THE GENERALS: American Military Command from World War II to Today

Those familiar with Tom Ricks’ books on Iraq, Fiasco and The Gamble, a familiar one: a series of vividly written vignettes tied together by a provocative theme. In Fiasco, the theme was the failure of U.S. leadership to cope with the insurgency growing in Iraq between 2003 and 2005. The Gamble considered the efforts of General Petraeus and others to use the “surge” to contain that same insurgency. Ricks’s insightful, first-hand observations were the essential content to the two works. However, in his latest book, Ricks turns his attention away from current events to address a more historical theme, the U.S. Army’s failure since World War II to choose competent men to lead its forces into battle.

The baseline for the narrative is George Marshall’s famous purge of Army generals in the months prior to America’s entry into World War II. In Ricks’ view, Marshall’s ruthlessness was a necessary step in preparing the Army for war. Even more, Marshall’s willingness to sack the lazy, the incompetent, and the faint of heart should have served as a model for the senior American military leaders who succeeded him. Unfortunately, it did no such thing. Through the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and into the war in Iraq, the Army has failed the nation by putting inadequate men at the head of American forces committed to combat. His examples of failures in generalship include well-known figures like Lloyd Fredendall and Ned Almond, more controversial figures like Douglas MacArthur and William Westmoreland, and more contemporary leaders such as Tommy Franks and Ricardo Sanchez.

Such a narrative would be a depressing one if Ricks did not write so well or possess such a fine eye for the illustrative story and the pungent quote. However, in tackling a historical topic that spans several decades he is forced to leave his usual sources, the first person interview and on-site observation. In his new book, Ricks must rely on secondary sources and he seems far less sure of his material than he has been in his previous works. The first problem with his sources is inconsistency. On one page, Ricks will cite historians of impeccable credentials like Russell Weigley or Forrest Pogue, and then, a few pages later Ricks builds his argument on testimony from a SAMS monograph or MMAS thesis. [Disclaimer: there are many good SAMS monographs and MMAS theses. There are many bad ones, too.]

More troubling is Ricks’ handling of secondary sources that offer contradictory assessments. When confronted by such conflicting inputs, the author punts; he offers both views without attempting to reconcile them or provide an independent assessment. On one page, for example, using the evidence of a Military Review article by Wade Merkel, Ricks credits Marshall for creating an “incentive system [for Army generals] that encouraged prudent risk taking.” On another page, Ricks concludes his section on World War II by quoting Russell Weigley’s assessment that the Army’s senior leaders were “addicted to playing it safe.” Which was it, “prudent risk-taking” or “playing it safe”? In his section on the Korean War, Ricks spends a full chapter celebrating the way Matthew Ridgway revived the morale of UN forces after defeat at the hands of the Chinese, calling the general’s performance “a model of how to revitalize the spirit and reverse the fortunes of a sagging military force.” Then, near the conclusion he quotes Walter Millett’s scathing assessment of Ridgway’s generalship (“as mean-spirited an American officer as ever wore stars”). So, was Ridgway a good general or not?

Ricks seems most uncertain about the Army commanders in Vietnam. He accepts the thesis offered by Lewis Sorley and Andrew Krepinevich, which holds that Westmoreland was a organization man...
who pursued a wrongheaded “attritionist” strategy. The author contrasts Westmoreland’s conduct of the war with the more enlightened approach of his successor, Creighton Abrams. However, after lauding Abrams’ initiatives, Ricks cites Richard Hunt in concluding that Abrams’ efforts were destined to failure, as well. What? the reader asks? If both Westmoreland and Abrams pursued doomed strategies, then how does one judge one to be so much wiser and more effective than the other? Scholars familiar with Ricks’ sources will be able to sort out such contradictions in the narrative. The more casual reader is likely to be perplexed.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the biggest flaw in Ricks’ book is not his choice and handling of sources. Instead, it is his prescription for improving the quality of America’s military leadership by returning to the practice of having senior military commanders fire the general officers subordinate to them when those subordinates have been proven incompetent or ineffective. This seems analogous to arguing that a reduction in crime can be achieved through incarcerating more criminals. Certainly, putting more lawbreakers in prison will achieve some beneficial effect; however, the real solutions to widespread criminal activity are achieved by addressing the socio-economic conditions that breed crime. To follow the analogy, instead of firing more inept generals, we should be turning a critical eye on the system that produced such dysfunctional leaders. We should be looking instead at the commissioning programs, mentorship polices, promotion criteria, and education system that gave us such poor “outputs.” When these systems, institutions, and polices are poor, they breed bad leaders. Beyond that, we can’t wait until a clueless or toxic leader reaches the general officer ranks to “cull the herd.” By that point, too much damage has been done. The general in question will have left a trail of disheartened subordinates and demoralized units in his wake.

By calling for more generals to be sacked, Ricks seems to fall prey to a reductionist approach that one often finds in modern journalism. The reporter and columnist seek the big “story,” the newsworthy sound bite, and the provocative headline. Ricks would have served the Army and the country with a more nuanced approach that looked more closely at the reasons why we pick the leaders we do. And yet, despite the harshness of my critique, I will offer my own contradictory assessment. I believe this “outsider” to military culture has done the Army an invaluable service by providing a highly readable challenge to the way we pick our leaders. I am convinced the book should be read by every serving officer and every civilian interested in military affairs. Tom Ricks has written an important book that should be debated in the cafeterias and classrooms of every service school in the military.

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In the contemporary world of television game shows that examine such things as whether contestants are smarter than a fifth grader or more adept at outdoor living than a Boy Scout, one can imagine author Francis J. Gavin moderating a game show that explores how much contemporary nuclear theorists and policy makers really understand nuclear history. Gavin argues that much of the current thinking about nuclear weapons demonstrates a propensity for two fundamental errors: first, to assume that the nuclear present is largely (or perhaps altogether) discontiguous from the nuclear past; and second, to “get the story wrong” when attempting to take the lessons of nuclear history into account.

However, Gavin’s project is not merely to set the rest of us straight on nuclear history so that we can “get it right.” Rather, it is to point out that the most useful insights to nuclear weapon issues are likely found at the convergence of nuclear theory, policy, and history, with the additional caution that even a firm grasp of the former two does not imply an equally firm grasp of the latter. Theorists tend to be prescriptive; policy makers, reactive; and historians, descriptive; and there is a place in the intellectual world for all three. However, while theorists and policy makers routinely have consulted each others’ perspective, neither seems to have felt the same urgency to avail themselvess of the historian’s.
But why should we care? Are historians really the best people to navigate the ship of state through the murky waters of the nuclear world? Gavin certainly does not argue that they are. However, he challenges the reader to consider why the nuclear theorist or policy maker, invoking the nonempirical data of logic, game theory, and gut feeling (since, after all, a nuclear war has never been fought) would be any better suited to the task. He simply points out that, ignoring historical perspectives risks taking for granted many factors that should figure into something as significant as a nation’s nuclear weapons calculus. But Gavin does not stop there. He additionally points to the tendency of some to conflate “nuclear history,” “Cold War history,” and “post-World War II history,” which, although contemporaneous, are not precisely the same thing; and the facts of one do not necessarily provide answers for the others.

