**THE LAST WARRIOR: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy**

Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, Basic Books, New York, 2015, 336 pages

In the arena of national security policy, Andrew Marshall may be the “most influential man you have never heard of.” Through most of the Cold War and up to his retirement in 2015, Marshall operated behind the scenes, first at the RAND Corporation and then in the little-known Office of Net Assessment (ONA), an organization buried deep in the recesses of the Pentagon. There, he advised a series of key leaders on how to manage the strategic competition with the Soviet Union and, more recently, China. Sometimes jokingly referred to as “Yoda,” he mentored platoons of bright young officers and defense intellectuals in an office that eventually became known as “Saint Andrew’s Prep.”

In *The Last Warrior*, authors Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts trace Marshall’s career in what they call an “intellectual history” rather than a standard biography. Their book describes Marshall’s education as a young economist recruited to the newly created RAND Corporation in 1949. There, Marshall analyzed the problems of nuclear strategy with such well-known “wizards of Armageddon” as Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, and Herman Kahn. With the maturation of his analytical skills, Henry Kissinger lured Marshall from California to Washington; by 1973, he became the head of the new ONA under Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. In this role, Marshall’s mission was to look over the horizon to anticipate emerging threats while seeking areas of opportunity where the United States might gain an advantage over its rivals. There, he identified the early signs of the Soviet Union’s collapse; he heralded the “Revolution in Military Affairs,” and he offered the first warnings of China’s rise as a strategic competitor to the United States.

Given this track record, the authors argue that Marshall is one of the great unsung heroes of recent American history. Yet, they face at least four formidable obstacles in making their case. First, Marshall is reticent about putting himself in the spotlight. He is, by nature, a self-effacing man, and he let his protégés write the ONA’s most influential studies and assessments. Second, much of the important work Marshall was involved with remains classified. Third, Marshall insisted that ONA’s products be “diagnostic” rather than prescriptive. He directed his subordinates to identify issues and opportunities without recommending a certain course of action. Thus, one is hard-pressed to assess his role in the constructing of key policies. Fourth, there is the issue of bias. Both Watts and Krepinevich are former members of “Saint Andrew’s Prep,” and Krepinevich leads the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments—a think tank that receives a sizeable chunk of its budget from ONA.

For these reasons, readers may have to make their own assessments of Marshall’s significance. Granting that, the book is well-written, well-researched, and recommended for those looking for “deep background” on U.S. strategic decision making in the Cold War and after.

Scott Stephenson, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**HOSTILE INTENT AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: Human Factors Theory and Application**

Edited by Alex Stedmon and Glyn Lawson, Ashgate, Burlington, Vermont, 2015, 356 pages

Terrorism is becoming more diverse and innovative as it continues to evolve. Defense, intelligence, and police services are tasked
with anticipating and countering terrorist activities before they occur. Human factors in counterterrorism are still an area largely under-researched, and yet human factors have immense potential in developing effective policies and strategies for combating terrorism. Alex Stedmon and Glyn Lawson, recognized researchers in the field of human factors and ergonomics, edit a timely study that presents world-leading ideas and research that explore the emerging domain of human factors in counterterrorism.

Hostile Intent and Counter-Terrorism is broken into six key themes: conceptualizing terrorism, deception and decision-making, social and cultural factors in terrorism, modeling hostile intent, strategies for counterterrorism, and future directions. Stedmon and Lawson use empirical studies to challenge widely held beliefs that terrorists are irrational and that militant social networks form for carrying out violent acts.

Among Stedmon and Lawson’s many significant observations and reflections, four stand out. First, responsibility modeling for evaluating emergency preparedness is extremely beneficial for identifying and managing vulnerabilities. Counterterrorism experts can develop those models for prospective and retrospective analysis. Second, counterterrorism policies must focus upon educating and reassuring the public about the real risks of terrorism. Any approach that chooses, instead, to emphasize the dangers associated with terrorism is likely to have the counterproductive effect of increasing fears. Third, a mixed-methods approach that combines quantitative and qualitative analysis of primary and secondary data to analyze changes in network relations and activities within terrorist groups is indispensable. This approach allow researchers to identify changes in leadership relations over time corresponding to major events in a group’s development. Fourth, research of female suicide bombers indicates that this growing and dangerous phenomenon is not ideological or cultural but is associated with the disintegration of traditional patriarchal societies. Disintegration results in the weakening of traditional norms that would prevent women from taking nontraditional roles including suicide terrorism.

Stedmon and Lawson go beyond traditional works of reporting research efforts to include a section that looks to the potential future directions of hostile intent and counterterrorism research. Potential future research questions include: How can counterterrorism policies be best adapted to engage the public? How can intelligence analysis be improved? How best can we integrate design into security dialogue and practice? Hostile Intent and Counter-Terrorism illustrates the unique insights that human factors research can provide in developing our understanding of counterterrorism measures.

This book is a must read for researchers investigating counterterrorism. In addition, it will provide a valuable resource to security stakeholders at policy and practitioner levels.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE CONQUERING TIDE: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-1944

For readers interested in the broad historical aspects of the war in the Pacific during World War II, The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-1944 is the perfect companion. Ian Toll has hit a home run, and The Conquering Tide distinguishes him as this generation’s Samuel Eliot Morison. For World War II or naval history fans, this book is a must read and would be a great addition to their library.
The Conquering Tide highlights a well-synchronized mix of battles fought in the air, land, and sea throughout the Pacific from 1942 to 1944. Toll repeatedly allows the reader to get a sense of what it was like sitting in the cockpit of an airplane during an air-to-air engagement, bounding along a sandy beach during an amphibious landing, or feeling the fear as a torpedo approaches a ship you are serving on. Toll's detail regarding the interservice rivalries of the Navy and Army, not just within the American armed forces but also within the Imperial Japanese forces, leaves the reader feeling irritated at the inability for these services to work together as a team for a common cause.

As he writes of the war's progression and America gaining footholds, Toll expands upon how American service leaders improved their integration, particularly in their usage of air assets, while the Japanese leaders continued to lose momentum and were unable to integrate their air force, navy, or army forces to achieve needed victories. Last, his use of primary and secondary sources is extensive, and his bibliography and notes are organized to enable readers to find other sources to research if they are interested in specific subjects.

Although The Conquering Tide is a fantastic book, the author faced the challenge of fitting two full years of the war in the Pacific into one very broad book. He could have easily picked one year and still had plenty of material and references. As I read the book, I constantly wanted more detail about the human dimension and military actions during this pivotal time in the war. Toll eloquently hits the highlights within this period in the Pacific War but does not expand upon any subject in great detail. I believe Toll's intended audience for this book is readers not already familiar with the subject.

Regardless, The Conquering Tide is a page-turner and keeps the reader interested from start to finish.

I highly recommend this book for any U.S. service member who is interested in the Pacific War during World War II. The leadership and operational lessons learned will allow readers to increase their knowledge on the complexity of conducting joint operations and maintaining unity of effort.

