Kosovo remains an experiment in progress seventeen years after the Rambouillet Accords and the issuance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, authorizing international civil and military forces in Kosovo to end the violence, reestablish governance, and enable security in the region. Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions is an informative and thought-provoking book that investigates how international and local actors have built state bureaucracies and democratic institutions in Kosovo.

This book, structured as a comparative research study, is well organized and easy to follow. Unlike other literary works on Kosovo that focus on broad aspects of state building, Elton Skendaj, an assistant professor at the University of Miami and a former European studies research scholar at the Wilson Center, examines in detail the effectiveness of select core bureaucracies within Kosovo. He explores the court system, customs service, police force, and central administration, while simultaneously analyzing the progress of democratic reforms in elections, civil society, the media, and the legislature.

Skendaj posits that state building and democratization by international actors are two different processes that require complementary but different approaches to build and sustain effective bureaucracies. To support his hypothesis, he argues, “effective bureaucracies can be built when local actors take ownership of the institutions or international actors insulate the bureaucracy form political influence.” Additionally, Skendaj argues, “democratic progress is more likely when citizens mobilize for regime change, citizens are demobilized, as authoritarian liberal elites negotiate for regime change, and coalitions of international and local actors jointly support regime change.”

The author skillfully creates a realistic narrative on the challenges of building effective state institutions in post-conflict environments. He does this by using data from numerous authoritative sources to support his analysis of various institutions in Kosovo: one hundred fifty formal interviews, internal and official government reports, strategies of international organizations, government agencies, nongovernmental agencies, and public surveys. Using the indicators of mission fulfillment, penalization for corruption, and responsiveness, Skendaj illustrates the various factors to create variances in institutional effectiveness caused by local, national, and international actors.

One of the most intriguing aspects of this book is his analysis of how international actors have prematurely demobilized citizens and hindered their participation in the democratic process, inadvertently undermining the accountability of political leaders to the citizens of Kosovo. Skendaj is clearly at his best in the closing chapter of the book, applying aspects of his analysis of institutions and state building policy in Kosovo to other countries, including Bosnia, East Timor, Georgia, Singapore, Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

This book contains useful figures and tables that help support the analysis, and an extensive reference section. I highly recommend this well-written and documented book to both researchers and midgrade to senior-level military officers and government officials involved in developing postconflict strategies and policies.

Every reader who wants to learn how to get more of what he or she personally values, from improved stability in an Afghan village to a child eating dinner without a fuss, should read *Getting More: How You Can Negotiate to Succeed in Work and Life*.

Stuart Diamond is one of the world’s leading negotiation strategists, and he has advised corporate and governmental leaders in over forty countries; academic and military leaders also trust his advice. He currently teaches negotiation at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton Business School, and he previously taught negotiation at Columbia, New York University, Berkeley, Oxford, and Harvard. Retired Adm. William McRaven, former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, included *Getting More* as one of only fourteen books on his 2014 reading list.

Diamond’s thesis is that every interaction in life is a negotiation. Consistently using the strategies discussed throughout the book results in a marked improvement toward getting more of what the reader values. As Diamond explains his negotiation techniques, he illustrates his points with anecdotes about real-world successes from his students. Those stories are concise and appropriate. Each illustration lends practical credibility to Diamond’s theories. Collectively, they motivate the reader to try the negotiation tools explained in the book.

Diamond organizes *Getting More* into three primary topics. First, he contrasts his theory with other well-known negotiation styles. For example, he strongly disagrees with using leverage to coerce other parties in a negotiation. He also shuns purely logical win-win arguments. Instead, his negotiation approach centers on building relationships, situational relativity, and incremental progress toward clear goals.

Second, he explains the details of his many strategies to progress toward one’s goals. One of his primary techniques is trading items of unequal value. Diamond explains, “First, find out what each party cares and doesn’t care about, big and small, tangible and intangible, in the deal or outside the deal, rational and emotional. Then trade off items that one party values but the other party doesn’t.” Only creativity limits negotiations.

Another technique uses the other party’s standards to frame the situation. Diamond’s students showed scores of convincing examples using this technique: from negotiating with Comcast about poor customer service to buying sponsorship rights from a professional sports team. In addition to techniques like these, he also explains that no individual technique is flawless in every situation. The cumulative goal is improving one’s batting average, not total victory.

Third, Diamond shows how to apply his many negotiation techniques in a variety of settings. Constantly prepare. Understand the other party’s needs, and keep asking questions to refine one’s understanding of those needs. Always stay focused on one’s own goals. Through the myriad settings and student examples, the reader feels overwhelmingly convinced of the validity of Diamond’s techniques.

The only weakness in Diamond’s strategy is that it requires the reader to practice, as success depends on one’s effort. One must use the techniques and work to master them. Luckily, Diamond’s approachable writing style motivates the reader to try. Throughout *Getting More*, he proves how commonplace negotiations are in daily life. Diamond’s strategies teach the reader how to get more of what each reader values, and the student examples show the reader success is possible. If one wants to get more in life, reading this book is a good place to start.

Maj. Christie Downs, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN THE GREAT WAR: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917**

David R. Stone, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 2015, 368 pages

The centenary of the First World War has been met with a flood of commemorative scholarship and events, helping us to reassess the causes and course of the war. David Stone’s *The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front* is a very necessary reexamination of the Eastern Front. This is the first English language general work about

*The Russian Army* benefits from work done in the Russian archives, as well as the deeper understandings of Russian civil and military society, possible only after the Cold War. Stone’s main argument is an important one—despite staggering defeats, setbacks, and waning public support, the Russian Empire collapsed from the inside. The Russian Imperial Army remained in the field and, surprisingly, effective until 1917, when political disintegration in Saint Petersburg and elsewhere destroyed it. Stone also provides vital context and corrections for several common mischaracterizations about the Russian, as well as Austro-Hungarian and German, experiences of the Great War.

On the rare occasion that most people think about World War I’s Eastern Front, the Russian losses at Tannenberg, and finally, the peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk, all paint a simple narrative of failure.

While the Russians certainly struggled to counter the material and tactical superiority of the German army, they did have successes—usually against the Austrians and the Ottomans. The 1914 loss at Tannenberg was counterbalanced by major Russian victories in Austrian Galicia, including the capture of Lviv, Austria-Hungary’s fourth largest city. Even after the devastating effects of the Great Retreat in 1915, the Russian army conducted major offensives in every year of the war, including a 1916 offensive led by Aleksei Brusilov—this was one of the most effective tactical performances of any army during the war.

