RAPE IS RAPE
How Denial, Distortion, and Victim Blaming are Fueling a Hidden Acquaintance Rape Crisis
Jody Raphael, J.D. Lawrence Hill Books
Chicago, 2013, 258 pages, $18.95

With the congressional spotlight firmly fixed on the nation’s military brass as they struggle to find explanations and solutions for the apparent explosion in reported rape cases, it’s easy to conclude that the uniformed services are uniquely inept at dealing with sexual assault in the ranks.

But, if there’s one thing Jody Raphael’s exhaustively researched and documented book, Rape is Rape: How Denial, Distortion, and Victim Blaming are Fueling a Hidden Acquaintance Rape Crisis, achieves best, it is showing that the military’s spectacular failure in handling the reality of rape is just part of a larger societal failure to treat rape like the horrific crime it is.

Raphael, an attorney and academic researcher, opens and closes her unblinking analysis of acquaintance rape with the 2007 case history of how a 19-year-old U.S. Air Force enlisted woman wound up being court-martialed for her own gang rape, while her three airmen attackers went free. But the bulk of her book—a fast yet far-from-easy read—examines acquaintance rape (especially date rape) as a national, if not global, plague depriving its victims of basic human freedoms, justice, and dignity.

Legally defining and verifying a rape is more than the cut-and-dried “he said, she said” that the public sees in media accounts drawn from police reports. In addition, because the process of proving a crime actually occurred is laden with so many evidentiary variables, prejudices, and preconceptions uncommon to other criminal offenses, Raphael contends that what she terms “rape denial” and “victim blaming” often obstruct justice.

“Rape is probably the only offense in which a suspect can successfully defend himself by claiming that the victim consented to the crime,” she writes, “which causes the police to intensely scrutinize the believability of the injured party’s description of events.”

Through a string of detailed, sometimes unpleasantly graphic personal accounts from women like “Megan,” “Riley,” and “Tracy,” Raphael forces readers to see the crime through the victims’ eyes and to empathize with them as they seek help. Raphael does an excellent job of showing that convincing police, prosecutors, medical responders, judges, and juries that they were indeed harmed by people they once trusted, is often times more arduous than the rape itself.

One prosecutor Raphael quotes—angered by the distinction society often makes between rape and other crimes—succinctly boils down the credibility disconnect: “Compare (a rape complainant) with someone who goes to the police and says someone she met at a bar broke into her house to steal something. Under no circumstances would anyone question a victim who makes that type of report. They would take it as truth and simply go with it. But somebody breaking into your house is the equivalent of somebody breaking into your body.”

The book shows how feminists as well as political conservatives can wind up as “rape deniers” and “victim blamers” for reasons as varied as the social spectrum allows, with Raphael fuelling her examination with carefully gathered quotes and thoroughly compiled statistics.

And, like abortion, the rape issue has the power to polarize political arguments and prove that ignorance—of law or nature—is no defense. This was famously illustrated by conservative Missouri Congressman Todd Akin’s 2012 election debate observation that abortion for rape victims is
unnecessary because “If it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut the whole thing down.” Akin’s comment caused his own party to drop him, with President Obama responding simply, “The views expressed were offensive. Rape is rape.”

The author takes particular aim at large institutions, including universities, churches, and the military, for not only failing to install or enforce procedures and policies to protect constituents from sexual predators but also for lacking the will to investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators when a rape is reported.

After discussing notorious cases involving accused rapists such as international financier Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Penn State’s Jerry Sandusky, assorted Catholic priests, and professional athletes as well as lesser known college frat boys, prisoners, and military cadets, Raphael dares to imagine a world without rape denial, offering ways to improve the way rape cases are reported, handled, and analyzed—and she says the process begins within each of us.

“Writer Albert Camus understood that, in the face of evil, ordinary people must just respond out of simple decency: ‘All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and it’s up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestilences,’” she posits.

Raphael cites studies that indicate only two to eight percent of rape reports are false—and it would have been interesting to read real accounts from those who cried rape when there was none, or perhaps from men who were rape victims.

However, the author’s laser focus is on the gender that statistically suffers the most from this crime, and that makes it most reading for anyone wishing to understand how something as abhorrent as rape can ever be denied.

Carol Saynisch, M.A., APR, is a journalist and international media consultant from Steilacoom, Washington.

A T THE HEART of None of Us Were Like This Before is one unit’s tragic story.

The 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, deployed to Iraq from April 2003 to March 2004. These soldiers knew they might experience terrible events in war. However, unlike their imaginings, these events did not find them in great tank battles in Iraq’s deserts and cities. It instead found a few of them in a small jail on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Lion near Balad, Iraq, where the soldiers inflicted horrors upon their detainees and, ultimately, themselves.

According to their first-hand accounts, they tied prisoners to the highest rung on the jail bars and “let them hang there for a couple days.” They made detainees do push-ups and prolonged stress positions. They deprived prisoners of food and drink. They kept detainees awake by blasting music in their ears. They splashed chicken blood on walls to create fear and performed mock executions. They beat, choked, and water boarded prisoners.

The tales they tell Joshua Phillips are mutually consistent and are the same stories they tell their loved ones. One of them showed Phillips photos to substantiate his claims.

The soldiers never “broke” a detainee (that is, forced a detainee to give them helpful information). But, the soldiers themselves returned home broken, mere shells of the young men they had once been. Sgt. Adam Gray drank too much, became bitter and moody, and attempted suicide. Once he “snapped,” putting a knife to a fellow soldier’s throat. Spc. Jonathan Millantz, a medic, was discharged for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He, too, drank too much and attempted a drug overdose. Other soldiers from the unit struggled with drugs and alcohol, insomnia, high blood pressure, depression, keeping jobs, and various symptoms associated with PTSD.