Maj. Matthew Prescott, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The Making of a Navy SEAL: My Story of Surviving the Toughest Challenge and Training the Best
Brandon Webb and John David Mann, foreword by Marcus Luttrell, St. Martin's Griffin, New York, 2015, 256 pages

The Making of a Navy SEAL is Brandon Webb's autobiographical account of his life from early teens to the completion of his Navy career. One should not judge this book by its title; it is less a story about becoming a SEAL than one about overcoming adversity and achieving extraordinary goals. Webb takes the reader through his trying times of self-discovery, and the conflicts with his father that led him to discover the Navy SEALs, which ultimately became his passion. He discusses setback after setback as he pushed through obstacles put in his way by family, friends, leaders, and even the Navy, to pursue his dream of becoming a SEAL and excelling at his work. Rather than a Hollywood-style shoot-'em-up SEAL story, this is a factual account of one man's journey from troubled teen to a man that boys would strive to emulate.

The book is in six parts, each with multiple chapters. Each part covers a significant period in Webb's life: teen years, first tour in the Navy, SEAL training, sniper training, operational time, and time as an instructor. The chapters are short. They break down detailed military terms in a manner nonmilitary readers can easily understand. Webb's perspective is based on his unique experiences and a deep understanding of the SEALs. He provides a great look into the phases of SEAL training and the mind of a determined individual set on accomplishing a goal.
This is a great book focused toward the younger male reader. By the author’s own admission on page xvii, in the first paragraph, he speaks to that audience: “What I would not give to be twelve years old again … I can’t go back in time, but I can give you some tips that I wish I’d had when I was about your age.”

The professional military reader will not get much out of this book. There are some points that are interesting and might be new information, but overall the book is written in a very basic way. Some of the detailed explanations, and occasionally misused basic terms, may put off the military professional. This book seems targeted at men in their early teens to early twenties. At around 213 pages, the very short chapters likely will help busy young readers progress rapidly through the book and remain interested. To that end, Webb hits the nail on the head. This is an outstanding book, easy to read and easy to understand. For that young man looking at the challenges in front of him and wondering how he will ever overcome them, this story can provide some perspective.

Lt. Col. Steven Zynda, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AIRPOWER REBORN: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd
Edited by John Andreas Olsen, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2015, 256 pages

For over 2,500 years, since warrior–scholars such as Thucydides have been writing about warfare, strategic landpower theory has been developed, debated, and refined. Airpower theory, on the other hand, has a relatively short history, having evolved only during the last one hundred years. In Airpower Reborn, John Andreas Olsen and five other leading strategic theorists present an authoritative, comprehensive, and well-structured book on the development of airpower theory by its original proponents, such as Giulio Douhet and Sir Hugh Trenchard, through to the contemporary work of John Warden III.

Olsen organizes the book into five chapters, each authored by a different strategic theorist, and an introductory essay written by himself. Chapter 1, by Peter Faber, presents a historical perspective on airpower theory, tracing its development from Douhet to Warden. Faber offers an analytical framework to categorize the different airpower theories and correlates the debates between the theories of Warden and Boyd with those of Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz.

Frans Osinga provides a detailed examination of the theories of John Boyd in chapter 2. Osinga provides his interpretation and critique of Boyd’s theory, suggesting that it offers significantly more to strategic planners than the often-misunderstood OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop. Osinga captures Boyd’s vision of war as a dynamic contest between complex adaptive systems.

Warden builds on his earlier airpower theories in chapter 3, offering an alternative approach to warfare where the use of force is directly linked to end-state strategic objectives rather than the act of fighting battles. This chapter shares a similar perspective to Osinga’s by considering warfare within a systems approach. Building on his five-ring model for identifying centers of gravity, Warden draws on examples from Operation Desert Storm to illustrate the application of this model.

Chapter 4, by Alan Stephens, presents the thesis that modern Western strategic thinking is simply an extension of the land-power dominated strategic theory from the nineteenth century. Stephens argues that airpower theorists must change this paradigm by moving toward a strategy based on knowledge dominance, tempo, precision, and a fleeting footprint. In a play on words taken from the terminology of fighter aircraft development, Stephens labels this the “fifth-generation strategy.”

Colin S. Gray presents a summary of airpower theory in the form of twenty-seven dicta in the final chapter. Gray emphasizes that theory provides an explanation that serves as a guide, but theory is not a definitive checklist for success. Gray’s essay presents a reasoned assessment of airpower’s potential and limitations into the future.

Airpower Reborn is well written and logically structured. It brings together a century of airpower theory in one concise reference, providing airpower’s historical roots as well as its contemporary theory. Not all
readers will agree with certain theoretical aspects, but most will find the discussion intellectually stimulating. Airpower practitioners and anybody involved in strategic planning, from policymakers to warfighters, are likely to consider it a must-read.

**Maj. Ian Sherman, Australian Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**OUTSOURCING SECURITY: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy**

Bruce E. Stanley, Potomac Books as an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2015, 198 pages

How do privateers affect foreign policy? To whom do they swear an oath? Who pays them? Those questions come to mind about private military contractors (PMCs) and private security contractors (PSCs) in twenty-first century conflicts. *Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy* examines the growth of contracting organizations over the last two-and-a-half decades. Those who wish to understand a framework for why the U.S. government employs PMCs and PSCs should read Bruce Stanley’s book. However, I caution those wanting a political analysis of PMCs not to be misled by the book’s title. Stanley deliberately does not provide a significant amount of historical analysis.

Stanley argues the United States created a situation in which PMCs are used regularly because of reduced troop levels. While his argument is valid, I believe it would be stronger if he combined his hypothesis with an in-depth historical and political analysis. Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Joint Endeavor, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom prove as the supply of available U.S. troops decreased, there was a corresponding increase in PMCs to fill the gap. Stanley provides a framework of the PMC community and analyzes each of the operations to show the increased contractor use. I inferred the relevance of statistics and tied their importance to larger foreign policy questions, which is not a negative aspect, but my conclusions could be much different from Stanley’s. His book provides a comprehensive analysis of the situation in which PMCs are employed, but not of the significance of that employment to foreign policy.

Stanley’s use of statistics creates an authoritative tone, but his argument would be stronger if he incorporated an in-depth political or historical analysis. While he gives strong evidence to prove his hypothesis, Stanley appears reluctant to address the effect of contracting on foreign relations. While he does briefly discuss the significance of the rise of PMCs, the discussion could have illustrated why the contractor industry grew in the first place. Stanley’s case studies begin with Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, but contractor usage by the United States did not begin with those operations. His argument would be reinforced had he touched upon the political reasoning behind policy decisions that brought about an increase in PMCs over the last twenty-five years. Policymakers could then use his framework to understand the development of the industry and how to regulate its future.

