**THEY WERE HEROES**  
A Sergeant Major’s Tribute to the Combat Marines of Iraq and Afghanistan  

Do we as a nation show our appreciation and properly recognize the sacrifices our service members make? In *They Were Heroes*, Sgt. Maj. David Devaney does just that by commemorating the heroism and sacrifices marines made during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. After Devaney’s visits with wounded warriors at the Bethesda National Naval Medical Center—now merged with Walter Reed Army Medical Center—he wanted to share their stories with the world. Devaney was encouraged to tell the stories of those heroes after sharing them with the U.S Naval Institute’s editorial board for *Proceedings* magazine.

The book has three distinctive sections: anecdotes from battles in Iraq, from battles in Afghanistan, and from assistance calls by casualty assistance calls officers (CACOs). Every story is different. However, each provides a compelling account of marine bravery in the face of adversity. Devaney helps readers vicariously experience combat by effectively recounting the details of each battle and event. Each story’s details are collected from the statements of those who survived the ordeal and lived to tell the story. Stories of the battles are told with enough detail to provide a clear picture of the environment and conditions in which the marines fought. Also, Devaney minimizes military jargon to facilitate easy reading for nonmilitary readers.

One unique aspect of the book is the stories of two CACOs. Those are the stories that are not familiar to the public. The stories, starting from the CACOs’ initial notification to the fallen hero’s family, to the completion of the CACOs’ duty, bring closure to the marines. Devaney also included the correspondence between himself and the family members of fallen Marine Cpl. John R. Stalvey to help bring awareness of sacrifice that families made alongside our fallen heroes.

Additionally, Devaney provides the award citations for all fifty-two stories to support the stories of heroism of our marines. These citations capture the essence of the marines’ heroic acts and provide further details of the battles—a great way to show the impact of each marine’s actions and sacrifices on others’ lives.

This book is highly recommended to all. Devaney delivers a good reminder that we are a nation at war, and the price is the lives of those answering the Nation’s call. Additionally, Devaney’s contribution to recognizing and reminding us of our service members’ sacrifices is a great reason to read this book.

Maj. Yong C. Choe, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**THE EVOLUTION OF CYBER WAR**  
International Norms for Emerging-Technology Weapons  
Brian M. Mazanec, Potomac Books, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2015, 352 pages

This book looks at the development of norms for cyber war: what should be fair game and what is not? How do these norms emerge, and what is the process of developing these norms?
The author, Brian Mazanec, lays out his “norm evolution theory” in an analytical framework that considers actors, motives, and other material and nonmaterial factors. His theory indicates that the development of norms goes through three stages: norm emergence (where the norm comes into existence), norm cascade (a tipping point where the norm’s international adoption accelerates), and norm internalization (where states and actors accept it).

Mazanec applies this framework to three historical case studies: the development and accepted use of chemical and biological warfare, strategic bombing, and nuclear weapons. In each of his three case studies, he closely examines the impact of the variables during each of the three stages. He devotes a separate chapter to each of the three case studies. At the end of each chapter, he includes a summarization table that indicates which factors were of greater significance in developing the norms.

Based on his findings in the three case studies, he lays out how he believes the emergence and development of norms will proceed for cyber war. He presents primary and secondary hypotheses to examine candidate norms for emerging cyber warfare. He also looks at recent known cyberattacks (such as the 1982 Trans-Siberian Gas Pipeline, 2007 Estonia, 2007 Operation Orchard, 2008 Georgia, 2009 Stuxnet, 2012 Saudi-Aramco, and 2012 Operation Ababil) to further refine the likelihood of these candidate norms and who the leading advocates will likely be for their development, and opines why.

He includes a chapter on conclusions and lists four recommendations for U.S. policymakers to consider as the world continues to expand operations into cyberspace.

Mazanec certainly has the credentials and background to examine this topic. The book is well written from start to finish and flows in a logical manner. He does a good job with definitions and includes a page of pertinent acronyms. I would recommend this book more for strategic policy makers than for students of cyber war.

Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

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**COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

**Volume 1, The First Counterinsurgency Era, 1899–1945**


This work appears to be “straight history,” recounting events in the development of the U.S. Marine Corps as an institution. Leo Daugherty provides the expected chronology for marine interventions in the Philippines, Caribbean islands, Central America, and the Pacific. The historical narrative delivers sufficient political context for marine counterinsurgency (COIN) and related operations, accounts of institutional and field decisions, combat actions, and summaries of “lessons learned” in fine style.

Daugherty weaves three major interpretive threads into his factual account. The first is the evolution of the 1940 Small Wars Manual—considered by marines as the “bible” for irregular warfare. (It was not another instructional drill book.) The second was the transformation of education and training supporting marine warfighting generally, but COIN in particular. Foremost were the various Marine Corps schools, educating resident student officers to think in complex environments where “cookbook” solutions could not be had. The last thread deals with the emerging requirement for unique formations possessing special skills—Marine Raider and parachute battalions in the Pacific War—intended to fight behind enemy lines and employ lessons learned from years of conducting COIN in austere environments.

Of particular interest is Appendix A, “A Creditable Position: James Carson Breckinridge and the Development of Marine Corps Schools,” by Troy Elkins. It’s clear why Daugherty included this piece, since education—not merely training—is indispensable to successful counterinsurgency.

Today’s education imperatives reflect quite old requirements, such as Breckinridge’s 1929 demand for greater critical thinking capability in military leaders. He tried to overcome his students’ tendencies to give solutions to problems they believed their instructors wanted, not ones they felt best fit the situation. Our
current conceptions on adult education are evident in Breckinridge’s efforts that aimed “to prevent students from passively accepting information given to them.” Instead, “students learned to analyze critically a broad spectrum of information in order to avert narrowness of thought and instill intellectual curiosity and initiative.”

Most controversial was the creation, brief employment, and disbandment of marine special forces. Marine Raider and parachute battalions were configured for waging irregular and unconventional warfare in the enemy rear area. Their creators had extensive experience in counterinsurgency and wanted to create problems for the Japanese. The marine commandant made his wishes known that there would be no “special” or “elite” units in the corps, but such efforts persisted. Daugherty describes how these formations were never employed the way their advocates originally intended, and both types of battalions—Raider and paramarine—were eliminated by mid-1943. Despite this, a number of marine COIN advocates earned their spurs in such units; some, like Victor “Brute” Krulak, would shepherd their COIN conceptions well into the second half of the twentieth century.

Recommended for professional and academic specialists in COIN operations, *Counterinsurgency and the United States Marine Corps: Volume 1* brings together wide-ranging scholarship on a little-known segment of twentieth-century American military development. It also generates fodder for current debates on how to best educate leaders and organize forces for COIN within a conventional force.

**Col. Eric M. Walters, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Lee, Virginia**

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**AVENUE OF SPIES**  
*A True Story of Terror, Espionage, and One American Family’s Heroic Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Paris*  
Alex Kershaw, Crown Publishers, New York, 2015, 320 pages

Alex Kershaw’s biographical novel about an American physician in German-occupied Paris, with his masterful storytelling, captures the reader’s attention and poignantly encapsulates the situations of those involved. Kershaw is a well-known, bestselling history author. His previous works include *The Bedford Boys, The Longest Winter*, and *The Liberator*, all centered on various World War II events. He weaves the tale with first-person accounts, anecdotes from established historical tomes, and even legal transcripts from the aftermath of World War II. Kershaw’s thoroughly researched and unbiased writing allows the reader to experience all the emotions and complexity of the story.