Russia clearly lost in World War I, but Stone correctly emphasizes that all of the Eastern empires—Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Ottomans, and Imperial Germany—collapsed as well. Russia’s difficulties with multinational troops, supply, transport, and command and control, were different only in degree from the other combatants.

Even the breakdown of the Russian army in 1917 had parallels on the Western Front—the French army likewise refused to fight after the failed Nivelle offensive. This is not to overemphasize the similarity of the war’s combatants; Russia had its quirks. For example, during the initial burst of patriotism in July 1914, Tsar Nicholas II had to make a special exception to policy so volunteers could join the army.

Overall, *The Russian Army* is a strategic-level study. Stone delves little into the low-level tactics or the personal experiences of Russian soldiers. While this approach certainly has its drawbacks, it results in a clear, focused narrative on the overall successes and setbacks of the Russian army throughout the war.

It also provides Stone the opportunity to overview Russian campaigns in the Caucasus Mountains and in Romania. Briskly paced, clearly written, and efficient, this is a must-have for students of the First World War.

John Fahey, Vienna, Austria

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**THE FRENCH ARMY AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR**

Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2014, 468 pages

In the size of France’s fielded forces, the scale of its industrial output, and the vastness of the price it paid in blood, the French contribution to Allied victory in World War I was enormous. What is more, in the decisive theater of war, the Western Front, the French army was the dominant Allied force through most of the war. Yet, a hundred years afterward, the mountain of World War I books provided by British authors has encouraged American readers to undervalue the French contribution to victory. In recent years, authors such as Leonard Smith and Robert Doughty have helped to balance this distorted perspective on the war. In her new book, *The French Army and the First World War*, Elizabeth Greenhalgh takes another important step closer to getting the story right.

Greenhalgh’s study of the French army provides a chronological narrative that takes the reader from France’s preparation for war to victory and demobilization in 1919. In doing so, she uses three relationships as her thematic framework: the French army to the
French nation and the republic’s political leaders, the French army to France’s allies, and the French army to its enemies. Each relationship tells us something important. First, Greenhalgh describes the way a succession of French military commanders sparred with the civil government while, at the same time, depending on the politicians to mobilize and remobilize public support for the war. Second, with France’s allies, Greenhalgh suggests the many ways that French generals found Douglas Haig (and later John Pershing), difficult partners in the project of war. Third, in its life-or-death struggle with the most powerful army in the world, the author believes the French army ultimately proved to be a more successful “learning organization” than its German enemy was.

With this book, along with her previous works Victory Through Coalition and Foch in Command, Greenhalgh has solidified her place as one of the most important of our current World War I historians. More important, The French Army and the First World War will help balance what the author believes are the unfair judgments of contemporary British observers, as well as the distortions found in the received views expressed in current English-language historiography. This new volume reflects both her own extensive research into the French war effort as well as a comprehensive summary of the new works appearing on the war. It is well documented and well supported by detailed maps, and when considering the topic of the French army in World War I, one should expect this book to serve as “the” scholarly reference for many years to come.

Dr. Scott Stephenson, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

SHAPING U.S. MILITARY LAW: Governing a Constitutional Military

Shaping U.S. Military Law: Governing a Constitutional Military is a comprehensive study of the evolution and shaping of U.S. military law. The military has requirements for a set of governing laws unique to the culture and discipline of the military, yet it must allow for a degree of transparency and civilian oversight commensurate with the military being subordinate to civil authority. Joshua Kastenberg’s central idea addresses the supposition by many legal academicians that the federal judiciary (the U.S. Supreme Court and the appropriate appellate courts) largely shows deference to the military establishment, thereby allowing the military to provide its own legal oversight and operate as a questionable anomaly. This is a common friction point of many of the cases the author uses to address this claim.

Two major themes recur throughout the book: the personalities of the Supreme Court justices throughout the years, and the ways their personal jurisprudence helped shape military law. The author provides surprising insight into the political leanings of the justices and which cases they did or did not address. From his research findings, you could also expect which justice would likely write the dissenting opinion. It might come as a surprise to the reader that “politics of the court” are alive and well even at the Supreme Court level.

The other recurring theme is how the courts attempted to define the jurisdiction of crimes committed by service members that might otherwise be the purview of a civil court, such as rape of a civilian in an off-post apartment or sexual assault of a minor. The main idea in those types of offenses was proving a service connection so the service member could be tried under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Kastenberg ties these two themes together using a long series of cases beginning shortly after World War II with O’Callahan v. Parker, up to and including today. O’Callahan was landmark in that it overturned jurisdiction from the military into the federal judiciary, and mandated that the military must prove a clear service connection in order for there to be a trial under the UCMJ. Many cases were not deferred to the military courts because of the stringent requirement to prove this nexus. This, along with the personalities of the justices, has shown that there has been little deference to the military in terms of self-over- sight, and that the military courts system has been, and is still under, quite a bit of federal judiciary review.

Kastenberg is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force and a judge advocate general (JAG) officer, thereby providing credibility to the book’s analysis and documentation. The book is well written, extensively using the
language of the legal courts, and is well cited. The historical background of the formulation and progression of military governing laws over the years is extremely informative. However, I would limit my recommendation mainly to JAG students or other legal profession members.

Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

**UNMAKING THE BOMB: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation**

Those two Latin phrases form an interesting contrast. The first phrase is the motto of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the school located just east of the Military Review offices. The second phrase graces the inside front cover of Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation. Each upholds a deep belief about our world, and a belief about what we must prepare for.

Which of the two beliefs you hold may determine your reaction to this book. The authors discuss nuclear war, and how we can eliminate the possibility of nuclear war by eliminating the primary materials used to make a nuclear bomb: the fissile materials.

The book is an accessible and interesting look into the mind of disarmament proponents. It is written with minimal technical language and no math. If you can remember your high school physics, you will be comfortable with everything in this book. It is interesting because it documents the world of fissile material production, storage, and security. There are 470 endnotes that superbly lay out the sources of information for each technical assertion made by the authors. They definitely know their subject in great depth.