That is not to say, of course, that nuclear historians have cornered the market on accurate perspectives of what is really going on—far from it. Indeed, Gavin acknowledges that historians themselves differ wildly on their assessments of the role that nuclear weapons have played in the world. Moreover, he himself invokes two axioms of nuclear history that will not receive universal embrace: first, that “there is a lot of continuity between our nuclear past and our contemporary nuclear world” and, second, that the world has “had one nuclear revolution, not two.” At least this much is clear: embrace of Gavin’s axioms yields a different picture of the world than what obtains without them.

As a practical matter, Gavin urges a reassessment of three fundamental issues directly affecting contemporary nuclear discourse: “the role of nuclear weapons in preventing interstate/great power war,” the concern that “nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of those who are not deterrable,” and the question of whether “nuclear weapons actually create or worsen crises between states.” He illustrates his argument with challenging observations concerning, for example, the Kennedy doctrine of “flexible response” (which, he argues, turned out to be not nearly so different from Eisenhower’s “massive retaliation” as the name clearly seems calculated to imply), the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises (which he argues were more closely related than many now living might realize), the proliferation lessons of the 1960s (with China as his nominee for “nuclear rogue state” of the decade—experience with which, he argues, affords important insights for dealing with “nuclear rogue” states today), concerns with nuclear terrorism (which began, as he points out, in 1946, and not merely after 9/11, as some have supposed), and current calls for a nuclear-free world (which, he notes, solve some problems, but raise a host of others). To each related theory and policy discussion he imparts a useful perspective concerning both the neglect and the misuse of historical data. More importantly, he points out that, inasmuch as the United States now has over seven decades’ experience with nuclear weapons, and that it is now possible to obtain in important measure the distancing of time generally required for historical analysis, it seems odd—or worse—not to avail oneself of the historian’s perspective.

COL John Mark Mattox, Ph.D., USA, Alexandria, Virginia

**INSURGENTS, RAIDERS, AND BANDITS: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World**

John Arquilla, Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 2011, 310 pages, $27.50

*Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits* records the activities and motives of a number of guerrillas, raiders, and counterinsurgency experts over the last 250 years. Starting with the 18th century, John Arquilla highlights so-called “masters” from across the globe and from varying cultures and standpoints. His account of Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov, the celebrated “Chechen lion” who died in 2005, ends the investigation. The stories of Nathanael Greene, T.E. Lawrence, Orde Wingate, and Vo Nguyen Giap, and less well-known Francisco Espoz y Mina, Abd el-Kader, and Christiaan de Wet show they have a great deal in common—most noticeably their indomitability in the face of defeat, adaptive personalities, and ability to shape future conflict. But while the biographical accounts of the masters are most instructive, Arquilla also highlights a small number of countries with a deep experience of irregular war as well as a cast of “supporting characters” that make recurring appearances. In the case of the latter, Winston Churchill is the most frequent. His links to the Boer War, T.E. Lawrence,
and Josip Broz (Tito) are well known. But there are others, like Jan Smuts and Louis Napoleon, who also reappear with a degree of frequency. Arquilla notes that these characters “help connect the individual stories to larger themes and tides of global events that influenced, and were in turn influenced by, the various masters.” The author also uncovers “the ever-deepening encounter with advanced technology.” Here Arquilla exposes the dependence conventional armies have on technical advances versus an irregular army’s ability to concentrate its efforts on exploiting undue reliance on such high-tech sustenance.

While not earth shattering or groundbreaking, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits has much to offer students of irregular warfare. Arquilla’s deft research is obvious and his choice of masters impressive and wide-ranging. Not only does he cover well-known individuals, but also introduces several unfamiliar practitioners who are worthy of closer examination. Phoolan Devi, the avenging Indian dacoit and folk hero, is a case in point. Throughout the study, the author captures each individual’s essence and places his or her actions in a useful political and historical context; Arquilla is adept at setting the strategic stage before delving into the tactical and chronological aspects.

For those looking for an immediate synopsis, Arquilla’s final chapter, “Master Lessons . . . and a Look Ahead,” draws the strands of the individual studies together and provides a number of thought-provoking observations. Here the author notes that the captains of irregular warfare rarely have a string of unbroken victories. Instead, they habitually struggle through difficult patches, regularly losing battles and large tracts of territory. Success under these circumstances comes from resilience and exceptional ruthlessness—common characteristics amongst the masters. In making sense of a wealth of information, the author summarizes that five interrelated pairs of concepts (transformation and integration, narratives and nation building, deep strikes and infrastructure attacks, networks and swarming, and cooption and infiltration) have borne upon the phenomenon of irregular warfare—and will continue to do so. Applying these instructive criteria, Arquilla argues that Osama bin-Laden is unlikely ever to be seen as a master of irregular warfare. Likewise, he notes the next conflict will unfold along irregular lines, in either the physical or virtual world, or both.

Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits is an informative, enjoyable study. Despite its abundant positives, the book is let down by a lack of photographs, quality maps, and an uninspiring book cover. For those specialists looking for forensic analysis and new angles of contemporary investigation—this is probably not the book. However, for those with a professional or personal interest in irregular warfare and, in particular its matchless cast of leaders, the book will not disappoint. Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits undoubtedly has a place on every young officer’s bookshelf and will be a welcome addition to any military library.

Lt. Col. Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D., British Army, Episkopi Garrison, Cyprus

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DOUBLE CROSS: The True Story of the D-Day Spies

After the fall of France and other early triumphs, Hitler boasted of “many secret agents in England.” He was entirely correct. But all his agents had been co-opted to work for the Allies and deceive their former spymasters. Tricky customers that these turncoats may have been, an equally eccentric section of British Intelligence managed to shape them into an effective unit. Ultimately they succeeded in decoying Nazi reinforcements away from Normandy during the crucial Longest Day.

Ben Macintyre’s story concerns these men and women, and the case officers of the Britain’s ultrasecret Twenty Committee [XX, the Roman numeral 20, is a double cross] organized along the stiff-upper-lip lines of a cricket club. The committee was headed by the son of a Scottish banker whose family considered him “less than promising” and arranged through the old-boy network to get him into government. This maestro, who continued throughout the war to wear tartan military trousers, was Thomas Argyll Robertson, known as “Tar” from his initials.

He assembled a motley array of traitors, wastrels, and misfits that included a wildly imaginative Spaniard with a diploma in chicken farming, a mercurial Serbian playboy, a diminutive fighter
pilot whose allegiance was first and foremost to Poland, the hard-partying bisexual daughter of a Peruvian diplomat, and a volatile 29-year-old French woman who almost derailed the entire plot when bureaucrats refused to allow her pet dog into the country. Even the Twenty Committee, with the ear of Churchill, had to bow before the archaic quarantine law.

