Mission Command in the Regionally Aligned Division Headquarters


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COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
Greetings! As the new Editor-in-Chief and Director of Military Review, I would like to extend my thanks to our readers, authors, and advocates. Without your continued support and loyalty, the publication would not be the respected publication it is today. Military Review found its roots in 1922 and is still going strong, and getting better with every edition. We are always exploring new ways to improve our publication and increase readership. You may have already seen some changes in the electronic and printed versions, and there are more changes coming.

Our first change was updating our electronic version, making it easier to navigate and we hope more appealing. Rather than scrolling through a PDF format, we are now displaying the journal in a program that simulates turning the pages of the actual journal. The best part of this new format is the ability to zoom in and out, move the page around to specific areas, and go directly to the page you would like to read. Some articles will have embedded audio and video files to enhance understanding of the articles. We are also revamping the MR website, making it more understandable and accessible.

Next, we changed the look and feel of the MR cover. We hope that with a more dynamic presentation our readers will be more inclined to pick it up, thereby increasing our readership. We receive numerous recommendations from our readers and authors on ways to improve MR. One venue voiced repeatedly through our readers is to reduce the size of the published articles. In the past, the recommended size of submitted manuscripts was 3,000 to 5,000 words. By reducing the size of the manuscript to 2,000 to 3,000 words, we are able to showcase the hard work of more authors. This in turn increases the probability of our audience reading an article in its entirety and opening up forums/debates on more topics. Let’s face it, in the fast-paced world we live in today, and the limited time we have for luxuries such as reading, this concept is a good fit.

You will also see MR transition back to “themed” editions. Beginning in 2015, each edition will have a theme-based topic relevant to the Army. We are counting on our readers to provide feedback on the specific themes they would like to see in the future.

We also want to dispel the myth that MR is only for officers. It is true, we receive more articles from officers and civilians than from our non commissioned officers, but we want our NCOs to know they too have a voice. Their roles as leaders and innovative thinkers are just as vital as our officers’ roles; that is why we are dedicating one of our first themed 2015 editions to our NCOs.

Right now, the majority of MR’s content is printed in black and white, which is another aspect we would like to change to move the Army’s professional journal into the 21st century. We believe that with the addition of color, coupled with more graphics, we will capture and hold the reader’s attention, thus expanding our audiences.

These are just some of the forecasted changes to the Army’s professional journal. If you would like to make your own recommendations, please contact us, we would love to hear from you. Send your ideas to usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.military-review-public-email@mail.mil or to Military Review, 290 Stimson Ave, Unit 2, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 66027-1293.

I look forward to hearing from you, our readers, and providing our force with the latest ideas that stimulate critical thought, cultivate new ideas, assist leader education and training, and promote doctrine development.
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Front cover: Afghan Border Police and U.S. Army Soldiers from ABP Zone 1, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, hike from their landing zone to an observation point along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, 21 January 2013. (U.S. Army, Sgt. Jon Heinrich)
IFE AT THE corners of 4 map sheets” is how then-Lt. Gen. Vincent Brooks, as the commanding general of Army Central Command (ARCENT), described the role of the regionally aligned force. The 1st Armored Division, as the first regionally aligned force division headquarters, has found that life at the intersection of those map sheets requires a change from old habits and mindsets. Success as an aligned force requires embracing mission command as a philosophy, establishing mission command systems to keep hands on the forward problem, and adopting a forward-focused mindset. Mission command enables the regionally aligned force to create shared trust and understanding within the headquarters, build the relationships and teams necessary to support the geographic combatant commander, and develop the flexibility necessary to provide mission-tailored command posts to the combatant command.

In May 2012, the Army expanded the concept of regionally aligning units from only brigade combat teams to division headquarters. Forces Command aligned the 1st Armored Division to support U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), making our team one of the first regionally aligned division headquarters. The chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Ray Odierno, outlined his intent for regionally aligned forces on 25 October 2012, indicating their purpose: “to provide the combatant commander with up to a Joint Task Force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment.” Our 1st Armored Division team viewed alignment as a tremendous opportunity. Our commanding general at the time, Maj. Gen. Dana J.H. Pittard, described the division’s role in this way, nested with the chief of staff of the Army’s intent: “Our goal is to broadly collaborate our
understanding and build trust (at all levels), which will best allow our supported combatant commander to prevent conflict, shape the environment (as needed), and posture us to win (if needed).”

**Before You Ask the Question: The Answer is Yes.**

First Armored Division committed early on in our regionally aligned force mission to provide complete support to our supported combatant commander. The question was, “How do we best, and in the most responsive way possible, add value to the combatant command?” The operating environment is already challenging—our view was that the regionally aligned force does not need to add additional challenges or complications. Combatant commands will sometimes encounter this type of response when requesting assets from Army units:

- Combatant commander: “I need 100 soldiers.”
- Supporting Army unit: “Acknowledged, we’ll send a brigade (or equivalent).”

Such inflexibility means that Army loses some credibility within the combatant command. If the combatant commander needs ten soldiers, that is what we will send. When a supported combatant commander submits a request, the regionally aligned force should respond within the intent and guideline of that intent. The bottom line: before a supported combatant commander asks the question, the answer from the regionally aligned force should be “yes.”

**Get in a Good Stance: Always Forward, Globally Connected, and Expeditionary**

Pittard encouraged our team to retain an expansive view of our role as a regionally aligned headquarters, to “keep our hands on the problem,” and to develop a mindset of being “always forward, globally connected, and expeditionary.” The further an organization is from the problem, the harder it is for that organization to fully understand the problem. We all tend to view the world through a lens that is familiar to us, which, if we are not careful, further inhibits our ability to understand completely the motivations and intentions of our regional partners. Our ability to influence the operating environment directly relates to our proximity to our partners. Regional alignment has required us to “get closer”; engaging partners without understanding the environment means that

The 1st Armored Division tactical command post integrated into the National Training Center rotation 12-09 at Fort Irwin, Calif, 30 July 2012.
we lose relevance and our partners will be less willing to engage us.

To keep our hands on the problem, our team applied the tenants of mission command to our staff and unit activities. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command*, defines mission command as both a philosophy and as a warfighting function. Embracing mission command as a philosophy required a change in mindset more than anything else we did. Organizational change is difficult, and moving a large team requires a “big idea.” In this case, that idea was retaining a forward footing. In 1st Armored Division, the staff had to buy into the idea that we must look forward to help us better manage transitions and add value to our supported combatant commander from day one. In exercising mission command as a warfighting function, the division staff has repeatedly honed its skills, including conducting the operations process, conducting inform and influence activities, and conducting knowledge and information management.

As part of supporting the combatant commander with what he requires, the division has built and fine-tuned what we call a tailored command post. In developing this concept, the division conducted multiple command post exercise iterations. These included a rotation at the National Training Center in July and August 2012, which was the first time in almost five years that a division level tactical command post deployed to the National Training Center and integrated into the rotation.

A typical pattern for a headquarters is to surge through a command post training event, gain a high level of staff proficiency during execution, but then return to the headquarters, recover equipment, and resume work in cubicles. Facilities are an important component to mission command, and the typical “cubicle farm” works against the principles of mission command. Such cubicles are neither truly private nor open, with high gray walls that discourage collaboration and hinder the building of teams and trust. Other organizational enemies include stove-piping of information in isolated staff sections and staff muscle atrophy—the erosion of individual and collective staff task proficiencies. Our current global operating environment is so complex, changing, and ambiguous that we cannot afford to conduct business this way anymore.

Rather than viewing command post training as a series of discrete events, the 1st Armored Division approach has been to create an environment at home station that allows us to train and operate in our command post every day. Our goal is to connect to the network using our digital systems and allow our soldiers’ daily repetitions to create a level of familiarity and understanding that makes us easily conversant about problems in our aligned region. In that command post—our division operations center—our headquarters links into CENTCOM and ARCENT battle rhythm events such as battle updates. If done right, approaches such as this can mitigate the problem of “the first 100 days”—that time when units are transitioning and there is great risk due to decreased situational understanding. Staying connected in this way means deploying with a staff that has at least a basic understanding of the operating environment.

The scope of a geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility is well beyond that which one division, or even corps, could successfully attempt to understand completely. The commander should designate an area of interest on which to focus the regionally aligned force. For 1st Armored Division, this CENTCOM-directed focus has been largely on the Levant, which includes Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. While not every geographic command will have a similar hotspot, it should still focus the division or corps on a particular portion of the area of responsibility.

You cannot get there from a “cold start”; being of value as a regionally aligned force means that you have to constantly study, strive to understand, and work to reduce uncertainty as much as possible.

Our goal every day has been to understand the current operating environment, the combatant commander’s priorities, and potential contingency operations. You cannot get there from a “cold start”; being of value as a regionally aligned force means that you have to constantly study, strive to understand, and work to reduce uncertainty as much as possible.
Building Relationships

The regionally aligned force at division and corps level can provide a valuable asset for the combatant commander’s use in shaping operations (Phase 0). By keeping hands on the problem, the aligned force can enhance the combatant commander’s shaping efforts. The force can build relationships with the lead federal agency (normally the Department of State), which will pay dividends when and if operations transition to deterring operations (Phase 1) and beyond. Additionally, designating a regionally aligned force in Phase 0 makes transitioning to Phase 1 easier, with the regionally aligned force headquarters prepared to set up the core of a joint task force or a combined joint task force.

Phase 0 activities focus on developing ally capabilities, improving information exchange, and intelligence sharing—all things the regionally aligned force does through mission command. The regionally aligned headquarters can be the consistent face of the U.S. military for the members of the partner nation’s military and can establish long-term relationships to aid in building the capacity of our key allies. Such relationships are one of the ways the regionally aligned force can provide value to the combatant commander in the human dimension.

The 1st Armored Division established these relationships with members of the Jordanian Armed Forces, from general officer down through staff level at Exercise Eager Light in November 2012. The relationships proved valuable when the division fulfilled the regionally aligned concept by filling a majority of the positions in a CENTCOM forward-deployed command post. The relationships also led to the Jordanian military leadership specifically requesting 1st Armored Division to participate in Exercise Eager Lion in June 2013.

Exercise, Exercise, Exercise (Politics, Perceptions, Tribes, and Money)

1st Armored Division also participated in two other partnered exercises: Earnest Leader Phase I (a seminar with Saudi Arabian partners at Fort Bliss, Texas) and Earnest Leader Command Post Exercise (in Saudi Arabia). Such exercises are tremendous opportunities and provide a venue for the regionally aligned force to meet the combatant commander’s intent of forming teams across his operating environment.

Joint exercises also provide the opportunities for training within a fiscally uncertain environment, as there is significant funding at the combatant command level to conduct partnered training and to participate in relationship-building exercises. With the Army force generation programmed training reduced by budgetary constraints, this joint and partnered training environment is a great place in which to find additional opportunities to train.

Exercise management involves politics, however; the Army is in competition with other services to take advantage of these training opportunities, and there are sensitivities about who does what and who contributes where. Other services have built enduring, deep relationships with the combatant command-level action officers who plan and direct partnered training exercises, which makes getting the Army’s foot in the door difficult. The regionally aligned force must become fluent in joint exercise language.

Establishing relationships in both the geographic combatant command and Army service component command should be a priority for every regionally aligned corps or division headquarters. Doing so can keep the force nested in the supported command’s decision cycle and keep it responsive to the needs of the supported combatant commander.

The regionally aligned force staff must also become conversant in, and comfortable using, the Joint Operation Planning Process. Although exposed to this during Intermediate-Level Education, few Army majors know it well. Training for regional alignment should therefore include staff exercises using this process.

The Regionally Aligned Force Community of Interest

The regionally aligned force must also be “comfortable being uncomfortable,” by reaching out to others to challenge staff ideas, encouraging venues that expose the headquarters to different perspectives, and retaining enduring contact with partners across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. There are many nuances, key players, and narratives to consider when integrating into a region; therefore, we cannot afford to limit perspectives to those contained at Fort Bliss or any other installation. Academic outreach is therefore crucial for a regionally aligned force.
The regionally aligned force community of interest is the network of organizations that can share emerging training requirements and best practices with the regionally aligned force. The 1st Armored Division reached out to several academic institutions to develop such a network early on in regional alignment. The first academic engagement was with Leadership Development and Education for a Sustained Peace, which taught an excellent seminar on Levant culture, history, and politics. The network grew when the Army War College sent senior faculty to Fort Bliss to teach a seminar on establishing and leading a combined joint task force headquarters. Additionally, the U.S. Agency for International Development taught the Joint Humanitarian Assistance Operation Course in preparation for a potential humanitarian assistance mission.

The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, particularly its knowledge management team, has provided valuable assistance to the division headquarters. For the regionally aligned force headquarters looking to integrate into a new operating environment, understanding the interagency environment is critical. Our regionally aligned force headquarters is just one part of a larger ecosystem in which our interagency partners have their own decision cycles, spheres of influence, and access to resources, as do military partners throughout our operating environment. We must be comfortable with this—and the only way to have a shot at understanding what is really going on is to challenge our perspective by embracing the processes, systems, and ideas of those other agencies who work as part of our operational environment. The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command helped the division staff understand how to “talk” in a joint environment and to identify critical processes and decision cycles across the operating environment so we could tailor our outputs to become inputs to other processes. Doing this helped us add value to our partners by taking an approach that accounts for their activities, ensuring that we were postured to enable systems and processes across the operating environment.

These organizations have all played an important role in supporting 1st Armored Division as the regionally aligned force, but this is just the beginning of what the community of interest can and should be. It must be a “big Army” effort to influence players Army-wide and across the Department of Defense to become part of a network in support of the regionally aligned force. The Army can also make this network extend beyond the Department of Defense to include relevant joint and interagency partners who are players in the region, and establish a recurring event where all such players come together to collaborate with the regionally aligned force. This network would be a powerful asset for the combatant commander.

Challenges with Being Regionally Aligned

Embracing regional alignment as an Army and best enabling follow-on regionally aligned force headquarters will require improvement in several areas, starting with the network. Regional alignment should grant units access to forward networks from home station, but bureaucracy at multiple levels (Army service component command, and combatant command) makes this a slow process and prevents an easy and seamless connection across our mission command systems with the supported combatant commander.

A second challenge is that the protocols for sharing information with coalition partners are neither fully established nor sourced. Issues here include an ingrained Army habit of over-classifying products and an associated foreign disclosure process that prevents the timely sharing of information with partners; both practices inhibit information sharing. Regionally aligned force headquarters need a cross-domain architecture that allows for rapid transfer of information. They also need hardware, such as additional server stacks, to establish a partnered mission command network. There is a financial cost associated with establishing this level of connectivity, but this is the price of readiness, particularly if the Army wants regionally aligned forces to have the mindset of “always forward, globally connected, and expeditionary.”

In lieu of that partnered mission command network, the staff should be prepared to go where partners are the most comfortable—that is, move to analog versus digital systems if needed. This can require a return to basics and training on skills, which have atrophied in the Army’s move away from map boards and overlays to the digital common operating picture.
A third challenge is the difficulty in establishing interorganizational unity of effort in a region. Many organizations tend to act unilaterally; collaboration in a region is often casual, and, at times, arbitrary. A regionally aligned headquarters can facilitate unity of effort among these organizations by creating venues, which enable collaboration, especially in information fusion and integrated planning. While the lead federal agency in Phase 0 is often the Department of State, the regionally aligned force can assist the Department of State in the region by providing the planning capacity inherent in the headquarters. This interagency coordination should not be reserved for deployments only, but should occur routinely at home station. Again, this will require an Army push to incorporate the right players into this network.

The Army, at the Department of the Army headquarters and the Army service component command level, also has a responsibility to the combatant commander to explain what the regionally aligned force brings to the table. The Army service component should also authorize discussion directly between the regionally aligned force and the combatant command to build relationships at both the action officer and commander level.

An additional challenge is that very little “juice” comes with regional alignment; it currently does not trigger additional resources of people, money, or equipment. The Army should therefore develop a force generation model for regionally aligned headquarters, which addresses personnel manning, additional resources (funding and equipment), and training requirements and opportunities. As an example, additional travel funds are required for
leaders to meet partners and build relationships, whether with partner nations or at the combatant command. These types of engagements should be part of the regionally aligned force generation model and scheduled early in the alignment period.

Finally, a challenge internal to the regionally aligned force is in fostering intellectual curiosity across the headquarters. All of the training and touch points described previously—be they academic seminars, relationship building, or command post touch points—all build understanding of the operational environment. This is just a beginning, however, and the staff must build on this understanding through its own reading. While leaders cannot instill curiosity, they can encourage it in the staff. The community of interest, for example, can collectively create a recommended reading list as a starting point for such individual studies.

Mission command and the regionally aligned force are mutually supportive concepts. Preventing conflict and shaping the environment in a region requires continued engagement, which the regionally aligned force can do through physical presence or from home station. Mission command, as both a philosophy and a warfighting function, enables the force to do this. In its support of the combatant commander, the regionally aligned force can then demonstrate the value and necessity of mission command, as it builds relationships with partners in the region and keeps “hands on the problem.”

For 1st Armored Division, embracing mission command meant a shift toward conducting staff operations at home station the same way we do while deployed, including establishing a home station command post linked into the Army service component command and combatant command, setting a battle rhythm at home station similar to that used while deployed, and keeping a “forward mindset” all the time. While there is a cost involved in equipping the regionally aligned force to remain connected forward, this is more about “head ware” than it is about hardware. The regionally aligned force must adopt a forward-focused mindset to be most responsive and add value to the supported combatant commander.

MR
The Strategic Planning “Problem”


Over the past decade, the U.S. Army has struggled with a host of complex problems in pursuing its strategic military objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq. Problems like ethnic and tribal politics, lack of suitable governance at many levels, collapse of the rule of law, diverse cultural and religious norms, radicalization and extremist groups, economic challenges, illegal drug trade, external state interference, and cross-border sanctuaries have confronted planners in both theaters. We can expect these problems and others to be part of the contextual dynamics of future campaigns. Consequently, a significant question has emerged for the Army: How do we prepare officers with the knowledge, skills, and experience to develop strategic plans to address complex problems for which solutions are not easily identifiable?

The Army’s answer to this question initially focused on the procedures and processes that planners use to understand and develop solutions to problems. The Army relies heavily on the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), which is tremendously useful at solving complicated, but familiar operational and tactical problems. The process is ideally suited to rapidly develop effective courses of action for problems that can be framed using existing doctrine. However, despite MDMP’s tremendous value, the process does not force commanders and their staffs to ask the appropriate questions necessary to grapple with complex but unfamiliar problems. As became clear in Iraq and Afghanistan, campaign strategies and many of the operational challenges required a broader understanding of the environment, an understanding of the interplay of nonmilitary elements, an ability to cooperate with a wide range of intergovernmental and multinational partners, and in many cases a new lexicon to describe the environment. As Gen. Martin Dempsey explained in 2010, “In Iraq and in
Afghanistan we found that the traditional planning processes were inadequate for the complexity of the operational environment.  

To address this inadequacy, the Army turned to Design as a companion piece to MDMP to help planners address the issues associated with complex and unfamiliar problems. Design, originally adopted from the Israeli theory of Systemic Operational Design, required practitioners spend considerable time defining the environment and framing the problem before beginning to identify a solution. Design emphasized the need for critical and creative thinking and iterative solution processes to understand clearly the depth of the problem that operational planners encountered on the ground. The vehicle for introducing Design and similar critical thinking skills to the Army was the school most identified with planning processes and operational planners: The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The school embraced this change wholeheartedly and revamped its curriculum to include the use of Design and MDMP as companion parts of a coherent planning process. It acknowledged that both can play an important role in developing operational and tactical plans, depending on the situation. Design is now a standard part of the curriculum for majors in the Command and General Staff Officers Course and for battalion and brigade command-selects in the School for Command Preparation Tactical Commander’s Development Program.

The Yingling Argument

However, the introduction of the Army Design Methodology and the inclusion of Design into professional military education and other leader development forums did not address a more fundamental problem: the need for leaders who could think and operate in the realm of strategy. Thus, concurrent with the debate on the need for a better planning process, another debate emerged on the need for further education of our officer corps to develop better collaboration, communication, and influence skills at the strategic level and critical and creative thinking skills in general. The public face of this debate was provided by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling who


(U.S. Army)
posited in an article in the Armed Forces Journal that the Army did not value intellectual creativity in its senior leaders. In his article, he broadly attacked the officer professional development path as a “system that . . . does little to reward creativity and moral courage” in its senior leaders.4

While possibly overstating the problem, Yingling’s assertion is worth further investigation. A review of the resumes of all serving active duty general officers, conducted in 2007 (the same year that Yingling published his article), showed that roughly 70 percent of the general officers held advanced degrees from civilian institutions, and almost half of those officers held master’s degrees from both civilian and military institutions (such as the National War College, Army War College, SAMS, etc.).5 On its face, this would seem to refute Yingling’s assertion.

However, upon closer inspection there may be something to what Yingling says. It is important to note that many of the general officers who earned advanced degrees did so on their own time and not as the result of a focused effort by the Army to develop their intellectual capacity. Many of them earned their degrees at night or during weekends while performing some other duty—such as attending the Command and General Staff College. Also notable, despite the proliferation of master’s degrees, only six of the 300 active-serving general officers possessed degrees at the doctoral level. Four of the six officers earned their doctorate in conjunction with a tour of duty as an instructor at the United States Military Academy (USMA).

This lack of focused education has more to do with career timelines and requirements than with a lack of institutional interest in intellectual development. Given the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols and joint assignments, key developmental jobs, positions in the institutional Army, and promotion timelines tied to a 30-year career, there is little room for advanced civil schooling. Many of the opportunities, such as advanced degrees for foreign area officers or other functional area specialties, require an officer to forgo the opportunities for advancement in his or her operational branch. For officers in operational tracks, opportunities exist for advanced degrees, but they have traditionally been associated with a utilization tour as an instructor at USMA or in another institutional assignment.

These utilization tours can continue up to three years, potentially sacrificing important operational experience that officers require for successful battalion command—a key step to future service as a senior leader. In many cases, those who pursue more traditional assignments focused on developing operational expertise have an advantage over their peers who did not. Pursuing a doctoral-level degree with the requisite time to develop and write a doctoral dissertation is usually detrimental to an officer’s career in the operational Army. In the case of the six general officers who earned Ph.D.s noted above, all of them wrote their dissertations on their own time—a remarkable achievement given the time required to complete a doctoral dissertation satisfactorily.6

In Search of a Solution

In December 2011, in Gen. Odierno’s first trip to Fort Leavenworth as the Army’s 37th chief of staff, he asked Lt. Gen. David Perkins, commanding general of the Combined Arms Center, to develop a concept that would satisfy a critical capability gap—one that Odierno had witnessed during several years of leading multinational forces in Iraq. Odierno explained that while he had many talented officers and advisors throughout his tours, they generally lacked the academic depth and strategic planning experience to develop viable strategic plans in conjunction with civilian and military officials from the United States and other partner nations. He wanted a concept for a systematic way to prepare planners capable of developing grand strategic and theater plans and capable of shaping the strategic debate with influential thinkers outside the military.

The Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program

In an effort to address these issues, SAMS developed the Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program (ASP3). This program sends selected field grade officers at the ranks of senior major through senior lieutenant colonel to highly respected doctoral programs throughout the nation in order to use the new skills and knowledge during operational assignments. While enrolled, the officers complete their studies toward a doctorate, augmented with professional education that provides the skills
strategic planners and leaders require to operate at the highest levels. The success of ASP3 involves three key components:

- Selecting the right officer.
- Providing the right education.
- Providing the right experience through a managed process of strategic level assignments.

In each of these elements, experience and education provide a balanced approach to creating the end product: an officer “who can think creatively, plan strategically, and communicate with senior leaders in all branches of government and academia.”7

Inherently included in this definition is the ability for those senior leaders to operate within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment as well as collaborate with other important players including foreign civilian and military leaders, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and myriad elements that make up the modern battlefield.

The first component, selecting the right officer, requires a holistic approach that includes evaluating the officer’s ability to complete a doctorate, ensuring the officer has the experience and preparation to serve at the strategic level, and coordinating with career managers as well as senior leaders. Pursuing a doctorate involves a substantial amount of individual study and effort, and the officer must have a strong desire to complete the requirements. One indicator of an officer’s ability to undergo a doctoral program is successful completion of a rigorous post-graduate degree that includes a significant writing requirement in the form of a thesis or monograph. The officer’s demonstrated commitment to a lengthy research project gives a strong indication that the officer will be able to complete a doctoral dissertation in the future. Likewise, publishing in academic journals also serves to identify those who have the wherewithal to complete a doctorate. Officers with a strong performance in operational and planning assignments have potential to serve successfully as strategic planners, and a broad range of assignments help contribute to their future success. Additionally, support from senior leaders in the form of letters of recommendation helps identify the right officers to complete this demanding program. Ideally, the individual would have served 12-20 years in the Army with experience in tactical and operational units, have experience as an operational planner, and have a strong academic background. The experience as an operational planner is critical to providing context for the coursework and educational experience.

Having selected the best officers, providing the appropriate civilian and professional education is key. For civilian education, this involves finding the university and degree program that can satisfy an officer’s professional and academic interests and contribute to his or her ability to plan, collaborate, and communicate at the strategic level. Study in a
liberal arts field is most relevant for establishing the broad base of knowledge and building the critical and creative thinking skills that effective strategic planners require. Degrees in economics, international relations, political science, history, strategic studies, security studies, and others that provide a window into a complex and diverse world are ideally suited for strategic planning.

Augmenting the university education with professional coursework that addresses military problems at the strategic level is important to ensure that the development does not become a purely academic exercise. Most full-time doctoral programs involve two years of coursework conducted during the fall and spring semesters, which leaves the summers free for other academic and developmental opportunities. To ensure the advanced civil schooling serves a practical military purpose, ASP3 will use the summer to deliver coursework and practical exercises focused on strategic history, theory, systems, issues, and planning.

Finally, the third component, the holistic management of an ASP3 officer’s career, will allow the Army and nation to maximize the benefit of the program. Within the context of a 20- to 30-year career, there are conditions that must be satisfied to keep officers competitive for promotion among their peers. Removing an officer from operational assignments for more than two years at a time places the officer at risk when compared to those who remain in operational assignments. Juxtaposing this with the fact that most liberal arts Ph.D. candidates are enrolled in graduate school from 4 to 10 years, there is a fundamental tension between the constraints of the officer personnel management system and the academic requirements of a typical doctoral program. This requires some creative management to allow officers to complete the academic requirements and at the same time remain competitive for career advancement.

Unlike other Army-sponsored doctoral programs, this civilian education is designed to be applied practically in an operational environment. The critical step is completing the Ph.D. coursework within two years. Officers will then apply their coursework as strategic planners or commanders in a subsequent “developmental tour” to gain experience. For candidates in the program, this tour involves assignments at a combatant command or other strategic headquarters, but does not preclude battalion and brigade command for those selected. With this paradigm, it is possible for officers in ASP3 to complete the Ph.D. coursework, but remain competitive among their peers. Once the development tour is complete, students will take an additional year to focus on completing their dissertations and earning their Ph.D. Managed correctly, the assignment as a strategic planner should provide opportunities to advance the thinking, research, and logic to develop the dissertation argument. Once awarded the Ph.D., the officer will be well-suited to address grand strategic problems in further utilization tours as a senior leader for our Army and nation. The ASP3, although designed for Army officers, will in effect serve the greater joint force. Most strategic planning positions for ASP3 officers will be in joint headquarters (e.g., combatant commands, joint staff, and Department of Defense) rather than in Headquarters, Department of the Army.

The Role of a Coordinating Agency

To ensure the education does not fail in achieving its goals to produce strategic planners for the military, charging a coordinating agency in managing the educational process and assisting in the career management of the officer is essential. This agency has a critical role in selecting the right officer, providing the necessary education, and helping to manage the career assignments. It will guide the selection of doctoral programs and assist officers during the application process. It will also be responsible for developing and delivering the professional instruction that will augment the civilian education. This instruction will not only focus on the practical aspects of strategic planning, but also allow officers to network with others in the program and to share useful ideas gained from the different academic fields and schools.

After the initial assignment, the same coordinating agency will assist officers with the research and drafting of the doctoral dissertation. Where the writing physically occurs is not as important as providing the resources, time, and mentorship needed to complete the requirement. Throughout the writing process, the coordinating agency can bring officers together on an occasional basis to provide feedback from peers and
instructors who have a Ph.D. The combination of a writing-syndicate atmosphere and critical feedback will have a catalytic effect, something that most civilian doctoral programs do not provide.

Finally, with a low number of students per year, the agency will assist in managing the officer’s career through interfacing with Human Resources Command, senior leaders, and assignment officers. This effort will continue to develop the skills needed for strategic planners while still allowing the officer to remain competitive in the operational Army. For example, the student who desires to write about homeland security for his dissertation is ideally suited for a developmental assignment at U.S. Northern Command. Because the coordinating agency has visibility on these nuanced requirements, it can inform the assignment officer, ensuring that the Army and the joint community gain the most from the officer’s education.

The coordinating agency must embed with the Army’s traditional professional military educational institutions. Currently, this coordinating agency exists within SAMS. With the current small number of students, SAMS is well suited to manage the tasks above. As the program grows and matures it may prove prudent to relook this relationship. Other options could include creating a new school of its own or relocating the coordinating responsibility to another institution. However, as the coordination of the program evolves in the future, the requirement for managing and mentoring the students will continue to be important for their success—from the time they begin their education to the time they finish their career.

Why a Ph.D.?

Developing adept strategic planners is not simply the result of advanced degrees or professional education but includes a holistic career path that combines experience with education. For operational planners, the education requirement is usually satisfied through the Command and General Staff College, SAMS, and a developmental tour as a division or corps planner. However, a much broader education, including interaction with those outside the military, is required for successful strategic planning. A strategic planner must understand the different aspects and perspectives on defense and foreign affairs and their historical development beyond what a master’s program can generally deliver. For example, for strategic planners at a NATO headquarters to be successful, not only must they understand military capabilities and capacities but also they must possess a broad knowledge of economics, governmental structures, historical context of traditional European political and territorial issues, and other pertinent strategic factors. Simply stated, a NATO planner who does not account for the current economic and political pressures within Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and the eurozone will be unable to develop feasible strategic options for his or her commander. Sufficient education in these areas is not possible within the current content and structure of master’s programs in professional military education. It requires engaging civilian academic institutions with the requisite knowledge and expertise and building time in an officer’s career to attend schools to gain these broader skills. However, does that education require a Ph.D.?

Developing adept strategic planners is not simply the result of advanced degrees or professional education but includes a holistic career path that combines experience with education.

The fundamental reason for pursuing a doctorate of philosophy is to gain the skills, experience, and education required to “create new knowledge.” In academia, delivering this knowledge in the form of a published article, book, or doctoral dissertation is the norm. Although the coursework in a doctoral program seeks to establish a broad base of knowledge in an academic discipline like international relations, the dissertation focuses very narrowly on a specific topic on which the Ph.D. candidate becomes a recognized expert. Upon earning the degree, Ph.D.s enter academia and continue research on their specific area of expertise, passing on their knowledge to the next generation of scholars and encouraging further research. At its most basic level, a traditional Ph.D.
program is focused on producing a future professor or researcher—not someone who is going to apply the education practically.

However, despite a university’s focus on academia, there is a practical role for officers with a Ph.D. When the military found itself struggling for answers in Iraq and Afghanistan, it reached out to a number of recognized experts for assistance, most of whom had a Ph.D. Likewise, many of those who have held civilian leadership positions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense have earned doctorates. In both cases, having a doctorate has been helpful because strategic planning and policy work demands creating new knowledge. The attributes and skills required to conduct high-level research and identify new and unfamiliar phenomena are prerequisites for solving complex and unfamiliar problems at the strategic level. Doctoral coursework provides exposure to a broad array of viewpoints and methods. The extensive experience in research and writing creates a natural skepticism for faulty logic and weak arguments. A person with a Ph.D. understands how to do thorough research, develop a coherent narrative, and create a new lexicon and language that resonates with others to begin the process of solving a problem. At the strategic level, all problems are unique, despite aspects that may be familiar (e.g., the insurgencies in Iraq and Vietnam). Planners must describe new phenomena and identify new approaches accurately and clearly so that other agencies, multinational and intergovernmental partners, and subordinate staffs can address those problems. To be effective, a military strategic planner must be able to inform strategic debate through coherent analysis and dialogue with influential thinkers within and outside government.

Conclusion

In 2005, the Department of the Army conducted an in-depth study of leader development in response to a requirement levied by the Secretary of the Army Transition Team. The review, appropriately titled “The Review of Education, Training, and Assignments for Leaders Task Force,” examined various aspects of officer professional development. One of the key findings identified the need to “send officers most likely to be successful in the
operations career field to advanced civil schooling with a utilization tour that does not take the officer off the command track.” The narrative went on to further say, “the goal of this initiative is not to reap a utilization of the officer’s knowledge; but to exercise the officer’s mind. Therefore, any rigorous program that develops mental agility is acceptable. [Human Resources Command] could assist the officer to get into the best school possible while acknowledging that there is nothing wrong with the officer enjoying the pace and location of graduate schooling.”

The Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program makes great strides at operationalizing this critical finding.

