INSIDE THE BATAAN DEATH MARCH: Defeat, Travail and Memory
Kevin C. Murphy, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, North Carolina, 2014, 328 pages

The surrender of the combined U.S. and Philippine forces following the Battle of Bataan in the Philippines in April 1942 represents the greatest defeat of a U.S. Army. The Bataan Death March, the forcible transfer of sixty to eighty thousand Allied prisoners by the Imperial Japanese army over a distance of more than sixty miles from Bataan to Camp O’Donnell, is viewed by some as the greatest war crime ever perpetuated against American combatants in war. The Bataan Death March marked only the beginning of the great sorrow and travail experienced by thousands of American service members in captivity, aboard hell ships, and in Japanese forced-labor camps. Kevin Murphy, the chair of the Department of Humanities at the University of the Sciences in Philadelphia, provides one of the more comprehensive looks at the Bataan Death March in decades.

Previous research focused primarily on survivor accounts of alleged Japanese barbarity and war crimes against Allied prisoners of war—both during the march and during the prisoners’ subsequent incarceration in the Philippines, China, and Japan. Murphy breaks that mold in his consideration of three aspects of the march. The author considers the impact of the overwhelming Japanese army victory over the combined U.S. and Philippine forces and the effect it had on the Allied prisoners. He describes the different dimensions of suffering the Death March survivors experienced while in confinement as well as after the war. Finally, he challenges the recollections of prisoner eyewitness accounts of the alleged Japanese barbarity.

The strength of Inside the Bataan Death March is Murphy’s account of an unprepared and under-equipped Filipino-American force attempting to defend the Philippines against a numerically superior and better-equipped Imperial Japanese army. He contends that poor leadership by Gen. MacArthur, in addition to climate and language issues within the Filipino forces, exacerbated the dire situation. Murphy’s experience as an English teacher in Japan provides the author with an insight of Japanese history and the culture that contributed to the Japanese mindset pertaining to military personnel and civilians vanquished in war. Less compelling is the author’s attempt to marginalize the Japanese brutality against Allied prisoners of war—and the local Filipino populace—by discrediting the eyewitness accounts of survivors and the local populace. While other factors contributed to the suffering by those forced to endure the Bataan Death March, Murphy ignores the fact that almost 40 percent of Allied prisoners died in Japanese confinement. Conspicuously absent are eyewitness accounts from the Japanese soldiers who participated in the Death March. The only Japanese accounts consist of the trial testimony of Japanese army officers at Gen. Homma’s war crimes trial in 1945.

Murphy persuasively tells the story of the Bataan Death March—and those who endured it. Inside the Bataan Death March may be the most comprehensive study of the Bataan Death March in decades. I would highly recommend this book to those interested in the Pacific theater of war or the Imperial Japanese army.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LINCOLN'S CODE: The Laws of War in American History
John Fabian Witt, Free Press, New York, 2013, 512 pages

While visiting the former Confederate Richmond following its seizure by Union forces, President Lincoln counseled operational commander Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, saying, “If I were you, I’d let ‘em up easy.” Along with political intuition and foresight for life after
war, Lincoln articulated an ethic about the use of force—he focused on the ends. Ethical norms later took shape in the Hague and Geneva conventions. For anyone invoking these conventions, or the laws of war, *Lincoln’s Code* is highly recommended.

John Fabian Witt, Yale historian and law professor, presents an account of U.S. moral and legal perspectives during the Civil War. The heroes, in Witt’s account, are Lincoln and Francis Lieber—one, a great president; the other, a barely known, itinerate academic. Lieber, after being requested by Secretary of War Stanton, and Stanton’s general-in-chief Henry Halleck, produced a code of 157 articles linking conduct with the aims of war.

Lieber’s Code is “a working document for the soldier and layman, not a treatise for the lawyer or statesman.” Issued by Lincoln as General Order 100 before the spring 1863 fighting season, it was not moral philosophy in a vacuum. These were lessons learned during conflict: “Laws of war typically come in the dismayed aftershock of conflict, not in the impassioned heat of battle.”

General Order 100 established four red lines: prohibiting assassination, the use of poison, torture, and perfidy in violation of truce or treaty. It sharply distinguished combatants and noncombatants. Lieber passionately contended the aims, the ends, and the purpose of war form the final measure of ethical conduct. He constrained war, emphasizing proportionality, and outlawing “destruction greater than necessary.” While specifying red lines, Lieber prioritized ends: seeking justice, preserving, and protecting the nation.

From December 1862 through early 1863, Lincoln used Lieber’s Code to shift military thought and practice, which was inherited from Swiss diplomat Emmerich de Vattel. Vattel’s *The Law of Nations* long guided ethics and law in military practice—including the teaching of ethics at West Point and Annapolis. Vattel’s Enlightenment framework emphasized proper conduct. Lieber subordinated conduct to the goal, or purpose, of war. Thus, swift and extensive destruction was acceptable only if necessary to advance a legitimate war aim. Lieber adapted Clausewitz’s definition of war: a fight “to compel him [an enemy] to peace at my will.” For Lincoln, such a peace was an intact nation without slavery. To rebuild a nation after civil war, Lincoln counseled, “Let ’em up easy.”

Witt shows how law and ethics shape practice in war. The law of war was central in debates about U.S. policies and practices toward al-Qaida and affiliates under Presidents Bush and Obama. Critics argue the United States violated the law of war, or improperly cited it, as support for policies. Witt’s account of Lincoln and Lieber presents dynamics of squaring national practice with application of international law. By deepening our conversation with voices from the past, Witt helps us consider the ethical aims of war and move beyond a “checklist” mindset that blunts moral thinking about using force.

**Col. Franklin E. Wester, U.S. Army, Retired, Arlington, Virginia**

---

**HELL’S ANGELS: The True Story of the 303rd Bomb Group in World War II**  
Jay A. Stout, Berkley Publishing Group, New York, 2015, 464 pages

For a reading public used to hearing a decade’s worth of stories about MRAPs (mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles), convoy duty, and desert supply routes, a story about B-17 bomber runs over Nazi Germany might at first seem rather out of date; and yet, Jay Stout draws out a timeless story from the air war over Europe. It is one that highlights the universal themes of modern warfare: young men traveling immense distances in heavily armored machines, the loneliness of desert spaces, the suddenness of death, and the loss of one’s closest companions.

