]. See, I was out of touch from planning; the last time I’d been into seriously planning post-hostilities was Phase V. I didn’t know we had dropped the whole phase from Joint doctrine. But, I beat him up about that. I said, “You know Ken, you just glossed over all the hard stuff. What do we do after the fact?” And with that seed provided by Ken’s presentation, before I left MIT I talked to all those great political science professors that I had up there, I took advantage of those minds, specifically on Phase IV, post-hostilities operations.

There was also a post-hostilities planning effort going on that predated my arrival at CFLCC. I just fell in on it and gave it my attention because I was the new guy, I was fresh, I had all the energy. All these folks were nearing tracer burnout because they’d been going at it since September 2001. We knew the ultimate end-state was win—I didn’t say win the peace. That was crap. It’s win the war. How do you win the war? You win the war at the end of the campaign. What are the campaign end states? Keep those in mind. What do we do in Phase I, II and III that set us up for Phase IV? I mean, that is the approach that I took. That is what I told our operational planning group. That was the message we all took up to Central Command. And there were the two guys, there again, the two 50-pound brains that General Franks mentions in his book, Halverson and Fitzgerald. Even though they were deeply involved in the educational process that the CINC had going on with OSD, they also recognized that there had to be attention given to the question, What do we do post-hostilities? And there really was a group of folks there in the long-range planning element—the first time I saw it was in April 2002—that was considering, What do we do? How do we articulate the totality of Phase IV of the campaign? Because I read their plan. Because we had to be linked in it. So, Clay, we did do that. At least, we made the best attempt I possibly could.

**Question:** It seems that one of the assumptions that was made—and I mean no disrespect to my fellow branch officers—that Armored Cavalry and Infantry and these types of people can jump right in and do disciplined law and order. And division MPs aren’t equipped for that either. I’m sorry, post camp- and station-type,
disciplined law-and-order-type MPs, combined with civil affairs unit to make this Phase IV work. I’m sure you’re aware of that. And I’m sure that they were included on your list. What happened to these support units that were supposed to have been up there with you? Because we never saw many MPs running around. This was a critical need for these people. At least, having spent a good part of my career as an MP, I can understand … a commander’s right hand.

**Answer Benson:** Actually, at one point every active component, almost every active component and about 75 percent of the reserve component Military Police were in Iraq. What we ran in to was the decision not to have a time phased forced deployment list where one decision is taken and all the forces flow, because that was viewed as archaic, something that was built for the big war in the central region of Europe that never happened. We had to go back to the Secretary with requests for forces that were separate packages. And then that got us into alert and mobilization, and then, in all candor, once we started to alert and mobilize some of these reserve component units, we found out that they had been lying on their readiness for years. Forces Command had to cobble together units to meet needs to provide the source. They had to take three to make one. But, with the “start and stop” that we went through with the request for forces process, it interrupted the way we’d been training guys for years. You’re going to get alerted, you’re going to get mobilized, you’re going to go to a mobilization unit. You’re going to train for a little while, then you’re going to go.

I recognize the reason why we did the RFF (request for forces). I mean, the Secretary wanted to be more personally involved. And I really respect that. He wanted to know what was going on. Just that the downstream effects of that was the “stop and start.” And then it compounded with who is really ready? How much is ready? Who do we need? When can they get here? What is realistic to expect? Then the other thing we came up against was, under what law were various Reserve component units mobilized? Some were mobilized under Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up, and I learned, to my chagrin, you could only keep guys on active duty for 270 days. The last 90 they had to be back getting ready to demobilize. I really did not know that. Those units mobilized under the partial mobilization, we could keep for two years.

But at the end of the two years, there was a period where they could not be recalled. So, now we got into, How long are we going to be here? What do we think? Who are we going to need downstream? Maybe we better not call these guys up. Maybe we better get those guys. I dived into that stinky end of the pool with all of our Reserve Component guys and really kind of hammered it through. We did have a lot of those folks there, it’s just that they came later on because the other effect of the request for forces process we were bumping up against was, When do we...
need these guys? Well, God, you know, some of them we wanted within ten days after we crossed the line of departure. Well, we can’t get the reserve guys there that fast. OK, then we’ve got to go and pull active component and push the reserve component guys further downstream.

In the macro it made sense because, well, now we’ve got somewhat of a sustainable force flow, but like you said, the division MPs, those kind of MPs, the civil affairs guys... you know there’s not that many active component civil affairs guys. And the other part was, all of those regional civil affairs guys had been called up for Afghanistan. They were coming up on the end of their 18 months of a two-year call up under the law. So, it’s like, oh my God, let’s go get some of those guys from Southeast Asia, bring them in because it’s civil affairs. It was pretty amazing. It really was. It was an amazing process to go through. So, we did have a lot of those folks. It was just a matter of when they could come. There was a whole host of factors.

**Question:** Kevin, you mentioned during your presentation that you...(This question had to do with the decision to not recall the Iraqi regular army.)

**Answer Benson:** They weren’t so tainted with the blood of ethnic groups because the Shia had fought in the regular Iraqi army against Shiite Iranians. So we felt that there would be great utility in being able to recall them. To that end, we devoted a lot of time to collecting arms and ammunition. I sent officers out to look at post camps and stations, as we would call them, that were not so damaged they couldn’t be repaired by the Iraqi army with minimal trouble to be recalled. We even were engaged in discussions with Iraqi general officers. Now, were they Baathists? Sure they were. To make flag rank you had to be. Hell, to make field grade you had to be. But they were guys, insofar as we knew, who were vetted through processes with other government agencies, and they didn’t have blood on their hands to the extent like some of the guys in the Special Republican Guard.

I gave a presentation to Mr. Walt Slocum who worked for Ambassador Bremer and the conclusion of my presentation was, “Sir, we’re pretty confident we can do this. We can recall them and that would really help.” And, as I said, we’re the soldiers of a Republic. We got our say, and he said to me at the end, “Great presentation, Colonel. Thank you very much.” Hey, this was supposed to be a decision briefing. Then the realization was, “Holy cow! I think a decision’s been made.” It may well have been. De-Baathification was the other one, too. That was the policy of the government. De-Baathification. Now, I was involved in discussions about what does that really mean? I mean, you know, none of us wanted to put General McKiernan in a position like in the Patton movie where, “Well, I guess they joined because it’s like joining the Republican or the Democratic party.” We didn’t want to put him
in that position. What we tried to articulate was that there were concentric circles of bad guys around Saddam. There should be a limit. You know, the guy who’s in the Baath party who runs the sewage treatment plant in Basra is probably not as bad as the number 5 guy in the deck of 52. So, we should be able to apply a little reason in our approach. But, de-Baathification is the policy of the government.

**Question:** Thank you for two great, very excellent presentations. It was both gratifying, but a little scary, to see the planning in both cases was very far along and very thoughtful and somehow didn’t quite make it into fulfilling the promise of the plan. For John Fishel I wanted to ask a question. I wanted to ask if you could comment on the pace, in the Panama situation, with which we rehabilitated and drew upon police, civil servants, soldiers, etcetera from Panama to go back about their functions and get back in business, and how long it took to get them into play helping their own population? With Kevin, I’d like you to follow up on the comments you’ve already made. You’ve, kind of, half answered my question. Given the planning, could you address a little bit how you fit in and how resonant you felt your relationship was with CENTCOM? And then, at the second level, how well you fit in and how much you encountered when we went from [Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay] Garner to [Ambassador Paul] Bremer in, I think it was May, and then when you went from whomever was before Garner to Garner in, I think it was January. How much turbulence did that create in your plan?

**Answer Fishel:** The PDF simply went home. They did the same thing the Iraqi’s did. They went home. But the PDF, all 18,000 of them, most of them were cops of one kind or another. There were 3,500 guys in the PDF who were military. The rest of them were some kind of policeman. So, the issue was, what are you going to do with these people? If you let them stay home, they still have weapons, they still have training, and they have sort of a unit structure. They can be bad guys. We actually had a government in hand, in place, sort of. We inaugurated President Guillermo Endara, First Vice President Arias Calderón, and Second Vice President Billy Ford before the first troops went in. Sorry, the Panamanians did that. There was a Panamanian Justice of the Peace who came on Fort Clayton and did it. So, there was a government there. Calderón was dual hatted as the Minister of Government and Justice, which owned the police. And his right-hand man was a guy of Pakistani origin who ultimately became the first civilian director of the National Police Force ever in Panama.

After a series of discussions with the CINC and with State Department representation, the decision was made to invite the police to come back. The first call back and reporting for duty was actually, I believe, 22 December. The same day that you had the last attack of the die hards, literally on the station where the recruitment was taking place. So, they had police coming back in three days into
Operation JUST CAUSE. Then we discovered, surprisingly, that this really was the gang that couldn’t shoot straight. The guy who is now my boss was the G3 of our US force liaison, which is now the Director of the Center for Atmospheric Defense Studies. At the time, he was a young major. He took the first group out to the firing range, and asked, “How many of you guys know how to shoot?” “Yeah, we know how to shoot.” All of a sudden the bullets were flying in every direction except at the targets. So, he had to come up with a plan for what we called the “20-hour course” to train these guys, to make them safe to walk the streets.

In the meantime, by early February, we had the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the US Department of Justice on board, which was going to train everybody, the whole new police force, to do everything. By April, the entire police force had gone through the 20-hour course and ICITAP’s basic training course for new policemen or old policemen wasn’t in place for another year. A long answer, but we brought former PDF back in early and tried to make them safe to walk the streets. They did develop a very different attitude—the same guys showed a very different attitude under a quasi-democratically elected regime than they had under the not so democratic regime. A year later, I was able to go back and see something that I’ve never seen earlier, which was policemen actually talking to people in the streets. The old PDF cops, nobody would approach them, and they wouldn’t talk to civilians. People were talking to the policemen. People were asking questions, and they were holding conversation. It was civilized. Kind of like you expect in the United States and rarely see.

**Question:** Was there a similar approach with the civil service?

**Answer Fishel:** Civil service, such as it was, was much less of a problem. It was still corrupt, but the civil servants were civil servants and they did their thing. The most solid institution in Panama was the PDF. It was the government, and it had it’s hands in everything.

**Answer Benson:** The two-part question. The serendipity of the Army assignment process allowed me to fit in really well. Why do I say that? Because from 1996 to 1998 I had my second tour as a SAMs educated planner, where I was Chief of War Plans at 3d US Army. So, I had two years working with the Central Command staff in the subordinate component headquarters. When I came back in the summer of 2002, many of the guys and gals with whom I’d worked over the course of my career were also back there. I was General Franks’ Chief of Plans when he was the 3d Army Commander. So, you know, he could tease me, make fun of me, say that I had more hair when I worked for him. You know, all that kind of stuff. But it helped, because there was recognition. It helped that all of the colonels and the lieutenant colonels and even some of the majors, we’d all worked together.
before at various assignments. Even our Air Force, Navy, and Marine brothers and sisters, we’d seen them before, as well. Sometimes there were friction points, to put it kindly, with the other components, but we all had worked with each other before, or knew each other, or knew people who knew each other. So, among the group of planners and general staff officers, we fit in really well.

Pre-Garner to Garner to Bremer. Before ORHA, there was nothing. And the post-hostilities planning was being done at Central Command in the land component. I had heard rumblings that a group led by General Garner—I didn’t know the name at the time—was being formed, and they were walking around and trying to go to conferences in December 2002. I first met their advance party in January 2003, but they were still trying to get organized. Frankly, they couldn’t contribute an awful lot until they got organized. When we, the land component, did our internal plan handover from the planners to the operations section, then my folks shifted solely to Phase IV vice the simultaneous effort that we had been doing for Phases III and IV, and to force flow management. They, ORHA, were somewhat better organized. On D-day, I was actually at a planning effort with ORHA in their beach-side Hilton where they were living, in civilian clothes, and it was very surreal. I did not work with CPA when Ambassador Bremer took over, because that occurred at just about the time we did the battle hand over to the Vth Corps, and my focus then at the time, reverted back to different responsibilities—continuing the force flow, planning for OIF II, and then interaction with the Central Command J5 on post-Saddam theater engagement strategy.

**Question:** What was OIF II?

**Answer Benson:** OIF II was when the guys currently in theater were replaced, or did a relief in place. It was who follows, who replaces the 3d Division? Who relieves the Marines in place? So, I went to Warsaw to talk to the Poles and all that. That’s the shorthand. OIF II is, you know, the second group of folks. OIF III is the third group of folks, etcetera.

**Question:** The question I have, we briefed General Garner’s guy, well, Lieutenant General Ron Adams, in late January. At that time, he showed us his organizational chart for ORHA, and it was under the operational control of CFLCC. They weren’t obviously very comfortable with that. Did that ever translate into anything on the ground? Were you guys actually in any control of what ORHA was doing?

**Answer Benson:** It was in our best interest to embrace General Garner’s folks because their success meant that I could go home, but there was really a lot of friction. My personal impression, and I would tell this to General Garner, was that ORHA was a pretty top-heavy organization. I couldn’t turn around without running into a retired brigadier, or a retired major general, or an ambassador. But there
weren’t many Indians. I can’t remember the guy’s name, because they called him the ORHA Jedi. There was a SAMS educated officer who was their sole planner. They had a law firm of colonels who would love to think deep thoughts and give him all kinds of guidance. And that poor son of a gun was busy. I tried to help him. As for operational control? Well, hell, there were three retired Lieutenant Generals who were Lieutenant Generals when Lieutenant General McKiernan was a Brigadier or a Colonel. But they all knew each other. There was no friction there. General McKiernan said, “Look, this is the direction we want to go. Please work with Kevin. Kevin, work with them.” So, I mean, General McKiernan didn’t say, “Jay, I want you to do A, B, and C.” It wasn’t like that. It was discourse. I don’t think there was friction there. What friction there was resulted, in my opinion, from General Garner not having enough stuff.

**Question:** As you well know, ideally there’s supposed to be a well-organized interagency plan that gets together all the assets of government, which the military is a part of, to marshal the capabilities to solve Phase IV and beyond. I wonder if you could both comment on that.

**Answer Fishel:** We’ve come a long way. I mean, the environment is such that, at least the norm—unless somebody countermands the norm, which happens—is to talk to the other agencies. You don’t hold things within…if it’s something State or DOJ or somebody else is really going to be playing in, you need them on board, so you’re going to talk to them, and they’re going to talk to you. Obviously, there are personality factors, there are policy issues, there are times when people are going to say no. But, the SOP is different than it was when we were trying, when we were planning, and when I was being told not only no, but hell no, you can’t. That was the norm then. The norm now is, you’ve got to try to get unity of effort. You can’t do it if you don’t talk to the other guys. They can’t do it if they can’t talk to you. We’ve got problems still, but I think we’ve come a long way. Part of that is what we saw in, at least the attempt to do it 10 years ago.

**Answer Benson:** Having been the lead planner for the XVIII Airborne Corps Haiti operations, and having served on that island, I have a different perspective. By way of anecdote, during the first presentation we made to people of ambassadorial rank on the Haiti plan, we took a break. And this guy came running down the hall with his cell phone, and I heard him say, “Jesus Christ, these military people are serious. They’re going to go kill people.” Now, I’m a prisoner of my experience and I admit that. And this is my personal opinion. I do not believe in this interagency thing. I have personally never seen it. I have worked with certain other governmental agencies for whom I have a great deal of respect and admiration because they were there with us. And if that is interagency, I believe in those acronymed agencies. But this broad Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, Department
of Health and Human Services, etcetera. If we, as military officers, think that we are going to get teams of specialists from all of these agencies who will come out and be planners with us, we should all do a urinalysis. I do not think that will ever happen. I believe in the country team, and when there is an ambassador and he has a team, because I’ve worked with very effective country teams. But this thing, interagency, it possibly exists inside the Beltway. Now, again, that’s my personal opinion.

**Answer Fishel:** But he’s right, you know. That was such an important question. Let me interject with ten years of DC experience. It is true that the Washington interagency generates a plan. The thing that’s missed here, and the reason Kevin didn’t see any of them, you’ve got to remember that the Washington interagency is a very effective organization at doing what it was designed to do within law, and what it is charged to do, which is to develop policy recommendations for the president. It operates at the grand strategy and strategy level and promulgates plans. The US government is organized to operate at that level and at the tactical level down in the ambassador’s residence where they have the ambassador and a DCI and an attaché. That’s how our government is organized. DoD is the only organization within the government that has an operational echelon. So, if you are a SAMs planner, or if you’re a military organization at the operational echelon, you won’t see any of them because they don’t exist there. That is a fundamental problem with government organization, not really with military organization. One I hope you could all help us solve.
Terrorism Revisited
Felix Moos

I had prepared a very academic presentation, but it’s 1:00 in the afternoon. I have learned from my classes at the University of Kansas that I might put you to sleep if I read it or deliver a PowerPoint presentation; thus, I will refrain from doing so. Yet, I also know that you love to hear a German accent and so I shall simply ruminate for a while about: What is terrorism? Where is it occurring? What might we do about it?

I was shaken back into reality recently when, at the University of Kansas, Viet Dinh, one of the authors of the Patriot Act, who was at the time an Assistant Attorney General to John Ashcroft, described in some detail how he negotiated US Senate and House versions of a bill titled: “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism,” which eventually became known as the Patriot Act. I heard a law professor, in the presence of the current dean as well as a former dean of the Law School, earnestly discuss why José Padilla should not have been arrested at O’Hare International Airport. The legal discussion went something as follows: Since O’Hare International Airport was clearly not a battlefield, you couldn’t possibly simply arrest José Padilla and charge him, or label him, an unlawful combatant even though he was returning from Pakistan, was on a terrorist watch list, and was suspected to be involved in a conspiracy to explode a “dirty bomb” somewhere in the United States. For me, this underscores how divided America has become, and how the American academy has failed to engage in the “real world” where violence and terrorism are an everyday fact of life. I was taken aback because shortly thereafter, a Turkish professor of law took the stage and made his presentation with a strong plea that the international community should reach some greater agreement focusing on the very real terrorist challenges now existing in at least 70 out of today’s nearly 190 national states, rather than dwelling on philosophical constructs about what constitutes actionable acts of terrorism. Existing differences of opinion are based on assuming that, on the one hand, all terrorism is simply criminal activity and therefore should be handled by local police forces and the existing criminal justice system even without the additional provisions of the Patriot Act; whereas on the other hand there are those, including myself, who would argue we are at war and therefore these conventional, traditional, criminal justice statutes and the law professors teaching them, are, in fact, becoming inoperative and dysfunctional. I leave it up to you to make your own choice.

Furthermore, the point I’m trying to make is that, if I take the University of Kansas as a microcosm of our social universe today, I find it quite remarkable that
only one percent of the American population currently serves in the military—one percent. In other words, the military presents a very miniscule part of American society despite that, if you look at television—the news—one might well conclude that the US military is more omnipotent in our society than in fact it is. Obviously, since the United States is at war our military is a very important segment of our society; nevertheless, it still represents only one percent of our total population. A Harvard professor recently published the results of a study deducing that three-fourths of high-school-age Americans would not serve in any military, even though they would be called upon to do so. I must add that sometimes, when I hear all the historians going back to what happened in the 200 years plus of US history, I’m reminded, as a German-born American and immigrant to this country who has served in the military and taught at a War College, that I’m not against the reading of Thucydides, and/or Sun Tzu, or the study of accounts of the Peloponnesian Wars, or the lessons learned from military occupations of Haiti or Panama. But I would also like to remind this audience that we should pay much greater attention to what is happening right now and what may happen in the immediate future. War has always brought many unforeseen consequences that may, or may not be repeated. Certainly we must learn from the past, and our past mistakes—our past failures. Equally important, however, is that we should focus more viably, more consistently, more accurately, on future challenges, future theaters of war, and the cultural settings of any potential foes.

In a way, I agree with one of my learned military experts that at present, various people are shooting at us Americans simply because we are Americans. Even greater numbers of individuals around the world dislike us, or worse, hate us. We might well have to learn more expeditiously whom to kill and whom to spare. We will have to reconsider the nature and meaning of terrorism, and we have to do so with a different mind-set and through different eyes than we did a few short years ago. In 1972, two colleagues and I started a course titled “Violence and Terrorism in the Modern World” at the University of Kansas. When this course came up for consideration by the university’s Committee on Undergraduate Studies charged with approving additions to the curriculum, our colleagues politely informed us, in very direct language, to “drop dead.” Terrorism was not an academic subject, it was not worthy of any academic attention, and perhaps we had better desist from teaching about such an unpleasant topic with no real applicability or value to a college curriculum. We prevailed, nevertheless, and we have been teaching this course for more than 30 years. Needless to say, we haven’t changed our mind. So let me talk briefly about what I feel, as a non-native-born American, about the word terrorism and how I, currently, perceive this concept.

At times, recently, I have even suggested that we should bid farewell to the
whole concept of a “war on terrorism.” We have waged a “war on poverty;” we had, and still are engaged in, a “war on drugs;” we fought and are still fighting a “war on AIDS;” we even have a kind of war on gay marriage and evolution—at least in some parts of Kansas. But I wonder not just “What’s The Matter with Kansas?” but to where all this is leading us? What is happening in all these still continuing “wars?” When I try to connect with my students of today, I find that they are generally unaffected by what is taking place in the world. For many of them, if not for most, it is more important to attend a basketball or football game with tens of thousands of other spectators—and I do understand all the accouterments that make this form of entertainment so attractive. Who among all of these sports fans would rather meet with a very small group to discuss what is happening in far off lands? Why concern yourself with such unpleasant realities as violence, death, terrorism, or war? Thus, it is probably not unreasonable to conclude that a majority of Americans today apparently are largely disinterested in foreign events. Why should this be? It is a fact that the concept of terrorism has been used in every which way. You have all heard that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter;” that seems to be a widely held opinion among Americans, even among some intellectuals. This means then that the term may have lost its effectiveness because it is so often misused, or at best, inappropriately used.

I came to the United States in late 1948 from Germany as a student, and shortly thereafter, in mid 1950, found myself in the American military in another war—Korea. Since then, 25June 1950, the beginning of the Korean War, the United States has never really been at peace. There was always either more war or less war, but never, no war. Nobody can viably argue that this has been a very peaceful 50 or so years. An armistice was signed in Korea in July 1953, and open warfare at Dien Bin Phu began that November when North Vietnamese insurgents (at the time) challenged a regular French force. The war had simply shifted its geographical arena. Therefore, to recognize the usefulness or disusefulness of the term “terrorism,” we, the American people, must decide if we are at war or not. And this is not just another war. This is not just another war like Korea or Vietnam. This is a real, very expensive, very critical, very different war that is going to be with us for at least 25 to 30 years. Therefore, might I suggest that the military, just like universities, have done a less than adequate job of engaging the American public or informing it sufficiently about what is really taking place in the world, and then persuading it to become far more engaged.

I took note of a remark about the former Iranian Prime Minister, Mossadegh and the Shah of Iran, yet, I am also painfully aware that, if I ask my students about what happened tot this former Prime Minister or the late Shah, I get nothing but blank stares. What I have referenced is that all of us Americans must realize that we are, unfortunate as this may be, involved in a prolonged armed conflict. We are,
whether we want to be or not, more internationally challenged and engaged than ever before, and, thus, for our survival, in our self-interest, we can ill afford to do business as usual. Fiddling while Rome is burning is not really an option. This entails then, that we better think very carefully about how we are going to train people in cultural awareness and also educate them for a reality that must include terrorism, war, insurgency AND counterinsurgency.

I have thought about these issues since the 1960s. I worked, at one time in my career, for the special operations office (of the American University) helping to write country handbooks, and manuals for CRACs in the Republic of Korea (Korean-US Forces Community Relations Councils). I assisted with writing books on insurgencies from Algeria to Vietnam and Korea to the Japanese in Manchuria in 1931. Isn’t it then puzzling that we don’t have a better mechanism created to connect all Americans—or at least all Americans enrolled in our schools—more appropriately, more efficiently, with what is happening in the world. A local Kansas newspaper, the Lawrence Journal World, noted in a recent article that the United States is even falling behind in producing high school graduates. We are now between eighth and tenth in an overall international ranking. We are falling behind countries like South Korea and Singapore. In other words, more of our young men and women today do not even opt to finish high school. How then can we meaningfully confront such complex topics as a Sunni-driven insurgency in Iraq, or a nuclear-bomb technology progression in North Korea or Iran? How can we possibly hope to respond to these challenges without educating our American public on these and other critical issues? This holds true for our military, our universities, and our high schools. I happen to think that one can’t easily learn a foreign language at age 25 or 30. For many critical languages such as Chinese, Korean, Arabic, or Uighur you have to start no later than high school. Therefore, we should think very seriously about how to produce, through ROTC, or a program like ROTC, a whole new, differently educated/trained generation of intelligence analysts and military foreign area officers (FAOs) from the ground up.

Consider the term “terrorism” for a moment. Contemplate the fact that we haven’t come up with a better, far more descriptive term reflecting violent, deadly realities existing in the early 21st century. Primarily, we overuse the term” terrorism” because people have come to accept it. Terrorism contains the one dictum that makes terrorism terroristic, and that is fear. Presently, many students have not encountered that fear since they have not personally experienced any acts of terrorism. They do not fear that in Lawrence, Kansas they suddenly can’t drink water from the tap, or they can’t get their pizza in the student union. They are not really worried about their everyday existence. They are, however, concerned that the University of Kansas football team will not have a good season, or that their team loses a game in the NCAA finals. Thus, are we justified in asking what kind of...
message we are conveying to the American public? Why do we want them to know what is happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, or mainland China? Does it really matter if the Peoples’ Republic of China threatens to attack Taiwan or the mistress of Kim Chong Il in North Korea dies?

When should we properly use the concept of terrorism? When might we properly use the concept of insurgency? We have experienced insurgencies in a great many of the wars we have fought over the last two centuries; yet, we seem to rediscover every time we are in trouble and/or at war, that there is an ongoing insurgency somewhere where American soldiers are fighting and dying because of the insurgency. When are we going to wake up to the fact that not only do we need historians to tell us what happened in the past, but, perhaps even more so, we need knowledgeable individuals who will tell us what is happening right now, and perhaps, in the future? In my own discipline, anthropology, we need a more reality-based anthropology with research and fieldwork perhaps under fire, in “critical” geographical settings where the American military is, or will be, actively engaged.

Someone noted that we should learn whom to kill and whom NOT to kill. Considerable cultural sensitivity is required to distinguish the sandals and the dosha, or the turban, or any other distinctive article of clothing and their particular colors and shapes, in a variety of different cultural settings, to decide very quickly about friend or foe—within a second—otherwise, you may be dead. Anthropologists have been teaching cultural sensitivity for well over 50 years. I urge you to open up your curriculum on insurgency and on what some military term ‘terrorism,’” to the best, brightest and most culturally sensitive brains we have available. Definitely include and involve more individuals that are non-native-born Americans who know languages, have lived over long periods of time abroad, know other cultures, and look at Americans very much in the same way that most of you, a military audience, are looking at Iraqis.

I recall that when I arrived in the United States as a student at Ohio State, I was asked to write an essay on the topic of what democracy meant to me. It didn’t mean much since I had received a good part of my earlier education in Nazi Germany, and obviously democracy was not something I heard, or learned about, everyday. You have to be aware that non-material culture—the ideas, the values, and attitudes—are learned and not inherited. Anthropologists maintain that, yes, the 46 chromosomes inherited from a father and mother compose one’s genetic make-up that at least up to now, cannot be changed. Culture, however, is learned whereas our genes are inherited. Unless I am well over six feet, I most likely couldn’t ever become a University of Kansas basketball player—even if I were the right age. One is not born an American, rather, one becomes an American by being acculturated into the American culture through parental and educational socialization. One is not born as
a colonel or major at Fort Leavenworth nor with all the skills and accomplishments one needs to make it to Bell Hall. You learned all these things in grade school, in high school, in college, and in your individual military service. It follows then, that we would do well to place a different emphasis on what our young learn in our schools; and we would be well advised to change some American attitudes on public education. Money alone will not be sufficient.