The Army has seized the opportunity to address the need for a combination of strategic planning and policy assignments enabled by extensive civilian education and professional instruction—the combination of experience and education currently lacking in the development of strategic planners and leaders. Working within existing constraints of the Army personnel management system, ASP3 provides selected officers with a skill set that is critically important to the nation and the military. In the end, the success of ASP3 will require senior leaders, mentors, and others in the career management and leader development community to recognize the intrinsic value of a comprehensive program that combines civilian and professional education with strategic experience. This combination will provide a solid foundation for future strategic planning and strategic leadership. MR

NOTES

3. Thomas C. Graves and Dr. Bruce Stanley “Design and Operational Art: A Practical Approach to Teaching the Army Design Methodology,” Military Review (July-August 2013). This article gives a much more detailed discussion of the history of the SAMS curriculum with regard to the integration of Design and design-type thinking.
4. Paul Yingling, “A Failure in Generalship,” Armed Forces Journal (May 2007), as referenced at <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198>, 8 February 2013. At the time of publishing, Yingling was serving as a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army and assigned as the deputy commander of 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. His article attracted much attention and debate throughout the Army and military.
6. Ibid.
7. Combined Arms Center briefing to chief of staff of the Army, 27 January 2012. This wording drawn directly from the problem statement of the presentation, as approved by Gen. Raymond Odierno.
8. Examples of doctoral programs sponsored by the Army are the Professor, U.S. Army War College Program, and the Professor, U.S. Military Academy (USMA) Program. The focus of both is to create academic instructors.
9. A variety of different Ph.D.s have used the phrase “create new knowledge” in different conversations with the author as an argument against the pursuit of a Ph.D. for strategic planners. The phrase was used by Ph.D. professors at the School of Advanced Military Studies, USMA, Harvard, and at other institutions in interviews with academics. Because it was so widely used by different audiences, it is referenced in this article.
Delivering the Command and General Staff Officer Course at the Operational Edge

Lt. Col. John A. Schatzel, U.S. Army, Retired
Lt. Col. Wendell Stevens, U.S. Army, Retired

In 2011, THE U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command released its vision for professional military education in The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015. This publication challenges the Army to deliver knowledge to leaders at the “operational edge” to develop adaptive soldiers with cognitive, interpersonal, and cultural skills and sound judgment in complex environments, and to develop an adaptive knowledge delivery system that is responsive, allows rapid updates in curriculum, and is not bound by brick and mortar.¹

Since 1881, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth has developed adaptable leaders using multiple resident and nonresident methods. In 1923, the staff college added correspondence courses to educate the officer corps dispersed abroad. In his remarks to the 1937 graduating Command and General Staff College class, Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring remarked:

Leavenworth may be said to be the metronome of the service. It establishes the training tempo of the Army. Its students are by no means confined to those within the limits of this old post. Through correspondence courses and through its splendid publications, Leavenworth has attracted as students hundreds of officers who have never seen this post. Each year scores of new alumni from Leavenworth carry modern military doctrine to Army posts throughout the country and in our island possessions.²

Seventy-five years later, the Command and General Staff College, through the Command and General Staff School, continues to promulgate modern military doctrine and educate thousands of field grade officers annually both in residence and around the globe. The staff school accomplishes this through an integrated approach of resident and nonresident venues, state of the art technology, distributed learning, and one standard curriculum for the Command and General Staff Officer Course. This approach also fulfills requirements for Army Directive 2012-21 (Optimization of Intermediate-Level Education) to—

- Provide a tailored, high-quality education opportunity for all officers.
- Intermediate Level Education.
- Reinforce education earlier in an officer’s development timeline.³
DISTANCE EDUCATION

Distributed learning is the delivery of training “to soldiers and [Department of Army] civilians, units, and organizations at the right place and time through the use of multiple means and technology; may involve student-instructor interaction in real time (synchronous) and non-real time (asynchronous).”

The Command and General Staff Officer School consists of a common core course and functional area qualification course. For operations-career field officers, the qualification course is the Advanced Operations Course (AOC). Successful completion of the common course and the respective qualification course is required for award of the Joint Professional Military Education Phase I credit and Military Education Level Four.

The common core prepares all field grade officers with a warfighting focus for leadership positions in Army, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations executing unified land operations. The AOC provides operations career-field officers with a warfighting focus for battalion and brigade command and prepares them to conduct unified land operations in joint, interagency, and multi-national environments. The course also provides officers with the requisite competencies to serve successfully as division through echelon-above-corps level staff officers.

From an educational standpoint, the common core builds an officer’s foundational knowledge and comprehension of Army and joint doctrine, while AOC uses more of a collaborative learning environment to analyze military problems and apply military processes. Using a sports analogy, the common core is the individual training a player does in the offseason to prepare for the collective team scrimmages of AOC in the preseason. Together, they prepare officers for the complex problems the Army faces in seasons of peace and war.

Beyond the “Brick and Mortar” of Fort Leavenworth

The Army has never been able to bring all officers from all components to the resident course at Fort Leavenworth, regardless of the impacts of selection boards and military conflicts. To create more resident experiences for the common core, the Command and General Staff School established pilot programs at Fort Gordon, Ga., and Fort Lee, Va., in 2003, and another at Fort Belvoir, Va., in 2004. In 2009, the Army added a fourth common core campus at Redstone Arsenal, Ala. Since the program’s inception, over 6,900 officers have attended an in-class, collaborative common core course. Moreover, since 2004, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation at Fort Benning, Ga., also taught the Command and General Staff Officer Course to U.S. and international field grade officers from 15 different countries.

For decades, The Army School System provided variations of the resident staff officer course to tens of thousands of National Guard and Reserve officers across the country at its 100-plus locations across the continental United States and in Hawaii, Germany, and Puerto Rico. Today, The Army School System continues to teach the common core in three phases to thousands of officers each year using a combination of online lessons, weekend classes, and annual training.

The classic form of nonresident correspondence courses that many call the “box of books” began in 1923 when the college established the Correspondence School for the National Guard and Army Reserve officers. In 1948, correspondence courses were officially renamed Army Extension Courses, and the Command and General Staff College established the Extension Course Department. Over the decades, the department name for nonresident studies changed several more times. In 1997, the Department of Defense and White House established the Advanced Distributed Learning program, an initiative to promote the use of technology-based learning. Shortly thereafter, the Command and General Staff College began to digitize its curriculum under the School of Advanced Distributed Learning. In 2007, the college completely reorganized, integrating the School of Advanced Distributed Learning and renaming it the Department of Distance Education.

Now the department has three divisions of 80 instructors and advisors who facilitate instruction to over 4,500 Army officers from all three components worldwide. The current faculty is a mix of active duty and retired officers serving as Department of the Army civilians. The Department of Distance Education continues to add faculty to meet the growing student population generated by the 2012 Army Directive for Optimization of Intermediate-Level Education.
Regardless of venue—resident, satellite or distributed learning—all officers receive the same curriculum. Contractors convert the resident materials into computer-based instruction modules for access in the Blackboard learning management system. Such global access is extremely important to officers who already have a full-time military and/or civilian job and must complete the common core and AOC at night, on the weekends, or during deployments. The distributed learning venue also makes the Army’s common core portion of the Command and General Staff Officer Course available to all interested sister service officers and makes AOC available for the Army’s majors working in interagency fellowships.

Learning at the Operational Edge

The Department of Distance Education’s common core course—like the resident common core—has nine blocks of instruction broken into three phases. Students have a maximum of 18 months to complete the course at their pace, though many complete it in less than a year. Having all the course materials accessible online allows flexibility for students deploying in and out of theater, moving to new assignments, and receiving long-term medical treatment. In addition to reviewing approximately 100 lessons with 60-plus quizzes, students submit 21 written individual assignments with which faculty members evaluate students and provide helpful feedback. The asynchronous, self-paced approach in the common core conforms to the Command and General Staff School’s philosophy toward developing agile and adaptive leaders who “must be self-motivated for active participation in our diverse, broad, and ever-changing professional body of knowledge.”

Some officers are concerned that current distributed learning courses are merely digitized versions of the old “box of books” program where students muddled through completely on their own. In a recent article published in Military Review, the authors stated that—

The broader [Intermediate-Level Education] program does have a requirement for posting public engagements through means such as blogging or commenting on public forums, but the emphasis is on one-way communication rather than conversation.13

Fortunately, both assertions are no longer true. Over the past six years, the Department of Distance Education made great strides in its common core and AOC programs to make them more social.

In 2011, the Research and Development Corporation (RAND) conducted an independent study of the Department of Distance Education’s Common Core. The study noted that while students achieve all of the course’s learning objectives using the online curriculum in Blackboard, they greatly desired interaction with faculty and peers, as well as more timely feedback.14 Based on these findings, the Command and General Staff School—

- Hired 20 common core course facilitators to provide more interactive assistance and expedited feedback.
- Assigned a facilitator to every student to answer their course questions by email, phone calls, and through Defense Connect Online.
- Offered virtual classrooms using Defense Connect Online technology to provide instructor-to-student and student-to-student assistance in the nine common core blocks of instruction.
- Partnered common core facilitators with resident Command and General Staff Officers Course teaching teams to keep the Department of Distance Education faculty in tune with resident delivery of the curriculum.

The Department of Distance Education also encourages officers to engage their peers and supervisors in professional forums like the “S-3 XO Net” found at https://www.milsuite.mil. At the field grade officer level, making your professional military education a social educational experience is a two-way street.

Upon completing the common core in any venue other than at Fort Leavenworth or the Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation History, officers coordinate with their branch managers to reserve their virtual “seat” in an upcoming AOC distributed learning class. As of 2013, there are four AOC starts per year based on the graduation dates of the four common core satellite locations.

The Department of Distance Education’s AOC program is a 12-month program conducted using both synchronous and asynchronous techniques to achieve an “adaptive learning” environment that transforms “the learner from a passive [recipient] of information to a collaborator in the educational process.” Officers are formed into staff groups of 16 students coming from widely diverse branches, components, and duty stations. It is not unusual to be on a team of officers dispersed from Afghanistan, Kuwait, Germany, Kosovo, the continental United States, Hawaii, and Korea. An AOC facilitator guides two separate staff groups through a yearlong schedule of weekly lessons that currently cover seven blocks of instruction—one leadership block, two military history blocks, and four operations blocks covering Coalition Forces Land Component Command to brigade-level planning.

In AOC, the vast majority of learning takes place through peer-to-peer interaction instead of facilitator-to-student as officers collectively apply Joint and Army planning processes to analyze and solve complicated problems. As they work, students share their branch expertise, operational experiences, and personal perspectives of the course materials. By the end of Advanced Operations Course, the average staff group will spend approximately 65 hours together online using Defense Connect Online.

In 2012, the RAND Corporation examined the Department of Distance Education’s AOC program using exit and post graduation surveys. Their study found that AOC—

uses a more ambitious approach than most standard distance or blended learning programs in the Army or elsewhere in that it requires substantial instructor-student and student-student interaction and is completely distributed and often synchronous in nature.

This approach has its strengths and weaknesses. As to strengths, the majority of students reported that AOC met its core purpose, student-instructor and student-student interactions were important, and instructors and computer-based instruction lessons were effective. The Command and General Staff School’s continuous improvement process for AOC allows for constant revision and updates. Additionally, the experience gained from AOC’s virtual planning sessions...
helps students become agile with collaborative tools in the current and future operational environments.\textsuperscript{17}

As to weaknesses, students reported feeling unprepared for interagency and multinational settings, they did not find similar growth compared to resident students in developing critical field grade skills, and they had more issues with effective collaboration in planning and executing the Military Decision Making Process.\textsuperscript{18} The Research and Development Corporation also found that while both virtual teams and collocated teams can achieve the same learning objectives, “virtual groups experience more hurdles to collaboration on complex tasks.”\textsuperscript{19} One of RAND’s concluding recommendations is to reduce some of the social aspects of the course that make it so challenging for the student. For example, RAND recommends that AOC have fewer synchronous exercises, but make them greater in-depth, while shifting some collaborative activities to higher-level computer based instructions.\textsuperscript{20}

There is one social aspect of AOC by distributed learning that should never be removed—the bonding, through shared experiences, of a staff group made up of diverse branches and geographically dispersed officers. Students often discover they work with or live near each other, and in many cases seek out local classmates to collaborate on assignments. Some teams connect using social networking sites such as Facebook, and at least one group continues to share a weekly newsletter. Many AOC facilitators also transition to career-long mentors of former students as they progress in their careers.

**Conclusion**

Many years before Army Learning Concept 2015 was published, the Command and General Staff College and School began pushing its renowned resident program to over 100 resident sites with the help of other Army installations and The Army School System, as well as through an ever-evolving correspondence program. Today, Command and General Staff School maintains the Command and General Staff Officer Course curriculum for all venues across the Army, making it globally accessible through the Blackboard learning management system. The school established and professionally staffed the Department of Distance Education to manage the distance-learning instruction of the core course and AOC through a virtual classroom of excellence. The Department of Distance Education continues to improve its instructional approaches and exploit the latest technologies, such as smart phones and tablets and the dot-com domain, to make professional military education as accessible and up-to-date as possible for all mid-grade officers.

No school or program can rest on its accomplishments, especially when professional military education is critical to developing leaders who run the Army and lead our soldiers in unified land operations. The Command and General Staff College and School will continue to learn, adapt, and improve to educate officers serving at the operational edge. 

*Ad bellum pace parati* (prepared in peace for war).\textsuperscript{21}

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**NOTES**

4. TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, 62.
15. TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, 61.
17. Ibid., 71.
18. Ibid., 72.
19. Ibid., 70.
20. Ibid., 75.
Taking Ownership of Mission Command

Maj. Demetrios A. Ghikas, U.S. Army

The Army understands the mutually supporting domains of leader development—institutional, operational, and self-development domains create confident and competent leaders. As we transition from our recent conflicts, the Army seeks to develop leaders to apply mission command by improving the combined effects of training, education, and experience. Ultimately, the experience gained in each training domain reinforces the lessons learned in the others, in a continuous and progressive process. Therefore, it is important that our thinking, actions, activities, and processes enable the practice of the mission command philosophy. By practicing mission command today at every level of the Army, we mitigate the risks in its implementation and synthesize the knowledge we need to meet tomorrow’s challenges.

What is Mission Command?

Mission command is the Army’s answer to the uncertainty, ambiguity, and fog of war and conflict. It is both the Army’s philosophy of command and a warfighting function. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 currently defines mission command as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.¹

As a warfighting function, mission command consists of people, organizations, tasks, processes, and systems. Wholly necessary, these components are no different from any other warfighting function. Apart from the unique fact this warfighting function integrates and synchronizes the others, what, then, is important about mission command?²

Consider the doctrinal definition of mission command provided above. Strip away the numerous adjectives from the definition momentarily, and what this really says is commanders must give their subordinates mission orders; clear, concise orders that convey mission and intent. Those soldiers in turn use their initiative to execute the mission in the manner that best meets
their commander’s intent. It may sound simple, but its practice in combat under conditions of increasing uncertainty and ever-growing complexity will demand the utmost in initiative, agility, and adaptation from those who must execute.

Complexity demands clear thinking, and to that end, doctrine provides our leaders with guidance, in the form of principles, which support the mission command philosophy (see Figure 1). They can be found both in doctrine and reprinted in various journals and forums over the past year. Notably, each of these principles begins with a clear verb, and thus compels to action our leaders, our people, our organizations, and our systems.

In our profession, each action has a purpose, and the purpose of these principles ultimately is to apply mission command toward the execution of our mission. We can agree then that mission command is a warfighting function whose systems and processes enable and serve the exercise of its philosophy and its principles, vice a collection of costly systems and organizations that serve only themselves.

We have thus far only discussed a guiding philosophy—a system of values and an underlying theory. Before addressing its implementation and its practice, it is helpful to reflect on the changes the Army has experienced in the last decade, the evolving environment that calls for adaptation, and the process by which our people—our most valuable resource—will adapt in the face of this changing world.

The Changing Environment

The past 12 years of conflict, largely focused on counterinsurgency and large-scale stability operations, have encouraged us to place a high premium on leaders who are adaptable and resilient, tactically proficient, culturally competent, and able to deal with a broad set of military, political, social, and other operational factors that present challenges to mission accomplishment. This is due, in large part,
EMBRACING MISSION COMMAND

to the broad set of tasks that leaders at all levels have had to conduct. From clear-hold-build counterinsurgency, to more nuanced undertakings such as leader engagements, tribal shuras, agricultural and infrastructure development, security force assistance, counterdrug efforts and more, our junior leaders are not only expected, but have also grown accustomed to, dealing with complex problems.

As the last decade and its lessons move further from the present, we simultaneously face the dilemma posed by an uncertain strategic environment. The U.S. exit from Vietnam in the mid-1970s meant primarily a return to training for large-scale “conventional” conflict in Central Europe. The environment today calls for the Army to possess a wider array of competencies. This environment is characterized by economic and political instability, a convergence of people and technologies that increases the speed of change around the world, and the proliferation of destructive technologies, available at lower cost to a wider variety of actors.

The most profound challenges to U.S. interests will manifest from rising powers attempting to change the state of international security affairs. Compounding these challenges is further disorder that results from loss of governance or territory, loss of control over populations and resources, and chaotic events such as natural catastrophes and pandemics. In this changing environment, we find that we must be prepared for more, not fewer, contingencies in order to protect our vital interests. Deterring and defeating malign actors represents only one mission among many—asymmetric and hybrid threats, anti-access and area-denial challenges, cyberspace, and weapons of mass destruction will feature heavily in the array of forces with which we must contend.

Martin Dempsey reiterates the guidance given earlier in the capstone concept for joint operations, that, “Mission command must be institutionalized and operationalized into all aspects of the joint force—our doctrine, our education, our training, and our manpower and personnel processes.” The resulting Army guidance in this regard follows suit. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, further reiterates in his address to the Class of 2013 at the U.S. Military Academy, “In our new doctrine, the Army is embracing mission command . . . it is critical that you understand and lead using the philosophy of mission command. We will empower soldiers, squads, and commanders at every level so they may rapidly respond to the demands of the incredibly complex environment in which they are asked to operate.” The call for mission command is loud and clear.

Risks in Implementation

As the Army now goes about the business of implementing mission command as a philosophy and a warfighting function, it acknowledges in the recently published Army Mission Command Strategy that implementation is not complete. This attributes to a lack of understanding of the doctrine, and consequently a lack of synchronization between the operational and institutional force. By this strategy then, unity of effort across the force is key to implementing the warfighting function, and the first condition we must set is that all leaders across the Army understand and practice the philosophy. Indeed senior leaders, commanders, doctrine writers, and instructors are right now working toward this result. Anecdotally, a sampling of opinions of recent graduates of the Army’s Command and General Staff Officer’s Course (CGSOC) confirms the institution is earnestly trying to instill the philosophy of mission command in our current crop of mid-grade officers. Undoubtedly, it is with the expectation that over time, the Army’s culture will change as its future battalion and brigade commanders practice the new command philosophy. However, unless deliberate steps are taken to apply the philosophy into every aspect of everyday business, even the strategy states there will be risk in implementation, and leaders who want to see the mission command philosophy become reality should guard against wishful thinking.
Chief among the risks in trying to implement mission command is that Army leaders at various levels simply do not implement it. Those who brush off such risks may not fully appreciate the effect that incomplete or incorrect implementation may have. Simply, that a failure to practice the principles of mission command is a willful decision to revert to those practices, which are anathema to it, namely: micromanagement, risk-avoidance, and the zero-defects mentality. If we wish to have agile and adaptive leaders who can execute complex tasks in uncertain environments, these behaviors will guarantee we get just the opposite. Should we be concerned about this risk?

Recent critics in the public sphere have voiced their concern that the mission command system (the technological and organizational aspects of the warfighting function) will ultimately undercut the philosophy by empowering commanders with an unprecedented capacity for micromanagement. Given the choice between the art of command and the science of control, the argument goes; the leaders we have traditionally tended to develop will gravitate toward retaining greater control. For example, Gregory Fontenot and Kevin Benson assert in *The Conundrum of Mission Command* that a command philosophy that treats command as an art is unrealistic. “Really—command is an art? If . . . the analogy of command to art is valid, then we need to examine our human resources and education systems, for they produce far more scientists than artists.”10 Donald Vandergriff similarly points out that the Army’s personnel system may not be best suited to the mission command philosophy.11

Such assertions might raise a few eyebrows, if for no other reason than they suggest the Army is incapable of change. Are there skeptics in uniform, echoing the criticism found in print and circulating throughout the media, who doubt the Army can fully inculcate the mission command philosophy within our culture?12 Anyone deeply familiar with Army culture may conclude that there are such skeptics; probably many do doubt the days of micromanagement and risk-aversion are behind us. However, the Mission Command Strategy acknowledges this point; this is the Army’s strategy, and therefore it is incumbent upon leaders at every level to clarify the intent of mission command, to ensure understanding, and to see that subordinates have the opportunity to exercise disciplined initiative.

The Army Mission Command Strategy recognizes that a cultural change must occur, and that there are risks involved, and should now give some reassurance to the naysayers and skeptics. The message from the leadership is that we will go further than to simply say, “It’s in the doctrine, talk to your subordinates about it, and everyone will get on board,” because this is simplistic—it does not fully account for human nature and how people learn and develop. Experience is the vital catalyst for learning and development that one cannot replicate or substitute.

**Linking Two Strategies**

According to doctrine, leader development takes place within three training domains: the operational, the institutional, and the self-development domains.13 The recently published Army Leader Development Strategy does not diverge from this model (see Figure 2). Moreover, the strategy adds clarity to the model by describing what the author believes to be the very linchpin that connects these mutually supporting domains. “Leader development is achieved through the career-long synthesis of the training, education, and experiences acquired through opportunities in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains, supported by peer and developmental relationships [emphasis added].”14 Examine closely the usage here of the word synthesis. The term has many definitions, but in common English usage it generally means to combine objects or ideas into a complex whole.15

...good leader development is...a learner-centric, goal-oriented process.

However, good leader development is not an additive, or merely the combined sum of training, education, and experience. Rather, it is a learner-centric, goal-oriented process. Here again, doctrine agrees and reiterates that leader development is both progressive and continuous, and that self-development complements institutional and operational learning.16
Within the institutional domain, CGSOC may provide a good example of this idea in practice, since one of its major educational principles is the use of the Socratic and Adult Learning Methods. These educational methods are largely experiential, in that students are intended to develop or create knowledge based on concrete experience, reflection, critical analysis, and synthesis. (Synthesis, in an educational context, is a learning goal within the cognitive domain.) Varying types of experiential learning models have been described over the years, the Kolb method being quite influential both in and outside of the military. Within the CGSOC, the steps of this continuous process are—concrete experience, publish and process, generalize new information, develop ideas, apply ideas, and provide feedback (see Figure 3). Whatever the steps and how they are depicted, the fundamental characteristic of adult learning is that learning is treated as a holistic, continuous, process of adaptation to the world, grounded in experience. The CGSOC’s methodology corresponds to this theory, by transforming experience into created knowledge.

*Synthesis*, then, in a leader development sense, is a goal and product of experiential learning; the student transforms experience into knowledge. Similarly, the leaders we wish to develop must gain concrete experience, and in a goal-oriented fashion, reflect on it, analyze it, and synthesize the knowledge the Army needs to meet tomorrow’s challenges. This process should not be limited to a classroom setting. Rather, the continuous cycle of experience, reflection, conceptualization, and experimentation must take place within the three development domains. In every case we find one obvious, common thread through each domain—the student, the learner, or the developing leader.

One way to think of this is to envision experiential learning taking place in each domain (see Figure 4).
Beginning with the operational domain, training is conducted in various individual and collective events. Once a training event concludes, leaders at every level have the opportunity to conduct reflective observation (usually an after action review). By reflecting on the concrete experience of training, tactics, techniques, and procedures are refined; ideas are then developed and applied in future training. When soldiers depart their organization to attend training in the institutional domain, the cycle continues. In the classroom setting, these leaders begin with concrete experience and reflection and use their operational experience to conceptualize new ideas, which they will further develop and apply. This process is perpetual in the self-development domain as well. Since the student continually transitions or progresses through each domain, the knowledge synthesized by this process (the combined effects of these domains) naturally resides.

The very minds of developing leaders is the first obvious place where the effects of training, education, and leader development naturally intersect; therefore it is critical that mission command be reinforced in every domain if we wish to fully implement it. Learning, after all, does not begin or end within the schoolhouse. Consequently, teaching adults like adults cannot be limited to certain aspects of the institution. To clarify: by weighing each individual’s experiences in the institutional setting, and subsequent application of new knowledge in the operational domain, the idea that the Army trusts subordinates to take initiative and make prudent risk judgments will either be affirmed or refuted in the minds of those subordinates. This is why the Army Mission Command Strategy aligns its lines of effort through the three leader development domains, and why, perhaps more relevantly, it concludes that, “People, rather than technology, systems or processes, are the center of [mission command].”

What this may mean in practice for now is that the system needs time to work. Leaders are not developed overnight, and certainly not if the Army as a whole is trying a new idea. If we teach mission command in the schoolhouse then we must practice in training, and perhaps more importantly, our leaders’ experiences outside of controlled settings must positively reinforce the wisdom and benefit of the philosophy. It is important then for the Army to seize the opportunity now to reinforce mission command in our thinking, actions, activities, and processes.

By applying mission command in the operational domain, and by observing or reflecting on the experiences and lessons learned, Army leaders begin the process of thinking critically about concepts and how to apply them when confronted with change. As the Army continues to implement the Mission Command Strategy, leaders at every level should also continue to embrace a culture of...
EMBRACING MISSION COMMAND

They work in practice. If a subordinate is trusted to make prudent risk judgments, do we not stand by our original decision to trust that person if those judgments prove wrong? Will subordinates in turn trust their leaders enough that they will assume risk and take initiative when the opportunity arises? On the other hand, will experience teach them that it is better to play it safe, take a center-of-mass evaluation, and move on?

The Army sees itself as a learning institution, and as such, we should never stop asking questions. As we search for those answers, each of us would do well to ponder how mission command would affect the manner in which we think, act, and lead. We can look within our organizations and decide how best to promote and reward adaptive, bold, and imaginative leaders.\textsuperscript{23} Maybe this is the appropriate juncture in which the Army could examine our human resources system, and find ways to look at careers holistically. Gen. Robert Cone, commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, recently stated, “Such leaders cannot be mass produced. Our personnel systems are going to have to resist the temptation to treat people as a commodity and evolve to look at each as an individual.”\textsuperscript{24}

Of course, we will have further questions to ask if we wish to contemplate such a change. Have we really considered the question of who is number one among our subordinates? Did the leader make mistakes and not assume risk? Alternatively, did the leader take risks and make mistakes, but learn from them, correct them, and ultimately succeed? Should we expect to find a great number of subordinates who assume much risk and somehow never make mistakes?

Perhaps there are opportunities to inculcate further mission command that we have not considered. An important first step may be to address the concern that the philosophy is taking a back

Figure 4
Hypothetical model of experiential learning across all leader development domains.

Continuous learning, and in turn provide feedback in the institutional domain at every opportunity. This best informs how to approach changes to doctrine, training, education, and leader development.

Opportunities for the Next Turn

We have established mission command as a philosophy of command codified in doctrine. Leaders in every situation and every setting must practice it. If we only partially employ it in certain contexts, then surely it will never permeate our leadership culture, and accordingly it will die a quick death as another bygone catchphrase. It is a philosophy that values those who take risks, but who do so deliberately and prudently. While leadership doctrine as currently written recognizes it is only prudent to make checks and corrections, good organizations are founded on trust in experienced and empowered subordinates.\textsuperscript{22} Presently as always, leaders will judge theories by how well
seat to mission command systems, technologies, and processes. Addressing this concern now will go further to instil the philosophy and the practice within leaders at all levels, while minimizing the risks in implementation. Given the present abundance of complex mission command systems, and the future growth of mission command enablers such as cyber, we could alleviate unnecessary complexity by minimizing the degree of control to that which is essential. This is especially true when we continue to field systems that require us to stop everything while performing a mission. This is a good thing. After all, mission command as a philosophy recognizes that war and conflict are chaotic; the more complexity one adds to a mission, the more likely it is to fail.

As we consider how best to answer these questions and wrestle with making mission command a reality, let us close by reflecting on these words from Gen. Cone. “When faced with unforeseen situations, we count on smart and adaptable leaders to ensure the ‘Army we have’ can be rapidly transformed into the ‘Army we need.’” The mission command philosophy encourages us to empower leaders to be adaptive and agile to the fullest extent possible in the conduct of Unified Land Operations. It is the Army’s philosophy of command, and the onus is on each of us to practice it. Ensuring this happens is the responsibility of everyone, operating in and through every leader development domain. While falling short of this goal will teach future leaders only that there is a difference between what is taught and what is practiced, each leader today making mission command a personal responsibility will affirm and reinforce our philosophy by and through everything we do every day. MR

NOTES

6. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept (Fort Eustis, VA: HQ, TRADOC, 19 December 2012), 11.
16. ADRP 7-0, 3-4.
23. TRADOC Pub 525-3-3 (Draft), U.S. Army Functional Concept for Mission Command, unpublished draft.
25. Ibid.
A Philosophy’s German Birth and American Adoption

LIKE MANY GREAT military innovations, mission command was conceived in the womb of war following defeat’s painful insights. In 1806, Napoleon decisively beat the Prussian army at the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt. Although the French attack was poorly coordinated, the rigid Prussian army fought even worse, failing to capitalize on opportunities. In the weeks that followed, Napoleon’s Grande Armée pursued their demoralized enemy, destroyed Prussian units piecemeal, and occupied Berlin.

This event’s psychic shock propelled the Prussian army’s transformation. Gerhard von Scharnhorst, the chief of the Prussian General Staff, spearheaded reform. Scharnhorst believed that the best way to prepare armies for battle was to comprehensively educate junior leaders and then empower them to make independent decisions. The General Staff and Military Academy he founded would influence generations of German officers to think as he did about command.

The great military theorist Carl von Clausewitz was Scharnhorst’s protégé. Clausewitz’s concept of “friction” gave sustenance to the embryonic philosophy that would later be called “auftragstaktik” (mission command). Clausewitz wrote that because of war’s reciprocal nature and underlying moral forces, “war is the realm of uncertainty.” Unforeseen difficulties accumulate...
at every level, creating a “kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.”

Success, he concluded, goes to commanders who outmatch the enemy’s ability to exploit friction.

Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who considered himself a disciple of Clausewitz, is known as “The Father of Auftragstaktik.” During Moltke’s 30-year tenure as chief of staff, auftragstaktik was “established as coherent theory . . . and enforced as official doctrine.” Moltke cemented the support that military culture, education, and training gave to what had become decentralized command. Schools gave extensive tactical educations even to junior officers and noncommissioned officers.

Leaders typically valued aggressive initiative over strict obedience from their subordinates, and, until the 1920s, officers faced training scenarios in which they had to disobey orders to meet the commander’s intent.

Decentralized command propelled the Prussians to rapid victory over the French in 1870. In 1918, semiautonomous German “shock troops” achieved the only major tactical breakthrough on the Western Front (a breakthrough they could not exploit due to attrition and logistical shortcomings). Later, as a key components of “blitzkrieg,” auftragstaktik fueled the quick defeat of Allied armies in Europe, Asia, and Africa at the start of World War II.

Elements of this philosophy drifted across the Atlantic. Since at least 1905, U.S. Army doctrine has sporadically endorsed these elements. As long ago as the American Civil War, a few notable commanders (such as Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee) routinely issued mission orders. General George S. Patton Jr. exemplified mission command more than any other American commander, even outperforming his German foes in this regard. “Never tell people how to do things,” wrote Patton. “Tell them what to do, and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.”

Nonetheless, it was not until our Army looked for ways to offset the Soviet army’s huge quantitative edge in Europe that auftragstaktik was given precedence in doctrine. The 1982 U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, was a milestone in this regard, emphasizing mission orders, subordinate initiative, and an “offensive spirit” (an unintended double entendre).

Today, mission command is the foundation of the U.S. Army’s warfighting philosophy. It features prominently in key doctrine and as a subject at service schools. It even has a dedicated manual, Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission Command, which defines mission command as the “exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”

Thanks to our Army’s adopting auftragstaktik, advocates say we can do more with less throughout the spectrum of conflict. Mission command gives small unit commanders the flexibility to rapidly react, maneuver, and win battles involving heavy conventional forces. Since “local commanders have the best grasp of their situations,” empowering junior officers to solve their own problems helps us defeat insurgencies. And, decentralizing information operations ensures we keep pace with dispersed enemies’ rapid delivery of messages to key populations. Doctrine and training, proponents argue, have finally come together to ensure that Army leaders can outmatch their enemies’ ability to exploit friction.

If only it were this easy.
Saying It Is So Does Not Make It So

“So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.” Thus F. Scott Fitzgerald ended The Great Gatsby, hauntingly evoking the idea that human beings can only with difficulty escape key events of their past. The same can be said of institutions, borne back to their past by deep, often hidden cultural biases.

The eminent organizational theorist Edgar Schein defines culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.” Schein defines three levels of organizational culture. The first level consists of visible “artifacts” such as mission statements, heroic narratives, and doctrinal manuals. The second consists of the unwritten rules and values that govern day-to-day behavior. And on the deepest level, the third level, are the organization’s basic assumptions, its preferences for certain solutions based on past experiences.

Schein’s model helps us understand why organizations may say they value one thing when actually they prefer something else. It also explains why our Army may not be fully implementing mission command, despite a strong doctrinal commitment to the approach.

In a recent book, Israeli Defense Forces veteran and scholar Eitan Shamir comprehensively addresses the effects of military culture on the practice of mission command. With regard to the U.S. Army, he argues, forces inhibiting the practice of mission command outweigh the forces supporting it. Tom Guthrie, Jorg Muth, Donald Vandergriff, and many other critics agree.

The proof, some say, lies in our Army’s lackluster battlefield performance in the decades since auftragstaktik’s adoption. To them, even an apparent victory such as the Gulf War is a qualified success. In that war, coalition forces fought to detailed plan in one massive, synchronized enveloping attack. Written orders with annexes typically ran 1,000 pages long, and, as Gen. Colin Powell later wrote, “No one over there was going to tell Schwarzkopf he made a mistake.” When the Iraqi army collapsed earlier than expected, commanders lacked the freedom of action, competency, and initiative to pursue and destroy retreating Iraqi columns. Most of the Republican Guard escaped, ensuring the survival of Saddam’s regime and another war with Iraq a decade later.

Some critics argue that, with a few notable exceptions, our Army has also failed to exercise mission command during more recent conflicts. Wrote British Brigadier Nigel Aylwin Foster after serving with U.S. forces in Iraq for a year:

... whilst the U.S. Army may espouse mission command, in Iraq it did not practice it. Commanders and staff at all levels rarely if ever questioned authority, and were reluctant to deviate from precise instructions. Staunch loyalty upward and conformity to one’s superior were noticeable traits. Each commander had his own style, but if there was a common trend, it was for micromanagement, with many hours devoted to daily briefings and updates.