*Avenue of Spies* is the saga of Dr. Sumner Jackson, his wife, Toquette, and his son, Phillip, in Germany-occupied France during World War II. Jackson, a renowned American physician who served valorously in World War I and after the war, settles in Paris with Toquette and works at the American Hospital in Paris. After many happy and peaceful years, the terror of the Third Reich descends upon the city, and the Jacksons face an agonizing decision: to aid in the various resistance efforts or to stand by idly and protect themselves. This is the conundrum of a moral courage decision. If the Jacksons help the resistance and are caught, the punishment will be swift and ruthless. If they do nothing, then they violate their own internal values system. Then what lesson have they taught their son?

Ultimately, the Jacksons choose to help the resistance in various ways, while living just houses away from the Gestapo and their horrific torture chambers. The tension and fear felt daily by the Jacksons leap off the pages, but hope and conviction are stronger than fear. The only question is, how long will the Jacksons’ luck hold?

This superbly written book should be on the reading list for every leader, uniformed or otherwise. Much in the same vein as Laura Hildebrandt’s *Unbroken*, the story forces the reader to assess his or her own moral and value systems. The brilliance of this book is the lack of a thesis or hypothesis; rather, Kershaw focuses on highlighting the narrative of a single American family in an extraordinary situation. He allows the reader two opportunities: (1) to learn about the bravery of
analyzing the outcomes of historical events can assist leaders in their future decision-making processes. Christopher Lawrence provides a well-researched and well-analyzed study of the nature of insurgencies and guerrilla warfare since World War II. He conducted his analysis in conjunction with The Dupuy Institute’s long-term insurgency research. Their research provides a unique quantitative historical analysis of this subject using a wide array of influencing factors to anticipate the outcome of a particular type of insurgency. However, Lawrence does not dismiss the unpredictability of the human element in his conclusions. Over the past forty years, strategic and tactical counterinsurgency thinking has had limited advancement. The author looked at a number of variables that affected the outcomes of insurgencies as a means to advance knowledge in this area. Specifically, the author uses data from numerous cases since World War II to illustrate how selected variables have affected the outcomes of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. He also examines conditions where there was no decisive winner. His analysis includes comparing and contrasting specific variables (e.g., terrain, location, sanctuary, and others) and, then, considers thoughts from renowned insurgency theorists. Overwhelmingly, the data he analyzed proves that force ratios and insurgent causes are the two most important factors that influence insurgencies.

The author and the Dupuy Institute use selected models to predict the outcomes of insurgencies. The results of these models continually produce patterns showing that the motivation of insurgents and high force ratios are key factors that influence success in either insurgencies or counterinsurgencies. Taking into consideration these two key variables, along with the results of his studies, Lawrence argues that the United States has engaged in counterinsurgencies with half or less of an optimum number of forces.

During the Gulf War in 1990–1991, the Dupuy Institute used their combat model to provide multiple casualty estimates to the U.S. House of Representatives for an intervention into Kuwait. The accuracy of their model’s prediction was noted by many authoritative sources. Subsequently, the Department of Defense contracts the institute to provide estimates for the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It bases its estimates on data from previous insurgencies, and results are in line with actual casualties. Using various factors, based on historical data discussed throughout the book, the author shows how best the United States can project power and eliminate the previous pitfalls. Lawrence is clear that the methodology in his research cannot predict the outcome of a future insurgency. However, his measures of research have shown consistent validity and reliability in their outcomes. The analysis of historical data demonstrates that affected military interventions, specifically insurgencies in this study, can assist planners to anticipate possible outcomes. Lawrence and the institute explain and show how their models closely estimated the actual outcomes of events in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, the analysis using their models provides a logical estimate of what it would have taken for the United States and allied forces to be successful in Vietnam.

Lawrence’s book shows that reliable outcome estimates are determined through quantitative reasoning. Being able to anticipate the outcomes of any military operation, through reliable means, can greatly assist in strategic and operational level leaders’ decision-making processes. These results are what the book brings to...
light for military leaders and their staffs. Staff members who develop course-of-action recommendations can use the techniques described by Lawrence to provide quality analysis. Commanders will have the confidence from their staff estimates to choose the best courses of action for future military operations. Logically estimating the outcomes of future military operations, as the author writes, is what U.S. citizens should expect and demand from their leaders who take this country to war.


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### BARRIERS TO BIOWEAPONS

**The Challenges of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development**


President Bill Clinton reportedly read Richard Preston’s *The Cobra Event*, the terrifying fictional story of a viral bioterrorist attack against New York City. The novel seems to have had an impact on Clinton, more so perhaps than the nonfiction strategy documents of his predecessor. In President George H.W. Bush’s 1993 *National Security Strategy*, the last of his presidency, the term “biological” was mentioned only four times, and the focus was on arms control measures and the need to “press for a full accounting of former Soviet biological warfare programs.”

With *Cobra Event* on his bookshelf, Clinton’s 1998 *National Security Strategy* devoted entire sections to the perceived biological weapons threat: “The Administration has significantly increased funding to enhance biological and chemical defense capabilities and has begun the vaccination of military personnel against the anthrax bacteria, the most feared biological weapon threat today.” The document also highlighted terrorist use of biological weapons, and in a commencement speech at the U.S. Naval Academy, Clinton announced a massive effort to protect the civilian population from biological weapons. Initiatives included public health and medical surveillance systems, training and equipping first responders, development of medicines and vaccines, and notably, preventing the nefarious use of biotechnology innovations.

In the days following 9/11, letters containing spores of Bacillus anthracis were disseminated through the U.S. postal system, resulting in the deaths of five people, and spreading fear and panic in an already fragile public and national security apparatus. Overseas for the CIA at the time, I remember receiving my mail from the United States; the yellowed, barely-legible, brittle envelopes were the result of irradiation as a precaution against additional attacks.

The threat from biological weapons seemed to be expanding, as the United States attempted to understand and deal with terrorist interest in biological weapons, along with nation-state programs—the former Soviet Union, China, Syria, Libya, Iran, North Korea, and Iraq, among others. Then in October 2002, the U.S. intelligence community produced a *National Intelligence Estimate* on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs that stated unequivocally, “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons.” This certainty evaporated quickly.

Author Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley deploys this history as backstory to her thought-provoking work on the challenges of accurately assessing the threat posed by biological weapons. She was able to incorporate into *Barriers to Bioweapons* interviews with several scientists from the Soviet and American biological weapons programs, her visits to former bioweapons facilities in the former Soviet Union, and her involvement in the DOD-sponsored Cooperative Threat Reduction Program—designed to reduce the proliferation threat posed by a crumbling post-Soviet WMD infrastructure.

The result is a persuasive analysis of the challenges involved with the development and dissemination of biological agents. She points out, for example, that the two largest programs, the Soviet Union and United States, were well financed and lasted many years, but they were never as successful as this investment warranted. She then compares the outcomes of these larger
programs to those of smaller (and much less successful), covert programs like the South African and Iraqi biological weapons programs, as well as that of the Japanese terrorist organization Aum Shinrikyo. Her analysis seeks to demonstrate that barriers of education and practical weaponization experience, along with organizational, managerial, and political issues, combined with economics, contribute to making the pursuit of biological weapons generally untenable, at least in the sense of a WMD meant to cause large numbers of fatalities vice mass fear and panic. In the last chapter of Barriers, and based on her research, the author provides several useful options for effective biological counterproliferation strategies and an updated paradigm for assessment of risk from these programs and technologies. Most compelling is her assertion that focus on acquisition and availability of biological weapons-related technology, restricting scientific publication, and concern with the emergence of new biotechnologies do not merit the interest so far afforded them in the U.S. national security approach.

In late November 2015, the Los Angeles Times reported that the Government Accountability Office was about to release a report indicating “the nation’s main defense against biological terrorism—a $1 billion network of air samplers in cities across the country—cannot be counted on to detect an attack.” Whether biological weapons pose a threat worthy of this level of investment is an important question. Barriers to Bioweapons should be in the library of those attempting to answer it.