We also meet an avaricious set of German spymasters, one of whom was himself turned by the Serbian playboy Dusko Popov and played a crucial role in the ultimate hoax. Also illustrative of the complex route taken by the turncoats, the Polish loyalist Roman Czerniawski cofounded in Paris the only successful spy network that Britain could call upon after the fall of France. But when his net was betrayed and Czerniawski was facing torture and probably death at the hands of the Gestapo, he handed his jailers an incredible demand directed to none other than the German military commander in France, stating: “No collaboration which might be proposed to me could come about unless I was convinced that I was working for the good of the Polish nation.” Nobody had actually asked him to collaborate, but the German military intelligence service Abwehr took the hint. He repaid them with a triple cross.

Neither side ever completely trusted their agents but covered enormous partying debts they ran up and parried their repeated threats to return to former spymasters. The Twenty Committee even found a way to save money by letting Abwehr payments continue to many of the operatives.

The reader may find that the narrative through the first half of the book takes twists and turns like a double-jointed snake as it details the careers of an unlikely cast of spies coming together around an idea that evolved into the supreme hoax of World War II. While its agents pulled the wool over Abwehr’s eyes, members of the Twenty Committee stood warily behind the scenes to make sure it was mostly cotton. The beginning of the D-Day plot—code named Fortitude—doesn’t begin to unfold in this book until after the spies’ recruitments and exotic backgrounds are treated in depth. D-Day itself only covers about 50 pages.

Some readers might find this narrative run-up rather tedious, but the story would fail without Macintyre’s stories about such an unlikely bunch of crazies along with some equally bizarre byproducts of the subterfuge, for example: A carrier pigeon scheme, a look-alike for General Bernard Montgomery to appear in various places that would pull German attention in the wrong direction or General George Patton, blustering around an area of England to reinforce the notion of a ghost army preparing to storm across the Channel at Calais—the major focus of the deception.

The author was helped mightily by an apparent plethora of diaries and detailed records kept on all sides, a practice usually considered a no-no in spycraft. Illustrative of the intricate weaves taken by Operation Fortitude was one example of Twenty Committee reasoning when at a late stage of the deception it appeared that a crucial Abwehr turncoat, Johann (Johnny) Jebsen, might fall into the hands of the Gestapo. In the British rationale, “There is the chance that self interest of those involved might protect Jebsen . . . Brandes (an unscrupulous Abwehr controller) will fear a counter-investigation. Schreiber (a capable Abwehr agent but involved in the plot against Hitler) will not willingly admit that Tricycle (the man who recruited Jebsen) has been fooling them. Hansen (chief of Abwehr foreign intelligence) will not willingly reach a conclusion that undermines the whole Abwehr.” Indeed, it was rather shaky reasoning on a deception that if unravelled could have set the scene for a Normandy bloodbath.

Early on, General Dwight Eisenhower told the planners: “Just keep the 15th Army out of my hair for the first two days.” A week after the invasion, only one 15th Army division had moved south. Even a month following D-Day, 22 German divisions were still languishing in the Calais region awaiting Patton’s ghost army that, of course, never arrived. Nobody can say for certain this was mainly through the efforts of the Twenty Committee. But studies after the war showed that Hitler himself had reposed “almost a mystic confidence” in the reports of the turncoat Spanish chicken farmer and accomplished liar, Juan Pujol Garcia, known as “Garbo” by the British and “Arabel” by the Germans. Arabel received the Iron Cross and Garbo was decorated by the British, although they never wore the medals side by side.

The “Aftermath” chapter that concludes the book provides a satisfying closure to Macintyre’s tale. It details the postwar lives of the entire cast
of characters, most of them survivors who melded into new roles that seldom, however, approximated the high drama of wartime. The book also contains 30 pages of interesting photos in which all of the main characters on both sides are shown.

George Ridge, J.D., Tuscan, Arizona

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**SECURING PEACE: State-Building and Economic Development in Post-Conflict Countries**
ed. by Richard Kozul-Wright and Piergiuseppe Fortunato,
Bloomsbury Publishing, New York, 2011, 256 pages, $85.00

This cast of distinguished scholars in the fields of economics, political science, as well as United Nation’s experts, contribute an informative body of work addressing how and why civil war undermines economic development among poor countries and then propose a model for economic development. Contributing authors, including the two editors, present an array of interwoven chapters that systematically dissect civil conflict and post-conflict development literature, ranging from the theoretical and empirical to that directly dealing with post-conflict recovery, aid effectiveness, resource mobilization, and reconstruction. In an effort to highlight the importance of such work, the authors note that civil wars now account for the overwhelming majority of conflicts around the world and conflicts’ correlation to poverty. Nearly one-half of all countries with a per capita GDP of less than $2,000 between the years 1990-2000 experienced conflict and that one-half of all civil wars have flare-ups within five years of their conclusion. This has lead to a vicious cycle of economic under-development and institutional failure within these affected countries. The situation is particularly serious in Sub-Saharan Africa where two-thirds of this region’s countries have experienced a civil war within the last 25 years.

With this backdrop in place, the editors move forward with the book’s thesis, which is “economic growth reduces the likelihood of conflict.” Thus, the only way out of this destructive downward spiral is through a collective and concerted commitment to promote economic growth by host countries, the international community of developed countries, and international institutions. However, there are no state-building international assistance success stories to work from. The editors profess that in order to be successful going forward, economic development efforts must include a division of government power, no “strings attached” development aid to bridge financial/capital gaps, a more long-term than short-term development focus by outside actors, eliminating corruption within government, the establishment of state institutions and public goods, rule of law, property rights, and credit and financial institutions. Furthermore, development assistance must focus on taking conflict prevention measures vice focusing solely on reacting to conflict. It must also consider necessary economic complementarities, and address socio-economic inequalities. Ultimately, a balance between market forces and public interests must be created to legitimate government and promote development, which in the end leads to an enduring peace.

While *Securing Peace: State-Building and Economic Development in Post-Conflict Countries* is well-crafted, the analysis substantive, and conclusions and recommendations sound, it does not meaningfully advance the body of knowledge on the subject. Also of concern is the number of dated sources cited throughout the book. It leads the reader to believe that some of the chapters were put together earlier than others from now dated material and published without incorporating more currently available literature. That being said, it does provide the reader various perspectives of the principle challenges faced by governments, international organizations and financial institutions in accomplishing state-building in post-conflict countries. The book is best read by graduate-level students in the fields of economics and political science, and junior to mid-grade military officers and government agency personnel who either are, or may likely, find themselves involved in post-conflict planning.

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**SEPTEMBER HOPE: The American Side of a Bridge Too Far**
John C. McManus, NAL Caliber,
New York, 2012, 502 pages, $27.95

John C. McManus, one of the most prolific World War II combat scholars, has written an excellent
book about the American forces that helped liberate Holland during World War II. By researching materials on the 82d and 101st airborne divisions, the 104th Infantry Division, and the various air wings that delivered troops and attacked enemy targets, McManus has delivered a thorough telling of Operation Market Garden and the follow-on operations in the latter months of 1944.