Our Army’s adoption of mission command is, at best, half-realized. Outlined in this essay are three cultural tendencies to overcome if mission command’s promise is to be fulfilled. Even more critical is putting mission command in proper perspective: it is not a philosophy that necessarily wins wars instead of battles. For this philosophy, we must look elsewhere, within an ancient theoretical tradition that helps us better understand the one enduring constant of warfare—human nature.

To grow leaders who truly practice mission command and can win the peace, our Army requires a fundamental reorientation, one that supports deep changes to Army culture, doctrine, training, personnel management, and education.

The River Our Doctrine Rows Against

The most important cultural quality supporting mission command, experts agree, is a climate of trust based on perceptions that colleagues are professionally competent and possess sound judgment. Other enabling cultural characteristics include excellent communication based on shared understanding of doctrine, high value on learning as expressed and emphasized in training and education, tolerance for well-intended mistakes, a propensity for action and initiatives, and responsibility linked to authority.
Unfortunately, few of these qualities are what they could be in our Army.

**All that glitters is gold.** The British poet Thomas Gray ended a poem about a cat that drowned chasing goldfish in a tub, thus: “Not all that tempts your wandering eyes/And heedless hearts, is lawful prize;/Nor all that glisters gold.” Our military would do well to heed this moral rather than continue the often-headlong pursuit of glittery new technology.

Our love of technology is a cultural preference with deep historical roots. It is, perhaps, the natural one for the military of an economically powerful nation. Technology’s decisive use in long-ago wars of near-annihilation reinforced this preference. For example, Native Americans could not win against the repeating rifle, and in 1945, the atom bomb emphatically ended our nation’s bloody struggle with Japan.

This preference prevails despite superior weapons proving nondecisive on more recent battlefields. In Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, such weapons made missions seem accomplishable, only for us to find that quick victory was a shimmering mirage. Short-term kinetic effects like “body counts” and “shock and awe,” we learned, are not in themselves sufficient to achieve lasting success in modern conflicts. Indeed, they can actually be harmful if they distract us from modern war’s most significant components, its political and moral aspects.

Technology’s primacy is most evident in budgetary decisions. The U.S. Army is currently set to downsize more than the technology-based Air Force and Navy. Of the categories of military spending, only the procurement budget is projected to grow over the next three years. Most of this growing budget is going to high-dollar, “gee-whiz” weapons such as jet fighters, missiles, submarines, and destroyers—weapons that have only marginally influenced battlefield outcomes during the last 50 years.

Our Army is not immune to technology’s sirens’ song. We are, for example, spending billions on...
enhancing internal networks of sensors and information pathways. Such networks provide an obvious lure away from mission command. During the Vietnam War, commanders in helicopters gave orders to junior leaders below them in the midst of battle.36 Today’s senior leaders do not have to leave their command post—or even be in theater—to micromanage operations.

Telling senior leaders they can watch and communicate with their smallest units is one thing. But, also expecting them not to control these units’ actions when they disagree with their subordinates’ decisions is almost certainly unrealistic.

Telling senior leaders they can watch and communicate with their smallest units is one thing. But, also expecting them not to control these units’ actions when they disagree with their subordinates’ decisions is almost certainly unrealistic. Every book is sacred. Shamir says, “An organizational culture dictating that subordinates cannot be trusted will be expressed through strong control procedures.”37 This is precisely the culture that Tom Guthrie describes as belonging to the U.S. Army: “If we intend to truly embrace mission command, then we should do it to the fullest, and that will require commitment to changing a culture from one of control and process to one of decentralization and trust. We cannot afford to preach one thing and do another.”38 Army leaders want to be trusted, Guthrie says, but are slow to trust.39 Instead, they tend to micromanage subordinates and encourage them to “do things by the book.”40 In an actual brigade, he asks, will company commanders really be permitted to not post schedules on company boards six weeks out?41 To not conduct weekly training meetings?42

Guthrie is right: control and process swamp “Big Army” training. The Digital Training Management System allows any leader to remotely view and critique a unit’s training schedule—or show up to see if it is being followed. Units are assigned “mission essential tasks” that are broken into “collective tasks,” which in turn prescribe supporting tasks, conditions, and standards. Field Manuals, ADPs, ATPs, STPs, TCs, and SOPs—all contain rubrics explaining how to solve specific problems.43 Training is complete when a unit performs the required actions in the required order. If a trainee misses a step or finds another solution, retraining is required. By focusing on automatic behavioral responses to given stimuli and on process instead of results, our Army perpetuates a pattern of our past, when major wars were fought largely with conscripts who had little time for formal military education before being thrown into battle.

As a junior officer, it never occurred to me there might be a better way to prepare units for combat. I then served two years with a British Army regiment as an exchange officer. This regiment rotated a squadron [company] every six months through dangerous Helmand Province in Afghanistan. Rather than being told exactly what to do when and how, deploying squadron commanders were given empty training calendars and told, “Get your troops ready for combat!” And that is exactly what they did. They regularly talked to the regimental commander, to each other, and to staff officers about what, when, where, and how to conduct training. This dialogue built trust and esprit de corps among leaders. It also led to effective and, at times, inspired training.

These squadrons received nothing but praise from their coalition leadership in Afghanistan. Enabling their success was a personnel system that selects only mature, staff-college-educated majors for company command: these officers “not only excel when given a degree of freedom, indeed, they demand this freedom from their commanding officers.”44 Education also supported their success: cadets are trained and mentored by “colour sergeants considered the best of their generation and who have passed an extensive period of selection,” and “the instructors at the UK Staff College . . . are taken from the top 10-15% of majors.”45

Do not argue with the commander. In combat, “Big Army” decision briefs too frequently transpire thus: a junior staff officer nervously briefs as the commander asks questions. Briefing complete, quiet discussion ensues between the commander and a few trusted advisors. While the few discuss, most staff members listen (or daydream). Finally, the commander delivers guidance. When he does, it is the rare subordinate who says, “Wait a minute, sir. You’re wrong, and here’s why.” When this does occur, the dissenting officer is almost invariably a leader of great credibility and rank, such as the chief of staff or operations officer.

It is likely that the taboo against openly disagreeing with the commander also dates from the time when a few professionally educated commanders had to lead subordinates who had little military education. In these circumstances, suppressing collaboration ensured that a commander’s time was not wasted answering foolish questions. However, a noncollaborative environment is incompatible
with mission command. No leader—no matter how brilliant, experienced, and well-educated—is an island. In the absence of detailed orders, he must be willing to listen and accept advice from others. A commander’s encouragement and acceptance of criticism is necessary for establishing a climate conducive to mission command. Also, his spending time developing his subordinates is key so that they understand how he thinks and can correctly execute his intent.\textsuperscript{46} Over time, this dialogue builds mutual trust.\textsuperscript{47} Unfortunately, in survey after survey, Army officers report that their leaders’ greatest shortcoming is the failure to develop subordinates.\textsuperscript{48}

A commander’s encouragement and acceptance of criticism is necessary for establishing a climate conducive to mission command.

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**War is a Moral Contest and a Favorable, Enduring Peace the Prize**

Half-hearted implementation is not the main problem with the Army’s foundational philosophy. The deeper problem is that it fails to pass the essential litmus test of any army’s core philosophy: does it help win wars, not just battles? True, auftragstaktik transformed the German army into a tactically superior force. However, in 1871, the Treaty of Frankfurt saved this army from fighting (and perhaps losing) a protracted insurgency in Paris. They were also defeated in two world wars. Expediting the loss of World War II were oft-brutal tactics that enraged local populations and ensured the army fought on three fronts—on the western and eastern fronts and against strong insurgencies. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel wrote that his only concern regarding junior officers was that they “bring with them a good grounding in tactics.”\textsuperscript{49} Rommel’s view epitomized the military culture that produced an army that was as strategically weak as it was tactically strong—a dichotomy that would have been even more pronounced in today’s “age of the strategic corporal.”\textsuperscript{50} Indeed, as our own military learned in Vietnam, it is possible for a tactically superior force to win nearly every battle but still lose the war.

The reason mission command fails as a foundational philosophy is that it says nothing about the framework—the intents of higher commanders—in which missions are executed. If this framework is flawed, even perfectly executed missions produce flawed outcomes.

A good starting place for understanding what this philosophy could say can be found in Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*. Sun Tzu gave “moral influence” primacy in war. Leaders who exercise this influence are not simply avoiding unlawful actions; they are choosing just actions that cause “the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril.”\textsuperscript{51} Thus, to Sun Tzu, the key to military success is fostering the will to fight of one’s nation and troops by maintaining their sense of moral purpose (or “Tao” or “justice”).

Clausewitz likewise emphasized moral forces, devoting the first book of *On War* to the subject. He wrote, “One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely honed blade.”\textsuperscript{52} An important distinction Clausewitz made was between “Absolute War,” war with no limitations on the use of force, and “Real War,” war as it must actually be fought given social and other constraints.\textsuperscript{53} Like Sun Tzu, Clausewitz considered these constraints critical because of their ability to inspire one’s own country and soldiers to fight harder (or to give up, if disregarded).

U.S. Air Force Col. John Boyd broadened this tradition. Boyd famously described decision making as an “observe-orient-decide-act” (OODA) loop: the side that achieves immediate tactical success is the one that, through rapid and well-chosen action, disrupts their opponent’s OODA loop and prevents them from responding effectively. This is precisely the type of success that mission command potentially enables. However, Boyd also emphasized that grand strategy must have “a moral design” and that the “name of the game” in warfare is to “preserve or build up our moral authority while compromising that of our adversaries in order to pump up our resolve, drain away adversaries’ resolve, and attract them as well as
others to our cause and way of life.” Thus, to Boyd, just as important as morally influencing one’s own side was exerting this influence upon an enemy and this opponent’s base of popular support.

“Fourth generation warfare” theorists have expressed views consistent with this tradition. They argue that, thanks to information technology, today’s insurgents can far more easily convince the political decision makers of enemy nations “that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.” Insurgents do this by undermining perceptions of the “legitimacy” of this nation’s actions among international organizations, this nation’s people, and the populations and leaders of allied countries. (Noteworthy here is that Sun Tzu’s moral concept of “justice” buttresses the political concept of “legitimacy.”)

Current U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine narrowly falls within this tradition. The doctrine states that the greatest prize for either counterinsurgent or insurgent is the good opinion of the population they wish to govern: “The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy.”

Army Doctrinal Publication 1, The Army, briefly intersects this tradition, stating that the “moral-ethical field” of conflict includes not just obeying laws, but applying combat power in such a way as to meet the expectations of America’s citizens. However, this doctrine does not explore how soldiers are supposed to fulfill Americans’ expectations—unless its discussion of institutional artifacts (the Oath of Service, Soldier’s Creed, Army Civilian Creed, Warrior Ethos, and Army Values) are assumed to be these means.

Peter Fromm, Kevin Cutright, and I are currently writing within this tradition. We argue that, in an increasingly “flat” world, information technology enables warring parties to affect the perceptions and moral judgments of all of a conflict’s key populations—their own troops, enemy forces, populations at
home and in the theater of war, and the international community—to a degree never before possible. The enduring negative judgments of just one of these populations have the potential to defeat America’s military in a conflict. Moreover, even conventional wars must be fought far differently today than in the past. As I wrote: “Many still do not realize that, when Dresden’s citizens have video cell phones and are plugged into the Internet, the military that firebombs them probably does not get to continue its [population-centric] strategic bombing campaign.”

Key to our argument is that “legitimacy represents the psychological hub of a lasting peace. For a modern democracy to create legitimate outcomes from war, its conflict must follow what is perceived to be a moral trajectory.” In our view, any “peace” short of the annihilation of one’s enemy and this enemy’s base of popular support must be reinforced by moral forces. One way these moral forces (specifically, those involving judgments of right and wrong) are made visible is via political organs, processes, debates, and decisions. Thus, while war may be as Clausewitz called it, “the continuation of politics by other means,” politics is but the visible manifestation of broader and deeper moral currents.

Undergirding this theoretical tradition is the idea that the real goal of war is a favorable peace that lasts due to supporting moral forces. As Clausewitz wrote, “In many cases, particularly those involving great and decisive actions, the analysis extends to the ultimate objective, which is to bring about peace.” The philosopher John Rawls amplified this idea, describing what occurs when a peace is simply coerced rather than morally earned: “The way a war is fought and the actions ending it endure in the historical memory of peoples and may set the stage for future war.” Unfortunately, Army doctrine promotes annihilative tactical victory as the ultimate goal by arguing that peace is the natural consequence of such victory. For example, the Army’s capstone manual says, “If U.S. forces fight, the Nation expects us to inflict a defeat of sufficient magnitude that the enemy abandons his objectives and agrees to peace on our terms.”

A modern army’s warfighting philosophy must set the ultimate goal for conflict as achieving a favorable peace obtained via actions that give this peace an enduring moral foundation. Beyond the counterinsurgency manual’s narrow focus on local sentiment and our Army’s capstone manual’s unelaborated mention of the importance of fulfilling American expectations, this idea has largely been an afterthought to America’s military services. The possible exception is the U.S. Marine Corps, which has recognized the primacy of the “human” domain in armed conflict in doctrine since at least 1995.

Joint doctrine has recently taken small steps in the right direction. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, describes warring parties as involved in a “clash of moral wills and/or physical strengths.” It also provides the PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information) rubric to help planners systematically consider a conflict’s physical and human domains.

Still, this doctrine raises more questions than it answers. In a clash of wills, do physical factors really matter as much as moral ones? Is there a relationship between “moral wills” and communities’ perceptions of right and wrong? If there is, how deep is this relationship? Do the concepts of “just war” and “just actions” belong within the PMESII construct? If these concepts do belong, just how important is it that our nation and military perform actions that conflict-influencing populations deem just?

The U.S. Army’s lengthy 2011 study on the human domain likewise describes war as a “savage clash of wills.” However, the scope of this study is confined to the issue of soldier readiness. Thankfully, our Army’s 2012 “Capstone Concept” provides room for growth, admitting that “current doctrine does not adequately address the moral, cognitive, social and physical aspects of human populations in conflict.”

The U.S. military’s slow doctrinal acknowledgment of the overriding importance of war’s political and moral factors primarily derives from cultural bias. One such bias is the misconception of many military leaders that strategic concerns are for politicians and tactical concerns are for soldiers. But, in the information age, all tactical actions are potentially political. A deeper inhibition, though, is...
that many soldiers are simply blind to all but the physical aspects of war. To them, war is nothing more than killing the enemy before he kills you (and doing so quickly, before the “liberal press” turns American civilians against the war). Any other viewpoint, they ironically and anachronistically contend, is out-of-touch with reality.

Our military’s preference for purely physical solutions has roots in an increasingly distant past, when we could employ raw force with much greater abandon and success. Until the start of the 20th century, for example, our Army could relocate, concentrate, and even exterminate America’s indigenous peoples without incurring significant moral blowback. However, just as modern democracies can no longer sustain population-centric bombing campaigns, our Army can no longer resort to such harsh counterinsurgency tactics that, if used today, would produce counterproductive outrage and quickly lead to national shame and defeat.

Our Army must better prepare leaders for modern realities.

Changing a River’s Course

In 1812, an earthquake near New Madrid, Mo., caused the Mississippi River to flow backward for several hours. Today, our Army needs just such a tectonic shift, but one that changes our course permanently rather than temporarily. This shift will not happen on its own. Senior Army leaders must guide change deliberately and with the faith of a Scharnhorst or Moltke that they are doing what is right for our institution and nation.

There are several models that senior leaders can leverage to effect organizational change—change that would prepare leaders to practice decentralized command and promote morally-aware strategic and operational frameworks for this command. Steps these models suggest include:

- **Unflinchingly assess Army culture.** To determine the extent of harmful cultural bias, surveys must ask the uncomfortable questions that typically go unasked. Should civilians on the battlefield be treated with respect? Should detainees? Is torture okay? Should soldiers assume additional risk to avoid killing locals? If so, how much risk? Should the opinions of local nationals and coalition allies matter to soldiers? Should international law be respected? And so on.

- **Get organizational buy-in for change.** Not since the end of the Vietnam War have conditions been better for this. Even those soldiers who supported America’s entry into Afghanistan and Iraq generally agree that the cost of these campaigns was exorbitant.

- **Clarify the cultural goal.** This means publishing a clear, consistent, and concise professional ethic. This ethic must include prioritized values and an ethical decision-making tool that help leaders of all ranks reason through and resolve ethical problems.

- **Transform doctrine and training.** Most field manuals stifle creativity and should be either discarded or greatly abridged. Capstone doctrine should unequivocally declare an enduring, favorable peace as the ultimate prize of conflict. The human aspects of conflict (especially moral factors) need to be delineated to properly illustrate how they aspects support this peace. In training, we must focus on results not process. For instance, to reinforce collaboration and build trust and initiative among leaders, Tactical Decision Games rather than rigid tasks/conditions/standards could be employed. Some training scenarios should force junior leaders to disobey explicit tasks in order to meet their commander’s intent.

- **Improve leader evaluations.** Efficiency reports must display 360-degree input from subordinates, peers, and superiors. The perceptions of subordinates as to whether they feel mentored or micromanaged, and whether their leaders promote or stifle collaboration and learning, should be weighted heavily.

- **Put experience where it counts.** Selection for company command needs to be far more stringent, not something every junior officer does to get promoted. Teaching positions at service schools should be important, rather than detrimental, to career advancement, and the standards for filling these jobs—especially those jobs that influence cadets and junior NCOs—should be high.

- **Make education our top priority.** The primary goal of Army education should be to make all leaders professionally trustworthy and, to a degree, morally autonomous. Instruction should aim to
advance moral reasoning skills as well as historical and cultural understanding of likely theaters of deployment. A tiered approach that provides more extensive instruction for strategic leaders is necessary. However, junior leaders require meaningful ethical instruction that includes vignettes and exploratory discussions and goes beyond simple PowerPoint indoctrination.79 When dollars are short, the last thing cut should be education.

There are alternatives to our growing leaders who can practice true mission command and win the best possible peace. We could, for example, continue as we have done, pulling our oars against the current of an increasingly remote past, often exhausting ourselves and our nation’s treasury for the sake of little (if any) lasting battlefield progress. Or worse, we could give in to this current, let go of what adaptive doctrine we have created, and float unmerrily down the stream toward the next series of rapids waiting to capsize us.

Surely though, such alternatives are unacceptable. **MR**

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2. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 65.
5. Like Clausewitz, Moltke recognized the importance of friction in war. He embraced attempts to counter and exploit friction by empowering leader initiative at the lowest levels: “The advantage of the situation will never be fully utilized if subordinate commanders wait for orders. It will be generally more advisable to proceed actively and keep the initiative there when one has to wait to the law of the opponent.” See Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*, ed. Daniel J. Hughes, trans. Daniel J. Hughes and Harry Bell (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 133.
11. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 11 August 2003), 2-11. Grant’s guidance to Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman before Sherman’s infamous “March to the Sea” consisted of this simple expression of intent: “You, I propose to move against Johnston’s Army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country attempting to fight his battle could usually observe orbiting in tiers above him his battalion commander, brigade commander, assistant division commander, division commander, and even his field force [corps] commander. With all that advice from the sky, it was easy to imagine how much individual control the company commander himself could exert on the ground.”
14. FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 20 August 1982), 2-2. This manual stated: “Initiative implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. The underlying purpose of every encounter with the enemy is to seize or retain independence of action.”
15. Mission command is discussed extensively in all key doctrine, including TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept: Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1-0, The Army: ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations; ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency: ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, states that “The foundation of unified land operations is built on initiative, decisive action, and mission command—linked and nested through purposeful and simultaneous execution of both combined arms maneuver and wide area security—to achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state” (page 5). Since “initiative, decisive action, and mission command” are the foundation and “initiative” and “decisive action” are key components of mission command, it can be deduced from this statement that the mission command philosophy alone is the foundation of the Army’s warfighting doctrine.
17. ADP 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: GPO, 17 May 2012), iv. In this essay, references to “mission command” are to the philosophy of decentralization only.
22. Ibid., 25-27.
29. Shamir, 136-44. To Shamir, exceptions to the rule that the U.S. does not implement mission command well include the 3rd Infantry Division’s “Thunder Runs” in Baghdad in early 2003 and the operations of the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, Iraq, from 2003-2004.
31. Shamir, 26-27. Shamir reached this conclusion by comparing eight credible sources.
32. Ibid. This list came from summarizing the aforementioned eight sources.
34. Ibid., 4. (See Figure 1.)
36. David Richard Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet: US-Vietnam in Perspective* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 142. “The company commander on the ground attempting to fight his battle could usually observe orbiting in tiers above him his battalion commander, brigade commander, assistant division commander, division commander, and even his field force [corps] commander. With all that advice from the sky, it was easy to imagine how much individual control the company commander himself could exert on the ground.”
37. Shamir, 22.
international law), wrote in Article 29 “the ultimate object of all modern war is a

pher to argue that peace is war’s ultimate objective. Francis Lieber, who wrote


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2013. 4GW theorists are not argu

JFQ, 45. Ibid. 26-27. T.X. Hammes, letter to Col. John A. Keenan, editor, Marine Corps Gazette, 3 January 2010. Provided by Col. Hammes to author, 6 July 2013. A Tactical Decision Game is a traditional training tool used by the U.S. Marine Corps. A vignette is provided that a team analyzes and plans against. A leader/moderator manages the imaginary execution of the plan much as a “dungeon master” might during a “Dungeons and Dragons” game. The moderator flips the coin and, if heads, the step


etera (September 1987): 21-34, 26. 47. Nielsen, 25-26; Lothar Rendulic, The Command Decision (Stuttgart, Germany: Historical Division, U.S. Army Europe, 1945-54, 1947), 9. German superior officers maintained close teacher-student relationships with their subordinates, relationships that were reinforced by the time they spent together in map exercises, terrain walks, sand-table exercises, and field exercises. 48. The Center for Army Leadership, 2011 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 21 May 2012), 6, 67. This report is based on a survey of 16,800 uniformed leaders. Exhibit 4 shows that, for the fifth year in a row, surveyed officers reported that “Develops Others” was their leaders’ worst attribute. 49. Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, ed. B.H. Liddell Hart, trans. Paul Findlay (New York: Da Capo Press, 1953), 523. Rommel wrote: “With the lower-ranking staff officers, I was less concerned about their knowledge of strategy (for how often does a junior staff officer have to think in terms of strategy?) than that they should bring with them a good grounding in tactics, to enable them to cope with the many tactical problems which faced us in the African campaign.” 50. Marine Gen. Charles Krulak coined the term “strategic corporal,” which refers to the possibility of the actions of even junior enlisted service members having strategic repercussions on battlefields in the information age. 51. Sun Tzu. The Art of War: The New Illustrated Edition, trans. Samuel Griffith (New York: Watkins Publishing Limited, 2005), 92. 52. Clausewitz, 142. 53. Ibid., 223-26. 54. John R. Boyd, “The Strategic Game of?” Project on Government Oversight: Defense and the National Interest, June 2006, www.dionpg.org/boyd/strategic_game.pdf (25 June 2013), slide 54. 55. Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 2. 56. Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW) theory has lost popularity in recent years, largely due to the criticism that the model describes warfare as progressing in linear phases that are artificial, misleading constructs. The so-called “fourth generation of warfare,” critics argue, is really describing low-level military conflict that is as old as war itself. 4GW theorists argue, however, that insurgencies and terrorism are new, but rather that information technology enables these groups to influence an enemy nation’s center of gravity—its political decision makers—for much easier and to a far greater degree than they typically could in the past. 4GW is a not a new form of warfare; what is new is the general decision makers—far more easily and to a far greater degree than they typically could in the past. 57. U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, FM 3-24, 1-8. 58. ADP 1, The Army (Washington, DC: GPO, 17 September 2012), 2-4. 59. Douglas A. Pryer, “Steering America’s Warship toward Moral Communica-

(26 June 2013) for a comprehensive summary of how current doctrine fails to con-
Lt. Gen. Frederic (Rick) Brown, Ph.D., U.S. Army, retired from the Army in 1989, having served 32 years in various command and staff assignments. He graduated from West Point and later attended the Graduate Institute in Geneva, Switzerland, as an Olmsted Scholar, receiving both Licence and Doctorate degrees. He has published several books and articles, as well as numerous papers on national security issues.

PHOTO: Convoy guide 1st Lt. Justin Koper, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (second from right), briefs 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry convoy leaders about trouble spots on their approach route to Forward Operating Base Wilson. The leaders are (from left) 1st Lt. John Ghee, Staff Sgt. Michael Beyers, and 1st Sgt. Jeff Gunter. (Staff Sgt. Raymond Drumstar)

REBUILDING AMERICA’S ARMY after an extraordinarily difficult and extended commitment presents tough challenges. The Army is severely attrited from the extended commitment to the “long war”—exacerbated by the converging pressures of continuing transformation and reorganization for the future (a task once described by the director of the Army staff as “it’s like designing an aircraft in flight”). Intense mission demands have now endured for well over a decade. To these we should now add national social stresses such as increased roles for women and open sexual relationships.

Yet America’s Army responds well, innovating as it reorients and rebuilds. The modular brigade modifications to create security transition teams that support security force assistance are clear examples of institutional redesign to support stability operations and decisive action.¹ Now the Army must complement this organizational response with doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); and leader development. Relationships gained through sharing requisite skills, knowledge, and attitudes (SKA) characteristic of “soft power” are prerequisites for successful combined arms maneuver and wide-area security operations.

Modifications in Army governance processes may also be necessary to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of operating and generating forces. Similar to how changes were initiated after Vietnam, the most significant improvements in both approach and eventual execution are likely to come “bottom-up”—from young officers and noncommissioned officers who have again-and-again faced the full spectrum of operational environments. Today, Generation Y leaders who are accustomed to global access via “cloud
computing” seek better practices using information management (IM) and knowledge management (KM) to cross organizational stovepipes to seek better practices. Frustrated by DOD collaboration restrictions, they expect to cross the boundaries of organization, function, level, or culture to collaborate as they did in combat—routinely sharing knowledge with appropriate security classifications displacing the previous garrison practices of guarding knowledge within organizational or functional stovepipes to protect turf. The practices and tools necessary to support these expectations need to be available for rebuilding.

One way to generate the essential skills, knowledge, and characteristics of “soft power” is through Teams of Leaders (ToL) using high performing leader team building and intensive collaboration across borders. ToL development and current evolutions follow past “hard power” rebuilding development paths proven successful after Vietnam. Teams of Leaders also reflects the emerging outcomes-based training and education construct designed to develop adaptive and agile leaders. Task/condition/standard and SKA development process comparisons may be instructive.

The Personal Road to ToL

As director of the Army Training Study in 1978, I was charged with developing and justifying Army training requirements. I concluded that it was necessary to rationalize and focus Army training—to structure it. Fortunately, I was subsequently assigned, in 1979, as assistant division commander in the 8th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Paul Gorman. Gorman, with Gen. William DePuy, was in a continuing process of creating the Army Training System. Due to Gorman’s extraordinary competence and brilliance in design as the trainer in the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), he was assigned to command what became the Army training troop tester in U.S. Army Europe, 8th ID.

In the early 1970s, TRADOC and the Army’s Research Institute for Behavioral Science (ARI) had demonstrated novel training techniques for maneuver units, termed tactical engagement system. The tactical engagement system-trained squads and platoons were demonstrably more lethal and more survivable after the training. Gorman conceptualized and then invested TRADOC funds in the early development of the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), a system that enabled companies and battalions to replicate force-on-force ground combat employing eye-safe lasers rather than bullets or other projectiles. In 1977, Gorman was sent to Europe to command the 8th ID (Mechanized), where he made the Tactical Engagement System the centerpiece of the division’s training for readiness. In 1979, MILES was ready for its operational test, and although Gorman had been reassigned, the 8th ID was chosen to conduct the test because the rigor of the latter mandated a holistic training “system” within which MILES could provide replicable improvements in collective training. In effect, the operational test had to show that MILES could perform as a realistic direct fire instrumentation system for powerfully instructive after action reviews (AARs).

As the 8th ID assistant division commander, I directed the MILES operational testing, supported by then-Maj. Larry Word from ARI. Together with superb officers and NCOs from the operational testing battalions, we created what became the Army’s structured collective training system employing opposing forces, observer controllers, and AARs fused to train to task/condition/standard. Subsequently assigned as the deputy chief of staff—training in TRADOC, I overwatched the implementation of the Tactical Engagement System to task/condition/standard not only in field maneuvers at the National Training Center, but also in command post exercises. Integrating the Tactical Engagement System into a structured learning program to task/condition/standard worked beyond our dreams. We generated serious “hard power” to support offensive and defensive operations.

Shortly thereafter, I was assigned to command the U.S. Army Armor Center responsible for fielding the improved Abrams tank (the M1A2). Aware of the effects of the use of computer-based simulation in training, we teamed with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to develop a low-cost full-armored fighting vehicle simulation to support Abrams/Bradley training. The original product, Simulation Networking, was improved, renamed and fielded as the Close Combat Tactical Trainer. Now, due to the low operating costs of the simulation, we could increase the competency levels of the mounted force significantly by requiring frequent
training on tough mandatory armored fighting vehicle-structured gunnery and maneuver exercises.

Sensitized by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to the importance of emerging information capabilities applied to training, we realized that timely flow of data and information among and between fighting vehicles could provide decisive battlefield advantage—seriously improving Battle Command. We established combat data linking and indirectly supported combat leader teaming with the Inter-Vehicular Information System later known as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) then Blue Force Tracking. These were clear bottom-up improvements to existent Army Battle Command Systems. Mission command followed as we supported development of Field Manual 6.0, Mission Command, in 2003, most recently reinforced in 2012 by Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command. The statement “The fundamental basis of mission command is creating trust and mutual understanding between superiors and subordinates” reflected increasing personal focus on developing shared SKA “soft power” as well as TCS “hard power.”

We were backing into information technology and, as we began to exchange combat information, also into information management (IM). Reflecting concern that emerging broad Army IM systems, particularly Army Knowledge Online (AKO), were not sufficiently user friendly, I was asked to become the senior mentor for the IM extension. Subsequently various prototype user nets employed in Iraq demonstrated the likely tactical utility of IT/IM. Simultaneously, as it became more user friendly, AKO realized gradually its great potential.

But we all sensed that there could and should be more than IT/IM. Leaders act to make things happen. The technology was there to form groups of leaders collaborating to improve job performance in professional forums—today recognized inter alia as Facebook and expanding MilSuite on AKO. Influenced by the power of emerging collaboration among leaders demonstrated by the Companycommand.mil forum at West Point, I became the senior
mentor for Army KM developing what is now called the Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS). CAVNET and Iron Horse Net and forums such as NCO Net and S1 Net flourished as social media grew. Army KM expanded, generating shared actionable knowledge. Actionable understanding was yet to come.

When I was asked to explain BCKS more broadly to Army leadership, I conducted workshops in every major TRADOC school and in all corps level commands, worldwide. Each BCKS workshop engaged the commander and his/her key subordinates. Explanation of BCKS was followed by a discussion of how it could be employed to solve command issues raised by subordinates. BCKS was to be shaped by them to be their tool created bottom-up, not imposed top-down. Then

The shared trust required for high performance broadens horizons.

the leaders adjourned for the day, returning later to describe to the commander how they proposed to employ BCKS. I was available to counsel both seniors and subordinates about alternatives for implementing BCKS.

About halfway through the BCKS workshop explanations, I realized that what we were doing was building actionable understanding to use BCKS in leader teams formed within organizations or units for that purpose. The IM and KM were necessary but not sufficient. Leaders working together to a common purpose and crossing various borders as required to develop positive relationships had to be the practical desired outcome for chains of command. We were quickly approaching the need to generate the shared consensus and relationships characteristic of “soft power,” and were now seriously into supporting mission command.

I found I really had to think through what, then develop how, to build leader teams to advantage the IM and KM of the Battle Command Knowledge System for both teams of equals and for teams composed of leaders and subordinates. The central insight was that these workshops were essentially team building exercises—later described as leader team exercises (LTX). Proofs of principle preceded or took place concurrently at I Corps and in the 10th Mountain Division developing shared actionable understanding in leader teams preparing for service in Afghanistan.

The next step was to establish just what made leader teams really good. Fortunately 12 years of unit command combined with numerous observation visits to various combat training centers produced an experience-based hypothesis confirmed by continuing personal research for another 5 years. Leader team high performance is based on shared skills, knowledge, and attitudes of shared purpose, shared trust, shared competence, and resultant shared confidence by every member of the particular leader team be it composed of peers or seniors and subordinates. These results were documented in several contemporary documents.

Influenced by the growing success of BCKS in the Army, Gen. John Craddock, commanding general, European Command (EUCOM), asked me to apply information and knowledge management to EUCOM—Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM). We conducted multiple workshops in all directorates at EUCOM headquarters then at 10 offices of defense collaboration and with their country teams. By now, improving IM and KM had almost become secondary; the desired outcome was high performing teams of leaders across the many JIIM boundaries of organization, function, level, or culture. In 2007, I renamed the effort Teams of Leaders portraying it essentially as a Venn diagram existent at the intersection of information management, knowledge management, and the building of high performing leader teams. A ToL culture both within EUCOM and networked vertically from the joint staff through “front-line” organizations provided the freedom for intensive collaboration between existent and fully operational leader teams. These three ToL components, interacting, facilitate a continuous collaborative environment, team building, and shared trust, which enable JIIM operations to make and execute decisions while rapidly sharing
The performance potential of ToL—IM x KM x high performing leader team building—is equal and perhaps greater than the improved performance achieved routinely by the OC x OPFOR x AAR x IS paradigm of the highly successful Army Training System.

what they have learned. Included below are two views of the conceptual framework—top and side. The side view is perhaps more expressive of ToL because presentation as a stool accentuates that there is more to ToL than a Venn diagram portrays. The essence of value-added from ToL is the combination of legs that supports the seat of the stool portrayed in the side view. ToL is the entire stool; the seat of the stool becomes an abiding ToL purpose not just the legs. Building that seat well seems a key to successful ToL introduction and subsequent institutionalization.

The point of this lengthy explanation is that influenced by personal insights and recalling the processes involved in the development of the Army Training System, we have developed Teams of Leaders similarly—test, fix, test—over the past decade to address a current challenge of equivalent magnitude. That is, developing high performing leader teams possessing productive relationships employing IT/IM and KM to team across boundaries of organization, function, level, or culture in supporting national security policies and programs.

