THE WAR CAME HOME WITH HIM
A Daughter’s Memoir
Catherine Madison, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 2015, 256 pages

Catherine Madison writes a dramatic account of her father’s captivity as a prisoner of war during the Korean Conflict, while simultaneously recounting vivid memories of her childhood. The chapters alternate between her physician father’s military service, emphasizing his prisoner-of-war experience, and her childhood encounters with the damaged man who returned home from the war. This skillfully artistic work reads as a novel, lending to its intrigue, as well as shedding light on the consequences of war using primary source accounts from a collection of secret documents found years later. The strengths of the book are its intellectual quality, the compelling nature of the story, and the introspection of both the author and her father, Alexander “Doc” Boysen.

Madison’s experience as a journalist and editor lend to the intellectual merit of this book. Her expertise as a writer brings the story and its nuances to life. The sophisticated details prompt the reader to think deeply and critically about the dynamic effects of war, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other consequences of combat for both soldiers and their families.

Her communicative imagery and gripping account maintain the reader’s interest because of the veracity and depth of the story—a story of horror, suspense, and hope. What makes the book most riveting is the realistic account of prisoners’ suffering from a physician’s perspective, from one who fought daily to treat his comrades but was prohibited mostly due to the contempt of his captors and the severe lack of medical supplies. The gruesome recounting of the rate at which American prisoners died, how they died, and the ruthless denial of treatment stir up emotion by bringing the reader face to face with the “Tiger,” and other North Korean and Chinese captors. Then upon returning home, Doc went mentally and emotionally untreated himself, which most likely contributed to the dysfunction of his family and the contempt he showed toward it.

This book does not cover operations or battles during the war. Rather, it takes the reader on a journey through an in-depth look at the depravity of man, a journey that leaves an indelible impression as to how any culture could treat fellow humans so harshly and inhumanely. Not surprisingly, Doc does not engage in much in-depth introspection until his later years, and even then does not seem to comprehend the consequences of the disdainful approach with which he chose to treat his daughter. What appears to be an attempt to offer protection and love comes across as extreme parental control that was distant and uncaring. In the end, it seems that the veiled cries of his soul were often mistaken for the self-sufficient toughness of a survivor.

The book steers away from politics and opinion but may lead readers to speculate about possible strategies to help veterans such as Doc, who suffered a host of mental, emotional, spiritual, and physical trauma. Because the book is written like a novel, the author does not attempt to provide such remedies, but she leaves the reader free to decide what judgment to render regarding what could or should have been done for America’s forgotten heroes who survived some of the most brutal treatment only one short generation ago.

Chaplain (Maj.) Valeria Van Dress, West Point, New York
HELL BEFORE THEIR VERY EYES
American Soldiers Liberate Concentration Camps in Germany, April 1945
John C. McManus, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 2015, 189 pages

It has been seventy years since the Allies liberated some of the most notorious Nazi concentration camps during the latter months of World War II, yet that experience had a deep and lasting impact on those who took part. While much has been written about the victims and perpetrators of the Third Reich’s Konzentrationslager system, a new book by military historian John McManus hones in on the unique perspective of the liberators, in this case American forces, as they encountered Ohrdruf, Buchenwald, and Dachau in Germany during April 1945.

Relying on personal testimony, diaries, unit histories, and other primary resources, McManus effectively describes, compares, and contrasts the liberation of these notorious camps in a concise, well-researched, and highly readable work. Hell Before Their Very Eyes is a valuable entry in Johns Hopkins’s Witness to History series, focusing on (as the title suggests) first-person accounts of seminal events in American history.

McManus is at his best by letting the soldiers’ words speak for themselves, showing that even battle-hardened veterans experienced emotions ranging from shock, revulsion, and disbelief to shame, anger, and guilt—upon seeing the camps for the first time. Almost to a man, liberators recall that their strongest memory of the experience was the collective stench of the camps, including the dead, the dying, and the living. Perhaps tellingly, many soldiers were guilt-ridden for not having arrived earlier, or for being unable to do more for camp survivors. Fittingly, most liberators were determined to bear witness, perhaps anticipating that their stories would not be believed later.

Another of the book’s strengths is balance. While liberation was virtually universally welcomed by the victims, and the Americans were met with deep gratitude, McManus shows us that not all went smoothly. American forces were woefully unprepared initially for dealing with the human tragedy of the camps, despite the fact that knowledge of their existence was widespread by April 1945. Even worse, the initial shock and ambiguity of encountering the camps led to breakdowns of discipline and even atrocities, such as the incident in the Dachau coal yard where American soldiers executed an estimated twenty to twenty-five unarmed Schutzstaffel (SS, Protection Squadron) guards in reprisal.

There is little not to like about Hell Before Their Very Eyes, a small gem of a book that is eminently readable, concise, yet packed with emotion and visceral description. It also suggests potential future research, perhaps comparing American forces’ experiences with those of British or Russian forces who also liberated concentration camps in Germany and Poland. While the series Witness to History primarily targets the college undergraduate, military professionals will find great value in McManus’s first-hand accounts of liberators confronting the horrors of the Holocaust—a subject relatively uncommon in today’s military literature.

Col. Mark Montesclaros, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Gordon, Georgia

21ST CENTURY ELLIS
Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern Era
Edited by B. A. Friedman, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2015, 176 pages

21st Century Ellis is an edited work that combines the written products of Col. Earl “Pete” Ellis with commentary by Maj. Brett Friedman of the U.S. Marine Corps. This book is part of the Naval Institute Press’s 21st Century Foundations series, which provides a modern perspective on theorists of the past. This is the third in the series and follows U.S. Navy Cmdr. Benjamin Armstrong’s superb 21st Century Mahan and 21st Century Sims.

