To Compel with Armed Force:
A Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Tippecanoe

Major Harry D. Tunnell IV
By TRADOC regulation, the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), located within the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has the mission to assist units and agencies Army-wide with development and execution of staff rides. In conjunction with this mission, CSI publishes a series of staff ride guides that, to date, include such specific engagements as the Revolutionary War Battle of the Cowpens and the Civil War battles of Chickamauga and Wilson’s Creek. Other guides for Vicksburg, the Sioux Wars, Pea Ridge, Bentonville, and the 1864 Overland Campaign are in various stages of preparation.

In this latest addition to the staff ride guide series, Major Harry D. Tunnell IV examines the Battle of Tippecanoe, an engagement that occurred in 1811 in the Indiana Territory. The battle pitted the Regular and militia forces of William Henry Harrison, the governor of the territory, against the warriors of Tecumseh, a Shawnee chief who was attempting to create an Indian tribal confederacy with British support. In keeping with other CSI staff ride guides, Tunnell offers a narrative and analytical account of the battle, the events and issues leading up to it, and its ramifications for U.S. history. He follows this with a detailed plan that officers today can adopt for conducting a staff ride at the site of the battle. The result is an excellent blend of written history and field instruction that enables participating officers to grapple with historical events and critical decisions while standing on the very sites where those events unfolded and decisions were made.

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March 2000

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You will approach and order him to disperse, which he may be permitted to do, on condition of satisfactory assurances that in future he shall not assemble or attempt to assemble any number of Indians, armed or hostile in attitude. If he neglects or refuses to disperse he will be attacked and compelled to it by the force under your command. He will probably in that case be taken prisoner. His adherents should be informed that in any case they shall hereafter form any combination of a hostile nature, and oblige the government to send an armed force against them, they will be driven beyond the great waters, and never again permitted to live within the Jurisdictional limits of the United States.

—William Eustis, Secretary of War, letter to Governor Harrison
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My final and most important thanks are to my parents Doc and Annie.
Errata

This page lists known errors in the book *To Compel with Armed Force: A Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Tippecanoe* by Harry D. Tunnell IV.

II. EXPANSION INTO THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY

Page 24 (Note 19)

Lines 12-16 of Note 19: The section of the note that indicates that Chief Blue Jacket may have been Caucasian is incorrect. DNA testing of Chief Blue Jacket’s descendants as well as several members of the Swearingen family unequivocally suggest that Chief Blue Jacket was a Native American Shawnee and not part of the Swearingen family line.¹ The myth that Chief Blue Jacket was Caucasian has persisted since the late 19th Century; the DNA testing should lay this notion to rest for subsequent researchers.

References


I. INTRODUCTION

Military History is the account of how force served political ends and how man, individual hero or leader or aggregated professionals, conscripts, or irregulars, accomplished this service.¹

—Colonel F. B. Nihart, USMC, Military Affairs

The study of military history has always been important to soldiers. General of the Army George C. Marshall, while he was a colonel at the Infantry School before World War II, directed the writing of a series of case studies that were published as Infantry in Battle. Years later, in 1971, the Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, formed an ad hoc committee to determine the need for the study of military history in the Army. The committee’s review determined that there continued to be a need for military history studies and made several recommendations concerning incorporating history into the officer education program. The committee’s recommendations also resulted in the publication of A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History.²

In this regard, the staff ride provides an excellent methodology for the application of military history because it offers a detailed program of study for campaigns and battles. The unique aspect of the staff ride is that, after classroom work, the campaign or battle study includes a visit to the battlefield site. After the battlefield visit, there is a final period of instruction that synthesizes the information learned during the preliminary classroom studies and the field visit.

Since the early twentieth century, staff rides have been an important tool in the U.S. Army to train leaders. Army staff rides were first implemented in 1906 as a formal part of the education of officers at the General Service and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In that year, Major Eben Swift led a small contingent of students to Chattanooga, Tennessee, to study the 1864 Atlanta campaign.³ Since 1906, the staff ride has remained an important part of formal military education programs.

Staff rides are also an integral part of informal programs conducted as home station training. Units often sponsor staff rides as part of their officer and noncommissioned officer development programs. The staff ride remains relevant to the study of military history because it permits students to become familiar with a campaign or battle and to conduct an analysis of the engagement(s) at the actual locations where key events happened.
Finally, the staff ride promotes critical thought about the actions surrounding a particular aspect of military history.

Staff rides are simple to incorporate into many types of unit training programs. Through a historical analysis of a commander’s use of terrain, maneuver, and the decision-making process during the extreme stress of battle, a class of officers and NCOs can hone their leadership abilities. Because trainers and students often confuse staff rides with other types of training events that include battlefield visits or terrain analysis at a field site, it is important to define what a staff ride is, as well as some of the other terms commonly used to describe the study and analysis of battles and campaigns.

The terms “staff ride,” “historical battlefield tour,” and “tactical exercise without troops (TEWT)” are the most commonly confused or misused terms when describing the activities that organizations perform in the conduct of training at a battlefield. Dr. William G. Robertson, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, in his pamphlet, *The Staff Ride*, has developed definitions for these terms. This study will use Robertson’s definitions.

A staff ride is an event that...

...consists of systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign, and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each. It envisions maximum student involvement before arrival at the site to guarantee thought, analysis, and discussion. A staff ride thus links a historical event, systematic preliminary study, and actual terrain to produce battle analysis in three dimensions. It consists of three distinct phases: preliminary study, field study, and integration.

Historical battlefield tours, in contrast, are visits to battlefields or campaign sites that do not include preliminary study. Such historical battlefield tours, led by an expert, can stimulate thought and promote student discussion, but they will be limited by the students’ lack of systematic preparation. TEWTs, for their part, utilize hypothetical scenarios that are played out on actual terrain and involve the employment of current doctrinal concepts. During TEWTs, terrain and doctrine, rather than history, are the instructional vehicles.

There are many battlefields throughout the United States that support the development and conduct of staff rides. The preferences, goals, and
resources of those developing the staff ride determine the battlefield to use. Many of the sites have easy access because they are open to the public and are part of permanently established state or national parks. Other locations may be on privately owned land and require coordination with the owners for approval to visit the site. The available sites span the spectrum of American eighteenth- and nineteenth-century warfare. Many staff ride sites for Revolutionary War and Civil War battles are available to the public. In addition to these locations, there are also Indian War battlefields available. Overseas U.S. units (particularly in Europe or Korea) can often develop staff rides for locations in their areas.

This handbook describes a staff ride for the Tippecanoe battlefield at Battle Ground, Indiana. The field study phase of the staff ride covers the 7 November 1811 battle between the Shawnee-led Indian confederacy and U.S. forces commanded by General William Henry Harrison. A staff ride of the Tippecanoe campaign allows one to examine many lessons that still apply to twentieth-century military operations, especially in the realm of operations other than war. A critical analysis of the centers of gravity, decision points, force protection measures, and methods of battlefield leadership that were important almost 190 years ago will provide insight into notions of how to think and make decisions that are still relevant for today’s officers.

Students of the military art often overlook the Battle of Tippecanoe because it occurred for the United States between the American Revolution and the War of 1812. The campaign is nonetheless important because it was a critical step that helped the new country establish dominance over the American northwest, where continuing tensions existed among the Americans, Indians, and remaining British in the area. (The War of 1812 eventually forced a resolution to the political and military struggles in this part of America.) The Battle of Tippecanoe, moreover, served as a precursor to the types of political and military activities that happened in the territory during the War of 1812. Henry Adams, who has written extensively about early U.S. history, called the Battle of Tippecanoe “a premature outbreak of the great wars of 1812.”

The organization of this staff ride provides the participant with background information about events that led to the battle, and not just what happened at the battle site. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relationships and treaty obligations among the United States and various Indian tribes in the Northwest Territory and the American northwest from the late eighteenth century through the War of 1812. Chapter 3 describes the
Tippecanoe campaign. Chapter 4 describes the important battlefield activities at Tippecanoe. The suggested route of the staff ride, battlefield vignettes, and discussion points make up chapter 5. The attached appendices provide information about casualties, meteorological data, biographical sketches, tactics, doctrine, and how nineteenth-century Americans and Indians organized for battle.
Notes

1. F. B. Nihart, Military Affairs, as quoted in Robert Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966), 149.


5. Ibid., 5.


II. EXPANSION INTO THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY

... the opinion of Mr. Jefferson on the subject, went so far as to assert a claim of the United States as lords paramount to the lands of all extinguished or decayed tribes, to the exclusion of all recent settlers.¹

—Governor William Henry Harrison,
Letter to the Secretary of War, William Eustis

To understand fully the context of the Tippecanoe campaign, it is important to consider how the United States developed her claims to the areas that made up the Northwest Territory. It is also important to review America's relationship with the Indian tribes in the area. These issues are important because the Battle of Tippecanoe resulted from American attempts to settle new areas in the northwest and from Indian attempts to prevent that expansion.

During the eighteenth century, three European countries competed for and claimed rights of control over territory in North America: Spain, France, and Britain. Great Britain eventually gained the rights to Canada and most of the French territory east of the Mississippi River upon the conclusion of the French and Indian War in 1763. Control of the immense area was important because of the vast revenues gained from the fur trade.²

The fur trade was managed several ways in North America. In addition to private ventures, governments also owned or sponsored trading posts in an area and bartered directly with individual Indians or Indian tribes for furs. As a result, the first traders dramatically improved the quality of life of the Indians with whom they came into contact. With the advent of the traders, iron, steel, and firearms were introduced that supplemented or replaced traditional Indian tools and weapons made of bone, wood, or stone. These new technologies allowed the Indians to improve their hunting ability and to produce items important in sustaining a higher (by European standards) quality of life. But as their lifestyle changed, the Indians became more dependent on the resources gained through trade and came to rely on particular governments for trade. Political consequences arose out of these relationships. One eventual consequence was that a government could demand allegiance from an Indian tribe that was its trading partner, a frequent occurrence during the various wars in North America.³

During the period between the French and Indian War and the Revolutionary War, the British made an effort to reorganize their territory
in North America. On 7 October 1763, the British issued a Royal Proclamation regulating the governmental organization of the colonies and separating the colonists and the Indians. The proclamation established colonial boundaries and created a vast interior region under the jurisdiction of the government in Great Britain. The western limit of the colonial area ran generally along the Appalachian crest from eastern Florida to Quebec. This western limit became known as the "Proclamation Line."

The Proclamation Line provided for the separation of the colonists and the Indians by prohibiting colonial governments from purchasing land or establishing new settlements in areas west of the line. Meanwhile, the royal government in Britain would manage activities with the Indians in the interior. Although there were eventually modifications to the boundary, the Proclamation Line was generally in effect until the American Revolution.

Even though the British government attempted to prevent friction on the frontier by separating the Indians and the colonists, disputes continued and culminated in major outbreaks of violence. One such occurrence was the 10 October 1774 battle between Shawnee Indians and the militia forces at the white settlement at Point Pleasant (in future West Virginia). The day-long battle resulted in the Treaty of Camp Charlotte, which gave the settlers control of the area that would eventually become Kentucky and established the Indian-white boundary at the Ohio River.

Within a year, the American Revolution was under way. Even more so than the Camp Charlotte treaty and other previous agreements, the Revolutionary War had many unexpected consequences regarding Indian lands in the area set aside under the 1763 Royal Proclamation. The 1783 Treaty of Paris that ended the American Revolution defined the western boundary of the new American republic as the Mississippi River. It also gave the United States all former British possessions from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, southwest through the Great Lakes, to the Mississippi River. The United States now controlled the area in which the British had prohibited new settlements under the 1763 Royal Proclamation. After the Treaty of Paris, the Indians theoretically retained title to the land set aside under the proclamation; however, the United States government viewed these Indians (many of whom were allied with Great Britain during the Revolutionary War) as a conquered people with few rights.

The political dynamics that developed as a result of alliances formed during the Revolution continued to influence frontier events after the war.
Most of the Woodland Indian tribes\(^8\) allied themselves with the British during the war. The Indians viewed the Americans as their enemies, rather than the British, because the British were more generous with trade goods, and the settlers encroached on Indian areas.\(^9\) Thus, in their efforts to prevent expansion of the new republic, the British continued to support their former Indian allies during the post-Revolution period.

The political traditions of the United States and the Indian tribes were distinctly different, and the accompanying confusion that these differences caused resulted in frequent problems and misunderstandings. The United States viewed the various Indian tribes as independent nations who should be dealt with in the same fashion as European nations. Many problems arose because the Indians did not organize themselves politically in ways that American leaders understood. For instance, an Indian tribe was generally a group with common cultural traditions that did not have a central authority to make and enforce political decisions. This was because the tribe included several subgroups (called septs or clans) that were politically semiautonomous.\(^10\)

Indian perceptions about land ownership, moreover, also differed from the American point of view. The eighteenth-century northwestern Indian viewed land as a resource to be occupied and used. Once the desired resources were exhausted, the group moved to another area.\(^11\) The Indian concept of common use rather than ownership was significantly different from Euro-American concepts that encouraged citizens to amass large tracts of land as symbols of wealth.

Conflict on the frontier between Indians and Americans, therefore, was inevitable because of their different perceptions about one another and the American government's desire to settle the new territory. During the postwar period, the United States planned to establish control over its new territories. Because the Articles of Confederation did not allow Congress to levy taxes, exploitation of the potential wealth in the American northwest provided the United States with a way to pay off the country's large war debt that had resulted from the Revolution.\(^12\) Consequently, the government sponsored expeditions to explore the new areas and provided incentives to individuals to move to the frontier. The Indian tribes' options to maintain their traditional communities and ways of life were few after the Revolution. The tribes could attempt to coexist with the white man, or they could contest American encroachments upon their traditional territory.
Meanwhile, the British maintained a continued interest in the American northwest, seeking to retain their lucrative fur trade in the area bordered by the Mississippi River, Great Lakes, and Ohio River, as well as to protect Canada. Initially, the British wanted an Indian buffer state between British possessions in Canada and the United States. But the final boundaries established by the Treaty of Paris made this impractical because the treaty ceded the buffered area to the United States. To protect their North American interests, the British encouraged the northwestern Indian tribes to resist American expansion and to keep the Americans south of the Ohio River. Indian successes at keeping settlers south of the Ohio would create a de facto Indian buffer state even if a de jure one were impossible.\textsuperscript{13}

The Treaty of Paris and the subsequent Jay Treaty allowed the British to maintain existing posts and garrisons on U.S. soil until 1796. Maintenance of these posts allowed the British to continue a profitable fur trade in the area and to control the important trade routes along the Great Lakes. The posts also provided the northwestern Indians with guns, ammunition, and other supplies. As a result of the treaties, the British maintained garrisons at Detroit and Fort Mackinac in Michigan, as well as several others that controlled entrances to the Great Lakes.\textsuperscript{14}

Engagements with the Indians continued in the American northwest as U.S. forces occupied the new territories and established communities in the unsettled countryside. In 1787, Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance, outlining the procedures governing the area that would eventually become Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota. The ordinance described the requirements for territorial government and the conditions for statehood in a vast area designated as the Northwest Territory. The ordinance also stated that the area would contain no fewer than three states and no more than five, and it prohibited the invasion of any land that the Indians retained title to except in the case of a lawful war authorized by Congress.\textsuperscript{15}

The Northwest Ordinance, in addition, formalized the procedures settling the area south of the Great Lakes. Prior to the ordinance, President George Washington tried to develop policies designed to gain control of the Indian titled lands east of the Mississippi. The policy was to make the area attractive to settlers by providing land grants or selling government land at extremely low prices. The growth of the white settlements would also kill off much of the game, thereby making the area unattractive to the Indians. Washington felt that the loss of game coupled with government
inducements would cause the Indians to sell their land to the government in return for better land to the west of the Mississippi. The enticements worked for the settlers, and large numbers of them flocked to the frontier. The Indians, however, desired no land beyond the Mississippi River and insisted that the frontier should remain at the Ohio River. As the Indians resisted white encroachment onto their lands, violence erupted, forcing the president to send a series of military expeditions in an attempt to establish American dominance in the region.

The first military expedition to the Northwest Territory occurred in 1790. After a two-month training period, General Josiah Harmar left Cincinnati with a 1,400-man force. In September 1790, Harmar's force fought engagements with a combined Indian force of Miami, Shawnee, Potawatomi, and Chippewa in the Maumee valley. The Indians, led by Chiefs Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, dominated the action and defeated the Americans. After the series of engagements, Harmar's casualties were 183 killed and thirty-one wounded. As a result of the expedition, problems in the territory increased as the Indians gained confidence.

As the Indian harassment increased, Congress voted in 1791 to raise another expedition to deal with the strife in the northwest. The force gathered for the campaign again turned out to be inadequately trained and disciplined. The quality of the soldiers was often poor because enticements to enlist for the campaign were few. The offer of a scant two dollars per month pay usually resulted in the enlistment of men "purchased from prisons, wheelbarrows and brothels."

The army, organized in March 1791, consisted of about 1,400 men, with General Arthur St. Clair commanding. St. Clair's expeditionary force was plagued by poor leadership, poor supply discipline, and desertion. The Indians, once again led by Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, engaged the expedition at dawn on 4 November 1791. The battle stands as the worst defeat of American arms during the Indian Wars; of 920 Americans engaged, the Indians killed 632 and wounded 264.

In 1792, Congress authorized the organization of the American Legion ("Legion" was then a term that denoted a combined arms force). General Anthony Wayne commanded this Legion, which consisted of infantry, artillery, and light dragoons. A combination of ongoing peace negotiations with the Indians and Wayne's desire not to employ the Legion before it was prepared kept the force from conducting major operations for two years. Wayne used the time wisely, building and garrisoning small outposts
throughout the area to protect his lines of communication. So that the force could quickly build redoubts and abatis while on campaign to provide protection for encampments, Wayne spent considerable time training his men, employing standards from Steuben's Blue Book to teach close order drill, and training his force extensively in marksmanship and the employment of field fortifications.  

As Wayne continued his preparations for action against the Indians, the British became increasingly alarmed and feared that Detroit might be Wayne's possible objective. Consequently, the British, in violation of the 1783 peace treaty between the United States and Great Britain, established Fort Miamis to protect Detroit's approaches. In addition to providing protection for the British garrison at Detroit, establishment of the fort restored the Indians' confidence that the English would continue to lend aid and support to their attacks against the Americans. By the summer of 1794, the situation on the frontier had deteriorated to the point that military action became necessary. As the Legion left its winter quarters at Fort Washington (present-day Cincinnati, Ohio), several units of mounted Kentucky militia arrived to reinforce the well-trained and well-supplied army.  

On 20 August 1794, Wayne defeated a large Indian force four miles from Fort Miamis at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, near present-day Maumee, Ohio. After the battle, the Indians retreated toward their British allies in Fort Miamis and attempted to gain sanctuary inside the protective walls of the fort. The British, however, closed the gates and refused to shelter the Indian force. The Indians, without refuge and their confidence in their British allies shaken, had little choice but to seek terms with Wayne's advancing Legion. Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers resulted in the 1795 Treaty of Greenville.

The treaty allowed the United States access to the disputed areas and established the conditions for future American expansion. The accord also relinquished the United States' claim to all Indian lands in the Northwest Territory, except for parts of Ohio and sixteen other small tracts of land. These tracts were administrative areas at strategic locations throughout the Northwest Territory. In addition, the treaty allowed the United States to build forts at these locations and obtain unrestricted access to important waterways, portages, and other mobility corridors. The treaty also allowed the United States to survey the sixteen tracts and to have the right of free passage to them. Finally, the agreement required the Indians to recognize that they were under the protection of the United States. As a protectorate of
the United States, the Indians could sell their land—but only to the United States government.  

As things quieted down after Wayne’s successful campaign, the United States began to take additional steps to develop the frontier area. In 1800, all of the Northwest Territory, with the exception of Ohio, became the Indiana Territory. During the early 1800s, the Indiana Territory was a sparsely populated area with William Henry Harrison as the first territorial governor. Harrison was not a stranger to the American northwest; as a young officer, he had served in the American Legion commanded by Wayne. After leaving the army, Harrison remained in the area and served as the Northwest Territory’s delegate to Congress, before his appointment as governor by President John Adams. After his appointment as governor, Harrison established the capital for the territory at Vincennes and began his administration of the immense area.

U.S. public policy toward the Indians in the Old Northwest shifted during the administration of Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson enunciated his Indian policy in his second inaugural address on 4 March 1805, stating that “humanity enjoins us to teach them [the Indians] agriculture and the domestic arts.” The address implied that Jefferson wanted to find ways to coexist peacefully with the Indians on the frontier. But the president’s inaugural remarks were deceptive; his private views were quite different. An earlier letter to Governor Harrison, written 27 February 1803, outlined the “unofficial” United States policy. In the letter, Jefferson informed Harrison to draw the Indians into farming and encourage their indebtedness to the U.S. trading posts. The reason for the emphasis on agriculture was twofold. Once the Indians were farmers, they would realize that they did not need vast areas of land for hunting and would sell them to the United States. The second point was that the Indians would need to buy their farming supplies from the trading posts. Once Indian leaders were sufficiently in debt, the United States could offer them the opportunity to sell their lands to reduce their debt. If peaceful attempts to gain territory failed and hostilities ensued, Jefferson told Harrison that “seizing the whole country of that tribe and driving them across the Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to others and a furtherance of our final consolidation.”

As white encroachment of Indian lands continued, many Indians began developing different ideas about the possession of land and how to live in the same areas as white men. The sustained American expansion indicated
to many Indians that it was impossible to coexist peacefully with white settlers. The Shawnee became preeminent among the Indians in resisting white encroachments into Indian territory, although they were not always successful in these endeavors. As settlers began moving into the wilderness, the Shawnee were forced to move several times in the American south and northwest, eventually winding up in Ohio. Although forced to migrate, the Shawnee developed a reputation that made them feared by the settlers for their warlike prowess.

Two Shawnee brothers eventually emerged as Indian leaders who attempted to unify the Indians throughout the Old Northwest. The two brothers, Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh, moved from Ohio to the Indiana Territory after the Treaty of Greenville. Tenskwatawa, or “The Prophet,” was a spiritual leader in the Shawnee tribe and rose to prominence about 1805. The Prophet preached that Indians should abandon alcohol and anything associated with the Americans’ way of life. The Prophet’s teachings also emphasized a return to the traditional Indian ways. Tenskwatawa was familiar enough with one of the most common evils associated with the white man—alcohol. Before the development of his revivalist religion and subsequent rise to power as the “Shawnee Prophet,” Tenskwatawa had been a vagabond and drunk.

Meanwhile, the Prophet’s brother, Tecumseh, attempted to organize the Indians politically. The Prophet’s religious ideas often attracted Indians to the various villages that the brothers established, and Tecumseh used their attendance to promote his ideas about reestablishing Indian ownership of lands lost to white encroachment. Tecumseh eventually established an Indian confederacy or amalgamation of tribes. A respected warrior and leader, he served as the political leader of the confederacy. In his role as organizer and leader, he traveled throughout the American northwest and south to gain support for his pan-Indian confederacy. By 1810, he had assembled over 1,000 warriors from various tribes, including the Shawnee, Kickapoo, Delaware, Ottawa, and Chippewa Indians.

Tecumseh’s ideas about protecting Indian lands were a radical departure from traditional Indian thought. Tecumseh proposed that Indians were linked culturally, racially, and politically. Because of these common associations, any Indian land was under the common ownership of all Indians. A particular tribe had the right of transitory ownership as long as it physically occupied an area. But once a tribe abandoned an area, the land
reverted to common Indian ownership and required the mutual agreement of all tribes to sell the land.34

If Tecumseh could successfully establish an amalgamation of tribes, it would destroy ideas of tribal independence and limit the authority of tribes to establish individual confederacies. Accomplishment of this goal would establish joint ownership of Indian lands and prevent individual tribes from making separate land cessions to the United States.35 The resulting confederacy would strengthen the Indians' political and military responses to U.S. encroachment on Indian lands. In 1808, the confederacy led by Tecumseh settled near the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers. The village established by Tecumseh and his brother, known as Prophet's Town, became the headquarters of the confederacy.

During the years between 1800 and 1810, a series of disputes erupted between the Indians and the territorial government at Vincennes. The problems ranged from Indian attacks of settlements, to settlers violating treaty provisions and hunting on Indian lands. Meanwhile, Harrison's continued treaty negotiations with separate tribes rather than the confederacy caused friction between the Indians, settlers, and the territorial government. The most serious problems stemmed from the Treaty of Fort Wayne (1809) (see map 1). In this treaty, a few tribes ceded 3,000,000 acres of land to the United States. Tecumseh, who was traveling to gather support for his confederacy during the treaty negotiations, refused to agree to the land cessions. Since Tecumseh's followers and many other area tribes failed to agree to the provisions of the treaty, the confederacy refused to recognize its terms.36

By the summer of 1810, both sides were posturing for war in the territory. Tecumseh continued to travel in attempts to strengthen his confederacy. Between 1810 and 1811, the U.S. secretary of war ordered an infantry regiment and two separate companies to the Indiana Territory. Even though the American military presence increased, Harrison, the Prophet, and Tecumseh met several times between 1808 and 1811 to attempt to resolve the developing problems. Harrison and Tecumseh conducted the most important series of meetings, the last of which occurred during the summer of 1811. The two leaders discussed rumors that the confederacy was preparing for war, Indian and white attacks on one another, and Indian dissatisfaction with land cessions.37

The final meeting was inconclusive, and Tecumseh traveled south to recruit other Indians for his confederacy. Harrison believed that the
Map 1. Treaty of Fort Wayne
confederacy was a major threat and became determined to destroy its headquarters at Prophet's Town and force the dispersion of its occupants. Shortly after Tecumseh began his southern journey, Harrison prepared for a campaign in the new purchase. Harrison recruited and organized his force, and it left Vincennes late in September 1811, moving toward the new land cessions.38

After a brief halt to train and to establish an army post, Harrison continued his march through the new purchase and arrived in the vicinity of Prophet's Town on 6 November 1811. The American force and the Indian confederacy fought the Battle of Tippecanoe the day after Harrison’s army arrived outside of Prophet's Town. The American army defeated the confederacy, destroyed the Indian headquarters at Prophet’s Town, and then returned to Vincennes.

The confederacy immediately dispersed. As a result of the battle, it lost a large part of its support from other tribes. Meanwhile, Tecumseh returned from his southern trip and tried to rebuild the federation, but without the manpower pledged from the tribes formerly in the confederacy, the amalgamation of tribes failed to present a major military threat to the United States.39 In a final effort to restore Indian independence in the American northwest, Tecumseh joined forces with the British.

At the time of the Tippecanoe battle, an ongoing national debate existed in the United States about the merits of going to war with Great Britain. Napoleon had been waging war on the European continent during much of the first decade of the eighteenth century, and the effects of the Napoleonic wars retarded American commerce. The French and British tried to establish naval blockades during the Napoleonic wars to interdict each other’s sea lines of communication. The French blockades, however, had little effect since they were unenforceable because of Great Britain’s dominant naval power. The English naval policies, however, seriously disrupted American trade and frequently resulted in the impressment of American seamen.40

The problems with Britain, and to a lesser extent France, occurred throughout the first decade of the nineteenth century. Congress, the shipping classes in New England, and many newspapers became incensed with British practices. Prompted by these highly charged emotions, many Americans agitated for war. Meanwhile, Tippecanoe fueled the war fires in the American east, as many citizens blamed America’s frontier problems on Britain’s influence over the northwestern Indian tribes. As a reaction to the
battle and the British aid to the Indians, Congressman Henry Clay called for the punishment of Canada and Britain. 41

In the spring of 1812, the Indians again began raiding the white settlements on the frontier. The increased Indian attacks in the northwest and the potential for war with Britain and its Indian allies persuaded the United States to raise another force for service in the Old Northwest. General William Hull arrived in Dayton early in June 1812 to assume command of the forces in the Northwest Territory. Later that month, on 18 June 1812, the United States declared war on Great Britain. After his arrival, Hull conducted inconclusive operations throughout the area. Eventually, a combined British-Indian force placed Hull’s command under siege at Detroit. On 16 August 1812, Hull surrendered Detroit and all U.S. forces in the area to the British and Indian force led by General Isaac Brock and Tecumseh. 42

After Hull’s surrender, William Henry Harrison became the supreme commander of the Northwest army. 43 There were two major actions in Harrison’s area that were significant enough to influence the outcome of the war in the Old Northwest. The first was a naval engagement, during which Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry defeated the British naval force on Lake Erie on 10 September 1813. After his victory, Perry sent his famous dispatch to Harrison at Fort Meigs: “We have met the enemy and they are ours.” 44

Once the Americans controlled Lake Erie, the British-Indian position at Detroit became untenable, and British General Henry Proctor (Brock’s replacement) prepared to abandon Detroit. Simultaneously, Harrison prepared to invade Canada. To facilitate the invasion, Perry ferried Harrison’s force across Lake Erie to the mouth of the Detroit River. On 27 September 1813, American forces led by General Harrison occupied Fort Malden and Detroit. 45 After securing each, Harrison’s army pursued Tecumseh and Proctor into Canada. On 5 October 1813, the American army engaged and defeated the British-Indian force at the Battle of the Thames near Moraviantown (Ontario, Canada). Tecumseh died during the battle, and Harrison’s forces routed the combined British-Indian force. 46

Following the Battle of the Thames, all of the major impediments to continued American settlement of the Old Northwest disappeared. The destruction of the Indian confederacy that began at Tippecanoe became complete when Tecumseh died in Ontario. In the end, most of the tribes recognized the authority of the United States in the Old Northwest. 47 After
the War of 1812, there was never another serious Indian threat in the American northwest. In 1816, Indiana became the nineteenth state, and by 1826, almost all Indian title to land in Indiana had been extinguished.
NOTES

1. C. F. Klinck, ed., Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction in Early Records (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), 63. This is from an extract of a letter from Governor Harrison to the secretary of war, 4 July 1810. The letter explains Harrison’s position on determining with whom he needed to negotiate to purchase Indian lands. In the letter, Harrison states that it was President Jefferson’s opinion that the United States did not need to negotiate land purchases with tribes that had recently moved to the area. So from Harrison’s perspective, the Miami was the major tribe with rightful claims to territory in Indiana. Harrison felt that the remaining tribes, such as the Shawnee (who migrated to Indiana after the Treaty of Greenville), had no legitimate claims.


5. Cappon, 86; and Maxwell, 152.


5. Eighteenth-century Woodland Indians lived east of the Mississippi River, throughout the Great Lakes region, and the northeastern United States and Canada. A few Woodland tribes (namely the Shawnee) lived at one time in the southeastern United States. Woodland Indians also shared a language association. Woodland Indian language groups are Algonkian, Iroquoian, Siouan, and Muskogian.

9. Downey, 7; and Eckert, *Gateway*, 34.


13. Eckert, *Gateway*, 107, 116, describes British efforts to define the American boundary at the Ohio River during the negotiations to end the Revolutionary
War. The references also describe continued British promotion of the idea that the Indians should focus on the Ohio River as the Indian-white border after the signing of the Treaty of Paris. Eckert, *Gateway*, 763, describes British efforts to establish an Indian buffer state at the negotiations to end the War of 1812. It would have required the United States to cede Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, half of Ohio, and part of Minnesota. The American negotiators refused to entertain the idea.

14. Beavans, 9-14; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 363; Eckert, *Gateway*, 239-40; David R. Edmunds, “The Thin Red Line: Tecumseh, the Prophet and Shawnee Resistance,” *Timeline* 4, no. 6 (1987-88): 15; and Urwin, 30. The British turned over their posts to the United States in 1796. Afterward, the British established new posts in Canada to fulfill the roles of their former posts in the United States. Fort Malden, for example, was established on the Canadian side of the Detroit River after the British turned Detroit over to the United States. After 1796, the British, from their Canadian posts, continued to support the northwestern Indian tribes through British traders (or army personnel disguised as traders) that traveled throughout the American northwest.

15. See Eckert, *Gateway*, 138-40, 699, for more details on the impact of the Northwest Ordinance and the attitude of the local settlers toward the ordinance. The ordinance also prohibited slavery or other forms of involuntary servitude, described procedures for territorial representation in Congress, and had clauses designed to promote education. The Northwest Ordinance is relevant to congressional authority to declare war because the United States Constitution was not in effect until 1789. The U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, grants Congress the authority to declare war and to raise and support armies.


18. As cited in Downey, 52-53; and Weigley, 91.

19. Downey, 54-60; Eckert, The Frontiersman, 392-401; Eckert, Gateway, 701-2; and Hook, 18-19, provide detailed accounts of the battle. St. Clair began the expedition without ample supplies, so his soldiers were on reduced rations from the start. Camp followers probably consumed part of the army's provisions, even though St. Clair prohibited the release of supplies to them. Additionally, about 300 militia deserted, and St. Clair sent a company of regulars to catch them. Finally, the night prior to the attack, St. Clair's force failed to establish proper defensive positions. The Indian attack at first light quickly overwhelmed the American position, and only twenty-four members of those engaged returned uninjured. In addition to the American military casualties, there were approximately 200 camp followers killed. Only sixty-six Indians were killed and nine wounded. Eckert reports that Chief Blue Jacket, a white man adopted by the Shawnees, killed and scalped his brother during the battle. The boys were separated as youngsters, and Blue Jacket (Marmaduke Van Swearingin) grew up to be a Shawnee war chief; his brother (Charles Van Swearingen) was a captain on the expedition.

20. Esarey, History, 122; Gifford, 319-21; Gunderson, "William Henry Harrison," 10-24; Weigley, 93. Weigley calls Wayne the "Father of the Regular Army" because he provided the army with its first "model of excellence." Wayne issued every officer in his command a copy of the Blue Book and demanded that they become proficient in the drills that it contained. Wayne also trained his units in open-order formations in addition to the standard formations. The Legion trained extensively with the bayonet and live ammunition. In addition to marksmanship training, Wayne conducted maneuver live-fire as well as blank-fire exercises. He also conducted training exercises that included soldiers dressed and acting like Indians to simulate an opposing force. He commented that "We must burn a good deal of powder, . . . to make . . . marksman and soldiers." Wayne's approach to training was unique for the time. William Henry Harrison had served as a company grade officer in Wayne's command.

21. There were at least three forts in the general area over a period of years, and in use at different times, known as "Fort Miamis" or "Fort Miami." These forts are easily confused with one another.


24. Greenville is the modern spelling. Greeneville is the eighteen-century spelling, and it is still found in many references.

25. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 439; and Charles J. Kappler, ed., *Indian Affairs. Laws and Treaties* 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1904), 39-43. The treaty also formally gave the United States control of a few other areas to which the American government had previously extinguished Indian title. The treaty specified annuity arrangements to compensate the Indians and had clauses about the punishment of whites that murdered Indians (and vice versa). The treaty established the means for the United States to gain title to land that the United States felt was already American territory (after the Treaty of Paris).