As a future combat leader, I want to know how contractors will affect my soldiers and our mission. Having read Stanley’s book, I have a level of certainty about when to expect a PMC to be used, but my question for Stanley is, so what? What will an increase in PMC use have on American foreign policy? For the security community, to what extent do we allow private contractors to shape American security policy? Those questions are complicated, but they add to the complexity of the twenty-first-century warfare my generation will be fighting.

**Cadet Casey McNicholas, U.S. Army Cadet Command, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington**

**81 DAYS BELOW ZERO: The Incredible Story of a World War II Pilot in Alaska’s Frozen Wilderness**

Brian Murphy with Toula Vlahou, Da Capo Press, Boston, 2015, 238 pages

Americans are enamored with survival stories. Simply turn on your television and you are inundated with reality shows tied to survival (most very loosely). Consequently, when a book focuses on a true story of survival, it is likely to appeal to a
significant audience. This is the case with 81 Days Below Zero.

Within this excellent volume, author Brian Murphy (with assistance from his wife Toula Vlahou) details the incredible story of Leon Crane. Crane was part of a five-man, B-24 Liberator crew that crashed in Alaska while conducting a test flight days before Christmas in 1943. He was the sole survivor, going on to survive an amazing eighty-one days in brutal conditions before his rescue.

The telling of Crane’s story is a challenge for any would-be writer. Throughout his life, Crane was very reluctant to discuss his experience. Consequently, there is a not a great deal of archived material available. The challenge is even more difficult because Crane died in 2002; thus, the possibility of interviewing Crane was not available.

So how did Murphy meet the challenge and fill in the blanks? He made significant use of accessible resources. Those include an unedited transcript of an interview with Crane, a 1944 story written by Crane, and a videotaped oral history from the late 1990s. Murphy combined those with interviews of family members and friends to provide himself with an understanding of Crane’s ordeal and of the man himself. He then utilized this information to extrapolate on parts of the story that may have been missing or needed expansion.

Throughout the pages of 81 Days Below Zero, two things are emphasized for the readers. First, the ability of Crane to overcome what Murphy labels as the “enemies” of survival, which include pain, cold, thirst (which was not an issue), hunger, fatigue, boredom, and loneliness. Second, the unbelievable strokes of luck that aided Crane tremendously in defeating the aforementioned enemies. Some of those opportune breaks will literally have readers shaking their heads in astonishment.

An interesting aspect of 81 Days Below Zero is Murphy’s decision to interweave many other stories within the story in his book. In particular, the author inserts several chapters within the volume detailing the efforts decades later to search the wreckage site. This discussion and his shift into other areas may not be appealing to some readers who sought a book solely focused on Crane’s “81 days.” For others, this may be appreciated background information that aids in telling the entire story.

81 Days Below Zero is a book that should grip the preponderance of readers. Murphy crafted a volume that is superbly written, thoroughly researched, and is unique within this popular genre. Crane’s incredible story of survival deserves to be known by a far greater audience. That is why 81 Days Below Zero is such a valuable contribution.

Lt. Col. Rick Baillergeon, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE UNSUBSTANTIAL AIR: American Fliers in the First World War

Samuel Hynes’s latest work covers a subset of World War I history previously neglected, a discussion of who America’s first combat aviators were and how they undertook their combat roles. Hynes is a World War II Marine pilot who has previously written about his own combat experiences as well as another book detailing soldiers’ accounts of twentieth-century wars. He is a masterful storyteller who engages the reader from page one.

Using various first-hand aviator accounts to family and friends, Hynes artfully and seamlessly transformed disparate accounts into an awe-inspiring narrative that brings the reader from pilot training through the World War I front lines. The use of the author’s personal knowledge regarding military
aviation coupled with first-hand accounts from American aviators in World War I has never been as detailed in other works regarding the subject. What makes this work an easily understood and fascinating read was the simple premise Hynes expertly proved, which was based on Billy Mitchell’s quotation in the prologue, page 1, “The only interest and romance in this war was in the air.” Hynes writes about this romance in the air throughout the book and uses the personal letters and testimony of several aviators to demonstrate his point.

Hynes uses nineteen chapters (or waypoints) to plot his course on this journey. These nineteen waypoints then are grouped into three sections. The first seven waypoints allow the reader to understand how the young men of 1914 America underwent pilot training; how colleges and universities were the first to develop flight training courses that the military then supported to boost its ranks; and how some Americans went to foreign militaries to fly at the onset of the war and at the forefront of military aviation. Hynes also described in detail the romance of the flight for these young men using their letters home as the basis.

Section two describes in detail how the American aviators were flying and undertaking missions in World War I. Hynes used this section to describe low-level flying; close air support (which had different terminology during the war); how pilots spent their free time around the French countryside; and, how pilots dealt with death of close friends. Additionally, this section also evaluated the start of differences between combat pilots and support/reconnaissance pilots. At the beginning of chapter 12, Hynes tells the story of the lack of observation pilot collections, but has plenty of pilot material; an interesting take still seen in various aviation units in today’s military. The only negative against the book occurs in this section due to the lack of a map with city names and locations. Having a map in the book would have made it easier for the reader to follow the location of the forces in relation to the front lines.

The third and final section describes in detail the final few months of the war and the postwar aviation period. In this section, various pilots not giving up flying because the war was over illustrates the romance of aviation. Hynes also describes the various postwar memorials and writings and how they directly affected how pilots trained for future combat aviation roles.

Ultimately, Hynes’s book is a must read for anyone interested in aviation history or in firsthand accounts of World War I events. This book gives an interesting look at the lead up and first use of American airpower in war and should be mandatory reading for all members of the U.S. Air Force, as well as all other military aviators, to inform them where military aviation truly started as depicted straight from those flying the first combat missions.


A Higher Form of Killing
Diana Preston, Bloomsbury Press, New York, 2015, 352 pages

A follower of today’s headlines cannot escape the constant mention of concerns over the threat of weapons of mass destruction. In A Higher Form of Killing, author Diane Preston impressively details a mere six-week period in 1915 when the entire concept of killing on a mass scale took a quantum leap on battlefields, at sea, and in city streets. The tools of this paradigm shift were poison gas, submarine warfare, and aerial bombardment.

Preston provides a concise historical run up to World War I, expertly weaving the political, technological, and legal currents influencing the evolution of warfare. Beginning with the Old Testament, she considers centuries of study and debate as to the nature of “just war,” ending with the Hague Conference of 1899. That the conference placed bans on the use of airdropped bombs and poison gas is evidence of the world’s awareness at the time of the potential horrors to come. However, also fascinating is her recounting of the many rationale presented in opposition to bans; most notably that gas was a more “humane” way of dying than, say, being blown to bits.

Preston proceeds in chronological order, with chapters rotating between U-boats, chemical weapons, and aerial bombardment (practiced mostly by zeppelins). Each weapon’s development, tactical employment, and strategic impact is explained in precise detail, but in a narrative format that seizes and holds the reader’s attention. One particularly insightful
thread she identifies is the nexus of the military, scientific, and psychological thought that encouraged industry to develop weapons designed to inflict terror on civilian populations.