Stout, an experienced combat pilot and accomplished author, delves into the history of the 303rd Bombardment Group (Heavy), one of the most storied units among the Allied bomber commands during the Allied air offensive. He uses a balanced mixture of first-person accounts and official military records, providing an account that has a satisfying breadth and depth to it. The story begins with the challenges the United States faced in putting together an air force—when only working with the rawest of recruits and a minimum of equipment. Overcoming delays and politics, the unit grew into its own and eventually made its way to Molesworth in England to begin the U.S. air campaign.
At that point, the narrative takes on its most fascinating dimensions. Stout weaves together the recollections of scores of pilots, enlisted men, and support crews into a multifaceted recounting of the daily life on the base and in the air. This color provides a counterpoint to the serious events that drive the narrative, the recounting of the 303rd’s missions over France and Germany. Stout captures the clichéd truth about the hours of monotony—and the moments of terror—that composed the bombing runs and the return home. He does not romanticize the hardships—shrapnel wounds, vomit, cowardice, and exploding fireballs occur in equal measure with dogged determination and quick-thinking heroics. As the reader follows these young crews along missions, through their disappointments and triumphs, a sort of kinship develops as the reader pulls for the men to make it back across the English Channel one more time. All too often, however, the wrenching realities of death in the sky jar the reader into the realization that air combat was a very personal and deeply tragic assignment. Though seventy years have passed, the reader can still feel some hint of the emotional devastation that was all too often part of the wartime experience.

Stout’s work is a significant accomplishment in that the author manages to tell the story of an entire bomber group in a way that is both comprehensive and intimate. Operations, tactics, arms, equipment, and personnel are all covered in detail, yet without obscuring the larger story. This work will introduce the 303rd’s story to a new generation, telling afresh the sacrifices and duties that thousands of young men faced and, perhaps most importantly, reminding us that wars, even in just causes, can require a high cost.

Jonathan E. Newell, Hill, New Hampshire

The book *Band of Giants* is an enjoyable, concise coverage of the American War for Independence. At 288 pages, it may seem too concise, but that is not the case. Through Kelly’s coverage, a novice on the American War for Independence becomes well educated. Those knowledgeable on the topic are well reminded of how in doubt the outcome of the war actually was—and the extraordinary personalities that eventually achieved an American victory.

The book covers two main themes rather well. First, it depicts major actions with just enough detail to convey the main idea of how they were joined and why the outcomes evolved as they did. Here, the reader needs a warning: although the main title, *Band of Giants*, hints of glowing accounts of American successes, the book’s content is at odds with the title. Kelly explains the battles well while making it clear that all ranks of the American forces were, for the most part, pure novices in the art of war.

That leads to the author’s second theme; he shows Americans as something of a bumbling lot. Kelly does not ridicule the Americans but highlights their overall dearth of military experience. For instance, he begins with a rather ghastly account of how George Washington clumsily starts, it seems, the French and Indian War. He also discusses how Gen. Henry Knox learned about artillery from books in his Boston bookstore; Nathaniel Greene hailed from a Quaker family that ran a foundry; and sharpshooting Daniel Morgan was, in reality, a simple backwoods wagoner. The personal anecdotes and excerpts of letters to family and fellow officers illuminate the very human side of these men—so much so that readers will squirm a little.

Kelly also repeatedly shows British strategists dealing significant blows to the Americans. More squirming will ensue; there are many significant blows. And yet, it is American critical and creative thinking that happily carry the day in some cases. The classic example is Washington’s bold gamble at Trenton. The episode, probably familiar to most readers to some degree, is still a delight to read.

The book is indeed a broad sweep. Details of some major engagements, and the people involved, are condensed or abridged, if not altogether eliminated. For example, Gen. Lee is present during the Battle of Charleston, but little is provided as to what he does there. This writing style results in the book being kept short, interesting, and punchy. The level of detail of both the people and the battles is just about right.

Regarding the title, the word “band” may seem as a play on the recent *Band of Brothers* series. Toss...
that notion. The title's origin is not apparent until the entrance of the Marquis de Lafayette. This very informative coverage highlights how the critical French support factored in in this America-versus-Britain drama. Without divulging too much, it is enough to point out this is where the author derives, aptly, the book’s title.

The “Giants” were in some cases inept and befuddled, but, overall, they were determined.

**Col. John R. Culclasure, U.S. Air Force, Retired, Fort Belvoir, Virginia**

---

**KRAV MAGA: Real World Solutions to Real World Violence**


In *Krav Maga*, Gershon Ben Keren, who has more than twenty years of martial arts experience, black belts in various forms of judo, and a psychology background, delivers a hard-punching book (pun intended), hoping to “improve [one’s] survival chances in violent situations.” Initially designed as a military self-defense system and used by the Israeli Defense Forces, Krav Maga, founded by Imi Lichtenfeld, has evolved into a full-fledged martial art and is an umbrella term for various fighting systems.

In his book, Ben Keren discusses Krav Maga Yashir, his technique, expanding on Lichtenfeld’s principles. Want to defend against a gun attack? How about against a knife attack from behind while at the ATM? Want to pinpoint someone monitoring your movements in a crowded mall? It’s all here—and more.

First, the author dispels notions that Krav Maga is a collection of moves used to thwart an attack. He’s adamant: “It’s a systematic approach to self-defense, not an encyclopedia of techniques.” While reading, I thought: “Would I be able to do execute these moves? Should I know this already?” Ben Keren attempts to alleviate the stress of unpreparedness; however, a feeling of unease still settled over me.

The book is clear and coherent, spanning three sections: basic skills, self-defense scenarios, and unarmed assaults and dynamic components of assaults. Each section delivers step-by-step, picture-perfect depictions of form and execution of various techniques, allowing the reader to build on the foundational techniques and then move to more complex scenarios, demonstrating and emphasizing Krav Maga’s reliance on natural responses to attacks and its concept of replication. Because the system capitalizes on the body’s natural reaction to stress and assault, it’s one a novice can implement—with practice. To be clear, Krav Maga’s not solely about violence; it discusses steps to avoid or defuse potential assaults. Frankly, one’s goal should be avoiding physical confrontation anyway.

Krav Maga, like any other self-defense system, requires dutiful practice. Read it; then revisit it as often as necessary when a refresher is warranted. By no means will you be an expert after reading this book. What you will be is knowledgeable of natural body movement self-defense techniques, more aware of your surroundings, and capable—if you remember to practice—of protecting yourself in a range of scenarios. From time to time, I put the book down to process what I learned. I would review a move and attempt to re-create it; that was helpful.

I recommend this book for combatant instructors, martial arts enthusiasts, and laypeople with an interest in learning self-defense techniques.

