



Trafficking Terror through Tajikistan

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Russian border guards patrol Tajik-Afghan borderland near Kulyab, Tajikistan, 12 July 2003. The U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign in neighboring Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks caused a brief lull in drug traffic through this Central Asian nation. But now, traffic on this key route for Afghan drugs is soaring to new heights. (AP Photo/ Pavel Pavlov)

SINCE THE ISLAMIC Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was founded in 1998, the organization has evolved and continued to operate despite the significant damage inflicted on it by Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and its subsequent relocation to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.¹

Arguments about the current state of the IMU and their alleged migration north into Central Asia and northern Afghanistan persist.² Occasionally neglected is the key role that the opium trade has played and will continue to play in formulating the IMU's strategy, as opium brings immense profits for militants to use in sustaining their operations.³

In 2012, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that Afghanistan, part of the "Golden Crescent," witnessed a surge in opium production.⁴ This surge will be beneficial to the IMU as they become increasingly involved in facilitating trafficking, where they are already strategically placed, by serving to help them finance and expand their organization's operations.⁵

What is the risk involved with militant trafficking in Central Asia? Is this danger more evident in some states than in others? How will trafficking financially sustain militant operations? Despite the lack of much information on this clandestine industry, how it relates to any future ramifications resulting from the IMU's operations needs examination.

The opium trade is capable of increasing the IMU's capabilities while sustaining the organization and prolonging its existence, contributes to the region's continuing instability, and is able to manifest itself in Tajikistan.

Opium's Evolving Landscape

As of 2012, Afghanistan remains responsible for 63 percent of the global opium market, and production shows no sign of ceasing.⁶ Although potential

opium production decreased in 2010 to 3,600 tons as a result of crop failure, it made a comeback in 2011 at 5,800 tons.⁷ The numbers for 2011 remained lower than at any point between 2006-2009 but were substantially higher than estimates for the years ranging from 1997-2005.⁸ This demonstrates that Afghanistan shows no signs of reducing its opium production.

What does this mean for Central Asia? The region has historically been one of several trafficking routes out of Afghanistan toward European and Russian markets. In 2009, approximately 90 tons of heroin were transferred through Central Asia alone.⁹

At present, a quarter of Afghanistan's annual output is being trafficked through Central Asia.¹⁰ However, crackdowns along the Pakistan border from drone strikes and Pakistani military operations may push alternate routes northward, which will increase reliance on IMU-type factions and return the opium flow through Central Asia to previous levels.¹¹ Additionally, avenues through Iran are becoming problematic for traffickers. In 2010, Iran snatched 27 tons or 33 percent of total global heroin seizures.¹² Opium caught in transit through Iran was down to 401 tons in 2010, from 580 tons in 2009, which at the time represented 89 percent of global opium seizures.¹³ Tajikistan accounted for .2 percent of global opium seizures, Uzbekistan .1 percent, and Kyrgyzstan .06 percent, and in 2010, the only Central Asian state to report a decline in heroin crossing its borders was Uzbekistan.¹⁴

These numbers demonstrate that the Central Asian regimes are doing less than other regional governments to combat trafficking owing to corruption (many are engaged in trafficking themselves)

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and weak governance. This fact does not go unnoticed by militants funding their operations through trafficking. As profits will clearly be maximized if fewer shipments are apprehended, an increased

focus on northern routes through Central Asia should be expected.

Militant Islamists, such as the IMU will continue to fund their operations through the opium trade, despite the fact that since OEF the IMU's significant involvement in drug trafficking has been greatly reduced. Prior to OEF, according to Interpol's Criminal Intelligence Directorate, 60 percent of Afghan heroin in 2000 was trafficked through Central Asia.¹⁵ According to Kyrgyz authorities, 70 percent of this Central Asian heroin was moved by the IMU.¹⁶

At present, partially resulting from IMU displacement in Central Asia post-9/11, much of the trafficking operation has been taken over by corrupt politicians and local militias. This is most evident in Tajikistan where the IMU's direct influence in trafficking has been historically evident and will likely remain the place of its resurgence.¹⁷ Tajikistan is ideal because the IMU has historic dealings from locations such as Tavildar. Tajikistan's President Rahmano was previously too weak and unwilling to enforce the rule of law in the regions outlying Dushanbe, the capital, notably in semi-autonomous regions. However, attempts to consolidate and enforce his power have been made in the Rasht district from 2010-2011.¹⁸ There have also been operations in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in 2012. The government achieved a degree of success in both of these areas.¹⁹