26. Howard Peckham, *Indiana: A Bicentennial History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 36, and Family History Section, Indiana Historical Society, *Census of Indiana Territory for 1807* (Indianapolis, IN: Family History Section, Indiana Historical Society, 1980). Peckham estimated that the territory had a population of about 2,500. The 1807 Census shows a population of 2,587. The figures, however, are somewhat misleading because the census only counted free white males of voting age; the census did not count women, children, slaves (although illegal, there were slaves in the area), etc. Some estimates of the population are as high as 25,000 people. The original Indiana Territory encompassed most of the Northwest Territory except for Ohio. The area of the Indiana Territory decreased as Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin became populated enough to become territories, separated territories, or states.

27. P. D. DeHart, *Past and Present of Tippecanoe County Indiana*, vol. 1 (Indianapolis, IN: B. F. Bowen & Company Publishers, 1909), 67. As governor, Harrison was also the superintendent of Indian affairs. In 1803, President Jefferson appointed Harrison as the sole commissioner for treating with the Indians.

29. Ibid., 56-57. Jefferson said that his letter was "unofficial and private." Several sources describe the letter or quote passages from it. There are some slight variations between sources, but the concepts of turning the Indians toward agriculture, forcing their indebtedness, and removing them beyond the Mississippi River are essentially the same in each reference.

30. Drake, 21; Hook, 14-15; and Johnson, 6. The Shawnee were a Woodland tribe of the Algonkian language group who moved from the Cumberland River area in Tennessee to Ohio. Shawnee groups also lived as far south as Georgia, Alabama, and Florida.

31. Reed Beard, The Battle of Tippecanoe (Chicago, IL: Hammond Press, W. B. Conkey Co., 1911), 22; and Peckham, 40. The brothers established several villages, to include one at Greenville, Ohio. The Greenville village was established in an area that violated the terms of the Treaty of Greenville, and in the spring of 1808, the Kickapoo and Potawatomi tribes offered the brothers land in Indiana. The brothers relocated to Indiana and established Prophet's Town to the immediate south of the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers.

32. Beard, 13-14; Rachel Buff, "Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa: Myth, Historiography and Popular Memory," Historical Reflections (1995): 279; Drake, 86-88; Eckert, Gateway, 346-48; David R. Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 7-8, 11, 19; Edmunds, Quest, 83-98, 160; Esarey, History, 182; Hook, 22-23; and Pirtle, 2. The Prophet said that he had a dream in which he saw all who had died as drunkards "with flames issuing from their mouths." The Prophet also preached that Indians should return to their traditional lifestyle, which also included prohibitions on Indian and white intermarriages. The Prophet's religion emphasized that Indians needed to reject practices learned from white men (to include the tools, clothes, and food learned from contact with whites). The Prophet's teachings specifically focused on abandoning anything associated with Americans and said that Americans developed from an evil spirit. According to the Prophet, the French and British developed from the same Master of Life deity as the Indians. By teaching that the British and French shared the same positive spiritual legacy as Indians, the Prophet gave his followers a way to continue their access to the white man's technology (although in a limited way). The Prophet promoted obviously political topics, such as the idea that Indians should unite in common goals as one people. Buff notes that the Prophet's ideas focused on a return to traditions that would ensure restoration of
land and peace and that politics and religion were traditionally associated with one another in Indian culture. Edmunds and Buff believe that the Prophet's role was much more significant than is usually acknowledged and that the religion that he sponsored was a genuine movement in its own right, rather than merely a subset of Tecumseh's confederacy. Many authors submit that the Prophet's movement predated Tecumseh's and was the initial reason that Indians assembled—to hear the Prophet and not Tecumseh. Regardless of whether or not the Prophet's movement predated Tecumseh's political efforts, it is commonly recognized that between the two brothers, Tecumseh's leadership and influence were ascendant at the time of the Battle of Tippecanoe.

33. Drake, 43; Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 11-13; and Hook, 26. Tecumseh is often referred to as an "Indian Chief"; this is incorrect. Although he was a political and combat leader, Tecumseh was never recognized as a chief in the traditions of the Shawnee tribe. In fact, Tecumseh usually referred to himself as a warrior. Tecumseh's confederation ultimately included tribes as far away as the west side of the Mississippi River. The Chickasaws and Choctaws in the American south refused to join the confederacy, but the Creeks (Alabama) sent a party north with Tecumseh in 1811-12.

34. Beard, 23; Edmunds, Quest, 97-98; Pirtle, xiii.

35. Adams, 351; Downey, 83.

36. Hook, 26. The Indian nations listed on the treaty are "Delawares," "Putawatimees," "Miamies," and "Eel River Miamies." See Kappler, 101-4, for a copy of the treaty. Adams, 334-35, has an excellent map that shows Indian cessions from 1795-1810 and includes this treaty. Adams, 342-64, also details many of the problems, such as Indian attacks, treaty violations, and 1809 treaty issues that led up to the Battle of Tippecanoe. Eckert, Gateway, 339-40, 352; Maxwell, 152-53, discuss some of the methods used to gain Indian agreement during treaty negotiations. American treaty negotiators employed many methods to gain Indian agreement to treaties; some of the methods were ethical; many were not. See chapter 3, note 8, for more details on negotiation practices during treaties.

the Rifle Regiment were the Regular Army organizations ordered to the Indiana Territory. Adams, 357-59, details Indian-white attacks (1810-11) and the 1811 meeting. All of Eckert’s works, as well as Hook, 27-30, provide details of Harrison’s meeting with Tecumseh.

38. Bill Gilbert, God Gave Us This Country (New York: Atheneum, 1989), 268-69; and Peckham, 41.

39. Drako, 155-56.

40. Adams, 374-76; Eckert, Gateway, 365-30; Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History, Volume I: 1775-1902 (Pennsylvania: Combined Books, 1996), 120-23. Britain and France adopted policies that led to the search and seizure of American merchant shipping regardless of whether or not the ships carried contraband. Great Britain was able to carry out its policies with greater effect. An example of British action is the Chesapeake incident. On 22 June 1807, a British warship, Leopard, fired on the Chesapeake, an American warship in American waters, and accused the Americans of hiring British deserters as sailors. The crew of the Leopard boarded the Chesapeake and impressed some of the crew. President Jefferson signed the Embargo Act as a response to these European naval policies. The act restricted all international trade in American ports and was unpopular with American merchants. The 1809 Non-Intercourse Act replaced the Embargo Act and restricted trade with only Great Britain and France. The United States declared war on Great Britain in the summer of 1812; a Senate vote to declare war on France failed by two votes.

41. Adams, 376; Israel, 664; Matloff, 120-21; Pirtle, 10.

42. Drake, 157; Klinck, 147; Weigley, 118-20.

43. Weigley, 123, 132. Weigley considers Harrison a competent officer whose militia performed well. Weigley’s analysis is that “When volunteer companies were led by a William Henry Harrison or an Andrew Jackson, who used them with regard to their limitations but who both disciplined and inspired them, meeting the British was not likely to end in rout and might even lead to victory.”

44. Adams, 707, provides an excellent summary of the Lake Erie battle. Heinl, 166, contains Perry’s complete quotation.

46. Adams, 710-15; Klinck, 184-215, discusses the Battle of the Thames. Klinck also provides primary source accounts of Tecumseh’s death. Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, has extensive notes on Tecumseh at the Battle of the Thames.


48. Adams, 1297, Israel, 664.
I. INTRODUCTION

Military History is the account of how force served political ends and how man, individual hero or leader or aggregated professionals, conscripts, or irregulars, accomplished this service.¹

—Colonel F. B. Nihart, USMC, Military Affairs

The study of military history has always been important to soldiers. General of the Army George C. Marshall, while he was a colonel at the Infantry School before World War II, directed the writing of a series of case studies that were published as Infantry in Battle. Years later, in 1971, the Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, formed an ad hoc committee to determine the need for the study of military history in the Army. The committee’s review determined that there continued to be a need for military history studies and made several recommendations concerning incorporating history into the officer education program. The committee’s recommendations also resulted in the publication of A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History.²

In this regard, the staff ride provides an excellent methodology for the application of military history because it offers a detailed program of study for campaigns and battles. The unique aspect of the staff ride is that, after classroom work, the campaign or battle study includes a visit to the battlefield site. After the battlefield visit, there is a final period of instruction that synthesizes the information learned during the preliminary classroom studies and the field visit.

Since the early twentieth century, staff rides have been an important tool in the U.S. Army to train leaders. Army staff rides were first implemented in 1906 as a formal part of the education of officers at the General Service and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In that year, Major Eben Swift led a small contingent of students to Chattanooga, Tennessee, to study the 1864 Atlanta campaign.³ Since 1906, the staff ride has remained an important part of formal military education programs.

Staff rides are also an integral part of informal programs conducted as home station training. Units often sponsor staff rides as part of their officer and noncommissioned officer development programs. The staff ride remains relevant to the study of military history because it permits students to become familiar with a campaign or battle and to conduct an analysis of the engagement(s) at the actual locations where key events happened.
Finally, the staff ride promotes critical thought about the actions surrounding a particular aspect of military history.

Staff rides are simple to incorporate into many types of unit training programs. Through a historical analysis of a commander's use of terrain, maneuver, and the decision-making process during the extreme stress of battle, a class of officers and NCOs can hone their leadership abilities. Because trainers and students often confuse staff rides with other types of training events that include battlefield visits or terrain analysis at a field site, it is important to define what a staff ride is, as well as some of the other terms commonly used to describe the study and analysis of battles and campaigns.

The terms “staff ride,” “historical battlefield tour,” and “tactical exercise without troops (TEWT)” are the most commonly confused or misused terms when describing the activities that organizations perform in the conduct of training at a battlefield. Dr. William G. Robertson, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, in his pamphlet, *The Staff Ride,* has developed definitions for these terms. This study will use Robertson’s definitions.

A staff ride is an event that

... consists of systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign, and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each. It envisions maximum student involvement before arrival at the site to guarantee thought, analysis, and discussion. A staff ride thus links a historical event, systematic preliminary study, and actual terrain to produce battle analysis in three dimensions. It consists of three distinct phases: preliminary study, field study, and integration.

Historical battlefield tours, in contrast, are visits to battlefields or campaign sites that do not include preliminary study. Such historical battlefield tours, led by an expert, can stimulate thought and promote student discussion, but they will be limited by the students’ lack of systematic preparation. TEWTs, for their part, utilize hypothetical scenarios that are played out on actual terrain and involve the employment of current doctrinal concepts. During TEWTs, terrain and doctrine, rather than history, are the instructional vehicles.

There are many battlefields throughout the United States that support the development and conduct of staff rides. The preferences, goals, and
resources of those developing the staff ride determine the battlefield to use. Many of the sites have easy access because they are open to the public and are part of permanently established state or national parks. Other locations may be on privately owned land and require coordination with the owners for approval to visit the site. The available sites span the spectrum of American eighteenth- and nineteenth-century warfare. Many staff ride sites for Revolutionary War and Civil War battles are available to the public. In addition to these locations, there are also Indian War battlefields available. Overseas U.S. units (particularly in Europe or Korea) can often develop staff rides for locations in their areas.

This handbook describes a staff ride for the Tippecanoe battlefield at Battle Ground, Indiana. The field study phase of the staff ride covers the 7 November 1811 battle between the Shawnee-led Indian confederacy and U.S. forces commanded by General William Henry Harrison. A staff ride of the Tippecanoe campaign allows one to examine many lessons that still apply to twentieth-century military operations, especially in the realm of operations other than war. A critical analysis of the centers of gravity, decision points, force protection measures, and methods of battlefield leadership that were important almost 190 years ago will provide insight into notions of how to think and make decisions that are still relevant for today’s officers.

Students of the military art often overlook the Battle of Tippecanoe because it occurred for the United States between the American Revolution and the War of 1812. The campaign is nonetheless important because it was a critical step that helped the new country establish dominance over the American northwest, where continuing tensions existed among the Americans, Indians, and remaining British in the area. (The War of 1812 eventually forced a resolution to the political and military struggles in this part of America.) The Battle of Tippecanoe, moreover, served as a precursor to the types of political and military activities that happened in the territory during the War of 1812. Henry Adams, who has written extensively about early U.S. history, called the Battle of Tippecanoe “a premature outbreak of the great wars of 1812.”

The organization of this staff ride provides the participant with background information about events that led to the battle, and not just what happened at the battle site. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relationships and treaty obligations among the United States and various Indian tribes in the Northwest Territory and the American northwest from the late eighteenth century through the War of 1812. Chapter 3 describes the
Tippecanoe campaign. Chapter 4 describes the important battlefield activities at Tippecanoe. The suggested route of the staff ride, battlefield vignettes, and discussion points make up chapter 5. The attached appendices provide information about casualties, meteorological data, biographical sketches, tactics, doctrine, and how nineteenth-century Americans and Indians organized for battle.
Notes


5. Ibid., 5.


II. EXPANSION INTO THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY

... the opinion of Mr. Jefferson on the subject, went so far as to as-
sert a claim of the United States as lords paramount to the lands of all
extinguished or decayed tribes, to the exclusion of all recent settlers.¹

—Governor William Henry Harrison,
Letter to the Secretary of War, William Eustis

To understand fully the context of the Tippecanoe campaign, it is
important to consider how the United States developed her claims to the
areas that made up the Northwest Territory. It is also important to review
America’s relationship with the Indian tribes in the area. These issues are
important because the Battle of Tippecanoe resulted from American
attempts to settle new areas in the northwest and from Indian attempts to
prevent that expansion.

During the eighteenth century, three European countries competed for
and claimed rights of control over territory in North America: Spain,
France, and Britain. Great Britain eventually gained the rights to Canada
and most of the French territory east of the Mississippi River upon the
conclusion of the French and Indian War in 1763. Control of the immense
area was important because of the vast revenues gained from the fur trade.²

The fur trade was managed several ways in North America. In addition
to private ventures, governments also owned or sponsored trading posts in
an area and bartered directly with individual Indians or Indian tribes for
furs. As a result, the first traders dramatically improved the quality of life
of the Indians with whom they came into contact. With the advent of the
traders, iron, steel, and firearms were introduced that supplemented or
replaced traditional Indian tools and weapons made of bone, wood, or stone.
These new technologies allowed the Indians to improve their hunting
ability and to produce items important in sustaining a higher (by European
standards) quality of life. But as their lifestyle changed, the Indians became
more dependent on the resources gained through trade and came to rely on
particular governments for trade. Political consequences arose out of these
relationships. One eventual consequence was that a government could
demand allegiance from an Indian tribe that was its trading partner, a
frequent occurrence during the various wars in North America.³

During the period between the French and Indian War and the
Revolutionary War, the British made an effort to reorganize their territory
On 7 October 1763, the British issued a Royal Proclamation regulating the governmental organization of the colonies and separating the colonists and the Indians. The proclamation established colonial boundaries and created a vast interior region under the jurisdiction of the government in Great Britain. The western limit of the colonial area ran generally along the Appalachian crest from eastern Florida to Quebec. This western limit became known as the "Proclamation Line."

The Proclamation Line provided for the separation of the colonists and the Indians by prohibiting colonial governments from purchasing land or establishing new settlements in areas west of the line. Meanwhile, the royal government in Britain would manage activities with the Indians in the interior. Although there were eventually modifications to the boundary, the Proclamation Line was generally in effect until the American Revolution.

Even though the British government attempted to prevent friction on the frontier by separating the Indians and the colonists, disputes continued and culminated in major outbreaks of violence. One such occurrence was the 10 October 1774 battle between Shawnee Indians and the militia forces at the white settlement at Point Pleasant (in future West Virginia). The day-long battle resulted in the Treaty of Camp Charlotte, which gave the settlers control of the area that would eventually become Kentucky and established the Indian-white boundary at the Ohio River.

Within a year, the American Revolution was under way. Even more so than the Camp Charlotte treaty and other previous agreements, the Revolutionary War had many unexpected consequences regarding Indian lands in the area set aside under the 1763 Royal Proclamation. The 1783 Treaty of Paris that ended the American Revolution defined the western boundary of the new American republic as the Mississippi River. It also gave the United States all former British possessions from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, southwest through the Great Lakes, to the Mississippi River. The United States now controlled the area in which the British had prohibited new settlements under the 1763 Royal Proclamation. After the Treaty of Paris, the Indians theoretically retained title to the land set aside under the proclamation; however, the United States government viewed these Indians (many of whom were allied with Great Britain during the Revolutionary War) as a conquered people with few rights.

The political dynamics that developed as a result of alliances formed during the Revolution continued to influence frontier events after the war.
Most of the Woodland Indian tribes\(^8\) allied themselves with the British during the war. The Indians viewed the Americans as their enemies, rather than the British, because the British were more generous with trade goods, and the settlers encroached on Indian areas.\(^9\) Thus, in their efforts to prevent expansion of the new republic, the British continued to support their former Indian allies during the post-Revolution period.

The political traditions of the United States and the Indian tribes were distinctly different, and the accompanying confusion that these differences caused resulted in frequent problems and misunderstandings. The United States viewed the various Indian tribes as independent nations who should be dealt with in the same fashion as European nations. Many problems arose because the Indians did not organize themselves politically in ways that American leaders understood. For instance, an Indian tribe was generally a group with common cultural traditions that did not have a central authority to make and enforce political decisions. This was because the tribe included several subgroups (called septs or clans) that were politically semiautonomous.\(^10\)

Indian perceptions about land ownership, moreover, also differed from the American point of view. The eighteenth-century northwestern Indian viewed land as a resource to be occupied and used. Once the desired resources were exhausted, the group moved to another area.\(^11\) The Indian concept of common use rather than ownership was significantly different from Euro-American concepts that encouraged citizens to amass large tracts of land as symbols of wealth.

Conflict on the frontier between Indians and Americans, therefore, was inevitable because of their different perceptions about one another and the American government's desire to settle the new territory. During the postwar period, the United States planned to establish control over its new territories. Because the Articles of Confederation did not allow Congress to levy taxes, exploitation of the potential wealth in the American northwest provided the United States with a way to pay off the country's large war debt that had resulted from the Revolution.\(^12\) Consequently, the government sponsored expeditions to explore the new areas and provided incentives to individuals to move to the frontier. The Indian tribes' options to maintain their traditional communities and ways of life were few after the Revolution. The tribes could attempt to coexist with the white man, or they could contest American encroachments upon their traditional territory.
Meanwhile, the British maintained a continued interest in the American northwest, seeking to retain their lucrative fur trade in the area bordered by the Mississippi River, Great Lakes, and Ohio River, as well as to protect Canada. Initially, the British wanted an Indian buffer state between British possessions in Canada and the United States. But the final boundaries established by the Treaty of Paris made this impractical because the treaty ceded the buffered area to the United States. To protect their North American interests, the British encouraged the northwestern Indian tribes to resist American expansion and to keep the Americans south of the Ohio River. Indian successes at keeping settlers south of the Ohio would create a de facto Indian buffer state even if a de jure one were impossible.\textsuperscript{13}

The Treaty of Paris and the subsequent Jay Treaty allowed the British to maintain existing posts and garrisons on U.S. soil until 1796. Maintenance of these posts allowed the British to continue a profitable fur trade in the area and to control the important trade routes along the Great Lakes. The posts also provided the northwestern Indians with guns, ammunition, and other supplies. As a result of the treaties, the British maintained garrisons at Detroit and Fort Mackinac in Michigan, as well as several others that controlled entrances to the Great Lakes.\textsuperscript{14}

Engagements with the Indians continued in the American northwest as U.S. forces occupied the new territories and established communities in the unsettled countryside. In 1787, Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance, outlining the procedures governing the area that would eventually become Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota. The ordinance described the requirements for territorial government and the conditions for statehood in a vast area designated as the Northwest Territory. The ordinance also stated that the area would contain no fewer than three states and no more than five, and it prohibited the invasion of any land that the Indians retained title to except in the case of a lawful war authorized by Congress.\textsuperscript{15}

The Northwest Ordinance, in addition, formalized the procedures settling the area south of the Great Lakes. Prior to the ordinance, President George Washington tried to develop policies designed to gain control of the Indian titled lands east of the Mississippi. The policy was to make the area attractive to settlers by providing land grants or selling government land at extremely low prices. The growth of the white settlements would also kill off much of the game, thereby making the area unattractive to the Indians. Washington felt that the loss of game coupled with government
inducements would cause the Indians to sell their land to the government in return for better land to the west of the Mississippi. The inducements worked for the settlers, and large numbers of them flocked to the frontier. The Indians, however, desired no land beyond the Mississippi River and insisted that the frontier should remain at the Ohio River. As the Indians resisted white encroachment onto their lands, violence erupted, forcing the president to send a series of military expeditions in an attempt to establish American dominance in the region.

The first military expedition to the Northwest Territory occurred in 1790. After a two-month training period, General Josiah Harmar left Cincinnati with a 1,400-man force. In September 1790, Harmar’s force fought engagements with a combined Indian force of Miami, Shawnee, Potawatomi, and Chippewa in the Maumee valley. The Indians, led by Chiefs Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, dominated the action and defeated the Americans. After the series of engagements, Harmar’s casualties were 183 killed and thirty-one wounded. As a result of the expedition, problems in the territory increased as the Indians gained confidence.

As the Indian harassment increased, Congress voted in 1791 to raise another expedition to deal with the strife in the northwest. The force gathered for the campaign again turned out to be inadequately trained and disciplined. The quality of the soldiers was often poor because inducements to enlist for the campaign were few. The offer of a scant two dollars per month pay usually resulted in the enlistment of men “purchased from prisons, wheelbarrows and brothels.”

The army, organized in March 1791, consisted of about 1,400 men, with General Arthur St. Clair commanding. St. Clair’s expeditionary force was plagued by poor leadership, poor supply discipline, and desertion. The Indians, once again led by Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, engaged the expedition at dawn on 4 November 1791. The battle stands as the worst defeat of American arms during the Indian Wars; of 920 Americans engaged, the Indians killed 632 and wounded 264.

In 1792, Congress authorized the organization of the American Legion (“Legion” was then a term that denoted a combined arms force). General Anthony Wayne commanded this Legion, which consisted of infantry, artillery, and light dragoons. A combination of ongoing peace negotiations with the Indians and Wayne’s desire not to employ the Legion before it was prepared kept the force from conducting major operations for two years. Wayne used the time wisely, building and garrisoning small outposts
throughout the area to protect his lines of communication. So that the force
could quickly build redoubts and abatis while on campaign to provide
protection for encampments, Wayne spent considerable time training his
men, employing standards from Steuben’s Blue Book to teach close order
drill, and training his force extensively in marksmanship and the
employment of field fortifications.20

As Wayne continued his preparations for action against the Indians, the
British became increasingly alarmed and feared that Detroit might be
Wayne’s possible objective. Consequently, the British, in violation of the
1783 peace treaty between the United States and Great Britain, established
Fort Miamis to protect Detroit’s approaches21 In addition to providing
protection for the British garrison at Detroit, establishment of the fort
restored the Indians’ confidence that the English would continue to lend aid
and support to their attacks against the Americans. By the summer of 1794,
the situation on the frontier had deteriorated to the point that military action
became necessary. As the Legion left its winter quarters at Fort Washington
(present-day Cincinnati, Ohio), several units of mounted Kentucky militia
arrived to reinforce the well-trained and well-supplied army.22

On 20 August 1794, Wayne defeated a large Indian force four miles
from Fort Miamis at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, near present-day
Maumee, Ohio. After the battle, the Indians retreated toward their British
allies in Fort Miamis and attempted to gain sanctuary inside the protective
walls of the fort. The British, however, closed the gates and refused to
shelter the Indian force. The Indians, without refuge and their confidence in
their British allies shaken, had little choice but to seek terms with Wayne’s
advancing Legion.23 Wayne’s victory at Fallen Timbers resulted in the 1795
Treaty of Greenville.24

The treaty allowed the United States access to the disputed areas and
established the conditions for future American expansion. The accord also
relinquished the United States’ claim to all Indian lands in the Northwest
Territory, except for parts of Ohio and sixteen other small tracts of land.
These tracts were administrative areas at strategic locations throughout the
Northwest Territory. In addition, the treaty allowed the United States to
build forts at these locations and obtain unrestricted access to important
waterways, portages, and other mobility corridors. The treaty also allowed
the United States to survey the sixteen tracts and to have the right of free
passage to them. Finally, the agreement required the Indians to recognize
that they were under the protection of the United States. As a protectorate of
the United States, the Indians could sell their land—but only to the United States government.25

As things quieted down after Wayne’s successful campaign, the United States began to take additional steps to develop the frontier area. In 1800, all of the Northwest Territory, with the exception of Ohio, became the Indiana Territory. During the early 1800s, the Indiana Territory was a sparsely populated area with William Henry Harrison as the first territorial governor.26 Harrison was not a stranger to the American northwest; as a young officer, he had served in the American Legion commanded by Wayne. After leaving the army, Harrison remained in the area and served as the Northwest Territory’s delegate to Congress, before his appointment as governor by President John Adams. After his appointment as governor, Harrison established the capital for the territory at Vincennes and began his administration of the immense area.27

U.S. public policy toward the Indians in the Old Northwest shifted during the administration of Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson enunciated his Indian policy in his second inaugural address on 4 March 1805, stating that “humanity enjoins us to teach them [the Indians] agriculture and the domestic arts.”18 The address implied that Jefferson wanted to find ways to coexist peacefully with the Indians on the frontier. But the president’s inaugural remarks were deceptive; his private views were quite different. An earlier letter to Governor Harrison, written 27 February 1803, outlined the “unofficial” United States policy. In the letter, Jefferson instructed Harrison to draw the Indians into farming and encourage their indebtedness to the U.S. trading posts. The reason for the emphasis on agriculture was twofold. Once the Indians were farmers, they would realize that they did not need vast areas of land for hunting and would sell them to the United States. The second point was that the Indians would need to buy their farming supplies from the trading posts. Once Indian leaders were sufficiently in debt, the United States could offer them the opportunity to sell their lands to reduce their debt. If peaceful attempts to gain territory failed and hostilities ensued, Jefferson told Harrison that “seizing the whole country of that tribe and driving them across the Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to others and a furtherance of our final consolidation.”29

As white encroachment of Indian lands continued, many Indians began developing different ideas about the possession of land and how to live in the same areas as white men. The sustained American expansion indicated
to many Indians that it was impossible to coexist peacefully with white settlers. The Shawnee became preeminent among the Indians in resisting white encroachments into Indian territory, although they were not always successful in these endeavors. As settlers began moving into the wilderness, the Shawnee were forced to move several times in the American south and northwest, eventually winding up in Ohio. Although forced to migrate, the Shawnee developed a reputation that made them feared by the settlers for their warlike prowess.

Two Shawnee brothers eventually emerged as Indian leaders who attempted to unify the Indians throughout the Old Northwest. The two brothers, Tenskwatava and Tecumseh, moved from Ohio to the Indiana Territory after the Treaty of Greenville. Tenskwatava, or “The Prophet,” was a spiritual leader in the Shawnee tribe and rose to prominence about 1805. The Prophet preached that Indians should abandon alcohol and anything associated with the Americans’ way of life. The Prophet’s teachings also emphasized a return to the traditional Indian ways. Tenskwatava was familiar enough with one of the most common evils associated with the white man—alcohol. Before the development of his revivalist religion and subsequent rise to power as the “Shawnee Prophet,” Tenskwatava had been a vagabond and drunk.

Meanwhile, the Prophet’s brother, Tecumseh, attempted to organize the Indians politically. The Prophet’s religious ideas often attracted Indians to the various villages that the brothers established, and Tecumseh used their attendance to promote his ideas about reestablishing Indian ownership of lands lost to white encroachment. Tecumseh eventually established an Indian confederacy or amalgamation of tribes. A respected warrior and leader, he served as the political leader of the confederacy. In his role as organizer and leader, he traveled throughout the American northwest and south to gain support for his pan-Indian confederacy. By 1810, he had assembled over 1,000 warriors from various tribes, including the Shawnee, Kickapoo, Delaware, Ottawa, and Chippewa Indians.

Tecumseh’s ideas about protecting Indian lands were a radical departure from traditional Indian thought. Tecumseh proposed that Indians were linked culturally, racially, and politically. Because of these common associations, any Indian land was under the common ownership of all Indians. A particular tribe had the right of transitory ownership as long as it physically occupied an area. But once a tribe abandoned an area, the land
reverted to common Indian ownership and required the mutual agreement of all tribes to sell the land.34

If Tecumseh could successfully establish an amalgamation of tribes, it would destroy ideas of tribal independence and limit the authority of tribes to establish individual confederacies. Accomplishment of this goal would establish joint ownership of Indian lands and prevent individual tribes from making separate land cessions to the United States.35 The resulting confederacy would strengthen the Indians’ political and military responses to U.S. encroachment on Indian lands. In 1808, the confederacy led by Tecumseh settled near the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers. The village established by Tecumseh and his brother, known as Prophet’s Town, became the headquarters of the confederacy.

During the years between 1800 and 1810, a series of disputes erupted between the Indians and the territorial government at Vincennes. The problems ranged from Indian attacks of settlements, to settlers violating treaty provisions and hunting on Indian lands. Meanwhile, Harrison’s continued treaty negotiations with separate tribes rather than the confederacy caused friction between the Indians, settlers, and the territorial government. The most serious problems stemmed from the Treaty of Fort Wayne (1809) (see map 1). In this treaty, a few tribes ceded 3,000,000 acres of land to the United States. Tecumseh, who was traveling to gather support for his confederacy during the treaty negotiations, refused to agree to the land cessions. Since Tecumseh’s followers and many other area tribes failed to agree to the provisions of the treaty, the confederacy refused to recognize its terms.36

By the summer of 1810, both sides were posturing for war in the territory. Tecumseh continued to travel in attempts to strengthen his confederacy. Between 1810 and 1811, the U.S. secretary of war ordered an infantry regiment and two separate companies to the Indiana Territory. Even though the American military presence increased, Harrison, the Prophet, and Tecumseh met several times between 1808 and 1811 to attempt to resolve the developing problems. Harrison and Tecumseh conducted the most important series of meetings, the last of which occurred during the summer of 1811. The two leaders discussed rumors that the confederacy was preparing for war, Indian and white attacks on one another, and Indian dissatisfaction with land cessions.37

The final meeting was inconclusive, and Tecumseh traveled south to recruit other Indians for his confederacy. Harrison believed that the
confederacy was a major threat and became determined to destroy its headquarters at Prophet's Town and force the dispersion of its occupants. Shortly after Tecumseh began his southern journey, Harrison prepared for a campaign in the new purchase. Harrison recruited and organized his force, and it left Vincennes late in September 1811, moving toward the new land cessions.38

After a brief halt to train and to establish an army post, Harrison continued his march through the new purchase and arrived in the vicinity of Prophet's Town on 6 November 1811. The American force and the Indian confederacy fought the Battle of Tippecanoe the day after Harrison's army arrived outside of Prophet's Town. The American army defeated the confederacy, destroyed the Indian headquarters at Prophet's Town, and then returned to Vincennes.

The confederacy immediately dispersed. As a result of the battle, it lost a large part of its support from other tribes. Meanwhile, Tecumseh returned from his southern trip and tried to rebuild the federation, but without the manpower pledged from the tribes formerly in the confederacy, the amalgamation of tribes failed to present a major military threat to the United States.39 In a final effort to restore Indian independence in the American northwest, Tecumseh joined forces with the British.

At the time of the Tippecanoe battle, an ongoing national debate existed in the United States about the merits of going to war with Great Britain. Napoleon had been waging war on the European continent during much of the first decade of the eighteenth century, and the effects of the Napoleonic wars retarded American commerce. The French and British tried to establish naval blockades during the Napoleonic wars to interdict each other's sea lines of communication. The French blockades, however, had little effect since they were unenforceable because of Great Britain's dominant naval power. The English naval policies, however, seriously disrupted American trade and frequently resulted in the impressment of American seamen.40

The problems with Britain, and to a lesser extent France, occurred throughout the first decade of the nineteenth century. Congress, the shipping classes in New England, and many newspapers became incensed with British practices. Prompted by these highly charged emotions, many Americans agitated for war. Meanwhile, Tippecanoe fueled the war fires in the American east, as many citizens blamed America's frontier problems on Britain's influence over the northwestern Indian tribes. As a reaction to the
battle and the British aid to the Indians, Congressman Henry Clay called for
the punishment of Canada and Britain. 41

In the spring of 1812, the Indians again began raiding the white
settlements on the frontier. The increased Indian attacks in the northwest
and the potential for war with Britain and its Indian allies persuaded the
United States to raise another force for service in the Old Northwest.
General William Hull arrived in Dayton early in June 1812 to assume
command of the forces in the Northwest Territory. Later that month, on 18
June 1812, the United States declared war on Great Britain. After his
arrival, Hull conducted inconclusive operations throughout the area.
Eventually, a combined British-Indian force placed Hull’s command under
siege at Detroit. On 16 August 1812, Hull surrendered Detroit and all U.S.
forces in the area to the British and Indian force led by General Isaac Brock
and Tecumseh.42

After Hull’s surrender, William Henry Harrison became the supreme
commander of the Northwest army.43 There were two major actions in
Harrison’s area that were significant enough to influence the outcome of the
war in the Old Northwest. The first was a naval engagement, during which
Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry defeated the British naval force on Lake
Erie on 10 September 1813. After his victory, Perry sent his famous
dispatch to Harrison at Fort Meigs: “We have met the enemy and they are
ours.”44

Once the Americans controlled Lake Erie, the British-Indian position at
Detroit became untenable, and British General Henry Proctor (Brock’s
replacement) prepared to abandon Detroit. Simultaneously, Harrison
prepared to invade Canada. To facilitate the invasion, Perry ferried
Harrison’s force across Lake Erie to the mouth of the Detroit River. On 27
September 1813, American forces led by General Harrison occupied Fort
Malden and Detroit.45 After securing each, Harrison’s army pursued
Tecumseh and Proctor into Canada. On 5 October 1813, the American
army engaged and defeated the British-Indian force at the Battle of the
Thames near Moraviantown (Ontario, Canada). Tecumseh died during the
battle, and Harrison’s forces routed the combined British-Indian force.46

Following the Battle of the Thames, all of the major impediments to
continued American settlement of the Old Northwest disappeared. The
destruction of the Indian confederacy that began at Tippecanoe became
complete when Tecumseh died in Ontario. In the end, most of the tribes
recognized the authority of the United States in the Old Northwest.47 After
the War of 1812, there was never another serious Indian threat in the American northwest. In 1816, Indiana became the nineteenth state, and by 1826, almost all Indian title to land in Indiana had been extinguished.
NOTES

1. C. F. Klinck, ed., *Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction in Early Records* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), 63. This is from an extract of a letter from Governor Harrison to the secretary of war, 4 July 1810. The letter explains Harrison’s position on determining with whom he needed to negotiate to purchase Indian lands. In the letter, Harrison states that it was President Jefferson’s opinion that the United States did not need to negotiate land purchases with tribes that had recently moved to the area. So from Harrison’s perspective, the Miami was the major tribe with rightful claims to territory in Indiana. Harrison felt that the remaining tribes, such as the Shawnee (who migrated to Indiana after the Treaty of Greenville), had no legitimate claims.