One confirming “proof” was EUCOM ToL as acknowledged by Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, commander of EUCOM/SACEUR from 2007-2009. He wrote:

“During my tenure as EUCOM commander one of the two most significant ‘wins’ was the command’s embrace of the Teams of Leaders concept. Without question—ToL was and remains the enabler for a significantly higher performing staff, increased horizontal and vertical communications, and shared priorities and focus of effort. This—ToL—is no silver bullet—not fairy dust—but rather the application of enlightened, thoughtful, effective procedures by talented professionals—commencing with a series of ‘ah-ha’s’ that quickly become self-generating. While buffeted by the growth of the command, thanks to ToL, based on the ToL precedent, I am increasingly enthusiastic about what this program offers to the U.S. whole of government and multinational organizations.”

Personally responsible for several parallel development paths of both the Army Training System—“hard power”—and generic Teams of Leaders—“soft power”—for the past thirty years, I believe the performance potential of ToL—IM x KM x high performing leader team building—is equal and perhaps greater than the improved performance achieved routinely by the OC x OPFOR x AAR x IS paradigm of the highly successful Army Training System. I equate the goodness of ToL developing high performing leader teams sharing skills, knowledge, and attitudes and advantaging both information and knowledge management for the Army supporting mission command and broader JIIM applications to the “goodness” of the Army Training System drawing particularly on the training benefits of interactions of Observer/Controllers and AARs training to TCS. Both appear to be breakthroughs benefitting then-emerging art and science to significantly improve human team performance. In combination, supporting the art of command and the science of control, they can be strategically decisive.

Mastery of task/condition/standard achieved by the Army Training System is highly effective “hard power” essential to successful offensive and defensive operations. Developing positive leader team relationships across borders through shared skills, knowledge, attitudes ensures dominant “soft
power” required for successful stability and civil support operations. Vastly broader JIIM applications such as support to civilian law enforcement seem certain to follow.

**Building the “Seat of the ToL Stool”**

All of the essential goodness evident in sharing data and information developing knowledge and eventually actionable understanding to solve problems should make collaboration the evident cure-all for improved decision making. It isn’t. Sharing often is resisted, particularly across walls of stovepipes in bureaucratic organizations governed by those competing for power, position, and resources—no win-win collaboration, rather zero-sum contests of will. Win-win can come only after senior leader intervention to encourage informal collaboration across borders accompanied by institutionalization of ToL organizational practices.

Sharing supporting ToL requires some measure of skills, knowledge, and attitudes to be possessed and shared by all of the members of any leader team if the leader team is to be effective. Building this sharing isn’t rocket science. First, we need to work together to develop shared purpose within the team. What exactly are we becoming a team to do? As you define the problem together, shared competence develops. You begin to think through the problem being addressed together by understanding each other’s competencies. With that, trust develops. To the degree that these shared SKA of purpose, trust, and competence expand, leader team performance improves. As improvement occurs, shared confidence develops. When SKA are fully shared among all members of the team, particularly across borders, escalating high performance occurs that sells itself. A high performing leader team—the leadership leg of ToL—has been generated, often stimulated through short rapid-thinking LTX. (Success breeds “champions” who, co-opted, then spread “their” ToL practices across borders. Seem simple? It is, just as a comparable AAR thinking process has been applied to generating “hard power.”

The rate of further ToL proliferation is influenced by the over-arching collaboration environment that is present in the organizational stovepipe of the “champion.” This is the seat of the stool, embedding ToL practices in the routine of organizations.
Easiest is presence in organizations encouraged to share data and information drawing on available IM and KM—all seen together as providing a win-win. In a closed, reactive, stovepipe sensing sharing as zero-sum, the “champion” needs senior support to “give informal collaboration a try.” Results will convince the “doubting Thomas.”

A central issue introducing ToL is demonstrating how best to blend current sharing practices in such a way as to advantage several important national strengths. These strengths are the shared culture of “Yankee initiative,” the ability to seek “workarounds,” and the increasing willingness of Generation Y participants to collaborate, drawing on multiple address books and social networking. Teams of leaders can obviously accelerate application of these strengths across borders.

The lubrication of decision making across borders that is enabled by the three legs of ToL interacting strongly in the ToL seat supports adaptive behavior. Seeking shared purpose, trust, and competence moves a leader “out of his or her box.” In fact, the most successful applications of ToL can be when the sharing occurs across stove-piped organizations with previously impermeable boundaries. Modest improvements in decision making resulting from sharing information, and hopefully knowledge, can appear significant compared to previous absence of any collaboration. More becomes “better,” and through observing the effects of “better,” ToL “believers” are generated.

The shared trust required for high performance broadens horizons. When team members move across borders into new areas and are introduced to unsuspected considerations, they influence decisions across the border, whatever the border may have been. Interactions of the three legs of ToL building the seat contribute directly to broadening leaders’ horizons and perspectives and perhaps to the development of actionable understanding how to address and achieve the purpose for which that particular leader team was generated. A broadened leader is likely to be a more adaptive leader, practicing mission command when engaged in planning processes or when engaged practicing ToL across JIIM organizations.

![Teams of Leaders (side view)](image-url)
The shared SKA of high performance, particularly shared trust and shared competence, become performance multipliers as new mission purposes arise under uncertain and often unpredictable circumstances. Gen. Martin Dempsey, then—commanding general of TRADOC, observed the same in discussing mission command. The leader team, already high performing due to the presence of shared SKA that brought success and the resulting shared confidence, can more rapidly respond to uncertainty. Shared trust and competence provide a robust cushion when new purposes appear.

The most effective sharing may be bottom-up, where and when both distance and time can be reduced to zero to support adaptation as operational concepts may direct. Sharing can be right, left, up, and down across boundaries of organization, function, level, and culture. The most pronounced effectiveness benefits can be sharing across levels. The “top” seeks actual “ground truth” the bottom welcomes “heads-up,” what may be coming down within the organizational or functional stovepipe. Win-win! Exactly this was the stimulus for developing the IM/KM capabilities of FBCB2 supporting professional forums in the Battle Command Knowledge System.

The SKA of high performing leader teams in ToL can be generated across any combination of environments by structured exercises comparable to those situational training exercises developed to support task training for “hard power.” High performing leader team development can be structured drawing on suggested LTX or unstructured (self-guided) practices. It can be with or without coach or mentor; grouped or virtual. In every case, ToL application generates some successful “champions” influenced positively by their ToL.

Army Maj. Gen. Patrick Murphy, the adjutant general of the New York National Guard, briefs Army Gen. Frank Grass, the chief of the National Guard Bureau, during a visit to areas impacted by Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey and New York, 2 November 2012.
experiences. These “champions” then recommend the ToL they understand and have adapted in practice for their uses to their friends. So, co-opted to tell their grouped and virtual associates, they expand ToL application more broadly. They tell their friends about the benefits of sharing trust, sharing purpose, and shared competence all reinforced by the elixir of shared confidence—success stimulating greater successes! All occurs without direction “top-down” but with shared enthusiasm bottom-up. That is the magic of ToL.

By stimulating shared actionable understanding of challenges and solutions across every border of human associations, ToL applied to general leader preparation can and should stimulate significant improvements in both effectiveness and efficiency within and well beyond America’s Army. ToL draws on U.S. individual initiative “tell me what, not how to”—accelerating national IM and KM capabilities the sharing/teaming leadership characteristic of Generation Y, and crossing traditional borders to produce often unexpected rewards as atypical leader teams share SKA. The more senior leaders “let go” and encourage informal collaboration bottom-up, the greater the performance levels achieved by their organizations. The more senior leaders add potential cross-border teaming and collaboration opportunities within their guidance and intent, the greater are opportunities for subordinates to broaden teaming possibilities advantaging IM and KM.

In sum, ToL included in leader preparation encourages novel perspectives and insights about the art of the possible in adapting to highly unpredictable uncertainty by combining the science of IT, IM, and KM with the art of developing and sustaining high performing leader teams. All are fueled by the power of crossing borders, enabling, if not stimulating, bottom-up, direct, immediate, responses to solve problems and to meet unexpected challenges developing relationships—the ultimate “soft power” supporting wide-area security and combined arms maneuver operations. MR

NOTES

2. The constraints of inviolable stovepipes can be devastating. An organization with talented leaders submerged within a nonsupportive climate underperforms despite individual leader competencies. “Yankee initiative” is driven underground to avoid an organizational culture that inhibits collaboration.
4. Actionable knowledge is necessary but not sufficient. More than knowledge is required to prevail; actionable understanding is essential to be “ahead of, not behind, the curve.”
7. This has been a team effort with the significant support of Dr. Rick Morris, Dr. Mike Prevou, and Lt. Col. Brad Hilton.
8. Sharing and consensus building of “soft power” is equally important developing positive federal, state, and local relationships essential to effective domestic emergency management. See Christine Le Jeune, Consequence Management: Steps in the Right Direction? AUSA ILW National Security Watch NSW 10-2 8, September 2010. Think ToL.
9. For an excellent example of inability to collaborate in defense programs, see Bastian Giegerich, “Budget Crunch: Implications for European Defence, Survival 52, August-September 2010, 87-98.
10. Shared trust receives additional emphasis in contemporary discussions of implementing nuclear weapon “dual key” practices in securing highly sensitive information—post Wikileaks (Manning and Snowden).
12. For “a way” see the Mission Command Center of Excellence developed by EUCOM Teams of Leaders Coaching Guide,” version 1.0., 3 March 2008.
Fighting and Winning Like Women*

Dr. Robert M. Hill

IN MAY 2012, National Public Radio’s Renee Montagne spent time in Afghanistan covering a range of critical issues facing the country as it looks to a future without significant NATO and U.S. force presence. On 10 May, the topic was women’s rights and concerns that if the Taliban were brought into the political process or able to reestablish any degree of control, gains in women’s rights would be, most assuredly, jeopardized.¹

That same day, I read about the 2012 DePuy writing contest on the topic of women’s role in the Army over the next 20 years. In light of the National Public Radio story, it struck me as ironic that the U.S. Army was wrestling with the very same question. This soul-searching suggests a number of things:

● Best case—we’re not as advanced on issues of equality as we’d like or need to be.
● Worst case—we continue to hold onto outdated and sexist views of women; i.e., we’ve fundamentally not changed much at all since their full integration in the early 1970s.
● Risk—Asking such a question is just lip service and a stall tactic.
● Opportunity: Admitting that we truly do know the answer is the first step toward genuine change. But like the joke—“Hey boss, when do you need that report,” and the reply comes back, “Yesterday!”—we cannot wait 20 years to make needed changes.

Three Vignettes

I was a cadet at West Point when the first class with women entered in 1976 and ambivalent about their admittance into the Corps of Cadets. I remember asking my father, an alumnus and career infantry officer who saw combat in Greece, Korea, and Vietnam, how he felt. He surprised me with his response: future wars would demand more brain than brawn and women were damned smart. It would be foolish to limit the military’s intellectual capital because of outdated stereotypes and prejudices.
A year after my graduation, as the cadets in the first class that included women were considered for leadership opportunities, I heard that a female company-mate had been recommended for a position on the brigade staff, making her one of the corps’ highest-ranking cadets. Knowing her, I felt the academy had made a wise choice. Instead of accepting it, she declined. The story I heard was that she worried she would never know whether her selection was due to her achievements and potential or solely based on her gender.

I recently encouraged my 24-year-old daughter to consider joining the military. She has struggled with college academics, and I felt that enlisting would provide an alternative glide path to success. When I mentioned this to a friend, he said I should watch the film The Invisible War, about rape in the U.S. military, and reconsider my position.

As the saying goes, the more things change, the more they stay the same. Only in this case, as it relates to the role of women in the military, achieving the status quo is decidedly bad: for women, men, the Army, the Department of Defense, the nation and the world.

**War on Women**

Let’s face it: being a woman is tough. Many assume much of women’s plight occurs in countries such as Iran, India, China, and Afghanistan, where they are murdered, mutilated, poisoned, or constantly harasseed. The idea that they are maligned and mistreated in the U.S. is all-too-readily dismissed or ignored. It should not be.

In the United States, women are facing assaults on a number of fronts, from reproductive rights to equal pay for equal work, issues that many thought had been resolved but, in fact, have been simmering at a sub-boil for some time. Whether there truly is a “war on women” or it is simply partisan politics is debatable; yet it is clearly symptomatic of the fact that gender issues remain unresolved and polemical.

The number of sexual assaults that the DOD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office(SAPRO) estimates occur each year evidences this fact. In 2010, SAPRO concluded that of the approximately 19,000 sexual assaults that occurred only 3,100 of them were reported. While some assaults were against men, the vast majority were against women. As a consequence, in 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta implemented significant policy changes designed to enhance reporting of assaults or harassment, shift blame away from the victims, and hold perpetrators accountable. Yet, without fundamental changes to the way we (men and women) view women and their role in the military, we’re not likely to see meaningful progress toward any end state—whether characterized by equality, equity, democracy, meritocracy, inclusiveness, decency, fairness, or any combination thereof—that matters.

When I mentioned this essay and its fundamental premise to a coworker, she said sarcastically, “Chivalry is still alive.” She elaborated that outmoded conceptions of gender roles continue to affect our vision of women, and of men, and their proper role in society and with one to the other.

Our hesitancy to allow women into combat arms, among other considerations, might well stem from a fear of upending those historic and faith-based conceptions of gender. We are *weirded out* by the idea that we will have to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with defeminized women or feminized men or both. Given the momentum of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell repeal and the imminent decree that women be allowed to serve in combat arms and attend Ranger School, we need to adjust our thinking—and fast—even though it will be a struggle for many.

Two snippets of dialogue from the movie *G.I. Jane* are instructive of this struggle. They reveal how stereotypes are simultaneously dead-on and far wide of the mark. As a quick refresher, *G.I. Jane* starred Demi Moore as Lt. Jordan O’Neil, an idealistic young naval officer given the opportunity to attend S.E.A.L. training, where her primary instructor and antagonist is Master Chief John Urgayle, played by Viggo Mortensen.

**Lt. Jordan O’Neil:** You were given the Navy Cross right? May I ask what you got it for?
**Master Chief John Urgayle:** Since it bears on this conversation, I got it for pulling a 250-pound man out of a burning tank.

**Lt. Jordan O’Neil:** So stopping to save a man makes you a hero, but if a man stops to help a woman, he’s gone soft?
**Master Chief John Urgayle:** Could you have pulled that man clear? Lieutenant, you couldn’t even haul your own body weight out of the water today.
Lt. Blondell: Lieutenant, why are you doing this?
Lt. Jordan O’Neil: Do you ask the men the same question?
Lt. Blondell: As a matter of fact: yes, I do ask them.
Lt. Jordan O’Neil: And what do they say?
Lt. Blondell: “Cause I get to blow shit up.”

Asking the Right Question

The answer to the question “What is the role of women in the United States Army for the next 20 years?” is simple: the role of women, the role of any minority, should be identical to the role of the majority. In other words, women should be able to do anything they are capable of doing.

If we are truly committed to enacting real change, a more important question to ask ourselves is “What is the role of leaders (the majority of them men) in the U.S. Army over the next 20 years if we’re going to achieve a fully inclusive, operationally effective force?”

Until we answer this question without prejudice or bias, answering the same question about women will yield only cosmetic and marginal results.

Success in the Army, or any military service, should not be determined by race, gender, sexual orientation, or even sexual identity but by one’s competence, period. As I argued in “Soldiers All” (Military Review, November-December 2011), achieving full equity and equality means being blind to difference and, at the same time, open-eyed to the fact that real differences exist. Rather than use these differences to drive wedges among the force, we must become more sophisticated in using these differences to achieve an operational advantage.

We have to be careful not to apply these differences stereotypically or in broad-brush fashion. These differences exist on an individual level more than they exist on a group or sub-population level. Therefore, it’s not that women, by their gender, are more this or that. It is that an individual woman has particular strengths and weaknesses, and the sooner that we learn to focus on and optimize this soldier’s strengths and shore up her weaknesses, the sooner we will become a smarter, more optimized force as a whole.

Our goal must be a singular force that achieves and exploits unity through difference. To achieve this singular force, we must decide the status quo and incremental change are no longer acceptable and must implement efforts that foster radically adjusted mindsets and behaviors at all levels. The actual doing is not the hard part; it is the decision to act that is hard. Moreover, although forcing it
is an option, this decision must really be made on an individual level if it is to be enduring. Here are some thoughts on how to achieve a singular yet diverse force.

**Lead the Way**

In most instances, the American military can rightfully be proud of its efforts to make itself more representative of the nation it swears to defend. It took longer than it should have to allow gay and lesbian soldiers to serve openly, but as Kenneth Karst concludes, “... it is hard to find any other institution in American society that has done better” at integrating minorities.6

Often, the military’s hand is forced, such as Truman’s executive order mandating the full integration of African Americans. Naysayers viewed these mandates as social experiments that would impair military readiness. However, research tended to prove otherwise. With each integration—whether it was religious, ethnic, racial, or sexual minority—we expanded our capacity to deal with an increasingly complex, globalized, and interconnected world.

Perhaps because the integration of minorities has always been directive in nature, it has fueled quiet and persistent dissent and a sort of passive-aggressive behavior that insidiously weakens the fabric of the force. The time has come for the Army to champion the inclusion of all minorities openly and proactively, and to say, quite simply, all are welcome.

Entrance into the force should depend on criteria that do not discriminate except to meet minimum essential cognitive and physical standards, proven competence, and a demonstrated willingness to adhere to Army values and standards, period. What this might mean, however, is that admittance of individuals who do not fit neatly into sexual, racial, or ethnic categories, such as those who are transgen-dered, will be allowed. The rationale will be clear: we will want to recruit any individual who enables us to become more sophisticated in our capacity and capability to solve the intractable challenges confronting us.

This same inclusive mindset should simultaneously enable us to value the soldiers who comprise our force today and reject outright any behavior that demonstrates disrespect toward any one of them. The staggering statistics of harassment, rape, and other forms of violence largely directed against women is evidence that there is vast room for improvement. However, we can no longer afford to solve this and related problems through reactive, overly prescriptive, and top-down-driven solutions. Instead, we must quickly engender system-wide, bottom-up acceptance of difference, otherness, and diversity.

The momentum is there with the repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell and the impending policy change to allow women into combat arms. We need to continue, even accelerate, this momentum. The more barriers we eliminate, the more each soldier feels valued for his or her unique contribution and the more quickly we can become an operationally adaptive, resourceful, resilient, and optimized force.

**Renormalize Standards**

The main issues that continue to center the debate about the proper role of women in the Army and military are physical and biological differences and the degree to which they affect, or should affect, the integration of women into physically demanding roles. As Catherine Aspy, a Harvard graduate and former soldier, argues: “Combat is not primarily about brains, or patriotism, or dedication to duty. There is no question women soldiers have those in abundance. Combat is about war-fighting capacity and the morale of the unit. Here physical strength can be a life-and-death issue. And that is why the physical disparities between men and women cannot be ignored.”7

This matter is, without question, one of life or death, and Aspy is correct: one cannot ignore physical disparities. However, this fact should not shut down options, merely give gravity to the decisions that senior leaders make in dealing with it. One of the hallmarks of being an American is the opportunity to dream big and realize one’s dreams through pluck, tenacity, and hard work. The goal should be to maximize opportunities for all soldiers, to favor inclusion over exclusion, to widen opportunities for advancement, and help as many soldiers as possible achieve these opportunities, while minimizing obstacles and barriers.

This does not mean lowering standards. Rather, it means establishing the right standards for the task based on a range of factors that themselves are researched, measured, evaluated, reevaluated, second-guessed, and explained thoroughly and
clearly. The challenge will be to create these standards without pre-bias, colored by tacit or stereotypical thinking. The process by which the Department of Defense formulates standards must be explicit and transparent, as well as open to reasonable and defensible changes that account for new research or evidence. These standards must also account for the ways that technology is enabling physical difference to be offset and leveled.

In the end, we may not all agree with certain specific standards that are established, but there should be broad agreement on their formulation. A strong female soldier or weak male soldier should equally believe that the standards, while tough, are fair and attainable; and both should be given an equal chance and, more importantly, equal encouragement to attain them.

Be Vigilant, Be Vocal
The “mindset reset” that I am advocating will not be easy. The naysayers will be many, and though they are losing ground, they are still potent and, in some instances, dangerous.

When asked by CNN how she felt about the wave of recent legislation infringing on women’s rights, such as the Virginia law requiring women to have an ultrasound first before an abortion, Eve Ensler, the author of The Vagina Monologues, said that she pitied those seeking to control women’s sexual and reproductive rights. “To some degree, the world has changed,” she said. “And they don’t know what to do in the new world.” In short, their effort to limit women’s rights is a “last-gasp” retaliation against the inevitability of complete liberation and full equality; but it is in their last gasp that opponents of change can be most vociferous and vicious.

The Soldier’s Creed states that, “I will never leave a fallen comrade.” If we truly and fully accept Army values and creeds, then we will quickly find ourselves incapable of accepting or enabling those who deny, denigrate, or demoralize fellow soldiers. We will feel duty-bound (and gladly so) to speak against intolerance and hatred every time it is muttered or spewed. And we most certainly will shun, even incarcerate if necessary, those who fell a comrade in the first place through harassment or violence, and we will take the steps necessary to discharge them from service.

As Albert Einstein intoned, the world is dangerous not because of evil people but because of those who do nothing about it. More often than not, evil people manifest their depravity by targeting and preying upon others, typically a minority or minorities. It fuels their egos and quest for power. About the only way, and the best way, to siphon off this fuel is to erase difference or otherness. Yes, it is utopian and damned difficult to achieve, but not impossible. It is certainly easier when the foe is clear, definable, something to which we can all point to and say, “Bad, wrong, stop, or I will make you stop.” It is far more difficult when the foe—whether it is prejudice, bigotry, bias, or subtle forms of harassment—is more tacit, hazy, and diffuse.

Years ago, a boss articulated a common precept of leadership that might be shorthanded as “trust on credit.” He called it his prime directive. It said, “I assume you are good, decent, and desire to do the right and noble thing and will extend trust under that assumption until you prove otherwise.” Like any precept of the Warrior Ethos, never leaving a fallen comrade should not be merely a forced obligation but a willful choice borne of the view that every fellow soldier is an equal comrade in the first place.

Inform (Educate) and Influence
Overcoming prejudice, bigotry, malign behavior, and violence directed against fellow soldiers is a form of counterinsurgency, something we have become adept at over the past decade. Our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, among other places, has taught us how powerful informing and influencing can be in achieving mission objectives. These tandem tasks are now foundational to leadership under the mission command construct, and they must be employed swiftly and conscientiously in the fight against intolerance.

Yet the change being advocated cannot be commanded, commandeered, or coerced. As stated earlier, educating, training, and Influencing inclusive and welcoming perceptions and behaviors among the force must become less reactive, prescriptive,
and top-down. Commanders set the tone and nothing is more important. They must be accountable for creating environments that are mission-focused but never at the expense of any individual or sub-group. The challenge will be the one expressed by two individuals interviewed for the *New York Times* article “Black? White? Asian? More Young Americans Choose All of the Above”: “I don’t want a color-blind society at all,” Ms. Wood said. “I just want both my races to be acknowledged.” Ms. López-Mullins countered, “I want mine not to matter.”

At the end of the day, the soldiers themselves must foster a fully inclusive force that treats everyone on his or her own merits, and we should do everything possible to empower them to create new models, strategies, and tactics for achieving this end state.

**The Role of One, the Role of All**

The role of women in the Army over the next 20 years is to fight and win. It is the same role as that for men, for African Americans, for Asian Americans, for gays, for lesbians, for Filipino Americans, for Norwegian Americans, for gay Cuban Americans, for lesbian Norwegian Filipino Americans and every shade, star, and stripe in between. That is why the asterisk appears in the title of the essay. Substitute any class or category.
you wish—if they are American soldiers, their mission is to fight and win.

Rather than debate the reasons why any given class or category cannot or should not be included in the all-inclusive category of “fighters and winners,” we should dedicate our energies to fostering reasons they should. Army leaders have always encouraged soldiers to achieve their fullest potential and fulfill their aspirations, but sometimes within artificial constraints or boundaries dictated by antiquated and stereotypical thinking. There is no better time than right now, prompted by a question such as this one, to reshape our thinking and radically adjust our mindset in a positive and proactive way.

In the distant future, we will be a blended nation, all of us some shade of brown; our distinctness and otherness will be erased. Or will it? At root is the very human fear of losing our individual identity. Unfortunately, history has tended to base this identity on the wrong criteria. It is not about how we look but how we act and exemplify Army values.

I don’t know about you, but I am not afraid to act like a woman. MR

NOTES

8. Wayne Drash and Jessica Ravitz.

Joss Whedon speaks powerfully to the issue of equality, particularly gender equality. Click on image above to watch. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cYaczoJMRhs
IN 1990, RETIRED Lt. Gen. (then Col.) L.D. Holder wrote an article for Military Review titled “Concept of the Operation—See Ops Overlay.” In the article, Holder voiced his concerns that the Army was drifting away from the standard field order and that leader focus had shifted away from what was required to win a combined arms fight. Holder argued that an over reliance on a rigid, methodical planning process and the relatively new doctrinal addition of commander’s intent had left many orders without an appropriate concept of operations paragraph and subsequently left subordinates without a clear understanding of the operation. In essence, leaders were losing the balance between the “art” and the “science” of writing effective mission orders.

Over the past decade of persistent conflict, many Army leaders have again distanced themselves from the “art” of effective orders production. Officers have learned to create expert multi-paged concept of operations (CONOPs) in electronic media as a tool to provide situational awareness to higher echelons and to assist in the allocation of resources. These CONOP slides rarely convey the actual concept of the operation and usually consist of poorly drawn intent symbols on satellite imagery and a task and purpose for each element. While the slides have some utility, they never were intended to be used as a briefing tool for company commanders and platoon leaders. Using these products, instead of doctrinally complete mission orders, could lead to a disjointed understanding of the concept of operations in a combined arms fight. The undesired effect of this process has created a generation of officers unfamiliar with the doctrinally correct way to write effective mission orders.

Multiple changes to doctrine over the last decade have contributed to a lack of understanding. Although current doctrine clearly defines the contents of the concept of operation paragraph, many leaders are guilty of relying on knowledge acquired during the Captain’s Career Course or the Command and
General Staff College (CGSC). Depending on how long ago the leader attended these courses, his or her doctrinal knowledge may be outdated. This article defines what current doctrine requires for production of effective mission orders, while focusing on what Holder argued in 1990 was the most important part of the order: the commander’s intent and the concept of operation.

To address this growing concern, we have to start with a common understanding of how our Army fights. Unified land operations are executed through decisive action by means of the Army’s core competencies and guided by mission command. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 defines unified land operations as the ability to—

“seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.”

Unified land operations are executed through decisive action.

Decisive Action

Decisive action is the “continuous, simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks.” When conducting operations outside of the United States and its territories, the Army simultaneously combines three elements—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines the elements of defense support of civil authorities and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland security. Decisive action is conducted by means of the Army’s core competencies.

Army’s Core Competencies

The Army has two core competencies: combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Combined arms maneuver is “the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative.” Wide area security is “the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains to retain the initiative.”

These two core competencies provide a focus and construct for understanding how Army forces use combined arms to achieve success. As an Army, we are guided by mission command.

Mission Command

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command, defines “philosophy” as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders. It enables disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”

To exercise authority and direction using mission orders, leaders must understand what a doctrinally correct mission order looks like. Holder stated, “Because tight centralized control of operations isn’t possible or desirable . . . all regimental leaders must train their juniors to do the right things and then trust them to act independently . . . Leaders must teach and practice mission orders.” To do this, we must understand and utilize the Army operations process.

Operations Process

For many, Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operations Process, Appendix E, “Army Operation Plan and Order Format” was the starting point for doctrinally correct order writing. Since the release of ADRP 5-0 in May of 2012, that appendix is now gone. Leaders and staff officers now must consult Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, Chapter 12, “Plans and Orders.” Luckily for those who committed Appendix E to memory, Chapter 12 is very similar. Although this document is the current doctrinal guide, it will soon be outdated with the release of Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff Organizations and Operations, which, as of 15 May 2013, was in signature draft development. After its eventual publication, FM 6-0 will be the one-stop location for commanders and staffs to reference doctrinally correct orders formats.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0 states that the “unit’s task organization, mission
statement, commander’s intent, concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions, and control measures are the key components of a plan." As we look at these components, task organization and mission are typically directed by what is available and the leader’s immediate higher headquarters. The commander and staff must create the commander’s intent and concept of operation through the operations process. The remaining elements—tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions, and control measures—should follow naturally from well-developed commander’s intent and concept of the operation paragraphs. As a result, the development of the commander’s intent and the concept of operation are of paramount importance and must be well developed.

To achieve this goal, Army leaders use three planning methods: Army design methodology, the military decision making process, and troop leading procedures. During the planning process, commanders must create intent and concept based upon their understanding of mission (task and purpose) and the higher concept one and two levels up. Tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions, and control measures are created from course of action development and a thorough, well-planned concept of the operation.

For the purpose of illustration, we will reference a fictitious battalion-level operations order used in a practical exercise at the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course. For the sake of brevity, the information provided below is a summary of the situation paragraph from that operations order.

**General Situation**

Recent success of 4ID combat operations led to the capitulation of the Iraqi V Corps Headquarters and regular army forces in and around LUSOM. Due to the V Corps’ surrender, the Nanda and Ramses divisions are currently repositioning to the south and east to establish defensive positions vic [vicinity of] BAYJI and KIRKUK. The two mechanized BDEs [brigades] of the Nanda Division have established a hasty defense vic BAYJI and have been in position for approximately 12 hours. The armor BDE of the Nanda Division is currently moving south along HWY 1. INTEL sources indicate that a BDE from the Ramses Division vic KIRKUK is preparing to move southwest towards BAYJI to reinforce the Nanda Division defenses. It is estimated that CFLCC [Coalition Forces Land Component Command] and division shaping operations have left the Nanda Division at 60-70% strength and the Ramses Division at 55% strength. The 4ID is preparing to attack east to destroy the remaining Nanda Division forces and fix the Ramses Division to prevent the disruption of the CFLCC DO [decisive operation](3ID vic Baghdad) from the north.

**Enemy Forces**

DISPOSITION: The 114th BDE currently has 3 BNs [battalions] deployed in a disruption zone defending key crossing sites along the Thar Thar wadi. Decisive to the Brigade Commander is the retention of the wadi crossing sites for up to 48 hours. This is decisive because it prevents the US from massing on the division DO (MDA vic BAYJI). He will accomplish this through a strongpoint defense. The BN in the north (BDE DO) will destroy enemy forces in order to prevent an organized ATK [attack] on the division DO. The BN in the middle will block enemy forces in order to prevent envelopment of the BDE DO. The BN to the south will fix in order to prevent bypass of the BDE DO. An armor company is the BNERES [battalion reserve]. Fedayeen forces will operate independently of Army and will be utilized as disruption forces throughout the AO [area of operation]. Indirect fires will be used to neutralize mounted forces then destroy dismounted infantry and engineer forces to prevent US forces massing on the BDE DO. The purpose of engineers is counter-mobility and then survivability. The purpose of air defense is to destroy enemy aircraft in order to prevent the massing of CAS [close air support] on the BN positions. Continued loss of combat power will result in a
withdrawal under pressure towards the MDA vic BAYJI. His desired endstate is to have pushed US forces south and west allowing time for the division DO to complete defensive preparations in BAYJI.

**1BCT MISSION:** 1ABCT attacks 182200NOVXX to seize crossing sites along the Thar Thar Wadi to pass the division DO (3ABCT) east to BAYJI (OBJ TIGER).

**1BCT COMMANDER’S INTENT:**

Expanded Purpose: Facilitate 3ABCT seizure of OBJ Tiger

Key Tasks:
- Breach obstacles.
- Integrate fires into the maneuver plan.
- Synchronize maneuver in order to maintain the tempo of the operation.
- Conduct FPOL with 3 ABCT.

Endstate: Key crossing sites seized, enemy forces neutralized, collateral damage minimized and the BCT prepared for future operations.

**Concept of the Operation:** 1ABCT will accomplish this by conducting a penetration along multiple axes with TF 1-22 (DO) attacking to the south and TF 1-66 attacking to the north. Decisive to this operation is the seizure of OBJ LION. This is decisive because it will allow the division DO to attack east to BAYJI along an improved highway with a fixed crossing site over the wadi. Critical to this operation is the destruction of enemy reconnaissance forces west of the wadi and rapid improvement of crossing sites and passage operations.

**Decisive Operation (DO):** TF 1-22 attacks to seize OBJ [objective] LION in order to pass the division DO east to BAYJI.

**Shaping Operations:** TF 1-66 attacks to seize OBJ WOLF to prevent the disruption of the 1ABCT DO in the south and provide an additional crossing site for 3ABCT. 7/10 CAV initially follows TF 1-22 then guards south of PL [phase line] FLORIDA to prevent disruption of the 3ABCT attack from the south. CAS will destroy the 114th ADA [air defense artillery] and FA [field artillery] assets to prevent them from interfering with the DO. Fires will suppress enemy armor and destroy enemy infantry forces to assist breaching operations. Engineers will provide mobility by breaching obstacles to pass the ABCT DO. Reconnaissance and security operations will focus on identifying the disposition of 1st echelon forces and locating the 114th BDE FA BN.

**The deception objective is:** The commander of the 114th BDE commits his reserve in the north vic OBJ WOLF. The deception story is that the 1ABCT DO is in the north with the following indicators: TF 1-66 attacks in the north at H-1, and an initial focus of CAS and early commitment of an Attack AVN [aviation] BN to destroy enemy force vic OBJ WOLF. The desired deception result is that the 114th BDE reserve is unable to influence the ABCT DO on OBJ LION.

**Tactical Risk:** is assumed by the limited use of the ABCT reconnaissance battalion prior to the DO. This will be mitigated by additional CAS providing armed reconnaissance, additional fire support, and additional attack AVN support provided to each Task Force during the DO.

**Endstate:** TF 1-66 has seized OBJ WOLF, TF 1-22 has seized OBJ LION, 7/10 CAV has been passed and is conducting a guard south of PL FLORIDA, the ABCT is prepared to pass the division DO east along RTE [route] T-BIRD and/or RTE CAMARO (TF 1-66 AR) and enemy forces are unable to influence the passage of 3ABCT, the division DO.