**Maj. John L. Hewitt III, U.S. Army, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina**

---

**THE ORDEAL OF THE REUNION: A New History of Reconstruction**


Stability operations will remain, albeit reluctantly, a central mission of the U.S. military for the foreseeable future, and officers should study the history of such operations as earnestly as they study conventional battles and campaigns. Soldiers can start with no better example than the Civil War and Reconstruction—and with no better book than Mark W. Summers’ *The Ordeal of the*
Reunion. The author does not intend for this New History of Reconstruction to replace other works, especially Eric Foner’s massive study of the period. However, by focusing primarily on the political aspects of reconstruction and placing them in the context of the events of the era, he outlines the key facts, frustrations, and failures of the “post-war” program for the modern officer.

Summers begins with wartime reconstruction and the evolving policies toward occupying and governing border and rebellious states. Lincoln ultimately adopted a policy to rapidly return states to civil authority by accepting government based on only a loyal 10 percent of the electorate. His critics rightly observed that this was too narrow of a portion of the electorate to be sustained without military support. This proved all too true by the end of 1865. President Johnson required only a grudging acceptance of the Thirteenth Amendment, and a largely insincere profession of loyalty thus enabled the former rebels to quickly use the courts and legislatures to suppress the freedmen and punish Unionists.

Slowly and reluctantly, the Republicans realized the Union victory would be lost if something more drastic were not done. Over the vetoes of the president, Congress passed a series of acts that renewed the military occupation of the South and set requirements for a return to full statehood. The GOP won the fight with Johnson over reconstruction policy and control of the army of occupation but, unfortunately, this did not produce a successful reconstruction of the South nor the acceptance of the civil rights of black Americans.

Summers describes how the spirit of white southern resistance never ended. Their acceptance of congressional requirements was never more than tactical or temporary. The southern Democrats were also quite willing to use intimidation and violence to obstruct and overthrow “reconstruction.” Reflecting Gary Gallagher’s argument in The Union War, the author reminds readers that for the Union generation that fought the war, it was not about ending slavery but was about restoring the Union. Thus, most northerners were more concerned with reconstructing the Union than with reconstructing the social and political landscape of the South—much less guaranteeing equal rights for the former slaves.

Because the nation sacrificed regional “peace” for racial justice, Summers takes the long view in judging the success of reconstruction. The Union was restored and slavery was ended, but it took nearly a century for the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to be enforced as intended. This American story should remind military officers that stability is often fragile, and it can be temporary, and reconstructing a society is a very long-term effort.

Finally, no history can tell the complete story, and Summers’ impressive overview has little room for personal stories of military officers during reconstruction. For the accounts of several largely unsung heroes, such as Adelbert Ames, Lewis Merrill, and even James Longstreet, I also recommend The Bloody Shirt: Terror after the Civil War by Stephen Budiansky.

Donald B. Connelly, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE GREAT WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIANISM, 1918-1924

In this scholarly monograph, Bruno Cabanes, professor of history at The Ohio State University, argues that the aftermath of the First World War marked “a decisive turning point in the redefinition of humanitarianism” from a form of charity work to an assertion of humanitarian rights. Previously, European and American humanitarians worked to ease suffering and were driven by a Christian-based ethic of empathy. In this effort, the nation-state often played a critical role in delivering aid. But the devastating consequences of World War I—hundreds of thousands of refugees, many veterans suffering from severe psychological or physical distress, famines and epidemics, and the collapse of the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman empires—were so severe that nation-states could no longer solve these problems themselves.

Humanitarians addressed these challenges by emphasizing transnational approaches to activism. Beyond practical considerations, Cabanes argues that the postwar assertion of humanitarian rights “became
a way of turning away from war” and “were an active part of the culture of the post-war transition period, with ... unique aspirations for a lasting peace and for justice.” By turning away from war, rights activists were rejecting the “nationalization of rights” in favor of creating “a shared humanist culture.”

This cultural redefinition of rights occurred at the League of Nations and the International Labour Office as well as among groups of humanitarian activists. Cabanes examines the actions of five humanitarians. Rene Cassin was a French legal scholar and disabled combat veteran who defended the rights of fellow war victims by working with veterans associations and the League of Nations. Albert Thomas ran the International Labour Office and promoted international standards of social welfare and workers’ rights—actions, which he saw as necessary to maintain the postwar peace. Fridtjof Nansen, high commissioner for refugees at the League of Nations, revolutionized the rights of stateless persons by creating a passport for refugees fleeing the turmoil of the Russian Revolution. Herbert Hoover, American businessman and future president, organized humanitarian relief for famine- and epidemic-stricken Belgium, Central Europe, and Russia. Finally, Eglantyne Jebb, British philanthropist, founded the Save the Children Fund to organize relief for starving German and Austrian children.

Although Cabanes identifies the rights politics of the 1920s as primarily concerned with protecting the rights of groups, he detects the seeds of a more radical interpretation of rights—the assertion of universal, individual human rights. In this sense, the “1920s mark a decisive step in the transition from one basic understanding of rights to the other.” Cabanes makes a compelling case that the post-World War I period contributed significantly to the later emergence of claims to individual, universal human rights. His work serves an important function by addressing the influence that wartime experiences had in shaping the assertion of international rights—be they humanitarian rights or human rights—during the twentieth century. It is a thoughtful, scholarly book that should be read by military historians, international lawyers, and rights activists.

**Capt. Brian Drohan, U.S. Army, West Point, New York**

---

**THE AMERICAN WAY OF BOMBING: Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from Flying Fortresses to Drones**


The book *The American Way of Bombing* provides an analysis of the American aerial bombing philosophy since it was introduced as a means to wage war; it offers a discourse on the second- and third-order effects that have been created—specifically in the areas of legality, morality, and the establishment of norms. The author and his contributors completed extensive research and analysis on these topics.

The book is arranged in three parts. Part 1 examines the historical and theoretical perspectives of aerial bombing during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and since 9/11; it goes into detail of how aerial bombing was used and what targets it was used against. The editors also lay out the appropriate international legal frameworks and address the various aspects of the laws that attempted to create acceptable norms for bombing during war.

In part 2, Evangelista and Shue attempt to interpret, and to look critically, at the existing laws governing the use of aerial bombing. They examine the impact of bombing on the civilian population and the geographic infrastructure, and they delve into how the extensive damage done by bombing has an order of magnitude effect on the population for years to come. The editors make numerous claims that the effects of aerial bombing often far outweigh the military necessity cited as the reason for the bombing’s authorization.

In part 3, the editors examine the constructing of new norms with respect to the use of aerial bombing, land mines, cluster munitions, and unmanned drones. Here again, each are measured against existing laws and scrutinized against their effects on populations versus the gains of military advantage. Much of the discussion focuses on the use of drones and their impact on the ever-evolving legal framework. It also includes a discussion on the development of norms for the use of future
“automated” killing systems (i.e., no human-in-the-loop decision making).