5. Cappon, 86; and Maxwell, 152.


5. Eighteenth-century Woodland Indians lived east of the Mississippi River, throughout the Great Lakes region, and the northeastern United States and Canada. A few Woodland tribes (namely the Shawnee) lived at one time in the southeastern United States. Woodland Indians also shared a language association. Woodland Indian language groups are Algonkian, Iroquoian, Siouan, and Muskogian.

9. Downey, 7; and Eckert, *Gateway*, 34.


13. Eckert, *Gateway*, 107, 116, describes British efforts to define the American boundary at the Ohio River during the negotiations to end the Revolutionary
War. The references also describe continued British promotion of the idea that the Indians should focus on the Ohio River as the Indian-white border after the signing of the Treaty of Paris. Eckert, *Gateway*, 763, describes British efforts to establish an Indian buffer state at the negotiations to end the War of 1812. It would have required the United States to cede Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, half of Ohio, and part of Minnesota. The American negotiators refused to entertain the idea.

14. Beavans, 9-14; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 363; Eckert, *Gateway*, 239-40; David R. Edmunds, “The Thin Red Line: Tecumseh, the Prophet and Shawnee Resistance,” *Timeline* 4, no. 6 (1987-88): 15; and Urwin, 30. The British turned over their posts to the United States in 1796. Afterward, the British established new posts in Canada to fulfill the roles of their former posts in the United States. Fort Malden, for example, was established on the Canadian side of the Detroit River after the British turned Detroit over to the United States. After 1796, the British, from their Canadian posts, continued to support the northwestern Indian tribes through British traders (or army personnel disguised as traders) that traveled throughout the American northwest.

15. See Eckert, *Gateway*, 138-40, 699, for more details on the impact of the Northwest Ordinance and the attitude of the local settlers toward the ordinance. The ordinance also prohibited slavery or other forms of involuntary servitude, described procedures for territorial representation in Congress, and had clauses designed to promote education. The Northwest Ordinance is relevant to congressional authority to declare war because the United States Constitution was not in effect until 1789. The U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, grants Congress the authority to declare war and to raise and support armies.


18. As cited in Downey, 52-53; and Weigley, 91.

19. Downey, 54-60; Eckert, The Frontiersman, 392-401; Eckert, Gateway, 701-2; and Hook, 18-19, provide detailed accounts of the battle. St. Clair began the expedition without ample supplies, so his soldiers were on reduced rations from the start. Camp followers probably consumed part of the army’s provisions, even though St. Clair prohibited the release of supplies to them. Additionally, about 300 militia deserted, and St. Clair sent a company of regulars to catch them. Finally, the night prior to the attack, St. Clair’s force failed to establish proper defensive positions. The Indian attack at first light quickly overwhelmed the American position, and only twenty-four members of those engaged returned uninjured. In addition to the American military casualties, there were approximately 200 camp followers killed. Only sixty-six Indians were killed and nine wounded. Eckert reports that Chief Blue Jacket, a white man adopted by the Shawnees, killed and scalped his brother during the battle. The boys were separated as youngsters, and Blue Jacket (Marmaduke Van Swearingin) grew up to be a Shawnee war chief, his brother (Charles Van Swearingen) was a captain on the expedition.

20. Esarey, History, 122; Gifford, 319-21; Gunderson, “William Henry Harrison,” 10-24; Weigley, 93. Weigley calls Wayne the “Father of the Regular Army” because he provided the army with its first “model of excellence.” Wayne issued every officer in his command a copy of the Blue Book and demanded that they become proficient in the drills that it contained. Wayne also trained his units in open-order formations in addition to the standard formations. The Legion trained extensively with the bayonet and live ammunition. In addition to marksmanship training, Wayne conducted maneuver live-fire as well as blank-fire exercises. He also conducted training exercises that included soldiers dressed and acting like Indians to simulate an opposing force. He commented that “We must burn a good deal of powder, . . . to make . . . marksman and soldiers.” Wayne’s approach to training was unique for the time. William Henry Harrison had served as a company grade officer in Wayne’s command.

21. There were at least three forts in the general area over a period of years, and in use at different times, known as “Fort Miamis” or “Fort Miami.” These forts are easily confused with one another.


24. Greenville is the modern spelling. Greeneville is the eighteen-century spelling, and it is still found in many references.

25. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 439; and Charles J. Kappler, ed., *Indian Affairs. Laws and Treaties* 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1904), 39-43. The treaty also formally gave the United States control of a few other areas to which the American government had previously extinguished Indian title. The treaty specified annuity arrangements to compensate the Indians and had clauses about the punishment of whites that murdered Indians (and vice versa). The treaty established the means for the United States to gain title to land that the United States felt was already American territory (after the Treaty of Paris).

26. Howard Peckham, *Indiana: A Bicentennial History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 36, and Family History Section, Indiana Historical Society, *Census of Indiana Territory for 1807* (Indianapolis, IN: Family History Section, Indiana Historical Society, 1980). Peckham estimated that the territory had a population of about 2,500. The 1807 Census shows a population of 2,587. The figures, however, are somewhat misleading because the census only counted free white males of voting age; the census did not count women, children, slaves (although illegal, there were slaves in the area), etc. Some estimates of the population are as high as 25,000 people. The original Indiana Territory encompassed most of the Northwest Territory except for Ohio. The area of the Indiana Territory decreased as Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin became populated enough to become territories, separated territories, or states.

27. P. D. DeHart, *Past and Present of Tippecanoe County Indiana*, vol. 1 (Indianapolis, IN: B. F. Bowen & Company Publishers, 1909), 67. As governor, Harrison was also the superintendent of Indian affairs. In 1803, President Jefferson appointed Harrison as the sole commissioner for treating with the Indians.

29. Ibid., 56-57. Jefferson said that his letter was “unofficial and private.” Several sources describe the letter or quote passages from it. There are some slight variations between sources, but the concepts of turning the Indians toward agriculture, forcing their indebtedness, and removing them beyond the Mississippi River are essentially the same in each reference.

30. Drake, 21; Hook, 14-15; and Johnson, 6. The Shawnee were a Woodland tribe of the Algonkian language group who moved from the Cumberland River area in Tennessee to Ohio. Shawnee groups also lived as far south as Georgia, Alabama, and Florida.

31. Reed Beard, The Battle of Tippecanoe (Chicago, IL: Hammond Press, W. B. Conkey Co., 1911), 22; and Peckham, 40. The brothers established several villages, to include one at Greenville, Ohio. The Greenville village was established in an area that violated the terms of the Treaty of Greenville, and in the spring of 1808, the Kickapoo and Potawatomi tribes offered the brothers land in Indiana. The brothers relocated to Indiana and established Prophet’s Town to the immediate south of the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers.

32. Beard, 13-14; Rachel Buff, “Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa: Myth, Historiography and Popular Memory,” Historical Reflections (1995): 279; Drake, 86-88; Eckert, Gateway, 346-48; David R. Edmunds, “Thin Red Line,” 7-8, 11, 19; Edmunds, Quest, 83-98, 160; Esarey, History, 182; Hook, 22-23; and Pirtle, 2. The Prophet said that he had a dream in which he saw all who had died as drunkards “with flames issuing from their mouths.” The Prophet also preached that Indians should return to their traditional lifestyle, which also included prohibitions on Indian and white intermarriages. The Prophet’s religion emphasized that Indians needed to reject practices learned from white men (to include the tools, clothes, and food learned from contact with whites). The Prophet’s teachings specifically focused on abandoning anything associated with Americans and said that Americans developed from an evil spirit. According to the Prophet, the French and British developed from the same Master of Life deity as the Indians. By teaching that the British and French shared the same positive spiritual legacy as Indians, the Prophet gave his followers a way to continue their access to the white man’s technology (although in a limited way). The Prophet promoted obviously political topics, such as the idea that Indians should unite in common goals as one people. Buff notes that the Prophet’s ideas focused on a return to traditions that would ensure restoration of
land and peace and that politics and religion were traditionally associated with one another in Indian culture. Edmunds and Buff believe that the Prophet's role was much more significant than is usually acknowledged and that the religion that he sponsored was a genuine movement in its own right, rather than merely a subset of Tecumseh's confederacy. Many authors submit that the Prophet's movement predates Tecumseh's and was the initial reason that Indians assembled—to hear the Prophet and not Tecumseh. Regardless of whether or not the Prophet's movement predated Tecumseh's political efforts, it is commonly recognized that between the two brothers, Tecumseh's leadership and influence were ascendant at the time of the Battle of Tippecanoe.

33. Drake, 43; Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 11-13; and Hook, 26. Tecumseh is often referred to as an "Indian Chief"; this is incorrect. Although he was a political and combat leader, Tecumseh was never recognized as a chief in the traditions of the Shawnee tribe. In fact, Tecumseh usually referred to himself as a warrior. Tecumseh's confederation ultimately included tribes as far away as the west side of the Mississippi River. The Chickasaws and Choctaws in the American south refused to join the confederacy, but the Creeks (Alabama) sent a party north with Tecumseh in 1811-12.

34. Beard, 23; Edmunds, Quest, 97-98; Pirtle, xiii.

35. Adams, 351; Downey, 83.

36. Hook, 26. The Indian nations listed on the treaty are "Delawares," "Putawatimies," "Miamies," and "Eel River Miamies." See Kappler, 101-4, for a copy of the treaty. Adams, 334-35, has an excellent map that shows Indian cessions from 1795-1810 and includes this treaty. Adams, 342-64, also details many of the problems, such as Indian attacks, treaty violations, and 1809 treaty issues that led up to the Battle of Tippecanoe. Eckert, Gateway, 339-40, 352; Maxwell, 152-53, discuss some of the methods used to gain Indian agreement during treaty negotiations. American treaty negotiators employed many methods to gain Indian agreement to treaties; some of the methods were ethical; many were not. See chapter 3, note 8, for more details on negotiation practices during treaties.

the Rifle Regiment were the Regular Army organizations ordered to the Indiana Territory. Adams, 357-59, details Indian-white attacks (1810-11) and the 1811 meeting. All of Eckert's works, as well as Hook, 27-30, provide details of Harrison's meeting with Tecumseh.


39. Drake, 155-56.

40. Adams, 374-76; Eckert, *Gateway*, 365-30; Maurice Matloff, ed., *American Military History, Volume 1: 1775-1902* (Pennsylvania: Combined Books, 1996), 120-23. Britain and France adopted policies that led to the search and seizure of American merchant shipping regardless of whether or not the ships carried contraband. Great Britain was able to carry out its policies with greater effect. An example of British action is the *Chesapeake* incident. On 22 June 1807, a British warship, *Leopard*, fired on the *Chesapeake*, an American warship in American waters, and accused the Americans of hiring British deserters as sailors. The crew of the *Leopard* boarded the *Chesapeake* and impressed some of the crew. President Jefferson signed the Embargo Act as a response to these European naval policies. The act restricted all international trade in American ports and was unpopular with American merchants. The 1809 Non-Intercourse Act replaced the Embargo Act and restricted trade with only Great Britain and France. The United States declared war on Great Britain in the summer of 1812; a Senate vote to declare war on France failed by two votes.

41. Adams, 376; Israel, 664; Matloff, 120-21; Pirtle, 10.

42. Drake, 157; Klinck, 147; Weigley, 118-20.

43. Weigley, 123, 132. Weigley considers Harrison a competent officer whose militia performed well. Weigley's analysis is that "When volunteer companies were led by a William Henry Harrison or an Andrew Jackson, who used them with regard to their limitations but who both disciplined and inspired them, meeting the British was not likely to end in rout and might even lead to victory."

44. Adams, 707, provides an excellent summary of the Lake Erie battle. Heinl, 166, contains Perry's complete quotation.

46. Adams, 710-15; Klinck, 184-215, discusses the Battle of the Thames. Klinck also provides primary source accounts of Tecumseh's death. Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, has extensive notes on Tecumseh at the Battle of the Thames.


48. Adams, 1297, Israel, 664.
III. TIPPECANOE CAMPAIGN

...he [the president] is so far off he will not be injured by the war; he may sit in his town and drink his wine, while you and I have to fight it out.

—Tecumseh, remark to Governor Harrison

Setting the Stage

Tecumseh’s adamant refusal to accept the provisions of the Treaty of Fort Wayne foreshadowed the inevitability of another Indian war. Harrison was apprehensive that Tecumseh would prevent a survey of the lands ceded by the treaty. Settlers, likewise, were afraid that Indian raids would continue or that the Indians would attack Vincennes. Tecumseh and the tribes allied with him, for their part, were alarmed that the Seventeen Fires—the Americans arrayed against the Indians—would consume all of the Indian lands. Each side feared the threat posed by the other, and these fears made the campaign and resulting battle inevitable. The only question remaining was when the battle would happen.

Successive administrations in Washington urged Harrison to continue his efforts to extinguish Indian title to lands in the Indiana Territory. In response, Harrison, throughout his years as governor, proved extremely adept at gaining land cessions to support the growing expansion of settlements along the frontier. Indeed, between 1802 and 1809, he extinguished Indian title to over one hundred million acres.3

Meanwhile, over the same decade, Tecumseh organized and established a confederacy or amalgamation of tribes. Starting in 1801 and continuing until his death in 1813, Tecumseh supported a grand but simple plan for a confederacy that would allow the Indians to maintain their independence and regain lands lost to American encroachment. The plan proposed that the Indians on both sides of the Mississippi join forces when they received a “great sign.” Thereupon, they would regain the lands lost to white encroachment—peaceably, if possible, but by force, if necessary. The goal of the confederacy was to “take over the place of the whites which had been usurped from them.”4

Tecumseh was successful in establishing his confederacy, and by 1805, he had more tribes pledged to the coalition than had any previous Indian confederacy. As more tribes pledged their support, his headquarters at Prophet’s Town continued to increase in size. In support of the confederacy, small groups of warriors or individual braves moved with
their families to the village at Tippecanoe. In the summer of 1810, the size of the village grew from 1,000 warriors and their families to 3,000 warriors, alone, all of whom camped within thirty miles of Prophet’s Town.6

Politically, Tecumseh focused his efforts on recruiting support from the various Indian leaders. This support would provide him with manpower at his Tippecanoe headquarters and with additional forces if hostilities erupted. For material support, Tecumseh relied on the British. Although he refused until the War of 1812 to establish a formal political-military alliance with the British, he, nonetheless, accepted supplies from them on a routine basis. By 1810, Tecumseh’s warriors were so well supplied by the British forces who provided them with guns, ammunition, and other supplies at no cost that they refused to buy anything from American traders.7

The Almost War

As American possessions continued to expand, concern grew on both sides about the threat of war. Consequently, Harrison and Tecumseh met several times between 1810 and 1811 in attempts to prevent hostilities and to discuss the impact of the most recent land cessions. The meetings and discussions had little long-term effect, however, because each side focused on short-term remedies that would protect their particular political or military interests.

Tecumseh was clearly focused on protecting Indian lands as well as renegotiating the rights to territory already ceded to the United States. He used the meetings to buy time for the confederacy until it was strong enough to act politically or militarily to regain Indian territory. Harrison, on the other hand, was determined to protect the territory gained during previous negotiations as well as ensure his ability to treat with individual tribes for new land cessions.8 President Madison’s administration encouraged these efforts. Secretary of War William Eustis wrote to Harrison, directing him to extinguish the Indian title to lands east of the Wabash River. Harrison concluded several treaties, including the Treaty of Fort Wayne, shortly after receiving this guidance. The agreements were ratified after the new year, and the lands gained as a result of the treaty were quickly offered for public sale.9

The Treaty of Fort Wayne was a major catalyst for the Tippecanoe campaign. In the spring of 1809, Harrison met with several representatives of the area tribes at Greenville, Ohio, and gained rights to more than three million acres of land in Indiana. This agreement became final on 30
September 1809 at Fort Wayne, Indiana. Because Tecumseh was away recruiting tribes for the confederacy during the negotiations, the treaty was concluded without his or his band’s input. Subsequent meetings between Tecumseh and Harrison at Vincennes were a result of Harrison’s desire to take possession of the new purchase and Tecumseh’s desire to retain the area for Indian use.

Each side tried to gain the support of the undecided Indian tribes. For this purpose, Tecumseh continued traversing the area. Harrison, for his part, either met with the various Indian chiefs or sent letters by messenger to them. The tone of Harrison’s missives was to limit the influence of Tecumseh among the leaders of the different tribes in the territory. The nature of Harrison’s messages depended upon the disposition of the recipients toward the United States. Tribes that maintained an attitude of friendship toward the United States were congratulated for not joining Tecumseh. Tribes that considered joining Tecumseh’s coalition received letters threatening their destruction. Many of Harrison’s letters had the expected effect, such as the congratulatory one sent to Chief Black Hoof, who responded that he would maintain friendship with the United States. The threatening letter to the Wyandots, in contrast, had the opposite effect. The Wyandots considered the letter a declaration of war and joined Tecumseh.

When Tecumseh made recruiting trips, his brother remained in charge at Prophet’s Town. The Prophet, however, had neither the political acumen nor discipline of his older brother and often encouraged the warriors at Tippecanoe to take provocative actions that only drew the United States and the confederacy closer to war. Furthermore, during one of Tecumseh’s absences, in July 1810, the Prophet urged the warriors at Prophet’s Town to destroy a white settlement and proposed an attack on Vincennes. This caused a rift among the tribes supporting the confederation; many Indians left Prophet’s Town, and some tribes refused to continue support of the confederacy.

Nonetheless, the Prophet convinced approximately 500 warriors to strike out for Vincennes. The warriors canoed down the Wabash and established a camp about fifty miles from the town. Harrison, through his intelligence network, however, was informed of the proposed attack. To protect the capital, he raised three companies of volunteer militia and stationed them a few miles above Vincennes at Fort Knox. Tecumseh, meanwhile, warned of his brother’s plans, quickly returned to the
headquarters at Tippecanoe, put a stop to the intended attack, and delayed
the inevitable confrontation. 11

Because of the increasing tensions between the settlers and the Indians
on the frontier, Harrison and Tecumseh subsequently met twice at
Vincennes. Harrison initiated the first meeting by writing to Tecumseh. A
messenger read the letter to Tecumseh and his brother at Prophet’s Town in
July 1810. Harrison’s emissary told the brothers that

Although I must say that you are an enemy to the Seventeen Fires,
and that you have used the greatest exertions to lead them [the Indians]
astray. In this you have been in some measure successful; as I am told
they are ready to raise the tomahawk against their father. . . . Don’t de-
ceive yourselves; do not believe that all nations of Indians united are
able to resist the force of the Seventeen Fires. . . . what can a few brave
warriors do against the innumerable warriors of the Seventeen Fires?
Our blue-coats are more numerous than you can count. . . . Do not think
that the red-coats can protect you; they are not able to protect them-
selves. . . . What reason have you to complain of the Seventeen Fires?
Have they taken anything from you? Have they ever violated the trea-
ties made with the red men? You say they have purchased lands from
those who had no right to sell them. Show that this is true and the land
will be restored. Show us the rightful owners. I have full power to ar-
range this business; but if you would rather carry your complaints be-
fore your great father, the President, you shall be indulged. I will
immediately take means to send you. . . . 12

Tecumseh declined the trip to Washington, preferring instead to meet
with Harrison at Vincennes. During the August 1810 meeting, Tecumseh
told Harrison that the Treaty of Fort Wayne was invalid. Furthermore,
Tecumseh threatened that if the land was not restored, Harrison would see
“how it will be settled.” 13 Harrison countered that the Shawnees did not
have the right to represent the Indians at treaty negotiations because they
had been driven from their traditional homelands in Florida and Georgia by
the Creek Indians. Moreover, since the Miami occupied the land when the
Shawnee were in the south, the Miami were the appropriate tribe to deal
with during treaty negotiations. Finally, Harrison stated that all Indians
were not one people and that the Shawnee did not have the right to come
from a “distant country” and tell the Miami how to dispose of their lands. 14

The strongly stated positions almost resulted in a fight between the
Indians present and Harrison’s contingent. The meeting reconvened the
next day with Harrison and Tecumseh outwardly displaying more restraint.
Harrison asked Tecumseh if he planned to prevent a survey of the land on the Wabash. Tecumseh replied that he was determined to maintain the pre-1809 boundary. Harrison promised to pass Tecumseh's concerns to the president, but he did not think it would make a difference. The governor also emphasized that the American title to the land "will be protected and supported by the sword."\textsuperscript{15} Tecumseh told Harrison that he wanted to support the United States, but if the President did not agree to his terms, then the Indians would support the British.\textsuperscript{16}

Since the establishment of Prophet's Town, Harrison routinely received reports about activities at the village, such as its size and the intent of the Indian leaders there. The spies, traders, and government Indian agents that made up a large part of Harrison's frontier intelligence system continually submitted reports that gave the governor reason for grave concern about the potential threat from the Indians at Prophet's Town. As Harrison's suspicions grew, he began to believe that Tecumseh and his brother were preparing for war with the United States.

In the spring of 1811, another incident occurred that raised Harrison's concern. Part of the annuity that the United States paid to area Indian tribes was salt, an important commodity in short supply on the frontier. As a boat moved up the Wabash to distribute the salt annuity, the Prophet seized the entire shipment for his use at Tippecanoe. Upon their return to Vincennes, the boatmen reported seeing hundreds of Indian canoes lined up along the banks of the Wabash. Harrison now realized that Tecumseh's warriors could move faster down the Wabash River with a large force to attack Vincennes than they could on an overland route (which had been his earlier expectation). Given this approach, an attack could happen with little warning.\textsuperscript{17}

Soon, the situation deteriorated, with more violent incidents between the Indians and the settlers, causing Harrison to recognize the enduring threat of an Indian attack on Vincennes. As a result of the increased disorder and his continued concern for the protection of Vincennes, Harrison wrote to Secretary Eustis requesting reinforcements, together with the authority to take the offensive if war seemed imminent. Responding to Harrison's requests, Eustis sent the 4th U.S. to Vincennes.\textsuperscript{18}

The continued unrest along the frontier brought Harrison and Tecumseh together for another meeting at Vincennes on 27 July 1811. In addition to discussions over the land ceded by the 1809 treaty, Harrison requested that Tecumseh turn over to him two Potawatomi warriors who were accused of
murdering settlers. Tecumseh refused, because the whites, he explained, had not been murdered. The settlers were executed because they had killed two Wea Indians without provocation.\textsuperscript{19}

The two days of meetings concluded with Tecumseh telling Harrison that he planned to leave for the south to visit tribes and bring back more Indians for the confederacy. Tecumseh asked Harrison to delay any action in the disputed area until his return in the spring. Tecumseh explained that the land on the Wabash was the best hunting ground and that, since the size of the Tippecanoe village would grow with new arrivals, the Indians needed the land to feed their increasing population. Tecumseh closed by stating that, upon his return, he would go to Washington and talk to the president.\textsuperscript{20}

Tecumseh left for the south to meet with the Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Creek Indians to gain their support for his confederacy's war with the United States. Before departing, he directed his brother to go back to Prophet's Town and to avoid any premature battle with Harrison's forces. Although Tecumseh told Harrison that he would return in the spring, Harrison's spies reported that a major event sponsored by Tecumseh (they were not sure what) was to occur in the late fall. Harrison knew that if he were to take action, it would have to be before Tecumseh's return.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{The Campaign}

The campaign started in the summer of 1811 as both sides were making final preparations to protect their interests. Harrison made his intentions clear to the administration through letters to the secretary of war. He was convinced that the key to breaking up the Indian union and extinguishing Indian title to land was to continue to deal with individual chiefs or small tribes, rather than with a unified, politically powerful Indian body. Harrison also felt that Tecumseh's efforts to increase the number of tribes pledged to the confederacy posed a serious threat to U.S. interests. The governor expressed his concerns in a letter to Secretary of War Eustis: "A step of this sort would be of infinite prejudice to the United States. . . . It would shut the door against further extinguishing of Indian title upon the valuable tract of country south of the Wabash . . . . The establishment of tranquillity between the neighboring tribes will always be a sure indication of war against us."\textsuperscript{22}

In the same letter, Harrison proposed attacking the Indians during Tecumseh's trip south, emphasizing that Tecumseh's absence " . . . affords a most favorable opportunity for breaking up his Confederacy . . . . He is now upon the last round to put a finishing stroke to his work. I hope, however, before his return, that that part of the fabric [sic] which he considered
complete [the coalition of tribes] will be demolished and even its foundation rooted up."²³

Secretary Eustis quickly responded in a 17 July 1811 letter, telling Harrison that “If the Prophet should commence, or seriously threaten hostilities, he ought to be attacked; provided the force under your command is sufficient to ensure success.”²⁴ Three days later, the secretary of war dispatched another letter to Harrison that provided additional guidance and modified the earlier hard-line approach to the problem:

Since my letter of the 17th instant, I have been particularly instructed by the President [Madison] to communicate to your excellency his earnest desire that peace may, if possible, be preserved with the Indians, and that to this end every proper means may be adopted. By this it is not intended . . . that the banditti under the Prophet should not be attacked and vanquished, providing such a measure should be rendered absolutely necessary.²⁵

Harrison obviously felt that the time was right and that there were compelling reasons to take strong action against the Indians. He was concerned about the continued material support that the British gave the Indians and the threat such a British-Indian military alliance posed to American security on the frontier. Although Harrison was unsure of how much British support the Indians were getting, he believed a British-supported Indian war was likely. Therefore, he felt that he should crush the Indians before the British openly aided them.²⁶

Harrison also believed that the time was right to attack because of the absence of the coalition’s leader, Tecumseh. Whenever Tecumseh was gone, the Prophet was in charge, and Harrison believed that the Prophet did not have the same leadership or tactical skills as his brother. In short, it would be easier to destroy or disrupt the coalition while Tecumseh was away. Another significant consideration for Harrison was the constant threat of an Indian attack on Vincennes. He felt that a major military operation would deter future Indian attacks or break up the confederacy.

An 18 September 1811 letter from the secretary of war outlined the secretary’s views on the situation and gave Harrison further encouragement to complete preparations for an expedition against the Prophet. Eustis told Harrison:

The course to be pursued with the Prophet and his assemblage, must depend, in a great measure, if not wholly, on his conduct, and on the circumstances which occur as you approach him.
You will approach and order him to disperse, which he may be permitted to do, on condition of satisfactory assurances that in future he shall not assemble or attempt to assemble any number of Indians, armed or hostile in attitude. If he neglects or refuses to disperse he will be attacked and compelled to it by the force under your command. He will probably in that case be taken prisoner. His adherents should be informed that in case they shall hereafter form any combination of a hostile nature, and oblige the government to send an armed force against them, they will be driven beyond the great waters, and never again permitted to live within the Jurisdictional limits of the United States.

You will judge the expediency of taking the chief or any of the associates as hostages. The objection to this measure appears to be, that it acknowledges the principal as an enemy entitled to respect, and implies the inconvenience of entering into & performing stipulations with a man of bad faith.

A post may be established on the new purchase on the [W]abash, if in your judgment it is required for the Security of the purchase or the Territories.

After Harrison received the secretary of war’s approval to take action against the Indians, he began increasing the size of his force for a possible expedition. The regulars, commanded by Colonel John Parker Boyd, were already under his command, so Harrison activated militia units and recruited volunteers to augment the regulars. The pool of potential recruits extended outside of Indiana’s territorial boundary. For example, Kentucky actively supported the proposed campaign and provided militia to augment Harrison’s force. Many settlers in Kentucky considered imminent hostilities in Indiana a threat to their own security. On 31 August 1811, a Lexington, Kentucky, newspaper endorsed military action by writing: “If Harrison is defeated for want of your help you will have the enemy to fight on your own shore of the Ohio ere long.”

No large body of experienced manpower existed to cull for Indian fighters. Militia volunteers were generally hastily armed civilians with little military experience who had never seen, heard, or fought a hostile Indian warrior. Potential combatants, moreover, lacked combat experience because there had not been a major military operation in the region since the 1794 Fallen Timbers campaign. Harrison relied on training and adequate numbers to overcome the lack of experience in his army. By mid-October, he was able to assemble a force of about 1,100 men to conduct the campaign.
One problem that Harrison faced was how to design a legitimate reason for military action against the Indians. Although Eustis endorsed Harrison’s desire to occupy the new purchase and, if required, to march on the Prophet, only Congress had the authority to declare war. Harrison, as governor, could occupy the new purchases, but the Tippecanoe village remained beyond the boundary of the new land cessions. Thus, Harrison had limited authority to march against the Prophet, since a move beyond the 1809 boundary still constituted an invasion of Indian territory without the consent of Congress.32

Several circumstances combined to give Harrison a pretense to conduct a show of force. Tecumseh told Harrison in one of their meetings that he would contest efforts to survey the land cessions.33 There was also the issue of the two Potawatomi Indians who had killed the whites earlier in the summer. Finally, a few Indians, encouraged by the Prophet, had stolen several horses from settlers during a raid in September 1811. While the incident was not enough pretext for offensive action, it provided a valid excuse for a significant show of force.34

On 26 September 1811, Harrison’s force left the territorial capital and headed for the new purchase. The men moved about sixty-five miles north of Vincennes (present-day Terre Haute, Indiana), where they stopped for almost a month to build a fort, train, and gather supplies. Establishment of the fort, named Fort Harrison, accomplished two important objectives. First, it provided a formal means to occupy the new cessions. Second, the fort offered a secure location for the army to stockpile supplies and protect its line of communication as it moved farther into hostile territory.

Several important events transpired while Harrison’s force was establishing the new post. For one, Harrison sent a delegation to the Delaware Indians to obtain a few chiefs to use as negotiators with the Indians at Prophet’s Town. The chiefs, who agreed to help Harrison, however, were delayed while en route to join the army at Fort Harrison by a war party from Prophet’s Town that intercepted them. The war party forced the Delaware chiefs to accompany them to the Tippecanoe village. The Delawares, nonetheless, were eventually released and resumed their journey to join Harrison. The delegates, furious because of their detention, arrived at Fort Harrison on 27 October 1811 and provided the governor with intelligence about the Prophet’s intentions and about activities at the village. The chiefs reported that the warriors at Tippecanoe performed war dances nightly and that the Prophet promised to burn alive the first prisoners captured.35
An Indian party from Prophet's Town subsequently provided Harrison with his excuse to enter the Tippecanoe area and take offensive action. On the night of 10 October 1811, one of the hostile Indians shot and severely wounded a sentinel at the fort. Harrison then increased the size of his force with additional companies from Vincennes and prepared to march. Upon arrival of reinforcements, his strength grew from roughly 900 men to about 1,100 regulars and militia.36

Initially, Harrison thought that, without Tecumseh's leadership, the advance of an army would demoralize the Indians enough to make them desert or agree to the governor's demands. After the attack on the sentry, however, he realized that the Indians at Prophet's Town would fight. Thus, rather than move hastily against the Prophet in early October, he waited for his supplies to catch up with him.37 Shortly after the attack on his sentry, Harrison wrote Eustis and told him that "Nothing now remains but to chastise him [the Prophet] and he shall certainly get it."38 The inevitable clash between the Seventeen Fires and the amalgamation of tribes was only a few days march away.

After receiving and consolidating his supplies, Harrison wasted no time. Leaving Lieutenant Colonel James Miller (4th U.S.) with a small detachment to garrison the fort, he moved the army north toward Tippecanoe. One day after starting the march, Harrison sent a delegation of Delaware and Miami Indians to Prophet's Town with a message for Tenskwatawa. The message demanded that the Potawatomies, Winnebagoes, and Kickapoos return to their tribes, that the stolen horses be returned, and that the murderers of the whites surrender. The delegation departed and was never heard from again.39

There were two main routes to Prophet's Town from Fort Harrison. The shorter route, on the east side of the Wabash, consisted of densely wooded terrain favorable for ambush. The other route was on the opposite side of the river and, although longer, passed through more open terrain, enhancing the security of the U.S. force. Harrison ordered a route cleared along the eastern side of the Wabash and began moving the army along the trail, creating the impression that the army was taking the less secure route. On 31 October 1811, however, the army crossed the river to the more secure route. The deception was successful, and the force encountered no Indian scouts during its transit through most of the new purchase.40 Shortly after crossing the Wabash, the army reached the extreme boundary of the land cession at the Vermillion River.
At the river, Harrison halted and built a blockhouse to cache supplies and boats. The army was then approximately sixty miles from Prophet’s Town; crossing the Vermillion into Indian territory would be an act of war. 41 On 3 November 1811, Harrison left a small detachment at the blockhouse and crossed the river into Indian Territory, arriving in the vicinity of Prophet’s Town on 6 November 1811.

The army continued its march to within a few hundred yards of Prophet’s Town before setting up camp a short distance away from the village, near Burnett Creek. During the early morning hours of 7 November 1811, several hundred Indians attacked the army’s encampment, but after a fierce fight of about two hours, the Indians retreated. The next day, the American’s burned Prophet’s Town and began the long march back to Vincennes.

Following the battle, a small party of Indians established a camp on Wildcat Creek, while the rest of the Prophet’s Town population dispersed, spreading the news of the defeat. The immediate impact of the Indian loss was that tribes and individuals deserted the coalition. Without British assistance, the remaining confederacy was so degraded that it posed no serious threat to American expansion. After the Battle of Tippecanoe, Tecumseh was never able to organize a solely Indian confederacy with the same degree of success. 42

**Analysis**

American strategic goals during the Tippecanoe campaign remained consistent with Jefferson’s unofficial instructions requiring Harrison to exhaust Indian title to lands peacefully or force the Indians across the Mississippi. The strategic goal that Tecumseh expressed for the confederacy was also straightforward. The confederacy wanted to develop a political and military amalgamation of tribes strong enough to resist American advances, either through negotiations or by force of arms. To support their strategic goals, the Indians developed a de facto alliance with the British for material support. The Indians also used intertribal agreements to support anticipated manpower requirements and to ensure the political unity of the confederacy.

Operational levels of war are characterized by the American expeditions to defeat the Indians. The earlier expeditions led by Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne are examples of major operations that were conducted without clearly defined strategic goals; these expeditions were merely punitive in nature. Harrison’s operation into the land purchase, in contrast,
was a major operation designed and conducted to achieve a strategic goal: to reduce the major Indian threat in the area. Reduction of this threat allowed the United States to continue its policy of extinguishing Indian title to land in the territory as rapidly as possible.