Operation Market Garden was Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s effort to break across the Rhine River in Holland. His plan called for dropping three airborne divisions—two American and one British—behind enemy lines to hold various bridges, while the British XXX Corps pushed north to pivot into Germany. It was a risky, reckless, and just plain bad idea. At the time Montgomery proposed his plan to American General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied armies were bogged down for want of supplies. Almost everything came from the Normandy beaches and was hauled across France over poor roads though bombed-out towns. The obvious solution was to liberate the Belgium city of Antwerp with its Scheldt River that fed to the North Sea, a traffic lane for Allied ships. But the Germans cleverly held onto the Scheldt estuary, the river’s banks, making resupply impossible.

Instead of clearing the banks, Montgomery pressed his plan on Eisenhower, who finally approved. McManus claims that Eisenhower’s decision to green light the operation was “stunningly poor thinking” and places the blame on Eisenhower, who weakened his own broad front strategy by agreeing to Montgomery’s wants. Worse than agreeing to the operation was Eisenhower’s 22 September decision to let Montgomery continue pushing into northern Germany, once Market Garden had ingloriously ended with the destruction of a British airborne division and no bridge into Germany. Instead of ordering Montgomery to finally clear the all-important estuary, Eisenhower doubled down on his British commander’s failed operation.

The heart of September Hope is the 82d and 101st airborne divisions’ airdrops and subsequent fighting. Here, McManus is in his element, depicting squads, platoons, and companies coming to grips with the Germans in desperate combat. While the chapter on airdrop is interesting, the bombing and strafing that prepared the battlefield is fascinating—if only because it was not in Cornelius Ryan’s famous A Bridge Too Far. McManus, who wrote a previous book about American combat airmen in World War II, does an excellent job depicting the action. The ground war is equally fascinating as the Americans capture some bridges and fail to capture others, all in well-depicted engagements. The book climaxes, much like the American experience in Holland, with the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82d Airborne crossing the Waal River.

Most histories of Market Garden end with either the British withdrawal from Arnhem or the static fighting by airborne forces after the maneuver campaign had ended. McManus takes his book further, following the exploits of Major General Terry Allen’s 104th Infantry Division as it swept north through Holland and cleared a portion of the Scheldt estuary. The chapter on the 104th gives voice to an underreported element of Montgomery’s campaign. September Hope is a very readable account of the American portion of Market Garden. McManus does a pitch-perfect job describing the action, from Eisenhower’s headquarters to the Dutch battlefields. This is an excellent book for anyone interested in World War II combat or the experiences of airborne troops.

Kevin M. Hymel, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AFGHAN ENDGAMES: Strategy and Policy Choices for America’s Longest War
Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, editors, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2012, 229 pages, $29.95

Afghan Endgames is a presentation of original thought by a notable team of scholars, coming by an unusual academic path. The book was guided by editors from the Naval Postgraduate School as an outgrowth of a research project funded by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but published by Georgetown University Press. It is not a predictable solution to the problem of Afghanistan, but is still a relevant one, even given the announcements of initial decisions regarding post-2014 troop strength and strategy. The independence and originality of thought in the book lead to an innovative combination of recommendations for the endgame in Afghanistan.
Editors Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla assembled some recognizable names to complete this study: Andrew J. Bacevich, Victor Davis Hanson, Frederick W. Kagan, and Edward N. Luttwak, a balanced array of current national security commentators from across the spectrum. The volume divides into four major parts: an overview of the current situation in Afghanistan, a discussion of strategic alternatives, a section on alternative perspectives (which contains the most original ideas in the volume), and a conclusion by the editors, which draws the several strands together.

The arguments that stand out among the eleven original essays are the importance of the local solution, rather than a central government, to long-term success in the NATO coalition effort, and the many impediments to building a solution from the top down, or from the outside. There are significant challenges and threats to long-term success, but these are not insurmountable. Bacevich, the contrarian, predictably argued for withdrawal, and Kagan, the interventionist, for staying the course, but the value of *Afghan Endgames* is an effort to find a middle ground. The book concludes with specific recommendations, still relevant as of this writing, which include: go local, go small, and go long; stop expensive development projects; identify and nurture young Afghan leaders; develop Afghan security forces at the lowest possible level (such as in Village Stability Operations); drastically reduce funding to Pakistan, and use all statecraft to persuade India to sharply reduce its footprint in Afghanistan. These simple conclusions at the end belie the complex arguments and synthesis that led to them, and it is in the originality of these arguments that the book’s value lies.

*Afghan Endgames* would be valuable to the international security practitioner trying to sort through the debate about the future of Afghanistan in the national security media, particularly when compared to official NATO or U.S. policy and strategy. It connects current debate to long-term trends in Afghanistan in a useful way, while the editors weave a skillful middle road in making their recommendations. Read it before the policies of 2014 are firmly in execution, else risk a foregone conclusion.

**COL Dean A. Nowowiejski, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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The *Battle of Adwa* is an outstanding addition to any military history library. The book provides a comprehensive and objective account of the devastating Ethiopian victory over the Italians in 1896. The Italian defeat resonated throughout the halls of power in Europe as one of the few setbacks for colonizing states in the mad scramble for African territory from 1880 to 1902. For the Italians, latecomers to the colonial race, the author shows how inept generals, hubristic politicians, and poor logistics contributed to this ignoble catastrophe. One of the most important themes throughout, which is relevant for modern U.S. operations, is the high risk associated with underestimating the enemy. The Italians fell for this error at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. They poorly reconnoitered enemy dispositions and terrain, underestimated opponent strength, and displayed poor leadership at the tactical level.

Far from being “barbarian savages,” the Ethiopians demonstrated savvy and competence throughout the campaign. Ethiopian Emperor Menelik waged a strategic information campaign in the capitals of Europe through his Swiss proxy Alfred Ilg—the Italians were painted as the aggressors. In parallel, Menelik suppressed domestic dissent and raised an army of 100,000 troops, equipped with modern rifles and artillery, which overwhelmed the Italian Army before further troops and supplies could be delivered from the homeland. Finally, the Emperor limited his war aims to only ejecting the Italians from Ethiopia and not sweeping them into the Red Sea—a move with potential international repercussions. Author Raymond Jonas offers the reader a well-researched book, written with verve that provides insights into a little known colonial campaign that informs discussion of this volatile Horn of Africa region today. Hence, it is recommended for all military professionals and military history aficionados with an interest in African history and current events.

**LTC Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., USAR, Zurich, Switzerland**
THE SNAKE EATERS:
An Unlikely Band of Brothers and the Battle for the Soul of Iraq

In The Snake Eaters, Owen West depicts the complex relationship between an Iraqi Battalion (3/3-1, the “Snake Eaters”) and their U.S. advisors (the “Outcasts”) in Habbaniyah, Iraq, in the Anbar Province from September 2005 to February 2007.