I was once involved in the negotiations of a compact with the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. I was fortunate in that I was flown across the Pacific approaching 100 times, and I experienced living in spectacular island worlds like Palau and Yap in the western Carolines and Saipan in the eastern Marianas. However, if I question my students on the most recent territorial acquisition of the United States no one is able to offer a comment. The American-affiliated, unincorporated territory of the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianna Islands remains ignored and unrecognized by most current American college students. Furthermore, when questioned about possible US overseas territories for anthropological fieldwork, no one readily names Yap or American Samoa. Moreover, if one were to continue and ask, for example: “What happened on the island of Tinian back in World War II?” not a single student recalls an airstrip and a certain B-29 taking off from there on a historical flight that will probably be known a thousand years hence. “Have you ever heard of the Enola Gay?” No. “Atomic bombs?” “Well, did we drop one on Germany or one on Hiroshima in Japan?” These young men and women are the future leaders, the senators and congressmen, the college professors, the instructors and students of the Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff College. With that kind of reality, can one really ask about terrorism in Fallujah, Iraq or in Afghanistan?

We do need to look at history, past realities, and lessons learned, but just as much we need to pay more attention to the present. At the same time, we need to more effectively forecast the future. What do we know about North Korea? Why do we teach a Korean language at the National Defense Language Institute in Monterey that is not easily understood by North Koreans? What do we really know about Kim Jong Il and his father Kim Il Sung, North Koreans, their culture, and their ways of learned behavior like chulima or the spirit of North Korean self-reliance? What do we know about Iran, Iranians, and their culture, and how many Farsi speakers are we training, not to say anything about the current, and surely accelerating, challenge to the United States by the Peoples’ Republic of China? Let me remind you that in the lifetime of my students, Iraq will have a population of roughly 50 million people. Iran will have a population of 97 million, and Afghanistan will have a population of around 80 million. If we can’t deal well with insurgencies now, how in the world are we going to deal with double the numbers of individuals in those countries that are dissatisfied with their own culture and
with their own system of government. Georgie Anne Geyer observed in 1996, that the Middle East:

Is a region in economic and social crisis. It is one of the few regions of the world to have experienced a long-term decline in real per capita income. That decline is twice as great as sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. It is also the only region of the world to have experienced a long period of declining productivity. The Middle East is in the throes of a major demographic crisis. The population doubles every 26 to 29 years in the region compared to every 42 years for the world as a whole and to 162 years for advanced, developed nations. This creates an extremely young population with 43 percent to 45 percent 14 years or younger, versus 31.6 percent for the world and 22 percent for developed countries…Many young men in the Middle East have never had a job that really contributes to their nation’s productivity and have no hope of getting one.

Did anyone seriously note these and/or similar observations? Be aware that all I am trying to bring before you are existing reasons for terrorism in different geographical and cultural settings. I wish I could give you a more sexy definition for this phenomenon, but “asymmetric warfare” has not, to date, replaced “terrorism.” Nevertheless, what is incontestable in all of this is that terrorism occurs in more than 70 out of 190 countries. How are we reacting to the reality that the United States, as the only remaining superpower, is being challenged by asymmetric states like North Korea and Iran, or by organizations like al Qaeda?

Let me remind all of you about the percentage of populations under 25 years-of-age in the various Arab Muslim countries of the Middle East. The population pyramid in the whole Muslim-Arab world remains noticeably skewed. In Oman, 63 percent of the population is under 25; in Egypt, it’s 56 percent. If you look at Iran it is 59 percent; for Iraq it is 52 percent. These are considerable population segments under 25. If you know anything about what is happening in the worlds of insurgen- cies and terrorism it is that we are facing young males with their testosterone bubbling. They do all the things that our young men and women do at the University of Kansas, but there are also some important differences because these particular young men have weapons, they are not distracted by basketball championship games or dates with willing young co-eds, they play for keeps with highly lethal weapons—not just violent video games for them. This is a reality problem, and a challenge that I have heard discussed very rarely. The population forecasts for all of these Muslim, as well as of the other developing countries, indicate that their respective populations under 25 are expanding rapidly and therefore the problem
is not going to go away but will very likely increase. Military force alone is not an answer. You may recall that the first US governor general of the Philippines requested not only additional troops, but also American schoolteachers and that these school teachers created a system of education in the Philippines using English as a second language. To this very day Filipinos benefit from an American-like educational system.

All of you, of course, know German because you speak to God everyday. You might understand from this graphic representation that most of the Muslims in Germany are Turks—whereas the Muslims in France are primarily of North African origin. Furthermore, Muslims in Germany, rather than becoming acculturated in the greater secular German culture are becoming more religious not less religious. In other words, the material culture of television, computers, music, CDs, DVDs and many such other culture-technology accouterments are affecting them in a different way, so that the onslaught of globalization that they believe is led by the United States renders them more religious, not more secular as might be expected. And these are the Turks living in that ocean of German culture.

I’m not so sure if it is fair to call Professor Bernard Lewis the godfather of the neoconservatives because he argues that much of our problem with Muslims and the insurgency fought by them is caused by an Islamic culture that is one of poverty, one of unresolved internal tensions, one of having governments that are despotic and are not democratic, etcetera. Professor Lewis maintains that Islamic culture today is failing its populations and that stark reality will render *jihadists* more determined to fight us than ever.

Take the example of Iraq. Is this progress? This is not Vietnam. This is not World War II. Iraq, with a different culture and thus different value system, is not like Germany or Japan in 1945. Forget it. It’s a totally different cultural context. Without knowing a great deal about a specific culture—of the Turkmen, the Kurds, the Shia, the Sunni, and the tribal populations living in the marshes of southern Iraq—one can hardly decide what dangers lay ahead. We learn from the statistics that the most dangerous ordinance are mortar rockets in Baghdad. Why should that be? Because it is a sophisticated population that has available weapons to chose from. That is similar to your significant other giving you a Harley-Davidson, you will surely not just keep it in the garage. You’re going to ride it. The Middle East is awash in weapons and these young men with few, if any, career or employment opportunities are going to use them.

When you consider the Sunni Triangle, statistics show where the attacks are actually occurring. These are the deaths that obviously indicate what this violence is all about. The 21 to 25 year-olds are the most numerous of American fatalities
in Iraq. These are young American men, and increasingly also young women, who are the same age as students at the University of Kansas but they find themselves in Iraq or Afghanistan, and they know relatively little about what they’re getting into because we, as educators, have failed them. We must teach about these albeit grim realities and different cultures, not just at Fort Leavenworth, but also in our high schools, in our colleges, our universities across our land.

The definition of terrorism has to be re-evaluated because this is a new kind of war; one that we are not used to and have yet much to learn about. Fort Leavenworth as an institution is every bit as cumbersome as is the University of Kansas. It takes imagination, drive, and probably the ear of the Commanding General to bring about change and something new and different. However, if it is too different, it will be resisted by some, because change is ever unsettling. Nevertheless, let’s remember that too little change over a long period of time is as dysfunctional as too much change in a very short period of time. If significant segments of American society continue to deny or ignore that we are at war, and continue to do business as usual, we are bound to pay a very heavy price.

I have taken more than my time. I thank you for listening to an anthropologist—not a Kumbaya-singing FAO—one who continues to try his best to bring about change by better understanding the plethora of cultural paradigms that might well save a few American lives.
The US Military and the Global Counterinsurgency

Robert M. Cassidy

"This is a guerrilla war. Not one waged within a state, but one waged across states. Each guerrilla action is designed to elicit an overreaction that will, in turn, increase the guerrilla’s support within Islam. The aggressor has a discernible organization. It has forces organized into combat formations, dispersed individuals with varying degrees of training, field commanders, and senior leadership."

Waging Ancient War

The guerrilla is paramount. Like a swarm of irate hornets surrounding an unprotected man, the guerrillas dart in, deliver a stinging attack, and retreat quickly when a powerful hand is raised against them. Viet Cong

The above quotes are discerning and somewhat disquieting because the United States’ enemies in the ongoing global war, particularly those affiliated with or allied with “the base” (al Qaeda), are fighting a guerrilla war of global scale and scope in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and potentially in Thailand. Employing terror to attack America and its coalition partners overseas and at home, employing any means, their goal is to disrupt the coalition and to threaten its members’ democracies by employing terror and insurgent tactics to prolong the war and to wear down the West’s will to persist in the struggle. However, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is a misnomer and is not at all useful in describing and circumscribing our enemy and the kind of war we are prosecuting. The war against al Qaeda, its associate groups, and other groups that rally behind the ideological banner of radical Islamic fundamentalism is better viewed as a global counterinsurgency in which the United States and its coalition partners endeavor to isolate and eradicate an overlapping network of nasty nihilists who seek sanctuary, support, and recruits in the ungoverned periphery and seam states inhabited by the humiliated have-nots.

The terrorists and global guerrillas of the 21st century are incubating in Asia, Africa, and South America. They also form amid the populations of the West as alienated expatriates galvanize in and around mosques where they become proselytes to a radicalized version of Islam, preached by mullahs linked to al Qaeda-affiliated groups. Victory and death is an apt mantra for the suicide bomber or insurgent who believes in a blissful paradise in the afterlife. Notwithstanding the mutating and transnational nature of this 21st-century brand of guerrilla war, many of the techniques and tactics of the guerrilla remain unchanged and even similar to those employed by one of the US military’s most resolute historical guerrilla enemies—the Viet Cong.

The bad news is that counterinsurgency is more arduous and complex than waging war against adversaries who remain willing and sufficiently injudicious to
confront the West within its preferred conventional war paradigm—a model that has predominated in warfare for the past several centuries. Modern military history shows that the West and its military forces have generally dominated and monopolized the conventional way of war, usually winning when the east or the south decided to fight according to this paradigm. The philosophies of Jomini, Clausewitz, and Svechin are entrenched in Western military cultures. Consequently, the US military, as well as many of its Western partners, have previously exhibited an almost exclusive preference for a big, conventional war paradigm. One characteristic of this predilection for conventional war has been an espousal of the direct use of military force, combining maneuver and firepower to mass combat power at the decisive point to bring about the destruction or annihilation of some enemy force or army. Conversely, the US Army has traditionally and culturally eschewed and marginalized counterinsurgency as a fleeting aberration. Regrettably, this military cultural proclivity has hampered the Army and some other Western armies from seriously studying and learning the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare. Nor has counterinsurgency been well codified in the US military’s institutional memory or doctrine, even though the US military has an institutional history with examples of success in prosecuting counterinsurgency operations.

An ideologically driven global insurgency—a fourth generation-like mutating form of war characterized by a stateless, adaptive, complex, and polyccephalous host—is proving to be even more challenging than traditional insurgencies. Another challenge is that the enemy we are most likely to fight for the foreseeable future is one who has for many more centuries embraced a different philosophy of war. Potential adversaries are from Asia and the Near East, cultures that generally espouse the Eastern tradition of war. The Eastern way of war stems from the philosophies of Sun Tzu and Mao and it is distinguishable from the western way by its reliance on indirectness, perfidy, attrition, and protraction. In other words, the eastern way of war is inherently more irregular, unorthodox, and asymmetric than our traditional conception of war.

According to one distinguished British historian, the history of culture’s development in Asia clearly demonstrates that is a major determinant of the character of warfare. If there is such a thing as an Oriental way of war as something that is discernible and distinct as European warfare, it is characterized by behavior unique to it. Keegan asserts that delay, evasion, and indirectness are three distinguishable behavioral traits of an Eastern way of war. Furthermore, as a result of the United States’ coalitions two victories against Iraq during the two principally conventional wars in the Persian Gulf, it is unlikely that another second-tier power will be dumb enough to fight the US and its allies according to this Western warfare paradigm. 3

Otto von Bismarck was once reported to have stated: “Fools say they learn
from experience; I prefer to learn from the experience of others.’ The fact that a
not insignificant number of American and coalition troops have been fighting to
counter insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and
elsewhere provides a very realistic and grave impetus for the idea that learning
from the experiences of other counterinsurgencies from the past is preferable to
adapting in contact. Moreover, an important corollary to this is the imperative to
learn from and adapt to the current counterinsurgencies, and to capture them in our
institutional memory, instead of erasing these experiences because of a perception
that counterinsurgency is once again a fleeting aberration. Some general American
military lessons in counterinsurgency are listed in a slideshow addendum to this ar-
ticle. This article places the current global war against al Qaeda and others in a dif-
ferent context, as a protracted and complex global insurgency waged by networks
and groupings of transnational insurgents and terrorists motivated by extremist
religious ideology. I borrow my organization for this article from both Clausewitz
and Sun Tzu, by merging together two of their more well known maxims to arrive
at this outline: know the enemy, know yourself, and know what kind of war you are
prosecuting. The conclusion distills some current thinking about what the strategic
environment requires for a successful conclusion to insurgency on a global scale.
One distinct difference in the nature of this evolving insurgency is that it lacks the
Maoist notion of a phased revolutionary guerrilla paradigm that culminates in the
mobilization of conventional forces.4

The Enemy: Radical Fundamentalist Islamic Networks

When you’re fighting against functional nihilists like al Qaeda who see your way of life
as anathema to everything they hope and dream about in the future, you are not going
to be able to deter these people.5

Al Qaeda is also characterized by a broad-based ideology, a novel structure, a robust
capacity for regeneration and a very diverse membership that cuts across ethnic,
class, and national boundaries. It is neither a single group nor a coalition of groups:
it comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan; satellite terrorist cells worldwide;
a conglomerate of Islamist political parties; and other largely independent terrorist
groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other responsibilities.6

Al Qaeda and its affiliated networks espouse an ideology that can mobilize
a broad base of support while minimizing national, class, ethnic, or intra-Islamic
sectarian boundaries. Furthermore, America’s enemies in this global war are com-
plex, adaptive, asymmetric, innovative, dispersed, networked, resilient, and capable
of regeneration. The groups that affiliate with the al Qaeda group function as a loose
coalition, each with its own command, control, and communications structures. Ac-
cording to an expert on al Qaeda, “the coalition has one unique characteristic that
enhances its resilience and allows forces to be multiplied in pursuit of a particular
objective: whenever necessary, these groups interact or merge, cooperating ideologically, financially, and technically.” In 1998, al Qaeda reorganized into four distinct but interconnected entities to further advance the goals of radical Islam: the first was a pyramidal structure to enable better strategic and tactical direction; the second was a global network of terrorists; the third was guerrilla warfare bases inside Afghanistan; and the fourth was a loose alliance of transnational insurgent and terrorist groups. Even though al Qaeda is a political entity infused with a radical religious ideology, its operations are founded on a cultural network from which it recruits known persons; it has no formal process by which it recruits and promotes its members. The longevity and resilience of al Qaeda are not predicated on the total quantity of terrorists and insurgents that it may have trained in the past but more simply on its capacity to continue to recruit, mobilize, and inspire both actual and potential fighters, supporters, and sympathizers.7

Al Qaeda and like-minded Islamist fanatics are waging a global jihad that draws on historical roots: Muslim reactions to colonial rule; a series of military defeats at the hands of the West; a profound sense of humiliation and a desire for revenge; a host of failing governments and economies in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia; an increase in emigration accompanied by the isolation and alienation frequently felt by marginalized immigrant diasporas; a vivified sense of unity among all Muslims fueled by charismatic leaders such as Osama bin Laden, who employ images of suffering Muslims—in Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, and Iraq—to animate followers; and a common sense of purpose and lasting cohesion created by the ultimately successful jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda’s ultimate aim is to supplant the Westphalian secular state system with a medieval caliphate system based on an extreme interpretation of Islam. The foci in this struggle are generally located in the belt running along the north of Africa, through the Middle East, across Central Asia, to the Islamic frontiers of Indonesia and the Philippines—what has been called the arc of instability. With few exceptions, the states along this seam are failing or are poorly governed by corrupt, unpopular, or untenable regimes.8

Osama bin Laden “provided a suitably inspirational manifesto for a disparate mass of Muslims who saw themselves as victims and as an underclass, and his success restored their self-esteem.” He developed an extremely effective rallying cry that cut across a divided Islamic culture. This clarion call is undoubtedly understandable to every Muslim because it is strong in condemnation of the Crusader Infidels. Bin Laden’s multipurpose declaration was a necessary instrument to mobilize a very divided population of supporters. Active support for al Qaeda hails from a broad range of professional classes, teachers, engineers, students, and from a diverse array of ethnic groups. Even more troubling is the knowledge that both Sunni and Shiite Muslim groups may support al Qaeda training and initiatives as a result
of a June 1996 union between al Qaeda and Hezbollah International. The unique characteristic of al Qaeda is that its insurgent and terrorist activities come from a remarkable array of supporters whose culture, race, and professional background may vary significantly, but who nevertheless are so committed to the movement that they will sacrifice themselves for it. In most cases, a radical fundamentalist religious belief provides their common connection or bond. Many Muslim communities may see the world from the perspective of an underclass, whose most personal sense of identity is also challenged by Western values, the ubiquity and constancy of which highlight an fundamentally and unambiguously successful culture that visibly dominates the communications, commerce, technology, and global security arenas.⁹

Through his al Qaeda network, Osama bin Laden employed his interpretive and distorted view of Islam as an instrument to mobilize warriors behind the ideological banner of *jihad*. However, *jihad* is one of the basic tasks assigned for Muslims by the Prophet. This word, which generally translates to ‘striving,’ was usually cited in the context of striving in the path of God’ and was interpreted to mean an armed struggle for the advancement or defense of Muslim power. In theory, *jihad* was divided into two houses: the House of Islam in which a Muslim polity ruled and Muslim law predominated, and the House of War, the remainder of the world, still populated and more saliently, reigned over by infidels. “Between the two, there was to be a perpetual state of war until the entire world either embraced Islam or submitted to the rule of the Muslim state.” Likewise, the language for describing *jihad* has not changed very much over the centuries. A 16th-century Ottoman scholar described *jihad* as an obligation not just for every individual, but for the entire Muslim community. According to this scholar, the struggle should be continuous and should last forever. Therefore that peace with the infidel is not possible even though a Muslim commander or ruler or commander may negotiate a temporary break in fighting if it is to the benefit of a Muslim community. However, such a cessation of hostilities would not be considered legally binding.¹⁰

In a philosophical and spiritual sense, *jihad* is contained within a mythical paradigm of Islamic orthodoxy and is thus a force within Islam that can create a society devoted to the service of god. This is salient in several respects. One, many Muslims espouse the perspective that this is a time of crisis for Islam. For them, it is not only the West that poses a grave threat to the Muslim community, but it is also the apostate rulers, or satraps, who rule oppressive governments within the lands of Islam that pose a threat. Two, *jihad* is a pathway to a renaissance within Islam, but that renewal necessitates a spiritual as well as an armed struggle. Three, no one is excluded from this struggle because Islam is in peril at its very core. Lastly, this collective defense of the House of Islam animates a feeling of unity for all Muslims—an encomium for the perpetual struggle that frames the Islamic
experience in mythical terms. As it is applied to *jihad*, Islamic law emphasizes the centrality of perpetual struggle as a condition of the religion.\(^{11}\)

We avoid the construct, but it is for America’s current jihadist foes a religious war starting centuries ago and lasting until judgment day. It is this mindset that has been grafted upon the tactics of contemporary terrorism. The two now flow together, applying jihadist codes of operation to a terrorist repertoire. It is a powerful and dangerous combination. Like all religious fanatics, they see themselves as morally superior, armed with the sword of God, commanded to wage holy war.\(^{12}\)

Osama bin Laden has wrapped himself in the banner of *jihad* and submerged himself in an endless and “a historical story of Islam.” That this story has been so fervently and frequently replayed is not astonishing. What is amazing is how the West ignores its claim and also forgets the refrain of a community that has lost its way. Even though the United States has characterized al Qaeda as a terrorist network as though it were a syndicate of criminal gangs, it benefits from the support, sometimes passive, of millions of Muslims across the globe. It is not difficult to discern how Osama bin Laden views himself either. Like the Prophet Mohammed, bin Laden sees himself as “the warrior prodigal with his band of *mujahideen*, sweeping out of the desert to renew a degenerate Arabia—an Arabia run by a subverted kingdom, which in turn is run by foreign infidels.” Bin Laden, moreover, has declared in his decree against the Jews and the Crusaders that the duty of every capable Muslim is to kill civilian and military Americans and their allies, wherever possible, until the US armed forces and their coalition allies have vacated the lands of Islam and no longer pose a threat to Muslims.\(^{13}\)

According to one RAND expert on Islamic ideology, four ideological positions fundamentally prevail throughout the Muslim world today: secularists, traditionalists, modernists, and fundamentalists. Two of these are most salient in the global struggle against nihilistic terrorists—the fundamentalists and the modernists.

On the one hand, the fundamentalists reject contemporary Western culture and eschew democratic values. They seek a Draconian and authoritarian state to promulgate an extreme interpretation of Islamic morality and law. They are able and willing to adapt, innovate, and leverage modern technology. Fundamentalists are in no way averse to any type of violence against all types of targets. Unlike scriptural fundamentalists, radical fundamentalists “are much less concerned with the literal substance of Islam, with which they take considerable liberties either deliberately or because of the ignorance of orthodox Islamic doctrine.” The Taliban, al Qaeda, and a host of other radical Islamic radical movements and groups are
subsumed within this category across the globe. On the other hand, modernists want the Islamic world to become part of the modern world. They aspire to reform Islam to reconcile it with modernity. They deliberately seek a far-sweeping transformation of the contemporary orthodox interpretation and practice of Islam. Furthermore, their core values—a community based on social responsibility, equality, and freedom, and individual conscience—are not incongruous to modern democratic principles.14

Ideology notwithstanding, the mujahideen veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War initially provided the nucleus of al Qaeda’s fighting force. Their incentives to continue to fight and to prosecute jihad elsewhere were manifold: an innate desire to continue in meaningful activity, survival of their organization, and their inflated self-image as a consequence of defeating a superpower. Moreover, their like-minded Taliban brethren’s subsequent victories against other factions in Afghanistan guaranteed sanctuary for al Qaeda’s holy warriors and safe haven for its training camps, which graduated thousands more jihad volunteers. What Osama bin Laden and his associates contributed to this strong but unfocused pool of veterans was a sense of mission, vision, and strategy that conflated the 20th-century theory of a unified Islamic political power with a renaissance of the Islamic caliphate paradigm. It reframed myriad local conflicts into one singular struggle between a genuine form of Islam and a host of corrupt rulers who would fall without the backing of the West and the United States, in particular. By expunging the conceptual borders between individual states and their wars, al Qaeda then was able to draw its recruits and operatives from a bigger pool of humanity. Secured in the haven of Afghanistan, sufficiently funded, supported by Pakistan, and animated by a powerful ideology, al Qaeda became the rallying banner of Islam’s answer to past frustrations, humiliations, trepidations, and defeats.15

In their view, they had already driven the Russians out of Afghanistan, in a defeat so overwhelming that it led directly to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Having overcome the superpower that they had always regarded as more formidable, they felt ready to take on the other; in this they were encouraged by the opinion, often expressed by Osama bin Laden, among others, that America was a paper tiger. Their hatred is neither constrained by fear nor diluted by respect.16

The mujahideen from the Afghan war were a proven force as a result of their training and war experiences fighting the Soviets. Although this group was ethnically heterogeneous, its members were linked by al Qaeda’s base network and by their collective trust in bin Laden’s leadership. “They were a brotherhood, which had come together in the crucible of the same war and had passed to and from
Afghanistan through the same al Qaeda system to return as legitimate citizens in their 50 different countries of origin.” Bin Laden has and does use them as an instrument of his attacks on the West. The largest part of the force, numbering in the tens of thousands, was organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces in the crucible of the Soviet-Afghan war. A large number in this pool hailed from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. They had fought in Bosnia; US forces had encountered some of them in Somalia. Another group, which is approximately 10,000 strong, lives in Western states and have received combat training of some shape or form. A third group has approximately several thousand members and is capable of commanding the aforementioned forces. A couple of hundred individuals, which include both heads of known terrorist organizations and officials operating with or without the authority of their state governments, make up the al Qaeda network’s top command structure. Osama bin Laden most likely viewed the events of 2001 as a renewal of the struggle for the religious domination of the globe, one that started back in the seventh century. It created another moment of opportunity for him and his underlings. To them, “America exemplifies the civilization and embodies the leadership of the House of War, and, like Rome and Byzantium, it has become degenerate and demoralized, ready to be overthrown.”17

In addition to a common ideology and a common bond derived from the crucible of the Soviet war, many or most members of the al Qaeda group come from the lands of the East, whose warriors for centuries have embraced a way of warfare distinct and different from the Western way of war. The preferred style of combat in the Eastern way of warfare for a span of almost 3,000 years was the horse warrior: “That was, indeed, one in which evasion, delay, and indirectness were paramount.” The horse warriors elected to fight from a distance and to employ missiles instead of edged weapons; when confronted, they would withdraw with determination and count upon wearing down an enemy by prolongation and attrition rather than by defeating him in one single trial of arms. According to one popular military writer, the enemies we will most likely fight in the future will not be soldiers with the discipline, modernity, and orthodoxy that term evokes in the West, but warriors, defined as “erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order.” These barbaric warriors, unlike Western warrior soldiers, do not play by rules, do not respect conventions, and do not comply with unpleasant orders.

Warriors have always been around, but with the rise of professional soldiers their importance was eclipsed. Now, thanks to the confluence of fragmented former empires, stateless global insurgents, and the diminution of a warrior ethos in parts of the post-modern West, the warrior thug has returned to the fore, with more financing, arms, and brutality than since the 14th century. A big danger that we face is savage warriors who do not recognize the civilized constraints by which we
operate and who will do absolutely anything to achieve their ends. Germinating in the Hobbesian deprivation of overpopulated and ravaged wastelands, or frustrated over their cultural defeat in Muslim lands, these warriors not only commit atrocities but they seem to derive immense pleasure in doing so. The decapitation fad is but one testimony to the barbaric proclivities of the stateless ‘warriors’ of the 21st century.\textsuperscript{18}

Many Muslims also may harbor deep feelings of resentment and humiliation as a consequence of the relatively bloodless seizure of Baghdad and the perceived unchecked projection of American power and influence into the region. Al Qaeda’s adept propagandists effectively translated the US coalitions’ seizure of Baghdad and the subsequent occupation of Iraq as the latest in a series of ignominious historical Western conquests of Muslims for which there must be retaliation. Although the voice of radical Islamic terrorism speaks of targeting the entire West as its enemy, its offensive is now directed principally against the United States as the very essence of Western supremacy and civilization.

What’s more alarming, however, is that al Qaeda’s resiliency, along with its potential longevity, does not stem from the agglomeration of jihadists that it may have trained or not trained in the past, but more from its continued capacity to recruit, to mobilize, and to inspire both current and future fighters and supporters. In a different form and with a different modus operandi, the al Qaeda group and its associates are 21st-century barbarians: instead of directly invading our heartland across our frontiers, they hide in the hinterland of the have-not world; they recruit, train, and proliferate from the sanctuary; and they conspire to plan indirect and insidious attacks against population centers and against symbols of American power abroad. As a final footnote, one expert on asymmetric warfare noted, “A fourth generation may emerge from emerge from non-Western cultural traditions, such as Islamic or Asiatic traditions.” Moreover, the fact that some non-Western adversaries in the Islamic world are not inherently strong in technology will compel them to develop and employ fourth-generation warfare (asymmetry) through ideas rather than technology.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Ourselves: The Western Way of Warfare}

The Mamelukes once represented a military and culture whose way of warfare predominated. However, their approach to warfare became so embedded and ossified in their military culture that the Mamelukes became incapable of adapting to changes in warfare. The Mamelukes were slave soldiers and were essentially the professional core of the armies in many Muslim states. Moreover, they frequently became the rulers of such states, with Mameluke leaders remaining in power for generations. However, instead of using their power to legally liberate themselves, the Mamelukes ardently perpetuated this institutional culture and resisted all pressure
to change. The rationale for the Mameluke resistance to change is understandable but not excusable because they ultimately contributed to their own demise. Since Mameluke military preeminence stemmed from a monopoly of the elaborate skills of horsemanship and archery, they were afraid to abandon these skills for the common practices of musketry or fighting on foot since this would remove them from their position of military primacy. The rigidity of the Mameluke military culture, similar to the culture of the Zulus, is what undid them in the end. “Though their political power derived from their military exclusivity, they preferred to persist in their outmoded warrior style rather then adapt to new ways in warfare.” Likewise the Zulus had developed a very effective military culture that was so rigid, however, that it contributed to their demise.20

Shaka was a perfect Clausewitzian. He designed a military system to preserve and protect a way of life, which it did with dramatic efficiency. Zulu culture, by making warrior values paramount, by linking those values to the preservation of a cattle-herding-economy, and by locking up the energies and imagination of the most dynamic members of the community in sterile military bondage until well past maturity, denied itself the chance to evolve and adapt to the world around it. In short, the rise and fall of the Zulu nation offers an awful warning of the shortcomings of the Clausewitzian analysis.21

The early 21st-century security environment again engenders a contradiction between military cultures and the essence of modern war that presents traditional Western military institutions with a dilemma. Enemies of the West solve the dilemma by eliminating the culture of order. The members of al Qaeda and the terrorist groups associated with it do not wear uniforms, don formal ranks, conduct drill, or render salutes. It is quite possible that the global insurgents who wage war against Western culture in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere have or are developing a military culture that is congruous with the unruly character of modern war. The broader non-Western culture from which many of these terrorists hail is also a variable that may nurture this phenomenon.