Friedman organizes the book into a preface, introduction, and five chapters. The first chapter discusses Ellis’s personal experience and the Marine Corps’ experience with counterinsurgency or, more specifically,
during the so-called Banana Wars. Friedman features Ellis’s 1921 piece, “Bush Brigades.” The second chapter discusses Ellis and combined warfare during the First World War. The third and fourth chapters, exceptional both in terms of Friedman’s commentary and Ellis’s pieces, discusses Ellis’s thoughts on naval bases and the Advanced Base Force, both of which had incalculable impact upon the modern Marine Corps, and Ellis and the Pacific theater, respectively. In the fifth chapter, Friedman discusses how Ellis’s legacy is useful for our understanding of the modern Pacific.

It is no accident that one of the key books on Ellis is titled *Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet, 1880-1923*, and Friedman’s commentary and selection of Ellis’s writings related to amphibious warfare are very convincing. Friedman’s section on counterinsurgency, however, is not as convincing as the discussion of Ellis’s contribution to amphibious warfare. In *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940*, Keith Bickel treats Ellis’s writings on small wars as important; however, he places less emphasis on Ellis’s contribution than Friedman. With respect to Ellis and the *Small Wars Manual*, Bickel’s most salient and interesting observation is that “they did not invent a new way of waging warfare. Neither did they envision or invent new ways of waging small wars, as Ellis did for waging amphibious landings.” This both underlines Ellis’s groundbreaking work on amphibious landings and downplays the importance of his work on the *Small Wars Manual*.

This is a great book that combines several of Ellis’s key works and Friedman’s good contextualization for and commentary on Ellis’s thought. In the preface, Friedman writes, “The Marine Corps has on occasion inflated the importance of some aspects of our history, and I feared that Ellis’s legacy was more tradition than substance. Instead, I found a trove of ideas with clear indirect applications for ... any era.” There is no question of Ellis’s importance in the development of amphibious warfare and impact of his thoughts on the Marine Corps, the war in the Pacific, and subsequent amphibious operations. Consequently, Friedman’s book is a tremendous resource for those researching those subjects; however, he likely overstates Ellis’s importance to the development of the Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* and the originality and presence of Ellis’s thinking on counterinsurgency. Regardless, this book is invaluable to those interested in the Pacific during World War II, the Marine Corps, and amphibious warfare in general.

**Lt. Col. Jon Klug, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE Strategies for a Changing World**


*Nayantara Hensel* is an accomplished economist in academia, the public and private sector, and the Department of Defense (DOD). She argues that the global defense sector is under a plethora of dynamic stressors associated with the highly turbulent international geopolitical and economic environment, requiring strategic transformation in defense planning. These adjustments are necessary in order to effectively maintain peace, deter conflict, and adequately respond to crisis while ensuring the viability of the defense sector looking into the future. Exacerbating this situation is the struggle nations face in managing competing demands—balancing the necessity for preserving or modernizing military equipment and capabilities, while addressing economic growth challenges and cumbersome debt burdens.

The author does not propose a concrete way ahead for nations nor for the defense industrial base to meet these challenges. What she does provide, with historical context, is a detailed domestic and international overview of the existing environment along with how states and the global defense sector are choosing to respond. She gives specific attention to the interaction of the DOD and military services, the U.S. defense industrial base and defense contractors, their European counterparts, and various developing countries in the Middle East and Asia.

Hensel describes the historical ebbs and flows of the U.S. defense budget and its impact on the U.S. defense industrial base and defense contractors. Highlighted is an account of the U.S. defense budget contractions of the 1990s, along with the corresponding consolidation, mergers, and acquisitions of the U.S. defense industry necessitated by shrinking fiscal means. Further addressed are the long-term benefits of defense contractors building alliances or merging as a strategic
response, such as leveraging collective corporate skill sets, financial resources, infrastructure, research, and development to produce new products, and being better positioned to diversify product lines to compete globally for defense contracts and private sector sales.

The author presents an intriguing investigation into the increasingly globalized and competitive nature of defense sales. What is most revealing is how interconnected the defense sector is among nations. Many nations are producing critical components for each other’s most-sophisticated weapon systems, aircraft, ships, and missiles. Another prominent outcome is the active role U.S. foreign military sales play in promoting state diplomacy, notably, how significant these sales are as a favorable component of U.S. trade figures.

Thoroughly covered are trends in purchases and sales between states. Figures that stand out among many include military expenditures as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) among the four highest-purchasing nations, including about 4 percent of GDP for the United States and for Russia. However, the figures are 9 percent of GDP for Saudi Arabia and 5 percent for the United Arab Emirates, which attests to the fragile condition of the Middle East. Russia and the United States remain far and away the leading exporters of defense equipment, while India has emerged as the leading importer of defense equipment—attesting to its desire to be a regional military hegemonic power and a military counterbalance to China in Asia. Other nations in Asia—Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea—are also major purchasers of defense equipment for much the same reason.

The book is an exhaustive international defense sector mine of data. As such, the book is not only rich and dense but also a well-articulated and well-researched manuscript. The author presents numerous case studies in illustrative support. The text is full of comparative figures, tables, and diagrams depicting everything from specific defense sector purchases by country of interest by cost, to time series, cross-country defense expenditures of the last twenty years. The book is enlightening, compelling, and worth the read by anyone wanting a better understanding of the behavioral responses of nations to national security concerns in light of geopolitical and economic pressures, domestic and international. It is a must-read for those operating in the defense industrial base, those involved in defense procurement, defense policymakers, senior military professionals, and defense-oriented economists.

**Dr. David A. Anderson, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**THE LONGEST YEAR**

*America at Home and at War in 1944*


In *The Longest Year: America at Home and at War in 1944*, Victor Brooks captures the highlights of the main military campaigns that took place during 1944 in both the Pacific and European theaters of operation during World War II. Written specifically from the American perspective, Brooks illustrates the most important strategic and operational decisions made during this period. He does this while transporting the reader back and forth from the leaders’ headquarters on the battlefield to the factory workers at home in the United States. The decisions made by leaders such as President Franklin Roosevelt; Gens. George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, and Douglas MacArthur; and Adms. Chester Nimitz and Raymond Spruance during this integral time in the war are written so vividly the reader is able to sense the stress these leaders felt before approving the missions that achieved decisive results in 1944.