The author provides an interesting parallax view of the impact of these weapons through three lenses. First, a discussion of the political decisions and reactions to use of these weapons; second, the way military leaders wielded and defended against these new capabilities; and finally, the impact of these implements on soldier and civilian alike. To do this, she examines archival material from the United Kingdom, United States, and Germany, as well as extensive files of war letters and remembrances of survivors. Using these resources, she delves into the efficacy of such weapons, asking the question whether the military advantage derived from the use of these weapons was worth the cost of public approbation.

In the case of all three, the answer seems to be “no”; they were sometimes tactically effective but produced extremely negative public reaction (in the case of gas and aerial bombing) or strategically disastrous (unrestricted U-boat warfare being a precipitate for American intervention). Preston then provides an illuminating look at how these weapons remained largely unaddressed from a treaty perspective during the interwar period, leading to the predictable use of their much technically advanced successors, the submarines and bombers of World War II.

This book is detailed enough to edify the serious student of history, but also eminently readable for those approaching the subject for the first time. I would highly recommend it for both audiences. Preston concludes with a highly compelling explanation of why readers should care about these century-old developments. In short, these weapons are still with us, in much more powerful modern incarnations. The question that should concern all with regard to such weapons is their employment in the future. Her answer relies less on history and more on the calculations resident in the hearts and minds of those who would use them. That is a sobering prospect indeed.

Robert M. Brown, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ARDENNES 1944: The Battle of the Bulge
Anthony Beevor, Viking, New York, 2015, 480 pages

The Ardennes offensive launched by the Germans in late 1944, more commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge, needs little introduction and one wonders if another telling is necessary. The wondering does not last long as Anthony Beevor, the distinguished author of D-Day, does not disappoint with this excellent new addition to the literature.

At 0520 hours on 16 December 1944, artillery from the 6th Panzer Army opened fire on the surprised American troops. A battle of desperation on both sides—a last gasp for the Germans and for the understrength Americans—began in the snowy and bitter cold Ardennes forest. It brought the incredibly hard eastern front fighting to the west, Beevor argues. By the end, casualties on both sides were similar, he notes with 80,000 killed, wounded, or missing on the German side and 75,482 with 8,407 dead for the Americans. Additionally, the British suffered two hundred killed, but civilian casualties were difficult to measure. The overall results were far from even as the German attack was checked and ultimately reversed.

The author does an excellent job laying out Hitler’s strategy and reasons behind the attack and argues persuasively that the absence of the two Panzer Armies from the eastern front opened the door for the Russian winter attack. The only absence in the book is any thinking on how, or if, the Allied demand for unconditional surrender factored into German thinking; the author is silent on this point.

This is a complex story to tell, especially from the multiple perspectives used. But, Beevor does a masterful
job. He seamlessly connects the soldiers in their foxholes to the generals in their headquarters, encompassing all levels from small unit tactics to theater strategy, including the ambivalence to downright negativity over the plan by many in the German leadership ranks. He provides an excellent account of Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny's infiltration of English speaking German soldiers behind American lines, and the "overreaction bordering on paranoia" it created. The anecdotal accounts of the senior leadership, particularly on the Allied side, demonstrate the strengths, weaknesses, character, and overall personalities of this disparate group.

An important component of the book is how the author weaves the impact of the battle on the civilian population with the military aspects, adding another human dimension. The kindness shown by American troops toward the Belgians and the reciprocation of these suffering people is juxtaposed against the abuse and cruelty by the Waffen-SS. This enriches the overall picture Beevor paints of the conflict.

The well-known command structure controversies are thoroughly handled, most importantly the transfer of the U.S. First Army to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, angering his American counterparts. Montgomery's public pronouncements, aided by a complicit British press corps, resulted in a public relations nightmare for not only Dwight Eisenhower, but also Winston Churchill and Field Marshal Alan Brooke, who understood the deeper implications. Beevor argues that this ensured that the British would minimally influence the conduct of the remainder of the war.

An in-depth and captivating account of this important battle, Ardennes 1944 is an outstanding addition to the bookshelf and is highly recommended.

Gary R. Ryman, Scott Township, Pennsylvania

KILL CHAIN: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins
Andrew Cockburn, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2015, 320 pages

In President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1961 farewell address, he famously warned of the growing military-industrial complex: "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." Andrew Cockburn's book, Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins, at its surface, attempts to trace the history of the U.S. drone program, but in reality is a commentary on how drone warfare is a direct product of Ike's prescient warning. Cockburn articulates the danger of the military and industry's affection for automated warfare despite surprisingly poor results that targeted killings have engendered on the battlefield. While Cockburn brings many biases to his conclusions, Kill Chain represents an important work in the U.S.' public discourse over the merits of expanded drone use.

Cockburn has written extensively on national security affairs, war, and military strategy. Known for his New York Times Editors' Choice, Rumsfeld, and his analysis of the Soviet military in The Threat, Kill Chain represents deeply researched first-hand military and intelligence sources regarding the history of the U.S. drone program. The scope of Kill Chain is vast: Cockburn connects today's modern drones to their roots in World War II's strategic bombing campaigns and the rise of automated battlefield sensors in Vietnam. He analyzes the effectiveness of air power in Kosovo and the Gulf War as well as the use of "high value targeting" across both conventional and irregular conflicts like counternarcotics in Colombia.

Cockburn's conclusions are clear: the military-industrial complex is selling a profitable story that targeted killing with drones (and reliance on technology in general) is an efficient improvement to warfare. This story, more colloquially referred to as RMA (revolution in military affairs), is misleading because the technology is creating the opposite of its intended effects. Cockburn highlights, for example, that eliminating cocaine kingpins in Colombia actually increases cocaine supply in the United States. Additionally, the targeting of terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan increases violence and further radicalizes insurgencies.

A reader who is looking to study drones specifically should beware that Kill Chain is more a critique of military high-value targeting and RMA in general—this is where the author's biases are most apparent. War is tough, complicated, and the enemy always has a vote. Cockburn rather oversimplifies and misinterprets these
aspects of warfare by blaming past failures on the military’s targeting approach and the tools used to prosecute it. Cockburn’s antitechnology and antiwar views in general cloud his analysis of drones as a useful platform. Technology, whether it be computerized analytical tools, battlefield sensors, or unmanned aviation, is a reality and it would be irresponsible not to harness it to win wars. Cockburn should not shun its use, blaming it for all failures, but rather should analyze where we are getting drone use wrong and recommend how we can use it better. Cockburn should have separated the strategy—high-value targeting—from the tools used to prosecute it (drones); they are certainly linked but not the same. By viewing drones, RMA, and high-value targeting as insep- arably linked, Cockburn undermines his conclusions.