West is a third-generation Marine who served two tours in Iraq. From October 2006 until February 2007, he served as a Marine Reservist advisor to the Snake Eaters. He uses his personal experience in the later portion of the book and relies on exhaustive research and interviews for the majority of the volume. His father is Bing West, the author of many books on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Snake Eaters is a snapshot of a complex period in the Iraq War. As the book opens, Iraq is experiencing a dramatic increase in insurgent attacks and the United States is responding. The book is an excellent case study on the challenges and difficulties of counterinsurgency. West blends culture, civilian populace, insurgents, the Iraqi Army, and U.S. advisors and forces operating near Habbaniyah. He tells how a violent area was transformed into an area where the civilian populace believed it was in control.

West discusses the role and importance of being an advisor and includes many of the misconceptions about how advisors should be used. He argues that advisors are best used outside the wire and stresses the criticality of the use of advisors today and in the future. He states, “No matter how we entered Iraq and Afghanistan—and will undoubtedly enter future small wars—all roads out lead through the advisor.”

Finally, The Snake Eaters is a testament to the power of teamwork and leadership in combat. As the nickname suggests, the “Outcasts” were clearly a collection of outsiders—reservists who were mechanics, clerks, and salesmen in civilian life—who were able to form a team that achieved extraordinary things. It is a story many readers will find remarkable.

The Snake Eaters is one of the best books on the Iraq War. The book is readable and informative. There is no question it will remain relevant to readers for years to come.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform

During the 11 October 2012 vice presidential debates, Vice President Joe Biden stated that the Obama Administration’s initial responses to the 11 September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi were based on the U.S. intelligence community’s immediate assessments of what occurred. For two full weeks after the 11 September 2012 attacks, the administration placed most of the blame for the consulate attacks on a U.S. citizen-made video that purportedly insulted the Prophet Mohammed. Unfortunately, the day prior, the House Committee of Oversight and Government Reform U.S. State Department personnel involved with the incident, directly contradicted the administration’s initial response to the incident. Many immediate reactions to Vice President Biden’s remarks were that he had thrown the intelligence community “under the bus.”

In Paul Pillar’s Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform, the primary theme is that U.S. political leaders selectively use intelligence to achieve and find excuses for achieving policy goals. In some cases (as in weapons of mass destruction and the Iraq War of 2003), Pillar accuses the George W. Bush administration of making up its own intelligence and then blaming the intelligence community for getting it wrong. Though Pillar spends time discussing the run-up to the Iraq War of 2003 and WMD’s, he also briefly touches on more distant examples of intelligence politicization (Korean War, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam), and the reform of the intelligence community, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission.

Not only does Pillar take the Bush administration to task, but he also gives his perspective of the U.S. Congress role in the politicization of intelligence. Specifically, did Congress do enough to question the Bush administration’s evidence for the 2003
Iraq invasion? Pillar’s assertion is that they did not, including Republicans and Democrats. The larger and probably more relevant part of his book is spent on 9/11 and the subsequent 9/11 Commission, whose report brought about the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the resulting subordination of the CIA to the DNI. Pillar’s view is that the entire 9/11 Commission report was biased and its reforms misguided and ineffective.

Pillar’s book is detailed and informative, providing a better understanding of just how hard it is to be an intelligence professional in a world where all that matters is being wrong, once.

James M. Burcalow, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The success of the 2007 “Surge,” and the brilliance of General David Petraeus in turning around a seemingly unbroken parade of bad news in Iraq have been extensively studied from the perspectives of Washington-level strategists and American tactical commanders on the ground. However, Norman Cigar’s study examines this critical period in the Iraq conflict from the perspective of Iraqis at the province and village level, the “human terrain” so vital to the major U.S. victory and accompanying Al-Qaida failure.

The author is the director of Regional Studies at the Marine Corps University, with an extensive background in Middle East intelligence analysis for the Marine Corps and Army. Cigar’s study profits from his use of original Arabic sources and obvious familiarity with the language and the culture, which set him apart from others writing on the region. He also shows a remarkable ability to examine events with detached neutrality, rather than seeing the region through the lens of U.S. objectives. His goal is to explain why, beginning in late 2006, key tribal leaders began to throw their support behind the U.S. effort in Iraq and to actively oppose Al-Qaeda, and what could cause them to turn their allegiance away from the central government and back to Al-Qaeda in the future. Cigar avoids falling into any moral or ideological trap, resisting the temptation to portray the tribal sheiks as motivated by anything except their own interests.

In contrast to the successful U.S. planners, Al-Qaeda comes across as clumsy and mired in ideological fantasy as it alienates the tribal leaders. Imposing an “Islamic State of Iraq,” with non-Iraqis in key leadership positions, Al-Qaeda implemented a harsh version of sharia law and, as a consequence, usurped much of the tribal leaders’ authority. Cigar warns of the fragility of that success now that the Iraqi government has taken control of operations. Failing to find jobs for tribal fighters, or to pay them promptly, combined with a resilient Al-Qaeda that has learned from its earlier mistakes threatens to drive many tribal militias back into the Al-Qaeda orbit.

While somewhat dry and spartan in its presentation, Cigar’s study offers a perspective that makes the successes of 2007 and the dangers of the future very clear.

COL David D. DiMeo, USA, Retired, Bowling Green, KY


Conceptualizing Modern War is a crash course in the current trends in defining war and strategic concepts. Written by a variety of U.S. and Norwegian officers and academics, the book brings a high degree of intellectual vigor and historical perspective to questions of modern war. The authors examine a wide assortment of basic assumptions and definitions of war, including asymmetry, Generations of War, Effects Based Operations, insurgency, terrorism, guerrilla wars and others. They bring useful historical perspective to these definitions. For example, over 80 percent of wars in the last two centuries have pitted state against nonstate actors. Even “normal” wars between states usually involve significant action by nonstate elements (for example Tito’s guerrillas in Yugoslavia during the Second World War). This alone makes one wonder why the most common state of war is referred to as irregular and why most modern
nations continue to organize and train their forces for state-on-state warfare.

Several strategic concepts come under heavy criticism in Conceptualizing Modern War. Several authors deconstruct the concept of Generations of War (be it 4GW, 5GW, or even 6GW) and question its usefulness as an analytical model. Antulio Echevarria attacks the Generations of War’s simplistic model of historical progression for overemphasizing the role of technology in changing war. Ole Maaø attacks Mary Kaldor’s paradigm of New Wars—arguing that Kaldor’s combination of identity politics, displacement of peoples, and a decentralized global military economy, is anything but new. Both the Generations of War and New Wars are denounced for being ahistorical and ignoring the inherent continuities of strategic thought and technique. Torgeir E. Sæveraas and Dag Henriksen, both of the Norwegian Air Force Academy, attack the Effects-Based Operations model for being too deterministic and ignoring the enemy’s role in the outcome of war. Arent Arntzen and Tor Grøtan attack the Navy’s concept of Network Centric Warfare for similar reasons. Most of the contributors to the book denounce the U.S. and NATO’s obsession with new technology and its centrality to our concept of warfare.