One of the soldiers, after years of depression and therapy, angrily told Phillips: “None of us were like this before. None of us thought about dragging people through concertina wire or beating them or sandbagging them or strangling them or anything like that.” Heartbreakingly, both Gray and Millantz died, miles and three years apart, under circumstances the Army ruled accidental but which many friends, fellow soldiers, and loved ones believe to have been suicides.

NONE OF US WERE LIKE THIS BEFORE
American Soldiers and Torture
Joshua E.S. Phillips, Verso
London and New York
2010, 238 pages, $16.96
As powerful as their story is, *None of Us Were Like This Before* is much more than this sad tale. Just as Herman Melville in *Moby Dick* used his storyline as a springboard for explanatory and speculative essays, Phillips explores in depth many questions that the core story raises but fails to answer completely.

How did U.S. forces turn to torture? How widespread was it? Why, as in the case of the FOB Lion jail, were many cases never investigated? When investigated, why were these inquiries often the “whitewash” claimed by the former head of the Detainee Abuse Task Force in Iraq? Did torture work, to gather intelligence? What effects did it have on the tortured? On the torturer? What was the fallout of public scandals like Abu Ghraib on Iraqis? On the insurgency in Iraq? On Arab opinion of Americans? To what degree were U.S. political and military leaders to blame for the torture committed by their soldiers? To what degree was American media to blame, when the “good guys” were increasingly depicted as using torture to good effect?

The well-organized, accurate answers that Phillips provides are grounded in deep research, to include his own dangerous fieldwork in Afghanistan, Syria, and Jordan. In addition, the writing style that conveys his points is clear, logical, and highly readable, and his supporting quotes and anecdotes are well chosen, impactful, and often poignant.

The book does have one minor flaw, the incomplete answer to the question, “How did American soldiers turn to torture?” Phillips rightly emphasizes the role that America’s media (especially movies and television shows) played in encouraging young soldiers to torture, a role given short shrift in overly politicized accounts that dwell on the Bush administration’s enabling policies. He also correctly describes how soldiers transferred onto prisoners corrective training (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) they themselves had received. Inadequately supervised and fuelled by the passions of war and the dark psychological impulses secretly harbored by all human beings, such hazing often escalates into torture.

However, Phillips does not emphasize enough of the role that survival, escape, evasion, and resistance (SERE) schools played. He properly delimits the importance of the formal promulgation of SERE techniques, pointing out that there were no enabling memoranda for many abuse cases. But he fails to acknowledge the far broader impact these techniques had because some of the tens of thousands of service members who have been instructors, trainees, or role-playing guards at a SERE course chose to use these techniques against prisoners. This use, too frequently, also descended into torture.

When, for example, an officer who served at Guantanamo Bay tells Phillips that, prior to the adoption of abusive interrogation memoranda, interrogators were blasting loud music at detainees and subjecting them to hot and cold temperatures, it is less likely that the interrogators were “freelancing” than they were using SERE techniques they had either personally experienced or heard about. When he describes conventional soldiers mimicking how Special Forces operators were treating prisoners, he does not acknowledge that these operators were required to attend SERE courses. But this is cherry picking. In the end, *None of Us Were Like This Before* will endure as war literature. This will be primarily due to its contribution to the subject of “moral injury,” a psychological condition little known within the U.S. military but increasingly studied by mental health experts. These experts say that, while PTSD is an anxiety disorder occurring after a physically traumatic event, moral injury occurs when people see or do things that conflict with their own deeply held values. Those inflicted with moral injury, they claim, share some symptoms with PTSD sufferers but tend to exhibit symptoms that last longer and are felt more intensely.

By way of powerful anecdotes, Phillips makes the compelling case that this claim is true. It is therefore fitting that Dr. Jonathan Shay, the psychiatrist and celebrated author who first clinically defined moral injury, wrote the book’s foreword. Shay writes, “Sober and responsible troop leaders and trainers are concerned about the prevention of psychological and moral injury as a readiness issue.”

These words succinctly point the way to the primary readership this book deserves—anyone who cares about the readiness and welfare of America’s soldiers. It should also be essential reading for foreign policy makers, military historians, mental health professionals, military policemen, and interrogators.

THE FURTHER ADVENTURES OF DOCTRINE MAN
Volume 1, Doctrine Man.
Self-published, 2013
163 pages, price varies

THE FURTHER ADVENTURES of Doctrine Man is an enjoyable read as well as compelling commentary on the state of the Army in general. It also comments on one of the Army’s least appreciated roles, the writer of doctrine. A fine line exists between skeptics and cynics, and understanding the distinction is important in the context of Doctrine Man. A skeptic is analytical and engaged while a cynic believes in nothing. The skeptic provides a useful service by asking probing questions and challenging assumptions. The cynic dismisses everything as useless and often finds himself marginalized as an irredeemable crank. “Doctrine Man” is undoubtedly a skeptic, someone committed to making the Army better while questioning those who seem to live the unexamined life or, worse yet, produce ill-considered doctrine.

Doctrine Man’s actual identity is a mystery, and this is probably a good thing given his focused ridicule of Army doctrinal developments over the last half-decade. He demonstrates a rapier wit in suggesting that trivial changes in doctrine undermine what should be enduring principles. For example, he takes to task those who would change the name of full spectrum operations (FM 3-0) to decisive action (ADRP 3-0) and act as if something significant had occurred. On the other hand, “Doctrine Man” gives no pass to those “stuck in the Kasserine Pass.” Those stuck in the past lack imagination, but those who change with the wind lack conviction, if not vision. To quote Term Burglar’s observation on the mutability of doctrine, “These are enduring principles . . . it’s not like they change every six months,” which is exactly how often doctrine seemed to change over the last several years.