John G. Breen, PhD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE SEARCH FOR THE JAPANESE FLEET
USS Nautilus and the Battle of Midway
David W. Jourdan, Potomac Books,
Lincoln, Nebraska, 2015, 424 pages

In The Search for the Japanese Fleet: USS Nautilus and the Battle of Midway, David W. Jourdan writes on the pivotal Battle of Midway through a lens not previously used to view the battle by historians. The USS Nautilus (SS-168), commanded by Lt. Cmdr. William Brockman Jr. and manned by a ninety-three-person crew, was on her maiden voyage and tasked with locating the Japanese 1st Air Fleet, or Kido Butai, and then subsequently inflicting as much damage as possible on the enemy. Jourdan argues convincingly that Nautilus’s actions during the battle, and the initiative of her commander, assisted greatly in the destruction of Kido Butai and the overall thwarting of the planned Japanese invasion of Midway.

The intent of the book is to use the exploits and records of the USS Nautilus to create an untold story of the Battle of Midway. He then illustrates how these accounts were instrumental in assisting the author and his team with locating the sunken Japanese fleet. Nautilus’s mission log, Brockman’s after action report, and interviews from crew members are used to assist the search efforts, and ultimately the team discovers the Japanese carrier Kaga.

Jourdan uses abundant sources throughout the book with a heavy emphasis on interviews and correspondence from historical subject-matter experts, participants of the battle, and U.S. Navy records and personal accounts. Referenced frequently by the author are Shattered Sword by Jon Parshall and Tony Tully, and The Battle of Midway by Richard Bates, and he states they were both invaluable in assisting him to write his book.

The book has many strengths, but one in particular is the author’s ability to pack so much detailed information about the Nautilus’s maiden voyage and the Battle of Midway into such a small book. Other highlights include the description of how submarines were employed during World War II, the Japanese grand strategy for the campaign, and the counter actions of TF-16 (Task Force-16) and TF-17 during the battle. The mix of history and the underwater detective work required to find the Japanese fleet keeps the reader engaged from start to finish.

For readers already well versed in the Battle of Midway, the true value of this book is the author’s account of modern-day underwater exploration and the sophisticated technology used to find the Japanese
Jourdan’s book does not provide any new details on the Battle of Midway other than the exploits of the USS Nautilus. Along with this book, the achievements of Jourdan and his team of deep-sea explorers are rewarded in the Discovery Channel documentary The Search for the Japanese Fleet. The film complements this book greatly to instill a greater understanding of USS Nautilus’s actions during the battle and the difficult task of locating Kaga after years of unsuccessful underwater exploration.

With the Battle of Midway arguably being the turning point in the Pacific during World War II, this book is worthwhile to service members and veterans interested in modern-day underwater exploration and search efforts. For individuals interested in the Battle of Midway, this book is valuable in understanding the interesting dynamic that American and Japanese submarines played in this pivotal battle.

Maj. Matthew Prescott, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Hirohito’s War
The Pacific War 1941–1945
Francis Pike, Bloomsbury Publishing Company, New York, 2015, 1,184 pages

The Japanese Empire reached its peak by June 1942. In just ten years, Japan achieved a remarkable expansion of its empire from 243,500 square miles to 2.9 million square miles. Japanese forces achieved victories so stunning and in such rapid succession that planning did not go beyond March 1942. Despite its success, Japan was no closer to its initial objective of forcing the United States to a negotiated settlement that permitted Japan to keep its Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan’s defeat at Midway and the strategy that followed doomed the island nation to failure.

Historian Francis Pike, author of Empires at War: A Short History of Modern Asia Since World War II, provides the most comprehensive single volume account on the Pacific War to date in Hirohito’s War: The Pacific War 1941–1945. Pike offers a fresh interpretation of the conflict and balances the Western-centric view with attention to the Japanese perspective. Pike challenges widely held perceptions of historians and scholars concerning the Pacific War.

For example, Pike challenges a widely held belief that Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s ten-point ultimatum delivered to Japanese Ambassador Nomura on 26 November 1941 gave Japan no other choice but war with the United States. Pike counters that this ignores the simple fact that Japan was already deploying forces to attack the Philippines, Malaya, and Pearl Harbor when the ultimatum was delivered.

Among Pike’s many significant observations and reflections, two stand out. First, Pike challenges the long-held belief by many historians that Hirohito was simply a constitutional monarch forced into war by his generals. Pike asserts that Hirohito demonstrated his absolute powers on three separate occasions: he forced the resignation of the prime minister in 1929, he overruled his military advisors to insist on the harshest treatment of officers involved in an attempted coup in 1936, and he overruled his advisors by insisting on a Japanese surrender in 1945.

Second, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s plans for war with the United States were predicated on a Japanese invasion and defeat of American forces in the Philippines. It was assumed that the U.S. Navy would then steam across the Pacific Ocean to relieve or retake the Philippines. Japanese submarines armed with modern torpedoes would attrite the U.S. Navy by 30 percent by the time it arrived at the Marshall Islands. The Japanese Navy would then destroy the American Navy in a repeat of the destruction of the Russian fleet at Tsushima. Destruction of the American fleet would
result in America’s acceptance of Japan’s Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Hirohito’s War suffers from the lack of maps or illustrations in the book. Maps and illustrations are referred to throughout the book, but the readers can only access these on Pike’s website. Readers may also find Pike’s prose, in addition to 1,184 pages of reading, a challenge.

In summary, Pike provides a detailed and highly useful narrative of the Pacific War. Hirohito’s War is strongly recommended, despite its length and lack of maps or illustrations, for the balanced view it presents. It is a great addition to any World War II collection.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

TO HELL AND BACK
Europe 1914–1949
Ian Kershaw, Viking, New York, 2015, 624 pages

Eminent British historian Sir Ian Kershaw lends his considerable skills to To Hell and Back: Europe 1914–1949, the eighth installment of The Penguin History of Europe, which spans the classical period up to modern day. (The author will also write the ninth and final volume in the series, covering 1950 to the present.) Kershaw, perhaps best known for his masterful biography of Adolf Hitler as well as his chronicles of the Third Reich, is eminently qualified to pen this history.

Kershaw admits that To Hell and Back is “by some distance the hardest book” he has ever written, and that, except for some primary research on the interwar period, he uses mainly secondary sources in to compose his history of Europe during the turbulent first half of the twentieth century. Readers need not worry—there is much to learn from Kershaw’s impressive ability to distill and explain the complex social and political trends that form the crux of the book.

Europe was at war for ten of the thirty-five years spanned in Kershaw’s work. However, the author reminds us that for much of the remaining period, Europe was anything but at peace, and was wracked by constant turmoil, chaos, and death. To Hell and Back effectively and equally conveys the horrors of both world wars as well as their aftermaths—whether the political turmoil and economic chaos of post-Versailles and post-depression Europe, or the utter destruction and social disorientation affecting the continent following World War II.

This is neither a combat history of the world wars nor a detailed examination of the interwar period, but Kershaw covers more than enough to provide context. His main approach is identifying the social and political forces that shaped both wars, the interwar period, and the onset of the Cold War. Chief among these seminal factors are nationalism rooted in race and ethnicity, revisionist demands for lost territory, a heightened sense of class conflict, and a breakdown in the efficacy of capitalism.

How these forces affected the entirety of Europe—not just Western Europe as one might expect based on the author’s expertise—is perhaps To Hell and Back’s greatest strength. Kershaw seamlessly integrates a state-by-state analysis into his narrative, never making the reader feel that the book is simply an accumulation of individual national histories. His coverage of central, southern, and eastern Europe is particularly instructive, especially for readers accustomed to a western perspective. Kershaw always seems on the mark, whether covering the destructive ethnic conflicts that continuously ravaged Eastern Europe, or explaining why fascism took such a firm hold in Italy and Germany during the interwar period.

To Hell and Back is certainly a worthy entry to the Penguin European history anthology, and it stands alone as a solid, well-researched, and eminently readable work. Kershaw’s work makes a memorable contribution to our understanding of the forces and trends that continue to shape modern-day Europe. It is highly recommended to students of both world wars, the interwar period, and
Modern European history. His next entry to the Penguin series, Fractured Continent: Europe 1950—The Present, is eagerly anticipated.

Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Georgia

THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO THE KOREAN WAR

“The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy,” said Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Omar Bradley, often misquoted as in reference to the Korean War. He was in fact talking about the possible expansion of the Korean War into China, as was advocated by Gen. Douglas MacArthur before being fired by President Harry Truman. Mistakes such as this are common concerning the Korean War, a war often called “the forgotten war.” That the war is forgotten is as much a consequence of circumstance as it is of a national narrow attention span, what with the concept of the heroic war of World War II and the tragic mistake of Vietnam. The Korean War was short, brutal, and bloody, and The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War relates a thorough history of the conflict.

To begin with, it is important to clarify what this book is not—it is not a normal history book, or even a simple backgrounder for the Korean War. For the price, nearly $200, it is not marketed for the mass market. Simply put, the book is an organized academic backgrounder for the war. The text is organized into three parts, with each bringing to light an aspect of the war, with further chapters by academics who tackle specific sections of the theme. The book’s organization makes it extremely easy for any reader to focus on a specific perspective of the war in the first section, which covers the politics and background of the various actors.

Next, the book tackles what we in the U.S. armed forces understand as capacities and capabilities. In the section titled “Tactics, Equipment, and Logistics,” a number of experts detail aspects of the war that generally became a line or a paragraph in a general history, or even a specialized book that gets put in that pile we mean to read “some day.” With chapters such as “Naval Operations” by historian Edward Marolda, formerly of the Naval History and Heritage Command, or “Republic of Korea Army” by Il-Song Park, head of the Military History Department at the Korean Military Academy, it is clear the editors found some top talent to contribute.

The final section addresses the flow of the fight, with multiple chapters covering the highlights in depth. Readers looking for a general history of the Korean War will most likely find this book too detailed. However, anyone seeking to understand the Korean War in depth without having to invest the time to find and read twenty individual books, or those looking to write academically on the Korean War, will consider this book worth its weight in gold.


THE AIR FORCE WAY OF WAR
U.S. Tactics and Training after Vietnam
Brian Laslie, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 2015, 260 pages

The U.S. Air Force in recent decades has created a new conversation about the role of airpower in conflict, after dominating performances in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force. Historian Brian Laslie has thoroughly analyzed recent air operations and produced a thought-provoking treatise on the importance of a post-Vietnam training renaissance leading to U.S. success after Vietnam. Beginning in the 1970s, the U.S. Air Force’s Tactical Air Command (TAC) and an innovative team of young officers began...
a military revolution by creating new exercises with extraordinary realism outside combat. Laslie carefully builds the case that Red Flag and other major training events increasingly gave TAC fighter units unique advantages over their adversaries. He cautions that today even our allies are no longer able to keep pace with these American airpower capabilities. Joint officers that want to understand the true strength of our air operations should study The Air Force Way of War.

Laslie is candid about the shortcomings of the Air Force during the Vietnam War, such as “poor organization, weak command and control, and lack of unity of command.” Soviet-era anti-aircraft technology was very capable of downing tactical U.S. aircraft in alarming numbers. Soviet aircraft with higher maneuverability were many ways technologically equal with U.S. peers. Tactical pilots were stretched with many different missions and a limited proficiency in any of them, especially in basic fighter maneuvering concepts. This resulted in part because the needs of the bombers of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in the 1950s and 1960s had been given a higher priority than TAC.

After Vietnam, Richard “Moody” Suter, a major on the Air Staff, developed a new concept of progressively more difficult training against Soviet-style aggressors in a mature environment. New command structures were stressed with a single air component command controlling the fight. New aircraft, such as the F-16, A-10, and the low observable F-117, were given realistic scenarios to increase their survival during the first ten missions. In addition, a young John Jumper from the Fighter Weapons School advocated new tactics, training, and evaluation. Pilots practiced the destruction of integrated air defense systems followed by deep attack. The skills thus developed would be validated against the Libyans during the benchmark 1986 El Dorado Canyon Operation.

Other airpower theorists of this era, such as John Boyd and John Warden, provided important contributions as air campaigns were developed. Laslie makes the case that by the 1990s, the terms “tactical” and “strategic” were no longer useful in describing airpower. Warden and the Checkmate cell’s “Instant Thunder” brought tactical aviation to the forefront against Iraq in a strategic role. Therefore, the targeting emphasis shifted away from fielded forces since the ground forces were not considered the critical center of gravity. The success of these modern master air attack plans ultimately exposed SAC as having “the wrong equipment, the wrong mentality, and the wrong grasp of aerial warfare.” TAC and SAC subsequently consolidated into a more sensible Air Combat Command. Can the Air Force now adjust and develop better strategies to fully use the capabilities of remotely piloted aircraft?

James Cricks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ISLAM AND NAZI GERMANY’S WAR

Islam and Nazi Germany’s War is a well-written survey of Nazi attempts to compensate for military manpower shortages in World War II by seeking to mobilize support among Muslims from North Africa to Eurasia. In bringing order to this complex enterprise, the author wrestles effectively with some of the exquisite paradoxes of Nazi thinking. After all, how was it that the leaders of a regime whose founding doctrine stressed extreme racial and cultural intolerance could seek support from populations that did not neatly fit Aryan stereotypes? Even though the Nazis focused their recruitment on lighter skinned populations of the former Ottoman Empire, the North Caucasus, and fringes of Central Asia, the convoluted logic of the quest was inescapable.

Author David Motadel’s nuanced analysis reveals the efforts of Nazi policymakers to market their cause to populations with which they had little historical connection. Of course, some Nazi ideologists had noted in passing before the war that the Islamic world shared a list of enemies—from Jews to British imperialists to Slavs—with the Third Reich. With this in mind, strategic communications in the Arab world...
focused on setting Germany apart as a willing friend and potential ally. In response, men such as Amin al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem, took up the cause by 1940 and emerged as a key adviser to the Nazi hierarchy. Aggressive courtship of Muslim partners, however, really began in 1942 as it became clear that German victory was not at hand and indeed might never come.

An initial problem entailed the mere act of communicating interest in a common front to potential Muslim allies. Relatively few Muslims in most of the war zones were literate, and fewer still possessed radios. Recruiting Muslims from among Soviet prisoners of war sometimes proved simpler. In the meantime, the Nazis confronted a huge problem of their own making in trying to sell Germans—steeped in years of racist indoctrination—on the virtues of their proposed allies. The Schutzstaffel (SS) units in particular had to learn to work alongside Muslim units of their own creation. For the most part, German officials followed in the wake of the Wehrmacht and spread an invitation to join the cause to any Muslims who would listen. Much of their argument centered on “shared values” between Nazis and Muslims. They even sponsored friendly Muslim hierarchies and institutions to demonstrate their benevolent concern for the ulama (mullahs). The message resonated best in places where predominantly Turkic Muslims, subjugated by Slavic populations, lived as minorities in lands they once owned. In turn, some Muslims perceived this as an opportunity to align their fates with that of an apparently victorious power.

To be sure, the Nazi recruitment campaign was not wildly successful, although it did yield a few divisions of soldiers in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Of course, a good many Muslims served in armies fighting the Nazis as well, a fact that was sometimes lost in the aftermath. Indeed, it is also noteworthy that Nazi attempts to instigate unrest behind allied lines had little effect. Nevertheless, in the end, associating themselves with the Nazi cause often had serious postwar consequences for Muslim minorities. To their later regret, Muslims in Yugoslavia aligned themselves with Croatian fascists of the Ustasha. Serb memories of the terror they were subjected to helped fuel Bosnian Serb aggression during the Yugoslav Civil War of the 1990s. Meanwhile, within the borders of the Soviet Union, significant, but not large, numbers of Chechens, Ingushis, and Crimean Tatars, among others, joined the invaders. Once the Red Army regained control of the Crimea and North Caucasus in 1943–1944, Joseph Stalin directed the wholesale deportation of entire populations to Siberia and Central Asia. Many perished during the removal process while those who arrived in their assigned places of exile typically found they were less than welcome. Ultimately, return to their ancestral homes became possible for some under Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950s, while others had to wait until the Gorbachev era at the close of the Cold War.

In summation, Motadel’s study includes much original research and pulls together in a coherent narrative the separate experiences of a variety of Muslim populations. The work is highly readable and provides fresh coverage of a seldom-addressed aspect of the war. Overall, the book draws upon a broad range of sources, including many documents from the German archives, and is a valuable contribution to scholarship on the war. For students and scholars alike, it serves as useful background for understanding many developments of the post-Cold War period across the Middle East, the Balkans, and western Eurasia.

Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
the bank was not only necessary but also constitutional, after receiving strident arguments to the contrary from Jefferson. His signing of the bill led Jefferson and Madison to believe he was under the control of Hamilton. Fleming demonstrates this perception was incorrect, showing there was a nearly even split in the disputed decisions of the administration, half favoring Jefferson. The author also takes issue with historians believing Washington did not intend to be an activist president.

Jefferson had an almost religious fervor and faith in liberty, a utopian perception of it. He believed the bank would inherently favor the rich and further the formation of an aristocratic class. His view toward liberty was also the driving force behind his blind support of the French Revolution, which caused the final split between Jefferson and Washington.

Fleming paints Washington’s forbearance of the cabinet warfare, played out in the newspapers and vicious personal criticism, as evidence of his leadership and political skills. Washington had excellent sources and information on the actions of Jefferson and Madison. His interest in considering all sides of questions and receiving unvarnished advice led Washington to request both Jefferson and Hamilton extend their tenures in office. Washington also kept the opposition leader, Jefferson, close by and demonstrated neutrality—a smart political move, Fleming argues.

In contrast, Fleming has a less favorable view of Jefferson’s terms as president, unsurprisingly. Jefferson’s lack of military knowledge led to his insistence on building a small and poorly equipped class of naval gunboat of his own design, insufficient for the challenges faced. The Louisiana Purchase is portrayed as virtually pure luck from which Jefferson benefitted, an act that ensured his easy reelection.

On 10 August 1943, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton met Pvt. Paul G. Bennett while visiting soldiers in an evacuation hospital in Sicily. When Patton inquired about Bennett’s injury, the young soldier replied, “It’s my nerves.” Patton grew angry and yelled, “Your nerves? Hell, you’re just a goddamned coward you yellow son of a bitch.” He then slapped the soldier twice while shouting, “I ought to shoot you myself right now.” This now infamous scene not only earned Patton a rebuke from Gen. Dwight Eisenhower but also brought to light Patton’s anachronistic view of cowardice. The media response and public outcry that followed signaled a shift in societal understanding of this complicated emotion and begged the question: What exactly do we mean by cowardice?

In Cowardice: A Brief History, Chris Walsh attempts to answer this question and many others surrounding the taboo word. Early in his book, Walsh defines a coward as “someone who, because of excessive fear, fails...
to do what he is supposed to do.” From there, he sets out to prove that cowardice is dangerous in its ability to cause inaction or drive recklessness, and useful as a tool for self-examination and development. He does this through a survey of the societal concepts of cowardice throughout American history.

Walsh marks the transformation of America’s view of cowardice through its wars. From the American Revolution to the War on Terror, Walsh traces the use of the word. He argues that the Civil War marked a shift in the previously pejorative understanding of the word, and it also ushered in the medicalization of cowardly behavior. What was once considered cowardly was medically excused during the Civil War as “nostalgia” and “soldier’s heart.” In later wars, it became “shell shock” and posttraumatic stress disorder. As evident through these changes, Walsh argues, society’s attitude toward cowardice has softened over time.

Walsh’s survey of cowardice includes books such as Joseph Heller’s Catch-22, films such as Stanley Kubrick’s Paths of Glory, and philosophers from Confucius to Søren Kierkegaard. Though this vastness signals a thoroughness in Walsh’s research, it also contributes to one of the book’s shortcomings: its dizzying array of sources. For example, in one paragraph Walsh takes his readers from eighteenth century sermons to 1960s fiction to Iraq War examples of cowardice. The genre of sources throughout the book includes literature, psychology, anthropology, sociology, physiology, philosophy, and even neuroscience, among others. The book’s epigraph alone quotes George Washington, Mahatma Gandhi, Samuel Johnson, and Dante Alighieri. Nevertheless, the varied nature of the myriad sources is made more palatable through Walsh’s eloquent prose and graceful style.

Of the numerous sources that Walsh calls upon in his “brief history,” almost all are primary accounts or examples. This may be due in part to the paucity of studies on the subject of cowardice. In fact, in the Library of Congress, Walsh’s book is the only entry cataloged under “Cowardice—history.” Walsh himself claims that his is the only substantial scholarly consideration of the subject. Yet, his study seems incomplete in that it examines cowardice through primarily an American military lens. Though he excuses this omission in the name of brevity, it seems that examining cowardice through various cultures might prove useful in achieving what his book sets out to do.

Nevertheless, Walsh’s well-written study of cowardice and thoughtful consideration of its evolution is clear on every page. Even the book’s yellow cover serves as a reminder of the pervasive nature of the taboo subject throughout our everyday culture. Furthermore, it unveils interesting questions about cowardice in today’s wars and society. The book is an erudite and thought-provoking study that will prove invaluable for anyone wishing to better understand cowardice, its role in war, or society’s view of it.

Maj. Paul de León, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**WATERLOO**

The Aftermath

Paul O’Keeffe, The Overlook Press, New York, New York, 2015, 400 pages

Paul O’Keeffe’s Waterloo: The Aftermath is eminently readable narrative history, and an ideal companion to further study the end of Napoleon’s empire. The author, an accomplished writer and historian who earned his PhD from the University of Liverpool, draws extensively on contemporary sources, connecting the immediate aftereffects of the battle to the courses of events that led to the ultimate end of Napoleon’s era.

True to its title, the book’s focus is not the actions on the field but the consequences of the battle and events up until the time of Napoleon’s exile a few frantic weeks later. In the opening pages of the book, the author describes the battle from its periphery. The reader experiences the cannon fire, the ground trembling from artillery more than fifty miles away, the confusion of the initial reports,
and the sight of casualties as they stream away from the field. This style continues throughout the book, immersing the reader into the events as they happen.

The author’s goal is not to offer a new theory on the already well-studied battle but rather to provide a visceral experience that is often missing in history books. His execution is superb. Twenty-two pages of notes and eleven pages of a bibliography are woven together with a narrative talent to bring the events to life. The author makes extensive use of archived letters, newspapers, and other firsthand accounts in the book. Covered in detail are engrossing descriptions of the catastrophe on the field of battle, the spreading of the news in England, and the frantic retreat of the French army.

In a book full of excellent chapters, the last full chapter, dealing with Napoleon himself, is perhaps the best. The reader experiences his flight from the field, and his desperate withdrawal to Paris. Gone is the confident emperor that terrorized Europe, and in his place is a man who seems to realize that the end is near. As he returns to Paris, instead of listening to his advisors and proceeding directly to the Chamber of Representatives to plea for their support, he draws a bath and rests. Having lost the initiative, he shortly abdicates the throne thereafter in favor of his son. Plans are made to escape to America, but the English cannot allow it, and he instead ends up on a British warship on patrol in the English Channel. Despite his pleas for shelter in the English countryside, the British government knows that such a move is untenable and relegates him to his final exile on the island of St. Helena. Although the end of the story is known from the first word, the reader cannot help but see all the chances for a different course, and a different Europe.

Analysis of history is often undermined by hindsight; readers know what happens in the end so the end therefore seems inevitable. O’Keeffe manages to bring the reader closer to the original experience through the use of contemporary sources. He excels in showing the tiny crossroads where history could have been dramatically different. His combination of scholarly and firsthand sources is excellent, creating narrative history at its best. Waterloo: The Aftermath is highly recommended as an accompaniment to further study of Napoleon and the end of the French Empire. However, one can still enjoy the book with even a casual understanding of the battle and its consequences.

Maj. Brian A. Devlin, U.S. Army, Stuttgart, Germany

Bosworth 1485
The Battle that Transformed England

Regardless of who created the aphorism “history is written by the victor,” nothing could be closer to the truth than in the case of King Richard III, the last Plantagenet king of England. Richard’s grave, discovered under a parking lot in Leicester, England, in 2012, helped rekindle an investigation by some historians as to what kind of king he was. His defeat at the Battle of Bosworth in 1485 ended an almost five hundred-year Plantagenet reign and allowed for future writers, such as William Shakespeare, to portray him in a light that might not have been grounded totally in truth. Author Dr. Michael Jones first challenges the credibility of those portrayals by reexamining primary sources of the time and coupling this research with evidence gathered from the burial site of the king. A second discussion, not as powerful as the first, argues about where the battle really took place.

Jones argues early in his text that many of the authors who wrote about Richard III were doing nothing more than attempting to paint the victor and survivor of the battle, Henry VII, in a positive light. Those portrayals, and what ultimately has become accepted history, ignore the need to be objective rather than subjective in their nature. As a result, we have been left with a history of Richard III that was written to make him look more like a maleficent monster than a monarch—a king willing to sink to any level to maintain his throne against a worthier contender.
Does this necessarily mean that Richard III was the quintessence of evil? Jones’s evidence points to his demeanor being somewhere in between. He makes the case that Richard III did possibly commit some horrendous acts, such as murdering Edward IV’s (his brother’s) two sons. Jones also points out that Richard did commit some heroic acts, such as his doomed charge against Henry VII’s ranks at the Battle of Bosworth. The objective nature with which Jones approaches his research is commendable. The reader is never forced to see things Jones’ way when reading his text. He simply states his researched discoveries and allows the readers to make their decision.

As mentioned before, Jones’s book also discusses where the Battle of Bosworth occurred. This discussion does not necessarily add to his initial argument, but it could rather be the subject of another publication. The lasting effects of the battle itself are what really matters in this book. It represents the end of one chapter of the history of the British people and the beginning of another.

In terms of the quality of study by historians, this text is extraordinarily valuable. Its objective nature and fresh look on a subject a few centuries old create an informative and enlightening read.

Right from the start, Jones makes the claim that his book is intended for a general audience. It is not over-burdened with in-text sources, which allows for a very easy and informative read. For someone interested in a pivotal moment in British history, I would highly recommend *Bosworth 1485: The Battle that Transformed England*.

1st Lt. Eugene M. Harding, U.S. Army National Guard, Auburn, Indiana

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**SPAIN**

*The Centre of the World, 1519–1682*

Robert Goodwin, Bloomsbury Press, New York, 2015, 608 pages

Robert Goodwin presents the reader with an intimate portrait of Spain during its Golden Age in which he more or less successfully weaves the separate strands of music, art, military affairs, politics, economics, and religion together and shows us the relationships among them. Spain is presented as a cosmopolitan Renaissance state with Castilian overtones. Goodwin gives us a world in which the modern nation-state is struggling to be born, high politics resembles a series of family feuds, feudal and aristocratic mores struggle for social dominion with a bourgeois set of values, and religion has a paramount role in society.

The narrative is divided into two parts: “Gold” and “Glitter.” “Gold” shows how the Spanish monarchs built on their Habsburg and Aragonese inheritances to fashion a globe-girdling empire—from the Mediterranean basin and northern Europe to the Caribbean basin and from the Americas to Africa and Asia. Goodwin details the ways the representatives of Charles V and Philip II conquered, administered, and exploited the resources of this empire, as well as defended Catholic orthodoxy in the face of Protestantism as Holy Roman emperors. “Glitter” shows Spain in relative decline, with both Philip III and Philip IV drawn into endless wars with the Netherlands and their allies; Spanish society is contrasted with the expansive Dutch, French, and English societies. These rising powers supplanted Spain and the Habsburgs in Europe, but in its relative decline, Spain created a Golden Age of art and literature while remaining a Great Power with an extensive colonial empire.

Goodwin depicts Spanish monarchs and their courts as sophisticated patrons of the arts as well as capable military men who understood how to wage war despite the handicaps concerning public finance imposed by a divided medieval state structure. All those attributes intertwine with devotion to religion that most of us today do not understand.

The study of Spanish history and the Spanish Empire in the Americas is neglected in our educational system. If studied at all, Spanish history is a precursor to the English and French colonization of the Americas. The study of Spanish history remains heavily influenced by the Black Legend of Spain, assiduously propagated by those who emphasized the villainy of Catholic Spain, supposedly exemplified by the Inquisition and the merciless conquest of the indigenous high civilizations of the Americas. Goodwin exposes the falsity of this portrait.

The Spanish Empire existed from the early sixteenth century until the early nineteenth century. Its final remnants were liquidated only in 1898. In Central and South America, it created dependencies that matured
into successful independent states. Wars in the region are rare, in contrast with other parts of the world.

Goodwin leaves us pondering whether Spain truly declined because in many ways it did not. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Spain and its empire were peaceful, stable, and relatively prosperous, and its colonial society more civilized than the contemporary British colonies in North America. Perhaps it did not really decline but suffered under the perception of decline. Perhaps we should be asking more questions about this portion of the past.

Lewis Bernstein, PhD, Woodbridge, Virginia

**FATAL RIVALRY**

**Flodden, 1513: Henry VIII, James IV and the Battle for Renaissance Britain**

George Goodwin, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2013, 320 pages

The Battle of Flodden is the next strategic-level event to mark a functional shift in the balance of power in England in the sixteenth century, following the Battle of Towton in 1461. The latter was one of the bloodiest engagements in English history and a landmark event that changed the fortunes of kings and lords alike. In the Battle of Towton, however, the primary leadership in both camps were English. This review of the successor engagement of Flodden makes the transition to one of international significance and open conflict between opposing nations, with an effect felt across the channel into mainland Europe. As a reviewer for George Goodwin's *Fatal Colours*, I would be remiss not to highlight this salient point and true paradigm shift. The outcome of this engagement decided whether Scotland would be more of a vassal state or an independent and autonomous kingdom.

