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FOR TWO HUNDRED years, Rome preserved a tentative peace in the Western civilized world. We still remember this “Pax Romana” as one of the world’s long periods of interstate harmony. It did not arise out of a superior economic or political system. In fact, the attractions of soft-power held little sway with those threatening civilization. Rather, as English historian Edward Gibbon tells us, the Roman world’s internal peace and prosperity was “guarded by ancient renown and disciplined valor.”

Rome’s legions stood on the empire’s frontiers, often finding themselves in combat against barbarians set on destroying civilization. As long as the legions were held in readiness, Rome remained safe. Since the legionaries could never let down their guard, such a state of readiness entailed a significant investment in people and materiel.

When not campaigning, legionary training and preparation, almost as hard and as expensive as war, consumed the Roman army. Josephus tells us that “their drills were bloodless battles, their battles bloody drills.” Only when such endless preparation for war ceased did decay set in, allowing what Gibbon called “the fairest part of the earth, and most civilized portion of mankind” to fall into the nihilistic barbarism of the Dark Ages.

For the past seven decades, the U.S. military has accepted a role similar to that of Rome’s legionary army, guaranteeing peace through training and discipline. Our Army and our sister services have stood as the final underwriter of global order and stability. The world has enjoyed an era of unprecedented peace and prosperity free of full scale war. When crisis, conflict, and war emerged, America’s Army returned the peace. American soldiers fought and died in Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Moreover, when not fighting, our Army stood guard against the Soviet Union’s military formations.
Those decades of preparation left the Army well positioned to crush Saddam Hussein’s military might in two major conflicts—Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition, the Army’s commitment to professional learning—aimed at producing intellectually flexible leaders—made possible the rapid adaption of the force in the face of two violent and widely disparate conflicts. As it always has, the U.S. Army answered the nation’s call after 9/11.

Today we stand at a historical inflection point: the end of a decade-plus of war while facing an uncertain and dangerous future. The kind of conflict we will fight next is as unknown as the location or date. What is certain is that our Army will again be called on to deploy and engage our nation’s foes—perhaps sooner, perhaps later.

While we must never lose track of the fact that we still have soldiers deployed and in danger across the globe, we must also prepare our Army for the future. After over a decade of war, rebalancing the near-term readiness for today’s missions with long-term readiness required to prevent or win tomorrow’s conflicts requires three simple investments:

- Put the intellectual ahead of the physical.
- Invest in the process.
- Develop tomorrow’s leaders.

Readiness is ensured only if our Army is poised for the contests to come; for when we are again called, our nation will not accept excuses if we are ill-prepared. The good news is that these involve the strongest traditions of our Army. We build great leaders and have a long tradition of operators who are intellectuals and deep thinkers who know how to fight. We just need to discipline ourselves and integrate the lessons of ten years of war with our view of the future.

**Put the Intellectual Ahead of the Physical**

During the wars, the superb support we received allowed us to rapidly solve the problems that confronted us. There was one standard: save lives from immediate wartime threats. Our leaders, industry, and military focused on delivering physical solutions now without worrying about the long-term integration and sustainment of those solutions.

Now we face a different problem set: what will future Army leaders require in 20 years and how do we prepare for it?

Answering this question is arguably the most important issue facing the Army today. Whether tens of billions of dollars in future investments are wasted or put to use building an Army that remains second to none, rests on today’s decisions. Unfortunately, peering into the future to determine how warfare will evolve is fraught with uncertainty and risk. Questions as varied as the role of cyber in ground warfare, the implications of China’s rise, the Arab Spring, weapons of mass destruction proliferation and the continuing effects of failing states remain unanswered and require deep exploration. Moreover, we are only on the cusp of information and technological revolutions that will dramatically affect the character of war. Investing wisely requires us to pick our way through a host of competing choices while maintaining the flexibility to adapt when we get some things wrong.

The Army Capabilities Integration Center, our Centers of Excellence, and the Combined Arms Center are the experts at leading our professional debate about the future of war and discerning the requirements of that future. Venues such as the Strategic Landpower Task Force and the Campaign of Learning are essential in sharpening our thoughts on landpower’s role in future warfare.

**Doctrine 2015**

2012 saw the release of Doctrine 2015 – *A Common Professional Language*. The new, simple, and hierarchical framework allows rapid updating of techniques, tactics, and procedures in the lower levels of doctrine through a wiki-like process overseen by school commandants. More importantly, the effort completes 30 of 31 ADPs and ADRPs that capture the immutable principles of our profession in a concise format. Doctrine 2015 provides the foundation and flexibility for thinking through the future of our profession.
At the same time, we need to encourage a healthy debate within our schools and professional journals about the face of future war. Our goal is to constantly challenge our own thinking through internal debate and to build a consensus on the way forward.

Out of these debates, future concepts will evolve. In turn, rigorous testing of these ideas will either convincingly display their relevance or demonstrate the need to discard or refine them. The Combat Training Centers, Battle Labs, and the TRADOC Analysis Center, possess world-class testing, experimentation, and analytical systems, all of which are available to augment our professional body of knowledge. To support this process, TRADOC is currently working concepts for a 7th Warfighting Function, examining the possibility of a human domain and working with the U.S. Marines and SOCOM to articulate the role of strategic Landpower in compelling and influencing people, governments, and their military.

Invest in the Process

In many ways, the easiest part of preparing for the future is translating that thought into a winning force. Our Army has not been defeated on the battlefield in seven decades and remains a force without equal. This was no accident. Investments in the right equipment (the Big Five), innovative training (Combat Training Centers), and extensive leader development (unparalleled institutions for professional military education), created today’s Army. Maintaining all of these strengths remains at the top of TRADOC’s priority list, but doing so does require us to rededicate ourselves to investing in the processes that build a force for the long term.

That investment begins by returning to our operational-intellectual tradition. We need soldiers, after gaining operational experience, to invest their time in the institutional Army as trainers or by helping to think through complex problems. Continuing the wartime emphasis on near-term readiness will not allow soldiers to take time out of careers for education and other broadening activities. Moreover, it creates a reluctance to place top quality talent into the institutional Army. Yet, our forefathers invested their best talent into the future.

Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG)

Afghanistan in 2010 saw a sudden and marked rise of insider attacks that threatened to drive a wedge of distrust between ISAF and the Afghan security forces. The AWG, in their role of global scouts, had already identified the potential threat. In the preceding year, they had developed the Insider Threat Handbook and the Advanced Situational Awareness Training Course. Both were ready at the time of the spike and provided immediate solutions that rapidly addressed the threat.
efforts and delivered us a superb Army. We owe our successors the same professional stewardship.

Fine-tuning that force will also involve a delicate balance of redisarming ourselves to follow our proven methods for force development. During

The Future Army

To support the wars and then integrate them into the Army’s system. We brought the Asymmetric Warfare Group into TRADOC to serve as global scouts who can go to future battlefields and provide real-time intelligence and lessons learned to guide the investment process. Now the trick is to integrate and evolve other successful activities, such as the Rapid Equipping Force or the Joint IED Defeat Organization so that we maintain their innovation through the coming fiscal challenges.

Develop Tomorrow’s Leaders

Great leaders remain our ultimate strategic reserve as well as the key guides along the path of preparation. When faced with unforeseen situations, we count on smart and adaptable leaders to ensure the “Army we have” can be rapidly transformed into the “Army we need.” Moreover, soldiers deserve the best leadership the Army can deliver, and that requires investing in leader development not just money, but also time. War necessitated delaying the professional education of many of our leaders. In reality, we mortgaged our leader development system to provide immediate battlefield leadership. That bill is now due.

Thankfully, leader development remains the Army’s great strength. We know what it requires of the institutional Army and we still possess the people who know how to develop great leaders. All that remains is for the Army to signal our young leaders, through promotions and other selections, that education and broadening experiences are once again crucial to their advancement.

Developing leaders means investing in our schools. For the most part, our junior professional military education institutions continue to do a spectacular job turning out professional and competent leaders. In the future, we are going to maintain this performance, while turning our attention to improving our mid-level and senior professional military institutions. There is no reason not to demand the equivalent of Harvard on the Missouri at Leavenworth, or a Princeton-level education in strategy from the Army War College. We will increase the rigor of both institutions by putting in place a challenging curriculum, recruiting or building a world-class faculty, and by investing in the newest equipment and latest networking capability. Our ultimate goal is to return Leavenworth and Carlisle to their former status as leaders in operational and strategic thought. As we cannot possibly confront the

Returning to Competitive Command and General Staff College

The foundation of improving talent management in the Army was returning to OER block checks. Junior officers felt they did not receive meaningful feedback on where they stood until their first major’s OER. Meanwhile a return to optimized ILE was essential in restoring the quality of CGSC, but boards could not distinguish between officers. The return to senior rater block check for captains and lieutenants allowed a transition to competitive CGSC, more discerning promotion rates, and other selective actions to shape the force.
future environment without access to the best strategic thinking available, we will make the development of strategic leaders a core competency. However, building leaders for the 21st-century Army is much broader than developing quality leaders; it also requires the creation of the right mix of both experts and generalists. Such leaders cannot be mass produced. Our personnel systems are going to have to resist the temptation to treat people as a commodity and evolve to look at each as an individual. That implies the Army’s future success rests on its ability to make talent management a core competency. The system requires the capability to provide some future Army leaders opportunities to acquire expert skills, while sending others, particularly those marked for senior level leadership, along paths that expose them to as many experiences as possible. By helping our leaders find where their unique talents best fit, we allow every soldier to obtain the training, education, and experience necessary for them to best contribute to the Army’s total well being. Moreover, by building the right balance of experts and generalists, the Army is creating a talent pool capable of confronting any obstacle an uncertain future might throw in our path. We have typically done well managing the top ten percent of our personnel. Now we must leverage technology and experience to assist all of our people in reaching their fullest potential.

Finally, by exciting our current leaders about the future of our Army, we help ensure that the best and brightest will continue in the ranks. By managing them based on their unique contributions and investing appropriately in their education and the development, we send a strong signal about the value we place on our junior leaders—the irreplaceable core of our success.

Expanding Warrior Leader Course

WLC has undergone a transformation in the last 12 months. During the height of the wars, WLC was reduced to 15 days to return leaders back to the fight faster. That reduction came at a cost in the fundamental leadership skills, such as counseling and property accountability. A critical task selection board of CSMs from the Active, Guard, and Reserve components determined the need to add more training on leadership, counseling, training management, and some field craft, such as land navigation. They also felt the contact time – often up to 16 hours a day – was too high to remain in all of the training. Based upon the board’s input, senior leaders from across the Active and Reserve Components agreed to expand WLC to 22 days.

No Accident

Rome’s legionaries no longer stand watch along the Rhine. Instead, the American people and many of our allies look to the U.S. Army to guarantee a civilized peace. We will not let them down.

Our Army possesses the people and tools necessary to successfully meet any challenge awaiting us, just as Rome’s legionaries did for so long. Our task is to put our people and our tools to good use, as we prepare the future force so that our Army remains without rival. This will not happen by accident. Rather, it will be the result of a deliberate process, one that TRADOC will lead but in which every soldier must participate. MR

Advance Strategic Plans and Policy Program

During the wars, senior leaders noted that while we had talented, adaptable, intelligent officers, few could frame strategic problems effectively for them. Fewer still could stand toe to toe with a four star and argue a point. The Advanced Strategic Plans Program was developed to take officers who have demonstrated the right talent set and send them for doctoral studies in strategic disciplines. These officers will then serve as advisors to combatant commanders and help shape policy at the highest levels.
Since the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was founded in 1998, the organization has evolved and continued to operate despite the significant damage inflicted on it by Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and its subsequent relocation to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.1

Arguments about the current state of the IMU and their alleged migration north into Central Asia and northern Afghanistan persist.2 Occasionally neglected is the key role that the opium trade has played and will continue to play in formulating the IMU’s strategy, as opium brings immense profits for militants to use in sustaining their operations.3

In 2012, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that Afghanistan, part of the “Golden Crescent,” witnessed a surge in opium production.4 This surge will be beneficial to the IMU as they become increasingly involved in facilitating trafficking, where they are already strategically placed, by serving to help them finance and expand their organization’s operations.5

What is the risk involved with militant trafficking in Central Asia? Is this danger more evident in some states than in others? How will trafficking financially sustain militant operations? Despite the lack of much information on this clandestine industry, how it relates to any future ramifications resulting from the IMU’s operations needs examination.

The opium trade is capable of increasing the IMU’s capabilities while sustaining the organization and prolonging its existence, contributes to the region’s continuing instability, and is able to manifest itself in Tajikistan.

Opium’s Evolving Landscape

As of 2012, Afghanistan remains responsible for 63 percent of the global opium market, and production shows no sign of ceasing.6 Although potential
opium production decreased in 2010 to 3,600 tons as a result of crop failure, it made a comeback in 2011 at 5,800 tons. The numbers for 2011 remained lower than at any point between 2006-2009 but were substantially higher than estimates for the years ranging from 1997-2005. This demonstrates that Afghanistan shows no signs of reducing its opium production.

What does this mean for Central Asia? The region has historically been one of several trafficking routes out of Afghanistan toward European and Russian markets. In 2009, approximately 90 tons of heroin were transferred through Central Asia alone. However, crackdowns along the Pakistan border from drone strikes and Pakistani military operations may push alternate routes northward, which will increase reliance on IMU-type factions and return the opium flow through Central Asia to previous levels. Additionally, avenues through Iran are becoming problematic for traffickers. In 2010, Iran snatched 27 tons or 33 percent of total global heroin seizures. Opium caught in transit through Iran was down to 401 tons in 2010, from 580 tons in 2009, which at the time represented 89 percent of global opium seizures. Tajikistan accounted for .2 percent of global opium seizures, Uzbekistan .1 percent, and Kyrgyzstan .06 percent, and in 2010, the only Central Asian state to report a decline in heroin crossing its borders was Uzbekistan.

These numbers demonstrate that the Central Asian regimes are doing less than other regional governments to combat trafficking owing to corruption (many are engaged in trafficking themselves) and weak governance. This fact does not go unnoticed by militants funding their operations through trafficking. As profits will clearly be maximized if fewer shipments are apprehended, an increased focus on northern routes through Central Asia should be expected.

Militant Islamists, such as the IMU will continue to fund their operations through the opium trade, despite the fact that since OEF the IMU’s significant involvement in drug trafficking has been greatly reduced. Prior to OEF, according to Interpol’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate, 60 percent of Afghan heroin in 2000 was trafficked through Central Asia. According to Kyrgyz authorities, 70 percent of this Central Asian heroin was moved by the IMU.

At present, partially resulting from IMU displacement in Central Asia post-9/11, much of the trafficking operation has been taken over by corrupt politicians and local militias. This is most evident in Tajikistan where the IMU’s direct influence in trafficking has been historically evident and will likely remain the place of its resurgence. Tajikistan is ideal because the IMU has historic dealings from locations such as Tavildar. Tajikistan’s President Rahma no was previously too weak and unwilling to enforce the rule of law in the regions outlying Dushanbe, the capital, notably in semi-autonomous regions. However, attempts to consolidate and enforce his power have been made in the Rasht district from 2010-2011. There have also been operations in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in 2012. The government achieved a degree of success in both of these areas.

Afghanistan (Tajiks comprise roughly 20-25 percent of the country) is situated south of the Tajik border, which creates strong kinship ties that transcend loyalty to Dushanbe for local inhabitants. Weak governance coupled with the fact that the Afghani-Tajik border runs 1,200 kilometers, makes any substantial monitoring unlikely. Corruption and government involvement in trafficking has deep roots. In Tajikistan, part of this involvement is traceable to the 1997 peace accord brokered by the UN, the UTO, and the government in Dushanbe. Dushanbe agreed to end the country’s civil war (1992-1997), create a power-sharing government, and offer general amnesty to the war’s participants.

However, this agreement failed to successfully integrate all former militias into the central army, which enabled former militia commanders to retain political control of their respective regions. This
arrangement has created a system where several politicians remain little more than warlords who run their own private armies and are hardly accountable to the government in Dushanbe.25

Most of the few remaining warlord politicians who financed themselves through the drug trade during the war previously collaborated with militant Islamists, and they have had few incentives to discontinue their profitable practices even though the war has ceased. The previously mentioned operations against regional warlord Tolib Ayombekov, in Gorno-Badakshshan Autonomous Oblast in 2012, may well be more about control of drug turf than of concern for Tajikistan’s stability.26

Current Routes and the Role of Tajikistan

Most drug shipments entering Central Asia are forced to follow the routes of major highways, as the region is too mountainous to afford alternate routes. As Matthew Stein and Charles Bartles from the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office told this author, the only exception is when traffickers occasionally cut across borders, such as Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan.27 The Panj River, which stretches along most of the Afghan-Tajik border, makes cutting across borders more problematic and tends to channel shipments. Most shipments entering Central Asia eventually reach Osh where they are then sent to markets in Russia and Europe. In Osh, organized criminal networks manage most of the distribution.28 These criminal elements are organized around kinship ties, and they are quite capable of buying off the politicians who could interfere with trafficking. For instance, the UNODC estimates that authorities stop no more than 5 percent of a minimum of at least 20,000 kg of narcotics that passes through Kyrgyzstan annually, primarily through Osh.29

In Uzbekistan, corrupt officials run trafficking operations, and any IMU involvement would be immediately crushed. Because of the tight state control imposed by President Islam Karimov’s regime, Uzbekistan is not a preferred route for traffickers and moves less Afghan opium than neighboring Tajikistan.30 The IMU is most capable of manifesting itself in Tajikistan’s drug scene.

In the 1990s, opium entering Khorog, Tajikistan, from Afghanistan was sent to Osh along M41, or the “Pamir Highway,” since it was one of the only major road systems running through the country.31 According to one representative from an international organization that this author spoke with, this led to the Pamir Highway becoming “the most trafficked route in the world.”32 Continued foreign investment in Tajikistan has created additional roads, which allow for alternate routes. Construction of associated bridges closed the gap that existed between Tajikistan and Afghanistan from the Panj River. This has only increased the flow of trafficking throughout Tajikistan and the ability of the IMU to infiltrate the market.

According to Stein and Bartles, Tajikistan is like the “Wild West” with little or no state control, and where the IMU will find it conducive to advancing themselves in the trade in these mountainous regions.33 Dr. Svante Cornell recognizes the significance of these routes and enclaves that geography makes possible, such as Chorku in the Isfara district of Tajikistan, where “neither the state they are geographically located in nor the state legally administering them are able to exert strong governmental authority.”34 Here heroin is stored before transfer, similar to Jirgatal and Tavildara before.35

The Role of Militants

Despite the marginalization of militant Islamists in trafficking operations, the fact that they are returning to the region along previously established drug routes suggests their involvement is still relevant. It may become more so as their regional presence increases.36 Gretchen Peters’ research indicates that IMU involvement in trafficking already includes providing security for shipments of heroin as they move out of Afghanistan.37 The Taliban alone takes in approximately $250 million a year for protection services, so it is clear IMU security services bring the organization sizeable revenue.38

Current practice in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region places a Zakat of 2.5 percent on traffickers for protection.39 An Ushr of 10 percent is expected from farmers.40 This information comes from the UNODC.41 The hawala system, which moves billions of dollars every year, makes it difficult to determine the exact profits being obtained.42 As the system is based on personal trust, it avoids wire transfers and moves clandestinely.43
Prior to 2001, in addition to opium profits, the IMU was able to rely on the Taliban to provide the organization with a safe-haven and Al-Qaeda to provide arms, ammunition, capital, and admission to training facilities. Presently, this absence of patronage has led to an increased reliance on drug trafficking to finance the organization, and the IMU is undoubtedly involved in racketeering operations. Ahmed Rashid argues the IMU is active in the opium trade because, after having resided in Pakistan for more than a decade, it has to find independent sources of funding and financing. Moreover, the IMU is the only organization with contacts all around the Afghan struggle, from Pakistan through Central Asia. Its ability to move freely across Afghanistan and Tajikistan, unlike other groups operating in the region, should not be underestimated.

The International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) scheduled departure from Afghanistan is cause for concern, because it may lead to IMU trafficking returning to pre-OEF levels. Afghanistan currently accounts for 63 percent of global opium production. That is down from 74 percent in 2009 (UNODC, 2009). The 2009 levels were down from 87 percent in 2005 (UNODC, 2005). However, ISAF withdrawal may see these numbers increase with the aforementioned developing reliance on routes through Central Asia. Reduced assistance and direct foreign investment entering Afghanistan in the years to come will help foster resurgence in and a dependence on opium production to provide for the populace’s basic sustenance. The failure to introduce alternate and competitive options will again drive production levels, to the elation of militants, disrupting Central Asian regional security concerns.
Although, corrupt officials have taken over much of the trade, the potential profit remains high enough that the IMU may actively participate in regional operations without stepping on anyone’s toes. One American analyst of Central Asia working in Tajikistan summed it up when he defined the drug trade “as a model for inter-ethnic cooperation.”50 The point being that militant Islamists will likely meet little resistance if they reinstate themselves in Tajikistan’s trafficking, especially if Tajikistan’s President Rahmano’s government proves incapable of exerting sustained influence beyond Dushanbe, has little incentive to tackle trafficking, and is likely engaged in transferring opium itself.

The opium trade alone has raised Tajikistan’s GDP by 30 percent.51 Regional governments run by the corrupt former warlords do not want to see the drug trade go away as the profits they make far exceed anything legitimate business would provide. As the American analyst told this author, there is “no incentive for these guys [Central Asian governments] not to exaggerate, they’re getting VIP status, [which] is understandable when you see them fighting to get funding for arts, culture, education, and then they immediately get it for drugs.”52 For example, in 2007, the U.S. gave $45.2 million in aid to Tajikistan, of which $20.34 million went to security (to counter drugs and terrorism).53 As clearly illustrated, drug profits far exceed revenue generated via legitimate business ventures and foreign aid. This offers little incentive for the government to clamp down on a practice that has proven to be one of the most profitable economic industries in the country.

According to UNODC’s Central Asian Section, the annual profit to Tajikistan from reexport of heroin is roughly $2.2 billion, and $1.8 billion of that figure is net profit.54 Although, estimates placed the market value at $1.4 billion for 2009, it is doubtful these figures will dramatically decrease as long as there remains significant demand.55 Russia alone consumes 50-95 tons of heroin annually; Europe 60-80 tons.56 (Only 7 percent of heroin consumed in the U.S. comes from Afghanistan).57 The point being is that there is plenty of money to go around, little incentive to stop, and the likelihood of significant turf wars emerging is not plausible as it would be too disruptive to business. The more likely scenario would be increased coordinated efforts between rogue corrupt government officials and militants operating in Tajikistan.

Nevertheless, even Chinese, Iranian, and U.S. funding that is directed toward economic development, such as roads and other critical infrastructure, often facilitates trafficking. For example, the Panj Bridge, created in 2007 with $33 million in U.S. aid, was created to foster trade and connect Tajikistan to Afghanistan.58 Although the bridge is being used to increase trade, commerce in opium thrives.59

These investments often have the adverse effect of facilitating ease of transport, increasing profits, and encouraging larger shipments of heroin to be moved as it makes its way into Osh, where it is then distributed to its European and Russian markets. In the Panj case, militants in Kunduz are clearly taking advantage of these developments to finance their operations.

**What’s Being Done?**

Even with approximately 6,000 Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan, little is being done to combat trafficking because the government remains incapable and not inclined to address it.60 Former militia leaders integrated into the government actively participate in trafficking. Corruption at the micro level fails to tackle the issue. Petty corruption often occurs because security personnel are underpaid, understaffed, and underequipped to deal with trafficking, which makes them susceptible to bribes. Moreover, incentives to actively participate in the trade increase when salaries for officials, soldiers, and policemen may be as low as $10-$30 per month.61 The corruption often starts the moment an individual takes a job. Many positions are obtained via payment or bribe, and afterward, individuals may continue to give a portion of their earnings to their superiors after using their new authority for drug extortion.62 Frequently, these officials do not just allow drug traffickers to operate but actively participate in the trafficking themselves. One Tajik law enforcement officer claimed,

Nearly all law enforcement and border patrolling officers in the border districts are involved in drug trafficking. Some of them smuggle drugs into Tajikistan; others deliver drugs from border districts to other parts of the country; others still ‘open’ the border to traffickers and provide them with crucial
information. In other parts of Tajikistan the percentage of corrupted officers is lower. In my opinion, eight officers out of ten are corrupted in Dushanbe. This assessment was reinforced when, in 2005, senior officers from the State Border Protection Committee were detained due to their opium-trafficking activities. Pinpointing the corrupt officials can be as simple as determining which officials live moderately and those who live luxuriously. However, since the rule of law is practically non-existent, little effort has been made to do so.

The vast majority of efforts that have actually focused on stopping drugs attempt to do so at the border but fail to address the issue after they enter Tajikistan. Nonetheless, the government has made some attempts to better coordinate efforts to end the drug trade. For example, in 1999, Tajikistan along with the UNODC established the Drug Control Agency (DCA). However, the organization has 400 members, which is an inadequate number to effectively tackle the drug trade and the corrupt officials that facilitate its success. It has been argued that instead of eliminating opium trafficking, the DCA has attempted to take charge of it.

The existence of high-level involvement raises doubt that Tajikistan will make any serious efforts to address the issue, militants or not. For example, Tajikistan’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan was twice arrested for transferring drugs, and during the latter incident, he was seized with $1 million and 62 kilograms of heroin. However, high profile cases are rare and when they do occur are often the result of political leveraging.

Generally, when arrests are made, they are aimed at low-level couriers who depend on trafficking for sustenance and fail to address the causes of the industry—corruption, underdevelopment, and poverty. This unwillingness to curb drug trafficking on the part of Tajikistan creates favorable conditions for the IMU to reinsert themselves in the country’s burgeoning opium trade.

Consequences of Complacency

IMU involvement in the drug trade is significant for several reasons. As Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown states, “illicit economies provide an opportunity for belligerent groups to increase their power along multiple dimensions.” This increased power is visible when militants’ abilities and local support expands, which can manifest itself in accumulated political capital, increased fighting capacity with improved weapons, and rising recruitment numbers.

According to Dr. Felbab-Brown, “in short, sponsorship of illicit economies allows nonstate armed groups to function as security providers and economic and political regulators.” The IMU had already enhanced its capabilities under Juma Namangani prior to 9/11, after transit routes expanded from the initial Khorog to Osh route into the IMU strongholds of Jirgatal and Tavildara during Tajikistan’s Civil War. Drug revenue permitted the IMU to pay fighters high wages in a region where unemployment was rampant. Additionally, with high revenues from drugs, the IMU were always able to pay villagers for supplies instead confiscating them, which contributed to their popular support.

It appears the IMU has been continuing this trend with some success. In 2007, pro-Taliban insurgent incursions into the Swat Valley broke out, many allegedly orchestrated by IMU. These insurgents were able to pay fighters 200 rupees ($3.35) a day, compared to the average daily income of 40 rupees.
Options are limited for combating the drug trade in Central Asia and curbing militant financing and influence. As Felbab-Brown states, “Efforts to limit the belligerents’ resources should focus on mechanisms that do not harm the wider population directly.” But doing so is problematic in Central Asia, where the drug trade remains attractive.

Although this illicit economy does bring a degree of stability, it has also been devastating on society. In 1995, there were 823 registered heroin addicts in Tajikistan; by 2001, the number had reached 6,243 according to official Tajik figures. However, UNODC estimates much higher figures, with 75,000 addicts by 2001 and 100,000 by 2005.

Currently, 82 percent of registered drug users in Tajikistan identify themselves as heroin addicts. The increasing figures led the Tajik government to crack down on internal domestic use, which had the adverse effect of forcing individuals to start injecting heroin as opposed to smoking it, because the former is more cost effective. This has led to an increase in HIV cases resulting from shared needle use and the fear that Tajikistan is entering a serious HIV epidemic. The World Bank reported that 70-80 percent of heroin addicts who inject will be diagnosed with HIV, which has already begun trickling into the rest of the population, albeit slowly.

Regardless, the IMU will continue to use opium to fund their operations. Opium corrodes Central Asian society, which in turn causes the leadership to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. The IMU may be able to effectively use this weakened legitimacy to increase their own popular appeal as well.

Overall, the opium trade is a vital component for organizations such as the IMU to continue funding, running, and developing their operations. The industry shows no signs of waning, and trafficking through Central Asia may increase significantly in the near future. Militant Central Asians, such as the IMU, are positioned to assert themselves in Tajikistan’s trafficking operations from northern Afghanistan and into Kyrgyzstan.
A History of the illicit trade is encouraged to read the Introduction:


The Golden Crescent generally refers to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, although Central Asia plays a pivotal role in its operations.

1. Several groups have splintered from the IMU in recent years. However, since the IMU remains the largest group by most accounts, it will be used here to refer to militant Central Asians in general.

2. For the purposes of this paper, Central Asia will be used to refer to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

3. Opium is classified as an “opiod,” or type of narcotic extracted from the poppy plant, which can be processed into heroin and morphine. Opium has been used for thousands of years for medicinal purposes, mentioned in ancient Greek and Chinese texts, before it became associated with its current recreational and commercial purposes. Legislation in the 1920s forced the market fully into the illicit economy, which continues to fund criminals, militias, insurgencies, and terrorists such as the IMU. Although not dealing with Central Asia specifically, anyone wishing to understand the history of the illicit trade is encouraged to read the Introduction: A History of Heroin, McCoy, Alfred W. The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago, IL, Lawrence Hill Books, Chicago Review Press, 1972/2003) 1-23.

4. The Golden Crescent generally refers to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, although Central Asia plays a pivotal role in its operations.


6. Ibid., 27.

7. Ibid., 26. These numbers are separate from both heroin and morphine production coming from the region, which both fell in 2011.


13. Ibid., 31. 64. Afghanistan was next on the list responsible for 5 percent of global seizures, followed by Pakistan at 4 percent.

14. Ibid.


17. The IMU, under Namangani, from its stronghold in Tajikistan, was deeply involved in opium trafficking. Although it is essential to recognize this past history, it is not the purpose of this paper to explore this in great detail. Those interested in the IMU’s early opium involvement should reference Ahmed Rashid’s Jhhat: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (2002).


22. The United Tajik Opposition (UTO) was composed of those elements opposing Tajik President Rahmon’s forces. The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was associated with this organization. The American analyst of Central Asian affairs working in Tajikistan, said the UTO, which was also inclusive of run-away democratic organizations abroad/in exile, was in actuality only the name of the negotiating group at the conclusion of the civil war, a common misconception.

23. This power sharing government has failed to fully materialize and groups such as the IRP find themselves increasingly marginalized from the political process.


25. Paoli, 954.


29. David Trilling, “Organized Crime Helps Stoke Instability in Kyrgyzstan’s...
32. Representative from an International Organization based in Kyrgyzstan, personal interview, 9 June 2012.
33. Stein and Bartles, interview.
34. Cornell, 588.
35. These two locations were IMU strongholds in Tajikistan and trafficking hubs for the IMU under Juma Namanganli.
38. Ibid., 23. Protection services through Iran from Afghanistan are estimated to range between $2,000 to $2,500 per convoy/shipment, with approximately 8-10 individuals providing security. Although these figures may vary for Central Asia and IMU members operating out of Pakistan and Afghanistan, they offer a rough estimate of the income generated by these services. UNODC, “The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment,” 2011, 28.
39. Generally referring to one of the Pillars of Islam, zakat refers to almsgiving. However, in this context it refers to a tax being placed on drug traffickers for protection services. Groups like the IMU may be physically providing protection or simply setting up checkpoints whereby individuals passing must pay a tax.
40. The 10 percent tax placed on farmer’s harvests, which has been providing a steady stream of income to finance insurgent activities in the region.
42. An informal system often used by Islamic terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah, to fund their operatives, this system has been in place thousands of years. It must be acknowledged that many individuals working abroad for remittances use the system to send money to their families in their home countries. Money is given to an individual to deliver, for a small fee. The entire system is built on trust, and has been successful because individuals honor their agreements. No records are kept of transactions.
45. Ahmed Rashid, phone interview, 29 June 2012. In addition, to drug trafficking, Ahmed Rashid mentioned to this author kidnappings for ransom attributed to IMU like factions have been increasing in Pakistan, which serve as additional sources of revenue.
46. Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, and Shivante E. Cornell, “Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU,” Silk Road Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, July 2006, 47.
49. Engvall, 828.
The Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTCs) continue to serve as the premier leader development and collective training venues in the world. The CTCs provide a complex, challenging operational environment, highly capable opposing forces (OPFOR), professional Observer-Coach-Trainers (OCTs) who are doctrinal experts, and world class instrumentation to capture cause-and-effect data. Training at the CTCs is the next closest thing to actual combat operations. Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) participate in force-on-force and live-fire training at one of the three maneuver CTCs: the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), National Training Center (NTC), or Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC). Corps, Division, and Functional/Multifunctional Brigade Headquarters conduct simulation-supported Warfighter Exercises (WFX) with the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP). Regardless of the venue, the CTC experience provides the capstone event to home station training, providing feedback to commanders on how well they trained their units and leaders and what they need to do to improve readiness in future training at home station.

Established in the 1980s, the CTCs changed the way we train units and develop leaders and significantly improved Army readiness for operations. Leaders attributed their units’ performance in Operation Desert Storm to the rigorous training provided by the CTCs. More recently, the CTCs proved their value by quickly adapting training to readiness requirements for Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/New Dawn (OND), transitioning from a pre-9/11 sole focus on major combat operations to training units and leaders deploying to counterinsurgency operations in training environments accurately reflecting the complex and challenging nature of the theater. The CTCs are dynamic training resources for commanders. They rapidly adapt the training environment to reflect the operational environment and ensure the “practice is tougher than the game.”
Army in Transition

With the conclusion of combat operations in Iraq, and the initiation of the drawdown in Afghanistan, the Army is now focusing on preparing our formations and soldiers for future operations. To support this transition, the CTCs are transforming the way we train. Since the CTC Program has always served as an engine of change for the Army, the CTCs are adapting to support commanders as they train units to conduct Decisive Action against hybrid threats as part of Unified Land Operations. Decisive Action is the simultaneous conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks (or defense support to civil authorities on the domestic side). Hybrid threats are diverse and dynamic combinations of regular and irregular forces, terrorists, and criminal elements working to achieve mutually beneficial objectives and effects.

The purpose of this article is to describe the CTC Program’s efforts to enable this transformation and to inform soldiers on what they can expect when they train at our CTCs. There are five critical lines of effort in this transformation:

- Rebalancing leader development with unit readiness.
- Reestablishing an expeditionary mindset in the Army.
- Adjusting the CTCs to adapt to Army force structure changes.
- Ensuring the training Operational Environment (OE) replicates the necessary complexity and dynamic nature to challenge units for future operational requirements.

Leader Development

The CTCs have long been the Army’s premier venue for developing adaptive leaders with the intellectual agility to respond to volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous conditions on the modern battlefield. They replicate battlefields where a commander can try new concepts without the fear of failure. However, over the last decade the CTCs focused more on unit readiness than leader development due to operational requirements and lack of dwell time for the operating force. OCTs played a greater role in training units, rather than providing observations to the training unit commander to support his role as the primary trainer. The CTC Program is now rebalancing leader development with unit readiness.

Coupled with our new Training Doctrine (ADP/ADRP 7-0), the CTCs are renewing the focus on commander-driven training. Commanders will accomplish this through execution of mission command during planning, preparation, and execution of missions, as well as through leader-led after-action reviews (AARs) in which unit commanders guide their soldiers through development of self-generated solutions to improve unit performance. The AARs, conducted throughout the exercise, help commanders and their soldiers learn to improve and sustain unit performance through the process of self-discovery. AARs focus on mission command and the factors that led to decisions and actions, rather than on inculcating theater-unique processes and techniques as was necessary when training units for OEF and OIF/OND. OCTs will support unit commanders and leaders by providing doctrinally based observations and insights, as well as assist the unit in determining solutions based on cause-and-effect.

Exercise scenarios will support leader development as well. The Army chief of staff (CSA) directed the CTCs to design scenarios which “require units to...
conduct Decisive Action as the predominant training theme, with leaders at all levels challenged to integrate and synchronize all warfighting functions . . . with the commander challenged to determine the most effective application of the elements of combat power.”3 The CTCs are already aggressively executing this guidance in Decisive Action rotations at the maneuver CTCs (MCTC) and in MCTP Warfighter Exercises. The CTC scenarios are challenging leaders at all levels to accomplish both the missions and the commander-developed training objectives through mission command, while providing commanders the flexibility to “rheostat” the intensity level based on individual and unit needs. Though both OPFOR and BLUFOR want to “win,” unit and leader training is still the primary objective of any CTC exercise.

**SOF-CF Interdependence**

“The ultimate goal of SOF-CF interdependence is to increase operational effectiveness by enabling the joint force to present a seamless front to our enemies and a united face to our friends and partners.”4

In OEF and OIF/OND, special operations forces and land-owning BCTs routinely operated together or in mutual support. When operating separately, they worked to ensure complementary effects. The CTC Program will maintain SOF-CF interdependence in the transition to Decisive Action training. Anticipated SOF future operational requirements may challenge this goal. The CTCs and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (as well as Joint SOF) are campaigning to ensure the SOF-CF interdependence lessons learned in combat are carried forward into future training and leader development. In future rotations, the success of the rotational units, both SOF and CF, will hinge on their ability to interoperate, with training outcomes impacting both training audiences—SOF will no longer be an enabling capability, but an interdependent capability required to achieve the desired exercise end state.

At the operational level, MCTP will stress SOF-CF integration at the division and corps level, with combined/joint special operations headquarters participating in future corps (and some division) WFXs as a prime training audience rather than only as a response cell. This increased SOF participation will be critical as corps and division headquarters train to serve as Joint Task Forces and Land Component Commands for future contingencies. The four CTCs must ensure the training environment enables both SOF and CF commanders to achieve their training objectives.

**Expeditionary Mindset**

Prior to OEF and OIF/OND, the U.S. Army trained to deploy and operate as an expeditionary force. ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, defines an expeditionary capability as —

the ability to promptly deploy combined arms forces worldwide into any area of operations and conduct operations upon arrival. Expeditionary operations require the ability to deploy quickly with little notice, rapidly shape conditions in the operational area, and operate immediately on arrival exploiting success and consolidating tactical and operational gains. Expeditionary capabilities are more than physical attributes; they begin with a mindset that pervades the force.5

To achieve this end, the expeditionary force must be able to sustain itself in a very austere environment. However, this pre-9/11 mindset gradually dissipated over time as large, secure forward operating bases (FOBs) were established with hard-stand facilities and mature sustainment lines of communication in theater. The same can be said for training at the CTCs, with procedures modified and contracts let, which minimized pre- and post-rotational requirements for soldiers due to lack of dwell time. To prepare for the future, the CTCs must adapt to the requirements associated with an expeditionary force.

The CTCs will lead the way in reestablishing an expeditionary mindset across the Force. Decisive Action rotation soldiers will be expected to shoulder almost all of the burden for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration at MCTCs. This includes conducting their own rail download, establishing and securing tactical assembly areas away from the security and facilities of FOBs, establishing mission command systems without benefit of hard-wired facilities, and conducting sustainment operations from brigade sustainment areas that must secure themselves and be mobile in order to support operational requirements. Corps and division HQs will revert from operating in fixed site, hard-wired buildings to establishing field command posts, with soldiers challenged to set up the significant
communications architecture required for mission command at that level.

The prepositioned (PREPO) fleets of vehicles and other equipment at all three MCTCs will be modified, so training units can optimize their use. Initial analysis indicates increasing the fleets of wheeled vehicles, trailers, and generators, as well as adding Blue Force Tracker/Movement Tracking System installation kits to PREPO vehicles will significantly expand the draw capabilities at JRTC, JMRC, and NTC. This will also reduce wear and tear on a unit’s home station fleet, and free up transportation funds to be applied to other training requirements.

Rebuilding an expeditionary mindset will be an exciting challenge for our junior leaders and soldiers who have never really experienced it. Lieutenant Colonel Matt Canfield, JRTC’s Operations Group chief of staff, offered the following insights based on his observations of Decisive Action rotations:

The Decisive Action model offers a striking contrast to the Mission Rehearsal Exercise. No FOBs, no contracted chow, no laundry service, no air conditioning in the TOC and sleeping quarters, no “commuting” to work to and from the FOBs. The soldiers lived out of their rucksacks for the 11 day period with MREs on-the-go, no showers, and dismounted operations in the woods. They slept under poncho liners and had to figure out how to conduct their missions for the first three days without the benefit of the Mission Command network. They quickly learned to have a folded analog map in their pocket and a flashlight with plenty of batteries. It was a paradigm shift of game-changing proportions.6

Training Force Structure

Recent Army decisions to restructure the BCT will affect the CTC Program. The addition of a 3d Combined Arms Battalion, the transition of the Brigade Special Troops Battalion into the Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB), and the addition of a Fires Battery to the BCT’s force structure make it a much more formidable force on the battlefield. It also requires a different echelons-above-brigade (EAB) force package to adequately train its mission essential tasks to standard. Last year FORSCOM worked with the TRADOC warfighting function proponents to develop EAB support packages for each of the three types of BCTs for future MCTC rotations. These “troop list” packages include aviation, maneuver enhancement, and sustainment task forces, as well as fires, SOF, and Joint-Interagency-Intergovernmental-Multinational (JIIM) capabilities. The future BCT force structure with approved echelons-above-brigade enable packages will represent a 17 percent increase in the number of soldiers being trained at the MCTCs. Additionally, the Division Tactical Command Post will deploy to the MCTC and integrate with the CTC Operations Group to provide a “Higher Headquarters Control” mission command function for the BCT.

The CTC program is adjusting to meet this 17 percent growth in the training unit’s strength and BCT structure. Adjustments include restructuring the Operations Groups to provide OCTs at the right level and with the right skill sets to ensure units and soldiers receive optimal benefit from their CTC training rotations. Modernized instrumentation systems at the MCTCs will be able to track 4,000 dismounts, 3,000 vehicles, and 95 aircraft—four times the current capability at JRTC or JMRC, and a slight improvement for NTC. Live fire capability upgrades at each of the MCTCs will enable simultaneous battalion-level live-fire exercise opportunities that can be integrated with ongoing force-on-force operations. TRADOC is now exploring using the Live, Virtual, Constructive-Integrating Architecture to link the integrated training environment at home station with training at an MCTC to allow more units to train for less money during a CTC “dirt” rotation.

Operational environment

The more formidable BCT will require a more robust and challenging OE than pre-9/11. This OE must include a strategic setting, both tailor able and scalable based on unit training objectives, and contain a rich variety of potential...
threats, including near-peer with anti-access, area denial, cyber, and weapons of mass destruction capability. Additionally, the operational variables (PMESII-PT) and mission variables (METT-TC) in this OE must be adaptable to facilitate training for any type operation, anywhere in the conflict continuum. Based on these requirements, the CTCs are utilizing the Decisive Action Training Environment.

The Decisive Action Training Environment is a complex OE with a hybrid threat that can be employed asymmetrically to counter our strengths. While not a scenario, it provides the PMESII-PT variables to create scenarios to enable commanders to meet their training objectives both at home station and the CTCs and is based on “real world” threat capabilities and tactics. To populate this OE, the MCTCs are using a combination of permanent party OPFOR, augmentation units, and role players. These forces perform a wide variety of roles, including host nation forces, threat conventional forces, insurgents, guerrillas, civilians on the battlefield, criminals, etc., all of which are necessary to establish the conditions to enable units to achieve their training objectives.

Threats encountered at CTCs today are not the Krasnovians or Atlanticans encountered at a CTC pre-9/11. Today’s OPFORs are sophisticated elements with UAVs, tier II mission command systems, and cyber capabilities, including GPS jamming, cell phone networks, and social media capability. The CTCs also provide both host nation forces and civilians on the battlefield, with stability operations a part of every exercise. Effective stability operations can lead to valuable intelligence, while poor execution or neglect of stability operations can lead to friendly and neutral villagers becoming insurgents. This complex OE is necessary to challenge leaders and units to accomplish missions while executing simultaneous Wide Area Security and Combined Arms Maneuver under exceptionally stressful conditions.
Mission Command Training Program

While most of this article has focused on the MCTCs, the MCTP is undergoing its own transformation. The first change is implementation of the “bigger-fewer” concept. Rather than conducting separate exercises to support training of an individual HQ, the MCTP will conduct five to six large, multi-echelon WFXs annually, with all Operations Groups supporting each exercise. For example, a corps WFX may include a division HQ, one or two BCTs, and up to nine functional/multifunctional brigades as part of the training audience. This exercise architecture provides optimal mission command training opportunities, improves both vertical and horizontal staff coordination, and increases the potential for attracting JIIM participants. It will also facilitate post-OEF integration for the Active Army and Reserve Components, since these WFXs will be multi-compo. This “bigger-fewer” construct will not require all training units to collocate to train. The MCTP will use improved network capabilities to connect these units to the exercise so many can conduct distributed training using their mission command systems from home station, while avoiding transportation and temporary duty costs.

The long-term goal is to integrate these MCTP corps and division multi-echelon WFXs with Global Combatant Command exercises. This will increase the Joint-Interagency-Intergovernmental-Multinational component and provide high-payoff training opportunities for Special Operations Forces, multinational partners, and our Unified Action Joint partners that enable operational level headquarters to tie tactical capabilities to regional or national strategies. It also enables the Global Combatant Command to work with their regionally-aligned corps and divisions, standardizing operating practices and procedures while fostering relationships. Additionally, these exercises will enable corps and division HQ to build the capability to serve as either Joint Task Force or Land Component Command HQ.

Establishing Joint Task Forces/Land Component Command capability in training will significantly reduce required reaction time should a crisis arise. To facilitate this future capability, the MCTP is building on their long-standing wartime training support relationships with the USAF 505th Command and Control Wing and Joint Staff J7-South Training Team (formerly the JFCOM-derived Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center), the organization that trains Joint HQ. This relationship includes an OCT exchange program, as well as integrating exercise planning and design efforts. Finally, MCTP is collaborating with Army Cyber Command to help commanders hone critical cyber-warfare skills emergent in today’s strategic environment.

To add multinational complexity and improve interoperability, MCTP is establishing OCT exchange programs with both the British and Canadian armies. Tied to this are plans for NATO partners to participate habitually in future U.S. corps and division WFXs.

Overall, MCTP’s transformed exercise architecture and OCT initiatives will ensure operational level HQs can train in a much more relevant, realistic, and complex environment than previously possible, with all the required enablers to fully train commanders and staffs.
Leading Change

The CTC Program is leading the Army’s transition to provide ready units capable of conducting Decisive Action against hybrid threats. This comprehensive approach includes rebalancing leader development with unit readiness, maintaining the SOF-CF interdependence developed over a decade of war, and reestablishing the expeditionary mindset of the American soldier. The CTCs themselves are transforming as well by restructuring the Operations Groups, and enhancing the OE with a hybrid threat OPFOR that can challenge training units conventionally, asymmetrically, and in cyberspace. The Army is also restarting the Project Warrior program, which will ensure our best officers serve as OCTS at the MCTCs, followed by a tour as a Small Group Instructor at a TRADOC Center of Excellence. Candidates will be a select group of individuals who have demonstrated outstanding performance in key leadership positions, and have great potential for future service. They must also possess superb training skills, coaching abilities, and tactical proficiencies to enable the knowledge and experience transfer between the CTCs and the school houses. The combined effects of these initiatives will help drive the transformation of the CTC Program to ensure the U.S. Army remains the best trained land force in the world, with agile, adaptive leaders and units ready to win in all operational environments. **MR**

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NOTES

3. CSA GEN Raymond T. Odierno provided this guidance at the 8 November 2011 CSA Combat Training Center Huddle.
6. LTC Jack Canfield, chief of staff for the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Operations Group, made this statement in February 2013 based on his observations of decisive action training at the JRTC.
ON 23 MAY 2012, during a visit to Islamabad, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said, “Turkey will stay in Afghanistan even after all the other forces have left, and will leave only when our Afghan brothers and sisters tell us, “Thank you, now you can go home.”1 Turkish President Abdullah Gül echoed this view during the May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, reiterating that Turkey’s commitment to Afghanistan was for the long-term.

These comments, which reflect a special relationship between Turkey and Afghanistan, are more than just rhetorical. Turkey has a strong religious, historical, and cultural relationship with Afghanistan. Afghanistan established diplomatic relations with Turkey shortly after it gained independence in 1919 and was the second country to recognize the Republic of Turkey. The two countries have signed numerous friendship and cooperation agreements since 1921. These warm relations that date back to the founding of both countries have continued until the present. Today, Turkey views its presence in Afghanistan not only as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, but also as a “brotherhood duty” to help the Afghan people restore peace. To be sure, Turkey’s views toward Afghanistan are also based on its own strategic interests: as long as Afghanistan is unstable, the whole region will be unstable, posing a security threat to Turkey. When Afghanistan becomes a secure and stable country, this will introduce wider stability in the region, bringing new economic benefits for the region in general and for Turkey in particular.2

The shared Islamic religion and cultural ties have made it easier for Turkey to play an active role in Afghanistan, although it refuses to participate in combat operations. Instead, Turkish troops are only involved in ensuring security in their area of responsibility, providing logistical assistance to other international forces, training Afghan security personnel and contributing to capacity development.
This would not be possible without the military missions of the other ISAF forces, particularly the large numbers of U.S. forces. Nevertheless, the Turkish forces’ noncombatant role still gives them an advantage. In a January 2012 interview with the NATO channel, Kabul Provincial Governor Dr. Zabibullah Mojadid said, “Contrary to some other international forces here, the Turks don’t march through our streets with their guns and their caravans, ready to fire. When you see other forces with their hands on their triggers, people are very intimidated. Afghans don’t look at the Turkish forces as foreign forces here, they somehow view them as their own.”

“We Are All Muslims”

In their book A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West, Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser note that all the peacekeeping operations that have taken place after the Cold War have been in Muslim countries or in countries in which Muslim interests are directly involved, thus increasing the need to have Muslim peacekeepers. As such, they identify Turkey (as well as Egypt and Pakistan) as one of the countries most likely to succeed as leaders of these missions. The common Islamic faith is a significant factor in Turkey’s success in winning the hearts and minds of the public. Saleha Fareed, an Afghan orphanage manager, said in the aforementioned NATO interview, “Why are the Turks happy with the Afghans and Afghans happy with the Turks? Everyone knows it’s because we are all Muslims and much of our culture and traditions are similar.”

Noncombat Role and Civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams

In 2001 Turkey took part in the International Security Assistance Force with 300 troops on the condition that it would not deploy its troops for explicit counterinsurgency or counterterrorist operations. It assumed the role of ISAF commander twice: first from June 2002-February 2003 (ISAF II); and second from February 2005-August 2005 (ISAF-VII). During the first period Turkey, which initially had only 276 personnel, increased its troop number to 1300. During the ISAF-VII term, Turkey commanded 8,000 personnel from 30 countries, including 1,450 Turkish personnel. During this period it also operated the Kabul International Airport. In addition, the Turkish Armed Forces took over the Kabul Regional Command (the Regional Command Capital) on 1 November 2009, and their mission has been extended by one-year periods since then. Currently, Turkey is set to continue in this role until 1 November 2013. According to the website of the International Security Assistance Force, Turkey has 1,101 troops in Afghanistan as of June 2013, placing it 8th among the 50 ISAF nations.

Perhaps more important than its military contributions is Turkey’s social and cultural contributions. Turks run the Wardak and Jawzjan Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), the only PRTs run by civilian diplomats. They decided on this concept over a military-led PRT because they thought it would help them interact with local authorities and local people, enabling them to leverage their cultural ties and common values in fulfilling their mission. This strategy has worked well. Wardak Province Governor Halim Fedai says, “The Turkish programs are very sympathetic and acceptable to Afghans because they work within the Afghan culture and they are sensitive to Afghan values. We have a very good strong historical relationship with Turkey.”

The PRT in Wardak (a town 25 miles west of Kabul and one of the poorest provinces in Afghanistan) was established on 12 November 2006. This PRT cooperates with the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (similar to the U.S. Agency for International Development) and has completed over 200 projects with its 130 employees. Its stated goal is to focus on socio-cultural projects that can benefit the Afghan public in the fields of education, health, and infrastructure with a view to enhance their quality of life. This has included restoring and building schools, hospitals and mosques, conducting health checks for people who live far away from city centers, training Afghan women to become midwives or nurses, building a sports complex at Kabul University, training Afghan police and military forces, training judges, prosecutors and mayors, and building roads, bridges, and water wells. In addition to these activities, which are funded by the Turkish government, private Turkish entrepreneurs have invested over $2 billion in Afghanistan since 2002 in various projects.
Following its success in Wardak Province, Turkey established the Jawzjan PRT in Shibirgan (the provincial center of Jawzjan) on 21 July 2010. The Jawzjan PRT operates in Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul Provinces under Regional Command North. Like the Wardak PRT, the director is a civilian coordinator assigned by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. This PRT also houses other civilian components, such as civilians from the Departments of the Interior, Education, Health, and Agriculture, representatives from the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency, a police special operations team, and a police training and advisory team.

Diplomatic Initiatives: Afghanistan-Turkey-Pakistan

Turkey has close ties with both the Afghan and Pakistani governments and has initiated a trilateral mechanism called the Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit. The purpose of this initiative is to improve relations between the two countries, whose ties are strained due to Afghan belief that Pakistan supports the Taliban and that Pakistan’s northwestern tribal regions are being used as a base for Taliban fighters seeking to overthrow the Afghan government. The first summit, which brought the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan together in Turkey, was held in 2007. Since the start of this initiative, seven such summits have taken place (2007, 2008, 2009, twice in 2010, 2011, and 2012) at the presidential level.

Each year the focus of the meetings has been different, but they generally involve dialogue on economic cooperation, cooperation in the fight against terrorism, and cooperation in the intelligence, political and military fields, as well as security and training. After the 2009 summit Turkish Parliamentary Deputy Kayatürk noted that it was the first time that the military and intelligence chiefs of Afghanistan and Pakistan had come together. These trilateral summits may not solve decades-
long problems, but they serve to keep the lines of communication open. In this case, just keeping the talks moving can be critical, even if the meetings do not yield many concrete results.

The most important outcome came from the fifth trilateral summit, which took place in December 2010, when the three countries agreed to conduct joint military exercises. These took place in March 2011 and included demonstrations by the Turkish army and joint exercises in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) against terrorists, basic and battle order training, MOUT demonstration by the Turkish Army, combat order, training control, and combating improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The exercises were conducted in Turkey and aimed at establishing close military ties among the countries.

After the sixth summit in November 2011, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zerdaří said that in solving the problems between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was important for a country like Turkey, which knows the region and culture well, rather than far-away countries to take the lead: “Turkey is our friend, and a brother Muslim country. This is why I think it’s more appropriate for Turkey to support and guide us when we need it.”¹¹ The Afghan side shares this view. During the same month Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs Rassoul Zalmai said, “Afghans are honored and blessed to have a friend like Turkey.”¹² Following this, in a visit to Turkey in December 2011, Afghan President Karzai expressed his preference for Turkey to host a liaison office for the Afghan Taliban to facilitate reconciliation. In reality, this was unlikely because of Turkey’s role in ISAF, and Qatar was ultimately chosen as the venue for a Taliban representative office.¹³ However, it would not be surprising to see Turkey play some kind of reconciliatory role between the Taliban and the Afghan government, because Turkey views the Taliban as being different from Al-Qaida.

Pakistan welcomes these diplomatic initiatives by Turkey and views them as especially valuable due to Turkey’s membership in NATO. Such moves help Pakistanis trust Turkish support and sincerity. A 22 May 2012 article in the Pakistan Observer, a popular English-language daily newspaper published in Islamabad, summarized the Pakistani point of view. The article, “Turkey Supports Pakistan at Chicago Summit,” stated:

Turkish President Abdullah Gül at the NATO summit in Chicago... backed Pakistan’s position on crucial issues... Turkish endorsement of Pakistan’s positions is meaningful in that it is a member of NATO and its voice is being heard in the organization. The support of Turkey is very important as it comes at a time when others are unduly pressuring Pakistan on issues involving re-engagement with the United States and NATO... There is tremendous goodwill and determination on both sides to take their relations to new heights and we are sure this model relationship has the potential to benefit people of the two countries immensely.¹⁴

This relationship with Pakistan has likely prevented Turkish troops from being attacked by the Afghan Taliban, which are supported by Pakistan and who use Pakistani territory as a base of operations. Turkey has suffered very low casualties in Afghanistan, and these have been due to crashes and accidents and not to Taliban attacks.

There have been other diplomatic initiatives as well. Turkey initiated the “Istanbul for Afghanistan” summit (short for Istanbul Summit for Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia).¹⁵ This initiative was launched in November 2011 and brings
together all the countries that border Afghanistan, with the goal of involving all those countries in finding sustainable solutions to Afghanistan’s security and stability problems. The presidents of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey, the first vice president of Iran, the special representative of the president and the minister of foreign affairs of China, and the minister of foreign affairs of Tajikistan met in Istanbul upon the invitation of Turkey. (Representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Russia, the Islamic Conference, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, the UN, EU, and NATO attended as observers.)

Aside from governmental initiatives, the Turkish private sector and business industry have also been cooperating with the Investment Support Agency of Afghanistan. The Turkish business community and chambers of commerce have agreed on a “Cooperation on Energy and Mineral Resources” between the two countries, signed in February 2011. The memorandum of understanding calls for cooperation in energy and mineral resources, the first of its kind Afghanistan has signed with another country in the field of mining.

**Capacity Development:**
**Building Strong Indigenous Armed Forces**

Turkey has contributed to training local police and military forces in Afghanistan. Turkish personnel in Afghanistan have trained over 12,500 Afghan personnel; and another 3,300 have trained in Turkey. It is also leading a NATO training mission that plans to train 15,000 Afghan policemen over the course of a decade.

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In accordance with the agreement, the first round of 500 officers arrived in Turkey in July 2011. They received professional instruction during a six-month course given by Afghan and Turkish instructors. Upon graduation in February 2012, officers were assigned to units of the Afghan National Police throughout Afghanistan. The second round of 500 officers graduated in February 2013 after completing the six-month course covering 54 subjects, including theoretical and practical covering human rights, commandos, and crime scene investigation subjects, among others. Another round of Afghan policeman are expected to be traveling to Turkey in late 2013 for the training course.

In addition, 300 senior cadets from the Afghan National Academy completed a one-month training in Izmir with the Turkish Army in September 2011. The ultimate goal was to build strong and indigenous armed forces such that the number of coalition combat forces in Afghanistan could be reduced. This is part of a broader effort to support plans to hand over security to Afghans in 2014 and reduce the role of coalition forces to logistics, intelligence, and medical and air transportation, instead of a combat role.

The Turkish police are also providing counternarcotics training to the Afghan police by hosting Afghan police at the Turkish Academy of International Narcotics and Fighting Organized Crime. This institution is under the Police Department’s organized crime office. Another field of capacity development is specialized training for Afghan doctors in medical schools in Turkey. On 10 December 2011 the Health Departments of the two countries agreed to have Afghan doctors, nurses and midwives, and other medical officials train in Turkish medical schools in programs ranging from three months to one year.
NATO Responsibility or Brotherhood Pledge?

On 16 March 2012 a Turkish military helicopter crashed into a home near Kabul, killing 12 Turkish soldiers on board and four Afghans on the ground. This was only the second time that Turkish forces suffered casualties (previously, in 2009, two Turkish soldiers, one of them a colonel, were killed in a traffic accident in northern Afghanistan). In general, the force has suffered relatively few casualties due to its noncombatant role. The helicopter crash caused a stir in Turkey about the necessity of Turkey’s presence in Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led mission, claiming that the soldiers had lost their lives for “U.S. interests.” Main opposition Republican Peoples’ Party Deputy Bülent Tezcan submitted a petition to the Turkish parliament, demanding that the prime minister answer a series of questions about Turkey’s mission in Afghanistan. Republican Peoples’ Party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu questioned what Turkey was doing in Afghanistan.  

Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of another opposition party, the Nationalist Movement Party, said that the incident made it necessary to “reconsider our military presence there. . . Turkey’s presence has no strategic importance anymore. In fact, our presence is starting to lead to lost lives. We need to start planning a road map to withdraw our troops there . . . Turkey should move to close its Afghanistan chapter.” The crash came shortly after the Qur’an burnings and the shooting incident that took place in Afghanistan, providing additional ammunition for those calling for Turkey to withdraw. Bahçeli said, “These incidents have brought to the surface some realities that we need to face. The U.S. soldiers’ burning of our Holy Book the Qur’an at the Baghram air base, and then massacring 16 civil Afghans including women and children in Kandahar, has created a provocative environment there. The Prime Minister has turned a blind eye to these realities.” These comments are not only a way to attack the government, but also demonstrate a general reluctance in Turkey to be seen as bowing to U.S. interests.
In response to these criticisms, government leaders argued that Turkish troops had not lost their lives in Afghanistan for U.S. interests, but rather as part of a much more important mission that has a historical meaning for Turkey. Turkish Defense Minister İsmet Yılmaz said that the presence of Turkish troops in Afghanistan had nothing to do with NATO, arguing that “Afghanistan was [one of the] first countries to recognize Turkey during our founding, it was the first country to open an embassy in Ankara. We have a pact that goes back to the era of Atatürk, [Mustafa Kemal, the founder of Turkey]. Turkey will help when Afghanistan is in trouble, and Afghanistan will help when Turkey is in trouble. Our presence there has nothing to do with NATO.”

The Concept of Civilian PRTs after 2014

The concept of civilian PRTs has long been a topic of discussion, which has become more prevalent as 2014 approaches, when the process of transitioning the security responsibility to Afghan troops will end. Many European countries have already announced plans to end their missions; others are considering alternative strategies and policies that will stabilize Afghanistan after 2014. One of the options being discussed is transitioning the PRTs into purely civilian roles.

The success of the civilian PRTs in Wardak and Jawzjan, initiated by Turkey, may offer a model for part of the contingent of U.S. troops that will stay in Afghanistan after 2014 as advisors and trainers. That the Turkish civilian-run PRTs are winning Afghan hearts and minds points to the importance that the teams working with indigenous forces are familiar with, among other things, local languages and cultures. It also suggests the Muslim faith can be emphasized as a common denominator among the different groups in Afghanistan. The main question is whether this is feasible without the support that military components of PRTs provide. Nevertheless, analyzing the advantages of the concept is useful.

Studies on the topic point out that civilian PRTs would potentially eliminate some of the problems that studies on military-led PRTs have identified. These include unclear coordination between military and civilian PRT efforts due to a lack of clear lines of authority and chains of command, as well as confusion regarding the exact definition of PRTs, what their goals are and how their objectives relate to an overall political purpose. This has also led to differing ideas on how they should relate to nongovernmental organization (NGO) humanitarian relief efforts.

Civilian-led PRTs would reduce some of the tension inherent in joint military and civilian undertakings, and would assuage some of the mistrust that local populations feel toward foreign militaries. They would also dispel the problem of the relationship between PRTs and NGOs. According to a United States Institute of Peace report on U.S. experience with PRTs in Afghanistan, some NGOs have complained about members of PRTs engaged in reconstruction work (who wear the same uniforms as those who engage in military operations), arguing that this makes it hard for the local population to differentiate between NGO efforts and the efforts of those engaged in military operations. NGOs involved in relief work apparently want to be viewed as neutral, but worry that their safety is compromised if locals are not able to differentiate between foreign civilian and military actors.

Currently it is not exactly clear what type of role U.S. forces will play after 2014 and whether the civilian-led PRT concept would be successful. One reason the Turkish civilian-run PRTs have been successful has been Turkey’s advantage over its Western allies due to its cultural, religious, and historical ties, and to its noncombat mission. To be sure, Turkey would not be able to do this without the security provided by the U.S. and the other main robust forces there, whose core goals in Afghanistan involve security and denying sanctuary to armed insurgent groups and terrorists, in addition to the development, capacity building and training on governance that they provide. This begs the question of whether civilian PRTs can sustain their efforts without the security umbrella that ISAF currently provides.

The same issue also raises the question of how and whether Turkey can sustain a presence there, even in a noncombat role. Despite all the comments about Turkey’s long-term commitments to Afghanistan, it is uncertain whether it can sustain its projects without this security umbrella. This will depend on how much the U.S. eventually commits to Afghanistan beyond 2014.


4. “Turkey Renews Its Agreement,” NATO Channel, 6 January 2012, <http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=r7Nh1XAYGpw>. Fernando Lujan, major in the Special Forces who served in Afghanistan, claims that [foreign] soldiers are seen as spacemen by locals.”


7. PRT Jawzjan operates in Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul Provinces. On 15 April 2010, Turkey and Sweden agreed that the Swedish-led PRT Mazarr-e Sharif (MES) and PRT Jawzjan would have “concurrent responsibilities” for the development and capacity building efforts in both Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul Provinces.


Much has been written about the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Most of the writing revolves around its espionage exploits, clandestine activities, and its role as the predecessor of the modern Central Intelligence Agency. Usually any historical mention of the OSS Special Operations (SO) activities focuses on the three-person “Jedburgh” teams that parachuted into France or Detachment 101 (also known as the Kachin Rangers) in Burma. Overlooked by most historians is an important special operations unit inserted behind enemy lines during World War II: the Operational Groups (OG). The OGs were small highly trained military units tasked with organizing, training, and supplying French resistance Maquis movements to fight against the Axis powers behind enemy lines in the European theater of operations. The OGs have been historically ignored. The activities of the OGs proved the significant role guerrilla warfare could play on the modern battlefield and reintroduced the concept of guerrilla creation of the OSS and the OGs.

In 1940, Secretary of the Navy William Knox proposed that a mission be sent to England to acquire intelligence about the situation in Europe and develop relations with the British. Of great interest to Knox and President Roosevelt were the subversive “fifth column” actions the Germans were perpetrating in Europe. The person chosen for this mission was millionaire Wall Street lawyer and World War I Medal of Honor winner retired Colonel William “Wild Bill” Donovan. During two missions between July and December 1940, Donovan gathered intelligence on the situation in Europe and the Mediterranean. Donovan’s findings showed the Germans to be “making the fullest use of threats and promises, of subversion and sabotage, and special intelligence,” and that “preparation in the field of irregular and unorthodox warfare was as important as orthodox military preparedness,”

PHOTO: Personnel of OSS camp, Ceylon, 1945 (National Archives, 540054)
and furthermore that “neither America nor Britain was [capable of] fighting this new and important war on more than the smallest scale.” To win this “new and important war” Donovan looked to an age-old idea, guerrilla warfare. He envisioned developing small units of highly trained personnel inserted behind enemy lines charged with committing acts of sabotage, intelligence gathering, and, most importantly, training and coordinating guerrilla resistance activities. In 1942 Donovan was put in charge of the Office of Strategic Services and “given the authority to operate in the fields of sabotage, espionage, and counterespionage in enemy occupied or controlled territory, guerrilla warfare, and [with] underground groups in enemy-occupied or controlled territory. . . .” With this mission, Donovan and the OSS could begin recruiting and training the agents needed to accomplish his goal of “sewing [sic] the dragon’s teeth” in occupied Europe.

Donovan conceived of two types of units to be inserted behind enemy lines; first were the OGs, and second were the Jedburghs. The OGs and the Jedburghs were tasked similar missions to link up with existing resistance groups and coordinate their activities with Allied command, organize supply drops by wireless transmitter, and pass on intelligence; here is where the similarity stops. The Jedburghs were small three-person units acting covertly to support and direct guerrilla activity. Unlike Jedburghs who had to rely exclusively on the unknown capabilities of partially trained and armed resistance fighters as their primary offensive force, the OGs were trained soldiers capable of operating autonomously and unsupported by guerrillas behind enemy lines if necessary. Because of this fact, OGs were generally assigned missions that required active and aggressive actions against the enemy in critical areas of operation and against important high-value targets that were likely to be protected by strong enemy elements—missions that would normally have been assigned to elite commando units, such as Army Rangers or the British Special Air Service. Commanders knew what the OGs were capable of accomplishing and could rely on them to carry out mission objectives or die trying. Accordingly, in 1944, the OGs were designated the 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion Provisional (Separate), testifying that “OGs in effect constituted tactical military units.”

Recruitment and Training

The OGs were not looking to recruit typical soldiers; they wanted intelligent, motivated soldiers willing to think and act creatively in the absence of direct orders—what we would call today those who can “think outside the box.” However, the most important requirement for perspective OGs was language proficiency. As previously mentioned, the OG’s first task was to arm and train the resistance fighters in their areas of operation in the use of dangerous weapons and complex guerrilla tactics. This required a near fluent level of language expertise. The OSS scoured the military bases of the United States looking for men that could fill this role. They looked to recruit first-generation Americans who were not only fluent in French, Italian, Norwegian, Greek, and the Slavic languages, but also who understood the social mores of their parents’ country of origin. If the candidate met the language requirement, the next requirement was “willingness to perform hazardous duty,” followed up by the question, “Would you volunteer to operate behind enemy lines in uniform?”

William J. Donovan reviews the Operational Groups at Area F, the Congressional Country Club, prior to their departure for China. Bethesda, MD, 1945. (U.S. Army)
Since all the OGS came from the regular military units, they did not require basic training, but they did require specialized training on the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare. The OSS was breaking new ground: an undertaking such as this had not previously been conceived of in the U.S. military and there was no precedent in training a unit to operate as guerrillas behind enemy lines. The most important source of inspiration was the British Special Air Service and Special Operations Executive, who had considerably more experience in training commandos than the U.S. military. The British lent their knowledge in the form of manuals, course outlines, and eventually instructors who were invaluable to the creation of the OSS training program. There are a few versions of the training syllabus used by the OGS, but all reflect the need for OGS to be proficient in the following skills: demolitions, small arms (with focus on foreign weapons), heavy weapons (including the newly introduced bazooka), armed and unarmed combat (specifically silent killing techniques), scouting, patrolling, reconnaissance, use of signal equipment, unit security measures, principles of small unit tactics, methods of guerrilla warfare, urban warfare, methods of organizing and training civilians in the techniques, execution of guerrilla warfare, and much more.

The OG’s initial training curriculum consisted of 152 hours of instruction (not including physical conditioning). More than one-third (57 hours) of that training was dedicated to the OG’s primary mission, guerrilla warfare theory and tactics. The advanced training consisted of an additional 106 hours of instruction focused intensely on demolitions, weapons, and preparation for jump training that would take place elsewhere. The OG trainees were not just graded on physical skills of marksmanship and close combat, they were also judged on their mental abilities and personality traits such as the ability to cooperate with others, leadership skills, and emotional stability. Once graduated from advanced training, the OGS went to Fort Benning, Georgia, or to a British Special Operations Executive training camp overseas for parachute jump training. By the end of their training, the typical OG underwent a total of 250 hours of training, not including prior infantry training. This made the OGS the best trained units in the OSS.

**Company “B” 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion Provisional (Separate)**

The OGS’ operations took place all across the European theater during World War II. OGS detachments were sent to Norway, Italy, France, Greece, and the Balkans. Plans to jump into Germany were scrapped after the fall of Berlin in May 1945. The overall mission of Company B was to support the southern invasion of France from the Mediterranean, Operation Dragoon. Company B consisted of 21 separate Operational Groups. Thirteen OG sections were dispatched out of North Africa, and the remaining eight came from the United Kingdom. This discussion focuses on one operation, Justine, which is representative of the mission goals assigned to OGS according to the Company B operational report. The missions assigned to all French OGS were:

- Cutting enemy lines of communication.
- Attacking vital enemy installations.
- Organizing and training local resistance elements.
- Boosting morale and efforts of local resistance elements.
- Furnishing intelligence to local Allied Armies.

**Operation Justine**

On 29 June 1944, Operation Justine, consisting of 15 soldiers and commanded by First Lieutenant V. G. Hoppers, was inserted by air into the Vercors region of France 37 miles southwest of Grenoble in the department of Isère. Its mission was to arm and train the Maquis, stiffen their defenses in the region, and engage in guerrilla attacks against enemy lines of communication and troops. The geography of the Vercors area where the OGS landed consist of heavily wooded, steep-sided plateaus and deep valleys with only three main roads leading into the area; those roads were flanked by either steep cliff faces or heavily wooded hills. The Vercors was perfect country for guerrilla fighting. Because of its defensibility, it became a haven for resistance fighters and earned the moniker “the Fortress of Vercors.” The Resistance felt so secure in the Vercors that 5,000 Maquis amassed in the region, against the recommendations of the Allied command to keep their
units small and mobile. To make matters worse, within days of the OGSs arrival, the leadership of the “Fortress Vercors” imprudently declared itself “The Free Republic of Vercors.”

The first offensive action taken by the OGSs was an ambush on 7 July. The section with 20 Maquis they had trained and armed set an ambush on a main north-south route near the village of Lus-la-Croix-Haute, 44 miles southeast of their headquarters in Vassieux-en-Vercors and 40 miles south of Grenoble. The ambush location was a “strip of road about 300 yards in length, shaped like a horseshoe” flanked on the east by a 30-foot high escarpment, a perfect location for an ambush. The men were arranged in an L-shaped ambush. At the top of the “L” were two men, one armed with a bazooka and another with a Browning Automatic Rifle (light machine gun) tasked with stopping the lead vehicle and any others attempting to flee down the road away from the ambush. The remaining men were positioned along the escarpment above the road and were armed with small arms (rifles, submachine guns), hand grenades, and Gammon grenades.

Shortly after the ambush was set, the unit was notified by a local sympathizer that a German convoy of 6 trucks and 120 troops was about an hour away. When the convoy arrived at the ambush site, the first truck was struck and disabled by a bazooka round. The second truck in line attempted to maneuver around the disabled truck but was stopped by the Browning machine gun. The remaining three trucks and one bus were attacked by the men positioned along the road. They rained down small-arms fire and grenades on the German soldiers in the rear of the trucks who were savaged by the shrapnel-packed Gammon grenades. A second truck was destroyed by a bazooka round as the Germans exited the remaining vehicles and began to set up machine gun and mortar positions to return fire. In traditional guerrilla style, as quickly as the attack was initiated, it was stopped.
The OGs and the Maquis fighters fell back to a preestablished rendezvous point 10 miles away. All arrived safely, save one Maquis fighter who was known dead and a second who did not arrive at all. The next day, the missing man was found in a nearby village, where, having been captured, he was tortured to death by the Germans in front of the villagers. The death toll inflicted on the Germans by the OGs and their Maquis counterparts was 60 dead and 25 wounded and three trucks and one bus destroyed.

One week after the ambush at Lus-la-Croix-Haute, Bastille Day, a massive Allied airdrop of 1,457 containers (with red, white, and blue parachutes) holding small arms, ammunition, and other supplies landed in the Vercors. The declaration of the “Free Republic” led to stepped up guerrilla attacks, and now a sizeable airdrop forced the Germans to take action. On 16 July the OGs received intelligence that there were troop buildups occurring in Grenoble to the northeast and to Valance in the west, and there was intelligence that an airborne assault would soon take place. On the morning 19 July, the drone of aircraft could be heard above the plateau, and the men of the Vercors saw 20 planes towing 20 gliders. At first, some thought that this was a long-awaited insertion of allied infantry, but as the gliders drifted to earth, it became apparent that it was not reinforcements but a German airborne assault. The gliders landed on a partially completed landing strip being constructed near Vassieux and disgorged 400 SS Sturmtruppen. The Maquis fought bravely against the Sturmtruppen (one Maquis manning a heavy machine gun decimating two gliders), but they were driven off and the Germans invaded the village of Vassieux. The OGs organized an assault on the village to wrest it from German control. Fighting ranged over three days. The OGs and Maquis were unable to dislodge the Sturmtruppen but succeeded in pinning them down in the village. Coinciding with the air assault, German infantry, artillery, and armor and French paramilitary “Milice” forces attacked the Vercors from the northeast and west. By this time it was decided that despite a heroic defense so far, without heavy weapons, artillery, or air support, the Maquis could not hold “Fortress Vercors” against the massive German assault.

The OGs and their Maquis guides began a torturous two-week retreat traveling under the cover of darkness, hiding in forests thick with German and Milice patrols, “never allowed to speak above a whisper,” and subsisting on “nothing but raw potatoes and a little cheese.” Finally, on 9 August the section escaped the dragnet around Vercors and found their way to other resistance groups. At the end of the ordeal, the men of operation Justine were in bad shape, tired, sick, and malnourished. First Lieutenant Hoppers lost 37 pounds; some men were unable to walk for weeks, and others suffered from dysentery lasting a month.

Though the Vercors itself was lost, overall Justine was a success for the OGs and the doctrine of unconventional warfare. First, the ambush led by the OGs was a smashing success with 60 German KIA to two Maquis lost. Secondly, this and other attacks forced the Germans to commit troops and aircraft to assault the Vercors. An estimated 22,000 German troops and significant equipment (infantry, armor, artillery, aircraft, and Milice) were used in the attack and the attempts to seal off the region. Theses troops were “all diverted from the front in Normandy or from defensive positions in the south.” The verifiable damaged inflicted by the OGs and their Maquis compatriots were 250 Sturmtruppen KIA during the battle at Vassieux (over half of that assault force) and the downing of three aircraft. The only causality for the OGs was First Lieutenant Chester L. Myers, who came down with appendicitis prior to the German attack and, while recovering from surgery, was captured and shot by the Germans. Operation Justine proved that a small, aggressive, and well trained guerrilla force could affect battle not only on a tactical level but also on the operational level, producing results that greatly outweighed their physical and material costs.

One can gauge the achievements of the OGs and the success of the doctrine of unconventional warfare by looking at the Operational Groups “box score.”

Following are the OGs Box Scores:

- Known Germans Killed 461
- Known Germans Wounded 467
- Known German Prisoners 10,021
- Air Craft Shot Down 3
- Power/Telecommunications Lines cut 11
- Americans Killed Officers: 3 Enlisted: 4
- Americans Wounded Officers: 4 Enlisted: 2
● Americans Captured or Missing Officers: 2
  ● Enlisted 2
  ● Officers: 2
  ● Locomotives Destroyed 3
  ● Vehicles Destroyed 33
  ● Bridges Destroyed 32
  ● Roads Mined 17

Taking into account that there were only 356 OG personnel operating in France, the ratio of enemy dead, wounded, and captured in action to OGs is astounding. Killed in action 65:1, wounded in action 66:1, and captured 2,505:1. These “scores” as they are only represent incidents that the OGs were directly involved with and reported on. If one were to take into consideration the damage inflicted on the enemy by those Maquis that were armed and trained by the OGs, it is no doubt these “scores” would be considerably higher. Nor do these numbers accurately register the importance of timely tactical intelligence rendered to Allied command regarding German troop movements.

There were other factors that stymied the overall effectiveness of the OGs. The greatest complaint by the OGs in the after-action reports was that they were deployed too late to be as effective as they could have been. It was mentioned in all reports compiled by Lieutenant Colonel Cox that, had the OGs been dropped into the region months earlier, they would have had time to train the Maquis more effectively, obtain increased situational awareness, and accomplish considerably more. That within such a limited time frame the OGs accomplished as much as they did is remarkable: most of OG operations only lasted from one to two months on average, yet provided stunning results. The OSS and the OGs had proved the military potential of unconventional warfare, yet in October 1945, President Truman issued an executive order abolishing the unconventional warfare unit along the lines of the original operational groups. On 1 May 1952, the Psychological Warfare Center was founded in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to train soldiers in the same skills and tactics taught to the OG sections in 1944.

As the Cold War grew colder, the U.S. military began to recognize the military potential of disaffected citizens living on the other side of the Iron Curtain. In 1951, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare issued a report that estimated a “370,000 man potential within the USSR and satellites.” The potential to recruit nearly 400,000 guerrillas inside the Soviet bloc during a future war piqued the interest of some in the U.S. military in developing an unconventional warfare unit along the lines of the original operational groups. On 1 May 1952, the Psychological Warfare Center was founded in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to train soldiers in the same skills and tactics taught to the OG sections in 1944. The man chosen to head the command and train the new unit was Colonel Aaron Bank, who was trained as an OG but dropped into France as a Jedburgh in 1944. We can see the influence of the OGs in the recruitment and training of the 10th Special Forces Group. The requirements for Special Forces are nearly identical to those of the OGs: “airborne trained or volunteer for jump training; language capability (European) . . . [and] volunteer to parachute and operate behind enemy lines in uniform.” Some of the initial instructors at the 10th Special Forces Group center were OSS veterans, and the OSS and OGs were considered the benchmark for the 10th Special Forces. Bank said he “was determined to obtain a level of proficiency equal to or better than the unit’s OSS predecessors.”

“Jedburghs” in front of a B-24 just before night at Area T, Harrington Airdrome, England, 1944. (DOD)
2. Ibid., 7-8.
3. Ibid., 105.
4. This quote is in reference to the ancient Greek myth of Cadmus who founded the city of Thebes. Cadmus killed the sacred dragon that guarded the spring of Ares and at the urging of the goddess Athena. He was told to sow the dragon’s teeth into the earth; where the teeth were planted sprang forth a group of armed warriors who went on to found the city of Thebes with him. Donovan no doubt meant this as an allusion to the OSS agents in a Cadmus like role planting seeds of resistance and springing up guerrilla warriors from nothing to attack the enemy’s rear.
5. Memorandum 94, 22 December 1941, William J. Donovan to President Franklin Roosevelt.
9. Ibid., 199-200.
10. LTC Alfred Cox, Operational Report: Company “B” 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion Provisional (Separate). 1944: OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 99, Box 44, National Archives II.
11. Not mentioned in Cox’s report was the protection of installations (bridges, power stations, and factories) deemed vital to the success of the invasion that might be the targets of destruction by the retreating Germans, called “counter-scorching” missions.
12. Sources for Operation Justine comes from, unless otherwise noted, Cox, Operational Report: Company “B,” 1-9; Original Field Report: Operation “Justine” 6/28-8/24, 1944, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 99, Box 41, National Archives II.
14. British Gammon grenades consisted of canvas-like material bag and impact fuse. That the user would pre-fill the bag with up to 2 pounds of C-2 plastic explosives or other materials (the OGS of Justine used one pound of C-2 and one pound of scrap iron). Once the pin was pulled the grenade thrown would explode on impact, making this weapon as dangerous to the user as the enemy if not handled correctly. The Gammon grenade was considerably more powerful than a standard grenade and was quite useful in destroying vehicles.
16. The Milice were the militia forces of the French Vichy government working with the Nazis.
18. National Archives, Results of Partisan Operations Controlled or Led by OGS, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 99, Box 40, Folder 8, II.
21. Ibid., 125.
23. Ibid., 172.

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"Out-of-the-box thinking from deep inside the Army box."

- Armed Forces Journal
On the night of 9 October 2012 the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, conducted a forcible-entry airborne assault into the fictional country of Atropia to seize an airfield and facilitate a noncombatant evacuation operation. The brigade received its orders 96 hours earlier at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and spent the limited time available alerting the force, conducting mission planning and rehearsals, and marshalling the force at Fort Bragg’s Pope Army Airfield with all required support and sustainment organized for a combat airborne assault. The joint force deployed directly from homestation to the contested drop zone hundreds of miles and a time zone away. The emerging security environment requires flexible, versatile and rapidly deployable forcible-entry packages; the Global Response Force (GRF), a brigade combat team prepared to deploy anywhere in the world within 96 hours of notification, is designed as such, and should be continually developed as a unique asset for U.S. 21st century defense.

General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has identified the ability to gain and maintain operational access a principle defense challenge in the 21st century. In *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, the secretary of defense cited the chairman’s Joint Operational Access Concept as a U.S. strategic imperative. Concepts such as Air-Sea Battle address future programs, postures, and methods aimed at defeating long-range adversarial anti-access systems. Efforts to provide access are a shaping operation and cannot be expected to preclude the need to insert ground forces. Forcible-entry operations are designed to exploit the maneuver space enabled by operational access, and the GRF exists to conduct these operations.

Operation Atropian Reach (5-13 October 2012) was developed by the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in concert with joint
planning teams from the 18th Airborne Corps and the 82d Airborne Division, as a joint operational access exercise. It included key components of U.S. strategic response: the GRF, a joint special operations task force, U.S. Air Force mobility and strike assets, and a scenario that included the U.S. Department of State, and other agencies as well as various intergovernmental and multinational partners on the ground, portrayed by former members of these communities. Atropian Reach provides a great contextual backdrop to the larger discussion of joint operational access and the role of the GRF.

Joint Forcible-Entry and Joint Operational Access

The ability to ensure operational access in the future is being challenged—and may well be the most difficult operational challenge U.S. forces will face over the coming decades."—General Martin Dempsey, Joint Operational Access Concept

The United States has identified the ability to gain access to areas of its choosing, whether opposed or unopposed, as a strategic imperative; tactically, joint response forces train and stand ready to seize, hold, and build lodgments to meet that end. Joint operational access comprises the numerous shaping operations that together carve a space for forcible entry, essentially bridging the strategic imperative and tactical mission accomplishment.

Forcible-entry operations are undertaken to provide access by a military force to a desirable position in the face of adversarial opposition. Often this position is an advantageous piece of terrain, known as a lodgment, from which a force can enable a larger operational or strategic objective. Lodgments may be airheads or beachheads or a combination thereof; in any case, there are conditions that must be set to successfully seize this key terrain, and operational access is required to do so. Consider, for example, the amphibious assaults at Normandy on D-Day an operation undertaken against great opposition to secure a strategic foothold on mainland Europe. The operation was enabled by separate lines of access, specifically, aerial access to conduct military deception at Calais, France, prior to the operation, as well as aerial access to support the invasion with strikes and an inland insertion of airborne forces. Setting such conditions requires an initial level of access, the maintenance and achievement of which is growing increasingly difficult in the 21st century.

The emerging global operating environment includes adversarial gains in anti-access weapons and technology relative to U.S. capabilities and force projection posture. While the United States insists that access to the global commons and to select territories and domains is an imperative, and while the United States continues to maintain the ability to achieve that access, it is increasingly evident that potential adversaries have identified that their own relatively cheap investments in anti-access and area denial capabilities provide a high return.

The Joint Operational Access Concept identifies three trends that complicate U.S. access in the current environment: the dramatic proliferation of anti-access technology, the changing U.S. overseas defense posture, and the emergence of space and cyber as increasingly important—and contested—domains. Additionally, the chairman’s concept document on joint operational access points out 30 core tactical competencies that, when combined with cross-domain synergy, will help give U.S. forces the edge in the current and future fight for access. These competencies are at the heart of what rapid response forces must understand and what exercises such as Operation Atropian Reach help to foster through practice. Of the 30 specified tasks, four are highlighted below as especially pertinent to the relationship between joint forcible-entry and joint operational access.

First, the joint force must possess the fundamental capability to conduct forcible-entry operations, including raids and other limited-objective operations, as well as the initiation of sustained land operations. Considering that we have identified joint operational access as an imperative capability in the century to come, investment in training specially organized forces such as the GRF should follow. The training required to maintain the requisite level of proficiency on tasks such as airborne and amphibious assaults is extensive and resource intensive. Developing this readiness should be viewed as a nested cost within the broader concept of operational access. Training exercises such as Operation Atropian Reach, which bring together
teams from across the joint and interagency community, are critical events in building and maintaining this fundamental forcible-entry capability.

Second, operational access requires the capability to conduct en route mission command, planning, rehearsals, and assembly of deploying forces, to include linking up personnel with prepositioned equipment.\(^9\) This task implies that, as history has proven, the forcible-entry task force has a limited amount of time to plan and organize before deployment, and must be able to draw on mission command systems en route to gain the requisite visibility across the joint task force. Drawing on these systems often includes gaining early access into closed mission networks for concurrent planning and updates.

For Operation Atropian Reach, extensive work went into extending a closed mission network to Fort Bragg to ensure digital system integration during mission planning and assault force deployment. The assault force relied heavily upon organic Joint Network Transport Capability systems to affect this link-up. Although new ground was broken during the exercise, future iterations must continue toward the “installation as a docking station” concept. Here, units are able to plug into existing network enterprise centers at home station for planning, unplug to deploy, plug back in for en route mission command, unplug to assault, and plug in again on the ground. The same hardware and network is used throughout; the only difference is that on the ground, forces use their Joint Network Transport Capability systems, whereas at home and en route they can access the network through other established architectures. For example, in the event of deployment to North Africa, the Global Response Force would need U.S. Africa Command’s network accessible via the “installation docking station” at Fort Bragg, as well as en route (airborne or at intermediate staging); once inserted into an austere environment, the secure Joint Network Transport Capability systems could link into this network for seamless transition of digital mission command systems.

Third, operational access is contingent on enabling joint maneuver forces to penetrate sophisticated anti-access systems and close within striking range with acceptable risk.\(^{10}\) This task underscores the bridge between anti-access and area denial. Anti-access refers to longer range capabilities that prevent access from a distance, while area denial refers to those measures taken to limit the freedom of maneuver of a force once it has gained access.\(^{11}\) The forcible-entry airborne task force is trained and equipped to overcome area denial efforts such as short-to-medium range anti-aircraft weaponry or intentional damage to runways and airfields. However, if the force is prohibited from ever penetrating sophisticated enemy integrated air defense systems, for example, overall access—and the operation—will fail. Operation Atropian Reach was not driven by a scenario that required rigorous masking of sophisticated anti-access systems during aerial insertion; however, exercises such as the U.S. Air Force’s Mobility Forces Exercise, which takes place biannually in the Nevada Test and Training Range, practice this sort of sophisticated penetration of a forcible-entry task force and serve as great joint operational access training opportunities.\(^{12}\)

Finally, the joint operational access concept identifies that we must be able to perform mission command in a degraded and austere communications environment.\(^{13}\) The battlefields of the future will likely present significant communications challenges involving either austere and immature infrastructures or sophisticated area-denial electronic and cyber attack from our adversaries. The joint expeditionary force must become practiced at fighting through the initial friction of a degraded communication environment and the transitions associated with the introduction of our hardened network systems. Operation Atropian Reach’s exercise design forced the airborne task force to practice the skills needed when communications are degraded, and then navigate through the challenges of establishing digital connectivity across ten battalion task forces—all under free-play enemy action, including electronic jamming and military cyber attack. Multiple iterations in complex training environments such as this ensure readiness across our joint forcible-entry task forces.

...we must be able to perform mission command in a degraded and austere communications environment.
The Global Response Force

“We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to retain force structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas that, by necessity, were deemphasized over the past decade.”—Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense

The 82d Airborne Division maintains the GRF. Organized to conduct combat operations as the lead ground element for a joint force land component commander, the GRF’s mission is synonymous with the division’s overarching mission to strategically deploy and conduct forcible-entry parachute assault to secure key objectives for follow-on military operations in support of U.S. national interests. The GRF is a flexible, versatile, and rapidly deployable task force poised to be a key component of U.S. defense strategy in the 21st century.

The response force is a roughly 5,000-person joint task force comprised of specialists from across the range of warfighting functions. The core of the formation is an airborne infantry brigade combat team. The brigade includes two infantry battalions, a reconnaissance squadron, a field artillery battalion, a special troops battalion, and a support battalion; all personnel are airborne qualified, and the units are tailored, along with special equipment, for insertion via airborne assault. In addition to these organic elements, the GRF includes a Stryker infantry company, a mechanized infantry company team (including M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles), a combat aviation battalion (including attack and assault helicopters), additional heavy artillery assets (towed 155mm howitzers and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems), a U.S. Air Force contingent (including a special tactics team, tactical air control parties, an air liaison officer, and a joint task force-port opening team), an explosive ordnance disposal team, a military police platoon, and additional engineer and military intelligence assets to augment those organic to the special troops battalion.

Paratroopers assigned to the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, perform noncombatant evacuee operations as part of a joint operational access exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA, 11 October 2012.
The GRF deploys in two main echelons. The first, and lighter of the two, is organized to conduct an airborne assault onto a contested airfield, seize the lodgment, and prepare to receive the second echelon via air-landed aircraft. The response force and its associated enablers maintain specific preparedness standards at home station to meet rapid deployment timelines. However, the force package is extremely versatile and can be reconfigured from a decisive action forcible-entry posture into one configured for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief during the deployment sequence at the departure airfield.

The GRF or a component battalion task force has been called upon 18 times since 9/11. These missions include special tours in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, disaster relief missions following Hurricane Katrina and the Haiti earthquake, and combat operations with joint special operations task forces. Pre-9/11, the 82d Airborne Division maintained a somewhat similar response force known as the Defense Ready Brigade, or DRB. These ready brigades saw combat in Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, conducted a combat parachute assault into Panama as part of Operation Just Cause in 1989, and proved to be an effective flexible deterrent en route to Port-Au-Prince, Haiti, as part of Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994. As well, the DRB planned for many other operations that were not executed.

Although the GRF has answered the nation’s call to combat repeatedly over the last decade, the environment for which it must be prepared in the years to come promises new challenges. None of the recent combat deployments required forcible entry, and most were into combat zones with established communication networks and support systems. The operating environment of the future will be undoubtedly different. As Operation Atropian Reach exposed, joint forcible entry is a “team sport” and our forces require practice. Additionally, the ready brigade has changed significantly since it was last employed for forcible entry over 20 years ago. The DRB is now the GRF; acronyms aside, the GRF is larger, heavier, more technical, and capable of creating effects that far outreach its predecessor. Today, rather than simply more lethal combat power, the commander programs for the early introduction of a Joint Network Transport Capability satellite, followed closely by other automated battle command systems and platforms that enable three-dimensional mission command and networked systems up to the Top Secret-Sensitive Compartmented Information level. These systems are not only capable of being dropped into the most remote locations for operations but also increasingly necessary as our adversaries acquire increasingly sophisticated electronic and cyber attack capabilities.

Joint exercises that afford the opportunity to practice cross-domain synergy are invaluable. For Operation Atropian Reach, the GRF and joint enablers deployed from Hawaii, Alaska, California, Washington, Oklahoma, Texas, Kentucky, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Georgia. During the GRF’s next joint operational access exercise, many of the same players will participate along with joint forces from the U.S. Marine Corps and multinational forces from the United Kingdom and Canada.
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations and Joint Forcible Entry

NEOs (noncombatant evacuation operations) usually involve swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of an objective and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission.\(^5\) JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

NEOs are a core mission for the GRF, and one that is increasingly relevant. The requirement to conduct a noncombatant evacuation precipitated Operation Atropian Reach, and by way of the exercise’s well-developed scenario, the response force received invaluable training on a very complex mission set. Recent events across Northern Africa and the Middle East underscore the need to maintain a military force capable and ready to conduct a forcible entry to assure the safety of American citizens and interests abroad—a commitment that the secretary of defense recently reaffirmed as a defense priority.\(^6\)

NEOs require special considerations with respect to mission command, planning, and execution that should be considered. First, mission command is unique because the decision to evacuate rests solely with the U.S. ambassador, and he or she maintains overall control of the evacuation operation. If military forces are needed, the request comes from the secretary of state to the secretary of defense.\(^7\) As the situation develops, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorizes the appropriate geographic combatant commander to lead the operation. Requests for forces such as the GRF are submitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commander stands up a joint task force if deemed necessary. During Operation Atropian Reach, the combatant commander stood up Joint Task Force-180 from the 18th Airborne Corps, which was specifically responsible for facilitating the noncombatant evacuation. The joint task force included an expeditionary force headquarters from the 82d Airborne Division and the GRF, charged with executing the forcible entry. Last year, in response to the deteriorating situation in Libya, U.S. Africa Command stood up a joint task force and coordinated for a potential evacuation operation that would include battlespace and assets from three separate combatant commands.\(^8\)

In addition to complex mission command relationships, NEOs are characterized by uncertainty. Military forces involved in these operations must not only be agile enough to deploy rapidly, but flexible enough to adapt to a swiftly changing situation. The security situation on the ground and relationship with the host nation may not initially suggest the need to overcome robust anti-access or execute forcible entry; however, task forces must remain prepared for the situation to deteriorate and plan to retain operational access and the necessary lodgments to complete the evacuation against armed resistance. During rapid deployment planning for Operation Atropian Reach the security situation moved from initially permissive to uncertain, driving the GRF to organize for an airborne assault. In the hours preceding task force deployment, the response force commander was able to conduct a secure video teleconference with the U.S. ambassador to Atropia to gain information vital to the evacuation operation.

Additionally, Joint Task Force-180 established an intermediate staging base at nearby Alexandria International Airport during the operation. Intermediate staging bases typically serve not only as a sustainment node but also as an evacuation safe area during a NEO. The GRF was able to conduct recovery operations, marshal American citizens, and transport them out of Atropia to the staging base via U.S. Air Force aircraft during Operation Atropian Risk. Numerous additional layers of friction, including an armed insurgent opposition, an immature communications environment, and an uncooperative host government security force around the U.S. consulate came together, resulting in a dynamic and realistic mission rehearsal for the GRF.

A New Focus

In many ways, Operation Atropian Reach is emblematic of a new focus for the joint expeditionary force. The combination of joint operational access and forcible entry to facilitate a noncombatant evacuation demands new skill-sets and a new focus. This dynamic training is an appropriate mission rehearsal for the GRF and the larger joint task force, because the next time the response force is called upon it will not be into an established combat zone, but into an environment characterized by uncertain conditions, multi-nodal threats, and an immature communications architecture.
Joint operational access has been identified as a national strategic imperative. The United States enters into a century in which the country’s gaps in technological advantage are narrowing. The mass proliferation of relatively cheap yet sophisticated anti-access technology, a reduced force projection footprint abroad, and the growing threats associated with the cyber domain challenge our ability to gain and maintain access to the global commons, a piece of ground, or broader domains. To protect vital national interests abroad in this environment, we must invest in a range of capabilities designed to defeat anti-access systems and provide maneuver space within which to work. Further, we must invest in our joint forcible-entry capabilities such that when needed, they are equipped, trained, and ready to complete the mission.

The GRF is the nation’s strategic forcible-entry package. Joint operational access exercises such as Operation Atropian Reach are critical readiness events, but are admittedly burdensome upon scarce resources. Nonetheless, these complex tasks cannot be practiced in a vacuum, and the synergy achieved through joint training iterations results in gained efficiencies across the joint force. A renewed focus and resource allocation pertaining to joint forcible entry as a key aspect of joint operational access keeps the force in step with the secretary of defense’s pledge: “We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness . . . and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas that, by necessity, were deemphasized over the past decade.”

NOTES

3. The training served as the mission rehearsal exercise for 2d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, prior to becoming the Global Response Force.
4. Dempsey, ii.
6. Dempsey, ii.
7. Ibid., iii.
8. Ibid., JOA-016, 35.
9. Ibid., JOA-015, 35.
10. Ibid., JOA-017, 35.
11. Ibid., i.
12. As of this year, the Mobility Forces Exercise is renamed Joint Force Entry (JFE) Exercise to fall in line with the joint terminology; it is the capstone exercise preceding graduation from the USAF Weapons School and consistently includes large mobility aircraft packages and sophisticated anti-access scenarios. JFE 12B takes place 26-30 November 2012 out of Nellis AFB, NV.
17. JP 3-68, III-1.
ON 26 APRIL 2011, in his www.foreignpolicy.com blog, “The Best Defense,” defense writer Tom Ricks posted, “A stunning post from an Army wife.” It opened with a quote from an Army spouse which appeared in her blog, “Misadventures of an Army Wife.” The quote read, “If you are reading this, you should know that I am dead. At least I hope I’m dead. It would be awful to fail at your own suicide.” Ricks gave a brief synopsis of the online suicide note—no longer available—in which the spouse described her officer husband’s altered manner and high-risk behaviors following redeployment. After suicidal ideations on the part of both partners, her husband expressed a desire to end the marriage.

Ricks posted the quote, the chronicle of the spouse’s suicide attempt, and an update on her well-being with no editorial commentary. The 37 ensuing reader comments made the post truly extraordinary on a blog focused primarily on strategy and policy. Soldiers wrote extensively of their concern for their spouses’ well-being during past deployments, of negative family readiness group (FRG) experiences, and offered various solutions to the problem of family stress during deployments. While not empirical evidence, those anecdotes are illustrative examples of a broader crisis of leadership, namely, who specifically is responsible for taking care of families. The responsibility for family readiness belongs to commanders, especially at the lowest unit levels.

The link between leadership and suicide prevention is almost a truism since former-Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter Chiarelli released the Army Health Promotion/Risk Reduction/Suicide Prevention Report 2010 (henceforth referred to here as the 2010 HP/RR/SP). That good order and
discipline are essential to reducing soldier high-risk behavior and suicides is now commonly accepted. It is also known that, in the Army, relationship problems are a common risk factor when it comes to suicide.5 As the 2010 HP/RR/SP report notes, the contributing factors to a failed relationship can be complex and varied.6 I submit that good leadership is important to family readiness, and although family readiness receives lip service, it is rarely seriously discussed in relation to soldier morale and readiness. The discussion that follows is woven from three strands. The first and largest strand that runs throughout is the oversight for family and soldier readiness by an installation-level Community Health Promotion Council (CHPC). The CHPC is a meeting of tactical, garrison, and medical assets intended to address the wellness needs of the military community. By providing a forum to identify needs and share best practices, it can ensure that clear areas of responsibility are established and observed so that Army leaders across the installation can take care of not only their soldiers, but also their soldiers’ families. The second strand of this discussion is intended to establish the relationship between family satisfaction and unit readiness. The third strand outlines what, for our purposes, will be called the “engaged leader paradigm” and its positive impact on the family and soldier readiness relationship.

In its chapter entitled, “The Lost Art of Leadership in Garrison,” the 2010 HP/RR/SP report identifies the leadership as “the garrison community (post, camps, and stations) comprised of commanders, staffs, and program/service providers; both military and civilian.”7 The report goes on to assert that “leadership must rely on the communication, collaboration, and experience of this full range of leaders to provide situational awareness and inform decisions regarding mitigation of environmental risk and individual high-risk behavior.”8 This exact interaction already takes place at Army installations via the CHPC discussed above, which is designed to provide a holistic approach to health promotion. The council is governed by Army Regulation (AR) 600-63, Army Health Promotion, which states that senior commanders “have overall responsibility for health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention efforts.”9 Additionally, “all tenant organizations fall under the CHPC for health promotion policy and programs.”10 The regulation lays out a process by which leadership, installation agency representatives, and various other members of the community address holistic wellness issues, which are brought up through the health promotion council. Often, these issues are brought to the council after commanders have met with their units to discuss issues and best practices, often through a brigade-level health promotion council, referred to as brigade health promotion teams (BHPTs) here, although the name and structure can vary from unit to unit.11 After the community council has discussed courses of action for the issues brought forward, the tasked agencies or units send out guidance and policies where appropriate based on the council’s findings.

As it relates to family and soldier readiness, to make sure this top-down approach is effective, there needs to be a bottom-up effort on the part of units to make sure that trends, needs, best practices, and lessons learned are being identified and shared. As a brigade-level version of the community council, the BHPT allows leaders to provide the CHPC with the most relevant information. As will be shown, for a CHPC to truly address the holistic wellness of a military community, family readiness must be an integral part of holistic wellness discussions at the unit level. Even if it has not traditionally been thought of as a component of healthy living, family readiness matters to the overall health of the soldier and family.

Before the role of the installation CHPC is examined, let us establish the relationship between soldier and family readiness. We begin with a look at the unit, which here refers loosely to the company, to see how commanders currently care for the well-being of their soldiers and their families at the most basic level. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, states that, “If leaders show loyalty to their

...family readiness must be an integral part of holistic wellness discussions at the unit level.
soldiers, the Army, and the nation, they earn the loyalty of their soldiers. If leaders consider their soldiers’ needs and care for their well-being, and if they demonstrate genuine concern, these leaders build a positive command climate.” Chapter 3 of *Army Command Policy* outlines the Army’s concept of holistic well-being and the responsibility of commanders to ensure a positive standard of living for their soldiers and their families. The chapter makes it clear that the burden of improving and maintaining subordinates’ quality of life is placed squarely on the shoulders of the commander.

**Family Readiness Group**

One tool at the commander’s disposal is the family readiness group (FRG), a command program run by volunteers. *Army Command Policy* defines family readiness as “the mutual reinforcement provided to soldiers, civilian employees, retirees (regardless of marital status), and their family members—both immediate and extended. Examples include Family Readiness Groups (FRG), newsletters, telephone trees, and other volunteer programs and activities.” Unit commanders are required to “maintain, as appropriate to the needs of their units, a unit FRG to encourage self-sufficiency among its members by providing information, referral assistance, and mutual support.”

I’ll say only one more thing on the matter of my wife. She, smartly, has said that FRGs shouldn’t be run by family members. There’s simply too much anxiety and too much pressure, and too much potential for rivalry...

The quote above gets at the paradox at the heart of the FRG system—a required command program staffed by volunteers, one which requires family members undergoing the stress of military life to give of their time and energy for other families undergoing many of the exact same stressors. A look at the FRG system as it functions at the company level and above is crucial to understanding the way the Army has asked its commanders to take care of soldiers and families for the past decade, and what is necessary to move forward. Perhaps no other institution in the Army is so ubiquitous and yet so profoundly misunderstood. What are some perceptions of FRGs? The 2010 Survey of Army Families found that the majority of surveyed spouses said their readiness group was run well. Most rated them as good or fair in helping their family. Tellingly,
of the four-fifths of spouses who said FRGs in their soldier spouse’s unit was active, nine-tenths said they attending meetings, and one-fourth served as FRG leaders.\textsuperscript{17} With a 28 percent response rate with 16,805 usable responses from spouses of Active Component soldiers, it is possible to conjecture that these findings are not necessarily indicative of the broader perceptions held of FRGs.\textsuperscript{18} Surveys issued to spouses are never mandatory, and so one could hypothesize that those who voluntarily respond to a survey on Army family life might be the kind of spouses who are already more involved in their spouse’s unit. Spouses who finds the Army lifestyle intimidating or not to their taste, or whose soldier spouse does not inform them about the Army or their unit, would probably be less likely to respond to a survey from the Army.

A survey of soldiers returning from deployment paints a smaller but contradictory picture of FRGs. The Reintegration Unit Risk Inventory is an 80-item questionnaire that screens for high-risk behaviors and attitudes related to combat and post-combat experiences that may compromise unit readiness. The inventory is required by Deployment Cycle Support (DCS) Directive, dated 26 March 2007, and is conducted 120 to 180 days after redeployment.\textsuperscript{19} Fifty-one percent of redeploying soldiers indicated on the inventory that their spouse did not participate in a family readiness group.\textsuperscript{20} When asked to rate their FRG, 13 percent said poor and 33 percent said the question did not apply to them.\textsuperscript{21} While this data provides only a snapshot of one installation, it is worth noting that despite emphasis in Army Command Policy on the well-being of the total Army family (which includes the soldiers themselves), the soldier respondents either had a negative view of FRGs, were apparently unaware of them, or felt that family readiness did not include them. This is a marked contrast to the rosy findings in the 2010 Survey of Army Families.

There are many reasons a soldier might feel that questions on family readiness groups do not apply to him or her. Take the Survey of Army Families itself, which poses questions of family issues only to the spouses of Active Component soldiers. A soldier who feels questions about the FRG do not apply to him or her could likely be a soldier without a spouse, who believes family readiness groups are for married soldiers and their families. Assuming the Army means what it says in Army Command Policy about well-being including the soldiers, their families, veterans, and retirees, a true look at the effectiveness of the Army FRG and its related programs would presumably ask the soldiers themselves what they think of the utility of readiness groups. The very methodology of the survey would seem to indicate a perception of Army family care that is at odds with Army command and health promotion policy: in this view, spouses take care of the total Army family (which includes the soldiers themselves), the soldier respondents either had a negative view of FRGs, were apparently unaware of them, or felt that family readiness did not include them.

of spouses, families take care of families, and there is minimal command involvement. After over a decade of persistent conflict, Army leaders have grown accustomed to this paradigm. With so many tactical demands on the unit as it cycled through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process, leader responsibility for family readiness arguably shifted more to the volunteer-run FRGs. Like so many other proficiencies, tasks, and skills, family care was outsourced during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This time, however, the responsibility fell not to contractors, but to the families themselves.

Despite the negative views of FRGs indicated by the Reintegration Unit Risk Inventory results cited above, caring for soldiers and their families matters very much to the soldiers themselves. Results from a 2002 study of a 193-man sample from two infantry battalions at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (then Fort Lewis) showed that when asked to rate their identities as a soldier, 75 percent of respondents viewed their family identities as the most salient, and 93.8 percent viewed their family identity as one of their top three salient identities.\textsuperscript{22} Additional data seems to support that
soldiers are very concerned about their families’ well-being. In their January 2010 study, “The Effects of Multiple Deployments on Army Adolescents,” Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras found that even though 56 percent of Army adolescents responding to their survey said they coped well to very well with deployments, deployed “soldiers appear to be more pessimistic with estimates that a third of their children are coping poorly or very poorly with deployments.” While studies and data support that soldiers and their families need support from Army leadership, it is unclear that the family readiness group is necessarily the best way to provide that support. There are two key reasons for why the Army might have outgrown the FRG paradigm: a negative view of FRGs, and a need to overcome a misunderstanding of the commander’s role vis-à-vis family care after 10 years of family-member run FRGs. The 4 August 2011 rapid action revision of Army Command Policy even appears to de-emphasize the role of the FRG. The acronym appears only three times in the regulation, not including its appearance in the glossary. Each time the FRG is mentioned in Army Command Policy, it is in conjunction with other tools for family readiness, and with an emphasis on self-sufficiency on the part of the soldier and his or her family.

Leader Paradigm

Suppose the Army were to shift to a family care paradigm without family readiness groups. That world would arguably be one in which soldiers and families could agree that they were receiving adequate support to meet the stressors of Army life. It would require the engaged leader paradigm mentioned earlier. In the engaged leader paradigm, Army commanders and leaders are not only engaged with their soldiers, but also understand and know the programs available to their soldiers and their families. Involved, knowledgeable leaders at the lowest level would likely result in a robust brigade health promotion team, which would in turn mean a robust and effective community health promotion council. Truly engaged leadership does not stop at barracks checks, regular counseling, and disciplinary action. A leader’s concern must extend to the family if true soldier readiness is the goal. Additionally, a leader who is knowledgeable about the programs and resources which are relevant to family readiness supports the CHPC, which is tasked with “identify[ing] and eliminate[ing] redundancies and voids in programs and services by evaluating population needs, assessing existing programs, and coordinating targeted interventions.” Knowledgeable junior leader engagement will provide the brigade health promotion team with the ground truth about how these programs are being utilized by soldiers and their families, helping to ensure responsible resource management when the brigade commander takes these findings to the community council.

As Todd D. Woodruff and Thomas A. Kolditz argue in their paper “The Need to Develop Expert Knowledge of the Military Family,” engaged leadership with knowledge of relevant resources is linked to family satisfaction, a vital component to retention and soldier readiness. Family readiness group operations typically take place at the company level, and were they to go away, company grade commanders and leaders would need to increase their knowledge of family programs and resources to fill that gap. Woodruff and Kolditz observe that “it is the frontline leaders who will have the greatest effect on the day-to-day lives of soldiers and families,” and yet “not all Army leaders have developed adequate expert knowledge to care for families, and the retention picture for the Army overall has shown signs of possible problems.” This is especially true at the company level, where junior leaders—officers, especially—are less likely to be familiar with the stresses of family life or the relevant resources, despite making the most decisions that directly impact soldiers and families. This problem is easily remedied by incorporating family resource curriculum into Reserve Officer Training Corps and service academy training, the basic officer leader course, and the captains’ career course. Serious discussions and thoughtfully developed programs of instruction on family topics taught by senior leaders will help abolish the perception that family issues are taken care of primarily by volunteers and other family members. With the link between family readiness and soldier readiness established, and the proposed engaged leader paradigm as a replace-
ment for the FRG system, let us examine how this paradigm would manifest at higher organizational levels in the Army.

As has been previously stated, the brigade health promotion team does not appear in the *Army Health Promotion*, but it appears in many installation health promotion policies in one form or another as a useful tool in the community health promotion council process. As a health promotion team at the brigade level, the BHPT shares the same emphasis on collaboration in the interest of holistic wellness. However, a BHPT will only be as effective as its battalions are engaged. If battalions model their steering committees, currently a regular meeting with commanders and FRG leaders, on the CHPC model, leaders and commanders would have a forum to address wellness trends and best practices within their units. The battalion commander then brings these findings to the BHPT, which the brigade commander then shares with the CHPC. This process ensures the best policies, collaboration, and best practices emanate from the CHPC back down into units, and the soldiers and families that comprise them.

It may be argued that the social support for spouses during deployments would go away if the FRG system were to be replaced with an engaged leadership model that simply enfold family issues into its purview. These fears are misplaced for a few reasons, the first and foremost reason being tradition. The FRG is an artificial construct, and cohesive units and personal relationships between unit members and their families predate any formal family support network in the Army. Woodruff and Kolditz cite a poll conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation, the *Washington Post*, and Harvard University in which the spouse respondents who coped best with the era of persistent conflict were those who developed meaningful relationships with other spouses.28 There is no reason why, in an inclusive command climate, spouses would not know or see each other socially. Especially at the company level, a positive atmosphere is more likely to foster a sense of *esprit de corps* that would supplant any of the sense of obligatory participation that can accompany the FRG system.

Similarly, that pillar of unit involvement—volunteerism—predates FRGs. A unit in which leaders know their soldiers’ families as well as their soldiers, and in which the families know each other, will likely experience little difficulty in getting participation when meals are needed after a pregnancy. In fact, *Army Command Policy* specifically states that soldiers should encourage...
their spouses to support quality of life programs and activities, acknowledging that volunteers are essential to many such programs. Concerted effort on the part of junior leadership to care about their soldier’s lives and families will hopefully foster organic relationships between leadership, members of the unit, and their families that will keep leaders informed of the needs and trends in their unit and benefit the soldiers and their families.

Displacing the FRG system with the engaged leader paradigm would greatly, although probably not entirely, eliminate the pressure family members, specifically spouses, sometimes feel to volunteer for unit activities. There are perhaps very few organizations in the civilian world that depend as heavily as the military on the unpaid, voluntary labor of the spouses of its employees to accomplish mission essential tasks. Army Command Policy provides a safeguard against pressure on family members to volunteer in Chapter 4, section 18: “Employment and volunteer work of spouse.” This section of Army Command Policy supports a spouse’s right to work or volunteer wherever he or she chooses, and prohibits a spouse’s work or education decisions from influencing their soldier’s career. In a unit under the engaged leader paradigm, the commander will know that and try to avoid the appearance of any financial pressure on a spouse or family member to volunteer. It is not enough for commanders and junior leaders to know the relevant resources, they must know the regulations.

At the Fort Hood CHPC on 19 October 2010, Major General William Grimsley expressed concern that incoming company commanders to the installation seemed not to know the extent of their authority or those things for which they could be held accountable. To fill this gap, Fort Hood provides recurring, local-level mandatory courses: a company commander and first sergeant course, an executive officer/operations officer course, and a battalion/brigade commander and command sergeant major course. These courses lay out the basic regulatory requirements for which leaders are responsible, as well as local policy, points of contact, and information unique to the installation. For the engaged leader paradigm to work, it is essential that unit leaders be acquainted with the relevant policies and regulations. Otherwise, unit leaders will either be limited by risk aversion or overstep their bounds and become overly intrusive. Army schoolhouses have a responsibility to review the existing programs of instruction on well-being and family care in their leadership courses to ensure that these crucial components of unit and soldier readiness are treated with the same seriousness as the tactical ones. Instructing students on the regulations and policies which govern well-being and family care is one important way to accomplish this. Once the leader leaves the schoolhouse, as Grimsley’s comment at the CHPC demonstrates, the CHPC can serve as a helpful mechanism in identifying continuing gaps in leader knowledge and developing outcomes to fill them.

Not a Panacea

Before we conclude this discussion, a quote from an Army official raises a provocative insight. Speaking to the New York Times in response to the 16 March 2012 shooting of Afghan civilians by Staff Sergeant Robert Bales, who was then on his fourth deployment, the official said, “When it all comes out, it will be a combination of stress, alcohol, and domestic issues—he just snapped.” While these factors do not excuse the soldier’s actions, they do illustrate that the impact of family readiness, mental health, and individual readiness of our soldiers can have broader strategic implications as well. The 24 hour news cycle and proliferation of social media mean that such actions by soldiers are interpreted and analyzed widely by the public who draw conclusions about how the Army cares for its soldiers and their families. Most lay people would be shocked to know that this soldier’s wife had as her primary recourse a small cadre of volunteers—mostly spouses just like her—as she dealt with the stressors of four combat deployments.

After over a decade of persistent conflict, the FRG is something of a sacred cow, but it is not a panacea. Its volunteers are just that, volunteers. As such, the FRG apparatus can only react to crises, usually at the very lowest levels. Commanders relinquished their direct link to their soldiers’ family lives when they made FRG volunteers their intermediaries responsible for providing command information to family members. Therefore, despite their legitimacy as leaders of a command program,
FRG leaders then have no real authority to follow up or to inquire as to whether a spouse is using the appropriate resources. However, the intent here is not to argue that FRGs are ineffective, but to make the case that BHPTs and the CHPC facilitated by the engaged leader paradigm are so much more effective. Rather than merely address the needs of a single family or company as an FRG does, the BHPT can spread best practices and raise awareness of trends across a brigade. When those results are brought before the CHPC, they have the potential to impact soldiers and families across the installation. As years of combat stress accumulate and the pressures of reintegration mount, the Army’s focus is on prevention, and the FRG system does not and cannot support that goal. As the Army returns to more garrison-based operations, there is no reason why a leader’s answer to a soldier’s family stresses should ever be, “Let the FRG deal with it.” Instead, an engaged leader knows the relevant resource, ensures that the soldier takes full advantage, and tries where appropriate to include the soldier’s spouse. The engaged leader knows his soldiers and can determine whether this soldier’s problem fits in with a broader trend within the unit, which the leader can then bring through the BHPT where the entire installation can benefit. The Army stops reacting and gets serious about prevention when leader involvement and knowledge at every level is engaged and brought before the CHPC to generate real solutions. **MR**

**NOTES**

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 35.
8. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 8.
11. Ibid., 7.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
17. Ibid., slide 20.
20. William Shipman, “Reintegration Unit Risk Inventory (R-URI) Summary of Results” (III Corps & Fort Hood Community Health Promotion Council, Fort Hood, TX, 20 March 2012).
21. Ibid.
24. AR 600-63, 8.
25. Snider and Matthews, 531.
26. Ibid., 532.
27. Ibid., 535.
28. Snider and Matthews, 534.
29. Minutes, III Corps & Fort Hood Community Health Promotion Council, 19 October 2010.
OVER THE PAST five years, the Army has annually updated its doctrine to reflect the evolution of its understanding of the Army design methodology. As the Army design doctrine has evolved, so has the design curriculum at the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). In an effort to maintain relevance with the operational army and joint force, the SAMS faculty adjusted its design and operational art curriculum based on feedback from commanders and senior Army leaders. Thus, the updated curriculum increases the student officers’ understanding of Army design methodology and improves communication between graduates and their commanders. Previous versions of the SAMS design curriculum did not acknowledge the past application of critical and creative thinking from military practitioners. Instead, the design curriculum relied on theory and concepts from a variety of design disciplines, resulting in a heavy reliance on metaphor to reach understanding about design.

This article describes the current SAMS design curriculum, highlights its relationship to the broader SAMS curriculum, and demonstrates a practical way to teach Army design methodology.

Mission and Development

The mission of SAMS focuses on educating members of our Armed Forces, our allies, and the interagency at the graduate level to be “agile and adaptive leaders” who are critical and creative thinkers, people who produce viable options to solve operational and strategic problems. The SAMS goal is to develop effective operational planners who are good leaders and great teammates. The Advanced Military Studies Program has eight graduate outcomes. First, the graduate is grounded in operational theory, doctrine, and history. Second, the graduate is a “critical and creative thinker” who can identify problems and propose viable solutions. Third, the graduate can
clearly communicate recommendations verbally, graphically, and in writing. Fourth, the graduate has a firm understanding of peer leadership and team building. Fifth, the graduate has the courage to lead from above, beside, and below. Sixth, the graduate is physically and mentally tough. Seventh, the graduate can collaborate effectively to get the job done. Finally, the graduate “does not care who gets the credit.”

The development of the SAMS design curriculum can be categorized into three time periods: the curriculum predesign doctrine, the curriculum during the development of the design doctrine, and the curriculum post-design doctrine. Prior to the development of the design doctrine, SAMS introduced the concepts of design in its curriculum. In January 2008, the U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center published Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD). The planning methods proposed in the pamphlet followed three years of Army level seminars and wargames to increase operational and strategic thinking.

Just prior to CACD’s publication, the TRADOC commander directed that the planning methods proposed in CACD be implemented at the School of Advanced Military Studies beginning in June 2007. TRADOC proposed four goals for SAMS. First, improve the existing doctrinal operational design approach by improving the Army understanding of complex problems and the environment. Second, develop critical and creative thinkers and adaptive leaders. Third, refine and continue to develop CACD methods through course iteration and provide input to the Army for doctrinal institutionalization. Fourth, produce graduates who have mastery in the CACD methods. The SAMS leadership and faculty approached the TRADOC tasking by developing a pilot course that focused on design and drafting a design student text during the 2008 academic year.

Design

In 2009, the concept of design made its first appearance in Army doctrine with the publication of Army Field Manual-Interim (FMI) 5-2, Design (Draft). This began a three year effort to incorporate the Army design methodology into Army doctrine.

The stated purpose of FMI 5-2, Design, was to provide a comprehensive account of design doctrine and institutionalize an approach to reasoning and critical thinking. By academic year 2009, SAMS incorporated a 24-lesson design course into its 11-month curriculum. The design course relied on a variety of theories, concepts, and models to learn about design. Though not an exhaustive list, some of these included systemic operational design theory, chaos and complexity theory, systems theory, and organizational theory. Additionally, concepts of narrative and discourse, culture, and for a short time, even the field of architecture design was used in the curriculum.

By March 2010, TRADOC introduced Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operations Process, which superseded FMI 5-2. The TRADOC commander pointed out that the intent of FM 5-0, The Operations Process, was to encourage greater flexibility through critical thought, action, and initiative. Three ideas were central to the new doctrine. First, the new doctrine introduced design. Second, the doctrine expanded the discussion of full spectrum operations. Third, the new doctrine reinforced the central role of commanders. Twelve months later, FM 5-0, The Operations Process, was updated once again with change 1 to account for new doctrine established in the Army’s Operations manual, FM 3-0.
In March 2012, TRADOC released a series of doctrinal updates that include Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 5-0, *The Operations Process*, and Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process*. Together, these two manuals provided an expanded discussion of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. The updated manuals established a common frame of reference and the language for commanders and staffs to exercise mission command. The manual also replaced the term “design,” with the new doctrinal term “Army design methodology.” Additionally, the definition of Army design methodology was again updated, although many of the original concepts introduced in the 2009 FMI were retained in the chapter focused on planning, chapter 2.

In addition to the published doctrine on design, other design publications emerged. In 2009, Dr. Jack Kem published *Design: Tools of the Trade* to link design to the 2008 version of FM 3-0, *Operations*, manual and the ideas concerning battle command. SAMS published the Design Student Text, version 2.0 in the spring of 2010 to supplement the design curriculum. By October 2011, the Joint Staff J-7 released the Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design to describe design ideas in the context of joint doctrine, specifically operational design and the joint operational planning process. Spring 2012 saw the Army Research Institutes publication of *Army Design Methodology Commander’s Resource*, which sought to bridge the gap between design theory and the application of the Army design methodology in the field. These are just the official publications; a myriad of articles, monographs, and blogs have proliferated on the Internet. The short time frame during which official publications and academic writing about design proliferated only served to further obfuscate core design principles and convoluted discussion.

**Curriculum Changes**

With the publication of FM 5-0 and ADP/APRP 5-0, SAMS refined its curriculum for academic years 2011, 2012, and 2013, fully implementing TRADOC’s directive. Based on feedback from the operational Army, many of the concepts were retained in the SAMS design course while others were discarded as the curriculum was refined. Since much of the existing design theory was based on a variety of fields of study such as architectural design, product design, process design, or engineering design (to name a few) they only served as a metaphor for student understanding. The addition of military history improved the SAMS students’ understanding by placing the key components of design in their proper context of what military commanders and organizations do: solve military problems. Placing design within a military context had the additional benefit of increasing understanding among military practitioners and improved communication between the graduate and the operational commander.

In 2012, the refinement of the SAMS curriculum resulted in the yet another update to the design course. The Design and Operational Art course incorporated many of the ideas, concepts, theories, models, and practices of the previous seven years. Thus, the current SAMS design course teaches student officers to evaluate unfamiliar and complex problems. Three additional course elements enable student officers to achieve the course objective: analyze and explain the current operational environment; analyze, develop, and explain the military problem; and analyze and develop a new operational approach to solve a military problem. The objectives of the Design and Operational Art course link directly to the Advanced Military Studies mission: graduate agile and adaptive leaders who are critical and creative thinkers who produce viable options to solve operational and strategic problems. Furthermore, the Design and Operational Art course supports the graduate outcomes by providing grounding in operational theory, doctrine, and history; developing clear communication skills; improve understanding of peer leadership and team building; and developing the ability to collaborate effectively to get the job done.

**Based on feedback from the operational Army, many of the concepts were retained in the SAMS design course while others were discarded as the curriculum was refined.**
The Design and Operational Art course is typically the fourth of five courses within the academic year. The three courses that precede the Design and Operational Art course are Theory of Operational Art, Evolution of Operational Art, and Strategic Context of Operational Art. The Future of Operational Art course follows the design course. The courses that precede the design course provide the student officers with a theoretical, historical, and practical context necessary to establish the utility of the Army design methodology within a military context.

The Design and Operational Art course is six weeks long, with 18 lessons. Typically, there are three lessons per week that average about three hours in length. All of the lessons are in a seminar setting co-taught by a military officer (former battalion commander) and a civilian faculty member (Ph.D.). Following the classroom lessons is a two-week practical exercise, in which the student officers apply the course material to an unfamiliar military situation. The lessons devoted to the Design and Operational Art course are comparable in length to the other four courses in SAMS.

The course is presented in five modules. The first module is an introduction to design methodology. The second module focuses on analyzing and explaining the operational environment. The third module introduces how to analyze, develop, and explain an operational military problem. The fourth module examines how to analyze, develop, and explain an operational approach. The fifth module focuses on practicing how to use the Army design methodology. As previously mentioned, a two-week practical exercise follows the seminar course work. The course material used during the lessons consist of Army and joint planning doctrine; ideas, concepts, and models from a variety of academic disciplines; military historical examples; and practical application. Military doctrine provides a foundation and start point for the discussion of the Army design methodology.
The ideas, concepts, and models supplement military doctrine and provide the student officers with additional problem solving tools. The military historical examples illustrate how previous military commanders and military organizations have addressed unfamiliar and complex situations. Additionally, the historical cases arm the student officer with practical military examples to illustrate how the key concepts of the Army design methodology can be used within a military context. The goal of this approach is to improve the SAMS graduate ability to communicate with operational commanders. The practical exercises that are incorporated into the courseware enable the student officer to use the ideas, concepts, and models to enhance their understanding of how they can apply them to military planning.

The first module consists of three lessons that examine the current Army doctrine on planning and the Army design methodology. Secondary readings provide the student officers with the context in which the Army design methodology evolved following its introduction in 2005, how the Army design methodology fits into Army planning, and how the design and operational art are used as part of Army planning. Underpinning the introductory module is a military historical case—T.E. Lawrence in World War I—that illustrates some of the key concepts of the Army design methodology. The student officer is introduced to the concept of “applied practitioner” as a reminder that the outcomes of their planning results in action, most often involving the lives of others. Several models are introduced to help the student officers understand how to develop a better understanding of the operational environment and the problems associated with unfamiliar problems. These models supplement the existing tools and models in current Army and Joint doctrine.

The module concludes with a lesson on what strategic leaders do, based on current Army leadership doctrine. Additionally, student officers are provided with theoretical tools that can assist them as future planners working in large organizations. For many of the SAMS graduates this will be the first time they have served at headquarters above the battalion and brigade level. Throughout the week, the students are challenged to apply the doctrine and concepts to assess the T.E. Lawrence case study, providing them with the first of seven opportunities to practice the Army design methodology.

The second module also consists of three lessons that focus on analyzing and explaining the operational environment. Once again, a military historical case—Prussia 1806 to 1813—is used as a guide to illustrate how a military leader developed an understanding of the operational environment and developed a narrative that guided change in military organization. The majority of the modules’ readings focus on how a well-constructed narrative helps explain an unfamiliar or complex situation. Although the models and tools for analyzing an operational environment are familiar and useful for most military planners, the emphasis on narrative development enhances the SAMS graduates’ ability to communicate effectively with operational commanders. Like the first module, the students are challenged with applying the concepts and ideas to the military historical case, specifically their ability to analyze and explain the operational environment.

The third module consists of four lessons that emphasize how to analyze, develop, and explain an operational military problem. Two historical cases are used to illustrate military organizations that failed to understand the operational problem. The first historical case is the Allied search for the V1
and V2 rockets during World War II. The second historical case is the United Nations military intervention during the siege of Sarajevo, Bosnia, in the early 1990s. Several secondary sources provide complementary ideas about how to understand complexity and military failures. Together, the ideas presented provide the student officers with conceptual models to better understand and anticipate military problems. Student officers use the military historical cases to continue their practice of applying the Army design methodology, specifically their ability to analyze, develop, and explain an operational military problem.

The fourth module is composed of three lessons that examine how to analyze, develop, and explain a new operational approach. Using Field Marshall William Slim’s experience as a Corps and Army level commander in Burma from 1942 to 1945 illustrates how an operational commander creates a new operational approach to solve a difficult military problem. The module links the Army design methodology to operational art, specifically with focused study of the elements of operational design, center of gravity, and center of gravity analysis. The military historical case allows student officers to examine how Slim created a new operational approach based on his understanding of the operational environment. More specifically, the historical cases highlights how Slim created a new narrative to help him explain not only the problem, but also how he intended to implement his new operational approach. Throughout this module, student officers are challenged to apply the Army design methodology to the military historical case.

The final module covers two weeks and consists of five lessons that allow the student officers to practice using the Army design methodology. Once again, two military historical cases are used to illustrate the key concepts of the Army design methodology. The first historical case is the U.S. Army’s transition to the all-volunteer force between 1968 and 1973. The second historical case is General Abrams in Vietnam between 1968 and 1971. Both cases illustrate how a military organization or military commander changed operational approach based on a change in the strategic context. Secondary readings complement the case studies by introducing the student officers to some ideas and concepts about critical and creative thinking, complex adaptive systems, chaos theory, and systems theory. Student officers apply all of the course material to analyzing and explaining the operational environment; analyzing, developing, and explaining an operational military problem; and developing and explaining a new operational approach within the two historical cases.

Practical Application

A two-week exercise follows the eight weeks of coursework. The practical exercise introduces student officers to an unfamiliar and complex situation. The students are placed into military organizations and positions that require them to analyze and explain the operational environment; analyze, develop, and explain an operational military problem; and develop and explain a new operational approach. Exercises rely on a variety of scenarios, most place the students within a joint task force headquarters or a combatant command. Often the practical exercise includes scenario injects that are a catalyst for reframing. The goal of the practical exercise is to allow the student officers to apply the doctrine, theory, models, and concepts from the coursework to creating a new operational approach.

As the Army design doctrine evolved, so has the SAMS design curriculum. To remain consistent with current Army doctrine, the SAMS design curriculum has been adjusted in an effort to remain relevant with the operational army, improve the student officers’ understanding of the Army design methodology, and improve communication between the SAMS graduate and the operational commander. Although some of the course material introduced between 2008 and 2010 remains, the addition of the historical cases provides a military example to illustrate the key concepts of the Army design methodology. The recent update to Army doctrine enabled the updates to the SAMS design curriculum to align with the concepts of Unified Land Operations and integrated planning. As the Army and joint community receive feedback from the operational force and continue to learn about design, SAMS will continue to evolve its design curriculum to serve the operational commander better.
DESIGN

NOTES

A More Flexible Army and a More Stable World

First Lieutenant George W. Runkle IV, U.S. Army

THE NATION’S CURRENT obsession with budget austerity along with the redeployment of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan is leading us to a more fiscally constrained environment and a desire to dramatically cut the end-strength of our Army. In addition, the nation’s policy of a “Pacific pivot” is facing constraints based on the reality of the situation in Africa. Recent journal articles have discussed the flexibility and cost-effectiveness of a cyclic-based as opposed to a tier-based deployment model for long-term commitments.

The cyclic model (known as the Army Force Generation, or ARFORGEN model) allows units recently returned from deployment to turn in their equipment to other units (so they can deploy more quickly) and saves the Army large amounts of money on equipment costs. The traditional tier-based deployment model, in which forces expected to deploy quicker receive more funding than other forces, relegates the Army National Guard fewer resources, and limits it to an unused strategic reserve force (as was the case throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s). Of these two models, the tier-based deployment model costs significantly less but is not able to effectively support long-term commitments.

Since 2001, the National Guard has made it known that it will not allow itself to return to being an underfunded strategic reserve force. Their lobbying efforts have recently gained a seat at the table of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The establishment of a National Guard position on the Joint Chiefs should eliminate any vestigial beliefs that the Army can significantly decrease National Guard funding.

Meanwhile, as the war in Iraq has ended and the war in Afghanistan is in its closing stages, the issue of what our Army should train for has arisen. Typically phrased as “fighting the last war,” the question is whether or not the training of our forces and our doctrine should focus on counterinsurgency...
or high-intensity conflicts. The Army’s budgetary limits are central to the debates on training strategy and the feasibility of the ARFORGEN model.

The advantages and disadvantages of both a purely tier-based and a purely cyclic-based deployment model have been addressed in other articles. I am proposing a third approach, dedicating all Army National Guard brigade combat teams (but not maneuver enhancement brigades) to an enduring cyclic-based deployment model focused solely on low-intensity conflict. Such a move would entail splitting the Active Component’s brigades into a hybrid deployment model, blending principles of the tier- and cyclical-deployment philosophies. The Active Component would be comprised of two groups of brigade combat teams. One group would be 10 brigade combat teams focused solely on low-intensity conflict: three infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) and seven Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs). The other group of 26 IBCTs and armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) would be devoted only to high-intensity conflicts.

The Active Component’s low-intensity conflict brigades (normally, the 1st BCT of each division) would work on a tier-based model as expeditionary brigades immediately deploying, regardless of whether a conflict was high-intensity or low. (See below for their role in a high-intensity conflict). Once mobilization and movement of Army National Guard brigades was complete, the Army National Guard’s low-intensity conflict brigades would either relieve or supplement the Active Component brigades, based on the projected time-length and scope of the mission. For example, in situations such as humanitarian relief, the Active Component brigades would return to home station immediately, whereas in a situation such as Iraq after the opening stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, they would remain in theater and continue operations until relieved by another brigade in a cyclical fashion. Finally, this plan allows for 9 brigades of the Active Component would be inactivated, leaving 36 brigade combat teams in the Active Component.

In this model, each of the Army’s ten deployable divisions would include one low-intensity conflict brigade and two high-intensity conflict brigades (with the exception of the 2d and the 25th Infantry Divisions). The 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular Army:</th>
<th>Army National Guard:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st BCTs of 1st ID, 2d ID, 3d ID, 4th ID, 25th ID, 1st Cav, and 1st Armored Divisions—SBCT devoted to COIN, Low-Intensity Conflict; on a cyclic deployment model.</td>
<td>BCTs and Infantry Divisions—mixture of SBCT and IBCTs trained specifically for low-intensity and COIN missions. All HBCT equipment (M1, M2, etc.) returned to the Active Component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remainder of brigades—IBCT/HBCT brigades on a cyclic deployment model and trained for HIC; 4th BCT of most divisions inactivated (9 brigades inactivated total).</td>
<td>Units on cycle to deploy for 1 full year in every 5 (but can additionally deploy up to 30 days a year overseas during 2 of the remaining 4 years).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade of 10th Mountain Div, 82d Abn Div, and 101st Abn Div—Low intensity conflict and on rotation to react world wide within 96 hours. Not equipped with Stryker vehicles.</td>
<td>116th and 278th Cavalry Regiments—SBCT regiments, partnered with active duty cavalry regiments and on cyclic rotation as strategic reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d &amp; 3d Cavalry Regiments—Each designate squadrons to concentrate on HIC and on LiC on cyclic rotation as strategic reserve.</td>
<td>U.S. Reserve, Army Special Operations Forces 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment—remain unchanged</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Figure 1**  
Concept of Organization
would retain four brigades in a 1:3 setup of low-intensity conflict brigades to high-intensity conflict brigades. The Army’s two Stryker-equipped Cavalry Regiments (2d and 3d Cavalry Regiments) would designate two of their squadrons each for high-intensity conflict and two squadrons for low-intensity conflict. The 2d Cavalry Regiment and 3d Cavalry Regiment would then become a part of the Army’s strategic reserve, with one of the two regiments always ready to deploy within 96 hours (again, a cyclical rotation) to provide heavier, motorized support to the 82d Airborne Division. The special operations community, Army maneuver enhancement brigades, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment would not be affected by these changes. This approach allows the Army greater flexibility by giving it the ability to quickly deploy properly trained forces for both high-intensity and low-intensity conflicts in every probable region of conflict in the world. In addition, it gives Army National Guard units a unique opportunity to conduct worldwide training year round and a significant, highly visible mission. It also enables the Army to embrace the use of cultural awareness training, rather than continuing to give haphazard training to a unit right before deployment.

Finally, and perhaps most pertinent in today’s tight budgets, this model presents a strategy where the Army can remain relevant and increase its combat capability despite inactivating nine brigade combat teams.

The Role of the Active Component

In this model (Figure 1), the 1st brigade combat team of every division in the Army is exclusively tasked with training for and conducting low-intensity conflict missions. These ten brigades, with the exception of the three assigned to the 10th Mountain Division, 82d Airborne Division, and 101st Airborne Division, would become SBCTs. Although all of these brigades could (and should) be deployed worldwide to support Army low-intensity conflict operations, each would receive tailored cultural and language training to a specific geographic area of responsibility where there is a strong likelihood of conflict (Figure 2). In time of low-intensity conflict or a need for humanitarian assistance, the brigade with the cultural focus for that area will be the first to deploy.

In the event of high-intensity conflict, the role of providing the initial heavy forces would fall on the parent divisions of those low-intensity conflict brigades that have received in-depth cultural awareness training for that geographic area. For example, in case of high-intensity conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the 2d Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division would be immediately committed; in case of a high-intensity conflict with Iran, the 1st Cavalry Division and 1st Armored Division would be the first heavy forces deployed.

We may expect warfare in the future to consist of a short-linear-high-intensity conflict followed by a longer, nonlinear, low-intensity conflict using a hybrid variety of modern, high technology weapons and simple, homemade explosives. In this model, the single low-intensity conflict brigade is vital to ensuring that the vacuum caused by the fall of the enemy and the forward movement of Army high-intensity conflict brigades does not result in chaos or an insurgency. In the areas where major enemy forces have been cleared (but remain in other areas of the country), the low-intensity conflict brigades would also be responsible for maintaining lines of communication, beginning the reconstruction process (handling humanitarian issues, restoring infrastructure, etc.), and fully securing an area once it has been cleared of organized enemy resistance.

A Brigade in Guam?

On their own, the inactivation of nine brigades, the reconfiguration of 10 brigades, or a shift in focus away from Europe would cause monumental changes to the Army’s force structure. Taken together, they represent the largest change in size and scope of the Army since it shrank from 18 divisions to 10.

To an Army veteran, perhaps the most striking of these changes is the movement of an infantry brigade from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to Guam. The movement of this brigade serves five purposes:

- A credible deterrent force is trained in high-intensity conflict to quickly react to any incident in the Spratley Islands, Indonesia, or the Indian
Ocean (thanks to its IBCT configuration and co-location with Air Force and Navy facilities).

- A flexible reserve is able to quickly augment forces in Korea without being vulnerable to a surprise first strike.
- Credible protection is provided of vital U.S. military assets that deploy on a regular basis to Guam, including U.S. Navy vessels and U.S. Air Force bombers.
- The ability to quickly augment and reinforce U.S. Marines moving from Okinawa to Guam is provided, should they be required to conduct a contingency operation elsewhere.
- Partnership between U.S. forces and Asian militaries, especially China is encouraged by making U.S. forces closer and more accessible to Asian militaries.

Although Guam would see increased crowding, especially with the increased number of Marines moving from Okinawa, the island is the only practical option. As the largest American territory in the Western Pacific, Guam does not require the same diplomatic preparations required in the improbable return of U.S. forces to Okinawa or the Philippines. As for maneuver training, locating a brigade in Guam is really no different than the current placement of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy.

A Redesigned SBCT

The Stryker is an excellent weapon for low-intensity conflicts, especially in urban areas or when there is a lower risk of mines or antitank weapons. As such, low-intensity conflict brigades in the Active Component that are not airborne, mountain, or air assault should be equipped with Strykers. The inherent modularity of the Stryker family allows commanders flexibility in terms of firepower and capabilities—ranging from the mobile gun system (MGS) to the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance vehicle—that low-intensity conflict requires. In addition, the use of Strykers to outfit the majority of the Army National Guard brigades means that logistics and transportation are greatly simplified for prolonged low-intensity conflicts.

Once the Active Component’s high-intensity conflict brigades have redeployed (assuming they deployed at all), all Army forces in an operation would have the same types and quantities of vehicles. This is especially important because of the Army’s habit of attaching brigades from multiple divisions to one single division headquarters and attaching battalions from multiple brigades to a single brigade without taking into consideration whether the brigade is equipped to support those units (i.e., assigning tank battalions to an IBCT).

However, the change in focus for the SBCT means that some changes would have to be made to the organization of the SBCT (Figure 2). Four changes are proposed:

- The addition of a five-company civil affairs battalion to the brigade, with each company in it permanently dedicated to support a specific battalion in the brigade.
- The removal of the Mobile Gun System platoons from the infantry companies to consolidate the nine M1128 MGS vehicles at the squadron level (in headquarters and headquarters company). This would allow the squadron commander better flexibility in using the vehicle’s firepower and optics capabilities to cover areas that are not well covered by infantry units or to give the MGS platoon a larger battle space that takes advantage of the vehicle’s capabilities (i.e., highways).
- Increase the number of M117 Guardian armored security vehicles in the brigade from 6 to 12.
- The addition of an Army National Guard field-grade liaison officer, branch immaterial, Active Guard and Reserve Title 10, at the brigade staff level to coordinate combined training between Active Component and Reserve Component Stryker units during peacetime.

Although current doctrine stipulates that individual Civil Affairs branch companies support individual brigades, reconfiguring the companies to support individual battalions instead would give battalion commanders, often operating in their own autonomous battle space, greater capabilities to stabilize their areas of operation. These Civil Affairs battalions would only be assigned to the Stryker brigade combat teams; the low-intensity conflict IBCTs of the 10th Mountain Division, 82d Airborne Division, and 101st Airborne Division would receive dedicated civil affairs augmentation from the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
The Role of the Army National Guard

As of 2013, the Army National Guard is comprised of 28 brigade combat teams, organized into 8 divisions and divided into one SBCT, 7 ABCTs, and 20 IBCTs. The ABCTs, with their parent divisions noted in parentheses, are:

- 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (34th Infantry Division)-Minnesota. 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team-North Carolina.
- 55th Armored Brigade Combat Team (28th Infantry Division)-Pennsylvania.
- 81st Armored Brigade Combat Team (28th Infantry Division)-Washington/Oregon.
- 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team-Idaho.
- 155th Armored Brigade Combat Team-Mississippi.
- 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment-Tennessee.

In the proposed model, all of the Army National Guard’s heavy brigades would transition to a Stryker brigade combat team configuration (although they would lack the civil affairs battalion assigned to the Active Component). With the exception of the 116th Cavalry Brigade and the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, all of the Army National Guard’s brigades would focus on low-intensity conflict and follow the current five-year deployment rotation, where the brigade deploys one year of every five. The current designations of the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team and the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment would change to the 116th Cavalry Regiment and the 278th Cavalry Regiment, respectively.

The 5-Year Cycle of an Army National Guard Brigade

In an Army National Guard brigade’s cycle, their annual trainings would be structured based on the number of years since the last deployment of the brigade. Annual training would be restricted for the first two years following a deployment to two weeks in the continental United States (deploying as a battalion to rebuild individual

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**Figure 2**

Current SBCT Organization
### Force Structure

#### Proposed Active Component Force Structure. Net Loss: 9 Active Component Brigades inactivated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>No change in location, squadrons divide focus between high and low-intensity conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>Becomes SBCT, personnel remain at Fort Knox, KY and brigade becomes 1st SBCT, 1st ID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Armored Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th ABCT</td>
<td>Inactivate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172d ABCT</td>
<td>Inactivate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Airborne BCT</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>Equipment and personnel remain at Fort Riley, KS and brigade re-flagged as 3d ABCT, 1st ID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>Remains at Fort Riley as ABCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>Becomes SBCT, personnel remain at Fort Knox, KY and brigade becomes 1st SBCT, 1st ID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>Inactivate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>Reconfigures as SBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>Remains ABCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>Reconfigures to ABCT formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division</td>
<td>Reconfigures as SBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division</td>
<td>Remains ABCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division</td>
<td>Remains ABCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division</td>
<td>Inactivate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 2d Infantry Division</td>
<td>Reflags as 2d ABCT, 2d Infantry Division and remains in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division</td>
<td>Reflags as 1st SBCT, 2d Infantry Division and remains at Fort Lewis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division</td>
<td>Becomes IBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division</td>
<td>Becomes ABCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division</td>
<td>Converts to SBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division</td>
<td>Remains ABCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division</td>
<td>Converts to IBCT, moves to Fort Stewart, GA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Brigade, 3d Infantry Division</td>
<td>Inactivate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Converts to SBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Converts to IBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Converts to IBCT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and collective tasks). The annual trainings of years three and four would be brigade-level, month-long deployments for training outside of the United States. Deployments outside of the United States would function as miniature mission-readiness exercises, concentrating on partnership with coalition nations and various aspects of the spectrum of low-intensity conflict—counterinsurgency, stability operations, operations other than war. In addition, one or both of these two 30-day deployments could be to areas of the world where the U.S. military commonly participates in humanitarian projects and where the potential for a low-intensity conflict to erupt is the highest—Central America, Southeast Asia, and other strategically important loci for American interests.

Deploying Army National Guard brigades to potential flashpoints for month-long, real-world training and to Europe to train with coalition partners for low-intensity conflict operations would successfully counter future low-intensity conflicts and sustain the Army’s presence in Europe after the inactivation of the 170th and 172d Brigade Combat Teams.

During a brigade’s fifth year of a cycle (i.e., the deployment year), it does not necessarily have to deploy for the entire year. During this year, a brigade would be available for a rotation in a long-term operation (i.e. Operation Enduring Freedom), and on first call (to deploy within three weeks) to join the Active Component’s brigades in response to unforeseen low-intensity conflicts and emergency humanitarian situations (e.g., the 1994 intervention in Haiti, the 2011 Japanese earthquake, and the like). At this point in the deployment cycle, the 116th Cavalry Regiment and the 278th Cavalry Regiment differ from other Army National Guard brigades. The 116th and 278th would be task-organized similar to the 2d Cavalry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade, Division, Division</th>
<th>Action/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Inactivate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division</td>
<td>Focuses training on low-intensity conflict and COIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division</td>
<td>Remains IBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division</td>
<td>Remains IBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Division</td>
<td>Inactivate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Remains at Fort Wainwright, AK and focuses training on COIN and low-intensity conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Remains IBCT, moves to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Remains at Schofield Barracks with Division HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Remains at Fort Richardson, Alaska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 82d Airborne</td>
<td>Division Focuses training on low-intensity conflict and COIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division</td>
<td>Remains IBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Remains IBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Brigade, 82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>Inactivate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division</td>
<td>Focuses training on low-intensity conflict and COIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division</td>
<td>Remains IBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division</td>
<td>Remains IBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Brigade, 101st Airborne Division</td>
<td>Inactivate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division</td>
<td>Focuses training on low-intensity conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division</td>
<td>Remains IBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division</td>
<td>Remains IBCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Division</td>
<td>Inactivate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regiment and the 3d Cavalry Regiment—i.e., with two squadrons devoted to high-intensity conflict and two to low-intensity conflict. In addition, as strategic reserve forces, the length and locations of these two regiments’ deployments would be more predictable. They could expect to spend the entire year of deployment forward near the projected future high-intensity conflict (e.g., Korea or the Middle East) or someplace that would allow quick movement to a low-intensity conflict (e.g., Germany or Guam).

Like Active Component brigades, each Army National Guard brigade would receive cultural training for a specific region of the world. However, the training would not be binding and would be a “best case scenario” situation. Thus, despite having trained on the cultures and languages of South America, a brigade could still deploy to Central Asia during its deployment year, if the situation dictated it.

The eight division headquarters currently in the Army National Guard would mirror the Active Component’s divisional headquarters in purpose and organization with one difference: in states where both a division headquarters and a State Troop Command exist, the two headquarters would consolidate under the divisional headquarters.

**Fully Equipped Units**

The author formerly served as a platoon leader in a MGS (M1127) platoon of a cavalry squadron. Doctrinally, the platoon was supposed to be equipped with three M1127 vehicles. In reality, the platoon had one M1126 Infantry Combat Vehicle and one M1127 MGS. None of the regiment’s mobile gun system platoons had more than one M1127. This disparity between doctrine and reality is the inevitable result of poor management of equipment at the strategic level and a reluctance to demand industrial capacity to meet requirements. Specifying that each division has only one Stryker brigade will ensure that these brigades receive their full and proper equipment, because division commanders will not be forced to distribute their Strykers as equally as possible. Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (Current ABCTs are listed as SBCTs)</th>
<th>From States</th>
<th>Cultural Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28th ID (2d IBCT, 53d IBCT, 55th SBCT, and 56th SBCT) and 42d ID (27th IBCT, 50th IBCT, and 86th IBCT)</td>
<td>Florida, Maine, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont</td>
<td>Central Asia and Middle East (tactical focus on mountain operations, taking the lead from the 86th IBCT, Vermont ARNG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th ID (30th SBCT and 116th IBCT), 34th ID (1st SBCT, 2d IBCT, 32d IBCT), and 35th ID (33d IBCT, 39th IBCT, 48th IBCT)</td>
<td>Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, Virginia</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th ID (45th IBCT, 56th IBCT, 72d IBCT, 155th SBCT, 256th BCT)</td>
<td>Oklahoma, Texas, Mississippi, Louisiana</td>
<td>Central/South America, Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38th ID (37th IBCT, and 76th IBCT)</td>
<td>Indiana, Michigan, Ohio</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th ID (29th IBCT, 41st IBCT, 79th IBCT, 81st SBCT)</td>
<td>California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington</td>
<td>Pacific Rim (heavy emphasis on Korean peninsula)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4*

**Cultural Focus of Army National Guard Brigades**
having one Stryker brigade per division will also allow more visibility at the G-3 and G-4 level as to the readiness of Stryker brigades. The transfer of M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradleys from the Army National Guard to the Active Component and the cancellation of Foreign Military Sales of the M1 Abrams to Iraq will allow our ABCTs to be fully equipped as well, while ensuring adequate reserve stocks of vehicles both in forward areas and in the United States.

Relevant Cultural Training

The tailoring of brigades to geographical areas means that the Army will be able to conduct appropriate cultural training, including a serious investment in language skills, ahead of time. Although unforeseen events will still happen, we will be better off than where we are now where units receive hastily prepared and conducted cultural training (if any, at all).

In this model, perhaps the best cultural training units will receive real-world experience. As Bernard Brodie wrote shortly after the end of World War II, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to prevent them.” Although he was writing about the importance of deterrence to prevent nuclear holocaust, these words are as appropriate today as they were in 1946. Unencumbered by heavy equipment, the low-intensity conflict brigades will be able to deploy to austere and previously unvisited locations to conduct multinational training and partnership exercises. These exercises would ensure that the U.S. Army is in a position to mentor other nation’s militaries against violations of international law.

Cost

Adopting this proposed model of organization, with the inherent inactivation of nine brigade combat teams, would actually make the Army’s forces better equipped and stronger while reducing overall costs.

The most significant cost benefit that comes out of this model is the reduced training costs for the Army National Guard, while actually increasing the quality of training for those units. Currently, Army National Guard units with heavy equipment (Bradleys, Abrams, etc.) cannot actually conduct training with their equipment on normal drill weekends. To conduct maneuver or weapons training, they must use four-day drill weekends to travel long distances (sometimes up to eight hours) to the nearest state or federal military reservation (where the equipment is stored and where land exists to train with). The large amount of resources required for even a company to conduct training therefore means that platoon and company-level training does not occur on a regular basis. Any training in a National Guard armored brigade combat team that involves the vehicles inevitably becomes a battalion or brigade-level training event. In addition, the impracticality of moving the vehicles for a two-week or even month-long training event means that Army National Guard heavy brigades are forced to train in the same location every year and do not enjoy the benefits that come from partnered training outside of the continental United States.

The 48th Brigade Combat Team of the Georgia Army National Guard is a prime example of the benefits of converting Army National Guard heavy brigades to infantry brigades.

The 48th Brigade Combat Team of the Georgia Army National Guard is a prime example of the benefits of converting Army National Guard heavy brigades to infantry brigades. The 48th was a mechanized brigade from the early 1980s until 2006, with its equipment (M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley vehicles) permanently located at Fort Stewart, Georgia. During this time, the brigade’s primary maneuver battalions never conducted an annual training exercise outside of the state of Georgia. In addition, because of the timetable required for the various gunnery tables and maintenance of their vehicles, annual training took place during the same six-week window every year. Following the brigade’s deployment to Iraq in 2005-2006, the brigade transitioned from an armored brigade combat team to an infantry brigade combat team. The following year, the brigade sent each of its maneuver battalions to train concurrently
in separate states, allowing the brigade command element a unique command and control training opportunity. In 2008, the brigade sent a battalion to the Republic of Georgia to conduct training with a NATO partner nation and the U.S. Army’s Southern European Task Force from Vicenza, Italy. In 2009, the brigade rotated units on annual training at various times throughout the year, this time to Germany and various locations in the United States. These annual training events allowed the brigade’s soldiers exposure to working with NATO partners and to face the unique training challenges that simply do not occur when a unit trains at the same place, at the same time, every year for over 20 years. Unquestionably, the experiences the brigade gained from 2007-2009 facilitated the success of the brigade during its deployment to Afghanistan in 2009-2010.

**Consolidating Equipment**

The reduction of armored brigade combat teams and consolidation of forces allows for a consolidation of equipment that is or will be in storage. Based on cost estimates from the Army’s Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, the author recommends that armored brigade combat team equipment sets not used to outfit specific brigades be stored at two installations to support U.S. Army armored brigade combat teams deployed in conflict. Those installations are Fort Hunter, Liggett, California, which is currently the largest U.S. Army Reserve post in the nation and Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, which is an exceptionally large post that is not home to any permanently based maneuver units. These installations are both located near a plethora of suitable Naval ports for the movement of equipment by ship and U.S. Air Force installations large enough to accommodate larger cargo aircraft such as the C-5 *Galaxy* and Antonov AN-124. This consolidation would not be something new to the Army, as it occurred in Germany during the Cold War and in Qatar and Kuwait during the 1990s.

With support from the U.S. Army’s Surface Distribution and Deployment Command, the following cost estimates for the movement of equipment between

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade Type</th>
<th>Storage Location/ CONUS Staging Site</th>
<th>Overseas Staging Site</th>
<th>Cost (Millions of Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SBCT</td>
<td>Hampton Roads, VA (CONUS Sea Port of Embarkation)</td>
<td>Rota Naval Station, Spain</td>
<td>$10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCT</td>
<td>Fort Stewart, GA</td>
<td>Kuwait (Port Codes PN1, PN2, or PN4)</td>
<td>$17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCT</td>
<td>Fort Hunter Liggett, CA</td>
<td>Korea (Port Codes UDC, UDM, or UD6)</td>
<td>$10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCT</td>
<td>Yakima Training Center, WA</td>
<td>Korea (Port Codes UDC, UDM, or UD6)</td>
<td>$12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCT</td>
<td>Fort A.P. Hill, VA</td>
<td>Kuwait (Port Codes PN1, PN2, or PN4)</td>
<td>$17.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5**

Cost to Transfer Equipment from Storage to Staging Site
the continental United States and overseas locations have been developed.\(^3\) These estimates are based on the assumption that economy (frugality) is the most important factor in the movement of equipment, not speed. Vehicle types and quantities that were used to calculate these costs are based on FKSM 71-8, “Armor/Cavalry Reference Data: brigade combat teams” (May 2010, U.S. Army Armor Center), and may vary from the actual quantities and types of vehicles a brigade possesses. Due to a lack of published data, quantities for MRAP-type vehicles could not be determined. Figure 5 should be used only for general planning purposes, as actual costs vary.

**Drawbacks**

Any informed reader will clearly identify that the cost of moving equipment and retraining personnel (in the case of Army National Guard personnel) are substantial hurdles to this plan. However, we must ask what is better. Spending a large sum now to ensure that our forces are properly equipped and prepared to conduct likely operations, or spending an even larger sum later (and in a rush), because our forces are not equipped or trained to conduct the operations the Army is already being called on to conduct?

With support from the U.S. Army’s Surface Distribution and Deployment Command, the following cost estimate for the movement of equipment between the continental United States and overseas locations have been developed.\(^4\)

One fiscal drawback that might also be a benefit is the need for increased production of Stryker and MRAP vehicles. Due to the need of both the Active and Reserve Components to equip more brigades with Strykers, production would have to be increased on a phenomenal scale. At this time, all Strykers are produced for the Army in Ontario, Canada. Owing to the overall low number of Strykers that have been built, brigades scheduled to become SBCTs in this proposed model would have to become IBCTs in the interim while awaiting their vehicles. Conversion to the IBCT configuration before becoming an SBCT will allow them to train for their wartime mission without interruption, because the Stryker (unlike a tank in an ABCT) is simply a platform to facilitate the mission.

Due to the nature of the Army National Guard, its existing unit structure, and the number of battalions required, it is impossible to assign Civil Affairs battalions permanently to every Army National Guard SBCT. As a solution to this, Army National Guard brigades should foster training relationships with Army Reserve civil affairs battalions so that Army National Guard brigades may gain competency at working with and employing Civil Affairs units. Army National Guard Stryker brigades would then receive the doctrinally mandated civil affairs battalions during mobilization, although infantry brigade combat teams would not necessarily receive formally attached civil affairs battalions.

**The Model**

The proposed model is a strategy to accomplish the goals of repositioning U.S. Army forces toward post-Cold War hot spots, reducing the size of the Army, ensuring a continued forward presence, and remaining the most proficient Army in the world in both high-intensity and low-intensity conflicts. The model allows reserve units an opportunity to retain a one-in-five deployment schedule while also giving Active Component personnel a more stable dwell time because brigades focused on high-intensity conflict will deploy less often than those focused on low-intensity conflict. While it would be a great effort in terms of logistics and cost, it also presents the opportunities for great benefits—increased industrial capacity, a firm and consistent approach by the Army to partnership and low-intensity conflict, and a viable strategy to make good on the Army’s claim that it has total dominance on the battlefield. *MR*

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NOTES

1. For the purposes of this article, low-intensity conflict operations include, but are not limited to antiterrorism operations, counterinsurgency, force protection, humanitarian assistance, advising and assistance to foreign militaries, stability operations, and other types of civil-military operations. High-intensity conflict operations include force-on-force activities against organized, well-equipped state and non-state actors (i.e., Hezbollah, North Korea, etc.) and are characterized by operations similar to the first two months of Operation Iraqi Freedom.


3. U.S. Army SDDC Business Integration Branch Cost estimate number 12347. Special thanks to the U.S. Army Surface Distribution and Deployment Command, especially the Business Integration Branch and Mr. Richard Cody, Ms. Dora Elias, Ms. Diana Johnson, Mr. Charles Morgan, Ms. Sharon Thomas, and Mr. Johnnie Woods III.

4. Ibid.
At first, the obvious question concerning the role women will play in the U.S. Army in the next 20 years is, “When will we gender integrate the combat arms—Infantry, Armor and Field Artillery?” Surely all soldiers should have the widest possible opportunities to pursue the most demanding and critical jobs in the U.S. Army. These jobs exist to manage and apply violence upon the nation’s enemies, “to kill people and break things,” as an infantryman might put it. Haven’t nearly 40 years of experience, and particularly the last decade of enduring combat operations, validated the fact that women have served successfully in every branch and military occupational specialty (MOS) open to them?

Considering the problem of gender integration from this perspective, one sees there is no substantive difference in performing required tasks to their standards between equally trained and duty-qualified male and female soldiers. If the vast majority of MOSs are equivalent, why should the combat arms be different?

But what if the obvious question and its obvious solution are just a little too simple? Considered further, a deeper and more complex question emerges: Are there specific benefits to fully integrating women into the combat arms? Does integrating women into the combat arms serve as a combat multiplier, (achieving a measurable and predictable increase in combat power)? Does the war fighting capability of each branch of the combat arms becomes greater than the sum of their individual parts? And as we ask these questions, we must acknowledge that valid reasons exist for maintaining the existing ban against women in the combat arms. The justification for maintaining the ban is that male soldiers provide a predictable measure of superiority in their roles. Using the same logic, if female soldiers are demonstrably more effective in specific roles and missions, if their employment serves as a combat multiplier, would not it make sense to increase their use in such roles?

SGT Francis I. Fonseca, a combat medic with Charlie Company, 703d Brigade Support Battalion, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, fires an M4 carbine weapon, during an advanced marksmanship course at Fort Stewart, GA, 21 February 2012. (U.S. Army, SSG Tanya Thomas)
As members of the profession of arms, we must objectively and dispassionately consider how best to improve the practice of our profession. Romantic or emotional attachment to tradition must not prevent us from doing what is best to prepare the force to achieve victory at the lowest cost in blood. If female and male soldiers are equivalent in all aspects, then the Army will be improved by opening the combat arms to women. So, too, if there are substantive differences between men and women as groups, then those differences ought to be recognized and exploited.

This essay proposes the hypothesis that women as a group tend to have abilities and capacities that make them more effective than men in certain tactical situations. If so, the profession of arms must take full advantage of such capabilities as a combat multiplier.

Context
This hypothesis relies on three sets of assumptions regarding the—

- Threat environment the U.S. Army will face in the next 20 years.
- Nature and character of the All Volunteer Force (AVF).
- Unique differences between women and men as groups.

The assumptions frame the question and provide a “common operating picture” for discussion.

Assumption one. The global threat environment will be complex and multi-polar, characterized by low- and medium-intensity conflict (L/MIC) asymmetric warfare waged by conventional and irregular forces. The center of gravity in such conflict consists of communities and population centers. The mission is to control them over time (measured in years), instead of engaging in high-intensity battles with other conventional forces for short periods (weeks or months).

A war of sequential battles and campaigns, culminating in victory or unambiguous defeat, may well still occur in the near future, but it is unlikely. Few adversaries have the means to pursue such a conventional war-fighting capability. Those that do—China and perhaps India—do not share our cultural concept of warfare. They are not enthusiastic about expeditionary power-projection beyond their traditional homeland frontiers. A host of regional-level players, like Russia, Turkey, and Iran represent significant conventional threats in their neighborhoods, but lack the natural and economic resources or population to project power globally. The influence such states can exert also depends on their relationship with international organizations (such as the African Union or the Arab League). In addition, significant transnational and nonstate actors (Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Peru’s Shining Path are good examples) lack any significant conventional military capability but are nonetheless able to wage effective military and informational campaigns.

Such nonstate actors demonstrate that the techniques and tactics of asymmetric warfare can transcend any particular nation, ethnic group, or cultural tradition. The poorest of peoples can wage war using such methods, making creative use of materials and resources at hand and taking advantage of the passage of time to wear down an opponent seeking a quick, clean, and decisive victory.

Asymmetric warfare occurs predominantly within communities and population centers, as the combatants struggle to gain the active support of...
a significant portion of the uncommitted civilian population and the quiet acquiescence of the rest.\textsuperscript{4} The side that best controls the civilian populace will eventually achieve victory. The key to controlling civilian communities are effective information gathering, building and maintaining operational credibility, and enhanced force protection.\textsuperscript{5}

The U.S. Army has more years of combat experience in asymmetric warfare in the last 12 years than in all the conventional, high-intensity battles of the last century combined.\textsuperscript{6} Other than Operation Desert Storm (1991) and the initial campaign of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003), all U.S. Army combat operations since 1953 have been (and continue to be) in low- and medium-intensity asymmetric conflicts. This reality alone argues that such conflict will continue to be the most likely (if not the most dangerous) threat the U.S. Army will face.

Assumption two. The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) has been thoroughly validated as being able to meet the personnel needs of the U.S. Army. No prospective return to conscription is likely in the absence of any existential military threat. The success of the AVF is dependent upon getting the best possible benefit from the civilian population base.

The All-Volunteer Force was instituted in 1973. Within five years of the end of conscription, women were fully integrated into the U.S. Army with the abolition of the Women’s Army Corps.\textsuperscript{7} Since that time, the Army has successfully completed four significant strategic realignment and reorganizations (the post-Vietnam era, the Reagan Cold War build-up, the post-Desert Shield/Desert Storm draw-down, and the Global War on Terrorism build-up.) More importantly, in spite of strategic failures, the Army has achieved success in low-, medium-, and high-intensity combat operations against enemy forces of various sizes and compositions. During this 40-year span, there has been no significant data to indicate that the AVF, and the women who serve as soldiers, have been less than fully capable to meet the demands expected.

The U.S. Army’s first significant experience with female soldiers as a fully integrated element of the total force (the Regular Army and the Reserve Components) was during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. Research conducted after the war revealed that soldiers had a “generally positive assessment” regarding male and female duty performance, “identifying no significant differences between the genders other than physical strength capabilities.”\textsuperscript{8} These data were drawn from combat support and combat service support units operating as far forward as Department of Defense policy would allow women to operate. These included medical, military police (MP), aviation, and logistics units.\textsuperscript{9}

During the last 11 to 12-plus years of enduring conflict, we have further validated early data from the Persian Gulf War. For the 70 percent of Army occupational specialties open to either gender, no evidence exists that male and female soldiers are other than equivalent.\textsuperscript{10} Furthermore, the current ban on women serving in direct combat units below the level of brigade (in place since 1994) has largely been overcome by the reality of the low- and medium-intensity conflict environment. The linear battlefield of conventional operations simply doesn’t exist in the asymmetric battle space.\textsuperscript{11} The Army has continued to achieve success in battle, affirming the strength of the AVF and integration of women throughout the force.

In sum, operational evidence suggests that the AVF has met all demands and challenges successfully, providing no operational reasons for a return to conscription. Because women have demonstrated an equivalency to men as soldiers in some 70 percent of military occupational specialties and branches, they represent a significant pool of available recruits. As the AVF gets smaller in the coming years, women will fill a critical personnel-resourcing requirement by being available to serve in the very units and forces necessary for success in asymmetric warfare.

Assumption three. At this time, no compelling physiological evidence exists demonstrating that
women as a group meet the physical and psychological demands of deliberate close combat conditions in sufficient numbers to justify fully ending the existing ban on assigning them to all combat arms.

Army MOSs that remain closed are those whose primary functions involve direct application of violence and lethal force upon enemy forces. The U.S. Army’s cultural foundations, traditions, and self-image are within combat arms. This 30 percent carries the heaviest burdens of conventional warfare, which the other 70 percent sustain and support. Ground combat—closing with, capturing and destroying the enemy—is tough, hard, physically and mentally punishing work. In the years following the Persian Gulf War, the Army spent considerable time studying the physical differences between women and men with an eye to fully integrating women into the combat arms. The research substantiated that there are significant physical differences between the sexes:

- On average, women are five inches shorter, have 55 to 60 percent less upper body strength, a higher fat-to-muscle ratio, lower bone density, and 20 percent less aerobic capacity.
- A 1997 study to determine the effectiveness of adding an extra 8 hours per week of physical training for female soldiers demonstrated that after 14 weeks, 78 percent of participants could successfully achieve male-level standards but only to the minimum passing level.
- Women suffer twice the incidence rate of stress fractures during initial entry training.
- Female soldiers sustained injuries requiring hospitalization at a rate 10-times higher than male peers during advanced individual training.

Unlike other branches where the physical demands of tasks and work practices can be modified through team effort, the physical demands of sustained combat simply cannot be engineered or modified away. The inherent nature of close ground combat legitimately trumps the principal of equivalence. Introducing women into the combat arms as a general practice would do nothing to
improve the accomplishment of mission, and would increase risks to individual soldiers.

Furthermore, males are generally recognized to have a psychological predisposition to aggressive behavior—a predisposition that can be an advantage in tactical combat operations. Witness the common pattern of behavior demonstrated by boys and young men who tend to favor sports and recreations that have a high occurrence of violence and physical risk (e.g., football or boxing.) Even though such sports are open and available to girls and young women, relatively few avail themselves of the opportunity, most preferring to participate in sports and activities that encourage and emphasize athleticism and teamwork (e.g., soccer or volleyball).

Positive Indicators—Abilities and Capacities

Forty years of experience (including the last ten of persistent combat) have more than answered the question that women are fully equivalent as soldiers in the majority of Army operations. But based on physiological differences, it does not appear that integrating women into the combat arms would be a combat multiplier—that is, that a specific increase in combat power or effect would be achieved (to balance out the demonstrated increased risk of injury and resulting loss of manpower).

If the U.S. Army were only required to prepare for a conventional high-intensity conflict, the discussion might end there; however, as addressed above, the most likely threat the U.S. Army will face in the coming decades will not be the type of fight we configured combat arms to fight. Low- and medium-intensity asymmetric warfare is community- and population-based, requires effective information gathering, building and maintaining operational credibility, and enhanced force protection. Recent scholarship has suggested that the deliberate, purposeful use of female soldiers in these types of security environments may improve operational effectiveness.13

Studies conducted in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (the legal framework within recognized international law for addressing issues affecting women’s peace and security) draw on stabilization and peacekeeping operational experience from Cambodia, Kosovo, Timor Leste, Afghanistan, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These studies found that 80 percent of internally displaced persons and affected civilians are women, children, and the elderly.14 Female soldiers are able to gather information from sources (women and children) not otherwise available to men due to cultural restrictions.15

As a result, information gathering across the population spectrum improved the overall intelligence picture.16 Since 2010, smaller ad hoc or provisional assets, such as the U.S. Marine Corps “Lionesses” and Female Engagement Teams have validated that deliberate female engagement with civilian populations yields positive results, including reduced tensions and enhanced credibility with civilians.

We may achieve enhanced force protection because improved tactical intelligence and improved credibility within the civilian populace can lead to better identification and elimination of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) before they are employed.17

If substantiated, this research strongly suggests that the use of female soldiers in the low- to mid-intensity conflict asymmetric operational environment can improve tactical intelligence, thus actively reducing soldiers’ exposure to ambush and IED attack, resulting in fewer casualties and an increase in mission success. By improving trust and credibility with the civilian population, host nation civil-military interaction becomes more effective, reducing the amount of time needed to achieve success. This can have a tremendous impact on units tasked with providing area security in this unique environment—MPs, Civil Affairs, and Engineers—as well as other combat support and combat service support troops who operate within the asymmetric battle space.
Testing the Hypothesis

Based upon the assumptions discussed above, let us restate this article’s hypothesis in a way that we evaluate and test:

Female soldiers are physiologically and psychologically better suited to specific tactical missions, and units with a higher percentage of women demonstrate superior performance to that of all-male units when required to perform the same general mission sets (in a comparable environment).

Evaluation requires rigorous and detailed investigation of qualitative and quantitative data from the available body of information and records of units having experience conducting area security missions. The available data base has two primary sources, including records from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, and historical data from deployed units. Not less than three levels of analysis and evaluation are necessary.

● First, by examining the incidence rate of ambush and IED attacks in operational areas patrolled by mixed-gender units conducting area security missions, as opposed to single gender units—IN, AR, and FA—executing the same types of missions. Given comparable area security responsibilities, if the hypothesis has validity, the rate of attacks should be lower over time where mixed gender units have been operating.

● Second, if we find such a pattern, is the rate of incidence inversely proportional to the density of female soldiers—that is, as the number of female soldiers increases, does the rate of attacks drop proportionally?

● Third, if the data substantiates that such a relationship exists, does the data also suggest that there is a point of “diminishing returns” at which there is no further tactical benefit derived from increasing the proportion of female soldiers in such units?

If analysis and evaluation of the data substantiates all three levels—a difference in rate of incidents, inverse relationship between number of ambush and IED attacks and the percentage of female soldiers conducting area security missions, and correlation of the point at which that relationship reaches steady-state—then the hypothesis is supported. If this is so, Army leaders could reasonably conclude that the effectiveness of units conducting area security missions are improved by increasing the number of female soldiers up to the point of maximum benefit.

After evaluation, actually testing this hypothesis in practice will require deliberate planning, programming, and resourcing of specific units whose doctrinal mission closely aligns with area security during low- to medium-intensity conflict operations. Such deliberate actions take years to complete through the institutional Army’s force management systems. If started today with active duty recruits reporting to Initial Entry Training, it would take upwards of two years for these soldiers to be fully integrated into their units and perform effectively as a member of their team, squad, or platoon. These realities are reflected in the Army’s Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN), in that Regular Army units are available for deployment once every three years, and RC units once every five. Appreciating these realities, the operational needs of the Army (as reflected by ARFORGEN planning) can be harnessed to thoroughly test this concept.

Specific MP units currently perform area security missions in support of deployment- and contingency expeditionary (DEF and CEF, respectively) force packages in the ARFORGEN planning. During a unit’s RE-SET period (when individual personnel assignments and training are prioritized) the mix of female and male soldiers can be adjusted through regular scheduled permanent change of station (PCS) and unit reassignments to match (or get as close to) the evaluated ratio of “maximum benefit” discussed above. By doctrine, this would allow two years for Regular Army units, and five for RC to reach full readiness for mission success. No new systems other than those currently in use for the managing personnel operations would be needed. Such a deliberate program would have the best economy and lowest cost, but has the disadvantage of delaying validation of the concept three-to-six years in the future. Although least expensive, such a plan does little to address the potential benefits of this concept to units that are already inside of the ARFORGEN cycle, specifically MP units tasked to meet area security missions in support of DEF and CEF packages in ARFORGEN planning in the next two to three years. In this case, using the RC to test the concept may provide a cost-effective alternative.
Despite its many successes (or perhaps because of them), the Army is now entering a period of force reductions, as the United States returns to its historical pattern of down-sizing following times of war. How will the institutional army change in the coming decades? To start with, the Regular Army will be a lot smaller—projected force reductions will eliminate eight brigade combat teams (BCT), representing 72,000 soldiers. Eight fewer BCTs mean that the Regular Army’s immediate operational capability will be curtailed during a time when the international security environment is likely becoming more complex and uncertain. The RC will continue to serve as an operation reserve in support of Active Duty deployments and missions, particularly in the branches and capabilities necessary to conduct effective L/MIC asymmetric warfare. Specifically, the RC provides over 66 percent of the Logistics Corps, 75 percent of Engineer units, 70 percent of Medical resources, 70 percent of Military Police units and 85 percent of Civil Affairs assets. This reliance upon RC forces complicates the personnel challenges the Army faces, given that both the Regular Army and the RC are competing for volunteers in the same population base.

Recent comments by Lieutenant General Jack Stultz (former Chief of Army Reserve) illustrate the possibilities for such cost effectiveness. Reserve forces already make up 70 percent of the total available force for MP and 75 percent of Engineers. Furthermore, there is tremendous demand for RC support of stability and security-cooperation missions in addition to the area security responsibilities demands of current operations. Stated another way, RC forces are already carrying a significant portion of the area security mission, and this will continue to be the case in the coming decades. Not surprisingly, meeting these responsibilities often requires overcoming significant challenges to personnel and training readiness for RC units. Ensuring that units are fully manned, equipped and trained prior to mobilization and deployment commonly demands significant cross-leveling of personnel often within months of mobilization. Although such moves are far from the doctrinal ideal of how best to prepare units for combat, the fact is that such actions are common and necessary to get units to full manning. Since these practices are already recognized as normal and necessary, why not take advantage of the situation in order to adjust

(U.S. Army, SPC Kristina Truluck)

U.S. soldiers from the female engagement team for the 1st Infantry Division talk with Afghan women, gathering information at Mullayan, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 1 November 2011.
the balance of male-female soldiers assigned to MP units to get as close as possible to the evaluated optimum? In other words, why not make a virtue out of a vice—if a unit is to receive 10 to 30 percent cross-leveled personnel to bring it to full strength, why not take advantage of the sunk-costs already required to increase the combat effectiveness of deploying units and reduce soldiers’ exposure to IED attacks and ambush?

Conclusions

This article has set forth the hypothesis that women as a group tend to have abilities and capacities that make them more effective than men in certain tactical situations—in particular the conduct of area security, stability, and security-cooperation missions. Evaluating and testing such a hypothesis is well within the capabilities of the U.S. Army without committing significant new resources or engaging in disruptive force modernization programs by leveraging the existing active duty personnel management systems and the demonstrated capabilities of the reserve components. The hypothesis is appropriate and worth consideration if the assumptions we set are legitimate—that the particular mission sets in which women are particularly effective are likely to continue being common, that there are substantive and significant physiological differences between men and women, and that the U.S. will continue to look to a professional all-volunteer force to meet its military requirements. If so, and if the hypothesis is found to be valid after thorough and rigorous historical and current evaluation, then the U.S. Army would be strengthened and enhanced by taking full advantage of women as a combat multiplier. **MR**

NOTES

4. Ibid., 35.
6. Author’s notes: Years of high-intensity combat in the 20th Century: 8.5-1.5 for World War I; 4.0 for World War II; 3.0 for Korea. Vietnam was a mix of low- and medium-intensity conflict. Global War on Terror has been virtually all L/MIC.
9. Ibid., 12.
15. Ibid., 60.
16. Ibid., 59.
17. Ibid., 61.
19. FM 3-24, 169.
Those familiar with Tom Ricks’ books on Iraq, *Fiasco* and *The Gamble*, will find the format of his new book, *The Generals*, a familiar one: a series of vividly written vignettes tied together by a provocative theme. In *Fiasco*, the theme was the failure of U.S. leadership to cope with the insurgency growing in Iraq between 2003 and 2005. *The Gamble* considered the efforts of General Petraeus and others to use the “surge” to contain that same insurgency. Ricks’s insightful, first-hand observations were the essential content to the two works. However, in his latest book, Ricks turns his attention away from current events to address a more historical theme, the U.S. Army’s failure since World War II to choose competent men to lead its forces into battle.

The baseline for the narrative is George Marshall’s famous purge of Army generals in the months prior to America’s entry into World War II. In Ricks’ view, Marshall’s ruthlessness was a necessary step in preparing the Army for war. Even more, Marshall’s willingness to sack the lazy, the incompetent, and the faint of heart should have served as a model for the senior American military leaders who succeeded him. Unfortunately, it did no such thing. Through the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and into the war in Iraq, the Army has failed the nation by putting inadequate men at the head of American forces committed to combat. His examples of failures in generalship include well-known figures like Lloyd Fredendall and Ned Almond, more controversial figures like Douglas MacArthur and William Westmoreland, and more contemporary leaders such as Tommy Franks and Ricardo Sanchez.

Such a narrative would be a depressing one if Ricks did not write so well or possess such a fine eye for the illustrative story and the pungent quote. However, in tackling a historical topic that spans several decades he is forced to leave his usual sources, the first person interview and on-site observation. In his new book, Ricks must rely on secondary sources and he seems far less sure of his material than he has been in his previous works. The first problem with his sources is inconsistency. On one page, Ricks will cite historians of impeccable credentials like Russell Weigley or Forrest Pogue, and then, a few pages later Ricks builds his argument on testimony from a SAMS monograph or MMAS thesis. [Disclaimer: there are many good SAMS monographs and MMAS theses. There are many bad ones, too.]

More troubling is Ricks’ handling of secondary sources that offer contradictory assessments. When confronted by such conflicting inputs, the author punts; he offers both views without attempting to reconcile them or provide an independent assessment. On one page, for example, using the evidence of a *Military Review* article by Wade Merkel, Ricks credits Marshall for creating an “incentive system [for Army generals] that encouraged prudent risk taking.” On another page, Ricks concludes his section on World War II by quoting Russell Weigley’s assessment that the Army’s senior leaders were “addicted to playing it safe.” Which was it, “prudent risk-taking” or “playing it safe”? In his section on the Korean War, Ricks spends a full chapter celebrating the way Matthew Ridgway revived the morale of UN forces after defeat at the hands of the Chinese, calling the general’s performance “a model of how to revitalize the spirit and reverse the fortunes of a sagging military force.” Then, near the conclusion he quotes Walter Millett’s scathing assessment of Ridgway’s generalship (“as mean-spirited an American officer as ever wore stars”). So, was Ridgway a good general or not?

Ricks seems most uncertain about the Army commanders in Vietnam. He accepts the thesis offered by Lewis Sorley and Andrew Krepinevich, which holds that Westmoreland was a organization man.
who pursued a wrongheaded “attritionist” strategy. The author contrasts Westmoreland’s conduct of the war with the more enlightened approach of his successor, Creighton Abrams. However, after lauding Abrams’ initiatives, Ricks cites Richard Hunt in concluding that Abrams’ efforts were destined to failure, as well. What? the reader asks? If both Westmoreland and Abrams pursued doomed strategies, then how does one judge one to be so much wiser and more effective than the other? Scholars familiar with Ricks’ sources will be able to sort out such contradictions in the narrative. The more casual reader is likely to be perplexed.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the biggest flaw in Ricks’ book is not his choice and handling of sources. Instead, it is his prescription for improving the quality of America’s military leadership by returning to the practice of having senior military commanders fire the general officers subordinate to them when those subordinates have been proven incompetent or ineffective. This seems analogous to arguing that a reduction in crime can be achieved through incarcerating more criminals. Certainly, putting more lawbreakers in prison will achieve some beneficial effect; however, the real solutions to widespread criminal activity are achieved by addressing the socio-economic conditions that breed crime. To follow the analogy, instead of firing more inept generals, we should be turning a critical eye on the system that produced such dysfunctional leaders. We should be looking instead at the commissioning programs, mentorship polices, promotion criteria, and education system that gave us such poor “outputs.” When these systems, institutions, and polices are poor, they breed bad leaders. Beyond that, we can’t wait until a clueless or toxic leader reaches the general officer ranks to “cull the herd.” By that point, too much damage has been done. The general in question will have left a trail of disheartened subordinates and demoralized units in his wake.

By calling for more generals to be sacked, Ricks seems to fall prey to a reductionist approach that one often finds in modern journalism. The reporter and columnist seek the big “story,” the newsworthy sound bite, and the provocative headline. Ricks would have served the Army and the country with a more nuanced approach that looked more closely at the reasons why we pick the leaders we do. And yet, despite the harshness of my critique, I will offer my own contradictory assessment. I believe this “outsider” to military culture has done the Army an invaluable service by providing a highly readable challenge to the way we pick our leaders. I am convinced the book should be read by every serving officer and every civilian interested in military affairs. Tom Ricks has written an important book that should be debated in the cafeterias and classrooms of every service school in the military.

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In the contemporary world of television game shows that examine such things as whether contestants are smarter than a fifth grader or more adept at outdoor living than a Boy Scout, one can imagine author Francis J. Gavin moderating a game show that explores how much contemporary nuclear theorists and policy makers really understand nuclear history. Gavin argues that much of the current thinking about nuclear weapons demonstrates a propensity for two fundamental errors: first, to assume that the nuclear present is largely (or perhaps altogether) discontiguous from the nuclear past; and second, to “get the story wrong” when attempting to take the lessons of nuclear history into account.

However, Gavin’s project is not merely to set the rest of us straight on nuclear history so that we can “get it right.” Rather, it is to point out that the most useful insights to nuclear weapon issues are likely found at the convergence of nuclear theory, policy, and history, with the additional caution that even a firm grasp of the former two does not imply an equally firm grasp of the latter. Theorists tend to be prescriptive; policy makers, reactive; and historians, descriptive; and there is a place in the intellectual world for all three. However, while theorists and policy makers routinely have consulted each others’ perspective, neither seems to have felt the same urgency to avail themselves of the historian’s.
But why should we care? Are historians really the best people to navigate the ship of state through the murky waters of the nuclear world? Gavin certainly does not argue that they are. However, he challenges the reader to consider why the nuclear theorist or policy maker, invoking the nonempirical data of logic, game theory, and gut feeling (since, after all, a nuclear war has never been fought) would be any better suited to the task. He simply points out that, ignoring historical perspectives risks taking for granted many factors that should figure into something as significant as a nation’s nuclear weapons calculus. But Gavin does not stop there. He additionally points to the tendency of some to conflate “nuclear history,” “Cold War history,” and “post-World War II history,” which, although contemporaneous, are not precisely the same thing; and the facts of one do not necessarily provide answers for the others.

That is not to say, of course, that nuclear historians have cornered the market on accurate perspectives of what is really going on—far from it. Indeed, Gavin acknowledges that historians themselves differ wildly on their assessments of the role that nuclear weapons have played in the world. Moreover, he himself invokes two axioms of nuclear history that will not receive universal embrace: first, that “there is a lot of continuity between our nuclear past and our contemporary nuclear world” and, second, that the world has “had one nuclear revolution, not two.” At least this much is clear: embrace of Gavin’s axioms yields a different picture of the world than what obtains without them.

As a practical matter, Gavin urges a reassessment of three fundamental issues directly affecting contemporary nuclear discourse: “the role of nuclear weapons in preventing interstate/great power war,” the concern that “nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of those who are not deterrable,” and the question of whether “nuclear weapons actually create or worsen crises between states.” He illustrates his argument with challenging observations concerning, for example, the Kennedy doctrine of “flexible response” (which, he argues, turned out to be not nearly so different from Eisenhower’s “massive retaliation” as the name clearly seems calculated to imply), the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises (which he argues were more closely related than many now living might realize), the proliferation lessons of the 1960s (with China as his nominee for “nuclear rogue state” of the decade—experience with which, he argues, affords important insights for dealing with “nuclear rogue” states today), concerns with nuclear terrorism (which began, as he points out, in 1946, and not merely after 9/11, as some have supposed), and current calls for a nuclear-free world (which, he notes, solve some problems, but raise a host of others). To each related theory and policy discussion he imparts a useful perspective concerning both the neglect and the misuse of historical data. More importantly, he points out that, inasmuch as the United States now has over seven decades’ experience with nuclear weapons, and that it is now possible to obtain in important measure the distancing of time generally required for historical analysis, it seems odd—or worse—not to avail oneself of the historian’s perspective.

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INSURGENTS, RAIDERS, AND BANDITS:
How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World
John Arquilla, Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 2011, 310 pages, $27.50

*Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits* records the activities and motives of a number of guerrillas, raiders, and counterinsurgency experts over the last 250 years. Starting with the 18th century, John Arquilla highlights so-called “masters” from across the globe and from varying cultures and standpoints. His account of Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov, the celebrated “Chechen lion” who died in 2005, ends the investigation. The stories of Nathanael Greene, T.E. Lawrence, Orde Wingate, and Vo Nguyen Giap, and less well-known Francisco Espoz y Mina, Abd el-Kader, and Christiaan de Wet show they have a great deal in common—most noticeably their indomitability in the face of defeat, adaptive personalities, and ability to shape future conflict. But while the biographical accounts of the masters are most instructive, Arquilla also highlights a small number of countries with a deep experience of irregular war as well as a cast of “supporting characters” that make recurring appearances. In the case of the latter, Winston Churchill is the most frequent. His links to the Boer War, T.E. Lawrence,
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and Josip Broz (Tito) are well known. But there are others, like Jan Smuts and Louis Napoleon, who also reappear with a degree of frequency. Arquilla notes that these characters “help connect the individual stories to larger themes and tides of global events that influenced, and were in turn influenced by, the various masters.” The author also uncovers “the ever-deepening encounter with advanced technology.” Here Arquilla exposes the dependence conventional armies have on technical advances versus an irregular army’s ability to concentrate its efforts on exploiting undue reliance on such high-tech sustenance.

While not earth shattering or groundbreaking, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits has much to offer students of irregular warfare. Arquilla’s deft research is obvious and his choice of masters impressive and wide-ranging. Not only does he cover well-known individuals, but also introduces several unfamiliar practitioners who are worthy of closer examination. Phoolan Devi, the avenging Indian dacoit and folk hero, is a case in point. Throughout the study, the author captures each individual’s essence and places his or her actions in a useful political and historical context; Arquilla is adept at setting the strategic stage before delving into the tactical and chronological aspects.

For those looking for an immediate synopsis, Arquilla’s final chapter, “Master Lessons . . . and a Look Ahead,” draws the strands of the individual studies together and provides a number of thought-provoking observations. Here the author notes that the captains of irregular warfare rarely have a string of unbroken victories. Instead, they habitually struggle through difficult patches, regularly losing battles and large tracts of territory. Success under these circumstances comes from resilience and exceptional ruthlessness—common characteristics amongst the masters. In making sense of a wealth of information, the author summarizes that five interrelated pairs of concepts (transformation and integration, narratives and nation building, deep strikes and infrastructure attacks, networks and swarming, and cooptation and infiltration) have borne upon the phenomenon of irregular warfare—and will continue to do so. Applying these instructive criteria, Arquilla argues that Osama bin-Laden is unlikely ever to be seen as a master of irregular warfare. Likewise, he notes the next conflict will unfold along irregular lines, in either the physical or virtual world, or both.

Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits is an informative, enjoyable study. Despite its abundant positives, the book is let down by a lack of photographs, quality maps, and an uninspiring book cover. For those specialists looking for forensic analysis and new angles of contemporary investigation—this is probably not the book. However, for those with a professional or personal interest in irregular warfare and, in particular its matchless cast of leaders, the book will not disappoint. Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits undoubtedly has a place on every young officer’s bookshelf and will be a welcome addition to any military library.

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DOUBLE CROSS: The True Story of the D-Day Spies

After the fall of France and other early triumphs, Hitler boasted of “many secret agents in England.” He was entirely correct. But all his agents had been co-opted to work for the Allies and deceive their former spymasters. Tricky customers that these turncoats may have been, an equally eccentric section of British Intelligence managed to shape them into an effective unit. Ultimately they succeeded in decoying Nazi reinforcements away from Normandy during the crucial Longest Day.

Ben Macintyre’s story concerns these men and women, and the case officers of the Britain’s ultrasecret Twenty Committee [XX, the Roman numeral 20, is a double cross] organized along the stiff-upper-lip lines of a cricket club. The committee was headed by the son of a Scottish banker whose family considered him “less than promising” and arranged through the old-boy network to get him into government. This maestro, who continued throughout the war to wear tartan military trousers, was Thomas Argyll Robertson, known as “Tar” from his initials.

He assembled a motley array of traitors, wastrels, and misfits that included a wildly imaginative Spaniard with a diploma in chicken farming, a mercurial Serbian playboy, a diminutive fighter
pilot whose allegiance was first and foremost to Poland, the hard-partying bisexual daughter of a Peruvian diplomat, and a volatile 29-year-old French woman who almost derailed the entire plot when bureaucrats refused to allow her pet dog into the country. Even the Twenty Committee, with the ear of Churchill, had to bow before the archaic quarantine law.

We also meet an avaricious set of German spymasters, one of whom was himself turned by the Serbian playboy Dusko Popov and played a crucial role in the ultimate hoax. Also illustrative of the complex route taken by the turncoats, the Polish loyalist Roman Czerniawski cofounded in Paris the only successful spy network that Britain could call upon after the fall of France. But when his net was betrayed and Czerniawski was facing torture and probably death at the hands of the Gestapo, he handed his jailers an incredible demand directed to none other than the German military commander in France, stating: “No collaboration which might be proposed to me could come about unless I was convinced that I was working for the good of the Polish nation.” Nobody had actually asked him to collaborate, but the German military intelligence service Abwehr took the hint. He repaid them with a triple cross.

Neither side ever completely trusted their agents but covered enormous partying debts they ran up and parried their repeated threats to return to former spymasters. The Twenty Committee even found a way to save money by letting Abwehr payments continue to many of the operatives.

The reader may find that the narrative through the first half of the book takes twists and turns like a double-jointed snake as it details the careers of an unlikely cast of spies coming together around an idea that evolved into the supreme hoax of World War II. While its agents pulled the wool over Abwehr’s eyes, members of the Twenty Committee stood warily behind the scenes to make sure it was mostly cotton. The beginning of the D-Day plot—code named Fortitude—doesn’t begin to unfold in this book until after the spies’ recruitments and exotic backgrounds are treated in depth. D-Day itself only covers about 50 pages.

Some readers might find this narrative run-up rather tedious, but the story would fail without Macintyre’s stories about such an unlikely bunch of crazies along with some equally bizarre byproducts of the subterfuge, for example: A carrier pigeon scheme, a look-alike for General Bernard Montgomery to appear in various places that would pull German attention in the wrong direction or General George Patton, blustering around an area of England to reinforce the notion of a ghost army preparing to storm across the Channel at Calais—the major focus of the deception.

The author was helped mightily by an apparent plethora of diaries and detailed records kept on all sides, a practice usually considered a no-no in spycraft. Illustrative of the intricate weaves taken by Operation Fortitude was one example of Twenty Committee reasoning when at a late stage of the deception it appeared that a crucial Abwehr turncoat, Johann (Johnny) Jebsen, might fall into the hands of the Gestapo. In the British rationale, “There is the chance that self interest of those involved might protect Jebsen . . . Brandes (an unscrupulous Abwehr controller) will fear a counter-investigation. Schreiber (a capable Abwehr agent but involved in the plot against Hitler) will not willingly admit that Tricycle (the man who recruited Jebsen) has been fooling them. Hansen (chief of Abwehr foreign intelligence) will not willingly reach a conclusion that undermines the whole Abwehr.” Indeed, it was rather shaky reasoning on a deception that if unravelled could have set the scene for a Normandy bloodbath.

Early on, General Dwight Eisenhower told the planners: “Just keep the 15th Army out of my hair for the first two days.” A week after the invasion, only one 15th Army division had moved south. Even a month following D-Day, 22 German divisions were still languishing in the Calais region awaiting Patton’s ghost army that, of course, never arrived. Nobody can say for certain this was mainly through the efforts of the Twenty Committee. But studies after the war showed that Hitler himself had reposed “almost a mystic confidence” in the reports of the turncoat Spanish chicken farmer and accomplished liar, Juan Pujol Garcia, known as “Garbo” by the British and “Arabel” by the Germans. Arabel received the Iron Cross and Garbo was decorated by the British, although they never wore the medals side by side.

The “Aftermath” chapter that concludes the book provides a satisfying closure to Macintyre’s tale. It details the postwar lives of the entire cast
of characters, most of them survivors who melded into new roles that seldom, however, approximated the high drama of wartime. The book also contains 30 pages of interesting photos in which all of the main characters on both sides are shown.

George Ridge, J.D., Tuscan, Arizona

SECURING PEACE:  
State-Building and Economic Development in Post-Conflict Countries  
ed. by Richard Kozul-Wright and Piergiuseppe Fortunato,  
Bloomsbury Publishing, New York,  
2011, 256 pages, $85.00  

This cast of distinguished scholars in the fields of economics, political science, as well as United Nation’s experts, contribute an informative body of work addressing how and why civil war undermines economic development among poor countries and then propose a model for economic development. Contributing authors, including the two editors, present an array of interwoven chapters that systematically dissect civil conflict and post-conflict development literature, ranging from the theoretical and empirical to that directly dealing with post-conflict recovery, aid effectiveness, resource mobilization, and reconstruction. In an effort to highlight the importance of such work, the authors note that civil wars now account for the overwhelming majority of conflicts around the world and conflicts’ correlation to poverty. Nearly one-half of all countries with a per capita GDP of less than $2,000 between the years 1990-2000 experienced conflict and that one-half of all civil wars have flare-ups within five years of their conclusion. This has lead to a vicious cycle of economic under-development and institutional failure within these affected countries. The situation is particularly serious in Sub-Saharan Africa where two-thirds of this region’s countries have experienced a civil war within the last 25 years.

With this backdrop in place, the editors move forward with the book’s thesis, which is “economic growth reduces the likelihood of conflict.” Thus, the only way out of this destructive downward spiral is through a collective and concerted commitment to promote economic growth by host countries, the international community of developed countries, and international institutions. However, there are no state-building international assistance success stories to work from. The editors profess that in order to be successful going forward, economic development efforts must include a division of government power, no “strings attached” development aid to bridge financial/capital gaps, a more long-term than short-term development focus by outside actors, eliminating corruption within government, the establishment of state institutions and public goods, rule of law, property rights, and credit and financial institutions. Furthermore, development assistance must focus on taking conflict prevention measures vice focusing solely on reacting to conflict. It must also consider necessary economic complementarities, and address socio-economic inequalities. Ultimately, a balance between market forces and public interests must be created to legitimize government and promote development, which in the end leads to an enduring peace.

While Securing Peace: State-Building and Economic Development in Post-Conflict Countries is well-crafted, the analysis substantive, and conclusions and recommendations sound, it does not meaningfully advance the body of knowledge on the subject. Also of concern is the number of dated sources cited throughout the book. It leads the reader to believe that some of the chapters were put together earlier than others from now dated material and published without incorporating more currently available literature. That being said, it does provide the reader various perspectives of the principle challenges faced by governments, international organizations and financial institutions in accomplishing state-building in post-conflict countries. The book is best read by graduate-level students in the fields of economics and political science, and junior to mid-grade military officers and government agency personnel who either are, or may likely, find themselves involved in post-conflict planning.

David A. Anderson, Ph.D., LtCol, USMC, Retired,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

SEPTEMBER HOPE:  
The American Side of a Bridge Too Far  
John C. McManus, NAL Caliber,  
New York, 2012, 502 pages, $27.95  

John C. McManus, one of the most prolific World War II combat scholars, has written an excellent
book about the American forces that helped liberate Holland during World War II. By researching materials on the 82d and 101st airborne divisions, the 104th Infantry Division, and the various air wings that delivered troops and attacked enemy targets, McManus has delivered a thorough telling of Operation Market Garden and the follow-on operations in the latter months of 1944.

Operation Market Garden was Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s effort to break across the Rhine River in Holland. His plan called for dropping three airborne divisions—two American and one British—behind enemy lines to hold various bridges, while the British XXX Corps pushed north to pivot into Germany. It was a risky, reckless, and just plain bad idea. At the time Montgomery proposed his plan to American General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied armies were bogged down for want of supplies. Almost everything came from the Normandy beaches and was hauled across France over poor roads though bombed-out towns. The obvious solution was to liberate the Belgium city of Antwerp with its Scheldt River that fed to the North Sea, a traffic lane for Allied ships. But the Germans cleverly held onto the Scheldt estuary, the river’s banks, making resupply impossible.

Instead of clearing the banks, Montgomery pressed his plan on Eisenhower, who finally approved. McManus claims that Eisenhower’s decision to green light the operation was “stunningly poor thinking” and places the blame on Eisenhower, who weakened his own broad front strategy by agreeing to Montgomery’s wants. Worse than agreeing to the operation was Eisenhower’s 22 September decision to let Montgomery continue pushing into northern Germany, once Market Garden had ingloriously ended with the destruction of a British airborne division and no bridge into Germany. Instead of ordering Montgomery to finally clear the all-important estuary, Eisenhower doubled down on his British commander’s failed operation.

The heart of September Hope is the 82d and 101st airborne divisions’ airdrops and subsequent fighting. Here, McManus is in his element, depicting squads, platoons, and companies coming to grips with the Germans in desperate combat. While the chapter on airdrop is interesting, the bombing and strafing that prepared the battlefield is fascinating—if only because it was not in Cornelius Ryan’s famous A Bridge Too Far. McManus, who wrote a previous book about American combat airmen in World War II, does an excellent job depicting the action. The ground war is equally fascinating as the Americans capture some bridges and fail to capture others, all in well-depicted engagements. The book climaxizes, much like the American experience in Holland, with the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82d Airborne crossing the Waal River.

Most histories of Market Garden end with either the British withdrawal from Arnhem or the static fighting by airborne forces after the maneuver campaign had ended. McManus takes his book further, following the exploits of Major General Terry Allen’s 104th Infantry Division as it swept north through Holland and cleared a portion of the Scheldt estuary. The chapter on the 104th gives voice to an underreported element of Montgomery’s campaign.

September Hope is a very readable account of the American portion of Market Garden. McManus does a pitch-perfect job describing the action, from Eisenhower’s headquarters to the Dutch battlefields. This is an excellent book for anyone interested in World War II combat or the experiences of airborne troops.

Kevin M. Hymel, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AFGHAN ENDGAMES:
Strategy and Policy Choices for America’s Longest War
Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, editors, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2012, 229 pages, $29.95

Afghan Endgames is a presentation of original thought by a notable team of scholars, coming by an unusual academic path. The book was guided by editors from the Naval Postgraduate School as an outgrowth of a research project funded by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but published by Georgetown University Press. It is not a predictable solution to the problem of Afghanistan, but is still a relevant one, even given the announcements of initial decisions regarding post-2014 troop strength and strategy. The independence and originality of thought in the book lead to an innovative combination of recommendations for the endgame in Afghanistan.
Editors Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla assembled some recognizable names to complete this study: Andrew J. Bacevich, Victor Davis Hanson, Frederick W. Kagan, and Edward N. Luttwak, a balanced array of current national security commentators from across the spectrum. The volume divides into four major parts: an overview of the current situation in Afghanistan, a discussion of strategic alternatives, a section on alternative perspectives (which contains the most original ideas in the volume), and a conclusion by the editors, which draws the several strands together.

The arguments that stand out among the eleven original essays are the importance of the local solution, rather than a central government, to long-term success in the NATO coalition effort, and the many impediments to building a solution from the top down, or from the outside. There are significant challenges and threats to long-term success, but these are not insurmountable. Bacevich, the contrarian, predictably argued for withdrawal, and Kagan, the interventionist, for staying the course, but the value of *Afghan Endgames* is an effort to find a middle ground. The book concludes with specific recommendations, still relevant as of this writing, which include: go local, go small, and go long; stop expensive development projects; identify and nurture young Afghan leaders; develop Afghan security forces at the lowest possible level (such as in Village Stability Operations); drastically reduce funding to Pakistan, and use all statecraft to persuade India to sharply reduce its footprint in Afghanistan. These simple conclusions at the end belie the complex arguments and synthesis that led to them, and it is in the originality of these arguments that the book’s value lies.

*Afghan Endgames* would be valuable to the international security practitioner trying to sort through the debate about the future of Afghanistan in the national security media, particularly when compared to official NATO or U.S. policy and strategy. It connects current debate to long-term trends in Afghanistan in a useful way, while the editors weave a skillful middle road in making their recommendations. Read it before the policies of 2014 are firmly in execution, else risk a foregone conclusion.

**COL Dean A. Nowowiejski, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**The Battle of Adwa:**

*The Battle of Adwa* is an outstanding addition to any military history library. The book provides a comprehensive and objective account of the devastating Ethiopian victory over the Italians in 1896. The Italian defeat resonated throughout the halls of power in Europe as one of the few setbacks for colonizing states in the mad scramble for African territory from 1880 to 1902. For the Italians, latecomers to the colonial race, the author shows how inept generals, hubristic politicians, and poor logistics contributed to this ignoble catastrophe. One of the most important themes throughout, which is relevant for modern U.S. operations, is the high risk associated with underestimating the enemy. The Italians fell for this error at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. They poorly reconnoitered enemy dispositions and terrain, underestimated opponent strength, and displayed poor leadership at the tactical level.

Far from being “barbarian savages,” the Ethiopians demonstrated savvy and competence throughout the campaign. Ethiopian Emperor Menelik waged a strategic information campaign in the capitals of Europe through his Swiss proxy Alfred Ilg—the Italians were painted as the aggressors. In parallel, Menelik suppressed domestic dissent and raised an army of 100,000 troops, equipped with modern rifles and artillery, which overwhelmed the Italian Army before further troops and supplies could be delivered from the homeland. Finally, the Emperor limited his war aims to only ejecting the Italians from Ethiopia and not sweeping them into the Red Sea—a move with potential international repercussions. Author Raymond Jonas offers the reader a well-researched book, written with verve that provides insights into a little known colonial campaign that informs discussion of this volatile Horn of Africa region today. Hence, it is recommended for all military professionals and military history aficionados with an interest in African history and current events.

**LTC Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., USAR, Zurich, Switzerland**
THE SNAKE EATERS:
An Unlikely Band of Brothers and the Battle for the Soul of Iraq

In The Snake Eaters, Owen West depicts the complex relationship between an Iraqi Battalion (3/3-1, the “Snake Eaters”) and their U.S. advisors (the “Outcasts”) in Habbaniyah, Iraq, in the Anbar Province from September 2005 to February 2007.

West is a third-generation Marine who served two tours in Iraq. From October 2006 until February 2007, he served as a Marine Reservist advisor to the Snake Eaters. He uses his personal experience in the later portion of the book and relies on exhaustive research and interviews for the majority of the volume. His father is Bing West, the author of many books on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Snake Eaters is a snapshot of a complex period in the Iraq War. As the book opens, Iraq is experiencing a dramatic increase in insurgent attacks and the United States is responding.

The book is an excellent case study on the challenges and difficulties of counterinsurgency. West blends culture, civilian populace, insurgents, the Iraqi Army, and U.S. advisors and forces operating near Habbaniyah. He tells how a violent area was transformed into an area where the civilian populace believed it was in control.

West discusses the role and importance of being an advisor and includes many of the misconceptions about how advisors should be used. He argues that advisors are best used outside the wire and stresses the criticality of the use of advisors today and in the future. He states, “No matter how we entered Iraq and Afghanistan—and will undoubtedly enter future small wars—all roads out lead through the advisor.”

Finally, The Snake Eaters is a testament to the power of teamwork and leadership in combat. As the nickname suggests, the “Outcasts” were clearly a collection of outsiders—reservists who were mechanics, clerks, and salesmen in civilian life—who were able to form a team that achieved extraordinary things. It is a story many readers will find remarkable.

The Snake Eaters is one of the best books on the Iraq War. The book is readable and informative. There is no question it will remain relevant to readers for years to come.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform

During the 11 October 2012 vice presidential debates, Vice President Joe Biden stated that the Obama Administration’s initial responses to the 11 September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi were based on the U.S. intelligence community’s immediate assessments of what occurred. For two full weeks after the 11 September 2012 attacks, the administration placed most of the blame for the consulate attacks on a U.S. citizen-made video that purportedly insulted the Prophet Mohammed. Unfortunately, the day prior, the House Committee of Oversight and Government Reform U.S. State Department personnel involved with the incident, directly contradicted the administration’s initial response to the incident. Many immediate reactions to Vice President Biden’s remarks were that he had thrown the intelligence community “under the bus.”

In Paul Pillar’s Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform, the primary theme is that U.S. political leaders selectively use intelligence to achieve and find excuses for achieving policy goals. In some cases (as in weapons of mass destruction and the Iraq War of 2003), Pillar accuses the George W. Bush administration of making up its own intelligence and then blaming the intelligence community for getting it wrong. Though Pillar spends time discussing the run-up to the Iraq War of 2003 and WMD’s, he also briefly touches on more distant examples of intelligence politicization (Korean War, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam), and the reform of the intelligence community, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission.

Not only does Pillar take the Bush administration to task, but he also gives his perspective of the U.S. Congress role in the politicization of intelligence. Specifically, did Congress do enough to question the Bush administration’s evidence for the 2003
Iraq invasion? Pillar’s assertion is that they did not, including Republicans and Democrats. The larger and probably more relevant part of his book is spent on 9/11 and the subsequent 9/11 Commission, whose report brought about the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the resulting subordination of the CIA to the DNI. Pillar’s view is that the entire 9/11 Commission report was biased and its reforms misguided and ineffective.

Pillar’s book is detailed and informative, providing a better understanding of just how hard it is to be an intelligence professional in a world where all that matters is being wrong, once.

James M. Burcalow, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The success of the 2007 “Surge,” and the brilliance of General David Petraeus in turning around a seemingly unbroken parade of bad news in Iraq have been extensively studied from the perspectives of Washington-level strategists and American tactical commanders on the ground. However, Norman Cigar’s study examines this critical period in the Iraq conflict from the perspective of Iraqis at the province and village level, the “human terrain” so vital to the major U.S. victory and accompanying Al-Qaïda failure.

The author is the director of Regional Studies at the Marine Corps University, with an extensive background in Middle East intelligence analysis for the Marine Corps and Army. Cigar’s study profits from his use of original Arabic sources and obvious familiarity with the language and the culture, which set him apart from others writing on the region. He also shows a remarkable ability to examine events with detached neutrality, rather than seeing the region through the lens of U.S. objectives. His goal is to explain why, beginning in late 2006, key tribal leaders began to throw their support behind the U.S. effort in Iraq and to actively oppose Al-Qaeda, and what could cause them to turn their allegiance away from the central government and back to Al-Qaeda in the future. Cigar avoids falling into any moral or ideological trap, resisting the temptation to portray the tribal sheiks as motivated by anything except their own interests.

In contrast to the successful U.S. planners, Al-Qaeda comes across as clumsy and mired in ideological fantasy as it alienates the tribal leaders. Imposing an “Islamic State of Iraq,” with non-Iraqis in key leadership positions, Al-Qaeda implemented a harsh version of sharia law and, as a consequence, usurped much of the tribal leaders’ authority. Cigar warns of the fragility of that success now that the Iraqi government has taken control of operations. Failing to find jobs for tribal fighters, or to pay them promptly, combined with a resilient Al-Qaeda that has learned from its earlier mistakes threatens to drive many tribal militias back into the Al-Qaeda orbit.

While somewhat dry and spartan in its presentation, Cigar’s study offers a perspective that makes the successes of 2007 and the dangers of the future very clear.

COL David D. DiMeo, USA, Retired, Bowling Green, KY


Conceptualizing Modern War is a crash course in the current trends in defining war and strategic concepts. Written by a variety of U.S. and Norwegian officers and academics, the book brings a high degree of intellectual vigor and historical perspective to questions of modern war. The authors examine a wide assortment of basic assumptions and definitions of war, including asymmetry, Generations of War, Effects Based Operations, insurgency, terrorism, guerrilla wars and others. They bring useful historical perspective to these definitions. For example, over 80 percent of wars in the last two centuries have pitted state against nonstate actors. Even “normal” wars between states usually involve significant action by nonstate elements (for example Tito’s guerrillas in Yugoslavia during the Second World War). This alone makes one wonder why the most common state of war is referred to as irregular and why most modern
nations continue to organize and train their forces for state-on-state warfare.

Several strategic concepts come under heavy criticism in *Conceptualizing Modern War*. Several authors deconstruct the concept of Generations of War (be it 4GW, 5GW, or even 6GW) and question its usefulness as an analytical model. Antulio Echevarria attacks the Generations of War’s simplistic model of historical progression for over-emphasizing the role of technology in changing war. Ole Maao attacks Mary Kaldor’s paradigm of New Wars—arguing that Kaldor’s combination of identity politics, displacement of peoples, and a decentralized global military economy, is anything but new. Both the Generations of War and New Wars are denounced for being ahistorical and ignoring the inherent continuities of strategic thought and technique. Torgeir E. Sæveraas and Dag Henriksen, both of the Norwegian Air Force Academy, attack the Effects-Based Operations model for being too deterministic and ignoring the enemy’s role in the outcome of war. Arent Arntzen and Tor Grøtåan attack the Navy’s concept of Network Centric Warfare for similar reasons. Most of the contributors to the book denounce the U.S. and NATO’s obsession with new technology and its centrality to our concept of warfare.

While it is easy to criticize analytical models, it is necessary in order to promote intellectual vigor among NATO’s defense sector. As an alternative to technology-based generations or concepts of war, several authors, particularly David Kilcullen recommend looking at war by the nature of the opponents. Kilcullen’s model of war avoids technological cul-de-sacs and simply defines war as conventional (between states), traditional (between nonstate actors) and irregular (between states and nonstates). Still, perhaps the most important lesson of *Conceptualizing Modern Warfare* is that there is no magic bullet, analytical mode, or model that will fit all wars. Every conflict is different, requiring intensive analysis and understanding of the local conditions, causes and actors. One-size-fits-all models act as a mental block to this analysis. The book is a must read for those interested in strategic discourse, the history of war, and strategic analysts. It is also an example of our NATO allies’ considerable potential for intellectual contribution.

**1LT John E. Fahey, Lafayette, Indiana**

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**CATACLYSM:**

*General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan*

Herman S. Wolk,

University of North Texas Press,

Denton, 2012, 300 pages, $24.95

In his introduction, retired U.S. Air Force senior historian Herman S. Wolk describes *Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan* as an analytical work that binds together the stories of the B-29 and General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold’s role in World War II Pacific.

Wolk taps numerous primary and secondary sources including correspondence, lectures, interviews, oral history transcripts, interrogations, and monographs to focus on Arnold, policy, strategy, and command during World War II, particularly as these topics affected war in the Pacific. What emerges is a well-researched argument that challenges several historical interpretations regarding Arnold, strategic bombing, and use of the atomic bomb in 1945.

Early on, Wolk identifies a series of questions: Why was unified command never established in the Pacific? Was Arnold the reluctant warrior when he established the Twentieth Air Force? In the spring of 1945, was it absolutely necessary to ditch high-altitude precision bombing against the Japanese home islands in favor of area incendiary attacks? Was it necessary to drop the atomic bomb on Japan? As Wolk addresses each question, he examines Arnold’s relationships with officials in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and senior air commanders in the Pacific. Always coloring the relationships were Arnold’s efforts to employ the B-29 Superfortress in the strategic bombing of Japan.

Wolk initially focuses on the evolution of Air Corps doctrine related to morale or population bombing. He explores Roosevelt’s efforts to spur aircraft production for the lend-lease effort and Arnold’s concerns that this priority would prevent the build up of the Army Air Corps. Wolk then analyzes the use of air plans to defeat Japan, the formation of the 20th Air Force, Arnold’s decision to place Major General Curtis LeMay in command
of the XXI Bomber Group, and the decision to drop the atomic bomb. Wolk concludes his work by answering the question “Who was Hap Arnold?” According to Wolk, “Arnold was a doer, a fixer, a driver. His long suit was impatience, wait for nothing. His forte was vision, the ability to recognize what had to be done to build, organize, and control air forces.”

*Cataclysm* is as an objective, persuasive, articulate account of Hap Arnold and the strategic bombing effort against Japan in 1944 and 1945. It is a must read for any serious student of World War II, air power, and senior-level military command.

**Stephen D. Coats, Ph.D.,**
**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**CITIZEN SOLDIER:**
*A Life of Harry S. Truman,*

Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, “The ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of comfort and convenience, but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy.” This quote exemplifies the life of President Harry S. Truman. Author Aida Donald looks into Truman’s life from humble beginnings through struggles to become the president of the United States.

Donald extensively researched documents including letters Truman wrote to his wife Bess, papers from the Truman library, recently released government documents, and a collection of Truman’s private thoughts that he wrote while staying in seclusion at the Pickwick Hotel in Kansas City in order to calm his nerves because of the associations he had to keep in order to be elected president.

Truman saw his association with the Pendergast political machine (one of the most corrupt political machines in the country) as a necessary evil in the days of getting elected in Missouri. The association hurt Truman throughout his political life as people assumed that if he was part of the Pendergast machine he also must be corrupt. The association caused Truman anxiety, although Truman was known as the one honest man in the organization. Because of this association, Truman isolated himself from even his fellow Democrats thereby limiting his effectiveness as a U.S. senator; he worked hard to prove he was honest and that he could get things accomplished.

Donald focuses on Truman’s life before he entered politics. He came from a humble farm family, married Bess Wallace, but failed repeatedly at farming and a number of business ventures. Truman served as a “citizen soldier” in World War I but battled a number of psychosomatic illnesses throughout his career.

Donald’s wit combined with her extensive research and attention to detail make this a biography compelling to any military and historical reader.

**MAJ Jason R. Ravnsborg, USAR,**
**Yankton, South Dakota**
WE RECOMMEND

**BATTLE FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC: The Strategic Naval Campaign that Won World War II in Europe**

John R. Bruning, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2013, 300 pages, $40.00

The Battle of the North Atlantic was the longest continuous military campaign of World War II, running from 1939 until the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, though it reached its peak from mid-1940 through the end of 1943. The Battle of the North Atlantic pitted German U-boats and other warships of the German navy against Allied merchant shipping. Initially, convoys of merchant ships were protected for the most part by the British and Canadian navies and air forces. Starting in the early fall of 1941, before Pearl Harbor, these forces were aided by ships and aircraft of the United States.

*The Battle for the North Atlantic* began on the first day of the European war and lasted for six years, involving thousands of ships and stretching over hundreds of miles of the vast ocean and seas in a succession of more than a hundred convoy battles and as many as a thousand single-ship encounters. Tactical advantage switched back and forth over the six years as new weapons, tactics, and countermeasures were developed by both sides. The Allies gradually gained the upper hand, driving the German surface raiders from the ocean by the end of 1942 and decisively defeating the U-boats in a series of convoy battles between March and May 1943.

*From the publisher.*

**THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT: A Complete History,**

Kathryn Moore, Fall River Press, New York, 2013, 688 pages, $19.95

Remarkable and comprehensive, this single-volume reference offers a fascinating glimpse into the American presidency and its continuing evolution. It’s organized chronologically and contains detailed personal and political profiles of each president, official portraits, timelines for every term, intriguing facts and stats, and much more. Readable, rigorously researched, and completely revised and updated to include the 2012 campaign and election, *The American President* paints a vibrant portrait of the highest office in the land.

*From the publisher.*
PME Distance Learning

Jack T. Judy and Micheal R. Matinez, Department of Distance Education, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas—Raymond A. Kimball and CPT Joseph M. Byerly’s article “To Make Army PME Distance Learning Work, Make It Social” (Military Review, May-June 2013) is a great article and makes good points. However, we would like to take an opportunity to mitigate some of the negative “stigma” leaders associate with a nonresident learning approach and to discuss some current distance learning professional military education delivery approaches.

Leaders should not regard distance learning courses as a poor relation of resident courses; distance learning courses do not produce inferior learning outcomes compared to resident programs. There is a need to educate the force on the effectiveness of distance learning programs to alleviate the stigma associated by leaders. The U.S. Department of Education report Evaluation of Evidence-Based Practices in Online Learning: A Meta-Analysis and Review of Online Learning Studies disclosed some illuminating results. In short, it found:

● “Students in online courses performed modestly better, on average, than those learning the same material through traditional face-to-face instruction.” (Barbara Means, et al., “Evaluation of Evidence-Based Practices in Online Learning: A Meta-Analysis and Review of Online Learning Studies”; U.S. Department of Education Rev, September 2010). While the average effect was relatively small, this demonstrated the parity between the two methodologies.

● “Instruction combining online and face-to-face elements had a larger advantage relative to purely face-to-face instruction than did purely online instruction.” This demonstrates that a combination provides an additional advantage between the other two methods, but goes on to say, “the learning outcomes for students in purely online conditions and those for students in purely face-to-face conditions were statistically equivalent.”

The results of this meta-analysis (a quantitative statistical analysis of several separate but similar experiments or studies) provide evidence that distance learning programs provide educational outcomes as good as, if not better than, resident learning.

The prejudicial outlook on nonresident Intermediate Level Education (ILE) likely resides with attendees being board selected and leaders interpreting resident attendance as an indicator of potential. The Army has migrated back to a selection process for resident attendance. Understandably, the Army applies a “best qualified” standard for selection, so admittedly selection to attend the resident course does reflect some level of achievement. However, the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) has a finite number of available slots for resident students, so to alleviate an increasing backlog, the Army has combined options to educate officers that include the use of distance learning, along with satellite campuses, The Army School System, and in some cases constructive credit.

Based on the premise (from the article) that distance learning needs to be “social” to reach its full potential, there are elements that do live up to their full potential. The CGSS distance learning Advanced Operations Course (AOC) provides students a collaborative “social” learning environment. The course includes social aspects such as online sessions via a facilitated Defense Connect Online, as well as discussion boards—gaining the benefits touted in the Cavalry Leaders’ Course case study. Essentially, this course is a hybrid of the best of both approaches, providing an online element as well as a collaborative element. Drawing a conclusion from the above meta-analysis, the distance learning AOC methodology provides a larger advantage relative to other methods (strictly online or face-to-face).

Now, for all the hard-core traditionalists who still advocate face-to-face is the “only” way to learn and may pose the argument that one cannot maneuver a squad (company, battalion, etc.) from behind a
computer, let’s explore this. Perhaps this is how we frame this discussion. Think of maneuvering (or another collective task) as the practice of what they have learned. As with all military training, we learn first, and then go practice. There are certain aspects of face-to-face interaction that distance learning cannot replace, so the learning content has to be appropriate. For example, I don’t know that I would want to have surgery done by surgeons who completed their degree completely online. Nevertheless, surgeons can now operate from a remote location, so being “resident” isn’t always necessary. In another respect, with advancements in technology, maneuvering units from behind computers is becoming more of a reality. Look at systems such as Blue Force Tracker and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below that provide leaders greatly improved situational awareness on the battlefield.

Studies support that distance learning provides the same learning outcomes as resident courses, so we should not base an officer’s career progression on the method he or she used to complete ILE. The CGSS distance learning does provide a “social” aspect to the curriculum, providing that “vital component” for students’ education. The fact that officers who have completed their ILE through distance learning compete and qualify for battalion command, joint assignments, and the very competitive School of Advanced Military Studies program should indicate the level of learning these officers achieved via distance learning. The Army has made significant investments in the delivery of professional military education on line, anywhere and anytime. It’s time to appreciate the advancement in online education and delivery rather than relive the glory days of the past.

Kaplan Replies to Fontenot’s Review

Fred Kaplan, Brooklyn, NY—As a rule, I don’t believe in responding to negative reviews; critics have a right to criticize. But Colonel (retired) Greg Fontenot’s pan of my book, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (Military Review, March-April 2013), is so blatantly dishonest, such a seamless stream of willful distortion, that I’m compelled to make an exception.

The dishonesty begins with the first sentence, where he denounces me as “a journalist, not a historian.” First, I’m proud to wear the tag journalist; more to the point, I am also a historian, as anyone who has read my 1983 book, The Wizards of Armageddon, could attest. And since Wizards has been required reading at the military academies and Leavenworth’s School of Advance Military Studies at various times over the decades, I’m sure many of MR’s readers could back me up here.

But onto The Insurgents. Fontenot’s main point is that Petraeus, Nagl, et al., weren’t really insurgents; in fact, he writes, they succeeded because “Army leadership supported them.” As his prime example, he cites General Peter Chiarelli. How could Chiarelli be an “insurgent,” he scoffs, when he was the vice chief of staff! As Fontenot knows (assuming he actually read my book), my account of Chiarelli-as-insurgent takes place in 2004-2006, when he was commander of the 1st Cav, then MNF-I, trying to impose a COIN strategy in Baghdad, against the overriding opposition of his superiors, especially Generals Casey and Abizaid. As Fontenot surely knows, Chiarelli was promoted to vice in 2008, after Petraeus & Co. won their bureaucratic battles.

He also notes Petraeus’s support from General Peter Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff during the pertinent time-period, though, as the colonel knows, Schoomaker himself was something of an insurgent: he’d come up through special operations, and he was brought out of a three-year-long retirement to take the job by SecDef Rumsfeld, who thought that he would reduce the army’s size. (He didn’t anticipate that Schoomaker would also promote COIN, which Rumsfeld detested.)

Fontenot goes so far as to claim that Major General Barbara Fast and Ralph Peters are the only resisters I cite to the COINdistas’ ascension. This is sheer deception. I also chronicle the opposition of nearly the entire top brass of the time (Schoomaker
excluded), including JCS chairman General Peter Pace, Army vice chief General Richard Cody (who also ran the BG promotion board), as well as Rumsfeld and many others.

More egregiously, Fontenot sidesteps the context of this fight. As he must know, throughout the 1980s-1990s, when my characters were climbing up the ranks, official Army doctrine hardly recognized as “war” anything short of major combat operations. The generals of the day labeled smaller clashes as “low-intensity conflicts” or “military operations other than war”—MOOTW, which they pronounced moo-t-wah. (General Shalikshavili, the chairman at the time, was known to have muttered, “Real men don’t do moo-t-wah.”) Yet the junior officers of the day were deployed to El Salvador, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti—none of them officially considered combat zones. This was the institutional culture that these then-junior officers sought to change.

Fontenot insists that Petraeus was not at all an insurgent but “an enabled and adroit insider.” Then why did Petraeus have to operate behind his superiors’ backs in Mosul, bring in his own entourage to write a new COIN field manual, form a secret back channel with a White House assistant and feed her rebuttals to the Chiefs’ arguments against the “surge”? Did Fontenot even read my book? Or is he merely trying to persuade others not to?

On a minor but no less misleading point, Fontenot chides me for criticizing Ralph Peters on the grounds that he lacked combat experience. This is not at all the case. In one chapter, I recount the confrontation between Peters and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl over the COIN field manual. Peters keeps saying that the point of war is to kill the enemy; this irritates Nagl, in part because he had been killing plenty of enemy in Anbar whereas Peters hadn’t ever fired a gun in anger. I don’t know whether Fontenot read the chapter too hastily or simply has a grudge to bear.

Finally Fontenot writes, “Kaplan really doesn’t ask whether the solutions…reached and embedded in FM 3-24 were or are sound.” Again, I have to wonder whether he bothered to read this book. Its 20 or so other reviewers (all but two of whom wrote very favorable notices) seemed to have gotten my point. (For some examples, please visit the homepage of my website, fredkaplan.info.) My book lays out the history and evolution of the COIN idea in an objective way—how the idea came about, why it appealed to a generation of young officers in the post-Vietnam era, how they emerged as a community (a “cabal,” by their own account) and insinuated it into mainstream Army doctrine, and how it collapsed in Afghanistan. I sought to understand this doctrine, but I am also quite critical of its relevance to today’s conflicts and today’s world.

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**Fontenot Reponds to Kaplan**

Colonel Greg Fontenot, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, KS—Despite Mr. Kaplan’s assertion to the contrary I did not, in my review try to “persuade others not to” read his book. Actually, I recommended his book. I opined that Kaplan had “written an interesting story.” I wrote that he did a good job of making, “the case that connections and networks matter in institutions.” I further described what he wrote as a, “good story about a group of officers and academics, most of whom shared similar experiences in elite institutions, who came together, supported by the Army leadership, to adapt the Army to fight in Iraq.” Finally, I described his book as “interesting and worth taking the time to read.” Apparently, what Mr. Kaplan wants is an uncritical assessment of his book. I stand by my review. I formed my opinion on the basis of a careful reading of his book and my own experience as a soldier and defense professional since 1971 serving in peace, war, and various conditions in between as diverse as the Fulda Gap and Kabul.

I find Kaplan’s allegation that I have not read his book troubling. I find his accusation that I am dishonest offensive. Surely there is a logical contradiction between accusing me of “willful distortion” on the one hand and wondering if I really had read his book, on the other. At one point in his missive to the editor he admits that I may have read at least one chapter if hastily. He further asserts in the same instance that I may have held a grudge, presumably against John Nagl. I did read the chapter carefully and have great respect for John Nagl as a soldier and a scholar. Nagl may have felt as irritated as Kaplan reports in the chapter in question, but Nagl had the good sense to attack Ralph Peters’ viewpoint not Peters. My point in the review is the insinuation
Kaplan makes through this vignette is that Peters’ views are irrelevant because he lacked combat experience. Yet Kaplan invites no such conclusions about those who contributed to FM 3-24 who had no more combat experience than Peters had, that is to say, none. Either way the fact is that Ralph Peters’ objections did not matter as he was in no position to impede the development of FM 3-24.

I will not write a point by point rebuttal but will respond to Kaplan’s inference that I ignored or as sidestepped the context of the 1980s and 1990s. In 1977, I published my first written critique of Army doctrine in Infantry. Since that time, I have maintained an active interest in Army doctrine, criticizing it when I thought it appropriate and will publish my next criticism in the June edition of Army. These articles have included everything from assessments of FM 3-0 to peace enforcement in Bosnia. I commanded a battalion in Desert Storm and as a brigade commander led the first U.S. troops across the Sava River in December 1995. I do understand the context of the 1980s and 1990s—having experienced it, thought about it, studied and wrote about it. I most certainly did not ignore that context in writing my review.

If Kaplan’s “insurgents” had come together in the 1980s then the drama he imagined in writing The Insurgents would actually have existed. There truly would have been resistance to a counterinsurgency approach in the 1980s and 1990s although the winds of change were evident after Desert Storm. None of this back and forth between Kaplan and me reduces the significance of FM 3-24 or the efforts of those who participated in writing it. What Dave Petraeus and his team achieved is remarkable. I was at Fort Leavenworth when Petraeus commanded here. He was engaging, energetic, and supported on post and elsewhere with enthusiasm. We perceived accurately that he had performed brilliantly in Iraq in combat and during the transition. The context of the 1980s and 1990s simply did not apply when Petraeus served at Fort Leavenworth.

Despite what Kaplan claims, Petraeus confronted no serious opposition at Leavenworth or inside the Army. He encountered no more serious opposition to his efforts than I have witnessed in the development of various Army field manuals since I first became involved personally. My own experience in developing Army doctrine dates to 1992 as the lead for General Fred Franks’ initiative group. The sausage-making that is the Army doctrine process is always interesting and occasionally dangerous to those who are making the sausage. That was not the case in the development of FM 3-24. The sad situation in the field reduced what opposition there was to impotence. The winds of change in the Army’s thinking wafted in first with General Fred Franks’ FM 100-5 published in 1993, gusted in Somalia, and were blowing a full gale at the end of the century following Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

With respect to his ad hominem attack on me I will only say that Kaplan may style himself as he likes, but he has not earned the right to style me as dishonest.
All I wanted was a cigarette.
We weren’t allowed to smoke.
He knew where to go.

We swept sidewalks together.
Raked sand together.
Talked about life together.

His window was across from mine.
I think he saw me changing once.
Maybe more than once.

He was getting dishonorably discharged.
I didn’t think he was a good man.
I didn’t think he was a bad one, either.

It had been two weeks since I landed in Monterey.
I only wanted a cigarette.
He knew where to go.

I bought the Southern Comfort and bottom shelf gin.
He carried them with him to his room.
I didn’t think anything of it.

We raked sand together.
We ate lunch together.
We watched movies together.

We sat on a makeshift bench by the ditch by the installation fence.
We drank and smoked and laughed.
I taught him Farsi and he taught me Russian.

Russian for “hello” and “goodbye.”
Russian for “This is allowed.”
Russian for “This is not allowed.”

I think he saw me changing once.
He tried to kiss me on the cheek.
I told him no, my boyfriend wouldn’t like that very much.

We smoked some more.
We drank some more.
We laughed some more.

It was 2130.
I had to be in my room by 2200.
He said not to worry, I’d be back in time.

I insisted and tried to leave.
I fell to the ground.
He didn’t help me up.

I only wanted a cigarette.
He kissed me on the mouth.
I did not kiss him back.

I was immobile.
Paralyzed.
Drugged?

He kissed me again.
And again.
And again.

I did not kiss him back.
I had a boyfriend.
All I wanted was to smoke and drink and laugh.

He grabbed me by the ankles.
Pulled me over the ditch behind the army barracks by the installation fence.
I could hear soldiers coming back to their rooms.

I was paralyzed.
I always thought I would fight.
Fend him off with car keys stuffed between my fingers.

I looked up at the tree branches above me, my watch said 2147.
That was the last time I prayed to God.
There were leaves in my hair and dirt on my arms.

There was something less than a man between my legs.
It looked at me with hate in its eyes.

We swept sidewalks together.

God kicked back and swigged a PBR
while I was raped behind the army barracks,
over the ditch by the installation fence.

He helped me up.
I couldn’t stand on my own.
How sweet.

I vomited by a tree.
I was disgusted with myself and him and God.
I wanted to drown in Southern Comfort and bottom shelf gin.

He walked me to my barracks building.
How sweet.
I made it to my room by 2200.

All the girls watched me stumble down the hallway.
I was so violently alone.
Taps wailed outside the window.

I left my hat by the bench by the ditch by the installation fence.
He brought it to me the next morning.
How sweet.

SSgt Ashley Garza is an intelligence analyst stationed at Ft. Benning, GA. Originally from Oreland, Pennsylvania, she joined the Air Force in 2009. SSgt Garza studies Psychology and is working toward becoming a Counseling Psychologist. Her focus is helping those with PTSD, especially survivors of sexual assault. Read more of her poetry at http://hellopoetry.com/-ashley-garza.
Farewell Colonel Smith

... O, now, for ever
Farewell the tranquil mind! Farewell content!
Farewell the plumèd troops, and the big wars
That make ambition virtue! O, farewell!
Farewell the neighing steed, and the shrill trump,
The spirit-stirring drum, th’ear-piercing fife,
The royal banner, and all quality,
Pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war!
And, O, you mortal engines, whose rude throats
Th’immortal Jove’s dread clamours counterfeit,
Farewell! Othello’s occupation’s gone!

from Othello, William Shakespeare, c. 1604

COL John J. Smith retired on 31 July 2013 after nearly 32 years on active duty in the Army, the last five as Editor-in-Chief of Military Review. Commissioned through Officer Candidate School, he was also a Field Artilleryman and an Academy Professor at West Point.