The book is well written. The author provides abundant research notes, cites appropriate legal frameworks, and indicates where the United States stands with respect to each of them. The flow of the information is logical, and most chapters begin with an overview of the issue. It provides a well-documented discussion that uses credible research facts and then usually finishes with a concluding paragraph that elaborates on the friction points.

I highly recommend this book for military officers. It provides discussion of the appropriate legal and moral issues, and it makes the reader consider the second- and third-order effects created by some of our unique weapon systems and how those effects will likely impact our ability to employ such weapons in the future.

Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

---

**MY LIFE AS A FOREIGN COUNTRY: A Memoir**

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated many personal memoirs and will continue to do so. Many of these memoirs have clearly captured the human dimension of the wars. Others have been crafted in ways that provide readers with distinctive perspectives of war. To date, I have not found any which combine both of these aspects as well as Brian Turner’s superb memoir, *My Life as a Foreign Country*.

The foundation for Turner’s memoir is his tour in Iraq from 2003 to 2004. During that period, Sgt. Turner served as an infantry team leader in the 2nd Infantry Division. From this foundation, he expands into various other aspects of his life and those of others. It is a view which readers will find unique in regard to other war memoirs they may have read.

The uniqueness of Turner’s volume lies in many areas. First, Turner is a highly acclaimed poet. He has received much praise for his previously published books of poetry focused on the impact of war. Because of his talents in crafting poetry, every word he utilizes seems to have meaning. Consequently, I found myself slowly digesting each paragraph and page. It is clearly one of the best written volumes I have read in many years.

Second, throughout his memoir, he interweaves the military experiences of his family. He relives his father’s experiences during the Cold War. He retells the stories of his uncle, who fought in Vietnam. He re-creates the actions of his grandfather during World War II. Readers readily discover the influence of Turner’s family in his life. For many, it will also reaffirm that war itself has changed little over the past decades.

Finally, he envisions the thoughts of those he encounters during war. He addresses the Iraqi civilians who try to live their lives through the chaos. Turner strives to understand the bomb makers and suicide bombers who attempt to kill or maim him and his fellow soldiers. He also tries to comprehend the enemies who fought against his relatives. In total, Turner’s decision to intersperse this analysis adds incredible value to the book.

The most powerful portion of the memoir is Turner’s reflections on life after Iraq. As with anyone who has fought in combat, it is an experience that forever changes one’s life. Turner shares how war has affected him and his life. He also reflects on how he copes with the mental aspects of the impact of war. Certainly, one of these ways is to express his emotions and feelings in written form.

Every war has those select memoirs that define that war. In the years to come, *My Life as a Foreign Country* will unquestionably be one of those select volumes. Brian Turner has crafted a volume that is superbly written, gripping, and clearly unique. It captures a soldier’s perspective of war and war’s inevitable impact on the rest of his life. This is a book that will impact every reader, and its words not soon forgotten.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

---

**ARMED STATE BUILDING: Confronting State Failure, 1898-2012**

The author is a former White House National Security Council staffer and Deputy National Security Advisor staffer for Iraq and
Afghanistan. He asserts that no widely accepted scholarly theories exist to account for why some international state-building ventures succeed while others fail. He then sets out on a quest to establish a comprehensive theory in order to propose unified practical approaches to future state building. The result is a way of matching the right strategy to the right conflict condition in order to better ensure success.

Miller begins his quest by detailing the history of modern armed state building. Along the way, he challenges the effectiveness of theories, such as “sequencing,” noting that truly no single approach to state building fits all situations. At the heart of his investigation is identifying the relative effectiveness of state-building efforts of the past. In doing so, he analyzes some forty U.S. and international efforts over approximately the last one hundred years to determine their level of enduring success or failure. He also accounts for the relative effectiveness of international institutions in aiding in state building, thus acknowledging the liberalist approach to state building that has dominated the post-World War II period. Part of this process includes defining the traits of a functioning state and a failed state. He synthesizes traditional international-relations theory, characteristics of functional states, and types of state failures, in combination with strategies for state building, into a proposed theoretical model that he surmises will indicate the most suitable approach to state building based upon country-specific characteristics.

Miller applies a cross-section of post-World War II country cases, both successes and failures, to test his theory. The country cases range from West Germany, 1945-1955—a success; to Liberia, 1993-1997—a failure. His analysis is sound and persuasive in spite of the somewhat subjective quality of his defined model criteria and the brevity of his supporting country-case studies. It’s not that his definitions are necessarily wrong, they are just subject to much scholarly debate, which creates reliability concerns. His country case studies would have also benefited from greater substantive rigor, thus leaving less doubt over the validity of his case analysis outcomes.

Although the book reads like a doctoral dissertation, it is nonetheless well-crafted and articulated, with numerous insightfully presented supporting figures, tables, and diagrams. He does a good job deriving resources from across the existing body of literature in framing and supporting his thesis, bringing added credence to his work.

In recognizing the complex nature of the subject matter, the author does a commendable job in advancing the body of knowledge in a meaningful way. His efforts certainly enhance the ongoing debate on how to best address conflict and post-conflict state building. Of special note, in appendix A of the book, Miller does an exceptional job in summarizing all United Nations- and U.S.-led state building interventions since 1898. This appendix alone is of value to a wide array of readers.

As a complete body of work, this book is best read by conflict theory scholars, military and interagency professionals, international relations/affairs scholars and practitioners, development economists, and military historians.

Dr. David A. Anderson, Lt. Col., U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, and William E. Odom, both of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ALIEN RULE


The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted the growth of a vast subfield of scholarship on modern imperialism and intervention into the affairs of other states. Many scholars are heartily opposed to Bush-era instances of state building and use studies of earlier empires as critiques of current or recent U.S. policy. Michael Hechter’s Alien Rule stands out among this field by making the controversial suggestion that, although alien rule—the rule of one group by people not of that group—often is exploitative, alien rule can be beneficial to a subjected people.

Alien rulers can become legitimate and effective if they provide competent, fair, effective government. He finds several examples of successful alien rule throughout history, and even some contemporary examples, though the latter fall mostly in the category of academic receivership, some stepfamilies, and business mergers. His most useful sections
examine how an alien ruler gains legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects.