2. **MISSION.** TF 1-22 attacks 182200NOVXX to seize OBJ LION in order to pass the DIV DO (3ABCT) east to BAYJI (OBJ TIGER)⁹
Commander’s Intent

As described in ADRP 5-0, the commander’s intent “succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation. It includes the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and the conditions that define the end state. It links the mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units. A clear commander’s intent facilitates a shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions that represent mission accomplishment.”

Commander’s intent, when used properly, should bridge the gap between the mission and the concept of operations. A clear commander’s intent enables a shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions that represent mission accomplishment. During execution, the commander’s intent spurs disciplined initiative. Notice that in the illustration below, the TF 1-22 commander provides the expanded purpose that is broader in scope than the purpose in the mission statement. Since his battalion is the decisive operation for the brigade, and the brigade is a shaping operation for the division, it is appropriate for the TF 1-22 expanded purpose to be broader than the brigade’s purpose, but more narrow than the division purpose. The commander has also identified key tasks that his unit must accomplish. These key tasks are incorporated into every course of action that his staff develops. Finally, the conditions that represent the end state are broad in nature and represent the conditions that must be set in terms of terrain, civil, and enemy forces in relationship to TF 1-22. Again, all of these conditions must be set by any course of action that is developed for consideration.

Commander’s intent, however, is not a comprehensive statement that leads to mission success. If subordinates do not have a clear understanding of the concept of the operation, leaders will simply execute at the whim or the initiative of whoever is in the lead. When discussing an overreliance on intent, Holder stated, “When we do this, however, we omit the unifying element of the plan, the idea that pulls everything together, which is the commander’s concept of what he wants to make happen and how he plans to accomplish his goal.”

In preparation for 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment’s deployment to Iraq, Maj. Gen. McMaster echoed Holder’s words in a letter to his regimental leaders dated 25 January 2005. Then-Col. McMaster stated the following:

The concept of operation is the most important part of the order and, since the 1990s, most of our Army has not done this well. The result is that we tend to overwrite intent and then go immediately into a detailed scheme of maneuver. It is one of the reasons why we often tend to fall out of plans prematurely. The concept is the only element of an order
in which commanders communicate how all of their forces will combine efforts to accomplish the mission. It should cover the type of offensive, defensive, reconnaissance, or security operation; describe forms of maneuver; identify formations; describe actions on contact; describe the timing of the operation; define the cooperation between maneuver forces at critical points in the fight; and describe how all arms will be coordinated. In short, the concept is important because it explains how the commander visualizes the operation—it tells the story of the operation or battle. A good concept permits units to take initiative within the intent and assists subordinate commanders in nesting their efforts with their higher headquarters and adjacent units.”

Concept of the Operation

As stated in ADRP 5-0, the concept of the operation is a “statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state.”13 The concept of the operation expands the commander’s intent by describing how the commander wants the force to accomplish the mission. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement one another.

Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. An established operational framework and associated vocabulary can assist tremendously in this task. Army leaders are not bound by any specific framework for conceptually organizing operations, but three operational frameworks have proven valuable in the past.14 These are—

● Deep-close security (typically used in operational or strategic level plans only).
● Decisive, shaping, sustaining (always used in tactical and operational level plans).
● Main and supporting efforts (used to allocate resources and support by phase).

Although the designation of decisive, shaping, or sustaining operations does not change throughout the mission, the designation of main effort and supporting effort will typically change from one phase to another throughout the course of the operation. The main effort is defined as a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success.15 The supporting effort is defined as a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort.16 While this may appear confusing at first, it is actually quite simple. The designation of main effort and supporting effort assists in allocating resources by phase of the operation and determines priorities of support. It stands to reason that a shaping operation would be the main effort during the initial phases of the operation as it is creating or preserving favorable conditions for the decisive operation. Therefore, it also stands to reason that, during the phase that includes the decisive point of the operation, the decisive operation is the main effort and will be allocated a significant portion of the available resources and support.

ADRP 5-0 defines the Concept of Operation as “a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state.”17

3A. TF CDR’s INTENT

Expanded Purpose: Facilitate 3ABCT seizure of Bayji (OBJ Tiger)

Key Tasks:

● Seize crossing sites.
● Neutralize enemy AT [anti-tank] systems.
● Pass friendly forces east from PL KILLEEN to PL VIRGINIA.
● Minimize collateral damage to bridges across the wadi system.
● BPT [be prepared to] to defeat enemy CATK in zone.

Endstate: Key crossing sites seized, enemy neutralized in zone, collateral damage minimized, and the battalion posture for future operations.
3B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

Concept of the Operation. We will accomplish this by conducting a penetration. Decisive to the operation is the seizure of OBJ LION EAST. This is decisive because it controls the crossing sites over the Thar Thar Wadi to pass the DIV DO east to BAYJI. Critical to this operation is the destruction of enemy forces in the disruption zone west of PL ALABAMA, passage of the TF DO onto OBJ LION EAST, and rapidly setting the conditions for passage of the DIV DO.

Decisive Operation: TM D seizes OBJ LION EAST in order to pass the DIV DO east to BAYJI and establishes BP 4.

Shaping Operations: TM C moves along AXIS SAW and establishes ABF PSN #3 in order to fix the enemy on OBJ COUGAR (O/O seize and establish BP 3) to prevent the enemy from repositioning against the TF DO. A/1-4 AVN attacks to destroy enemy reconnaissance forces in the disruption zone in support of TM C. The TF MB will move along AXIS HAMMER and AXIS NAIL with TM B and TM A forward followed by TM D (DO) and the TF RES. TM B destroys enemy forces on OBJ BEAR in order to prevent the enemy from disrupting the TF DO and establishes BP 1. TM A seizes OBJ LION WEST in order to pass the TF DO onto OBJ LION EAST and establishes BP 2. A/1-4 AV destroys enemy forces on OBJ LION WEST in order to prevent enemy forces from disrupting TM A breaching operations; and then destroys enemy forces on OBJ LION EAST in support of TM D. The purpose of fires is to disrupt enemy reconnaissance assets in the disruption zone, then to disrupt enemy armor on OBJs COUGAR and LION to prevent massing of direct fires against the TF DO. The purpose of CAS is to destroy enemy armor and indirect fire assets. The purpose of engineers initially is to provide mobility by breaching obstacles and improving crossing sites, then provide counter-mobility.

Tactical Risk is assumed by the use of limited combat power for the deception operation. This will be mitigated by additional fires support during PH I, phased CCA support until the TF MB crosses PL ALABAMA, and use of CAS on OBJs LION EAST and COUGAR during PH II and PH III. Additionally, the TF FAS and MCP will be in close proximity of TM C throughout the operation.

TF Reconnaissance and Security operations will focus on identifying the location and disposition of the 114th BN within the disruption zone.

Sustaining Operations: The FSC will establish vic AA REGULAR with MSR FORD as the primary route used to sustain combat power during the attack and MSR CHEVY as the primary route after the attack.

The deception objective is: The Enemy BN CDR commits his Reserve to OBJ COUGAR. The deception is that the TF DO is in the north vic OBJ COUGAR with the following indicators: TF Scouts operating initially in the northern portion of the enemy’s disruption zone, FA Fires initially focused in the north, early commitment of A/1-4 AV in the north along AXIS SAW and TM C attacking east along AXIS SAW prior to TF MB LD.

Endstate is: the TF is prepared to pass 7/10 CAV and 3ABCT from CP 1 to CP 6 with TM C securing OBJ COUGAR and occupying BP 3, TM B securing OBJ BEAR and occupying BP 1, TM A securing OBJ LION WEST and occupying BP 2 and TM D securing OBJ LION EAST and occupying BP 4 postured to defeat ENY CATKs from PL CAROLINA to PL VIRGINIA.18
The concept of the operation paragraph is more specific than the commander’s intent. Its purpose is to assist the subordinate leader’s visualization of the plan. A successful concept of the operation paragraph will clearly define the decisive point, the tactical risk and how to mitigate it, and the essential task and purpose for each element. Most importantly, the paragraph explains where the decisive point is, how the decisive operation will achieve the decisive point, and how each shaping operation’s purpose is nested to create conditions for the decisive operation. The task and purpose from the concept of the operation paragraph is the essential task and purpose for each subordinate element, and therefore it will be the task and purpose in their mission statements. If each subordinate element clearly understands the commander’s intent and how its task and purpose relates to the other elements, subordinate leaders will be able to exercise disciplined initiative in the face of changing conditions or when the scheme of maneuver no longer applies. The quality of the concept of the operation paragraph and the clarity with which it is communicated to subordinate leaders can mean the difference between success or failure in combat.

The concept should expand upon the commander’s intent, describing how he wants the force to accomplish the mission. The concept of operation describes the combined arms fight from the line of departure to the limit of advance, while succinctly defining what each subordinate unit will accomplish. It should be a well-written paragraph that enables subordinates to visualize how, when, and where their unit will contribute to mission accomplishment.

See the example of the TF 1-22 (3B. Concept of the Operation). This is a good written example that clearly describes the essential task of each of the subordinate units and how their purposes are nested to accomplish the task force mission. It also clearly describes how artillery, close air support, and close combat attack aviation will be used to set conditions for success.

At the Maneuver Captains Career Course, common tactics, techniques, and procedures shared with the captains to brief concept of operation effectively is using the course of action (COA) statement using the COA Sketch. Students brief the following:

- Form of maneuver or defense.
- Decisive point of the operation and why it is decisive. This is not simply repeating the purpose of the operation, this is a specific justification of the decisive point that is correctly nested with the essential task (e.g., terrain or enemy focused).
- Operational risk and how it will be mitigated (operational risk is based upon a conscious decision to accept risk in the course of action. It is not an inherent risk).
- Task and purpose of the decisive operation (vertically nested in support of the higher echelon’s essential task and overall purpose) and shaping operations (horizontally nested to support the decisive operation). Finally, the purpose of key enablers (e.g., air defense artillery, field artillery engineers, combat aviation, and others).
- Endstate (This is not the same as the commander’s intent endstate. It should be specific with respect to the selected COA, whereas the commander’s intent endstate is not tied to any one COA. The endstate should define what the organization has accomplished with respect to its task[s] and purpose[s], where the force is located, and what the force is prepared to do.)

After briefing these items from the COA statement, the full description of the concept is briefed from start to finish using the COA sketch. The concept should read like a story and provide clarity. The story must include all of the phases, when they begin and end, any critical events, and any essential tasks. The story must describe the actions of all enablers to better understand the combined arms fight. As Holder stated in 1990:

A clear, specific concept of operations does not automatically commit a commander to micromanagement. As he writes his concept, the commander should observe our established operational guideline that calls for subordinates to get the greatest possible freedom of action consistent with accomplishing the mission. If, however, the force is to be used in any coordinated fashion, it cannot be expected to succeed by “swanning about,” following the unguided initiative of whoever is in the lead. Some directed cooperation will have to take place. This is
not excessive or unnecessary interference with a subordinate’s initiative. It is simply the way combined arms operations work.19

Conclusion
In recent combat operations, many offensive missions have been hastily planned in reaction to an enemy attack or sudden change in the operational environment. When conducting hasty planning, many leaders may “hand wave” the concept of the operation paragraph, failing to realize that it is where they need to spend the most effort. The quality of the concept of the operation paragraph and the clarity with which it is communicated to subordinate leaders can mean the difference between success or failure in combat. To communicate a clear concept of the operation, leaders must understand doctrine and practice the art of mission command.

As we transition out of Afghanistan and focus our attention on training and preparing for the next fight, we must use this opportunity to train the next generation of Army leaders to write proper mission orders. The decisive action training environment will provide an excellent environment in which to train this task to standard. An environment with uncertain conditions and a hybrid threat in one of the combat training centers will necessitate the use of clear commander’s intent and concept of the operation, thereby enabling effective mission command. Holder’s admonition of a clearly written concept of the operation paragraph is as relevant today, if not more so, than when he expressed it in *Military Review* over 20 years ago. *MR*

NOTES

2. Ibid., 2-2.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 2-9.
5. Ibid.
8. Ibid. 2-4.
10. ADRP 5-0, 2-19.
13. ADRP 5-0, 2-19.
14. ADRP 3-0, 1-9.
15. Ibid., Glossary-4.
16. Ibid., Glossary-6.
17. ADRP 5-0, 2-19.
18. Maneuver Center of Excellence, Block A2: ABCT Offense Operations Order.
Applying Principles of Counterinsurgency to the Fight Against Sexual Assault in the Military

Countering the Insurgency within Our Ranks

1st Lt. Chad R. Christian

AFTER OVER A decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan combating a violent insurgency of extremists, the U.S. military is now facing a new fight with another violent enemy—one hidden within our own ranks. Failures in leadership and the lack of personal accountability within our formations ensure this enemy’s survival. Leaders fail to create a culture of respect and professionalism, provide an environment that is safe and supportive of victims, deliberately investigate accusations, and ruthlessly prosecute offenders. While the battlefield and enemy have changed, the principles of warfare remain the same. The Army should use the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan to more effectively combat the current war against sexual predators in the Armed Forces.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are very complex and have been the topic of numerous books, articles, and debates over the last decade. There are six fundamental principles of COIN that apply to all counterinsurgency operations. Examining these principles and applying them in conjunction with lessons learned in Afghanistan may help the military to end sexual assault.

Fundamental Principles of COIN

Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, defines COIN as military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. COIN is a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations spanning multiple agencies. To be successful, COIN requires cooperation on all levels. Just like COIN, the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program includes multiple organizations, such as the Army Community Service, Family Advocacy Program, and the Criminal Investigations Division.

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PHOTO: (DOD)
FM 3-24 devotes an entire chapter to discussing the importance of integrating civilian and military activities into counterinsurgency operations. It also investigates how insurgents strive to disguise their intentions, and when successful, make COIN operations extremely difficult. Insurgencies take many different forms, and while each is unique, they tend to share certain commonalities. Although the structure, level of organization, and goals of each insurgent group may vary, fundamental COIN principles are applicable to all insurgent groups.

- Identify insurgent motivations and depth of commitment.
- Identify likely insurgent weapons and tactics.
- Identify the operational environment in which insurgents seek to initiate and develop their campaign and strategy.
- Stabilize the area of operation to facilitate the local government’s ability to provide for the local populace.
- Conduct education and information operations targeting insurgents, victims, and potential victims.

- Train the indigenous government and security forces to conduct effective COIN operations independently.

**Identify insurgent motivation and depth of commitment.** An insurgent’s level of commitment and drive correlates to various motivating factors. For example, a hardline Islamic extremist who is motivated by a convoluted view of religious duty, a hatred for Western culture, and disgust of the basic concept of freedom will not negotiate. However, myriad factors motivate large numbers of the local population in Afghanistan to cooperate with insurgents. In many cases the Taliban intimidate the local populace and coerce them into action by providing or limiting certain resources or services. In many villages, the Taliban demand cooperation and support from the population—resistance results in threats to destroy homes, crops and livelihood, or even death. Another motivating factor is economic necessity. Afghan families typically depend on the men for survival. Many of the men have no ideological commitment to the insurgent cause, but monetary...
compensation is incentive enough to convince them to plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or become an informant for the Taliban. Analysis of the insurgents’ motivation and strategy will shape counterinsurgency operations.

**Identify likely insurgent weapons and tactics.** Understanding the potential weapons and tactics a unit is likely to encounter is vital to planning effective COIN operations. While one area of operations may primarily face the threat of remote control or pressure plate IEDs, another may be more vulnerable to dismounted IEDs, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms attacks. Some insurgent groups utilize cell phones, while others primarily rely on two-way radios for communication. If a commander can identify specific weapon systems or tactics used to target his soldiers, he can request the proper assets to effectively target the enemy and ensure his soldiers receive the proper training to identify potential threats and avoid becoming an easy target.

Insurgents routinely attempt to sow discourse among the people, planting seeds of doubt relating to the ability of the government to provide a safe environment for the people. If insurgents can show that the government cannot protect the people, the government loses credibility and victims will be more hesitant to report insurgent abuses.

**Identify the operational environment in which insurgents seek to initiate and develop their campaign and strategy.** Insurgents are most successful when they can operate on their own terms, and will always attempt to operate in an environment that provides them a distinct advantage. Insurgents capitalize on weaknesses in the local government and attempt to manipulate the populace by spreading intimidation and fear. They often attempt to camouflage themselves among the local populace or security forces. In many cases, even the indigenous forces cannot recognize the imposters. Despite this challenge, U.S. and coalition forces continue to treat all security forces with dignity and respect, while simultaneously enacting preventative controls and procedures designed to serve as a safeguard against potential attacks from within.

Col. Timothy K. Deady, in a *Parameters* article he wrote in 2005, contends that America’s strategy in the Philippines was successful because the United States “effectively targeted both the insurgents’ strategic and operational centers of gravity. The oft-repeated observation of Mao Zedong, arguably the most successful insurgent leader of the 20th century, bears repeating: ‘The people are the sea in which the insurgent fish swims and draws strength.’ . . . As American garrisons drained the local lakes, the insurgent fish became easier to isolate and catch.”

Ultimately, the success of COIN operations is dependent on many factors, but is specifically linked to the capability of the local government and security forces and the level of support the insurgents receive from external sources and the local populace.

**Stabilize the area of operation to facilitate the local government’s ability to provide for the local populace.** FM 3-24 notes that platoon and squad-size elements execute most COIN operations. Commanders must train leaders at the lowest echelons to act intelligently and independently—then trust them. Insurgents succeed by sowing chaos and disorder anywhere, while the government fails unless it maintains a degree of order everywhere. Stability is the bedrock of counterinsurgency operations—without it no other aspects of COIN can be successful. After stabilizing a region, U.S. and coalition forces can shift the focus to providing training and education to the local government and security forces.

**Stability is the bedrock of counterinsurgency operations—without it no other aspects of COIN can be successful.**

**Conduct education and information operations targeting insurgents, victims, and potential victims.** Mobilizing popular support is vital to the success of any COIN operation. Information operations (IO) capabilities include collecting, controlling, exploiting, and protecting information. All levels of the service components should integrate information operations. One key element of IO is counterpropaganda. Insurgents rely on manipulating the local populace into distrusting the local government. Many local nationals are not informed and do not realize what their government and host security forces are doing to combat the insurgency.
Education is vital to the success of COIN operations. Local governments must provide a safe environment, free of intimidation, for victims or potential victims of insurgent intimidation. Without that guarantee, they will continue to act in survival mode with self-preservation being their only goal. Only after they feel comfortable with the security of their new situation will they embrace the government.

**Train the indigenous government and security forces to conduct effective COIN operations independently.** In *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, Seth G. Jones explores the importance of how the local government and its security forces ultimately determine the success of an insurgent group. “Counterinsurgency requires not only the capability of the United States to conduct unconventional war, but, most importantly, the ability to shape the capacity of the indigenous government and its security forces. Most COIN campaigns are not won or lost by external forces, but by indigenous forces.” He concluded, “successful COIN requires an understanding of the nature of the local conflict and the ability to shape the capacity of indigenous actors to conduct an effective counterinsurgency campaign.” The quality and competency of the host nation government and security forces left behind after U.S. and coalition forces have departed will determine the success of COIN operations.

**Using the Principles of COIN to Combat Sexual Harassment/Assault**

“Sexual assault is a crime that has no place in the Department of Defense (DOD). It is an attack on the values we defend and on the cohesion our units demand, and forever changes the lives of victims and their families.” The *Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, Fiscal Year 2012* assesses the prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the active duty force. The survey distinguishes between three categories of sexual offenses:

- Unwanted sexual contact (i.e., rape, or any unwanted sexual physical contact).
- Unwanted gender-related behaviors (i.e., sexual harassment and sexist behaviors).
- Gender discriminatory behaviors and sex discrimination.

While the severity of a crime might vary, there is no room for any form of sexual misconduct within the Armed Forces. Recent events brought to light some problems that were festering beneath the surface of our organizations, and resulted in leaders taking these issues seriously. SHARP is becoming the primary mission of the Armed Forces as we begin to transition from a decade of counterinsurgency operations.

**Principles of COIN applied to SHARP.** As the United States is working to improve COIN, starting in Iraq and continuing to Afghanistan, certain principles emerge that may apply to the war to eradicate sexual predators from within our ranks. The principles of COIN directly correlate to the fight to prevent sexual assault in the military, and apply at the lowest levels of command.

**Identify sexual predators’ motivation and depth of commitment.** As with any insurgency, understanding what drives your enemy to act is vital. With a clear understanding of what drives them to act, coupled with effective preventative measures, some potential perpetrators can be convinced to adjust their lifestyle in ways that would ultimately prevent them from committing these terrible acts. Of course this may not apply to the most violent and deviant sexual predators who are devoted to committing these crimes, leaving a trail of lives in ruin along the way. We can, however, implement effective policies and regulations that have the potential to influence the lives of many service members.

**Identify likely predators’ weapons and tactics.** Like any hunter, sexual predators utilize the most effective weapons available to attack their prey. The substance most widely used to assist in these criminal undertakings is alcohol. There are 362 references to alcohol in the first volume of the DOD Report. The second volume states that for active duty personnel, “overall, 6.1 percent of women and 1.2 percent of men indicated they experienced unwanted sexual contact in 2012.” The term “unwanted sexual contact” means intentional sexual contact that was against a person’s will or which occurred when the person did not or could not consent. This also includes completed or attempted sexual intercourse, sodomy, penetration by an object, and the unwanted touching of genitalia and other sexually-related areas of the body. The report states that of the 6.1 percent of women who indicated experiencing unwanted sexual contact,
47 percent indicated they or their offender had been drinking alcohol before the incident. Additionally, of the 1.2 percent of men who indicated experiencing unwanted sexual contact, 19 percent indicated they or their offender had been drinking alcohol before the incident. Many perpetrators capitalize on the diminished judgment of the victim, using coercion to achieve their objective.

A more deliberate weapon used in sexual assaults is a date rape drug, which quickly incapacitates the victim, eliminating the victim’s ability to resist any unwanted sexual advances. Understanding the weapons and tactics used can help identify effective preventative measures.

Assailants attempt to discredit their victims, hoping the fear of potential shame and embarrassment associated with assaults of this nature will prevent victims from pressing charges. Other predators attempt to intimidate their victims by undermining the command structure and convincing the victims that any attempt to report abuse would have serious repercussions.

If the chain of command doesn’t demonstrate that it can and will hold violators of SHARP accountable and protect its soldiers, sexual harassment and assault victims will be less likely to report abuse, promoting a culture of intimidation and corruption.

**Identify the operational environment in which sexual predators seek to initiate and develop their campaign and strategy.** The same way insurgents attempt to blend in among the local populace or security forces, sexual predators often stay near their peers. There is no “rapist”-tab worn on the left shoulder to identify sexual predators. Assailants are frequently stellar, married soldiers, often highly regarded by their chain of command, and whose accusation comes as a great surprise. As leaders, it is crucial to recognize that competence does not equal character. Throughout our Armed Forces, you can find many individuals who are proficient at their jobs, but morally corrupt.

Understanding how these individuals think and operate is the first step in countering the threat and
creating effective risk mitigation policies. Just as counterinsurgents strive to establish an environment that fosters the good governance for the population, our SHARP efforts should foster an environment that is intolerant of sexual misconduct, eliminating the threat and simultaneously increasing trust in the chain of command to address future issues effectively and fairly. Service members must continue to treat one another with dignity and respect, but must also remain vigilant to ensure they are not vulnerable to attacks from within their own ranks.

Implementing risk mitigation policies does not imply that a potential victim is in any way at fault because of their own actions; however, the fact remains that these predators do exist. This does not mean we must live in a perpetual state of fear, but we must put safeguards in place to decrease the possibility of these crimes being committed. I would have never allowed one of my soldiers to walk alone through a village in Afghanistan. While the majority of Afghans in the village may not harbor any negative feelings toward U.S. soldiers, there are a select few individuals who have nefarious intentions and are lying in wait for an opportunity to strike. The same principle holds true in a garrison environment. The buddy system is a policy created for a very specific reason: for service members to protect one another. We are stronger together.

Leadership is fundamental in creating an environment that is not conducive to sexual misconduct. An unprofessional, undisciplined environment can facilitate sexual assault or harassment. Tolerating inappropriate conversations or activities in the workplace undermines the chain of command’s ability to instill respect and professionalism in the daily operating environment. The success of SHARP programs depends on the capability and involvement of the chain of command, coupled with support provided by outside sources and other service members within our formations.

Stabilize the force to allow commanders to provide for their individual formations. Victims of sexual crimes often know the perpetrator before the assault. It could be a date, acquaintance, co-worker, boss, family member, ex-partner, or neighbor. Commanders should insist on a professional work environment. Inappropriate social interactions outside of a traditional work environment can have negative consequences. A proper respect for command structure is vital to a professional environment. Fraternization increases the potential for the unprofessionalism. This is very dangerous. Conversations becomes less guarded and can begin to include off-color jokes and comments that some may find particularly offensive.

The buddy system is a policy created for a very specific reason: for service members to protect one another. We are stronger together.

Unfortunately, even today there remains an underlying fear of repercussions for those soldiers who are trapped in a hostile or unprofessional work environment. We should empower service members of all ranks and positions to intervene and protect those in danger, without fear of repercussion. Junior noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers should understand they have a professional and moral obligation to intervene when inappropriate behaviors occur. Leaders should not force service members to endure a degrading, offensive atmosphere in the workplace because a complacent command climate allows such behavior to continue uninhibited.

Through all levels of the military, officers and senior noncommissioned officers must ensure that they do not tolerate fraternization, but instill discipline in their subordinates and demand a respectful, professional work environment.

Conduct education and information operations targeting perpetrators, victims, and potential victims. The DOD Report stresses the need for commanders to ensure soldiers understand, for example, that “the consumption of alcohol can impair the judgment of both parties, and the consequences of an alcohol-related sex crime can have a significant and long-lasting impact” on the victim, the offender, unit cohesion, and the readiness of the force.

Sexual predators and potential perpetrators must understand the severe consequences that accompany sexual misconduct. Every member of the Armed
Forces should be able to identify the different types of offenses and the contributing factors, such as irresponsible use of alcohol, which can serve as a catalyst in certain situations. This is where personal responsibility is vital. Some wonder if renewed pressure concerning the prosecution of military commanders for sexual offenses will result in cases being tried, despite a lack of evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the question of fairness involved, the fact is that when alcohol and sexual activity are combined, the parties involved have exposed themselves to claims of sexual misconduct. Effective educational programs will persuade some would-be offenders to act more responsibly, ultimately preventing future assaults.

Recent attention to the growing issue of sexual misconduct has highlighted the need for confidential, safe, and reliable services for victims—services that were unavailable in the past. Now there are numerous services available to provide support to those in need, and it is the responsibility of leaders on every level to ensure their subordinates are aware of the available resources. Victims will only come forward after they are confident their chain of command can be trusted to protect them.

We must empower the victims and potential victims of sexual assault to protect themselves, provide healing, and reprimand the perpetrators.

Train and equip the force with the necessary skills to combat sexual assault from within each formation in the Armed Forces. Just as the Armed Forces have adapted to the ever-evolving operational environments in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 12 years, they too must adapt a counter to an even more insidious threat—sexual assault and sexual harassment. We must continue to provide training and mentorship to each soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, to not only recognize inappropriate behavior, but to have the knowledge, experience, and moral fortitude to stand up for what is right and change the atmosphere within our ranks. The Army’s portion of the DOD Report disclosed that 97 percent of alleged offenders were male and 59 percent were E1-E4.
While commanders are responsible for creating a command climate that exudes professionalism and encourages respect, the lower echelons of leadership will win the war at the platoon, squad, and individual levels. SHARP Stand-Down Days are important to educate and initiate discussion on the topic, but they alone are not enough. Leaders must rigorously enforce the principles of SHARP at every formation, function, office, motor pool, and flight line on a daily basis. Commanders must provide a safe environment for their subordinates. In no way should this be confused with an environment that lacks discipline or encourages laziness. This is about the commander addressing misconduct within the formation. Strong senior leaders must empower strong subordinate leaders to ensure they are setting the proper example and creating an atmosphere conducive to trust and open communication without fear of intimidation or repercussion for doing what is right.

Creating a Culture of Respect

The U.S. Armed Forces is the most adaptable, successful, and morally anchored force in the world. It is national news when senior military leaders fail to uphold certain core values and principles in their daily lives. I am proud to be part of an organization that demands the highest level of moral fortitude from leaders at every level. Frankly, if a leader cannot uphold the high ethical standards expected of officers and senior noncommissioned officers, then they have no place in this organization. How can one be trusted to instill order, discipline, respect, and resilience into their subordinates when they fail to display those qualities in their own lives? We have seen a recent strategic surge to end a problem that is poisoning our formations, but ultimately, the success of this strategy is dependent on the quality of the implementation at the lowest levels. Because of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the agile and adaptive leaders throughout our Armed Forces maintain a certain skill set that can apply at the lowest levels. Commanders must ensure a fair, deliberate process to determine the guilt or innocence of any individual accused of an offense.

The atmosphere within our units must change—complacency must end. Leaders at every level have a professional and moral obligation to become more involved in the lives of their subordinates. This begins by strictly enforcing a professional work environment, but also extends to social situations. We are professionals 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, and must conduct ourselves accordingly. By applying these fundamental principles, we can reshape our approach to SHARP as we continue to promote dignity, respect, and integrity in the fight to end sexual assault in the Armed Forces. MR

NOTES

2. Ibid., chap. 2, “Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities.”
3. Ibid., 1-11.
4. FM 3-24, 1-5.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 1-21.
8. Ibid., E-2.
10. Ibid., 1-15.
15. Ibid., 1-26.
16. Ibid., 1-2.
17. Ibid., E-3.
19. Ibid., 10.
22. Ibid., 2.
23. Ibid., 1.
24. Ibid., 3.
25. Ibid., 4.
26. Ibid., 3. Of the 67 percent of women who did not report USC to a military authority, the main reasons they cited were: they did not want anyone to know (70 percent), they felt uncomfortable making a report (66 percent), and they did not think their report would be kept confidential (51 percent).
THE ELECTRON THEORY OF LEADERSHIP

Enabling Senior Leaders to Really See Their Organizations


It is the vicinity of Bayji, Iraq, and the company charged with defending the forward operationing base (FOB) is staging a mounted combat patrol to conduct a counter-reconnaissance mission. The brigade commander, a colonel, has decided to participate in the patrol to assess the overall security of the FOB and to see first-hand whether subordinate commanders have adhered to his guidance and intent regarding standards and troop leading procedures. Though the company commander and platoon leader are in the patrol, a young staff sergeant leads the patrol and executes the mission superbly, expertly meeting all standards with a by-the-book application of troop leading procedures.

The colonel walks away impressed with the quality of the mission, but unsure of whether the mission was an anomaly. Troubled, he returns to the tactical operations center. As he reflects on the success of the mission, the professionalism and discipline of the junior leaders, and how well planned the missions was, he is still bothered knowing he did not have the time to go on every patrol.

The “ELECTRON THEORY of Leadership” is something of a mix of elementary physics and lessons learned as leaders across the Army have progressed through increasing levels of authority, responsibility, and accountability. As noted in Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army Leadership, one of the key responsibilities of a leader is to have trust and build trust. A tangible way to do this is to have a true understanding of what is happening at the lowest organizational level—the tip of the spear, the edge, or where the rubber meets the road, to apply the most banal analogies.

Electrons and Leadership

What does this have to with electrons? Electrons are the building blocks of atoms, as subordinate units are the building blocks of the military. In a general physics course, the instructor informs the students that science does not allow us to see an electron in its natural state; it is invisible to us. The only way we can see it is to shine a light on it. Unfortunately, the application of light to an electron alters its state. Similarly, when a senior commander visits a subordinate unit, his or her very presence, much like the light to the electron, alters the unit from its natural state. Commanders must understand and mitigate this phenomenon to see through a potential “dog and pony” show and still get an accurate assessment (ground truth) of the unit.
One successful brigade commander described this skill as discernment—a vital meta-competency for senior leaders.

**Discernment:**

*The activity of determining the value and quality of a certain subject or event.*  
(Wikipedia)

*The quality of being able to grasp and comprehend that which is obscure.*  
(Merriam-Webster)

*The ability to judge people well.*  
(Cambridge Dictionary Online)

The following are five methods a unit commander can use to help assess subordinate units without “disturbing the electrons”:

**Continual presence.** The “continual presence” solution involves continuous iterative actions on the part of the senior leader where the leader’s presence is so frequent it no longer creates the “agitation of light on the electron”—the leader’s presence becomes part of the environment. At this point, the leader has gained the ability to see the unit in its natural state. The obvious difficulty with this solution is that it is not sustainable. Continual presence demands too much of the leader’s time, and will inevitably result in some units being left out or the leader’s neglect of other important responsibilities.

**Use of bellwether units.** An alternative to the constant presence solution is the selection of bellwether units. A bellwether unit is an organization that, because of its mission, location, or any other specific and appropriate dynamic, would serve to represent a larger number of units. Thus, through inference, the bellwether unit would allow the leader to “see” more units that he or she can actually visit. Clearly, the leader must exercise great caution and judgment in the selection of bellwether units because the units should represent the composition, character, and nature of other units.

**Use of surrogates.** A third solution to the presence problem is for a leader to allow a surrogate to serve as the eyes and ears at the units. Leaders have often used sergeants major, chaplains, or inspectors general to perform this role, but these representatives face the same problem of agitation or “dog and pony show” by their presence. The ability of a surrogate to truly “see” a unit is often dependent on what happens after they leave. If the visit is routinely followed by some sort of negative outcome, the subordinate command or unit’s openness and trust will evaporate, and the surrogate will be no better able to see the unit than the senior leader. Here, transparency is key.

One proven successful technique is to have relatively junior soldiers help the senior leader see the units. For example, a number of senior leaders have used their drivers to go out and talk to people to try to get a feel for the unit. Drivers are easily recognized by their position and association with “the boss”—it is common for soldiers to open up to them. Often, junior soldiers take advantage of this opportunity to get a message to the boss using an “open door” policy or other opportunity.