*The Longest Year* provides a sequential narrative of the pivotal campaigns and battles fought during 1944, including Anzio, the 8th Air Force’s “Big Week,” Normandy, Saipan, Leyte Gulf, and Bastogne. The defeat of the Germans in the liberated cities of Rome, Paris, and Nijmegen are also briefly discussed, allowing the reader to get a sense of the coalition leader jockeying occurring among the allied nations.

Victor Brooks is a seasoned historian and professor at Villanova University and is the author of several other acclaimed military history books on World War II. *The Longest Year* is well researched with a wide
variety of both primary and secondary sources ranging from American newspapers and magazines in 1944 to well-respected narratives and interviews covering the epic battles about which Brooks writes.

The most memorable portion of this book is the descriptions about the American home front in 1944. The rationing within the War Production Board, the war bonds campaign, Hollywood and Broadway productions, the “Victory Girls,” and the 1944 presidential election between Franklin Roosevelt and John Dewey are brilliantly described, leaving the reader wanting more about this largely unportrayed portion of World War II. Although the narratives describing the pivotal American battles that took place in 1944 are intriguing, Brooks’s thesis does not add any new conclusions to other material written on the same subjects.

With the majority of American strategic decision and policy makers already knowing the Allies would win World War II after the successful Normandy landings, this book is relevant and worthwhile to the security community because it provides valuable lessons learned on maintaining and exploiting the initiative after successful operations. Many of the individuals described in this book would later help reshape the international and security communities in both Europe and Asia immediately after the conclusion of the war. The Longest Year is valuable to any reader that wants to learn more about one of the most decisive years in American history.

Maj. Matthew Prescott, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Through an informative and highly readable collection of perspectives from national security and industry experts, editors Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Peter Dombrowski have successfully created an authoritative and timely reference for policy makers, scholars, and defense experts alike. Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective reviews the debate of strategic deterrence in the “Post Post-Cold War” and seeks an answer to the question: is missile defense a game changer or a strategic dead end?

Kelleher and Dombrowski comprehensively address their primary question over the course of fourteen chapters logically arranged within a framework of U.S. policies and programs, regional dynamics, and critical global analysis. Each chapter is designed to be referenced separately from the whole, making the book a convenient policy and defense reference tool. The authors begin their analysis with President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative announced in 1983, better known as “Star Wars.” They continue their examination through President George H. W. Bush’s realignment of missile defense goals with the technical limitations of the early 1990s. Next, the authors contrast President Bill Clinton’s redirection from national missile defense to theater missile defense systems and President George W. Bush’s assertion that such a distinction is artificial in a world globalized by intercontinental ballistic missiles. The policy debate examination culminates with the Obama Administration’s decision to cancel plans for missile-defense fixed sites in Europe in favor of a more tailorable approach based on variations of the Navy’s Standard Missile-3 Interceptor, both at sea and on shore.

Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective highlights important though often overlooked questions of extended deterrence in the modern age. The editors bring the risk versus reward of missile defense to the forefront when it comes to reliability, cost, and the proliferation of ballistic missiles in Iran and North Korea, among other nation-states. Contrasting perspectives are presented on whether missile defense spurs adversaries to pursue a greater quantity of missiles, risking an arms race, or whether missile defense creates critical uncertainty of the outcome of a ballistic missile attack, taking the enemy’s “cheap shot” off the table by...
forcing larger salvo-style attacks that the enemy may calculate are to close the U.S. nuclear red-line.

Chapter 4 addresses prominent concerns of reliability and performance in the U.S. national ballistic missile defense system. Simultaneously, it acknowledges the theater-level systems and systems in Israel cofunded by the United States, such as the Iron Dome, have demonstrated consistent success. Since 1985, the Missile Defense Agency estimates $165 billion has been spent in pursuit of a missile defense system. Yet, broad uncertainty remains in the system’s ability to reliably discriminate an enemy warhead among decoy countermeasures during a midcourse intercept, the point at which the currently deployed ballistic missile defense system is designed to destroy intercontinental threats. Proponents contend that likely adversaries do not possess the ability to deploy such countermeasures, and by the time they do, our radars and interceptors will have evolved to keep pace.

Is missile defense a game changer or a strategic dead end? Keller and Dombrowski’s work goes a long way to answer this question, but in the end only time will tell. For the near future, America’s pursuit of both national and theater missile defense will continue in earnest while actors on the world stage seek elements of leverage wherever their national aims and those of the United States do not align.

Maj. Jeff Porter, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**AFRICAN AMERICAN ARMY OFFICERS OF WORLD WAR I**
*A Vanguard of Equality in War and Beyond*
Adam P. Wilson, McFarland, Jefferson, North Carolina, 2015, 236 pages

Historian and philosopher Adam P. Wilson demonstrates how African-American officers during World War I used the skills developed as military leaders in a segregated U.S. Army to lead change during the Civil Rights Movement. This is a valuable book for those interested in the history of African-American officers who fought the two simultaneous battles of war and racism and their effect on civil rights. Wilson describes the military officership of African-Americans prior to World War I, during World War I, and during the Civil Rights Movement.

Prior to World War I, only a handful of African-American Army officers served outside of a war. In the first two chapters, Wilson lays out an excellent history of African-American soldier and officer service prior to the war. In chapter 1, Wilson describes the way white Americans perceived African-Americans. Wilson goes on to describe the struggle of African-Americans to attain officership through the United States Military Academy. Chapter 2 highlights the social and political fight to start a segregated African-American officer training camp in Fort Des Moines, Iowa. This chapter highlights leaders including Frederick Douglas and Booker T. Washington, who applied pressure to the War Department and the president to initiate an officer training camp. Howard University students, previously enlisted noncommissioned officers, and middle class lawyers and doctors made up the core of the cadets in the first training camp.