In the popular imagination, foreign rulers are invariably detested by a unified native population, but this is rarely the case in the real world. Hechter argues that the belief that native rule is always better is misguided. While alien rule is a particularly difficult type of governance, the author correctly points out that all political leaders face the same problems that aliens do. Every leader has to govern fairly, inspire trust, and encourage growth in order to maintain legitimacy and power without resorting to expensive forms of oppression. Alien rulers often replace failed or defeated native rulers and have the highest probability of success when they replace native rulers who are seen as incompetent or unfair.

For a professional military audience, Hechter’s chapter on military occupation is a must read. Military occupations usually cause resentment and resistance from local populations, and occupations themselves can vary greatly in brutality. Popular perceptions of military occupation emphasize brave resistance movements, but Hechter correctly points out that there are often as many collaborators as resisters. Collaborators can have a variety of motivations, ranging from personal gain to a sincere desire to improve governance within an occupied territory. Occupiers can increase the number of collaborators through fair and competent administration; but, for this to happen, occupying forces require significant incentives. Still, the author points to military occupations, such as the post-World War II occupations of Japan and Germany, as examples of occupiers successfully setting up friendly governments with real legitimacy among the occupied population.

While making a clear distinction between exploitative and beneficial alien rulers, Hechter argues that there are real benefits from alien rule. Some of his suggestions may seem outlandish; for example, in his conclusion, he suggests there may be a future for an international market for governance where bureaucrats and politicians can be hired from outside a country. However, considering the necessary multinational responses to failed states, environmental change, natural disasters, and economic collapse, countries may—at times—be justified in inviting foreigners in to govern.

John E. Fahey, Krakow, Poland

If you want to read interesting, first-person stories of civilian seamen as they navigated the perils of World War II—this is the book for you. It is worth your time to briefly set down the Clausewitz and listen to what life was like for the merchant seaman directly from those men.

In a previous issue of Military Review, I wrote a review of John Bruning’s Battle for the North Atlantic: The Strategic Naval Campaign that Won World War II in Europe. My primary criticism of that book was its dedication to the sacrifices of merchant mariners without actually interviewing any of them to get a description of their struggles. Serendipitously, Merchant Marine Survivors of World War II forms the perfect reparation for that omission.

This book is a quick read that provides twenty transcriptions from taped interviews with World War II merchant mariners who recount their personal adventures. Each of the interviews are only a few pages long, and you can easily read one or two and set the book down to read again another time. The author himself is uniquely qualified to record and report on the stories—he is a merchant mariner himself. He graciously provides a photocopy of his own “Merchant Mariner’s Document,” or Z-Card, right inside the front cover. Reader beware; the stories are transcribed with minimal alteration—and the language is quintessential sailor talk—so don’t hand this book to the kids.

The transcriptions are gripping in their details of the perils faced by mariners. The stories include accounts of ship sinkings and their aftermaths, anecdotes that both fascinate and horrify. For example, in one story, men who spent days on a lifeboat in the cold North Atlantic had to have their feet amputated after being rescued. In another instance, a sailor recounts being adrift with a shipmate in a life raft and, after seeing a ship pass nearby without stopping, his companion gives up hope and quietly dies in the far corner of the raft. He reports that his companion died of a “broken heart,” but he maintained hope of rescue and was saved.

MERCHANT MARINE SURVIVORS OF WORLD WAR II: Oral Histories of Cargo Carrying Under Fire
Some of the stories are more humorous—in the slightly dark humor of war. One man tells of his ship being chased across the sea by a U-boat. Disastrously, the ship’s steering failed and the rudder jammed, which caused the civilian merchant to accidentally come about to face the oncoming warship! The submarine captain, rather than finish them off quickly with a torpedo, immediately submerged after apparently being unnerved by a merchant bold enough to charge his ship. In another story, sailors stranded in Russia decide to only drink vodka that burned with a blue flame. Upon testing a sample in an ashtray, the resulting explosion shattered glass, and the mushroom cloud it created convinced them they had a bad batch—so they wisely decided not drink it.

All things considered, this book was an enjoyable read and deserves a look. These men took enormous risks and were vital to winning the war yet were denied veterans assistance during and after the war. One sailor described an encounter in Sicily when he entered a Red Cross aid station to obtain clean drinking water, since the city water was unsafe, and was shooed out by the attendant who said, “You can’t come in here; this is for our boys fighting this war!” It is perhaps an apt depiction of the merchant mariner’s battle for respect during and after the war.


FU-GO: The Curious History of Japan’s Balloon Bomb Attack on America
Ross Coen, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2014, 296 pages

Following Lt. Col. James Doolittle’s daring raid against select Japanese cities in April 1942, the Japanese Imperial army sought a means of revenge against the U.S. population. In 1944, the Japanese army developed a program codenamed Fu-go, an abbreviated form of fusen bakuden (fire balloons), that manufactured bomb-carrying balloons. The project sent hundreds of the balloons aloft into the jet stream in late 1944 and early 1945. The Japanese built the balloons to travel across the Pacific Ocean to North America, where they hoped their bombs would start fires in the forests of the western United States and thereby divert American resources that might otherwise be directed against Japan. Moreover, the Imperial army sought a means to boost Japanese morale by demonstrating its ability to strike the U.S. mainland and causing widespread panic among the American populace.

Ross Coen’s monograph FU-GO: The Curious History of Japan’s Balloon Bomb Attack on America traces the development of this program as well as the American and Canadian responses to it. Coen argues that Fu-go “was a failed campaign to be sure.” The balloons caused little damage, claimed only six American lives, and, due in no small part to American and Canadian censorship, failed to incite any kind of panic among the populations of North America. Indeed, Coen notes that the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development concluded in early 1945 that the cost of mounting any kind of defense against the balloons would ultimately exceed the cost of any damage they inflicted.

Coen, a historian of the American West, weaves thorough research into a well-written narrative. His description of the technical details of the balloons’ construction and the apparatus that kept each one aloft is both fascinating and easily understood. Furthermore, the book’s appendices chart the locations where all known Fu-go balloons or material were found and provide the date and a description of each recovery. Coen also highlights some important regional differences in the way in which balloon sightings and recoveries were treated in the Western United States, Alaska, and Canada, respectively, ranging from tight censorship in the continental United States to widespread awareness of the events in Alaska.

Yet, Coen struggles to place the Fu-go program in a larger strategic context. He labels the balloons “the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile” and contends that they were “qualitatively no different from the tons of napalm-filled incendiary bombs dropped by American B-29s over Tokyo and other cities across Japan.” However, Coen does not develop this characterization, leaving both the implications of the comparison and the overall significance of the Fu-go program unexplained. Regardless, the book is highly recommended for a general audience,
especially those with an interest in World War II, although it may not offer anything particularly useful for military professionals.