Ultimately, *Kill Chain* highlights many missteps of the U.S. drone program, but as a result brings up several valid questions as Americans continue to grapple with the implications of emerging drone technology in the future of warfare. Despite its biases, *Kill Chain* can significantly contribute to American understanding of the implications of these platforms.

Capt. William J. Denn, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla**

David Kilcullen, Oxford University Express, New York, 2015, 342 pages

Many books are written analyzing past conflicts; however, few of them manage to link past events with the current tendencies in order to predict the nature of future conflicts and come up with recommendations to counter them. David Kilcullen accomplishes this with *Out of the Mountains*. His diverse background as a former lieutenant colonel in the Australian Army and as a senior advisor to Gen. David H. Petraeus and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provides him with a comprehensive knowledge about counterinsurgencies and conflicts. The author shows a unique knack for combining his tactical understanding from operations on the ground with the knowledge of the policy and strategy decision processes taking place at the highest level of government.

Kilcullen claims that the existing theories on conflict, including his own on counterinsurgency, are too narrow to address the uncertainty of today’s ever-changing and sporadic conflicts. Based on four global megatrends, Kilcullen uses case studies of different events and conflicts to highlight how these megatrends affect these incidents. This analysis leads to his new “theory of competitive control” that explains how nonstate armed groups draw their strength from local populations in competition with the state.

The four global megatrends identified by Kilcullen are population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and connectedness. These megatrends will affect not just conflict, but all aspects of life. Although the trends themselves might seem obvious, analyzing the effects is a complicated process. One way would be to isolate each factor and study it individually, but according to Kilcullen, this methodology does not provide viable answers. Since the factors are all mutually connected, these trends must be looked upon as “systems of systems.” While population growth, urbanization, and littoralization has gone on for decades, although at an accelerating rate, the real game-changer is the connectedness. The access to information anywhere in the world via the Internet and social media has provided nonstate actors and individuals with a powerful tool that only a few years back was reserved for states. This has changed the battlefield of conflicts and dissolved many of the physical boundaries. An example of this presented by Kilcullen is the 2008 Mumbai terror attack in which the terrorists carrying out the attack used Skype, cellphones, and satellite phones to stay in contact with their leaders in Pakistan, who monitored the social
media and the news in real-time. This allowed the leaders to direct the terrorist operation and react to the Indian response to the attack. The distinction between types of present and future conflicts is no longer that of regular or irregular warfare. Conflicts will be more of a hybrid kind in, which the military aspect is just one part of the puzzle. Therefore, a comprehensive effort combining the effects of all government institutions with local knowledge is required to resolve potential conflicts and prevent them from escalating.

Although Kilcullen’s target audience includes people involved in defining policies and strategies at the national level, anyone interested in or dealing with conflict resolution at any level can benefit from his views and theories presented in the book. Unlike his previous books, Out of the Mountains provides few implementable recommendations, especially at the tactical level. However, just like the counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan did not materialize overnight, solutions must evolve over time. Admitting that there are challenges to meet is the first step toward a solution, and Kilcullen does a good job defining these. Whether Kilcullen is right in his predictions, it is not known until the future has become the past. One can only hope that the message of using a comprehensive approach in which the military is only one part of the solution will reach the right people in time.

Maj. Kenneth Boesgaard, Danish Special Operations Command, Monterey, California

13 SOLDIERS: A Personal History of Americans at War

When an author decides to write a biography or collection of biographies, he or she will always face a number of obstacles to overcome. One of the biggest obstacles is trying to convey to an audience the importance of the deeds committed that are being discussed by the person. It is easy to write of the deeds of well-known soldiers. All one has to do is look at the military history section of a library to see the truth in this. Where the true difficulty begins is finding worthiness in the telling of the tale of a lesser-known individual.

Arizona Sen. John McCain and Mark Salter, the authors of the historical biography collection, 13 Soldiers: A Personal History of Americans at War, do an incredible job of bringing to life not only the experiences and stories of the individuals being examined, but also of those who served around them. The book begins with the experiences of little-known Revolutionary War soldier Pvt. Joseph Plumb Martin. The authors hammer on the consistent privations of Martin throughout the course of the war. This hammering produces a silver thread that stretches throughout the entire text, and was summed up very early in the work when the two authors asked the question, “What is it soldiers expect from those whose lives and liberty they defend?” McCain and Salter answer this question by saying these soldiers only ever expected “not fame and no more in compensation than the modest benefits they are promised.” In short, they were willing to give it all for next to nothing in return.

McCain and Salter cover soldiers from a wide variety of social classes and ethnicities, which helps produce a diversely unique work. Along with that coverage, they also work to expel some of the widely accepted truths laid out in some other historical texts. An example of this comes in the biography of Capt. Edward L. Baker, a buffalo soldier and Medal of Honor recipient who fought in the Spanish-American War. While being a well-written biography of Baker, McCain and Salter go on to contest the widely accepted role future President Theodore Roosevelt played in the taking of San Juan Hill. Allegedly, a certain sergeant by the name of Berry from the 10th Cavalry, also a buffalo soldier, made it to the hill before Roosevelt. Roosevelt, however, being the more
robust personality, took credit. This challenging of information taught to high school students creates a very interesting read. Herein lies the one major weakness of McCain and Salter’s work. If the authors are going to contest a widely accepted instance in history with new information, it would be behoove them to disclose their source in the text. While the two authors do have a bibliography, they never cite any of their information with footnotes or any kind of in-text citations.

This fact does not affect a reader from the general audience as it remains a quality text. It introduces an audience interested in history, but not researchers, to little-known or unknown soldiers. For the world of academia though, this text should not be used as a scholarly source due to the lack of quality citations. I would definitely recommend 13 Soldiers: A Personal History of Americans at War to a general audience of individuals interested in history, but for the world of academia, this text is still wanting.

1st Lt. Eugene M. Harding, U.S. Army National Guard, Auburn, Indiana

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**BLOOD AND STEEL 2: The Wehrmacht Archive: Retreat to the Reich, September to December 1944**

Donald E. Graves, Frontline Books, London, 2015, 202 pages

Blood and Steel 2, the second book in a series (the first covers the Normandy campaign), is a collection of annotated documents from the German archives and Allied intelligence files. Canadian military historian Donald Graves naturally focuses on the German forces opposing the First Canadian Army—making the title somewhat of a misnomer as the Germans fighting the Canadians actually retreated into the Netherlands. However, the documents selected are broad enough to provide a good overview of the general German situation in the west and at home in the fall of 1944, making this a valuable addition to any library on the Wehrmacht in World War II.

The documents are thematically organized, including looks at German morale, the individual soldier and POW experience, and organization and German assessments of Allied troops. The latter discussion focuses on the German impression of the American soldier. Documents chosen include orders, intelligence estimates, diary entries, and Allied POW interrogations. The documents are all from the 1944 period and thus rely on information gleaned from contemporary sources and do not depend on post-war research or analysis. Graves’ somewhat limited annotations are useful, although they supply minimal analysis of the presented documents.