Again, this becomes a matter of trust between leaders. Senior leaders should be open to insights from sources of information such as these while at the same time tempering their responses until they have sufficient understanding of the context, usually gained in discussion with the unit leaders. As is the case in most operational environments, overreaction based on a single data point can sometimes be worse than no reaction at all.

A commander within the Army Training and Doctrine Command and with basic combat training used to travel to different posts with “drill sergeants of the year.” After arriving at a training base, the post leadership would often escort the commander, but the drill sergeants were able to get out, explore, talk to their peers, and then report what they saw, heard, and perceived. This feedback was timely and priceless.

Another common technique for a senior leader trying to see reality in their units is to require some sort of standardized presentation, probably PowerPoint, where subordinate leaders brief their “charts.” We have all sat through training briefs with a multitude of slides that measure all things senior leaders need to see and know. The briefings often include key readiness indicators—qualified crews,
manning levels, deployability status, etc.,—but often grow into other measures with questionable relationship to the subject at hand—Association of the United States Army Memberships, Army Family Team Building participation, public school partnerships, or the number of specialists being recommended for promotion. These briefings can and do have a place for senior leaders, but only when what is being measured and briefed is important and relevant to the subject at hand and the amount of information and guidance exchanged is worthy of the time invested.

**Focused telescope.** A further potential solution to the problem of being able to truly see subunits in their natural state is the “focused telescope” approach. This technique is the process where a senior leader selects a key data point or event that is representative of a larger picture of the unit. The leader uses this technique as a lens to examine a specific item or event to “see” many units quickly. Here, it is important to ensure the leader focuses on the right thing—whatever is selected should serve as a true indicator of what the leader really wants to see—and know. As an example, observing an after action review is often a great indicator of the overall performance of a unit.

**Learning what to look for.** Finally, given that a senior leader does not have time to visit each unit frequently enough to become an invisible part of the environment (another electron, maybe), the leader should truly see and feel a unit, even when it is not in its natural state. So while subordinate leaders are introducing the senior leader to great soldiers, the senior leader seeks out soldiers in the shadows. When the subordinate commander shows an arms room, the senior leader insists on visiting another arms room or supply room, selected randomly. When briefed on a successful mission, the senior leader asks about an unsuccessful mission and what changes the unit made based on the lessons learned. The senior leader can sit in on an orders brief, a rehearsal, a training event, or an after action review. Importantly, the visit should not be scheduled or planned. The leader must show up unannounced.
There will be many forces at work to keep this unannounced visit from happening. Subordinate leaders will do their very best to get back on the planned agenda, making the most of all limited opportunities. The aide-de-camp—if the senior leader has one—will be calling ahead to make sure the leader’s time is not wasted. By establishing a climate of trust and communicating clear guidance, the leader will help subordinates overcome their natural resistance to show the total picture—good and bad.

Senior leaders who really want to “see” their subordinate units will use some combination of all these potential methods. While presence is important, constant visits are informative but very difficult. Surrogates expand the leader’s range but must have both the senior leader’s and the subordinates’ complete trust—or the surrogates will not be able to see any more than the commander will. Standardized briefings are useful and can enable identification of organizational and systemic problems; but they can become onerous “oxygen suckers” when they become encyclopedic and extraneous. Bellwether units may offer a senior leader an appropriate representative sample, but all soldiers and subordinates deserve the attention of the leader’s personal time and all the benefits derived from personal interaction. Finally, developing the skills that enable a leader to see the true essence and heart of a unit amidst the artificiality of an official visit is difficult, and leaders learn this ability to discern only by experience.

The leader who can see subordinate units in their natural state will enjoy better situational awareness and be able to tie the strategic, operational, and tactical levels together more seamlessly. The leader will more accurately assess whether his or her guidance and intent is reaching all levels of the command. Through understanding the agitating effect of the “light” provided by their own presence, senior leaders can take the steps described in this paper to “see” their own electrons. MR
A Role for Land Warfare Forces in Overcoming A2/AD


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N A SPEECH to students at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., Gen. Raymond Odierno stated that we are currently living in the most uncertain international scene that he has ever experienced in his 37-year military career. Terrorism, ethnic strife, the overthrow of despotic leaders, and the threat of nuclear weapons in conventional war are just a few reasons many long for the “good old days” of the Cold War. The bad news is that in the face of all these security challenges, the rise of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons systems poses major challenges that could potentially erode the deterrent effect of America’s land warfare forces and render America’s preferred way of battle unexecutable. The good news is that overcoming A2/AD weapons systems is possible, but requires a new focus for portions of America’s land warfare forces. These forces have an essential role in mitigating A2/AD, indeed, refocused land warfare forces will bolster steady state shaping, enhance deterrence, and ensure that in an A2/AD conflict the joint force commander has fully developed, prepared, versatile, and tailorable options. In a nutshell, in a counter-A2/AD campaign, land warfare forces are essential to create, expand, then potentially amplify the tactical gains delivered by the joint force to gain and maintain U.S. advantage.

Central Idea—Land Forces in A2/AD Environments

The so what of A2/AD is that it focuses on mitigating America’s ability to project military force. Strategically, it stymies America’s ability to protect its vital interests in key regions. Operationally, A2/AD prevents America from executing its preferred way of battle. Tactically, A2/AD presents a robust multi-domain defense with long-range offensive capabilities and fires. Figure 1 depicts current land warfare competencies that are directly applicable to overcoming A2/AD in any battle space. Figure 2 depicts three broad mission areas for land warfare forces to mitigate A2/AD: reconnaissance, raids, and seizures. The mission areas of figure 2 suggest the use of counter-A2/AD land warfare forces that include light infantry brigade combat team (BCT) and below-sized units that are rapidly deliverable using high-speed, survivable, horizontal/vertical lift platforms and, in certain scenarios, movement.
via undersea vehicles. To facilitate rapid objective area movement, assaulting land warfare forces must utilize a new generation of smart, light, armed, and all-terrain vehicles. Those ground-forces mobility attributes are consistent with current Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance for a lean, agile, flexible, and ready force. But at the BCT level and below—where fighting happens—existing land warfare forces tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) must be adapted and new ones created to overcome A2/AD’s effects on force security, movement, intelligence, signal, fires, and logistics. These counter-A2/AD TTPs will be different from the permissive condition ones found in counterinsurgency environments.

Lighter units will need to know they are supported in tough A2/AD conditions and that those supporting them understand the mechanics and possess the required expertise. Likewise, BCT systems and equipment must be purpose-built with the rigors of the A2/AD fight in mind. For example, land warfare forces will require integrated, survivable, self-healing tactical and strategic communications; rapidly responsive high-speed joint force fires; and secure, fused national-to-tactical multisource intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Overall, in winning an A2/AD fight, each service has much to offer, but no single service can establish the conditions to win that fight. Now, in the years before the A2/AD confrontation America will need to win, service chiefs and combatant commanders must understand A2/AD, the role of land warfare forces in mitigating A2/AD, and joint force vulnerabilities and dependencies. This ensures the best survivable capabilities are developed and once delivered, put into place as the enabling matrix on which to fix counter-A2/AD TTPs and concepts of operations.

**Countering A2/AD—Why Land Warfare Forces Matter?**

Land warfare forces are vital in prevailing against A2/AD because at the end of the day, not every adversary A2/AD capability of consequence can be mitigated through air force or naval means. Even in A2/AD warfare, with all of its anticipated and appropriate emphasis on technological strength, much warfighting will remain to be done as it has always needed doing: boots on ground at eyeball level.

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**Figure 1: Countering A2/AD**

*Land Warfare Competencies for A2/AD Environment*

- Combined Arms
- Force Protection
- ISR
- Air & Missile Defense
- Cyberspace Operations
- Space Operations Support
- Logistics
- PSYOP/Information Operations

**Mission Areas**

- Reconnaissance
- Raids
- Seizure

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Figure 2 provides some granularity regarding mission areas specifically designed to overcome critical A2/AD adversary capabilities the joint force will encounter in the fight’s initial conditions and throughout subsequent entry operations. Behind this vision is the imperative of gaining strategic freedom of action by specific tactical counter-A2/AD actions across a widespread denied battle space in every domain. Against that backdrop, land warfare forces are not an invasion or long-term occupation force, or utilized as the vanguard of a nation-building effort; even “kicking in the door” comes later. Early land warfare force employment against A2/AD is about tailored BCTs and slices of BCTs that enter the neighborhood to shape its places for the joint force subsequently to kick in the doors to the key houses, which themselves constitute key opponent targets.

How can land warfare forces best prepare for counter-A2/AD missions? The best way is to develop and integrate BCT TTPs within joint force concept of operations—leveraging land warfare
force capabilities that are powerful, effective, and unique. The following are key areas that should frame land warfare TTPs to concept of operations development for employment against the kinds of targets depicted in figure 3.

First, America’s land warfare forces contribute vital air/missile defense capacity, offensive/defensive cyberspace capabilities, and space operations competencies. In crucial ways, those land force capabilities are game-changers and necessary to joint mission accomplishment.

Second, in integrated cross-domain operations—an idea introduced in the Joint Operational Access Concept—land warfare forces will be America’s best means to perform reconnaissance, raids, and seizures, as well as mitigate key adversary systems and create additional options in all five domains for the joint force commander. As expected, such land warfare force efforts will in turn set the conditions for follow-on operations.3

Third, incorporating land warfare forces into an overall redeveloped joint force with optimized counter-A2/AD TTPs and concept of operations—the capability hardware plus the better warfighting idea software—ensures commanders have the most diverse set of military tools to address a range of A2/AD situations and actors.

To ensure unity of effort, vision, and purpose, fielding a highly capable counter-A2/AD land warfare force requires planning that is informed by the counter-A2/AD forces redevelopment efforts across the Armed Services. America’s leaders are asking what the Army’s future force should look like; this article steps into that future force design discussion with a vision of restructured land warfare forces to help overcome a major challenge of the 21st century: A2/AD. To develop counter-A2/AD competencies does not mean the Army must abandon its counterinsurgency capabilities, experiences, and competencies; this is a false choice. But in asking what the future force must look like, A2/AD must inform discussions on the kind of Army needed to satisfy projected future requirements—the discussion that should serve to frame the scope of full spectrum warfare.

The Problem—What is A2/AD?

Anti-Access/Area Denial’s complexities and capabilities can approach classic definitions of total war in that A2/AD cyberspace, space, and long-range missile attacks can bring war’s effects into America’s homeland. At the policy level, an A2/AD adversary will utilize its own diplomatic-information-military-economic-intelligence-law enforcement campaign to attain its national objectives. In this way A2/AD is the adversary’s countershaping corollary to America’s diplomacy and security cooperation. Practically speaking, in steady state, A2/AD is a style of aggressive peace and an aggressive style of war—both will mean the effects of instability and war is not likely confined to a distant locality or region. In simplest terms, A2/AD is a portfolio of ways and means developed to thwart joint force access, reduce freedom of action, and curtail operational latitude.4 As a way

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**Figure 2: Land Forces Utilization**

**Countering A2/AD: Potential Land Warfare Missions**

**RECONNAISANCE**
- Identify A2/AD systems, platforms, capabilities
- First effort in establishing routes, corridors & zones for joint force follow-on operations
- Establish persistent presence

**RAIDS**
- Render key A2/AD targets operationally ineffective
- Surprise entry, swift execution, rapid exit that utilizes existing, honed joint force TTPs
- Requires well-equipped cross domain units utilizing mission command, distributed land warfare TTPs

**SEIZURES**
- Wrest key terrain from adversary
- Enable follow-on joint force counter A2/AD to disrupt, degrade, deny, delay, and if necessary, destroy
- Allows land warfare forces to influence indigenous personnel
of warfare, A2/AD specializes in avoiding U.S. strengths while targeting American vulnerabilities and dependencies.

Fighting against A2/AD, new challenges emerge and familiar challenges take on new forms. For example, in the hands of an agile, adaptive, and aware A2/AD adversary, time becomes a weapon when its short, sharp, rapid onset denies America time to mobilize its resolve, economy, Reserves, and National Guard completely by blunting the projection of military forces. Moreover, America’s ability to operate from convenient regional sanctuaries to safely mass forces and effects, build combat power, stage logistics, and reinforce a campaign are the key U.S. activities an A2/AD adversary will seek to continuously preclude.

Before an A2/AD crisis becomes a full-blown conflict elsewhere, America’s government, military, and private sector could suffer large-scale, wide-area, or focused cyberspace attacks whose purposes are to cripple America’s ability to mobilize, generate, deploy, and fight. Harkening to total war, our adversaries may utilize cyber attacks to undermine U.S. and ally public support for military operations. Elsewhere, at relevant American forward bases, the A2/AD adversary’s missile forces may compel a U.S. defensive posture before America can deploy adequate missile defense capacity.

To sketch some broad campaign strokes of what A2/AD looks and sounds like, here is a notional basket of hostile activities any A2/AD adversary or competitor could undertake today. In those portions of the operations area where the adversary’s navy has sufficient freedom of action, it could mine littoral waters and cripple U.S. expeditionary naval forces and the maritime portion of the joint force logistics enterprise just as America is attempting to ramp up presence and build combat power. Missile raids against area U.S. Navy surface warfare groups may cause them to retire to mitigate risk of further attack. In space, using skills and access credentials stolen beforehand, the adversary could disrupt control of U.S. space assets and degrade orbital platform services with a three-way combination of offensive counterspace, offensive electromagnetic, and offensive counternetwork effects. To preclude a force buildup or to attack a massed force, key regional bases could suffer withering missile raids that damage facilities, delay reinforcement, and obstruct the buildup of combat power. Overall, adversary attacks in every domain using kinetic and nonkinetic force may rapidly cripple the U.S. logistics enterprise all the way back to the continental U.S. zip codes. Finally, because in war all sides have a story to tell, a war of counterinformation within the larger conflict will shift into hyperdrive as the adversary bombards media arenas with psychological shaping whose purpose is less to inform and more to undermine U.S. credibility and presence. That is certainly not an all-inclusive list of what A2/AD can do, but these points establish a foundation from which to tether the goals of A2/AD.\(^5\)

As shown in figure 4, nations employing A2/AD have four goals; however, it is inaccurate to
conflate these “goals” with ends. Rather, these goals are considered a framework to explain the strategic and operational so what of A2/AD. From figure 4, it is easy to connect the dots between A2/AD effects and the consequences of weakened American deterrence and limitations imposed on America’s use of armed force options. Whichever of A2/AD’s four goals become an adversary’s strategic priority(s) and in whatever order, the effect on U.S. planning and execution is that it could be far more difficult for the joint force to get to, get into, and stay in an A2/AD fight. These three challenges illustrate some, but not all, of the dilemmas A2/AD adversaries seek to create.

As an illustration of the differences in a counter-A2/AD campaign, in an attempt to circumvent one of the goals in figure 4, U.S. leaders may attempt to sidestep strategic preclusion and operational exclusion by hurriedly boosting forward military presence during a prewar crisis. Yet, such action could cause unforeseen consequences. In the case of an incomplete or inaccurate understanding of an A2/AD adversary’s escalation calculus, rapid regional buildups of U.S. forces could jeopardize regional balance America is attempting to stabilize. Large U.S. force movements intended to reassure allies could instead provoke uncontrollable escalation that make massed U.S. forward forces irresistible targets for an adversary’s preemptive strikes.

The existence of A2/AD is not oriented on a single actor, like China or Iran. As described in figure 4, the goals of A2/AD are common to denial capabilities employed by potential adversaries and competitors.

To summarize the description of the current A2/AD environment, here are 25,000-foot level takeaways so far: first, to hamper a more powerful nation’s air and naval forces are at the heart of any nation’s denial strategy. In certain scenarios, a well-orchestrated A2/AD portfolio can hold stronger nations at bay long enough to increase the political and economic costs of conflict significantly. Second, A2/AD technologies will certainly continue to metastasize because they have an appealing military and economic effectiveness. Technology proliferation will allow A2/AD actors to deploy more disruptive technologies than ever before. Third, A2/AD strategy will gradually appear in more places throughout the range of military operations than just high-intensity warfare, to include space and cyberspace.

**Figure 4: A2/AD Goals**

**Strategic Preclusion**
- Adversary A2/AD ways and means may compel U.S. leaders to conclude adversary cannot be overcome
- Fractured U.S. alliances; alliances may become weakened
- May compel the U.S. in key domain(s) with demonstrations and/or use of force

**Operational Exclusion**
- May block joint force points of entry
- May compel high-risk concentration of U.S. forces
- Seeks to operate throughout U.S. strategic and operational depths to blunt joint force deployment, transit forward

**Operational Degradation**
- Seeks to induce chronic friction in joint force operations through multiple lines of effort
- Seeks to degrade and where appropriate, destroy U.S. bases, facilities to affect joint force mission generation
- Seeks to sever joint force C4/ISR connectivity

**Strategic Exhaustion**
- Seeks to neutralize forward forces; interdict joint force forward deployment
- May force logistical over-extension
- May compel U.S. and Allies to accept a disadvantaged settlement
operations that will directly affect homeland defense. Fourth, offensive cyberspace, offensive counternetworks, and offensive counterspace have the potential to make any regional A2/AD fight global in nanoseconds. Importantly, warfare in those domains blurs distinctions of operational and strategic depth; they fuse to form a global battle space. Fifth, cyberspace and space warfare can easily disrupt America’s ability to mount credible defenses and synchronized offenses. Anti-access/area denial adversaries do not need armed forces that mirror image America’s force-on-force military; in contrast, asymmetric warfighting allows A2/AD adversaries to do without an intercontinental bomber force or massive blue water navy. All of these considerations point to the underlying changes in the characteristics of war in this era. Understanding these changes that act as a theoretical and strategic lasso around a group of diverse A2/AD adversaries improves American deterrence and its ability to win wars.

Challenge— Getting to the Fight

Lack of anticipation and respect for A2/AD could leave American combat power depleted, public support eroded, and ally confidence undermined well before traditional phase II (seize the initiative) operations. Anti-access/area denial adversary campaign actions may be serial, episodic, or simultaneous. The key point is that if an adversary can impede U.S. force flows and projection timelines, it has established control outside of the kinetic engagement ranges of all but a few of our nation’s long-range weapons systems. Anti-access/area denial allows adversaries, to one degree or another, to shift confrontation to ever-farther distances from their sovereign territory. As a way of war, A2/AD means that the joint expeditionary force will be in contact with adversary effects at times and locations that do not fit with general joint force warfare experience and understanding. It is highly unlikely U.S. forces would survive the transit to local bases and ports unaffected and unscathed. Similarly, under these conditions, a disorganized and disrupted host nation may not be able to deliver vital initial support. In particular, as logistical workarounds may have to be utilized, unprepared joint force units may not receive timely support because “best fit” ports of debarkation are the most likely targets of adversary A2/AD systems. Clearly, operating in A2/AD engagement envelopes will force leaders and policy makers to reconsider how U.S. forces are redeveloped and postured.

Interestingly, strategic leaps of U.S. land warfare forces, a recent stimulating idea, may yield untenable projection options because of the havoc caused by disrupted, jumbled force flows and absence of logistics sanctuaries close to the primary fight arena(s). Given global distances, especially across the Pacific, if land warfare forces move in the early hours and days of a U.S. campaign, they cannot leave their equipment behind on America’s shores with the assumption it will get to the fight in time for those forces to accomplish their counter-A2/AD missions. At least part of the solution for land warfare forces is to move with their lighter equipment and to enhance their agility, but that means their support must be proactively and responsibly executed in new ways by the joint force team. To ensure such support, air and naval forces must employ their respective counter-A2/AD TTPs (Air-Sea Battle) in concert with land warfare forces TTPs—all within over-arching joint force concept of operations where each service plays defined roles. Some commentators may claim these ideas have been tried before or that we already do them, but while A2/AD may have a historically familiar ring, it would render strategic reasoning tone deaf to not recognize that A2/AD can now be effectively utilized by a range of regimes to do far more than mitigate our stealth aircraft. One new development is that A2/AD opposes the projection that gets the joint force within fighting distance.

The vision of land warfare forces countering A2/AD neither challenge the laws of physics nor requires exquisite capabilities manufactured from unobtanium. However, getting land warfare forces into a counter-A2/AD fight begins today with an emphasis on better future TTPs and associated concept of operations to maximize U.S. technologies in innovative combinations that gain and maintain the upper hand. Additionally, planners must assume that the U.S. logistics enterprise will remain constrained in its ability to provide full capability and capacity in an A2/AD environment. Reliable and timely joint force movement and resupply will be crucial efforts that likely will be U.S. operations centers of gravity. Additionally, A2/AD’s diplomatic, economic,
and military successes in steady state could cause a lack of nearby or defendable regional logistical safe areas in conflict. Independent of political guidance, A2/AD—at least at the near-peer level—suggests a shift in joint force campaign style: gaining control rather than seeking outright supremacy or annihilation of opposing forces.

**Challenge—Getting Into the Fight**

In an A2/AD environment, getting land warfare forces into position from which to enter the fight will make entering the fight a battle unto itself. Perhaps the most demanding scenario for U.S. expeditionary forces is to build U.S. combat power under fire, overcome chronic friction, and then break out from a strategic defense to a sustained strategic offense. Given likely political constraints and because of its aggressive style of peace and war, America may find itself in an initial defensive condition, particularly if America does not preemptively use force. Even if none of that were binding, we risk unwarranted optimism of U.S. warfighting success if U.S. strategic assumptions expect an adversary to passively observe a months-long American buildup of regional combat power that culminates in a Desert Storm or Operation Iraqi Freedom-like U.S. offensive—again. Winning the transit to the primary fight arena(s) and successfully building combat power on America's terms are foundational to the successful conduct of any counter-A2/AD campaign.

**Challenge—Staying in the Fight**

Anti-access/area denial tends to impose another challenge, an inability to stay in a fight. In the initial phase of A2/AD mitigation, land warfare forces are not the “knockout punch” for the joint force in overcoming A2/AD. Conversely, the rest of the joint force’s initial campaign premise against an A2/AD adversary is not to conduct a holding operation until greater land warfare force arrives. As the conflict opens, U.S. forces both forward and elsewhere must immediately reduce and reshape the essential adversary A2/AD systems that pose the greatest risks to the joint force. This approach is not “rollback”; rather, this is about gaining control to create mission operations zones of specified presence, persistence, and associated approach/exit avenues secured by Air-Sea Battle TTPs to ensure sufficient temporal freedom of action. The dilemma for the joint force is that as it attempts to close its range to the adversary, it cannot build large massed formations at operationally advantageous distances without being attrited by long-range A2/AD fires. Further compounding the difficulty is that U.S. and ally missile defense capacity alone will likely be inadequate to protect large force formations and cover all of its other defense priorities. To counterweigh some of these impacts, land warfare forces must integrate with other optimized counter-A2/AD forces to create openings and opportunities for the eventual introduction of other joint force elements. Indeed, integrating land warfare forces allows other U.S./ally capabilities in other domains to more efficiently and effectively deliver effects to joint force benefit. Thematically, this benefit becomes a cross-domain advantage.

**Land Warfare Forces in the Fight**

From the perspective of land warfare forces, the relevant competencies in figure 1 are the game-changers that allow the joint force to prevail. Of the land warfare competencies listed in figure 1, the three previously mentioned merit amplification: cyberspace, air/missile defense, and intelligence/reconnaissance.

First, land warfare cyberspace capabilities can certainly contribute to the strategic cyberspace fight, but where Army cyber capabilities generate huge investment returns is in their ability to deliver relevant offensive cyber fires and preserve networks at the BCT counter-A2/AD mission level. Army cyber must collaborate with joint and ally cyber forces to set conditions for kinetic operations or to amplify land warfare forces gains.

Second, air/missile defense is a joint capability for which the threat’s scope will often exceed defensive capacity. Rather than an unreasonable, zero penetration defense, where no adversary missiles ever strike friendly targets, the focus of Army and joint air/missile defenses must be to create a bubble of appropriate defensive capability that the supported counter-A2/AD land warfare unit commander needs to execute reconnaissance, raid, or seizure missions. An inability to defend against incoming adversary airpower—regardless if it is manned or unmanned, aircraft or missile, may risk...
over-complicating or endangering counter-A2/AD land warfare force survival.

Third, Army intelligence must be tightly woven into the fabric of joint force intelligence functions to obtain and push vital real-time intelligence data needed by the executing counter-A2/AD land warfare force; intelligence needed to cue organic defensive and offensive kinetic/non-kinetic fires. The vitality of the land warfare intelligence/joint intelligence relationship is critical in A2/AD environments where networks may become temporarily unstable or information exchange rates may be slow. This increase in information friction and corresponding decrease in information flow may produce nearly immediate disruptions to logistics and operations initiative.

A Glimpse of Prevailing in the Fight—A Vignette

Through the lens of land warfare forces employed to conduct reconnaissance, raids, and seizures in a counter-A2/AD campaign, figure 2 outlines countering A2/AD in each of those three mission bins. These scenarios derive from three operational priorities in any counter-A2/AD campaign: first, keep U.S. forces alive; second, ensure the U.S. logistics enterprise functions as well as possible; and third, as able and appropriate carry the fight to targets that best unhang the most essential elements of the adversary’s denial framework. The targets of figure 3 are not rigidly categorized nor does figure 3 imply that all potential counter-A2/AD scenarios appear here. Indeed, the main benefit of this outline is to provide a deliberative framework to inform experimentation and, ultimately force redevelopment. What predominates the scenarios in figure 3 are not so much an action but rather a rationale to first mitigate certain systems that directly preclude or exclude joint force access, freedom of action, and operational latitude.

To provide readers with what well-honed counter-A2/AD execution looks like, the vignette of figure 5 is a notional joint force mission to mitigate a shore-based anti-ship missile system, an example of an important proliferated A2/AD capability rapidly becoming more abundant in the world’s littorals. The vignette is not a detailed explanation of all the details of how redeveloped joint force packages would mitigate a shore-based missile system; it is only a description of a notional joint force concept of operations and its centerpiece in this discussion—land warfare force TTPs to execute such a complex mission. The mission in figure 5 requires redeveloped forces using honed choreography with appropriate degrees of local customization—a kind of competence impossible to attain in a warfighting pick-up game. The scale and sophistication of A2/AD adversaries suggest
that the “we’ll work it out when we get there,” approach to warfare will yield undertrained, poorly equipped, and ineffectually organized forces.

**Counter-A2/AD Land Warfare Forces—A Way Ahead**

The descriptions in figures 2 and 3 are a place to start but they tee up important force structure questions. A balanced land warfare force structure allows the United States to better protect its vital interests. The argument for a balanced portfolio of land warfare capabilities is rooted in more than historical common sense and warfighting pragmatism; rather, it is grounded in a need to overcome A2/AD adversaries from early assault to larger entry operations. Getting the right balance of land warfare forces equipment, training, and organization will take time; however, potential changes to the current force structure ensures an Army with a balanced range of competencies throughout the future spectrum of war.

As land warfare forces’ access and freedom of action improves in initial operations, entry operations demand inclusion of other land warfare forces. Crafting the initial concept of operations and TTPs land warfare forces will need to successfully counter-A2/AD adversaries is a first step. These restructuring efforts will demand America’s largest training and experimentation venues where air, space, cyberspace, electromagnetic, and naval capabilities can be tested and honed until a robust family of concept of operations and TTPs emerge. While this redevelopment effort is too broad to call it “Air (+ Maritime, Cyber, Space, Special Operations Forces)—Land Battle II,” it is appropriate to call it what it is: The New Integrated Joint: Cross-Domain Operations . . . with land warfare forces in the fight.

**What Do We Now Know?**

We know that getting to the fight will be a fight. We also know that getting into the fight will be a fight. Staying in the fight will depend on the degree to which the joint force is prepared in steady state to operate and thrive amidst the attempted chronic friction and chaos of A2/AD. Anti-Access/Area Denial is not new; it weaves itself into the historic fabric of warfare, but that platitude entirely misses what a modern A2/AD capability implies for projection of an expeditionary force.

More broadly, the reach, immediacy, and lethality of newer tactical systems are not just better versions of what they replaced; instead, they will fundamentally change the way we project force and fight in future A2/AD conflicts. To effectively mitigate A2/AD, U.S. land warfare forces must be prepared to execute multiple missions. It is in the role of reconnaissance, raids, and seizures that land warfare forces will be of early benefit to overcome A2/AD and help carve out U.S. access, freedom of action, and operational latitude. America’s previous warfighting brilliance cannot blind today’s decision makers to the truth that military strength is redefined and built anew in each era based on the problems as they exist. In each era, forces for freedom must endeavor to remain strongest, most vigilant, most prepared, and most ready.

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**NOTES**

1. Gen. Raymond Odierno, speech to students at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 April 2013.
2. Ibid.
3. U.S. Department of Defense Joint Staff J7, Joint Operational Access Concept, 13. Note: within the JOAC text, “integrated” is explained as it is used in the multi-service Air-Sea Battle concept to counter-A2/AD threats. However, elsewhere in JOAC, “integrated” is used as both a characterization of adversary threat systems and the needed U.S. Department of Defense response to military operations.
7. Ibid., 13.
8. Ibid., 38.
9. Ibid., 22.

WITOLD PILECKI JUST about signs his own death warrant by allowing himself to be sent to Auschwitz; for that reason, one realizes immediately that Pilecki was a special man whose moral code is rare. His underground army superiors did not order him to do so; it was his own idea. There is a post-modern tendency to sully heroes and their idealism, but Pilecki is no holy fool. His Catholic faith, spirit of friendly good-fellowship, and patriotism buoy him. What were the sources of these traits that may help us understand why he volunteered to infiltrate and how he survived Auschwitz? The most striking characteristic in his upbringing was his parents’ determination to preserve the family’s Polish identity.

Pilecki was born on 13 May 1901 in Poland (where independence had not existed for over 100 years). The Third Partition (1795) expunged Poland, and the Russian Empire absorbed much of it; the Germans and Austro-Hungarians engulfed the remaining territories. Technically, Pilecki was born a Russian, although Russian authorities tried to suppress the family’s heritage. Countless major and minor Polish uprisings bloodied the 19th century, and Pilecki’s ancestors were participants in the January Uprising (1863-1864). As punishment for their disobedience, the Russians seized much of their property, forcing them into a life of exile. Pilecki’s father, Julian, a child of this revolution, eventually graduated from the Petersburg Institute of Forestry and accepted a forester position in the Russian region of Karelia, northeast of St. Petersburg, causing him to study in and work with the Russian language. He married Ludwika Oslecimska, a Polish woman, and together they had five children; Witold Pilecki was the third child.
Living in Russia proper took a toll on the family. Julian was concerned with the quality of the children’s schooling and more troubled with the children’s assimilation into Russian culture and language. In 1910, he moved his family to Polish Wilno (now Vilnius, Lithuania). However, the family’s patriotism came with a cost—Julian had to remain in Karelia because he was a senior inspector and the family could not afford to lose the income. Before and during World War I, Pilecki’s father was not a constant presence in his life. Perhaps the sacrifice made by his father would later serve as a model for Pilecki’s own sacrifices. Given the family legacy of duty to Poland, perhaps Pilecki would have learned from an early age, too, that sacrifice to the cause is more than a romantic notion.

Hemingway, Owen, and Remarque have taught us to be suspicious of facile patriotism, and have exposed its destructive underpinnings. For them, it is not sweet and fitting to die for the fatherland. However, when we shift our Western eyes to Eastern Europe, the viewpoint of dying for one’s country carried less cynicism than it did for the “lost generation.” When one begins to understand that during the time of imperial occupation “Poland” only existed in the mind and heart, then one will realize what made Pilecki, the man.

The move to the Russian-controlled territory of Poland was an improvement—Pilecki was able to attend a better school and was able to visit his Polish kinsmen. The phase before World War I marks another important influence in Pilecki’s life as he joins the scout movement, which at the time was illegal. The Russian imperial political police kept watchful eyes on the groups of highly organized, trained, and patriotic youth. Although World War I disrupted Pilecki’s formal education, the scouts were Pilecki’s constant. As his mother and siblings moved around to avoid the Eastern Front, Pilecki as a teenager founded several scouting regiments and organized educational courses for youths.

He returned to Wilno to restart his formal education, but this time in Eastern Europe was extremely chaotic. The Russian Civil War (1917-1922) interrupted his studies, and again the scouts influenced his life. Under the command of General Władysław Wetjko, he joined other scouts to fight the Bolsheviks.

Poland became independent in November 1918, and Pilecki joined the newly formed Polish army and fought in the lancer troop unit. He was discharged in the autumn of 1919 but, because of hostilities between Poland and the Soviet Union, he was forced to rejoin the Polish army to fight in the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921). Poland prevented the Soviets from advancing westward to transform Europe into a Communist continent. He participated in the “Miracle of the Vistula” campaign in August 1920.

After the Polish-Soviet War, Pilecki returned to school, earning his high school diploma. He deepened his commitment to the scouts, became a noncommissioned military officer, and ultimately took a 10-month course to become a cavalry reserve officer. Pilecki had to terminate his formal education. His family’s financial difficulties and his father’s poor health motivated him to become head of the family. He was able to turn around what remained of the ancestral estate. He became a respected community leader and was deeply involved in community service. Pilecki somehow strikes a balance between his family obligations and his country, all the while maintaining ties with the Polish army. In 1926, he was promoted to second lieutenant in the reserves. In 1932, he established a military horsemen training program called Krakus, and later he took command of various squadrons. In 1931, he married Maria Ostrowska and had two children. This period was the longest Pilecki had with his own family.

Living between two aggressive and destructive totalitarian dictatorships, Pilecki battled the Nazis on 1 September 1939, the beginning of World War II. He refused to accept defeat and disobeyed orders to surrender his weapon to the conquerors of Poland; rather than escaping to Hungary or Romania—when it was still possible—to avoid becoming a prisoner of war, he chose to continue fighting in Poland. On 9 November 1939, along with his remaining fellow soldiers and senior officers, Pilecki cofounded the Polish Secret Army (Tajna Armia), one of many underground armies forming at the time. Later, most of the various secret military organizations—including Pilecki’s group—consolidated and became The Home Army (Armia Krajowa).
That Pilecki managed to get to occupied Warsaw where he joined the underground and survived is truly a wonder. The joint Nazi-Soviet conquest (September-October 1939) and co-occupation (October 1939-June 1941) erased Poland’s borders, choked Poland’s leaders, and terrorized Poles. The Nazis unleashed Generalplan Ost, the colonization of Eastern Europe so that they could provide Germans their “living space” in Poland. To achieve it, Generalplan Ost, a series of planned murder, genocide, enslavement, expulsion, kidnapping, sterilization, starvation, incarceration, ban on education, and destruction of native culture programs, was put in place. Early programs included Operation Tannenberg (August-September 1939), Operation Intelligenzaktion (autumn 1939-spring 1940), and AB Aktion (spring 1940-summer 1940), which targeted and murdered mainly ethnic Poles. Some Polish Jews were killed in these early operations. Operation Reinhard, the program to exterminate Polish Jews, began in 1942.