Derek R. Mallett, Fort Gordon, Georgia

KAISER WILHELM II: A Concise Life

In August 1914, Europe went to war. This war was not like any previous war—it would completely destroy the old order and set the stage for an even greater conflict that would change the world forever. With the arrival of the one hundredth anniversary of World War I, many are looking back on this great event and trying to comprehend its meaning, its impact, and especially what caused it to happen. How could the “civilized” nations of Europe commit the equivalent of suicide? One key factor was the leaders involved, and no leader was more important in the beginning of the war than Kaiser Wilhelm II, the leader of Imperial Germany. In August 1914, no nation was as powerful as Germany or played a more critical role in the events of that time. To understand the origins of the war and the role Germany played requires an understanding of the kaiser.

_Kaiser Wilhelm II_ by John C.G. Rohl provides just such an understanding of the title character. The author begins with the birth of the young prince who, at the time of his birth, suffered damage to his left arm—leaving him physically and psychologically scarred. The authors delves into the impacts of the prince’s education and the attempts to repair his damaged arm, as well as his mother’s perceived British liberalism.

Elevated to the kaiser of Imperial Germany at a young age, Wilhelm II proved to be independent and was determined to rule as a king of old—by divine right. His famous dismissal of Prince Otto von Bismarck, the legendary chancellor who had brought about German unification, would set the stage for the kaiser’s personal rule. He, alone, would decide the path the nation would follow—and that path was to Germany’s rightful place in the world. During the years leading up to World War I, the author shows how the kaiser consolidates his personal rule. As a result, Germany transforms from reasoned decision making by experienced cabinet ministers to lackeys who did whatever the kaiser wanted. This led, ultimately, to the reckless challenging of national interests of other nations and, finally, to an unstable alliance system built to deal with the threat posed by Germany.

While _Kaiser Wilhelm II_ is a very condensed version of the author’s three-volume set on Wilhelm II, it is a complete and thorough overview of the kaiser and provides valuable insight on how he contributed to the start of World War I. This condensed version is an easy read and well worth the time of those wanting a good understanding of the origins of World War I as well as those desiring an understanding on how the concentration of power into one person leads to poor decision making—and to disaster. Rohl’s narrative of the kaiser also parallels another German leader, Adolf Hitler, who followed in the kaiser’s footsteps merely twenty years later.

Brent A. Stedry, Manhattan, Kansas

PRESIDENTS & THEIR GENERALS: An American History of Command in War

By writing _Presidents & Their Generals: An American History of Command in War_, Matthew Moten, former chairman of the History Department at the United States Military Academy, set himself an ambitious goal: to explain the nature of wartime political-military relations in the United States and to show how that relationship is one of constant negotiations between the commander in chief and his wartime commanders. The fact that there are negotiations does not mean that the parties are equal; only by working together can a synergistic effect result in the best policy decisions. Moten believes that this process is profoundly important to the American public and, consequently, they should understand the dynamics of this relationship.
To explain his theory, Moten created a series of short narratives exploring the relationship of the various presidents with their wartime military leaders. While primarily distilling secondary sources, he has composed a series of well-written narratives addressing wartime political-military relations, starting with the founding fathers and ending with the recent conflicts associated with President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. According to Moten, trust between the parties is the cement that holds the political-military relationship together. When that trust was absent, as in the case of Lincoln and McClellan, the relationship deteriorated and, consequently, detrimentally affected the execution of the war. When it existed, as in the cases of Lincoln and Grant, or Roosevelt and his chiefs of staff, the relationship flourished and military policy was conducted effectively.

The conclusions that Moten draws, however, are more varied than merely the general concept of trust. He makes the case that there is no impermeable barrier between the political decisions made by the civilian leadership and the military decisions made by the commanders. Instead, soldiers “stray into the realm of policy making, while civilians leaders involve themselves in professional military matters.” In taking this position, Moten squarely rejects Samuel Huntington’s concept of objective civilian control in which policy is entirely the prerogative of the civilian leadership and the military’s professional duty is to mutely execute orders and effectuate the civilian leader’s policy. Implicitly, he argues that the professional military must be part of the public dialogue on military matters, though not necessarily that their ideas should prevail.

In this regard, it is unfortunate that the author did not include the 2006 “Revolt of the Generals” against Secretary Rumsfeld in his narrative. While the “Revolt” did not fit squarely into his analysis of negotiations between the civilian and wartime military leaders, the underlying issues were trust—and to what extent the military should participate in public debate without appearing partisan. Both are central to his conclusions. In the final analysis, the author raised a number of profound issues regarding the relationship between the nation’s civilian leaders and its military commanders and, as such, should be required reading for America’s professional officer corps.

John C. Binkley, Ph.D., Annapolis, Maryland

DRONE WARS: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy
Edited by Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014, 512 pages

The book Drone Wars is an extensive anthology on the current debates surrounding the use of armed aerial drones in contemporary conflicts. The editors compiled a list of twenty-two essays and divided them into four major topic areas: drones on the ground, drones and the law of war, drones and policy, and drones and the future of war. Each topic area provides an in-depth view of the political, ethical, legal, and moral arguments surrounding the employment of armed drones. Contributing authors provide a wide array of opinions and observations detailing both the pros and cons of drone warfare. Many of the authors are subject matter experts in the fields of international law, policy, and strategy development. Others come from academia, media, government, and various think tanks from around the country. This impressive list helps to make the book an authoritative source on drone warfare.

Anthologies are dependent on the quality of their contributing authors, and Drone Wars does not lack quality authors. One of the leading experts on the evolution of robotics and drone warfare, Peter W. Singer, who is best known for his book, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, contributed a convincing essay on what he calls the “five deadly flaws” of thinking concerning emerging drone technology. Singer’s essay describes the emergence of robotic military technologies and how they are fundamentally transforming law, ethics, and our general view of war. A leading defense expert, Rosa Brooks, offers a balanced yet provocative essay, “Drones and Cognitive Dissonance,” on the back and forth arguments among military and policy experts on the employment of armed drones. However, a few essays try to inundate the reader with statistics and
legal jargon while others fail to accurately describe the relevancy of their central points. *Drone Wars* is not for someone with limited knowledge of drones. This is a book for advanced readers with foundational knowledge on defense and policy matters and for those researching authoritative sources.

A major shortcoming of *Drone Wars* is that the book focuses entirely on aerial drones and completely ignores the proliferation of armed maritime and land drones. An astute observer of drones, or military robotic systems, over the past fifteen years knows that drone technology is not limited to the air domain. In fact, all four U.S. military services are heavily invested through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to develop armed maritime and land drones. Many of these new unmanned robotic systems are designed to meet the same needs as aerial drones: to save money, reduce risk, and leverage new technologies. If we are to have an open discussion on the political, legal, ethical, and moral issues surrounding the employment of armed drones, then we need to include all drone systems and types—for they will all equally change the nature of warfare no matter what domain they operate within.