While it is easy to criticize analytical models, it is necessary in order to promote intellectual vigor among NATO’s defense sector. As an alternative to technology-based generations or concepts of war, several authors, particularly David Kilcullen recommend looking at war by the nature of the opponents. Kilcullen’s model of war avoids technological cul-de-sacs and simply defines war as conventional (between states), traditional (between nonstate actors) and irregular (between states and nonstates). Still, perhaps the most important lesson of Conceptualizing Modern Warfare is that there is no magic bullet, analytical mode, or model that will fit all wars. Every conflict is different, requiring intense analysis and understanding of the local conditions, causes and actors. One-size-fits-all models act as a mental block to this analysis. The book is a must read for those interested in strategic discourse, the history of war, and strategic analysts. It is also an example of our NATO allies’ considerable potential for intellectual contribution.

ILT John E. Fahey, Lafayette, Indiana

CATACLYSM:
General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan
Herman S. Wolk,
University of North Texas Press,
Denton, 2012, 300 pages, $24.95

In his introduction, retired U.S. Air Force senior historian Herman S. Wolk describes Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan as an analytical work that binds together the stories of the B-29 and General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold’s role in World War II Pacific.

Wolk taps numerous primary and secondary sources including correspondence, lectures, interviews, oral history transcripts, interrogations, and monographs to focus on Arnold, policy, strategy, and command during World War II, particularly as these topics affected war in the Pacific. What emerges is a well-researched argument that challenges several historical interpretations regarding Arnold, strategic bombing, and use of the atomic bomb in 1945.

Early on, Wolk identifies a series of questions: Why was unified command never established in the Pacific? Was Arnold the reluctant warrior when he established the Twentieth Air Force? In the spring of 1945, was it absolutely necessary to ditch high-altitude precision bombing against the Japanese home islands in favor of area incendiary attacks? Was it necessary to drop the atomic bomb on Japan? As Wolk addresses each question, he examines Arnold’s relationships with officials in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and senior air commanders in the Pacific. Always coloring the relationships were Arnold’s efforts to employ the B-29 Superfortress in the strategic bombing of Japan.

Wolk initially focuses on the evolution of Air Corps doctrine related to morale or population bombing. He explores Roosevelt’s efforts to spur aircraft production for the lend-lease effort and Arnold’s concerns that this priority would prevent the build up of the Army Air Corps. Wolk then analyzes the use of air plans to defeat Japan, the formation of the 20th Air Force, Arnold’s decision to place Major General Curtis LeMay in command.
of the XXI Bomber Group, and the decision to drop the atomic bomb. Wolk concludes his work by answering the question “Who was Hap Arnold?” According to Wolk, “Arnold was a doer, a fixer, a driver. His long suit was impatience, wait for nothing. His forte was vision, the ability to recognize what had to be done to build, organize, and control air forces.”

*Cataclysm* is as an objective, persuasive, articulate account of Hap Arnold and the strategic bombing effort against Japan in 1944 and 1945. It is a must read for any serious student of World War II, air power, and senior-level military command.

Stephen D. Coats, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**CITIZEN SOLDIER:**
A Life of Harry S. Truman,
Aida D. Donald, Basic Books,

Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, “The ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of comfort and convenience, but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy.” This quote exemplifies the life of President Harry S. Truman. Author Aida Donald looks into Truman’s life from humble beginnings through struggles to become the president of the United States.

Donald extensively researched documents including letters Truman wrote to his wife Bess, papers from the Truman library, recently released government documents, and a collection of Truman’s private thoughts that he wrote while staying in seclusion at the Pickwick Hotel in Kansas City in order to calm his nerves because of the associations he had to keep in order to be elected president.

Truman saw his association with the Pendergast political machine (one of the most corrupt political machines in the country) as a necessary evil in the days of getting elected in Missouri. The association hurt Truman throughout his political life as people assumed that if he was part of the Pendergast machine he also must be corrupt. The association caused Truman anxiety, although Truman was known as the one honest man in the organization. Because of this association, Truman isolated himself from even his fellow Democrats thereby limiting his effectiveness as a U.S. senator; he worked hard to prove he was honest and that he could get things accomplished.

Donald focuses on Truman’s life before he entered politics. He came from a humble farm family, married Bess Wallace, but failed repeatedly at farming and a number of business ventures. Truman served as a “citizen soldier” in World War I but battled a number of psychosomatic illnesses throughout his career.

Donald’s wit combined with her extensive research and attention to detail make this a biography compelling to any military and historical reader.

MAJ Jason R. Ravensborg, USAR,
Yankton, South Dakota
THE BATTLE OF the North Atlantic was the longest continuous military campaign of World War II, running from 1939 until the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, though it reached its peak from mid-1940 through the end of 1943. The Battle of the North Atlantic pitted German U-boats and other warships of the German navy against Allied merchant shipping. Initially, convoys of merchant ships were protected for the most part by the British and Canadian navies and air forces. Starting in the early fall of 1941, before Pearl Harbor, these forces were aided by ships and aircraft of the United States.

The Battle for the North Atlantic began on the first day of the European war and lasted for six years, involving thousands of ships and stretching over hundreds of miles of the vast ocean and seas in a succession of more than a hundred convoy battles and as many as a thousand single-ship encounters. Tactical advantage switched back and forth over the six years as new weapons, tactics, and countermeasures were developed by both sides. The Allies gradually gained the upper hand, driving the German surface raiders from the ocean by the end of 1942 and decisively defeating the U-boats in a series of convoy battles between March and May 1943.

From the publisher.

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT: A Complete History,

Kathryn Moore, Fall River Press, New York, 2013, 688 pages, $19.95

Remarkable and comprehensive, this single-volume reference offers a fascinating glimpse into the American presidency and its continuing evolution. It’s organized chronologically and contains detailed personal and political profiles of each president, official portraits, timelines for every term, intriguing facts and stats, and much more. Readable, rigorously researched, and completely revised and updated to include the 2012 campaign and election, The American President paints a vibrant portrait of the highest office in the land.

From the publisher.
PME Distance Learning

Jack T. Judy and Micheal R. Matinez, Department of Distance Education, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas—Raymond A. Kimball and CPT Joseph M. Byerly’s article “To Make Army PME Distance Learning Work, Make It Social” (Military Review, May-June 2013) is a great article and makes good points. However, we would like to take an opportunity to mitigate some of the negative “stigma” leaders associate with a nonresident learning approach and to discuss some current distance learning professional military education delivery approaches.

Leaders should not regard distance learning courses as a poor relation of resident courses; distance learning courses do not produce inferior learning outcomes compared to resident programs. There is a need to educate the force on the effectiveness of distance learning programs to alleviate the stigma associated by leaders. The U.S. Department of Education report Evaluation of Evidence-Based Practices in Online Learning: A Meta-Analysis and Review of Online Learning Studies disclosed some illuminating results. In short, it found:

- “Students in online courses performed modestly better, on average, than those learning the same material through traditional face-to-face instruction.” (Barbara Means, et al., “Evaluation of Evidence-Based Practices in Online Learning: A Meta-Analysis and Review of Online Learning Studies”; U.S. Department of Education Rev, September 2010). While the average effect was relatively small, this demonstrated the parity between the two methodologies.
- “Instruction combining online and face-to-face elements had a larger advantage relative to purely face-to-face instruction than did purely online instruction.” This demonstrates that a combination provides an additional advantage between the other two methods, but goes on to say, “the learning outcomes for students in purely online conditions and those for students in purely face-to-face conditions were statistically equivalent.”