*Fatal Rivalry* provides the reader with a view of gamesmanship of kings and lords during times of societal upheaval, changes in allegiances (marital or otherwise), and military industriousness. The Battle of Flodden, for which the author painstakingly leads the reader up to the climactic end point, addresses several of these ideas. Setting the stage is critical to understanding the notable differences as well as the similarities in combatants. The Scottish king, James IV, was well spoken and well respected, and he had leveraged all his diplomatic skills in uniting a fractured and often disassociated nation. He was akin to Henry the VII, king of England, in the preceding years and competed with him on more of a Renaissance stage then a militaristic one. However, as the sun set on Henry the VII, and his son, Henry the VIII took the thrown, a different position dominated the political landscape. Antagonism and liberal exercise of authority, primary in the English camp, led to the eventual escalation of hostilities with James IV.

The Scots crossed the border with over forty thousand men, the largest army ever assembled at the time, and with the most advanced siege craft. They captured English strongpoints in days and laid the foundation for their future use. Additionally, the Scots used pikemen tactics taken from the Swiss, utilizing these as well as their scouts and locals all along the borderlands for information and operational security. This army faced a much more traditional force of English that numbered around thirty-two thousand. It was divided into two echelons to meet its objectives on the battlefield, primarily attempting to secure the high ground. Whether a ruse or crafty stratagem, the Scottish king was enticed out of an excellent defensive position and forced to occupy another, or so he believed. This undid his advantage in siege craft and cannon—which could not easily be reset and aimed—accounting for their minimal use in the engagement that followed. Using pikemen was a good concept; however, in execution, the Scots did a poor job of reading the terrain, understanding the need for inertia in this type of weapon, and were bogged down in a muddy marsh, rendering their weapons and tactics moot.

The earl of Surrey and his counterpart lords on the English side took advantage of the situation. Although outnumbered and lacking in provisions and supplies, they used their bowmen and bladed forces to good effect, to include their killing the king and thousands of Scottish soldiers. As the armies melted away at the conclusion, the whole of the continent, as well as mainland...
Europe, were forced to recognize the state of affairs as favorable to the English. Aside from skirmishes over the next centuries, for all practical purposes, this was the conclusion of large-scale Scottish invasions, and within two hundred years, Scotland became an official part of Great Britain.

**Col. Thomas S. Bundt, PhD, U.S. Army, Fort Detrick, Maryland**

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**FALL OF THE DOUBLE EAGLE**  
The Battle for Galicia and the Demise of Austria-Hungary  
John R. Schindler, Potomac Books, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2015, 360 pages

The recent World War I centennial has resulted in a flood of new histories. Though most of this scholarship has focused on the Western Front, several new works have brought a new focus to the Eastern Front and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Published in just the last two years, Geoffrey Wawro’s *A Mad Catastrophe*, David Stone’s *The Russian Army in the Great War*, Laurence Cole’s *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism in Late Imperial Austria*, and Richard Bassett’s *For God and Kaiser* represent a welcome renaissance of Austro-Hungarian military history. John Schindler’s *Fall of the Double Eagle* is a worthy addition to the field—a fascinating history of a battle that gutted the Austro-Hungarian army in under three weeks and sealed the fate of the Habsburg dynasty.

Context is essential to understand the bewilderingly complicated Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Schindler does an excellent job of introducing the multinational state and army, and the lead-up to war. Such context is essential to understand 1914 since virtually everything in Austria-Hungary’s armament, training, tactics, and strategy was flawed throughout the war. Schindler devotes several chapters to the problems Austria-Hungary had with funding and training its army—the main problem being the cumbersome and complicated political arrangement of Austria-Hungary. This allowed intractable Hungarian politicians to make it very difficult to increase the military budget. Lower budgets meant fewer troops with shorter enlistments, a poorly trained reserve, and insufficient and outdated artillery. By the time the Austrians went to battle in Galicia—today’s southern Poland and western Ukraine—they were already fighting with a severe material disadvantage against the Russian army.

The central figure in *The Fall of the Double Eagle* is Conrad von Hőtzendorf, chief of staff of the Austro-Hungarian army from 1908 until 1917. His tactical doctrines, strategic concerns, training policies, and budgetary priorities defined the army by World War I. Unfortunately, even by the standards of his time, von Hőtzendorf failed to understand the realities of the modern battlefield, and was obsessed with infantry attacks as a panacea for tactical and strategic problems. Schindler does an excellent job of tracing how von Hőtzendorf’s botched initial deployment (he mistakenly sent an army to the Balkans, reversing his decision in time to ensure that two corps were unavailable to fight against either Serbia or Russia), cascaded into suicidal bayonet attacks against superior Russian artillery. When Austrian infantry fought Russian infantry on equal terms, they usually proved victorious, but the institutional failings of commanders ensured that Austro-Hungarian soldiers rarely fought on equal terms. Overall, the Austro-Hungarian army lost over four hundred thousand soldiers in three weeks—around half of all forces committed to the Eastern Front.

Schindler correctly emphasizes that one of the best-known elements of the Austro-Hungarian army—its multinational makeup—was not a fatal flaw in 1914. Austrian officers feared that Austria’s Slavic soldiers were disloyal and unreliable. This was simply untrue in 1914. Moreover, heavy casualties, poor leadership, and tactical blunders can easily explain the instances of Slavic units later cracking under the strains of war. In general, all units in Austria-Hungary’s army followed deeply flawed tactics.
tactical doctrine bravely and enthusiastically, until rendered ineffective by loss of men and officers. Poor treatment of Slavic units—particularly Czechs—by the army would eventually create disloyalty later in the war, but this was a creation of the army itself, not inherent to the troops.

One of Schindler’s most interesting contributions is his emphasis on Austria’s one real success: signals intelligence. Capt. Hermann Pokorny, a skilled linguist and mathematician, pioneered the use of radio intercepts and code breaking, giving von Hötzenhof’s generals’ real-time signals intelligence. Though often ignored by von Hötzenhof, Pokorny’s work saved countless lives during the general retreat back to Krakow in September 1914.

All in all, The Fall of the Double Eagle is an excellent examination of one of the most important battles of World War I, which would shape the future of the Eastern Front and destroy the prewar Austro-Hungarian army. Highly recommended.

John E. Fahey, Purdue University

SPRING 1865
The Closing Campaigns of the Civil War
Perry D. Jamieson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2015, 320 pages

Approximately sixty thousand books have been written about the American Civil War, so it is often difficult for authors to introduce new material, insight, and analysis to the historiography. Perry Jamieson’s Spring 1865: The Closing Campaigns of the Civil War, however, does not aim to break new ground. As a part of the “Great Campaigns of the Civil War” series, Jamieson, the senior historian emeritus of the U.S. Air Force, instead “offers readers concise syntheses of the major campaigns of the war, reflecting the findings of recent scholarship … [and] points to new ways of viewing military campaigns by looking beyond the battlefield and the headquarters tent to the wider political and social context within which these campaigns unfolded.” In other words, Jamieson uses a variety of contemporary secondary sources, instead of original primary source research, to synthesize a concise and readable history of the closing campaigns of the Civil War that is valuable to a wide variety of audiences.

Spring 1865 juxtaposes Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s march north through the Carolinas, which ended in Gen. Joseph E. Johnston’s surrender at Bennett Place, with Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s chase of Gen. Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia from the trenches at Petersburg, to the surrender at Appomattox. Each campaign is covered at a strategic, rather than a tactical level. Therefore, readers looking for an examination of small-unit battlefield tactics should consider volumes with a narrower scope. Jamieson also ties the military campaigns in with certain political aspects, such as the efforts to establish peace between the armies in the waning days of the war.

In lieu of covering such an expansive topic, the author does an excellent job at keeping the narrative concise, clear, and readable. Entire volumes have been written about some of the closing battles of the Civil War alone, but Spring 1865 covers two major campaigns thoroughly in the span of a manageable two-hundred pages. Jamieson’s narrative construction also contributes to the readability of his book. Each campaign (Grant pursuing Lee from Richmond, and Sherman moving north through the Carolinas) is generally covered in separate chapters, reducing the likelihood of confusion for the reader.