**Lt. Col. Andrew P. Creel, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

---

**THE LONGEST AFTERNOON: The 400 Men Who Decided the Battle of Waterloo**  
Brendan Simms, Basic Books, New York, 2015, 208 pages

The *Longest Afternoon* is a historical account of the Battle for the Farm of La Haye Sainte, the precursor to the Battle of Waterloo. The book is cleverly written in a third-person, omniscient narrative form. The author walks the reader through a minute-by-minute account of detailed actions by major and minor characters throughout the battle. Through his clever ability to entwine first-person accounting with historical narrative, Simms allows the reader to explore the many facets of the battle in detailed depth and vivid focus.

The book spans approximately three days. Simms begins on Saturday, 17 June 1815, the day following Wellington's Anglo-Allied army's retreat from the Battle at Quatre Bras, and ends two days later, the day after the Battle for the Farm of La Haye Sainte, with the retreat of Napoleon's French army. The main theme of the book is to account for the significance of this battle and to recognize the overwhelming impact that the bravery and courage of the 2nd Light Battalion of the King's German Legion—part of the Anglo-Allied army—had on the final outcome.

This is a very authoritative piece. Between the number of powerful first-person accounts and detailed historical events, the book reads as a minute-by-minute eyewitness accounting. The deliberate story line and powerful detailing leaves little room for question.

The greatest attraction of this book is its ability to tell the story of the battle in a very realistic sense. From the prelude to the closing chapter, the reader is left with a keen appreciation of everything from the weather and the environment to the emotions and passion of the soldiers on the battlefield. The reader is drawn into the history and given insight to feel the accountings in a very real and pragmatic fashion.

The major detractor from the book is the frequent references to names and palaces. Since the focus of the book takes place in context of a larger campaign, a lack of knowledge of that campaign, the tactics of 1815, and the relevant participants at specific locations doesn't allow a Napoleonic era novice to fully appreciate what is happening in the author's meticulously detailed account. This is definitely not a book for someone that doesn't already have knowledge of Napoleon, the Battle of Waterloo, or the French conquest of 1815.

The book contains many lessons that make it both worthwhile and relevant to the security community. The lack of precombat checks on the part of the legionnaires almost cost them the battle as they found themselves critically low on ammunition due to a logistical oversight. Also discussed are Napoleon's lack of tactical patience; his failure to account for the impact of environmental effects on men, weapon systems, and terrain; and, finally, how courage and timing can change the tide of combat. Were it not for the courage and tenacity of the 2nd Light Battalion to occupy and retain the Farm of La Haye Sainte, this battle could have ended much differently.

**Lt. Col. William Rogers, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**
A SCRAP OF PAPER: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War

There is an intense national and international debate underway over the right way to interpret and apply international law. It echoes, in some respects, a debate during World War I when Germany shrugged off international law, drew the United States into the conflict as a consequence, and eventually lost the war. A century later, U.S. decision makers strive to apply complex rules in challenging circumstances; meanwhile, it is losing ground in the information contest to enemies who have no use for such rules beyond their propaganda value. Professor Hull’s book provides a rare opportunity to examine international law as a factor in past decisions that remain relevant today.

The author has mined an impressive range of English, French, and German archives. She employs them to look at the interplay of international law advisors and civilian and military leaders at crucial decision-making points. Readers will find only limited coverage of tactical and operational implementation of the law. The author, in fact, acknowledges that International Law and the World War, a study published in 1920, is still the best source for a survey of legal issues in that conflict. However, the author sets out to accomplish several key tasks, and does so effectively, with the evidence set forth in her book.

For modern readers, she demonstrates that international law played a much larger role in the war than we now remember in that German violations of international law triggered the war; atrocities committed by German forces enraged popular opinion, and disdain for international law in strategic decision making eventually turned much of the world against the nation. She also favorably compares legal decisions taken by Britain and France with less admirable decisions by Germany. She presents her evidence in a series of detailed case studies.

A Scrap of Paper explores French, British, and German practice in international law as it related to Belgian neutrality, the outbreak of war, atrocities, treatment of civilians, treatment of prisoners of war, maritime blockade, reprisals, and the introduction of new technologies of war, including submarines, poison gas, and air power. In her introduction, the author invites the expectation that this book will similarly explore U.S. legal practice during the war and opines that “I must also admit another motive in writing this book. I have been deeply dismayed by the lawlessness of my own country in its pursuit of the war on terror.” However, U.S. practice is not one of her primary themes, and readers should not pick up the book with that expectation in mind.

This book will be of interest to serious students of World War I. It explores important, long-forgotten decision making that influenced some of the best known and far-reaching operations in military history. A Scrap of Paper is also a source of unusual case studies for practitioners who need to understand how diplomacy, operational design, and strategic communications shape, and are shaped, by international law. This book illuminates challenges facing practitioners today as much as those facing their predecessors a century ago.

Michael H. Hoffman, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

WEST POINT 1915: Eisenhower, Bradley, and the Class the Stars Fell On
Michael Haskew, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2014, 224 pages

Was it their time? Or, was it the men themselves that make this such a compelling subject? The Class of 1915 had the highest percentage of U.S. Military Academy graduates reaching general officer ever: 59 of 164. The author details his case why this class is the best in military history based upon “the magnificence of their deeds.” Haskew focuses much of his attention on the brightest stars, such as Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley, but he also candidly includes the accounts of officers who fell short of great expectations. This historical study should be read by Army officers who want to understand the human dimension of their profession—under stress at the highest level.

The book is filled with memorable stories, like one about a medical board unanimously voting against commissioning Cadet Eisenhower because of a knee injury. Ike first injured his knee as a star
running back in football and then compounded the fresh damage during horse riding. His academic record was unimpressive, and he had “a mountain of demerits” before being ranked 95th in overall conduct. Without the extraordinary intervention of the head of the Academy’s medical department to reverse the board and then take its split decision to Washington, Ike may have pursued his dream to Argentina. A fellow classmate, with inside information, related that ultimately Washington considered Eisenhower to be “a good gamble”—but only if he became an infantry officer.

Bradley’s start was also inauspicious. He was a long-shot “Augustine” (a cadet who enters in August) who missed the hell of June at Beast Barracks because of a special late congressional appointment. He scraped his way up from second-class status by lettering in football and baseball. Brad thought he was tarnished, but West Point was “sports oriented to a feverish degree.” The 1914 football team went 9-0, and the baseball team was among the best ever. Athletes got special privileges and their discipline was looser. Haskew allows military icons to be exposed by their peers as flawed individuals.