Doctrine Man does his best work when he derides vacuous concepts. He clearly demonstrates a fascination with language, deriding the phrase “governance forum” when the word meeting would suffice. Similarly, he makes light of “design,” describing it as classic comedy and rightly suggesting it was little more than a passing fad. Speaking of design, has anyone heard the phrase “wicked problem” lately? One of the best scenes in the book concerns the apparitional appearance of a character called the Stratcom Kid, whose ghostly outline is summed up with one biting comment: “The lack of substance is ironic, huh?”

There is much to like here. A floating skull represents the Prussian military theorist Clausewitz, often called “Dead Carl” in doctrine circles, and his comments are genuinely funny. Bif’s Compendium of Military Jargon may well be the book’s highlight. Particularly amusing are the definitions of mantra, slingshot effect, PowerPoint karaoke, and in-flight refueler; however, the definition of manicorn might be over the top as are nearly all goat appearances. The funniest yet most vexing character is Blue Falcon, someone with whom we have all served. Doctrine Man treats Blue Falcon with the disdain and contempt he deserves.

Overall, this is a fascinating commentary on the state of the Army, both in terms of doctrine as well as day-to-day life. Whether it’s the vacuous boss, the listless contractor, or the recently retired soldier who grows facial hair to be cool (called “Beardo” by Doctrine Man), this insightful book captures the Army climate with accuracy, and with an appropriate level of decorum. According to the author, there will be another compendium to follow; if it’s as good as the first volume, it will certainly be worth the wait.

Lt. Col. James Varner, USA, Retired,
Platte City, Missouri

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE 21St CENTURY
Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy
Therese Delpech, RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, CA, 2012, 181 pages, $15.47

ALTHOUGH THE COLD War ended without the United States and the Soviet Union fight-
ing each other directly in a war that could have turned nuclear, there are a number of current scenarios that could lead to the use of one or multiple nuclear bombs for the first time since 1945. Written by the recently deceased Therese Delpech, *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy*, is a well-written and relevant book about the emergence of nuclear weapons in fragile or unstable countries or the potential possession of nuclear weapons by nonstate actors that provide unique security challenges.

With the backdrop of the ongoing crisis involving Iran and its quest to develop nuclear power capability and the West’s determination to prevent them from developing the capability of weaponizing it, Delpech addresses one of the world’s greatest security concerns. Although the likelihood of a massive nuclear war has decreased in the last 20 years, Delpech argues that the likelihood of a nuclear attack has increased. Possibilities include nuclear terrorism from a terrorist group not concerned with a retaliatory attack, radical Islamists challenging the Pakistani government and gaining control of their nuclear arsenal, a radical nonstate actor instigating a war between Pakistan and India, a North Korean attack, Israeli use in response to an existential threat (e.g., Iran), or even an increasingly assertive China.

A common theme in the book is that deterrence remains a relevant and necessary strategy as the West faces these significant security concerns in 2013 and beyond. Delpech organizes her book in a way for the reader to follow her logic, starting with the current need to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and then discusses the primary reasons that nuclear deterrence succeeded in the Cold War and how many of those methods could be modified and applied to contingencies today. She does this through a series of short descriptions of how nuclear war was deterred in 21 different Cold War crises (e.g., Berlin Blockade, Korean War, Cuban Missile Crisis, Yom Kippur War, and others). She also discusses the possibilities of a conventional war escalating to the nuclear level, nuclear weapons in the hands of nonstate actors, how miscalculation and misperceptions could lead to nuclear war, and nuclear blackmail.

Delpech addresses how small powers (Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria) could impact the international security and financial arrangement, especially in this age of globalization and economic interconnectedness. Concluding with a section on how China, a rising economic and military power, and a declining but still well-armed Russia could affect the overall balance of power regarding international security, she provides the reader a vision of what could lie ahead.

I highly recommend *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century* for anyone interested in the study of international relations, strategic studies, or nuclear deterrence. Extremely relevant considering today’s complicated security concerns, it is well-written, thought-stimulating, and makes a strong argument for the need for strong nuclear deterrence in the future.

Lt. Col. David T. Seigel, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**WINNING AND LOSING ON THE WESTERN FRONT**

The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918

Jonathan Boff, Cambridge University Press
New York, 2012, 286 pages, $99.00

*We can no longer write off the British army on World War I’s Western Front as the hapless sheep led to the slaughter by “butchers and bunglers.” Instead, the scholarship of the last 20 years, led by historians like J.P. Harris, Niall Barr, Trevor Wilson, Robin Prior, Gary Sheffield, and others has pointed to a more complex view that sees the British Expeditionary as a genuine (if genuinely imperfect) “learning organization.”*

The battle is over and the revisionists have won; what remains is to police the battlefield and mop up the persistent questions that remain. One of these questions has to do with the final, decisive campaign of the war: the “Hundred Days.” Were the successes of the British Expeditionary Force in these final battles a function of German weakness and waning morale, British material and manpower superiority, or British virtuosity in combining the effects of tanks, aircraft, infantry,
artillery, and poison gas? Or had Haig’s forces, by 1918, evolved into a more skilled and adaptive command “style” than their German opponents?

Jonathan Boff tackles this question in his new book, Winning and Losing on the Western Front. He places special focus on Gen. Julian Byng’s Third Army, a formation that helped drive the Germans back to the Hindenburg Line, then cracked the line and pursued the German Second and Seventeenth Armies into Belgium in the last days of the war. Making imaginative use of his sources, Boff investigates the manpower, training, morale, weapons, tactical skill, and command style of the Third Army and the Germans that faced them. He finds none of the explanations for the outcome of the victory—the evaporation of German strength; the preponderance of Allied tanks, men, and planes; the improvement of British tactical orchestration; or the relative effectiveness of British and German “command culture” are sufficient to explain why the war ended the way it did. Each, however, is necessary. Perhaps his most interesting findings have to do with the unevenness of “learning” by the combatants. Some units managed their battles with an approach that looked like what we call “mission command,” others kept a tight leash on initiative. Beyond that, he argues that the Germans signally failed to adapt their doctrine and command procedures to the desperate circumstances they faced in the last months of 1918.