The book envisions a post-fissile world where all fissile materials are eradicated—or at least made inaccessible without enormous effort. The authors begin by extensively documenting their estimate of the current amount of fissile materials held throughout the world. They sum it all up to about 1,900 tons of fissile material in 2013: 1,400 tons of highly enriched uranium and 500 tons of separated plutonium. Since they estimate it only takes approximately four kilograms of plutonium or twelve kilograms of uranium to make a nuclear weapon, there is enough fissile material on earth now for more than one hundred thousand weapons. It is hard to not to agree that this is far more than is needed. Some current studies predict a nuclear winter after as few as one hundred nuclear detonations. The authors maintain that those large stockpiles may not be very safe in terms of thefts or attacks. They point to a study that postulated raiders of a storage facility could produce and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb before security forces could arrive to stop them. Even if decision makers are opposed to the complete elimination of fissile materials, they may still acknowledge a need to reduce the total quantity of those materials.

The authors propose a four-step action plan for complete elimination of fissile materials. First, gain transparency of all stockpiles so we know exactly what quantities are in existence. Second, stop all further production of fissile materials. Third, eliminate the materials in an irreversible method (various methods are proposed). Finally, ensure international verification of all these actions. In principle, this is a simple plan, but the difficulty is in the execution of the steps.

The vision of a world without the need for, or stockpiling of, nuclear fissile materials and thence no nuclear power plants and no nuclear weapons is thought provoking. It is also unlikely to be universally embraced, as even today there are new power plants and breeder reactors under construction in some countries still committed to nuclear
power. Nuclear-weapon states are still cloaking their weapons programs and do not appear likely to make them fully transparent. Nation states are jealous with sovereignty issues, and the step of turning all materials over to international verification seems unlikely. Putting a technological genie back in the bottle has historically been counter to human nature and perceived national interests.

This is a good book for learning about nuclear fissile material issues. It is enjoyable to read, and you will come out with a better appreciation for the global security threat posed by having excessive amounts of fissile materials spread throughout the world. Although the proposed vision of the complete elimination of fissile materials seems unlikely to be realized, it is an idea worthy of consideration.


WAGING WAR, PLANNING PEACE: U.S. Noncombat Operations and Major Wars

Aaron Rapport, a lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, argues that conventional singularly centric theories on why U.S. political leaders make the decisions they do in war planning—particularly for postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations—are limited by their inability to account for the complex nature of war. He asserts that construal level theory (CLT) from the field of psychological research can better explain how political leaders consider noncombat operations in war planning.

The author believes long-term war planning by political leaders routinely emphasizes a desired military outcome while discounting the role of postconflict operations in achieving a strategic end state. Furthermore, their near-term planning focuses almost exclusively on achieving combat objectives—discounting the time and costs associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction. There is a direct correlation between the future distance in time when an operation is conducted and the propensity among leaders to discount its risks and associated costs. Poor planning of postconflict operations produces less than desired outcomes often resulting in other enduring destabilizing activities, such as civil war.

Political leaders establish aspirational goals but fail to diligently consider the military means necessary to accomplish them. This lack of engagement leads to political ends that are disconnected from the military realities on the ground. Rapport notes that U.S. history shows that military occupations have succeeded less than one-third of the time since 1815. The premise here is that political leaders fail to adequately listen to and consider the advice of military leaders and intergovernmental or intragovernmental organizations and institutions before making policy that leads to war.

Rapport applies CLT while comparing and contrasting prevailing theoretical models to four historical war efforts led by the United States. Those cases include World War II (Germany), the Korean War, Vietnam, and Iraq. His analysis supports his argument and proves CLT as a better means of accounting for the U.S. policy decision-making process and the political strategic assessments involved in those military endeavors. These case analyses convincingly demonstrate that political leaders were overly optimistic in the feasibility of noncombat tasks, were unable to visualize how combat operations would affect meeting these tasks, or were unaware of how such tasks and events might help lead to a strategic military end state. Officials also lacked the necessary understanding of the costs of operations and the details of executing them.

Other notable results from the analysis included long-term goals can be disregarded even though they are known to be important; long-term objectives typically lack political aims and feasibility assessments; political and military leaders can be short-sighted; political leaders are essential in determining policy effects; and finally, the personality of leaders influences foreign policy, coupled with time, space, context, political constraints, and information. All results were in line with what CLT predicted.

Rapport concludes that concurrent integrated planning of all phases of war must take place to achieve desired outcomes. There should be a governmental organization created to coordinate combat and noncombat tasks and to assess all that is necessary to execute military operations before the military option chosen. If postconflict efforts are assessed fairly in war
planning, the United States may opt out of war beforehand after recognizing the prohibitive costs relative to risks in achieving desired outcomes.

Through fascinating insight, the author has done a superb job supporting his theoretical argument. The exhaustive scholarship, relevant detail, and personality nuances of political and military figures provided in each case study are beyond compare. The well-crafted book is easy to read and understand. It is a must-read for political science, international security or international affairs professionals and scholars, those involved in state building, government policy makers, and senior military professionals.

Anyone else interested in learning about the importance of integrated and comprehensive near- and long-term war planning in achieving strategic objectives through military means will also find this book an enlightening read.

Lt. Col. David A. Anderson, PhD, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**CRUCIBLE OF COMMAND: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee—The War They Fought, the Peace They Forged**

William C. Davis, Da Capo Press, Boston, 2015, 686 pages

Historian William C. Davis has written an excellent dual biography of two men who shaped the American Civil War. At first glance, it may seem that the two could not be more different. Ulysses S. Grant was the Northern son of a tanner while Robert E. Lee was the Southern son of a ne’er-do-well Revolutionary War officer. Yet, the author succeeds in underlining key similarities. He portrays them as real men of their times while still explaining the origins of their traditional iconic images. This is a valuable book for those who have already studied tactical and operational levels of command yet need to become students of strategic thinking. These persons necessarily need to understand the philosophy of others in strategic decision-making positions, such as Grant and Lee. This is not a comprehensive view of each man’s personal and professional lives. The focus is squarely on their moral worlds and illuminates how and why they made the decisions they did. Fortunately, the author writes of only the most salient points of each man’s personal lives as they relate to leadership. This intelligent approach narrows the scope of the book, as well as effectively highlighting how individual ethics and perspectives shaped each man’s life and decisions.