Another part of Generalplan Ost was łapanka, the indiscriminate mass arrests of innocent passersby; the Wehrmacht or SS would suddenly seal off a city block, and all the civilians caught in the cordon would step into waiting trucks. Captured Poles were sent to labor or concentration camps; others were executed.

Early measures to crush the Poles were taken to such extremes that the Nazi security services complained that they needed additional support to keep up with the demands of those actions. Prison overcrowding strained their efforts to neutralize current and thwart future Polish resistance. Working under SS-Gruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, SS-Oberführer Arpad Wigand proposed at the end of 1939 to create a new concentration camp in Nazi-occupied Poland, specifically in Auschwitz (Oświęcim). The town’s location was prime—the confluence of the Vistula (Wisla) and Sola Rivers, good train connections, natural resources, and existing barracks. The Polish army had used the building structures prior to the war.

In fact, the quarters for Polish troops predate independent Poland. Auschwitz was founded by the Germans in the 1200s; however, soon after the German inhabitants abandoned the town, the Poles purchased and incorporated it in the Polish Kingdom. As a result of the Three Partitions (the last one in 1795), Auschwitz returned to being a Germanic town. When Auschwitz lay between the Germanic and Austro-Hungarian empires, it was an important seasonal labor center and emigration hub. As historians Deborah Dwork and Robert Jan van Pelt point out, right before the start of World War I, imperial officials erected “twenty-seven brick dormitories for 3,000 workers, ninety wooden barracks to house an additional 9,000 men, and buildings for infrastructural services to support the life of the temporary community.” During World War I the buildings were not used. After the war, Auschwitz became again Oświęcim in independent Poland. The Polish army used the structures. When the Nazis defeated Poland, they renamed the town Auschwitz.

Still photograph from the Soviet film of the liberation of Auschwitz, taken as the child survivors of Auschwitz, wearing adult-size prisoner jackets, stand behind a barbed wire fence, Auschwitz concentration camp, 1945. (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of Belarusian State Archive of Documentary Film and Photography)
Initially failing in January 1940 to meet the requirements of an SS commission that was sent by Inspector for Concentration Camps, SS-Oberführer Richard Glücks, the Auschwitz site was quickly championed by Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, and the new Nazi concentration camp at Auschwitz was established on 27 April 1940. On 4 May 1940, SS-Hauptsturmführer Rudolf Höss became the camp commandant. His orders were to immediately prepare the camp to hold 10,000 people.

The demands exasperated Höss because, as he claims in Kommandant in Auschwitz (1958), not only were the former Polish army barracks in a state of ruin, but also he was disappointed with the moral shortcomings of his SS staff. In spite of the eagerness of local SS functionaries to send their Polish prisoners to Auschwitz and the ambitions of Himmler for Auschwitz (creating a model German town and farming paradise), Höss received no support. He resorted to pilfering barbed wire from the countryside, going nearly 100 miles one way “to get a couple of huge cooking kettles for the prisoners’ kitchen, and I had to go all the way to the Sudetenland for bed frames and straw sacks.” He ordered 10-20 local Polish workers to repair the barracks and 300 local Jews to dismantle the homes of 1,200 local people forced to resettle. Höss needed the building materials from the homes, but also needed to remove all eyewitnesses and individuals who might help support escapees. By March 1941, there would be a 40-square kilometer region dubbed “area of interest” surrounding the entire Auschwitz complex—the zone was heavily patrolled.

Rapportführer Gerhard Palitzch, a noncommissioned SS officer who worked with Höss at Sachsenhausen concentration camp in 1938, was sent to Auschwitz to assist Höss. Höss disliked the man, calling him a “most cunning and slippery creature,” and supposedly disapproved of the 30 convicted German criminals he brought with him on 20 May 1940 from Sachsenhausen. The 30 men served as “prisoner-functionaries,” specifically kapos. Kapos assisted the SS at concentration camps by supervising the “ordinary prisoners.” Kapos also terrorized and murdered camp inmates. Palitzch’s 30 men each received camp numbers from 1 to 30.

At this point, Auschwitz was not a death factory, daily murdering thousands of Jews. Auschwitz Camp II-Birkenau, was not yet built. In 1940, the site (where numerous gas chambers and crematoria were eventually located) was still a Polish village named Brzezinka, approximately three kilometers from Auschwitz Camp I. Auschwitz was not yet the synthetic rubber factory called Auschwitz III-Monowitz (Buna). It was not yet the concentration camp system consisting of over 40 sub-camps. Auschwitz I-Main Camp was a political prisoner camp enslaving and massacring ethnic Poles. From the beginning, Auschwitz I was a house of horrors, but too few in the West know that the “Auschwitz” in their minds (extermination of Jews in gas chambers) would come into being in 1942.

Historian and chair of the historical department at the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, Franciszek Piper explains that the history of Auschwitz can be divided into two periods:

- A “Polish” period (1940 to mid-1942), when the majority of deportees and victims were Poles.
- A “Jewish” period (mid-1942 to 1945), when Jews represented the majority of deportees and victims.

Piper adds, “The total number of Poles deported to the camp lay somewhere between 140,000-150,000.” Piper also says, “The total number of those who died in the camp from 1940 to 1945 reaches 1,082,000; this figure rounded to 1,100,000, should be regarded as a minimum.” “Out of a total of 1,300,000 people deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau over the period from 1940 to 1495,” Piper concludes, “960,000 Jews (865,000 unregistered and 95,000 registered); 70,000-75,000 (74,000 Poles (10,000 unregistered and 64,000 registered)); 21,000 Gypsies (2,000 unregistered and 19,000 registered); 15,000 Soviet POWs (3,000 unregistered and 12,000 registered); 10,000-15,000 registered prisoners of other nationalities” were murdered by the Nazis. Moreover, one must bear in mind that the Nazis murdered close to 6 million Polish people—2.9 million Polish Jews and 2.8 million ethnic Poles.

On 14 June 1940, Auschwitz was not entirely ready when it received its first transport of victims. This first group consisted of 728 Polish political prisoners from a Nazi prison in German-occupied Tarnów, Poland, and included some Polish Jews. Some of these men were captured for participation in or suspicion of being members of resistance cells, for attempts of crossing the border to join...
the exile Polish army in France, or for no reason at all. Because the first 30 camp identification numbers were assigned to the 30 German kapos, these 728 Polish men were given the numbers 31 to 758. Stanisław Ryniak, the first person confined in Auschwitz, received the number 31; at the age of 24, he was captured in May 1940 because the Nazis suspected him of being an underground member. Ignacy Plachta was given the number 758. Of the original 728 men first transported to Auschwitz, 239 survived, and few still live today.

From the second transport to Auschwitz, Kazimierz Piechowski (number 918) was one of many boy scouts captured and sent to the camp. On 20 June 1942, Piechowski was the leader of a group of three other inmates that escaped in the most daring and successful escape from Auschwitz. Stealing SS uniforms, weapons, and Höss’s own car, the group drove out of Auschwitz, impersonating their tormentors, even interacting with real SS subordinates. Piechowski’s escape group carried and delivered one of the first reports on Auschwitz written by Pilecki.

Even with these arrivals, Auschwitz still was not fully operational. Because of damaged Auschwitz barracks, the political Polish prisoners were housed nearby in a former Polish Tobacco Monopoly building. Moreover, Kazimierz Piechowski (number 918) adds, “we had to help build it.” Auschwitz was built and expanded by those who were confined there.

On 14 June 1940, Kazimierz Albin (number 118) recalled when Höss’s second in command, camp commander SS-Obersturmführer Karl Fritzsch, accosted him and his fellow first transport members: “This is Auschwitz Concentration Camp . . . Any resistance or disobedience will be ruthlessly punished. Anyone disobeying superiors, or trying to escape, will be sentenced to death. Young and healthy people don’t live longer than three months here. Priests one month, Jews two weeks. There is only one way
out—through the crematorium chimneys.” The use of gas to kill people began the following year. What Fritzsch meant was that once the Auschwitz victim was murdered by overwork, starvation, torture, bullet, lethal injection, or beating, his ashes would then be set free. Pilecki stresses, “the killing started the very day the first transport of Poles was brought.”

Wilhelm Brasse (number 3444), whose transport of 460 people arrived in Auschwitz on 31 August 1940, remembered witnessing Jewish men and Polish priests being degraded and worked to death. He saw SS-men and kapos hitching priests to carts and forcing them to pull carts like horses. Pilecki himself witnessed how Poles, Jews, and priests were harnessed to rollers in order to “level” the camp’s parade ground. In addition, kapos and SS-men were particularly sadistic toward Jews. Not only were Jewish victims finished off with overwork in penal companies, their camp tormentors would train dogs to kill them, restrain Jewish men and smash their testicles with hammers, and strangle Jewish men by ordering them to lay down and a kapo would place a spade’s handle on the man’s neck, placing all his weight on the handle. In Leszek Wosiewicz’s 1989 Oscar-nominated film Kornblumenblau (based on the experiences of Auschwitz survivors), an early scene depicts a kapo riding his men-drawn carriage around the camp. Hearing or reading about this episode is already unsettling; however, when viewing it, one becomes more demoralized.

By September 1940, Poles already knew to dread and, as best they could, to avoid Auschwitz. Pilecki is not a madman leaping senselessly toward his own destruction. He is not some blindly irrepressible optimist believing that will power, patriotism, and goodness will overcome. His self-appointed mission was to arrive in Auschwitz to establish a military organization to elevate morale; organize and distribute additional food, clothing, and supplies; gather intelligence about the camp, and train inmates to take over the camp and to assist the support troops that Pilecki believed would arrive to liberate the camp. The first phase of the mission was to create cells of resistance and support groups to aid fellow inmates. He felt “a semblance of happiness” when he sensed that the other inmates were beginning to come together to stand firm, as best as they could, against their tormentors. Another aspect of Pilecki’s mission was to fight back, as best as he could, the SS-men and kapos. One memorable act of defiance was when Pilecki’s group cultivated typhus strains and infected SS-personnel.

There was no guarantee that Pilecki would end up in his intended target of Auschwitz. When he stepped into a roundup on 19 September 1940, he felt sure he would be sent to Auschwitz. Since the AB Aktion and roundups were still going on, the Nazis could have tortured and executed him in occupied Warsaw’s Pawiak, Mokotów, or any other Gestapo-run prison. They could have taken him to Palmiry to murder him in the forest. At the very least, they could have sent him to a forced labor colony somewhere in Germany. On 22 September 1940, Pilecki received Auschwitz camp number 4859; he says, “The two thirteens (composed by the inner and outer digits) convinced my comrades that I would die; the numbers cheered me up.” The fact that Pilecki avoided death for two years and seven months is miraculous. There were so many times that a blow from a kapo’s fist or baton could have been his last, that illness could have killed him, that the day’s execution list could have contained his name, that the Gestapo could have discovered his true identity (and they came very close to finding out)—his survival really is a miracle.

The remarkable element of Pilecki’s time in Auschwitz was the fact that his own escape was successful. The isolation of the camp, the camp’s 40-square kilometers “area of interest,” the intimidation and murder of the local population aiding runaways, the willingness of the locals to assist escapees, and the collective responsibility imposed upon the remaining Auschwitz inmates were very real inhibitors for escape. A shaved head, starved and unhealthy appearance, striped camp uniform, all stymied men and women from escaping. Pilecki must have been blessed not to be one of the 10-20 randomly chosen inmates that camp security would execute as punishment for another inmate’s escape attempt. Henryk Świebocki estimates that “a total of 802 people escaped. The largest group of escapees was Poles (396), followed by residents of the former USRR (179), Jews (115), Gypsies (38) . . . 144 successfully escaped and survived the war.” Pilecki also explains that the Gestapo would and did arrest and send the escapee’s family members to Auschwitz. Pilecki’s assumed identity
helped his loved ones avoid this fate.

This exceptional book’s value is obvious; nonetheless, one must consider the facts of to what extent the Allies dismissed Pilecki’s various reports on Auschwitz. Throughout his time in the concentration camp, Pilecki smuggled out several intelligence reports about the camp by having inmates escaping Auschwitz to deliver his statements to the Polish Underground, who then forwarded them to the British and American governments. In autumn 1943, Pilecki submitted “Raport W,” to the Polish exile government in London, which then forwarded it to the Allies. Both Raul Hilberg and Norman Davies say that once Pilecki’s report was forwarded to the Office of Strategic Services (the U.S. intelligence agency) officials questioned its “reliability” and filed it away.

Pilecki was in Auschwitz during both the Polish period and Jewish period. His years of confinement distinguish, in my opinion, his eye-witness testimony from other intelligence reports on Auschwitz (for example, the three documents that make up the so-called Auschwitz Protocols). He was there for most of the building expansion phases, for most of the changes in policy toward every individual ethnic group, and for most of the executions of Nazi extermination policies toward those groups. He watched Soviet POWs build Auschwitz Camp II-Birkenau, which was to serve as a 100,000-capacity Soviet POW camp; however, he witnessed that same proposed-POW camp become instead the gassing facility to murder Jews upon arrival. Pilecki saw the victims of inhuman medical experiments performed on Jews and others, and saw the camp destroy the Roma and Sinti.

Pilecki witnessed the first experiment using Zyklon B gas. On 3-5 September 1941, and acting on his own initiative, Fritzsch placed about 600 Soviet POWs and 250 sick Poles in the basement of the infamous Block 11 in Auschwitz I-Main Camp, and filled the room with the gas; it was successful. After the Nazis refined the methods of killing with gas, Zyklon B was used in Auschwitz-Birkenau-Camp II to murder Jews, starting March 1942. Killing Jews with exhaust fumes from vehicles became the preferred method of murder in the other Nazi death camps (Treblinka, Sobibór, Chelmno, and Belzec); Majdanek would use both Zyklon B and engine fumes to murder Jews.

In the recently declassified document (2000) dubbed The Höfle Telegram, British intelligence intercepted a coded Nazi cable, which, when deciphered, revealed that by 31 December 1942, 1,274,166 people had been murdered in Nazi death camps: Treblinka-713,555, Majdanek-24,733, Sobibór-101,370, and Belzec-434,508. For some reason, the statistics of murdered victims from the Chelmno and Auschwitz death camps were not included. Based upon available sources, Franciszek Piper estimates that “for the years 1942-43, around 83,000 death certificates were issued for registered prisoners [in Auschwitz]. . . . At the end of February or beginning of March 1943, death certificates
stopped being issued in most cases for registered Jews . . . One can establish only around 100,000 cases of registered prisoners dying.” After 1943, Auschwitz became the largest killing site of Jews.

After his escape, Pilecki was frustrated when his underground superiors ignored his demands to invade Auschwitz. As he endured Auschwitz’s evil and watched as it murdered real heroic men and women, Pilecki’s sense of justice was offended by the limitations and reluctance of the Home Army and Allies. He spoke freely in The Auschwitz Volunteer, calling out their cowardliness. His outrage did not consume him; he fought on. During 1944, he continued his resistance work, trying to minimize the influence of the growing Soviet takeover of Poland. He participated as an anonymous infantry soldier during the doomed 1944 Warsaw Uprising, only revealing his rank when it was necessary. He later smuggled himself into Italy, joining the Polish II Corps, commanded by General Władysław Anders. It was in Italy that he wrote his memoirs—published now as The Auschwitz Volunteer—about his years in Auschwitz. He could have stayed in Italy, could have brought his family, and could have avoided the Soviets and Polish Communists. Instead, he chose to return to Soviet-influenced Communist Poland to engage in spy work.

Pilecki’s cover was blown in July 1946, and he was ordered to leave Poland. He disobeyed because he did not want to abandon his family, and he was unable to find a substitute for his undercover work. So, he stayed. His life was in serious danger. In a show trial known as “The Trial of the Sixteen” (18-21 June 1945), key leaders of the Polish Home Army were falsely found guilty of collaborating with Hitler and planning military action against the Soviets. Moreover, from the late 1940s to 1950s, the Soviet secret police and Communist Polish security services killed the remnants of the underground army, which was anti-communist.

Polish Communists captured Pilecki on 8 May 1947 and placed him in Warsaw’s Mokotów prison where its interrogators brutally tortured him for months. Pilecki’s friends from Auschwitz who survived tried to help him by pleading for help from a fellow Auschwitz survivor, the prime minister of Communist Poland, Józef Cyrankiewicz. Cyrankiewicz refused to help; moreover, he wrote a letter to the judge presiding in the case to throw out any record of Pilecki’s time in Auschwitz. A man who shared in the same indignities as Pilecki sold him out; as the common expression goes, “with friends like these who needs enemies.” Pilecki’s torturers broke him, and he confessed to being an “enemy of the people.” Pilecki told a family member who visited him in prison that Auschwitz was a trifle, child’s play (igrasza) compared to the torture he received from his Communist persecutors. Pilecki’s photograph from this time is horrible to look at; he is almost unrecognizable.

Pilecki’s show trial began on 3 March 1948, and on 15 March 1948, the court sentenced him to death, finding him guilty of being a German collaborator, an anti-communist spy for the West, and numerous other charges. On 25 May 1948, Pilecki was executed. It is believed he was buried somewhere in Warsaw’s Powązki Cemetery; since 2012, investigators have exhumed several bodies from a part of the cemetery believed to be a common burial site for executed political prisoners during the Stalinist era of Communist Poland, expecting one of them to be Pilecki.

The importance of Pilecki’s heroism undermines a facile interpretation of history. Not all were bystanders, and many more than we are led to believe stood up and fought totalitarian evil. There were many “good guys” who did extraordinary things like Witold Pilecki, and the sad thing is, so few of us know these heroes. There seems a tendency to overlook or bypass a hero like Pilecki because his last name is difficult to pronounce (correctly) or for some other reason. The Holocaust is not an easy subject. There are some things that will be lost to the historian—documents, explanations, etc. That is why it becomes imperative to include the story of Pilecki in our classrooms. Pilecki is not some exotic footnote in specialized research. In “Speaking of a Mammal” (1956), Czesław Miłosz notes, “man cannot be reduced to just a part in history.” For decades, the memory of Pilecki “did not exist” in Communist Poland, and very few in the West knew of him. Students sometimes think that George Orwell’s 1984 was only a book, something that sprang from his imagination. Memory holes did exist. It is a challenge to teach students about totalitarianism because to them it seems so outrageous and alien. And, when Pilecki was rehabilitated finally in 1990,
something good, for once, came out from the abyss. *The Auschwitz Volunteer* is truly a gift. However, how many other heroes remain in the memory hole?

Much has changed since Czesław Miłosz wrote *The Captive Mind* (1951), but his words are still relevant. He writes, “A living human being, even if he be thousands of miles away, is not so easily ejected from one’s memory. If he is being tortured, his voice is heard at the very least by those people who have (uncomfortable as it may be for them) a vivid imagination. And even if he is already dead, he is still part of the present.” Orwell did not need to suffer in a totalitarian regime to recognize the dangers of “Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past.” Pilecki’s case makes Miłosz and Orwell’s insights all the more real, and Miłosz lived long enough to see that Pilecki returned as a presence in the now.

This history of World War II disillusions us; the “good war” was not as straightforward or principled as we would like to believe. Pilecki’s heroism may have been doomed, but his courage uplifts us. His example may be difficult to follow, but he shows what is possible. How are we finally to make sense of Pilecki? I am reminded of a well-known inscription found on the walls of the former Gestapo headquarters of occupied Warsaw, which today houses the Mausoleum of Struggle and Martyrdom Museum. It reads—

*It is easy to speak about Poland.*

*It is harder to work for her.*

*Even harder to die for her.*

*And the hardest to suffer for her.*

This epitaph defines Pilecki.

My one complaint about this edition of *The Auschwitz Volunteer* is that, even with the now available paperback edition, it is still too expensive to use in a college course. If we want our young people not to grow up cynically, we should not make it easier for them to become so by restricting them from knowing real heroes like Pilecki.*MR*
RAPE IS RAPE
How Denial, Distortion, and Victim Blaming are Fueling a Hidden Acquaintance Rape Crisis
Jody Raphael, J.D. Lawrence Hill Books Chicago, 2013, 258 pages, $18.95

With the congressional spotlight firmly fixed on the nation’s military brass as they struggle to find explanations and solutions for the apparent explosion in reported rape cases, it’s easy to conclude that the uniformed services are uniquely inept at dealing with sexual assault in the ranks.

But, if there’s one thing Jody Raphael’s exhaustively researched and documented book, Rape is Rape: How Denial, Distortion, and Victim Blaming are Fueling a Hidden Acquaintance Rape Crisis, achieves best, it is showing that the military’s spectacular failure in handling the reality of rape is just part of a larger societal failure to treat rape like the horrific crime it is.

Raphael, an attorney and academic researcher, opens and closes her unblinking analysis of acquaintance rape with the 2007 case history of how a 19-year-old U.S. Air Force enlisted woman wound up being court-martialed for her own gang rape, while her three airmen attackers went free. But the bulk of her book—a fast yet far-from-easy read—examines acquaintance rape (especially date rape) as a national, if not global, plague depriving its victims of basic human freedoms, justice, and dignity.

Legally defining and verifying a rape is more than the cut-and-dried “he said, she said” that the public sees in media accounts drawn from police reports. In addition, because the process of proving a crime actually occurred is laden with so many evidentiary variables, prejudices, and preconceptions uncommon to other criminal offenses, Raphael contends that what she terms “rape denial” and “victim blaming” often obstruct justice.

“Rape is probably the only offense in which a suspect can successfully defend himself by claiming that the victim consented to the crime,” she writes, “which causes the police to intensely scrutinize the believability of the injured party’s description of events.”

Through a string of detailed, sometimes unpleasantly graphic personal accounts from women like “Megan,” “Riley,” and “Tracy,” Raphael forces readers to see the crime through the victims’ eyes and to empathize with them as they seek help. Raphael does an excellent job of showing that convincing police, prosecutors, medical responders, judges, and juries that they were indeed harmed by people they once trusted, is often times more arduous than the rape itself.

One prosecutor Raphael quotes—angered by the distinction society often makes between rape and other crimes—succinctly boils down the credibility disconnect: “Compare (a rape complainant) with someone who goes to the police and says someone she met at a bar broke into her house to steal something. Under no circumstances would anyone question a victim who makes that type of report. They would take it as truth and simply go with it. But somebody breaking into your house is the equivalent of somebody breaking into your body.”

The book shows how feminists as well as political conservatives can wind up as “rape deniers” and “victim blamers” for reasons as varied as the social spectrum allows, with Raphael fuelling her examination with carefully gathered quotes and thoroughly compiled statistics.

And, like abortion, the rape issue has the power to polarize political arguments and prove that ignorance—of law or nature—is no defense. This was famously illustrated by conservative Missouri Congressman Todd Akin’s 2012 election debate observation that abortion for rape victims is
unnecessary because “If it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut the whole thing down.” Akin’s comment caused his own party to drop him, with President Obama responding simply, “The views expressed were offensive. Rape is rape.”

The author takes particular aim at large institutions, including universities, churches, and the military, for not only failing to install or enforce procedures and policies to protect constituents from sexual predators but also for lacking the will to investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators when a rape is reported.

After discussing notorious cases involving accused rapists such as international financier Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Penn State’s Jerry Sandusky, assorted Catholic priests, and professional athletes as well as lesser known college frat boys, prisoners, and military cadets, Raphael dares to imagine a world without rape denial, offering ways to improve the way rape cases are reported, handled, and analyzed—and she says the process begins within each of us.

“Writer Albert Camus understood that, in the face of evil, ordinary people must just respond out of simple decency: ‘All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and it’s up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestilences,’” she posits.

Raphael cites studies that indicate only two to eight percent of rape reports are false—and it would have been interesting to read real accounts from those who cried rape when there was none, or perhaps from men who were rape victims.

However, the author’s laser focus is on the gender that statistically suffers the most from this crime, and that makes it must reading for anyone wishing to understand how something as abhorrent as rape can ever be denied.

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**NONE OF US WERE LIKE THIS BEFORE**

American Soldiers and Torture

Joshua E.S. Phillips, Verso

London and New York

2010, 238 pages, $16.96

A T THE HEART of None of Us Were Like This Before is one unit’s tragic story.

The 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, deployed to Iraq from April 2003 to March 2004. These soldiers knew they might experience terrible events in war. However, unlike their imaginings, these events did not find them in great tank battles in Iraq’s deserts and cities. It instead found a few of them in a small jail on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Lion near Balad, Iraq, where the soldiers inflicted horrors upon their detainees and, ultimately, themselves.

According to their first-hand accounts, they tied prisoners to the highest rung on the jail bars and “let them hang there for a couple days.” They made detainees do push-ups and prolonged stress positions. They deprived prisoners of food and drink. They kept detainees awake by blasting music in their ears. They splashed chicken blood on walls to create fear and performed mock executions. They beat, choked, and water boarded prisoners.

The tales they tell Joshua Phillips are mutually consistent and are the same stories they tell their loved ones. One of them showed Phillips photos to substantiate his claims.

The soldiers never “broke” a detainee (that is, forced a detainee to give them helpful information). But, the soldiers themselves returned home broken, mere shells of the young men they had once been. Sgt. Adam Gray drank too much, became bitter and moody, and attempted suicide. Once he “snapped,” putting a knife to a fellow soldier’s throat. Spc. Jonathan Millantz, a medic, was discharged for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He, too, drank too much and attempted a drug overdose. Other soldiers from the unit struggled with drugs and alcohol, insomnia, high blood pressure, depression, keeping jobs, and various symptoms associated with PTSD.

One of the soldiers, after years of depression and therapy, angrily told Phillips: “None of us were like this before. None of us thought about dragging people through concertina wire or beating them or sandbagging them or strangling them or anything like that.” Heartbreakingly, both Gray and Millantz died, miles and three years apart, under circumstances the Army ruled accidental but which many friends, fellow soldiers, and loved ones believe to have been suicides.
As powerful as their story is, *None of Us Were Like This Before* is much more than this sad tale. Just as Herman Melville in *Moby Dick* used his storyline as a springboard for explanatory and speculative essays, Phillips explores in depth many questions that the core story raises but fails to answer completely.

How did U.S. forces turn to torture? How widespread was it? Why, as in the case of the FOB Lion jail, were many cases never investigated? When investigated, why were these inquiries often the “whitewash” claimed by the former head of the Detainee Abuse Task Force in Iraq? Did torture work, to gather intelligence? What effects did it have on the tortured? On the torturer? What was the fallout of public scandals like Abu Ghraib on Iraqis? On the insurgency in Iraq? On Arab opinion of Americans? To what degree were U.S. political and military leaders to blame for the torture committed by their soldiers? To what degree was American media to blame, when the “good guys” were increasingly depicted as using torture to good effect?

The well-organized, accurate answers that Phillips provides are grounded in deep research, to include his own dangerous fieldwork in Afghanistan, Syria, and Jordan. In addition, the writing style that conveys his points is clear, logical, and highly readable, and his supporting quotes and anecdotes are well chosen, impactful, and often poignant.

The book does have one minor flaw, the incomplete answer to the question, “How did American soldiers turn to torture?” Phillips rightly emphasizes the role that America’s media (especially movies and television shows) played in encouraging young soldiers to torture, a role given short shrift in overly politicized accounts that dwell on the Bush administration’s enabling policies. He also correctly describes how soldiers transferred onto prisoners corrective training (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) they themselves had received. Inadequately supervised and fuelled by the passions of war and the dark psychological impulses secretly harbored by all human beings, such hazing often escalates into torture.

However, Phillips does not emphasize enough of the role that survival, escape, evasion, and resistance (SERE) schools played. He properly delimits the importance of the formal promulgation of SERE techniques, pointing out that there were no enabling memoranda for many abuse cases. But he fails to acknowledge the far broader impact these techniques had because some of the tens of thousands of service members who have been instructors, trainees, or role-playing guards at a SERE course chose to use these techniques against prisoners. This use, too frequently, also descended into torture.

When, for example, an officer who served at Guantanamo Bay tells Phillips that, prior to the adoption of abusive interrogation memoranda, interrogators were blasting loud music at detainees and subjecting them to hot and cold temperatures, it is less likely that the interrogators were “freelancing” than they were using SERE techniques they had either personally experienced or heard about. When he describes conventional soldiers mimicking how Special Forces operators were treating prisoners, he does not acknowledge that these operators were required to attend SERE courses. But this is cherry picking. In the end, *None of Us Were Like This Before* will endure as war literature. This will be primarily due to its contribution to the subject of “moral injury,” a psychological condition little known within the U.S. military but increasingly studied by mental health experts. These experts say that, while PTSD is an anxiety disorder occurring after a physically traumatic event, moral injury occurs when people see or do things that conflict with their own deeply held values. Those inflicted with moral injury, they claim, share some symptoms with PTSD sufferers but tend to exhibit symptoms that last longer and are felt more intensely.

By way of powerful anecdotes, Phillips makes the compelling case that this claim is true. It is therefore fitting that Dr. Jonathan Shay, the psychiatrist and celebrated author who first clinically defined moral injury, wrote the book’s foreword. Shay writes, “Sober and responsible troop leaders and trainers are concerned about the prevention of psychological and moral injury as a readiness issue.”

These words succinctly point the way to the primary readership this book deserves—anyone who cares about the readiness and welfare of America’s soldiers. It should also be essential reading for foreign policy makers, military historians, mental health professionals, military policemen, and interrogators.

THE FURTHER ADVENTURES OF DOCTRINE MAN
Volume 1, Doctrine Man.
Self-published, 2013
163 pages, price varies

THE FURTHER ADVENTURES of Doctrine Man is an enjoyable read as well as compelling commentary on the state of the Army in general. It also comments on one of the Army’s least appreciated roles, the writer of doctrine. A fine line exists between skeptics and cynics, and understanding the distinction is important in the context of Doctrine Man. A skeptic is analytical and engaged while a cynic believes in nothing. The skeptic provides a useful service by asking probing questions and challenging assumptions. The cynic dismisses everything as useless and often finds himself marginalized as an irredeemable crank. “Doctrine Man” is undoubtedly a skeptic, someone committed to making the Army better while questioning those who seem to live the unexamined life or, worse yet, produce ill-considered doctrine.

Doctrine Man’s actual identity is a mystery, and this is probably a good thing given his focused ridicule of Army doctrinal developments over the last half-decade. He demonstrates a rapier wit in suggesting that trivial changes in doctrine undermine what should be enduring principles. For example, he takes to task those who would change the name of full spectrum operations (FM 3-0) to decisive action (ADRP 3-0) and act as if something significant had occurred. On the other hand, “Doctrine Man” gives no pass to those “stuck in the Kasserine Pass.” Those stuck in the past lack imagination, but those who change with the wind lack conviction, if not vision. To quote Term Burglar’s observation on the mutability of doctrine, “These are enduring principles . . . it’s not like they change every six months,” which is exactly how often doctrine seemed to change over the last several years.

Doctrine Man does his best work when he derides vacuous concepts. He clearly demonstrates a fascination with language, deriding the phrase “gover-
nance forum” when the word meeting would suffice. Similarly, he makes light of “design,” describing it as classic comedy and rightly suggesting it was little more than a passing fad. Speaking of design, has anyone heard the phrase “wicked problem” lately? One of the best scenes in the book concerns the apparitional appearance of a character called the Stratcom Kid, whose ghostly outline is summed up with one biting comment: “The lack of substance is ironic, huh?”

There is much to like here. A floating skull represents the Prussian military theorist Clausewitz, often called “Dead Carl” in doctrine circles, and his comments are genuinely funny. Bif’s Compendium of Military Jargon may well be the book’s highlight. Particularly amusing are the definitions of mantrum, slingshot effect, PowerPoint karaoke, and in-flight refueler; however, the definition of manicorn might be over the top as are nearly all goat appearances. The funniest yet most vexing character is Blue Falcon, someone with whom we have all served. Doctrine Man treats Blue Falcon with the disdain and contempt he deserves.

Overall, this is a fascinating commentary on the state of the Army, both in terms of doctrine as well as day-to-day life. Whether it’s the vacuous boss, the listless contractor, or the recently retired soldier who grows facial hair to be cool (called “Beardo” by Doctrine Man), this insightful book captures the Army climate with accuracy, and with an appropriate level of decorum. According to the author, there will be another compendium to follow; if it’s as good as the first volume, it will certainly be worth the wait.

Lt. Col. James Varner, USA, Retired, Platte City, Missouri

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE 21St CENTURY
Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy
Therese Delpech, RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, CA, 2012, 181 pages, $15.47

ALTHOUGH THE COLD War ended without the United States and the Soviet Union fight-
ing each other directly in a war that could have turned nuclear, there are a number of current scenarios that could lead to the use of one or multiple nuclear bombs for the first time since 1945. Written by the recently deceased Therese Delpech, *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy*, is a well-written and relevant book about the emergence of nuclear weapons in fragile or unstable countries or the potential possession of nuclear weapons by nonstate actors that provide unique security challenges.

With the backdrop of the ongoing crisis involving Iran and its quest to develop nuclear power capability and the West’s determination to prevent them from developing the capability of weaponizing it, Delpech addresses one of the world’s greatest security concerns. Although the likelihood of a massive nuclear war has decreased in the last 20 years, Delpech argues that the likelihood of a nuclear attack has increased. Possibilities include nuclear terrorism from a terrorist group not concerned with a retaliatory attack, radical Islamists challenging the Pakistani government and gaining control of their nuclear arsenal, a radical nonstate actor instigating a war between Pakistan and India, a North Korean attack, Israeli use in response to an existential threat (e.g., Iran), or even an increasingly assertive China.