If this reviewer finds Boff perhaps a little generous in his evaluation of British commanders and harsh in his judgment of their German counterparts, it warrants a disclaimer. In my own work, The Final Battle, I have considered many of the same questions that Boff examines in this book. However, when it comes to understanding the battlefield of 1918, Boff’s research is more comprehensive, his analysis more imaginative, and his conclusions more persuasive than my own. Winning and Losing on the Western Front is a remarkable book that takes us a quantum leap forward in our understanding of the how the “Great War” ended in 1918.

Dr. Scott Stephenson, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FEW THINK OF the U.S. Army when recounting the glories and horrors of ground combat in the Pacific theater during the Second World War. Indeed, several recent memoirs and the well-received HBO series The Pacific focused national attention on the exploits of the Marine Corps, and perhaps rightfully so. This includes the vicious battle for the island of Peleliu in the Palaus group, which was noted specifically for its ferocity and brutality—on the part of both sides.

However, little has been written about the role of Army divisions during the battle for the Palaus. Authors Bobby Blair and John DeCioccio effectively break this paradigm in their accounting of the Army’s 81st Infantry Division during the Pacific campaign. The 81st played a major role in securing Peleliu’s neighboring Angaur Island, seizing the key Ulithi archipelago in the Carolines, and relieving its more well-known brethren—1st Marine Division—on the island of Peleliu itself. Blair and DeCioccio effectively argue that rather than simply “mopping up” after the 1st Marines on Peleliu, the 81st employed innovative leadership, effective tactics, and endured intense combat in a fight against a desperate enemy whose defeat was not necessarily predetermined.

Written in no-nonsense staccato prose, the book deftly covers the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, effectively setting the larger context for the Palaus and Ulithi campaigns, recounting the crucial decisions that agonized the key leaders, and detailing the tactical innovations of both sides on the ground. Regarding the latter, the authors effectively describe the new Japanese policy for the Palaus campaign that focused on digging in, avoiding direct engagement at all times, and killing as many Americans as humanly possible. On the American side, the 81st countered these desperate and deadly measures with some innovative techniques of its
own, including the use of sieges vice frontal attacks, extensive sandbagging to secure terrain gained, and effective use of armored bulldozers and long-range flamethrowers. This was knock-down, drag-out combat at its most vicious.

The authors are particularly effective in describing the inter-service rivalry between the Marines and the Army, as exacerbated by the 1st Marine Division commander. This not only affected the conduct of the fight on Peleliu; it perhaps unnecessarily prolonged it. Another strength of Blair and DeCioccio is their description of the fight from the Japanese perspective. Indeed, the reader develops empathy for a desperate enemy employing vicious tactics that would foreshadow even greater human suffering on Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

It is the tragedy of Peleliu that the fruits of victory were never used in the Allies’ subsequent drives leading to Japan’s defeat in World War II. For its part, the 81st was disbanded shortly after the war while on occupation duty in Japan, its tale largely untold. Victory at Peleliu succeeds in plugging this gap and giving the division its rightful due. Written in Spartan style, Blair and DiCioccio effectively and without fanfare pay homage to the 81st without ever denigrating the role of the Marines on Peleliu. Incorporating extensive interviews and first-person accounts, the book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the role of Army units in this critical theater during the Second World War.

Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Georgia

---

KOREAN UNIFICATION
Inevitable Challenges,
Jacques L. Fuqua Jr, Potomac Books
Dulles, VA, 2011, 220 pages, $29.95

In KOREAN UNIFICATION: Inevitable Challenges, author Jacques L. Fuqua analyzes the challenges brought on by the assumed reunification of North and South Korea, within the existing South Korean economic and governing system. The first part of his book places the current Korean situation into historical context. The second part addresses the obstacles faced in repatriating and assimilating the North with the South. Fuqua’s primary focus is on addressing the obstacles facing the repatriation and assimilation of what has become two countries with distinctly different peoples and cultures. In order to integrate the North with the South, he believes the North Korean people will need to be “re-made.”

Fuqua provides a broad historical overview of the rich history of the Korean Peninsula, clearly demonstrating that its diverse peoples lacked unification. Unfortunately, other than identifying this hurdle to unification the historical summary provides little substantive value in addressing his thesis. This is a bit perplexing when considering the amount of time committed to providing this perspective.

In addressing the obstacles of integration, the author provides a litany of general data detailing the growing cultural, social, political, economic, educational, and mental/physical health divergence, between the North and South that has taken place over the last 60 years. Through this holistic perspective, he notes that the North Korean domestic situation is increasingly dire while South Koreans continue to flourish. He asserts that these differences make unification even more difficult.

Fuqua further highlights these challenges through a few anecdotal cases of North Koreans defecting South and the obstacles they faced in assimilating—ranging from language dialect differences to the lack of relevant work skills and discrimination issues. He cites a source believing individual assimilation takes at least three years. Between the assessment and the underdeveloped or poorly maintained infrastructure of the North, the author offers a $5 trillion price tag for the cost of unification—arguably an insurmountable impediment.

The author’s research is informative and adequate in addressing his general thesis; it unfortunately does so in an unimaginative and very “vanilla-like” way. In other words, it reads too much like a CIA or military foreign area specialist’s background report than substantive scholarly analysis. This, coupled with some superfluous and somewhat distracting information provided and questionable research assumptions, such as the need to remake and infuse the North with the South, adds a significant note of caution to the validity of the author’s conclusions.
This book is best read by those interested in a broad historical overview of the Korean Peninsula, along with some of the issues faced in a possible unification of the Koreans. It provides little enlightenment to the more astute and informed reader on this subject.