This book is authoritative partly because of Davis’s credentials and partly due to his wisdom for writing only what he knows to be true. He is primarily interested in facts, and he deliberately relies on contemporary accounts as source material. An interesting aspect of the work is that the author repeatedly delights in dispelling myths about each man. An example would be lengthy descriptions of how each man experienced slave owning and slavery, which reveals nuanced truths about the times. As a crucial theme, the author draws several successful parallels between Grant and Lee. Among these are that each could compartmentalize their awesome responsibilities, yet each had outstanding strategic vision. Each carefully planned operations, yet either could audaciously find advantages in unexpected setbacks. One important contrast between the two is that while Grant had no fear of direct personal confrontations, Lee detested them. Finally, Davis’s primary point is that each man possessed a willingness to seize the initiative and never let go.

One deficit is that the author spends a lot of time defending Grant from charges of alcoholism, which may be revealing of some bias by Davis. As a primarily Southern and Confederate historian writing about Grant, he may have felt a conscious need to explain away Grant’s possible failings in order to appear objective.

A student of war who wants to understand how a military leader’s personal ethos affects strategic decision
making would be Davis’s ideal reader. Both men were—clearly—gifted in understanding strategy. Yet, their behavioral influences and choices also affected how they each made decisions. Davis outlines how their aptitudes developed and how they each were influenced by their ethics. Neither stopped being a student of war, and each had his own ideas of how to use, or not use, a general staff. This is invaluable information for midgrade leaders who aspire to become more beneficial to their senior leaders or to ascend to higher command. **Lt. Col. John T. Miller, Fort Belvoir, Virginia**

**LEGEND: A Harrowing Story from the Vietnam War of One Green Beret’s Heroic Mission to Rescue a Special Forces Team Caught Behind Enemy Lines**


**Legend** is a concise biography of retired U.S. Army Master Sgt. Roy P. Benavidez. Its centerpiece is an account of a single day of combat in 1968 in Cambodia—outside the recognized battle lines of the Vietnam War. Eric Blehm grips the reader’s attention in the opening paragraphs of the prologue with the final scenes of the battle. He introduces the struggle that followed to give Benavidez full recognition for his actions that day.

Blehm recounts the impoverished upbringing that forged the traits that made Benavidez a man who would defy impossible odds to help his friends in need. He then reviews Benavidez’s early military career, his dogged pursuit of an airborne assignment, and his first tour in Vietnam, which left him paralyzed in a military hospital bed. His recovery and return to duty are proof of Benavidez’s indomitable spirit.

Interwoven in Benavidez’s personal story is the history of the Vietnam War. It provides a broad context for those less familiar with the subject. Blehm briefly delves deeper into the history and the politics of the parallel secret war in Cambodia, providing the reader a sense of the intrigue that surrounded Cambodia’s Prince Norodom Sihanouk and of the tenacious mindset of the Viet Cong enemy. Both set the stage for the battle to come.

Blehm’s straightforward, no-nonsense prose captures the pace of the action that unfolds. Once the battle begins, the reader will not want to put the book down. The actions of the small team from the Studies and Observations Group, of the aviators of the 240th Assault Helicopter Company, and of Benavidez himself, could potentially leave the reader in total disbelief—if not for Blehm’s earlier illustration of how such men develop to be so tough.

This book is a worthwhile contribution to the history of the Vietnam War. Its depiction of the values and determination that led a man to risk his life and overcome extreme adversity has much wider appeal. Anyone unfamiliar with the story should ignore Internet videos on the subject and learn about it for the first time as Blehm reveals it.

Consider this book required reading for anyone thinking of trying out for Special Forces because it clearly describes the mind-set and determination expected to earn the Green Beret. For those who served in Special Forces, this book is a reminder of the principles for which they fought and should continue to fight. Readers of John L. Plaster’s book *SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam* will find *Legend* an eye-opening expansion upon the shorter summary Plaster provides of the battle. While Benavidez’s autobiographical *Medal of Honor* provides greater detail on other aspects of his life, *Legend* updates the tale with accounts from additional witnesses, archives, and declassified files.

The greatest service of this book is in keeping the legend alive—not merely of Benavidez but of all of those with whom he served that day—and their generation. It is a vivid reminder to adopt, as Benavidez did, the credo of “Duty, Honor, Country.”

**Maj. Thomas Nypaver, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**
A VERY PRINCIPLED BOY: The Life of Duncan Lee, Red Spy and Cold Warrior
Mark A. Bradley, Basic Books, New York, 384 pages

Petraeus, Cartwright, Sterling, Kiriakou, Manning, Snowden—these are military and civilian officials who, admittedly, reportedly, or as revealed after conviction in a court of law, provided classified information to those without requisite security clearances or a need to know. Recipients included lovers, journalists, and—perhaps directly or eventually—foreign intelligence services. Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director David Petraeus paid a fine, and he remains on probation. Jeffrey Sterling, a former midlevel CIA officer, was prosecuted and sentenced to prison. With regard to the case of former Marine Gen. James Cartwright, the information that would have been needed to be released in support of a court proceeding was, reportedly, deemed too sensitive. While critics have suggested nefarious motivations for this variance in prosecution, this is not the first time our leaders have struggled with how far to go in prosecuting espionage.

Such is the setting for Mark Bradley’s A Very Principled Boy: The Life of Duncan Lee, Red Spy and Cold Warrior. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the predecessor of the CIA, and in 1943, Duncan Lee worked in the office of OSS director William “Wild Bill” Donovan. J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) knew Lee was also a Soviet spy and investigated him extensively, but Lee died a free man in 1988. How did he get away with this when others did not? Mark Bradley, himself a former CIA officer, taps into declassified primary and secondary sources for Principled Boy, providing readers with a valuable examination of this ultimately feckless counterintelligence prosecution, hobbled as it was by internecine politics and national security concerns.

Things went awry for Lee when his second Soviet NKGB (Soviet secret police) handler, Elizabeth Bentley, with whom he claimed to have had a sexual relationship, voluntarily provided detailed information to the FBI about the network of spies she ran, including Lee. It seems obvious what should have then happened: the FBI’s star witness provides enough information to allow the FBI to investigate Lee fully, collect additional damning evidence, and prosecute him in a court of law. As the reader learns, Lee quite cleverly committed his information to memory and only delivered it verbally to his NKGB handlers. As such, the FBI had no “smoking gun” documents to use in court as evidence of his betrayal.