To be certain, today the United States and its allies face a panoply of enemies whose various aims are best achieved by avoiding or mitigating US military superiority, attacking American cities, and disrupting its commerce. This type of war is not the preferred paradigm for a military culture that has exhibited an embedded preference for conventional war. Preferred wars are ones that are consistent with conventional doctrinal templates centered on firepower and maneuver. Fourth Generation-like wars are also least preferred their characteristics tend to dampen the West’s obvious advantages in technology and resources. The current and
emerging enemies of the United States will wage wars “that compel us to rethink our assumptions, to reconfigure our forces, and to reinvigorate our alliances.”

Some assert that a distinctively Western way of warfare can be traced through the history of American and Western military history all the way back to the Greeks and Romans. The Greeks had instituted a new kind of warfare for themselves that emphasized the purpose of battle as a decisive action, “fought within the dramatic unities of time, place, and action and dedicated to securing victory, even at the risk of suffering bloody defeat, in a single test of skill and courage.” The legions of Rome adopted and improved upon the Greeks’ methods. The Roman legions were without peer on the conventional battlefield but the German barbarians attacked them in wooded and hilly terrain. Arminius’ Germanic guerrillas ambushed and harassed Varus’ three legions. Poor leadership, inclement weather, inflexible tactics, unfavorable terrain, and a cunning and imaginative opponent mitigated the Roman advantages in discipline, technology, and training. The legions maintained their unit cohesion as best as they could but they ultimately yielded to attrition and exhaustion. The survivors were taken prisoner and crucified, buried alive, or offered as living sacrifices to the pagan gods. Three legions perished in the Teutoburg forest and Arminius had the heads of key Roman leaders spiked to the trees as an admonition to Rome. The German barbarians also ripped apart the half-burned body of Varus, decapitated it, and had it delivered to the Caesar Augustus who subsequently decided that the barbarian territories beyond the Danube in northern Germany were too tough for his legions to colonize.

During the years leading up to World War II, America’s military-strategic culture embraced a concept of war derived from the Civil War. America’s strategic aim of completely imposing its political aims upon the vanquished, therefore, would be achieved by applying overwhelming and decisive combat power to destroy the enemy’s armed forces and by destroying the enemy’s economic resources and will to fight. World War II shaped US military culture in a huge way because it validated and further embedded the cultural predilections for big conventional wars of decision. Officers in the American Army had been able to prepare themselves for the transition from a small peacetime Army in 1940 to the World War II Army in part because the US Army had embraced the traditions of the only big, European-style war in its history—the American Civil War. One military policy expert noted that, “the Civil War had molded the American army’s conceptions of the nature of full-scale war in ways that would profoundly affect its conduct of the Second World War.” The remembered memory of the Civil War pointed to massive force as the principal military principle.

Competition between powerful European and Eurasian states in the military sphere before and after World War II, moreover, produced a homogeneity of
military thinking and doctrine that emphasized conventional maneuver and firepower aimed at the annihilation of other symmetrically inclined armies with like aims. One can presuppose that this homogenization emerged in different regions according to two cultural patterns—the blitzkrieg pattern and the guerrilla warfare pattern. On the one hand, the metric for success in the blitzkrieg pattern was the capacity to raise and employ large armored and mechanized formations designed to destroy an opponent’s armed forces. On the other hand, the metric for success in the guerrilla warfare pattern was the capacity to wage a protracted war against a technologically superior opponent. The blitzkrieg preference emphasizes a direct strategic approach whereas the guerrilla warfare preference emphasizes an indirect strategic approach. Throughout the previous century, Western militaries, especially the American military, were surprisingly consistent in how they waged war. They have developed an unusual ability to translate national treasure, an industrial base capacity, and technological innovation into an orthodox battlefield overmatch. However, the composition and character of non-Western military entities are changing as they develop concepts for defeating the firepower-centric methods engendered by the American way of war. The imperative to remain effective and to survive against overwhelming firepower is compelling enemies to disperse and hide while adapting or eliminating the cumbersome logistics and transportation tails that still afflict the Western way of war.25

The biggest mistake the US military leadership committed in Vietnam was attempting to fight a guerrilla enemy the same way it had fought the German army in World War II. US forces staged large-unit operational sweeps with sexy names like JUNCTION CITY and one with the historically ironic moniker of “Operation FRANCIS MARION.” US airplanes also dropped more than 7 million tons of bombs, exceeding 300 times the explosive power of the atomic bombs it dropped on Japan in World War II. Neither the big-unit sweeps nor the ‘bomb-them-into-the-Stone-Age’ method had much effect on a guerrilla enemy who hid in the jungles and then emerged when he chose to ambush American soldiers. Moreover, the lack of knowledge about how best to win the support of the population was at the center the American military’s doctrinal challenges in Vietnam. The US Army’s doctrine for operations against insurgent forces, then prescribed by its capstone manual FM 100-5 *Operations*, emphasized the destruction of the guerrilla units. “Despite the intimation that elimination of the guerrillas might not solve the country’s problems, *Operations*, with its aggressively offensive nature, pointed the advisers squarely at the PLAF guerrillas as their objectives and not the South Vietnamese people.” Moreover, much of the Pentagon’s interpretation of transformation also remains focused on decisive and orthodox battles instead of small wars and insurgencies. Consequently, according to two military experts, the US armed forces have neither dedicated adequate resources to thinking about
protracted counterinsurgencies nor did they establish the doctrine, training, and equipment to wage small wars effectively.26

This Kind of War—A Potential Revolution in Guerrilla Warfare

*The Pentagon’s focus on rapid, decisive operations is largely irrelevant in this type of war.*27

*We have made every mistake known ad even re-invented some new ones. Perhaps, the greatest oversights are the political/military nature of the struggle; the need for unity of command of the US political-military efforts, and the need for security in order to execute the economic and political programs.*28

A strategic paradox exists when an ostensibly militarily superior power confronts a seemingly inferior opponent because the superior power has unlimited means but generally has limited aims; the obverse is true for the outmatched opponent. Such a paradox inheres in the war against al Qaeda because the United States has characterized this war as a war on terrorism. However, this somewhat limited definition of the enemy has formed the basis of a US strategy that employs limited means to achieve its ends and has not properly identified the war’s wider scope as an insurgency being waged by non-state armed groups. Terrorism is neither an enemy nor an objective, but a tactic or method. Declaring war against a method does not seem rational, yet, an accurate conception about what type of war one is prosecuting is one of Clausewitz’s foremost maxims. A more rational conception of the conflict is as a global insurgency being waged against the international system of states, particularly those states with large Muslim populations. The enemy commonly employs classic insurgency methods within failing or failed Islamic states.

Osama bin Laden himself has underscored the asymmetric merits of insurgent warfare and has consistently lauded the victory that he maintains was realized by employing this approach against American forces in Somalia. Bin Laden also proclaimed in his 1996 declaration of war, “That, due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy armed forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e., using fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy.” Thus, the other half of this strategic paradox has al Qaeda and its associates using limited but networked and technology-enabled means, to wage total war against the secular regimes in the Middle East, against Israel, and against the West. It operates like this with the nominally passive, but sometimes active, support of the world’s Muslim population. Its aim is total—to undo the Western state system and to establish a caliphate, imposing an interpretive version of universal Islamic law under its rule. Al Qaeda is simply one of the principal fighting arms of a radical Islamic fundamentalist insurgency that is metastasizing within greater Islam.29

Chronic decade-long wars simmer or persist in many parts of the world: Burma,
Colombia, India, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Basque region of Spain, and Thailand. The threats we face today are likely to engage us for many years. America’s terrorist enemies view war as a perpetual condition and they are resolved to attack the United States and the West, to destroy domestic tranquility, disrupt economies, and make our lifestyle untenable. The West now confronts a more complex panoply of recalcitrant threats: large-scale terrorist attacks that may occur anywhere in the world, including the US homeland; the continuing development in some countries of weapons of mass destruction and the possibility that these may come into the hands of political or criminal gangs; recurring warfare that in some countries has become a profitable economic enterprise; local and regional ethnic tribal conflicts that may suddenly convulse into humanitarian disasters and genocide or that may preserve chaotic ungoverned areas where warlords and terrorists find refuge; increasingly networked organized crime engaged in drug trafficking, the smuggling of human beings, and possibly trafficking in the ingredients of weapons of mass destruction; the exploitation of the Internet by criminals or terrorists; and the potential for complex remote sabotage. Especially salient for those who make national security strategy, these evolving perils are not consistent with how the West has organized—military assets, troops, planning scenarios—to manage national security.30

Guerrilla war is a primordial and timeless form of warfare, but now it is metamorphosing into a global and transnational phenomenon. However, much of our strategic culture stems from a social and political construct that gradually developed during the Middle Ages and that was ultimately realized and codified during the age of the Enlightenment. The secular state is a modern concept that replaced monarchies and coexisted with the independent city-states in Europe as recently as the early 20th century. What al Qaeda rejects and is attacking is this Western construct of a secular nation-state. Fanaticism and barbarism are not novel but what is new is the coupling of barbaric and asymmetric methods with a global and radical Islamic fundamentalist ideology that supplies a potentially endless line of recruits and allies for this world war. These nihilistic Luddites have leveraged the values of liberal Western polities—freedoms, openness, and technology—to bring the war to the core of the empire.31

According to one British expert on counterinsurgency, “Osama bin Laden and his international network have expanded the definition of insurgency to include a global dimension.” Al Qaeda’s methods are broadly germane and appealing to other similarly dispersed terrorist groups. Osama bin Laden’s adaptive model of organization is a very significant product of global change that enables global insurgency as an option where the weak can effectively challenge the strong. The al Qaeda movement’s sources of support and energy, the nature of its organization, the environment in which it operates, are all global and transnational. The international
scope of their organization, objectives, intent, recruiting base, and their organization differentiates global guerrillas from popular guerrillas operating within one region or state. The global insurgent “faces the most formidable opposition forces of all and, in its effort to survive, becomes a dangerous and highly organized manifestation of insurgency, with a demonstrated capacity to attack the heart of powerful countries and to survive intensive counter-measures.” As additional examples of the enemy network’s propensity for insurgency on a regional and global scale, a 9 April 2003 declaration posted on al Qaeda’s phantom web site (al Neda), under the caption, “Guerrilla Warfare is the Most Powerful Weapon Muslims Have and it is the Best Method to Continue the Conflict with the Crusader Enemy,” states “the successful attempts of dealing defeat to invaders using guerrilla warfare were many, and we will not expound on them. However, these attempts have proven that the most effective method for the materially weak against the materially strong is guerrilla warfare.” Moreover, a former Egyptian army special forces officer named Saif al-Adel, one of al Qaeda’s most senior operational commanders, has promoted “the use of guerrilla warfare tactics against the American and British forces in Iraq” and provided explicit and copious practical guidance on how to carry them out.32

Current US Army doctrine defines insurgency as “an armed political movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government, or separation from it, through use of subversion and armed conflict.” It is a protracted political-military conflict aimed at undermining government legitimacy and increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency. The goal of an insurgency is to mobilize material and human resources to establish an alternative counter-state. Effective mobilization enables active and passive support for the insurgency’s programs, operations, and goals. Loyalty to the insurgent movement is usually garnered by acts but may also be won by through abstract tenets. On the one hand, pledges to eliminate poverty or end hunger may attract to a portion of the people. On the other hand, the desire to eliminate a foreign occupation or to establish a government based on religious or political ideology may attract other parts of the population.

Army doctrine states that the most potent ideologies harness “latent, emotive concerns of the populace, such as the desire for justice, the creation of an idealized religious state, or liberation from foreign occupation.” Moreover, ideology shapes and animates the insurgents’ perception of the environment by providing the lens, to include analytical categories and lexicon by which conditions are assessed. The effect is that the ideology influences the guerrilla movement’s operational and organizational methods. Another current study on insurgency by the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute underscores the importance of ideology and leaders who can employ that ideology to “unify diverse groups and organizations.
and impose their will under situations of high stress.” Psychologically, successful guerrilla leaders are so devoted to their movement that they will persevere although their odds of success are very unfavorable. They become true-faith apostles motivated by vision. Likewise, effective insurgent leaders believe so fervently in their movement that they become absolutely ruthless and capable of doing almost anything to weaken the counterinsurgent forces and to protect their cause.33

Unfortunately, globalization and information-age technology have enabled a near-revolutionary transformation and conflation of insurgency and terrorism. According to the same Army War College study cited above, “Insurgency is likely to continue to mutate or evolve.” For example, insurgencies may become increasingly networked, with no centralized command and no common strategy, only a unifying objective. This would make them less effective in terms of seizing power or attaining other political goals but more resilient in the face of regime counterinsurgency operations. Information technology and networking has enabled the linkage of a host of various insurgent movements and like-minded organizations, including transnational criminal organizations that operate regionally and globally. The ideological underpinnings of insurgent activities have also metamorphosed. A unifying ideology based on transnational and radical Islam predominates and there are very few insurgencies still based on the Marxist ideology that used to hold primacy in the context of guerrilla warfare. Radical fundamentalist Islam poses a greater and potentially more complex menace than Marxism posed. For example, clerics play a critical role in political and ideological mobilization but they are not considered acceptable targets. What’s more, since radical Islam emphasizes the transcendental and the spiritual, it animates humans of massive destruction—suicide bombers who were not common phenomena in the previous context of secular Marxist insurgencies.34

The resurgence of Islamic ideology is a critical factor in this insurgency, making the war as much about Western values as about military prowess. Pursuing a purely military campaign could lead to the asphyxiation or contraction of those values by the gradual decay of domestic civil liberties. This would also help fulfill one of al Qaeda’s war aims to expand the schism between the West and the Islamic world. Although the counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq certainly have military dimensions, the principal focus should be ideological, political, and economic. America and its allies will not be successful by using military force alone; they will be successful if they can strengthen local reformers and allies; and if they steer clear of imposing their own political values. On a global level, victory in the struggle against radical fundamentalist Islam and al Qaeda cannot be achieved so long as popular resentment at the United States in the Islamic world is influenced by perceptions that America is too close to Israel to move forward on the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Western military victory against the Taliban in Afghanistan and
coalition attacks against a host of Islamic fighters in Iraq have further intensified radical Islamic resentment. Although some have viewed Iraq as an imprudent detour from the critical targets in this global counterinsurgency, it has in fact sucked in al Qaeda supporters where few existed under Saddam’s secular regime. Furthermore, the madrassas are still inculcating and proliferating far more jihad fighters daily than the West could ever catch or kill. Al Qaeda, though weakened, still operates as a cross-channeled and networked virtual entity in a loose coalition with supporters in 90 different states.35

Insurgency is a method adopted by political organizations that cannot otherwise achieve their aims by normal means. “It is a strategy of desperation used by those too weak to do otherwise.” Insurgents avoid the sphere of conventional pitched battle where they are relatively weaker and focus in those areas where they can take the edge off asymmetrically, especially in the political and the psychological domains. The global insurgent is characterized by the international dispersal of his organization, and he thrives in a state of statelessness that is attained by the multiethnic nature of the movement and by this very geographic dispersal. This war against radical Islam is a guerrilla war: one waged not within a state but one waged across states. Each guerrilla action is intended to provoke an overreaction that will increase the guerrilla’s popular support within Islamic communities. The enemy aggressor, moreover, has a discernible organization: forces organized for direct combat or terror operations, a pool of dispersed individuals with varying degrees of training, commanders in the field, and senior leadership.36

One well-argued essay has postulated that al Qaeda represents a new wave in warfare because it has adopted a complex organizational structure and because it exploits a powerful mix of high- and low-technology means of warfare. Capable of organizing insurgency on a global scale, its operators are transnational ‘super-empowered’ individuals who are no longer constrained by traditional state borders. Another author and an apostle of fourth generation warfare claimed that “the genesis of an idea-based fourth generation may be visible in terrorism.” Terrorists like those in al Qaeda survive off the land and take haven in their enemies’ backyards. Moreover, their dispersed area of operation includes the totality of the enemy’s civil society. Many of the characteristics of this global insurgency and terror network also indicate a possible shift toward a next generation of warfare. One way to identify or discern that war may be witnessing the emergence of a fourth generation is the fact that it seems difficult to arrive at an appropriate moniker for the enemy—names have ranged from non-compliant forces (NCF) and anti-coalition militia (ACM) to Opposition Militia Forces (OMF), or, simply to just terrorists, extremists, or thugs. However, many of the activities of these non-state armed groups without territorial-based armies do approximate guerrilla warfare. One military expert has commented that the current methods and tactics employed by our enemies
should not be surprising in view of the last 50 years of Western victories over Islamic armies in conventional wars. Since the Israeli war of independence, when fighting conventional Western-style war, Islamic armies have lost seven wars and won none. However, when fighting unconventional wars against Israel, the United States, and the Soviet Union, Islamic forces have won five and lost none, with the outcome of the war in Iraq as yet undetermined.37

Al Qaeda and its allies have shown some resilience in the face of American-led efforts to curb their aims. The clandestine nature of these organizations has enabled them to maintain organizations in the darkness whereas their hit-and-run tactics continue to protract the wars they wage in an attempt to erode the legitimacy of the target governments. The longer bin Laden and al Qaeda survive, the larger its following will become as more Muslims across the globe see this jihad not as an abstract theological form of hope but as an effective and legitimate way to take action on their anger. The Middle East offers fertile soil in which to generate a revolution, and al Qaeda has harnessed the potential for recruitment in the region more than any other organization. In promulgating its own political agenda, al Qaeda has been able to draw from a reserve of despair and antipathy within the Middle East that has improved its standing within the Islamic community in general. Confronted with repressive regimes, daunting poverty levels, poor educational opportunities, and economic stagnation, Muslims throughout the Middle East have seethed with rage as they found their once-magnificent culture marginalized and enfeebled by America and the West. It is in this environment of despondence and anger that Osama bin Laden’s call for a renaissance of traditional Muslim values and caliphate rule has found broad appeal. By effectively employing psychological warfare, or the propaganda war for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people, bin Laden has made his political aims reverberate throughout the Muslim world. What’s more, al Qaeda has made media and publicity one of its four operational committees, on an equal footing with its military, finance, and fatwa and Islamic study committees. They have carried out a successful information warfare strategy that draws on the heroic framework of Islam to deny combatant commanders access to the Middle Eastern population for their own information warfare inroads. Because al Qaeda’s information warfare campaign “emphasizes the idealized return to fundamental religious values and the rejection of both technological and political modernity,” the United States and coalition’s messages of nation building and democratization may not carry weight with that audience.38

Radical Islamic ideology is also apparent among the Chechen separatist fighters who have adopted the slogans and garbs of Islamic extremist fighters in other parts of the world. In fact, a segment of the Chechen separatists have blended tribal and nationalist aims with the tactics and ideology of groups such as al Qaeda. A merging of the Chechen ethno-national code of adat and Wahhabism has emerged
within the ranks of the Chechen insurgents. Osama bin Laden himself has pro-
claimed that the Chechen insurgency is part of his global religious war, and al
Qaeda’s interest in the region is undisputed. As early as 1997, bin Laden declared
that Chechnya was an incubator for religious war and that it was among the regions
where infidels are perpetrating injustice against Muslims. It is evident that at least
the demonstration effect of Islamic extremism has had an influence on the insurg-
gents’ methods in the Chechen war since the Chechens now perpetrate large-scale
attacks and, increasingly, use suicide bombings more to spread fear and shock
than to achieve a military objective. The Chechen guerrillas have also borrowed
al Qaeda’s method of acquiring funds channeled through organizations posing as
charities. What’s more, international funds have helped pay and arm fighters with
significant amounts of monies coming from outside Chechnya, from places such
as the Gulf, Europe, and even North America.39

Conclusion

Shock and awe campaigns, it seems, are only the price of admission to the war on
terror; the counterinsurgencies that follow are the main show. Indeed, Iraq is not a
strategic anomaly in the present geopolitical order. From southern Afghanistan to the
Horn of Africa and east to the Philippine archipelago, American troops are engaged
in similarly open-ended, low-level counterinsurgency operations against Islamist guer-
rillas. In each of these places, there is no clash of armies on barren planes; no clearly
definable enemy force that can be decisively or swiftly annihilated; and few statues of
dictators left to tear down.40

One conception is that the current war against al Qaeda and sponsors of ter-
rorism is a global insurgency requiring a counterinsurgency strategy on a global
scale. Thus, to achieve some sort of permanent peace in the war against radical
fundamentalist Islam, a comprehensive long-term counterinsurgency strategy that
integrates national and international resources and agencies on a global scale is
necessary. Many would agree that a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
a sine qua non for achieving a peaceful resolution to what will be a prolonged war.
Others advocate for regime change, or at least regime modification in Syria, Iran,
and Saudi Arabia as other preconditions for undermining radical fundamentalist
Islam and the ideological rationale behind the jihad against the West. Yet, these
radical fundamentalists are products of the non-Western world and as such they
are a measure of how well the sole superpower and its like-minded Western friends
are bringing security and hope to those lawless areas missing out on the benefits of
modernity. There are perfectly rational reasons why a group like al Qaeda sought
sanctuary in places such as Afghanistan and Sudan—they were two of the least
globalized and poorly governed countries on the planet. Part of the solution there-
fore also includes efforts to increase the number of states in the zone of ‘peace and
stability’ while concomitantly decreasing the number of states in the zone of ‘war

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and turmoil.’ This short conclusion distills some ideas about how to approach such a long-term and coherent strategy for peace.41

One of the foremost experts on al Qaeda, Rohan Gunaratna, has asserted that every Muslim country from Tunisia to Indonesia must counter the Islamist threat. He advocates that the international community develop punitive and prophylactic measures aimed at targeting the supply and demand side of al Qaeda. With as much ardor, the West must impose sanctions and penalties on those governments or organizations that provide sanctuary to al Qaeda and its allies. More self-evidently, a ruthless global, regional, and national manhunt for al Qaeda’s leaders, members, and supporters must continue until they are all captured or killed. Gunaratna also promotes “irresistible incentives for al Qaeda defectors; and attractive rewards for information leading to the arrests of al Qaeda operatives or disruption of al Qaeda plans and preparations.”

The military dimension is only one part, and not the principal one, of a broader strategy of implementing political and socio-economic and political reforms. To ruin al Qaeda’s appeal in Muslim eyes the West must discredit al Qaeda’s ideology because as long as it is perceived as legitimate and influential, its allies and membership will grow. However, the widespread support it enjoys today is underlined by the strong perception among Muslims that the West has consistently done them wrong. The invasion of Iraq, according to Gunaratna, “acutely exacerbated” this belief because Iraq is a country whose Islamic sites and history are second only to Saudi Arabia in importance as symbols to Muslims. Since wider support from Muslim societies is essential to win the fight against al Qaeda and its brand of Islamist terrorism, there must be a coherent plan by the international community to remedy the perceived and actual complaints of the moderate Muslims. In the end, al Qaeda’s existence will be determined by the ability and the willingness of the “anti-terrorist coalition to destroy its leadership, to counter its ideology, to marginalize its support, and to disrupt its recruitment.”42

As stated in another work published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), to be sustainable, any global counterinsurgency strategy must harness all elements of national and international power rather than imposing the burden on the military instrument almost exclusively. This SSI monograph postulates that a complete understanding of the current strategic environment must differentiate between wars waged by states and wars waged by non-state armed groups that lack legitimate status. Even though Westerners may perceive terrorism as barbaric and reprehensible, many populations in the Third World may perceive it as the only way to fight against internal or external occupation or oppression. The author of this SSI piece argues that, instead of declaring war on terrorism, “We must, instead, declare war on specific aggressors, those lacking legitimate status within the international
system of states and using destructive force across state boundaries against the United States.” Al Qaeda is a base or network for a host of organizations that is a loose coalition of groups and individuals lacking state sovereignty. There are about 30 or so organizations with a coincidence of interests that tend to reside and seek sanctuary in failing states. Since there are at least 30 failing states, however, “Unilateral invasion, occupation, and nation-building constitute an exhaustive strategy that cannot be sustained.” Any strategy that depends on remaking Islamic states situated within the arc of instability into modern (Western) democracies is genuinely a strategy of exhaustion and may equate to the “height of hubris.”

Another more recent SSI analysis of insurgency and counterinsurgency challenges whether the question of when and how to engage in counterinsurgency support should be an all-or-nothing issue in US strategy. This study suggests that there should perhaps be a corollary to the Powell Doctrine that prescribes that America only embark on counterinsurgencies if the interests are vital and it is willing to see the effort through to the end, even if a significant commitment of personnel and resources will be required for more than 10 years. Moreover, Steve Metz and Ray Millen assert that the United States must determine whether its strategy for counterinsurgency operations is one of management or victory. “Traditional thinking is that victory, defined as the eradication of the insurgency as a political and military force and the amelioration of the factors that allowed it to emerge in the first place, is the appropriate goal.” However, a management or containment approach to counterinsurgency may have merit, especially in view of the United States’ ongoing commitments to counterinsurgency worldwide and the concomitant resources and time required to achieve total victory in counterinsurgency. A containment strategy would possibly differentiate between different types of insurgencies and commit the American military only to countering those insurgencies related to the support or sanctuary of international terrorism. It may be plausible to “adopt a strategy of intervention and stabilization when necessary without an attempt to transform the societies or and without committing to a protracted counterinsurgency.”

Ultimately the Metz and Millen study recommends adopting an interagency effects-based approach to counterinsurgency planning that concentrates on the following essential aims: rupture the insurgent movement through political, psychological, and military means, to include direct strikes, fracturing and using groups against each another, and offering amnesties; destroy the legitimacy of the insurgent movement in the view of the local population and any international community; demoralize the insurgent movement by establishing and maintaining the perception that long-term trends are undesirable; sever the insurgents’ external and internal support by isolating or destroying its logistical and political ties; and cut off the funds of the insurgent movement and cause it to squander those funds that
In an award-winning essay, author Grant Highland has reiterated that, in an effort to decapitate the insurgency’s leadership while improving security at home, the United States must continue to ruthlessly pursue al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Although this is very self-evident, keeping al Qaeda on the run does give the United States time to confront the genuine strategic challenge in this war: to establish a long-term peace in the Middle East, the United States will have to ultimately face and counter the broader insurgency occurring within Islam itself. A bolder project would be to eliminate the global insurgents’ external preoccupation with the West to allow their discontent to revert back to internal dissatisfaction. The real strategic challenge is not al Qaeda but the conditions that allowed al Qaeda to germinate in the first case. Those conditions in the arc of instability ostensibly provide al Qaeda with its recruits and its legitimacy.

According to Highland, economic support, diplomacy, and cooperation must be extended to those states in the Middle East that are moving toward reform. The essence of the challenge is the disaffected Muslim populations all over the world. Assisting states such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Yemen, Morocco, Malaysia, and Indonesia means encouraging those populations who “found their own their own brand of renewal within the construct of Islam without abrogating modernity” to determine their own political future. Diligent support for these populations, employing all elements of national power, could create the genuine possibility of arresting the Islamic insurgency by demonstrated effect of success in these states. This approach, in fact, would quite possibly defuse the radical hate-filled ideology of al Qaeda and diminish its appeal.