**Dr. David A. Anderson,**
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

---

**EDUCATING AMERICA’S MILITARY**
Joan Johnson-Freese, Routledge
London, 2013, 144 pages, $33.90

**EDUCATING AMERICA’S MILITARY** is essential reading for anyone, especially policymakers, involved in the professional military education (PME) arena. Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese provides a series of well-written, soundly researched, and even-handed arguments in a readable essay form. Her book is a profound description of what’s right and what’s wrong in PME complete with the gray areas of continuing debate. I found myself scribbling notes on virtually every page, many with exclamation marks or asterisks where I too had experienced similar debates and conclusions in my combined ten years as an academic at the U.S. Army War College, Command and General Staff College, and Logistics University. Yet, instead of enjoying what would have been my confirmation bias, I would read on to find she offers counterarguments that make me realize that the issues are more complex than I had imagined. Explicit throughout her essay are the cultural clashes that occur between academics and uniformed practitioners who occupy both faculty and education administrative roles. This includes competing cultural values, from academics over-theorizing (“great lecture professor, but I see no practical use”) to the military practitioner’s prime directive to be a team player (a euphemism for “professor, why can’t you just do what you’re told?!”).

Johnson-Freese’s coup de grâce is her critical deconstruction of how PME curriculum is developed and governed—generally by “random officers and individuals” and characterized by “disjointed fads” that produce “dumb-downed” course materials so that anyone can teach with them. All-in-all, *Educating America’s Military* is the most comprehensive and scholarly critique available in the contemporary PME community, period. Johnson-Freese has crafted a remarkable work that brings the PME debates up-to-date and demands significant institutional and Congressional response.

**Christopher R. Paparone,** Fort Lee, Virginia

---

**JACKSON’S SWORD**
The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier
Samuel J. Watson
University Press of Kansas
Lawrence, 2012, 460 pages, $39.95

**JACKSON’S SWORD** was written with today’s Army officers in mind. Samuel J. Watson’s historiographical notes are as impressive as his use of contemporary operational language. His book focuses on American borderland conflicts during the Early American period to explore the profession of arms and a foundational period for the U.S. Army. He points out that early America Army officers had substantial power in local affairs.

Early U.S. military history often appears divorced from current issues, but Watson shows that field commanders quickly shifted gears between civil military activities and pitched battles. He describes how long lines of communications isolated commanders and how political leaders recognized the need for autonomy for campaign commanders. The repeated success of the young U.S. Army serves as a vital check to the “lead by UAV” or command and control helicopter-mentality given the physical leadership present in Watson’s work.

Watson explores the notion of a profession of arms during a period of Republican ideology that was often at odds with professional militaries. This is evident in Andrew Jackson’s role as a nonprofessional officer; a man as capable of inspiring his soldiers through personal courage as he was at committing atrocities. The power of Jackson’s reputation and his recognition of public opinion challenges the 21st century’s
often-insular profession of arms. The book’s greatest contribution is that Army officers were the most powerful force in our young nation and that the remoteness of frontier combat shaped the profession of arms in a manner isolated from other social and cultural forces. Conflict on the borders “tempered and confirmed” military bureaucratic changes “setting the tone” ever since for the regular army officer corps.

Joseph Miller, Old Town, Maine

NATO in AFGHANISTAN
The Liberal Disconnect
Sten Rynning, Stanford University Press
Redwood City, CA, 2012, 288 pages, $25.95

OTHER NATO-MEMBER ARMED forces have been in Afghanistan almost as long as the U.S. armed forces have and NATO, as an organization, has been in Afghanistan as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) lead since 11 August 2003. What has NATO done well, what has it done poorly, and is regional NATO the best organization to settle a conflict in an out-of-region remote locale? Dr. Sten Rynning, who has written extensively about NATO strategic issues, examines these issues and produces a detailed political and diplomatic account of NATO in Afghanistan that is also an examination of NATO’s future.

NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect is more a diplomatic and political history than it is a military history. Fighting a war as an alliance is never easy and, despite the dominant roles of the United States and Great Britain, the conduct of the Afghanistan Conflict has been a thorny one for NATO. NATO-liberal governments initially expected that NATO would provide Afghanistan with a benevolent transition to democracy and a thriving economy with little fighting, whereas the ground truth has been a long, hard campaign dominated by military actions, not nationbuilding. Several NATO militaries arrived in Afghanistan prepared to do anything but fight. After initial entry, U.S. action and interest in Afghanistan waned as the bulk of its personnel and material shifted into Iraq. Consequently, NATO’s initial performance was not stellar and the enemy regained some of its strength, support, and territory. NATO’s performance improved markedly over time and its surge in support of the United States in 2009 proved NATO’s best showing. NATO clearly demonstrated that it was of more long-term value to Afghanistan than the UN and other international organizations.

After the significant contributions by NATO nations, will Afghanistan survive and flourish following NATO withdrawal? NATO will survive the Afghanistan Conflict, but will it still be relevant? NATO has now fought two conflicts—a regional one in Kosovo and a nonregional one in Afghanistan. In both, NATO had to first determine whether this was a European or an Atlantic response and whether NATO was still a relevant and responsive geopolitical force or if the European Union could better deal with the issue. Rynning argues that NATO must resume its common purpose as a trans-Atlantic Western alliance promoting Western ideals and interests to remain a positive world actor.

There are few books written about NATO in Afghanistan. This is the only one dealing with the strategic level. It is recommended for higher-level staffs and government professionals, but be aware, English is not the author’s primary language and he tends to over-stuff sentences with information. This, coupled with his indirect English sentence structure, means the reader may have to re-reread the same paragraph two or three times to comprehend the meaning. It will take some time to get through, but is worth the effort.