A common theme in the book is that deterrence remains a relevant and necessary strategy as the West faces these significant security concerns in 2013 and beyond. Delpech organizes her book is a way for the reader to follow her logic, starting with the current need to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and then discusses the primary reasons that nuclear deterrence succeeded in the Cold War and how many of those methods could be modified and applied to contingencies today. She does this through a series of short descriptions of how nuclear war was deterred in 21 different Cold War crises (e.g., Berlin Blockade, Korean War, Cuban Missile Crisis, Yom Kippur War, and others). She also discusses the possibilities of a conventional war escalating to the nuclear level, nuclear weapons in the hands of nonstate actors, how miscalculation and misperceptions could lead to nuclear war, and nuclear blackmail.

Delpech addresses how small powers (Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria) could impact the international security and financial arrangement, especially in this age of globalization and economic interconnectedness. Concluding with a section on how China, a rising economic and military power, and a declining but still well-armed Russia could affect the overall balance of power regarding international security, she provides the reader a vision of what could lie ahead.

I highly recommend *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century* for anyone interested in the study of international relations, strategic studies, or nuclear deterrence. Extremely relevant considering today’s complicated security concerns, it is well-written, thought-stimulating, and makes a strong argument for the need for strong nuclear deterrence in the future.

Lt. Col. David T. Seigel, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**WINNING AND LOSING ON THE WESTERN FRONT**
The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918
Jonathan Boff, Cambridge University Press
New York, 2012, 286 pages, $99.00

We can no longer write off the British army on World War I’s Western Front as the hapless sheep led to the slaughter by “butchers and bunglers.” Instead, the scholarship of the last 20 years, led by historians like J.P. Harris, Niall Barr, Trevor Wilson, Robin Prior, Gary Sheffield, and others has pointed to a more complex view that sees the British Expeditionary as a genuine (if genuinely imperfect) “learning organization.”

The battle is over and the revisionists have won; what remains is to police the battlefield and mop up the persistent questions that remain. One of these questions has to do with the final, decisive campaign of the war: the “Hundred Days.” Were the successes of the British Expeditionary Force in these final battles a function of German weakness and waning morale, British material and manpower superiority, or British virtuosity in combining the effects of tanks, aircraft, infantry,
artillery, and poison gas? Or had Haig’s forces, by 1918, evolved into a more skilled and adaptive command “style” than their German opponents?

Jonathan Boff tackles this question in his new book, *Winning and Losing on the Western Front*. He places special focus on Gen. Julian Byng’s Third Army, a formation that helped drive the Germans back to the Hindenburg Line, then cracked the line and pursued the German Second and Seventeenth Armies into Belgium in the last days of the war. Making imaginative use of his sources, Boff investigates the manpower, training, morale, weapons, tactical skill, and command style of the Third Army and the Germans that faced them. He finds none of the explanations for the outcome of the victory—the evaporation of German strength; the preponderance of Allied tanks, men, and planes; the improvement of British tactical orchestration; or the relative effectiveness of British and German “command culture” are sufficient to explain why the war ended the way it did. Each, however, is necessary. Perhaps his most interesting findings have to do with the unevenness of “learning” by the combatants. Some units managed their battles with an approach that looked like what we call “mission command,” others kept a tight leash on initiative. Beyond that, he argues that the Germans signally failed to adapt their doctrine and command procedures to the desperate circumstances they faced in the last months of 1918.

If this reviewer finds Boff perhaps a little generous in his evaluation of British commanders and harsh in his judgment of their German counterparts, it warrants a disclaimer. In my own work, *The Final Battle*, I have considered many of the same questions that Boff examines in this book. However, when it comes to understanding the battlefield of 1918, Boff’s research is more comprehensive, his analysis more imaginative, and his conclusions more persuasive than my own. *Winning and Losing on the Western Front* is a remarkable book that takes us a quantum leap forward in our understanding of the how the “Great War” ended in 1918.

Dr. Scott Stephenson, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**VICTORY AT PELELIU**

The 81st Infantry Division’s Pacific Campaign

Bobby C. Blair and John Peter DeCioccio

University of Oklahoma Press, Norman

2011, 320 pages, $34.95

FEW THINK OF the U.S. Army when recounting the glories and horrors of ground combat in the Pacific theater during the Second World War. Indeed, several recent memoirs and the well-received HBO series *The Pacific* focused national attention on the exploits of the Marine Corps, and perhaps rightfully so. This includes the vicious battle for the island of Peleliu in the Palau group, which was noted specifically for its ferocity and brutality—on the part of both sides.

However, little has been written about the role of Army divisions during the battle for the Palau. Authors Bobby Blair and John DeCioccio effectively break this paradigm in their accounting of the Army’s 81st Infantry Division during the Pacific campaign. The 81st played a major role in securing Peleliu’s neighboring Angaur Island, seizing the key Ulithi archipelago in the Carolines, and relieving its more well-known brethren—1st Marine Division—on the island of Peleliu itself. Blair and DeCioccio effectively argue that rather than simply “mopping up” after the 1st Marines on Peleliu, the 81st employed innovative leadership, effective tactics, and endured intense combat in a fight against a desperate enemy whose defeat was not necessarily predetermined.

Written in no-nonsense staccato prose, the book deftly covers the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, effectively setting the larger context for the Palaus and Ulithi campaigns, recounting the crucial decisions that agonized the key leaders, and detailing the tactical innovations of both sides on the ground. Regarding the latter, the authors effectively describe the new Japanese policy for the Palaus campaign that focused on digging in, avoiding direct engagement at all times, and killing as many Americans as humanly possible. On the American side, the 81st countered these desperate and deadly measures with some innovative techniques of its
own, including the use of sieges vice frontal attacks, extensive sandbagging to secure terrain gained, and effective use of armored bulldozers and long-range flamethrowers. This was knock-down, drag-out combat at its most vicious.

The authors are particularly effective in describing the inter-service rivalry between the Marines and the Army, as exacerbated by the 1st Marine Division commander. This not only affected the conduct of the fight on Peleliu; it perhaps unnecessarily prolonged it. Another strength of Blair and DeCioccio is their description of the fight from the Japanese perspective. Indeed, the reader develops empathy for a desperate enemy employing vicious tactics that would foreshadow even greater human suffering on Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

It is the tragedy of Peleliu that the fruits of victory were never used in the Allies’ subsequent drives leading to Japan’s defeat in World War II. For its part, the 81st was disbanded shortly after the war while on occupation duty in Japan, its tale largely untold. Victory at Peleliu succeeds in plugging this gap and giving the division its rightful due. Written in Spartan style, Blair and DiCioccio effectively and without fanfare pay homage to the 81st without ever denigrating the role of the Marines on Peleliu. Incorporating extensive interviews and first-person accounts, the book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the role of Army units in this critical theater during the Second World War. 

Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Georgia

KOREAN UNIFICATION

Inevitable Challenges,
Jacques L. Fuqua Jr, Potomac Books
Dulles, VA, 2011, 220 pages, $29.95

I n KOREAN UNIFICATION: Inevitable Challenges, author Jacques L. Fuqua analyzes the challenges brought on by the assumed reunification of North and South Korea, within the existing South Korean economic and governing system. The first part of his book places the current Korean situation into historical context. The second part addresses the obstacles faced in repatriating and assimilating the North with the South. Fuqua’s primary focus is on addressing the obstacles facing the repatriation and assimilation of what has become two countries with distinctly different peoples and cultures. In order to integrate the North with the South, he believes the North Korean people will need to be “re-made.”

Fuqua provides a broad historical overview of the rich history of the Korean Peninsula, clearly demonstrating that its diverse peoples lacked unification. Unfortunately, other than identifying this hurdle to unification the historical summary provides little substantive value in addressing his thesis. This is a bit perplexing when considering the amount of time committed to providing this perspective.

In addressing the obstacles of integration, the author provides a litany of general data detailing the growing cultural, social, political, economic, educational, and mental/physical health divergence, between the North and South that has taken place over the last 60 years. Through this holistic perspective, he notes that the North Korean domestic situation is increasingly dire while South Koreans continue to flourish. He asserts that these differences make unification even more difficult. Fuqua further highlights these challenges through a few anecdotal cases of North Koreans defecting South and the obstacles they faced in assimilating—ranging from language dialect differences to the lack of relevant work skills and discrimination issues. He cites a source believing individual assimilation takes at least three years. Between the assessment and the underdeveloped or poorly maintained infrastructure of the North, the author offers a $5 trillion price tag for the cost of unification—arguably an insurmountable impediment.

The author’s research is informative and adequate in addressing his general thesis; it unfortunately does so in an unimaginative and very “vanilla-like” way. In other words, it reads too much like a CIA or military foreign area specialist’s background report than substantive scholarly analysis. This, coupled with some superfluous and somewhat distracting information provided and questionable research assumptions, such as the need to remake and infuse the North with the South, adds a significant note of caution to the validity of the author’s conclusions.
This book is best read by those interested in a broad historical overview of the Korean Peninsula, along with some of the issues faced in a possible unification of the Koreans. It provides little enlightenment to the more astute and informed reader on this subject.

**Dr. David A. Anderson,**  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**EDUCATING AMERICA’S MILITARY**  
Joan Johnson-Freese, Routledge  
London, 2013, 144 pages, $33.90

**EDUCATING AMERICA’S MILITARY** is essential reading for anyone, especially policymakers, involved in the professional military education (PME) arena. Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese provides a series of well-written, soundly researched, and even-handed arguments in a readable essay form. Her book is a profound description of what’s right and what’s wrong in PME complete with the gray areas of continuing debate. I found myself scribbling notes on virtually every page, many with exclamation marks or asterisks where I too had experienced similar debates and conclusions in my combined ten years as an academic at the U.S. Army War College, Command and General Staff College, and Logistics University. Yet, instead of enjoying what would have been my confirmation bias, I would read on to find she offers counterarguments that make me realize that the issues are more complex than I had imagined. Explicit throughout her essay are the cultural clashes that occur between academics and uniformed practitioners who occupy both faculty and education administrative roles. This includes competing cultural values, from academics over-theorizing (“great lecture professor, but I see no practical use”) to the military practitioner’s prime directive to be a team player (a euphemism for “professor, why can’t you just do what you’re told?!”).

Johnson-Freese’s coup de grâce is her critical deconstruction of how PME curriculum is developed and governed—generally by “random officers and individuals” and characterized by “disjointed fads” that produce “dumb-downed” course materials so that anyone can teach with them. All-in-all, *Educating America’s Military* is the most comprehensive and scholarly critique available in the contemporary PME community, period. Johnson-Freese has crafted a remarkable work that brings the PME debates up-to-date and demands significant institutional and Congressional response.

**Christopher R. Paparone, Fort Lee, Virginia**

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**JACKSON’S SWORD**  
The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier  
Samuel J. Watson  
University Press of Kansas  
Lawrence, 2012, 460 pages, $39.95

**JACKSON’S SWORD** WAS written with today’s Army officers in mind. Samuel J. Watson’s historiographical notes are as impressive as his use of contemporary operational language. His book focuses on American borderland conflicts during the Early American period to explore the profession of arms and a foundational period for the U.S. Army. He points out that early America Army officers had substantial power in local affairs.

Early U.S. military history often appears divorced from current issues, but Watson shows that field commanders quickly shifted gears between civil military activities and pitched battles. He describes how long lines of communications isolated commanders and how political leaders recognized the need for autonomy for campaign commanders. The repeated success of the young U.S. Army serves as a vital check to the “lead by UAV” or command and control helicopter-mentality given the physical leadership present in Watson’s work.

Watson explores the notion of a profession of arms during a period of Republican ideology that was often at odds with professional militaries. This is evident in Andrew Jackson’s role as a nonprofessional officer; a man as capable of inspiring his soldiers through personal courage as he was at committing atrocities. The power of Jackson’s reputation and his recognition of public opinion challenges the 21st century’s
often-insular profession of arms. The book’s greatest contribution is that Army officers were the most powerful force in our young nation and that the remoteness of frontier combat shaped the profession of arms in a manner isolated from other social and cultural forces. Conflict on the borders “tempered and confirmed” military bureaucratic changes “setting the tone” ever since for the regular army officer corps. 

Joseph Miller, Old Town, Maine

NATO in AFGHANISTAN
The Liberal Disconnect
Sten Rynning, Stanford University Press
Redwood City, CA, 2012, 288 pages, $25.95

OTHER NATO-MEMBER ARMED forces have been in Afghanistan almost as long as the U.S. armed forces have and NATO, as an organization, has been in Afghanistan as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) lead since 11 August 2003. What has NATO done well, what has it done poorly, and is regional NATO the best organization to settle a conflict in an out-of-region remote locale? Dr. Sten Rynning, who has written extensively about NATO strategic issues, examines these issues and produces a detailed political and diplomatic account of NATO in Afghanistan that is also an examination of NATO’s future.

NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect is more a diplomatic and political history than it is a military history. Fighting a war as an alliance is never easy and, despite the dominant roles of the United States and Great Britain, the conduct of the Afghanistan Conflict has been a thorny one for NATO. NATO-liberal governments initially expected that NATO would provide Afghanistan with a benevolent transition to democracy and a thriving economy with little fighting, whereas the ground truth has been a long, hard campaign dominated by military actions, not nationbuilding. Several NATO militaries arrived in Afghanistan prepared to do anything but fight. After initial entry, U.S. action and interest in Afghanistan waned as the bulk of its personnel and material shifted into Iraq. Consequently, NATO’s initial performance was not stellar and the enemy regained some of its strength, support, and territory. NATO’s performance improved markedly over time and its surge in support of the United States in 2009 proved NATO’s best showing. NATO clearly demonstrated that it was of more long-term value to Afghanistan than the UN and other international organizations.

After the significant contributions by NATO nations, will Afghanistan survive and flourish following NATO withdrawal? NATO will survive the Afghanistan Conflict, but will it still be relevant? NATO has now fought two conflicts—a regional one in Kosovo and a nonregional one in Afghanistan. In both, NATO had to first determine whether this was a European or an Atlantic response and whether NATO was still a relevant and responsive geopolitical force or if the European Union could better deal with the issue. Rynning argues that NATO must resume its common purpose as a trans-Atlantic Western alliance promoting Western ideals and interests to remain a positive world actor.

There are few books written about NATO in Afghanistan. This is the only one dealing with the strategic level. It is recommended for higher-level staffs and government professionals, but be aware, English is not the author’s primary language and he tends to over-stuff sentences with information. This, coupled with his indirect English sentence structure, means the reader may have to re-reread the same paragraph two or three times to comprehend the meaning. It will take some time to get through, but is worth the effort.

Lt. Col. Lester W. Grau, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

TEACHING AMERICA TO THE WORLD AND THE WORLD TO AMERICA
Education and Foreign Relations Since 1870
Richard Garlitz and Lisa Jarvinen, eds.
Palgrave Macmillian, New York 2012, 256 pages, $70.90

Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.—Nelson Mandela

Democracy cannot succeed unless those who express their choice are prepared to choose wisely.
The real safeguard of democracy, therefore, is education.—Franklin D. Roosevelt

Richard Garlitz and Lisa Jarvinen’s Teaching America to the World and the World to America is a collection of essays that traces the influence of education on American foreign relations from the close of the Civil War, to the reestablishment of educational exchanges between the United States and China in the 1970s. In his introduction, Garlitz highlights the book’s primary purpose is to “examine how students and teachers shaped American global power in the twentieth century.” He also draws the reader’s attention to two themes that serve to interconnect each of the volume’s ten essays; first, the idea that education strongly supported American “empire-building,” to include the “spread of values, ideas, and consumer goods,” and second, that education plays a crucial role in “self-strengthening” efforts, such as foreign countries looking to emulate perceived American successes, and America’s desire to broaden its cultural awareness through exchange programs.

The authors describe the role of international students and government-sponsored education modernization programs through historical examples. Each essay provides a cultural perspective while encompassing topics like Argentina’s nationbuilding push to “Americanize” its school system in the mid-19th century, Iran’s modernization efforts under the Shah in the 1950s and 1960s, and the work of Japanese Fulbright students in rebuilding Japan in the aftermath of World War II, to name just a few. Hongshan Li’s essay, “From State Function to Private Enterprise: Reversing the Historical Trend in U.S.-China Education Exchange,” is relevant for those studying U.S.-China relations.

Teaching America to the World goes a long way in demonstrating how education and student exchanges have impacted U.S. foreign relations. Officers and faculty interested in gaining a multifaceted historical perspective on the role education plays in nationbuilding, or “self-strengthening” initiatives, should read this book.

Col. Clayton T. Newton, USA, Retired Redstone Arsenal, Alabama

FROM KABUL TO BAGHDAD AND BACK
The U.S. at War in Afghanistan and Iraq

In an effort to glean meaning, while contributing to national defense strategy in the future, the U.S. military is forced to look inward at the key strategic decisions made during the operational planning of the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of war. U.S. foreign policy is a lightning rod of controversy that is still being played out today, with bipartisan agreement a daunting challenge. One decision impacting national strategy was conducting simultaneous campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors deconstruct each campaign to identify the weaknesses and impacts from such a strategy.

John Ballard, David Lamm, and John Wood, all esteemed scholars in the field of national strategic studies, provide accurate details of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, highlighting successes while also critiquing failures. Their analyses highlight how divergent lines of effort undermined the Afghanistan effort while attempting the first “generated-start” war in Iraq. The novelties of preemptive strike and speed are openly critiqued and the fallacy of war on the cheap is rebuked in favor of more traditionally held views. Commonly held beliefs of deficient Phase IV (stability) planning are scrutinized, with close examination of the frayed civilian-military relationships and resulting failures during the most difficult periods in both wars.

The authors draw parallels between the campaigns and highlight levels of success the “surge” strategy had in Iraq and Afghanistan. Senior leaders’ lack of cultural understanding and strategic understanding is discussed at length as well is the argument of counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism operations. The current administration’s decision to accelerate the U.S. troop withdrawal, hoping Afghan security forces are capable to assume the mission, is discussed.

From Kabul to Baghdad and Back is a concise, well-written depiction of the events in Iraq and
Afghanistan and should be considered required reading for the military student. The authors’ research provides lessons learned in the way of strategic decision making in the operational approach to war, with takeaways of resource and post-hostilities’ planning. The basic premise of a two-front war is strongly rebuked, with historical precedent and current challenges highlighted to support the authors’ arguments.

Michael R. Wacker, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**LIFE LOOKING DEATH IN THE EYE**
The Iraqi War as Experienced by a U.S. Army Contractor
Mahir Ibrahimov, Ph.D.,
Global Scholarly Publications,
New York, 2012, 213 pages, $--

*Life Looking Death in the Eye* falls a little short of the transformative experience it promises. With a yearlong narration of the war, the author offers insight into the mistakes the U.S. Army made in the Iraq war. He presents viewpoints on the Iraq War from U.S. soldiers and officers, Iraqi nationals, and Muslims from other countries. Dr. Mahir Ibrahimov’s background adds credibility to his perspective and allows him to gather a wide range of viewpoints. A naturalized U.S. citizen originally from Azerbaijan, Ibrahimov studied U.S. policy in the Middle East extensively and served as a soldier in the Soviet Army.

The first third of Ibrahimov’s book outlines the complex insurgency that took root in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. While the information is somewhat simplistic, it seems fairly accurate and informative. The author also delves into the West-versus-Islam issue. He provides a perspective of the rise of militant Islam during the 1970s until present day. He concludes that the West should devote more time becoming aware of the Muslim culture and its beliefs to prevent further conflict.

One of the author’s duties as a translator brought him in contact with a group of people whose plight has yet to be fully explored, despite having borne the brunt of the war’s violence. The group includes truck drivers from other nations who were critical in providing supplies that were required to prosecute the war. The truck drivers faced tremendous hardship and dangers as insurgents frequently targeted their convoys with improvised explosive devices, hijackings, and ambushes. While the author does relate some interactions with the drivers, he would have been well served to devote more time exploring the plight of these men.

The author describes his experiences with a U.S. Army Civil Affairs units whose primary mission was to rebuild Iraq. His frequent visits to Iraqi villages with the unit brought him in close contact with the Iraqis. Ibrahimov’s interactions with the Iraqi citizens allow the reader to understand challenges faced not only by the ordinary Iraqi citizen but also the U.S. soldiers attempting to rebuild the country. The trips allowed Ibrahimov to experience Iraq’s history and culture.

While the book is awkwardly organized, it is useful for providing a different aspect of the Iraq war. Ibrahimov’s background and position within the U.S. military allowed him access that few others are exposed to. His experiences validate the need for the military to put more effort into cultural understanding. Ibrahimov’s commentary on the tactical mistakes that had strategic implications is useful for anyone examining the war.

Maj. Michael S. Fletcher, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**TERRORISM AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE**
How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection
Blake W. Mobley, Columbia University Press
New York, 2012, 340 pages, $36.00

*Terrorism and Counterintelligence* explores the potential to exploit weaknesses in terrorist group counterintelligence vulnerabilities and security practices to manipulate terrorist group decision making and design more effective counterterrorism efforts. According to Blake W. Mobley, three main factors shape terrorist group counterintelligence (CI) capabilities: the group organizational structure, its popular support, and its access to the territory it controls.
Terrorist groups face tradeoffs in choosing how to structure their counterintelligence capabilities. Centralized organizations have superior CI training and compartmentalization, which also makes them vulnerable to penetrations. Decentralized organizations are more difficult to train and develop fewer SOPs, but are also less predictable and more difficult to penetrate. Groups with popular support are more likely to expose sensitive details about their plans and members, while clandestine organizations have a greater tension between secrecy and popularity.

Controlling territory is the factor that offers the most important CI advantages. Terrorists who control territory tend to have superior communications and physical security, and better CI vetting. However, controlling territory also makes them more vulnerable. Groups that do not control territory and face powerful adversaries would benefit from a loose organization—that way, limited penetrations would not lead to a catastrophic collapse of the group.

Mobley presents case studies of major terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda, to illustrate his points. A further analysis showed the groups’ failure to control territory was the most challenging security problem for all.

If repetition is a successful way to promote learning, this book succeeds; the author describes the factors and their significance, illustrates the factors in the case studies, and then repeats each one a third time in a summary. The book is recommended for those interested in understanding how to penetrate or undermine terrorist groups. The case studies are recommended reading where more in-depth academic research and background is desired.

Lt. Col. Chris North, USA, Retired, Advisor, Afghanistan

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ROOSEVELT’S CENTURIONS
FDR and the Commanders He Led to Victory in World War II
Joseph E. Persico, Random House
New York, 2012, 672 pages, $ 35.00

FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, HIS admirals, and his generals is a subject thoroughly written about and to write something new is difficult. The best anyone can do is to give the subject a new viewpoint. Joseph Persico accomplishes this goal. However, I question Persico’s historical facts.

The author argues that Roosevelt “was not a military meddler in a league with Churchill—Roosevelt was largely content to have the professionals wage the tactical war. But on the strategic level, he retained for himself the consequential decisions.”

Persico says Churchill convinced Roosevelt that a North African invasion against the Vichy French instead of against the Germans in Europe was a wise military policy and not simply a naked imperialist objective. Eisenhower described this decision as “The bleakest day in history.” So why did we do it?

Persico writes favorably about Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and most negatively about Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. Those with no knowledge of King’s contributions during the war would believe King a dreadful human being and someone who did not have the qualifications to be commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and simultaneously chief of Naval Operations. Many writers have criticized King as a personality, but none have criticized King as a superb naval officer. Persico believes that Nimitz should have been in King’s job. Obviously, Roosevelt did not support this view.

Persico includes the usual major events and players of the war such as The Neutrality Acts, Chamberlain as villain, FDR as a fine judge of men and as a poor manager, Churchill, Pearl Harbor, Executive Order Number 9066 (placing 114,000 American citizens and others of Japanese descent into camps without any legal reason for doing so), and how MacArthur was able to obtain FDR’s approval to invade the Philippines.

Allenbrooke, Montgomery, Marshall, King, Nimitz, Stilwell, Arnold, MacArthur, and Leahy are all covered. Persico gives his opinions but always against a backdrop of FDR as master of anything he touched, people or ideas. You will either agree or disagree with Persico’s opinions.

Roosevelt’s Centurions is well written and covers the important issues of World War II. But if you are not a fan of Roosevelt, there are many other books about the Second World War including Edwin P. Hoyt’s How They Won the War in the Pacific and Forrest C. Pogue’s Ordeal and Hope.

Robert Previdi, Manhasset, New York
Taking Exception to Presentation of American Exceptionalism


The authors write that this “usually occurs when Americans apprehend the empirical fact that they enjoy remarkable freedoms and prosperity and transfer those accomplishments of their forebears into feelings of personal superiority.” They go on to assert, “Instead of perceiving their heritage as a lucky accident, they irrationally perceive it as a personal virtue and a sign of their own superiority.”

Their argument shows a misunderstanding, both of what American exceptionalism means and how it was born.

Americans are exceptional not because we think we’re better than others, but because we know our country is different. The United States was founded on a universal truth, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence: all are created free and equal. No other country is dedicated to the principle of freedom and equality as we are. All other countries are founded on things such as ethnic traits or adherence to a particular religion.

Our unique founding explains why anyone can come here and become an American; you don’t have to be concerned about your race, religion, or color. You simply have to adopt our creed: liberty, equality, and government by consent.

Further, American’s heritage isn’t “a lucky accident,” as the article puts it. The framers of the Constitution knew exactly what they were doing—allowing the people to govern themselves according to common beliefs and the rule of law. Luck has nothing to do with it.

American service members are, almost by definition, the tip of the spear. They represent our country overseas and carry forth our founding ideals. They live out those founding principles every day, often in the most difficult circumstances imaginable. They, like the country they serve, are exceptional.

The Myths We Soldiers Tell Ourselves


General Officers come under frequent attack, but almost no one doubts their commitment. Because the deep cultural change the authors call for can only come from the top, it is especially needful that our generals read, distribute, and put forward the rationale of the writers. Only generals have the power to replace the myths with more considered judgments aspiring to the truth.

A general in uniform comes as close to being the “absolute prince” the authors refer to as anyone in our society ever comes. They are accorded “unlimited deference” in the cult that military command has become. At any hour generals can say to this man “come” and he comes, and to that man “go” and he goes; they convene court martials; they decide who gets promoted; they determine the culture in the Army. What a general does or approves—explicit or implicit—is good to go. It’s pretty heady stuff.

So much so, that Secretary Robert Gates looked wistfully over his own leaf rake’s handle at the military aides raking the leaves in Chairman Mullen’s yard next door. Our society places great trust and confidence in a flag officer. It’s not clear that the record justifies the trust.

Despite their responsibility for celebrating and carrying out democracy’s high ideals, generals, as
a set, are responsible for both the existence and the maintenance of the myths soldiers live by. Without the generals’ imprimatur, none of these myths our authors describe could take hold in military culture.

The camel is called ambition. And more than his nose is under the tent.

How did we get the generals we have?

Though I have met second lieutenants whose *hit* the commissioner’s birthing table with a decided penchant for stardom, the majority of our generals begin their service for the right reasons and in the right way. They love America’s ideals and rightly judge them worth dying for. They keep their heads down, their shoulders to the wheel, and their eyes on the American men and women filling their ranks. A good many of them begin by being “eye-watering” good.

One day they wake to discover they’re “early select” for field grade rank. That’s nice they notice, but they don’t yet read their own press clippings, they don’t yet drink the Kool-aid of their own genius. They go back to work, get selected for battalion command, and on another day they wake to a demand, a request, a suggestion, a certain understanding that the brigade commander wants them to, say, recruit more members for the Association of the United States Army (AUSA).

Having just left the Pentagon as a senior general’s aide, our emerging star knows the AUSA leader and has been heard to say that Old Bourbon-breathed-Bob is a sorry so-and-so. Now the general has just told the brigade commander who holds the new commander’s future in hand that this AUSA membership is the lowest in the division.

At the next brigade officer’s call in the consolidated dining facility, Captain Slim and Slick who used to be the general’s aide is asked to stand on his chair. This captain is then commended by the brigade commander for having the highest AUSA membership in the brigade. Everybody gets the message, and our Lt. Col. New-in-Command goes to this lonely office and stares at the ceiling. “Well,” he mutters to himself, “I’m not being asked to do evil; success is a tough game; this is the way it’s played, and I didn’t come this far to lose. If I let the battalion get a bad reputation, the soldiers will suffer for my choice.” And so he, maybe, gets after AUSA membership. Maybe he doesn’t, maybe he lets this ONE go.

If he’s lucky the command sergeant major will take on this campaign. The lieutenant colonel gets promoted.

And then, he commands a brigade, meets a congressional delegation, gets caught doing right, and the once-slight murmurs of stardom become the whispers that in turn become the cocktail party facts shared by those who know. Time passes, and after a few more turns of the wheel, it’s “all-in.” Our one-time eye-watering good second lieutenant who got up early, worked hard, and served his troops has become a wholly vested company man bound to all manner of indecent requests for the sake of the team. It’s a big team; the stakes are high—Westmoreland in Vietnam.

Generals must submit to civilian leadership. The constitution requires it, a democratic heart commands it; it’s the right way, the way it has to be. So the question rises: Are generals the problem, or are politicians the problem? And the further question: Are politicians the problem, or are the people who elect them the problem?

Put another way, do we have the generals we have because we want the generals we have? The answer appears to be “yes.” The ranks are full of patriots who would, if encouraged, if even permitted, consistently be able to resist what they in their own human decency regard as unreasonable expectations. Indeed, had the generals we have been encouraged to be the people they wanted to be, this conversation would be unnecessary.

For now it is too late, our brigade commander went on to stars under the recognition that the only way soldiers can play the essential political game is to support the AUSA because the AUSA has an entry to politics that generals are forbidden. And, sorry to say, our politics are sometimes a bourbon-soaked and sordid business, hence Bourbon-breathed-Bob, director of AUSA.

Bourbon-breathed-Bob is, after all, best able to work K-street and the other corridors of power to get the pay raises and the hardware purchases for our troops. Bourbon-Bob can say things about veterans and retirees that a general cannot say. Moving on and up involves support for Bourbon-Bob. So we lean on junior soldiers to spend money in joining an organization they don’t understand, an organization very few of them would join left to their own judgments and inclinations.
Ambition itself is not the problem. Ambition is how things get done. It’s a question of which things, how motivated. Generals are the one percent of military society. Maybe we’re all serving the one percent, one way or another.

All of our generals grew up under this system, and it may be unfair to ask them to change it. It would be unfair except for this fact: Without them, change cannot occur, and Fromm et al., tell us that change needs to occur.

I think that Fromm et al., are right.

There are others, but permit me to name one general who retained his native human decency despite the burden of stars on his collar—Paul T. Mikolashek. Of him, more we need. To that general and to all others like him, I apologize while urging our senior officers to use the “Myths” piece to follow our authors’ lead in taking up a new kind of conversation.

Thanks to Military Review for publishing this essay and to the authors for recording their best reflected convictions while exercising courage.

Army Ethics: Simple, But Not Simple-Minded

Maj. George Knapp, U.S. Army Retired—I found Lt. Col. Brian Imiola’s short piece, “The Imaginary Army Ethic: A Call for Articulating a Real Foundation for Our Profession” (Military Review, May-June 2013), the best statement I have ever read about the problem of U.S. Army ethics. He is right, of course. The Army does not have a set of ethics and it needs one. What follows is my simple proposal for one, but first a few words about simplicity.

Chess is a simple game, but it is not simple-minded. We can quickly learn how to play. At first, our games are quick and easy. As we learn more about the game, we begin to see its variety, complexity, and how difficult it is to master, but we do master it to the best of our ability and we become good chess players. The analogy of chess to Army Ethics is direct—at first simple to grasp, but very challenging to master. Mastery is the reward.

Let us begin with a definition. Army Ethics is a set of principles, values, standards, and discipline guiding the Army’s people, decisions, procedures, and systems. Army Ethics is central to our people’s welfare by making it clear to them what is right and what is wrong. Consistently choosing right over wrong establishes integrity, builds character, security, dependability, and trust among our people, our leaders, our organizations, and our relationship with the American people.

Let us continue with a visual model. The five principles of Army ethics are: morality, honesty, integrity, loyalty, and accountability. Army Values, Standards, and Discipline support these principles in detail.

The Five Principles of Army Ethics—Simple, But Not Simple-Minded

- Morality is choice between good and evil.
- Honesty is rejection of lying, cheating, stealing, and those who do.
- Integrity is the result of doing the right thing so often that it becomes second nature and creates an automatic presumption about us by all others.
- Loyalty is faithfulness to the Constitution of the United States and to each other.
- Accountability is willingness to accept responsibility for everything that we, our people, and our organizations do and don’t do.

Our Army Values are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Our Army standards are well-understood and established methods and outcomes for our individual and collective tasks. Army discipline is doing the right thing even when there is nobody there to tell us what
to do. These three supporting elements apply to all our people and to all our organizations.

This is a simple model for Army Ethics, but it is not simple-minded. At its root is the classic struggle between good and evil. We want our people and our organizations to always do the right thing. We want our friends and enemies to know that we always do the right thing. Those of us who cannot see the difference between right and wrong need to stand aside. Those of us who want to see everything as gray, relativist, complicated, or somehow too “problematic” need to get out of the way as well.

We need to preach this ethic to every soldier, every contract worker, and every Army civilian. Every one of us should be able to recite the five principles by heart and know what they mean. Those of us who cannot should get out of the way.

The people of the United States of America deserve an army that always chooses good over evil. They deserve an army that has unqualified integrity based on its deeds. They deserve honesty from their soldiers and their leaders. They deserve an army loyal to the Constitution and to the American people. Finally, America deserves an army that takes responsibility for everything it does or fails to do.

And so, I put before you this simple model as a logical place to start building Army Ethics. Once again, the five principles of Army Ethics are morality, honesty, integrity, loyalty, and accountability. If you can’t remember them, write them on your fingers.
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Recipient
Ty M. Carter

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Specialist Ty. M. Carter’s heroic actions and tactical skill were critical to the defense of Combat Outpost Keating, preventing the enemy from capturing the position and saving the lives of his fellow Soldiers. Specialist Carter’s extraordinary heroism and selflessness above and beyond the call of duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, and the United States Army.

Go to  http://www.army.mil/medalofhonor/carter/citation.html to read the entire official narrative and learn more about Staff Sergeant Ty M. Carter.