Another expert in international security has proposed that the United States should adopt a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy that focuses on reducing Islamic hostility toward it instead of pursuing an empire with the sword. Rather than placing US forces on the front lines around the world, in Islamic lands in particular, which increases anti-American resentment, the United States should seek to minimize its military footprint and use force in moderation. According to John Mearsheimer, “Trying to stamp out terrorism with military forces is likely to enrage, not humble, the masses in the Islamic world.” That rage in turn translates into antipathy toward America, further causing difficulties for efforts to eradicate al Qaeda. There are four principal components of his ‘hearts and minds’ strategy. First, the United States should concentrate on destroying al Qaeda and its close affiliates instead of not prosecuting a global war against all terrorist organizations wherever they might emerge. Second, the United States must place the highest emphasis on securing the nuclear weapons and fissile material in the former Soviet Union because terrorists are most likely to obtain a weapon of mass destruction from that environment.
Third, instead of emphasizing military force almost exclusively in its campaign against terror, America should emphasize diplomacy, intelligence, and covert action against al Qaeda. Fourth, America needs to espouse policies that mitigate and arrest the widespread anti-Americanism in the Islamic world.47

According to Mearsheimer, adopting an approach like the one outlined above would create an environment whereby states and individuals in that region would less likely support al Qaeda and would more likely be willing to increase their cooperation with the United States against terrorism. The core of the problem is specific American policies: the apparent elation with which the United States employs force against Islamic societies; the US support of repressive satrap regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt; and most significantly, the continued and unqualified support of Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “The United States should make a major effort to end the war between Israel and Palestinians, because that is the only way America can remain close to Israel and still have good relations with the Islamic world. In short, the United States has to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict or distance itself from Israel.”48

In any information warfare campaign calculated for the ideological struggle between the West and radical fundamentalist Islam, according to RAND expert Cheryl Bernard, the West should support the modernists to propagate their moderate version of Islam by enabling them with a wide platform to enunciate and disseminate their views. Conversely, the West must thoroughly counter the radical fundamentalists by targeting weaknesses in their Islamic ideological credentials. Bernard advocates that the United States and its allies oppose the fundamentalists’ interpretive and distorted version of Islam in the following way: contest their interpretation of Islam and reveal their inaccuracies; expose their connections to illegal groups and operations; make public the consequences of their associates’ actions; illustrate their inability to develop their countries in positive ways; direct and target the messages to the young, to the devout traditionalists, Muslim minorities in the West, and to women; depict violent terrorists and extremists correctly as disturbed and pusillanimous, not as heroes; persuade journalists to investigate corruption, immorality, and hypocrisy in fundamentalist and terrorist circles; and promote ruptures among fundamentalists.49

As a postscript, military cultural change is also an imperative to adopting and sustaining a capacity and predilection for stability operations and counterinsurgency. The US military is adapting from the bottom up, in contact, but it needs to view and value counterinsurgency as a core competency, for the long term. All curricula in its professional military education system must dedicate a much larger share to thinking and planning for counterinsurgency. In the area of doctrine, the new interim Field Manual (FMI) 3-07, Counterinsurgency Operations is a start,
but the percentage and quality of Army and joint doctrine for counterinsurgency is still quite small. Doctrinally, there needs to be much more cooperation and collaboration at the joint, interagency, and multinational levels. America does have some allies who have some experiences with success in small wars. Moreover, a capacity for a unified civil-military interagency approach at the strategic, operational, and tactical level is a *sine qua non* for success in counterinsurgency. Part of the solution is better and stronger cross-embedded interagency command and liaison elements, down to at least the UEy/JTF level. Another more innovative solution is to genuinely mobilize the Department of State and USAID so they can develop off-the-shelf modular units of action that can be plugged in to CJTFs before they deploy. The Civil Operations and Rural Development System (CORDS) in Vietnam, while not at all flawless, offers some lessons and methods for interagency integration down to the grass roots level that are germane today. A CORDS-like USAID modular UA is conceivable and not infeasible. It would be a start toward remedying some of the problems that inhered in the CPA during OIF.

The Uptonian Paradox remains a US military cultural characteristic that is an impediment in prosecuting COIN, local or global. It is manifest in the predilection that has caused some in the military to believe in the primacy of the military sphere once the shooting starts. The paradox and its name stem from the fact that Emory Upton’s influence on American military thought contributed to the following contradiction: The US Army has embraced Clausewitz as the quintessential oracle of war but it has also tended to eschew Clausewitz’s overarching theme—the linkage of the military instrument to political purposes. In his writings, Upton strengthened the tendency to separate the civil and military spheres by advocating minimal civilian control to maximize military effectiveness. A similar phenomenon, with a Uptonian character, manifested itself after the Vietnam War under the rubric of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. After the nadir of the Vietnam War, the US military underwent an intellectual and professional renaissance that refocused it almost exclusively on the big-war paradigm and eschewed several studies that captured the true lessons of Vietnam. The Army embraced a book sponsored by the Army War College asserting that the US military failed in Vietnam, not because it was unable to adapt to counterinsurgency but because it did not fight that war conventionally enough. This cultural aversion to counterinsurgency and small wars was codified in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which essentially proscribed the use of force for anything other than conventional war.

Since unified civil-military-political effort is one *sine qua non* for success in COIN—military cultural preferences cannot and must not try to divorce the military from politics. What’s more, success in counterinsurgency has never been the result of an exclusively military function. The history of counterinsurgency demonstrates that the fullest measure of integration of all government agencies under
unified control (and preferably unified command) is the only way to harmonize the elements of national power. A better solution is to cultivate an organizational culture where every agency of government involved in the counterinsurgency effort is cognizant of the primacy of information, the requirement to mold messages and images, and the salience of developing strategies, operations, and tactical plans focused on achieving the desired political and psychological effects.50

With valid reasons, there are some historians who caution against generalizing too much from the counterinsurgencies of the 20th century and before. However, there are still valuable lessons to be distilled from those experiences and applied to the mutating and global nature of 21st-century insurgency. “The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.” The British, who have also had fairly extensive experiences with small wars and counterinsurgencies, have delineated six counterinsurgency principles: political primacy and political aim, coordinated government machinery, intelligence and information, separating the insurgent from his support, neutralizing the insurgent and longer-term postinsurgency planning. To these one may add another enduring lesson that the American military has learned over and over again, from the Indian wars, the Philippine Insurrection, the Banana Wars, Vietnam, to the present: The early and deliberate employment of indigenous forces in a counterinsurgent role can be a very effective method in helping achieve a successful outcome. General lessons from previous American counterinsurgency efforts are listed in the slideshow addendum to this article. The global counterinsurgency will be protracted, but the US military will prevail as it adapts and preserves current and previous counterinsurgency lessons and techniques in its organizational culture.51

Although he lived well over 100 years ago, George Crook epitomized the ultimate counterguerrilla leader because he was ruthless, resilient, adaptive, and fully knowledgeable about the enemy. As the result of his experience in California before the Civil War, Crook already knew much about the Indians and he learned much more. He studied them so fervently that one of his aides observed that Crook knew the Indian better than the Indian did. In war he was ruthless and resolute, and in peace he was considerate and humane in a paternalistic way. He insisted on honest treatment of the Indians and he never made a promise that he could not honor. Moreover, he consistently got on the trail, and he stayed on it until he found and cornered his enemy, despite all obstacles and hardships. He emphasized innovative techniques that were to become his trademark—extensive use of Indians to fight Indians and reliance on pack mules for field transportation. The use of Indians as counterguerrillas armed him with the Indian skill in guerrilla warfare and a psychological method that unhinged the enemy. The use of pack mules allowed him
mobility not possible with wagon trains. Counterinsurgent leaders of this era who emulate Crook are doing well against insurgents.\textsuperscript{52}
Notes


20. Ibid.


27. Unnamed retired four-star general, with three decades of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency expertise, email correspondence, 29 August 2004.


42. D. Robert Worley, Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), ix-x, 1, 6, 8, 33, and 36.


47. Ibid.


Cassidy Slide Addendum:
Lessons From Past Counterinsurgencies

Figure 1

### Relevant Lessons: from Vietnam and from Counterinsurgencies Pre-dating Vietnam

- Army History of Successful Counterinsurgencies During Indian Campaigns and in the Philippines
- USMC Small Wars in Central and South America
- USMC Limited Success with Combined Action Platoons early in Vietnam War
- A Better War—Abrams Era Limited Successes with Vietnamization, CORDS, and Pacification
- Host of Works Documenting Operational and Tactical Lessons from Vietnam
- **PROBLEM:** The Army as an Institution did not Learn from its Experience in Vietnam

Figure 2

### Indian Campaigns Lessons

- **Miles-Coerce Population Relocation Via Resource Denial**
- **Crook—Insert Small Teams of Enemy Tribes into Apache Insurgents’ Sanctuaries to Induce Fear and Sap Will**
- **Redress Indian Grievances, Treat Prisoners Well, Avoid Killing Women and Children**
- **Legacy of Loose Body of Principles:**
  - Close Civil-Military Coordination of Pacification
  - Firm but Fair Paternalistic Government
  - Economic and Educational Reforms
Lessons from the Philippines

- Search and Destroy was Counterproductive
- Enhance Perceived Regime Legitimacy Instead of use of Excessive Military Force
- Mobilize Popular Support Among Agrarian Elite and New Commercial Class
- Patrolling Emphasized Presence Over Search and Destroy and Cordon and Search
- Use of Indigenous Forces to Divide and Conquer—Macabes, Philippine Scouts, Paramilitary Police, and Philippine Constabulary
- Allowed Creation of Pro- and Anti-American Political Parties to Encourage Insurgents to Vote, Not Fight

Banana Wars -- Small Wars Manual

- Employ Native Troops, Supported by Marines, as Early as Possible to Assume Responsibility for Security
- Motive is Social, Economic, and Political Development of the People, Not Material Destruction
- The Goal is to Gain Results with the Least Application of Force and the Consequent Minimum Loss of Life
- Keys are Active Patrolling, Psychological Operations, Garrisoning Specific Locations, Guaranteeing the Security of the Local Population, and Denying Sanctuary to Insurgents
### Strategic Lessons of Vietnam

- Focus on War of Big Battalions and the Primacy of Combat Operations Assured that Pacification was 2nd.
- Did Not Understand the Nature of the Conflict—Tried to Turn Guerrilla War into Something it was Not.
- Did not Understand the Enemy, Did not Know Allies, Ignored Geopolitical Aspects of Security Environment.
- No Appreciation of the Centrality of Moral Legitimacy in Supporting the Counterguerrilla Effort. VC conducted Prolonged and Indirect War Against Legitimacy of GVN.
- Principally Sought Military Solution to a Primarily Political, Ideological, and Administrative Problem.

### Operational Lessons of Vietnam: Efforts That Achieved Some Success

**Combined Action Platoons (USMC):**

- Village Pacification which coupled Marine Squads and Indigenous Platoons to Jointly Secure Local Area
- Exponential Increase in Number of Forces Available for Local Security Patrols
- Commensurate Increase in Intelligence Resulting from Presence and Saturation Patrolling
- Tasks: Destroy VCI, Secure Population, Organize People’s Intelligence Nets, Civic Action and Propaganda
Operational Lessons of Vietnam: Efforts That Achieved Some Success

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support:
✓ Created by Johnson Administration and Integrated with the Military Effort Under MACV in 1967
✓ Met with Some Success During Abrams' Era Because of Civil and Military Leadership's Emphasis on Pacification
✓ Concomitant Efforts to Vietname-Improve and Expand RVN, TF, PSDF—Helped Secure the Population
✓ Accelerated Pacification Campaign (Phoenix)—PRUs Spearhead CORDS/CIA Effort to Expunge VCI

Operational Lessons of Vietnam: Things That Did Not Work

✓ Allied Forces Never Organized into Single Combined and Unified Command
✓ CORDS and CAP Never Integrated or Harmonized
✓ Big Unit Search and Destroy-Attritional Approach
✓ Two-War Approach—Focus on Destroying NVA and VC Main Forces while Marginalizing COIN
✓ Command/Individual Rotation Policy—Disruptive and Not Conducive to Capturing/Institutionalizing Lessons
UNCLASSIFIED

Lessons from El Salvador

✓ Regime Legitimacy and Popular Support Improved by Professionalizing the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF)
✓ Congressionally Imposed Limit of 55 Advisers in Military Group Precluded Conventionalizing/Americanizing the War
✓ Civilian Controlled and Professionalized ESAF Exhibited Restraint in the Use of Force and Observance of Basic Human Rights
✓ USAID Driven/Funded Economic Support = Popular Support
✓ Government and ESAF Redress Massive Social Inequities
✓ Co-opted Insurgents (FMLN) into Political Process by Allowing them to Create a Political Party and to Vote
✓ General Galvin (CINCSOUTH) Adopted an Approach Modeled after the Vietnam Era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)

Figure 9
Iraq Revisited
Jay M. Garner

I’d like to discuss some things that I think need to happen over in Iraq for us to be successful. Then, I’d like to give you my lessons learned. After that, I’ll answer any questions that you want to ask.

Let’s talk very quickly about postwar Iraq and what was going on there in the years before the invasion. There are a couple of significant things. Iraq is a fairly rich agricultural country along the Fertile Crescent of the Tigris and Euphrates. And the crop production up north had gone from almost 4 million hectares under Saddam Hussein, down to about 1.8 million hectares. It had been cut in half. In the area of health, Hussein’s government spent less than 90 cents per person per year on health care. 90 cents a year, per person. 22 percent of the children in Iraq suffered from malnutrition.

The electrical grids in Iraq were only capable of producing 50 percent of the electricity that the country needed—at its maximum production. In the education system there was only one book per six students. The country was only capable of producing 60 percent of the potable water that it needed. In Baghdad alone, the residents of Baghdad dumped 500 metric tons of sewage into the Tigris River every day, which went south to all the towns and cities down south for them to use as cooking water, drinking water, washing water, and that type of thing. And finally, the infant mortality rate in prewar Iraq is the highest in the Middle East. That’s five times higher than Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia has a fairly high infant mortality rate.

Like Gordon [Rudd] said, I was in a restaurant in New York toward the end of January. I got a call from Rumsfeld’s office saying, “We’d like to talk to you. We want to talk to you about doing something in postwar Iraq.” So, I went to see them. And Secretary of Defense [Donald] Rumsfeld said, “[General] Tommy Franks [Commander, US Central Command] and I really want you to do this.” I was the president of a company, and I had 2,000 people that worked for me. I said, “You know, first of all, I’ve got to go see if I can get a leave of absence from my company. Number two, I’ve got to go to the wife I’ve been married to for 44 years and see if she’ll let me do this.”

And the president signed a decision memorandum creating the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs on 20 January 2003. I went to work for Rumsfeld around 27 January and spent from 1 February until 15 March in the Pentagon. During that time, we formed an interagency team with quite a bit of military on it. We brought military in there to do what we call “expeditionary staff work.” Really,
we’d have never been able to accomplish anything if we hadn’t had military people in there that know how to get gasoline, know how to get rations, know how to move you from Point A to Point B, and all those type of things.

By 16 March, we had close to 300 people. We’d grown from one person to 300 people in about six weeks, and we deployed to Kuwait. From 16 March to 21 April, we stayed in Kuwait. On 27 March, we took a team of about 40 people, and we put them in Basrah to begin working postwar efforts in the south. We actually collocated them with the British. On 7 April, we took another team of similar size and put them up in Erbil to begin working postwar issues in northern Iraq.

Around 10 April, LTG Dave McKiernan made the decision to disband Task Force IV. So, he let me cherry-pick Task Force IV. Task Force IV had some outstanding colonels on it, some great colonels. So, I cherry-picked all the good colonels. That was a windfall for me, because they became invaluable over the next two or three months.

On 14 April, I went to Nasiriyah, and the following day we held the first meeting ever held in Iraq to discuss democracy in Iraq. We held it at the site of the ancient city of Ur, where many people say civilization began. I thought that day, what an incredible experience to be at the point where civilization began, and also now, for the first time, to be with the Iraqis talking at this place where democracy in Iraq can begin. We had about 300 Iraqis there—none from Baghdad, because the fighting was still going on in Baghdad. We had Iraqis from the north, the south, and about 125 from the US and from Britain and other places in Europe. It was an interesting day. I was taken back by how much the Iraqis—I’m not talking about the expatriates now, I’m talking about the 150 that were there from Iraq—I was taken back about how much they had thought about democracy and the form of government and how you do that, and that type of thing. So, that was a good day. It was a very emotional day for the Iraqis.

On 21 April, I went to Baghdad to do three things: number one, to make an assessment of the hospital system, because I was convinced that we would have an outbreak of epidemics; number two, to look at the electrical grid system, because if we’re going to stabilize things, especially like hospital medical care, that type of thing, you’ve got to have electricity; and the third thing, to look at the sewage system there, to see how backed up it was because I was afraid we were going to get, like I said, an epidemic there. My chief of staff was Jerry Bates, some of you might know him. He’s a retired 3-star general. He commanded the Second Armored Division several years ago. By that time, we’d grown to almost 400 people. Jerry Bates got all of them lined up, got them chalked up, and began the road march from Kuwait City to Baghdad. He started that on the morning of 23 April, in about 150
On the 22nd, I went up to northern Iraq. The reason I did that was that I’d been told by several people that [Jalal] Talabani and [Masoud] Barzani—the two Kurdish leaders, Talabani, the PUK [Popular Union of Kurdistan], and Barzani, the KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party]—were going to come to Baghdad and form a government. I didn’t want them to do that. I know Talabani and Barzani very well. We went through an awful lot together in 1991. I like both of them; I’ve maintained a fairly close relationship with both of them, and friendship with both of them.

So, on the 22nd, I met them in Erbil, and then we all went to As Sulaymaniyyah together and sat down in As Sulaymaniyyah. And I asked if they were going to try to form a government, and they said, “What we were going to do is put together a leadership group that you could use so that there’s a face of leadership for the Iraqi people.” They said, “If you don’t do that, then you’re going to look like an occupying force.” I said, “Alright, who do you propose be in this?” They said, “Well, the two of us,” Talabani and Barzani, plus [Ahmed] Chalabi, because he was the darling of the administration, Pachichi, Allawi, Hakim, and they said two others. “What we want to do,” they said, “is take two others out of Iraq, not expatriates—we want a Christian and probably Jafari who is a Dawa. I can’t remember their names now. And I said, “The only problem I got with that is Hakim.” Now Hakim is very fundamentalist. His uncle stayed in Iran, and his uncle got killed last year in 2003. A very fundamentalist cleric. Talabani said, “Look Jay, it’s better to have Hakim inside the tent than outside the tent.” I said, “Well, that’s probably pretty good advice. What I want you to do, then, you put this group together. I want you to be in Baghdad in five days. I’ll use you as a leadership group, as an Iraqi face for the Iraqi people. And I want you to have the communications necessary to talk to me every day.”

Larry Dirita called [Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz that night to inform them about our plan and I called John Abizaid to arrange safe passage for the Kurds to travel to Baghdad. So, they did that. They all came to Baghdad. All seven of them came there. They took their deputies and formed a deputies committee and put it in the hotel downtown. They met 8 to10 hours a day and had direct communication with me. I wrote several things for them to put out over the airwaves or put in the newspapers. That worked pretty well, I think, although the problem with that whole process was that it was difficult for the Iraqi population to identify with any one of these leaders. See, you had some Kurds on there, some expatriates that the Iraqi people don’t care about at all—Chalabi, Allawi, Pachichi, and those guys. Then you got a couple of people in there, Hakim for one, who’s very fundamentalist. So, it was kind of hard for the Iraqis to identify with any one person in that group. That’s why we tried to make it sort of a mosaic.
On the 22nd, we held the second conference for Iraqis to get together and discuss democracy. President Bush sent over an envoy, Zal Khalilzad. (He’s a good guy. He’s now the envoy in Afghanistan.) That was kind of an interesting day because the Baathists attempted to dominate the proceedings, and the rest of the Iraqis there wouldn’t allow them to do that. I thought that was a pretty good sign.

When Jerry Bates arrived with the 300 plus people we had on 24 April, the environment there was not permissive. The UN was not there because they wouldn’t allow anybody to come in because it was a non-permissive environment. There were no contractors in there. The Bechtel/Halliburton bunch wasn’t in there. We only had the KBR guys that came with us out of Kuwait. The State Department Disaster Assistance Relief teams refused to come into Baghdad because it wasn’t permissive.

On 17 April, I flew to Doha to see Tommy Franks, and I said, “You’ve got to get me and my team into Baghdad, into Iraq.” He said, “Jay, it’s too damn dangerous right now. The worst thing that could happen is we get a bunch of civilians killed going in there.” I said, “Yeah, but there’s too many vacuums that are filling up right now with things that you and I don’t want them to fill it up with. So, you’ve got to do that.” Now, Tommy Franks’ plan was that we would go into Phase IV in about anywhere from 30 to 90 days after combat operations, then we would take our whole team and put it in there. I said, “You know, that plan doesn’t work anymore.” He said, “Well, you’re probably right. Let me call Dave McKiernan, and I’ll see what we can do to provide you with security.” So, that was on the 17th. On the 18th he called me back. He said, “Jay, you’re free to go. God bless you, and Dave and I will give you everything we can possibly give you, but you know we still got a fight on our hands.” I said, “I know that and I appreciate it.” Then we road marched into Baghdad.

I had a real good team, I thought. When we first started putting together this team, I told Rumsfeld, “You know what you’re going to get out of this interagency team. You’re going to get a C team. You’re going to get every guy or gal that interagency wanted to unload.” Well, that wasn’t true. I got extremely good people. I had four retired ambassadors, three of whom were fantastic. And I had four active ambassadors. One of them was Margaret Tutwiler, who was ambassador to Morocco at the time. She was the PAO [Public Affairs Officer] during the [George H.W.] Bush administration, and she came to be my PAO. Then, I had five retired generals—Jerry Bates, Buck Walters, Bruce Moore, Ron Adams, and myself. I thought we all worked well together, and everybody is kind of one team, one fight. On that team, you didn’t get any of the [bureaucratic] warfare that was going on outside that team between the State Department and the Department of Defense. Rumsfeld said, “Look, here’s what I want you to do. Form this organization from the interagency.
There’s been an immense amount of planning.” And there had been. You read that there was no plan; there were tons of plans. He said, “There’s been an immense amount of planning. What we need to do, number one, is operationalize these plans.” And he said, “Number two, the plans have all been done in the vertical stovepipe of the agency or department they’re in, so we need to horizontally connect them.” So, that’s what we tried to do for the next two months.

But, what we really focused on during the time we were in the Pentagon and in Kuwait was oil field fires, because Saddam had done that in the first Gulf War. Also, we were concerned about large numbers of refugees and displaced people because we thought there was a high probability that he would gas both the Kurds and the Shia. You know, he’d done it in previous years before, and he’d do that to create a massive problem for us as we entered Iraq. We were also concerned that there would be a food shortage that could lead to famine. The Oil for Food program had ceased in January, so we were afraid that, number one, many of them had sold the food, and, number two, the rest had consumed it. So, there would be a vast food shortage. The problem with the Oil for Food program was that it was managed by the UN to sell the oil and purchase the food, but, once the food arrived in Iraq, it was an Iraqi distribution system with about 44,000 nodes in it. We were afraid that, as a function of the war, that whole distribution system had been disrupted. So, we feared there would be a famine. And then, the last thing was epidemics. You know, there’s a high incidence of cholera in Iraq in the summertime. So, we were really worried about epidemics.

What we found when we got in there was that none of those things happened. And I think you can credit the military operation for that. I sure as hell think Saddam would have set the oil fields afire. In fact, when the 173d and the Special Operations guys got up north, and when the Brits got in the south, they found charges on several of the rigs. So, I think the intent was to set them on fire. The refugees and IDPs (Internally Displaced People)—I really thought he’d create that problem for us. I think what happened is, that first day, as you know, Tommy Franks went after him, and I think General Franks rang his bell that first day, and he took away all his military communications.

The food shortage, there wasn’t one. They hadn’t sold the food. They hadn’t consumed all of it, and the distribution system was intact. So, we began immediately—about three weeks in there—delivering food again.

And, then, we stopped epidemics. We did that through a concentrated effort to hire Iraqis to pick up garbage, and we provided potable water. In fact, at the end of the first week, we were in Baghdad, and we had hundreds of Iraqis hired picking up garbage. So, we were able to avert all that.
What we found is, we needed to go into immediate reconstruction. That was an incredible problem because we don’t do postwar stuff in the military or in the government. We hire to have it done. We don’t have an organization to do postwar things. We might put one together to plan things, but when it comes to execution, we hire contractors to do that. What had happened was, the money wasn’t available until late—until after the war started—to hire the contractors. Then, once you hire them, they’ve got to go out and get the team, the team has to be formed, they have to identify what their workload is, and then they’ve got to go through the CENTCOM requirements to do all the things they have to do to be allowed to come into the country. So, that’s a long process. We did not begin to get large numbers of contractors there until June. So, this was April, and we were there and had a lot of things to do. So, that was the first problem.

The second problem was the electrical grids. Like I told you, the existing grids only had the capacity to serve about half the country. But, the electrical grids in northern and southern Iraq are damn good. They are capable of providing electricity to the people. But what Saddam Hussein had done for years was to tap off the electricity from the northern and southern grids and pull it into Baghdad, so the Baathists and the military—everybody except the people in Saddam City—could have it almost 24/7, while the people in the north and south only got electricity for a few hours a day. When we got there, we all knew that there was not the capacity to provide electricity to the whole country, but we didn’t realize what bad shape the electrical grids were in. In fact, the entire infrastructure was horrible. You’ve read about it, and it was terrible.

We took Brigadier General Steve Hawkins, who had been the commander of Task Force IV, and we had him form an engineering organization that had a lot of LTG Dave McKiernan’s tactical engineers, a lot of engineers from the Corps of Engineers, Jordanian engineers, a few Kuwaiti engineers, and a lot of Iraqi engineers. By just sheer workload and skill, they put most of the electrical stuff back together, where you could again begin to produce about 50 percent per day. But, that created an interesting dilemma. I was down in Al Hila, near the ancient city of Babylon. The governor down there had a big electrical grid near there, and he said, “You know, we really appreciate you all liberating us and getting rid of Saddam Hussein.” I said, “Well, the ball’s in your court now. You have to make something out of this.” He said, “We will. We like this democracy. For instance, we’re not sending any more electricity to Baghdad. This is ours. We’re going to keep it all down here for us.” I thought, “Yeah, this is a double-edged sword here, because you’ve got to pump some into Baghdad.” But we had huge electrical grid problems. Still have those today.

Our plan was to immediately bring back the public service in 20 of the 23
ministries. We weren’t going to use the Ministry of Propaganda, the Ministry of Intelligence, that type of thing. But the rest of them—Health, Education, Police, Agriculture, etcetera—we were going to bring all those back. We were going to bring them back immediately and start the Public Works function to get the country functioning again. What happened was that only one or two government buildings were destroyed by warfare, but as a result of looting, 17 of the 20 buildings we were going to use were destroyed. They were not structurally sound. There were no excess buildings in Baghdad. Since there were no buildings there, none of the public servants showed up.

So, I had to take this team of mine and put them on the streets of Baghdad, walking around saying, “Do you know anybody that was in the Ministry of Agriculture? Do you know anybody that was in the Ministry of Education, etcetera?” Over the first week, they put together the nucleus for those 20 ministries. They got people to come back. As they got enough to come back, in every instance the “little old lady in tennis shoes” came up with the disk that she had pulled before the war, and that gave us the roster of who was in that ministry. With that roster, we could then begin to put out that we could pay them. That’s one of the ways we got them back was to start paying them.

Once we got them back, we had a huge problem of where do they meet? And, how do we put them together? The second problem we had with the ministries was there was no civilian telecommunications center. Remember that when 3d ID entered Baghdad, Baghdad Bob was on the radio saying, “There’s no one here. They’re not even across our borders yet.” Well, finally, CentCom took out his ability to do that. And, in doing that, they took out the telecommunications system, so that there was literally no way to communicate on the civilian side in Iraq, except up north where the Kurds had a very good system. But from Tikrit south, there was no way to communicate. So, just to start the schools, we had to bring the public servants in from the countryside, put them in the Republican Palace, and spend that day telling them when school would start, when they would graduate, when we would pay all the teachers, etcetera, and then send them back out to do that. And you couldn’t change your mind, because you’d have to call them all back in together again.