Lt. Col. Lester W. Grau, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

TEACHING AMERICA TO THE WORLD
AND THE WORLD TO AMERICA
Education and Foreign Relations Since 1870
Richard Garlitz and Lisa Jarvinen, eds.
Palgrave Macmillian, New York
2012, 256 pages, $70.90

Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.—Nelson Mandela

Democracy cannot succeed unless those who express their choice are prepared to choose wisely.
The real safeguard of democracy, therefore, is education.—Franklin D. Roosevelt

RICHARD GARLITZ AND Lisa Jarvinen’s Teaching America to the World and the World to America is a collection of essays that traces the influence of education on American foreign relations from the close of the Civil War, to the reestablishment of educational exchanges between the United States and China in the 1970s. In his introduction, Garlitz highlights the book’s primary purpose is to “examine how students and teachers shaped American global power in the twentieth century.” He also draws the reader’s attention to two themes that serve to interconnect each of the volume’s ten essays; first, the idea that education strongly supported American “empire-building,” to include the “spread of values, ideas, and consumer goods,” and second, that education plays a crucial role in “self-strengthening” efforts, such as foreign countries looking to emulate perceived American successes, and America’s desire to broaden its cultural awareness through exchange programs.

The authors describe the role of international students and government-sponsored education modernization programs through historical examples. Each essay provides a cultural perspective while encompassing topics like Argentina’s nationbuilding push to “Americanize” its school system in the mid-19th century, Iran’s modernization efforts under the Shah in the 1950s and 1960s, and the work of Japanese Fulbright students in rebuilding Japan in the aftermath of World War II, to name just a few. Hongshan Li’s essay, “From State Function to Private Enterprise: Reversing the Historical Trend in U.S.-China Education Exchange,” is relevant for those studying U.S.-China relations.

Teaching America to the World goes a long way in demonstrating how education and student exchanges have impacted U.S. foreign relations. Officers and faculty interested in gaining a multifaceted historical perspective on the role education plays in nationbuilding, or “self-strengthening” initiatives, should read this book.

Col. Clayton T. Newton, USA, Retired Redstone Arsenal, Alabama

FROM KABUL TO BAGHDAD AND BACK
The U.S. at War in Afghanistan and Iraq

IN AN EFFORT to glean meaning, while contributing to national defense strategy in the future, the U.S. military is forced to look inward at the key strategic decisions made during the operational planning of the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of war. U.S. foreign policy is a lightning rod of controversy that is still being played out today, with bipartisan agreement a daunting challenge. One decision impacting national strategy was conducting simultaneous campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors deconstruct each campaign to identify the weaknesses and impacts from such a strategy.

John Ballard, David Lamm, and John Wood, all esteemed scholars in the field of national strategic studies, provide accurate details of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, highlighting successes while also critiquing failures. Their analyses highlight how divergent lines of effort undermined the Afghanistan effort while attempting the first “generated-start” war in Iraq. The novelties of preemptive strike and speed are openly critiqued and the fallacy of war on the cheap is rebuked in favor of more traditionally held views. Commonly held beliefs of deficient Phase IV (stability) planning are scrutinized, with close examination of the frayed civilian-military relationships and resulting failures during the most difficult periods in both wars.

The authors draw parallels between the campaigns and highlight levels of success the “surge” strategy had in Iraq and Afghanistan. Senior leaders’ lack of cultural understanding and strategic understanding is discussed at length as well is the argument of counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism operations. The current administration’s decision to accelerate the U.S. troop withdrawal, hoping Afghan security forces are capable to assume the mission, is discussed.

From Kabul to Baghdad and Back is a concise, well-written depiction of the events in Iraq and
Afghanistan and should be considered required reading for the military student. The authors’ research provides lessons learned in the way of strategic decision making in the operational approach to war, with takeaways of resource and post-hostilities’ planning. The basic premise of a two-front war is strongly rebuked, with historical precedent and current challenges highlighted to support the authors’ arguments.

Michael R. Wacker, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LIFE LOOKING DEATH IN THE EYE
The Iraqi War as Experienced by a U.S. Army Contractor
Mahir Ibrahimov, Ph.D.,
Global Scholarly Publications,
New York, 2012, 213 pages, $--
Terrorist groups face tradeoffs in choosing how to structure their counterintelligence capabilities. Centralized organizations have superior CI training and compartmentalization, which also makes them vulnerable to penetrations. Decentralized organizations are more difficult to train and develop fewer SOPs, but are also less predictable and more difficult to penetrate. Groups with popular support are more likely to expose sensitive details about their plans and members, while clandestine organizations have a greater tension between secrecy and popularity.

Controlling territory is the factor that offers the most important CI advantages. Terrorists who control territory tend to have superior communications and physical security, and better CI vetting. However, controlling territory also makes them more vulnerable. Groups that do not control territory and face powerful adversaries would benefit from a loose organization—that way, limited penetrations would not lead to a catastrophic collapse of the group.

Mobley presents case studies of major terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda, to illustrate his points. A further analysis showed the groups’ failure to control territory was the most challenging security problem for all.

If repetition is a successful way to promote learning, this book succeeds; the author describes the factors and their significance, illustrates the factors in the case studies, and then repeats each one a third time in a summary. The book is recommended for those interested in understanding how to penetrate or undermine terrorist groups. The case studies are recommended reading where more in-depth academic research and background is desired.

Lt. Col. Chris North, USA, Retired, Advisor, Afghanistan

ROOSEVELT’S CENTURIONS
FDR and the Commanders He Led to Victory in World War II
Joseph E. Persico, Random House
New York, 2012, 672 pages, $ 35.00

FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, HIS admirals, and his generals is a subject thoroughly written about and to write something new is difficult. The best anyone can do is to give the subject a new viewpoint. Joseph Persico accomplishes this goal. However, I question Persicos’ historical facts.

The author argues that Roosevelt “was not a military meddler in a league with Churchill—Roosevelt was largely content to have the professionals wage the tactical war. But on the strategic level, he retained for himself the consequential decisions.”