The operational objective of the Tippecanoe campaign (see map 2) was to make the confederacy ineffective by destroying its base of operation, which would result in a loss of support for the coalition from other tribes. The objective could be accomplished by a show of force or combat. An additional operational objective of the Tippecanoe campaign was to demonstrate U.S. resolve to enforce treaty obligations. The campaign would terminate when the Indians at Prophet’s Town had dispersed and the village was destroyed—regardless of whether the Indian displacement was peaceful or by force.

The confederacy’s operational objectives are not as clearly defined. Operationally, the Indians wanted to demonstrate to the United States that previous treaty negotiations were invalid. Tecumseh’s paradigm held that the Treaty of Fort Wayne was invalid unless it was endorsed by a single, unified Indian political entity. To achieve his operational goal, Tecumseh planned to contest the United States’ occupation of the lands ceded by the 1809 treaty.

Tecumseh also wanted to improve the military strength and capability of the confederacy. This could be demonstrated by increasing the number of Indians at Prophet’s Town and the number of tribes that could be assembled on demand to conduct military operations. The size of the available Indian force was important to establish the military and political credibility of the confederacy with the United States. A major Indian success in the field against U.S. military forces would serve the same purpose and increase the credibility of the confederacy among undecided Indian tribes. It was important for Tecumseh to win any engagement against an American army. The operational specifics of Tecumseh’s grand plan were not clearly defined. The general operational objective was that the tribes would assemble on command (a great sign) and regain their lands through negotiation or force.

Tactically, the United States planned to occupy the land cessions with troops and build forts to show permanency. Harrison also wanted to conduct a show of force in the Tippecanoe area large enough to force the Indians to disperse. Part of Harrison’s plan required destroying Prophet’s Town, which, he felt, would cause the confederacy to lose the support of
Approximately 150 miles between Vincennes and Prophet's Town

Map 2. Route, Tippecanoe campaign
trades already pledged to it and cause undecided tribes to decline membership in the confederacy.

The Indians' tactical plans are difficult to discern, and one must rely on previously established models to predict Indian tactics. Tecumseh never clearly stated how he proposed to stop the United States from occupying the land purchases. One option was that the warriors could have canoed down the Wabash and attacked Vincennes. While this was a possibility that caused a great deal of concern, there was not a recent precedent for that type of large-scale attack. The Indians could have continued to conduct raids and attacks on outlying settlements, but they probably would have had little chance for operational success with these types of tactics.

An analysis of the Indian engagements with Generals Harmar and Wayne indicates that the Indians might have tried to conduct a series of ambushes on an American force in close terrain (see table 1). Previous major defeats of large American forces had garnered some longer-term gains for the Indians: because of their military successes against Harmar and St. Clair, the Indians were able to prevent encroachment of their lands for almost five years. In both of these operations, the Indians picked the time and location of the engagements, unlike their fight with General Wayne and the American Legion at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Tecumseh would have been familiar with the successes and failures of these campaigns. Had Tecumseh been present during the Tippecanoe campaign, he might have applied the Indian lessons learned during combat with Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne.

To meet their own strategic goals, which were to protect Canada and maintain a lucrative fur trade in North America, the British supported the Indians at the operational and tactical levels of war. To achieve their strategic goals, the British pursued an operational design that promoted the establishment of an Indian buffer state and British control of crucial trade routes along the Great Lakes. At the tactical level, the British provided substantial covert aid to the northwestern Indian tribes.

The operational design of the campaign also provides some interesting lessons. The components of operational design are centers of gravity, lines of operation, decisive points, and culmination points. Centers of gravity are that characteristic, capability, or location from which a force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Lines of operation are how a force is connected to its base of operation. Decisive points are the keys to centers of gravity. Decisive points influence the outcome of an
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
<th>INDIAN CONFEDERACY</th>
<th>GREAT BRITAIN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC</td>
<td>• Gain Indian land.</td>
<td>• Retain land.</td>
<td>• Protect Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Assimilate Indians peacefully or drive them across the Mississippi.</td>
<td>• Compel U.S. to recognize confederacy as the agency to negotiate with.</td>
<td>• Maintain North American fur trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL</td>
<td>• Make confederacy ineffective.</td>
<td>• Show that 1809 treaty was invalid.</td>
<td>• Influence creation of Indian buffer state.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Show U.S. resolve regarding treaty enforcement.</td>
<td>• Improve military capability and size of the confederacy</td>
<td>• Control the Great Lakes lines of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICAL</td>
<td>• Occupy 1809 land cessions.</td>
<td>• Prevent occupation of 1809 land cessions.</td>
<td>• Support Indian combat operations with advisers, equipment, and supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Force confederacy to disperse.</td>
<td>• Attack Vincennes, raid settlements, or attack forts.</td>
<td>• Maintain posts along the Great Lakes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Destroy Prophet's Town.</td>
<td>• Ambush military forces</td>
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Table 1. Campaign analysis, levels of war

action by providing the commander with a marked advantage over the enemy by helping him to gain or maintain the initiative. Decisive points can be geographical in nature or things that sustain command. The final element of operational design is the culmination point. The culmination point has offensive and defensive applications. Offensively, the culminating point is reached at the time and place where the attacker's combat power does not exceed the defenders. During the defense, a defender culminates when he can no longer assume the counteroffensive or defend successfully.46

The centers of gravity for the United States and the confederacy were similar. In each case, the center of gravity was the ability to sustain the political efforts to accomplish the strategic goals. The United States' center of gravity was presidential policy about continued territorial expansion. The confederacy's center of gravity was the political unity of the confederacy and the continued support by various tribes for Tecumseh's plan.

Harrison’s lines of operation were clearly exterior and extended about 150 miles from Vincennes through the new land purchases to Prophet’s
Town. This line of operation was supported by land lines of communication (LOCs) from Vincennes, through Fort Harrison, and Boyd’s Blockhouse. The Wabash River provided an excellent water LOC that supported resupply between the capital and the outposts. The Indian lines of operation were interior because the confederacy operated from Prophet’s Town and remained in the general vicinity of the village. Normally, Indian lines of operation were not supported by well-established LOCs. Campaigning Indian forces were largely self-sustaining through foraging.47

There were several decisive points for each side during the campaign. Harrison obviously considered Tecumseh’s leadership and experience a decisive point. In Harrison’s mind, the best way to neutralize Tecumseh’s leadership was to attack the center of the confederacy in Tecumseh’s absence. The result of a successful attack would “destroy the fabric” of the confederacy because the tribes would see the futility of war with the United States and withdraw their support. The obvious risk involved was that Tecumseh would be able to rebuild the coalition faster than Harrison expected. Another decisive point for Harrison was to destroy Prophet’s Town. Even though it might be simple for the Indians to move their headquarters to another location, successful destruction of the village would demonstrate the resolve and power of the United States, and thus, in turn, would further cause the confederacy to lose support.

The decisive points for the confederacy were the preparedness of the U.S. military force, the force’s ability to sustain itself, and the army’s battlefield leadership. In the past, Indian forces had the most success against poorly trained American expeditions that exercised poor field discipline. Another characteristic of the earlier expeditions was their poor logistical sustainability. The Harmar and St. Clair expeditions did not maintain enough supplies on hand to conduct a campaign, and they did not adequately protect their LOCs. Battlefield leadership was also a decisive point for the Indians because poor American commanders in the past had not employed sound tactical principles during movement or while in static positions.

The force under Harrison was a mix of militia and regulars with little campaign experience. Harrison, however, seemed to have mastered many important lessons from General Wayne’s successful conduct of the Fallen Timbers campaign. Harrison ensured that his LOCs were well established and guarded, and he paid close attention to the tactical aspects of employing his force. He also used deception to prevent compromise of the route, and
he planned a route that gave him several terrain advantages in employing his force.48

Harrison’s force would have culminated if it had lost its ability to attack and destroy Prophet’s Town. The Indians, to succeed, needed to degrade Harrison’s force enough so that the army could not attack and destroy the village, thus allowing Tecumseh to claim that the confederacy maintained its integrity. The culminating point for the confederacy was a battlefield defeat. A battlefield defeat would demonstrate the ability of the United States to occupy and control Indian territory by force. The following table (see table 2) highlights the key aspects of operational design.

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<tr>
<th>CENTER OF GRAVITY</th>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
<th>INDIAN CONFEDERACY</th>
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<td>Presidential policy.</td>
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<td>Tribes’ continued support.</td>
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<th>LINES OF OPERATION</th>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Exterior.</td>
<td>Supported by land and water LOCs.</td>
<td>Interior.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Highly mobile forces that were foraging in nature.</td>
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<tr>
<th>DECISIVE POINTS</th>
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<th>INDIAN CONFEDERACY</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical employment.</td>
<td>Field discipline.</td>
<td>Tecumseh’s leadership.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field discipline.</td>
<td>Logistical discipline.</td>
<td>Prophet’s Town.</td>
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<td>Leadership.</td>
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<tr>
<th>CULMINATING POINTS</th>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
<th>INDIAN CONFEDERACY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loss of ability to attack and destroy Prophet’s Town.</td>
<td>Inability to protect Prophet’s Town.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inability to attack and defeat the army.</td>
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Table 2. Campaign analysis, operational design

Tactically, the Americans and Indians were generally evenly matched on the frontier, and in that respect the Indians of the old Northwest limited opportunities for U.S. expansion. From the end of the Revolutionary War until the Battle of Tippecanoe, several Indian armies organized and executed independent military operations that prevented the United States from achieving operational and strategic goals. The Indians, however, were not able to stop the American expansion in the territory in the long term. The last chance for the Indians to succeed in the Old Northwest was to conduct operations in conjunction with the British during the War of 1812. These combined Indian-British efforts also met with defeat because the United States’ ability continually to muster and sustain large military forces in the field finally overwhelmed the northwestern Indians and their ally.
NOTES

1. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 550. Tecumseh made this remark to Governor Harrison during one of their first meetings at Vincennes, Indiana Territory. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the land cessions under the 1809 treaty.

2. Indian term for the United States.


4. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 533-34. This was the general theme of Tecumseh’s speeches to the tribes he visited. The grand plan was also carved on wooden slabs and distributed to tribes with specific instructions. The inscriptions on the slabs had a dual meaning. One translation was benign and provided to curious whites; the other interpretation described the grand plan and was solely for Indian use. The slabs are referenced in many of the research materials. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 532, provides details about the slabs and includes a diagram of one.

5. Eckert, *Gateway*, 342. Previous Indian confederacies were generally short term and formed to meet an immediate threat. The confederacies organized to fight the different expeditions led by Generals Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne are examples of these types of short-term alliances. Tecumseh’s ideas centered around establishing a long-term confederacy or amalgamation of tribes that would deal with the United States on a political as well as military level.


7. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 535; and Pirtle, 10-11. The British had military posts and trading posts in Canada, around the Great Lakes area, that serviced Indian tribes in Indiana, Illinois, etc. British traders also traveled throughout the area and could often act as agents for the British government. During various times, the British offered bounties for white scalps or prisoners that the Indians captured. These practices continued as late as the War of 1812. See Eckert, *Gateway*, for details on some of the British bounty practices. See Matloff, 124-26, for more detail about Indian manpower contributions to the British during the War of 1812.
8. Retaining the ability to treat with individual chiefs was advantageous to Americans. It was not uncommon for Americans to ply Indians with alcohol and gifts or to find minor village chiefs (who did not have any real authority to sell land on behalf of their tribe) and gain land cessions from them. There were also instances when the treaties were ethical and conducted with the appropriate chief. In any case, it was not to Harrison’s advantage to deal with one centrally unified body of Indians who were opposed to further land cessions.

9. Carter, 16, 119; and Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 758. Secretary of War William Eustis informed Harrison in a 5 May 1810 letter that several treaties from the fall of 1809 had been ratified. This would include the Treaty of Fort Wayne, which was signed 30 September 1809 and proclaimed 16 January 1810. Before the treaty of Fort Wayne was valid, a supplemental treaty with the Wea Indians was required. This treaty was signed on 26 October 1809 and ratified 25 January 1810. See Kappler, 101-4, for copies of the treaty and the supplement. A Congressional Act for the sale of lands gained through the Treaty of Fort Wayne passed on 30 April 1810. The Proclamation of Public Land Sales for the area was issued 3 May 1811. The proclamation specified what lands were for sale, the office in charge of the sale, and the date of the sale.


11. Esarey, *History*, 98; and Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 498-501. This is not the same post that is currently in Kentucky. Fort Knox, Indiana Territory, was established at Vincennes in 1787.


13. Ibid., 605.


16. Downey, 85; Drake, 122; and Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 609-10. At the conclusion of Harrison’s comments, there was an outburst from Tecumseh and the Indian delegation, and they brandished tomahawks; in response, the American infantry guard was called to the area. Harrison even drew his sword before calm prevailed.
7. Cleaves, 64; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 535-36; and Pirtle, 7. The occupants of Prophet's Town had been without the salt annuity because the Prophet refused to accept it. Tecumseh was away from Prophet's Town when his brother refused the salt the previous year, as well as the next year when he confiscated all of it. A copy of Harrison's letter describing the incident can be found in Draper MSS. 1X15.

18. Carter, 20, 130, 131; Draper MSS. 1X15; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 551-52; Esarey, *History*, 98; and Adam Walker, *A Journal of Two Campaigns of the Fourth Regiment U.S. Infantry in the Indiana and Michigan Territories* (Keene, New Hampshire: Sentinel Press, 1816), 8-11. A company from the 7th U.S. was in Vincennes by the time Colonel Boyd and the 4th U.S. (plus one company from the Rifle Regiment) arrived. The 4th U.S. was from the east coast and was ordered to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, then Newport, Kentucky, and finally to Vincennes, Indiana Territory. Upon their arrival at Vincennes, the units were posted to Fort Knox.

19. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 555-57; Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 3; and Esarey, *History*, 185-86. See Kappler, 39-45, for a copy of the Treaty of Greenville. Many sources (including Harrison's correspondence) note that justice was not always reciprocal. The Treaty of Greenville authorized the Indians to drive settlers off of Indian lands (or punish them in any manner they saw fit). The treaty also specified measures to redress, i.e., "injuries done by individuals on either side." The injuries were rarely equitably dealt with, for example, the Indians had turned over offenders for trial, which resulted in convictions followed by hangings for the Indians. Harrison forced some whites to stand trial for murders of Indians; however, a white was never punished for murdering an Indian. This is probably one of the reasons that Tecumseh refused to acknowledge the incident as a murder or turn the Indians over to Harrison. Harrison recognized the injustice of this and, in some of his letters, seems sympathetic to the Indian plight regarding contact with white civilization, particularly in the area of American justice and corruption by alcohol. A few of the places that contain copies of Harrison's letters (describing injustices to Indians) are the Draper MSS. and Carter, *The Territory of Indiana 1810-1816*.


21. Downey, 86-87; Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 763; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 558; Edmunds, *Quest*, 219; and Hook, 30. Tecumseh is known to have
traveled as far south as Georgia and Alabama, and he may have traveled to the Carolinas, Florida, Mississippi, and Arkansas during his 1811 trip. Tecumseh hoped to return before spring and left instructions that his brother should appease the whites, if necessary, in order to make sure that the confederation did not fall apart. Tecumseh felt that he could build a confederacy strong enough to demand return of formerly held Indian lands or fight to regain them if required. He thought that the confederacy would be strong enough to act on the grand plan once he returned from the south. Therefore, he ordered his brother not to take any premature action and to have the village disperse if attacked. He felt that Prophet’s Town could be rebuilt if destroyed by Harrison, but the coalition of tribes could not be reorganized if they were defeated on the battlefield.

23. Ibid., 763.
25. Ibid., 219.
27. Carter, 133-34.
28. Pirtle, 16-17.
29. James Green, William Henry Harrison: His Life and Times (Richmond, VA: Garrett and Massie, Inc., 1941), 119-20; and Lexington newspaper as quoted in Tucker, 218.
30. Gilbert, 270; and Pirtle, 37.
31. This figure includes 350 regulars, but it does not include the two companies of militia that remained behind to guard the settlements.
32. The concept of invading Indian territory without the consent of Congress is from Tucker, 219. For additional information on entering Indian territory one can review several documents. The Northwest Ordinance specified that the Indians could not be invaded or disturbed except in “lawful wars authorized by Congress.” The U.S. Constitution also gives Congress the authority to declare
war. One can look at specific treaties to determine the legality of settlers, military, traders, etc., to enter Indian territory. Sometimes, the treaties specified the right of Indians to enter or use ceded land. For example, some treaties allowed the Indians to use U.S. "public lands" for hunting and fishing. The Treaty of Greenville even gave the Indians the right to expel unwanted settlers from their lands. Present-day Indian tribes still retain hunting and fishing rights under certain treaties. The Chippewa recently had their hunting and fishing rights affirmed in a 1983 court decision. See Duane Champagne, ed., *Native America: Portrait of the Peoples* (Detroit MI: Visible Ink Press, 1994), 55-91, for examples of current Indian claims in the American northeast.

33. Draper MSS. 1X14; and Drake, 132-33. Harrison wrote to Eustis on 6 June 1811 and told him that Indian actions were "by no means indicative of a pacific disposition." Harrison received several reports that led him to believe that the Prophet and Tecumseh were hostile. A Kickapoo chief visited Vincennes and warned Harrison that Tecumseh and his brother harbored hostile designs, regardless of what peaceful overtures they made. The governor of Missouri, General William Clarke, told Harrison that the Mississippi Indian tribes received war wampum belts from Tecumseh, inviting them to go to war against the Americans. Clarke further warned that the war would start with an attack on Vincennes and that the Sacs Indians had agreed to join the confederacy and had already sent a delegation to Fort Malden for arms and ammunition. Reports from the Chicago area indicated that the tribes in that area had already decided to go to war with the United States. A party surveying the 1809 land cessions was interrupted by a band of Wea Indians, who disarmed the survey party, tied them up, and detained them overnight. The Indians released the surveyors the next day and told them that they thought that they were deserters from the local garrison. The surveyors interpreted the Indian action as a manifestation of hostile intent and declined to complete the survey. Harrison, however, was not sure whether or not to consider the act as hostile.

34. This incident is summarized from several sources. The summary of the theft is from Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 555. The use of the theft as a pretense for a show of force is from ibid., 765, and Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 560-61. The Indians actually stole the horses twice. One party of Indians successfully conducted a horse-stealing raid, but the settlers went to Prophet's Town and reclaimed their horses. After the settlers left, the Prophet set the braves out to resteal the horses. The Indians surprised the settlers but did not kill them; they
simply walked into the camp, held the settlers under guard, and took all of the
horses. Harrison also included descriptions of Indian horse-stealing raids in
various pieces of correspondence. Some of these letters are in the Draper
MSS.

“Lt. Charles Larrabee’s account of the Battle of Tippecanoe,” *Indiana Magazine of History* (1961): 233. The chiefs who were detained at Prophet’s Town
eventually provided Harrison with valuable intelligence regarding the Pro-
phet’s strength. The chiefs reported that Harrison’s show of force caused the
Wea and Miami Indians, as well as a group of Potawatomi Indians, to abandon
the Prophet. The loss of support from Wea, Miami, and Potawatomi groups
caus ed the Prophet’s strength to dwindle to about 450 warriors. Harrison was
concerned that the Prophet might receive other reinforcements because there
were several sympathetic and large villages of Potawatomi Indians to the rear
of Prophet’s Town.

36. Adams, 362; and Pirtle, 27, 30-32. Harrison requested four companies of vol-
unteers (two from Kentucky and two from Indiana). Two companies eventu-
ally arrived and participated in the campaign. The territorial laws of the time
allowed colonels to turn out their commands in an emergency without the per-
mission of the governor. Harrison applied directly to General Wells of Jeffer-
son County, Kentucky, for volunteers and informed the governor of Kentucky
at a later date. Harrison told the governor that he felt that it would be faster to
approach Wells directly, and he felt confident that the governor would approve
of the action since Kentucky was initially prepared to provide a larger comple-
ment of troops for the campaign. Harrison, as governor, had the authority to
commission officers in the Indiana militia and did so once the volunteers ar-
rived. That is the reason that General Wells and a few others are referred to by
multiple titles in the source material. Wells is sometimes called general (Ken-
tucky militia) or major (Indiana militia).

relied on contractors to conduct their resupply operations. The contractors that
supported Harrison arrived later than expected and forced Harrison to delay his
departure from Fort Harrison. St. Clair’s expedition demonstrated to Harrison
the folly of conducting operations without proper logistics support. Harrison
was an ensign in the 1st U.S. shortly after St. Clair’s defeat and was aware that
many of St. Clair's difficulties with supplies contributed to his defeat. See Green, 26-29, for a description of Harrison's arrival at the 1st U.S. and Fort Washington. Gilbert and Eckert provide excellent descriptions of St. Clair's expedition and the troubles he had with supplies and desertion. Gilbert, 53-155, also provides a description of Harrison's arrival at the 1st U.S. and Fort Washington.

38. Tucker, 221.

39. Adams, 362-63; Drake, 148; Draper 1X1; Eckert, The Frontiersmen, 563; Esarey, History, 187; Pirtle, 31-32, 37; and Wesley J. Whickar, ed., "Shabonee's account of Tippecanoe," Indiana Magazine of History 17 (1921): 355. Harrison never saw the delegation again, although there are indicators that it reached Prophet's Town. There are several possibilities: the Prophet might have had the delegation killed, the delegation might have been released and traveled down the wrong side of the Wabash trying to reach Harrison, or the delegation might have abandoned the campaign. The Prophet apparently sent some type of delegation to the army after receiving Harrison's message. It is not clear who made up the delegation and its exact purpose. Shabonee indicates that the delegation was supposed to buy time for the Prophet while he prepared the Indians at Prophet's Town for battle.

40. Adams, 364; The Frontiersmen, 563; Edmunds, Quest, 155; Pirtle, 37; Tucker, 222; and Whickar, 355. Indian scouts watched Harrison's army during their movement from Vincennes. Apparently, the Indians stopped watching the army or lost contact with it after it left Fort Harrison because the delegation that was supposed to meet Harrison was reported to have traveled down the wrong bank of the Wabash. Shabonee highlights this and remarks: "We expected that the white warriors would come up on the south [the Wabash turns to the northeast above the Vermillion River] bank of the river, and then we could parley with them, but they crossed far down the river and came on this side, right up to the great Indian town."

41. Adams, 364; and Eckert, A Sorrow in Our Heart, 756. The blockhouse was named Boyd's Blockhouse in honor of Colonel Boyd (4th U.S.). Establishment of the blockhouse also provided a place for resupply boats to drop off needed supplies for Harrison's element. The Wabash was an important transportation route for Indians and whites in the area. Harrison was careful about securing his line of communication, a lesson probably learned from St. Clair's
failed expedition and Wayne's success at Fallen Timbers. Wayne spent the winter prior to his campaign building and manning forts along his expected LOC. Wayne also built a fort two days before the Fallen Timbers battle (Fort Deposit). The fort was used to cache all of the excess baggage and equipment not needed for combat. Wayne also knew that the Indians fasted before a battle; consequently, the delay caused by building the fort was to his advantage and the Indians detriment. The Indian force was physically weakened by one or two days of fasting, and some of the Indians departed before the battle in search of food. Fort Deposit was built on 17 August 1794, and the battle was fought on 20 August 1794. Eckert, Gateway, Gifford, and Gilbert provide details on the Indian tradition of fasting before battle and the impact of fasting at Fallen Timbers.

42. Beard, 75; Eckert, A Sorrow in Our Heart, 558; Eckert, Gateway, 385; Edmunds, Quest, 159-17; and Pirtle, xvi-xviii, 77. An example of the effect of Tippecanoe on recruiting tribes for the confederacy is found in Draper MSS. 4YY73. During his visit to the Creek Indians, Tecumseh proposed that the Indians in the north should drive the whites south of the Ohio River, while the southern Indian tribes should drive the whites north of the Cumberland River. The Creeks sent a delegation to Tippecanoe with Tecumseh to make an assessment on the viability of the plan. The delegation arrived at Tippecanoe shortly after the battle; it returned to its tribe, convinced that Tecumseh's plan would not work.

43. These engagements are highlighted because the Indian battle plan was based on taking advantage of the Indians' natural mobility by conducting a series of ambushes or engagements in close terrain. The St. Clair engagement is different because the Indian tactical plan was changed at the last minute to take advantage of the fact that the Americans were so unprepared. The Indians attacked St. Clair's poorly defended encampment at first light and successfully routed the Americans. Although he did not participate in the Harmar fight, Tecumseh was probably familiar with the tactics used during the engagement.

44 Eckert, Gateway, 185-87, 220-23; Edmunds, Quest, 33-34, 39-43; and Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 5. Tecumseh was a scout and spy for the Indian confederacy at St. Clair's defeat, and he led an Indian war party against the American army at the Battle of Fallen Timbers.
45. Downey, 55; Drake, 79; Esarey, *History*, 122; Gunderson, “William Henry Harrison,” 17; and Urwin, 30. British soldiers from the Detroit garrison attacked St. Clair’s expedition as part of the forces commanded by Little Turtle and Blue Jacket. On 30 June 1794, Canadian militia, dressed as Indians, participated in an Indian attack of an American supply column departing Fort Recovery (Ohio) during Wayne’s Fallen Timbers campaign.

46. Definitions for the elements of operational design are from *Operations*, 6-7 to 6-9.

47. Gilbert, 174-75, notes that it took between 200 and 400 deer and a like number of turkeys per day to sustain an Indian force of about 1,200 warriors during the Fallen Timbers campaign. The British, through military posts or traders, often supported Indian forces in the field with weapons and ammunition and some foodstuffs. The Indians also supplemented wild game with corn and other foodstuffs that they grew or procured locally. In general, however, the Indians had greater mobility because of the foraging nature of their sustainment program. The drawback to this type of logistical plan is that large Indian forces could not campaign in an area for extended periods of time because they quickly depleted the resources they needed to conduct sustained operations.

48. Harrison had served as a Regular Army ensign, lieutenant, and captain (1st U.S. and the American Legion). Harrison was one of General Wayne’s aides during the Fallen Timbers campaign and commanded a frontier outpost after the campaign.
IV. TIPPECANOE BATTLE

... the troops nineteen twentieths of whom had never been in action before behaved in a manner that can never be too much applauded.¹

—General Harrison, Post-Battle Report

The Approach

General Harrison faced a few unexpected difficulties after stopping to build the blockhouse. For instance, the army’s trackers came across signs indicating that large war parties were moving south. Additionally, Harrison received word that a few Indians had ambushed the supply boat on route to the army and forced it to return to Fort Harrison. Realizing that a quick response would eliminate the threat of a possible Indian attack on Vincennes, Harrison ordered Major Jordan and forty soldiers to return to Vincennes to prepare defenses there. Meanwhile, there was little to do to redress the lost resupply; the army would have to continue without the additional provisions.²

Harrison’s 2 November 1811 letter to the secretary of war provides some insight into his frame of mind. The governor hoped that the army’s military presence would force the Indians at Prophet’s Town to disperse, but he remained ready to attack and force their dispersion. Harrison wrote the letter to inform Eustis that the Indians had attacked the resupply boat and killed a member of the crew. He also noted that 4 November 1811 was the anniversary date of General St. Clair’s defeat by an earlier Indian confederacy. He told Eustis that, if attacked, he hoped to “alter the color with which it [St. Clair’s defeat] has been marked in our calendar for the last twenty years.”³

The army left the blockhouse on 3 November 1811 and crossed the Vermillion River into Indian territory. The blockhouse, twenty-five-feet square, with breastworks on each corner, held the army’s boats and heavy baggage. A small detachment of eight soldiers and a sergeant remained to guard the equipment. Although the army dropped off its unneeded equipment at the blockhouse, the force still remained large and cumbersome. The column that crossed the Vermillion included a supply train of wagons, cattle, hogs, and cannon that were needed to support the infantry and mounted troops.⁴

As Harrison maneuvered the army into Indian territory, he was careful to avoid terrain that would inhibit the employment of his force. This often meant taking a less than direct route toward Prophet’s Town, one that
provided the better security afforded by open prairie. Meanwhile, Harrison relied on his company of Spies and Guides to reconnoiter ahead of the force. He also carefully posted advance guards and flank security. Traveling in open terrain allowed him the freedom of employing his mounted elements forward of the column, in a security role, to reorient the army quickly in case of an attack.

The army conducted a slow and difficult approach to Prophet’s Town. Preparing the way, scouts carefully investigated ambush sites ahead. Harrison took pains to change the order of march whenever the terrain required, sometimes changing formation as often as three times in a mile and a half. Throughout the last day of the march, the army encountered hostile parties of Indians, who rebuffed with insulting gestures Harrison’s interpreter’s efforts to communicate. Harrison subsequently dispatched Captain Toussant Dubois, commander of the Spies and Guides, with a flag of truce to request a conference with the Prophet. As Dubois moved toward the town, Indians appeared on both of his flanks and attempted to cut him off from the army. Once Harrison realized this, he recalled Dubois and ordered the army to continue its approach toward Prophet’s Town.

As the army moved closer to the village, Harrison prepared to attack. Leaders halted their columns, ordered the men to place their backpacks in the wagons, and formed their units for battle. The army approached Prophet’s Town from the southeast and, as units came within sight of the village, the troops changed into their final attack formations and prepared to conduct an immediate assault. Although Harrison wanted to adhere to his initial orders and resolve the situation peacefully, he remained prepared to fight given the hostile intentions demonstrated by the Indians since the wounding of the sentry in October.

Harrison decided to place the interpreters in front of the army as it advanced, giving the Prophet a final opportunity to communicate his intentions. The Indians, seemingly surprised by Harrison’s final dispositions in preparation for an attack, sent a delegation to meet with the army commander before his forces could start an assault. The delegation expressed surprise at the army’s rapid advance and seeming haste to attack. The Prophet’s representatives informed Harrison that they were told by the delegation of Delaware emissaries that the army would not attack until the Prophet responded to Harrison’s demands. The Prophet’s response went undelivered since the group supposedly searched for the army on the wrong side of the Wabash. Harrison promised the Indians that he did not intend to
attack unless the issues expressed in the demands were not resolved. Harrison and the Prophet’s representatives agreed to meet the next morning for a conference.7

Harrison, meanwhile, inquired about a location with enough wood and water for the army. The Indians informed him that there was a suitable location to the northwest, within a few miles of Prophet’s Town, on what is today known as Burnett Creek.8 A few officers departed and examined the site, assessing its fitness. After a quick reconnaissance, they sent word that the location suited the army’s purpose.9 The area, in Harrison’s words, was

a piece of dry oak land, rising about ten feet above the level of a marshy prairie in front toward the Prophet’s town and nearly twice that high above a similar prairie in the rear, through which and near to this bank ran a small stream [Burnett Creek], clothed with willows and other brushwood. Towards the left flank this bench of land widened considerably but became gradually narrower in the opposite direction and at a distance of one hundred and fifty yards from the right flank terminated in an abrupt point.10

Harrison tried to organize his encampment in the form of a hollow square, but a rough trapezoid was as close as the terrain would allow. The back of the trapezoid was against the creek, while the front of the camp’s perimeter faced Prophet’s Town. An infantry force of regulars and Indiana militia guarded both of these areas. The smallest part of the perimeter was the battle position of the Indiana militia. Meanwhile, the eastern side of the encampment was under the control of the mounted riflemen from Kentucky. Dismounted dragoons served as the army’s reserve and positioned themselves behind the intersection of the 4th U.S. and mounted riflemen.

Based on the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew, Harrison ordered his men to sleep dressed and on their arms. The men also lit warming fires, and many soldiers, with only their uniforms or light blankets to provide protection from the weather, tried to rest. Meanwhile, a heavy guard of almost two companies patrolled the perimeter, while everyone else slept within a few feet of their assigned battle positions.11

The Indians, in the meantime, retired to Prophet’s Town and began planning for their meeting with Harrison in the morning. Although little historical record remains of what happened in the Indian camp, a council was probably held to determine the Indians’ course of action, select war chiefs, and conduct the traditional war dances and war songs. Some authors
suggest that a Potawatomi chief named Winnemac urged the attack. Others suggest that the idea was solely the Prophet's. A further tradition proposes a militant group of Winnebagoes encouraged the attack on the soldiers. Shabonee, an Ottawa chief and one of Tecumseh's trusted lieutenants, states that there were also two British soldiers at Prophet's Town—dressed as Indians—who urged the Prophet to attack.12

In any case, the Prophet decided to attack the army encampment (see map 3 for the camp's disposition). The initial Indian plan required that the Prophet and his delegation meet with Harrison in the morning, agree to his terms, and leave the camp. Two Winnebago volunteers would accompany the delegation into the camp but remain near Harrison when the delegation departed. Once the delegation was outside of the camp, the volunteers would kill Harrison with their tomahawks as a signal to start the battle. Sometime during the Indian council, the Prophet changed the battle plan. After one of his visions, he announced that the American army was half dead and the other half crazy. The Prophet also told his followers that his medicine would make the white men's weapons harmless and that bullets would pass harmlessly through the warriors.13

The Indians eventually decided to attack before daybreak. The central component of the new plan still remained to kill Harrison. One hundred warriors would crawl through the swamps on the northeastern side of the encampment, kill any sentinels, sneak into camp, and then kill Harrison. If they were discovered early, the braves would give the signal for the attack, and warriors waiting in ambush would shoot Harrison off of his distinctive light-gray horse. In addition to providing the means to initiate the main attack, the Indians hoped that the signal would have a psychological impact on the soldiers.14 Shabonee remembered that "the yell would be so loud and frightful that the whole of the whites would [hopefully] run for the thick woods up the creek, and that side was left open for this purpose."15

After the initial assault, warriors on several sides of the camp would fall upon the sleeping troops and destroy them. If the soldiers followed the pattern set by St. Clair's men, the Indians would encounter little resistance as they rushed into camp and routed an ill-prepared army. The Indians expected to fire at the backs of the American soldiers as they ran away or sought shelter in the nearby woods. Even though the Indians knew that Harrison had established a heavy guard around his campsites, they assumed that men who had marched all day would be in a deep sleep and unprepared for battle. Regardless of whether or not the attempt at surprise was successful, the most important part of the plan, the Prophet cautioned, was
Map 3. Plan of encampment, 6 November 1811
to kill Harrison. The Great Spirit warned that Harrison must die for the attack to succeed.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{The Engagement}

Early in the morning of 7 November 1811, General Harrison was in his tent, addressing a few of his officers. An orderly musician was also in the commander’s tent waiting for orders to give the signal to call out the men. Meanwhile, a few soldiers had risen early to rekindle the fires before stand-to. Shortly after four o’clock in the morning, a shot rang out from the northeastern side of the encampment. Corporal Steven Mars of the Kentucky militia fired at and wounded an infiltrating Indian warrior. Immediately after Mars fired, an “awful Indian yell” rang out around the encampment,\textsuperscript{17} and the Indians rushed the camp from several sides in a furious series of assaults.