The second portion of the book details the lives of the officers through training camp and during World War I. Chapter 3 provides insight into life at Fort Des Moines and the effect that society had on the camp. Wilson demonstrates the intellectual, social, and political hurdles the officers had to overcome. Upon graduation, the officers were dispersed to their units and deployed to France shortly thereafter as a part of the 92nd Division. Wilson provides many examples of the endemic racism toward the African-American soldiers, and, in contrast, of how receptive the French people were toward them. Their experiences with the French motivated the African-American officers to seek change in the United States. The fight on two fronts, with racism and with the Germans, is the overall theme through this section.

Finally, Wilson ties together the service of the first class of African-American cadets at Fort Des Moines to their leadership in the civil rights movement. This
portion of the book is the focus, as Wilson captures the work of African-American officers in the legal system, press, mentorship, and continued service in the military. The author packs the last five chapters with individual officers’ accomplishments, from winning court cases to coaching Olympic athletes.

Wilson masterfully combines the social, political, and military struggles with the contributions to the civil rights effort of the first class of African-American officers from Fort Des Moines who served in World War I. This book is well researched and is a must-read for military personnel wishing to know about desegregation in the U.S. Army.


WASHINGTON’S IMMORTALS
The Untold Story of an Elite Regiment Who Changed the Course of the Revolution

“I can assign no other regiment in which I can place the same confidence; and I request you will say so to your gallant regiment.”

In his tenth book, best-selling author Patrick K. O’Donnell offers an outstanding accounting of a group of citizen-soldiers from Maryland and their contributions to the American Revolution. Washington’s Immortals: The Untold Story of an Elite Regiment Who Changed the Course of the Revolution traces the formation and service of a group of Marylanders who eventually became known as the Immortals, or the Maryland 400.

Sparked by an interest in the story behind a dilapidated and rusting marker in downtown New York City commemorating the death of 256 Marylanders at the Battle of Brooklyn, O’Donnell embarked on a five-year journey to document the life and service of the Immortals. O’Donnell posits that the citizen-soldiers from this Maryland outfit were the beginnings of the greatest fighting regiment of the war and made the difference between victory and defeat for the Continental Army. What follows is a meticulously researched detailing of the Immortals’ actions throughout the war, from the Battle of Brooklyn in 1776 through the surrender of the British Army by Charles Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781.

The best aspect of this book is the manner in which O’Donnell details the service of the Immortals. Penned in a narrative history prose, it is enjoyable to read, without the dry, passionless style one often finds with typical regimental or unit histories. While all descriptions of battles (in both the northern and southern colonies) are excellent, the accounting of actions by the Immortals at Stony Point is particularly vivid. Another benefit to this approach is that the reader gains an appreciation for the Revolutionary War in general.

Students of military history and the American Revolution will find this book interesting and useful. It will especially be of interest to those desiring to learn more about the military contributions the state of Maryland made to the war. Today, the 175th Infantry Regiment, Maryland Army National Guard, traces its lineage to the Immortals.

While the author endeavors to educate the reader on the Immortals, readers finish the book with an added benefit—that of a renewed appreciation for what early Americans tolerated in the fight for independence and freedom. Often, the leadership challenges commanders faced, the sacrifices these patriots made, the physical and mental hardships they endured, and the commitments they upheld in the birth of our nation, marvel the reader.

David D. Haught, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

HALLOWED GROUND
A Walk at Gettysburg
James M. McPherson, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 2015, 207 pages

James McPherson originally wrote Hallowed Ground in 2003 as a short account of the major events that occurred on the Gettysburg battlefield in July 1863. The book is essentially a narrative that is augmented to assist the reader in conducting a battlefield tour. McPherson, one of this country’s premier Civil War historians, takes the reader to different
locations and expertly paints pictures of the events as they unfolded over the rolling Pennsylvania countryside. The reader can envision him pointing to Little Round Top and “The Angle,” and can easily visualize the lines of blue and butternut clashing on these iconic landmarks.

However, in McPherson’s original version, the single glaring limitation was the lack of any visual enhancement to his text. If the reader had never been to the battlefield, he or she likely would have a difficult time visualizing the scenes McPherson describes. In this updated 2015 edition, McPherson relates the adage that “a picture is worth a thousand words” and his intent to enhance his original words with photographs, paintings, and maps. He also updates this edition with the most recent changes to the national park and augments his text with quotes from major participants, such as Abner Doubleday, James Longstreet, and even George Custer.

Having served as a Gettysburg staff ride instructor for many years, I assessed this new edition for its value as a tour guide and as a possible source to build and conduct a staff ride. As a tour guide, this edition has great value. Although the descriptions of movement to different points on the battlefield are somewhat vague, a national park map can be used to augment the reader’s navigation. Once at those points, however, McPherson’s description of the basic actions allows for accurate visualization of the battle against the terrain backdrop. Because of his unique format of terrain orientation and action description, this edition is essential in conducting a battlefield tour.

McPherson’s work is less valuable if the reader is attempting to conduct a staff ride—a more rigorous event that normally requires preliminary study and comprehensive analysis. Hallowed Ground lacks the basic components of a staff ride: detailed descriptions of major actions and in-depth analysis of leader decisions, which are needed to fully understand the battle. Gettysburg, by Stephen Sears or Gettysburg: A Battlefield Guide, by Mark Grimsley and Brooks Simpson, are much better sources for such details.