The book has its share of cautionary tales of folly and tragedy. Ike would choose classmate James Ord to accompany him to the Philippines; while there, Ord would die after leaning out of a plane to drop a note. In World War II, Bradley chose another officer over his cadet first captain for a corps command because Bradley thought he lacked experience with large formations in combat. The former class leader was bitter afterwards. Eisenhower would later be the disciplinarian with Maj. Gen. Henry Miller after Miller was quoted discussing the Normandy invasion date. Miller, as well as other old friends, would not share in the glory of this group of war-hardened leaders.

There are historical nuggets throughout the book that have been overlooked by others, making it well worth the read. Some of these nuggets, however, could be missed in this work because, at times, it jumps quickly from one character to another. The book moves at a fast pace and maximizes the mention of the careers of even the more obscure members of the star-studded class. Haskew mined a great subject—and found some real gold.

James Cricks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HITLER’S WARRIOR: The Life and Wars of SS Colonel Jochen Peiper
Danny S. Parker, Da Capo Press, Boston, 2014, 480 pages

A highly decorated World War II veteran has difficulty adjusting to peacetime domesticity, can’t connect with his kids, encounters obstacles finding employment, and seeks a retirement home in an idyllic, sylvan locale. Does this sound like a plot line from William Wyler’s cinematic epic The Best Years of Our Lives? Not if the veteran is Col. Jochen Peiper, a member of Germany’s notorious Waffen SS and recipient of a death sentence for his role in the infamous Malmedy massacre of American POWs in December 1944.

Yet, Jochen Peiper did have difficulty adjusting to life after the war, as deftly portrayed in a new book by Danny S. Parker. By not focusing solely on Peiper’s military career, Parker brings a more complete and nuanced view to previous characterizations of Peiper as either a heartless SS automaton and unrepentant war criminal or an audacious and highly decorated combat leader, loved and respected by his men but victimized by politically motivated allegations of atrocities.

Thus, Parker’s strength is his coverage of lesser-known aspects of Peiper’s character and career, as evidenced by numerous primary sources, interviews, and Peiper’s personal notes and letters. One gains greater insight on his close relationships with such diverse figures as Heinrich Himmler, notorious Reichsführer SS and Peiper’s boss during two tours as adjutant, and Willis Everett, Peiper’s U.S. Army defense attorney during the Malmedy trial, with whom he remained in close contact well after the war’s end. One of Parker’s significant contributions is his portrait of the former SS colonel following commutation of his death sentence and his eventual release after nearly twelve years in prison. If one considers his debt for Malmedy paid, it is possible to develop empathy for Peiper as he seeks to shed his SS past, adjust to daily life with a long-absent family, and chart the course of his future in a post-war Germany with which he does not identify. Here, Peiper seems much like any veteran coming to grips with life after the army; in his case, this entailed haunting memories of grueling service—either
on the front lines with *Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler* (Hitler’s bodyguard), or in the front office with Himmler, number-two man in the Third Reich.

Peiper never could escape his past, as convincingly shown by the author. With Malmedy behind him, new allegations of war crimes cropped up from other places where he and his units served. Additionally, West German political sensitivities in the aftermath of the sensational Adolf Eichmann trial eventually caught up with Peiper, forcing him to leave Germany and seek refuge in a remote part of France. There, Parker paints a picture of an increasingly despondent man who eventually meets his demise at the hands of unknown assailants, possibly French Communists, in July 1976. Insights such as these are invaluable to understanding Peiper’s character and are an obvious strength of the book.

*Hitler’s Warrior* is meticulously researched, contains extensive notes, and reads like a novel. Parker clearly adds great depth to a study of the personal character of Jochen Peiper and shows that there is value in examining such a controversial figure. The book is highly recommended to students of World War II’s European theater, the international military tribunals, and post-war Germany.

**Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Georgia**

---

**ZERO SIX BRAVO: The Explosive True Story of How 60 Special Forces Survived Against an Iraqi Army of 100,000**

Damien Lewis, Quercus, New York, 2013, 324 pages

The book *Zero Six Bravo* is the history of sixty British and American Special Operations troops who took on the impossible in Southwest Asia in the days leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was a British mission, manned largely by Special Boat Service and Special Air Service operators. That said, American training, support, and equipment were critical to the mission and eventually to the very survival of those involved in this “Mission Impossible Iraq” that quickly became labeled as “Operation No Return” by those embarking upon it.

The story is one of teamwork, of insurmountable odds, and of highly trained Special Forces who are labeled as cowards by the international media—charges that they cannot refute because they are muzzled by their own nondisclosure rules. It is also the story of sixty men against one hundred thousand. Yes, that is a force ratio of 1,666 to 1.

It gets worse; the unit the men are pitted against is the very unit that Saddam has chosen for his last stand, and it represents one-third of his standing, active army. Can the odds be worse? Yes.

Further enemies are extreme heat in the daytime, murderous cold at nighttime, bad intelligence assessments from headquarters, and logistics that are stretched beyond the breaking point. Adversity, Murphy, and the unexpected become the norm.

Further enhancing things is the presence of the Fedayeen, who drink goats’ blood and then eat the hearts while they are still beating, as well as trackless deserts that are populated when they shouldn’t be in addition to seven hundred miles of harsh terrain with no guaranteed allied support. The odds of survival are not good.

This book will grab you, and you won’t put it down until you’ve turned the last page. The author, Damien Lewis, has written a dozen works of nonfiction, and he knows his craft well. By the end of his narrative, you will be familiar with “dickers,” “gobsmacked,” “TLZ,” “TSM,” “Pinkies,” “sod’s law,” and many other uniquely British terms.

By the end of the book, you’ll also have drawn your own conclusions as to whether or not these warriors were pusillanimous cowards or misunderstood heroes who fought through the Ninewa desert, the Sunni Triangle, and the gates of hell to accomplish a mission with zero chances of success. Are they heroes or villains? You decide.

Regardless, this book is highly entertaining and educational. The only challenge I have is to the accuracy of some of the firefight descriptions. At one point, the author describes T-72 tanks firing illumination. I have found no evidence of the T-72 tank having an illumination round capability. My only explanation is that the author may be referring to the firing of illumination flares off the tank.

No book is perfect. No book will quiet all critics. This book, however, will quell most of the naysayers and cynics, and it will do so while entertaining you and robbing you of sleep.

**Lt. Col. Glenn R. Mosher, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**