During the Indian onslaught, the sentries immediately abandoned their posts and ran inside the camp’s perimeter.\textsuperscript{18} In the meantime, Harrison ran outside, mounted the first horse that he saw, and rode to the location on the perimeter where the fighting was at its peak. At about the same time, Harrison’s aide, Colonel Abraham Owen, mounted a light-colored horse. Several Indians waiting in ambush immediately shot and killed him.\textsuperscript{19} The Indians were unusually aggressive, their fanaticism fired by the Prophet’s promise of success and by the idea that the bullets of their enemy could not
harm them. The fight raged for several hours, with the Indians attacking from three sides of the encampment. The warriors fought with cunning and personal bravery, but they fought as individuals and, in most cases, did not coordinate actions between their attacking parties.  

Within a few minutes of the initial onslaught, the firing nearly engulfed the entire perimeter of the camp. Initially, the shooting extended along the left flank, then, quickly, it moved around the front of the encampment, the right flank, and finally along the rear line. Harrison continually moved from one threatened location to another throughout the battle to direct his forces and inspire his soldiers. The fighting raged for over two hours.

The first critical event happened on the left flank, at the corner of the camp, where Captain Robert C. Barton's company of regulars tied in with Captain Frederick Geiger's Kentucky militia. The Indian attack in this area happened so quickly that the left flank of Geiger's company caved in. The fighting was fierce, with volunteers and Indians so intermingled that it became almost impossible to distinguish one from the other. Harrison arrived at the scene and quickly ordered Captain Joel Cook's 4th U.S. company and Wentworth's Indiana militia company (commanded by Lieutenant Peters, as Wentworth was already dead) to restore the angle.

After reducing the Indian penetration at the angle, Harrison rode to the front line, the section of the perimeter facing Prophet's Town. As he reached the area, he saw Major Joseph Hamilton Daviess busy forming the dragoons as a reserve in the rear of several companies in contact. The elements already in contact continued to receive heavy fire from the enemy, who were located in a small grove of trees fifteen or twenty yards to the front. The men from the Rifle Regiment were close to the trees and engaged the enemy, while a militia company to their left started to give way in disorder. Daviess requested permission to attack the Indians in the grove, and after several entreaties from Daviess, Harrison allowed him to gather his dragoons and drive the Indians from their position. Daviess, at the head of about twenty dragoons, charged single file into the grove. The party was too small, however, and the Indians attacked the dragoons on their flanks, driving the soldiers back with several casualties. Captain Josiah Snelling (4th U.S.) and his company charged the Indians and immediately dislodged them.

Several units of Indiana militia were fighting at the southwest part of the perimeter. The Indian attack in this area was late because the Indians were not in their final assault positions when Corporal Mars shot a comrade of
Harrison arrived at the spot to find most of the officers already killed or wounded. The security of this important area was under the command of two new junior officers, recently promoted from enlisted ranks during the march to Prophet's Town. John Tipton, an ensign (later a captain), was the only surviving officer among Captain Spier Spencer's Yellow Jackets, and Second Lieutenant Thomas Montgomery commanded Captain Jacob Warrick's company.

Harrison searched for men to restore the line. A fortuitous mistake provided him with a company of Indiana militia. Someone had mistakenly ordered Captain David Robb's company from its position in Major Wells' command. An officer recognized the error and held the company in place near the center of the encampment. Harrison, advised of the available company, ordered Robb to move to aid Spencer's and Warrick's companies. Harrison, meanwhile, moved Prescott's Company (4th U.S.) (not the entire regiment) to restore the integrity of Wells' line at the north part of the perimeter.24

The Indians selected Stone Eater and White Loon (two Miami Indians), as well as Winnemac, a Potawatomi, to be the war chiefs leading the assaults. Meanwhile, the Prophet, the spiritual leader, occupied a position on a small hill overlooking the battlefield.25 The Indian's attack plan,
however, ran into difficulty because Harrison's alert sentry threw off the
timing of their surprise attack. The loss of surprise forced the Indians to
conduct three uncoordinated assaults. In spite of the fact that the overall
attack was unsynchronized, the Indians, nonetheless, managed to maintain
a little control within some of the smaller assaulting elements. The pattern
of attack seemed to be a series of local assaults, during which wildly yelling
Indians rushed a particular area of the perimeter. Once driven back, they
would quickly reorganize and, on signal, rush the line again. Throughout
these assaults, individual Indians edged forward on their bellies and
attempted to provide suppressive fire.  

The Indian assaults continued until daylight. The night before, the
Prophet had told his warriors that he would beat his drum as a signal for
them to continue fighting; as long as the warriors could hear his drum, they
should continue the attack. For over two hours, the Indians attacked
fearlessly, spurred on by the Prophet's promise that the enemy bullets
would not hurt them. As the seemingly reckless onslaughts became more
and more costly to the Indians, however, runners climbed the Prophet's
small hill to inform him that his magic was failing. The Prophet,
evertheless, urged them to continue to attack the enemy position. By
daylight, the warriors knew that continued faith in the words of the Prophet
was unjustified, and their attack would not succeed. In the light of dawn, the
braves could see Harrison “alive [and] riding fearlessly among his troops in spite of bullets, and their [the warriors’] hearts melted.”

Harrison had been struggling throughout the night to maintain the integrity of the perimeter and to keep the Indians from breaking through. Once it became light, he thought that he could order a general charge of infantry and mounted troops. The charges would clear the remaining Indians off any important terrain around the perimeter. Meanwhile, Harrison ordered companies to reinforce the left and right flanks in preparation for the counterattacks at first light.

As Harrison dispatched the companies, Major Wells, at the northeastern side of the encampment, also concluded that counterattacks were needed to dislodge the Indians around the perimeter in his area. With a mixed force of infantry and dragoons, Wells charged the Indians before Harrison completed the reorganization. Wells’ infantry dislodged the Indians with bayonets, and the dragoons mounted a pursuit until the marsh forced them to halt. As Wells drove the Indians back in his area, Lieutenant Charles Larrabee and Captain Cook moved their companies (4th U.S.) to the right flank of the camp toward the Yellow Jackets. Larrabee’s company arrived first, and Larrabee, as the senior officer present, quickly organized the infantry for an immediate assault. The subsequent charge of the regulars and militia routed the enemy to their front.

After the Battle

The combined efforts of the various charges forced the Indians to break off their attack. After the army repelled the Indians’ attack, it spent the rest of the day consolidating and reorganizing. It had taken considerable casualties—thirty-seven killed and 126 wounded. Harrison’s force buried the dead, treated the wounded, and reestablished chains of command.

Another part of the consolidation was to recover lost livestock. Horses picketed inside and outside of the camp before the attack were loose, and the cattle and hogs outside the camp’s perimeter were scattered or stolen by Indians during the fighting. Efforts to recover livestock proved unsuccessful until the next day. Meanwhile, the lack of fresh meat caused many soldiers to eat the horseflesh of animals killed in battle. Soldiers also wandered the battlefield scalping dead Indians or snapping off shots at any enemy seen fleeing in the distance. Several soldiers found a wounded Potawatomi chief, and only two things saved the wounded man from being killed on the spot, the first being several misfires by the weapons of the
Modern-day view of the high ground and the rear line area (view is from Burnett Creek)

Modern-day view of Burnett Creek looking south
soldiers who found him. The timely arrival of a message from General Harrison ordering the chief's capture ultimately saved his life. The last thing that the soldiers did was to prepare for a possible follow-on Indian attack. Against that possibility, the army built breastworks and maintained 100-percent security throughout the night of 7 November 1811.32

Harrison felt that his force had won a decisive victory over the Prophet and his followers. Even though the army routed its Indian attackers, though, it was incapable of conducting a pursuit of the Indian force. After the early morning attack, the army found itself 150 miles from Vincennes, deep in enemy territory, with almost 20 percent of the force as casualties. Additionally, the troops were low on rations and other support needed to sustain continued operations. Harrison, however, felt that the Prophet would not be able to gather enough warriors to interdict his movement back to Vincennes. While another attack seemed unlikely, Harrison realized that any attack, no matter how improbable or small, would reduce the force's capability even more.33 The original objective of the campaign was to force the dispersal of the Prophet and his followers and destroy the Indians' headquarters. Harrison decided to stick with his plan and then return to Vincennes.

At sunrise on 8 November 1811, army mounted elements occupied Prophet's Town only to find the village abandoned except for an old woman who had been too sick to travel. A few Indians killed during the battle were found in the buildings, and several recent graves were discovered. Searches of the village and a nearby area resulted in a harvest of more than 5,000 bushels of corn and beans. In addition, before burning the town, the soldiers collected other abandoned supplies and foodstuffs that the army could use. Harrison's men also discovered evidence of British assistance to the Indians; the retreating warriors had left behind British gunpowder and several muskets in shipping containers from the British post at Malden (Canada). As their comrades destroyed Prophet's Town, soldiers back at the encampment burned all the officers' private baggage to make room for the wounded on the twenty-two available wagons.34

By noon of the next day, the army began its difficult journey back to Vincennes. As the army left the battlefield, the wounded chief remained behind under the care of the Indian woman. The chief carried a message from the governor advising the Indians to abandon the Prophet; any tribes that complied would have their past conduct forgiven.35
The troops began retracing their steps, determined to reach the capital in good order. They reached Boyd's Blockhouse on 12 November 1811 without incident. A resupply boat arrived at the blockhouse loaded with beef, flour, and whiskey shortly after the army arrived. Then, the wounded were transferred from the wagons to the boat and returned to Vincennes via the Wabash River. The next day, prior to their departure, the soldiers burned the blockhouse. Destroying it ensured that it would provide no future service to the Indians. Between 13 and 15 November 1811, the army moved from the blockhouse to Fort Harrison. After leaving Captain Snelling and his company of the 4th U.S. to garrison the fort, the rest of the force closed on Vincennes by 18 November 1811.

Meanwhile, most of the Indians scattered after the battle and returned to their own tribes or set out for new areas. A few Indians established a camp on Wildcat Creek within twenty miles of Prophet's Town. Indians not joining the band on Wildcat Creek spread news of the Indian defeat as they dispersed across the countryside. In the meantime, the Prophet no longer retained the ear of any tribes in the confederacy. In fact, many Indians blamed the loss on the Prophet and considered killing him. The Indians eventually decided to spare the Prophet's life, and about forty Shawnees remained loyal to him. But the defeat at Tippecanoe and his subsequent loss of credibility guaranteed that the Prophet would never have a future role in Indian politics.

**Analysis**

Combat power is an organization's ability to fight. The U.S. Army's capstone manual, *FM 100-5, Operations*, states that there are four main elements that define combat power: maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to gain a positional advantage. Firepower is the amount of fire delivered by a position, unit, or weapons system. Protection is how the commander conserves his unit's fighting potential. The final element of combat power is effective leadership. Leadership is the most important aspect of the dynamic because leaders inspire soldiers as well as provide purpose, direction, and motivation for them.

Indian maneuver at the battle was hampered by widespread superstition, and overconfidence within the Indian force negated many of the strong points of its plan. The initial acceptance of the Prophet's prophecies gave the attackers unrealistically low expectations about the capabilities of the American force. Furthermore, all of the proposed plans relied on attacking and killing Harrison.
Finally, the plan also attempted to capitalize on intimidating the U.S. force psychologically by rushing the encampment while intimidating the US. Psychological intimidation often provides an advantage, but its best maneuver rather than to based on the Indians' during campaigns in the have been aware that works on poorly trained but rarely on disciplined observed Harrison's throughout its training and later during the should have been aware force protection efforts.

The planned Indian three coordinated assaults, the attack forced the attack before the were in their final. This compelled the successive assaults rather than a quick attack to penetrate the sentries and kill Harrison, followed by two nearly simultaneous attacks from opposite ends of the encampment. The lack of coordination between the Indian assaults allowed Harrison to reposition companies inside the perimeter and counter various threats. The Indian efforts were initially violent enough to penetrate the angle of the perimeter on the left flank. Another attack was also severe enough on the right flank to make that position untenable without reinforcement. Harrison, through calm battlefield direction, was able to reposition his forces, which protected the integrity of the perimeter. The final aspects of Harrison's maneuver relied on forces conducting a series of local counterattacks at daylight to rout the enemy.

The major weapons systems employed were rifles and muskets. The Indians failed to take full advantage of the muskets available to them because the Prophet preached a return to the traditional Indian lifestyle, which included using only traditional weapons in warfare. Additionally, the Prophet promised protection against the weapons of the Americans. The unused cache of muskets captured at Prophet's Town indicated that many
Indians accepted the Prophet’s entreaties to return to traditional methods and his guarantees of protection from U.S. bullets.

The army effectively employed most of its weapons systems. The single most important contribution to firepower was the simple way in which the troops massed fires to meet the initial Indian assaults. The order to the men to sleep opposite their posts with weapons loaded and bayonets fixed allowed soldiers to react quickly, as individuals, and to form immediately into units. The units were shifted also to different areas to take advantage of a particular weapon or capability. Harrison did this throughout the night to restore the perimeter and to drive the Indians out of contested areas. He also changed the force’s task organization near the end of the battle in anticipation of the charges that he wanted to execute at first light. Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew, for example, commanded the militia infantry companies in the front line. Militiamen normally used their personal weapons, and in this case, these men used “squirrel rifles” that did not accept bayonets. Harrison shifted a company from the 4th U.S. with muskets and bayonets to Bartholomew immediately prior to the counterattack.41

In the area of protection, the Prophet relied on several attempts at deception to gain an advantage over the Americans. The efforts at deception focused on creating a story that indicated the Indians were not hostile. First, the Prophet sent emissaries to Harrison while the army organized and trained at Vincennes. The purpose of the emissaries was twofold: to spy on the army and to assure Harrison that the Prophet was a friend and not a threat. Later, as the army moved toward Prophet’s Town from Fort Harrison, the Prophet sent a delegation to meet the governor. A possible purpose of the delegation was to stall Harrison and allow the Prophet more time to prepare for operations against the army. The final effort by the Indians at deception was to propose a meeting to discuss terms in the morning. Indian efforts at deception were largely unsuccessful, however, because they mixed these efforts with overtly hostile actions (such as shooting the sentry), which forced Harrison to consistently employ force protection measures. Harrison’s vigilance in the area of force protection limited the Indians’ ability to achieve overwhelming surprise.

On his part, Harrison used deception early in the campaign to hide his real route of march through the new purchase. A reliance on training, discipline, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) protected the force once in the area of Prophet’s Town. The SOPs developed to protect the force in a static encampment were the employment of a large guard detail.
and the conduct of stand-to. The major failure in Harrison's protection effort was the lack of breastworks. Instead of building breastworks, the governor chose to use the available pioneer tools to cut wood for fires.

Although he remained cautious, Harrison believed he might be able to resolve the campaign without a fight. Consequently, he focused on improving the environmental conditions of soldiers living in the elements. Most of the militiamen did not have tents or any similar form of protection. The campaign had been in progress for almost sixty days, and the weather varied between rain, frost, and snow. The force also suffered various nonbattle injuries and illnesses during the campaign. Harrison might have harbored concerns about the fitness of the force for combat the next day if the planned negotiations with the Prophet failed. The fires also caused tactical problems for the army. The warming fires provided illumination for the Indians as they fired into the camp. As the battle raged, the soldiers realized the fires provided their attackers an advantage and tried to extinguish the fires. But many soldiers were shot as they approached the fires; consequently, the fires were never completely extinguished. The lack of breastworks and the use of warming fires probably increased the number of casualties among Harrison's force.

Harrison, however, posted the guard in a way that would counter the Indians' skill and ability to infiltrate a static encampment. The guard was large and posted close to the perimeter to limit the number of gaps available for the Indians to penetrate. The guard was to fight and delay any initial assault, allowing the soldiers time to occupy their positions on the perimeter. In reality, the guard provided early warning, but the speed and intensity of the first Indian attack caused the guard members to abandon their positions immediately. In the end, however, the early warning was ample enough for the other soldiers to occupy their positions.

Perhaps the simplest element of protection was Bartholomew's suggestion to have the men sleep on their arms. This suggestion, coupled with Harrison's orders to have soldiers sleep opposite their posts and man the perimeter in single, rather than double, ranks, was extremely effective. The logic was that, in Indian warfare, there was no "shock" from bayonet or cavalry charges to resist. Single ranks also offered advantages in speed because inexperienced troops maneuvered faster in single ranks rather than in double ones. A single rank also reduced the potential for fratricide because there was only one rank firing in one direction during the confusion of battle.
Leadership was a critical element on both sides. The Prophet was not a combat leader but rather a spiritual leader. His brother was the respected warrior. The Prophet had the leadership ability to embolden his followers and encourage them to attack, but he did not have the leadership ability to lead them, by personal example, during the attack. It also seems that the Prophet's prophecies, while they initially encouraged his warriors' fanaticism, eventually became a detriment to morale once the warriors' expectations went unfulfilled.

Harrison performed well as a leader and had a good reputation in the army. Lieutenant Larrabee wrote that the governor was "a firm man and a verry [sic] good displenarian [sic] and is acquainted with Indian fighting [sic], which is different from all others." Harrison was careful to set the example and share in the hardships encountered by the soldiers. Before the return march to Vincennes, he made sure that his personal property was among the equipment burned when the army made room on its wagons for the wounded. He also moved throughout the battle area, inspiring soldiers and providing direction: "In the heat of the action, his voice was frequently heard and easily distinguished, giving his orders in the same calm, cool, and collected manner with which we had been used to receive them on drill or parade. The confidence of the troops in the General was unlimited, and his measures were well calculated to gain the particular esteem of the 4th Regt." Harrison was astute enough to understand the nature of the militiamen and how to gain their loyalty. He realized that the Regular Army's style of discipline would not get the best effort from militia troops. Thus, he limited the types of punishment allowed in the army. The army that Harrison led consisted mainly of units from Indiana and Kentucky who joined for a short campaign to fight Indians. He knew that individualistic frontiersmen were unfamiliar with organizational discipline and that the militia members and volunteers might choose to go home before submitting to the harsh discipline associated with the Regular Army. (For a tactical analysis of elements of combat power, see table 3.)

Harrison's standards of discipline seem to have been successful. The army maintained its field discipline throughout the campaign, soldiers manned their positions in spite of serious casualties, and units repositioned and assaulted enemy positions while under fire. The small number of desertions during the campaign is noteworthy as is the willingness of junior leaders immediately to fill the void of killed or wounded commanders. All
The Prophet's forces, in contrast, failed in large part because of poor leadership. The Prophet tried to enhance the morale of his warriors by making promises, disguised as prophecies, that proved unrealistic. The approach worked in the initial stages of the battle, and the Indian assaults penetrated the perimeter. Eventually, the failure of the Indian force to achieve its objective of controlling the interior of the camp and killing Harrison caused the force to culminate. The fact that U.S. troops continued to kill and wound Indian warriors, despite the Prophet's promises to the contrary, eventually degraded morale to such a degree that the Indians called off the attack.

Combat power and its application determined the relative success or failure of each side's efforts during the engagement. One engagement often

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 3. Tactical analysis, elements of combat power</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MANEUVER</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Enemy lack of coordination allowed the U.S. command to reposition troops.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Dismounted dragoons employed as reserve.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Bayonet charges used to dislodge enemy.</td>
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<td>• Mounted charges used to dislodge enemy.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FIREPOWER</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Muskets, rifles, and bayonets.</td>
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<td>• Massed fires and bayonet charges.</td>
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<td><strong>PROTECTION</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• SOPs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Single ranks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Sleep opposite posts, with weapons loaded, and bayonets fixed.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LEADERSHIP</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Strong leadership by General Harrison.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Chain of command quickly reestablished during battle.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Few desertions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INDIAN CONFEDERACY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Three planned assaults.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Initial assault compromised before all forces were in attack positions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Did not reposition; assaults continued in the same general areas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Muskets, rifles, bows and arrows, and tomahawks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Fires usually not massed, delivered by individuals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Relied on deception.</td>
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<td>• Relied on stealth.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Relied on psychological impact of their attack.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Prophet's leadership was poor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Prophecies that did not come true eventually had a detrimental effect on morale.</td>
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decided the outcome of a campaign during this era. Consequently, understanding the importance of combat power was often crucial to the success or failure of a major military effort. Harrison understood the importance of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership and how these elements contribute to the success of military operations. Harrison took advantage of superior combat power to defeat the Indian forces at Tippecanoe.
NOTES

1. Draper MSS. 1X41. This is from General Harrison’s official report to Secretary of War Eustis. Harrison wrote his initial report from his headquarters near Prophet’s Town on 8 November 1811. A second letter to Eustis, written after the command returned to Vincennes, describes the engagement in detail.

2. Beard, 55; Eckert Gateway, 714-15; Logan Esarey, ed., Governors Messages and Letters, vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Commission, 1922-24), 606-7; and Richard J. Reid, The Battle of Tippecanoe (Fordsville, KY: Wendell Sandefor, 1993), 26-27. The boatmen were along the shore pulling the boat with a rope. One of the men remained in the boat asleep. An Indian party, which had abandoned Prophet’s Town once it heard of Harrison’s advance through the new purchase, was traveling down the opposite bank of the Wabash when they encountered the boat. One of these Indians swam to the boat and killed the sleeping boatman.

3. Draper MSS. 1X39.

4. Beard, 54; Freeman Cleaves, Old Tippecanoe (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1939), 89-91; William M. Cockrum, Pioneer History of Indiana (Oakland City, IN: Press of Oakland City Journal, 1907), 257; Downey, 86; and Eckert, Gateway, 380.

5. Draper MSS. 1X41.


7. Adams, 365; Carter, 133; Draper MSS. 1X41; Eckert, The Frontiersmen, 564-66; Sgt. Isaac Naylor, “Isaac Naylor’s Account of the Battle of Tippecanoe,” Indiana Magazine of History 2, no. 4 (1906): 164; Walker, 20; and Florence G. Watts, 242. The delegation that the Prophet’s emissaries referred to is the same delegation addressed in notes 39 and 40, chapter three. The Indians were probably not as surprised as they professed to be at the rapid advancement of the army since they had partially fortified their village with breastworks that ran around the village to the banks of the Wabash. Fortification of a static position was an unusual tactic for most Woodland Indians.
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8. Burnett Creek is also known as "Burnett's Creek."

9. Esarey, *Messages and Letters*, vol. 1, 614. Harrison received severe criticism after the battle for allowing the Indians to select the army's campsite. The criticism was unjustified because the Indians did not select the campsite or lead the army to their eventual remain overnight (RON) location. Harrison asked the Indians about locations with enough wood and water to support the army, since the army had passed few suitable locations en route. The Indians described a general area to Harrison and Major Marston Clarke, and Major Waller Taylor from Harrison's staff conducted the reconnaissance for the RON. Clarke and Taylor selected the actual campsite for the army.

10. Cockrum, 261; and Draper MSS. 1X42.

11. Draper MSS. 1X42; Cockrum, 263-64; George Pence, "General Joseph Bartholomew," *Indiana Magazine of History* 14, no. 4 (December 1918): 292; and Walker, 21, 24, 29. The guard consisted of about 130 men and was under the command of the field-grade officer of the day. The guard consisted of two captains' guards of four NCOs and forty-two privates each and two subalterns (lieutenants or ensigns) guards of twenty NCOs and privates. Harrison habitually established a strong guard immediately outside of his perimeter each night. The idea of employing guards of this type in Indian warfare was to keep them close enough so that the Indians could not infiltrate between them. The traditional approach of stationing pickets to watch roads and other traditional avenues of approach was not practical because the Indians did not fight in traditional formations. The soldiers not on guard duty slept fully clothed with their weapons and opposite their posts on the perimeter. The fires were lit in front of the tents between the troops sleeping on the perimeter and the line of guards. After the battle started, the soldiers tried to extinguish the fires but were never completely successful because the Indians engaged them as soon as they silhouetted themselves against the flames.

12. Cockrum, 239; Esarey, *History*, 188, 334; Hook, 33; Pirtle, 51; Tucker, 224; and Wesley J. Whickar, 356. It is believed that the Potawatomi, led by Winne/mac, were the largest contingent at Prophet's Town. Winne/mac's leadership of the largest element might have gained him more influence than other leaders during a council.

14. Downey, 87; and Whickar, 355-58.

15. Whickar, 358.

16. The summary of the Indian battle plan is from several sources: Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 565-66; Pirtle, 52, 56; Tucker, 224-26; and Whickar, 356-59. Shabonee commented about Harrison’s practice of posting a strong guard: “Every night he picked his camping ground and set his sentinels all around, as though he expected we would attack him in the dark. We should have done so before we did, if it had not been for this precaution.”

17. Cleaves, 99; Cockrum, 297; Naylor, 165; Pirtle, 52-53; Reid, 32-33; and Walker, 29. Corporal Mars, a member of Geiger’s Company of Mounted Riflemen, was killed in action on 7 November 1811.

18. Cockrum, 279-308; Draper MSS. 1X41; and Naylor, 163-69.

19. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 565; Downey, 87; Pirtle, 52; Tucker, 224-26; and Walker, 30. Some reports claim that Owen found Harrison’s horse and mounted it; other reports say that Owen owned and rode a light-colored horse throughout the campaign. In any case, the result was the same—Owen was shot and killed.


22. Cleaves, 99; Draper MSS. 1X43; and Walker, 22, 26.

23. Draper MSS. 1X43; Pirtle, 59; Reid, 36; and Walker, 23-24. The charge was that Daviess led a single file of dragoons rather than one on line (abreast).

24. Cockrum, 265; Draper MSS. 1X43; and Reid, 36-38. Harrison was not sure if Robb’s company was driven from their positions or moved because of some
mistake. Most sources attribute Robb's movement to an improper order or some other mistake.

25. Pirtle, 57. The Miami Indian tribe was not part of the confederacy, even though some individual members of the tribe supported the confederacy. The small hill that the Prophet watched the battle from is known today as “Prophet's Rock.”

26. Pirtle, 61-62. Indian tactics are from Cockrum, 265, and Watts, 244. Larrabee remembers the signal as a whistling noise on an instrument made for that purpose; Cockrum describes it as a rattling noise made with dried deer hoots. Both reports could be correct; there were several different tribes involved in the attack, and they could have used a variety of signaling techniques.

27. Draper MSS. 1X41-44; Drake, 152; Eckert, The Frontiersmen, 624-27; and Eckert, Gateway, 438-39. General Harrison remarked that the “Indians manifested a ferocity uncommon even with them.”


29. Cockrum, 265; Draper MSS. 1X43; Reid, 37-38; and Watts, 244.

30. DeHart, 83; Draper MSS. 1X4, 1X40-44; and Pirtle, 56. See Appendix A for the breakdown by position of Americans killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action (WIA). Twenty-five American soldiers eventually died of wounds, and four died en route to the battle, making the total number of deaths during the campaign sixty-six. Harrison suggested that the Indians had poisoned or chewed their ammunition to increase the lethality of any wounds they administered. He commented on this because it seemed as if his soldiers were dying of wounds from which they would normally have recovered. Harrison was sure that some of the Indians chewed their ammunition because he saw examples of it in captured ammunition pouches. Few precise estimates of Indian casualties exist because the Indians usually attempted to recover their casualties. Consequently, most references limit statements of Indian casualties to thirty-six, thirty-eight, or forty. These casualty figures are derived from first-hand accounts of the number of Indians found dead on the battlefield the next day. Indian dead and not yet buried and several recent graves were discovered the next day by the dragoons at Prophet’s Town, so the number of Indian casualties is probably higher than forty. Harrison or members of his command also received subsequent reports that Indian casualties were high. Many reports note
that the Indians carried off their dead as well as wounded during the battle. Harrison noted that a soldier had killed and scalped an Indian, and the Indian’s body was found the next day at Prophet’s Town, which confirms the practice of Indians recovering their dead. The Americans were also concerned with recovering the remains of their dead—Harrison reported that three American scalps had been taken and two of them were eventually recovered.

31. Naylor, 166. Naylor notes that Ensign John Tipton was elected and commissioned captain of Spencer’s Yellow Jackets within one hour of the end of the battle. The commander, Captain Spencer, and both of his lieutenants were killed during the battle. Tipton, 181, notes that Samuel Flanagan, Jacob Zenor, and Phillip Bell were the other soldiers elected to positions in the chain of command to replace the officers killed in action. Lieutenant Larrabee assumed command of a company of the 4th U.S. upon the death of the commander, Captain Baen.

32. Cleaves, 103; Naylor, 167-69; Pirtle, 71; Tipton, 181; Walker, 33, 35; and Watts, 245.

33. DeHart, 83; and Draper MSS. 1X40.

34. Cockrum, 269; Downey, 89; Draper MSS. 1X44; Edmunds, Quest, 159; Naylor, 167-69; Pirtle, 9, 76; Tipton, 181; and Walker, 33-34.

35. Draper MSS. 1X44; and Walker, 33, 38. The wounded Indian was treated and left at Tippecanoe. The Indian survived his wounds long enough to deliver the message. Harrison received confirmation of this and reported it to the secretary of war in a report dated 4 December 1811.

36. Cockrum, 270; Walker, 35-37; and Watts, 245-46. There were two deserters from the battle. Sergeant Reed and his eight-man detachment at the blockhouse captured the deserters and turned them over to Harrison once the army arrived at the blockhouse. Immediately after the battle, Harrison dispatched an express rider to Vincennes with news of the engagement. At Fort Harrison, Lieutenant Colonel James Miller received word of the army’s lack of supplies and sent a resupply boat to the blockhouse.

37. Adams, 369; Cockrum, 270; and Watts, 245-46.

38. Drake, 155-56; Edmunds, Quest, 158-60; Edmunds, “Thin Red Line,” 13; Draper MSS. 1X48; Pirtle, 62-63; and Walker, 38.
39. All definitions for the elements of combat power are from Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, 2-10 to 2-11.

40. In one of Tipton’s journal entries, he notes that General Harrison threatened to “break the officers” because they had not been enforcing the requirement to parade in line of battle before reveille (stand-to).

41. Cleaves, 102, and Pence, 292.

42. Walker, 16. Walker remarked that the Indians “lurked” around Fort Harrison nightly and alarmed the sentries. Their attempts to spy on the army or use the delegation to deceive Harrison about the intent of the Prophet are from Whickar, 353-63. Shabonee’s account indicates that the Indians wanted to draw Harrison farther into the new purchase and, once Harrison’s LOCs were extended, attack the army. This would fit the Indian pattern established in earlier combat in the American northwest.

43. Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 604-5. After the battle, Harrison claimed that a shortage of pioneer tools forced him to decide between building breastworks or chopping wood for fires. Controversy surrounds this decision, and many of Harrison’s detractors believed that Harrison was using the shortage of tools as an excuse for his failure as a commander. Before the battle, in a 29 October 1811 letter to the secretary of war, he commented on a shortage of axes and the poor quality of the axes that were available. He told Eustis that it was taking the army twice as long as expected to build Fort Harrison because of the lack of tools and the poor quality of those that were available.

44. Walker, 35. The Indians could approach within a few feet of a sentry without discovery. The sentinel at Fort Harrison was shot from a thicket of bushes about twelve feet to his front.

45. Draper MSS. 4X42.

46. Watts, 232.

47. Walker, 44.

48. Cleaves, 90; Gunderson, “William Henry Harrison,” 24; and Walker, 15-16, 31-32. Wayne was noted for his harsh punishments to enforce discipline in the American Legion. Gunderson notes that Harrison was not as “Draconian” as Wayne, and he managed to secure a “fierce bonding” with his troops. Many
sources comment on Harrison’s ability to exercise an appropriate style of leadership that resulted in effective performances from militia troops. Contrast the desertions of several hundred militia troops during St. Clair’s expedition to fifteen reported desertions (Reid, 15) during Harrison’s campaign. Reid’s figures do not differentiate between Regular Army and militia deserters; records and accounts that are available indicate that militia and regulars both deserted. Cleaves writes that Harrison directed that soldiers would not receive “petty punishments” for “the most trifling errors of the private soldier.” Walker remarked that the order developed among the troops “an affectionate and lasting regard for their General.” The order was not always followed, and some problems ensued as a result. Colonel Boyd (Harrison’s second in command) ordered the flogging of a wagoner for a breach of discipline. The militia captain assigned to conduct the flogging refused. Harrison eventually resolved the situation to the satisfaction of the militiamen. The Regular Army of the time was recognized for strict discipline developed through a harsh system of punishments. Harrison knew that militia soldiers would not respond well to this type of discipline, and about two-thirds of his army was militia. Walker said that while at Fort Harrison:

...some murmuring took place among them [militia], being heartily sick of the camp, and desirous of returning to their homes. Many, indeed, threatened to leave at all hazards, which caused the Governor much anxiety and trouble. He appeared not disposed to detain any man against his inclination; being endowed by nature with a heart as humane as brave; in his frequent addresses to the militia, his eloquence was formed to persuade; appeals were made to reason as well as feeling—and never were they made in vain—when the militia, unused to military restriction, threatened desertion, his eloquence calmed their passions, and hushed their discontented murmuring and in a short time all became tranquil, and unanimity reigned throughout the army.
V. BATTLEFIELD STAFF RIDE

Sam, sleep with your moccasins on, for them red devils are going to
fight before day.1

—J. S. Pfrimmer, from a story told by his father, Sam,
who fought at Tippecanoe

Introduction

The current terrain of the Tippecanoe encampment does not
significantly differ from General Harrison’s description. Several small
built-up areas and roads encompass the approaches to the encampment.
The battlefield is on a small plateau that is generally open throughout most
of the area. Moreover, there is still a drop-off from the encampment site to
Burnett Creek, and the terrain in this area remains wooded. The area behind
the creek leads to Prophet’s Rock and consists of open areas broken by
small stands of trees. A two-lane road runs along the hillside below
Prophet’s Rock.

A fence surrounds most of the encampment area, and there is a set of
steps that lead to Burnett Creek. The monument and museum are in the
general area that Major Samuel Wells and the mounted riflemen from
Kentucky occupied. This built-up area of the park leads to the town of
Battle Ground, Indiana. The swamps and marshes that protected the
Indians from the dragoons’ assault no longer exist. The opposite end of the
battlefield, near the position of Spencer’s Yellow Jackets, is still wooded.
Today, a two-lane road and railroad tracks run parallel to the positions
occupied by the infantry and militia commanded by Maj. G. C. Floyd (4th
U.S.) and Lt. Col. Bartholomew (IN militia). The area leading to Prophet’s
Town is generally open fields. A historical marker notes the general
location of the town itself.

Since the encampment occupied a relatively small area, a survey of most
of the battlefield can be made from a single vantage point. The main areas
of action during the battle are close enough together to allow a walking tour
to cover the events chronologically. Personnel conducting the staff ride can
also choose to cover the events in a clockwise or counterclockwise manner.
Regardless of the method selected, the participants will be able to see other
key pieces of the battlefield from most vantage points.