The most interesting documents for Military Review readers are those related to the German impression of the U.S. Army. To some extent these are contradictory, a point generally ignored by Graves. On one hand, various POWs and units report that American forces are timid and depend too heavily on aerial and artillery fire support (which the Germans did as well when they had such support available). On the other hand, a junior officer in the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, a unit virtually destroyed in Normandy, considered fighting the Americans to be a completely different and much harder than fighting the Russians. And the German 3rd Parachute Division, considered the best unit in the Wehrmacht as recounted in American intelligence estimates, was also destroyed in Normandy.

Another interesting feature of the book is the discussion of the organization of the German Army and its recovery from the battle of France. Documents give a sampling of how units received replacements and conducted training, how officers were selected, and how units as diverse as a stomach battalion, a V1 regiment, and a Tiger tank battalion were employed.

For the American reader, the use of British and Commonwealth terminology and acronyms may slightly hinder to those unfamiliar with them. For example, company is written “coy” and enlisted personnel are referred to as OR (for other ranks). However, the work provides a good sampling of both the state of affairs of the German armed forces in late 1944 and Germany as a whole at the same time. The $39.95 price tag for the book is a little steep for the material presented, but the Kindle version is more reasonably priced under ten dollars.

John J. McGrath, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
In Memoriam

John J. McGrath

September 29, 1956- March 30, 2016

Our staff at Military Review was deeply saddened in March by the sudden passing of our friend and colleague, John J. McGrath. John worked as a historian for our sister organization under the Army Press, the Combat Studies Institute. A prolific author, he wrote numerous books, articles, and studies, and was a recent contributor to our journal.

Before his tenure at the Combat Studies Institute, John spent several years as an archivist and historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington, D.C. He also served for more than twenty years as a commissioned officer in the active Army and Army Reserve.

John's gruff exterior hid a brilliant, incisive mind. As a historian and writer, his research was meticulous and his attention to detail was exacting. He was a perfectionist when it came to getting the story just right; this was exemplified by his painstakingly thorough recounting of tactical-level operations.

John was highly regarded among military historians and Army leadership. His book The Brigade: A History and his subsequent research paper on that topic were influential in Army-level plans for the future brigade structure. He was also one of the few historians who wrote about small-unit actions in Afghanistan.

A private man, John was a voracious reader and a rabid fan of all Boston sports teams. He was fiercely opinionated and defended his opinions passionately, and he could be brutally honest. But, he was also highly principled, hardworking, focused, and totally dedicated to the Army.

John McGrath will be sorely missed and fondly remembered.
Red, White, and True: Stories from Veterans and Families, World War II to Present
Edited by Tracy Crow, Potomac Books, Dulles, Virginia, 2014, 288 pages

As military members return from war, the images and emotions from their experiences follow them home, influencing their lives and the lives of those around them forever. The book Red, White, and True is an anthology of thirty-two selected writings from various authors about the lasting impacts of military service; it offers diverse perspectives from veterans, military spouses, and grown children of veterans about the struggles and triumphs of war and how it affected their lives. Tracy Crow is well qualified as the editor. She personally served ten years as an officer in the Marine Corps and received both her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in creative writing. Several of the individual authors, who are not military veterans themselves, are college writing faculty and students in creative writing programs. While each author’s experience is different, the theme throughout this book is the human heart in conflict with itself.

The book starts with an introduction explaining the editor’s inspiration for developing this anthology. When she realized everyone has a heart that at some point has wrestled with conflict, she set out to collect true stories that accurately portray American military war experiences. Each story recounts a unique experience within the timeframe from World War II through present day Iraq and Afghanistan. The individual stories of pain and struggle illustrate the damage that war rends and describes its impact throughout society. It is not a warmongering, flag-waving, mission-accomplished collection. These stories illuminate the emotional experience of war. The reader notices that the emotional experience is irrelevant to the war in which the experience occurred. Whether it is World War II, Vietnam, the Cold War, Korea, or present-day Iraq and Afghanistan, the unexpected, sudden death that occurs in war creates images and emotions that leave the mind of the veteran scarred for life.

Crow organized the book such that one could read any story independently or start at the beginning and read story after story to the end. The strength in the book is that every story is true, drawing an emotional connection between the reader and writer. The editor encouraged each author to go deeper into his or her story to get to the point where it showed the human heart and its conflict. Crow could have organized the book into sections of similar short stories so a reader could hone in on cross-generational experiences, for example, or the lighthearted silliness that sustains a combat unit through the ugly side of war. Overall, though, each story gains and maintains the reader’s attention through its gripping details. The anthology as a whole reveals the lasting impacts of death and destruction that our veterans have endured throughout history.

I recommend this book to anyone who has not seen combat and wants to understand the true nature of war and get a better understanding of what military members experience. It helps put into perspective what is going on in the mind of veterans. It reveals true experiences and perhaps explains some of the post-traumatic stress disorder, moral injury, depression, or withdrawal suffered by veterans today.

Maj. Allyson D. Benko, U.S. Air Force, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism and the Challenge to the Liberal Democratic World

The founder and executive director of Israel’s International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Boaz Ganor, offers a contemporary study of modern Islamist terrorism in Global Alert. Given the November 2015 attacks in France, his topic is timely. While his case studies draw heavily from Israeli experience, his analysis and insights are applicable to our own with 9/11 and the current international fight against the Islamic State.

Ganor defines terrorism as political violence in which a nonstate actor makes deliberate use of violence against civilians to achieve political ends. By galvanizing international support for his definition,
Ganor seeks to elevate the standards by which non-state actors are judged and change the cost-benefit calculus of attacking civilian targets. Despite the attacks on 9/11 and the rise of transregional terrorist groups, international agreement on defining terrorism is lacking. Without international consensus, there is little to suggest that these organizations will choose to take greater risk in attacking military targets.

His proposed legal framework to redefine combatants and civilians into four categories of involved actors is novel but cumbersome. He expands the definition of combatant to include nonstate actors. He distinguishes civilians into those uninvolved with hostilities from those used as human shields. Two additional categories, militias/reservists and civilian support personnel, complete his framework.

These tiers support his proportionality equation that assigns three levels of precautionary obligation for targeting involved actors. Uninvolved civilians retain the highest level of protection against attacks while combatants keep their low level of protection. However, he develops an intermediate level that includes militias and reservists not on active duty, civilian support personnel, and those civilians forced as shields. This departure seeks to close a gap exploited by terrorist organizations.

His loosening of the protections civilians enjoy should be skeptically viewed in the context of terrorism that he writes about. It raises a difficult question that has far-reaching implications for all forms of warfare. Legal analysts and scholars would have a fruitful debate based on his proposal.

In the second half of the book, he analyzes the tension between combating terrorism and liberal democratic values. Methods used to combat terrorism may be at odds with democratic values and may undermine the legitimacy of the state. The degree to which states choose to do this may or may not give the terrorist an advantage.