Afghanistan (Tajiks comprise roughly 20-25 percent of the country) is situated south of the Tajik border, which creates strong kinship ties that transcend loyalty to Dushanbe for local inhabitants.²⁰ Weak governance coupled with the fact that the Afghani-Tajik border runs 1,200 kilometers, makes any substantial monitoring unlikely.²¹

Corruption and government involvement in trafficking has deep roots. In Tajikistan, part of this involvement is traceable to the 1997 peace accord brokered by the UN, the UTO, and the government in Dushanbe.²² Dushanbe agreed to end the country's civil war (1992-1997), create a power-sharing government, and offer general amnesty to the war's participants.²³

However, this agreement failed to successfully integrate all former militias into the central army, which enabled former militia commanders to retain political control of their respective regions.²⁴ This

arrangement has created a system where several politicians remain little more than warlords who run their own private armies and are hardly accountable to the government in Dushanbe.²⁵

Most of the few remaining warlord politicians who financed themselves through the drug trade during the war previously collaborated with militant Islamists, and they have had few incentives to discontinue their profitable practices even though the war has ceased. The previously mentioned operations against regional warlord Tolib Ayombekov, in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in 2012, may well be more about control of drug turf than of concern for Tajikistan's stability.²⁶

Current Routes and the Role of Tajikistan

Most drug shipments entering Central Asia are forced to follow the routes of major highways, as the region is too mountainous to afford alternate routes. As Matthew Stein and Charles Bartles from the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office told this author, the only exception is when traffickers occasionally cut across borders, such as Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan.²⁷ The Panj River, which stretches along most of the Afghan-Tajik border, makes cutting across borders more problematic and tends to channel shipments. Most shipments entering Central Asia eventually reach Osh where they are then sent to markets in Russia and Europe. In Osh, organized criminal networks manage most of the distribution.²⁸ These criminal elements are organized around kinship ties, and they are quite capable of buying off the politicians who could interfere with trafficking. For instance, the UNODC estimates that authorities stop no more than 5 percent of a minimum of at least 20,000 kg of narcotics that passes through Kyrgyzstan annually, primarily through Osh.²⁹

In Uzbekistan, corrupt officials run trafficking operations, and any IMU involvement would be immediately crushed. Because of the tight state control imposed by President Islam Karimov's regime, Uzbekistan is not a preferred route for traffickers and moves less Afghan opium than neighboring Tajikistan.³⁰ The IMU is most capable of manifesting itself in Tajikistan's drug scene.

In the 1990s, opium entering Khorog, Tajikistan, from Afghanistan was sent to Osh along M41, or

the "Pamir Highway," since it was one of the only major road systems running through the country.³¹ According to one representative from an international organization that this author spoke with, this led to the Pamir Highway becoming "the most trafficked route in the world."³² Continued foreign investment in Tajikistan has created additional roads, which allow for alternate routes. Construction of associated bridges closed the gap that existed between Tajikistan and Afghanistan from the Panj River. This has only increased the flow of trafficking throughout Tajikistan and the ability of the IMU to infiltrate the market.

According to Stein and Bartles, Tajikistan is like the "Wild West" with little or no state control, and where the IMU will find it conducive to advancing themselves in the trade in these mountainous regions.³³ Dr. Svante Cornell recognizes the significance of these routes and enclaves that geography makes possible, such as Chorku in the Isfara district of Tajikistan, where "neither the state they are geographically located in nor the state legally administering them are able to exert strong governmental authority."³⁴ Here heroin is stored before transfer, similar to Jirgatal and Tavildara before.³⁵

The Role of Militants

Despite the marginalization of militant Islamists in trafficking operations, the fact that they are returning to the region along previously established drug routes suggests their involvement is still relevant. It may become more so as their regional presence increases.³⁶ Gretchen Peters' research indicates that IMU involvement in trafficking already includes providing security for shipments of heroin as they move out of Afghanistan.³⁷ The Taliban alone takes in approximately \$250 million a year for protection services, so it is clear IMU security services bring the organization sizeable revenue.³⁸

Current practice in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region places a *Zakat* of 2.5 percent on traffickers for protection.³⁹

An *Ushr* of 10 percent is expected from farmers.⁴⁰ This information comes from the UNODC.⁴¹ The *hawala* system, which moves billions of dollars every year, makes it difficult to determine the exact profits being obtained.⁴² As the system is based on personal trust, it avoids wire transfers and moves clandestinely.⁴³



(Dominic Hauser, DOD)

U.S. service members use a forklift to unload tents from a C-17 Globemaster on an airfield near Kulob, Tajikistan, as part of a mission to provide shelter to displaced citizens due to recent floods. Soldiers of Third Army, in cooperation with the 21st Airlift Squadron of Travis Air Force Base, CA, delivered over \$250,000 worth of tents as part of a call for international assistance by the Tajikistan government, Kulob, Tajikistan, 15 May 2010.

Prior to 2001, in addition to opium profits, the IMU was able to rely on the Taliban to provide the organization with a safe-haven and Al-Qaeda to provide arms, ammunition, capital, and admission to training facilities.⁴⁴

Presently, this absence of patronage has led to an increased reliance on drug trafficking to finance the organization, and the IMU is undoubtedly involved in racketeering operations. Ahmed Rashid argues the IMU is active in the opium trade because, after having resided in Pakistan for more than a decade, it has to find independent sources of funding and financing.⁴⁵ Moreover, the IMU is the only organization with contacts all around the Afghan struggle, from Pakistan through Central Asia. Its ability to move freely across Afghanistan and Tajikistan, unlike other groups operating in the region, should not be underestimated.⁴⁶

The International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) scheduled departure from Afghanistan is cause for concern, because it may lead to IMU trafficking returning to pre-OEF levels. Afghanistan currently accounts for 63 percent of global opium production.⁴⁷ That is down from 74 percent in 2009 (UNODC, 2009).⁴⁸ The 2009 levels were down from 87 percent in 2005 (UNODC, 2005).⁴⁹ However, ISAF withdrawal may see these numbers increase with the aforementioned developing reliance on routes through Central Asia. Reduced assistance and direct foreign investment entering Afghanistan in the years to come will help foster resurgence in and a dependence on opium production to provide for the populace's basic sustenance. The failure to introduce alternate and competitive options will again drive production levels, to the elation of militants, disrupting Central Asian regional security concerns.

Although, corrupt officials have taken over much of the trade, the potential profit remains high enough that the IMU may actively participate in regional operations without stepping on anyone's toes. One American analyst of Central Asia working in Tajikistan summed it up when he defined the drug trade "as a model for inter-ethnic cooperation."⁵⁰ The point being that militant Islamists will likely meet little resistance if they reinstate themselves in Tajikistan's trafficking, especially if Tajikistan's President Rahmano's government proves incapable of exerting sustained influence beyond Dushanbe, has little incentive to tackle trafficking, and is likely engaged in transferring opium itself.

The opium trade alone has raised Tajikistan's GDP by 30 percent.⁵¹ Regional governments run by the corrupt former warlords do not want to see the drug trade go away as the profits they make far exceed anything legitimate business would provide. As the American analyst told this author, there is "no incentive for these guys [Central Asian governments] not to exaggerate, they're getting VIP status, [which] is understandable when you see them fighting to get funding for arts, culture, education, and then they immediately get it for drugs."⁵² For example, in 2007, the U.S. gave \$45.2 million in aid to Tajikistan, of which \$20.34 million went to security (to counter drugs and terrorism).⁵³ As clearly illustrated, drug profits far exceed revenue generated via legitimate business ventures and foreign aid. This offers little incentive for the government to clamp down on a practice that has proven to be one of the most profitable economic industries in the country.

According to UNODC's Central Asian Section, the annual profit to Tajikistan from reexport of heroin is roughly \$2.2 billion, and \$1.8 billion of that figure is net profit.⁵⁴ Although, estimates placed the market value at \$1.4 billion for 2009, it is doubtful these figures will dramatically decrease as long as there remains significant demand.⁵⁵ Russia alone consumes 50-95 tons of heroin annually; Europe 60-80 tons.⁵⁶ (Only 7 percent of heroin consumed in the U.S. comes from Afghanistan).⁵⁷ The point being is that there is plenty of money to go around, little incentive to stop, and the likelihood of significant turf wars emerging is not plausible as it would be too disruptive to business. The more likely scenario would be increased coordinated

efforts between rogue corrupt government officials and militants operating in Tajikistan.

Nevertheless, even Chinese, Iranian, and U.S. funding that is directed toward economic development, such as roads and other critical infrastructure, often facilitates trafficking. For example, the Panj Bridge, created in 2007 with \$33 million in U.S. aid, was created to foster trade and connect Tajikistan to Afghanistan.⁵⁸ Although the bridge is being used to increase trade, commerce in opium thrives.⁵⁹

These investments often have the adverse effect of facilitating ease of transport, increasing profits, and encouraging larger shipments of heroin to be moved as it makes its way into Osh, where it is then distributed to its European and Russian markets. In the Panj case, militants in Kunduz are clearly taking advantage of these developments to finance their operations.

What's Being Done?

Even with approximately 6,000 Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan, little is being done to combat trafficking because the government remains incapable and not inclined to address it.⁶⁰ Former militia leaders integrated into the government actively participate in trafficking. Corruption at the micro level fails to tackle the issue. Petty corruption often occurs because security personnel are underpaid, understaffed, and underequipped to deal with trafficking, which makes them susceptible to bribes. Moreover, incentives to actively participate in the trade increase when salaries for officials, soldiers, and policemen may be as low as \$10-\$30 per month.⁶¹ The corruption often starts the moment an individual takes a job. Many positions are obtained via payment or bribe, and afterward, individuals may continue to give a portion of their earnings to their superiors after using their new authority for drug extortion.⁶² Frequently, these officials do not just allow drug traffickers to operate but actively participate in the trafficking themselves. One Tajik law enforcement officer claimed,

Nearly all law enforcement and border patrolling officers in the border districts are involved in drug trafficking. Some of them smuggle drugs into Tajikistan; others deliver drugs from border districts to other parts of the country; others still 'open' the border to traffickers and provide them with crucial

information. In other parts of Tajikistan the percentage of corrupted officers is lower. In my opinion, eight officers out of ten are corrupted in Dushanbe.⁶³

This assessment was reinforced when, in 2005, senior officers from the State Border Protection Committee were detained due to their opium-trafficking activities.⁶⁴ Pinpointing the corrupt officials can be as simple as determining which officials live moderately and those who live luxuriously.⁶⁵ However, since the rule of law is practically non-existent, little effort has been made to do so.

The vast majority of efforts that have actually focused on stopping drugs attempt to do so at the border but fail to address the issue after they enter Tajikistan. Nonetheless, the government has made some attempts to better coordinate efforts to end the drug trade. For example, in 1999, Tajikistan along with the UNODC established the Drug Control Agency (DCA). However, the organization has 400 members, which is an inadequate number to effectively tackle the drug trade and the corrupt officials that facilitate its success.⁶⁶ It has been argued that instead of eliminating opium trafficking, the DCA has attempted to take charge of it.⁶⁷



Afghan National Army soldiers (ANA) and U.S. Marines with 6th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 5, speak to local residents during a patrol in Sarakala, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 9 March 2012. The ANA and Marines encouraged the local populace to avoid illegal drug production activities. (U.S. Marine Corps, LCpl Michael E. Warren).

The existence of high-level involvement raises doubt that Tajikistan will make any serious efforts to address the issue, militants or not. For example, Tajikistan's Ambassador to Kazakhstan was twice arrested for transferring drugs, and during the latter incident, he was seized with \$1 million and 62 kilograms of heroin.⁶⁸ However, high profile cases are rare and when they do occur are often the result of political leveraging.⁶⁹

Generally, when arrests are made, they are aimed at low-level couriers who depend on trafficking for sustenance and fail to address the causes of the industry—corruption, underdevelopment, and poverty. This unwillingness to curb drug trafficking on the part of Tajikistan creates favorable conditions for the IMU to reinsert themselves in the country's burgeoning opium trade.

Consequences of Complacency

IMU involvement in the drug trade is significant for several reasons. As Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown states, "illicit economies provide an opportunity for belligerent groups to increase their power along multiple dimensions."⁷⁰ This increased power is visible when militants' abilities and local support expands, which can manifest itself in accumulated political capital, increased fighting capacity with improved weapons, and rising recruitment numbers.

According to Dr. Felbab-Brown, "in short, sponsorship of illicit economies allows nonstate armed groups to function as security providers and economic and political regulators."⁷¹ The IMU had already enhanced its capabilities under Juma Namangani prior to 9/11, after transit routes expanded from the initial Khorog to Osh route into the IMU strongholds of Jirgatal and Tavildara during Tajikistan's Civil War.⁷² Drug revenue permitted the IMU to pay fighters high wages in a region where unemployment was rampant. Additionally, with high revenues from drugs, the IMU were always able to pay villagers for supplies instead confiscating them, which contributed to their popular support.⁷³

It appears the IMU has been continuing this trend with some success. In 2007, pro-Taliban insurgent incursions into the Swat Valley broke out, many allegedly orchestrated by IMU. These insurgents were able to pay fighters 200 rupees (\$3.35) a day, compared to the average daily income of 40 rupees

(60 cents).⁷⁴ The IMU is continuing previous strategic practices, which they will mimic again in Central Asia. In countries like Tajikistan, where 60 percent of the inhabitants live below the poverty line, militant presence and job opportunity in the informal sector will likely be welcomed.⁷⁵

The routes used to traffic opium are capable of transporting arms and manpower into Central Asia, in addition to the revenue they provide. Locations where drugs are stored may also be used as safe havens for militants fleeing government repercussion or from whence to launch future operations inside Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan. These routes have already been used to send weapons into Afghanistan to fuel its insurgency, and they could easily reverse direction to funnel weapons into Central Asia via Tajikistan. In 2005 two former Taliban commanders were apprehended in Kunduz for running an extensive narcotics and arms network that operated along the Afghan-Tajik border.⁷⁶

Accusations that the IMU has become more of a criminal organization are incorrect, insofar as they retain their ideology. Phil Williams contends that the IMU's leadership and rank and file have been killed off, and yet that the organization continues to exist implies its ideology is holding the organization together.⁷⁷ Besides, as Williams states, "Being a greedy criminal is not necessarily incompatible with being a committed terrorist or insurgent."⁷⁸ Justification for heroin trafficking, of which consumption is prohibited in Islam, is justified in that it targets infidel markets and can be considered part of jihad.⁷⁹

Regardless of the exact current extent of militant Islamists involvement in the opium trade, Murat Laumulin asserts, "while most drug traffickers may have no connection to religious extremism, those who do are sufficiently important to provide a steady income stream for Islamic militant and terrorist groups."⁸⁰ Cornell believes, "the drug trade will allow the IMU to acquire the financial wherewithal to survive, and even possibly strengthen in the coming years unless the counternarcotics strategies in the region are more effective."⁸¹ The IMU clearly has the potential to benefit the most from the drug trade from their network that extends from Waziristan into Central Asia and their privileged status with the Taliban.⁸²

Options are limited for combating the drug trade in Central Asia and curbing militant financing and influence. As Felbab-Brown states, "Efforts to limit the belligerents' resources should focus on mechanisms that do not harm the wider population directly."⁸³ But doing so is problematic in Central Asia, where the drug trade remains attractive. According to the American analyst working in Tajikistan, "the drug trade is corroding society, but it's also bringing stability."⁸⁴ Only once a stable and legal alternative form of livelihood becomes widely available can the IMU's trafficking be effectively targeted without harming local citizens.