This chapter contains a map for the suggested route of the staff ride,
identifies stands that locate specific events, provides vignettes, and presents
discussion topics. Units conducting the staff ride should allow for two days
in which to visit all of the stands associated with the campaign and battle. The campaign route is approximately 150 miles and will require transportation to visit all of the stands along the route; one day is sufficient for this phase of the staff ride. Another day is needed to conduct a walking tour of the battlefield. Transportation between Prophet’s Town and the battlefield is not required, as the distance is less than one and one-half miles. Prophet’s Town is on private property, and units must coordinate with the owner if they plan any extensive activity at that stand. The vignettes will highlight the specific actions at each stand. The discussion topics should be tailored to fit the particular training objectives of the unit conducting the staff ride.

The Tippecanoe battlefield is part of the Indiana state park system. Visitors to the battlefield will find various monuments and a battlefield museum that are interesting sources of background information and can supplement the field-study phase of the staff ride. Additionally, several area libraries and a county historical association can provide information for the visitor to the battlefield. As a starting point, visitors can contact the Tippecanoe County Historical Association at (765) 567-2147.

Suggested Route and Vignettes

There are two distinct elements to the suggested staff ride route. The first part of the staff ride is oriented on the operational aspects of the campaign and follows the route of Harrison’s army from Vincennes to Prophet’s Town. The second part of the staff ride focuses on the tactical aspects of the battle and takes place at the Tippecanoe battlefield. To prevent confusion about how the discussion should be focused at a particular stand along the route (i.e., should the discussion orient on operational or tactical aspects), each route is identified differently. Note: The operational-level stands along the campaign route are identified alphabetically, while the tactical stands are identified numerically.

Stand A

Grouseland²

(Park and Scott Streets, near the center of Vincennes, Indiana. See Indiana map 4 for locations in relation to a modern map. Letters indicate stand locations.)

Situation: Between 1808 and 1811, four major meetings were conducted in the Vincennes area between Indian leaders from Prophet’s Town and
Governor Harrison. The first two meetings were between the Prophet and Harrison, and the third and fourth meetings were between Harrison and Tecumseh. The Prophet, during his meetings with Harrison, attempted to convince the governor that the settlement at Prophet’s Town was not a threat. During the meetings, Harrison noted that the Indians accompanying the Prophet appeared destitute. The governor later sent supplies to Prophet’s Town to help sustain the settlement during the winter of 1808-9.

The meetings between Tecumseh and Harrison were quite different, their purpose being to resolve problems generated by Harrison’s successful conclusion of the Treaty of Fort Wayne. Several hundred Indians, most of whom were warriors, accompanied Tecumseh to Vincennes for these meetings. They were a stark contrast from the destitute Indians that had accompanied the Prophet during his earlier meetings with Harrison.

The activities conducted at Grouseland were diplomatic in nature and oriented on preventive diplomacy. (Preventive diplomacy consists of the diplomatic actions taken before a predictable crisis in order to prevent or limit violence.\textsuperscript{3}) All of the meetings between Harrison and the Prophet, as well as Harrison and Tecumseh, fit into this category. During the last meeting, in the summer of 1811, Tecumseh informed Harrison that he would begin his southern travels to recruit more Indians for the pan-Indian confederacy.

**Discussion Points:** Could the location of the meetings have influenced their outcome? Since Tecumseh and Harrison refused to change their individual points of view about the validity of the Treaty of Fort Wayne, was preventive diplomacy a realistic option? Before the last meeting, during the summer of 1811, Harrison asked Tecumseh to limit the number of Indians that accompanied him to the meeting. He made the request because of the near outbreak of violence at their first meeting. Harrison also ensured that Vincennes was well garrisoned prior to Tecumseh’s arrival for the second meeting. Tecumseh, meanwhile, decreased the number of Indians that accompanied him, but his entourage still remained large, as befitted a warrior of his status. Harrison continued to chafe at the size of the delegation, apparently not understanding that a smaller retinue would be demeaning to Tecumseh. Considering the atmosphere of distrust on all sides, it is not surprising that the meetings began poorly and ended without positive result. What impact did these misunderstandings have on the effectiveness of the attempts at preventive diplomacy? Should the meetings have been held? What could have been done to prevent the misunderstandings?
Stand B

Fort Knox, Indiana Territory

(Several historical markers two miles north of Vincennes, Indiana, on Lower Fort Knox Road and the Wabash River)

Situation: The fort protected the approaches to Vincennes and was positioned on the Wabash. It was occupied by regulars, who were often augmented by militia (as the situation dictated). The army for the Tippecanoe campaign was initially organized in this area.

Discussion Points: Was the fort in the proper position to protect the approaches to the territorial capital (Vincennes)? Was manning of the fort, or increasing the size of the garrison at the fort, an example of a preventive deployment?

Stand C

Fort Harrison, Indiana Territory

(Historical marker at 3350 North 4th Street, Terre Haute, Indiana—the Elks Club)

Situation: Fort Harrison was built to show U.S. resolve regarding occupation of lands ceded by the Indians in the Treaty of Fort Wayne. The fort was also the training location for the army before its deployment to the Prophet’s Town area.

Discussion Points: Was this an appropriate show of force? Did establishment of the fort demonstrate American resolve or incite violence on the part of the Indians? Is this an example of a preventive deployment?

Stand D

Army Deception Crossing Site on the Wabash River

(Approximately three miles north of Big Raccoon Creek, vicinity Montezuma, Indiana)

Situation: The army departed from Fort Harrison and began moving through the new purchase toward Prophet’s Town. Harrison wanted the Indians to believe that the army would travel along the eastern route, which was a shorter route, but also a less secure one because of the close terrain that offered advantages to an ambushing force. To complete the deception,
Harrison ordered his soldiers to cut a road (which was normally done to ease movement of logistics trains) further along the deception route of march. Harrison and his army crossed the Wabash on 31 October 1811 to the side of the river that was used less frequently but offered better protection for the force because of its more open terrain.

**Discussion Points:** Harrison still believed that a show of force might accomplish his operational goals. Was deception appropriate during a peace operation? How does a commander balance the need for force protection with maintenance of a nonhostile or less-offensive posture?

**Stand E**

**Boyd’s Blockhouse**

(The mouth of the Vermillion River on the west bank of the Wabash River)

**Situation:** Once the army reached the vicinity of their crossing site at the Vermillion, the force halted and built a blockhouse to protect the army’s water LOC. The blockhouse was twenty-five-feet square, with breastworks on each corner, and was used to store the extra equipment, heavy baggage, and boats not needed in the objective area. Injured and sick soldiers were also left at the blockhouse.

**Discussion Points:** Was the construction of the blockhouse an effective means of protecting the army’s LOC? What advantages were gained by downloading equipment? Was there a better LOC? How effective would an overland LOC have been as the army’s primary LOC?

**Stand F**

**Army Crossing Site on the Vermillion River**

(SR63 and the Vermillion River)

**Situation:** After its departure from the blockhouse, the army crossed the Vermillion River and continued its approach to Prophet’s Town. The army still had approximately sixty miles to travel to reach the villages, and the final approach to the objective area would require another three days. Although the troops continued to find signs of Indians, the earlier deception proved successful, and the army was not compromised as it continued its march into Indian Territory.
Discussion Points: The successful deception allowed the army to conduct an unopposed and unobserved river crossing of the Vermillion River. Did this benefit outweigh the possible shortcomings of using deception operations during a peace operation?

Stand G

Final Army Encampment, 5 November 1811, Before Arrival at Prophet’s Town

(Two miles west of Montmorenci on 800W and Little Pine Creek)

Situation: The army camped within ten miles of Prophet’s Town and remained undetected by the Indians until the next day, 6 November 1811. (See map 4 for Tippecanoe campaign locations in relation to a modern map. Letters indicate stand locations.)

Discussion Points: Security was obviously enhanced because of the deception. Did showing up unexpectedly in the area of Prophet’s Town offer any operational advantage to the army? Was Harrison’s bargaining position with the Prophet improved, or did the army’s unexpected arrival force a confrontation with the Prophet?

Stand 1

Prophet’s Town

(A historical marker located on State Road SR225 at Houston Road)

Situation: The Prophet was in charge at the Tippecanoe headquarters, where Tecumseh had left strict orders that the Indians were not to engage Harrison’s forces. The Tippecanoe headquarters was a large Indian village that was partially fortified with rudimentary breastworks. The town was between one to two miles long and ran generally along the Wabash River. The living areas of the village were made up of between 100 and 200 Indian-style huts. There was also a large storehouse containing corn and beans. Cultivated fields used for farming probably ran to the south of the village; Harrison said that they were about 500 yards “below the town” and extended all the way to the banks of the Wabash.

Vignette: “He [Tecumseh] was not at the battle of Tippecanoe. If he had been there it would not have been fought. It was too soon. It frustrated all of his plans. He [The Prophet] was a great medicine. He talked much to the
Indians and told them what had happened. He told much truth, but some things that he told did not come to pass. He was called 'The Prophet.' Your people knew him only by that name. He was very cunning, but he was not so great a warrior as his brother, and he could not control the young warriors so well who were determined to fight. Perhaps your people do not know that the battle of Tippecanoe was the work of white men who came from Canada and urged us to make war. Two of them who wore red coats were at the Prophet's Town the day that your army came. It was they who urged Elskatawwa [the Prophet] to fight. They dressed themselves like Indians, to show us how to fight. They did not know our mode. We wanted to attack at midnight. They wanted to wait till daylight."

Teaching Points: Unity of command, objective. (For American troop dispositions, see map 5.)

Map 5. Tippecanoe battle, 7 November 1811 (numbers indicate stand locations)
Stand 2

Encampment at Tippecanoe

(Tippecanoe monument)

**Situation:** The encampment formed a trapezoid. Spencer's Yellow Jackets were at the western end of the encampment. The front of the trapezoid (the front line) faced Prophet's Town, while the rear of the trapezoid (the rear line) abutted Burnett Creek. The eastern end of the perimeter was Wells' position and that of the mounted riflemen. The dragoons, dismounted and serving as the army's reserve, were to the rear of the mounted riflemen and formed at right angles to the riflemen and the front line. Many of the horses and wagons were inside the perimeter. The remainder of the livestock was outside the perimeter, on the prairie.

Soldiers lit warming fires, and a large detachment guarded the camp. Breastworks were not built around the perimeter of the camp. Some of the regulars and officers pitched tents, but most of the soldiers slept in the open near their battle positions. All soldiers rested, wearing their equipment and accouterments, with weapons loaded and bayonets fixed. Most of the army slept in the elements, since the militia did not have tents.

**Vignette 1:** "It was my constant custom to assemble all of the field officers at my tent every evening by signal to give them the watch word and their instructions for the night—those given for the night of the 6th were that each Corps which formed a part of the exterior line of the encampment should hold its own ground until relieved. The Dragoons were directed to parade dismounted in case of night attack with their pistols in their belts and to act as a Corps de Reserve. The Camp was defended by two Captains Guards consisting of four noncommissioned officers and 42 privates and two Subalterns Guards of twenty noncommissioned officers and privates. The whole under the command of the field officer of the day. The troops were regularly called up an hour before day and made to continue under arms until it was quite light." 9

**Teaching Points:** Commander’s guidance, SOPs.

**Vignette 2:** "At or near 4 o'clock in the morning I was alarmed by the discharge of a gun, on which I immediately repaired to my company, where I found my men all paraded at their posts. The position of the men during the night, together with myself, while at rest was lying on our arms with our clothes on—as for myself I lay with my boots on greatcoat on &
accouterments buckled round me, with my rifle in my arms. At the report of
the gun I had no more to do than to throw off my blanket, put my hat on & go
to my company which was eight or ten steps from my tent, the time might be
one or two minutes, where I found my men as above mentioned."

**Teaching Points:** SOPs, location of key leaders.

### Stand 3

**Initial Engagement by the Sentry**

(The east side of the camp; the sentries were located outside of the perimeter)

**Situation:** The orderly was standing by preparing to give the signal for
stand-to. General Harrison was in his tent talking to some of his officers.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew, the field officer of the day,
was inspecting his sentries⁹ Some soldiers were awake or waking up in
preparation for stand-to. Other soldiers were adding fuel to the warming
fires as a drizzling rain fell. Then, the sentry near Major Wells’ command
fired at an infiltrating Indian. The wounded Indian cried out, and his
companions rushed the camp from several sides, pursuing the retreating
sentries. As the sentries retired into the camp, the units on the perimeter
were awake and forming for battle.

**Vignette 1:** “I awoke about four o’clock the next morning . . . . A drizzling
rain was falling and all things were still and quiet throughout the camp. I
was engaged in making a calculation when I should arrive at home. In a few
moments I heard the crack of a rifle . . . . I had just time to think that some
sentinel was alarmed and had fired his rifle without a real cause, when I
heard the crack of another rifle, followed by an awful Indian yell all around
the encampment. In less than a minute I saw the Indians charging our line
most furiously and shooting a great many balls into our camp fires,
throwing the live coals into the air three or four feet high. The sentinels,
closely pursued by the Indians, came to the line of the encampment in haste
and confusion. My brother, William Naylor, was on guard. He was pursued
so rapidly and furiously that he ran to the nearest point on the left flank,
where he remained with a company of regular soldiers until the battle was
near its termination. A young man, whose name was Daniel Pettit, was
pursued so closely and furiously by an Indian as he was running from the
guard fire to our lines, that to save his life he cocked his rifle as he ran and
turning suddenly round, placed the muzzle of his gun against the body of the
Indian and shot an ounce ball through him. The Indian fired his gun at the same instant, but it being longer than Pettit’s the muzzle passed by him and set fire to a handkerchief which he had tied round his head.

Teaching Points: Establishing security, force protection measures.

Vignette 2: “The men that were to crawl upon their bellies into the camp were seen in the grass by white man who had eyes like an owl, and he fired and hit his mark. The Indian was not brave. He cried out. He should have lain still and died. Then the other men fired. The other Indians were fools. They jumped out of the grass and yelled. They believed what had been told them, that a white man would run at a noise made in the night. Then many Indians who had crept very close so as to be ready to take scalps when the white men ran, all yelled like wolves, wild cats and screech owls; but it did not make the white men run. They jumped up right from their sleep with guns in their hands and sent a shower of bullets at every spot where they heard a noise. They could not see us. We could see them, for they had fires. Whether we were ready or not we had to fight now for the battle was begun.”

Teaching Points: Stealth, alternate plans in case of an early compromise.

Stand 4
First Indian Attack
(Apex of Geiger’s and Barton’s companies)

Situation: The Indians gained an advantage almost immediately in the area where Captain Barton’s company (4th U.S.) tied in with Captain Frederick Geiger’s company (KY mounted riflemen). The onslaught happened so rapidly that the Indians broke through the companies to the inside of the camp perimeter. General Harrison arrived in the area, quickly assessed the situation, and ordered Cook’s company (4th U.S.) and Wentworth’s company (IN militia, commanded by Peters) from the rear line to the shattered angle formed by Barton and Geiger.

Vignette 1: “At this moment my friend Warnock was shot by a rifle ball through his body. He ran few yards and fell dead on the ground. Our lines were broken and a few Indians were found on the inside of the encampment. In a few moments they were all killed. Our lines closed up and our men in the proper places. One Indian was killed in the back part of Captain Geiger’s tent, while he was attempting to tomahawk the Captain. The
Indians made four or five most fierce charges on our lines, yelling and screaming as they advanced, shooting balls and arrows into our ranks. At each charge they were driven off in confusion, carrying their dead and wounded as they retreated.¹²

Teaching Points: Immediate response to the threat, SOPs.

Vignette 2: "I rode to the angle that was attacked. I found that Barton's company had suffered severely and the left of Geiger's entirely broken. I immediately ordered Cook's and the late Capt. Wentworth's under Lieut. Peters to be brought up from the centre of the rear line where the ground was much more defensible and formed across the angle in support of Barton's and Geiger's."¹³

Teaching Points: Location of the commander, the impact on decision making, the assumption of command after leaders are killed or wounded.

Stand 5

Second Indian Attack

(Southeast edge of the line in Floyd's area)

Situation: Harrison rode to the next critical area, which was at the front line (facing Prophet's Town). There, Major Daviess was organizing his dragoons (KY militia), and he repeatedly asked Harrison for permission to attack a group of Indians in a stand of trees fifteen or twenty feet away, who were effectively engaging the soldiers on the front line. Harrison then authorized Daviess to drive the Indians from the small grove. Daviess led a single-file charge of about twenty dragoons. The Indians attacked the dragoons on their flanks, killing Daviess and another dragoon and wounding a third. Snelling and his men responded by attacking the Indians in the trees, dislodging them with bayonets.

Vignette: "... having the command of Capt Baens company, and judging it was better to charge the indians in front, than to stand and receive their fires, I so requested of Major Floyd, who commanded the right wing, as did Lieut. Hawkins commanding Whinet, but was refused on the ground of leaving this part of the line and angle wholly exposed to the Indians.¹⁴ [T]he commanding in chief arrived here, and seeing the situation of the companies, he ordered Major
Daviss to charge those Indians in front. [T]he Major's undaunted courage hurried him forward with two small a force to assure success. [I]n the charge the Major received a Mortal wound Coll White killed and one dragoon wounded. [T]he party returned without accomplishing its object, however the Indians soon found too warm a reception [sic] and left the ground in front. [T]he action had by this time become almost general on all sides. Capt Snelling and Prescott was ordered from this wing, to support the line across the head of the camp [vicinity Major Wells' command, to fill the space vacated by Robb's company], their vacancy supplied [sic] with dragoons. Capt S[nelling] charged and dislodged a body [sic] of Indians in that direction and nigh this angle. [T]he manner the Indians fought [sic] was desperate.

**Teaching Points:** Commander's repositioning of men on the battlefield, use of the reserve, execution of the reserve mission by other units if the reserve fails.

### Stand 6

**Third Indian Attack**

(Spencer's Yellow Jackets on the west side of the camp)

**Situation:** Spencer's Yellow Jackets (IN militia) were among the last engaged in the battle because the Indians in this area were not prepared to assault when the attack was compromised. The Yellow Jackets defended an area too large for them; the attack in this area was particularly savage and quickly decimated the Yellow Jacket chain of command. As Harrison arrived, he found that John Tipton, an ensign, was the only surviving officer among Spencer's Yellow Jackets. Thomas Montgomery, a second lieutenant, was commanding Warrick's company (IN militia), which was adjacent to the Yellow Jackets. Harrison ordered Robb's company (IN militia) to move to the aid of Spencer's and Warrick's companies. Harrison directed Prescott's company (4th U.S.) to fill the gap at Robb's old position.

**Vignette 1:** "[A] bloody Combat Took Place at Precisely 15 minutes before 5 in morning which lasted two hours and 20 minutes of a continuwel [sic] firing while many times mixed among the Indians so that we Could not tell the indians and our men apart. [T]hey kept up a firing on three sides of us took our tent from the guerd [sic] fire. [O]ur men fought Brave and By the timely help of Capt Cook [actually Lieutenant Larrabee, Cook arrived"
later] with a Company of infantry we maid [sic] a Charge and Drove them out of the timber across the prairie."

**Teaching Points:** Location of commander, repositioning of forces, assaults used in the defense to disrupt and dislodge attacking forces.

**Vignette 2:** "Where's your captain?" "Dead, sir." "Your first lieutenant?" "Dead, sir." "Your second lieutenant?" "Dead, sir." "Your ensign?" "Here, sir!"

**Teaching Points:** Reestablishment of the chain of command.

**Stand 7**

**Bayonet and Dragoon Charge**

(East side of the camp, in the vicinity of the Kentucky mounted riflemen)

**Situation:** Harrison wanted to conduct coordinated assaults from each end of the encampment at first light. Major Wells, unaware of Harrison's intent, prepared to attack the Indians at his end of the encampment, marshaling infantry and dragoons for the difficult task. The infantry subsequently attacked with fixed bayonets and drove the Indians back. The dragoons, now mounted, continued the attack until the marsh prevented continued pursuit.

**Vignette 1:** "Major Wells who commanded on the left flank not knowing my intentions precisely, had taken the command of these companies [and] had charged the enemy before I had formed the body of Dragoons with which I meant to support the infantry, a small detachment of those [dragoons] were however ready and proved amply. The Indians were driven by the Infantry at the point of the Bayonet and the Dragoons pursued and forced them into a marsh where they could not be followed."

**Teaching Points:** Use of countcrattacks, impact of subordinate initiative on synchronization, situation awareness.

**Vignette 2:** "As soon as daylight came our warriors saw that the Prophet's grand plan had failed—that the great white chief was alive riding fearlessly among his troops in spite of bullets, and their hearts melted. After that the Indians fought to save themselves, not to crush the whites. It was a terrible defeat. Our men all scattered and tried to get away. The white horsemen chased them and cut them down with long knives [swords]."

**Teaching Points:** Morale, assignment of unachievable objectives.
Stand 8

Final Counterattack

(Vicinity Spencer’s Yellow Jackets)

Situation: Light was beginning to break over the battlefield. Harrison had already repositioned several companies to reinforce his left and right flanks in preparation for the daylight assaults. Wells, unaware of Harrison’s wishes, began his series of assaults to destroy the Indians in his area. Companies from the 4th U.S. moved into position to support the battered Yellow Jackets. As soon as the infantry arrived in position, they charged with bayonets and drove the Indians out of their position. (For the scheme of maneuver in the battle, see map 6.)

Vignette: “... at the same time I received an order (as did Lieut Hawkins) and proceeded accordingly to support the rear line. [O]n my arrival the indians had gained ground upon Spencers company, being the senior officer present, commanded and formed the companies, charged the indians killed five and put the rest to flight. Capt Cook (and company) was also ordered to this point, but arrived too late to bare [sic] any share of the charge.”

Teaching Points: Use of counterattacks, junior leader initiative and ability.

Stand 9

Prophet’s Rock

(Historical markers on Prophet’s Rock Road and the hillside southwest of Battleground, Indiana)

Situation: During the battle, the Prophet established himself on a small hill overlooking the battlefield. To inspire the warriors and contribute his mystic powers that would help guarantee success in battle, he beat a drum and shouted incantations to the Great Spirit. Throughout the morning, runners informed the Prophet that his magic had failed to stop the bayonets and bullets of the enemy. The Prophet urged the warriors on and promised that the prophecy would be fulfilled. As daylight broke over the battleground, the warriors realized that the attack had failed and abandoned further attempts.

Teaching Points: Poor exercise of command and control, poor leadership.
Map 6. Interior movements, Tippecanoe battle, 7 November 1811: (A) Cook and Peters are ordered to reinforce the angle formed by Geiger and Barton. (B) Robb is driven from his position or mistakenly moves out of position and is halted by a staff officer. Robb is eventually ordered to reinforce the Yellow Jackets. (C) Prescott fills the gap on the left flank that was vacated by Robb. (D) Snelling, Albright, and Scott from the front line and Wilson from the rear line are ordered to the left flank. The bayonet charges on this flank are ordered by Wells before Harrison has the dragoons completely organized and prepared to assist. (E) Larrabee and Cook are ordered to the right flank in preparation for the daylight bayonet charges.
Stand 10

Encampment
(Tippecanoe monument)

Situation: 7-8 November 1811. Throughout the day, the army consolidated and reorganized. In addition, the soldiers erected breastworks about four feet high to strengthen their defensive position, treated the wounded, buried the dead, and reestablished their chains of command. That night, the force maintained 100-percent security in case of another attack. The next day, 8 November 1811, a mounted force moved to Prophet's Town and found the village empty. At the village, the army seized any usable supplies that it could transport, and all remaining captured supplies and material were burned along with the village. A captured and wounded Indian was treated and left at the village under the care of an Indian woman.

Vignette 1: "... no company suffered like ours. [W]e then held an Election for officers. I was elected Capt. Saml Flanagan first Lieut and Jacob Zenor second Lieut and Philip Bell Ensign. [W]e then built Breast-works our men in much confusion, our flour [flour] been too small and our beef [beef] last [lost]. Last night onley [sic] half Rations of whisky [sic] and no corn for our horses. [M]y horse killed I got [M]ahons to Ride 37 of them had been killed wounded and lost last night. I had one quart of whisky [sic]."

Teaching Points: Reestablish the chain of command, reestablish security.

Vignette 2: "... the day was spent in attending to the police of the camp fortifying the same, and preparing to attack the town the next day. [T]he night of the 7th was cold and rainny [sic], and but a little Soldiers rest obtained. [A]t sunrise the 8th inst the dragoons were sent to discover the situation of the town, and in 15 minuets [sic] an express arrived informed that the indians where leaveing [sic] town and all its contents had crossed the [W]abash and that the Dragoons had possession of the town. [A] number of waggons [sic] where [sic] dispatched, and returned from town loaded with beans corn and peas. ... [T]he day was spent burning and destroying the town of Tippicanoe [sic], and preparing for the march the next day."

Teaching Points: Preparation for future operations, focus on accomplishment of campaign objectives, redeployment upon accomplishment of campaign termination criteria.
NOTES

1. As cited in DeHart, 119. The quote is from a comment made to Pfrimmer’s fa-
ther, Sam, by a soldier named Bayard. Bayard made the remark to Sam on the
evening of 6 November 1811.

2. Eckert, Sorrow, 935-36. The governor’s mansion was known as Grouseland
because of the large numbers of ruffed grouse that inhabited the surrounding
woods.

3. The definition of preventive diplomacy is from Field Manual 100-23, Peace
Operations, 2.

4. According to Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, 2-3, preventive deploy-
ment is the deployment of military forces at the interface or zone of potential
conflict in order to deter violence.

5. Draper MSS. 1X41; and Walker, 20, 30.


7. Draper MSS. 1X42. Isaac Naylor, 169, describes the watchword for the night
of 6 November 1811 as “wide awake, wide awake.” The present-day 151st Infan-
try Regiment, Indiana Army National Guard, retains the watchword as their
regimental motto.

8. Report submitted 8 January 1812 by Captain Joel Cook, 4th U.S., in Presiden-
tial Papers Microfilm, William Henry Harrison, Presidential Papers Microfilm
Series 1: 1734-1813 Aug., Reel 1.


11. Shabonee, as cited in Whickar, 357.


13. General Harrison’s report to the secretary of war, in Draper MSS. 1X42.

14. Lieutenant Charles Larrabee commanded Captain Baen’s company because
Baen was serving as an acting major (battalion commander) during the battle.
Larrabee continued to command the company after the army’s return to Vin-
Colonel White was a militia officer whose unit was not called up to participate in the campaign. Colonel White enlisted and served as a private during the campaign. Colonel White was not the only officer that volunteered to serve at a lower rank. Major Wells was a major general in the Kentucky militia who volunteered to serve as a private. Harrison appointed Wells as a major and gave him command of a battalion of mounted riflemen. See George Fauntleroy White, "Memoir of Colonel Isaac White," *Indiana Magazine of History* 15, no. 4 (1919): 327-41, for more information on Colonel White.

Lieutenant Charles Larrabee, as cited in Watts, 243-44.

Draper MSS. 1X43. Harrison, in his report to the secretary of war, acknowledged that the Yellow Jackets were assigned a position on the perimeter that was too large for them to cover.

Exchange between General Harrison and Ensign John Tipton as cited in Downey, 88.

General Harrison's report to the secretary of war, in Draper MSS. 1X43.

Shabonee, as cited in Whickar, 357.

Lieutenant Charles Larrabee, as cited in Watts, 244.

Tipton, 180-81.

Lieutenant Charles Larrabee, as cited in Watts, 244.

Tipton, 180-81.
APPENDIX A

Training and Doctrine

My order of march hitherto had been similar to that used by General Wayne...³

—General Harrison, Postbattle Report

Raising Armies

U.S. Forces

During the years between the American Revolution and the War of 1812, various mixtures of regular, militia, and volunteer units conducted the major campaigns of the United States. Units from the Regular Army, Indiana, and Kentucky fought at Tippecanoe.³ To ensure that there were adequate forces available for military duties, Congress had enacted several pieces of legislation regarding national defense. These acts dictated the organization and strength of the military.

The post-Revolutionary War years saw an emphasis on establishing an efficient navy as the primary military tool to support American policy. Meanwhile, ground combat operations were to rely on militias. In light of this policy, it is understandable why militia units from Indiana and Kentucky provided the bulk of forces during the Tippecanoe campaign.³

After the American Revolution, Congress placed so little emphasis on maintaining a Continental Army that the army was disbanded, with the exception of one artillery battery to guard the stores at West Point. For several reasons, Congress felt that the United States could afford to rely on a well-regulated militia for defense. One reason was that the oceans provided the country with a measure of protection. Another was that the country was too poor to maintain a large standing army.⁴

Eventually, Congress began to see the need for some type of regular force to protect the frontier. The Constitution gave Congress the authority to raise and appropriate funds for the maintenance of an army for two-year periods. The first post-Revolutionary War army was composed of men on detached service from militias. Congress requested that several states provide men from their militias for a one-year period of service. The army was eventually organized, and Josiah Harmar was appointed commander.⁵ This general practice of raising an army for
specific emergencies and for a limited duration continued until the first decade of the nineteenth century.

The Regular Army eventually grew in size, but it still remained extremely small. Even so, it was entrusted with a large territorial responsibility. Prior to the War of 1812, army units garrisoned posts along the Canadian border. Army units had the further responsibility of protecting the American coastline as far as the mouth of the Mississippi. In addition, Army units were responsible for patrolling the borders along Spanish Florida and the Indian frontier. But the 1808 act of Congress allowed the Regular Army fewer than 10,000 men to accomplish all of these various tasks.\(^6\)

Militias, on their part, were designed to provide for local defense, so local governments organized and recruited militia units. The Militia Act of 1792 provided the guidance for forming, organizing, and equipping citizen militias in the states. The Militia Act required free white male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five to serve in state militias. The act also provided guidance on the weapons and equipment used by members of the militias and how the states should organize their militias into battalions, regiments, and divisions. The act also authorized the president to call up the militia for federal service—but not in excess of three months in any year. The general principles of the Militia Act prevailed without major revision until 1903.\(^7\)

Several traditional limitations, dating to Colonial America, applied to the employment of militia units. For instance, militias were used for short periods of service (generally three months) and did not serve outside of the boundaries of their home areas without special consent. Volunteer organizations also were developed to supplement the militia system. These units usually equipped themselves and paid dues to maintain meeting places. Some of these units were independent of the militia system, but most were incorporated into the system with special privileges. The services of volunteers remained relevant and important after the Revolutionary War because volunteers provided the federal government with manpower that could be used for longer periods and without regard to geographic limitations.\(^8\)

The Militia Act directed that members of the militia were required to provide themselves with certain minimum items of equipment. One problem was that members of militia units often refused to bring their personal weapons for drill and training. An extremely practical reason for
this attitude existed among the frontiersmen; if a militia soldier damaged his
weapon during training, no compensation was promised to replace his
broken firearm. In 1798, the Militia Act was amended to allow the federal
government to sell or loan weapons to volunteer companies and to set aside
30,000 weapons for sale to the states. This amendment, however, did not
achieve the desired result because the states were somewhat reluctant to
purchase weapons. Thus, in 1808, Congress appropriated $200,000 to arm
militias with muskets.9

Congress also had the duty of authorizing payment of militias for active
service. There was no authorization, however, allowing payment of
Harrison’s militia when that general started his march to secure the new
purchase. Letters between Harrison and Eustis addressed the problem of
paying the militias. In the summer of 1811, Eustis informed Harrison that
the act authorizing payment of the militia had expired; consequently, militia
called out the previous year could not be paid. Nonetheless, eventually
Eustis authorized Harrison to employ Boyd’s regulars and a few militia
units in the new purchase—even though there were no funds to pay them.
Eustis was confident, however, that Congress would authorize payment of
the militia in the next session.10

Indian Confederacy

Indians organized war parties for various reasons, but no formal
procedure, in a legislative sense, existed for such an undertaking. Several
fairly common cultural traditions, however, were invoked by the Woodland
Indians to organize combat forces after the Revolutionary War in order to
fight white encroachments in the Old Northwest. Indian combat elements,
once formed, varied in size from small raiding parties to large formations of
over 1,000. Many of the confederacies that were organized by the Indians
were loose, ad hoc associations. The fighting elements of these coalitions
often consisted of various war parties from allied villages that joined the
confederacy.

One tradition related to the organizing of Indians was the use of
wampum belts, which were a form of record keeping used to commemorate
important public occasions. The message on the belt was contained in the
shapes and colors of the design. The belts often accompanied important
agreements, such as treaties. A wampum belt with a primarily black design
was often used to indicate war or the intention to go to war.11 Wampum belts
were one possible communication tool between tribes attempting to
organize coalitions. An organizer of a confederacy could dispatch
messengers to potential allies with war wampum belts to request their support during future combat operations. The recipient who accepted the invitation could organize a war party and join his new ally in council.

The act of burying a tomahawk in the village war post was a common sign indicating that a member of the community wanted to form a war party. The act was more than symbolic because it announced a specific intention, and it opened membership in the war party to anyone who wished to join. Another method of organizing a war party was to send messengers to outlying villages to solicit volunteers. Once the decision was made to conduct the expedition, ceremonial war dances preceded the war party's departure. Any warrior who wanted to join a particular coalition could organize a war party to accompany him.

Council meetings, which could be single-village or multivillage conclaves, were often the forum used to address collective issues. Lighting a council fire signified that the negotiations or deliberations were in session. Although the council might determine a course of action for the tribe (such as peace with the United States), warriors could still form war parties outside the aegis of tribal policy and conduct combat operations. War dancing and ritual purification, such as fasting, might accompany a war council. The council held by the Indian confederacy before the attack on St. Clair's army consisted of more than 3,000 Indians.

**Equipping Armies**

**U.S. Forces**

The type of uniforms and equipment used by American soldiers during the years between the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 is difficult to determine because the army was small, few examples of uniforms and equipment remain, and local contractors often produced uniforms and equipment that might or might not be in accordance with government regulations. Another drawback in attempting to reconstruct uniforms of the period is that the uniform regulations prior to 1821 were vague. Because the War of 1812 followed the Battle of Tippecanoe so quickly, one may draw some general conclusions about uniforms and equipment from that conflict and apply them to the uniforms and equipment worn in the fall of 1811.