However, Hallowed Ground becomes useful for building staff rides in augmenting these basic components. Its strength lies in the general outline of locations (or “stands,” using a staff ride term) and the description of what you should be able to “see” from that location. More important, these depictions are reinforced with the words of the participants who stood at those same locations over 150 years ago. Knowing the thoughts of the leaders while simultaneously viewing the ground greatly assists staff ride participants in their accurate analysis of the events and ultimately with the development of their critical thinking. Of lesser importance, but still helpful in building a worthwhile staff ride, are McPherson’s insightful vignettes and histories of the battlefield as a national park. This type of information always enhances the general flow of a staff ride and may assist in reinforcing key points about the Army’s historical legacy.

McPherson has certainly improved his original work and has made it far more useful to the defense community. While of secondary use as a staff ride resource, it is certainly of primary use if one intends to conduct a more limited battlefield tour. Augmented with a National Park Service driving tour map, this book allows the reader to be guided by a premier civil war historian around this nation’s premier hallowed ground.

Lt. Col. Gary Linhart, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Any biography of Henry Clay is punctuated with names that many readers learned, and then forgot, to pass their high school and undergraduate history courses: the Missouri Compromise, the Nullification Crisis, the Compromise of 1850, and the American System. As speaker of the House of Representatives and, later, as senator from Kentucky, Clay stood at the center of national affairs for most of the first half of the nineteenth century. He brokered compromises to hold the Union...
together during political crises over the admission of Missouri to the Union, over South Carolina’s embrace of the doctrine of nullification, and in the aftermath of the Mexican-American War. Clay’s “American System” offered a legislative program to develop American industry and to bind the young nation together with the ties of commerce. Clay enjoyed a long career, serving in the legislative and executive branches, and funding his career through numerous appearances before the judicial branch. In an era when many Americans faced competing loyalties to their states and to the United States, Clay declared, “It has been my invariable rule to do all for the Union. If any man wants the key of my heart, let him take the key of the Union, and that is the key to my heart,” and it was the defense of the Union that was the key to all his great achievements.

Harlow Giles Unger’s Henry Clay: America’s Greatest Statesman tells this story quickly and with zeal. Unger is well positioned to write a biography of Clay. Over the past ten years, Unger has published biographies of John Marshall, John Quincy Adams, James Monroe, Patrick Henry, and other figures from Antebellum American history. Those names also appear in this book, and John Quincy Adams, in particular, is a hero of Unger’s. Unger does have definite heroes and villains: Clay and Adams are the former and John Randolph of Roanoke and Andrew Jackson are the latter.

Unger paints in stark terms the opposition to the nationalization advocated by Adams and Clay. Most Americans in the nineteenth century, Unger contends, had too limited a vision: “far from thinking about school or college, the average American man yearned to own property, work its soil, plant, and harvest enough to feed himself and his family, selling any surplus at market. And above all he wanted to be left alone on his land with his family.” Further, Unger locates the opposition to Clay’s American System in a defense of slavery. Unger argues, “by restricting the extent and ease of transportation, planters could keep blacks and poor whites in their thrall indefinitely. The American System threatened the future of slavery and the wealth of southern oligarchy by opening the South to transportation, commerce, education, ideas, competition, and emancipation.” Readers may well wonder what exactly is wrong with private property ownership and self-sufficiency, as well as why an improved national infrastructure would necessarily have doomed the institution of slavery, rather than making it even more profitable by connecting even more Southern farms to national and international markets.

The author successfully conveys Clay’s powerful, affable personality, as well as Clay’s certain oily quality that caused him to be dogged by scandal throughout his career. Although Unger is relentlessly positive about his subject, it appears that nineteenth century American voters could perceive Clay as a great showman, but one not entirely trustworthy. For instance, Unger writes of Clay’s speaking style that “to hear Henry Clay speak was a once-in-a-lifetime experience that Americans related to their children and grandchildren. But it did not mean they would vote for him.”

Henry Clay: America’s Greatest Statesman offers a glib, relentlessly positive introduction to Clay, but thoughtful readers will likely prefer Robert Remini’s older and more thorough biography of Henry Clay.

Mitchell McNaylor, Harvest, Alabama

TO PREPARE FOR SHERMAN’S COMING
The Battle of Wise’s Forks, March 1865
Wade Sokolosky and Mark A. Smith, Savas Beatie, El Dorado Hills, California, 2015, 252 pages

Until now, Civil War historians have neglected the Battle of Wise’s Forks, relegate it to a seemingly minor skirmish. In fact, it was the first of four major battles fought during a twelve-day period in North Carolina as part of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s 1865 Carolinas Campaign. In To Prepare for Sherman’s Coming, Wade Sokolosky and Mark Smith give the battle its rightful status, while simultaneously linking its importance with the strategic- and operational-level objectives of the U.S. Army during the waning months of the Civil War. The authors have gone to painstaking detail to research and present a succinct
history of the battle (much from original sources), which was fought from 7–11 March 1865.

By the first week of March 1865, Sherman’s army had crossed over into the Tar Heel state from South Carolina. Critical to Sherman’s army ultimately linking with the Union armies in Virginia was the establishment of a logistics base in Goldsboro with an operating railroad to the North Carolina coast. The authors discuss the significance, condition, and disposition of units on both sides before the battle. Much of the Union effort focused on rebuilding the rail lines between Morehead City and Goldsboro to further Sherman’s advance. Some seventeen miles of rail were completely missing, the rest were in chronic disrepair. The authors analyze the logistical challenges faced by Maj. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, the Union commander whose mission it was to set conditions for refitting and rearming Sherman’s army at Goldsboro.

The Confederates, led by the controversial Gen. Braxton Bragg, were determined to delay Cox’s advance from the coast, fighting several skirmishes that culminated in the Battle of Wise’s Forks. Ultimately, the Confederates withdrew from the field on 11 March, ceding the battle to the Union Army.