The next problem I had was with the people who were appointed to run the ministries. And I’m talking about the people off my team that were going to oversee the ministries. I’ll save that for just a minute, because that’s kind of a unique story, and I’ll cover that with you in just another minute or two.

Our initial concept was to do what I call “gentle de-Baathification.” I did not have a de-Baathification policy, and we had asked the Administration for that.
Rumsfeld asked me two or three days before I left, he said, “What are you going to do for de-Baathification?” I said, “Well, first of all, the Administration is supposed to give me a policy.” He said, “Well, we don’t have that right now, so what do you think?” I said, “I think there are two scenarios. The first scenario is that, in several places, when we get there the Baathists won’t be there anymore, because the people will have killed them.” That’s what happened in the north in 1991: as soon as the Kurds took over, they killed everybody in government. I said, “The second scenario is we bring them all back to work, and, over time, the people will start pointing out the bad guys. And as they point out the bad guys, we’ll vet them, and we’ll take them out.” I said, “What we won’t do, we won’t bring back the number one guy and we won’t bring back the personnel guy. We know they’re both bad.” He said, “Well, that sounds fine with me until we get you a policy.” So, we had what I call gentle de-Baathification, which was highly unpopular with Ahmed Chalabi and others in the administration.

The second thing was to immediately bring back the Iraqi army. We had budgeted for that. We had budgeted to pay 2 million public servants, about 300,000 soldiers, and about 12,000 police, to bring them back. What we had was $1.6 billion that the President released to us that were the frozen assets from the first Gulf War. It was Iraqi money—it wasn’t appropriated money; it was Iraqi money. So, our plan was to bring the Iraqi army back.

DoD let a contract, and they hired MPRI (Military Professional Resources, Incorporated). Some of you may know MPRI. MPRI trained the Croatian Army. They did a damn good job of it. They train armies around the world. So, I had an entire contracted training team from MPRI led by Paul Cerjan, a retired Army 3-star, that was going to bring back the Iraqi army and train them. John Abizaid beat on me every day to hurry up and get the army back. The problem we had is the army didn’t give up like it did in the first Gulf War. I thought, going in, that we’d have 100,000 to 150,000 prisoners, and we’d just take them all out and say, “Let us sign you back up.” A bunch of them would sign up, and we’d go to work with them. That didn’t happen. They took off their uniforms and they just kind of evaporated. So, it took us the first month we were there to begin to round them up. By the end of the first week in May, we had thousands of them showing up, wanting to come back. We were getting ready to bring them back when the decision was made not to do that, which caught me by surprise.

The third plan we had was to have a face of leadership for the Iraqi people, and I’ve already talked about that—that was the seven Iraqis that we brought together. Then we came up with nine rapid and immediate priorities that we needed to accomplish for stability. The first one was to get the ministries back to a functioning level countrywide. The second was to pay salaries, nationwide—that’s salaries to
all the public servants, the police, and the army. Number three was to restore the police, the court and prison systems. Number four was to restore basic services to Baghdad. We were getting the hell beat out of us in Baghdad because the reporters didn’t have any air conditioning. Number five was to end the fuel crisis. I don’t know if you remember that, but there was no fuel. All cooking in Iraq is done with propane, so we had to bring propane in. Plus, there wasn’t the gas to move vehicles around, trucks around. So, McKiernan, every day, brought in tankers to provide fuel to the Iraqi population. That’s amazing. A country that produces 2.5 million barrels of oil a day is out of fuel. The sixth thing was to purchase the harvest. Now, the wheat was ready to harvest—the wheat, barley, and other things. So we needed to purchase all that and to also re-establish the food distribution system. We needed to install interim town councils in every city of 100,000 or more. That’s 26 cities. And then, we needed to meet the public health needs and avoid epidemics. And, by and large, we accomplished most of those priorities.

Now, my problem. . .my specific set of problems was, number one, the in-fighting before I left between DoD and the State Department. The warfare between Rumsfeld and Powell permeated everything we did. Well, I fault Rumsfeld and Powell for that. I mean, they’re big guys; they should not operate that way. But, really, I fault Condoleezza Rice for that. I like her. I mean, she’s a great lady. But her job is to get the two of them and say, “Hey, if you can’t get along, then we’re going to meet in the President’s office before the sun sets in Washington,” And to my knowledge she didn’t do that.

The next problem I had was money—the $1.6 billion dollars plus the money that the Congress was appropriating. Over at OMB (Office of Management and Budget), I had this woman named Robin Cleveland who decided she hated me and everybody else at ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance), and made several statements that “I’m going to make this impossible for them. In fact, I’m going to make them fail.” In order to spend Iraqi money, I had to drag each dollar bill across the table, one at a time. I had to go through more to spend Iraqi money than you have to go through to spend appropriated money. It was almost impossible to get money. In fact, I ended up calling back to the Pentagon saying, “This is going to fail if I can’t have this much money.” That was ridiculous.

Now, I told you I’d talk about the ministries. This is an interesting story. The first week I was on the job, I drew up the organization. There were four pillars: one reconstruction, one humanitarian affairs, one civil administration, and the fourth one, the expeditionary staff to support everything. I sat down with Ron Adams and a couple of other people, and we said, “What function does every one of those pillars have to do?” And, based on those functions, we tasked the interagency for people. The interagency was great. I got everything I ever asked them for. So, out
of that, for example, we said, “We ought to get the guy that oversees Agriculture to come out of the Department of Agriculture.” And as we went through each ministry, we got good people to oversee things.

Well, the day before I left for Kuwait—we left for Kuwait on Sunday, 16 March—on the 15th, Rumsfeld calls me and says, “I want you to come see me.” So, I went over the morning of the 15th; it was just him and me in the office. He said, “Jay, really I haven’t focused on this enough, and I apologize to you because I’ve been so wrapped up in the war. But I’m looking at this organization now, and I just can’t agree with it.” I said, “I’m leaving tomorrow.” He said, “Well, it’s these people you got running ministries. I don’t think many of them are qualified, and I think DoD ought to run all these ministries.” I said, “Who are you going to have run Agriculture?” I went through the ministries. He said, “Well, we’ll find somebody.” I said, “This team is fine. It’s too late to change.” He said, “Well, I want you to think about this, and on the plane over, you reconsider all this and then call me as soon as you get to Kuwait. I’m going to put together a good team for you.” I said, “We’ve missed the window. It’s too late. I’m leaving tomorrow. We can’t raise people that fast.” He said to just call him. So, I land, I call him. I said that I still had my position, I didn’t agree with his. He said, “Well, I’m going to put together a good team for you. Don’t worry about it.” Now, I had never told this to any of the people that were overseeing the ministries. The only other person who knew this was Ron Adams.

So, in the first week of April, I get a call from Ryan Henry in Doug Feith’s shop. They said, “Hey, Rumsfeld now has the list of the people who are going to run the ministries for you. It’s a great team. Let me give you the names.” So, I write all of them down. I said, “When are they going to get here?” They said, “Well, we don’t know. It might take a long time for some of them.” I said, “You know, we’re going into Iraq in another week.” He said, “We’ll do this as fast as we can.” Two days later, on the 14th, just before I went to Nasiriyah, I get a call from Doug Feith’s office. They said, “There’s a little glitch on these people running ministries.” I said, “What is it?” They said, “Well, the White House found out we were doing that, and they don’t want us to select them, they want to select them. So, we have to go back to the drawing board because the White House wants to select everybody.” To make a long story short, those people that were to oversee ministries didn’t get there until June. Some didn’t get there until July, and some didn’t get there until August. But, the people we had selected early on, back when we were in the Pentagon, really did the job of overseeing the ministries and getting them started. And they did a damn good job.

We were very silent about this organization, ORHA. Even though the Administration had signed a Presidential Decision Memorandum, it didn’t want to talk
about this organization that I was the director of. And the reason for that—it would have been an admission that we were going to war—that we’ve got a postwar organization. But two days before we left for Kuwait, I told my PAO (Public Affairs Officer) guy, we’ve got to have a press conference. When we show up over there, everybody’s going to say, “What the hell is this?” So, we had a press conference in the Pentagon. And Jerry Bates and I conducted that press conference. I got one question in there about what was my involvement with INC? (The INC is the Iraqi National Congress, run by Ahmed Chalabi.) I said, “I don’t have any involvement with them.” They said, “Well, what’s your relationship with Ahmed Chalabi?” I said, “I don’t have a relationship with Ahmed Chalabi.” I said, “I don’t’ have a candidate. We’re going to get over there, we’re going to sort things out, and we’ll do the right things. None of us are going over there with a candidate.” That night, I got phone calls from Feith. He said that I had degraded Ahmed and the INC. I said, “Look, that’s not my problem. If you don’t like that, go get another guy. I don’t have a candidate. By the way, Rumsfeld doesn’t have one either. I’ve heard him say that several times.” So, they embargoed me from speaking to the press.

So, I get to Kuwait, and I’m embargoed from talking to the press. I’m there about two weeks, and the press is madder than hell at me. You can understand that. And they’re staying out in the Hilton Villa with me. So, I called Rumsfeld and I said, “Look, this is madness.” He said, “What?” I said, “That you got me embargoed from the press.” He said, “I don’t have you embargoed from the press. Go talk to them. Talk to anybody you need to talk to. Just be discreet.” And I said, “OK, great.” So, I told Margaret Tutwiler, who’s a great lady, I said, “Hey, I’m unembargoed, let’s talk to the press.” Forty-five minutes later, she came back and said, “Well, you know, we had a good 45 minutes, but you’re embargoed again.” I said, “By who?” She said, “The White House embargoed you.” So, the entire time I was in Kuwait, I was not allowed to talk to the press. So, what Margaret did—she said, “We’ve got to be careful with this, so what I’m going to do is, each night, when you come back from dinner, I’m going to get you ambushed by somebody from the press. One night it might be BBC, the next night it might be CNN. The next night, it might be CBS. I’ll hand pick them, and I’ll let them ambush you. Then I’ll shut it off after about 7 or 8 minutes.” So that’s the only way we were able to get things out to the press until we got into Baghdad.

Telecommunications. No telecommunications on the civil side. I talked about that. I talked about the ministry buildings—17 of the 20 buildings we were going to use were destroyed by looting. Looting is an interesting subject. Looting was over by the time I got there on the 21st. I get a lot of questions about whether we should have done more about looting. I’ll tell you my position on that. I talked to a lot of soldiers in the 3d ID about looting—a lot of sergeants and a lot of company-grade officers. What I pieced together from that is, in many cases the looting was
occurring on a street before the force got there. So, when they got there, the building was already on fire. Number two, in many cases, the looting was occurring while our troops were still having some combat operations, and they were more interested in taking cover than in trying to stop looting.

To me, looting is like a riot control operation. If you’re going to stop it, you’ve got to show your presence and be very physical. You have to stand up, you have to use loud speakers, etcetera. But if you’re in the middle of combat operations and do that, you’re a target. So, those are two incompatible scenarios. The third one: you’ve got a kid in the 3d ID that’s been fighting for the last 17 or 18 days, and he’s not going to shoot some women walking off with a chair or some kid carrying off a TV. It’s just not our culture to do that. I don’t know how we control looting in the future. That is a problem. I think it’s unfair to criticize CFLCC, McKiernan’s forces, for not controlling the looting. My opinion is, in most cases, they couldn’t have done a damn thing about it.

Next thing is, we had insufficient security to protect us. I’m talking about ORHA, the 350 people we have now. You’ve got three types of security. You’ve got personal security for the leaders of the organization. If they’re moving around, you give them a few bodyguards. We contracted that. We contracted South Africans. They’re meaner than hell, they were great at it. Then you’ve got physical security around the palace. We contracted that. We got Gurkhas. They’re great. They’re also meaner than hell and they have long knives. They’re great at that.

But, then we had to move around. Every day, I had to have a minimum of 27 elements move around—20 to go to the ministries, and seven to do other things. And, I moved around all day long. So, every day, McKiernan and Fuzzy Webster had to produce for me at least 58 gun vehicles, because, by the CENTCOM rule, you could not move around without a gun vehicle in front and a gun vehicle in back, and armed personnel inside your vehicle. So, McKiernan did his best. He stopped a lot of things he was doing to support me. I’ll tell you, the first day I was in Kuwait, McKiernan wrapped his arms around Jerry Bates and me, had a staff meeting, and said we were all one team.

So, the relationship … my personal relationship with CFLCC, I thought, was great, and I thought they busted their asses to support us. But, he simply did not have the force to give us the daily security that we needed. The third day I was there, I was talking to [Lieutenant General] Scott Wallace, [the V Corps commander]. And that day, the third day I was in Baghdad, that was the 24th of April, that day he had 276 static sites that he had to guard, that didn’t have a thing to do with the combat operations going on, trying to seal the border, that type thing. So, the force was just not sufficient to do what it had to do. You can go back in time
and say, [General Eric] Shinseki, was right. You know, they beat up Shinseki, but he was right.

Then there were three bad decisions made on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of May. I’ll tell you what they were and how they evolved. I don’t fault Jerry Bremer for this. Don’t think I’m taking a shot at Jerry Bremer, because I’m not. But, when he came over, I brought him into Baghdad on 11 May. I went and picked him up at Doha, flew him into Basrah, took him around Basrah, then brought him into Baghdad. On the 13th, he pulled out of his briefcase the de-Baathification policy. I read it, and thought it went to deep. It went down about five or six levels. I mean, you think about going down that far in our government and removing everybody. How efficient do you think the remaining government would be? Not very efficient. So, I got the CIA guy. He read it, and he said, “We can’t do this.” I said, “Well, let’s go talk to Bremer.” So, I went in there and said, “Jerry, this is too harsh. Give me about an hour, hour and a half, and we will sit down and do the puts and takes on this, and we’ll get Rumsfeld on the phone, and we’ll try to soften it.” He said, “No, I have my instructions and I’m going to issue this.” So, he issued the policy.

So, that’s the first tragic mistake, going that deep with de-Baathification and making that many enemies. As you know Sun-tzu says not to end up the day with more enemies than you started with that morning. Again, I’m not criticizing Jerry Bremmer. I believe that he was given some very firm instructions to execute, which unfortunately later turned out to be mistakes.

The next tragic mistake was the decision to not bring back the Iraqi army and to disband the Ministry of Defense. That shocked me, because up until the day before I went to pick-up Bremer, we were still doing VTCs (video teleconferences) with the Pentagon on how we were bringing back the Iraqi army. I think Walt Slocum gave birth to the idea of disbanding the Iraqi army and sold it. That was a tragic decision because, when we did that—we told somewhere between 250,000 and 350,000 Iraqi soldiers—I’m talking about the regular army now, not the Republican Guards or the Special Republican Guards—but we told somewhere between 250,000 and 350,000 Iraqi soldiers, “You don’t have a job.” Now, they’re still armed. They just took their uniforms off, hid their weapons, and put on civilian clothes.

Then, on Friday, they brought in the Iraqi leadership group we had put together and they were told, “We’re the government here. You’re not going to be the government. Go home.” And they went home that Saturday morning. So, on Saturday morning when we woke up, we had somewhere between 150,000 and 300,000 enemies we didn’t have on Wednesday morning, and we had no Iraqi face of leadership to explain things to the Iraqi people. We began to pay significantly for those
decisions. What happened, as you saw, months later the CPA began to try to rectify that. The first thing that happened, in the end of July, first of August, they put in the Committee of 25—they brought that back in order to have an Iraqi face in leadership. Then, later on, they started a very slow, but measured process to bring back elements of the army. And finally, a few months ago, they started bringing back some of the Baathists that they had de-Baathified.

Having said all that, I’m convinced in my heart of hearts that there’s still a chance over there to have a stable, economically viable, democratic confederation. And I want to underline the word confederation, because I’m going to explain to you what I mean by that. But in order to do that, we have to have a national strategy. I’m going to tell you, there’s no strategy for Iraq. There was never one when I was there, and I haven’t seen one since I left. But, we have to have one. I’ll tell you what I think ought to go into it. The first thing is an understanding that we, as Westerners, look at things through Western eyes. You cannot do that in the Middle East. You can’t do it anywhere else in the world. What we fail to realize is that we in America, with our wonderful democratic government, can’t take that government as a template and slap it on another country. You can’t do that in Latin America, you can’t do it in Africa, and you can’t do it in the Middle East. What happened to us in the West was a long, evolving process involving all the Western nations. You get it through two things—through technology and through capital investment. As you begin to have technological breakthroughs and you begin to have capital investment and create revenue, you’ve got to have a workforce. And you’ve got to keep that workforce happy. That results in a very complex process that leads governments to be secular, to be pluralistic, and to have toleration.

There’s another thing that happened in the West somewhere between 100 and 150 years ago. Sometime in that period, Westerners quit looking to the past. There’s not a Westerner you can find that gives a damn about the past. Do you think Americans care about the past? Go out on any street in America and ask the first 12 people, “Tell me about the past.” And they would talk about the ball game on Friday night or the vacation they had two weeks ago. No one in the West is wedded to the past. That is not true in the Middle East. That’s because we got comfortable, and we became confident in our government. So, we look to the future. All Westerners are futuristic.

As this government process goes on, the workers who are producing the revenue, the GDP, they begin to demand more of a share of the decisions of government. So, government has to release more decisions to the people. So then you begin to get the formation of a real democratic state. So, the modern democratic spirit that we have in this country, and you have in Western countries, is fundamentally different from anywhere else. The process we have took over 200 years to
get where we are right now. You couldn’t have taken our form of democracy today and, in 1781, gone to the former Colonies and said, “This is going to be your government,” they would have revoluted again. Let me ask you a question. How would you have liked to have been in a democratic America in 1900? No women’s rights, no unions, no real rights. How would you have liked to have been in democratic America in 1850, especially if you’re an African-American? Slavery. I mean, you just don’t get to where we are overnight. You have to grow there. And we have to realize that we have to give other countries time to do that. We have to do it on their timeline, not on our timeline.

So, what you have to have in Iraq is an understanding that they are fundamentally different, and they don’t see things like we do. They are wedded to the past. You have, right now, the legacy of Arab nationalism—Arab nationalism goes back decades. You have the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and religious law, and they shut down minority rights. You have decades of Kurdish repression. All that going on right now. You have to realize, that’s the environment we’re in. So, if you’re going to have a democratic transformation over there, it has to adapt to the comfort zone of the Iraqis and the people that you’re trying to impose that on. Number one, they embrace the past. Number two, you have to account for their ethnicity. Number three, you have to realize and account for their deep religious beliefs. Number four, you’ve got to look at what their tribal heritage is. Number five, you’ve got to do it on their timeline and not on ours.

The Iraqis have a legitimate right to shape their future. You know, we—the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority)—wrote a Constitution for them. We put together reconstruction projects and decided what needed to be built without much input from the Iraqis. That’s wrong. What we need to do is allow them to have some control over what’s going to happen in their country, and allow for their mistakes and failures. We have to allow them to fail. We just have to have enough oversight to make sure that they don’t collapse. If you’ve read Seven Pillars of Wisdom, T.E. Lawrence puts it best. I can’t remember exactly how he put it, but he said it’s better for them to do it imperfectly than for you to do it for them perfectly, because it’s their country and your time here is limited. That rings true today of our involvement in Iraq.

The first thing I think you need to do over there is have what I call democratic regionalism or federalism. You have to have federal entities. You know, there is no such thing as Iraq. Iraq’s a line drawn on maps around 1922 by the Brits and others. It takes a bunch of disparate people and puts a government in Baghdad that holds them together through fear and brutality for the next 85 years. They all know that. They’re not stupid. They know they’re not a third world country. And they’re not going to sit back and allow control from Baghdad unless they are the majority.
That’s the problem you have right now. If we have elections as outlined by Sistani, the UN, and the CPA, I predict to you that we will have a ruling Shia majority that could become fundamentalist and practice Islamic religious law. I’m going to tell you, the Kurds won’t stand for that. They’re not going to step back from 13 years of democracy. The Sunnis aren’t going to stand to stand for that either.

So, I think the only solution is, divide them into federal entities. You’ve already got one entity there called Kurdistan, the three northern provinces. The next one you could have is the Sunni Triangle. The third one is everything in the south that is Shia. Then there is the complex of Baghdad, because while nobody in Baghdad likes each other, they’ve learned how to coexist over the last 70 or 80 years. So, you could have an entity there. If you do that, you’ve backed everybody into a comfort zone in which they’re ethnically alike, they’re religiously alike, and they are tribally alike. You allow those federal entities to do their own taxation, to select their own language, select their own religion if they want to, to raise a police force, to design their own school system, design their own health system, etcetera. And over that, you put a very weak republican government, that has a UN representative, goes to OPEC, raises a small army to seal the borders, does some taxation, has basic standards for education, basic standards for medicine, those types of things. That’s not a unique idea. You can go back and call that the Articles of Confederation that took 13 federal entities in America and put them together, because they sure weren’t going to be ruled by anybody. So they started out with a weak federal government, and they slowly walked into democracy. I think that’s what we have to do over there, and if we don’t do that, I believe there is potential to have a civil war.

Let me tell you the ten things I think have to happen over there for us to be successful. The first one is, we have to adopt a foreign policy that negates Iranian influence in Shia Iraq. Let me tell you, that is important, because Iranians have been pouring through there since the war began. You know, the war in the 1980s between Iraq and Iran was Saddam Hussein shutting down the Iranians. We all talk about that war—it was a chemical war, a missile war, and all that—but he shut down the Iranians. They didn’t get another chance until we went to war over there. Since that time, you’ve had thousands of Iranians flowing through as religious pilgrims. You can see many of them with Sadr down in Najaf. So, Iran’s design is to bring fundamentalists and Islamic law into Iraq, and if we have an election in Iraq where majority rules without minority rights, we could get that.

We faced something like that before. What we need is a national strategy that says we’re not going to allow that. You know, I love Harry Truman. I think he was a great president. In 1947, when things were very dim for us, even though we had just won World War II, he went to Congress with a very bold statement. Let me read that
statement to you. He said, “I believe that it must be a policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure. Free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.” Now, that became the Truman Doctrine. What it did was stabilize what was going on in Greece and Turkey and really kept Greece and Turkey from falling [to the communists]. What we need is a presidential doctrine that is hard core and says we’re going to stop [Iranian, Syrian, and other attempts to influence events in Iraq]. Because if we allow that influence to spread we will endanger the Middle East, and we will have endangered ourselves.

The second thing we need to do is influence the development of the future government of Iraq, and the corresponding national elections, which will select that government, to prevent a nationwide Shia ruling majority. I just talked about that, and, like I said, my solution for that is federalism.

The third thing is, we need to absolutely guarantee the rights of minorities. If we have Shia and Islamic religious laws come in there, women will lose their rights, and so will others. Minority rights represent the core element of democracy. If we’re going to have a democracy there, we have to protect minority rights. And we have to be strong in doing that. If we have a presidential doctrine, then minority rights needs to be one of the fundamental principles of that doctrine.

The fourth thing, we need to share the wealth of Iraq with the people of Iraq, and the wealth of Iraq is oil. You know, production is back to 2.5 million barrels a day. It’s going to go higher because there are unlimited untapped resources in the north. The Kuwaiti Minister of Oil told me, “Iraq today is where Kuwait was 30 years ago. When we are finished with the exploration in the north of the oil fields, they will have a greater oil capacity than we have in Kuwait.” I believe that. What’s important is the issue of the future for Iraq. One of the main issues is what do they do with their petrodollars? I think those need to be shared with the federal entities, or shared directly with the people, somewhat like we do up in Alaska. If we do that, then what we’ve done is give the Iraqis a shared interest in their natural resources. It would alienate them completely when the pipelines are attacked, and it would demonstrate that the US harbors no claim toward Iraqi oil.

The fifth thing, we need to employ the unemployed youth. You know, half the population in the Arab world is under the age of 20, and that is certainly so in Iraq. That’s the most receptive age to incitement. We have to take the youth off the streets and put them to work. I think we ought to review [President Franklin D.] Roosevelt’s Depression era [programs like the Civilian Conservation Corps],
where he took the youth of America and put them on national projects. He paid
them, and out of that, he not only employed them, but it helped restore the economy
and provide a new infrastructure for the nation. And it wasn’t hard to do.

Sixth, we need to rapidly stimulate the Iraqi economy. The CPA made a cardinal
mistake by failing to promote Iraqi small business, Iraqi entrepreneurship, and
failing to involve thousands of Iraqis in the reconstruction of their own country.
We need to infuse money directly into Iraq. I’ll tell you how I’d do it, you may not
agree with this, most of the people I’ve talked to don’t agree with this, but I’d give
every family $1,000. About 5,000 families, that’s about $5 billion bucks, that’s
not a lot of money the way we’re spending it right now. But, I wouldn’t make it a
“freebie.” I’d make them do something for it. Like, you’d have to turn in an operta-
tional weapon or something. That’d do a lot to get weapons off the street. But, that
would infuse money. Then I would promote Iraqi small business. I would not allow
a contract over there that didn’t give at least half that contract to Iraqi businesses.
I’d employ the youth.

Let me go back in history. In 1947, [Secretary of State George C.] Marshall
got to the commencement exercise at Harvard and he made a statement. Let me
read it to you. He said, “Our policy is directed not against any country or any doc-
trine, but it’s directed against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. It’s purpose
is the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of
political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.” That became
the Marshall Plan. What we need is an Iraq Plan. We need a plan from the Admin-
istration that does exactly that. We need one that harnesses oil revenues, employs
the youth, infuses significant amount of money directly to Iraqis, and eliminates
the international debt against the Iraqis.

Seven, we need to provide electricity 24/7. Like I said, they don’t have the
capacity to do that. They never had electricity 24/7 under Saddam Hussein. But,
what he did, he used electricity as a weapon to punish the Kurds in the north and
the Shia in the south. He cut off their electricity. He provided it 24/7 in Baghdad.
We need to bring in these massive generating systems, countrywide, as we build
new grids and give them electricity 24/7. If we do that, it would immediately be
felt and would be well received by the Iraqi people, and it would be a significant
indicator that quality of life is rising. And it’s doable.

Eight, you need to remove—I call it decapitate—the head of the family of
each terrorist organization involved in terrorism in Iraq. I want you to think about
that for a minute. The way you defeat terrorism is exactly the same way that you
fight organized crime. You mount a coordinated offensive. And it’s crucial that the
forces involved go to the top of the pyramid. What we have to do is go to the top of
the pyramid and eliminate that. You don’t defeat drugs by picking up the dealer on the street. You go to the top of the pyramid and defeat him, take him out.

Nine, we need to increase international support to block financial aid for global terrorism. The engine that fuels terrorism is money, huge amounts of money. That money is channeled directly to terrorists by their direct supporters and supportive mosques. It comes through religious establishments. The money funds the terrorists’ travel, their explosives, their hideouts, their infrastructure. It brainwashes each new generation coming up. Their prime money sources are Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Authority. Many of these are safe havens for terrorists. What we need to do is monitor all donations from the rest of the world into Islamic organizations, and we need to dry up the finances that go into terrorist organizations. That’s hard but doable.

Finally, we need to develop a strategy right now for an independent, autonomous, and US-supported Kurdistan, that we would evolve should the Iraqi government fail. Now, what I’m saying is, if we have elections, and we don’t do anything to shape those elections, and the situation goes into majority rule—and majority rule is the Shia, who are a little over 60 percent of the population—and the Shia, because of the strong Iranian influence, go into religious law, we need to extract Kurdistan from that. Kurdistan is a relatively democratic area, they have a good economy, they have superb minority rights—about 25-30 percent of their leaders in Kurdistan are women, Christians, and others. We cannot let that go down, if everything else goes down. If we do support Kurdistan, it would be the third democracy in the Middle East, along with Israel and Turkey. Now, there’d be problems with the Turks, but we can control that. The other thing is the Kurds could be a beacon in that part of the Middle East for what we would like to see.

The Kurds have long been supportive of the United States. They had the Peshmarga [Kurdish warriors] with Special Operations Forces during the last war. Think about it, if the rest of the country goes down, and we let the Kurds go with it, how do we justify letting the democracy go down with that? We can’t do that. Think about the Philippines at the end of the Spanish American War. The Philippines gave us coaling and fueling stations for the Navy. It allowed us, for the next 50 years, to project ourselves in the Pacific so that we could maintain a Pacific presence. The Philippines became immensely important leading into World War II. It was our launch pad for a presence in the Pacific. The Kurdish region, the northern region, can be our launch pad for the next 50 years as a strategic strongpoint for us where we have troops, airfields, and things like that. I think that’s very important. If we allow that to slip away, that’s a huge, huge strategic mistake.