The results of this meta-analysis (a quantitative statistical analysis of several separate but similar experiments or studies) provide evidence that distance learning programs provide educational outcomes as good as, if not better than, resident learning.

The prejudicial outlook on nonresident Intermediate Level Education (ILE) likely resides with attendees being board selected and leaders interpreting resident attendance as an indicator of potential. The Army has migrated back to a selection process for resident attendance. Understandably, the Army applies a “best qualified” standard for selection, so admittedly selection to attend the resident course does reflect some level of achievement. However, the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) has a finite number of available slots for resident students, so to alleviate an increasing backlog, the Army has combined options to educate officers that include the use of distance learning, along with satellite campuses, The Army School System, and in some cases constructive credit.

Based on the premise (from the article) that distance learning needs to be “social” to reach its full potential, there are elements that do live up to their full potential. The CGSS distance learning Advanced Operations Course (AOC) provides students a collaborative “social” learning environment. The course includes social aspects such as online sessions via a facilitated Defense Connect Online, as well as discussion boards—gaining the benefits touted in the Cavalry Leaders’ Course case study. Essentially, this course is a hybrid of the best of both approaches, providing an online element as well as a collaborative element. Drawing a conclusion from the above meta-analysis, the distance learning AOC methodology provides a larger advantage relative to other methods (strictly online or face-to-face).

Now, for all the hard-core traditionalists who still advocate face-to-face is the “only” way to learn and may pose the argument that one cannot maneuver a squad (company, battalion, etc.) from behind a
Let’s explore this. Perhaps this is how we frame this discussion. Think of maneuvering (or another collective task) as the practice of what they have learned. As with all military training, we learn first, and then go practice. There are certain aspects of face-to-face interaction that distance learning cannot replace, so the learning content has to be appropriate. For example, I don’t know that I would want to have surgery done by surgeons who completed their degree completely online. Nevertheless, surgeons can now operate from a remote location, so being “resident” isn’t always necessary. In another respect, with advancements in technology, maneuvering units from behind computers is becoming more of a reality. Look at systems such as Blue Force Tracker and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below that provide leaders greatly improved situational awareness on the battlefield.

Studies support that distance learning provides the same learning outcomes as resident courses, so we should not base an officer’s career progression on the method he or she used to complete ILE. The CGSS distance learning does provide a “social” aspect to the curriculum, providing that “vital component” for students’ education. The fact that officers who have completed their ILE through distance learning compete and qualify for battalion command, joint assignments, and the very competitive School of Advanced Military Studies program should indicate the level of learning these officers achieved via distance learning. The Army has made significant investments in the delivery of professional military education on line, anywhere and anytime. It’s time to appreciate the advancement in online education and delivery rather than relive the glory days of the past.

Kaplan Replies to Fontenot’s Review

Fred Kaplan, Brooklyn, NY—As a rule, I don’t believe in responding to negative reviews; critics have a right to criticize. But Colonel (retired) Greg Fontenot’s pan of my book, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (Military Review, March-April 2013), is so blatantly dishonest, such a seamless stream of willful distortion, that I’m compelled to make an exception.

The dishonesty begins with the first sentence, where he denounces me as “a journalist, not a historian.” First, I’m proud to wear the tag journalist; more to the point, I am also a historian, as anyone who has read my 1983 book, The Wizards of Armageddon, could attest. And since Wizards has been required reading at the military academies and Leavenworth’s School of Advance Military Studies at various times over the decades, I’m sure many of MR’s readers could back me up here.

But onto The Insurgents. Fontenot’s main point is that Petraeus, Nagl, et al., weren’t really insurgents; in fact, he writes, they succeeded because “Army leadership supported them.” As his prime example, he cites General Peter Chiarelli. How could Chiarelli be an “insurgent,” he scoffs, when he was the vice chief of staff! As Fontenot knows (assuming he actually read my book), my account of Chiarelli-as-insurgent takes place in 2004-2006, when he was commander of the 1st Cav, then MNF-I, trying to impose a COIN strategy in Baghdad, against the overriding opposition of his superiors, especially Generals Casey and Abizaid. As Fontenot surely knows, Chiarelli was promoted to vice in 2008, after Petraeus & Co. won their bureaucratic battles.

He also notes Petraeus’s support from General Peter Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff during the pertinent time-period, though, as the colonel knows, Schoomaker himself was something of an insurgent: he’d come up through special operations, and he was brought out of a three-year-long retirement to take the job by SecDef Rumsfeld, who thought that he would reduce the army’s size. (He didn’t anticipate that Schoomaker would also promote COIN, which Rumsfeld detested.)

Fontenot goes so far as to claim that Major General Barbara Fast and Ralph Peters are the only resistors I cite to the COINdistas’ ascension. This is sheer deception. I also chronicle the opposition of nearly the entire top brass of the time (Schoomaker
excluded), including JCS chairman General Peter Pace, Army vice chief General Richard Cody (who also ran the BG promotion board), as well as Rumsfeld and many others.

More egregiously, Fontenot sidesteps the context of this fight. As he must know, throughout the 1980s-1990s, when my characters were climbing up the ranks, official Army doctrine hardly recognized as “war” anything short of major combat operations. The generals of the day labeled smaller clashes as “low-intensity conflicts” or “military operations other than war”—MOOTW, which they pronounced moot-wah. (General Shalikshavili, the chairman at the time, was known to have muttered, “Real men don’t do moot-wah.”) Yet the junior officers of the day were deployed to El Salvador, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti—none of them officially considered combat zones. This was the institutional culture that these then-junior officers sought to change.

Fontenot insists that Petraeus was not at all an insurgent but “an enabled and adroit insider.” Then why did Petraeus have to operate behind his superiors’ backs in Mosul, bring in his own entourage to write a new COIN field manual, form a secret back channel with a White House assistant and feed her rebuttals to the Chiefs’ arguments against the “surge”? Did Fontenot even read my book? Or is he merely trying to persuade others not to?

On a minor but no less misleading point, Fontenot chides me for criticizing Ralph Peters on the grounds that he lacked combat experience. This is not at all the case. In one chapter, I recount the confrontation between Peters and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl over the COIN field manual. Peters keeps saying that the point of war is to kill the enemy; this irritates Nagl, in part because he had been killing plenty of enemy in Anbar whereas Peters hadn’t ever fired a gun in anger. I don’t know whether Fontenot read the chapter too hastily or simply has a grudge to bear.