The book is most enjoyable, thoroughly researched, and highly documented. It flows extremely well. It is illustrated profusely, with many photos from the author’s personal collection. Maps detail troop movements and disposition of forces. The authors define the field commanders and their interactions that shaped the battle. The book does an excellent job of delivering perspectives from soldiers and officers alike, the suffering of soldiers, and the true cost of war.

This reader’s questions were answered completely due to the logical flow and completeness of the work. One appendix covers opposing forces and their organization for battle, while another appendix presents analysis on the number of casualties, especially Confederate, as they lacked the institutional record keeping of the Union Army. The authors present a strong argument that the often-quoted number of “about 1,500” Confederate casualties probably should be revised to about 823.

The authors bring a wealth of military knowledge and perspective, having collectively served forty-six years in the U.S. Army. They bring a well-rounded assessment in addition to maneuver and tactics—covering logistics, transportation, and hospitalization, areas sometimes overlooked in tactical studies.

This book is a welcome addition to anyone who values study of the Carolinas Campaign, and a well-written, well-illustrated, and originally researched look into the Battle of Wise’s Forks.

Patrick C. Beatty, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**DELIVERANCE FROM THE LITTLE BIG HORN**

**Doctor Henry Porter and Custer’s Seventh Cavalry**

Joan Nabseth Stevenson,
University of Oklahoma Press,
Norman, Oklahoma, 2013, 232 pages

How does a PhD, whose concentrations are Slavic languages and literature, take a fresh look at the Battle of the Little Big Horn through the eyes of a contract physician? The leap for Joan Nabseth Stevenson was not that great, as the daughter of a physician from Bismarck, North Dakota. Her father identified the start of the trail; she then explored and charted it masterfully.

Dr. Henry Rinaldo Porter was a contract physician assigned to the 7th Cavalry Regiment during the ill-fated “Expedition against the hostile Sioux,” and the only surgeon who survived Gen. George Custer’s foray into the valley of the Little Big Horn River. The only commissioned surgeon, Maj. George Lord, was in Custer’s column when it was annihilated. Porter and his contracted counterpart, Dr. James DeWolf, were assigned to accompany Maj. Marcus Reno’s battalion. DeWolf was killed in Reno’s “charge” from poor terrain in the woods to a more-defensible hilltop. Porter, as the only surviving physician, was responsible for treating the wounded members of both Reno’s and Capt. Frederick Benteen’s battalions.

The conditions for operating a field hospital under fire were anything but benign. Reno’s battalion fought two battles. The first battle was alone in the timber and...
the hilltop on 25 June. The second was after Benteen’s battalion joined them on the hilltop the next day. Although the position was defensible, Porter’s field hospital in a depression in the center of the hilltop was vulnerable to sniper fire from surrounding plateaus, and without water. The approach of Gen. Alfred Terry’s “Dakota” column and Col. John Gibbon’s “Montana” column caused the Sioux to break off their siege of Reno’s and Benteen’s battalions, but that hardly relieved Porter from his duty of caring for the 7th Cavalry’s wounded. He continued as the only surgeon on site, treating over fifty wounded men, until joined by Gibbon’s assistant surgeon, 1st Lt. Holmes Paulding. Porter accompanied and treated the wounded throughout the evacuation from the Little Big Horn Valley to a waiting riverboat on the Big Horn River, and subsequently down the Big Horn, Yellowstone, and Missouri rivers to Bismarck, Dakota Territory, and Fort Abraham Lincoln.

The author weaves the story masterfully, focusing on the battles fought by Reno and Benteen’s battalions, and their aftermath, rather than the details of Custer’s battle. She also provides an exceptional understanding of the convoluted relationship between Civil War and Indian War era contract physicians and the United States Army they served. This aspect of frontier service is not well known or understood by many. As the title “assistant acting surgeon” would indicate, their relationship to the soldiers and units they served was awkward at best. They were contractors, and just as with contractors today, they accompanied the force but were not part of the force, even though they shared the same hardships and dangers. Contract surgeons were neither enlisted nor commissioned; they had no rank. Their contracts were for a year at a time and could be annulled for any reason or for no reason at all. Porter’s contract to serve the 7th Cavalry was in fact his fourth with the Army, and although this particular contract commenced on 15 May 1876, the Army annulled it on 30 September 1876.

Stevenson also highlights another less-known hero of the Little Big Horn story: Capt. Grant Marsh, who piloted the contract river steamer Far West from its landing on the Big Horn River to Bismarck and Fort Abraham Lincoln, a distance of 710 miles by river, in approximately fifty-four hours. It was a phenomenal feat of piloting skill, and critical for the survival of wounded soldiers from the Little Big Horn.

The only flaw in this book is its scarcity of maps. There is only one, a large-scale map that depicts routes taken by the three columns—Montana, Wyoming, and Dakota—that set out from Forts Ellis, Fetterman, and Abraham Lincoln in the spring of 1876. What is missing are battle sketch maps to provide the reader with a clear understanding of the terrain, as well as the positions and spatial relationships of the battalion columns commanded by Custer, Reno, and Benteen. Although the paucity of maps is a significant shortfall, this is still an excellent work, especially for those who enjoy digging into the less-known details of major historical events.

Thomas E. Ward II, PhD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE AGE OF CATASTROPHE
A History of the West 1914-1945
Heinrich August Winkler, Yale University Press,
New Haven, Connecticut, 2015, 1,016 pages

Few authors have ever been as ambitious in attempting to chronicle the three crucial decades that spanned the World Wars as Heinrich August Winkler. His latest book, The Age of Catastrophe: A History of the West, 1914-1945, is the second book of a three-part historical series and it rises to the challenge. At a hefty 1,016 pages, it seamlessly weaves through the political and economic upheavals happening in the various nations of the Western world, from the Soviet Union to the United States of America.