Persico says Churchill convinced Roosevelt that a North African invasion against the Vichy French instead of against the Germans in Europe was a wise military policy and not simply a naked imperialist objective. Eisenhower described this decision as “The bleakest day in history.” So why did we do it?

Persico writes favorably about Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and most negatively about Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. Those with no knowledge of King’s contributions during the war would believe King a dreadful human being and someone who did not have the qualifications to be commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and simultaneously chief of Naval Operations. Many writers have criticized King as a personality, but none have criticized King as a superb naval officer. Persico believes that Nimitz should have been in King’s job. Obviously, Roosevelt did not support this view.

Persico includes the usual major events and players of the war such as The Neutrality Acts, Chamberlain as villain, FDR as a fine judge of men and as a poor manager, Churchill, Pearl Harbor, Executive Order Number 9066 (placing 114,000 American citizens and others of Japanese descent into camps without any legal reason for doing so), and how MacArthur was able to obtain FDR’s approval to invade the Philippines.

Allenbrooke, Montgomery, Marshall, King, Nimitz, Stilwell, Arnold, MacArthur, and Leahy are all covered. Persico gives his opinions but always against a backdrop of FDR as master of anything he touched, people or ideas. You will either agree or disagree with Persico’s opinions.

Roosevelt’s Centurions is well written and covers the important issues of World War II. But if you are not a fan of Roosevelt, there are many other books about the Second World War including Edwin P. Hoyt’s How They Won the War in the Pacific and Forrest C. Pogue’s Ordeal and Hope.

Robert Previdi, Manhasset, New York
Taking Exception to Presentation of American Exceptionalism


The authors write that this “usually occurs when Americans apprehend the empirical fact that they enjoy remarkable freedoms and prosperity and transfer those accomplishments of their forebears into feelings of personal superiority.” They go on to assert, “Instead of perceiving their heritage as a lucky accident, they irrationally perceive it as a personal virtue and a sign of their own superiority.”

Their argument shows a misunderstanding, both of what American exceptionalism means and how it was born.

Americans are exceptional not because we think we’re better than others, but because we know our country is different. The United States was founded on a universal truth, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence: all are created free and equal. No other country is dedicated to the principle of freedom and equality as we are. All other countries are founded on things such as ethnic traits or adherence to a particular religion.

Our unique founding explains why anyone can come here and become an American; you don’t have to be concerned about your race, religion, or color. You simply have to adopt our creed: liberty, equality, and government by consent.

Further, American’s heritage isn’t “a lucky accident,” as the article puts it. The framers of the Constitution knew exactly what they were doing—allowing the people to govern themselves according to common beliefs and the rule of law. Luck has nothing to do with it.

American service members are, almost by definition, the tip of the spear. They represent our country overseas and carry forth our founding ideals. They live out those founding principles every day, often in the most difficult circumstances imaginable. They, like the country they serve, are exceptional.

The Myths We Soldiers Tell Ourselves


General Officers come under frequent attack, but almost no one doubts their commitment. Because the deep cultural change the authors call for can only come from the top, it is especially needful that our generals read, distribute, and put forward the rationale of the writers. Only generals have the power to replace the myths with more considered judgments aspiring to the truth.

A general in uniform comes as close to being the “absolute prince” the authors refer to as anyone in our society ever comes. They are accorded “unlimited deference” in the cult that military command has become. At any hour generals can say to this man “come” and he comes, and to that man “go” and he goes; they convene court martials; they decide who gets promoted; they determine the culture in the Army. What a general does or approves—explicit or implicit—is good to go. It’s pretty heady stuff.

So much so, that Secretary Robert Gates looked wistfully over his own leaf rake’s handle at the military aides raking the leaves in Chairman Mullen’s yard next door. Our society places great trust and confidence in a flag officer. It’s not clear that the record justifies the trust.

Despite their responsibility for celebrating and carrying out democracy’s high ideals, generals, as
a set, are responsible for both the existence and the maintenance of the myths soldiers live by. Without the generals’ imprimatur, none of these myths our authors describe could take hold in military culture.

The camel is called *ambition*. And more than his nose is under the tent.

How did we get the generals we have?

Though I have met second lieutenants whose **hit the commissioner’s birthing table with a decided penchant for stardom, the majority of our generals begin their service for the right reasons and in the right way. They love America’s ideals and rightly judge them worth dying for. They keep their heads down, their shoulders to the wheel, and their eyes on the American men and women filling their ranks. A good many of them begin by being “eye-watering” good.

One day they wake to discover they’re “early select” for field grade rank. That’s nice they notice, but they don’t yet read their own press clippings, they don’t yet drink the Kool-aid of their own genius. They go back to work, get selected for battalion command, and on another day they wake to a demand, a request, a suggestion, a certain understanding that the brigade commander wants them to, say, recruit more members for the Association of the United States Army (AUSA).

Having just left the Pentagon as a senior general’s aide, our emerging star knows the AUSA leader and has been heard to say that Old Bourbon-breathed-Bob is a sorry so-and-so. Now the general has just told the brigade commander who holds the new commander’s future in hand that his AUSA membership is the lowest in the division.

At the next brigade officer’s call in the consolidated dining facility, Captain Slim and Slick who used to be the general’s aide is asked to stand on his chair. This captain is then commended by the brigade commander for having the highest AUSA membership in the brigade. Everybody gets the message, and our Lt. Col. New-in-Command goes to his lonely office and stares at the ceiling. “Well,” he mutters to himself, “I’m not being asked to do evil; success is a tough game; this is the way it’s played, and I didn’t come this far to lose. If I let the battalion get a bad reputation, the soldiers will suffer for my choice.” And so he, maybe, gets after AUSA membership. Maybe he doesn’t, maybe he lets this ONE go.