Although this illicit economy does bring a degree of stability, it has also been devastating on society. In 1995, there were 823 registered heroin addicts in Tajikistan; by 2001, the number had reached 6,243 according to official Tajik figures. However, UNODC estimates much higher figures, with 75,000 addicts by 2001 and 100,000 by 2005.⁸⁵

Currently, 82 percent of registered drug users in Tajikistan identify themselves as heroin addicts.⁸⁶ The increasing figures led the Tajik government to crack down on internal domestic use, which had the adverse effect of forcing individuals to start injecting heroin as opposed to smoking it, because the former is more cost effective. This has led to an increase in HIV cases resulting from shared needle use and the fear that Tajikistan is entering a serious HIV epidemic.⁸⁷ The World Bank reported that 70-80 percent of heroin addicts who inject will be diagnosed with HIV, which has already begun trickling into the rest of the population, albeit slowly.⁸⁸

Regardless, the IMU will continue to use opium to fund their operations. Opium corrodes Central Asian society, which in turn causes the leadership to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. The IMU may be able to effectively use this weakened legitimacy to increase their own popular appeal as well.

Overall, the opium trade is a vital component for organizations such as the IMU to continue funding, running, and developing their operations. The industry shows no signs of waning, and trafficking through Central Asia may increase significantly in the near future. Militant Central Asians, such as the IMU, are positioned to assert themselves in Tajikistan's trafficking operations from northern Afghanistan and into Kyrgyzstan. **MR**



U.S. Marine Cpl Cameron Collier, 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, sweeps an alleyway with a mine detector during a security patrol, Banadar, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 6 February 2012.

NOTES

1. Several groups have splintered from the IMU in recent years. However, since the IMU remains the largest group by most accounts, it will be used here to refer to militant Central Asians in general.

2. For the purposes of this paper, Central Asia will be used to refer to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

3. Opium is classified as an "opioid," or type of narcotic extracted from the poppy plant, which can be processed into heroin and morphine. Opium has been used for thousands of years for medicinal purposes, mentioned in ancient Greek and Chinese texts, before it became associated with its current recreational and commercial purposes. Legislation in the 1920s forced the market fully into the illicit economy, which continues to fund criminals, militias, insurgencies, and terrorists such as the IMU. Although not dealing with Central Asia specifically, anyone wishing to understand the history of the illicit trade is encouraged to read the Introduction: *A History of Heroin*, McCoy, Alfred W. *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade* (Chicago, IL, Lawrence Hill Books, Chicago Review Press, 1972/2003) 1-23.

4. The Golden Crescent generally refers to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, although Central Asia plays a pivotal role in its operations.

5. UNODC, *World Drug Report* (2012) (United Nations, New York, June 2012), 26.

6. *Ibid.*, 27.

7. *Ibid.*, 26. These numbers are separate from both heroin and morphine production coming from the region, which both fell in 2011.

8. *Ibid.*, 28. In 2006, the number was 6,100 tons; 2007, 8,200 tons; 2008, 7,700 tons; and 2009, 6,900 tons. Conversely it was 2,804 tons in 1997, 2,693 tons in 1998, 4,565 tons in 1999, 3,276 tons in 2000, 185 tons in 2001, 3,400 tons in 2002, 3,600 tons in 2003, 4,200 tons in 2004, and 4,100 tons in 2005, according to UNODC's "World Drug Report" (2012).

9. UNODC, "World Drug Report (2011)," 72.

10. International Crisis Group, "Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats," Asia Report N°205—24 May 2011, 17, <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspx>>.

11. Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al-Qaeda* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, St. Martin's Press, 2009), 160.

12. UNODC, "World Drug Report (2012)," 29.

13. *Ibid.*, 31, 64. Afghanistan was next on the list responsible for 5 percent of global seizures, followed by Pakistan at 4 percent.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Ahmed Rashid, "They're Only Sleeping: Why Militant Islamicists in Central Asia Aren't Going to Go Away," *New Yorker*, 14 January 2002, <http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/01/14/020114fa_FACT> (1 May 2012). This is substantially higher

than 25 percent of Afghan heroin being transferred through Central Asia according to the aforementioned report.

16. Phil Williams and Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability," U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April, 2012, 44.

17. The IMU, under Namangani, from its stronghold in Tavildara, was deeply involved in opium trafficking. Although it is essential to recognize this past history, it is not the purpose of this paper to explore this in great detail. Those interested in the IMU's early opium involvement should reference Ahmed Rashid's *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* (2002).

18. "Tajikistan Claims Militant Leader Killed," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 15 April 2011, <http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan_says_militant_leader_killed/3558497.html> (16 July 2012).