The regular infantry probably wore high-collared waist-length uniform coats, with red facings on the cuffs and collars. Whitened buff-leather belts and pantaloons were also probably worn. Black cylindrical caps, each with
an oblong silver plate that identified the soldier’s unit, were authorized in 1810. A wooden canteen, bayonet, musket, M1808 cartridge box, and knapsack completed the infantryman’s standard load of equipment. The M1808 contract musket was in service at the time of the Tippecanoe fight, and the Lherbette patent model knapsack was adopted in 1808.\textsuperscript{15}

Rifle Regiment regulars were authorized a different uniform—leather caps with cap devices specifying “U.S.R.R.” that reflected their unit of service. The rifleman’s winter uniform was green cloth faced with black. The summer uniform consisted of a green hunting shirt and pantaloons edged with buff fringe. Since the regulars deployed to the Indiana Territory in late summer, the soldiers might have been clad in their summer-issue uniforms. A three-inch-wide black waist belt, scalping knife, tomahawk, and M1803 rifle completed the standard uniform and equipment for the rifleman.\textsuperscript{16}

Little standardization of equipment existed among militias, and they used whatever was available, even personal items or equipment from government stocks. Uniform requirements were up to the individual. Harrison, for example, wore a uniform that included a fringed hunting shirt made of calico.\textsuperscript{17} Volunteers, such as Daviess’ Dragoons, supplied their own mounts in addition to other items of equipment. Joseph Daviess told his volunteers that they should have a brace of pistols and clothes that “ought to be a blue coatee and pantaloons without any scarlet, a hat or leather cap covered with bear skin, boots, spurs and a pair of tanned leather moccasins to spare.”\textsuperscript{18} The recruits apparently equipped themselves in accordance with Daviess’ desires. Adam Walker, a Regular Army soldier, wrote, “The Dragoons, commanded by Major Daviess, consisting of about 120 men, were well mounted and handsomely equipped, and composed of some of the most respectable citizens from Kentucky and Indiana.”\textsuperscript{19}

The unit that Daviess sponsored was a volunteer unit and composed of members who were probably wealthy or substantially more financially secure than the average frontiersman who composed the majority of the militia units. Not surprisingly, Daviess and his volunteers maintained a higher standard of equipment than the normal militia troops. The average militia soldier, however, was a hardy frontiersman that looked the part. Adam Walker was shocked at the appearance of the militiamen when he first encountered them, remarking, “. . . their appearance caused us to doubt whether we had not actually landed among the savages themselves. Many of these militia spoke the French language; —their dress was a short frock of deer skin, a belt around their bodies with a tomahawk and a scalping knife
attached to it, and were nearly as destitute of discipline as the savages themselves.”20

Although initially not impressed with the militiamen’s appearance, Walker gave them credit for their ability to use a particular piece of equipment to live off of the land: “The hatchet, however, was found to be a very useful article on the march—they had no tents; but with their hatchets would in a short time form themselves a secure shelter from the weather, on encamping at night.”21

The hatchet also performed a role as a weapon for the American militiaman, and a British officer that served in North America during the War of 1812 wrote: “In fact, the backwoodsmen of Kentucky and Ohio . . . differ very immaterially from the natives in their appearance . . . and the knife and hatchet are as formidable weapons with them as they are with the Indians . . .”22

The types of firearms employed by the armed forces of the time varied with the types of units employed. Regulars carried standard service arms, and militia soldiers who were not equipped from government stores carried personal weapons.23 The type of personal rifle that a militia soldier was likely to use was often called the long, or Kentucky, rifle. The Kentucky rifle of this period was a flintlock, between .32 and .38 caliber, and had varying barrel lengths up to about forty-eight inches long. Even though the rifle was an accurate weapon in excess of 200 yards, it was generally not suitable for military service because it did not accept a bayonet, and, because of the rifling, it took about twice as long to load as a musket. The regulars from the Rifle Regiment were equipped with the Model 1803 rifle, a weapon similar in design to the Kentucky rifle. The fact that this rifle has the same limitations as its civilian counterpart is probably the reason that the riflemen were equipped with muskets during the Battle of Tippecanoe.24

Muskets, on the other hand, while only effective between eighty and one hundred yards, allowed massed ranks to fire more rapidly and attack the enemy with bayonets. There were also various types of ammunition employed during this period. The standard “one ounce ball” of ammunition could be supplemented with three buckshot. This configuration was called “buck and ball.” During the Tippecanoe battle, the soldiers used a load of twelve buckshot rather than the standard ball.25
Indian Confederacy

Indian warriors relied on their traditional weapons as well as firearms. Their traditional weapons included scalping knives, traditional tomahawks, war clubs, and bows and arrows. Trade with Europeans and Americans significantly improved the quality of Indian weapons, and tomahawks with stone blades were being replaced by ones with steel or iron. Trade also ensured that rifles and muskets were available to the Indians. British government agents from Canada often supplied the Indians with firearms, lead, and powder.

The war club used by the Indians was a heavy weapon, about two feet in length, and made of ironwood or maple, with a large ball or knot at the end. Indian bows were usually of one-piece construction and made from ash, hickory, or oak. The traditional tomahawk was replaced with one of European or American manufacture. These improved hatchets, called trade tomahawks, were often a combination tomahawk and pipe.26

Indian flintlock muskets, acquired through trade with Europeans, were called trade fusils or trade guns. The Hudson Bay Company and Northwest Company produced large numbers of these weapons. These Northwest guns, as later model trade fusils are often called, probably derive their name from the association with the Northwest Company in lower Canada or because of their widespread employment on the American frontier. During the 1790s, Great Britain began to issue firearms of the trade fusil pattern to North American Indians. The weapons, known as presentation fusils because they were gifts to the Indians, served as a method to maintain Indian loyalty. The presentation fusils were generally .60 caliber with thirty-six-inch barrels and were produced under crown contract until around 1815. The presentation fusil is probably one of the more common firearms used by the Indians during the Battle of Tippecanoe.27

A warrior’s personal equipment might consist of a blanket and extra moccasins or the materials to repair or make new moccasins. Warriors also carried cord to bind prisoners, personal weapons, a powder horn, and bullet bag. In addition, the individual warrior often carried a pouch containing medicine to treat wounds. Rations were usually carried in a bearskin bag. Parched corn mixed with maple sugar was one of the more common individual rations. Most Indians commonly carried a device of spiritual significance for them: a sacred war bundle containing charms that represented ones ancestry, symbolized past victories, and had magical powers to protect the owner.28
Training Doctrine

U.S. Forces

Doctrine during the nineteenth century consisted of a few regulations about drill and formations and how to establish encampments and post guards. In 1811, the U.S. Army still used the same drill and field service regulation developed by Baron Von Steuben during the Revolutionary War. Much of what a commander did in the field depended on his personal experience. Harrison's concept of military doctrine evolved from personal study and what he had learned from General Anthony Wayne. The latter consisted of two important lessons concerning the importance of training and the maintaining of security while in the field.

On their part, the regulations developed by Baron Von Steuben focused on procedures for drilling individuals and formations. Although the major emphasis of the regulations was drill, they also addressed tactical movements through defiles and prescribed procedures for establishing an encampment and posting guards. During the initial stages of his army's organization, Harrison made efforts to train the force properly by conducting several combat training exercises. Tipton's Journal, for example, makes several references to training events or "sham battles." The army's headquarters also published orders that directed training exercises prior to the army's departure from Fort Harrison.

Harrison significantly modified many of the procedures in Von Steuben's regulations to fit the Indian threat. For example, the governor modified standards for camp organization, reveille, and guard duty during the campaign. According to the regulation, commanders positioned units in an encampment in a square or rectangular manner with specified areas for officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and the logistical wagons. Guards patrolled the outside of the camp on avenues of approach and on the interior of the camp near the wagons and mess areas. At reveille, troops paraded without weapons for roll call. The following figure (see figure 1) shows an example of a camp layout in accordance with the regulations of the era.

Harrison modified all of these procedures and had units sleep in the immediate vicinity of their battle positions with their weapons and equipment worn. Guards formed a tight ring around the camp, and Harrison directed that the command be alert and at their posts before reveille. Although Von Steuben does not discuss the use of breastworks, it seems
that this was an accepted practice if the threat dictated it, and, in any case, it was a procedure that Harrison knew.32

There was another uniquely American aspect of training that Harrison probably emphasized—marksmanship. Europeans emphasized volume of fire during infantry combat and trained accordingly. In fact, some armies did not bother to teach their soldiers to aim their muskets. America’s emphasized marksmanship training to reinforce the American practice of firing aimed shots in battle.33 The effect of this American practice was often devastating. Shabonee saw the effects of American marksmanship while on a scouting mission for the Prophet and commented: “I saw some of the men shoot squirrels, as they rode along, and I said, the Indians have no such guns. These men will kill us as far as they can see.”34 A British officer that fought against U.S. troops during the War of 1812 remarked, “... the English soldier, in particular, has but little chance with American riflemen, who conscious of his advantage, and taking a deliberate aim, seldom fails to attain his object...”35
Indian Confederacy

The Indian confederacy does not appear to have had a systematic training program, although it does seem that Prophet’s Town was a type of training center for the Indian confederacy. The types of daily life and training events that occurred in the village were probably not significantly different from events experienced during routine village life. Woodland Indian forces did not fight in the same disciplined and organized style that an American or European professional force used. Consequently, to train in the regimented style associated with professional armies held little utility for the Indians.

Prophet’s Town was a large village and was probably organized in the traditional style of the Woodland Indians. Large villages of the period often had streets and a number of living areas called wigwams. The wigwams were bark-covered structures with hides hung over the entrances as doors. Although the village had a variable population over the years, it was probably large enough to house about 1,000 warriors and 300 family members.

The training regime at Prophet’s Town was martial and religious in nature. The Prophet was the spiritual leader of the confederacy (while it was under the political-military guidance of Tecumseh). The Prophet provided the Indians spiritual direction through his lectures, prophecies, and prayers. He oriented his discussions on values that included a return to the traditional Indian lifestyle and separation of white and Indian cultures. The martial aspect of the training focused on hunting, manufacturing equipment needed for battle, and athletic contests. The athletics ran the gamut of activities from running and wrestling contests to sports that required the use of weapon skills such as the bow and arrow and war clubs.

Tactical Doctrine

U.S. Forces

Several different types of maneuver forces were employed during the campaign. Harrison’s army consisted of units designated as infantry, riflemen, mounted riflemen, and dragoons. Although there was not a great deal of written doctrine about how to employ each type of unit, general principles were practiced.

The employment of mounted elements was an area significantly lacking in American military doctrinal development. The American army had not
developed a complex set of tactical doctrine and drills for cavalry as European armies had. Rather, during the Revolutionary War, horses were mainly used as mounts for officers and messengers. Mounted units were usually assembled for emergencies and then disbanded. Although the American tactical experience with mounted troops was limited, some cavalry units were used during the Revolutionary War, and General Wayne's Legion included a troop of dragoons in every sublegion and a complement of mounted volunteers.  

The general principles of the age divided mounted troops into units of dragoons and cavalry. Dragoons were soldiers trained to fight either mounted or on foot and usually carried pistols, light swords, and carbines. Cavalry, on the other hand, were trained to fight exclusively on horseback, and their equipment consisted of heavy sabers and pistols. Mounted troops were employed to scout, protect flanks, and pursue or flank an enemy. The shock effect of a cavalry charge was also designed to break up an enemy formation. The American distinction between cavalry and dragoons was hazy at best. To confuse doctrinal matters more, the American militia on the frontier added another mounted arm, the mounted riflemen, who used his mount for transportation and dismounted to engage the enemy with rifle fire.

American Infantry formations were similar to European formations and imitated European tactical doctrine to a large degree. Linear formations that deployed into ranks were commonplace. Units moved to the battle area in open platoon columns and then deployed into line. Infantry formations relied on the line because it was the battle formation that brought the most weapons to bear on the enemy and produced the greatest volume of fire. Unlike their European counterparts who used three ranks, American infantry used two ranks, allowing it to cover more ground. To increase the lethality and effectiveness of their formations, the Americans also relied on aimed rifle and musket fires.

Artillery was another important arm that complemented infantry and cavalry formations, but it played no role at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Some of the literature indicates that Harrison took a few small cannon as part of his expeditionary force; however, there are no references regarding its actual employment during the battle. It is unlikely that cannon fires were employed during most of the battle because of the potential for fratricide, since any cannon would probably have been positioned on the inside of the perimeter and would have had to fire over the heads of the soldiers on the line of battle, a difficult task for a direct-fire weapon system.
eighteenth-century artillery was a direct-fire weapon unlike today’s artillery, which is an indirect-fire weapon).

An important combat multiplier for Harrison’s army was the intelligence function. Nineteenth-century armies did not have doctrinal methods to conduct intelligence operations. The scope and success of any intelligence operation was almost completely left to the proficiency of the commander in gathering and interpreting data. Harrison developed an intelligence network that included government agents, traders, whites that had lived among the Indians, and Indian informants. Part of the reason that Harrison’s intelligence-gathering operations were successful was because he relied on people who were familiar with Indian culture and customs. In this way, he was able to interpret properly indicators of hostility, such as the exchange of war wampum belts or war dancing at councils. Harrison also developed sources that could help him confirm information. After Tecumseh told Harrison that he was going south to recruit additional members for the confederacy, Harrison immediately dispatched spies to find out when Tecumseh actually departed.

Harrison also maintained a small tactical intelligence-gathering capability with the Spies and Guides, a detachment that conducted reconnaissance for the main body during the march. The various detached mounted elements, such as Spencer’s Yellow Jackets, were also used by Harrison to increase his reconnaissance and security capability. The Yellow Jackets conducted such tasks as finding fords or screening to the flanks or in front of the main body.

A unique force protection measure of the era was to take hostages. To ensure that each side honored truces, hostages could be exchanged between the hostile factions. Eustis addressed the idea of taking hostages in his 18 September 1811 letter to Harrison. Harrison’s officers also encouraged him to take hostages before the battle. Harrison apparently did not feel that the measure was needed and declined to take Indian hostages. In any case, there were no guarantees that the measure would prove successful or that Harrison could ensure the safety of the hostages and protect them from members of his own command.

**Indian Confederacy**

Indian warfare was decentralized, although Indians did wage war to achieve operational or strategic goals. Indians might go to war for several reasons, such as honor and prestige, dreams, or revenge, which is why a brave might form his own war party. The Indian confederacies of the
post-Revolutionary war period were not the first to try to achieve operational or strategic objectives. The Iroquois Indians provide an example of an intertribal war at the operational level. Near the end of the seventeenth century, Iroquois war parties attacked south into Virginia, east to the Atlantic coast, north to the St. Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers, and almost as far west as the Mississippi River. The Iroquois began the war because they wanted to eliminate their competitors in the fur trade with the Europeans, clearly an operational goal.43

Indian war parties usually employed ambushes or raids as their primary offensive tactics. Woodland Indian operations were normally dismounted, and some war parties traveled twenty-five miles a day. Indians usually organized into three groups while on the march: scouts, a main body, and hunters to sustain the force. War parties usually moved during the day, until they were within two or three days of the enemy; once they were within a few days of the enemy they moved at night. War parties made their final preparations for an attack close to the objective area. These final preparations included a rudimentary sand-table style rehearsal, the singing of medicine songs, and the building of litters to assist in the recovery of wounded personnel. Individuals within the war party were also designated to carry extra supplies of medicine, corn, and water. Another brave was usually designated to beat a drum to inspire the war party as it conducted the assault.44 The last collective action was to move into ambush, battle, or attack positions.

The war party attacked on signal. After the initial contact, the preliminary battle plan was often discarded, and the skirmish became a series of personal fights. Examples of individual courage were valued in Indian society, so warriors normally fought as individuals rather than as part of a team that conducted coordinated movements to achieve an overall objective. After an attack, some war parties might remain on the battlefield for a cannibalistic feast (this, however, was not a common practice among most Woodland Indian cultures). Normally, a war party looted as quickly as possible and began moving back to their home territory. Taking prisoners as well as scalps was a prestigious event, and prisoners were often tortured to death once the war party returned home. Although there was a great deal of distinction associated with capturing enemy personnel, war parties did not hesitate to kill prisoners that impeded their march back to safe territory.45

The triumph of an Indian attack over an adversary relied on individual effort rather than on collective discipline. The difference between victory
and defeat for a war party might also rely on how quickly it exfiltrated from enemy territory and returned to a relatively safe region. These factors made it extremely difficult for Indian armies to conduct complex operations such as pursuits. Indians did not have the command and control capability for that type of operation, since collective discipline was lost as soon as an attack began, and actions immediately following an attack often focused on looting, cultural rituals, or exfiltration. Successful Indian attacks usually culminated in the immediate area of the objective.

The Indian forces at Tippecanoe organized into three basic attacking elements. Three war chiefs led the attack, while the Prophet observed the battle from a hillside about 500 yards from the encampment. Estimates on the size of the Indian force at Tippecanoe range from 300 to 900 Indians. Groups from several tribes participated in the attack, and bands of Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Wyandot, Kickapoo, Winnebago, and Sacs are reported to have been present. Individuals whose tribes were not part of the confederacy also fought at Tippecanoe. Two of the assault leaders, White Loon and Stone Eater, were members of the Miami tribe, which was not part of the confederacy.46

The Indian confederacy also conducted extensive intelligence operations. Most of the Indian intelligence-gathering relating to the Tippecanoe campaign seemed to be tactical in nature. The confederacy began collecting intelligence as the army assembled at Vincennes. Meanwhile, the Indians met Harrison at Vincennes, ostensibly to reassure him that the Prophet was not a threat. The real purpose for their trips to Vincennes, however, was to gather intelligence on the army. The Prophet continued to employ scouts to conduct reconnaissance while the army was at Fort Harrison. Overall, the Prophet’s intelligence operations were not successful during the campaign. The confederacy lost contact with the army after it crossed the Wabash River, and the loss of contact contributed to the Prophet’s failure to delay Harrison’s approach through negotiation.
NOTES

1. From Harrison’s report on the campaign to Secretary of War Eustis on 18 November 1811, in Draper MSS. 1X41.

2. In addition to the 4th U.S., 7th U.S., and Rifle Regiment, the 2d U.S. was represented at the battle. Captain Piatt was assigned to the 2d U.S. and served as Harrison’s quartermaster.

3. Weigley, 97-105.


5. Urwin, 30; and U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sect. 8.

6. Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, from Its Organization, September 29, 1789 to March 2, 1903, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1903), 570-71; Matloff, 115; and Weigley, 109, 115-16. The 1808 act authorized seven infantry regiments, one rifle regiment, one light dragoon regiment, one light artillery regiment, one artillery regiment, and an engineer corps. Total authorized strength was 9,921 officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers.


8. Mahon, Decade, 1-2; and Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 18, 67 (hereafter referred to as History). During the War of 1812, the governors of Connecticut
and Massachusetts initially refused to release their militias for federal service. In 1813, both states relented but would only allow their militias to be used to guard their own state coasts. Shortly before the War of 1812, Congress authorized the formation of several volunteer units. Volunteer units could be used generally without restriction regarding geographic location. This was important since part of the theater of war included a foreign country (Canada).

9. Mahon, *History*, 58, 66; and Riker, 21-22. A member of a militia unit that damaged his rifle would have to pay about $13.00 for a new one, a large sum at the time.

10. Carter, 126, 130-31, and Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 547-48. The letters are dated 11 July 1811, 21 August 1811, and 22 August 1811. The letters authorized Harrison to move into the new purchase with a respectable force that would consist of regulars and militia. When Eustis wrote the letters, he believed that problems with the Indians at Prophet’s Town could be solved without violence. The pattern of letters between the secretary of war, Harrison, and the president prior to August 1811 indicate a desire to resolve the situation peacefully. In March 1811, Eustis told Harrison to defer his plans for establishing a post in the new purchase because the president wanted to avoid any “uneasiness” with the area tribes (Carter, 113-14). In May 1811, the government issued a proclamation of public sale for the lands gained by the Treaty of Fort Wayne (Carter, 119). This indicates that the government meant to settle the area, which would probably not help to resolve the issue peacefully. Finally, in September 1811, Eustis authorized Harrison to compel the Prophet to disperse, by force if necessary. The letter also authorizes Harrison to establish a post in the new purchase (Carter, 133-34). Regarding the issues of calling out and paying militia and volunteers, governors had the authority to call out militia and raise volunteer units during an emergency, but Congress was the agency that authorized the payment of these units. A local merchant, Charles Smith, who was also a lieutenant in the militia, covered the government’s earlier debt for the militia soldiers who were called up the previous year. Soldiers that served during the Tippecanoe campaign were eventually paid after the campaign. Pay receipts for some of the militiamen that served at Tippecanoe can be found in the *Compiled Service Records of Volunteer Soldiers Who Served From 1784-1811* (Microfilm, copy number M905, roll numbers 22 and 32). A private was paid $6.66 per month, a sergeant, $8.00 per month. The foragemaster, Lieutenant Bunting, was paid $25.00 per month for his duties.
Lieutenant Berry (killed in action, 7 November 1811) earned $33.33 per month. Soldiers were able to petition the government for pensions because of injury or for compensation for equipment and horses that were damaged by battle or killed as a result of hostile action. Dependents could also petition the government for pensions due to the death of a service member during the campaign.

11. Eckert, Gateway, 227-29; Johnson, Woodland Indians, 35; and Maxwell, 130-31. Geometric shapes or stick figures were incorporated into the design of the wampum belts, and each had special significance. A row of white diamond shapes connected together might represent a chain of friendship, a black bird in the design might represent bad news, and a raised hatchet might represent war.


13. Eckert, Gateway, 187-89, 226, 229; Maxwell, 129; and Scheele, 29-30. Lighting the council fire signified that the council was in session. No duration was set for council meetings, and councils could last days or weeks. Americans often adopted this practice of councils when treating with Indians. After the Battle of Fallen Timbers, General Wayne invited the Indian leaders to a council at Greenville. The council fire for the Treaty of Greenville negotiations was lit on 15 June 1795. Some 1,100 Indians representing twelve tribes were present at the negotiations. The negotiations lasted more than six weeks, and the council officially closed on 10 August 1795. Wayne also issued peace wampum belts to each group of Indians as they arrived at Greenville.


15. Campbell and Howell, 11-12; Esarey, Messages, vol. 1, 658; and Philip Katcher, U.S. Infantry Equipments 1775-1910 (Great Britain: Osprey, 1989), Plate B, 46. Pants or pantaloons were part of the authorized uniform during the Battle of Tippecanoe. On 6 December 1811, the 4th U.S. issued an order that forbade soldiers from cutting off their pantaloons, which indicates that at least some of the soldiers were issued pantaloons.

17. Bacon, 26-27.

18. As cited in Green, 120.


22. Klinck, 199.

23. Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 484, 585. A 10 November 1810 letter from Harrison to Eustis indicates that pistols and horsemen’s swords were ordered for the mounted militia. The equipment was to be deposited at Newport, Kentucky. Any deficiencies in arms and equipment were to be made up from these public stores. Soldiers armed with muskets were to be issued twenty-four rounds of ammunition, and riflemen were to receive one-half pound of powder and one pound of lead.


25. Draper MSS. 1X44; Urwin, 25; and Walker, 24.


27. Brown, 366-68.

29. Friederick Wilhelm Steuben, "Publisher's Note" no pagination; and Urwin, 25. Steuben's manual was the official army regulation from 1779-1812.

30. Cleaves, 88, 93; and Cockrum, 254. Tipton notes sham battles on 8, 26, and 27 October 1811. Cleaves discusses a training exercise conducted on 22 October 1811. Cockrum has copies of the orders published by Harrison's headquarters directing training on 23 October 1811. Cleaves notes that at the end of October 1811, Harrison wrote to the secretary of war that "I have used every exertion in my power to perfect them in the maneuvers which they are to perform."

31. Steuben, 75-79, 86, 91-94; and Walker, 21, 34-35. The procedure used throughout the campaign to form a line of battle was for the soldiers to step five paces in front of their tents. Harrison also directed that the units form in single ranks. These procedures allowed units to form quickly with minimum confusion. As lessons were learned during the campaign, procedures were modified. After the Indian attack, fires were still used, but they were built outside of the line of sentinels. Any fires in camp were extinguished when the soldiers went to sleep. This put an attacking enemy between the line of battle and the fires. The sentry procedures were also modified after the battle. The sentries put a stake in the ground at a man's height and then draped a blanket and hat on the stake. The sentry then moved to cover behind a log or tree to watch his post. Prior to the battle the sentries walked their posts.

32. Esarey, Messages, vol. 1, 604-5; Pirtle, 52; and Steuben, 75-79, 86, 91-94. Harrison's written order published 27 September 1811 established the SOP for camp guards and the order of march.

33. Gifford, 319-20; and Urwin, 26, 34. General Wayne was noted for his emphasis on marksmanship training while organizing and training the American Legion.

34. Whickar, 355.

35. Klinck, 199-200.


37. Drake, 105; McCollough, 25; and Scheele, 51.
38. Swafford Johnson, *History of the U. S. Cavalry* (Greenwich, CT: Crescent Books, 1985), 12-14, 22, 26, 32; and Matloff, 112-13. There were four sublegions in the Legion. The first cavalry manual for the U.S. Army was written by Phil Kearny in the 1830s.

39. Elting, 50; and Swafford Johnson, 12-14, 22.


42. Cleaves, 96.

43. Scheele, 17-20.

44. Johnson, *Woodland Indians*, 20, 24; and Scheele, 17, 34, 53.

45. Scheele, 36, 39-41.

46. See Cockrum, 269, for a list of the tribes in the attack. Eckert, *Gateway*, 438; Edmunds, *Quest*, 159; and Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 604-5, 628. Accurate figures for the Indian confederacy’s strength during the attack have never been determined. Eckert believes that there were just over 300 Indians in the attack, while Edmunds reports Indian strength as between 600 and 700. Harrison was not sure of the numbers of Indians in the attack and received varying reports on Indian strength throughout the campaign. Harrison’s 8 November 1811 report remarks that Indian strength must have been considerable. On 18 November 1811, Harrison wrote that “I am possessed of no data by which I can form a correct statement. It must have been considerable and perhaps not much inferior to our own.” See Draper MSS. 1X40, 1X44. A few weeks before the attack, Harrison was fairly certain that the Prophet had at least 350 of his own warriors and revised this to 450 later on. As the army moved toward Prophet’s Town, it encountered several large trails leading from the Illinois River area toward Prophet’s Town; Harrison began to believe that the Prophet was joined by a substantial number of additional Indians and revised his estimate to about 600 Indians.
William Henry Harrison published his order assuming command of the expeditionary force on 16 September 1811. Harrison also published a series of orders that described the organization of the army. The infantry formed one brigade, commanded by Colonel Boyd. Regular Army infantry units were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Miller (4th U.S.) and Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew commanded the militia infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Miller became ill and remained at Fort Harrison, and Major Floyd assumed his duties. Captain Baen was appointed as acting major.2 A figure below (see figure 2) shows the infantry task organization.

The same series of orders (and subsequent guidance when additional mounted units arrived) established the organizational structure for the various mounted units. Joseph Daviess from Kentucky was commissioned as a major in the Indiana militia and placed in command of the Dragoons. General Samuel Wells of the Kentucky militia was also commissioned as a major in the Indiana militia and placed in command of a mounted battalion. Spencer’s Yellow Jackets were designated as a detached corps that would report to General Harrison and his staff.3 A figure below (see figure three) shows the task organization for mounted units.

In addition to his duties as the infantry brigade commander, Colonel Boyd served as Harrison’s second in command with the rank of “acting brigadier general.” To fulfill his duties, the order of battle shows that Boyd had two staffs supporting him in his dual role. Boyd was Harrison’s second in command and commander of troops (Harrison was the commander in chief and the expedition commander), and as such, Harrison authorized Boyd an aide-de-camp and an adjutant. As the infantry brigade commander, Boyd had his normal staff from the 4th U.S. available. Boyd was not the only soldier with multiple duties, however; some members of his 4th U.S. staff also filled dual roles and worked on Harrison’s staff as well as Boyd’s.
Figure 2. Infantry task organization, 6-7 November 1811. Lieutenant Colonel Miller is not reflected as part of this organizational chart because he remained behind at Fort Harrison. Major Floyd assumed Miller's field duties and responsibilities after the army departed from Fort Harrison.

Figure 3. Mounted elements task organization, 6-7 November 1811.
U.S. Order of Battle

Harrison's companies varied in size during the campaign. The 4th U.S. deployed to the Indiana Territory under strength because of troop illness and desertions. The elements from the 7th U.S. and the Rifle Regiment were both small detachments rather than full strength companies. The size of militia and volunteer companies, moreover, varied from region to region, the unit size depending upon the number of eligible men and the recruiting ability of the man organizing the unit. Officers were commissioned into the state militia by the governor. Volunteer organizations elected their officers.

The following list is the U.S. order of battle for the Tippecanoe campaign, 16 September 1811 to 18 November 1811. Unit strengths, when known, are listed next to the unit as (officer/NCO/privates). Any soldier that was promoted during the campaign is only counted once and counted in the strength of his original grade. For example, John Tipton was promoted from private to ensign on 21 October 1811 and to captain on 7 November 1811. Rather than count Tipton several times, he is counted once as a private for strength purposes. Soldiers with special duties, such as musicians, saddlers, and trumpeters, are counted in the NCO end strength. A table (see table 4) showing U.S. casualties in the Tippecanoe campaign follows this order of battle.

Commander
Governor William Henry Harrison, commander in chief

General Staff
Lieutenant Colonel William McFarland, adjutant general
Colonel Abraham Owen, aide-de-camp (killed in action [KIA], 7 Nov 1811)
Major Henry Hurst, aide-de-camp
Major Waller Taylor, aide-de-camp
Major Marston G. Clark, aide-de-camp
Thomas Randolph (civilian), acting aide-de-camp (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)
Captain Piatt, chief quartermaster
Captain Robert Buntin, quartermaster of the militia
Dr. Josiah Foster, chief surgeon
Dr. Hosea Blood, surgeon’s mate
Second Lieutenant Robert Bunting Jr., Indiana militia forage master

_The Troops_
Colonel Boyd, brigade commander (with the rank of brigadier general)
George Croghan, aide-de-camp
Lieutenant Nathan Adams, adjutant

_Field and Staff of Indiana Militia_
Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew (wounded in action [WIA], 7 Nov 1811)
Major Regin Redman, aide-de-camp
Sergeant Major Chapman Dunslow

_Field and Staff of Indiana Infantry Militia_
Lieutenant Colonel Luke Decker (WIA, 7 Nov 1811)
Sergeant Major William Ready

_Field and Staff of Dragoons of Indiana Militia_
Major Joseph H. Daviess (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)
Major Benjamin Parke (promoted, 7 Nov 1811)
Sergeant Major William Prince

_Captain Spier Spencer’s Company of Mounted Riflemen of the Indiana Militia (4/10/46)_
Captain Spier Spencer (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)
Captain John Tipton (promoted, 7 Nov 1811)
Spies and Guides of the Indiana Militia (1/0/18)
  Captain Toussant Dubois

Company of Indiana Militia (4/7/48)
  Captain Jacob Warrick (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)
  Lieutenant Thomas Montgomery (commander from 7 to 9 Nov 1811)
  Captain James Smith (assumed command on 9 Nov 1811)

Company of Mounted Riflemen of the Indiana Militia (3/5/69)
  Captain David Robb

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/11/57)
  Captain John Norris (WIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/6/59)
  Captain William Hargrove

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (8/4/66)
  Captain Thomas Scott

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/8/37)
  Captain Walter Wilson

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/8/6)
  Captain Andrew Wilkins

Company of Riflemen of Indiana Militia (3/10/56)
  Captain John Bigger
Detachment of Mounted Riflemen of Indiana Militia (1/1/20)
Lieutenant Thomas Berry (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Company of Light Dragoons of Indiana Militia (4/9/70)
Captain Benjamin Parke (promoted to major, 7 Nov 1811)

Company of Light Dragoons of Indiana Militia (5/9/20)
Captain Charles Beggs

Field and Staff of a Battalion of Kentucky Light Dragoons
Major Samuel Wells

Company of Kentucky Mounted Militia (3/7/18)
Captain Peter Funk

Company of Mounted Riflemen of Kentucky Militia (3/9/50)
Captain Frederick Geiger (WIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Field and Staff of the 4th U.S. Infantry
Colonel John Boyd
Lieutenant Colonel James Miller
Lieutenant Colonel Zebulon Pike
Major G. R. C. Floyd
Sergeant Major Winthrop Ayre

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (3/9/50)
Captain Josiah Snelling
Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (3/9/50)
George W. Prescott

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (3/7/38)
Captain William C. Baen (acting major, DOW, 9 Nov 1811)
First Lieutenant Charles Larrabee (commander, 7 Nov 1811)

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (2/9/42)
Captain Joel Cook

Captain Return B. Brown

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (2/5/21)
Captain Robert C. Barton

First Lieutenant Charles Fuller

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (2/8/21)
First Lieutenant O. G. Burton

Infantry Company, 7th U.S. (25 total)
Lieutenant Albright

Company of Riflemen, The Rifle Regiment (2/8/28)
Lieutenant Abraham Hawkins
Table 4. U.S. casualties, Tippecanoe battle. The report was copied from war department records. The report only shows one aide killed in action. Randolph was a civilian aide and may not be reflected in military records. This table does not include the four soldiers that died prior to 7 November 1811. Source: Draper MSS. 1X4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DOW</th>
<th>WIA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDE-DE-CAMP</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIEUTENANT COLONELS</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJORS</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADJUTANT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURGEON'S MAJE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPTAINS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBALTERNS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERGEANTS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORPORALS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSICIANS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIVATES</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. U.S. casualties, Tippecanoe battle. The report was copied from war department records. The report only shows one aide killed in action. Randolph was a civilian aide and may not be reflected in military records. This table does not include the four soldiers that died prior to 7 November 1811. Source: Draper MSS. 1X4.
NOTES


3. Beard, 47-49; and Draper MSS. 1X41-44.

4. Beard, 102-33; Cockrum, 279-308; Draper MSS. 1X43; Esarey, Messages, vol. 1, 569-70, 632; Heitman, 391; Pirtle, 35; Reid, 16-30; and Walker, 84-85. The dates of the campaign are based on two orders issued by Harrison’s headquarters. In the first order, a “Military Order” dated 16 September 1811, Harrison assumes command of the military expedition. A brigade order, dated 18 November 1811, dissolves the brigade. If an officer was KIA or WIA, and his replacement is known, the replacement is listed along with other relevant data. This order of battle lists key personnel. More complete rosters are available in Beard, Cockrum, and Pirtle; however, even these rosters are not complete since unit strengths for the 7th U.S. are missing and all of Harrison’s personal staff are not reflected. At least two black men accompanied the army, one of whom was Harrison’s personal servant (probably a slave). Several sources, including Harrison’s correspondence and reports, refer to the two men. One of the main reasons to maintain an army roster was to record an individual’s campaign participation for pay purposes; since slaves and other types of servants were not eligible for militia service, and hence were not compensated financially, there was no reason to include them on these types of documents.

5. This company was called Spencer’s Yellow Jackets. The Yellow Jackets were under the direct control of Harrison’s headquarters for reporting purposes and taskings.

6. This company reported directly to General Harrison.

7. Esarey, Messages, vol. 1, 646. A regimental order dated 23 November 1811 assigned Lieutenants Burton (Welch’s company), Fuller (Wentworth’s company), and Larrabee (Baen’s company) to permanent command of their respective companies. The same regimental order promoted several enlisted
soldiers, most of whom were recognized for their good conduct in action at Tippecanoe.


9. Trevor Dupuy, et. al., *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography* (New York: Castle Books, 1995), 598; Gilpin, 22 (Note 16); Zebulon Pike, *Zebulon Pike's Arkansaw Journal: In Search of the Southern Louisiana Purchase Boundary Line*, eds. Stephen Hart and Archer Butler (Colorado Springs, CO: Stewart Commission of Colorado and the Denver Public Library, 1932), xivi; and John Terrell, *Zebulon Pike: The Life and Times of an Adventurer* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968), 46-149. Zebulon Pike was probably not at the Battle of Tippecanoe since he was carried on paper as a lieutenant colonel in the 4th U.S. but served in another organization. This is the same Pike who led the expedition credited with the discovery of Pike's Peak (the mountain is named in his honor). During the War of 1812, then Brigadier General Pike led the American attack on York, Upper Canada (Toronto). Pike was wounded in a powder magazine explosion after the initial assault on York and died of his wounds on 27 April 1813 shortly after being informed that the British forces had surrendered.

10. Beard, 119; and Cockrum, 267. This company, formerly commanded by Captain Paul Wentworth, is often referred to as “Wentworth’s company.” Wentworth resigned from the service on 29 October 1811. It is not clear who actually commanded this company during the battle. Harrison, in his report to the secretary of war, mentions eight of the ten Regular Army company commanders by name—Burton and Fuller are the two omissions. One officer who is not listed as a company commander in the official roll of the army is mentioned as a company commander in Harrison’s report. This officer is Lieutenant Peters. Harrison, in his report, said that “the companies commanded by . . . Lieutenants Larrabee, Peters . . .” Second Lieutenant Peters is reflected on the roll of the army as serving in the company commanded by Lieutenant Fuller.
Although Peters was apparently fourth in the company chain of command, it appears that he commanded the company during the battle. The only Regular Army company that is not listed in the roll of the army is the small company from the 7th U.S.; however, Harrison also mentions the commander of this company (Albright) by name in his report. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Lieutenant Peters that Harrison refers to came from Albright’s company. Additionally, several maps from secondary sources show a company commanded by a Lieutenant Peters in the rear line. Therefore, through a process of elimination, it is likely that the company commanded by Peters on 7 November 1811 was Fuller’s company. Map 3 and 6 show a company commanded by Peters in the rear line, even though the roll of the army shows Fuller as a company commander, and a subsequent order, dated 23 November 1811, gave Fuller permanent company command.

11. Beard, 120. This company was formerly commanded by Captain Welch and is sometimes referred to as “Welch’s company.”

12. Esarey, ed., Messages, vol. 1, 646. In May 1810, Secretary Eustis informed Governor Harrison that Captain Posey and a company (7th U.S.) would move from the detachment at Newport, Kentucky, to Vincennes and report to Harrison for further instructions. The company was actually about twenty-five soldiers that were attached to the 4th U.S. Albright commanded the company during the battle of Tippecanoe. Harrison refers to the company as “Posey’s company of the 7th Regt. headed by Lieut. Albright.” See Draper MSS. 1X43, and Carter, 20.

13. Beard, 119, 121; Esarey, Messages, vol. 1, 646; and Walker, 5. There were about sixteen soldiers from this company at the battle. The difference between Esarey’s figures and those on the army roll might be because of illness or the performance of details or duties elsewhere (the blockhouse, Fort Harrison, etc.). This is the company formerly commanded by Captain Whitney. There is also another Lieutenant Abraham Hawkins in the 4th U.S.; Second Lieutenant Abraham Hawkins was assigned to Captain Burton’s company.
APPENDIX C

Chronology

. . . we took a north Cours[e] up the East side of the Wabash and Crosst [sic] to the west with orders to kill all the Indians we saw. fine news.'

—John Tipton, 31 October 1811, diary entry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1754</td>
<td>French and Indian War begins (called the Seven Years' War in Europe).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>French and Indian War ends. England gains Canada and French possessions east of the Mississippi River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>Proclamation of 1763. Great Britain issues a proclamation that restricts the authority of colonial governments to administer territory and establish settlements west of the Allegheny Mountains. The interior region west of the Allegheny Mountains is set aside for Indian use and administered by the royal government in England. The purpose of the proclamation is to separate Indian and colonial settlements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775</td>
<td>American Revolution begins. Almost all Indian tribes in the American northwest are allied with Great Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1776</td>
<td>Declaration of Independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1779</td>
<td>Americans seize Vincennes from the British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>Articles of Confederation adopted by the United States. Cornwallis surrenders to Washington at Yorktown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1783</td>
<td>Treaty of Paris ends the American Revolution. The United States gains possession of all British territory east of the Mississippi and south of Canada. The new American territory includes the Indian Territory protected by the Proclamation of 1763.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1787</td>
<td>Constitution adopted by the United States. Northwest Ordinance adopted. The ordinance established the Northwest Territory (present-day Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota) The ordinance stated the conditions for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
statehood and directed that the area would be divided into no less than three and no more than five states.

1789 The U.S. Constitution becomes effective. George Washington becomes first president of the United States. Washington establishes a policy of settling the area that would become the Northwest Territory by giving land grants to ex-soldiers or offering the land for sale at extremely inexpensive prices.

1790 Harmar’s expedition. Indian forces led by Chiefs Little Turtle and Blue Jacket defeat American forces led by General Josiah Harmar.

1791 St. Clair’s defeat. Indian forces led by Chiefs Little Turtle and Blue Jacket defeat American forces led by General Arthur St. Clair. The defeat is the worst defeat of American arms during the Indian Wars. Only twenty-four Americans are not wounded or killed; over nine hundred Americans are engaged.

1792 Kentucky becomes a state.

1793 War between Britain and France begins; the United States declares neutrality.

1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers. American forces led by General Anthony “Mad Anthony” Wayne defeat Indian forces led by Chief Blue Jacket.

1795 Treaty of Greenville, a result of the American victory at Fallen Timbers. The United States cedes much of the Northwest Territory to the Indians. The United States retains the right, however, to establish several administrative areas (and routes between them) in Indian Territory. The treaty also stipulates that the Indians in the territory are under the protection of the United States. The Indians have the right to sell the land ceded to them by the United States, but they can only sell it to the United States.

1795 The Jay treaty between the United States and Great Britain is signed. The treaty requires Great Britain to turn over its military posts in the United States no later than 1796.

1796 John Adams elected president. Great Britain turns over British forts on U.S. territory to the United States. As a consequence of the turnover, the United States gains unrestricted access to the American side of the Great Lakes.
1800 Spain cedes Louisiana to France. The Indiana territory is established (present-day Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota). William Henry Harrison is appointed the first governor.

1801 Thomas Jefferson becomes president.

1803 Ohio becomes a state. The United States buys the Louisiana territory from France. The Louisiana Purchase greatly expands the territory of the United States. Jefferson declares his unofficial policy to Harrison: extinguish Indian title to territory by forcing the Indians into a state of indebtedness to the United States or by forcing them across the Mississippi River.

1807 Embargo act closes U.S. ports to trade. Britain and France generate maritime policies during the Napoleonic Wars that had a negative impact on U.S. trade. Britain also has a policy of impressing sailors. The Embargo act was a response to these British and French actions. The act restricted any international trade in United States ports.

1808 James Madison is elected president. Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa (the Prophet) establish Prophet's Town near the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers, Indiana Territory.

1809 Illinois Territory is established. The area of present-day Michigan becomes a separate territory. Harrison concludes the Treaty of Fort Wayne. The Embargo act is repealed.

1810 A company from the 7th U.S. is ordered to Vincennes. Harrison is informed that Congress has ratified several treaties made with the Indians. Congress passes an act approving sale of the land gained in the Treaty of Fort Wayne. Tecumseh and Harrison have their first meeting, which is held at Vincennes.

1811

May Proclamation of sale is issued for public lands gained as a result of the Treaty of Fort Wayne.

Jul The 4th U.S. in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is attached to Governor Harrison. The regiment arrives in Vincennes in September 1811.

Jul Harrison and Tecumseh conduct their second meeting at Vincennes. After the conference, Tecumseh departs on a trip
through the American south to recruit more Indian tribes into his confederacy.

Aug The secretary of war informs Harrison that Congress has not appropriated funds to pay the militia. The secretary advises Harrison that he expects the appropriations and to organize the militia needed for a campaign against the Prophet.

Sep The 4th U.S. and a company of the Rifle Regiment arrive at Vincennes. Harrison organizes and trains forces for the upcoming campaign at Vincennes and Fort Knox. Once organized, the army moves north and establishes Fort Harrison (near present-day Terre Haute, Indiana).

Sep The secretary of war authorizes General Harrison to approach Prophet's Town and order the Indians there to disperse. If they refuse, Harrison is authorized to attack and compel them to disperse by force.

10 Oct A sentry is shot and wounded by Indians at Fort Harrison.

29 Oct The army departs Fort Harrison.

31 Oct The army crosses to the west side of the Wabash River as part of a deception.

1-2 Nov The army builds Boyd's Blockhouse at the mouth of the Vermillion River (on the west side of the Wabash River).

3 Nov The army crosses the Vermillion River and enters Indian Territory.

6 Nov The army arrives outside of Prophet's Town and agrees to meet with Indian representatives the next day to discuss peace terms. The army establishes its camp on Burnett Creek.

7 Nov Battle of Tippecanoe. American forces repulse an Indian attack.

8 Nov General Harrison's forces destroy Prophet's Town.

9 Nov The army departs the Prophet's Town area.

12 Nov The army reaches Boyd's Blockhouse. The army is resupplied, and casualties are evacuated by boat down the Wabash River to Vincennes.

18 Nov The army arrives in Vincennes.

1812 The United States declares war on Great Britain. Anti-British sentiment caused by British maritime policies and the belief that
the British are providing aid to the northwestern Indians (particularly Tecumseh’s confederation) cause the War of 1812. Combined British-Indian forces operate in the American northwest throughout the summer. The Indian forces are commanded by Tecumseh, and the British forces are commanded by General Brock (and later General Proctor). Americans surrender Fort Macinac and Detroit. Fort Dearborn (Chicago, Illinois) is seized by the British and Indians.

1813  An American fleet commanded by Oliver Hazard Perry defeats the British fleet on Lake Erie. General Harrison’s force defeats a British-Indian force at the Battle of the Thames (Ontario, Canada). Tecumseh is killed during the battle.

1814  Treaty of Ghent ends the War of 1812.

1816  Indiana becomes a state.

1. Tipton, 179. 142
APPENDIX D

Biographical Sketches

... one of the most important results of Tippecanoe was that it established Harrison as the one man in the West to block Tecumseh during the war that was to follow.¹

—Alec R. Gilpin, *The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest*

There was an unofficial policy for many years in Indiana that resulted in the naming of new counties after participants in the Battle of Tippecanoe: Spencer, Tipton, Bartholomew, Daviess, Floyd, Parke, Randolph, Warrick, Dubois, and Harrison (Harrison county was organized before the battle).²

The characters, groups, and events that are central to this part of Indiana history continue to be commemorated in other ways. Streets (Tecumseh Street), schools (Shawnee Middle School), and geographical areas (Tippecanoe County; Battle Ground, Indiana; and Winamac, Indiana) provide reminders, throughout daily life, of an important part of the state's history.

The following sketches are designed to familiarize the reader with the lives of the individuals that participated in the campaign. The sketches may provide insight into how the perspectives of these characters developed. They may also be used to enhance role playing during the staff ride. Participants may become familiar with a particular character and discuss that person's actions during the engagement.

During any discussion of a character as part of the staff ride, the role player should discuss what the person did, his actions' impact on the battle, and why the role player thinks the person acted that way. Characters can be addressed at a stand where the event happened, at the beginning of the field study phase to set the stage for the campaign, or throughout the staff ride. For example, the role players assigned to Harrison and Tecumseh can discuss how their characters' actions set the stage for the campaign; role players can also analyze the impact of Harrison's subsequent actions on the battlefield. Role players assigned to Wells and Daviess can discuss their battlefield actions as well as how these men might have influenced Kentucky to support the campaign with troops.
United States

Joseph Bartholomew (1766-1840) was born in New Jersey and lived in Pennsylvania and Kentucky before moving to the Indiana Territory in 1798, where he was commander of the Clark County militia. During the Tippecanoe campaign, the infantry was organized into a provisional brigade, with Colonel Boyd as the commander and Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew as commander of all militia infantry (Bartholomew reported directly to Boyd). The morning of the battle, Bartholomew commanded the militia infantry in the front line. Bartholomew, an experienced Indian fighter, may have been the officer that wisely recommended that the men sleep on their arms. He was also the field officer of the day and was wounded during the engagement. In the 1790s, Bartholomew helped to survey the boundaries designated by the Treaty of Greenville. His military service included combat in Indian campaigns during the War of 1812, and he was granted a pension for his 1812 war service. He was active in state politics, eventually serving in the Indiana state legislature. Bartholomew County, Indiana, was organized in his honor in 1821.

John Parker Boyd (1764-1830), Harrison’s second in command and commander of the provisional infantry brigade and all Regular Army troops during the Tippecanoe campaign, was commissioned an ensign in the U.S. Army in 1786. He resigned his commission in 1789 and departed for India, where he was a mercenary until his return to the United States in 1808. Boyd subsequently was promoted to colonel and assumed command of the 4th U.S. on 7 October 1808. He was promoted to brigadier general during the War of 1812 and honorably discharged from the army in 1815. Boyd employed unpopular and severe disciplinary measures during the Tippecanoe campaign that caused problems with the militia units. After the Battle of Tippecanoe, he was the center of controversy, claiming that the militia would have been routed were it not for the efforts of the Regular Army units. The resulting debate also included discussions about Harrison’s fitness as commander at Tippecanoe. Apparently, Boyd’s officers did not agree with him; several of his company grade officers, to include three of his company commanders, wrote statements reflecting their confidence in Harrison as a battlefield commander. A group of field grade officers from the militia and 4th U.S. wrote similar statements.

Joseph Hamilton Daviess [Daveiss, Davis] (1774-1811) was a major commanding a battalion of dragoons of Indiana militia during the Tippecanoe campaign. Daviess was born in Virginia and moved to Kentucky in 1779. Later, he became a U.S. district attorney in Kentucky.
and a well-known orator. Daviess, active in recruiting volunteers from Kentucky for service in the Tippecanoe campaign, joined the campaign as a volunteer private and was promoted to major by Harrison and placed in command of the dragoon battalion (three troops). Daviess, as well as Isaac White, was killed in action leading a charge of dragoons on 7 November 1811. Daviess County, Indiana, was organized in 1817 in his honor. Counties in Kentucky and Illinois also have been named for Daviess.

_Toussant Dubois [Toussaint] (d. 1816)_ was the captain who commanded the Company of Spies and Guides of Indiana militia during the campaign. Dubois was believed to be either French or French Creole. He was a merchant and Indian trader who frequently served as one of Harrison’s messengers to Tecumseh, his brother, and other Indian leaders in the territory. He was the dispatch rider that Harrison sent to Vincennes immediately after the battle with news of the engagement. Two of Dubois’ sons fought at the Battle of Tippecanoe as members of Parke’s Dragoons (IN militia). In 1812, Dubois was commissioned major commandant of all spies in Indiana. He was a wealthy and respected member of the community and a member of the Board of Trustees of Vincennes University. Dubois County, Indiana, was organized in 1818 in his honor.

_ William Henry Harrison (1773-1841), known as “Old Tippecanoe,”_ was commander in chief of the Indiana militia and overall commander of all military forces engaged at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Born in Virginia, he attended Hampden-Sidney College and later studied medicine at the College of Physicians and Surgeons in Philadelphia. Commissioned as an ensign in 1791 and promoted to lieutenant in 1792, he served as Major General Anthony Wayne’s aide-de-camp at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 and was a signatory to the Treaty of Greenville (1795). Promoted to captain in 1797, he commanded Fort Washington (near present-day Cincinnati, Ohio) until he resigned from the army in 1798. Appointed as the first secretary to the Northwest Territory in 1798, he became the territory’s representative to Congress (1799). Appointed governor of the Indiana Territory in 1800, he served as the commander in chief of the Indiana militia while governor. After the Battle of Tippecanoe, Harrison was the commander in chief in the Old Northwest during the War of 1812; a major general of Kentucky militia (1812); brigadier general, Regular Army (1812); and major general, Regular Army (1813). During the War of 1812, forces led by Harrison recaptured Detroit and defeated British-Indian forces at the Battle of the Thames (Ontario, Canada) in 1813. Tecumseh was allied with the British during the War of 1812 and subsequently killed by
Harrison's forces during the Battle of the Thames. Harrison resigned from the army in 1814 and settled in Ohio. His wartime service was recognized by an 1818 resolution in Congress for his actions at the Battle of the Thames. After his army service, Harrison served in the House of Representatives, the state senate, and the U.S. Senate. He also served for a short time as the U.S. minister to Columbia and ran unsuccessfully for president of the United States in 1836. Harrison's political career culminated in his winning the 1840 presidential election. Harrison was president from 4 March 1841 to 4 April 1841, when he died in office. Harrison County, Indiana, was organized in his honor in 1808.

Charles Larrabee (1782-1862) was commissioned on 13 June 1808 and served as a company commander in the 4th U.S. during the Battle of Tippecanoe. Larrabee commanded Captain Baen's company because Baen served as an acting major and battalion commander during the battle. Baen was killed at Tippecanoe, and Larrabee retained command of the company after the campaign. Larrabee was promoted to captain in 1812 and breveted a major on 9 August 1812 for gallant conduct. He resigned from the army in 1825.

Isaac Naylor (1790-1873), born in Virginia, moved to Kentucky in 1793 and thence to Indiana Territory in 1805. Naylor was a sergeant in a company of riflemen of Indiana militia during the Battle of Tippecanoe (a battle in which his brother also participated). Naylor also fought in Indian campaigns during the War of 1812 and, after his military service, became a circuit court judge, serving in that capacity for twenty years.

Benjamin Parke was commander of a company of light dragoons of Indiana militia during the Tippecanoe campaign. He was promoted to major and assumed command of Daviess' battalion of dragoons on 7 November 1811 after Daviess was killed. After the campaign, Parke served as a territorial congressman and a judge. Parke County, Indiana, was organized and named in his honor in 1821.

Thomas Randolph (d. 1811) was Indiana attorney general and Harrison's acting aide-de-camp (as a civilian) during the Battle of Tippecanoe. He was killed in action on 7 November 1811. Randolph County, Indiana, was organized and named in his honor in 1818.

Spier Spencer (d. 1811) was a captain and commander of a company of mounted riflemen of Indiana militia during the Battle of Tippecanoe. Spencer was killed in action on 7 November 1811. His twelve-year-old son accompanied him on the campaign and fought as a rifleman during the
engagement. Spencer, the acting sheriff of Harrison County, Indiana Territory, organized the company known as Spencer's Yellow Jackets. The company was called the Yellow Jackets because of the light-colored buckskin hunting shirts worn by members of the company. Spencer County, Indiana, was organized in 1818 in honor of Spencer.12

**John Tipton (1786-1839)** was an enlisted soldier assigned to Spencer's Yellow Jackets during the Tippecanoe campaign. He had been promoted to ensign on 21 October 1811 and to captain on 7 November 1811. He assumed command of his company after all of the other officers were killed. Tipton was born in Tennessee, where his father was killed by Indians in 1793. Tipton and his family moved to Indiana Territory in 1807. His military service after Tippecanoe included promotion to major, service in a frontier ranger company, and combat in engagements with Indians during the War of 1812. Later, he was a justice of the peace and Indian agent for Logansport and Fort Wayne, Indiana. He was active in politics and eventually served as a U.S. senator from Indiana, 1831-39. While in the U.S. Senate, Tipton was the chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs. In 1829, he bought the land that encompassed the Tippecanoe battlefield and donated the area to the state in 1836. Tipton County, Indiana, was organized in his honor in 1844.13

**Jacob Warrick (d. 1811),** a captain and commander of a company of infantry of Indiana militia during the Tippecanoe campaign, was killed in action on 7 November 1811. Warrick County, Indiana, was organized and named in his honor in 1813.14

**Samuel Wells,** a major and commander of a battalion of Kentucky light dragoons, was a major general in the Kentucky militia who volunteered to serve as a private during the Tippecanoe campaign. Harrison promoted Wells to major in the Indiana militia and placed him in command of two companies of mounted riflemen.15

**Isaac White (ca. 1776-1811)** was born in Virginia and moved to the Indiana Territory in 1800. A colonel and commander of the Knox County militia, White's unit was not called up for the campaign. White, nonetheless, enlisted as a private in the dragoons and was killed in action on 7 November 1811. He died in the dragoon assault led by Major Daviess. White County, Indiana, was organized and named in his honor in 1834. A county in Illinois is also named for Isaac White.16
Indian Confederacy

Shabonee (1775-1859), an Ottawa Indian and grand nephew of Pontiac, lived for many years in what is now Illinois and eventually became a "Peace Chief" of the Potawatomi Indian tribe. Shabonee was an Indian scout for the Prophet's forces during the Tippecanoe campaign and participated in the attack on the encampment on 7 November 1811. He was one of Tecumseh's trusted lieutenants and fought with Tecumseh throughout the War of 1812 and at the Battle of the Thames. Disgusted with the way the British treated their Indian allies during the War of 1812, Shabonee transferred his allegiance to the Americans. Later, during the Black Hawk Wars (1832), he warned settlers of impending Indian raids. He was awarded land in Illinois as a reward for his services, but he eventually left the state to join his tribe, which had moved to Mississippi. Later, he returned to Illinois to find his land had been purchased by land speculators at public auction. American citizens, grateful for Shabonee's prior service, purchased a farm for him in Illinois, where he spent the remainder of his life. He is buried in Morris, Illinois.17

Stone Eater was a Miami and one of the Indians selected to lead the attack on Harrison's encampment on 7 November 1811.

Tecumseh [Techumthe, Tecumtha] (ca. 1768-1813) was the Shawnee warrior that organized the Indian confederacy engaged by General Harrison's forces at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Tecumseh was not at the battle; at the time, he was traveling in the area that is now the southern United States attempting to recruit Creek Indians and other tribes for his confederacy. He returned to Tippecanoe in February or March 1812, where he discovered that his brother, the Prophet, against his express orders, had attacked Harrison's force. Tecumseh's father was Shawnee and his mother reportedly Creek. The father was killed at the Battle of Point Pleasant (present-day West Virginia) in 1774. Tecumseh's older brother was killed during a raid in Kentucky with Tecumseh, Shabonee, and a war party of Cherokee Indians. In the Indian victory over General Arthur St. Clair's forces, Tecumseh had fought as a member of the Indian confederacy led by Little Turtle and Blue Jacket. During the campaign, Tecumseh served as a spy and scout for the confederacy. Later, he led a war party against General Wayne's forces at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. After the Indian defeat at Fallen Timbers, he refused to attend the peace council at Greenville. He allied himself with the British after the Battle of Tippecanoe and led Indian forces in Canada and the American northwest during the War of 1812. He was killed at the Battle of the Thames by forces under the command of
Harrison. Throughout his adult life, he was well-known and respected as an orator, political organizer, and war leader by both Indians and whites. Tecumseh also was celebrated for his refusal to allow torture or the killing of prisoners; torture and killing prisoners were practices not uncommon among all warring sides during the Indian wars.18

**Tenskwatawa (ca. 1774-1834)**, known as “The Prophet,” led the Indian forces at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Tenskwatawa was not a war chief or leader but a spiritual leader for the members of the confederacy organized and led by his brother, Tecumseh. Tenskwatawa authorized the attack at Tippecanoe against the express orders of his brother, who was away recruiting other tribes for the confederacy. Tenskwatawa’s original name was Laulewasika, or “He-makes-a-loud-noise.” He later changed his name to Elkswatawa, which means “The Prophet,” and finally changed his name to Tenskwatawa or “Open Door.” To Americans, Tenskwatawa was known as “The Prophet” or “The Shawnee Prophet.” He lost his right eye as a youth while practicing with a bow and arrow. As a young man, he was known as a drunk. He eventually reformed himself and created a religious cult. He rose to prominence among Indians after the death of an old Shawnee prophet in 1805. He assumed the older prophet’s former role in the community and gained fame because of the accuracy of his predictions. Many believed that Tecumseh provided his brother with accurate predictions and that Tenskwatawa did not have any significant powers of prophecy. Tenskwatawa’s teachings emphasized a return to the Indians’ traditional lifestyle. Disavowed by Tecumseh after the defeat at Tippecanoe, Tenskwatawa allied himself with the British and wandered throughout the American northwest and Canada. In 1815, he and a small band of his followers moved to Missouri and then to Wyandotte County, Kansas, in 1828. He was a pensioner of the British government as a reward for his loyalty during the War of 1812.19

**White Loon**, whose Indian name was Wawpawwawqua, was a Wea Indian chief. The Wea Indians were a subtribe of the Miami Indian tribe. White Loon was one of the Indians selected to lead the attack on Harrison’s encampment on 7 November 1811.20

**Winnemac (d. 1812)**, a Potawatomi Indian chief and one of the Indians selected to lead the attack on Harrison’s encampment on 7 November 1811, had been an ally of the governor prior to the Battle of Tippecanoe. Winnemac eventually changed his allegiance to Tecumseh and was the leader of a large party of Potawatomi warriors at Prophet’s Town. He was also the leader of the war party that intercepted the Delaware Chiefs en route
to join Harrison and forced the chiefs to accompany him. Winnemac, to
Prophet's Town. Winamac, Indiana, was founded in 1835 and named in
honor of Chief Winnemac. 21
NOTES


2. Ronald L. Baker and Marvin Carmony, Indiana Place Names (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), xii; McCollough, 4; Pirtle, 78; and Watts, 225.

3. Baker and Carmony, 9; Pence, 287-303; and Draper MSS. 1X142-44.

4. Cleaves, 86-91; Draper MSS. 1X142-44; Esarey, Messages, vol. 1, 634-35; Esarey, Messages, vol. 2, 5-11; Heitman, vol. 1, 236; Presidential Papers, Series 1: 1734-1813 Aug., Reel 1; and Watts, 228. Bartholomew (Indiana militia), Decker (4th U.S.), Floyd (4th U.S.), Wells (Kentucky militia), Parke (Kentucky militia), and Pureell (4th U.S.) were the field grade officers that wrote the statement on Harrison's conduct. The statement, in part, reads "That the victory was obtained by his [Harrison's] vigilance and activity." Snelling, Cook, and Barton were the three 4th U.S. company commanders that completed a similar statement. Several other officers completed similar statements.

5. Baker and Carmony, 39; Cleaves, 93; Cockrum, 280; Draper MSS. 1X142-44; Green, 120-22; Pirtle, 80-86; and White 335-38.

6. Baker and Carmony, 43; Cockrum, 282; Eckert, Sorrow, 620-21; and Alameda McCollough, The Battle of Tippecanoe: Conflict of Cultures (The Research and Publications Committee of the Tippecanoe County Historical Association, 1991), 21; Pittsburgh Gazette, 29 November 1811; George R. Wilson, History of Dubois County. From Its Primitive Days to 1910 (Jasper, IN: George R. Wilson, 1910), 397-99, 404-5, 412.

7. Baker and Carmony, 67; Trevor Dupuy, et. al., 317; Green, 12-16, 34-44, 47-55; and Heitman, vol. 1, 505-6.

8. Draper MSS. 1X142-44; Heitman, vol. 1, 616; and Watts, 225-47.


10. Baker and Carmony, 126; Cockrum, 268, 280, 294; and Draper MSS. 1X142-44.
11. Baker and Carmony, 137; Cleaves, 88; and Cockrum, 279.

12. Bacon, 32; Baker and Carmony, 156; Cockrum, 280-81; George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point N.Y. from Its Establishment, in 1802, to 1890*, 3d ed., vol. 1 (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1891), 156; DeHart, 126; Draper MSS. 1X142-44, and Heitman, vol. 2, 910. Spencer’s brother, George, was wounded during the battle. George died of his wounds as the army reached Boyd's Blockhouse. Harrison took care of Spencer’s son, James, for the remainder of the campaign. Harrison also secured an appointment to West Point for James. James Spencer was officially appointed to West Point from Indiana for “his gallant conduct in the Battle of Tippecanoe.” He entered West Point 1 January 1812 and graduated 17 July 1817. He graduated second out of nineteen graduates in the class of 1817.

13. Baker and Carmony, 165; Cockrum, 281; DeHart, 119; Esarey, *Messages*, vol. 1, 521; Green, 122, 126; McCollough, 23; Pirtle, 90; and Tipton, 170-84. Tipton is often referred to as “General Tipton,” and his gravestone identifies him as such. To date, my research has not been able to determine if the title is honorary or if Tipton performed any duties commensurate with the grade.


15. Cockrum, 296; and Draper MSS. 1X142-44.


17. McCollough, 8; and Whickar, 353-54.


20. Eckert, *Sorrow*, 345, 652. The Miami tribe was the principal tribe and had three subtribes: Weas, Eel Rivers, and Piankeshaws.

21. Baker and Carmony, 93, 181; Cockrum, 269; Drake, 57-59; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 651; Eckert, *Gateway*, 30, 281-82; and Eckert, *Sorrow*, 742-43, 954. Winnemac was killed in 1812 by Tecumseh’s nephew, Johnny Logan. Logan was a Shawnee Indian scout for the U.S. Army during the War of 1812. He was fatally wounded in the engagement with Winnemac and died of his wounds.
several days later, on 25 November 1812. Johnny Logan was captured, while a youth, by an American expeditionary force raiding Shawnee villages. He was adopted into the family of one of his captors and remained with the family until he returned to the Shawnees during a prisoner exchange. Logan, whose Indian name was Spemica Lawba, or “Big Horn,” took the name of his adopted white father and remained a staunch ally of the United States until his death in 1812. Logan is the only Indian in Ohio history to be buried with full military honors. Logansport, Indiana, was named in honor of Johnny Logan.
APPENDIX E

Meteorological Data

... it stopt Raining and Began to Snow and Blow hard... it was the
Disagreeablest night I ever saw...

—John Tipton, 19 October 1811, diary entry

The weather during the Tippecanoe campaign was relatively severe for
troops operating without proper environmental protection. It is likely that
the precipitation and low temperatures had an impact on the health and
combat effectiveness of the force as well as on the overall mobility of the
march units and supply trains.

Generally, the weather consisted of rain and cold temperatures for much
of the campaign. The soldiers, many of whom did not have tents to provide
environmental protection or changes of clothing (as well as opportunities to
clean their clothes), suffered from illness and fatigue during the campaign. At
least seventy to eighty members of Harrison’s command did not fight at
the battle because of illness.3

The areas through which the army traveled to the battlefield varied from
open prairie to heavy forests. The effects of weather on the terrain probably
had an impact on the mobility of mounted and dismounted elements of
Harrison’s force and the supply trains (which consisted of wagons and
livestock). The army conducted frequent river and stream-crossing
operations because of Harrison’s wish to prevent compromising his force
(accomplished by crossing the Wabash and taking an unexpected route). Several
streams and creeks crosscut his route of march. Despite the
challenges weather posed to mobility, his command managed to maintain
rates of march of over ten miles per day after they departed Fort Harrison.
The following table (see table 5) details weather observations for October
and November 1811.
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<td>windy</td>
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### November 1811

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<tr>
<th>Sun</th>
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<th>Wed</th>
<th>Thurs</th>
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<td></td>
<td>rain a.m. and p.m., cold</td>
<td>rain, cold early a.m., cloudy</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>cold, cloudy</td>
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<td>clear, cold, water freezes</td>
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<td>cloudy, rain a.m.</td>
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### Table 6. Meteorological data, Tippecanoe campaign (October and November 1811)
Daylight and moonlight data for the week of the engagement indicate that the percentage of illumination was seemingly sufficient for night operations. The last quarter moon was on 7 November 1811. On 6 November 1811, the percentage of illumination was 68 percent and decreasing thereafter. At the time of the Indian attack, the illumination was about 58 percent. The illumination degraded to 39 percent by the time that the army began its retirement to Boyd's Blockhouse on 9 November 1811. However, cloud cover that normally accompanies rain probably reduced any advantage gained because of the illumination (it rained almost daily during the week of the attack).
NOTES

1. Tipton, 176.

2. Esarey, Messages, vol. 1, 597-98; and Reid, 15. There were various reasons for a soldier’s absence. A few of the categories and statistics for absences from the army’s 12 October 1811 strength report are 69 sick, 60 extra duty, and 126 absent for various reasons. On 12 October 1811, the army was authorized 1,225 soldiers and had 762 present for duty.

3. All of the light data are from the U.S. Naval Observatory, Astronomical Applications Department [on-line]; available from http://www.usno.navy.mil/cgi-bin/aa_pap; Internet; accessed 5 February 1998.
# GLOSSARY

**List of Abbreviations and Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American northwest</td>
<td>Refers to the post-1800 geographic area formerly encompassed by the Northwest Territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>Died of wounds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th U.S.</td>
<td>An Arabic numeral followed by “U.S.” denotes a United States Army Infantry Regiment. This example is for the 4th U.S. Infantry Regiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN militia</td>
<td>Indiana militia. The state or type of militia unit by function (KY militia, dragoon, mounted riflemen, etc.) is designated to prevent confusion. It was common at the time to refer to a unit in formal and informal writing by the commander’s name. For example, the company of mounted riflemen commanded by Captain Spencer is referred to as Captain Spier Spencer’s Company of Mounted Riflemen of the Indiana Militia. Other units might be referred to by simply the commander’s name, for example, Robb’s company. In cases where the type of unit is not clear, clarifying remarks are added: Robb’s company (IN militia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed in action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Purchase</td>
<td>Geographic area defined in the 1809 Treaty of Fort Wayne.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Territory</td>
<td>Geographic area in the United States defined by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The area encompassed current-day Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota. The area began to be divided into territories and states after 1800. The status of the various geographic areas in the Northwest Territory continued to change until they became states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Northwest</td>
<td>See American northwest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventeen Fires</td>
<td>The United States.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Arms, L. R. *A Short History of the NCO*. Fort Bliss, TX: U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, not dated.


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Major Harry D. Tunnell IV is a 1984 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and was commissioned in Infantry. In 1997, he received an M.A. in professional communication studies from Purdue University and, in 1998, an M.M.A.S. in military history from the USACGSC. He has served in a variety of positions in mechanized, light, Ranger, and air assault infantry units. He is currently the S3 (operations officer) for the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), at Fort Benning, Georgia.

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- Publish works in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve Components on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of the Army.
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