Spring 1865 does have a few minor weaknesses. Although not a criticism of the authorship, the nature of Jamieson’s approach, which presents secondary source findings and lacks the color of primary sources, may prove mundane to someone already familiar with the topic. This reviewer is also a firm believer that there can never be enough maps in a military history book. As Spring 1865 covers numerous geographical locations within its two-hundred pages, at least a half-dozen additional maps would be a welcome addition to the text.

Nevertheless, Spring 1865: The Closing Campaigns of the Civil War is a valuable addition to Civil War historiography. By condensing an immense amount of recent secondary source material into such a short and readable volume, Jamieson provides an excellent piece of work that will be welcome as a topic primer, or for the scholar seeking an update on the most recent scholarship in the field.

Nathan Marzoli, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
GRANT UNDER FIRE
An Exposé of Generalship & Character in the American Civil War

Grant Under Fire is a stinging critique of Lt. Gen. Ulysses Grant’s character and the historical records that have shaped his popular reputation. The book covers Grant’s life prior to and following the Civil War but focuses primarily on his generalship during the war. The author uses a myriad of sources from over a decade of research to highlight the historical distortions of Grant’s record. One of the primary targets of the author’s research is Grant’s own Personal Memoirs. Grant Under Fire highlights the many false records and outright lies written in Grant’s memoirs and later by a host of modern historians that have used his record without questioning its accuracy. The author also outlines Grant’s political connections that paved the way for his promotions, and a cabal of journalists that distorted the record by spinning Grant’s image in Northern newspapers. Grant’s closest colleague, Gen. William T. Sherman, is also exposed by the author as incompetent, morally questionable, and having only been promoted due to the influence of his prominent friend and political allies. This and much more are highlighted in Grant Under Fire, including Grant’s incompetence, cronyism, alcoholism, and hostility to those he disliked even at the expense of lives and the Union war effort.

Grant Under Fire is not written to attack or impugn Grant’s character but to simply set the record straight: a record that was clearly written to place Grant among history’s greatest military leaders, a record subsequently honored by the institution of the U.S. Army. I could not ignore the irony of reading this book in my home on Fort Leavenworth, which sits on the main road named in honor of Grant, adjacent to his bronze statue that is also down the hill from the former Command and General Staff College building also named in his honor. Connecting buildings were also named in honor of his two closest protégés: Sherman and Sheridan. These physical impressions are a lasting reminder of Grant’s legacy, no matter how it was recorded, and its impact on the U.S. Army in the early twentieth century.

Grant Under Fire is a fascinating book that takes a critical eye to known Civil War records and refutes what many believed to be the sterling image of the general. It is written for more advanced readers and researchers of the Civil War. As written, it is assumed that the reader already has a foundational understanding of events during the war. This book also validates what I have read in other books concerning Grant’s character, including Benson Bobrick’s book, Master of War, The Life of General George H. Thomas. I highly recommend Grant Under Fire to anyone with a deep interest in American history or to those looking for an authoritative source for researching general officer leadership and ethics in the American Civil War.

Lt. Col. Andrew P. Creel, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

A CHRISTMAS FAR FROM HOME
An Epic Tale of Courage and Survival During the Korean War
Stanley Weintraub, Da Capo Press, Boston, 2014, 261 pages

Bombs, artillery, rifles, and blood characterized the Christmas of 1950. That holiday season for soldiers and marines in Korea was certainly one they would never forget. A Christmas Far from Home by Stanley Weintraub is an essential read for all combat and service support commanders throughout the chain of command.

Weintraub, through primary source material, creates a descriptive image of the post-Thanksgiving offensive and subsequent withdrawal of United Nations (UN) forces in 1950. Even though he provides opinions about Gen. Douglas MacArthur and his “home by Christmas offensive,” Weintraub offers ample evidentiary support in his opposition to the offensive. The historical account reads like a novel as it tracks soldiers and marines from the banks of the Yalu River and creates a broad understanding of the withdrawal through multiple individual perspectives. His account sheds a light on one of the most significant turning points in the Korean War, namely the Chinese intervention that pushed the American offensive back through the Chosin Reservoir and Funchilin Pass to the strategic rescue at Hungnam Harbor. A Christmas Far from Home is a true Christmas story that offers a broad view of the American and Chinese offensives while incorporating personal accounts of heroism.
This book is not just relevant to the historical community, but also to the security and logistical professions. Weintraub effectively depicts a mass offensive and withdrawal that all field grade officers should study, a mass withdrawal that did not result in a Dunkirk-style catastrophe. While this story needed more maps to depict the movement of individual units, his use of sophisticated diction mapped out the scene in the readers mind. Company grade officers should also take note of this book as the author carefully balances the stories of battalions and regiments with platoons and companies, highlighting the heroes at the lowest level. Weintraub's most important lesson is to never forget, regardless of rank, how to be a soldier including the basic skills of how to fire a rifle, communicate, and move tactically.

As our nation's forgotten war, Weintraub reminds us of the sacrifices made over sixty years ago. The failed UN offensive should not be something we as combat leaders forget, but rather something we learn from. The strategic evacuation from Hungnam harbor is something that is logistically and tactically remarkable. Overall, Weintraub's book reminds soldiers their actions have a direct impact on geopolitics and that they have a responsibility to make well thought-out decisions.

Cadet Casey McNicholas, U.S. Army Cadet Command, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington

CHOOSING COURAGE
Inspiring Stories of What it Means to be a Hero
Peter Collier, Artisan, New York, 2015, 240 pages

In Choosing Courage, Peter Collier takes the reader on an educational and emotional journey by highlighting soldiers who received the highest military award (the Medal of Honor) and civilians who received the highest equivalent civilian award (the Citizen Honors Award). For the inspirational stories of the Medal of Honor recipients, he offers historical context from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He tells the stories of civilian Citizen Honors awardees who distinguished themselves during the 9/11 attacks and the Sparks Middle School shooting in Sparks, Nevada, and others who worked with the Doctors Without Borders relief organization.

In each illustrated account of courage, there are graphic, inspirational, horrific, and emotional revelations that will keep the reader engaged to the end. In addition, interviews with parents, spouses, children, and friends provide insight into the character of each hero. The stories present accounts of the background and upbringing of these amazing people. They include first- and second-hand accounts of their bravery under the most dangerous and trying conditions. Most revealing, each account provides the reflections of the awardee, which will humble readers and instill in them a renewed appreciation of life and the people around them. These reflections exemplify the human dimension of leadership and the inherent motivation to survive. A statement by a former Vietnam prisoner of war illustrates the power of these stories to inspire: “You survive hard times by using your mind and your imagination and by thinking about the good things you’ve done. You survive and succeed by focusing your mind on your life goals and never giving up.”

In another example, U.S. Army Lt. Vernon Baker, one of seven African-Americans retroactively awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions in World War II, was asked what he learned during his military service. He said, “Give respect before you expect it. Treat people the way they want to be treated. Remember the mission. Set the example. Keep going.”

Finally, the author describes Dr. Jordy Cox, who traveled all over the world to treat patients in developing countries during times of war and natural disasters. When awarded the Citizen Honors Award, he stated, “You do what your heart tells you. That’s what you are supposed to do.”

The book is well written, well organized, and interesting. It provides studies in leadership, motivation, and character building that are appropriate for any educational setting from middle school to university level. It is not exclusively for military readers; there is a civilian context for every account in the book. I recommend Choosing Courage for anyone seeking inspiration in the selfless actions of others thrust into situations where life or death is a consequence of doing the right thing.

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