The FBI did, however, have the Venona transcripts—decrypted Soviet communiques that confirmed Lee’s identity as a Soviet source and corroborated Bentley’s information. Even so, and perhaps as a result of parallels to current cases, U.S. national leadership at the time decided that the revelation of its intelligence capabilities—specifically, the ability to decrypt Soviet communiques—would do more damage than the value gleaned from its use in a criminal court proceeding.

This is where Principled Boy gets interesting—not so much for the information Lee was reported to have provided or his motivations, but rather for the government’s inability to prosecute. Over the years, Lee was able to keep his story straight enough, and FBI surveillance never was able to identify any incidents in which he conducted espionage. Lee thus benefited from the officials’ appropriate concerns regarding inadvertently providing sources and methods to Soviet intelligence, raw politics, Cold War national security excesses (McCarthyism), and the intercession of high-level supporters. Donovan, who hired Lee in the first place and who may have been as much or more interested in preserving his own reputation, continued to support Lee even as Bentley’s revelations surfaced and the FBI and State Department took steps to deal with Lee. The section of Principled Boy that addresses Ruth Shipley, director of the State Department’s passport office, and her Ahabian efforts to refuse Lee a passport, are quite entertaining, especially if you have any direct experience dealing with government bureaucracy.

The reader interested in a detailed history of Cold War espionage, and looking for useful lessons related to today’s counterintelligence challenges, will find A Very Principled Boy thought provoking and informative.

John G. Breen, PhD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
MISSION CREEP: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?

In the chapter “An Introduction to Mission Creep,” editors Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray assert that since the end of World War II, leaders of the U.S. government have “brought about a growing institutional imbalance at the heart of the foreign policy and national security policy process. This imbalance, many of the chapters in this book suggest, could be said to be gradually ‘militarizing’ American statecraft and global engagement.” To examine this statement, Adams and Murray have collected contributions from a diverse group of authors—some with academic credentials, others with experience in government, and a few with both attributes.

The author of each chapter investigates factors that have led leaders of the government to rely increasingly on the military rather than the Department of State (DOS) to represent the Nation in its interactions with leaders of other nations and their governments. For example, Gordon Adams, who has both academic and government credentials, claims there is a key reason why both the executive and legislative branches have inadequately funded DOS as compared to the Department of Defense (DOD). It is because the number of Americans with ties to DOD is considerably larger than the number with ties with DOS. These funding decisions have notably contributed to an imbalance between DOS and DOD for the past seventy years.

Edward Marks, retired from the foreign service, makes an intriguing proposal: DOS should establish a civilian position that has a scope of responsibilities similar to those of geographic combatant commanders. This individual would be accountable to synchronize the actions of the various elements of the government to achieve the goals of U.S. foreign policy on a regional basis rather than just within a country. Establishing this position would place a civilian that has an equal stature to geographic combatant commanders in position to lead foreign policy across a region. In short, this person would represent the lead department except during the conduct of combat operations.

The authors’ conclusions in Mission Creep effectively support the editors’ claim regarding the “militarization” of U.S. policy. The authors explain the implications of continuing the current approach, and they make viable suggestions to correct some of the problems. The chapters in the book are readable and well researched. Mission Creep is highly recommended for those who want to understand factors that have led to DOD becoming the lead department in performing many noncombat tasks, and to understand some of the steps that should be taken to enable DOS to assume the lead in developing and conducting the foreign policy of the U.S. government.

Paul B. Gardner, PhD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

COMBAT-READY KITCHEN: How the U.S. Military Shapes the Way You Eat

This book examines the impact of the feeding of the military—how it has translated into feeding our families, and how it has effected the corporations and academia that support both functions. Anastacia de Salcedo presents two sides of the issue—the military and corporate/academia facets—and the cooperation between the military and civilian corporations and universities. She proffers the information starting from 3500 B.C. up through what the Natick Soldier System Center is currently cooking up.

This book explains the vital role food plays in the modern military and discusses the interconnection between the military and the food industry. It goes into depth about some of the issues and processes the American military faced during different eras, such as the canning techniques developed by the U.S. Army for troops of the Civil War that spread into the commercial market thanks to the Swift and Armour companies. In addition, the author describes the advent of methods to treat meat products chemically and thermally to kill the bacteria that thrived in the tropical climate encountered by the Army during the Spanish-American War.

The book goes on to discuss how, during World War II, with millions of U.S. and allied troops to feed,
the Army applied new flash-freezing and freeze-drying methods, and it researched and implemented new deboning methods. Also introduced was airtight packaging, which was employed for bread, vegetables, and snacks. With the end of World War II, food manufacturers focused their manufacturing and marketing efforts on the consumer.

The author shows the significant impact of the military on food science, the American diet, the military-culinary complex, the efficiency of American agriculture, and new food-processing techniques. With scratch cooking becoming a dying art, many of the military techniques described in the book have been adopted by commercial food service companies.

I would recommend this book for anyone interested in the connections between the military and society. My impression of this book is that it is well researched and written.

Lt. Col. David Campbell Jr., U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AMERICA AND WORLD WAR I: A Traveler’s Guide
Mark D. Van Ells, Interlink Publishing Group, Inc., Northampton, Massachusetts, 2015, 432 pages

Mark Van Ells’s America and World War I: A Traveler’s Guide is an excellent book that skillfully executes the difficult task of combining the two genres of historical narrative and travel guide. In setting out to mesh the two styles, the author provides a great service to the reader without trying to be definitive in either genre. Thus, Van Ells’s work is not a traditional historical narrative with a thesis and supporting points, but it is scholarly and well researched, and it reads well. In addition, it is not a traditional tour book. Those looking for a guide to battlefield sites that leads the tourist from historic location to location will not find that here. However, Van Ells’s approach places the locations into a more comprehensive context that explains the importance of each site. Perhaps even more important, his book explores scores of locations beyond the well-known battlefields in France, locations that provide fresh new looks at the entire American war effort: an abundance of sites in the United States; airfields, training bases, and supply bases in France; and even sites in Great Britain and Italy. As the author puts it, “Great War history can turn up in the most unexpected places.”