Let me wind this up now, giving you some real quick lessons learned for the
future, because all you guys in here are going to be doing this for the rest of your careers. So, you need to start adopting some philosophy and your own personal doctrines for how you handle civilian-military affairs. The first one is, you have to have a positive relationship between the civilians and the military when you go into a war and a postwar situation. My view is that the civilian is always subordinate to the military—subordinate to the CINC (Commander in Chief; now called Combatant Commanders). (I know you can’t say CINC anymore, but I can because I’m a retired guy.) But, the civilian guy ought to be subordinate to the CINC. I’ll tell you why. He can’t accomplish anything without the military helping him do that. It ought to be that way until the handoff is made to the State Department, then the civilian can be in charge. I think, in doing that, you place some things OPCON (operational control) to the civilian. You put the civil affairs units OPCON to him, because he needs those. You OPCON to him some of the engineering support—I’m talking about Corps of Engineers type support, not tactical engineers. And some Military Police organizations, because he needs security. Some aviation, because he needs to be able to move around.

The second thing you have to have is security. And we’ve talked about that. You have a PSD (Personal Security Detail) for the leadership, you have to have static security, and you have to have mobile security so you can move your people around. Some of that can be contracted, but not all of it. The civilian piece of this has to be involved early in the concept of operations. I would say, my equation is that Day One of war plans equals Day One of postwar plans.

You’ve got to have money. Without money you can’t have contractors. You can’t get anything accomplished without contractors. You also need “quick start” money that you can give out to brigade, battalion, and company commanders. I mean, every company commander ought to have $10,000 in his pocket where he can do something. Every battalion commander ought to have $25,000; every brigade commander ought to have $50,000. That’s not a lot of money, by the way. They can accomplish immense things with that money. The money ought to be rapidly available through a streamlined process.

You need a blue chip source selection group that can rapidly approve contracts. Get away from our current way of doing contracting. You need to jettison the current government contracting process in time of war. It just doesn’t work.

The next thing you need to do is have clear national objectives with a national priority. We didn’t start this war with that, and we don’t have it now, I don’t think. You need to have a well-defined, hand-picked team from the start. You need to train for postwar just like we train for war. I would add “postwar” to the NTC (National Training Center) and CMTC (Combat Maneuver Training Center) exercise and
rotations we do. I’d take a retired ambassador, a retired general, or a retired some-
body, and make him the “Jerry Bremer” and have him put together a little team. At
the end of a rotation, we’d spend six or eight days going into the postwar piece of
that and see the major issues that fall out of that. You know, in the military, we don’t
take anything seriously unless we’re graded on it. Until we start grading ourselves
on that, we’re really not going to be serious about it, and we’re not going to do it
very well.

You have to have the immediate involvement, immediate interaction, and im-
mediate utilization of the indigenous population. You need daily meetings between
the civilian and the military leaders. In fact, you need to have an integrated staff. I
don’t think we have that today over there.

You need a robust media effort—TV, radio, newspapers, HBO-type movies—
focused on the population. Now, there’s one thing in this nation we ought to be
able to do better than anybody else in the world, and that’s media. We’ve got Hol-
lywood, we can do anything. But, even today, we haven’t solved the problem of
getting the word out to the Iraqi people. I’ll tell you, you can fault me for the initial
part of that because I didn’t do a good job on that. I had a bad media organization.
But we did a bad job on that; we still do a bad job on that. That’s very important.

I think we need much broadened and well-defined role for the Corps of Engi-
neers. The Corps of Engineers can do marvelous things in a postwar effort. And
we really haven’t harnessed the talent and the energy of the Corps of Engineers the
way we should. Right now, you got Carl Strock running the Corps, and we ought
to task him to restructure the Corps of Engineers for the future.

The final thing is, civilian operations in postwar. They don’t start with Phase
IV. They roll with the operation. We ought to have civilian operations rolling with
the operation and have them begin functioning as the territory is occupied. If we
had done it right in Iraq, we would have rolled all the way up to Baghdad and laid
out a carpet of civilian operations over everything we had uncovered.

All right, that’s my long monologue with you. I’ll be glad to answer any ques-
tions.
Garner Question and Answer Session

**Question:** Sir, in the conference we’ve touched on some touchy-feely stuff about cultural obstacles; the problems of changing another culture or communicating across it. It’s my own sense that, whether you’re talking about northern Iraq and the Kurds, or the Shiites, or whoever, a lieutenant or a sergeant employing first impressions, mutual respect, and development of common interests can overcome any, almost any, cultural obstacles around the world. But if there is a lack of developing common interests and emphasizing relationships, from the strategic to the tactical levels, then it is in that context that cultural obstacles become insurmountable. True or false?

**Answer:** Oh, I think it’s more complex than that. First of all, I think I agree with what you alluded to. I think if you leave disciplined soldiers to represent you, they’ll do it extremely well. You could see that in Iraq. I mean, kids surround the soldiers. They are fairly well respected. The problems we have in Iraq, those didn’t start with soldiers. They started at the top. I think the soldiers did a superb job. I agree though, I think you have to have mutual understanding, you have to have respect. But there’s another thing about the Middle East, too. You have to have force. If you don’t use force when you should use force, they lose respect for you. Because force is something that they understand. They believe it. When we didn’t finish what we were doing in Fallujah, when we went to the Iraqi brigade, we absolutely lost a monumental amount of respect, not only among the Iraqis, but in the whole Middle East. You know, it’s a double-edged sword.

**Question:** Sir, being a former civil affairs Officer, I’m still a little bit puzzled. Civil affairs—military government—was created during World War II to do, not just planning, but doing the quasi-civilian occupation job. Yet, over the years, civil affairs, even though it’s grown in strength—some 3,000 members in the reserve component—has lost its way in terms of any kind of involvement with civil administration. It was driven out of training. It was driven out of practice, really, within the organization. And yet, you’re implying that there ought to be an organization right behind the troops to perform that halfway function of emergency relief and to do the occupation type of role. I guess I’m puzzled about exactly what the role was in your organization, as well as in CFLCC and CENTCOM. Not just in the planning, but in the execution phase.

**Answer:** I didn’t have anything to do with the planning for civil affairs. That was all done by the J5 and by CFLCC. And they planned well, by the way. But, I think civil affairs organizations are like the Corps of Engineers. They have an immense potential there to do things, and we’re not using that potential now. We have to relook at how we’re doing that. I think the civil affairs organization should work
for whoever is going to be the civilian administrator working for the CINC. As you uncover territory, I think the civil affairs guys go in there, and they shape the future environment. They put in town councils if they need to, they get schools restarted—they provide the initial input to do things until you can get the civilians pushed in there to take over. What happened to us in Iraq was that we uncovered a place but immediately the Shiite were in there, and they filled that vacuum pertaining to human needs—schools, medical, public works, that type of thing. We need the civil affairs guys to come in there and fill that need. They have the talent to do it. They have the training to do it. They have the organization to do it. We just don’t let them do it.

**Question:** I continually saw in the newspapers where a young lieutenant or a young captain was doing an outstanding job as the “mayor” of a city, which is great, but I was always asking, “Shouldn’t that be a civil affairs type role?” And yet we’re throwing combat arms soldiers into it.

**Answer:** Well, the reason they do that, I think, is because the civil affairs guys are centralized in a civil affairs organization, and whoever is running that organization defines the dynamics of that civil affairs organization. So, if you’re commanding 3-325 IN, and you’re in a city, and you’ve got to do something, you tell an Alpha Company commander, “You go down there, and you start doing that stuff.” You don’t own that civil affairs guy. So, what we need to do is either have him OPCON to him, or have a direct support relationship. I mean, we know how to do these things. We’ve been doing them for hundreds of years.

**Question:** Sir, you have a very in-depth understanding of the Middle East and the people there. You understand that it’s very important to have person-to-person relationships and build trust and camaraderie and friendship with the leadership, as you’ve done with many in the Kurdish areas. When we send people from the United States Army to Iraq and other places, one builds a relationship whether he’s in psychological operations or covert operations, what have you. But then, two years later, a new guy goes in. How do we change the way we approach this thing in a culture that’s so different from ours so that we can build institutional relationships based on human relationships. The British Colonial Empire did it very well. My father used to tell me that the British agents that would come to Baluchistan would read Persian poetry and would sit down and recite it phrase by phrase. They would sit down and drink chai with the locals and establish camaraderie. And they’d be the same agents that would come over and over again. It seems like we can learn something from the Europeans and what they have done in the past in their empires. I don’t like to use the word “empire” for us—we’re not imperialists, we’re not colonialists. But we have worldwide interests, and in order to protect our worldwide interests, we need to look at the world from a different perspective and

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approach this thing from a different model. Perhaps a historical model, perhaps a new one. Your comments, sir.

**Answer:** A couple. We do a horrible job of what you’re professing. We’ve known for a long time now that we’re going to be intimately involved in the Middle East for a long period. We haven’t done anything to prepare the Armed Forces socially, politically, or culturally to do that. You know, the strength of the Army in World War II—going from an extremely small Army to a mega-million man Army, was in the institutions. During the interwar years, we put all our emphasis in the institutions to build the tactical and the doctrinal mindset of the military person. We haven’t done that now. The services are so small that they don’t have the ability to spend time in the institutions. The budget has been so small that we rob from the institutions to keep the operational Army going. Those were hard decisions, and they were terrible decisions, but they were the only decisions that could be made. Having said all that, number one, the military is too damn small. It needs to be larger. You need at least two more divisions in the Army. You need a lot more MPs in the Army, and you need, I think, another Marine Expeditionary Force in the Marine Corps. As you build size, you are able now to start putting fringe benefits on that size. You can now take more people and get them culturally engaged in things. You also have to put an importance on that.

The importance right now in the Army is to do tactical things. I mean, when was the last time an FAO made a second star [major general]? It hasn’t been a long time. The other thing we can do is take a page out of the Marine Corp’s book, where they go and recruit people who were born in other countries, so when the marines go into a country, they have two or three people in the Marine Expeditionary Unit, or four or five people that are there and speak the language. They grew up there, they have the culture, but they’re Marines. That helps. We don’t do that in the Army, and we should. We have the ability in this nation to do that.

**Question:** Sir, with respect to Kurdistan. Assume that there is a high degree of autonomy, or even independence. What’s your assessment of the prospect of being able to get the Turks to go along with them?

**Answer:** I think it’ll be a problem. Let me tell you what’s happening right now. I’m not in here trying to sell you an independent Kurdistan. In fact, if I brought Talibani and Brizani in here, they’d tell you, “We don’t want that if you can make the Iraqi system work. We don’t want that. But, what we’re not going to do, we’re not going to walk away from 13 years of freedom.” I support that. But since the last year they have had big operations going on in the exploration and drilling of oil in the north. All that’s done by Turkish companies. They are rebuilding their airfields. All that’s done by Turkish companies. So, what they’re doing, they’re pulling the Turks in there economically; they’re spending a lot of time with the Turks. And
they have become far closer to the Turkomans. So, given a little bit longer, I think
the Turks and the Kurds themselves will work out some of those problems, but not
all of those problems. It would take a strong position by us to get past the Turk-
ish thing. All I’m saying is that if all of Iraq goes south, don’t jettison the Kurdish
part of that with it, because they’re on our side and they always will be. And it’s a
democracy. You can’t let that go.

**Question**: This may be a bit parochial, but we talked a lot about interagency
operations. Any comments or observations on interservice issues that may have
come up in Phase IV or with your…

**Answer**: I was never there during Phase IV. I don’t even think we’re in Phase
IV now, are we? Once I got in Kuwait, I went up to CFLCC headquarters every
day. Bates and I went up there every day and watched what was going on. We sat
there with McKiernan and “Fuzzy” Webster and those guys. I thought they worked
tremendously well together. It’s what always happens. The problems between
the Air Force and the Army, and the problems between the Army and the Marine
Corps, and the problems between the Marine Corps and the Air Force, and the
Marine Corps and the Navy, and all that, are all Beltway problems. They don’t
generally occur that much in theater. The guys work out arrangements in theater.
So, I never saw a big problem.

**Question**: I was intrigued by your idea of the confederation structure for Iraq.
But I wanted to know, how hard would it be, or how desirable would it be, to divide
up the national ministries in order to support each of the federal states?

**Answer**: I don’t think you would. I think you keep the national ministries in
the republic, and they begin to provide that ministerial support, but on a far more
weakened basis than they do right now.

**Question**: But, if they’re going to set up, for example, educational systems
within each of the…

**Answer**: Then I think you have the republic Ministry of Education lay out
minimum standards of education, and they make sure that those standards are fol-
lowed inside each one of the federations. The Minister for Health would lay out
minimum health standards, minimum requirements for the amount of money that
federations would put into the heath system, and all that, and they would make sure
that it happens. But minimum stuff. But, initially, the internal control of Iraq would
be in the hands of the federations. And the external control of Iraq would be in the
hands of the republic.

**Question**: Would it be at all practical to take the edge off the ethnic aspect by
having each of the provinces be independent—I mean, have a confederation of the
18 provinces rather than a confederation of ethnic enclaves?

**Answer:** I think that’s another solution, John. I really do. I think that you could have 17 provinces and Baghdad. But I think that, if you carved out four or five entities, those entities that I talked of are pretty homogenous. And what you would do, after you elect the delegates in this election, then you would have them set up what the entities are going to be. And say it comes out to be four or five, then in the next set of elections, the people in the 17 provinces and Baghdad vote on which one of those entities they want to be in. For instance, you may have the people around Mozul vote to be in the Kurdish entity. So, you give the people a chance to say, “Here’s the one I want to live with.” And if you do that, you begin to get rid of the warfare that’s going on, because down there in Fallujah, for example, they’re not going to fight each other. They’re all Sunnis. They’re all members of tribes. And they all practice this religion, and they’re all interrelated somehow, and so they’re going to knock off this fighting because they’re in charge of their own destiny. The problem right now is they want to get us out of there. Also, [unless you arrange to put them in charge of their own destiny, they may say,] “Let’s have a civil war because if we don’t do that, we’re going to be ruled by the tyranny of the majority—the Shia.”

**Question:** Sir, have you been consulted by the US administration since leaving Iraq?

**Answer:** Let me see. From George Bush, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, no. From Rumsfeld, yes. Rumsfeld got Larry DeRita to call me, and Larry said, “Hey, Rumsfeld’s going over to see [Paul] Bremer. Write down a bunch of things that Rumsfeld has to focus on while he’s there. And some things he ought to ask, and things they ought to be doing right now.” So, I made up a list, and I took it over there. And Rumsfeld sent me a note that said, “Hey, thanks, this is good stuff.” Then Rumsfeld got over to Iraq and met with Bremer, and he says, “Oh, by the way, here’s a list of things Jay Garner thinks you ought to be doing.” So, what little relationship Bremer and I had just got tubed with that. But, I wrote him a plan for more rapidly bringing the Army back in, for more rapidly conducting elections—a lot of those type of things.

**Question:** Sir, based on your experience, both in the military and now as a retired general officer, what would you tell young majors and lieutenant colonels that are about to go over there at the battalion and brigade level? What’s the one piece … the one golden nugget you need to keep in your head as you start looking at conducting operations in that culturally different environment and trying to make sure everything they do is to the betterment of the mission or caring for their soldiers.

**Answer:** You mean, if my son was a company commander in the 503d, what
would I tell him?

Question: Yes, sir.

Answer: I’d tell him there are things that don’t change anywhere. Number one, you have to take care of your troops. You have to be very cognizant at all times of what they’re thinking about, what’s motivating them, and what’s not motivating them, and where they are. Number two, you’ve got to go find out things for yourself. To hell with staffs and all that. They’re good, but that’s data. You go find things out for yourself. There’s a great picture of Jim Gavin when he was commander of the 82d Airborne Division, and it’s right around the time of Operation Market Garden [in World War II]. It’s a picture of Jim Gavin walking by himself carrying an M-1, and he’s going to find out what the hell’s happening. I think that’s a tremendous lesson. If you’re a leader, you need to find out what’s going on. Don’t let people tell you what’s going on—you take that as data. And the final thing is, you’ve got to be sensitive to casualties. You may have to be forceful, but be forceful in a way that minimizes casualties. The American public’s not sensitive to casualties. Everybody thinks they are, but they’re not. But in the military, we are. I mean, you just don’t want to lose soldiers. But you’ve got to do what you’ve got to do. But you do it in the most intelligent way and the swiftest way and the most forceful way so that you minimize casualties.
The Limits of Influence: Training the Guardias in Latin America

Richard L. Millett

From 1898 through 1934, the United States created, trained, and equipped five small Latin American military/constabulary forces. The nations involved were Cuba, Panama, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. In each case the force was expected to provide virtually all aspects of the nation’s security, was designed to be apolitical, and to reduce both direct costs and opportunities for corruption. It was further hoped, if not expected, that these forces would provide the stability needed to avoid future armed US interventions.¹

In each case the forces, far from becoming a supporter of democratic stability, spawned predatory dictatorships. In each case the United States ultimately again found itself intervening twice with military force in Haiti, once in the Dominican Republic, conducting one major and several minor interventions in Panama and several limited interventions in Cuba plus the indirect efforts of the Bay of Pigs operation, and indirectly in Nicaragua via the contra project. In all but the Dominican Republic, the forces created by the United States were ultimately totally destroyed, twice by Marxist revolutionaries (Cuba and Nicaragua) and twice by US military intervention (Haiti and Panama). The institution’s survival in the Dominican Republic may be due to the US intervention there in 1965.

The sorry history of these efforts provides lessons in a number of areas. It has its most direct application to current and future efforts to develop other nations’ security forces, most notably, but by no means exclusively in today’s Iraq. It also illustrates the problems of combining police and military functions, the obstacles to reshaping another nation’s political and social environment, the dilemma of making policies sustainable and consistent, and the limits on exporting both doctrine and values. In sum, these are classic illustrations of the limits of influence.

Before beginning this analysis, however, it should be noted that while these forces rarely moderated and frequently exacerbated the political/social/economic problems of these small, weak nations, they were by no means the only source of such problems. Replacing military governments with civilian dictatorships, such as that of the Duvaliers in Haiti, or with Marxist authoritarians such as Castro in Cuba or the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, did nothing to provide either security or freedom for these nations. Establishing functioning democratic structures requires much more than good intentions, better-trained militaries, and new constitutions.

The first lesson to be drawn from these experiences is that technology transfers, values don’t. It is much easier to teach someone how to fire a weapon than to teach how to know when and against whom to use it. US efforts were relatively successful
in modernizing these forces, in increasing both their combat and internal security capacities. But efforts to implant political-military doctrines were generally futile. Armies quickly adapted the new training and technology to domestic norms and values. Authoritarian systems became more efficient and often more repressive, not more democratic.

Lesson two is that using the military in the role of police is always a bad idea, although sometimes it may be a worse idea not to so use them. In creating these forces it was thought that placing police under central control and incorporating them into the military would serve numerous useful purposes. It would reduce expenses, give the military a continuing, credible mission, and hopefully curb political manipulation and reduce corruption. But what it did was to further centralize authority, eliminating any local controls over or ties with police forces. Indeed, in some cases, individuals were deliberately assigned to areas where they had no local ties to prevent any sympathy with the population. In other cases local leaders formed their own paramilitary forces outside official state control. With both military and police officers graduating from the same institution and belonging to a united officer corps, it was common to assign those of less ability (and at times less moral scruples) to police duty, further undermining police functions. Order took precedence over justice, control was more important than free speech or press, and protecting privilege—not individual rights—was the priority.

Lesson three is that efforts to change a society by altering one institution never produce the desired effect and inevitably produce undesired effects. Trying to change police and other internal security forces without dealing with the massive problems of the broader administration of justice (legal systems, courts, traditional caste and class impunity, and so forth) only exacerbated existing problems. When there is no effective rule of law, the police will not function in a democratic manner; when a society is dominated by family, class, and caste divisions, the security forces will incorporate and maintain these divisions. The greatest change was often creating a new class of privilege and impunity, the officer corps, which exercised power and spawned corruption at hitherto unprecedented levels.

Lesson four is that language skills (or the lack thereof) and racial/ethnic prejudices have a major impact. Knowing not only the grammar, but the nuances and local variations of a language is vital. In Latin America knowing that loyalty and subservience to the state is very different than loyalty and subservience to the government or the people is vital. The Latin tradition is that of the army of the conquistadores, not our militia tradition. Loyalty goes to one’s immediate commander and then to the institution, not to the government or constitution. Understanding the lack of words for compromise, or accountability, the meaning of addressing a superior as mi coronel, knowing why, in Spanish for example, instead of being
disappointed one is deceived or betrayed, understanding such concepts of personalismo (the tendency to give loyalty to an individual rather than an institution) are all keys to knowing both the possibilities and limits of potential influence.

Racial prejudice was both common and generally accepted in the United States in the first third of the 20th century and this had a strong impact in places such as Haiti. It produced paternalism, a willingness to set much lower standards for and accept conduct by nationals of all ranks. The ultimate example was the court-martial by the Marines of a Dominican Lieutenant, Rafael Trujillo, who was accused of multiple rape and extortion. Despite overwhelming evidence against him, not only was he acquitted, but the case had no impact on his future promotions and assignments. As a result, when the United States withdrew, Trujillo rapidly took over first the army and eventually the entire nation, becoming in the process one of the most brutal and corrupt dictators in Latin American history.

Lesson five is that most influence rarely survives withdrawal. Power and culture overcome ideology, and once foreign trainers lose their direct authority, they also lose much of their influence. To exercise authority effectively usually meant operating as a caudillo, a cacique, a traditional jefe. But once the trainer was no longer in that position, the authority passed to his national successor, who was a product of the traditional, not the imported culture. What were necessary adaptations in the short run to create an effective force often undermined long-range policy goals concerning the nature and political orientation of the institution. The officers assigned to create these forces often understood this and at times attempted to communicate this to Washington but without success.

Lesson six is that secondary issues in the creation and training process often become major issues once command transfer is made to national authorities. The issue of intelligence is a key example. Under American control intelligence operated largely as a tactical military tool. Focus was on issues of collection and evaluation more than utilization. When American forces withdrew the newly created militaries retained control over all domestic and foreign intelligence and used it to protect the military institution and perpetuate governments in power. Internal dissent rather than foreign threats became the primary focus. Leaving behind a structure where all intelligence, foreign and domestic, was administered by the military made it inevitably an instrument of political control and repression.

Officers assigned to these missions were rarely prepared for the cultural and political obstacles they would encounter. Language skills were often neglected, selection was based more on institutional values than capability for the mission, and technical skills were generally valued above human skills. As a result, those involved frequently saw this as a job to be finished as quickly as possible so they could return
to something better or “more important.” What is remarkable is how well most officers and enlisted men functioned while assigned to these missions. They often developed a strong rapport with the nationals they were training and leading, and while in command, kept abuses of power under relative control. But they were unable to leave behind any structure that would curb these tendencies once they departed.

Finally, in all these cases communication between those making policies in Washington and those trying to carry out these policies in the field was very poor at best. Directives from higher authorities arrived quickly and forcefully; reactions, if transmitted at all, were delayed, re-routed, criticized, and ignored. Those doing the training quickly learned that questioning means and resources, much less objectives, could be career threatening. Under such circumstances “not on my watch” became an operative slogan, along with preparing excuses for ultimate failure such as “to really do the job would require our presence here for at least two generations.”

In summary, there are huge limits of influence when trying to develop a military force in another culture. The more ambitious the goals of such a project, the more radical the transformation envisioned, the more likely it is that the effort will not only fail, but that the ultimate results will be diametrically opposed to those originally sought. Sustainability of effort and resources can never be assumed, common language does not signify common values, ability to transmit technical knowledge does not equate with ability to instill values. Training can provide needed skills that serve both their national interests and ours. It can produce ties and relationships that may prove of future benefit. It can, if done properly, create a core within our own military who understand the military culture and the problems of another society. What it cannot do is transform a society according to preconceived blueprints. Refusal to understand and accept the limits of influence only ensures that the final result of creating military and police institutions in another culture will deviate even further from the original goals envisioned for such forces.
Notes


On the Ground: Training Indigenous Forces in Iraq
Aaron D. Boal

The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) was initially set up to assist in keeping the peace, particularly in the cities of Iraq. It fell somewhere between a police force and an army. The force was relatively small and acted to supplement what coalition forces were doing and help put a local face on Iraqi security. The first units were trained in a rather decentralized manner with a one-week basic training (established at the division level) and then soldiers were sent back to their local units, where coalition commanders had leeway to continue to train and implement the force. Our advisory group was small, one officer and one NCO responsible for coordinating supplies and tracking and reporting status of our company-size element as well as training one platoon. The other platoons were divided among the TCBs (troops, companies, and batteries) and trained as squads before being brought together to form platoons. This initial setup lasted a long time and acted as a pilot program for the larger ICDC that was to come, teaching us lessons and helping us identify issues we knew would intensify when larger numbers of soldiers had to be organized, trained, and incorporated.

Figure 1

Iraqi proved to be a dynamic contemporary operation environment (COE), and situations and missions changed quickly. This change had a large effect on ICDC as well. The NIA (New Iraqi Army) was being trained concurrently in a much more structured and thorough environment, but this system was unable to produce large numbers of soldiers in a short period of time. Pressure to get more Iraqi security...
forces into service increased, and this mission fell to the coalition line units. Our squadrons requirement jumped from one company-size organization to battalion size. This created numerous problems, from providing adequate personnel and facilities to train and operate to creating effective ways to train and implement this new force. The first steps were to establish a recruiting procedure, including background, medical, and physical conditioning testing, and to deal with the massive crowd-control problems and with force-protection issues that were created due to the large numbers of Iraqis who wanted these jobs. Just getting potential soldiers in the gate proved to be a challenge.

A big problem we encountered was that we were to establish a battalion with the headquarters that came with it, and this battalion was to fall under a higher headquarters. Unfortunately, this higher headquarters was not set up before the establishment of our battalion. Along with this the CMATT (Coalition Military Assistance Training Team) did not have adequate time to establish all the necessary systems and standards. Meanwhile, those of us down on the ground level did not have the luxury to wait for these to be in place, as we needed to train the soldiers and get them on the streets as soon as possible. An initial entry training, so to speak, was set up by our regimental headquarters. It was a six-day program that consisted of a day of in-processing and a day of out-processing, one day at the range shooting a small amount of familiarization fire, and three days actually conducting training on fieldcraft. Obviously this was inadequate to prepare these new soldiers, mostly with no experience, to conduct operations in the environment Iraq presented.
To compensate for this, we decided to recruit all of personnel at least four weeks before they were scheduled to report for their basic training. I met with our senior NCO and the other NCOs who had taken part in the initial ICDC effort and came up with the skills each soldier needed to operate and survive in Baghdad. We turned this into a four-week training calendar and developed tasks, conditions, and standards for all the training. This helped us come up with part of the doctrinal way we would operate, kind of gave us an SOP (standing operating procedure) that was not previously developed or provided by higher.

- Higher HQ Not Set Up
- CMATT
- Rubber Meets the Road
- Doctrine
- Training Program

Initial Reality

- Cadre Experience
- Training Facilities & Atmosphere
- “The Green Berets”
- Soldiers Attitudes & Motives
There were more than the obvious problems facing us as we established our ICDC unit. One of the major problems was that no one in our organization was trained to do this kind of work. They were excellent scouts and artillerymen and so forth, but not special forces soldiers who had spent years training and were specialists at this. In addition, training forces in Iraq was certainly not the same as training soldiers in America. US training centers stateside are customized to meet the needs of training units, and the atmosphere is one that supports the successful transition of a civilian to a soldier. In eastern Baghdad we did not have this environment. We had no facilities and little room to conduct training, as well no classroom space. This, combined with the huge communication barrier between the teachers and the students and the requirement for translators who did not themselves understand what we were instructing, made teaching even simple tasks tough.

The model most people have of training indigenous forces is probably one similar to Vietnam, where a base camp in a remote area is established, and local soldiers and US trainers alike live there. This was not the reality in Iraq. Our camp was located in the city with limited area to operate. This area was the soldiers’ home, and as we had no way to house all of these men, they went home nightly. This made soldiering a day job for them, and they easily turned the switch off every night. Establishing discipline and building teams were extremely difficult as a result and coupling this with the influences outside the camp and the established pecking order in tribes and neighborhoods made the task even more challenging.