If he’s lucky the command sergeant major will take on this campaign. The lieutenant colonel gets promoted.

And then, he commands a brigade, meets a congressional delegation, gets caught doing right, and the once-slight murmurs of stardom become the whispers that in turn become the cocktail party facts shared by those who know. Time passes, and after a few more turns of the wheel, it’s “all-in.” Our one-time eye-watering good second lieutenant who got up early, worked hard, and served his troops has become a wholly vested company man bound to all manner of indecent requests for the sake of the team. It’s a big team; the stakes are high—Westmoreland in Vietnam.

Generals must submit to civilian leadership. The constitution requires it, a democratic heart commands it; it’s the right way, the way it has to be. So the question rises: Are generals the problem, or are politicians the problem? And the further question: Are politicians the problem, or are the people who elect them the problem?

Put another way, do we have the generals we have because we want the generals we have? The answer appears to be “yes.” The ranks are full of patriots who would, if encouraged, if even permitted, consistently be able to resist what they in their own human decency regard as unreasonable expectations. Indeed, had the generals we have been encouraged to be the people they wanted to be, this conversation would be unnecessary.

For now it is too late, our brigade commander went on to stars under the recognition that the only way soldiers can play the essential political game is to support the AUSA because the AUSA has an entry to politics that generals are forbidden. And, sorry to say, our politics are sometimes a bourbon-soaked and sordid business, hence Bourbon-breathed-Bob, director of AUSA.

Bourbon-breathed-Bob is, after all, best able to work K-street and the other corridors of power to get the pay raises and the hardware purchases for our troops. Bourbon-Bob can say things about veterans and retirees that a general cannot say. Moving on and up involves support for Bourbon-Bob. So we lean on junior soldiers to spend money in joining an organization they don’t understand, an organization very few of them would join left to their own judgments and inclinations.
Ambition itself is not the problem. Ambition is how things get done. It’s a question of which things, how motivated. Generals are the one percent of military society. Maybe we’re all serving the one percent, one way or another.

All of our generals grew up under this system, and it may be unfair to ask them to change it. It would be unfair except for this fact: Without them, change cannot occur, and Fromm et al., tell us that change needs to occur.

I think that Fromm et al., are right.

There are others, but permit me to name one general who retained his native human decency despite the burden of stars on his collar—Paul T. Mikolashek. Of him, more we need. To that general and to all others like him, I apologize while urging our senior officers to use the “Myths” piece to follow our authors’ lead in taking up a new kind of conversation.

Thanks to Military Review for publishing this essay and to the authors for recording their best reflected convictions while exercising courage.

*Army Ethics: Simple, But Not Simple-Minded*

Maj. George Knapp, *U.S. Army Retired*—I found Lt. Col. Brian Imiola’s short piece, “The Imaginary Army Ethic: A Call for Articulating a Real Foundation for Our Profession” (*Military Review*, May-June 2013), the best statement I have ever read about the problem of U.S. Army ethics. He is right, of course. The Army does not have a set of ethics and it needs one. What follows is my simple proposal for one, but first a few words about simplicity.

Chess is a simple game, but it is not simple-minded. We can quickly learn how to play. At first, our games are quick and easy. As we learn more about the game, we begin to see its variety, complexity, and how difficult it is to master, but we do master it to the best of our ability and we become good chess players. The analogy of chess to Army Ethics is direct—at first simple to grasp, but very challenging to master. Mastery is the reward.

Let us begin with a definition. Army Ethics is a set of principles, values, standards, and discipline guiding the Army’s people, decisions, procedures, and systems. Army Ethics is central to our people’s welfare by making it clear to them what is right and what is wrong. Consistently choosing right over wrong establishes integrity, builds character, security, dependability, and trust among our people, our leaders, our organizations, and our relationship with the American people.

Let us continue with a visual model. The five principles of Army ethics are: morality, honesty, integrity, loyalty, and accountability. Army Values, Standards, and Discipline support these principles in detail.

*Army Ethics* • *Morality* • *Honesty* • *Integrity* • *Loyalty* • *Accountability*

*Values* • *Standards* • *Discipline*

**The Five Principles of Army Ethics—Simple, But Not Simple-Minded**

- *Morality* is choice between good and evil.
- *Honesty* is rejection of lying, cheating, stealing, and those who do.
- *Integrity* is the result of doing the right thing so often that it becomes second nature and creates an automatic presumption about us by all others.
- *Loyalty* is faithfulness to the Constitution of the United States and to each other.
- *Accountability* is willingness to accept responsibility for everything that we, our people, and our organizations do and don’t do.

Our Army Values are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Our Army standards are well-understood and established methods and outcomes for our individual and collective tasks. Army discipline is doing the right thing even when there is nobody there to tell us what
to do. These three supporting elements apply to all our people and to all our organizations.

This is a simple model for Army Ethics, but it is not simple-minded. At its root is the classic struggle between good and evil. We want our people and our organizations to always do the right thing. We want our friends and enemies to know that we always do the right thing. Those of us who cannot see the difference between right and wrong need to stand aside. Those of us who want to see everything as gray, relativist, complicated, or somehow too “problematic” need to get out of the way as well.

We need to preach this ethic to every soldier, every contract worker, and every Army civilian. Every one of us should be able to recite the five principles by heart and know what they mean. Those of us who cannot should get out of the way.

The people of the United States of America deserve an army that always chooses good over evil. They deserve an army that has unqualified integrity based on its deeds. They deserve honesty from their soldiers and their leaders. They deserve an army loyal to the Constitution and to the American people. Finally, America deserves an army that takes responsibility for everything it does or fails to do.

And so, I put before you this simple model as a logical place to start building Army Ethics. Once again, the five principles of Army Ethics are morality, honesty, integrity, loyalty, and accountability. If you can’t remember them, write them on your fingers.