The book is generally arranged chronologically, but it includes topical chapters such as those on Pershing, the American rear area, areas outside of France, African-American troops, the war at sea, and the air war. The first four chapters (almost one-fifth of the book) cover events before American units arrive in France, which is one of the great strengths of the book. These pre-deployment sections examine skirmishes with Poncho Villa in Columbus, New Mexico (a training ground for the Army and John Pershing), the training of American soldiers on bases across the United States, and the embarkation of American forces for their deployment to France. The next chapter, “The Great War at Sea,” covers sites in the United States and Europe—locations that are truly unique because the Navy’s role in the war is virtually ignored by tour guide books. Chapters 6 and 7 cover the American arrival and training in Europe before being committed to battle. Van Ells explores ground that is rarely treated in other works: debarkation ports and training bases throughout France, as well as “quiet” sectors of the front were Yanks got their first taste of combat. The remaining chapters trace the major battles of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France.

While not the best guide book (but still very useful) for seeing the traditional AEF battlefields in France, Van Ells’s work excels in many areas. Those wishing to visit the major AEF battlefields can use other guides such as the Michelin series, the works of Maj. and Mrs. Holt, and modern road maps, and supplement them with material from Van Ells. Those who seek the more unique sites in both Europe and America will
Remembrance of the federal mobilization of the National Guard for service along the Mexican border in 1916 has largely been conflated with the concurrent Punitive Expedition into Mexico, and overshadowed by the entrance of the United States into the Great War. Charles Harris and Louis Sadler aim to correct this oversight with their detailed study of the National Guard’s service on the border. The border crisis is often seen as a sideshow to the Punitive Expedition, even though around one hundred fifty thousand guardsmen served on the border, while around twelve thousand soldiers served in the Punitive Expedition. Therefore, Harris and Sadler question which was the main effort and which was the sideshow. They dismiss the common misperception that movement of National Guard units from every state to the border was an overreaction to a few bandit raids on Texas towns in the aftermath of the raid by Francisco “Pancho” Villa on Columbus, New Mexico.

Instead, they argue that the government of Mexican President Venustiano Carranza was sponsoring raids along the border, and that it was involved in the Plan of San Diego, a proposed uprising of Hispanics within the Border States. They show that the threat of war was very real. In that light, the mobilization was part of a successful American effort to demonstrate the ability to mass large numbers of troops on the border to deter the Carranza government.

Against that background, the volume tells the story of the mobilization of the Guard and its service along the border. The book is in two sections: the first section is an overview of the border crisis from early 1916 until the removal of most National Guard units by February 1917. The second section centers on the experience of National Guard units from specific states to specific sections of the border. Drawing mainly on newspaper accounts, War Department records, and state records, the authors describe the process of mobilization and the service on the border, with chapters moving in geographical order from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean.

The book’s organization is effective if encyclopedic, although tighter editing could have avoided some repetition. What emerges is the span of readiness of units, from barely functional to well organized and ready for service. The Army, however, tried to hold National Guard units to standards that Regular Army units could not meet, and it tended to denigrate the competency of the Guard formations in an attempt to force Congress to institute universal military training. While on the border, Guard units began ambitious programs that not only gave guardsmen toughening and training but also gave Regular Army officers experience handling larger formations.

The border call-up provided important practical experience to regular officers who would soon be handling similarly sized formations in Europe. The presence of two guard divisions (New York and Pennsylvania), plus enough Guard and Regular units to make another seven provisional divisions, allowed regular officers to create corps and conduct large-scale training exercises.

*The Great Call-Up* is a welcome addition to the historiography of the National Guard and the evolution of the U.S. Army. Harris and Sadler have caused us to look anew at the border crisis and the call-up. They have brought a long-needed recognition of the importance of the call-up to an understanding of the border and relations between the United States and Mexico during the second decade of the twentieth century, the evolution of the National Guard, and the preparation of the U.S. Army for entrance into the Great War.

**Barry M. Stentiford, PhD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**
narrower—yet still broad—topical areas. The papers were primarily written by U.S. Military Academy faculty for the 2011 Student Conference on U.S. Affairs. The conference is an annual four-day event focused on U.S. foreign policy, hosted at the academy. It brings together faculty and undergraduates from universities across the United States and foreign universities, as well as policymakers from around the world.

The first six papers examine domestic issues in foreign policy. The second six papers examine regional dynamics in foreign policy. The final six papers consider how to turn global challenges into foreign policy opportunities.

In thought-provoking fashion, the papers within the first section address a myriad of domestic issues that influence, if not drive, U.S. foreign policy. Consider the challenges and opportunities in developing and coordinating whole-of-government approaches to foreign policy issues within the current domestic political environment. How does the evolution of education in the United States influence foreign policy? Does the average citizen give thought to how civil-military relations in the United States affect foreign policy? How do these, and other domestic issues, influence domestic policies as we strive to protect national interests?

The second section of the book focuses on regions of the globe beyond U.S. boundaries. Issues are pursued relating to China as a competitor and partner and to the continually changing politics of the Middle East, as relationships with allies shift in accordance with their strategic interests. The authors consider how the European economic crisis, the European Union, and the future of NATO affect foreign policy. What does the recent United States policy shift toward the African continent portend with its myriad of foreign policy challenges and opportunities? What roles do North, Central, and South America play as producers and consumers of drugs, and what are the challenges to sovereignty that accompany drug production and consumption?

The final section of the book addresses the potential for turning global challenges into foreign-policy opportunities. How does the United States govern the electronic commons—the open-access resource that is the Internet? Are there opportunities within the challenges of controlling the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons with the myriad of state and nonstate actors? What is the correct mix of trade protectionism versus trade liberalism for the United States to maintain a leading position in the global economy? The writers consider the challenges of resource extraction, production, and movement to market and the environmental concerns associated with each step in the process. Other minerals besides oil have strategic implications for nations; for example, phosphate rock is essential for global fertilizer production. This resource clearly has global implications for a human population projected by some to reach around eleven billion by the end of this century.

*Thinking Beyond Boundaries* represents an opportunity for the reader to delve deeply into the complex issues facing U.S. leadership striving to protect current strategic interests, identify new interests arising from changing global situations, assist current allies, and sway possible future allies. This book is an excellent read, guaranteed to adjust most reader’s views on contemporary topics of concern.