Soldiers

- Peasants with Rifles
- Discipline
- Loyalties
- Infiltrators
- 10-90%
- Leaders

Figure 5
Eventually we were able to relieve some of the pressure on ourselves as we occupied land adjacent to our squadron base camp and established an ICDC base camp. While not spacious, it did give us our own land and enabled us to use it as we saw fit. It also gave us covered space (after tents and eventually buildings were erected) to conduct classes, store items, house a DFAC, and eventually house the staff and provide S&As for the companies. On top of this we had to deal with the reality of why most people were here—they needed money. Not that this is a bad thing, but it shows that most did not really want to be soldiers protecting their neighborhoods and had little interest in learning the trade and the skills associated with it. Rather, they were interested in doing the minimum to get a paycheck at the end of the month.

The quality of soldiers that came to serve in ICDC fell below the quality of the soldier that served in the US Army. This was mostly due to the background the ICDC soldiers came from. They were mostly of little means and had little education. Their critical thinking skills and ability to think tactically were limited due to the lack of education. They were mostly farmers and unskilled laborers who needed work, basically peasants. As most ICDC soldiers came from a chaotic environment that had been ruled for their lifetime by a dictator, most had little discipline and drive to work for their own betterment. Along with the lack of discipline came the question of loyalties, to whom these soldiers were loyal and why. It was a good assumption that many were far more loyal to their tribes and tribal leaders than to us or their chain of command. The fact that loyalty was in question made it difficult for ICDC soldiers to work together, as loyalty to the team and one another is key to any successful military unit. It also brought into question which ICDC soldiers were loyal to organizations that were subversive to the process of rebuilding a free Iraq.

It was accepted by most cadre members that there had to be some infiltrators in the group of ICDC soldiers we worked with, but identifying who they were or which groups they may be providing information to was nearly impossible. Overall I felt we had about 10 percent of the group that was actually interested in being ICDC members and had the capacity to do so successfully. This was combined with the lack of capable leaders that stepped forward. Most who wanted to lead did so only because they knew the leaders were paid more money. On top of this was the fact that many soldiers who had the potential to be good military leaders were not necessarily leaders outside of ICDC in the communities and tribes, making it difficult for them to get the other ICDC soldiers to follow them.

There were a lot of issues facing ICDC and certainly much to be done. Perhaps the most pressing question was where to start focusing our training program. While it was easy to focus on what we did not have, I decided to start with the assets we already had. For instance, we had an excellent group of officers, noncommissioned
officers, and soldiers who supported our operations. All of these men had at least six months of experience in combat operations in Baghdad, so they had a good idea of not only what operations were being done in the city and how to conduct them, but also of the specific environment we were operating in. Along with this, they obviously brought many years of military experience and years of training soldiers.

Creating a POI

- Where to Start
- Experience Advantage
- Use the 10%
- Universal Doctrine
- Maximize Time
- KISS

Figure 6

The task of training ICDC soldiers presented some unique challenges to our cadre, though. To help alleviate this, we turned to another asset, the small group of ICDC members who were capable and willing to help train the ICDC trainees. They knew the language, the culture, and what was effective with the trainees. Another source that provided quick help was US doctrine, which all of the cadre already knew. It gave us a focus for how we wanted to conduct operations and how to train. With these things we knew we had limited time to train and had to take advantage of the extra four weeks we made for ourselves, focusing on the key skills that needed to be learned and cutting out the extraneous. One of the keys to this was keeping our training and operations simple; we had enough problems without adding any more complications.

Like any organization, building a good team was critical to success. Getting the ICDC members to work with one another was a crucial first step. The differences between the soldiers, while not apparent on the surface, were most certainly there and caused a lot of discontent among the soldiers and interrupted training. Selection of the leadership was also crucial to the success of the team. The problem, of course,
was deciding whom to pick. The decisions rested on our shoulders, but what makes a good leader to us does not necessarily make a good leader to the locals. We based our decisions on education, experience, and if we were lucky, what we saw of their leadership skills in action. Trying to select officers proved particularly difficult, as judging the skill set needed for these jobs in the short amount of time available was terribly difficult.

![Building a Team](image)

**Figure 7**

One thing we did know was that once we established our leadership, we had to empower them to make decisions and lead. Along with this we knew we must be willing to see our mistakes in some cases and not be afraid to replace leaders who could not cut it and promote those who could. Trying to build loyalty up and down this thrown-together chain of command proved challenging, as well as establishing a common value set all ICDC soldiers could operate from. While the values are not necessarily identical to those of the US Army, the idea is the same in both cases.

As stated earlier, the process of choosing and developing leaders was essential to our success. So our first step was to try to identify what made a good leader for the ICDC and who possessed these traits. We found it hard to pinpoint what exactly these qualities were in a short period of time, so seeing leaders in action was generally the best way to determine who was good and who was not. Once we selected leaders, training them was imperative. We needed to impart lot of additional information to these new officers and NCOs, yet no additional time was available to do so, and we needed these leaders with their men so they could conduct operations. Therefore, pulling them out of their units was not a good option. Much of what
they learned turned out to be on the job training from platoon and company mentors.

![Training a Leader]

**Training a Leader**

- What Makes a Leader
- More info., Same Time
- Challenges & Decisions
- Empower & Support
- Key to Success

Eventually NCO and officer formal courses were developed, and leaders were cycled through so as not to take all of the leaders from a single unit at one time. One big tissue with training leaders was trying to instill some of the basic military leadership skills that would be essential for them to conduct successful operations. The biggest was the ability to make sound and timely decisions. One of the best ways the US Army develops its junior leaders is through field training and forcing leaders to make decisions on a simulated battlefield. Unfortunately, we did not have a lot of land upon which to operate and had only limited time; however, we still developed simulated combat lanes we could use. We basically acted as the opposing forces ourselves and used sticks as weapons and whatever else we could get our hands on while supplies were limited. Any challenges we could give these leaders would serve them well down the road, so we attempted to mentally challenge them and encourage them to take charge and make decisions as often as possible.

As we encouraged them to make decisions, we had to support them. These men would not be able to be leaders if we did not empower them, so we went with their decisions unless we knew they would prove catastrophic, and we encouraged them to make sound decisions through constant advice and mentoring. Sometimes they made bad decisions, but they learned and their men understood they were in charge, and we, as the cadre/adviser group, backed them up.
Along with establishing companies and platoons, we had the task of establishing a battalion headquarters, so not only did we have to train officers and NCOs to be effective leaders, we had to teach a group how to be staff officers. The obvious first problem with this is who to select to do the job. How were we to decide which personnel were qualified and would do the job well. We conducted interviews and gathered as much information as possible on candidates, which eased the selection. Actually we chose much of the staff from ICDC personnel we were already familiar with and knew were intelligent. In some cases we had good officers who really were not the combat type but had right stuff for staff work. In the case of the battalion S4 (logistics officer), we chose the ICDC soldier who had served as our supply sergeant and showed he had what it took to do the job and lead a staff section.

We decided to base our system basically off of the traditional US Army staff system, as at least all of the cadre members were familiar with it, and historically it proved effective and it was rather simple. Inside of this, we had to develop systems to make our staff operate. We had the promise of computers, but of course we did not know when they would show up, so all work had to be done the old-fashioned way with pens, paper, and filing cabinets. Something as seemingly simple as tracking soldier accountability at training proved challenging, as we built the system from scratch. Dealing with other areas that needed systems in place to support them, such as property accountability, weapons security, maintenance, and signal and radio issues proved a daily battle to establish effectively. More critical issues, such as operations planning, including running missions and conducting training, as well as intelligence gathering and planning, proved to be the focus of most of
our staff training, as they were very difficult.

We of course had the goal of being able to gather actionable intelligence from the line units, have it passed up, analyze it, create an effective plan to act on it, and execute the operation successfully, but making the systems work where this could be done and then work the vertical and lateral communication from the ICDC soldier on the ground through the chain of command and the staff and back down was a long process. The biggest problem for the cadre and advisers as we set this system up and mentored the new staff was that we were not staff officers ourselves and, for the most part, had never been. We had a basic understanding, but no in-depth understanding of how things got done efficiently. To some extent it was the blind leading the blind.

One tool that proved useful to us was our Squadron staff. Some of the officers and NCOs, and in one case a squared away specialist, basically volunteered to help train this new staff. They met at least once a week, often more, to discuss almost all aspects of their respective staff roles. In particular our S2 section (intelligence) made dramatic strides. One of squadron’s junior captains helped our new ICDC battalion S2 establish a very effective and thorough system of gathering and handling intelligence, including building their own commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) from scratch. A lot of what we tried did not work, and some of it did. We quickly established a policy of keeping what works and disposing of, or more common adapting, things that did not. We measured our success in this area based on results instead of by meeting a certain criteria. Bottom line, if it worked we did it.

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### Logistics

- **Food**
- **Water, Water, Water**
- **Transportation**
- **Uniforms, Medical Supplies, Weapons, Ammo, Maintenance, Commo, Supplies, etc.**
- **Financing the ICDC**

Figure 10
Logistics proved a great challenge throughout my time working with ICDC. We were responsible for getting our own logistics set up. While we were given some support, such as funding for providing meals during the day, and we had our own water buffalos and 5-ton trucks assigned to us, we were responsible to gather everything ourselves. We established our own ICDC DFAC (dining facility), as our squadron facility could not handle everyone. This ended up being a good step, as ICDC soldiers preferred local food while the squadron DFAC served American food. We also were able to procure MREs for soldiers who were not able to eat at the DFAC. We were also able to secure a ration of bottled water daily for the soldiers, and we had our own water buffalo, but ICDC soldiers went through water like we lived at an oasis. They washed before prayer, which was up to five times a day, and before and after meals, not to mention just to cool off and, of course, to drink.

We filled the water buffalo daily and finally had to get the ICDC leadership to understand they should not waste water, as it would run out and we could not get any more. Transportation was also a major issue, as, for the most part, we used US vehicles (HMMWVs and 5-tons) to move troops around. This meant we had to have US soldiers to operate and gun all of these vehicles as well as conduct maintenance on our 17-vehicle fleet. Along with this, trying to get a lot of soldiers to one place at the same time proved very difficult, and often we had to borrow vehicles.

If we conducted missions at different places and times, juggling cadre, support personnel, and vehicles to meet mission requirements ran our people and equipment ragged. Beyond this almost all other supplies proved challenging to get. The exception was rifles, which were provided by higher headquarters upon the ICDC soldier’s completion of his basic training. Eventually we were able to get enough ammunition to run missions, but we had very little to conduct marksmanship training, which the ICDC soldiers desperately needed. We were able to use various methods to procure things such as medical supplies, as our squadron medical officer hunted extra stuff down to provide us with combat lifesavers packs and trained our medics in immediate first aid and combat lifesaver skills. Other equipment such as radios and vehicles were basically nonexistent. We ended up buying handheld radios for communication needs and used a confiscated SUV for transporting the battalion leadership. We were able to scrounge money from multiple sources to buy supplies and other mission-essential items, such as flashlights, checkpoint equipment, and things as simple as pens and paper. There was little direct financing that came down to us specifically marked for ICDC except the payroll, which we picked up and distributed once a month.

Interaction between the cadre/advisers and the ICDC soldiers was tenuous sometimes. These were two groups of people who came together from very different
backgrounds and often times had little in common yet needed to work together daily. For the most part, both the US and Iraqi personnel had already decided what they thought of the other in generalities from contact they had with each other while the US forces were patrolling their streets. These preconceptions sometimes made it difficult to effectively train or be trained, especially if one let prejudices blind what the reality was. Both sides had to make an effort to relate to where the other was coming from. We particularly stressed this to our cadre/advisers, as we were already the trained professionals and working with these guys was our job. Meanwhile, the ICDC soldiers had comparatively limited education and lacked the military background and disciple our soldiers had.

One major difficulty was teaching operating in an ethical and lawful fashion, following a generated set of ROE (rules of engagement). Of course what we saw as ethical was not always the same view they had, our laws were not the same, and quite frankly they just did not get the concept or the content of the ROE. As I have said, this culture shock issue was a two-way street. The cadre was placed in a foreign environment, in many definitions, away from home, family, and most means of stress reduction and forced to deal with ICDC problems daily. Perhaps the culture shock was greater on the Iraqis, however. They were forced to come into a very American-style institution that sat in the middle of their own country and have foreigners tell them how to act in a military fashion, which in itself is a whole other world. Of course, for mission success, both sides had to figure out how to become comfortable with one another and work together.
Figure 12

The purpose of establishing the ICDC was to run missions, so getting the new ICDC soldiers on the streets was the focal point of our operations. All of our training focused on preparing them for this goal. Initially there were four main goals in the conduct of operations. First was the legitimization of the ICDC force. If locals did not respect its authority and see it as a legitimate, effective security force, the ICDC could not be successful. Second, we were conducting real-world missions and providing security to the neighborhoods. We wanted to start having these forces protect their neighborhoods. This gave them a worthwhile goal in an area they cared about and allowed them to be seen in an area where they would be respected. Third, these first missions were great on-the-job training for the ICDC soldiers. Since we had limited space in the base camp, getting into the city and into what was a very real situation provided great training for the men. Last, these missions built confidence and trust among not only the ICDC soldiers, but also between the ICDC and the US cadre, verifying the training we gave them and giving us credit in the conduct of future training.

Our goal was to be able to conduct a variety of missions that would provide security to the area. These missions included patrols, cordon and search operations, traffic control points and check points, IED sweeps, fixed-site security (particularly of their own base camp and the UN compound), and joint operations with the other security forces operating in the area, including coalition forces, Iraqi police, and the NIA. These missions were generally not complicated or rehearsed before being executed. The forces continued to improve as they conducted more missions.
There were of course some issues that arose during the planning and conduct of missions with ICDC. While patrolling one’s own neighborhood provided some incentive to the ICDC soldiers and helped bring credit to the organization, it also showed that these soldiers had a hard time policing themselves, as they had to go home at the end of the day and live in the same neighborhoods. This meant they had to deal with the criminal element and their families while off-duty, and they had no backup as the other ICDC soldiers were gone and they were not carrying their AK-47s. This made many ICDC soldiers hesitant to do their duty for fear of retribution.
Another pressing question was understanding exactly what the intended role of the ICDC was. Were they to be more like a police force or like an army or end up like a National Guard? At first it was very unclear of what was expected of the Civil Defense Corps, and what missions they needed to perform. As a group we concluded that they needed to be able to do the same type of operations the coalition forces were conducting, not deal with crime or worry about foreign armies, but rather battle insurgency and civil unrest inside the country. Eventually guidance and a simple mission-essential task list (METL) for the overall purpose of ICDC vs the police and the NIA were handed down and basically confirmed our policies.

On top of all the issues of taking new soldiers out into a real-world environment and the culture and communication gaps and the other problems I have mentioned throughout, we also faced the complex environment a large city offers. Taking soldiers into a more traditional environment would have proved challenging enough, but training these men to operate in perhaps the most complex and dangerous environment that exists complicated missions that much more. Safety was also always an issue as there certainly were real bad guys out there who wanted us to fail. This added to the safety issues that arise with green and relatively undisciplined soldiers walking the streets with loaded assault rifles. Safety always needed to be at the forefront of mission planning and in the mind of the leadership and US advisers during the conduct of operations.

There was a constant balance we tried to achieve while conducting missions. We needed to get training value out of the patrols, as the end goal of all of this was to have the ICDC be able to act independently, with little or no adviser assistance. This weighed against the fact that we needed to get the missions done now, not just train, so there was a lot of pressure to be proficient and effective now and the fact that there was a real threat who could set IEDs or ambush our forces, US and Iraqi, at any time; so we had to always be on our toes, which is difficult while teaching and advising.

There were restrictions we had to deal with as we conducted operations. The biggest, of course, like in any military operation, was politics. What we do as an Army is always in support of a political objective, so we are not always able to operate exactly how we would like. Timelines in particular were rushed as a lot of pressure was applied to get ICDC on the streets and operating. Iraq certainly proved a complex political environment, as a lot people and groups had to be taken into consideration when conducting any operation. The city itself was also very restrictive, including the number of civilians around. In addition, the heat of the summer and mud of the winter made operations difficult and had to be considered when planning an operation. As I mentioned before, time and resources were limited at best, and this certainly caused some restrictions in our ability to operate how
we wanted.

Other issues that fell beyond our control also caused problems for us. ICDC soldiers were only allowed to work 40 hours a week, obviously not always conducive to military operations. ICDC soldiers did not live in a high-tech environment and reaching them, particularly in a short period of time, was impossible. Very few had phones and ICDC basically had no way to muster, so we were only able to use soldiers as they were scheduled to come in, again not very conducive to a civil defense unit responsible for dealing with emergencies. Planning missions is a key to success in most military organizations, but prior planning was usually not something ICDC could do, as any secret information could not released because the soldiers could easily go home and compromise our operations by talking about them, again a problem due to lack of discipline. So missions were generally not truly planned until immediately before execution. We also faced a high operations tempo, particularly wearing down our US advisers and limiting training time available to the units. All in all we did not have a great deal of flexibility, which was important to operating in the COE of eastern Baghdad.

Communication between the Iraqis and the US cadre/advisers was a key factor in determining the difference between success and failure. Obviously there was the language barrier that had to be overcome for us to work together. While both the Iraqis and the US soldiers were able to learn some of the other’s language, this was not sufficient for the in-depth communication that was required, especially for the technical parts of conducting military operations. In addition to the language
barrier, there was a cultural barrier. This made things very difficult, as neither side really understood the other’s culture. This is where hired translators came in. Some were just that; they translated from one language to the other. We were looking for more than that, though. We wanted someone who could actually interpret from one language to the other with consideration to the cultures involved.

These interpreters were able to relate not just what was said, but the meaning behind it. Interpreters were vital to the success of our mission, in training, and in the conduct of operations. Without them the critical gap that lay between “us” and “them” could not be bridged. Another key piece to communicating and understanding the Iraqis was in how we treated them. Just like our own soldiers, they knew and appreciated you looking out for them and would try to communicate as best as possible when they respected you.

Being part of the cadre/adviser group was not an easy task for any of the soldiers who did it. It was incredibly challenging from the highest to the lowest rank. As I have already pointed out, none of the cadre came from a special-forces background and had little experience in what we were doing. Our cadre came from all of the combat arms, and in some of the enlisted men’s cases, they came from service and service-support branches as well. They were hand selected from all of the units in the squadron and had no prior notice that they were going to be involved with ICDC and had little chance to study up on what needed to be done. We were lucky as our squadron assigned highly competent soldiers to work on our project.
By the time our group of cadre handed off our ICDC units to our US replacements in eastern Baghdad, most were worn out. The operations tempo was very high and taxing on all of them, as they had so many soldiers to support, including advising leaders, coordinating training, going on missions, and filling in to help other cadre members and to aid the support operations. All of the cadre were advising above what their rank would traditionally have worked with. For example, sergeants first class were responsible for company-size elements, which were run by a captain and a first sergeant. This was true across the board and also in the staff sections. Many had additional duties as well, most helping run the support structure and advising leaders and staff. The job was also fairly dangerous, not only because we were running missions in Baghdad and the ICDC soldiers lacked discipline, but also the fact that there were 40 of them to only a few of us. Another concern was maintaining the safety and security of our US soldiers on missions with Iraqi soldiers whom sometimes we did not know, especially knowing that not all soldiers had the best intentions in being in the ICDC.

Building local security forces in the environment our Army is currently in is critical to our success. We should know Phase IV operations are the key to success of the overall mission, and the establishment of local indigenous forces means fewer US forces are needed. Selection and training of future cadre and advisers should be a top priority. This should be the case even more so when a unit is coming in as a replacement and the organization is already in place. They should come in with an adviser team already set up and trained. It is a difficult task and requires special training. Units should not wait until deployment to identify who the advisers
are going to be; they should be identified ahead of time and given time to train and prepare.

**Preparing Future Cadre**

- Top Priority
- Replacements
- Difficult Task
- Learn the Language
- Learn the Duties
- Learn the Missions
- Learn from Predecessors

*Figure 18*

Some key tasks to train should include a better understanding of the culture and a better grasp of the native language. They need to have a good understanding of what their duties will be and how to do them. Also learning all the missions that will be conducted is critical, as they will not necessarily have the luxury of conducting missions with a regular US unit before acting as advisers. If the units are already established, the new adviser group should ensure they learn all they can from their predecessors and maximize battle handover, including right seat-left seat rides.

**Recommendations**

- Preparation Time
- Resource
- Train Cadre
- Isolate
- Selection of Leaders
- Write Doctrine
- Key Decision Makers

*Figure 19*
Overall recommendations for conducting future operations of this type include giving units and advisers maximum preparation time. We know this is key part of Phase IV operations, so we need to start planning for them in Phase III. While preparing this we should ensure this critical mission is properly resourced, not thrown together at the last minute with soldiers on the ground scrounging for what they can get their hands on. We should take the time and establish a standard for training the cadre/advisers so they are prepared to accomplish their mission and are not trying to figure things out on the fly.

We should attempt to isolate the trainees and soldiers as much as possible to limit outside influence and allow for maximum training and team building. Those responsible for selecting the leadership of the local unit should allocate maximum effort to selecting capable leaders for the unit, as these leaders will help alleviate many of the problems that face US cadre and deal with the problems themselves. Doctrine should not only be written or pulled out of retirement, but also made readily available for the advisers/cadre who will need them. There is no reason to reinvent the wheel since we are not the first people to conduct these operations. Last, key decision makers in establishing and running adviser groups and local units need to spend a lot of time on the ground with these units. Working with these units is a unique experience, different from commanding standard US units, which cannot be understood unless one is down in the mud with them.
CSI Conference Roundtable Discussion

Moderator (Colonel Kevin Benson)

These are officers of distinction who I know have met that challenge, who crossed the line of departure, who faced fire and all other manners of uncomfortable times and high adventure, and the guys are going to introduce themselves and give a little opening remark and then we’ll open it up for questions. And the reason I’m moderating is because I’m a colonel, and, if it gets too tough, I get to interpose my body in between the spears. Gentlemen.

Major Jeffrey Madison

My name is Major Jeff Madison. I am, or I was, the executive officer for the 8th Finance Battalion. We provide direct support to 1st Armored Division. We deployed from Germany, I came from Baumholder myself, and several locations, in fact, from Germany and ended up supporting 1st Armored Division as well as the other task forces attached to them in the Baghdad area. We arrived in Baghdad after the major combat operations had ceased. We had been in the plan for participating in that if it had continued on. After we arrived here this afternoon, I haven’t been here for the rest of the conference so we’ve kind of been comparing notes on what’s been discussed. So I’m going to jump around a little bit here so I’m not overly redundant on some of the things you’ve already heard.

One of the questions I always ask whenever I get an opportunity to talk to people is, fact or fiction, do you need finance on the battlefield? And it’s a constant mission of ours to try and sell ourselves to the Army for some reason, even though every after-action review that I’ve ever read says, “Man, we should have had finance with us there at the very beginning. Finance, comptroller, contracting, that whole team.” So it is a myth. In fact, I have a quote here, you’ve probably all heard it a dozen times in this conference. But, “Money is the best ammo I have in this war.” General Petraeus said that while he was over there and it just kind of reiterates. So it is a myth. You do first need finance on the battlefield, and fortunately 1st Armored Division recognized that and worked us into their plan from the very beginning to include putting myself on their torch party their first 17 people in there along with the comptroller. So two financial managers in the team of 17, the first people to hit the ground, and an additional five in the next 200 that hit the ground.

I was going to talk about some of the normal finance support that we provide, but it sounds like we’re going to go a little different direction than that and I’ll review what they are, but I won’t go into them. Of course, paying you if you’re an Army military person, paying you is one of the things we do. But on the battlefield, it’s about third in the order of priority. Our most important missions are contracting
support and commercial vendor service support. Third, of course, is paying you. Armed Forces Entertainment (AFE) support, all that money they take in from you buying cases of Coke, we collect that in for them. We take in all that captured currency that people are supposed to turn in, but I was talking with some of the panel members up here; we’ve heard stories that perhaps not everybody was doing that. But putting the money to good use. And then there are some other programs that I do believe some have been touched on in the conference. And that’s hopefully some of the questions that will come in those areas.

We don’t create those programs; we help execute them, we help provide the cash for them, we help provide training for people who aren’t used to being held pecuniary liable for having funds from the US Treasury or other types of funds. So we help do that.

Some numbers real quick. The amount of cash that my battalion disbursed over the 15 months we were in theater, and I came back a little early, but close to $200 million in cash was going through the hands of my soldiers into other people’s hands. So those aren’t checks or EFTs (Electronic Funds Transfers), that’s dollars. Sometimes five and 10 dollar bills going through. So somewhere close to 500,000 transactions over that period. It’s incredible.

The other programs—I’m just going to hit the names of them and if you want to go into deeper questions about them, then we’ll do that after everybody else has introduced themselves. When I first arrived, it was called ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance). They were making payments to municipal workers. Like one-time payments of $20-25 to teachers, policemen, firemen, through the ORHA system, using funds that had been seized at some other point, not using our own funds. So there is one. Later they turned to the Office of Coalition Provisional Authority (OCPA). We, in turn, coined them ORHA payments for lack of a better term and then CPA payments. Very in line with the way we do things in the Army.

Then came the Brigade Commander’s Discretionary Fund. It started out with a whopping $25,000 in discretionary funds for a brigade commander to use at his discretion, you know, to make a huge impact on what was going on. And we can get into that a little bit more.

Then the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, or CERP as we called it, kind of took the Brigade Commander’s Discretionary Fund and upped the ante quite a bit, allowing the division commander to have due projects or have a fund up to $500,000 in projects up to $100,000 each. And the brigade commander’s $200,000—$50,000 per project.

Then another one I was talking about with the lieutenant over here, that we
called DFI (Divested Funds Iraq). That’s what we used to pay dinars to the Iraqi soldiers that he was training and we set up a program and the training to facilitate that process as well.

There were many other small things going on. We called them CREST payments. They were real estate payments that we made, for example at the convoy support centers along the various MSRs (Main Supply Routes), we were paying Iraqis for those and numerous other things. We were buying safes for everybody in the theater it seemed like because we found a vendor. When I say everybody, that includes the POW camps, where Tariq Aziz was held at Baghdad International Airport where I was located. When you capture somebody and they have money or valuables on them, that money has to be secured and as the number of prisoners goes up, of course, the amount of storage space you need exceeds the field safe you brought. Many other things going on. So I’ll leave it right there and keep it open. My point essentially is that we train for a certain type of standard mission that we do in every contingency or combat operations, which were some of those early things that I mentioned. Everything in those other programs I hadn’t heard of until I got on the ground. So these were things that we’re developing, helping turn victory into success, that people were using and I have some personal opinions on how to make those better or how they could have been done sooner, but we’ll do that after the others introduce themselves.

**Captain Edwin Werkheiser**

My name is Captain Ed Werkheiser. I commanded H Company of 2d Squadron, 3d ACR, which is a tank company in an ACR squadron for those of you that know something about the organization. It’s a stepchild kind of in the squadron. It’s not a cavalry troop. Probably only second in redheadedness to the attached howitzer battery. So it’s a little different. I was in two different places for the most part. The squadron was based between Fallujah and Ramadi. My little piece of the squadron was this town called Habaneyah, which is halfway between Fallujah and Ramadi, great real estate obviously. I was there from 28 April through 25 September with a couple of fits and starts. We were relieved for about a month and a half, two months by 2d Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division, at which time we moved the squadron to Ramadi.

And then I moved out west to Rupah which is out close, in relative terms, to the Jordanian border. The squadron was then responsible for much of the Saudi Arabian border, the Jordanian border, and part of the Syrian border. And, for those of you who know anything about doctrinal distances, that’s a little bit farther than any squadron is responsible for normally. It’s about 600 or 800 kilometers of border there. There’s nothing out there, but it’s a lot of border.