Our post-9/11 experience demonstrates his point and it remains to be seen if France and Belgium will follow suit. As part of his eight principles for formulating a doctrine against the modern terrorist organization, he articulates the need to win on legal, operational, and public opinion fronts. We see this conflict today with the Islamic State and the search for solutions that counter their ideological narrative.

Global Alert is a quick read for those seeking a broad overview of the modern Islamist terrorist organization. While gaining a familiarity with the legal arguments Ganor raises, the reader should place those into the context of the Israeli experience from which the author writes. Ganor starts a great conversation about the need to modify international agreements in light of terrorism—a conversation that we will all participate in for the foreseeable future.


THE FIRES OF BABYLON: Eagle Troop and the Battle of 73 Easting
Mike Guardia, Casemate Publishers, Havertown, Pennsylvania, 2015, 248 pages

The Fires of Babylon: Eagle Troop and the Battle of 73 Easting is an engaging historical account of Eagle Troop’s Battle of 73 Easting derived from personal interviews and memoirs of soldiers from Eagle Troop to give a minute-by-minute account of the battle. This book is not an argumentative piece, nor does it try to persuade the reader to view events under a particular lens; it is simply a description of events as told by the soldiers who lived through the United States’ first major tank battle since World War II. The author, Mike Guardia, is a veteran of the U.S. Army and served as an armor officer from 2008 to 2014.

The book begins by recounting the Army’s transition from the Vietnam War to the all-volunteer force. The struggles encountered during this time detail an army attempting to define itself and its role in the
decades-long Cold War. With the addition of new combat systems and doctrine, the Army needed to recruit soldiers who were motivated to serve and ready to face the Soviet threat. Several members of Eagle Troop recount their individual paths that led them to join the Army and their assignments in Eagle Troop.

The account of Eagle Troop’s rapid mobilization and deployment to Saudi Arabia and the struggle to survive the environment is a testament to how quickly the Army must be able to transition and adapt to threats around the globe. Many of the tenets and core competencies of the U.S. Army Operating Concept are on full display in this book. Details accounting the arrival in theater to crossing the berm north into Iraq provide a look into the friction at the tactical and operational levels of war that plague all armies in terms of planning and actuality once boots hit the ground.

The detailed account of the determination of the soldiers to perform their duties in the austere environment and the speed and ferocity with which the battle unfolded serves as the major attraction of this book. Eagle Troop, lead element of VII Corps, led the charge east from Saudi Arabia through the 73 Easting at a pace that caught the Iraqi Republican Guard by surprise. Although the battle is a small portion of the book, it highlights the tenets of initiative, endurance, and lethality in the U.S. Army Operating Concept.

I do not perceive any major detractors from the book. The only minor issue is the long lead up to the battle itself. The author uses the first third of the book for character background and development. If you are expecting to be submersed into the battle immediately, this may catch you off guard. One may derive lessons from the personal accounts of the soldiers and the actions of the units that were a part of this battle.

The book is well written and informative given the first-hand accounts and level of detail derived only from extensive research and a willingness to provide accuracy in detail. I recommend this book to casual readers interested in personal accounts of the battle and to Army leaders interested in how this battle relates to the U.S. Army Operating Concept tenets and core competencies.

Maj. John Halsell, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Dave Sloggett has penned an ambitious survey of the development and uses of unmanned aircraft (UMAs). An experienced analyst and scientific advisor to UK military forces, Sloggett sets out to document the long history of UMAs, their technical evolution, their operational uses, and their impact on counterinsurgency campaigns in the Middle East and South Asia.

He succeeds impressively in defining parameters:

What is a UMA, or “drone” in popular parlance? What does it do? How can it be used? His answers to these questions provide a fascinating analysis of the interplay between technology and operational uses. Drone Warfare draws the reader into the cycles of technological development in airworthiness, reliable remote control, and real-time sensing that broadened UMAs’ military utility from an experimental aircraft of questionable reliability to contemporary UMAs that regularly conduct surveillance and carry out precision strikes. Sloggett has collected an impressive set of facts for this work.

Drone Warfare falls short at times when the author fails to lay out these facts in a coherent narrative. Faced with competing demands for detail and succinctness as he navigates through the abundance of UMAs developed over the past century, Sloggett opts for succinctness. This can leave the reader bewildered by the sudden appearance of a new UMA or concept.
in the narrative (particularly in the chapter on intelligence collection and defense suppression), without much context or background information. The reader may be well served by reading *Drone Warfare* with Wikipedia or having *Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft* at the ready.

Another confusing approach is *Drone Warfare*’s twin focus on UMA technological development and operational impact. A significant portion of the book is devoted to analyzing and refuting claims that UMA strikes in tribal Pakistan incite further insurgent activity. Sloggett’s analysis is compelling, but the lack of detail about the development of the UMAs involved (such as the Predator and Reaper UMAs used for these strikes) makes for head-scratching reading. In other areas, he makes overly broad assertions about the impact of UMA operations on military campaigns. His claim that a Vietnam-era UMA that detected firing signals between enemy radar and a surface-to-air missile was a “pivotal moment” in the Vietnam War is particularly odd. It is not exactly on the same tier as the commitment of U.S. combat troops to South Vietnam in 1965 or the Tet Offensive.

Despite its shortcomings, *Drone Warfare* is a fine resource reference for the military scholar on UMAs, which is an increasingly prominent topic among the defense community and the public. Other similar works, such as Richard Whittle’s *Predator*, may be better written, but the breadth and scope of Sloggett’s work is impressive—and much needed.

*Jonathan Wong, Santa Monica, California*

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**OPERATION THUNDERCLAP AND THE BLACK MARCH: Two World War II Stories from the Unstoppable 91st Bomber Group**  
Richard Allison, Casemate, Philadelphia, 2014, 256 pages

This book examines the impact on a personal level of Operation Thunderclap and the Black March. The two main characters are Addison Bartush, a copilot for thirty-one missions with the 91st Bomb Group for Operation Thunderclap, and Paul Lynch, who was captured by the Germans on his first mission and survived the “Black March.” Richard Allison, based on extensive research, interviews, and the letters that Addison Bartush was able to provide, created a look through the eyes of both men into the final operations of the 91st Bomber Group and ordeal of captivity suffered by Allied service members from Germans.

This book tells the story of the two stories in vibrant detail from their training in the United States, to include the formation of the Bishop crew, named after pilot Dave Bishop. The author avoids made up dialogue to liven up the book. Arriving in November 1944 at Bassingbourne Airfield in southwest England, the Bishop crew began flying combat missions by the end of the month. The policy was that new crew members would fly with experienced crews before getting assigned together as a complete crew. Bartush filled in on 25 November with another crew as a copilot and was not available for the 26 November mission when German fighters downed the Wild Hare, the aircraft that had a majority of the Bishop crew assigned as replacements.