Finally Fontenot writes, “Kaplan really doesn’t ask whether the solutions…reached and embedded in FM 3-24 were or are sound.” Again, I have to wonder whether he bothered to read this book. Its 20 or so other reviewers (all but two of whom wrote very favorable notices) seemed to have gotten my point. (For some examples, please visit the homepage of my website, fredkaplan.info.) My book lays out the history and evolution of the COIN idea in an objective way—how the idea came about, why it appealed to a generation of young officers in the post-Vietnam era, how they emerged as a community (a “cabal,” by their own account) and insinuated it into mainstream Army doctrine, and how it collapsed in Afghanistan. I sought to understand this doctrine, but I am also quite critical of its relevance to today’s conflicts and today’s world.

Fontenot Reponds to Kaplan

Colonel Greg Fontenot, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, KS—Despite Mr. Kaplan’s assertion to the contrary I did not, in my review try to “persuade others not to” read his book. Actually, I recommended his book. I opined that Kaplan had “written an interesting story.” I wrote that he did a good job of making, “the case that connections and networks matter in institutions.” I further described what he wrote as a, “good story about a group of officers and academics, most of whom shared similar experiences in elite institutions, who came together, supported by the Army leadership, to adapt the Army to fight in Iraq.” Finally, I described his book as “interesting and worth taking the time to read.” Apparently, what Mr. Kaplan wants is an uncritical assessment of his book. I stand by my review. I formed my opinion on the basis of a careful reading of his book and my own experience as a soldier and defense professional since 1971 serving in peace, war, and various conditions in between as diverse as the Fulda Gap and Kabul.

I find Kaplan’s allegation that I have not read his book troubling. I find his accusation that I am dishonest offensive. Surely there is a logical contradiction between accusing me of “willful distortion” on the one hand and wondering if I really had read his book, on the other. At one point in his missive to the editor he admits that I may have read at least one chapter if hastily. He further asserts in the same instance that I may have held a grudge, presumably against John Nagl. I did read the chapter carefully and have great respect for John Nagl as a soldier and a scholar. Nagl may have felt as irritated as Kaplan reports in the chapter in question, but Nagl had the good sense to attack Ralph Peters’ viewpoint not Peters. My point in the review is the insinuation
Kaplan makes through this vignette is that Peters’ views are irrelevant because he lacked combat experience. Yet Kaplan invites no such conclusions about those who contributed to FM 3-24 who had no more combat experience than Peters had, that is to say, none. Either way the fact is that Ralph Peters’ objections did not matter as he was in no position to impede the development of FM 3-24.

I will not write a point by point rebuttal but will respond to Kaplan’s inference that I ignored or as sidestepped the context of the 1980s and 1990s. In 1977, I published my first written critique of Army doctrine in Infantry. Since that time, I have maintained an active interest in Army doctrine, criticizing it when I thought it appropriate and will publish my next criticism in the June edition of Army. These articles have included everything from assessments of FM 3-0 to peace enforcement in Bosnia. I commanded a battalion in Desert Storm and as a brigade commander led the first U.S. troops across the Sava River in December 1995. I do understand the context of the 1980s and 1990s—having experienced it, thought about it, studied and wrote about it. I most certainly did not ignore that context in writing my review.

If Kaplan’s “insurgents” had come together in the 1980s then the drama he imagined in writing The Insurgents would actually have existed. There truly would have been resistance to a counterinsurgency approach in the 1980s and 1990s although the winds of change were evident after Desert Storm. None of this back and forth between Kaplan and me reduces the significance of FM 3-24 or the efforts of those who participated in writing it. What Dave Petraeus and his team achieved is remarkable. I was at Fort Leavenworth when Petraeus commanded here. He was engaging, energetic, and supported on post and elsewhere with enthusiasm. We perceived accurately that he had performed brilliantly in Iraq in combat and during the transition. The context of the 1980s and 1990s simply did not apply when Petraeus served at Fort Leavenworth.

Despite what Kaplan claims, Petraeus confronted no serious opposition at Leavenworth or inside the Army. He encountered no more serious opposition to his efforts than I have witnessed in the development of various Army field manuals since I first became involved personally. My own experience in developing Army doctrine dates to 1992 as the lead for General Fred Franks’ initiative group. The sausage-making that is the Army doctrine process is always interesting and occasionally dangerous to those who are making the sausage. That was not the case in the development of FM 3-24. The sad situation in the field reduced what opposition there was to impotence. The winds of change in the Army’s thinking wafted in first with General Fred Franks’ FM 100-5 published in 1993, gusted in Somalia, and were blowing a full gale at the end of the century following Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

With respect to his ad hominem attack on me I will only say that Kaplan may style himself as he likes, but he has not earned the right to style me as dishonest.
All I wanted was a cigarette.
We weren’t allowed to smoke.
He knew where to go.

We swept sidewalks together.
Raked sand together.
Talked about life together.

His window was across from mine.
I think he saw me changing once.
Maybe more than once.

He was getting dishonorably discharged.
I didn’t think he was a good man.
I didn’t think he was a bad one, either.

It had been two weeks since I landed in Monterey.
I only wanted a cigarette.
He knew where to go.

I bought the Southern Comfort and bottom shelf gin.
He carried them with him to his room.
I didn’t think anything of it.

We raked sand together.
We ate lunch together.
We watched movies together.

We sat on a makeshift bench by the ditch by the installation fence.
We drank and smoked and laughed.
I taught him Farsi and he taught me Russian.

Russian for “hello” and “goodbye.”
Russian for “This is allowed.”
Russian for “This is not allowed.”

I think he saw me changing once.
He tried to kiss me on the cheek.
I told him no, my boyfriend wouldn’t like that very much.

We smoked some more.
We drank some more.
We laughed some more.

It was 2130.
I had to be in my room by 2200.
He said not to worry, I’d be back in time.

I insisted and tried to leave.
I fell to the ground.
He didn’t help me up.

I only wanted a cigarette.
He kissed me on the mouth.
I did not kiss him back.

I was immobile.
Paralyzed.
Drugged?

He kissed me again.
And again.
And again.

I did not kiss him back.
I had a boyfriend.
All I wanted was to smoke and drink and laugh.

He grabbed me by the ankles.
Pulled me over the ditch behind the army barracks by the installation fence.
I could hear soldiers coming back to their rooms.

I was paralyzed.
I always thought I would fight.
Fend him off with car keys stuffed between my fingers.

I looked up at the tree branches above me, my watch said 2147.
That was the last time I prayed to God.
There were leaves in my hair and dirt on my arms.

There was something less than a man between my legs.
It looked at me with hate in its eyes.
We swept sidewalks together.

God kicked back and swigged a PBR
while I was raped behind the army barracks,
over the ditch by the installation fence.

He helped me up.
I couldn’t stand on my own.
How sweet.

I vomited by a tree.
I was disgusted with myself and him and God.
I wanted to drown in Southern Comfort and bottom shelf gin.

He walked me to my barracks building.
How sweet.
I made it to my room by 2200.

All the girls watched me stumble down the hallway.
I was so violently alone.
Taps wailed outside the window.

I left my hat by the bench by the ditch by the installation fence.
He brought it to me the next morning.
How sweet.

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