So that’s two very different perspectives on what I got to do there. The main
missions that my company was responsible for—we did security missions, which would be of ourselves, our base camp, different sites. On one occasion early in May, I got sent to go to these two supposed chemical weapons sites to go secure them for awhile so we could exploit them, sites such as that. Ammo dumps, obviously, I don’t know if we’ve covered that earlier in the conference, but there was a 2 kilometer by 1 kilometer-long ammunition dump that we were responsible for securing, which we did to varying degrees of success. Convoys, either securing our own convoys or if a convoy was hit on the route, we would go, since those people usually didn’t have our radio frequency, we would go follow the plume of smoke and assume it was probably an American convoy and we would try to go rescue them. And then different events. If you were going to have the CA (civil affairs) people come down and they wanted to talk to some local leader or if you were going to hand out some reconstruction or some of this massive $25,000 in funds, you would need to secure that event. If you were going to recruit some police force or ICDC (Iraq Civil Defense Corps, now the Iraqi National Guard) guys, you would need to secure that event. So those are the type of security missions you had, all obviously very different.

You had reconnaissance missions and that’s the standard real world, real Army, I suppose, reconnaissance missions that learn whether this bridge can take your vehicles or whether this or that route works. But what we found more important was what I’ll call human or cultural reconnaissance, which involved going out and determining who the leaders were, be they civil or religious or cultural leaders, tribal leaders. You figure out where the tribes are, draw that map however you may. You would figure out what government and administrative structure is still there. You may come into a town that has absolutely no governmental structure whatsoever. You’d have to find that out because they’re not going to tell you. You may come in and find that there are police there already who are wearing the olive drab uniform, the Saddam pickle suit, and those guys may or may not be effective. You need to find that out. Then you need to figure out if there are any people who have specialties, people who speak English, obviously very important, because you’re going to need to hire those guys to be your translators if you can get the money. Because they are Iraqis, they’re not going to work for free.

People who have other skills—engineers, teachers, things like that, people who would be important for you in the area. And also like I said, what are the different boundaries. So you’d know if an incident happened in a certain area, you could go to this sheik to find out. And so on several occasions we just got all the people who we thought may be leaders and then we just put out a call to say if you’re a leader, come by. And we’d get these people all in a room and we’d put a map up, which is kind of funny because most Iraqis don’t know much about maps, and we would say where are your people? And then you’d get them all debating
on where their people are. But it gives us some idea of who’s responsible for what areas. If you have a problem there, you try to go to that guy or try to have him come to you, whichever way. So that sort of standard reconnaissance mission goes on all the time.

We also did raids, and obviously that is on actionable and non-actionable intelligence sometimes, and I think that was pretty self-explanatory. That’s a tactical mission that, although we were not initially comfortable with, since we are tankers and having never trained for it, that’s something that you can train at the tactical level that people know about. Or they can be proficient at it.

And then the final thing is civil interaction, which would be things where you would coordinate for the delivery or the establishment of some sort of reconstruction aid. You need to figure out what kind of projects are going to go on there, what these people need, prioritize their needs for them because they’re going to tell you that everything is equally important. And, as you know, you need to advise the government. In my first town, I created the government. Going back on the experience and the training I had from eighth grade civics to establish the government for them, whether it worked or not is open to debate. You also need to interact, like Lieutenant Boal was talking about with the security forces and the government agencies of the area. And, finally, you would need to interact with the locals to find bad guys, they would be intel sources. So those are the main missions that we were involved with on the tactical end, what we found out, and we had trained for absolutely—well, I wouldn’t say absolutely—but we trained for just about none of that stuff. So we kind of ended up finding it out on the way.

What I thought I’d do to generate some discussion is I could sit up here and tell stories, but I don’t know what you all really want to know. So I really came with five major AR points, lessons learned that I think we need to look for in the future. The first one would be we need to figure out how to translate what we call stable and secure there. That was our big mission. We wanted to create a stable and secure environment. We need to figure out how to translate stable and secure into a leadership or operational plan. And what I mean by that is we need to integrate or have a dialogue between the political objectives and then the execution. And my example that I’ll give is at the local level, you know you can get security relatively fast by giving some local power to a strong man, say, for instance. And he could probably use some muscle and get security there pretty easily. On the other hand, that probably does not set us up very well in the future for what we’re trying to do. So, and obviously, to establish some sort of representative or some sort of permanently stable government is going to require more resources at all levels.

So when you’re telling me at the tactical level what we want to do, I need to
know what the level of support for that is. And we don’t do a very good job of hav-
ing that dialogue between the tactical-level guy, maybe the squadron or brigade
level, and the people who are establishing what they want the place to look like. So
we never really knew exactly what it was the endstate was supposed to look like.
And that’s obviously going to change depending on the situation on the ground. So
that, I think, we need to do better.

At the tactical level, we need to train specialists to do a lot of these civil affairs
type missions. In the armored corps, we have master gunners, and we have master
drivers, and you send a guy to air load school and you send a guy to rail load school
and you send a guy to NBC school, and these are all a couple of weeks long. And
we don’t have any guys who know anything about contracting. We don’t have
any guys who know anything about civil engineering projects. These Iraqis would
bring me projects that they wanted to get done with these engineering layouts of
we’re going to put culverts here and all that, and I don’t know anything about that
really. I don’t know if I’m getting ripped off or not. I don’t know if it’s going to
work. And that doesn’t mean that I need somebody who’s a certified engineer, I
just need a guy who understands a little bit about the cultural things that Lieutenant
Boal was talking about. Instead of sending a guy to NBC school for three weeks,
send him to some sort of civil police training school where he goes and works with
the police guys in the local area, like Leesville, so that they have some idea of how
police work, how they function. So that way, in my company, I’ve got not just me
who’s trying to do everything, I’ve got 76 or 77 or some lieutenant who may not be
an expert, but at least he has a direction of some place to go with this stuff.

Third, I would say we need to restructure the tactical forces to create true
combined arms formations. I had a tank company, I didn’t have anything else, I
didn’t have any Humvees, I didn’t have any infantry guys, I didn’t have any MPs,
really nothing of that sort, and what I saw was I would like to have light infantry
with me. I would like to have MPs with me. I would like to have some sort of intel

guy with me. And I know in the units that we did transitions with, they would like
to have some sort of armored support with them. So really I think we have kind of
five armies right now—an institutional army, kind of like this one, a special opera-
tions type of army, a combat support and service support army, and then we have a
heavy and a light army. And really I could make justification for four of those per-
haps, based on functionality, but there really is no need for five of them. The heavy
and the light army, I don’t see why we have two different ones. We need to get rid
of that. That requires a lot of different things. But we need to integrate that better.

The fourth is a simple one, that the Humvee is not a combat vehicle. We have
somehow got this opinion that the Humvee is a great solution for everything, it is
functionally just not good. It doesn’t protect you very well. You’ve got the one guy
up on the top who’s not very well protected and he’s doing a lot. He’s fighting the vehicle, essentially. He’s got the best situational awareness. He’s employing the weapons system and he’s not protected. I don’t know why...and I read in the latest edition of Armor magazine that we’re equipping our scouts now with Humvees again. And the people who are going to be running into the first line of the enemy, they’re driving around in the least protected vehicle. I don’t know why we’re going to ever build another non-armored Humvee because even our service support and admin type vehicles need that protection because I think that’s the one thing we found here is that’s our most vulnerable asset out there. The enemy is not going to come looking after me in an Abrams tank, he’s going to come looking after Major Madison in his finance Humvee. So I don’t know why we should ever build another non-armored Humvee and we need to develop that it is not a combat vehicle.

The final thing is training. We need to figure out our training is going to need to change in a couple of ways. We need to figure out how to better train ethics and law of land war. And I don’t mean just a class. We just need to figure out how to integrate it better into what we can do. It doesn’t need to be a set of principles or a set of just kind of boring laws. It needs to be, exactly, case studies. This is what you can do. Right. The prisoners, I had never trained how to deal with prisoners before and I ended up, obviously, dealing with quite a few. We need realistic training for things such as gunnery and field problems. We’re never going to really find, I don’t think, a battlefield without civilians on it, yet we never train for that type of thing. With the tanks, our tabloid is set up where you’re shooting the closest engagement I think is like 200 meters with a machine gun, and really the farthest engagement I had out there was about 500 meters. So need to change that around. I think we’re making steps there.

And then finally our CTCs (combat Training Centers); they can’t train for some of the stuff we’re going to find in conflicts like this, which is they can’t really train complacency. Because when you’re going there, you’re only going there for a month and you may be in the box for three weeks at the most and they’re trying to give you a slice of everything you’re going to see out there. So you never do the same mission for a month. You never have that guy who’s guarding or securing stuff for a month where he gets complacent. Because you don’t really...I guess you need to train to be complacent, but the leaders need to know how to rotate the people through and they try to compress the civil interaction piece. It’s kind of a cookie cutter approach where I go talk to tribal sheik A and he gives me the information and the intel and then we go execute it. Well, it really is going to take you probably several weeks, a month, maybe your entire rotation to develop this guy. And it simplifies the problem. I don’t know how to fix that. But that’s going to be a problem if there are CTCs that are designed for short duration, high intensity type of things. And I’ve taken up way too much time.
Lieutenant Aaron Boal

I’m Lieutenant Aaron Boal, and we’ve met before. I also come from a cavalry regiment but I didn’t come from the 3d ACR; I come from the 2d ACR, which for those of you who are familiar with that is somewhat of an anomaly as we only have the Humvees, which we can talk about later. I think it’s a wonderful vehicle.

I already talked quite a bit. I’ll tell you a little bit about what else I did over there. I came over, as part of B Troop of 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry as a scout platoon leader. Scout platoon is made up of eight trucks, about 24 guys ended up with the mortar section. So I had an infantry section attached to me and ended up with approximately 30 guys. We rolled over there. We ran full-spectrum operations. Some of the things we did, mostly I spent most of my time in Eastern Baghdad. As you saw on the map, I put it before Tisan Essan, which was Salbon Essan, before we got there, which is 7 April, named after Saddam came to power, and they changed it to Nine Essan for 9 April after the liberation. We conducted...it’s a very poor area. I spoke of it before. We did conduct some operations in Sadr City, went out between Baghdad and Fallujah with the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. Conducted some operations out there to prevent the bringing in of weapons and terrorism that would funnel from the west in Syria through Fallujah to Baghdad. Moved over, did an ICDC after that. Did that for about six months. Was getting ready to go home, was attached to 1st Armored Division and we got the call to get extended and went south. I spent most of my time in al-Kut, operated as a FOO (Field Ordering Officer), establishing the new base camp that needed to get built. We moved on to an old air field down there. We kind of had gone through it before when we first got to Camp Oriole in Baghdad, but it had to be all redone. We fixed airplane hangars that were in less than stellar condition. I did that during the day. At night, I worked with the IP (Iraqi police) station as a liaison trying to tie the IPs in a little closer to what we were doing. The IPs were actually pretty good down there. And then I moved over and became a battle captain for 1st Squadron, or as my sergeant major liked to call me the “Battle Lieutenant” for 1st Squadron.

A couple other things I did in Baghdad, we guarded the UN compound. We did that for probably three months. They continued to do that after I had left the unit. Also, working with the police station, guarding that. As I said, we did full-spectrum operations. So just about any other mission that would come up, I think most units over there did it.

Moderator

Like I said, the guys are at the point end of the spear. So we’ll entertain questions for these soldiers.

Question: A couple of questions, one for Major Madison and one for Captain
Werkheiser. Major Madison, you mentioned the programs you hadn’t heard of and adjustments you had to make and recommendations. If you could get into that. And then Captain Werkheiser, we had talked before when we met several months ago about interacting with the Iraqi people and your observation of they think differently. If you could elaborate on that. And Lieutenant Boal, if you had interaction as well with the Iraqi people aside from what you were talking about earlier, your observations as well. So Major Madison?

Major Jeff Madison

The reason I’m here today is I went to Dr. Yates’ office. I was possibly going to pursue an MMAS in History. And one of the things I wanted to write about, which I later determined I don’t have the time for—I already had my master’s—this is supposed to be the greatest year of my life. Yeah, I’m off to a great start.

I very vividly remember sending my wife an e-mail sometime in May. I tried to find it real quick last night, just to nail it down. The announcement was made, we’re disbanding the Iraqi army and we’re not going to pay them these ORHA OCPA payments, these one-time payments like we’re paying everybody else. And I remember shooting my wife that e-mail, going, “This is going to be a problem. This is going to come back and haunt us.” I wasn’t, I’m not a diplomat or anything like that. It just seemed like that number of people, putting them out on the street, with the things I had seen up to that point. We were talking about paying interpreters $4 a week; $20 would make a big difference to them. And so trying to find alternate things for them to do, if the government’s not going to pay them, they’re going to have to sustain themselves somehow and perhaps crime is what they’re doing. So as some of these programs started coming out, I was encouraged to see that we were taking steps to do more things, but I really didn’t see how they impacted this group. And I think maybe later on, they made the decision to pay these individuals more along what Lieutenant Boal talked about, but the immediate part of last summer or summer of 2003, I think, was a defining point of which way they were going to go. Were they going to be friendlies or were they going to become supporters of the insurgency. And my recommendation, the line of thinking I was going along with, my grandfather proudly served in the Civilian Conservation Corps and I had studied a long, long time ago, maybe ninth grade history, American history, the Work Projects Administration and I just thought maybe somehow when we—you know, other places we’d gone we haven’t really defeated an army as such and turned them loose.

Those armies have stayed intact. They continued to get sustained and I’m talking recent history. So I don’t think we had to deal with this on the scale that we have, with the forethought of what are we going to do with these people. Perhaps could have been a little more in-depth. And even if it was only $20 a week, those
first several months for any number of projects, I could probably list off several right off the top of my head, but it wouldn’t really matter what they were doing. It might have made a significant difference on which side they decided to go with in the long run.

When you look at the programs we did institute, I jokingly said an incredible $25,000 for the brigade commander’s discretionary fund. As soon as I saw the first FRAGO (fragmentary order) on that, we just kind of sat around and laughed because when you’re trying to make an impact on a city that’s in the, or a country that’s in the shape that country was in, it just seemed like that was just dust in the wind compared to what was needed. Yeah, it did give the brigade commander the ability to go and say, “In my zone that I’m responsible for, here’s some projects that need immediate attention that don’t have to go through the OCPA process of getting racked and stacked in an order of merit. I can take this money and apply it immediately.” And I’m sure the brigade commanders used it wisely, but I know immediately the outcry was we need a whole lot more than $25,000. And I think the reaction from that was the CERP (Commanders Emergency Response Program), which came shortly, maybe two weeks later. Some of the units hadn’t even drawn their $25,000 because they hadn’t figured out how to do it. And this new program was announced.

Other commanders were coming to us and the comptrollers for the third time so they could get more than just $25,000 but they could only have $25,000 at a time. And so much for project on that first go around. So those were good ideas, I just think they needed more cash pushed behind them. And, yeah, it can get expensive when you count the number of brigades and divisions in the zone, but when you consider the amount of money that was approved, and the amount of money that had been seized or captured and the value of those programs is a drop in the bucket. And we’ll probably spend ten times that much—or not ten times—ten million times that much trying to fix what we didn’t fix initially.

The divested funds Iraq is just we established a payroll system for their soldiers—the soldiers that the lieutenant helped train. We hadn’t met before today, but he got to meet people from my battalion in developing this. For those of you that have been in the Army longer than I have, I’ve always got my pay through electronic funds transfer. But I know some of you were in the service when the Class A agent came to finance, picked up a big chunk of money and came to the unit and made the payments. Well, that’s basically the system we devised for paying the Iraqi soldiers. To finance soldiers today, that’s a big deal. Look what we made up. But in reality, we just kind of dusted off some old procedures that we had used and, from the eighth grade, maybe sooner or maybe earlier than the eighth grade. So there are things we’ve done in the past out there that are worth looking at again.
for you historians looking at financial management from other wars and lessons learned from that. I don’t know that we as a financial management community do a good job of that. We rely so much on technology, we forget about these other things like military payment certificates (MPCs). I’ve never seen them, but they were in our SOPs forever until recently; we finally dropped them and decided we’ll always use money rather than scrip. But I know there are other nuggets of knowledge out there that are valuable in these types of situations.
Appendix A: Conference Program

Day 1
Tuesday, 14 September 2004

0645 – 0745 Breakfast at Conference Center

0800 – 0815 Opening Remarks

Session 1

0815 – 0945 Keynote Presentation

Turning Battlefield Victory Into Strategic Success
Dr. Conrad C. Crane
US Army Military History Institute

Moderator
Colonel Thomas T. Smith
Combat Studies Institute

Session 2

1000 – 1145 The Broader Context

War and Aftermath
Prof. Frederick W. Kagan
US Military Academy

What War Should Be, What War Is
Prof. John A. Lynn
University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign

Moderator
Dr. Robert F. Baumann
US Army Command and General Staff
College
1200 – 1300 Lunch at Conference Center

**Session 3**

1300 – 1445 The Cultural Dimension

*The Critical Role of Cultural Orientation in International Relations—and in War*

Ambassador Edward L. Peck
Chief of Mission in Iraq, 1977-1980

**Session 4**

1500 – 1645 Early US “Stability Operations”

*Leonard Wood, John J. Pershing, and Pacifying the Moros in the Philippines: Americans in a Muslim Land*

Dr. Charles A. Byler
Carroll College

*A Tactical Loaf Gained and a Strategic Slice Garnered: The United States and the Mexican Revolution*

Dr. Irving W. Levinson
University of Tennessee

Moderator
Colonel Jeffrey D. Jore
US Army, US Defense Attaché Office

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**Day 2**
Wednesday, 15 September 2004

0645 – 0745 Breakfast at Conference Center

**Session 1**

0800 – 0945 Cold War “Stability Operations”
Success Without a Plan: The Dominican Intervention, 1965-1966
Dr. Lawrence A. Yates
Combat Studies Institute

Vietnamization An Incomplete Exit Strategy
Dr. James H. Willbanks
US Army Command and General Staff School

Moderator
Prof. Theodore A. Wilson
University of Kansas

Session 2

1000 – 1145 Planning for Success

Planning for Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama
Dr. John T. Fishel
National Defense University

Planning Phase IV for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson
US Army School of Advanced Military Studies

Moderator
Dr. Richard W. Stewart
US Army Center of Military History

1200 – 1300 Lunch at Conference Center

Session 3

1300 – 1445 Military Threats to Success: Terrorism and Insurgency

Terrorism Revisited
Prof. Felix Moos
University of Kansas
The Challenges of Countering Insurgency in the Context of a Global Insurgency
Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy
US Army, Europe

Moderator
Dr. Andrew J. Birtle
US Army Center of Military History

Session 4
1500 – 1645 Historical Tour of Leavenworth and Fort Leavenworth
Mr. Kelvin D. Crow
Assistant Command Historian
Combined Arms Center

Day 3
Thursday, 16 September 2004

0645 – 0745 Breakfast at Conference Center

Session 1
0800 – 0945 Victory Into Success?
My Experience in Iraq
Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner
US Army, Retired

Moderator
Dr. Gordon W. Rudd
USMC Command and Staff College

Session 2
1000 – 1145 Training Indigenous Militaries
The Limits of Influence: Training Constabularies in Latin America
Dr. Richard L. Millett, Prof. Emeritus  
Southern Illinois University at  
Edwardsville

Moderator  
Dr. Donald P. Wright  
Combat Studies Institute

1200 – 1300  
Lunch at Conference Center

**Session 3**

1300 – 1445  
On the Ground in Iraq

*On the Ground: Training Indigenous Forces in Iraq*  
Captain Aaron D. Boal

Roundtable and General Discussion

1500  
Adjournment
About the Presenters

Kevin C.M. Benson, Colonel, US Army, is a 1977 graduate of the United States Military Academy. Colonel Benson graduated from the Armor Officer Basic Course, US Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, US Army Command and General Staff College, and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program as a War College Fellow in 2001. He has written essays for Armor, Infantry, and Special Operations magazines, Military Review, the African Armed Forces Journal, Army magazine and Parameters. He has served in Armor and Cavalry units in the United States and Germany, and held planning staff positions in XVIII Airborne Corps and Third US Army. Most recently, Colonel Benson served as the Assistant Chief of Staff, C5 (Plans), Combined Forces Land Component Command and Third US Army from June 2002 to July 2003 during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/Operation COBRA II. Colonel Benson currently serves as the Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, (SAMS).

Aaron D. Boal is a First Lieutenant and a native of Kansas who graduated from the University of Kansas in 2001. Commissioned through ROTC into the Armor Branch, he joined the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Polk following completion of the Basic Course at Fort Knox. He also completed both the Scout Leaders course and the Cavalry Leaders course. In the 2d ACR, Lieutenant Boal served as a platoon leader of two platoons and as a battalion assistant operations officer. He deployed with his squadron to Iraq and entered that country during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in April 2003. Among other duties during his year in theater, Lieutenant Boal served as the operations officer for a US Army cadre team that trained Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) forces. Lieutenant Boal recently graduated from the Armor Officer Captains Career Course.

Charles Byler is an associate professor of history at Carroll College in Waukesha, Wisconsin. Born in Oregon, he received a B.A. from Whitman College and his Ph.D. from Yale University. His area of specialization is 20th-century American political and military history. He is currently writing a book on civil-military relations in the United States between the Civil War and World War I (forthcoming, Praeger).

Robert M. Cassidy, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, is a special assistant in the US Army Europe Commanding General’s Initiatives Group where he conducts strategic research and analysis on land-force issues within the EUCOM area of operations. He is a graduate of the French Joint Defense College (Collège Interarmées de Défense) and has a Ph.D. in International Security Studies from the Fletcher School.
of Law and Diplomacy. Previously, he was an assistant professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy. He has previously served as the aviation brigade operations officer in the 4th Infantry Division during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and as Squadron executive officer in 1-10 Cavalry of the same division. He has published articles in *Parameters* and *Military Review* on the topics of asymmetric conflict, military culture, and counterinsurgency. He is author of *Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War*.

Conrad C. Crane became the Director of the US Army Military History Institute on 1 February 2003. Before accepting that position, Dr. Crane served with the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the US Army War College from September 2000 to January 2003, where he held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research. He joined SSI after his retirement from active military service, a 26-year military career that concluded with nine years as Professor of History at the US Military Academy. He holds a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. He has authored or edited books on the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and Korea, and has written or lectured widely on air-power and land-power issues. Before leaving SSI he coauthored a prewar study on reconstructing Iraq that influenced Army planners and has attracted much attention from the media.

John T. Fishel is professor of National Security Policy at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of the National Defense University, having assumed that position on 8 December 1997. He has specialized in Latin American affairs throughout his career, focusing on issues of national development and security policy. He has written extensively on civil military operations and peacekeeping and is the author of *Civil Military Operations in the New World* (1997) and the editor and coauthor of *“The Savage Wars of Peace:” Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations* (1998). He is a past president of the Midwest Association for Latin American Studies (MALAS) and a former president of the North Central Council of Latin Americanists (NCCLA). Dr. Fishel served as a member of the Board of Visitors of the US Army School of the Americas. While on active duty as a lieutenant colonel in the US Army he served in the US Southern Command where he was, successively, Chief of the Civic Action Branch of the Directorate of Policy, Strategy, and Plans (J5), Chief of Research and Assessments of the Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD), Chief of the Policy and Strategy Division of the J5, and Deputy Chief of the US Forces Liaison Group. Concurrent with the latter position he served as Special Assistant to the Commander, US Military Support Group-Panama and to the Commander, US Army-South.
Jay M. Garner, Lieutenant General, US Army (Retired), was appointed as the Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in January 2003 and served in that assignment until Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III was named Presidential Envoy to Iraq and Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority on May 6, 2003. Before this appointment, Lieutenant General Garner served as President of SY Technology, Inc. since September 1, 1997. He was a member of the Army Science Board in 1998-1999 and was appointed by Congress as a member of the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and Organization in 2000-2001. He currently serves on the USSTRATCOM Strategic Advisory Board. Lieutenant General Garner served as Commanding General of the US Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (USASSDC), headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. He also served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington DC, and Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, Frankfurt, Germany. In 1991 he was Commanding General, Joint Task Force Bravo—Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq. He also served as Deputy Commanding General, US Army Air Defense School. He commanded at brigade and battalion levels in VII Corps in Europe. He served two tours in Vietnam, 1967-1968 and 1971-1972. His last assignment was as the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (AVCSA). He received a B.A. from Florida State University in history and a Ph.D. from Shippensburg State University, Pennsylvania, in public administration.


Irving Levinson received a B.A. from Northern Illinois University, an M.B.A. from Temple University in 1977, an M.A. from the University of Houston in Latin American history in 1997, and a Ph.D. from the University of Houston in Latin American history in 2003. Before beginning his new career as a historian, he
worked for 17 years in human resources management. Dr. Levinson taught Latin American history at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville in fall 2004 and spring 2005, Latin American and Mexican history at the University of Texas at Austin in spring 2004, and US history at the University of Houston, spring and fall 2002, and at Houston Community College, spring 2000 and spring 2002. He also taught the history of Texas as a guest lecturer at the Universidad de Veracruz School, Xalapa, Veracruz, México, March, 2001, and was a teaching assistant at the University of Houston, 1997-2000 and fall 2001. Dr. Levinson wrote the forthcoming book, *Wars Within War: Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, and the Americans, 1846-1848* (Fort Worth, Texas, Texas Christian University Press, 2005).

**Richard L. Millett** received his B.A. with honors from Harvard and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of New Mexico. He did postdoctoral work at Ohio State University and is a graduate of the Air War College. Dr. Millett taught at Southern Illinois University from 1966 through 1999. He has also taught at the University of Miami, St. Louis University, the Air War College, and four universities in Colombia. He has published over one hundred items, including *Colombia’s Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of a Wider War* (2002), *Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition* (1996), and *Searching for Panama* (1993). His articles have appeared in *Foreign Policy*, *The Wilson Quarterly*, *Journal of Inter-American Studies, Current History, The New Republic*, and numerous other journals. Dr. Millett has testified before Congress on 19 occasions, appeared on every major national TV network, including the PBS News Hour and Crossfire. He is also Senior Adviser for Latin America to Political Risk Services and a Research Associate of the Center for International Studies, University of Missouri-St. Louis. In 1993 he held the Chair of Military Affairs and in 2000 and 2001 held the Oppenheimer Chair of Warfighting Strategy at the Marine Corps University.

**Ambassador Edward L. Peck** is a frequent commentator for television and radio networks in the United States and abroad. Ambassador Peck lectures and teaches internationally on Middle East and other international issues for governments, educational institutions, civic organizations, and businesses. During a 32-year diplomatic career, he was Chief of Mission in Iraq and Mauritania, and an embassy officer in Sweden, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt. He speaks Arabic, French, Spanish, and Swedish. In the Reagan White House, he served as Deputy Director of the Cabinet Task Force on Terrorism. At the Department of State he was Deputy Coordinator, Covert Intelligence Programs, JCS Liaison Officer, Special Assistant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and Director, Office of Egyptian Affairs. He was also a Capstone Fellow, Institute for Higher Defense Studies, National Defense University. Ambassador Peck had two tours of active duty in Army airborne units, serving from private to first lieutenant, and lectures extensively at Department
of Defense schools and training programs. He holds a B.S. from UCLA, and an
M.B.A. from George Washington University. In retirement, Ambassador Peck
was Executive Secretary of the American Academy of Diplomacy, and Chairman,
Political Tradecraft Programs, National Foreign Affairs Training Center. He is a
Distinguished Visitor, National War College; Visiting Fellow, Woodrow Wilson
Foundation; and Senior Fellow, Joint Forces Staff College.

James H. Willbanks, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army (Retired), is a supervisory
professor and teaching team leader in the Department of Military History at the
US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Dr.
Willbanks has 23 years of service as an Infantry officer in various assignments,
to include a tour as an adviser in Vietnam. He is a graduate of the Command and
General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He holds a
B.A. from Texas A&M University and a Ph.D. from the University of Kansas in
US Military and Diplomatic History. Dr. Willbanks is the author of Abandoning
Vietnam (University Press of Kansas, 2004) and The Battle of An Loc (forthcoming,
Indiana University Press).

Lawrence A. Yates is a teacher and researcher on the Research and Publications
Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A.
and an M.A. in history from the University of Missouri, Kansas City, and a Ph.D.
in history from the University of Kansas. He is the author of several articles on US
contingency operations since World War II, has written a monograph on the US
intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, is coeditor and a contributor to
a book on urban operations, and is completing book-length studies of US military