Allison alternates chapters between Bartush and Lynch, describing their experiences. From Bartush’s point of view, he examines the Combined Bomber Offensive through the last year of the war against the Germans and their European allies. He stresses the Allies’ decision to use American aircraft to engage in daytime area bombing as opposed to “precision” attacks. He used destruction of Dresden as an example.

With Russians advanced into Poland, the Nazis chose to attempt to evacuate Allied prisoners from their prisoner of war camps and herd them on foot into Germany. Paul Lynch was among more than eight thousand prisoners held in Stalag Luft IV in Poland who endured the Black March, a five hundred-mile march in sometimes whiteout conditions with inadequate food and water, and no real plan in place for the housing of the prisoners on the move. Hundreds of the prisoners perished from starvation and exposure to the elements; on average, the prisoners lost about one-third of their body weight.

The Russians would eventually liberate Paul Lynch as the Third Reich collapsed. Allison discusses some the implications of the Yalta Conference and the policy of forced repatriation of all prisoners of war as part of the arrangement that resulted in
Russia declaring war on Japan three months after the formal surrender of Germany.

Allison attempts to tell two corresponding stories and, for a large part, he succeeds in his endeavor. However, his discussions of the “big picture” themes, such as the area bombardment by the U.S. Army Air Force in the final year of the war and the forced repatriation of prisoners, are a little bit distracting from the true story. Maps illustrating the route of the Black March would have been informative and helpful.

I would recommend this book for anyone interested in the closing of the air war in Europe and first-person perspectives on the treatment of prisoners during the Black March. This book is well researched and written.

Lt. Col. David Campbell Jr., U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WASHINGTON’S CIRCLE: The Creation of the President

In the superbly written book Washington’s Circle: The Creation of the President, David and Jeanne Heidler place the reader squarely inside George Washington’s inner circle of confidants to witness the stormy, confrontational, and emotionally draining creation of national policy and executive precedent during the formative years of the American republic. This is not another book about Washington; rather, it is the story of those indispensable people—the family, friends, and advisers—who helped sustain the president, shape his presidency, and define America.

Punctuated by bits of wit, Washington’s Circle is a compelling leadership drama. It allows the reader to experience the array of human emotions exuding from the intense debate over national issues, while simultaneously relaxing in the confidence, experience, and trust of Washington as he thoughtfully influences the creation of the federal government. From those who continuously sustained and reinvigorated Washington, to the brilliant men comprising the first cabinet who tested his patience, each person played an essential role in assisting Washington in his “final, most demanding job.”

The Heidlers, incorporating acclaimed research of the early American republic, scrutinize Washington’s vast network of friends and family, business and political associates, and wartime lieutenants developed over years of public service to determine the eligibility criteria for Washington’s Circle. The authors reveal a network of “those people who had close involvement in the country’s major events and who were intimately involved with Washington as a private and public figure during the opening years of the constitutional republic.” These include the heads of executive departments, cabinet secretaries, personal advisers, close family members, and personal staff. Each contributed to the unifying character that helped shape a strong constitutional government.

The Heidlers introduce the reader to the United States in spring 1789—a country emerging from a raging storm of revolution—and several years of inept governance under the Articles of the Confederation. After the contentious debate and ratification of the Constitution, the United States was a vast country, richly complex in nature and regional cultures and potentially rich in resources, yet it faced the daunting challenge of developing its system of governance while maintaining a wary eye on threats at every border. Many observers maintained it was only a matter of time before the republican model failed and a monarchy would again reign in America.

The Heidlers masterfully begin the eight-year journey on 14 April 1789 when Charles Thompson arrives at Mount Vernon and delivers the message to Washington that he was unanimously elected the first president of the United States. As the writers describe Washington reflecting on the election results, the reader is struck by a reluctant, even fearful, leader who already has sacrificed so much for liberty. He has asked for nothing in return for his leadership—he finds immeasurable enjoyment in his private life as a farmer, businessman, and family man. The passionate pleas from his close friends and advisors force him to grasp the reality that the revolution is not complete and that only he is entrusted to complete the tasks. Indeed, he fully understands the notion that his place in history would be judged not only on his battlefield exploits but also
on his leadership in building the enduring institutions supporting liberty and freedom. The Heidlers’ detailed account positions the reader alongside the time-weathered Washington as, with trembling hands, he delivers the inaugural speech that launches his eight-year presidential journey.

As the authors narrate this historical account, they acquaint the reader with Washington’s devoted wife Martha; his loyal secretary Tobias Lear; and his friend Gouverneur Morris, each of whom played a noteworthy role in shaping the Washington presidency. Their personal interactions with and sustainment of Washington provided him with a private audience to share his thoughts and emotions concerning the day’s issues and challenges.

The power of Washington’s Circle: The Creation of the President is the skillful, meticulous development of the “circle” comprised of some of America’s greatest political practitioners, including the author of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, Federalist James Madison. Considered Washington’s “prime minister” in Congress during his first term, Madison grew disillusioned by the growth of federal power; eventually, Madison drifted away from the president and led the opposition “Republicans” during Washington’s second term.

Henry Knox, once a rabid revolutionary, trusted lieutenant, and close friend of Washington, achieved modest success as secretary of war with his creation of the Native American pacification program, also known as the “Civilization Plan,” but never fully overcame his insecurity among the intellectual giants operating within the circle. Knox loses favor with Washington for his absence from duty during the first critical challenge to national authority, the Whiskey Rebellion. Just as Madison was transformed from a Federalist to a Republican, Attorney General Edmond Randolph’s ascent from a quasi-states-rights anti-Federalist in the first term to Washington’s most trusted, politically neutral advisor during the second term testifies to the fluctuating composition of the president’s inner circle—and the crushing personal toll these changes took on Washington.

By far, the book’s most enthralling storyline is the bitter personal feud between Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. The book comes alive with vivid debate between the brilliant, politically savvy, ultra-Federalist Hamilton and the formidable yet reserved Republican Jefferson as they clashed over profoundly important constitutional questions and precedent-setting policy, such as the “Necessary and Proper” clause of the Constitution, the creation of a National Bank, western expansion, and relations with France and Great Britain. The passion of these “gifted counselors” often was guided by conflicting political and philosophical visions of America, and it was driven by sectionalism and personal ambition. As the authors state, “They would make the easy seem impossible.” However, the combined brilliance of Hamilton and Jefferson guided Washington in establishing a coherent, effective United States executive branch.

David and Jeanne Heidler’s Washington’s Circle: The Creation of the President is splendidly written and well researched. They skillfully illustrate the leadership embodied in the first eight years of the constitutional government in a manner that comes alive with emotion. Their vivid descriptions of Washington’s inner circle and detailed discussions of their motives help create intense mental images that place the reader alongside Washington as he grapples with creating a new executive branch. This book should be considered required reading for the student of organizational leadership or United States government.