19. "Negotiations to End Fighting in East Tajikistan Continue," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 27 July 2012, <<http://www.rferl.org/content/negotiations-to-end-fighting-in-east-tajikistan-continue/24658259.html>> (2 August 2012).

20. Johan Engvall, "The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organized Crime in Tajikistan," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 58, no. 6 (September 2006): 838.

21. Letizia Paoli, Irina Rabkov, Victoria A. Greenfield, and Peter Reuter, "Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narco-State," *Journal of Drug Issues* (Fall 2007, 37-4): 953.

22. The United Tajik Opposition (UTO) was composed of those elements opposing Tajik President Rahmāno's forces. The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was associated with this organization. The American analyst of Central Asian affairs working in Tajikistan, said the UTO, which was also inclusive of run-away democratic organizations abroad/in exile, was in actuality only the name of the negotiating group at the conclusion of the civil war, a common misconception.

23. This power sharing government has failed to fully materialize and groups such as the IRP find themselves increasingly marginalized from the political process.

24. Gregory Gleason, "Power sharing in Tajikistan: political compromise and regional instability," *Conflict, Security & Development*, 1:03 (needs citation 2001), 125-26.

25. Paoli, 954.

26. "Tajikistan Troops Killed in Gorno-Badakhshan Clash," Eurasianet.org., Inside the Cocoon: Central Asia Today, 24 July 2012, <<http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65700>> (30 July 2012).

27. Matthew Stein and Charles Bartles, phone interview, 15 May 2012.

28. Svante E. Cornell, "Narcotics, Radicalism and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 17 (2005): 588.

29. David Trilling, "Organized Crime Helps Stoke Instability in Kyrgyzstan's

- Southern Provinces." *Eurasianet.org.*, 17 May 2010, <<http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61078>> (2 August 2012).
30. UNODC, "The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, July 2011, 44.
31. Cornell, 587.
32. Representative from an International Organization based in Kyrgyzstan, personal interview, 9 June 2012.
33. Stein and Bartles, interview.
34. Cornell, 588.
35. These two locations were IMU strongholds in Tajikistan and trafficking hubs for the IMU under Juma Namangani.
36. Thomas M. Sanderson, Daniel Kimmage, and David A. Gordon, "From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asia Jihadists," Center for Strategic & International Studies, CSIS Transnational Threats Project, Washington, DC, March 2010, 15.
37. Gretchen Peters, "How Opium Profits the Taliban," United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, August 2009, 20.
38. *Ibid.*, 23. Protection services through Iran from Afghanistan are estimated to range between \$2,000 to \$2,500 per convoy/shipment, with approximately 8-10 individuals providing security. Although these figures may vary for Central Asia and IMU members operating out of Pakistan and Afghanistan, they offer a rough estimate of the income generated by these services. UNODC, "The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment," 2011, 28.
39. Generally referring to one of the Pillars of Islam, *zakat* refers to almsgiving. However, in this context it refers to a tax being placed on drug traffickers for protection services. Groups like the IMU may be physically providing protection or simply setting up checkpoints whereby individuals passing must pay a tax.
40. The 10 percent tax placed on farmer's harvests, which has been providing a steady stream of income to finance insurgent activities in the region.
41. UNODC, "Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan opium," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, Austria, October 2009, 107 and 108.
42. An informal system often used by Islamic terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah, to fund their operatives, this system has been in place thousands of years. It must be acknowledged that many individuals working abroad for remittances use the system to send money to their families in their home countries. Money is given to an individual to deliver, for a small fee. The entire system is built on trust, and has been successful because individuals honor their arrangements. No records are kept of transactions.
43. David C. Faith, "The Hawala System," *Global Security Studies* vol. 2, issue 1 (Winter 2011): 23-33.
44. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2011* (New York, Penguin Books, 2004), 458.
45. Ahmed Rashid, phone interview, 29 June 2012. In addition, to drug trafficking, Ahmed Rashid mentioned to this author kidnappings for ransom attributed to IMU like factions have been increasing in Pakistan, which serve as additional sources of revenue.
46. Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, and Svante E. Cornell, "Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU," Silk Road Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, July 2006, 47.
47. UNODC, "World Drug Report (2012)," 27.
48. UNODC, "World Drug Report (2011)," 61.
49. Engvall, 828.
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