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**ALWAYS FAITHFUL, ALWAYS FORWARD: The Forging of a Special Operations Marine**


For those familiar with Dick Couch’s writing, the subject of his most recent work, *Always Faithful, Always Forward,* will not come as a surprise. In it, Couch follows the path of Class 1-13 on their journey to become critical skills operators (CSOs) and special operations officers in U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC, or Raiders).

Couch’s previous works in this field have followed the paths of similarly hopeful Army Rangers and Green Berets, and Navy SEALs (Sea, Air, and Land teams), among others. However, the most noticeable difference in *Always Faithful, Always Forward* is not the discrepancies between training in the various branches, but the newness and still-nebulous nature of MARSOC within the larger special operations forces (SOF) community.
Yes, its history is one steeped in the tradition of World War II’s Raiders, but the formal structure of MARSOC is one that arose in the midst of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan less than one decade ago. In this sense, the book is as much a learning process for the writer as it is for the reader.

Over the course of about 350 pages, Couch spans a great breadth of subjects related to MARSOC, including the history of Marine SOF, MARSOC’s current structure, and the role it has played in recent conflicts in the Middle East. Despite the frequent lack of detail in accordance with the classification that comes alongside MARSOC training, Couch also manages to give a close look at the pipeline from marine to CSO or special security officer (SSO).

Unfortunately, Couch does not take advantage of the relative dearth of history to build upon the story of Class 1-13 or the few that have come before it. The book frequently comes off as prescriptive and shies away from the telling of this class’s story in a personal manner. Considering the lack of history, this book’s most thoughtful opportunity was to tell the story of the marines who choose to go through this process, their backgrounds, and where they ended up (while CSOs stay within the MARSOC community, SSOs cycle out akin to the Army Ranger model).

That is not to say the book does not have value. In a policy environment that emphasizes interoperability, it is a worthwhile practice to understand not only the capabilities of corollary units, but also their culture, background, and values, particularly for service members at the tactical and operational levels of combat. *Always Faithful, Always Forward* acts as a basic text in this regard, but by seeking to cover a great expanse at the cost of depth and personality, Couch does not cover any one topic in a satisfying way. My bottom line? Use it as a bouncing-off point for a more in-depth understanding of the unit, or alone if you are looking to brush up on the basics.

**Adin Dobkin, Washington, D.C.**

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**APPOMATTOX: The Last Days of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia**

Michael E. Haskew, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2015, 256 pages

The Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) could be called the heart and soul of the entire Confederate Army during the American Civil War, and the heart of the Confederacy itself. Without its defeat, the idea of a Confederate States of America could not be eliminated.

Michael Haskew does a superb job in presenting the last days of the ANV and the defeat of Robert E. Lee. While this relatively short work of history concentrates on the final thirty days or so before its surrender, the author also intersperses a great deal of other noteworthy information.

He injects short, informative personal backgrounds on the key military and political figures of the period that support not only the main story but also the discussion of the war itself. In addition, the author compares and contrasts the leaders of both armies (he writes, “rarely have there been such differences in personality and style than between Lee and Grant”), lending credence and support to how events played out. When Lee became concerned about the delay in times between letters with Grant concerning the proposed cease fire before the surrender, it was Gen. James Longstreet who, based on his knowledge and relationship with Grant before the war, assured Lee that the terms would be generous. Haskew quotes the famous words of Lee just leaving for the surrender meeting, “There is nothing left for me to do but to go see Gen. Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths.”

There is preface and build up to the final battles leading to the surrender that make the book useful as a larger work of military history. These include the description of Grant’s ambitious and broad strategy in 1864, the four major battles of the Overland Campaign in 1864 that led to the establishment of the trench works around Petersburg and Richmond, and the startling comparisons of what would be nearly identical conditions of trench warfare in the First World War. The author provides
vivid descriptions of Richmond’s fall and the evacuation of the Confederate government in the vain hope of maintaining its existence. He also discusses Abraham Lincoln’s visit to Richmond almost immediately after its fall and adds a short insight into Lincoln’s desire to quickly integrate the South back into the Union. Speaking to his guide, Maj. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, Lincoln said, “If I were you, I’d let ‘em up easy, let ‘em up easy.” Haskew adds a rather humorous quotation of a North Carolina infantryman after capture: “Yes, you got me, and a hell of a git you got.” This does much to illustrate the poor state of the ANV along with its still-combative spirit. The author describes Philip Sheridan’s aggressive operations to interrupt and stop the joining of Lee’s force with Gen. Joseph Johnston’s in North Carolina.

The generous surrender terms by Grant and the poignant story of William McClean—who could rightfully claim that the war began in his front yard in Manassas and finished in his parlor in Appomattox—bring the human side of the conflict into the forefront. Haskew was correct when he concluded that Lee embodied the highest qualities of honor and nobility and led an army that covered itself in glory—but in the end was conquered, not the least reason being that it was tarnished by its defense of slavery.

I highly recommend including this book in any military professional’s library.

Col. Richard D. Koethe III, U.S. Army, Retired, Alexandria, Virginia

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AMERICANS AT WAR IN FOREIGN FORCES: A History, 1914-1945


Chris Dickon is an Emmy Award-winning public broadcasting producer and self-described researcher of “lesser-known aspects of American history.” His latest work is a thorough and in-depth account of Americans who have fought and died under the banners of foreign powers during the first half of the twentieth century. The author presents a painstakingly researched collection of personal stories and government records that intertwines tens of thousands of American-born combatants with some of the greatest military struggles of the last century.

Americans at War’s strength lies in its intensely human account of the personal lives and convictions of individuals leaving their home country to fight in the unspeakable horrors of combat. Covering land, air, and sea battles, Dickon weaves an account of little-known Ivy League adventurers, middle class professionals, and outcast mercenaries who risked their lives and citizenships in conflicts where the United States was determined not to participate.

Americans at War provides a glimpse into the lives of thousands of Americans who signed on with foreign forces to fight in some of the twentieth century’s bloodiest conflicts. Those men and women remained personally loyal to their home country but willingly left its isolationism to protect countries that did not have the luxury of deferring war. The book is valuable for its insight into the individual and international drama that accompanied the involvement of many Americans fighting European wars.

While rewarding for anyone interested in military or American history, the readability of the book could benefit from a thorough editing to correct distracting spelling errors and an occasionally difficult-to-follow progression. Particularly in the first half, the book suffers from a somewhat rambling and recursive narrative, making abrupt chronological shifts that occasionally leave the reader wondering what decade the author is talking about. I recommend readers patiently stay with the book from its beginning, though, as the historical accounts given in the first chapters enable the reader to understand American citizens’ involvement in the book’s later conflicts.

