Unraveling CORDS: Lessons Learned from a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF)

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Abstract

UNRAVELLING CORDS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM A JOINT INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE (JIATF) by LTC Patrick V. Howell, USA, 102 pages.

Though the United States military has excelled in winning wars, it has not enjoyed the same success at “winning the peace”. That requires a coordinated effort from several Departments and agencies of the United States government-- an Inter-Agency operation. And the US’ Inter-Agency efforts since the end of the Cold War have not been extremely successful.

However, conducting Inter-Agency operations is not new to the US government. During the Vietnam War, the US established the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) - a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) comprising numerous Departments and agencies. CORDS was a unique civil-military organization that combined all military and civilian pacification efforts, resources and personnel into a single chain of command— a Whole of Government (WoG) approach. This organizational approach differs from current US government and military doctrine for inter-agency operations.

In fact, a large body of research consistently cites CORDS as an example to be emulated for inter-agency operations. This raises three questions: 1) Was CORDS an effective JIATF for pacification?; 2) Was that success due to its WoG organizational approach?; and 3) How was CORDS created?

The monograph answers the first two research questions together by looking at pacification efforts in Vietnam across three distinct time periods. Then it will answer the last research question by comparing the bureaucratic politicking behind the creation of CORDS to other established patterns of bureaucratic policy-making.

The results of this monograph suggest that the US’ current doctrine for Inter-Agency Operations is inefficient and ineffective. Given the likely requirement for increasing Inter-Agency operations makes this a very relevant topic for research.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPM</td>
<td>Bureaucratic Politics Model</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Civic Action Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
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<td>COSVN</td>
<td>Central Office for South Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRVN</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HES</td>
<td>Hamlet Evaluation System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Government Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>J2</td>
<td>Intelligence Staff Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIACG/JIAWG</td>
<td>Joint Inter-Agency Coordination/Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JJATF</td>
<td>Joint Inter-Agency Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUSPAO</td>
<td>Joint United States Public Affairs Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>Lead Federal Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC-V</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command-Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measures of Effectiveness</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>Measures of Performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSSD</td>
<td>Most Similar Systems Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NLF</td>
<td>National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>NSAM</td>
<td>National Security Action Memorandum</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>OCO</td>
<td>Office of Civil Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAVN</td>
<td>Peoples’ Army of Vietnam (North Vietnam)</td>
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<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROVNN</td>
<td>Program for Reconstruction in Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDF</td>
<td>Peoples’ Self Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF/PF</td>
<td>Regional Force/Popular Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;R</td>
<td>Stability &amp; Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRV</td>
<td>Socialist Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>Security, Stabilization, Transition &amp; Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA/S</td>
<td>United States Information Agency/Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Viet Cong</td>
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<td>VCI</td>
<td>Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>WoG</td>
<td>Whole of Government</td>
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Introduction

“Pacification fell between the stools. It was everybody’s business and nobody’s.”1

Ambassador Robert Komer
Special Assistant to the President for Pacification in Vietnam

The United States is not organizationally prepared to handle the complex security threats it faces today and the near future.2 Though the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act developed a joint force that consistently achieves stellar military successes, “winning the war” does not bring about political or strategic victory because “winning the peace” requires an inter-agency effort by many Departments and agencies of the US government, other than the Department of Defense.3 The fact that the US’ involvement in 17 stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations around the world since the end of the Cold War have consistently displayed shortcomings in its inter-agency

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response & effectiveness does not bode well for future endeavors. These complex missions require complex solutions—and nothing is more complex than inter-agency operations.

Current governmental policy and joint doctrine calls for using the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) organizational approach for inter-agency operations. In the LFA approach, the President designates one Department or Agency to be “first among equals” to achieve Unity of Effort for inter-agency operations. The LFA coordinates with, and makes recommendations to, other agencies but it cannot direct or command any other agencies’ actions—it lacks Unity of Command. This raises a conundrum in that almost all of the literature & research advocate the integration of civil and military efforts to exercise Unity of Command. Additionally, a good majority of those works cite the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program from Vietnam as a successful inter-agency operation.

CORDS was a unique hybrid organization comprised of civilians from several agencies as well as military from the various services. Under the command of America’s first “civilian general”, Ambassador Robert Komer, CORDS planned, executed and supervised all aspects of the pacification program in Vietnam from 1967 to 1972— in modern parlance, it was a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force for Stability, Support, Transition and Reconstruction [JIATF-SSTR].

Taken from their parent agencies and placed under Ambassador Komer, its’ approximately 8,000

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4 Murdock and Flournoy, 7, 43; Burton 41. Past operations have been characterized by: bad inter-agency planning & coordination, slow response time, insufficient resources and most importantly, lack or little unity of efforts of the various agencies, and competition and infighting between various US government agencies. Examples are: Somalia and failure to quell insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the time-period of 1988-2006, the UN has engaged in 47 Stability operations.

5 Yaneer Bar-Yam, Making Things Work: Solving Complex Problems In A Complex World, (NESCI-Knowledge Press, 2004): 91. Interagency is the process of different elements of the US government (Departments and/or agencies) coordinating and working together.

6 See Literature review and Annotated Bibliography. Ad hoc or “Anarchical” organizational approach is the method of governmental decision-making as described in Graham Allison Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) in Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1971.):146.

7 This includes the military’s premier doctrinal publication on counterinsurgencies- Field Manual (FM) 3-24 “Counter Insurgency Operations” and FM 3-07 “Stability Operations”. See Literature Review and Annotated Bibliography. Other names for this approach are: “Whole of Government”, “NSC [National Security Council]” or “unified management.”

8 State Department, USAID, CIA, USIA, Treasury, Agriculture, Health-Education-Welfare and DoD civilians.
personnel were about 15% civilian and 85% military. With civilian and military personnel exercising command authority over each other, CORDS is the epitome of Unity of Command (or Whole of Government- WoG) approach to inter-agency operations.  

The heavy reliance on CORDS by researchers begs three very important questions that also have implications for planning and conducting future inter-agency operations:

1. Did CORDS successfully pacify South Vietnam?
2. Was the success due to the Whole of Government organizational approach?
3. What were the bureaucratic processes that created CORDS?

This monograph demonstrates that CORDS was an effective program because it used the Whole of Government (WOG) approach at the operational (policy-implementation) and tactical (policy-execution) levels—with WoG approach at the strategic (policy-making) level being a key antecedent condition. Further, it shows that CORDS existed as result of strong Presidential and other key leader, support.

To answer these three research questions, the monograph uses two separate qualitative research designs & methodologies. It uses the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) to answer research questions #1 & #2 (Was CORDS effective? Was it due to its organizational structure?). It then uses Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) in a pattern-matching design to answer research question #3 (what were the bureaucratic processes that led to CORDS creation and implementation?).

Both designs logically link the research questions, the data and the conclusions through construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. This monograph ensures its’

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10 Or… how did a single bureaucrat take personnel, material and financial assets from: DoD, State, USAID, CIA, USIA, etc.?

reliability by thorough footnoting to allow independent verification and research. Construct validity is established by clear explanations of how variables and indicators were developed, assessed and evaluated. The established methodologies of MSSD and pattern-matching achieve internal validity. Solid reliability, construct validity and internal validity allow the researcher to infer external validity. Studies of other JIATFs in future research will be the true test of external validity.

After the introduction, the monograph provides a short literature review surveying both the LFA vs WoG debate as well as what other research has uncovered for the three research questions. Then it provides a history of pacification in Vietnam from 1961-1975. Next, it addresses research questions #1 & #2 (together) and then question #3 - each section divided into “Research Design & Methodology” and then “Analysis”. The monograph concludes with: a summary of its findings and implications for today’s inter-agency operations; a review of the weaknesses in the monograph; and a list of ideas for future research.

Literature Review

This literature review will provide a short summary of the key points in the LFA vs WoG organizational approach debate. It will then review what the literature contains regarding CORDS, focusing on the three research questions.¹²

Of the various organizational approaches for Inter-Agency Operations

The debate begins in 1934 with a British pamphlet on “Imperial Policing” – equivalent to the modern term of pacification or SSTR operations. Based on 10 case studies of “Imperial

¹² This literature review is a short summary of the themes related to this topic, not a review of every article and book. That information summary of each reading is in the Annotated Bibliography.
“Policing” that took place from 1919-1931 within five locations in the British Empire, Major-General Sir Charles W. Gwynn (UK) describes three scenarios that require close civil and military operations. Two of those three scenarios demonstrate a Whole of Government (WoG) approach that would, dependent on the situation; subordinate the civil authorities and capabilities to the military, or vice-a-versa. The third resembles the Lead Federal Agency Approach (LFA) with the military and civilian authorities independent of each other but cooperative- but the civil authorities set with policy.\(^\text{13}\)

The default US governmental policy for inter-agency operations is *ad hoc* (“anarchical”) in which every situation is handled as it develops and every agency is an independent actor. This is the bureaucratic politics system as described in Graham Allison’s work.\(^\text{14}\) The foundation for this approach was the 1947 National Security Act that designates the National Security Council as the forum to “integrate domestic, foreign and military policies.”\(^\text{15}\) The NSC develops recommendations for the President by negotiation and consensus amongst themselves. As with every other previous President, President Bush re-iterated the purpose and processes of the NSC in his National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1.\(^\text{16}\)

However, the government is transitioning to the LFA approach issues for some issues. In NSPD-44, the President designated the Secretary of State as the “focal point” for “planning, coordination and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization (R&S).” However, the NSPD does not grant the State Department the [command] authority to “supervise”. It also specifically directs the Departments of State and Defense to work together due to the amount of


\(^{14}\) Allison 162.


support the military provides for SSTR operation—but State is again not granted “supervisory” or “directorial” authority over Defense.  

DoD Directive 3000.05 designates stability operations as a core military mission. It also acknowledges the LFA role of the State Department because DoD must “supports [sic] US government [State] plans” for SSTR [Security Stability and Transition Operations]. It further acknowledges that although civilian agencies are best suited to perform most SSTR tasks, the military might need to perform them initially due to having the required resources.

In performing missions, particularly SSTR, Joint doctrine specifically states that coordination between the military and other government agencies (as well as IGOs and NGOs) should not be attempted using usual military command and control structures- which would resemble a Unity of Command/WoG approach. Rather, the government will use the LFA approach to coordinate among the various players (US agencies, Departments, IGOs and NGOs)-- with the Lead Federal Agency designated based on the actual requirements.

Recognizing the need for better inter-agency operations over the last 15 years, particularly when the Defense Department (DoD) is the LFA, the US government has been placing inter-agency representatives into military commands. However, the commands do not place the inter-agency representatives into its command & staff structure according to the skills and knowledge they bring. Rather, they are all lumped together in one “cell” under various names: Joint Inter-Agency Working (or Coordination) Group being most prevalent (JIAWG or JIACG). These inter-agency cells “do not make policy, task, or replace existing lines of

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authority or reporting [bold in original]… [exist only] to enhance inter-agency coordination."

Several current articles address the issues and problems that have arisen with JIACGs/JIAWGs.21

Paradoxically, one of the military newest doctrinal manuals, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counter-Insurgency varies with previous doctrine by calling for unity of command (WoG approach) for all US Government agencies and all multinational military forces. However, because it recognizes that receiving authority for unity of command from civilian agencies is not likely, there might only be unity of effort by means of the coordination efforts thru JIACGs and JIAWGs.22 Of the three vignettes in Chapter 2 “Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities”, two cover organizations that successfully integrated civil-military/Whole of Government approaches: the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and the CORDS program from Vietnam.23

A large number of articles specifically cite the CORDS program as a model or template for successful inter-agency operations and/or pacification program. These pieces come from research papers for Professional Military Education (PME) academic institutions as well as professional journals on security affairs.24 Additionally, the implicit or explicit assumption that CORDS was a successful inter-agency pacification operation, the recommendation to use a Whole of Government approach runs through these articles.

Without citing CORDS, the theme of a more integrated civil-military command and control structure (Whole of Government) runs through a number of other works in PME research.

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21 See Annotated Bibliography.

22 Interestingly, it is easier to get foreign military units underneath an integrated American military command structure than it is to get other US agencies to do so.

23 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, para 2-9. Para 2-11,-13, 2-47 (JIACG) 2-51 (PRT), 2-52 (CORDS)

papers, professional journals and a think-tank study.\textsuperscript{25} While they do not cite CORDS as an example, they make many of the same points as the pieces that do cite CORDS.

**Of the success of the CORDS Program in Vietnam (1968-1972)**

While many sources state or assume that CORDS was successful, very few actually do any analysis to back up those claims. The few sources that actually address why CORDS was successful demonstrate correlation only, not causation. Otherwise, most of the sources in this section provide facts for the research design to use to analyze the three research questions.

The first CORDS Director, Ambassador Komer, answers all the research questions by crediting CORD’s success to “unified management … at the Washington level … and in the field… [due to] a grant of Presidential authority and solid Presidential backing.”\textsuperscript{26} Although he provides excellent first-hand observer explanatory notes, he does not conduct a rigorous analysis to demonstrate the link between unified management, Presidential backing and successful pacification. He demonstrates a correlation between a WoG organizational approach, Presidential-backing and CORDS’ success.\textsuperscript{27}

By conducting in-depth interviews and on-site observations, James McCollom’s 1971 Master’s thesis comes to the same conclusion as Komer: “defeat of an insurgency through superior organizational technique… [under a leader ] with plenty of backing.”\textsuperscript{28} His methodology of observation and interviews develops a possible explanation for CORDS performance. Like Komer, without using some other methodology to link the variables, McCollom merely identifies correlation, not causation. His reference to “plenty of backing” is only one line within 85+ pages of research, with no supporting material.

\textsuperscript{26} Komer, Bureaucracy at War [BAW] 169.
\textsuperscript{27} Because MSSD makes inductive argument, “Caused” is too strong of a word because inductive arguments never have 100% certainty. “Very likely” or “very probabilistic” would be more accurate.
Frank Jones’ 2005 article on Robert Komer provides more information for research question #3. Like Komer and McCollom, Jones provides an excellent explanation on “the sway a single person can have on national security policy by understanding and using the levers of power.”29 And like the other two, Jones also does not use any other methodology than explanation building.

History of Pacification in Vietnam30

The history of Vietnam cannot be understood outside of its geography, which explains patterns of settlement and shaped the terrain upon which CORDS engaged in pacification.31 Vietnam is located in South East Asia to the south of China and east of Laos and Cambodia. Its eastern coast lies on the South China Sea. The mostly hilly/mountainous country is slightly larger than Italy and slightly smaller than Germany.32

Colonized by the French in the mid-nineteenth century, the 1954 Geneva Accords divided Vietnam into two temporary areas (north for communists and nationalists and the south for French supporters). By 1956, that temporary division became permanent when South Vietnam’s President Diem failed to hold mandated elections. This led to the initiation of the South Vietnamese insurgency supported by North Vietnam.

To fight the insurgency, South Vietnam divided itself into a combination of war-time and traditional geographic regions. South Vietnam had four military corps; each one was responsible for one regional area. There were 44 traditional provinces within those four regions. In turn, the

31 Introduction sentence suggested by Professor Jacob Kipp (Monograph Director).
44 provinces had 234 military-districts. Those in turn had 2,553 traditional villages containing over 12,000 hamlets.

1961 to Spring 1966

Shortly after the division of Vietnam into two states in the 1950s, Communist North Vietnam helped initiate, and then supported, an insurgency in South Vietnam. To fight the Communist supported National Liberation Front (NLF) and their military arm, the Viet Cong (VC), the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN-South Vietnam) tried a variety of programs to “pacify” the people and earn their loyalty by showing them the government could provide services for them. The most notable programs were the late 1950s “Agroville”, 1961-1963 “Strategic Hamlet Program” and early 1960s “Civic Action Program (later called Revolutionary Development Program).” Corruption, inefficiency and lack of adequate financial support characterized most of these programs.

As part of its policy to resist Communist expansion, the United States provided advice and support to the government of South Vietnam in its pacification efforts. However, because there are many different aspects to pacification, the US could not decide if pacification was a civil or military issue. As a result, several agencies provided the US support to pacification to South Vietnam based upon their agency’s expertise. Although the US Ambassador was responsible for all US government activities in the country, each agency fielded their own separate staffs and

33 McCollum 13-15. The number of Provinces by Region were: I- 5 provinces; II- 12 provinces; III- 10 provinces; and IV- 17 provinces. In addition to one Army Corps for each region, South Vietnam also had a Strategic Reserve of Airborne, Ranger and Marine Forces.

34 George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War, an Administrative History of the Johnson Presidency Series (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1994): 66. The Civic Action program would later become the Revolutionary Development Program that copied the National Liberation Front (NLF)/VC (Viet Cong) tactic of sending team of personnel into a village/hamlet to teach, train, and win-over the population.

reported straight back to DC. Other than the President, no one person/agency exercised supervisory and tasking authority for the US pacification effort.\(^\text{36}\)

This situation continued when newly elected President Kennedy made two key decisions regarding Vietnam. In May he consciously decided not to appoint a single manager for Vietnam.\(^\text{37}\) This essentially let the Department of Defense, USIS (later USIA), CIA, USAID and other agencies each run their own efforts in Vietnam. Later that year, he changed the three-star director of the Military Assistance Group (MAAG) to a four-star commander of a Military Assistance Command- equal in rank to the Ambassador.\(^\text{38}\)

In 1964, the US increased military strength by over nine times in the course of a year, from 20,000 to over 180,000. Not only did the military build-up, but so did the civilian agencies. As a result, almost every one of the 243 provinces in South Vietnam had advisors from MAC-V, USAID, USIS and CIA providing separate advice to the single Province Chief on the pacification effort.\(^\text{39}\)

To manage this increase in US support to South Vietnam, President Johnson appointed Maxwell Taylor, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the US Ambassador to Vietnam. He further tasked Taylor to “exercise full responsibility for the effort of USG in RVN [including the] whole military effort.” Ambassador Taylor created the Mission Council to exercise unified control over the various agencies and programs. However, when Ambassador Taylor chose a “hands-off” approach and allowed every agency to appeal any Mission Council decision to their head office in DC, he effectively exercised no true supervisory or tasking authority.\(^\text{40}\)

\(^{36}\) Scoville v.vi.

\(^{37}\) This was not just regarding pacification, but for all US government efforts in Vietnam: Department of Defense, USAID, USIA, CIA, etc.

\(^{38}\) Scoville 5. US Ambassadors are (technically) responsible for all US government activity in their assigned countries. In theory, the MAAG Director worked for the US Ambassador. However, US Ambassador’s authority does not extend to the military forces under a designated Command. As such, Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MAC-V) did not fall under the Ambassador’s (technical) authority.

\(^{39}\) Scoville 7.

\(^{40}\) Scoville 7-9.
Because the Communist insurgency “had developed to formidable proportions [with] the guerrillas controlling much of the territory and population of the country,” President Johnson deployed US combat troops to Vietnam to prevent it from falling. Additionally, because the South Vietnamese government appeared as if it was ready to collapse, North Vietnam also deployed North Vietnamese conventional combat troops to assist the VC insurgents against the South Vietnamese government. Accordingly the MAC-V Commander, General Westmoreland conducted “search & destroy” operations against both the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong conventional forces. He did not devote any significant resources to fight the insurgency—also called the “other war” of pacification.

The lack of progress in, and how to revitalize, the pacification program was the topic of a high-level off-site meeting at Warrenton, Virginia from 8-11 January 1966 with all of the relevant agencies (DoD, CIA, State, USAID, USIS, etc). While all agreed that pacification needed to be improved and there should be a pacification representative in the National Security Council, the issue of pacification being a civil or military issue remained a “bitter controversy.”

President Johnson did not resolve this controversy at the Honolulu Conference in February 1966. After his meeting with the South Vietnamese leadership of President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, President Johnson announced that he would make “the other war [pacification]... a top priority.” Recognizing that civil development could not occur without physical security (reflecting the question of whether is pacification civil or military issue), he decided to: 1) appoint a special assistant for pacification on the National Security Council; and 2)

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41 Herring, LBJ and Vietnam 65.
43 Scoville 19-20.
direct the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), Deputy Ambassador Porter, to better coordinate and manage the various civilian pacification efforts in-country.\footnote{Scoville 24.}

**Spring 1966 to November 1966**

Accordingly, on March 28, 1966, President Johnson appointed Robert Komer as his “Special Assistant [for Pacification in Vietnam]” to serve as the focal point for all pacification efforts. As such, he was to “coordinate and supervise (emphasis added)” all civil and military programs. Additionally, the President granted Komer “direct access to me [the President]” and tasked all of the relevant agencies to establish “close and constant liaison” with Komer.\footnote{President Lyndon B. Johnson, “National Security Action Memorandum [NSAM] 343-Appointment of Special Assistant to the President for Peaceful Construction in Vietnam” (Washington, DC: The White House. March 28, 1966), http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam343.asp (accessed 20 Nov 2008) Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988): 654-655. In bureaucratic speak, “supervisory” authority grants a person the ability to direct and task another. Komer graduated from Harvard undergrad and Harvard Business School. He served in World War II as a Corporal in Military Intelligence (Office Strategic Service, predecessor to the CIA), a senior analyst at CIA in the Office of National Estimates, moved to the national Security Council (NSC) under McGeorge Bundy as a Middle East expert and then served as Deputy to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Sheehan 654-655.}

Earning the nick-name as the “Blowtorch”, Komer vigorously dove into his new job.\footnote{Frank L. Jones, “Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy,” *Parameters*. XXXV, No. 3 (Autumn 2005): 103-108, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/05autumn/jones.pdf (accessed September 18, 2008).} He applied his abrasive, results-oriented personality to both the various bureaucracies in D.C. as well as their field divisions in Vietnam when he made seven trips in-country in just over 13 months to assess the various pacification programs.\footnote{Scoville 28.} He became convinced that the system needed a “dramatic overhaul” because of the uncoordinated efforts taken by the various agencies. As the Special Assistant on the NSC (located in DC), Komer believed he had minimal impact on pacification in Vietnam because, though he could keep pacification on the minds of all of the relevant agencies and departments (and even the President) in Washington, he could not direct
how the field agencies in Vietnam implemented and executed those polices. He came to believe that because “pacification is a multi-faceted civil/military problem, it demands a multi-faceted civil-military response.”

In August 1966, based on his own in-country trips and analysis as well as the US Army’s PROVN study, Komer began staffing a proposal to increase the effectiveness of the various pacification programs already in existence by better management and coordination. The key to better coordination and management would be the implementation of the unified/single manager concept at the regional, province and district levels. Komer envisioned the overall pacification program at the national level being either: 1) under Ambassador Porter in the US Embassy; 2) split responsibility between MAC-V for all military pacification programs and Ambassador Porter for all civil programs; or 3) under MAC-V. He sent his proposal for unified management to all of the relevant agencies.

All of the agencies & Departments negatively reviewed Komer’s plan, except for the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff – which supported the idea of single/unified management of pacification under MAC-V. In an October 14, 1966 memo, Secretary


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50 Scoville 31.
51 Scoville 31-32. Lewis Sorley, “To Change a War.” 95-98, 103-104. Komer titled his proposal “Giving New Thrust to Pacification: Analysis, Concept and Management.” Considered a “counter-insurgency man”, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Johnson, commissioned the PROVN Study (Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam” in 1965. The team of 10 chosen officers & experts (historian, political scientist, economist, cultural anthropologist, intelligence, operations psychological operations, and economic development) published their study in March 1966- the same month as Komer’s appointment. PROVN argued that the US was executing the conventional war successfully but was failing at pacification. To improve “the other war”, it proposed 140 recommendations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Komer took PROVN and “rode it like a horse.” The team of General Abrams and Ambassador Colby (successors to Westmoreland/Komer) implemented even more of the suggestions.
52 Though the Joint Chiefs of Staff work for the Secretary of Defense, they are still separate bureaucratic players because they can still offer independent advice to the President.
McNamara presented the “New Thrust” proposal, with its analysis and recommendation, to the President. In it, Secretary McNamara blamed the “bad disappointment [of pacification on the] bad management of the US government and Republic of Vietnam.”

On October 15, 1966, because of his dissatisfaction with the pacification program, but because every civilian agency/Department was against Komer’s plan, President Johnson directed the civilian agencies to “fix” (unify/coordinate) their effort within 90, later 120, days.

**November 1966 to 1975**

Begun in November 1966, the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) brought all of the civilian pacification activities run by the various agencies and Departments under a single manager- Deputy Ambassador Porter. However, by the end of the 120-day window, OCO only filled 458 of 1468 positions. Primarily a USAID & CIA organization, it was comprised of six main divisions: War Victims/refugees (USAID), New Life Development (USAID), Revolutionary Development Cadre (CIA), Psychological operations (USIS/JUSPAO), Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”- USAID) and Public Safety (police-USIA). OCO had a single manager for all OCO activities at each level. However, given that it took almost the entire 120-days to reorganize, OCO provided no visible effect on the war.

At the end of the 120-day window, President Johnson decided to merge all civil and military pacification activities under MAC-V using the single manager concept. He introduced his new team for Vietnam to the South Vietnamese leadership at the Guam Conference in March.

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54 Scoville 39.
55 Scoville 42, 44-45. USAID provided 54% of the funds and 78% of the personnel. CIA provided 44% of the funds and almost none of the personnel. The remaining agencies (Treasury, Agriculture, Health-Education-Welfare, and USIA) provided the remaining money and personnel. The four regional directors were: I) Ambassador Koren (State); II) Robert Matteson (USAID); III) John Vann (USAID); and IV) Vince Heymann (CIA). Anticipating President Johnson’s future decision to merge everything under MAC-V, MAC-V simultaneously created the Directorate for Revolutionary Development Support (RDS). The RDS managed the military pacification efforts, primarily the advisors to the paramilitary Territorial Security Forces (Regional Force/Popular Forces- RF/PF). At this time, most US military advisors supported the Army of Republic of Vietnam, a “conventional” force not involved with pacification.
1967. He executed his decision on May 9, 1967 by appointing Robert Komer as the “single manager” for all US support to pacification in South Vietnam. He further directed that MAC-V would assume control over all civil and military pacification efforts and charged all “departments and agencies with meeting these requirements [to unify under MAC-V] promptly and effectively.”

Komer immediately drafted and submitted a proposed organizational table to General Westmoreland on May 23, 1967. General Westmoreland returned the proposal three days later with minor changes. Komer then received Ambassador Bunker’s approval. On May 28, 1967, Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) came into existence to focus on all aspects of pacification- the first civil-military hybrid organization in the US Army.

CORDS also created a single manager for pacification at the policy implementation and execution levels. For developing pacification policy, CORDS became a staff section on the MAC-V staff equal to all others- this would ensure that considered pacification issues for all operations. To execute pacification programs, CORDS created a single manager for all civil & military pacification activities at all levels of South Vietnamese government: national, regional, province, and district. Ambassador Komer, labeled as the America’s “first civilian general”, exercised command authority over all CORDS personnel- military and civilian. He simply incorporated the four OCO regional managers as the four CORDS regional managers.

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56 Scoville 49.
58 Robert Komer, “Memo, Komer for Westmoreland, 23 May 67, sub: Integration of OCO/RDS Activities within MACV, with attached staff study”, quoted in Scoville 66 (footnote 14). MAC-V Directive 10-12, quoted in Scoville 68 (footnote 18). MAC-V Directive 10-12, from General Westmoreland charged Komer with “supervising the formulation and execution of all military and civilian plans, policies and programs...” The name CORDS comes from combining the civil “OCO” with the military “RDS” to make “CORDS”—the civilian element of CORDS was listed first intentionally.
59 Scoville 66. The Senior Advisors were known as :PSA-Province Senior Advisor and DSA_District Senior Advisor.
Below the national level the CORDS unit at each level had a senior advisor (region, province or district), a deputy senior advisor and staff managing the various pacification programs. The local security situation and personal abilities determined whether the Province & District Senior Advisors would be military or civilian. If the Senior Advisor was military, the Deputy would be civilian, and vice versa. Depending on mission of the various individual pacification programs, the supervising staff section might be all military, all civilian or a combination. A military member could write an efficiency report on a civilian and a civilian could write one on a military member. Though civilians comprised 15%-20% of the 7,000-8,000 CORDS positions, they occupied 50% of the key leader and staff positions. In other words, civilian “punched above their weight” in influencing the execution of pacification efforts.

When forming CORDS, Komer not only combined the six OCO pacification divisions to MAC-Vs military advisors to the paramilitary Territorial Security forces, he also worked to modify, expand or even initiate new programs. The Revolutionary Development Cadre Program support transferred from the CIA to Department of Defense civilians. MAC-V dramatically increased the number of advisors to the paramilitary Territorial Security Forces. In 1968, after the Tet Offensive, President Thieu signed decrees in April and July 1968 that: 1) authorized the creation of a new paramilitary Territorial Security Force (Peoples Self-Defense Force-PSDF) at the village & hamlet level; and 2) supporting the CIA-sponsored Phoenix program. Both of these programs consequently came underneath CORDS as well.

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60 Scoville 80.
61 The military also executed Civic Action Programs (CAPs) that supported pacification efforts, but those units remained under MAC-V conventional force control, but CORDS coordinated for them. Types of CAPs are: MEDCAP (medical CAP), DENCAP (dental CAP), VETCAP (veterinarian CAP) and ENCAP (engineer CAP).
Perhaps the largest change of all that resulted from CORDS was the change in the South Vietnamese government. Whether the Vietnamese reflected the US organization or the US reflected the Vietnamese, there were many South Vietnamese pacification efforts and programs that, like the US effort pre-CORDS, were also uncoordinated. Each Vietnamese agency would coordinate directly with its US counter-part for advice and assistance. When President Johnson got serious about “the other war” and created a single pacification organization, so did the South Vietnamese. They created a CORDS equivalent in the Central Pacification & Development Council, headed by a general officer with a full-time staff. 63 Without counting the hamlet-level PSDF, the Vietnamese had 100 personnel for pacification for every American. Counting the PSDF, there were 500 Vietnamese working on pacification for every American. 64

By the end of 1967, the various indicators that CORDS used to evaluate rural pacification had all been increasing. In fact, President Johnson considered pacification to be running smooth enough that he abolished the position of the Special Assistant for Pacification on the National Security Council in late 1967. 65

Though primarily based in the cities, the Tet Offensive in January and February 1968 did have a negative effect in the rural areas. By July 1968, after the effects of Tet and mini-Tet (in May as well as again in August-September), CORDS initiated the Accelerated Pacification Campaign to re-pacify areas since the bulk of the Viet Cong fighting forces were destroyed. 66 By the autumn 1968, those indicators had risen to their previous levels and continued to climb until the end of the conflict. 67

63 Scoville 80.
64 Komer, BAW 126. By 1972, the South Vietnamese had approximately 930,000 pacification personnel (500,000 RF/PF paramilitary; 300,000 civil servants; 80,000 National Police; and 50,000 Revolutionary (later Rural) Development Cadre). Adding in the approximately 4 million members of the People’s Self-Defense Force (PSDF)—the hamlet level paramilitary Territorial Security Force makes almost 5 million South Vietnamese engaged in pacification in some way.
65 Herring, LBJ 87 and Scoville 60.
66 Andrade 18.
67 Scoville 80. The Tet Offensive was a tactical victory but strategic loss for the US. Tactically, the US destroyed a large majority of the Viet Cong fighting—though most of the civilian Viet Cong
In the summer/fall 1968, the two main leaders regarding pacification changed. General Abrams replaced General Westmoreland as the MAC-V Commander and Ambassador Colby replaced Ambassador Komer. Though the personalities and outlooks of these two new leaders differed from their predecessors, they continued the emphasis on pacification.68

From 1967 to 1970, US spending on pacification increased 38% from $555 million to $770 million. Breaking those costs down by service, MAC-V’s portion of the budget increased from 81% to 94% whereas USAID decreased from 19% to 5%, with the other agencies proving the remainder.69 While much of the military expenditures supported the paramilitary Territorial Security Forces (RF/PF/PSDF), military expenditures for other CORDS programs increased too. Additionally, MAC-V also supported CORDS by providing access to military resources that previously could not (easily) be accessed by civilian pacification agencies.70

General Abrams described the three years beginning with the Tet Offensive as: 1968 as the military contest; 1969 as expanding security; and 1970 as economic-political-security consolidation.71 In 1968, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (ACP) worked to roll back the gains the Communists had gotten from the Tet Offensive.72 In 1969, pacification efforts succeeded in: 1) increasing the village/hamlet security force (PSDF) to 2-3 million; 2) have 90% of the population in secure area; 3) re-settle a large number of war refugees; and 4) had elected officials in every village.73 By 1970, pacification had all but reached President Thieu’s goal of having 100% of the population living in a HES “C” [Government dominant] or better hamlet and

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68 Scoville 82-83. General Westmoreland became the US Army Chief of Staff and Ambassador was appointed the US Ambassador to Turkey. In fact, Sorley argue in his book A Better War that General Abrams placed a much higher emphasis on pacification that Westmoreland ever did.
69 Scoville 81. In absolute terms, CORDS from $485M to $729M and USAID from $70M to $41M.
70 Scoville 83. Such as: military engineering, transportation and various other Civic Action programs (MEDCAP, DENTCAP, VETCAP)
71 Sorley 223.
72 Sorley 74.
73 Sorler 74, 172. On page 72, Sorley stated 2 million in PSDF, but on page 172 he says 1.3 million PSDF in combat arms and 1.7 million in supporting roles.
90% at HES A [Complete government control] or B [Almost completely secure]. After consistently decreasing since 1963 to 1968, the kilometers of roads and numbers of bridges had finally begun to increase from 1968 onwards. By September 1970, they finally equaled the 1963 amount of roads and bridges and continued to expand for several more years.

With the war winding down from the US perspective, the US began withdrawing its 543,000 American troops. By the end of 1971, almost all of the combat forces were gone and only 139,000 remained (mostly support and service troops). However, by the beginning of 1972, the para-military Territorial Security forces and police forces had dramatically increased in size.

Between 1972 until 1975, North Vietnam launched three separate conventional force invasions of South Vietnam. During the defeated March 1972 invasion, only 95,000 Americans (of which only 9,000 were combat troops) were in Vietnam when Soviet-made tanks spearheaded 120,000 North Vietnamese soldiers. After the last US troops left in March 1973 and after the Summer 1973 Peace Accords, North Vietnam launched another failed offensive. However, during the 1975 Offensive, when the US did not provide its promised support to the South Vietnamese government, the North Vietnamese invaded and conquered South Vietnam using 22 conventional force divisions. In all of these cases, there was little to no support provided by the South Vietnamese Communists (VCI/NLF/VC). In other words, South Vietnam fell to an invasion launched by an external state using conventional forces rather than overthrown by a domestic insurgency.

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75 Sorley 223.
76 Sorley 276.
77 Sorley 306. RF/PF had 55,000 in 1679 Companies and 8,356 Platoons. The PSDF had grown to 4 million members (combat and support). The National Police and National Police Field Force had grown to 116,000.
79 Sorley 362-363. The Defense Attaché Officer was the only US military presence in the country.
Was CORDS an effective pacification program? If so, why?

Research Design & Methodology

The Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) compares systems (cases) that share numerous features but have different outcomes. Doing so allows the researcher to hold many variables constant while examining the differences. This implies that the different outcomes are a result of the differences between the cases. This methodology will answer research question #1 (“was CORDS a successful pacification campaign?”) and research question #2 (“was its success due to its organizational structure?”)

Normally used for area studies because “there is something inherently similar” to countries in the same region at the same time, this monograph will look at the same country over three consecutive time-periods using a time series analysis. This methodology implies that the presence or absence of a key variable explains the outcome and meets the test of internal validity. However, MSSD cases only make inductive (probabilistic) arguments relating the explanatory variable to the outcome. The monograph develops four aspects of the design to ensure construct validity: explanatory variables, time-periods, constant features and outcomes.

Examines three organizational structures for Inter-Agency Operations

Given the current debates between Komer’s belief that “unified management” (Whole of Government) made interagency pacification efforts successful and current doctrine that espouses the Lead Federal Agency approach, the organizational approach to pacification is the explanatory

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82 Landman 29. MSSD derive from John Stuart Mills’ (1843) Method of Difference. The best MSSD cases that look almost identical but have different outcomes. If every variable in the cases are the same but one, the researcher infers that it is that variable that caused the outcome difference.

83 An inductive argument can only make probable arguments—the stronger the inductive argument, the more likely the finding it correct (cogent). But it can never be 100% positive. Whereas an deductive argument is true (sound).

84 Graham Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model heavily influenced the selection of the explanatory variables.
variable to be examined. Additionally, in the absence of a WoG or LFA approach being used, the approach is anarchical and most similar to Graham Allison’s study of bureaucratic politics.

The design would be simple if policies developed instantly and perfectly became governmental action. However, because it takes several layers of the government to execute an action, the design will examine the inter-agency approach at each of those levels. The design defines what constitutes the WoG, LFA or anarchical approach at each of the three levels of government. This case study examines the approach to inter-agency operations at three levels: strategic, operational and tactical, to attempt to understand what made CORDS successful.

The strategic level occurs in Washington, D.C. (figuratively) and is where the actual policy-making occurs. This level is about determining the ends (goals), means (resources), and ways (methods). Using Graham Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM), it involves the President, Department and agency heads, key subordinates members of those Departments and agencies, and even influencers from outside the Executive branch. BPM assumes that the President cannot make all of the decisions by him or herself, the political leaders and bureaucrats below them provide input and suggestions.

If the President designates a single-person or agency as having supervisory and/or directive/tasking authority over others for a certain governmental policy, then they are using a WoG approach. The WoG designee resolves and decides the disagreements between agencies. If the President directs one person or agency to lead the coordination amongst all of the relevant agencies, but does not grant them the ability to force action, they are using an LFA approach. In

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85 Allison 172-173, 175. Allison recognizes there is a difference between making a policy and implementing a policy.
86 It “figuratively” occurs in D.C.
87 Allison 164, 165. Allison called these people: Chiefs (President & Department/Agency Heads) Staffers & Indians (immediate & key underlings to the Chiefs and their subordinates). Ad hoc (Congress, public opinion, press, foreign leaders, etc)
88 In military parlance, there is unity of command.
the absence of any person/agency using a WoG or LFA approach, then, by default, an anarchical approach is being used. Like the LFA approach, it requires the president to resolve all disagreements between the various agencies. However, because governmental policies are “only way stations to action,” nothing ensures governmental action will actually occur.90

Governmental bureaucracy implements policies at the operational level. While the operational level bureaucracy does not make policy, it has the ability to influence the implementation of the policy. At this level, the bureaucrats take the ends (goals), means (resources) and ways (broad guidance on type of action to take) and develop the actual plan. If this policy overlaps with other agencies (such as pacification), it is up to the operational level bureaucrats to not only plan & assess their own program, but also integrate it with the other agencies’ programs.

Due to broadly written governmental policy, there is considerable leeway in how operational level bureaucrats implement it. Two operational level bureaucrats can implement the same policy in vastly different ways depending on their view of it.91 In this case, the operational level is at the national & regional level in Vietnam.92 At this level, if one person/agency has the authority to direct implementation of a policy across all of the elements from the various Departments and agencies, then it is a WoG approach. If one agency directs and/or coordinates amongst several agencies to implement a policy, but the agencies frequently ignore or appeal them to their Department heads in D.C., then it is a LFA approach. If no one person or agency even attempts to coordinate policy implementation amongst the various agencies, then it is an anarchical approach. Additionally, operational level bureaucrats do not (often) directly control the

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90 Allison 172, 173, 178.
91 Allison 172-173, 178. This is why Presidents place their appointees at multiple layers within Departments/Agencies—to ensure that their policies are implemented. “Most oversight, policing and spurring done, not by the President, but by the President’s men or the men who agree with the President.”
92 At these levels, the pacification manager does not directly control any assets, they can only direct their own subordinate units that do have assets.
assets to execute policy. Instead, they direct and control subordinates that in turn execute the policy.

Members of the government’s Departments/agencies execute those policies at the tactical level. At this level, the tactical level personnel exercise miniscule influence on what policies to implement, but can exercise influence on how (efficiently) they are executed.\(^{93}\) For this case study, the tactical level is the Province & District level because they directly control the personnel on the ground executing the policy.\(^{94}\) A WoG approach exists when there is one US organization at the Province/District levels overseeing and synchronizing all of the pacification programs in that Province/District. If multiple Departments/agencies have representatives at the Province/District level that are independently executing policy, but one of them is coordinating between them, this is LFA approach. If no agency is trying to synchronize efforts at the tactical level, then tactical inter-agency operations are anarchical.

**Over three separate time periods**

This monograph examines the US’ pacification efforts over the course of three distinct time-periods. The time-periods correspond to changes in one or more of the explanatory variables. In other words, when the inter-agency approach (WoG, LFA or anarchical) changes at the strategic, operational and/or tactical level, a new time-period begins. Time-periods do not change when key personnel do because, even though the new personnel might develop,

\(^{93}\) Using CORDS advisors as an example, at the strategic level, bureaucrats decide to help better secure South Vietnam (end-goals) by providing 4,000 advisors (means/resources and way-technique). At the operational level, the bureaucrat decides: how big to make the teams, where to send them and to what type of units. The tactical level bureaucrat focuses on the actual execution of the training.

\(^{94}\) In Vietnam, there CORDS advisors at the: 4 Military Regions, 44 Provinces, and 234 Military Districts. There were also 2,552 Village and over 12,000 hamlets, but there was not a permanent US (CORDS) advisory unit at that level. Though advisor teams would work in Hamlets and Villages for certain projects, they were not continually assigned there.
implement or execute policy differently from their predecessors, they are still using the same inter-agency approach.  

Time-period #1 lasts from 1961 until Spring 1966. Though multiple agencies of the US had some type of presence in South Vietnam for many years before 1961, the man-power contributions were quite small relative to size of embassy personnel-strength and all fell under the nominal control of the Ambassador as part of his Country Team. In 1961, President Kennedy dramatically expanded the US effort in assisting Vietnam. As a result, the three-star general running the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) that worked for the Ambassador became a four-star general commanding the Military Assistance Command (MAC) that reported back to D.C. Additionally, three semi-independent agencies (USIA, USAID and CIA) all expanded their efforts and the sizes of their staffs all became much larger than the Ambassador’s embassy staff.

The second time-period is from Spring 1966 to November 1966. At the February 1966 Honolulu Conference meeting between President Johnson and President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, President Johnson decided to focus on “the other war” [pacification] and to make it “a top priority item.” Consequently he appointed Robert Komer as his “Special Assistant to the President for Peaceful Construction in Vietnam” with the mission to “serve as the focal point for the direction, coordination and supervision in Washington of US non-military programs… relating to Vietnam.” This change in the inter-agency approach at the strategic level marks the transition from time-period #1 to #2.

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95 See Sorley, A Better War. He highlighted the changeover from General Westmoreland and Ambassador Komer to General Abrams and Ambassador Kolby.
96 Scoville vi, 5. The actual name of the command was MAC-V (Military Assistance Command-Vietnam). USAID (United States Agency for International Development), USIA (United States Information Agency) and CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). Rough rule of thumb – when the size of the staff of a Department/agency become larger than the Ambassador’s staff in the embassy they were independent.
97 Scoville 23 and Herring, Long 157.
98 NSAM 343.
The third time-period is from November 1966 until 1975. In November 1966, President Johnson directed the creation of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO). OCO existed in Vietnam and reported to Robert Komer in D.C. 99 It brought all of the pacification programs from the various civilian agencies “under one roof”, with Ambassador Porter exercising supervisory power. 100 Four months later in May 1967, President Johnson ordered the creation of CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support). CORDS placed all military and civilian pacification efforts under the supervisory control of Ambassador Robert Komer while simultaneously placing CORDS underneath the control of General Westmoreland’s MAC-V (Military Assistance Command-Vietnam). In other words, CORDS joined the civilian pacification efforts (OCO) and the military’s pacification efforts (RDS- Revolutionary Development Support) together at the operational level. At the tactical level, CORDS replaced multiple advisors from MAC-V, USAID, CIA and USIA at every level (District, Province & Regional) with a single pacification manager. 101 These were changes to the inter-agency approach at the operational and tactical levels. The time-period ends in 1975 when the Peoples’ Army of Vietnam (North Vietnamese) invaded and conquered South Vietnam. 102

OCO was not broken into a separate time-period because it existed only 120 days, most of which were actually re-organizing and re-locating. Therefore, this design assumes OCO had no chance to have an effect on pacification for that short time period. Because the work creating OCO directly supported CORDS and because OCO [people, offices, etc] became the “CO” in “CORDS” it is included in the CORDS phase.

99 McCollum 34. President Johnson designated Robert Komer as a Field Director and gave him the Ambassadorial rank equivalent of a four-star general, making him “equal” to General Westmoreland, even though he reported to him.
100 Scoville 44-45.
102 Birtle 328.
Additionally, the design could end this time-period in 1973 when the last US forces left South Vietnam, except for the Defense Attaché.\textsuperscript{103} It could even end at the end of 1971 when the last US combat forces left Vietnam and only 139,000 troops remained to provide support and service to the South Vietnamese.\textsuperscript{104} However, because the South Vietnamese continued executing the US-initiated pacification programs even after the US left, the design runs time-period #3 until 1975.

With the same amount of various Pacification Programs

The MSSD cases that share the greater number of constant features while having the fewest number of differing (explanatory) variables makes the strongest argument. Further, the more similar those common features are to each other amongst the various cases also strengthens the argument. The constant features do not need to be identical, just similar—with more similar better than less similar.\textsuperscript{105}

This monograph examines the relationship between the inter-agency approach used at the strategic, operational and tactical levels (explanatory variable) to manage the pacification programs’ (constant feature) effect on the Communist insurgency (outcome). In this research, the “best” common features would be if the scope & scale of pacification programs remains constant during the entire time. The greater the fluctuation in the scope and scale of pacification programs, the weaker the internal validity for the MSSD.

The number of programs and their respective missions define the scope of pacification. The amount of resources (funding, personnel, equipment) defines the scale. Due to the number of pacification programs, some of which had sub-programs as well, this research will only examine

\textsuperscript{103} Scoville 362. Except for the Defense Attaché (DATT).
\textsuperscript{104} Scoville 276.
\textsuperscript{105} Landman 29.
the funding aspect of scale. In this research, the only data on funding found was from 1967-1970 (Time Period #3) which shows a 40% increase from $555 to $700 million.\textsuperscript{106}

By the withdrawal of US forces in 1972, the US and South Vietnam governments sponsored ten main pacification programs, most of which had been active since the early 1960s. Eight US agencies sponsored those ten programs that supported security and/or development.

The Territorial Security forces were three related paramilitary forces that provided security, but only in their local area. USAID originally sponsored the RF/PF programs but MAC-V assumed control of the program in the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{107} The Regional Forces (RF) operated in company or battalion-sized elements for the Regional Commander. They conducted patrols, sweeps and night ambushes anywhere in the Region. The Popular Forces (PF) operated in platoon-sized units for the District Commander. They guarded key installations and established ambushes anywhere in the District. Established in 1968 by President Thieu, the Popular Security Defense Force (PSDF) operated in squad to platoon size elements guarding their own hamlets and villages.\textsuperscript{108} Ultimately, the PSDF would grow to over 4 Million members with over 600,000 weapons.\textsuperscript{109} Though varying in quality and quantity over time, US support for these programs ranged from resources (weapons, radios, etc) to training. MAC-V trained the Territorial Defense Forces using seven-person teams (two US officers, three US sergeants and two South Vietnamese soldiers). Eventually MAC-V deployed 350 of these Military Assistance Teams (MAT) to train the RF, PF and PSDF.\textsuperscript{110}

Where the Territory Security force fought against the Viet Cong (VC) fighters, the CIA-sponsored \textit{Phoung Hoang} (“All seeing bird/Phoenix”) targeted the Viet Cong Infrastructure

\textsuperscript{106} Scoville 81.
\textsuperscript{107} Scoville 78.
\textsuperscript{108} McCollum 44-45. South Vietnam had four regions, 243 districts and over 12,000 hamlets. Approximate units sizes: Battalion= 500-800. Company= 100-150. Platoon= 30-40. Squad= 10-15. The RF/PF was originally called the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps respectively.
\textsuperscript{109} Scoville 81.
\textsuperscript{110} McCollom 44-45. Eventually the 353 MATs in CORDS would comprise approximately 50% of the CORDS personnel. On the Vietnamese side, eventually over 400,000 personnel were members of the RF, PF. This comprised 50% of the South Vietnamese personnel contribution to pacification.
(VCI)—the civilian side of the insurgency that created the “shadow governments” and that supported and directed the VC fighting forces. Founded in July 1967, Phoenix aimed to neutralize the VCI by capturing, killing or compromising them. Though the CIA led and supported the Phoenix program, MAC-V provided the military trainers and advisors.\textsuperscript{111} Phoenix program had spill-over with both the Territorial Security and Chieu Hoi programs.\textsuperscript{112}

The Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) program, sponsored by USAID, sought to encourage VCI/VC to leave the Communists and re-integrate into South Vietnamese. This in effect would weaken the VCI/VC by reducing their personnel strength. Called “Ralliers”, the defecting VCI/VC would go to a two-month rehabilitation center to learn a skill and democratic values before going back to their home hamlet or moved elsewhere.\textsuperscript{113} Chieu Hoi had synergistic effect (“spill-over”) with the Phoenix program and the field psychological warfare program.\textsuperscript{114} Originally sponsored by USAID, eventually the South Vietnamese government would run it completely.\textsuperscript{115}

Begun in 1975, the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), the Field Psychological Operations would use a variety of media to target two main audiences (radio, leaflets, touring cultural groups, broadcast speakers, etc.)\textsuperscript{116} To the South Vietnamese population, they would pass the message of how the government was supporting and protecting them. To the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} Andrade and Willbanks 11, 18. Sorley 67-68. Initially called ICEX (intelligence coordination and exploitation program), it was renamed Phoenix in December 1967. It really took off in July 1968 when President Thieu signed a decree supporting it.
\item \textsuperscript{112} As Phoenix increased its effectiveness, it forced the VCI to move at night to avoid being caught- which made it more likely they would be caught by a RF/PF/PSDF ambush or security point.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Phoenix would get information (“actionable intelligence”) from ralliers on the identity and location of other VCI personnel. Some ralliers would even join the CIA-sponsored Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) and participate in operations to capture/kill their former Communist compatriots.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Koch iii.
\item \textsuperscript{116} McCollom 27-28. JUSPAO was comprised of mostly USIS personnel with augmentation from MAC-V Psychological Operations specialists and USAID personnel. Representatives from the South Vietnamese Info service were also in unit. JUSPAO was the United States Information Services (USIA or USIS)
\end{itemize}
VCI/VC, they would pass on stories from ralliers on why they left the Communist movement. This program supported both the security and development aspects of pacification by targeting the VCI/VC and increasing support for the government.

Likewise, the USAID-sponsored Public Safety program also added to security and helped promote civil development by creating, training and supporting the National Police (NP) and the National Police Field Force (NPFF). Where the NP performed traditional police duties of enforcing law and order (civil development), the NPFF performed both normal law and order duties as well as paramilitary duties fighting insurgents (security). USAID contracted former police officers from the US and other countries to teach the Vietnamese police.117

The USAID also sponsored the New Life Development program to engage in a number of rural development activities. Within this program, USAID had branches that worked on all aspects of developing a country: public education, public administration (especially at local government level), economic development, land reform, agriculture, etc.118 The USAID, along with its South Vietnamese counter-parts, would send experts from the various disciplines to advise and train the South Vietnamese in these skills.119

Where the Rural Development program sent advisors that would spend a short amount of time in any one area, the Revolutionary Development (RD) program copied the methods of the VCI by deploying and stationing personnel in a village to win them over to the South Vietnamese side by implementing political, economic and social training & reforms. The Cadre team would not leave a village/hamlet until it was solidly in support of the South Vietnamese government. Began in 1964 by the CIA with name People’s Action Teams (PAT), DoD assumed

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117 McCollum 47. Because the exact date of Public safety program initiation. Because it was sponsored by the USAID, the author assumes it began in the early 1960s with the other USAID pacification programs.

118 McCollum 49-51. Because the exact beginning date for this program could not be located, the author assumes it began in the early 1960s with the other USAID pacification programs.

119 The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) mostly likely sent advisors to assist in agricultural development. The author found sources saying the Department of Agriculture assisted in the overall pacification efforts, but nothing specifically saying the provided agricultural development advisors.
sponsorship in May 1965 with the South Vietnamese government implementing it. The RVN would organize and train volunteers into 59-personnel “RD Cadre” teams and then station them into a specific village and/or hamlet to resist the VCI/VC influence. By the end of the war there were 850 RD Cadre teams.

To assist those people affected by the war, USAID also sponsored the War Victims program. This program aimed at assisting war veterans, war victims and refugees. Getting refugees out of refugee camps and back into their homes contributes to the development of a country.

In addition to providing MAT advisors for the Territorial Security forces (RF/PF/PSDF), MAC-V undertook a variety of Civic Action Projects (CAPs). MAC-V undertook a combination of immediate, low-impact CAPs as well as long-term, high-impact CAPs. Immediate, low-impact CAPs included sending medical doctors, dentists and veterinarians to villages and hamlets to provide care for the people and win their loyalty to the South Vietnamese government. Long-term, high-impact CAPS would include using military engineers to construct, develop and improve roads, airfields and waterways throughout the country.

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120 Herring LBJ 66. Scoville 12
121 Komer, BAW 24. There were 750 Vietnamese teams and 100 Montagnard teams.
122 McCollum 51. Many of these USAID advisors were former Peace Corps volunteers.
123 Komer, BAW 26. These various CAPs are named: Medical = MEDCAP; Dental = DENTCAP; Veterinarian = VETCAP; and Engineer (ENCAP). ENCAPS would not only contribute to the development of South Vietnam, but would also assist in military movements (roads & bridges).
The following Table summarizes all of the various pacification programs. Except for the PSDF and Phoenix Programs, all of the other pacification efforts by the various agencies existed throughout the case study. However, research did not discover funding amounts.

Table 1: Summary of US Pacification Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RF/PF</td>
<td>MAC-V</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Early 1960s</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDF</td>
<td>MAC-V</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field PSYOPS</td>
<td>JUSPAO/USIS</td>
<td>Security &amp; Development</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety (Police)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Security &amp; Development</td>
<td>Early 1960s</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Life (Rural)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Early 1960s</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Development</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Victims</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Early 1960s</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action Projects</td>
<td>MAC-V</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Mid-1960s</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pacification</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1967-1970 $550M to $770M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To see which Organizational Structure for Pacification was most effective

This monograph examines if the inter-agency approach (explanatory variable) used to implement and execute pacification programs in Vietnam (constant feature) made the counter-insurgency more effectiveuccessful (outcome). If the Viet Cong Communist insurgency was destroyed or weaker, that suggests that CORDS was successful. If the insurgency became stronger or overthrew the South Vietnamese government suggests that CORDS was a failure. The fact that South Vietnam fell to a “massive conventional North Vietnamese military force [of 22 Divisions], not a guerilla [Viet Cong] movement” rules out CORDS as a complete failure. 124

Because pacification is a complex mixture of multiple military and civilian programs, there is no one metric to evaluate its effectiveness. Researchers are unable to analyze a single, deterministic indicator. Instead this monograph will synthesize CORDS effectiveness by

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examining a variety of indicators linked to Measure of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) from both the US & South Vietnamese and Viet Cong & North Vietnamese perspectives. It is important to note that CORDS merely advised and assisted the South Vietnamese pacification efforts. Therefore, the monograph will also take into account the actions and effects of the South Vietnamese.

MOPs and MOEs are inter-related in that actors implement action “X” in order to produce outcome/effect “Y”. MOPs measure if the actor is executing action “X” properly while MOEs gauge if the desired outcome/effect “Y” is occurring. Because it is possible to successfully implement action “X” but have no outcome/effect “Y”, MOEs provide better construct validity than MOPs. However, being tangible acts, MOPs are easier to measure than MOEs. Further, since war is a struggle between opposing forces, data on the VC/NLF provides better indicators than on US & RVN. Within each of the four categories, there are a number of indicators. This monograph will first synthesize the indicators within a category and then synthesize the four categories to determine the effectiveness of CORDS for each time-period.

US- South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam) MOP. This is the easiest to measure, but least convincing, category of indicators. This section is not a simple list of the pacification programs, it describes what the various programs did to promote pacification.

As the first line of defense against the Viet Cong combat units, the combat performance of the RF/PF/PSDF affects pacification. If the RF/PF/PSDF increasingly engaged the VC and killed, captured or drove them away, that supports the security aspect of pacification. However, too many contacts could mean the insurgency is growing in strength. On the other hand, no contacts could mean there is no appreciable VCI/VC in the immediate area.

On the other hand, the quantity of the 59-personnel Revolutionary Development Cadres assigned to villages/hamlets does directly affect pacification. As a representative of the South

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125 Joint Pub 1-02, 338 for MOP and 337 for MOE. A rule of thumb/jargon way to differentiate between MOPs and MOEs is the following questions: MOP = “Are we doing things right?” vs MOE = “Are we doing the right thing?”
Vietnamese government, when a RD Cadre teams stay in a village, it forces a confrontation with the VCI/VC in the area. In a sense, the RD Cadres seize and hold onto both physical and human terrain. If the VCI/VC failed to remove or drive-off the RD Cadre team, the village/hamlet is under the control of the government and lost to the VC. The more RD Cadre teams fielded, the greater the positive effect on pacification.

Based on the assumption that “effectiveness is a function of efficiency”, this indicator will look for evidence of efficient operations and asset utilization in both US and South Vietnamese pacification efforts. Specifically, agencies pooling/sharing assets [equipment, personnel] instead of maintaining separate stockpiles is more efficient and frees up limited resources for other activities. For example, Agency “A” using under-utilized assets from agency “B” for project “Z” is more efficient than if “A” either not doing the project or having to procure (buy, rent) that asset for themselves.

MAC-V analysts noted a very strong positive correlation between the kilometers of usable roads & serviceable bridges and success in pacification - with more roads & bridges indicating improving pacification. They hypothesized the link was that as the government’s control of an area grew, it became harder for the insurgents to destroy those key pieces of infrastructure.

One of CORDS pacification efforts run by USAID was the number of refugees that resettled from camps back to their home villages and hamlets. MAC-V analysts assumed this was a good indicator of successful pacification because they believed people would not want to leave the protection of refugee camps unless they felt they would be secure and could prosper back home.

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126 Sorley, A Better War 95. Ambassador Bunker stated that the “ultimate yardstick for success [Blue MOP] … is what the Vietnamese can do for themselves… they’ve got to take over someday.”

127 Sorley, A Better War 223

128 Sorley, A Better War 77. Security and [economic] development was the two main aspects of pacification. Ambassador Bunker remarked, “I think that one of the best indication that you could have, a feeling of assurance on the part of the people.”
Begun in 1967, the CIA-led and MAC-V manned, Phuong Hoang “Phoenix” program targeted the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)—the Communist “shadow governments” the Viet Cong established in villages and hamlet as part of their Maoist-based insurgent strategy.\textsuperscript{129} Because the VCI allowed the main Viet Cong forces to operate by providing support and guidance, removing the VCI would degrade the capabilities and motivation of the main (fighting) forces.\textsuperscript{130} To address the VCI-issue, Phoenix operatives would kill, capture or compromise the “shadow governments” in villages using US-led Vietnamese forces (Provincial Reconnaissance Units- many of whom were former Viet Cong). The MOP for Phoenix is the number of VCI personnel neutralized.\textsuperscript{131} Because this indicator can also have diminishing returns (as the overall pacification becomes more successful, there should be fewer VCI to even to be able to target), it needs to be viewed in conjunction with other indicators.

Because there was no Public Safety (National Police) program before US involvement with South Vietnam, assuming that more police officers has a direct correlation in safety against criminals and insurgents, the mere growth of the National Police is an indicator of increased pacification. Data showing number of criminals and/or insurgents detained/arrested/imprisoned provides better information on the performance of Public Safety.

With further research, this monograph would have MOPs for each of the nine individual CORDS program (security and development)—and some of those have sub-programs that could also be evaluated.

US- South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam) MOE. Because MAC-V did not have open access to the records of the North Vietnamese and insurgent South Vietnamese [Viet Cong], they

\textsuperscript{129} Andrade and Willbanks 11.
\textsuperscript{130} Sorley, A Better War 68.
\textsuperscript{131} Scoville 78. Andrade and Willbanks 18. McCollum 48. Critics has labeled the “Phoenix” as an assassination program. The primary goal was to capture the VCI in order to get intelligence on other VCI members as seen by the 1968 statistics of 12,000 VCI neutralized: 72% captured, 15% killed, and 13% voluntarily surrendered. Phoenix had spill-over with other pacification programs. As it became more effective, it discouraged more VCI/VC members so that they would “rally” to the government under the Chieu Hoi program. Additionally, to avoid capture, it forced the VCI to move frequently at night, which made them more likely to be caught by the local security/paramilitary forces (RF/PF/PSDF)
developed their own MOEs to assess their own performance—the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES).

Initiated in January 1967 under MAC-V CORDS, the HES was a computer-based statistical analysis that calculated the effectiveness of the pacification program on a monthly basis. Every month the District Senior Advisor (DSA) and his small staff would collect data on 101 indicators in 27 objective areas addressing all aspects of pacification for every hamlet in his district and submit to CORDS headquarters in Saigon.132 Given that American DSAs had to collect 101 indicators for each of the, on the average, 51 Vietnamese hamlets in their district every month, the sheer volume of data points needed supports the critiques that the HES provided misleading data.133 However, the pacification experts acknowledged that HES results were “an imperfect system” and could not be completely accurate. Instead, they did see it as a valid instrument for measuring trends and that it was but one data point they used in conjunction with others to assess the pacification program.134


133 Travis iii, 39,40. South Vietnam had: four regions (a military territory), 44 provinces (traditional Vietnamese unit), 234 districts (military territory), and 2553 villages comprised of over 12,000 hamlets.

Created under the direction of the first CORDS Director, Ambassador Komer, the HES is only available for time-period three. Before the HES, MAC-V and other American officials would make “gut-call” assessments on how well South Vietnam was being pacified. While probably not precise, these “gut-calls” demonstrate rough trends.

Additionally, based again on the assumption that effectiveness is a function of efficiency, this monograph will consider subjective assessments made by US personnel on how efficient were their pacification efforts. If an assessor describes pacification as being run in a slip-shod manner, this implies that the pacification program is not as effective as if it was being run in a well-organized way.

Viet Cong- North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) MOP. Designed to eliminate the insurgency, observing how active or inactive the insurgents are gives insight into pacification’s effectiveness. The stated Communist strategy for victory in South Vietnam supports this relationship.

The North Vietnamese leadership of Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh developed the insurgent strategy of dau tranh (“struggle”) as a variation of Mao’s theory of guerrilla warfare. In Mao’s strategy, he visualized the insurgency occurring in three phases with each phase corresponding to the simultaneously rising strength of the insurgents and decreasing strength of the government. Evidence of the insurgency moving from a lower phase to a higher phase

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http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=1722&filename=1723.pdf  Ho Chi Minh served in Mao’s guerilla army that used Mao’s theory of insurgency for two years fighting against the Japanese. Druiker 74. The fact that Giap and Minh modified Mao’s theory to fit the war in Vietnam is in accordance with Mao’s thoughts that every struggle must be tailored to its specific situation.

suggests that pacification was not effective; and if the insurgency moves from a higher phase to a lower phase implies that pacification is working.

Another indicator that pacification is working is the number of Viet Cong (both the VCI leadership in the “shadow governments” and VC fighters) “ralliers” [VCI/VC defectors] that surrendered. Based on the assumption that people leave their cause when it is going badly, increasing and larger number of Chieu Hoi “ralliers” indicate that pacification is working. However, this is a diminishing return indicator because as pacification increases, at some point the number of ralliers will actually decrease. Researchers must compare Chieu Hoi rates with other indicators simultaneously rather than in isolation.

Viet Cong- North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) MOE. This is the hardest to measure but best indicator of pacification’s effectiveness. This category looks at statements, assessments and reports from Communist leaders both in the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam as well as in North Vietnam. These statements can directly or indirectly address pacification’s effectiveness by specifically addressing the performance of the US and South Vietnamese pacification programs or assessing the performance of the insurgents. If the insurgents are doing poorly that conversely implies the counter-insurgents are doing well. These statements can address either the pacification as a whole or merely specific aspects/programs that comprise pacification.

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Phase III “Strategic Offensive”: the insurgents form main force units and fight the government’s military. Mao did not see this strategy as linear and one-way. He predicted that some regions of the country would progress faster towards Phase III and others slower. He also predicted that sometimes the insurgents would have to move” backwards” from Phase III to II or II to I if the government’s strength was too great. Giap’s & Minh’s variation included the fact North Vietnam would provide aid and man-power to the South Vietnamese Communist insurgency.

McCollum 51-52. Koch iii.

Because this insurgency on the Vietnamese version of Mao with a local insurgency (South Vietnam) supported by an external state (North Vietnam), the comments of North Vietnamese have bearing on the results of the counter-insurgency/pacification in South Vietnam.
The performance of the pacification program in each of the three time-periods is based on synthesizing a number of variables in four broad categories.

Table 2: Indicators of Pacification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>US/RVN</th>
<th>VC/DRV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>• Territorial Security actions</td>
<td>• Phase of insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MOP)</td>
<td>• # of deployed RD Cadre Teams</td>
<td>• # of Chieu Hoi ralliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Examples of efficient operations (sharing assets)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Km of roads/# bridges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• # refugees re-settled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• # of VCI kill/captured by Phoenix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• # Police (NPF &amp; NPFF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>• Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)</td>
<td>• VC/SRV leaders evaluation of overall pacification program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MOE)</td>
<td>• Subjective evaluations on effectiveness</td>
<td>• VC/SRV leaders evaluation of specific pacification programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis

With an almost constant amount of Pacification Programs, and…

The US’ implemented eight pacification programs in Time Periods #1 & #2. It added two additional pacification programs (PSDF & Phoenix) in the third time-period.\(^{139}\) The following Table summarizes all of the various pacification programs. “Y” indicates that a program existed in that time-period, with the date the program began also annotated.

\(^{139}\) It is important to note that the South Vietnamese had approximately 100 times more personnel involved in pacification than the US- most of which were in the local security/paramilitary forces (RF/PF/PSDF).
### Table 3: Summary of all Pacification Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Period #1</th>
<th>Period #2</th>
<th>Period #3</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1961-SPRING 1966</td>
<td>TO NOV 1966</td>
<td>TO 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF/PF</td>
<td>MAC-V</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Y: Early 1960s</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDF</td>
<td>MAC-V</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Y: 1963</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field PSYOPS</td>
<td>JUSPAO/USIS</td>
<td>Security &amp; Development</td>
<td>Y: 1975</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety (Police)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Security &amp; Development</td>
<td>Y: Early 1960s</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Life (Rural)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Y: Early 1960s</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Development</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Y: 1964</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Victims</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Y: Early 1960s</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action Projects</td>
<td>MAC-V</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Y: Mid-1960s</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pacification</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1967-1970</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$550M to $770M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ineffective Pacification between 1961 – Spring 1966**

At the strategic-policy level, pacification was organized in an anarchical manner. In 1961, President Kennedy reserved responsibility for coordination and direction of all activities in Vietnam for himself and his immediate staff. He chose not to appoint single managers to oversee operations.\(^{140}\) In 1964, President Johnson established the Vietnam Coordinating Committee inside the State Department to manage policies and operations. This appears to be a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) organization; however, because the VCC “failed to deal in major [substantive] policy decisions or manage operations,” policy-making in Time Period #1 was conducted in an anarchical manner.\(^{141}\)

Based on President Eisenhower’s 1954 Executive Order (EO), it [mistakenly] appears as if the US Ambassador exercises Whole of Government (WoG) control over policy implementation at the operational (Vietnam) level. The EO gave the US Ambassador in each country authority to “manage and coordinate the US mission in all matters.”\(^{142}\) However, most

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\(^{140}\) Scoville 5.

\(^{141}\) Scoville 7.

\(^{142}\) President Dwight Eisenhower, Executive Order 10575, “Administration of Foreign Aid Functions” (8 November 1954), quoted in Scoville 4 (footnote 2). Though this EO has been updated and modified, US Ambassadors still retain this authority. This EO covers all US agency activity in a country, except for combat forces.
Ambassadors instead viewed their mission as “representational and reportorial” and not supervisory. Specifically, during his two tours to Vietnam, Ambassador Lodge primarily acted as the President’s representative to the government of South Vietnam instead of supervising the US efforts in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{143} During his year, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor even created a miniature National Security Council ("The Mission Council") "to supervise and coordinate the various US agencies in Vietnam, to include the whole military effort".

This appears to signal a solid WoG approach. However, because Ambassador Taylor “saw no reason to pull it together”, he destroyed his own authority over the military and civilian agencies. He promised the Joints Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of US Pacific Forces and General Westmoreland (MAC-V Commander) that he would “not interfere” with military matters; and he allowed every US civilian agency to appeal any Mission Council decision to their own agency heads in DC.\textsuperscript{144} Policy-execution was also done in this anarchical method.

With no unified operational control over US agencies, each agency fielded their own organization to implement policy at the operational (Vietnam) level as well as execute policies at the tactical (province and district) levels- and these acted under completely different chains of command. Because a single Vietnamese District Commander could receive advice from several US counterparts simultaneously (MAC-V, USAID, CIA, USIA) in 1964-1965, policy execution (tactical level) was also anarchical.

Pacification in this Time Period was ineffective. The various agencies implemented and executed various projects in an uncoordinated and inefficient manner. During this time the insurgency grew from political cadres in various hamlets and villages creating discontent against the government to small guerrilla bands undertaking small operations to eventually forming

\textsuperscript{143} Scoville 5. Lodge was Ambassador from August 1963 – July 1964 (23 months) and from Jul 1965 to April 1967 (21 months). Taylor was Ambassador from July 1964 to July 1965 (12 months).

\textsuperscript{144} Scoville 7-9,11.
conventional battalions and regiments able to take on and defeat large-scale units of the South Vietnamese Army.\textsuperscript{145}

**Ineffective Pacification between Spring 1966 – November 1966**

At the strategic-policy level, pacification changed from an anarchical (or failed LFA) to a Whole of Government approach- except for military pacification efforts. As his Special Assistant for Peaceful Construction in Vietnam (Pacification), President Johnson tasked Robert Komer to be the “focal point for the direction, coordination and supervision in Washington of US non-military programs.” Komer brought coherence to the DC-level strategic policy for non-military pacification. He did this by reviewing the various pacification efforts by the various agencies together, instead of separately. This allowed him to “expose contradictions and conflicts among them.” Komer could direct change, but it was up to the agencies to decide how to change\textsuperscript{146}. Being 11,000 miles away from Vietnam essentially made Komer an onlooker of the programs that the various agencies executed in country. In other words, he could set guidance but not develop the actual programs.\textsuperscript{147}

President Johnson had also directed Ambassador Lodge to task his Deputy Ambassador, William Porter, to coordinate the non-military pacification efforts of the various civilian agencies. In effect, Porter was to be the operational equivalent of Komer. “The Blow Torch” would issue the guidance from which Porter would develop the actual pacification programs through the various civilian agencies. However, because Ambassador Porter did not have a Presidential directive granting him operational authority over the civilian agencies, he had to convince the civilian agencies (as opposed to directing them). For this reason, at the operational level, pacification was executed in Lead Federal Agency (LFA) manner. Additionally, because

\textsuperscript{145} See Table 9: Pacification Status for Time Period 1 (1961 to Spring 1966) in Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{146} Komer, BAW xi.
\textsuperscript{147} Scoville 24 & NSAM 343.
Ambassador Lodge did not give Porter the time or resources to execute and coordinate pacification efforts, the true organizational approach remained anarchical.  

With pacification at the operational level still anarchical, the execution of pacification programs at the tactical level also remained anarchical. And likewise, pacification results remained ineffective.

Though Komer was able to keep “pacification squarely on the minds of senior officials,” the tyranny of distance (between DC and Vietnam) resulted in miniscule increases in pacification’s effectiveness-- pacified villages increased by less than 5% (approx 55%). Numerous US government officials and academic experts observed and evaluated the US’ programs as ineffective and uncoordinated. Though the massive Tet Offensive would not occur until January 1968, the VC’s recruitment growth and preparation for the surprise offensive increased during this time-period.

Effective Pacification (CORDS) between November 1966 -1975

Ambassador William Leonhart assumed Komer’s duties as the Special Assistant for the President when Robert Komer left DC to assume command of MAC-V CORDS in May 1967. Having all of the same authorities and responsibilities that Komer had, Leonhart continued pacification policy-making in Washington using the Whole of Government approach.

Operational policy-implementation for pacification (national and regional levels in Vietnam) was also Whole of Government. Because the majority of the pacification personnel and resources came from MAC-V, President Johnson established the unified US pacification program, CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support), as a unit within

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148 Scoville 26 & 54.
149 Herring, America’s Longest War 159.
150 See Table 10: Pacification Status for Time Period 2 (Spring 1966 to November 1966) in Appendix 1.
151 NSAM 362.
152 Scoville 53.
This meant that a single manager, Ambassador Komer, could not only review the various civilian and military pacification programs, but could also direct which programs to modify, add or cancel. With an integrated civilian-military staff, CORDS personnel provided a single point for planning and programming guidance on pacification efforts at the national and regional levels.

Policy-execution at the tactical level (Province and District) was also Whole of Government. The hybrid civilian-military structure existed at these levels as well- with civilians commanding military and military commanding civilians. The Vietnamese Province and District Commanders were now only receiving advice from one American advisor- either civilian or military. Those Province and District Advisors also had an integrated civilian-military staff with expertise on the various pacification programs in that area.

According to all four broad areas of observation, pacification in time period #3 was a resounding success. Through the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), as well as many other indicators, over 94% of all of the hamlets in South Vietnam were considered pacified. More importantly, the North Vietnamese/NLF considered the pacification programs (especially Chieu Hoi, Phoenix and PSDF) to have decimated their ranks and made the insurgency ineffective. In fact, when North Vietnam invaded in 1972 and 1975, there was little to no insurgent support.

Suggests that CORDS was effective due to its organizational structure

The MSSD model answers research question #1 and #2. See Table 4: Most Similar Systems Design- Organizational Structure and Success of Pacification. The MSSD model

153 “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson, Washington 1966,” Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS),IV: 262, .

154 NSAM 362 & Scoville 59.
156 See Table 11: Pacification Status for Time Period 3(November 1966 to 1975).
illustrates that the CORDS program was indeed an effective pacification program (RQ#1).

However, it is merely highly suggestive that the improvement in performance (outcome) was a result of the change to Whole of Government approach at the Operational (policy-implement) and Tactical levels (policy-execution) because of the scope and scale of the “constants” also changed.

Table 4: Most Similar Systems Design- Organizational Structure and Success of Pacification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RQ</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Time Period 1</th>
<th>Time Period 2</th>
<th>Time Period 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strategic Organization</td>
<td>Anarchical</td>
<td>Whole of Government (non-military)</td>
<td>Whole of Government (non-military) until late 1967… then none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operational Organization</td>
<td>Anarchical</td>
<td>LFA (non-military)</td>
<td>Whole of Government (military + civilian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tactical Organization</td>
<td>Anarchical</td>
<td>Anarchical</td>
<td>Whole of Government (military + civilian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant Features- Scope (# Pacification Programs)</td>
<td>8 programs</td>
<td>8 programs</td>
<td>10 programs, added…PSDF &amp; Phoenix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant Feature- Scale (Funding)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1967- $485M 1970- $729M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Outcome of Pacification (see Appendix 1)</td>
<td>50% pacified Not efficient Not effective</td>
<td>55% pacified Not efficient Not effective</td>
<td>94% pacified Efficient Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the change in scope of the pacification program, the MSSD model also suggests that pacification improved because of these two new programs. However, the PSDF could be argued to be merely an increase of scale of the Territorial Security program instead of completely new program (scope). If the Regional Force (RF) fielded paramilitary companies and battalions at the regional level and the Popular Force (PF) fielded paramilitary platoons and companies at the District level, it is a logical leap to field paramilitary squads and platoons at the village/hamlet level. Regarding Phoenix, from repeated statements from pacification personnel (including those involved in Phoenix), success was a synergistic result of all of the programs. In other words, though Phoenix had some great successes, it would not have had them if the other programs had not also been operating. These considerations of the PSDH and Phoenix reduce the likelihood that
the increase in scope of pacification programs caused CORDS’s success instead of CORDS’ organizational approach.

**How was CORDS created?**

**Research Design & Methodology**

The design uses the inductive method of pattern-matching to answer the question of “what were the bureaucratic processes that created CORDS?” This methodology is “one of the most desirable strategies” because it compares an already proven pattern (relationship between variables) to the facts of a case study. The more the patterns coincide; the stronger the internal validity of the case study. Because the patterns match, the researcher infers that the same relationship between the variables in the already proven explanation applies to the studied case. In this case, the design uses Graham Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model as the empirically-based pattern (theory) to compare against the facts in this case.

Written in 1971, Graham Allison developed the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) as an alternate way to explain how governments make policy decisions by analyzing the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Prior to his work, political scientists assumed that states made policy decisions in a rational manner, as if a single decision-maker received all of the information, processed & analyzed it and then made the best decision possible. The common assumption is that the President, as the Head of Government, would make the policy decisions, especially for foreign & security policy. In actuality, while he might be the final decision-approver, because of his crowded schedule and finite information, he relies on the bureaucracy below him to help.

Allison found that policy decisions are really the resultant of the bargaining, compromising & negotiating between the bureaucrats that comprise the government. And those bureaucrats occupy positions differentiated horizontally (between different Departments and

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157 Yin 109.
158 Allison.
159 Allison 176.
agencies) and vertically (from the President to lower level bureaucrats.) The bureaucrats are imperfect people with personal and parochial interests that have imperfect information. In BPM, the bureaucrat with the greatest bargaining power has the greatest influence on the policy decisions. Allison determined that a bureaucrat’s bargaining advantages derive from: 1) formal authority and responsibility; 2) actual control over resources; 3) expertise and control over information; 4) ability to affect other players’ objectives in other “games”; and 5) personal persuasion with other players.

This monograph will not examine the actual interplay between bureaucrats that led up to the decision to create CORDS. With eight agencies (Defense, State, USAID, CIA, USIS, Treasury and Health-Education-Welfare and Agriculture) involved with pacification losing control of their resources and personnel to a single person, Robert Komer, the monograph assumes that a tremendous amount of bureaucratic fighting occurred. What makes this interesting is the fact that Robert Komer, a single bureaucrat, successfully “took” assets from established bureaucracies to make his own organization (CORDS). He obviously wielded a tremendous amount of bargaining power. Which of the five bargaining advantages did he have?

The design will use the five sources of bargaining power as developed by Allison as the established theory for pattern-matching. The design will look for evidence of action or statements within each of the five sources of bargaining power to see which ones Komer possessed. The

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160 Allison 162, 164, 165. Allison labeled the levels: Chiefs (President and Department/agency heads), Staffers (Under/Deputy/Assistant Secretary level) and Indians (the bureaucrats below the Staffers). He also identified the ad hoc players that affect the process, such as: Congress, press, public opinion, etc.
161 Allison 168. Personal interests- the bureaucrats brings their world view and value to their job and its affects how they perceive issues. Parochial interests- “where you stand depends on where you sit”.
162 Allison 168. He also identifies that influence is also a function of: 1) the skill & will in using the bargaining powers; and 2) other player’s perceptions of another bureaucrats bargaining power and skill/will in using it.
163 Allison 169.
165 This relates to research question # 3 (―What were the bureaucratic processes that established CORDS”) because the actions he took might be necessary to re-create in order to create CJATFs in the future.
Design will focus on the creation of CORDS and its first months of existence while it was getting established. The Design will not focus on the bureaucratic dynamics once CORDS was an established organization. The five variables of bargaining power are:

1. **Formal authority and responsibility.** The highest authority in a government is the President. Bureaucrats wield greater bargaining power the closer they are to the President and/or the more access they have to the President. The more people between a bureaucrat and the President, the less bargaining power the bureaucrat wields.

2. **Control over resources.** If a bureaucrat has the power to give or take resources (personnel, funding, material, etc) to an activity, they have power over that activity.

3. **Expertise and control over information.** A subject matter expert wields greater power than a non-expert. That expertise could be from possessing truly unique knowledge or merely having access to key knowledge that others need along with the ability to decide who gets or does not get it.

4. **Ability to affect players in other games.** If bureaucrat “A” needs help from bureaucrat “B”, “A” can enlist “B”s help by helping “B” get something he wants.\(^{166}\)

5. **Personal persuasion with other players.** When a bureaucrat uses their personality, charisma and /or influence on another key player.

**Analysis**

Any analysis of bureaucratic politics must begin by indentifying the various key bureaucratic players. Because of the inter-agency aspects of this case-study, the heads of each of those agencies (the “Chiefs”) will be the major focus. Interestingly, although they all work for the Secretary of Defense, there are several DoD “Chiefs” because they have statutory or *de facto* access directly to the President (but for more narrow areas than the Secretary of Defense himself.) Because of the US-South Vietnam alliance and relationship, the President of South Vietnam is also a player.

\(^{166}\) In simpler terms, “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine.”
### Table 5: List of Key Policy-makers ("Chiefs")

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>BPM role</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President (POTUS)</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Most powerful of all players, but relies on others for information and execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of Republic of Vietnam</td>
<td>Thieu</td>
<td>Ad Hoc</td>
<td>Most impact of RVN government (which US was advising) and has access to POTUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC Advisor</td>
<td>Rostow</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>In charge of the inter-agency policy-coordination in White House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>Rostow</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>In charge of diplomacy and supervises USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Ambassador to Vietnam</td>
<td>McNamara</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>POTUS representative to South Vietnam President; “in charge” of all US activities in RVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>McNamara</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Senior representative for DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joints Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Wheeler</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Senior military representative for DoD and military advisor to POTUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Commander</td>
<td>Sharp</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Supervises all military activity in Pacific area, to include Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC-V Commander</td>
<td>Westmoreland</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Reports thru PACOM thru JCS thru SecDef to POTUS… however, as direct appointment by POTUS, &amp; due to POTUS interest in Vietnam, also reports straight to POTUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant for Pacification</td>
<td>Komer</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Member of NSC but had “direct access” to POTUS for pacification in Vietnam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Komer stated his “clear grant of presidential authority and solid presidential backing” enabled the “unified management” (Whole of Government) approach to be used at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of pacification.\(^{167}\)

**At the Strategic-level (Washington, D.C.)**

The decision to integrate policy-making and to create an organization in Vietnam to exercise “unified management” of pacification in Vietnam was a result of Komer’s successful leveraging of multiple sources of bureaucratic power. To Komer, putting the unified management of pacification (CORDS) underneath MAC-V was the logical choice because they had 90% of the people and resources.\(^{168}\) This would primarily require the State Department, USAID and CIA to give up people and resources to MAC-V as well as having the Department of Defense (MAC-V) assume responsibility for non-military programs.

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\(^{167}\) Komer, BAW 169.

\(^{168}\) Scoville 33.
After the Honolulu Conference, to emphasize his focus on the “other war” in Vietnam, President Johnson appointed Robert Komer as his Special Assistant for Peaceful Construction in Vietnam.\(^{169}\) The President’s NSAM was sent to the eight heads of every agency that had some role in pacification: Defense, State, USAID, USIA, CIA, Treasury, Agriculture and Health-Education-Welfare. Johnson informed the eight department/agency heads that “he [Komer] will have direct access to me” to carry out his mission as the focal point of directing, coordinating and supervising non-military pacification programs. The combination of supervisory authority over eight departments’ non-military pacification programs with direct access to the President gave Komer a tremendous amount of formal authority and responsibility.

Komer also wielded a tremendous amount of informal influence with the President by his personal persuasion and charisma. Komer had four traits influential with President Johnson: his scholastic background, personality, advocacy and loyalty. Even though he was a Middle East expert, Johnson saw him as a “Harvard man”, and Johnson considered Ivy Leaguers, particularly those from Harvard, as being able to doing anything.\(^{170}\) Komer’s “Blowtorch” moniker for being an “abrasive, impatient, no-nonsense man” that got results also fit with Johnson’s method of doing things.\(^{171}\) Komer’s work in the NSC as the “one-man, full-time, non-stop lobby for pacification” meshed well with the President’s emphasis on the “other war” as being the foreign equivalent of his domestic “Great Society”.\(^{172}\) These three specific traits plus his broad trait of personal loyalty to the President let Komer wield a great amount of persuasion on Johnson.

The ability to provide information to key policy-makers also increases the bargaining power of a bureaucrat.\(^{173}\) In this case, Komer knew President Johnson’s need for enormous

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\(^{169}\) NSAM 343.

\(^{170}\) Herring //LBJ// 71


\(^{172}\) Herring //LBJ// 71.

\(^{173}\) Allison specifically stated the ability to control access to information. A logical corollary would be if no one else provides the information, then the person that does is “controlling” it.
amounts of detailed information. Being the sole source of that information increased Komer’s influence even more.\textsuperscript{174}

Even with this influence with the President, Komer also sought support for other key players in policy-making by showing them how creating CORDS underneath of MAC-V could help them. To the MAC-V Commander, General Westmoreland, he argued that Westmoreland would have everything to gain and nothing to lose because “his [Westmoreland’s MAC-V] empire was being extended to all of the pacification [more funding, personnel & resources] and at the same time he was being relieved of the burden for it “because failure would be put on Komer’s head.”\textsuperscript{175} Additionally, because of the President’s keen interest in pacification, it would not benefit Westmoreland to appear to not to support it.\textsuperscript{176} Komer sold the Joints Chiefs of Staff on CORDS because it would increase the role, and importance, of US military forces in Vietnam—which would result in more funding for Defense.\textsuperscript{177} With that support, Komer also sold his idea to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) and the National Security Advisor (Walt Rostow).\textsuperscript{178}

After using his NSC-role as advisor to provide information to the President that pacification was not working, Komer convinced Secretary McNamara to brief the unified management for pacification underneath MAC-V (CORDS) concept to the President.\textsuperscript{179} The combined influence of all the Secretary of Defense, Joints Chiefs, MAC-V Commander and the NSC Advisor with the President’s belief the current approach (“anarchical”) to pacification overcame the opposition of the other agencies to creating CORDS. Once the President approved

\textsuperscript{174} Jones 115. The various Department/agency heads all had the same information (at least regarding their own departments). However, since pacification in Vietnam was such a small portion of their global efforts, they rarely brought up the specific subject.

\textsuperscript{175} Sheehan 656,657.

\textsuperscript{176} Scoville 33. “I’m not asking for it, but I believe my headquarters could take it in stride and perhaps carry out this important function more economically and efficiently than under the present arrangement.”

\textsuperscript{177} Scoville 35.

\textsuperscript{178} Jones 112.

\textsuperscript{179} Jones 112.
the concept for CORDS, Komer exerted control over information again by personally writing the NSAM. 180

Komer’s use of his formal authority & responsibility, informal power from persuasion & charisma with the President and other “Chiefs”, control of information to the President and his ability to “sell” CORDS to other “Chiefs” enabled a single bureaucrat to obtain the resources from eight departments & agencies to create CORDS. 181 Because, as a member of the National Security Council, Komer did not have any resources, he could not have used “control over resources” as a way to influence the creation of CORDS.

At the Operational-level (Nation and Regions of Vietnam)

However, because “decisions are only way-stations to actions” and a policy-decided does not mean a policy-implemented, the operational bureaucratic politicking about standing-up CORDS from the assets of eight agencies also merits study. In this case, Komer again exerted bureaucratic power with both connections to DC as well as to the President’s civilian and military representatives in Vietnam (Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland) to implement CORDS successfully.

Pejoratively called “the Guildenstein at the court of Lyndon [B. Johnson]”, Komer arrived in Vietnam in May 1967 with a large amount of DC-based formal and informal authority. 182 Given President Johnson’s focus on pacification combined with Komer’s “direct relationship with the President … as a member of his ‘household’” gave Komer a large amount of informal authority regarding the in-country “Chiefs” (Westmoreland, Bunker). 183 To execute the integrated pacification program, President Johnson appointed Komer as the Deputy Commander for Pacification Military Assistance Command-Vietnam with the civilian rank of ambassador and

180 Jones 105.
181 NSAM 362
182 Herring LBJ 82.
183 Scoville 28, note 24, Interview with Komer, 6 November 1969.
the equivalent military rank of four-star general. This granted him formal authority to both the military and civilian sides of pacification.184

He maintained this DC-based source of power by maintaining his contacts in DC as well personally briefing the Secretary of Defense on CORDS during in-country visits as well as flying back to Washington to brief the President and other key players personally. 185 All of these actions ensured that the in-country “Chiefs” - General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker, as well as the other senior representatives from the other agencies- knew Komer remained “the President’s man.”186

Though this DC-based authority probably affected the perceptions of the Vietnam-based “Chiefs” (heads of MAC-V, State, USAID, USIA, CIA) the authority would have less influence on the personnel within those agencies- especially if they wanted to “bureaucratically foot-drag” against the implementation of CORDS. Komer would need authority and influence from the Vietnam-based “Chiefs” to overcome this potential problem. He received this Vietnam-level authority from both the military and civilian sides.

On the military side, General Westmoreland conducted “MAC-V Commanders Conferences” on a regular basis that covered a wide-variety of topics pertaining to the war. The May 13, 1967 conference was devoted almost exclusively to one topic- pacification under the CORDS program.187 With Ambassador Bunker- the US Ambassador to Vietnam, Westmoreland spent most of the conference discussing the mission, rationale and organization of the new civilian-military hybrid organization, all under the direction of Ambassador Komer.

184 NSAM 362. For this reason Komer has been called “America’s first civilian general”. He exercised command authority inside of a military organization. Some sources say he was three-star military equivalent. Since Westmoreland’s military deputy, Creighton Abrams, was four-star general, Komer would have insisted on the same status and had the mean to insure it by writing the NSAM. Komer even insisted on having four-star license plates put on his car like Westmoreland and Abrams. He was actually given a “Secretary of the Army” plate modified with four general stars—a hybrid plate for civilian-military hybrid unit. Sheehan 654.
185 Scoville 74.
186 Scoville 74.
187 Scoville 62.
Westmoreland followed up this broad support for Komer with a specific written directive that CORDS, under Ambassador Komer, would “supervising [sic] the formulation and execution of all military and civilian plans, policies and programs.”\footnote{MAC-V Directive 10-12, quoted in Scoville 68 (footnote 18).} This directive emphasized that Komer was not a mere political advisor to MAC-V; rather he would exert command authority over the civilian-military CORDS organization.

Westmoreland solidified his support to Komer and CORDS’ broad pacification mission during an argument over the control of the CIA-sponsored Phoenix program. The decision was about whether to put it under the J2 (Intelligence) or CORDS. The J2 argued that Phoenix should fall under the J2 because of Phoenix’s close relations to intelligence gathering. Komer argued that Phoenix, with its focus on the Viet Cong Infrastructure, was but one more pacification program. In a meeting with all of the generals on the MAC-V staff, Westmoreland ended the argument and cemented Komer’s authority by declaring, “The Ambassador [Komer] is right… I think we ought to do it this way.”\footnote{Scoville 79.}

Komer received the same support and authority from the civilian side. In November 1966, all of the civilian pacification programs of the various civilian agencies had been merged into the Office of Civil Operations (OCO). Due to Komer’s reputation as the “Blow Torch”, when the White House announced the formation of CORDS underneath Komer’s leadership, “a cold chill went down the collective bureaucratic spine in Vietnam.”\footnote{McCollom 34, note 4, William R Corson, The Betrayal (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1968): 213.} However, in that same announcement, Ambassador Bunker quietly made it clear to the American civilian agencies that they would comply fully with the new structural arrangement.\footnote{William Colby, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989):209, quoted in Ross Coffey, “Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level: CORDS- a Model for the Advanced Civilian Team” (master’s theses, School of Advanced Military Studies, 25 May 2006): 48 (footnote 147), http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=728&filename=729.pdf (accessed on 10 October 2008).}
Bunker followed up that verbal support with specific actions that granted Komer more authority on the civilian side. Though the pacification efforts of the various civilian agencies fell underneath CORDS, the parent agencies continued to fund and man those programs (State, USAID, USIA, CIA, et al). Those same agencies also had continued presence in Vietnam for programs other than pacification. The parent agencies all fell under the authority of Ambassador Bunker and met with him through the Mission Council and its Executive Committee. Bunker placed Komer on both of those committees so that he could raise issues regarding the pacification efforts of the various civilian agencies to the in-country director and to the Ambassador himself.192 Komer also wrote the pacification portion of Bunker’s weekly message to President Johnson—writing the report for someone is a way in which to control information.

Another method for an agency to show support for a program is to provide it resources. In a joint MAC-V, USAID, JUSPAO (USIA) and OSA (Office of Special Assistant-CIA) directive signed by the in-country “Chiefs”, all of the agencies agreed to provide administrative and logistical resources on a non-reimbursable [free] basis.193 Directing your organization to provide assets to another one at no cost indicates support for the other program.

Komer now had four ways to pressure the various agencies that ran pacification programs: through MAC-V to the Department of Defense to NSC; directly to the directors in Vietnam; through Ambassador Bunker to the Secretary of State to the NSC; and directly into the NSC through his replacement as Special Assistant for Pacification, Ambassador Leonhart. Komer would use all four of these venues to ensure pacification’s implementation.

However, given that CORDS was merely advising the South Vietnamese and that there were over 100 Vietnamese involved with the various aspects of pacification for every one

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192 Scoville 76, 77.
193 General Westmoreland (MAC-V), Director McDonald (USAID), Director Zorthian (JUSPAO-USIA), Special Assistant Hall (OSA-CIA), “Administrative and Housekeeping Support for MACCORDS”, Joint MAC-V, USAID, JUSPA/OSA Directive Number 1-6 (January 5, 1968), quoted in McCollom 42 (footnote 2). However, NSAM 362 did direct that “logistic and administrative economies through consolidation and cross-servicing.” See Appendix 4.
American, the bureaucratic role from the Vietnamese side cannot be ignored. Though he was only an *ad hoc* player from the US perspective, President Thieu was a “Chief” in the South Vietnamese government. Komer gained his support for pacification, to include unified management, by having more meetings with him that any other American in Vietnam, except for the Ambassador.\(^{194}\) Additionally, wanting to improve and better support the paramilitary Territorial Security (RF/PF and later PSDF), further won over President Thieu because of his similar interest.\(^{195}\) The Vietnamese would mirror-image CORDS unified management by creating their own single manger for pacification—the Central Pacification and Development Council.\(^{196}\)

By combining his authority from the President, the authority from the in-country “Chiefs” and the host-nation leadership, Komer successfully brought about the implementation of CORDS in Vietnam.\(^{197}\) The “Chiefs” provided their support by: broad announcements to their respective organizations, specific directives, specific policy announcement (Phoenix in J2 vs CORDS), providing “free” resources and granting Komer direct and immediate access to them.

**At the Tactical-level (Provinces & Districts of Vietnam)**

Bureaucratic politics is germane to the tactical level as well because the best plan developed at the operational level still needs to be executed. Even if the operational policy-implementers thoroughly synchronize the various pacification programs, they cannot plan for every contingency and variation. In an anarchical policy-execution approach, the various pacification program managers’ (from the various agencies) only incentive is to execute their program well, regardless of how it fits with other pacification programs.

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\(^{194}\) McCollom 37


\(^{196}\) Scoville 80.

\(^{197}\) The idea of the three key in-theatre (operational/policy-implementation) leaders (MAC-V Commander, US Ambassador and Vietnam President) from Ross Coffey, “Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level”: 49.
Based on Graham Allison’s premise that “where you stand [on an issue], depends on where you sit [the job you hold]”, in anarchical policy-execution (tactical) level, the various pacification program managers from the various agencies have no incentive to integrate their program with others. In a LFA approach, the only pacification manager with a vested interest is the one from the lead agency. CORDS used united management by putting all pacification programs underneath one person at the District & Province (tactical) levels. This Whole of Government approach created a “bureaucracy with a vested interest in [all aspects of] pacification.”

Additionally, CORDS developed organizational loyalty by using two other techniques identified by Graham Allison. In CORDS, personnel wrote the evaluations on all of their subordinates, regardless of their service or agency. Assuming that every person is concerned about their career and will work to get a good evaluation, CORDS influenced their personnel to work hard to improve pacification to further their own careers.

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198 Allison 168.
199 Komer, Look 23.
200 Komer, Look 26.
201 This is an example of influence being a function of: “the ability to affect players’ objectives in other games.” In this case the “other game” is a person’s career.
Conclusion

By following protocols on construct validity, internal validity and reliability, established political science methodologies support Robert Komer’s claims that successful pacification took, “a clear grant of Presidential authority and solid Presidential backing… [to create] unified management” under the CORDS organization.202

Table 6: Most Similar Systems Design- Organizational Structure and Success of Pacification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RQ</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Time Period 1</th>
<th>Time Period 2</th>
<th>Time Period 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strategic Organization Approach</td>
<td>Anarchical</td>
<td>Whole of Government (non-military)</td>
<td>Whole of Government (non-military) until late 1967… then none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operational Organization Approach</td>
<td>Anarchical</td>
<td>LFA (non-military)</td>
<td>Whole of Government (military + civilian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tactical Organization Approach</td>
<td>Anarchical</td>
<td>Anarchical</td>
<td>Whole of Government (military + civilian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant Features-Scope (# Pacification Programs)</td>
<td>8 programs</td>
<td>8 programs</td>
<td>10 programs, added… PSDF Phoenix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant Feature- Scale (Funding)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1967- $485M 1970- $729M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Outcome of Pacification (see Appendix ?!)</td>
<td>50% pacified Not efficient Not effective</td>
<td>55% pacified Not efficient Not effective</td>
<td>94% pacified Efficient Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Most Similar System Design (MSSD) convincingly suggests that the US and South Vietnamese pacification efforts succeed in the time-period from November 1966 until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.

However, MSSD is merely highly suggestive that the Whole of Government (unified management) approach at the policy-implementation (operational) and policy-execution (tactical) levels resulted in successful pacification—with the Whole of Government (unified management) at the policy-making (strategic) level as an antecedent condition. Because the scope and scale of the constant features (pacification programs) changed from time-period two to three, the research cannot convincingly state that the change to Whole of Government (unified management)

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202 Komer, BAW 169.
approach at the operational and tactical levels resulted in successful pacification. These changes
do not negate the influence of the affect of organizational change on pacification performance,
but it does reduce the certainty of the conclusion.

To implement the Whole of Government approach at the policy-making (strategic) level
required not only strong support from the President, but also from other key “Chiefs” (Secretary
of Defense, Joint Chiefs, MAC-V Commander, National Security Advisor). Komer was able to
influence the decision of the president and the other “Chiefs” by his personal persuasion and
charisma, control/providing of key information, and ability to “sell” his idea to others by showing
how it would help them.

To successfully plan and implement pacification policy in-theater (Vietnam), not only did
Komer need Presidential backing, but also the support from the key agency heads (“Chiefs”) in
Vietnam itself. Without their backing it would have been much more difficult to overcome
bureaucratic inertia and resistance. Perhaps even more important was the support of the host-
nation’s leadership. With the exponentially larger South Vietnamese investment in pacification
(personnel-wise), the US merely advised and supported. President Thieu’s support was crucial to
institute change on the South Vietnamese side.

To execute pacification policies successfully, Komer created an organizational structure
in which every member- civilian and military- had a stake in the entire pacification program
(civilian and military programs). Within CORDS, civilians held all of the top leadership
positions at the national & regional level and 50% of the key leader and staff positions at the
Province & District levels—even though they only comprised approximately 15% of the CORDS
strength.

**Application to Inter-Agency Operations Today**

Based on the CORDS case-study, combining the likelihood of increased need of
interagency operations to address issues that cut across normal agency boundaries with the
current interagency doctrine, this case study suggests that the US will experience a large number of interagency failures because of lack of unified management. Even the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols approach would not succeed because it merely integrates the civilian agencies at the operational level.

Strategically, current doctrine calls for the Lead Federal Agency approach. For reconstruction & stabilization, the President has designated the State Department as the Lead Federal Agency.203 However, NSPD-44 only grants the State Department the mandate to “prepare, plan and conduct” reconstruction operations. It lacks the authority to “supervise” other contribution of other agencies. The Department of State’s current situation is analogous to its ineffective “Vietnam Coordination Committee” in 1964.

Operationally, regardless of the issue, for any interagency contribution to Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF), current military doctrine relegates interagency representatives to an advisory staff that is subordinate to the Commander-- with the role of merely passing information between the JIATF and their parent agencies.

However, there are currently two notable exceptions to current LFA doctrine. These organizations have adopted a CORDS-like organizational approach by integrating civilian & military personnel. The Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) is a Coast Guard-led JIATF that fights drug smuggling into the US from the Caribbean and Central/South America. The 500-person JIATF has an integrated command structure that includes members of all of the services along with a number of US law enforcement agencies as well as representatives from 11 countries- including the UK, France and Netherland.204 Activated in October 2007, Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the United States’ newest Regional Combatant Command (RCC).

203 Bush, NSPD-1.
Unlike the other RCCs which put their inter-agency personnel in Joint Inter-Agency Coordination (or Working) Groups (JIACG or JIAWG), AFRICOM has integrated civilians into its structure and even has placed them into key command and staff positions.  

**Weaknesses & Counter-Arguments**

**Of Facts**

One of the most glaring weaknesses in this case study is the fact that Vietnam fell to the North Vietnamese. While this seems compelling at first, further examination disproves it the fall of Vietnam as a weakness to the argument about CORDS effectiveness. First, South Vietnam fell to North Vietnamese conventional forces supported with Soviet-made tanks, not insurgents clad in “black pajamas”. Secondly, the mission of CORDS was to assist the South Vietnamese in pacifying their own rural areas of communist insurgents, not to defeat an invasion force. CORDS did succeed in that mission as evident by the fact that during both the 1972 and 1975 invasions by North Vietnam, almost no insurgent force rose up in arms to assist the Northern troops.

Another counter-argument is that the 1968 Tet Offensive all but destroyed the Viet Cong and there was not much for CORDS to do. In other words, the Viet Cong’s suicidal offensive did more to pacify South Vietnam than CORDS. If this was true, then the Hamlet Evaluation System’s (HES) statistical rating for pacification would have risen immediately after Tet. They did not. Instead, the HES rates declined for several months and did not start recovering until after the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (ACP) began. Additionally, while the Tet Offensive did kill a large number of the Viet Cong fighting forces, the Viet Cong Infrastructure suffered almost no casualties. The VCI were the political cadre that developed and directed the insurgent force,

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but did not fight. With the VCI remaining, they could always re-recruit more personnel, albeit from a diminish manpower pool.

**Of Design & Methodology**

Though this design thoroughly explores the question of CORDS’ effectiveness in Vietnam, it is merely a sample of one. Accordingly, it is hard to generalize from a case-study with a sample of one-case. This means that external validity is merely inferred.

A related critique is that this study could suffer from indeterminate research design—in that there are more independent variables (or phenomena) than there are cases. This prevents the researcher from determining the actual independent variable in the relationship. In this case, the variables are the strategic, operational and tactical organizational structure with the outcome being successful pacification. However, using the MSSD methodology with three separate time periods counters that criticism.

Regarding the MSSD structure itself, the three time-periods were not equal length. Time period #2 (Spring 1966 – November 1966) being approximately nine months, may not be long enough to allow any effects from using Whole of Government approach at the strategic level to occur. To counter this, the MSSD could be re-divided into two time-periods only: 1961 – November 1966 and November 1966-1975. The results would be the same.

Regarding the third research question about the bureaucratic processes that led to the creation of CORDS, the pattern-matching design assumes that all five variables of bargaining power were of equal influence and/ or that they are independent of each other. It is more likely that the variables of bureaucratic influence differ in importance. In fact, it is possible that the designation of formal authority & responsibility is a result of the other four areas of influence.

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207 Yin 21. Landman 53

208 Landman 53.
Further research could clarify this question. In fact, this could provide more clarity to the topic of creating JIATFs in that the establishment of formal authority from the President is the desired outcome, then it is a matter of study to see what it required to get that formal authority.

**Areas for Further Research**

At the strategic, policy-making level, President Obama’s administration appears, in its first weeks, to be leaning towards restructuring the National Security Council to have a stronger role in policy-making and supervising, instead of merely coordinating. Additionally, the new Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michelle Flournoy, was one of the Lead Investigators in the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study that advocated a stronger role of the NSC. She also has written an article advocating using a more CORDS-like approach for inter-agency operations. This points are relevant in that they might presage and change to inter-agency operations in the US government.

To overcome the indeterminate design and external validity critiques, further study would look at other examples of JIATFs with different organizational approaches as well as scope (mission) and scale (size). JIATF-South, Africa Command and S/CRS all come to mind. Also, study of inter-agency task forces in which the military has little or no presence.

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209 The idea for examining the relationships between the five variables of bureaucratic bargaining power came from comments from the Table Chair (Professor Anthony Bertelli, University of Georgia) and Table Discussant (Professor Anne O’Connell, University of California- Berkeley) from Table 39-4 “Bureaucratic Control –Operations) at the 2009 MidWest Political Science Association (MPSA) Annual Conference.

This study looked at how key people influenced the creation and “standing-up” of CORDS. It did not examine the attributes of the personnel that excelled in this hybrid civil-military organization. Interestingly, the first and second CORDS Directors (Komer and Colby) as well as the first four regional directors (two USAID, one CIA and one USIA), all had prior service in the military. This raises the question: did their prior experience in the military help them succeed in a hybrid civil-military structure? Or did it make it easier for the military personnel to work for civilians that had already worn a uniform? If either or both of these questions are “yes”, this has implication for military personnel management in that the government should encourage military officers to stay in the broader “security professional” community.\(^{211}\)

Where this area for further research would look at prior experiences (especially military) of senior CORDS personnel, it would also be interesting to follow the careers of junior CORDS personnel- military and civilian- to see how their experiences in a civil-military JIATF for Security, Stability, Transition & Reconstruction (JIATF-SSTR) affected their future careers. For example, as the chief negotiator for the Dayton Peace Accords that resulted in the US military’s deployment for a pacification mission, Richard Holbrooke began his government career as USAID officer in CORDS in South Vietnam.\(^{212}\)

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211 Clarke and Flournoy, BGN 2 39.
212 Professor Jacob Kipp (Monograph Director) suggested the idea of tracing the careers of junior CORDS officers from Vietnam to see how their CORDS experience affected them.
Lastly, the efforts and program of the South Vietnamese pacification programs suffer from a lack of research. No matter how much the CORDS program did and funded, the US ultimately only advised the South Vietnamese pacification efforts.
APPENDIXES
**Appendix 1 - Performance & Effectiveness Indicators for Pacification**

Table 8: Performance & Effectiveness Indicators for Pacification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Blue (US/RVN)</th>
<th>Red (NLF/VC/SRV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Performance (MOP)| • Territorial Security actions  
                   | • # of deployed RD Cadre Teams  
                   | • Examples of efficient operations (sharing assets)  
                   | • Km of roads/# bridges  
                   | • # refugees re-settled  
                   | • # of VCI kill/captured by Phoenix  
                   | • # Police (NPF & NPFF) | • Phase of insurgency  
                   | • # of Chieu Hoi ralliers |
Table 9: Pacification Status for Time Period 1 (1961 to Spring 1966)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>US &amp; RVN</th>
<th>NLF, VC &amp; SRV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Performance (MOP) | 1. “The most glaring operational failure of the Mission Council was that the Council failed to reduce competition between agencies for resources.” (Scoville 10)  
2. The number of bridges and kilometer of roads decreased from 1963 to Spring 1966. (Sorley 223)  
3. By 1965, almost every of the 243 districts had military advisory teams as well as teams from various civilian agencies... “it was no rarity for several American agencies to present conflicting advice to South Vietnamese officials.” (Scoville 7)  
4. The US deployed forces to prevent the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. (Komer Clear 18)  
5. Report assessing pacification in 1966: “Staggering disorganization...everyone is involved, and no one is in charge” (Herring, LBJ, 69). | 1. Insurgency progressed from Phase I to Phase II  
2. 1955: Communist infrastructure started developing after Diem formed government in 1955 in rural areas  
3. 1960: North Vietnam formed the National Liberation Front (NLF) to control and develop the southern communist movement. Formed guerrilla force—People Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF)(aka Viet Cong-VC)  
4. 1962: PLAF (VC) launched small scale attacks against government outposts and small units  
5. 1963: PLAF (VC) formed conventional units in Battalion and eventually Regiment sized  
6. 1963: North Vietnamese units (Peoples’ Army of Vietnam-PAVN) infiltrate into South Vietnam  
7. 1964: North Vietnam forms and deploys Central Office for Vietnam (COSVN) into South Vietnam to control all PAVN units as well as NLF/PLAF(VC)  
8. When President Johnson came into office, NLF (insurgent movement) controlled much of the territory and population. (Herring, LBJ, 65)  
9. From 1959 to 1965, the Viet Cong grew 3,000 to 30,000 full-time fighters and 80,000 militia-men. Additionally North Vietnam was also sending troops and material. (Birtle 323)  
10. By Spring 1965, the South Vietnamese were losing the equivalent of one battalion and one district per week. (Birtle 323) |

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Effectiveness (MOE)

1. 50% of the rural population was in Viet Cong control. (McCollum I and Herring LBJ 65)

2. Secretary of Defense McNamara: “I don’t think we have done a thing we can point to that has been effective in five years. I ask you to show me one area of the country that we have pacified.” (Scoville 16, note #1)\(^\text{214}\)

3. Harvard Professor of Government Henry Kissinger (after in country assessment): “little integration of the various American programs, the AID management lines to the field were hopelessly tangled and that the entire management structure needed to be overhauled” (Scoville 17)

4. US Army PROVN study (researched in 1965 and published in March 1966): “no two government agencies viewed the nation’s objectives in South Vietnam in the same manner.” (Scoville 29 & Sorley, Change a War)

\(^{214}\) Secretary of Defense McNamara, as quoted in “Briefing for General Westmoreland, 28 November 1965” MACV, Command History 1965: 229, quoted in Scoville 16 (footnote 1)
Table 10: Pacification Status for Time Period 2 (Spring 1966 to November 1966)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure (MOP)</th>
<th>US &amp; RVN</th>
<th>NLF, VC &amp; SRV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Performance   | 1. The civil side appears reluctant to call on resources the military possesses—which are frequently the best and most readily available. (Scoville 28)  
2. The number of bridges and kilometer of roads decreased from Spring 1966 to November 1966. (Sorely 223)  
3. “He [Komer] also kept pacification squarely on the minds of senior officials [in DC], including the President, and when a decision on the war was made, he provided a voice for pacification in the highest circles.” (Scoville 28) | 1. Though Tet Offensive did not occur until January 1968, NLF/VC forces preparing for it. (Herring, Long, 186) |

| Effectiveness (MOE) | 1. Secretary of Defense McNamara: “But the discouraging truth is that, as was the case in 1961 and 1963 and 1965, we have not found the formula, the catalyst… Pacification is a bad disappointment… If anything, it has gone backwards.” (Scoville 39, note 23)  
2. Official assessment trips as well as observations by independent observers generally claim there was little coordination between civilian agencies. Most concluded the system need a drastic overhaul. (Andrade & Willbanks 12)  
   a. “No connection between the military and civilian efforts… ineffective because not coordinated, integrated effort.”  
   b. “Military and civilian agencies often duplicated each other’s work”  
   c. “Military civic action projects undertaken without consulting with knowledgeable officials and soundness of project.”  
   d. “Instances of USAID schools being built but no teachers… and if the VC destroyed, no one cared because it was not ‘their’ school.”  
4. Pacified villages increased by less than 5% that year. (Herring Long 159)  
5. “Saigon bureaucracy became a stumbling block to progress.” (McCollum 29, note 10) | |

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Table 11: Pacification Status for Time Period 3 (November 1966 to 1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure (MOP)</th>
<th>US &amp; RVN</th>
<th>NLF, VC &amp; SRV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Territorial Security actions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. CORDS Director, Ambassador Colby in 1969: “The enemy seems unable to crank up his big units to hit us hard and our Vietnamese local forces [RF/PF/PSDF] are doing better against his guerrillas.” (Sorley 74)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Over 500,000 in RF/PF and 4 million in PSDF (Komer BAW 126)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. From 1968 to 1970, from 250 5-personnel MAT advisors for RF/PF/PSDF and 350 teams. (Sorley 72)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. # of deployed RD Cadre Teams</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Eventually over 50K RD Cadre personnel (Komer BAW 126)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ambassador Komer: “Pushing multiple programs simultaneously under central control also enabled us to utilize all available resources.” (Komer Clear 19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. MAC-V Commander, General Abrams: the # of bridges and kilometers of roads steadily decreased from 1963 to 1968, then began increasing. By September 1970 it passed the 1963 amount and continued to increase. (Sorley 223)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. # refugees re-settled. 1968 Tet and mini-Tet created approximately 1 million refugees with over 150,000 destroyed homes… the South Vietnamese government returned over 25% home in 1968 (Sorley 77)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Phase of insurgency- after Phase III 1968Tet, VC went back to Phase I &amp; II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. # of VCI kill/captured by Phoenix</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reaction to APC: VC assassinations increased by 86% in October &amp; November 1968. (Andrade 168, note 101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Post-Tet: Over 2,000 Viet Cong cadre (VCI) arrested every month. (Druiker 303)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Spring and summer 1969, due to losses of Tet and Accelerated Pacification Program, the VC needed maximal gains with minimal losses. They could no longer do large-scale operations… could only do small-scale and paramilitary operations. (Druiker 304, note 11)217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disappointing results of the 1969 campaign… pressure from Politburo… rising sentiment for lowering the level of armed struggle and reevaluating priorities… the debate led to the decision to reduce the level of combat in South Vietnam… to frustrate the enemy’s [US and RVN] pacification effort. (Druiker 305)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5. # of Chieu Hoi ralliers (numbers are approximate)(Koch iii, McCollom 52, Sorley 76, Cassidy 57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. 1963-1967: 95,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>b. 1968: 23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 1969: 47,000 (year after Tet- all time high)</td>
<td></td>
<td>c. 1970-1971: 52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. 1970-1971: 52,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. From captured documents:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. By the summer 1967, the US escalation [APC] had posed serious problems for the insurgency… the number of volunteers for service in the VC (aka PLAF] declined and comprised less than 50%. This forced the VC to draft local citizens which further frayed the image of success the VC had enjoyed… peasants become increasingly reluctant to provide support or join the movement. (Druiker 287, note 48)218</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From 1966 to 1971, police from 60,000 to 120,000 personnel (Andrade 16).

Unifying US pacification efforts under CORDS forced the Vietnamese to do the same with Central Pacification and Development Council… it forced the Vietnamese to integrate their efforts (Scoville 80 & McCollum 9).

―To permit logistic and administrative economies through consolidation and cross-servicing‖ (NSAM 362).

Recruitment was down and desertion rate was on the rise. (Druiker 316, note 35).

By 1973, what had once been a flourishing southern-based insurgency had given way to a faltering war effort whose prosecution was possible only by the infusion of men and material from North Vietnam. (Birtle 325)

During the March 1972 invasion by North Vietnam with 120,000 troops using Soviet tanks.

Regional CORDS Director John Paul Vann: “There is very little assistance being provided to the enemy… by the local forces and the enemy’s infrastructure (VCI) plays hardly any role at all.” (Sorley 322, note 6).

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)

HES showed improvement in latter part of 1967… fell off dramatically in aftermath of 1968 Tet… began to rise again in Autumn 1968.

In 1967, 62% of all hamlets considered secure, by 1970 almost 90% were secure. (McCollum 11 & Sorley 77)

By mid-1971, 94.7% of hamlets considered secure to some degree. (McCollum 60)

The RF/PF/PSDF program “have accomplished more in terms of making the countryside secure than any other single program.” (McCollum 45)

Increased advisor support to RF/PF & PSDF from MAC-V and the National Police Force “had an immediate impact in the security of

VDRN, Document 102, vol 3: 1, quoted in Duiker 316, note 35.


Directive No. 01/CT 71, as quoted in Gareth Porter, ed. Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation, II:551, as quoted in Sorley 275 (footnote 7).

Vietnam Military Institute, History of the People’s Army of Vietnam: 318.), quoted in Sorley 74-75.

the villages.” (McCollum 10)
c. Integrating under one command achieved a great deal of cohesion. (McCollom 9)
d. “The same programs [minus PSDF and Phoenix] that were in existence prior to CORDS are still in existence, but in expanded and more effective form. The big difference has been in the integration of the programs.” (McCollum 84)
e. “Travel, commerce and agriculture in the rural areas was being carried on as though there was no war… guerilla events were a seldom occurrence.” (McCollum i)

3. Ambassador Komer:
a. “CORDS created an institution with a vested interest in pacification.” (McColloum 38, note 8)
b. CORDS had great influence on where and which roads and waterways were constructed, fixed and maintained by MAC-V military engineers.” (Komer New Look 26)
c. Assets controlled and not shared by individual agencies pre-CORDS were being shared across agencies due to CORDS “unified management.” (Komer, BAW, 120)

a. PAVN Deputy Commander in SVN General Van DO: “extremely destructive” (note 40)
b. NLF/VC Minister of Justice Truong Nhu Tang: “dangerously effective” (note 41)
c. Post bellum Vietnam Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach: “we had many weaknesses in the South because of Phoenix.”

2. On Peoples’ Self Defense Force (PSDF): “Source of concern to Hanoi… the Party was nonetheless concerned about the program and anxious to undermine it.” (Druiker 317)

3. On Chieu Hoi “The Viet Cong has reacted vigorously against Chieu Hoi… causing doubt about the ability of the VC to liberate South Vietnam… attesting to its effectiveness” (Koch v)

4. From December 1970 to January 1970, PLAF/Viet Cong forces (Andrade 168)
   • Main forces: 80,000 to 43,000
   • Militia: 37,700 to 20,300

221 “Interview with Ambassador Robert W. Komer” (Washington, D.C., February 8, 1971), quoted in McCollum 38 (footnote 8)
# Appendix 2- Chronological List of Key Pacification Leaders

Table 12: Chronological List of Key Pacification Leader

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ambassador</th>
<th>MAC-V</th>
<th>Strategic/DC</th>
<th>Operational/Vietnam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Frederick Nolting (March)</td>
<td>Not exist</td>
<td>None (President Only)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Paul Harkin (February)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Henry Lodge (August)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Maxwell Taylor (July)</td>
<td>William Westmoreland (June)</td>
<td>Vietnam Coordination Committee (D/State)</td>
<td>Mission Council (mini-NSC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Henry Lodge (July)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Ellsworth Bunker (April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special Asst POTUS Komer (NSC)</td>
<td>D/Ambassador Porter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Ellsworth Bunker (April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special Asst POTUS Leonhart (NSC)</td>
<td>CORDS (Komer) (May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Ellsworth Bunker (April)</td>
<td>Creighton Abrams (July)</td>
<td>Disbanded</td>
<td>CORDS (Colby) (October)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Ellsworth Bunker (April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disbanded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Ellsworth Bunker (April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disbanded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Ellsworth Bunker (April)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disbanded</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>Ellsworth Bunker (April)</td>
<td>Frederick Weyand (June)</td>
<td>Disband</td>
<td>Disband</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Graham Martin (June)</td>
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<td>Disband</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>Graham Martin (June)</td>
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<td>Disband</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Graham Martin (June)</td>
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<td>Disband</td>
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Appendix 3- Map of Vietnam

Figure 1: Map of Republic of Vietnam

http://www.history.army.mil/books/Pacification_Spt/Ch1.htm#p2
Appendix 4- Key Primary Documents

NSAM 343 “Appointment of Special Assistant to the President”

SECRET
WASHINGTON

March 28, 1966

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 343

MEMORANDUM TO:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

In the Declaration of Honolulu, I renewed our pledge of common commitment with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to defend against aggression, to the work of social revolution, to the goal of free self-government, to the attack on hunger, ignorance and disease, and to the unending quest for peace. Before the Honolulu Conference and since, I have stressed repeatedly that the war on human misery and want is as fundamental to the successful resolution of the Vietnam conflict as are our military operations to ward off aggression. In recent weeks I have asked those Departments of the Government with special competence in our continuing attack on hunger, ignorance and disease to bring their resources to bear in Vietnam. I have expressed my special interest in the progress of these new initiatives and the effective marshalling of all governmental resources and programmes being brought to bear in the civil sector of our commitments in Vietnam.

In my view it is essential to designate a specific focal point for the direction, coordination and supervision in Washington of U.S. non-military programs for peaceful construction relating to Vietnam. I have accordingly designated Mr. Robert W. Komer as Special Assistant to me for carrying out this responsibility.
I have charged him and his deputy, Ambassador William  
Leonhart, to assure that adequate plans are prepared and co-
ordinated covering all aspects of such programs and that they are  
promptly and effectively carried out. This responsibility will  
include the mobilization of U.S. military resources in support  
of such programs. He will also assure that the Rural Construction/
Pacification Program is properly coordinated with the programs  
for combat force employment and military operations.

His functions will include ensuring full and timely support  
of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In  
accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the  
U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State.

In carrying out these duties, I want him to act in close and  
constant liaison with the heads of appropriate departments and  
agencies, and to draw on them for such administrative and other  
support as he may need. In addition to working closely with the  
addresses Cabinet officers he will have direct access to me at  
all times.

Those CIA activities related solely to intelligence collection  
are not affected by this NSAM.

http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hon/NSAMs/nsam343.asp
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 9, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 362

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Responsibility for U. S. Role in Pacification
(Revolutionary Development)

U. S. civil/military responsibility for support of Pacification
(Revolutionary Development) in Viet Nam will be integrated under
a single manager concept to provide added thrust forward in this
critical field.

Because the bulk of the people and resources involved are mil-
itary, COMUSMACV will be charged with this responsibility in
Viet Nam, under the overall authority of the Ambassador.

To carry out these responsibilities, under COMUSMACV,
Mr. Robert W. Komer will be appointed Deputy for Pacification
(Revolutionary Development) with personal rank of ambassador.

To this end the present functions and personnel of the Office of
Civil Operations of the U. S. Mission will become a part of
MACV. For the time being the civilian components will continue
to be supported with funds, personnel, and other requirements
by the civil agencies involved, such as State, AID, "IV", CIA,
and Department of Agriculture. COMUSMACV is expected to
call on these agencies, as well as the relevant military agencies,
for all resources needed for accomplishment of his mission.
I hereby charge all U. S. departments and agencies with meeting
these requirements promptly and effectively.

One purpose of uniting responsibility for Pacification (RD)
under COMUSMACV is to permit logistic and administrative
economies through consolidation and cross-servicing. I expect
possible steps to be taken in this direction. Any inter-agency
jurisdictional or other issues which may arise in country will
be referred to the U. S. Ambassador.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NSC 62460772c

Received: 2/12/72

-CONFIDENTIAL-

83
Ambassador William Leibhart will assume from Mr. Kemp the Washington supervisory responsibilities already assigned in NSAM 343, and will be appointed Special Assistant to the President for this purpose.

This new organizational arrangement represents an unprecedented melding of civil and military responsibilities to meet the overriding requirements of Viet Nam. Therefore, I count on all concerned -- in Washington and in Viet Nam -- to pull together in the national interest to make this arrangement work.

[Signature]

http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam362.asp
MACORDS, an integrated military and civilian organization, is eligible to receive support from both military and civilian sources. Civilian resources at the regional and province level come under MACORDS supervision and inasmuch as the majority of civilian support is provided by USAID, the term USAID/MACORDS is used to denote civilian support which is under MACORDS control.

MACORDS is authorized to obtain administrative support from the most readily available source.

When possible, support will be provided on a non-reimbursable basis.

MACV and USAID messes, PXs, medical service facilities, commissaries, and bulk food supply points are to be made available to all MACORDS personnel.

No property or supplies are to change ownership. The responsible agency will provide replacements and provide for future needs.

Signed: W. C. Westmoreland,
COMUSMACV
D. E. McDonald, Director,
USAID
Barry Zorthian,
Director, JUSPAO
John L. Hart, Special Assistant to the Ambassador.²

¹Interview, Major Joseph O’Keefe, MACORDS Reports and Analysis Directorate, December 10, 1970.

ANOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY


**Advocating Unity of Command Approach**


This article is about Joint Inter-Agency task Force-South (JIATF-S). JIATF-South is commanded by a Coast Guard Admiral with a DEA Deputy. This JIATF focuses on interdicting drugs coming from Latin American and the Caribbean.


Jones, a retired Marine general, made it clear that he will run the process and be the primary conduit of national security advice to Obama, eliminating the “back channels” that at times in the Bush administration allowed Cabinet secretaries and the vice president's office to unilaterally influence and make policy out of view of the others.

“The whole concept of what constitutes the membership of the national security community -- which, historically has been, let's face it, the Defense Department, the NSC itself and a little bit of the State Department, to the exclusion perhaps of the Energy Department, Commerce Department and Treasury, all the law enforcement agencies, the Drug Enforcement Administration, all of those things -- especially in the moment we're currently in, has got to embrace a broader membership.” This appears to be more of a Whole of Government (WoG) approach rather than the current anarchical approach.


Written in the late 1990s, Gibbings call for creating inter-agency cells in each RCC to improve inter-agency planning. Also calls for, in the long-term, empowering those inter-agency teams to make decisions. This call was the predecessor to forming JIACGs and JIAWGs.


Gwynn calls for unity of command between civil and military efforts for most situations—with the military or civil authorities being in change depending on the situation.


JIATF-South is a JIATF with a law-enforcement/counter-narcotics mission. Located in Key West, it is a planning/coordination JIATF, it does not have an execution arm. JIATF-South is
commanded by a Coast Guardsman with a DEA Deputy in an integrated command structure with inter-agency and multinational members (from 11 countries). Would be a good case study for further research on JIATFs


As an USAID employee, he has been very impressed with how much DoD planners have been “reaching across the Potomac River” to civilian agencies (especially USAID) since DoD Directive 3000.05 to do SSTR operations. However, he believes that whole-of-government challenges will require whole-of-government responses- not LFA approaches.


An information piece on the newly created inter-agency Combatant Command (Africa Command- AFRICOM)


In assessing the “inter-agency” problems that existed between the military CJTF-7 (GEN Sanchez) and the civilian CPA (Ambassador Bremer), Schaubelt posits that if these two DoD sponsored units had so many problems, how many problems would have existed if the civilian organization did NOT belong to DoD. He calls for better unity of command instead of mere unity of effort. He calls for an inter-agency Goldwater-Nichols.


Information piece on how JIATF-South is a law-enforcement organization fighting narcotic trafficking.

Advocating Emulating CORDS Approach


While the majority of the article is spent describing how the Phoenix Program operated under CORDS, the main purpose of the article is to apply those lessons learned from Phoenix to the current fight in Iraq. They argue that the key to pacification (or SSTR or R&S) is to integrate all efforts towards one goal. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams under the Coalition Provisional Authority attempted, but were not capable of it. They credit the single manager (unified management, unity of command, whole of government) approach applied by Phoenix/CORDS as successfully integrating all efforts… further, they say placing it under a military command and control structure is the best technique since only the military has the budget, material & manpower to get the job done (this is the same reason Ambassador Komer gave for putting CORDS under MAC-V).

Burton’s thesis assesses the current and future strategic situation and argues that the US will need more inter-agency operations. At the strategic (policy-making) level, he argue for a stronger National Security Council (NSC) and want to change the Regional Combatant Commands (RCC) from military-centric (with a JIACG) to Inter-Agency-centric. Operationally, he calls for more CORDS-like organizations. He specifically cites the law-enforcement/counter-drug JIATF-South.


Cassidy remarks that the military current doctrine (2006) on counter-insurgencies calls for the use of native forces. Based on his case studies of the US’ use of native forces in both the Philippines in the 1900s and the Vietnam War (he also looks at France’s uses of native troops in Algeria and Vietnam), he recommends that native troops be used using a unified management approach in conjunction with the other involved agencies (Special Operations Forces, CIA, State Department and native indigenous intelligence agencies. Cassidy never really explores the unified management concept incorporating the development aspects of counter-insurgencies.


Coffey critiques the State Department’s initial organization for Stability & Reconstruction. Coffey says the Advanced Civil Team (ACT) fails to address the two main problems with inter-agency operations: 1) failure to achieve unity of effort; and 2) the asymmetry of resources between the military and every other agency. He argues the ACT will fail because it merely serves as an R&S/SSTR advisor to the military operational commander. To be effective, the ACT needs to integrate itself into the chain of command—much like CORDS did.


Coffey critiques the 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq because, though it calls for using and integrating three tracks: military/security, economic and political, it does not establish an integrated (civil-military) command structure. He recommends the US adopt a CORDS-like approach to create a unifying mechanism to resolve operational problems. He also says such an organization will require: 1) the right people in the organization; and 2) a Presidential directive.


The authors assess the current strategic environment and predict that the US will need to execute a lot of inter-agency operations in the near future. While not advocating the changing of the Regional Combatant Commands (RCCs) from military to inter-agency, they do recommend that the NSC form standing regional-NSCs to coordinate regional policy and the NSC needs to go from merely policy-coordinating to planning and oversight. They argue that the State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization (S/CRS) is a good start, but Lead Federal Agency Approaches do not work. Rather, the US needs to look at more CORDS-like approaches. Also argue that, like Goldwater-Nichols creating the “joint” track for military officer, the government needs to make a “national security” track for civilians.


Keyes calls for reformation of the inter-agency process- might even need a version of the Goldwater-Nichols. Regardless, reform will be years away. In the interim, Keyes argues that the current doctrine of Lead Federal Agency (LFA) can work with the right people.


Lyman advocates more Unity of Command in inter-agency operations, he critiques the current doctrine of JIACGs as being fairly ineffectual. Recommends strengthening the NSC and having it assume a more managerial role. He critiques Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report as not going far enough.

McNaught critiques the current situation which has S/CRS doing inter-agency SSTR planning at the strategic planning level and PRTs at the tactical level. This leaves a huge gap at the operational level for planning. He agrees with the BGN study that using the current approach (with S/CRS) is really merely adding inter-agency inputs to a military plan, instead of creating a true political-military plan. Cites CORDS as an excellent example of creating pol-mil plans.


McNerney assessed the success of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. He thought they were a good start but a “muddle” because it only integrated civil-military operations at the tactical level. He recommends doing a CORDS-like approach for integrating at the operational level as well.


Written during SFOR in Bosnia, Moore assesses the strategic environment and foresees many challenges that will require inter-agency responses. He argues that LFA approach is not viable and that the US should use more of a unity of command approach—should use a more CORDS-like approach.


A 20-year military officer now working as a State Department Foreign Service Officer (FSO), Ray recommends that the NSC increase its role in policy-coordination to include more policy-supervision. (sounds more like command than coordinating)


Thompson is a former Army Foreign Area Officer and now an Instructor at the Defense Attaché School, he also worked for the CPA. In these two related articles, Foreign Service Officer Thompson critiques: 1) inter-agency operations in Iraq; 2) the Lead Federal Agency Approach of current doctrine; and 3) the weakness of JIACGS in promoting inter-agency operations. He advocates using CORDS-like approach from strategic to tactical levels. He calls for the RCCs to become inter-agency commands instead of military.

Written just after the end of the Cold War, Wells assesses the strategic environment and sees the military becoming more involved with other forms of conflict—especially insurgencies. He does a short analysis arguing that CORDS was effective and then recommends the US use CORDS-like organizations for future operations. He even argues that the unified management (unity of command) structure would work well for other inter-agency operation. He specifically recommends a JIATF be formed to fight narcotic smuggling.


Advocating Lead Federal Agency Approach


Re-iterate the NSC process as anarchical.

http://www.crs.state.gov/shortcut.cfm/CK59 (accessed on 8 January 2009)

Develops the State Department as Lead Federal Agency for Reconstruction & Stabilization.


Designates stability operations as a core military mission and that the military will support USG plan (done by State)—supports LFA.


A how-to manual to work with Joint Inter-Agency Working Groups. It states “the primary role of JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination... This advisory element of the CCDR’s staff facilitates information sharing and coordinated action across the interagency community. However, the JIACG does not make policy, task, or replace existing lines of authority or reporting.” (bold in original)


Based on NSPD-44 which designates D/State as LFA for S&R, this manual is based on the idea that they key to success in Reconstruction & Stabilization operations is to plan early using an integrated, interagency approach. This manual was written to help establish the better interagency planning.


Section 101- integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security


Information paper on Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It provides Tactics, Technique and Procedures for PRT Commanders and using units.


Lead Federal Agency is the doctrinal approach for inter-agency operations.

**CORDS Program**


This article explains the two main debates about the Vietnam War. The first major debate is between scholars that argued that Vietnam should have fought more as a conventional war
(Summers) or a pacification/counter-insurgency (Krepenevitch). Andrade says both are wrong because they oversimplify the problem—Vietnam was a conventional AND an insurgency simultaneously. Secondly, he critiques the debate over the idea that Westmoreland had it completely wrong by focusing only conventional and that Abrams was right. Again, Andrade argues it is wrong. By 1965, the South Vietnam government was on verge of failing due to attacks by both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong conventional/main force units. Also, CORDS did get started under Westmoreland while Abrams was Westmoreland’s Deputy and did not raise issue that he thought Westmoreland had it wrong. Andrade argues that each general fought the fight they needed to fight. This article provides some data used in the MSSD research design for Measures of Performance & Effectiveness (MOPs and MOEs)


Background information for CORDS.


Based on his archival research in Vietnam, this is a great source for providing information for how the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong assessed and evaluated the conflict. This book provides a lot of information for MOEs and MOPs for the Communist side. (Author uses term VDRN for “Vietnam Documents and Research Notes from his trips into the archives in Vietnam)


Primary source for evaluating the strategic/policy-making level as Whole of Government (except for military)


Primary source for evaluating the operational/policy-implementing level as Whole of Government for civil and military pacification efforts.


The author was personally involved with the Chieu Hoi (Rallier) program. Koch argues that, though the program did have some problems, Chieu Hoi had the most favorable cost-benefit ratio of any of the pacification programs.


This book based on the 1972 RAND report on CORDS.


Three days of interviews in 1970 between two US Army historians (Scoville and MacDonald) and Ambassador Komer CORDS Director, COL Montague, XO for Komer and Richard Moorsten, part of Komer’s White House staff. The 260-pages of interview notes serve as the major source for much of the writing on CORDS. Interviewer Scoville later write a Center of Military History monograph on CORDS using a lot of these interview notes.

Komer had several consistent themes throughout his writings. Pacification required both security (military) and development (civil). Because of the civil & military aspects of pacification, many agencies “played” in it, but no one was in charge of it. Unified management resulted in successful pacification – with no real change in the scope and scale of pacification (it just was much more efficient). Unified management (& Komer) was only successful because of the strong backing he had from the President.

However, Komer really is noting correlation between unified management. He never proves causation.


By combining history with analysis, this article provided insights into research question #3 (what were the bureaucratic processes that led to creation of CORDS). The author’s major puzzle was: “it is instructive as to the sway a single person can have on national security policy by understanding and using the levers of power.” The historical part of paper ends with Komer heading to Vietnam to become the Director of CORDS. Jones provides great insight on why Komer wielded so much bureaucratic power.

After serving in Vietnam twice (1965-1966 and 1970-1971) McCollum argues in his 1971 Master’s thesis that CORDS was successful due to unified management (just like Komer): “defeat of insurgency through superior organizational techniques.” He also says CORDS was successful because of, “plenty of backing.” His methodology was in-depth research and interviews in-country with members of CORDS, especially with MACCORDS Team 90 in Tay Ninh province.


Primary source showing that State, USAID, CIA, MACV and USIA would provide “free” support to CORDS.


This report was conducted by the think-tank Center for Strategic and International Studies by [Congress?]. The investigators begin by assessing the current strategic environment (and near future) and state that inter-agency operations are only going to increase in the future – and that the US does them poorly (17 operations since end of Cold War). Goldwater-Nichols was the landmark legislation that forced the military to become joint. This legislation was directly responsible for correcting the ineptitudes of joint operations (Desert One, Just Cause, etc). However, BGN says you cannot simply do the same formula to the I/A process because, unlike
the military that already good fight well individually (just not jointly), the US does not do inter-agency well.

They recommend that the NSC change from policy-coordination only to include policy-oversight. Further, they say their needs to be better integration at the operational and tactical levels. They considered the LFA vs NSC-centric approach and found the NSC-centric to work better (but some type of LFA may work better at tactical level)

They call for Regional Councils under the NSC to coordinate policy within that region. (But does not go as far as calling for the replacement of the military Regional Combatant Commanders with inter-agency regional NSC commands.)

However, at operational/tactical level, they do not call for a unified approach. Rather, they use a OCO (Office Civil Operations) approach with a unified manager (most likely the Ambassador) as the Special Representative for the POTUS for all civilian agencies who is co-equal to the senior military commander.


Author in CORDS from December 1967 to June 1968 and then worked in Center of Military History from 1969 to 1972. During that time he conducted intensive interviews with Ambassador Komer and wrote this history of CORDS. The study describes the “background and implementation of President Lyndon Johnson’s decision in May 1967 to create a civil/military organizations, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support- CORDS, to manage US advice and support to the South Vietnamese government’s pacification program” It “focuses on the years 1966-1968... from both perspective of government leadership in Washington and the US mission in Saigon... special emphasis on GEN Westmoreland, Ambassador Komer, Secretary McNamara and President Johnson”


A biography about John Paul Vann- considered one of the leading experts on counter-insurgency in Vietnam. A career Army officer, he joined USAID after retiring. He was one of the first four regional CORDS Directors and served in Vietnam many years. He eventually became the main advisor to a Vietnamese regional command and, like Ambassador Komer, wore military stars as a civilian.


A very pro-Abrams and anti-Westmoreland book (and Komer under Westmoreland ). Provides information for MSSD Design- especially the Outcomes MOPs & MOEs.


A paper about how Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Johnson, changed the American conception of the nature of the war in Vietnam. Considered a “counterinsurgency man 100%,” he
chartered the year-long study about the nature of the insurgency titled PROVN (“Program for Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam”). The PROVN report was known to have been reviewed by Ambassador Komer and General Abrams—and influenced their thinking.


Good tertiary source… 2 page summary of pacification in Vietnam.

**Research Design & Methodology**


This work was used for the pattern-matching methodology for research question #3 (what were the bureaucratic policies that led to the creation of CORDS). Additionally, Allison observation that policy-decision does not mean policy-executed due to “foot-dragging at the policy-implementation level helped develop the idea that organization approach need to be looked at the strategic/policy-making, operational/policy-implementing and tactical/policy-execution levels.


This work developed the thought that complex problems require complex solutions.


Did not use this reference in this paper. Could be reference for tangential idea about examining how the idea of inter-agency operations developed and spread.


These military sources helped develop the idea of looking at Measures of Performance (“are we doing things right”) vs Measures of Effectiveness (“are we doing the right thing”).


This paper was used only to gain some background information on the hamlet Evaluation System (HES). More importantly, the fact that Kalyvas studied the HES and determined it was, though it had “benefits and drawbacks”, it was still a “good source”. HES results were one of many indicators synthesized to determine if pacification worked.


This textbook explained the Most Similar Systems Design methodology as well as some of the strengths and weaknesses of various research designs.


This source helped construct the indicators for the VC/NLF/DRVN Measure of Performance. By using Mao’s 3-phase model for guerrilla warfare, the research design could evaluate how well or poorly the insurrection was going.


Mao’s comments on war-guerrilla war- guerrilla war in China clearly explains the problem of generalizing from a single event. Even though this monograph does a good job describing inter-agency-pacification operations-in Vietnam, does not mean its lesson can be easily transferred. In statistician terms, a sample of 1 does not describe a population.


Used to develop the VC/NLF Measure of Performance (MOP) by equating the three phases of a Mao-ist insurgency with how well the insurgency is working.

A study conducted by RAND to evaluate the Hamlet Evaluation System. RAND found the indicators to be representative for pacification (good construct validity) and the results statistically significant.


Travis’ thesis critiques the Hamlet Evaluation System as being prone to inflation. However, at the time of the thesis, the ratings had only been increasing. However, after the Tet Offensive, they decreased. Also, various key leaders in MAC-V (Abrams, Colby, etc) admitted they used HES more for trends than looking the specific HES percentage. They used HES as but one of many indicators in assessing pacification.


Van Evera does a easy-to-understand job of explaining logic diagrams for arguments and clarified the difference between antecedent, independent, intervening and dependent variable/phenomena.


Yin explains the issues of case study that need to be addressed: reliability, construct validity, internal validity and external validity—and strategies to achieve each one.

**General Information and for further research**


Good source to examine a facet not covered in monograph about how President Johnson’s civil-military relations might have affected the development of CORDS. Herspring argues that Johnson had the worst civil-military relations with the DoD of any President and he did not tolerate dissent from the Joint Chiefs. Given that, Westmoreland may have agreed to accepting CORDS more from not wanting to fight it.


Hess describes and evaluates the argument of various writers on the Vietnam War (scholars, participants, journalists). He provides an extensive historiography of the war with a complementary bibliographic essay.

After serving in an USAID Fellowship, Major Kelleher (USMC) made several observations. 1) Inter-agency coordination exists at strategic level (NSC) but no mechanisms exist at operational or tactical levels. 2) Based on current strategic situation, believes RCC will be involved more with humanitarian issues. 3) Recommends that the Combatant Commanders add a USAID Senior Humanitarian Advisor to go along with his State Department Political Officer (POLAD).


Information about how Goldwater-Nichols improved joint operations.


Not very relevant paper that addresses the inter-personal skills an officer will need to work in an inter-agency environment with civilians.

Joint Forces Staff College page on Inter-Agency Readings.


Over 100 sources—books, documents, periodicals, etc.