For military readers, the histories of World War I and World War II have been done to death. All too often historians and readers alike tend to study the world wars separately. Instead, Winkler convincingly argues they were part of a second Thirty Years’ War, which like that of seventeenth century Europe, dramatically altered the international system. The
The Westphalian system, which had emerged in 1648, had given way to a new one where borders were too easily ignored, one where Fascist and Bolshevist powers were freely interfering in the internal politics of other states. This is crucial to the overarching narrative of his trilogy: Western principles of national self-determination, democracy, and inalienable human rights were either difficult to assimilate or at times outright rejected until well into the twentieth century.

The Great War compelled Germany to adopt democracy and to respect the self-determination of nations; this is common knowledge. What separates Age of Catastrophe from the rest is that it tells us how those two principles fed Germany’s hegemonic ambitions and set the stage for a continuation of hostilities: the Second World War. Winkler contends that due to fears of a Soviet uprising, both real and imagined, Germany’s moderate socialist majority had sided with the army to preserve order, thus leaving power in the hands of the military and conservative elite in the short-lived Weimar Republic. In essence, too much of the old regime had remained. Although Winkler views this historical period as a “German chapter” of the book, he dedicates much attention to the developments happening throughout Europe but with a special focus on the United States and the Soviet Union. One can assume this will be the focal point of the third installment.

Winkler concentrates on Western political and economic history, and in so doing he illustrates how post-World War I peace left behind a fragile international order fraught with mistrust. This fragile order became more and more toxic under the waves of global economic hardships. Where Age of Catastrophe falls short is in its lack of coverage of the social conflicts afflicting Europe, and it could have included personal testimonies, as well. These could have provided additional context and a deeper, more personal connection between the reader and the events.

Although it is not a military history, Age of Catastrophe would be a wise addition to military readers’ libraries. Clausewitz’s most quoted passage, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means,” certainly comes to mind at first. However, his remark that “In war the result is never final” best reflects inter-war Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Whether they were victors (Italy), losers (Germany), or somewhere in between (Soviet Union), these nations were left wholly unsatisfied and undeterred by the post-World War I international order. Each sought to overturn it, first by using means other than war, and eventually, by war itself. In the process of doing so, they simultaneously attempted to destabilize their respective neighbors while embarking on a new enterprise that would remake societies into a brave new world: the totalitarian state.

Carlo Valle, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Published at the perfect time, the one hundredth anniversary of the Great War, Keith Jeffrey’s 1916: A Global History uses a novel approach to covering this year of consequence. As stated in his introduction, his “aim in this book has been to use emblematic events from each month of 1916 as hooks for a series of reflections through which the astonishing range, variety and interconnectedness of the wartime experience can be charted.” These hooks include Gallipoli, Verdun, Ypres, Jutland, the Somme, and various other chapters that cover Asia, Africa, the Balkans, and issues in the United States and Russia.

Aside from his interesting approach to the entire work, the material he covers in each chapter also sheds light on underappreciated aspects of the war. Of note for those of us on the west side of the Atlantic are internal issues in the United States in 1916 and American reactions to the war in Europe. For example, Jeffrey admirably discusses the “potential for traditional allegiances to colour responses to the war”—namely, the impact such groups as the German-American, British-American, and Irish-American communities had on national decision making. This influence included both propaganda and sabotage; the latter focused on
Another interesting aspect covered by Jeffrey is the way the American political and economic elite entered the war, despite the neutrality of their government. Americans supported the war by enlisting in the Canadian and British armies, by flying in the Royal Air Force (where “among military occupations ... flying was the only one [now that the cavalry had been dismounted] that gave personal pleasure to the individual who was doing it”), and by founding ventures to support troops. One of those ventures was the American Field Service, a volunteer ambulance organization. When reading about these dynamics from a century ago, it is not hard for a contemporary mind to be drawn to the stark contrast of the decreased propensity of today’s political and economic elite to undertake activities in support of military and political activities abroad.

While overall an informative and interesting read, 1916 does get some basic items wrong. The author’s take on the British decision to undertake the Gallipoli campaign is skewed, or at least simplistic. Jeffrey does not cover how opinions differed among members of the British War Council, or how members’ opinions evolved. He indicates all prominent politicians were in favor—even pushing for—an invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula, although eminent historians such as William Manchester, who wrote the seminal tome on Winston Churchill, offer a much more nuanced and detailed view of the decision to undertake the campaign.

Another incorrect item is Jeffrey’s discussion on the Preparedness Movement, an effort to increase the military ability of the United States. Jeffrey ascribes the movement to President Woodrow Wilson, saying he was attempting to address insecurity in Mexico. In reality, this movement was perpetrated by Republicans, namely Theodore Roosevelt and the recently retired Gen. Leonard Wood. What little Wilson did for preparedness was more likely done to blunt the criticism of such Republicans in the run-up to the election of 1916, where Wilson won under the slogan “He kept us out of the war.”

A quick, engaging read, I recommend 1916: A Global History to those interested in some of the underserved aspects of the world a century ago. The Great War was much more than trench warfare, and Jeffrey captures this in a novel way.

Maj. Nathan K. Finney, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
which Todt warned Hitler that the war could not be won by military means but only politically. Todt further warned Hitler of the dire consequences for Germany should the Americans become a direct participant in the conflict. Stargardt asserts that Hitler was not surprised by Todt’s comments but had himself shared months prior with Joseph Goebbels his doubt whether the Soviet Union or Germany could ever defeat each other. Hitler would decide to ignore Todt’s warning and his own concerns in declaring war against the United States on 11 December 1941.

Stargardt’s research challenges the widely held perception that German civilians were unaware of the atrocities committed by German soldiers during the war. He describes the pride and belief of German soldiers serving on the Eastern front who perceived they were protecting western civilization from Bolshevism and a perceived Jewish conspiracy for world domination. German soldiers’ participation in the shooting of civilians, accused partisans, and prisoners of war were captured on rolls of film and described in letters home to loved ones depicting to the German populace the horror that was unfolding in Eastern Europe. German citizens would later view the bombing of German cities as retaliation for the murder of Jews in Eastern Europe.

The year 1943 is seen as the turning point for the Germans, when they suffered losses on the battlefield and from the Allied air campaign targeting German cities. The war was no longer viewed as an “intrusion” as the German populace began to openly criticize German leaders and the Nazi party following the round-the-clock bombings of major cities by the Allies. The Allied air campaign would claim 420,000 German lives, many after August 1944 when Germany was losing the war on all of its fronts. Stargardt indicates German resilience remained intact with the belief that emerging “super weapons” would reverse German losses and that the tenuous Allied coalition would unravel. Germany’s destruction was complete with the devastation of its cities, the loss of 5.3 million men, and the emergence of a collective guilt for World War II.

Stargardt draws on a range of primary source materials—personal accounts, German records, and military correspondence—in providing an unprecedented view of World War II from the German populace. It may be the most definitive study of German society during World War II. It is an excellent addition for any historian or student of the war in Europe.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE LAST CAVALRYMAN
The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.
Harvey Ferguson, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 2015, 448 pages

Most cavalry officers realize that our particular specialty often appears rooted in the past. Bearing that in mind, the title of Harvey Ferguson’s book, *The Last Cavalryman: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott Jr.*, seemed somewhat pessimistic to this reader who is committed to the cavalry’s relevance on the modern battlefield. That said, and as the author points out, Truscott is not a well-known figure among today’s cavalry officers, and upon receiving the book this reader looked forward to learning something about him.

Ferguson provides interesting glimpses of cavalry life and horsemanship training from the general’s early years. He goes to great lengths to communicate the tactical situations that Truscott faced on the battlefields of the Second World War. He documents the general’s good tactical judgment. Also interesting to the modern Army officer are glimpses of inter- and intra-service bureaucratic infighting that remain familiar today. His description of the early years of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is fascinating.

Overall, the author provides a skillful portrait of the events in Truscott’s life and career. Perhaps due to a shortage of primary material on his subject (“it is likely that Truscott was involved in many more CIA operations than is known”), the author often illustrates important events from the point of view of others who were present. This technique does much to give some sense of the context in which Truscott lived, and it shows how Truscott’s life intersected those of well-known contemporaries, but this often-used technique soon becomes a series of digressions from the book’s avowed subject. A case in point is Audie Murphy, who served in Truscott’s division during the Italian campaign. The reader has a much better sense of Murphy after reading Ferguson’s book, but, strangely, not of Truscott.
Ultimately, this is where the book lets the reader down. Ferguson shows you what Truscott does but does not illuminate who he was. Having read the book, the reader is not left with any particularly good Truscott stories to share or any particularly pithy Truscott wisdom to quote (or even any particularly juicy Truscott transgressions to admire). This may be due to a paucity of personal correspondence and notes left behind by Ferguson’s subject, it may be due to the type of unexceptionally exceptional man Truscott was, or it may be because this creditable work of scholarship is Ferguson’s first book.

Truscott may well be an under-researched American general, but what this book demonstrates is that this may be for good reason. Those seeking greater insight into leadership and the effective use of mounted maneuver will get more from Tom Reiss’s *The Black Count: Glory, Revolution, Betrayal, and the Real Count of Monte Crisco*. It is a slightly shorter read, much less expensive, and it won the Pulitzer Prize. Leave this Truscott book to the historians.

Capt. Garri Benjamin Hendell, U.S. Army, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

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**TORCH**

North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory

Vincent P. O’Hara, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2015, 373 pages

The North African invasion in World War II, Operation Torch, is not a new subject for historians, but Vincent O’Hara takes a fresh look and brings some new perspective. Torch was much larger than a single amphibious invasion. It was a political decision far more than a strategic one. O’Hara dissects both the American and British views in detail. He also looks at a player less commonly considered and successfully integrates the French perspective into the narrative.

Beyond the political concerns of needing to get American troops into the fight in the European theater in 1942, the British and Americans tried to convince themselves that Torch would aid the Russians by engaging German troops. At the time, 70 percent of the German forces were facing the Russians and averaging 1,706 killed per day (over four years). In twenty-six months in North Africa, German casualties averaged sixteen per day, not exactly compelling evidence for Torch helping the Russians.

O’Hara writes that the Allies feared the Germans would attack through Egypt, to connect with forces in Iraq coming down from Turkey and Iran and ultimately to connect with Japanese troops attacking across the Indian subcontinent. He argues convincingly that this was neither part of the Axis strategy nor realistic based on their logistic capabilities. What the reader does not learn was how much of this strategic fear was “Allied” and how much was British concern for the loss of their empire.

The author moves from the inner sanctums of Roosevelt and Churchill where the decisions for Torch were made through the conflicts among the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the amateurish cloak and dagger of the diplomats dealing with the French. O’Hara provides a succinct but excellent summary of amphibious doctrine, experience, and equipment up to the time of Torch. Once the campaign begins, each landing is carefully parsed down to the battalion level. The naval battles are detailed practically salvo by salvo, with extensive comparisons of French and American battles’ after action reports. The maps provided are well done and helpful in navigating the narrative. Confusion reigned during operation Torch. Luckily, this was not confined to the Allied forces. Had the French resistance to the invasion been organized, the results could have been catastrophic.

Was Torch a good idea? O’Hara believes it was. He argues it taught the Americans to operate both strategically and operationally in coalition warfare and provided valuable experience in amphibious operations. More important, he contends, it secured French cooperation for the Allies. Had the French forces maintained belligerency against the Allies and actually fought with Germany, the cross-channel invasion, opposed by an additional fifty French divisions, would have been impossible. Torch would make a good scholarly addition to an officer’s library, but will likely not appeal to the general reader looking for a historical tale of the invasion.

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