I believe this book is an important and recommendable glimpse into the heart of an individual fighter’s commitment to the causes he or she believes are righteous. It also provides a historical narrative against which readers can better understand Americans who today join foreign causes. Modern accounts that
parallel Americans at War include Lawrence Franks, the former U.S. Army lieutenant who deserted U.S. military service for the French Foreign Legion in 2009, or the scores of U.S. citizens estimated to be fighting the Islamic State in Kurdish Peshmerga formations. Perhaps most applicable, though, might be insight that readers can find in understanding the backgrounds of the Americans who flocked to Europe in the last century and comparing them to the ultimately human motivations of the foreign fighters that have battled against coalition forces in the Global War on Terrorism.

**Maj. Lance B. Brender, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**THE OTTOMAN ENDGAME: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923**


The *Ottoman Endgame* by Sean McMeekin opens dramatically with the coronation of the last independent Ottoman emperor, Abdul Hamid, in 1876, and ends with the establishment of modern Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Between those two seminal events, McMeekin narrates a history of complex strategic decisions, momentous battles, and human tragedy.

The story, in different forms, has been told before. The genius of McMeekin’s work, however, is how he highlights the importance of all actors—local, national, religious, political, and military—in shaping the outcome that led to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of Turkey.

The simplistic belief that the troubles of the Middle East are solely the result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and greedy division of the Ottoman Empire by France and Great Britain is a great flaw of modern educated discourse. This book’s importance lies in its ability to explain the geopolitical decision making of the Entente powers (to include Russia, usually ignored), as well as that of the Ottomans, Imperial Germany, and local ethnic groups such as the Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Kurds.

Readers will note the numerous and forgotten successes of the Ottomans in their final years. From the Balkan wars in the early twentieth century to the final battles of World War I, the Ottoman forces showed a particular ability to regenerate and inflict grievous damage on their opponents. In fact, the book highlights that rather than solely being victims of Western imperialism, the Ottomans, and particularly the Young Turks, who ran the operations of the state following the revolution of 1911, were skilled at manipulating their opponents to prolong the existence of the empire. This is illustrated dramatically by the resurgence of Turkish forces under Mustapha Kamal after World War I that led to the creation of Turkey.

Military officers will benefit from the analysis of the numerous battles that shaped these outcomes. Diplomats and geopolitical thinkers will achieve a greater understanding of the forces and complex negotiations at play in the Ottoman Empire’s final years. Those historians and military enthusiasts with knowledge of the era will gain a better perspective on the relative importance of such iconic events as the battle of Gallipoli and T.E. Lawrence’s support for the Arab revolts, in comparison with the lesser-known but equally important Russian and British battles in the Caucasus.

The limits of McMeekin’s work lie in the breadth of the topic he addresses, which inhibits in-depth study of any single event, and the reliance of the author on his previous works as sources. The book will likely face criticism for its refusal to paint any group purely as victims, no matter how decimated during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. This detached and pithy analysis proves a respite from other politically charged historical narratives. The only chink in this detachment comes in McMeekin’s breathless coverage of the nationalist Turkish resurgence against the Greeks in 1922.

*The Ottoman Endgame* will prove to be an important addition to the academic literature on the final years of the empire and the creation of the modern Middle East. It acts as a cautionary tale to any entity attempting to alter the geopolitical landscape of this region. McMeekin’s narrative has no innocent leaders, only actors skillfully seeking the best possible outcomes for their associated groups.

**Maj. Roland Minez, U.S. Army Reserve, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**
Dennis Poindexter, a former faculty member of the Defense Security Institute and member of the president’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee, points out that cyberwar is a secretive and daunting type of warfare. Although cyberwarfare is not new, it is much more prevalent today, in the information age, than it was in the past. With the widespread use of the Internet, and its impact on developed and developing countries, cyberwar can have catastrophic effects on how we all live our lives. This book takes us on a journey by discussing traditional warfare and then describes how cyberwar, in conjunction with an interconnected world and high-speed Internet, redefines it.

Poindexter lays the groundwork for his audience as he discuss the history of warfare and how it has transformed from armies facing off on bloody battlefields to the secret technology sparring matches that warfare has become. He believes that some countries, mainly China, Russia, and the United States, are in the midst of a cyberwar, and their citizenries are oblivious to that fact. He places a spotlight on Chinese and Russian efforts to conduct war without firing a weapon or ever touching American soil. The war that these two countries wage against America is not a war of armies but rather a technological war in which the battlefield is cyberspace and the prize is control of information and access to crucial military, government, financial, and infrastructure systems.

Contrary to popular belief, cyberwar encompasses more than stealthy hackers stealing data and breaking into information systems. It also depends heavily on media outlets, including network news and social media, to propagate various agendas or to distract adversaries. Therefore, controlling the media or the narrative in the media is paramount because it allows cyber warriors to manipulate the psyche of a large population. This book gives the example of Russia’s overwhelming control of Crimea’s information and media outlets, which projected the idea that the region was welcoming of the Russian invaders. With this egregious distortion of information transmitted through conventional and cyber means, the author indicates that cyber warriors not only have the power to conduct cyberwarfare, but they also have the ability to wage an effective psychological campaign that can affect the perceptions and behaviors of a target audience.

Although there are numerous advantages to cyber technology, Poindexter focuses on the dangers of technology when it is used as an instrument of war. Therefore, he argues that the military should have a more defined role in combating cyber threats. He debates that a task so great should not leave the military out. Well, there is definitely validity in his argument. Even though the military is not as advanced as it would like to be, its leaders continue to address their role in cyber battles. Their struggle with defining the military role speaks to the complexity of cyberwarfare and forces them to look to scholars like Poindexter.

The book’s description of the new cyberwar is intriguing. We do not just need to protect nuclear launch codes. Electrical grids, hospital records, bank accounts, Internet topologies, and much more need our protection. This is a thought-provoking read that traces how cyberwar morphed from what it was in the 1980s to what is today and what it is likely to become as technology advances in the future. The author designed this book for inquisitive readers who are interested in the effects of technology on modern warfare, much like the military leaders mentioned earlier.

Capt. Matthew Miller, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas