On 11 April 2013, President Barack Obama presented Father Kapaun’s Medal of Honor to his nephew, Ray Kapaun, in recognition of the priest’s selfless service and sacrifice under enemy fire and as a POW.
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Front cover: 4th Century hoplite, Johnny Shumate.
The Human Shield in Islamic Jurisprudence

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A foreign area officer specializing in Arabic and the Middle East discusses the legal and moral restrictions of using civilians as human shields. He argues that Al-Qaeda’s choice to discard Islamic traditions with regard to the human shield leaves the door open for exploitation by the U.S. military.

Purpose in Mission Design: Understanding the Four Kinds of Operational Approach

Simon Murden, Ph.D.

Design, a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems, is on the verge of a sea change in conceptual capability; however, there is still much to be done.

Alternate Perspectives: Trying to Think from the Other Side of the Hill

Lieutenant Colonel William Greenberg, U.S. Army, Retired

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The Imaginary Army Ethic
A Call for Articulating a Real Foundation for Our Profession

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Imiola, U.S. Army, Ph.D.

Almost everyone is familiar with the story of the “Emperor’s New Clothes.” The Emperor is tricked into believing he has the finest suit of clothes made from a fabric that is invisible to those who are either unfit for their positions or hopelessly ignorant. Although neither the Emperor nor his ministers can see the imaginary suit of clothes, they pretend they can and in fact loudly proclaim its value and beauty. The townspeople follow suit. During a parade in which the Emperor “wears” his imaginary clothes, a child calls out that “The Emperor has no clothes!” It is only then that everyone realizes and admits that the Emperor’s fine set of clothes is in fact imaginary. The situation in this well-known story is analogous to that of today’s U.S. Army and its “ethic.”

For many years the Army has routinely talked about something imaginary—the “Army Ethic.” While references to the Army Ethic or our “professional military ethic” appear in any number of discussions about the Army and the profession and are even included in doctrine, the fact is that one of America’s most important and longest-existing organizations does not have a unified professional ethic.

Current and evolving Army doctrine provides evidence for the claim that we have an ethos but not an ethic. While we may be committed to an ethic,
one wonders what it is or where we find it. One cannot point to it, read it, or clearly articulate it. The initial draft of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1, *The Army Profession* (ADRP-1) which “defines and doctrinally describes the Army Profession and Ethic” illustrates the fact that we do not have an articulated unified ethic. In its text and glossary, ADRP-1 defines the Army Ethic as “the evolving set of laws, values, and beliefs deeply embedded within the core of the profession’s culture and practiced by its members to motivate and guide the conduct of individual members bound together in common moral purpose.” What work does this definition do for us as members of the profession? The answer: very little.

In fact, ADRP-1 merely defines the general term “professional ethic.” Such a definition could just as easily be applied to any profession. There is nothing in it unique to our institution, and it provides no account of our ethic. Nor does defining the Army Ethic in this manner provide any substance or ethical guidance to the institution or its members.

Consider an analogous definition such as one for the U.S. Constitution. Simply defining the Constitution as “the fundamental principles on which the United States is governed” is of little or no help if we actually wish to govern. We need to know what those principles are. We need them articulated in a clear manner that we can refer to and use to guide our actions and decisions. Thankfully, our Constitution goes on to do this. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the Army—our generic definition is completely unsatisfactory as a guide for Army professionals.

Similar to its definition, the description of our ethic provided in the draft of ARDP-1 also fails to provide much utility in guiding Army professionals. It provides the following chart as a framework to describe the Army ethic and its sources:

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### The Framework of the Army Ethic

#### Legal Foundations

**Army as Profession**

*Values/norms for performance of collective institution*

- The U.S. Constitution
- Titles 5, 10, 32, U.S. Code
- Treaties of which U.S. is party
- Status of Force Agreements
- Law of Land Warfare

#### Moral Foundations

**Army as Profession**

*Values/norms for performance of collective institution*

- The U.S. Declaration of independence
- Just War Tradition
- Army Culture-“Can-do”
- Trust Relationships of the Profession w/Public Civilian Leaders, Jr. Leaders

#### Legal-Individual

- Oath of:
  - Enlistment
  - Commission
  - Office
- U.S. Code - Standards of Exemplary Conduct
- Uniformed Code of Military Justice
- Army Regulations
- Rules of Engagement
- Soldier’s Rules

#### Moral-Individual

- Universal Norms:
  - Accepted Human Rights
  - Golden rule for interpersonal behavior
- Creed & Mottos:
  - Duty, Honor, Country
  - NCO Creed, Civilian Creed
  - 7 Army Values
  - Soldier’s Creed,
  - Warrior Ethos
This is a useful framework for understanding an ethos, but it is not an ethic. Simply asserting, as the draft of ADRP-1 does, that the Army Ethic is “rich and varied in its sources and its content” neither creates an ethic nor illuminates it.

Furthermore, the sum of these documents does not serve as a useful tool in articulating what ethical obligations we have as military professionals. Certainly, the expectation cannot be that every soldier is familiar with all of these policies, traditions, treaties, agreements, rules, creeds, and rights, let alone be able to analyze, synthesize, and apply them to the situations they will face in the course of their professional duties. This particular framework makes an Army Ethic appear as if it is everywhere when in fact it is nowhere. The situation is comparable to “When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.” Despite its failure to clearly articulate, prioritize, and provide professional ethical guidance for its soldiers, the Army still expects them to act morally and in accordance with something that does not exist.

Why the Army has not developed a unified professional ethic as other mature professions and fields have done is puzzling. The conclusion must be that, as members of a profession, we believe no ethical guidance is necessary or that we are utterly incapable of providing such guidance. A number of arguments have come forward along these lines, such as “We all know what the ethic is, so why do we need to articulate it?” Or, “If we articulate it, we will somehow get it wrong or not be able to capture the essence of what we take our ethic to be.” Others stress that the members of the profession are simply themselves the embodiment of the ethic. These views are problematic. They obscure and reduce the appreciation for our ethic. Take a moment and ask your peers what the Army Ethic is, and see what the result is. Ask them to describe it to you. I am guessing the best you will get is a rehash of the Army Values. While this is helpful, it is not an ethic. In fact, many of these values would be desirable in organizations we consider morally wrong. Courage is a virtue for a terrorist...
and loyalty is a virtue for members of organized crime syndicates. If we cannot articulate the Army Ethic to ourselves, how can we possibly expect to articulate it to new members of the profession or the American public? If we are to be the embodiment of the Army Ethic, we need to know what it is before we can embody it.

Finally, while it may not be possible to fully capture all the nuances of the Army Ethic, it appears other professions and fields have been able to do good work in codifying their own ethics. We can see this is the case for health professionals, lawyers, teachers, engineers, and law enforcement officials. Moreover, we also find clearly stated ethical codes for business with many corporations having their own refinement of the basic business code. These codes demonstrate the falseness of assertions that codes of ethics are implicit and cannot be articulated.

Other militaries also offer examples of clearly articulated codes of ethics. The Israeli Defense Force has a short, unified document that sets forth the sources, values, and principles of Israeli Defense Force service. Likewise, the Australian Army has a very simple list of core behaviors that identify what it means to be an Australian army soldier. While we should not necessarily adopt all of these for our use, they do show that developing such a code is possible.

The Army needs a professional ethic to guide its members in the performance of their duties. Up to this point, the Army has failed to adequately express such an ethic. If the Army intends to call itself a profession, it must address this issue sooner rather than later. There is a great deal to gain in doing so, including:

- Enabling and improving the moral development, moral confidence, and moral performance of our soldiers as Army professionals.
- Enhancing the relationship of trust that exists between the Army and its client—the American nation.
- Improving our status as a profession vis-à-vis other professions with existing professional codes of ethics.
- Unifying the various parts of our profession—branches, uniformed service members, and the Army Civilian Corps (the draft of ADRP-1 adds nonuniformed members and Department of the Army civilians to the profession).

Like the characters in the “Emperor’s New Clothes,” our professionals need to realize that their belief in something imaginary does not make it real. Once we do this, we can begin the important work of articulating an Army Ethic that is normative, unified, and accessible to the force.

The means and talent to articulate this type of ethic already exist within the Army. In fact, we have an organization focused along these very lines in the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, which has already done tremendous work with respect to the Army as a profession. Likewise, Army professionals have offered numerous ideas and suggestions for and about the ethic in Military Review and other journals. All the Army needs to do is put the right people together and give them the mission to articulate our ethic. Given the will, this entire process could be complete in under a year and we could celebrate the Army’s birthday in 2014 with the release of an ethic for our profession. **MR**
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense.

COL Douglas C. Crissman recently completed an Army War College Fellowship at the University of Texas at Austin. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. from the University of Virginia. He commanded a battalion in the 3rd Infantry Division and a brigade combat team in the 1st Cavalry Division.

PHOTO: In the early evening twilight of 9 September 2011, soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, perform sit-ups as part of a circuit obstacle course at Contingency Operating Base Adder in Iraq. Events continued throughout the night and into the next day as aspiring leaders were required to demonstrate their proficiency on a variety of tasks to earn their spurs. (U.S. Army, SPC Sharla Lewis)

THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY will draw down by nearly 15 percent over the next four years while the nation concurrently makes difficult strategic choices defining the Army of 2020 and beyond. Faced with fiscal constraints and a challenging and unpredictable global environment, Army leaders seek the optimum balance among personnel, force structure, and readiness.

Regardless of the outcome, the country will continue to rely heavily on the Army’s professionalism and the talent of its leaders. To maintain this trust and preserve this capability, the Army must continue its efforts to focus on the human dimension by refining and adapting its approach to developing leaders.

Recently, the Center for Army Leadership’s annual assessment of attitudes and perceptions on leader development (CASAL) identified “Develops Others” as the lowest-rated leader competency for the fifth year in a row. Just over half of Army leaders (59 percent) were regarded as effective at developing others by their subordinates. The CASAL further revealed that one fourth (22 to 26 percent) of those surveyed indicated their units placed a “low” or “very low” priority on leader development activities. Feedback also highlighted varying degrees of leader and subordinate understanding of what constituted leader development activities and programs as well as individual responsibilities as “givers” and “receivers” of leader development. These trends span multiple years and clearly illustrate a deficiency in the perceived effectiveness of Army efforts to “raise the next generation” in the eyes of its most important audience, today’s junior leaders.

While the Army has enjoyed a stellar reputation for leader development for generations, the decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan has altered our expectations of “what right looks like.” The Army must now seize the opportunity to improve consistency and effectiveness of unit-level leader...
development to deliver capable leaders for the Army of 2020 and beyond. This is best achieved through a concerted effort to—

- Increase awareness and understanding about leader development as a process rather than an event.
- Train and educate battalion and brigade-level commanders on the Army’s expectations for them as key leader developers as well as on fundamental approaches to enhance their success.
- Expand senior leader accountability of unit-level leader development programs.

**Leader Development: A Process, not an Event**

Army leader development is intended to occur across three complementary domains (institutional, operational, and self-development) through the lifelong synthesis of education, training, and experience. Reaching a shared understanding of leader development is crucial to the subordinate’s ability to recognize it when it is happening and to the leader’s ability to identify and leverage opportunities to integrate it with everyday activities.

Leader development is not the outcome of a series of classes or the product of a sequence of assignments, nor is it the job of one person or organization. It is a continuous process intended to achieve incremental and progressive results over time. The CASAL results suggest the lack of an integrated approach as one reason for lower effectiveness ratings as junior officers consider the various leader development activities as isolated events rather than part of an ongoing process of development. As businesses wrestle with designing effective leader development programs, they commonly cite a patchwork of programs inadequately linked to one another as a persistent obstacle to their effectiveness. In its recently revised and published Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, the Army defines leader development as “recruiting, accessing, developing, assigning, promoting, broadening, and retaining the best leaders, while challenging them over time with greater responsibility, authority and accountability.” This leader-driven process goes well beyond monthly professional development lectures, regular counseling sessions, an ideal combination/progression of assignments, or a two-hour block of instruction in an Army schoolhouse. Annual CASAL results over the past five years indicate subordinates may not always recognize leader development opportunities when they are happening, and leaders may be missing or failing to adequately create or leverage key developmental opportunities.

Reading different military and civilian leaders’ opinions on leader development in contemporary literature and reflecting on my own experiences, I recall many instances when leader development happened to me. In some cases, I did not realize the true importance of various episodes—their long-term impact on my development as a leader—for months or even years later.

For example, I recently came across a book given to me by a battalion commander I had when I was a lieutenant. As I pulled the book off the shelf, a few folded papers dropped to the floor. A handwritten note—written more than three years after I had served with this officer—explained why he sent me the book:

*It’s important for officers to read widely and be well-read. Nothing is more dangerous for our Army than creating an officer corps of ‘bubbas.’ It’s critical for your generation to be prepared to accept the mantle of senior leadership when you get there and our job is to make you better than we were.*

The book’s title and author are not as important as the act of this concerned senior leader who built on an existing relationship and made an effort to influence my continued development. His selfless personal gesture took forethought, vision, and follow-through—and demonstrated a desire to be actively engaged with cultivating the next generation to be ready to lead the Army of the future.

Similarly, I recall a conversation my brigade commander had with me while I was a young captain commanding one of his companies. He had just observed an after action review (AAR) covering the first three days of a Combat Training Center rotation. While the unit had accomplished a great deal, the AAR brought to the surface several areas for improvement. Noticing that I appeared a bit dejected afterwards, he pulled me aside and quickly recounted all the positive things he heard about our unit during the AAR and identified to me what a great opportunity we now had to work...
on those things we wanted to improve for the rest of the rotation. “Now, let’s get to work,” he said. With a quick slap on the back and a handshake, he was gone, but I will never forget that five-minute conversation and what it meant to me then and how it influenced similar conversations I have had with young leaders since. These two personal examples provide useful context to the discussion that follows and help illustrate opportunities for improvement.

It is important to understand that leader development often occurs when and where subordinates least expect it. It is the experienced and perceptive leader who sees an opportunity in the midst of a challenging set of circumstances or at a potential crossroads in a subordinate’s career and seizes it.

Neither of the formative experiences I related occurred during a professional development block of instruction or scheduled counseling session. Neither was formal or structured, yet both were effective, and each influenced my thoughts and actions during crucial periods early in my career. Each one caused me to feel encouraged, challenged, inspired, and developed. Each was part of a larger process, which was not intuitively obvious to me at the time. Their impact on me as a young leader was likely even more memorable because I perceived each as a transformational versus purely transactional interchange. In other words, they were not just about what I could do for the leaders or the unit at the time—achieve the next mission or get through the task at hand—but instead, what each leader was also doing in the moment to make me better for the long run. As important, each spawned further one-on-one interaction, or mentorship, and contributed to a broader leader development experience spanning two units, multiple duty positions, an Army school attendance, and nearly eight years.

Leaders who recognize and approach leader development as a process are able to balance the long-term needs of the Army, the near-term and career needs of their subordinates, and the immediate needs of their unit missions to determine how and when to integrate leader development opportunities in already-busy calendars and schedules. Subordinates (developing leaders) gain the greatest benefit when they understand and appreciate the broader process and are able to learn and grow from each developmental experience, thereby readying themselves to accept greater responsibility when called upon. Engaged leaders provide key context throughout the process, allowing instances like the two described above to be stitched together, often by the one being developed, to make the leader development experience more meaningful.

Creating Meaningful Developmental Experiences

Ask any successful leader to describe his or her most significant developmental experiences and the result will undoubtedly resemble a list of memorable moments—jobs, special assignments, interactions with peers, coaching from mentors, adverse situations, significant emotional events, etc. Each of those experiences taught the developing leaders something about themselves. More importantly, this increased self-awareness almost certainly helped them recognize a needed change in their leader behavior and gave them the motivation to make that change. Gaining a greater understanding of what these high-growth experiences consist of and how they contribute to increased self-awareness is therefore a useful endeavor.

The Center for Creative Leadership suggests that individual developmental experiences are most powerful when they combine elements of assessment, challenge, and support (Figure 1). Ideally then, the most impactful examples would include an opportunity for some form of assessment or feedback regarding the leader’s strengths or skill in a particular area, a challenge or set of challenges that stretch participants, and support for learning and progress before, during, and after. These formative experiences provide essential lessons often in an “on-the-job” context, but always with

![Figure 1](https://example.com/f1.png)

*Figure 1
Developmental Experiences Model
(Center for Creative Leadership).*
a combination of challenging variables—time constraints, human conflict, moral or ethical dilemmas, the reality of declining resources, and others. These “crucibles” forge the development of leaders unlike anything they can experience in the classroom or by reading a book.

Similar to trials or tests that corner individuals and force them to make decisions about who they are and what is really important to them, crucibles come in all shapes and sizes. Some might occur over months or years while others may run their course in just a few hours. Leaders can enrich any experience—a training program, an assignment, a relationship, or even a conversation—by ensuring the elements of assessment, challenge, and support are present. Maximum benefit occurs not when subordinates are able to just “survive” these experiences one after another, but rather when they can benefit from routine assessment and feedback and the opportunity to learn from and apply these lessons.

A common theme among many of today’s leader development programs is to provide young leaders opportunities to learn how to think rather than merely learning what to think. To this end, experiences meant to encourage innovation, ingenuity, initiative, and adaptability are generally viewed as not only worthwhile objectives for leader development activities, but also highly desirable leader attributes.

For the past several years, the Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group has focused on how to achieve adaptability as a training outcome. The group asserts that it is possible to design training that enhances the adaptability of individuals and teams by introducing opportunities to test and demonstrate their confidence, practice decision making, practice innovative problem solving, and/or demonstrate initiative—all with an awareness of accountability for their actions.

In Asymmetric Warfare Group’s two-week course, the Asymmetric Warfare Adaptive Leader Program, instructors teach student leaders to design training “at the threshold of failure” in order to enhance adaptability and achieve maximum growth (Figure 2). Like the Center of Creative Leadership...

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**Figure 2**

“Training at the Threshold of Failure” model (Asymmetric Warfare Adaptive Leader Program).
model, which calls for a challenging “stretch experience,” the Asymmetric Warfare Group believes participants should come as close to failure as possible to achieve maximum growth and learning. By adjusting scenario conditions and creating a “sweet spot” between order and chaos and simplicity and complexity, leaders can modify the experience to better align it with the competence and/or developmental needs of the individual or group.20

Busy training calendars and pre-deployment timelines can force training conditions to one side or the other of the “idealized realm of training” depicted in Figure 2. Training conditions that provide few opportunities for subordinates to exercise initiative, overcome adversity, consider innovative solutions, or taste failure may not achieve maximum growth and are not likely to become a crucible experience for most participants. Conversely, attempting to accomplish too many training objectives in one exercise, failing to properly gauge the readiness of units and leaders to accomplish certain tasks, or providing inadequate support and guidance during execution will likely have a destructive impact.

**Integrating Developmental Experiences into a Systematic Approach**

No matter how well-designed or robust an individual developmental experience or crucible might be, no single event achieves complete development.21 Development is most effective when lessons from one experience can be linked to and reinforced by other experiences. Behavioral change typically occurs gradually, as developmental experiences are linked to one another in the context of a larger, continuous process.22

Leaders can create a systematic approach to progressive development by exposing subordinates to a variety of experiences over time within an organizational context (Figure 3).23 A key aspect of this approach is the recognition that people do not all develop in the same way. Some individuals can learn different things from the same experience, and some may assimilate key lessons more readily than others.24 Engaged and perceptive leaders recognize these differences in individual progress and incorporate them into the feedback they provide and the design and timing of subsequent developmental experiences. While the Army offers numerous potential development opportunities, the ultimate objective, and most important job for leaders, is creating and aligning these experiences based on the individual needs of their subordinates.

**Leading to Develop: A Transformational vs. Solely Transactional Approach**

While commanding a battalion, I recall describing an effective leader as one who “dealt with people and solved problems” better than his or her peers. Furthermore, I believed a successful leader had to demonstrate skill in “determining what was important and then seeing that it got done.” While I still agree with these relatively simple principles, I now recognize them as incomplete because they address only the transactional nature of effective leadership. Incorporating the transformational aspect adds a longer-term view and emphasizes individual development as a key part of task accomplishment.

As leaders mature, they must recognize their role not only in managing human capital to accomplish the mission (the transactional component), but also in cultivating and enriching that human capital to make it more valuable in accomplishing the missions of the future (the transformational component). Retired Lieutenant General Walt Ulmer, Jr., a respected authority on leadership and leader development...
in both military and civilian circles, describes transformative leadership as applying the “enlightened use of inspiration, communication, and understanding of human behavior to motivate subordinates to achieve more than could ordinarily be expected.”

At their best, transformational leaders go well beyond the transaction of task accomplishment and convert their followers into leaders themselves by making them feel valued, helping them understand and find meaning in their contributions, and fostering a sense of ownership in the bigger picture of what the organization is doing. Leaders successful in applying this approach are more effective at converting the lessons of crucible events into truly transformative experiences that result in growth and improved performance over time.

As leaders identify opportunities to integrate leader development lessons across the full range of unit-level activities, they soon realize many of the lessons can be viewed as “teachable moments.” Respected advocate and prominent author Noel Tichy believes that leaders who approach every meeting, every training leader development event, every job assignment, and every decision with developing others in mind will find teaching and leading to be strongly linked. Tichy further emphasizes this connection by declaring that “for winning leaders, teaching is not a now-and-then sideline activity. It is how they lead and at the heart of everything they do.”

The result is that leader development may not be something one can see on a calendar or log the number of hours devoted to it in a given day or week. Instead, leader development permeates the very culture of a unit; embedded in all aspects of how the unit and its leaders approach accomplishing their missions. In the very best units, every day is “leader development day.”

**In the very best units, every day is “leader development day.”**

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**Reducing the Disparity between Leader Development Experiences in Units**

The consensus among private sector leader development professionals is that 70 percent of leader development occurs on the job, 20 percent is the result of their interactions with other people (peers, mentors), and 10 percent comes from training courses. Similarly, Army leaders spend the majority of their time, 70-80 percent of a typical career, in units and consistently refer to the experience they gain in the operational domain as most effective in contributing to their development as leaders. A 2008 study conducted by Rand’s Arroyo Center (Leader Development in Army Units: Views from the Field) surveyed over 450 officers (captain through colonel) from several captains’ career courses, the Command and General Staff College, the National Training Center, the Army War College, and the National Defense University and focused its inquiries on leader development activities in the officers’ last operational unit. Officer feedback indicated a wide disparity between individual leader development experiences—from excellent to nonexistent. While the RAND Arroyo team found ample evidence of unit-level leader development activities, there was “no set of activities they could characterize as a standard or typical leader development program.” Experiences differed not only between units, but also within units, and were based primarily on the attitude, capability, and approach of the commander (primarily battalion/squadron level).

Noting this variation, the study concluded that while a “one-size-fits-all” approach to unit-level leader development was not practical or prudent, the unit commander clearly set the tone, developed and shepherded the program, and was most responsible for its perceived effectiveness. Yet study results and junior leader feedback clearly illustrate a wide range in commanders’ ability to design, implement, and execute programs and activities that sufficiently stimulate and encourage subordinates. From understanding the broad approach of a good program, to acknowledging the scope of their responsibilities to design, monitor, and assess the experiential learning within their
organizations, leaders from captain through colonel demonstrated a wide range of awareness and abilities.37

Recent CASAL trends reinforced the Rand findings with many commanders expressing difficulties in implementing leader development programs, specifically needing help prioritizing, fostering, and supporting leader development initiatives in their units.38 Further highlighting the lack of consistency in both programs and results, CASAL recommendations stated that commanders could benefit from knowing “what right looks like” in terms of designing and implementing a unit-level leader development program.39 The implication is not that the Army’s process for selecting battalion and brigade-level commanders is flawed, but instead that merely being a good leader does not necessarily make one a good leader developer.

Leaders are the product of their experiences. Most commanders rely heavily on superiors, mentors, and peers to help shape their leader behavior and draw primarily upon their past leader development experiences—both positive and negative—as they design and execute their own programs.40 However, given the disparity in the effectiveness of unit programs and the developmental abilities of the commanders who lead them, there is value in attempting to raise awareness and improve results through increased training and education. While informal interaction amongst senior leaders governs this process today, time and energy invested in a more structured process could conceivably raise both leader confidence and the perceived effectiveness among subordinates.

From understanding what meaningful development experiences consist of to recognizing the value of connecting these events in the broad context of a unit-level program, the Army could leverage this opportunity to ensure its future commanders understand their pivotal role and inherent responsibilities in leader development. Facilitating this professional dialogue and nesting it with current precommand course instruction would allow the Army to give its soon-to-be commanders a better appreciation for the “science” of leader development and better prepare them to immediately apply the “art” upon assuming command.

For example, without necessarily prescribing a single solution, products like the one in Figure 4 could guide a discussion on the holistic or campaign-like approach to unit-level leader development given the 24-36 month tour of a typical junior officer. By illustrating the breadth, depth, and interconnectedness of potential developmental experiences, commanders could begin to envision what their own programs might look like given unit-specific conditions and variables. Additional discussions could showcase products like the Commander's Handbook for Unit Leader Development and the recently published Leader Development Improvement Guide, both developed by the Center for Army Leadership to address deficiencies noted in recent CASALs. Simple exercises highlighting their intended purpose and usefulness would expand commanders’ developmental tool kits. Expanding on a CASAL recommendation, commanders could also gain a better appreciation for the capability and flexibility of the Army’s Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback system during this structured dialogue. More than just a tool for 360-degree feedback for individuals, the assessment and feedback system can be used to design a unit-level feedback event to gain insight into the aggregate strengths and developmental needs of a particular leader audience (e.g., by rank or position) and therefore focus leader development activities.41 Coaching future battalion and brigade-level commanders on “what right looks like” with respect to these and other leader development approaches while resourcing them with knowledge, tools, and assistance from subject-matter experts can help our talented leaders become better leader developers and consequently improve the leader development experience in units.42

The Role of Accountability and Enhancing its Effectiveness

Fundamental leadership doctrine declares that a lack of true accountability often results in less effective or inconsistent results and frustrated or dissatisfied leaders and followers.43 A 2001 review of industry best practices in leadership development by the Army Research Institute acknowledged that the “presence of an influential champion” appeared to be the most important principle in successful leadership development
Soldiers do what leaders check—and junior leaders do what senior leaders check. While all senior leaders arguably understand the importance of leader development as well as their responsibility to develop their subordinates, expanded senior leader accountability can reduce inconsistencies across units. This accountability can take on many forms: guidance, emphasis, personal example, spot-checks, rewards and recognition, allocation of resources, empowering junior leaders to plan and conduct training, the active sharing of best practices, and others. However, it must go beyond merely establishing a positive command climate and stating that leader development is important.

A key form of senior leader support for leader development is their personal example, demonstrated by developing their own subordinates and holding their subordinates accountable for doing the same. Through their actions rather than merely words, senior leaders must convince their subordinates that developing leaders is good for them in the short and long term and that creating a system for developing leaders is best for the organization as well as the Army. Additionally, senior leaders must find innovative ways to measure and reward their subordinates’ true contributions toward developing leaders for the future. As important, and perhaps more difficult, senior leaders must influence the behavior of those leaders seen as not adequately contributing to the development of their subordinates. Jack Welch, former chief executive officer of General Electric, had trouble

Figure 4
getting his subordinate leaders to share his passion for leader development until he started stripping power from those who did not develop their subordinates. When considering individual leaders for promotion, Ford Motor Company now requires prospective leaders to declare which of their subordinates they have developed sufficiently to assume their position before they themselves are fully considered for promotion.

Based on the Army’s long-term, process-centric approach to leader development, evaluating the true impact of present day programs and activities is often difficult. Ideally, a battalion commander’s investment in developing his lieutenants would be measured by how many of them became battalion commanders themselves a decade later. Similarly, a brigade commander’s impact on cultivating the next generation of field grade officers would be at least partially measured by the percentage of captains serving under his or her leadership who elected to leave the Army before being promoted to major.

Obviously, senior leaders cannot wait for downstream indicators like these, but with a long-term view in mind, the personal example they set, the questions they ask, the things they check, and the feedback they give on subordinate unit leader development programs and activities can have valuable impacts today. For example, a division commander could both assess and influence brigade and battalion commander emphasis on one aspect of leader development by asking his personnel officer to tell him how many captains and majors across the division’s subordinate units were headed to recognized broadening assignments after their key and developmental time. Likewise, senior leaders might spend less time observing the actual execution of a particular training exercise and more time examining how the leaders attempted to shape the outcome of the event through leader training beforehand by coaching the importance of well-constructed, leader-driven after-action reviews or by ensuring leaders dedicated adequate time to retraining. Their demonstrated interest and focused curiosity alone speak volumes and, over time, communicate a consistent desire to instill a leader development culture across their organization.

It is not hard to imagine how these and other related leader behaviors would expand accountability and result in subordinate commanders thinking more broadly about how they are developing the various audiences of junior leaders under their care. The well-known studies on division-level leadership conducted in 2004 and 2010 underscore how quickly a division commander’s behavior, preferences, and priorities become known down to battalion and lower levels. Some might view these techniques as simply good leadership, but results from both the Rand and CASAL studies clearly illustrate inconsistency across the Army and therefore an opportunity for improvement.

Leader Development: Cultivating Human Capital for the Army of 2020 and Beyond

Over the past decade, Army leaders have performed superbly while fighting two wars under a demanding operational tempo. Countless examples of valor, integrity, fortitude, and compassion illustrate the talent, depth, and versatility of Army leaders at all levels, but we must not rest on our laurels. As today’s leaders ready the next generation to lead the Army of 2020 and beyond, the Army must leverage doctrine and the capability still resident in the force to improve the consistency and results of unit-level leader development efforts.

This crucial endeavor must go beyond merely reinvigorating efforts to ensure the Army continues to develop quality leaders at all levels. More completely, it must be about training great Army leaders to also be great leader developers and fostering an organizational culture where the next generation sees it as a primary responsibility, indeed a duty of theirs, to develop the generation behind them. By increasing awareness of the process of leader development, training and educating commanders to understand the art and science of design, executing first-rate leader development programs, and enhancing senior leader accountability of unit-level leader development activities, the Army can improve the quality and consistency of leader development in units, ensuring future leaders reap the benefits of a comprehensive and coherent leader development experience.
IMPROVING LEADER DEVELOPMENT

NOTES

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 65.
4. Ibid., 65-69.
6. Ibid.
12. ADRP 6-22, 7-9.
13. ADP 6-22, 9.
15. Ibid., 223.
19. Ibid., 7.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 225.
23. Ibid., 6.
29. Ibid.
31. CASAL, 19.
32. Peter Schirmer, et al., Leader Development in Army Units: Views from the Field, RAND ARROYO Center, xii.
33. Ibid., 61-63.
34. Ibid., 19.
35. Ibid., 32.
36. Ibid., 61, 63, 70.
37. Ibid., xv.
38. CASAL, 94.
39. Ibid.
41. CASAL, 96.
42. Ibid., 96.
45. ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders (Washington, DC: GPO, 23 August 2012), 2-3.
46. Tichy and Cohen, 191.
47. Ibid.
50. CASAL, 91-96; Schirmer, et al., 61-72.
51. Army Profession Campaign Annual Report, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2 April 2012, 12.
GENERAL WILLIAM C. Westmoreland served as chief of staff of the U.S. Army from July 1968 to June 1972, one of the most turbulent eras in the service’s history. Safe passage through this era’s Vietnam storm required the utmost in professionalism from the Army’s officer corps, but the state of officer professionalism was suspect. Confronted in 1970 with powerful evidence of a dysfunctional organizational culture, the chief of staff devoted considerable time and attention to this issue for the remainder of his tenure. Westmoreland decided that the keystone to improving officer professionalism was a major revision of the career management system, a project soon known as the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). This article will examine the development of OPMS and its implementation to assess whether it fulfilled its intended role in cultivating officer professionalism.

In March 1970, the Peers Report on the My Lai massacre concluded that officers in the Americal Division, including its general officers, had not properly investigated whether war crimes had occurred, a finding that Westmoreland found almost as deplorable as the murders themselves. This failure was “a matter of grave concern” to the chief of staff. In April, he tasked the Army War College to conduct “an analysis of the moral and professional climate” in the service. The study reported there was a “significant, widely perceived, rarely disavowed difference between the idealized professional climate and the existing professional climate.” Over the next two years this study—along with Westmoreland’s own observations and the steady flow of bad news into his office—would prompt him to launch several initiatives to improve the quality of training and leadership. While all these initiatives included aspects of officer professionalism, none focused just on this issue.
Better Professionalism through Better Career Management

By the autumn of 1970, Westmoreland had decided that officer professionalism required its own specific initiative. This made him the first chief of staff to acknowledge the unintended side effects of the career management system adopted after World War II and the resulting dysfunctional organizational culture described in the War College study. In October, after discussions with the deputy chief of staff for personnel, Lieutenant General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., Westmoreland made it clear that the way to improve officer professionalism was to improve officer career management by establishing the most effective methods for identifying, motivating, and utilizing three groups in the officer corps. The first was a “select group” whose members were “groomed by experience for high command responsibilities.” The second group was made up of “highly competent specialists” who “must be able to foresee promotion and necessary professional education on an equal basis with the potential commanders.” The third was “that large segment . . . who are neither technicians nor solely troop leaders.”

Westmoreland set several priorities for Kerwin. The first was “to identify our field grade officers best suited to command, to designate them explicitly as such, and to program them into stable command assignments and other positions of great responsibility.” The second was the issue of specialization, both in branch immaterial highly technical fields and in certain specialties of the combat and combat support arms. The third was the need to “institute a vigorous ‘selection out’ process” for generalists “who have reached their ceilings” and specialists “who have ceased to produce.” These officers undermined unit effectiveness and were “highly detrimental” to the motivation and retention of enlisted soldiers and junior officers. Finally, Westmoreland wanted an efficiency report “that will permit us to identify early in an officer’s career his interest, motivation, aptitude, particular capability, and estimated capacity and potential.”

While the professionalism study had emphasized selecting commanders and culling substandard performers, it had not discussed specialization. Westmoreland was taking note of a deep-rooted, widespread perception in the officer corps that service in such fields would leave one less competitive for promotion and for assignments that would boost careers, particularly troop command. A related issue was a long-standing concern among logistics officers that spending much of their career working in functional areas left them less competitive for promotions, advanced military school slots, and career-enhancing staff billets.

Kerwin responded by outlining the concept that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) would use in implementing Westmoreland’s guidance. The ODCSPER had created a “straw man proposal” derived from the chief of staff’s memorandum, comments from recent senior officer promotion boards and senior service college selection boards, the War College professionalism study, “the apparent best features” of other services officer systems, and “those key elements of our present officer system.” Combining these sources would “appear to offer the greatest hopes for eliminating nonproductive competition, the ticket-punching syndrome, and the many familiar inefficiencies and irritants variously described in preliminary discussions.” Kerwin had directed a thorough analysis of the concept in order
to define the problem, set objectives, and lay out the most effective lines on which to proceed, and he appointed an ODCSPER general officer steering committee to oversee the project. Work would be coordinated with other on-going Army Staff endeavors concerning professionalism with these efforts to culminate by the mid-1973 target date already set for completing the transition to an all-volunteer force.8

In June 1971 the draft OPMS went to the field “for critical comment and indication of acceptability” because of the “extremely sensitive nature of OPMS and the acute personal interest in it of each career officer.” A cover letter acknowledged that “OPMS will elicit a range of views depending on such variables as experience, rank, and expertise,” and it requested that field commands obtain “the widest possible reaction in the time allotted and to report conflicting views where they represent a consensus of a significant segment of the career officer and potential career officer population.”9

OPMS proposed the following definition of military professionalism:

Military professionalism is the attainment of excellence through education, experience and personal dedication. It is characterized by fidelity and selfless devotion, which presupposes self-discipline, great skill, extensive knowledge, and willingness to abide by established military ethics and promote high standards, tempered by sound judgement [sic], compassion, and understanding. Professionalism implies a special trust that is inherent in the oath executed by every member of the Army Forces of the United States.

OPMS rejected an officer’s code on the grounds that some officers would resent it, that the commissioning oath was a sufficient code, and that to publish a code “may be construed as an admission that professionalism within the Army Officer Corps is less than satisfactory.”10

OPMS would create a single component active officer corps. Since 1945, the authorized officer strength of the Regular Army had never been enough to fully man the active force—therefore tens of thousands of non-Regular officers could remain on active duty. Almost all the best career-enhancing schools and assignments, however, were for Regulars, and only Regulars received permanent promotions. These inequities since the mid-1950s had led many high-quality non-Regulars to leave active duty, contributing to the persistent shortage of captains and majors in the active force. The OPMS study concluded that the dual-component system had to go since high morale was vital to fostering professionalism “and it is axiomatic that high morale in the officer corps is now possible for only a minority.” In a single component active officer corps “all officers would compete on an equal basis, and the fittest would survive.”11

The core of OPMS was the changes in the branches managed by the Officer Personnel Directorate (OPD). The existing system had these officers (except for those in the Women’s Army Corps) compete against each other on the Army Promotion List. OPMS would have five career fields of related arms and services whose requirements were mutually supporting in the development of officer competence: the Combat Arms, the Combat Support Arms, the Materiel and Movement Services, “Other OPD Managed Branches,” and a new Specialist Corps. Promotion and school selection boards would consider officers only against their peers in a career field. The practice of officers holding temporary and permanent ranks would end. Annual continuation boards would identify officers no longer qualitatively competitive with their contemporaries and remove them from active duty.12

Under the existing system, officers in the specialist career program were expected to remain qualified in both their basic branch and their specialty. Under OPMS, these officers would form the Specialist Corps, a new basic branch of the Army. They would be assigned exclusively to positions requiring their specialty, and promotion quotas established for each specialty would ensure career progression opportunity. OPMS also recognized the need to support functional specialties within branches and groups of branches. Entry into specialization would be by the choice of individual officers, consistent with the needs of the service.13
To promote improved unit effectiveness and greater professional competence, the way field grade commanders were selected and staffs were manned would change. OPMS saw field grade command as a position of such complexity that it should now be, in effect, a new special career program. A centralized board would evaluate field grade officers as they entered the zone of eligibility for selection to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and would designate them as either best qualified for command or for staff. Officers selected for command would receive priority for command developmental assignments within their career pattern.

The designers of OPMS claimed that this process would eliminate the current corrosive competition for command slots but would not split the officer corps into an elite of commanders and an inferior class of staffers. Under “staff functionalization” only the unit commander, executive officer, operations officer, and liaison officer positions would be designated as branch material. Other staff positions would be filled by specialists in the functional area of that position, ending the practice of commanders using “the staff as a place to hold incoming/outgoing and/or unfit subordinate commanders.” The capability to provide sufficient qualified officers for a greatly enlarged wartime Army had been the crucial consideration in designing the existing career management system. OPMS sacrificed some of this capability but its developers argued that it would still produce officers able to assume positions of a higher grade, noting that senior infantry captains under OPMS would have more experience at the battalion and brigade level than most current field grade infantry officers.14

ODCSPER had already begun revising the officer evaluation system because most officers had lost confidence in the established process. In 1969, Kerwin had approved a recommendation to develop a new efficiency report and institute other changes to take effect in fiscal year 1972. The OPMS study found that these actions would support the new career management system. Several studies had discovered that the absence of an effective career and performance counseling system was a major cause of officer dissatisfaction. The OPMS steering committee concluded that addressing this need was so urgent that the plan for counseling training that was developed by the study should be implemented without waiting for approval of the entire OPMS concept.

Kerwin accepted this recommendation and implementing instructions were issued in April 1971.15

**Staffing OPMS: “We Must Not Give the Appearance of Running Scared”**16

Comments from the field were a shock to ODCSPER. There was inadequate support for several key concepts, including the Specialist Corps and separation of field grade officers into command and staff tracks. There was a general preference for keeping the current system with minor modifications. There was little support for what many saw as radical change at a time when the Army faced so many challenges. There was concern that OPMS was based on insufficient study and analysis. Some in ODCSPER suspected that the staffing process had been dominated by general and field grade officers, thereby providing an incomplete picture of the plan’s actual reception, since company grade officers were presumed to be more supportive of radical changes.17 The OPMS steering committee, however, decided this possibility did not outweigh the clear dislike of OPMS by many officers, and Kerwin concluded that the most successful field grade officers–those selected to attend CGSC–were “more conservative than we think.”

The negative reactions prompted a hurried effort within ODCSPER during the autumn to revise OPMS and still deliver a decision briefing by the end of the year. The deputy chief of staff for personnel stressed the need to reduce the pressure of ticket punching, especially for troop command assignments. Kerwin also made it clear that in presenting the revised OPMS to Westmoreland “we must not give the appearance of running scared.” Out of these discussions emerged a consensus that the original OPMS had been “simply too big a package” and that the revised version should be cut back to the “gut issues” that were most critical to improving officer professionalism.18

The revised version, referred to at this time as OPMS II, dropped the Specialist Corps, branch group specialization, and the concept of staff functionalization. A new concept of the “dual-track” gave officers a primary specialty based on their branch and then a secondary specialty in a functional area. Centralized selection of field grade officers for command assignments remained, but the formal sifting of officers into
The Army promotion list for OPD-managed branches was still subdivided, but with the abandonment of the Specialist Corps, there were now four groupings: Combat Arms, Combat Support Arms, Logistics Services, and Administrative Services. The counseling training system and the new efficiency report remained. The definition of professionalism was deleted as too contentious. (Many comments had called it insulting to officers.)

Because he had insufficient time to staff OPMS II in the same manner as OPMS I, Kerwin sent a team to CGSC to brief students on the revisions. The overall reaction was 60.7 percent favorable, with the new promotion system as the least-liked element. Among the branch groupings, combat-arms officers were the least supportive and logistics officers were the most supportive. Next, ODCSPER briefed the principals of the Army Staff and other senior officers. Their reactions varied “from mild acceptance to enthusiastic support.”

In January 1972, Kerwin briefed Westmoreland on OPMS II. The discussion that followed found the chief of staff’s closest advisors in disagreement. While the vice chief of staff, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., considered dual-track career development and centralized field grade command selection to be “desirable changes,” he argued against any changes to the promotion system. For Palmer, the core activity of the Army was combat and therefore the service “must continue its orientation on the combat arms within its corps of officers.” “More particular management,” such as specific instructions to promotion boards, could satisfy any need for specialists. The assistant vice chief of staff, Lieutenant General William E. DePuy, fully supported OPMS II and argued that the “officer corps should adjust to the needs of the Army, not the converse.”

After the discussion, Westmoreland directed ODCSPER to revise OPMS II “to demonstrate, with greater clarity, the preeminent importance of the combat arms officer,” to defer asking for
changes in promotion laws “until experience sufficient to justify such a proposal is acquired,” and to develop an implementation plan “with the flexibility to incorporate minor improvements without jeopardizing the basic soundness of OPMS II.”20

Centralized selection for field grade command soon became controversial when the OPMS steering committee abolished the command equivalent policy because “competence as a troop commander, as contrasted to managerial or technical competence, is of paramount importance for effective discharge of command responsibilities.” Army Materiel Command and the Corps of Engineers quickly attacked this decision, arguing that “the list of ‘commanders’ is an identification of the elite who will become the leaders (general officers) of tomorrow’s Army.” Soon thereafter, many of their command equivalent positions were restored.21

Cultivation of Professionalism

Westmoreland’s successor, General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., shared Palmer’s unease over OPMS. The emphasis on specialization would compartmentalize the officer corps. Officers would be forced “into a narrow mold poured in Washington,” leaving them unprepared for “the tough, unstructured jobs that must be done.” Abrams suggested that its real objective was advancing “the interests of specialists’ groups which subordinate the interests of the Army to narrow special interests.” Despite these concerns, Abrams accepted counter-arguments for the new system and approved its implementation, although he cautioned officers “to bear in mind that how well you do in the Army depends not on our system of management, but rather on your individual efforts and dedication to service.”22

OPMS did not cultivate a more professional officer corps. A study of the CGSC class of 1972, the same class Kerwin had used to staff OPMS II, found that the majority of students still believed that the former generalist career pattern, with its emphasis on troop command, was the route to promotion and status. The study concluded that success for OPMS “will be determined by how clearly it identifies the true values of the officer corps and how effectively it changes these values,” and that “a firm central authority must recognize the true needs of the Army and establish a program which will meet these needs.”23 A 1978 study found that the true values of the officer corps, as expressed in the officer evaluation system, remained the values of the generalist and that the “rational, albeit disconcerting,” response was to continue “the less risky, traditional ‘officer generalist’ behaviors.”24 Indeed, from 1970 to 2011, similar critiques of officer corps professionalism and the career management system have been made.25

The ideal and the practice of professionalism are weaker in 2013 than they were in 1970. The Army has given contractors many functions—such as training, logistics, and doctrine writing—formerly held to be the exclusive responsibility of soldiers, eroding the service’s jurisdictional claim to expertise. A 2002 study on the state of professionalism concluded that “today’s Army is more bureaucracy than profession.” It also found that one of Abrams’ concerns had been prescient: the career management system since 1974 had “shifted the balance away from individual development and toward a lock-step, centralized system that requires all officers to follow specific timelines and fill certain positions if they are to succeed.” These developments created a “trust gap” between junior and senior officers that “has reached dangerously dysfunctional levels.”26 Furthermore, the years of war since 2001 have encouraged much of the officer corps to limit the definition of professionalism to competence in tactical combat operations. The service as an institution in these years “essentially relayed the message that it prizes warriors over soldiers.”27

The decision by Kerwin and Westmoreland to abandon OPMS I—and Abrams’ ambivalence over OPMS II—made it clear that there would be no firm central authority realigning the true values of the officer corps to support the true needs of the

Despite the deplorable actions by general of the American Division, neither Westmoreland nor OPMS provided any direction on how general officers should improve and sustain their professionalism. As a recent evaluation of the service’s current efforts to improve professionalism pointed out, “The responsibility to conform the Army’s behavior to that of a moral, military profession vice occupation or bureaucracy rests squarely with the senior leaders of the profession . . . because they, rather than mid-level uniformed officers and civilians, control the major management systems of the Army.”

Westmoreland believed that effective managers using the proper management structures and procedures could solve any problem, and he made changing the career management system his primary response to the crisis in officer professionalism. As Bruce Palmer has noted, Westmoreland was also “the shrewdly calculating, prudent commander who chose the more conservative course.”

Strong objections from senior officers led him to jettison the radical aspects of OPMS I. His command style also prevented any serious examination of the assumptions that had shaped officer career management since 1945. Thus, he approved a version of OPMS that could not reduce the gap between the idealized professional climate and the then-existing climate. As a result, more than 40 years after Westmoreland commissioned the War College study, officer corps professionalism remains a matter of concern.

NOTES


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17. Recent evidence that company grade officers were more dissatisfied with the current state of professionalism and thus would be more open to radical changes appeared in Survey of Factors Relating to the Retention of Junior Officers conducted in February-March 1971 by the Personnel Management Development Directorate, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center. The survey found that the "most disatisfying" aspect of Army life for these officers was "leadership of superiors." This aspect was also the most important factor motivating these officers not to extend after their initial active duty obligation expired. File Attitude Study 1971, Box 1, DCSPER Instr Files 1971, RG 319, NARA.

18. The quotes in this paragraph are from Memorandum for Record, n.d. [but probably 18 October 1971], "Minutes of OPMS Steering Committee Session." The second and third quotes are by MG George W. Putnam, Jr., the Director of Military Personnel Policies.

19. The staffing of OPMS II is discussed in DODCSPR, "Briefing for the Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&L)."

20. Memorandum for Record, 12 January 1972, LTC. O.B. Combs, Jr., "CSA Decision Briefing on the Officer Personnel Management Study (OPMS II)," File 1972/320-1-2, Box 1346, Chief of Staff Correspondence 1963-1975, RG 319, NARA.

21. Command equivalents were assignments—such as depot commanders, district engineers, and senior advisors in Vietnam—deemed vital but not involving the leadership of American troops. They were designated as command equivalent in order to attract top caliber officers who might otherwise avoid them out of fear of harming their career by not having a field grade troop command tour. Addendum to Summary Sheet, 23 June 1972, MG George W. Putnam, Jr., to Chief of Staff, United States Army, "Centralized Selection of Commanders for Brigade and Battalion Level Troop Commands," File 1972/210:31-14-19, Box 1325, Chief of Staff Correspondence 1963-1975, RG 319, NARA; Letter, 17 July 1972, GEN Henry A. Miley, Jr. to GEN Bruce Palmer, Jr., Endorse A to Summary Sheet, 2 August 1972, DCSPER to Chief of Staff, "Acting CSA Reply to Letter from General Miller on OPMS," File VII-OPMS (Branch Development of Career Development) 1972 Volume II, Box 2, DCSPER Instr Files 1972, RG 319, NARA; Summary Sheet, 31 July 1973, Director of Military Personnel Management to Chief of Staff, "Notification Procedures and Years of Eligibility to be Used in Centralized Command Selection Process," File 320/14-18, Box 9, Office, Chief of Staff, Army, Instruction Files 1973, RG 319, NARA; Engineer Memoirs: Major General Richard S. Kern, U.S.A., Retired (Alexandria, Virginia: Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2002): 152-159 and Appendix A.

22. None of the available sources mentions a reason for the name change. Given the importance of marketing the initiative to the officer corps, the change probably was in line with Kernan's admonition not to appear to be running scared of negative feedback. LTC George R. Vernon, Individual Study Project "Of Officer Personnel Management: A Historical Perspective" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1978): 56-59; Memorandum, 15 August 1973, DGSS (CAR) to GEN Foster, "Announcement of DCSPR OPMS Summary Sheet," File 320/51-55, Box 10, Office, Chief of Staff, Army, Instruction Files 1973, RG 319, NARA. Abrams' caution is in Department of the Army General Staff System," 33rd Annual Report, 1972-73 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 March 1974): ii. There was no message from a chief of staff in previous versions of this pamphlet.


27. A recent summary of these developments is First Lieutenant Anthony M. Formica, U.S. Army, "Lost in Transmission: How the Army Has Garbled the Message about the Nature of its Profession," Military Review 92 (March-April 2012): 44-52. They also shared this disinclination with their predecessors. Donnelly, "Bilko’s Army: A Crisis in Command?"

28. On this, see: "Bilko’s Army: A Crisis in Command?"

29. Don M. Snider, Once Again, the Challenge to the U.S. Army During a Defense Reduction: To Remain a Military Profession (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2012): 30.

Early Mistakes with Security Forces Advisory Teams in Afghanistan

Captain Wesley Moerbe, U.S. Army

In mid-2011, the commander-in-chief announced the withdrawal of combat troops in Afghanistan by 2014. Overnight, the security forces advisory team (SFAT), rather than the brigade combat team (BCT), became the focal point of the war effort. Senior level military planners had the unenviable task of converting the theoretical into reality. When the first wave of these advisory teams were set to deploy in spring of 2012, the entire leadership of several BCTs received orders to start planning for a short-notice deployment as combat advisors. Such a dramatic strategy shift from the BCT to the 12-man SFAT in Afghanistan was a necessary change in methodology, but brought with it the natural friction and challenges inherent to any rapid change of mission.

Future SFATs will be more prepared with more advance notice and a more deliberate train-up prior to deployment. However, senior leaders must address other significant shortcomings before the next wave of advisors arrives or we are doomed to fight through the same “ambush” repeatedly. Most critically, we must organize SFATs more appropriately for their assigned missions, and once assigned, it should be rare if not unheard of to alter that SFAT mission or partner. Frivolous reassignments can, at the stroke of a pen, render weeks or months of training useless and indicate an attitude that predeployment training is irrelevant.

Defining command and support relationships (a headache for the majors and lieutenant colonels of division, brigade, and battalion level staffs) must be clearly outlined. We wasted weeks while members of our small advisory team muddled through the steps of learning how to support themselves in an austere outlying base, determining who to report to, and more importantly, who was their higher headquarters. Was it the landowning battalion commander or the brigade?
Campaign plans and orders seemed nebulous and poorly understood as they applied to SFATs. While we expect the teams to operate in relatively unstructured environments, a unifying theme or framework should address the benchmarks for success. If a document with such content does exist, a commander needs to take the time to look SFAT members in the eye and brief his expectations.

**Team Organization: Getting the Basics Right**

Given the necessity to be self-sustaining, and the relatively small size of a SFAT, composition and selection are of far greater importance than in a larger more conventional unit. Yet we found the organization of our team to be almost arbitrary. The original requirement for our own SFAT mission was to form a 12-man team configured to collaborate with an Afghan Border Patrol battalion. These units are paramilitary and have a bit more firepower than a police district. They have access to indirect fire, and their geographic location tends to put them in remote bases closer to the border with Pakistan. They tend to engage in direct fire engagements more frequently and their missions are analogous to dismounted infantry patrolling. These factors influenced us to select several fire supporters for the team, and to weight our composition with combat arms officers and soldiers.

Training focused nearly as much on being able to defend ourselves and fight as a squad as it did on advising Afghans. We made this decision based on the assumption that we would not have additional combat power assigned to assist us with force protection and to help run day-to-day operations on our outpost.

We divided precious time between trying to learn unfamiliar communication systems, reviewing small unit tactics, qualifying drivers in new vehicles, and catching up on the latest advances in command post and TOC operations. Simultaneously, our team was learning to train an Afghan to be a border policeman. Frankly, we were trying to learn what the border police does. This dichotomy came at a cost. Rather than becoming experts at all the right skills, we could only train to mediocrity at dozens of potential skills we might need. Moreover, once we finally thought the team was ready to take on the challenge of advising a border patrol unit, we received an extemporaneous change of mission. Our team would pair with an Afghan Police District headquarters.

This revelation (among others) came in the final weeks prior to deployment. As it turns out, we had our own security platoon to provide us fixed site security and mobility around the battlefield. In an instant, virtually half of our training and several of our teammates’ positions became irrelevant. Now we had six junior NCOs and soldiers without a day of staff experience and without any specified purpose. A capricious development of SFAT organization, paired with last minute changes of mission and a lack of timely information, put our team at significant disadvantages before we had even arrived in Afghanistan. Advanced warning and timely information about our future mission would have significantly changed the selection of our team members.

However, the most significant change of team composition occurred without warning after we arrived in Afghanistan. Upon our arrival in country, our SFAT discovered that two unknown National Guardsmen would fill the position of team leader and NCOIC. My first sergeant and I were no longer the team chief and NCOIC. This same stunning announcement surprised several other SFATs. Personnel changes create significant turbulence in small units. The sudden change in leadership after the team had already coalesced into a tight-knit group called for enormous amounts of patience, flexibility, and professionalism from everyone. Our team knew how its membership behaved in stressful situations, how each sounded on the radio, and what kind of decisions the leadership made. My first sergeant and I had developed a well-functioning command climate, one consistent with our leadership style. That chemistry changed significantly with the addition of new leadership. I do not mean to skewer our newer team members. Through no fault of their own, they too were put in a difficult position by this capricious decision.

Professionals have to work through challenges presented by egos and other inconveniences. However, our point of contention with this last decision was less about ego than it was about the fickle and arbitrary change in team leadership at a vulnerable point in our deployment. These changes ran at
cross-purposes to the central strategy of providing an effective advisory effort. If the SFAT is to be an enduring and decisive part of our strategy, we as an institution must be more deliberate with its selection and composition. The senior leadership involved in these changes seemed out of step with war effort.

**Command and Support Relationships: Who Does Number Two Work For?**

Given the relatively unconventional nature of the SFAT effort, it is understandable that there is some inherent difficulty developing doctrinally orthodox command and support relationships. Still, we have to meet the challenge and cannot shrug it off as an academic exercise in doctrine. We found that officers at every headquarters were hesitant to address this issue. One can only ask “why?”

The battalion’s task organization chart did not depict or define its relationship with the SFATs in doctrinal terms. We did not know, but had to assume we were under the operational control of the battalion headquarters. We did not know, but had to assume that the platoon supporting us was under our tactical control. These questions are not trivial, and it was not long before our inadequately addressed command-support relationship was an obvious liability.

This gap in our understanding became especially apparent in reporting. Our SFAT, whose primary responsibility began as simply advising, crept more and more into the purview of a battalion or brigade staff. Brigade staff officers began sending direct tasks to our team. Mindless assignments of tasks to SFATs required advisors to be absent for days at a time to receive “check the block training” at some mega-base away from our Afghan partners. Even division staff would occasionally issue tasks...
directly to SFATs. The tasking headquarters did not often consult battalion headquarters or notify it of these direct tasks. There seemed to be a systemic division-wide violation of the principle of unity of command.

We took on more and more responsibilities for meetings and reporting that only had a tangential connection to our advisory mission. We submitted redundant daily situation reports, personnel reports, and closure reports to a myriad of organizations in a myriad of different formats. Fusion meetings, linguist meetings, fuel meetings, targeting meetings, tactical infrastructure working groups, partnered back briefs, commanders’ update briefs, and their required reports sapped our energy and time for advisory efforts. The division became its own worst enemy. We found ourselves building slides and sitting on conference calls or Adobe Connect meetings to such an extent that our partnership with the Afghans took a backseat. We had no recourse because no one could articulate to which headquarters we belonged.

Rather than feeding our reports through a single battalion staff, we were obediently sending information to everyone and every organization who demanded it. Somewhere along the way, we became a de facto liaison to the Afghan Uniformed Police, rather than their advisors. In such situations, one cannot help but think they are being set up for failure.

We had no recourse because no one could articulate to which headquarters we belonged.

To make matters worse, we found that our own Afghan District Police had a higher headquarters whose advisors did not fall under or report to our own ISAF brigade headquarters. The entire idea of shadow-tracking communication between the Afghan echelons was lost in our own ISAF headquarters misalignment. Our assumption for training was that we would have access to advisors partnered with our Afghans’ higher headquarters. That would allow us to determine the breakdown in their staff systems if we could follow a report or request from its originator to the intended recipient, allowing for unity of effort. However, confusing and illogical reporting channels and arbitrary unit boundaries obscured an otherwise simple process.

Much of our work could not take place within a formal structure because these advisors had no obligation to maintain routine communication with us and vice versa. Without a unifying U.S. headquarters to force the provincial level advisors to communicate with their district counterparts, we never managed to break through this gridlock. Many opportunities to leverage the Afghan chain of command were lost to this senseless lack of organization.

Equally challenging was the dearth of sustainment support. Although at least a half dozen organizations required daily or weekly reports and meeting attendance, none was too keen to offer sustainment support. Again, the lack of a clearly outlined command-support relationship meant there was no one and no organization responsible for sustaining our SFAT. This problem was less prominent for those operating on larger forward operating bases with a battalion- or brigade-provided base defense operations center, but in outlying bases, it was outright crippling.

In the end, our logistical advisor assumed responsibility and succeeded in ensuring our outpost received the sustainment we needed, but it came at the expense of his partnership. We were never able to break the stalemate of struggling to provide for ourselves in an austere base and helping the Afghans become better at sustaining themselves, two jobs that were enormous in themselves.

Moreover, all of his procurement and support efforts depended on informal networking and in some cases calling in favors from fellow officers, a time-consuming process that put a premium on personal charisma and relationship development rather than forcing the logistics system to work as intended. One can only imagine that the staff and commander who conceived this mission framework had worried about anything but how the system would work. Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 provides adequate structure to help define these relationships, but battalion and brigade headquarters have to take the responsibility of assigning and enforcing them in a knowledgeable way.
The Gap between Campaign Design and an Executable Plan

Kandahar Province’s constantly changing and highly complex environment required the staff in RC-South to design a plan that allowed for a great deal of flexibility. This problem set was poorly defined and constantly evolving, and therefore a perfect candidate for campaign design methodology, the Army’s preferred technique for such unstructured environments. But planners might have overlooked the doctrinal imperative that we integrate our conceptual design methodology with a more detailed process like the military decision-making process to produce an executable plan.

SFATs found themselves searching for a sense of purpose and mission in the early months of the deployment. We saw specific guidance issued to battalion and company headquarters, but every echelon tiptoed around the thorny problem of issuing guidance to dozens of SFATs operating in RC-South. There seemed to be nothing substantive enough for an SFAT to base planning on. We needed something more tangible than a line of effort arrow that says, “Afghan Security Forces Development.” We needed guidance that was broad enough to allow us to develop an adaptable plan but with enough specificity that we could plot a few discrete benchmarks to measure progress.

We faced the dilemma of planning in a vacuum. This vacuum was particularly large given the unorthodox mission of security forces advising and the ethereal guidance in brigade and battalion orders. How do we develop our own campaign plan? What should our plan look like? If we are writing an order for ourselves, what are the decisive points? Whose base order do we use to ensure we are properly nested and at the appropriate level?

Eventually, we settled on what became the Police Garrison Concept as the keystone planning guidance for the remainder of our time there. It was never an annex to an OPORD; nor was it ever briefed in a formal setting. We did not direct, or even suggest, that the Police Garrison Concept was the framework plan we needed. It was simply, the closest thing to guidance that we could apply to SFATs partnered at the district level.

It took shape, rather spontaneously, in the paragraphs of emails exchanged between advisors. PowerPoint slides with measures of performance and measures of effectiveness sometimes landed in our inboxes. Phone conversations between advisory teams informally determined what they ought to do and what was achievable, but always in a casual manner that did not denote that these bits of email traffic and phone calls amounted to the SFAT operational framework.

All police advisory teams did not universally understand this Police Garrison Concept. To some, it meant a blueprint for constructing future police stations or checkpoints, while to others it was a Mission Command plan, and to others still, it was a plan to zone the police districts. While there was some truth to each of these, none by themselves captured the essence of the concept. Essentially, the Police Garrison Concept was the plan for district level Afghan police advisors. Subtly and gradually, we found the guidance that we had been looking for quite by accident.
Advising requires acting without highly specific guidance in highly unstructured environments, but some idea or overarching concept must provide an azimuth to unify our efforts or we will expend our energy fighting in a dozen different directions. Of course we had some of our own ideas coming into the mission and developed more as we went, but without a commonly understood framework like the Police Garrison Concept, our efforts were not focused, and we had difficulty deciphering what battalion, brigade, or division leaders defined as successful for the advisory effort.

Conclusions

It is tempting to view advisory teams as being flaccid, sapping combat power to secure, and yielding minimal visible results. Institutionally, we tend to defer to the warfighter. That is where leadership is most comfortable and the terrain most familiar. In the current operating environment, company commanders have to secure advisors at the expense of their own combat power. Operations officers have to apply scarce resources to advisors whose missions they often do not fully believe in or whose personalities make them unpleasant to interact with. Battalion commanders are often the same rank as advisors or possibly even junior to SFAT leaders who fall under their operational control. These factors intensify the sometimes-adversarial attitudes that can develop between conventional forces and their advisor counterparts. In the end, the solution is nothing new or unique, but will require the attentive officers and noncommissioned officers who lead the joint task forces, regional commands, and major Army commands to make decisions that may not be popular or with which they may not be comfortable.

Leadership at the BCT, regional command, and combatant command level can and must negotiate the often-uncharted waters of the advisory team and land-owning unit relationships without flinching. We must define, codify, and enforce the relationship without regard for rank-related discomfort. Pride must give way to strategic interests. Division and brigade staffs must respect the orders process and base their interaction with SFATs upon the command-support relationship rather than bypassing intermediate headquarters and directly tasking them. This will necessarily place greater stress on battalion headquarters, but we can mitigate it by adding a senior captain or major to act as a liaison to the SFATs. Every headquarters must ruthlessly seek out and eliminate redundant reporting.

Forces command and regional commands must take a more deliberate approach to building and assigning the SFAT composition. A change to an SFAT’s mission after the completion of home-station training and the requisite rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center is a clear indicator that we are not respecting the institutional differences between Afghan Security Forces, Afghan Army, Border Police, and Uniformed Police each require a very different approach as they have significantly different cultures. SFATs are not as interchangeable as infantry squads. Advisors must train, research, and prepare for their specific partnered force. Just as we would expect a BCT to remain on a consistent glide path for predeployment preparation, so we must provide that same stability to the SFAT if it is to succeed.

Finally, the brigade and battalion leadership must have all their subordinate SFAT leadership in one room and issue guidance that clearly states the benchmarks for success in the advisory effort. Time is too short for advisors to deduce their commander’s guidance over the course of several months. These benchmarks must have enough specificity to give direction, but enough latitude to adjust to the local conditions of each SFAT operating environment. The possibility of Afghan Security Force failure is worth considering. We must accept this will occur at times and honestly report failure when it happens. Occasionally, brigades and battalions must revisit these benchmarks to maintain relevance and feasibility, particularly when Afghans have setbacks.

Not all is gloomy in the SFAT mission. There are more successes than failures, and there is much to be proud of, especially when one considers the sudden development of the mission and the agility SFATs and conventional formations alike exhibit. Yet, consider how much more powerful and effective the SFAT could be if we applied more effort to these problems before the next advisors arrived in Afghanistan. MR
To Make Army PME Distance Learning Work, Make It Social

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Kimball and Captain Joseph M. Byerly, U.S. Army

Army Distance Learning (dL) for professional military education (PME) is not living up to its full potential. PME dL courses are seen as the poor relations of resident courses, and soldiers are counseled to avoid them if at all possible out of a belief that they will negatively affect career progression. With the return of competitive selection for resident attendance at Command and General Staff School, dL courses are likely to further sink in reputation and standing. This article proposes an immediate fix for dL PME courses to make them more relevant for participants and thereby enhance their standing in the PME hierarchy. The fix is to incorporate social learning, using a variety of resources to connect learners in conversation around professionally relevant content. The Army’s soldier-student population is familiar with and prefers social learning over individual study. Moreover, the Army already has a robust social networking system established. Introducing a social component into dL PME can, if done properly, increase the relative value of these courses and bring those more into line with the Army’s stated doctrine for learning environments.

The Mismatch of Doctrine vs. Reality

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept (ALC) for 2015, emphasizes the importance of social learning, but even it falls short in applying that preference to dL. ALC 2015 stresses that social engagement and collaborative participation are growing in importance, so future learning models must incorporate more opportunities for both.¹ One means of doing so is via storytelling, which ALC 2015 notes is a time-honored educational tradition that increases learning and enhances transfer of difficult concepts. ALC 2015 emphasizes the idea of a “continuous adaptive learning model” that uses a mix of live and electronically delivered content in both resident and nonresident courses. A peer-based learning system is an explicit part

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PHOTOS: (U.S. Army)
of this model; ALC 2015 notes the “Web 2.0” explosion of user-curated content and how it has become a familiar part of life and learning for an increasing number of learners. However, when it comes to implementing this social learning model, proposed ALC 2015 actions overwhelmingly focus on traditional classrooms and do not address dL. One example is particularly noteworthy: multiple agencies are directed to “convert most classroom experiences into collaborative problem solving events” (emphasis added). This deliberate exclusion of dL PME from the broader context of Army learning is symptomatic of a lack of social learning in dL programs.

Despite having well-established programs of instruction supported by significant infrastructure, most dL PME courses have no mechanism for enrolled students to engage with one another. The recently cancelled Phase I of the Captains Career Course was a dL module of 71 hours of “common core” training, for which completion was required for promotion. No discussion forum existed for that common formative experience for junior officers across the Army. An outside observer might argue that common core training is basic enough not to require collaborative learning, but several threads on various Army professional forums seeking assistance on unclear aspects of this module belie this assumption.

The dL version of Intermediate Level Education–Common Core (ILE-CC) likewise has no mechanism for social engagement among students. The broader ILE program does have a requirement for posting public engagement through means such as blogging or commenting on public forums, but the emphasis is on one-way communication rather than conversation. The Army War College’s distance education website lists a similar requirement for “writing forum participation,” but it is unclear whether this refers to an actual collaborative forum or simply a requirement to write and post material in an online space similar to that of ILE-CC.

The recently instituted Structured Self-Development for Army noncommissioned officers (NCOs) suffers from a similar lack of a social component. Structured Self-Development is envisioned as a lifelong learning tool, with automatic enrollment in each phase occurring after the completion of NCO PME schools such as the Warrior Leader Course. Each of its modules are structured with a series of tasks that mirror previously existing NCO Educational System courses. But just as in officer dL PME, Structured Self-Development is a solitary experience, with no social engagement with peers to facilitate the process. Its official catalog, published by the Sergeants Major Academy, is telling in this respect; interspersed throughout the catalog course descriptions are pictures of soldiers hunched over computers, presumably seeking out the “right” answers. In the few pictures depicting more than one soldier, an individual is pointing to a portion of the screen, emphasizing the orientation of the course as a provider of knowledge rather than as a facilitation tool. Nowhere in the catalog does the reader see NCOs engaging in conversation with one another. Small wonder, then, that less than 15 percent of the soldiers enrolled in Structured Self-Development 1 are on track to complete the course prior to attending the Warrior Leader Course.
The common thread running throughout all of these dL PME experiences is that, rather than connecting students with their peers and allowing for an exchange of ideas, these courses isolate the participants. These dL courses are structured more as an efficient means of content delivery to a recipient than true learning experiences. Nothing highlights this dissonance better than a recent column by Sergeant Major of the Army Raymond Chandler, who lauds the ability of the current generation of soldiers to connect via Facebook and Twitter, and then goes on to explain how Structured Self-Development will better communicate lessons to soldiers. The column misses one of the central truths of social media: they are so wildly successful because they provide unprecedented opportunities for people around the world to interact and engage.

These observations of Army dL PME are not just anecdotal or snapshots; outside research of Army dL has also reinforced these findings. A recently released 5-year RAND study of Army distance learning noted that most Army dL has little to no student-instructor interaction. The study makes no mention at all of peer-to-peer interaction, further underlining this serious gap in practice. Among its recommendations was to better link distance learning with the Army’s Knowledge Management program as a way of opening dL students to a broader variety of perspectives. Unfortunately, the RAND report specifically emphasizes greater integration with knowledge management databases—huge impersonal repositories of knowledge—rather than broader engagement with other human beings engaged in learning. Defining knowledge management exclusively in this manner ignores much of the recent research that places greater emphasis on the primacy of social aspects of learning.

**Why Social?**

A well-established and growing body of literature suggests that social learning is a vital component of all education, not just formal schooling. The common thread of schools of social learning is a persistent requirement to situate education...
within a genuine practice that derives both from the legitimacy of the subject material and the engagement of peers and experts. For example, activity theory promotes designing courses that produce participant structures and supports; these, in turn, produce both learning artifacts and social participation that helps immerse learners in relevant practices. Activity theory looks at the interchange of tools, rules, and desired objectives within a community of learners and a division of labor between those learners to produce specific outcomes. In the same vein, Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger’s seminal work on apprenticeship and communities of practice emphasizes the central role of “legitimate peripheral participation” in creating and defining learning experiences for learners engaged in a common practice. Legitimate peripheral participation is simply individuals engaging in knowing as an activity within a larger socio-cultural community that assists them in the construction of a learning identity within their practice. These are just two of the better-known schools of social learning; an exhaustive list would be beyond the scope of this article and not particularly instructive to the reader.

Far from being fads or buzzwords, these theories have great resonance when applied in the context of time-honored learning traditions. Many studies of the cognitive domain use Bloom’s Taxonomy, a hierarchy of six levels of learning that range from simple knowledge to more complex evaluation. Social learning techniques, with their emphasis on exposing the learners to new viewpoints, are especially useful in bringing students through the higher levels of the taxonomy such as application, analysis, and synthesis. Social learning is also a useful means of extending Socratic learning techniques beyond a simple exchange between instructor and student. Classic Socratic classrooms use a dialectic approach that seeks to achieve an understanding of a complex topic through a series of questions and answers that provide a deeper analysis of the subject. Online discussion forums can expand this dialectic to a larger group of learners, allowing many participants to contribute to and benefit from the discussion.

All of the above may sound very dry and academic, but Army studies have shown it to be an accurate representation of how the current and rising generations of soldiers learn best. A recent U.S. Army Research Institute study of self-learning habits among noncommissioned officers was blunt and to the point: “NCOs prefer approaches that are highly social and interactive.” The study found that most NCOs sought advice and feedback on their learning performance from peers and senior individuals whom they perceived as having valuable perspectives on the topic. Another popular learning strategy was information seeking, in which NCOs tracked down what they perceived to be good sources of information and reflected with others on the value of that information as compared to their own experiences. Even a little-used strategy of sense-making, when employed, primarily involved finding alternative and novel sources of learning and using them to summarize the individual’s own learning. A monograph on officer learning habits produced similar findings, noting that a majority of participants in the study favored peer-to-peer learning approaches. These approaches were perceived as having value for answering both open-ended problems and questions with discrete answers.

We Already Know How To Do This!

Indeed, this soldier preference for social learning potentially linked to enhanced DL is reflected in the growth and continued relevance of the Army professional forums, officially sanctioned and supported online spaces where soldiers can engage peers and subject-matter experts in conversation about specific practices. The Army professional forums began with just a handful of forums totaling a few thousand users in the early 2000s; they now consist of dozens of forums with nearly 300,000 users from all components of the Army. Army
professional forum communities span the full range of Army practices and concerns and feature real-time development of elements of those practices. Conversations in the forums focus on real problems and timely solutions to those problems, generated by the communities themselves. Although some of the forums have a contract or volunteer facilitator, the professional atmosphere and grass-roots ownership of the community reduces the need for active moderation of discussions.

One example of the impact these forums are already having on Army learning is the Read2Lead program, hosted within the Army professional forum community and supported by the Center for the Advancement of Leader Development and Organizational Learning at West Point. This innovative engagement draws upon the broader norms and conversations within the MilSpace community to support the established practice of professional reading. Members create a dynamic and interactive professional reading list by recommending books for reading, while voting and commenting on others’ recommendations. The result is a professional reading list with a situated context to help readers understand the value of specific texts. In the first year of the program’s inception, Read2Lead members recommended 88 books, voted hundreds of times on the value of those books, and posted 131 comments about how those books made a difference for them.

Integrating a social component into Army dL PME will not require an entirely new doctrine or set of procedures; we already possess the institutional knowledge to make this work.

**Cavalry Leaders’ Course: A Case Study**

A case study from the Cavalry Leaders Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, may help to better illustrate the utility of these techniques. The CLC, offered by the Armor School, exists to train soldiers involved in the planning and execution of reconnaissance missions how to synchronize and employ reconnaissance in today’s current operating environment.

Instructors at the Cavalry Leaders Course post articles and questions nightly on the milSuite platform. Students reply to questions on the message board and the responses are used as conversation starters the next day in class.
Students in the course include active and reserve component soldiers in grades ranging from E-7 to O-5, as well as marines of comparable grade. Every student is issued a laptop during the course to facilitate the use of electronic learning materials. The course itself is a fast-paced 15 days, which includes two separate company-level orders processes as well as an adaptive planning exercise. An environment of this intensity requires opportunities for reflection and synthesis of the course material.

The course uses the milSuite platform to host online professional discussions and share course content with members of the reconnaissance community. Each night, the students are presented with a discussion question along with supporting articles, doctrine, and case studies, which are posted on the message board. The message board, found on the Cavalry Leaders Course milBook page, enables students to extend discussions beyond the classroom and onto a professional forum accessible by leaders throughout the Army. This process allows students to learn not only from each other, but also from other leaders outside the classroom. The boards also allow students to remain in contact with one another after the conclusion of the course as they return to their units. These collaborative online discussions enhance the learning experience of the students while also generating additional topics and ideas for the instructors to use in subsequent class discussions.18

A recent Cavalry Leaders Course milBook discussion illustrates the power of this social learning model. The instructor began the discussion with a prompt, derived from an assigned reading:

Q: How has the emergence of hybrid threats created new challenges for company/troop level commanders vs. previous threat models (i.e., Cold War/Soviet doctrine)? What methods can be used to overcome or mitigate these challenges (i.e., training, operational, planning . . .)?

Over the next 24 hours, students post responses that seek to answer the question from a variety of perspectives, including some drawn from the students’ own experiences:

Simulations will have to be leveraged extensively to train both combined arms maneuver [CAM] and wide area security. Though often tedious, commanders will have to squeeze every ounce of value out of these systems in order to ensure that their formations are already operating at a high level when they do get to conduct FTXs, LFXs, MREs, etc. [field training exercises, live fire exercises, and mission rehearsal exercises]. The complexity of modern military operations has caused [U.S. forces] to rely on technology to increase their effectiveness or capabilities. At the same time, this opens up new lanes which hybrid enemies can use to strike at [U.S. forces]. Planning and training for every contingency is impossible . . . cavalry is best suited to cover as many bases as possible and is already headed in the right direction with training mounted tasks as they would against a peer threat . . . in addition to the forces that fall into “the sweet spot” . . . of the more contemporary IED [improvised explosive device] defeat and insurgent/dismount team type fight.

At this point, the discussion has already spanned almost twice the time that would have been available to engage the topic in the classroom, while gathering 21 responses to the prompt. One student then poses a challenge to the conceptual framework of “hybrid warfare” proposed by the author of the article:

I’m somewhat disappointed in the term of hybrid threat. While a compound threat has a clear definition (strategic coordination between regular and irregular forces), the hybrid threat relies on an entity to fit a “sweet spot” of maturity, capability, and complex terrain . . . Attempting to identify the hybrid threat has the potential to create a “planning trap” if the leadership isn’t careful. It is very
easy for planning to come to a standstill [when we have] difficulty identifying where an entity fits in the sweet spot.

The instructor in a conventional classroom, faced with the time crunch to cover all of the material, would have to choose one of several choices. He can attempt to answer the student’s question himself; he can throw out the question to the group to discuss; or he can table the question and promise to come back to it later. Instead, this instructor chose to go straight to the source material and invite the author himself to join the conversation. The author replies:

As [the student] points out, hybrid adversaries should definitely be examined and understood from a “macro” strategic-level approach. . . . That said, there is no magic threshold where an adversary is an inept armed mob just this side of it, and a ten-foot-tall hybrid threat that fights in a radically different way on the other. To again echo [the student’s] comment, time spent nitpicking over whether a particular adversary is or isn’t technically a hybrid threat is ultimately a red herring, at least from a tactical standpoint. The simple truth is that any adversary with access to advanced modern weapons and capabilities and the knowledge/training to use them effectively will make you glad you trained for CAM, or wish you had if you didn’t.

Not entirely satisfied with the answer he received, the student presses the author further, invoking some of the author’s own evaluative criteria to make the point:

I agree 100% that CAM is our best tool in attacking the stand-off fires “capability” of a hybrid threat. That should be our tactical focus. However, capability is only one variable of a hybrid threat. What role does a company or troop commander have in combating maturity and complexity of terrain (specifically human terrain)? Are there not other agencies (for example, State Department or the special operations forces community) that should focus on combating these other variables? Are we asking too much of these young officers to be warriors, diplomats, and politicians?

From start to “finish,” the exchange on this topic spanned six days and 27 posts. The term “finish” is in quotes because, in an online discussion forum, the conversation is never truly finished. Unlike conventional classroom conversations, which end when the instructor assesses that the discussion has served its pedagogical purpose, this discussion will remain available on milBook to the members of the class into the future. The discussion will also be available to future students, who can use the reflections in the forum as starting points for their own thinking on the topic.

**How to Go Social**

Every Army dL PME course should be assessed for potential integration of a social component, even ones that may not seem to readily lend themselves to that approach. It is true that not every course will be appropriate for a social approach; but the default question should be “Why shouldn’t we try a social addition?” not “Why should we?” A useful start would be to look at the elements of the course through the activity theory lens depicted in the activity theory model.19

For instance, courses could be evaluated to identify specific practices that students routinely struggle with or fail to fully integrate. Course managers may be able to identify specific tools in the practice that students may benefit from broader use of in a social context. Additionally, managers could single out specific divisions of labor that would help implement those tools. It is vital to **first** identify what the objectives and desired outcomes of a social component would be **before** jumping into how to do it. A grafted-on social component isolated from the core purposes of the course will feel inauthentic and will lack support. Fortunately, many of the course management systems in use for dL programs already contain social software such as discussion forums or blogging platforms, so the additional costs of adding social components will largely be for manpower. When establishing social learning platforms, picking the right person to manage them is as important, or even more important, than the platform used for the discussion. While the S6 may always be the “go-to” person when the task involves automation, a better choice would be someone who not only knows how to navigate the Internet but also has a passion for professional development.
Once the page is established and members have joined, the next step is content development and engagement. If the instructor comes across an article he thinks would be beneficial for the development of the class or their peer group, the article can be posted online. The instructor should ask questions that require responses beyond showing simple understanding, thereby driving discussion that accelerates the learning process. In addition to articles, instructors can also post and share other products and tools with students, which will increase the utility of the discussions.

Frequency of online interaction and relevance of posts should also be addressed when discussing implementation. If students are constantly required to sit in front of their computers reading and answering discussion questions, they may begin to feel overburdened by professional development, resulting in diminishing returns. Instructors should limit the frequency of responses to a reasonable interval driven by the needs of the course, with the exception of opportunities that might arise based on current events or trends within the Army.

Before posting articles and questions, instructors should also provide clear requirements for participation. Requirements should address length or quality of posts, expectations for content (quality and relevance of posts), and timeliness. This can be done by creating a document that contains guidelines for conduct and content on the unit message board.

**Conclusion**

The Army has always “done” social learning for PME; the vibrant discussions of formal NCO and officer development programs or informal after-hours unit calls are a persistent example. Discussions about the Army profession and its various practices in social settings have been a prominent feature of face-to-face PME for decades. If soldiers are our credentials, we owe it to ourselves to connect those soldiers in every way possible, and PME should be no exception. We have the expertise, the technology, and the imperative to do this now; seizing this opportunity could transform popular perceptions of dL PME and open new vistas of learning for the Army as a whole.
2. Ibid., 35.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 117
10. Ibid., 52.
12. Ibid., 68.
15. To further explore APF, visit <https://forums.army.mil>. An Army Knowledge Online account is required. As of this writing, the APF are in the midst of transitioning to the MilSuite platform, <https://www.milsuite.mil>.
16. CALDOL is the creator of the CompanyCommand and PlatoonLeader professional forums and serves as a research and development arm for APF.
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PHOTO: U.S. soldiers with the 145th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment record images and video of U.S. soldiers with 3rd Striker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, as they calibrate an M777 howitzer at Forward Operating Base Warhorse, Diyala Province, Iraq, 8 December 2009. (U.S. Navy, MCS01 Class Eileen Kelly Fors)

L ight’em all up!” was the headline on the front page of a prestigious Dutch newspaper. A still from leaked video footage taken from a U.S. attack helicopter in Iraq accompanied the story. These sorts of newspaper headlines appear after tragic incidents, particularly those involving civilian victims.

In another illustrative case, a commander is quoted as saying, “Yes, those pax are an imminent threat.” The chief of a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) camp in Kunduz, Afghanistan, made the judgment after he saw black dots (thermal images of persons) on his computer screen. He turned out to be tragically wrong.

These newspaper quotations emphasize what can go wrong with imagery interpretation during military operations, and they are not isolated cases. The first quotation is about an incident that took place in 2007, involving a group of journalists with their cameras mistaken for insurgents with weapons. Two of the news reporters did not survive the air strike that followed. The second quotation is about an air strike on two hijacked fuel trucks in Kunduz, Afghanistan, in September 2009. After the incident several reports came out deciphering the strike in terms of who was to blame for the scores of victims.

A common factor in such incidents is the use of technological assets that allow several military officers to see the objective simultaneously, i.e., a network of observers and decision makers observing the same incident with the intention of gaining a military advantage.

In earlier issues of Military Review, several authors focused on the difficulties in decision making, accountability, and responsibilities in these complex military missions. In this article, I take these difficulties very seriously to elucidate an often overlooked factor, the role of technology in decision making. I will discuss the pitfalls that can occur when making decisions in a network environment, specifically the sharing of live video images originating from manned or unmanned systems. This article’s central theme relates to the interaction between man and technology during network-enabled operations.
Terminology

The term “network-enabled capabilities” requires some explanation. The term means the use of network technologies and information technology assets to facilitate cooperation and information sharing. This can lead to a build-up of complex and ad hoc multinational environments, referred to as network-enabled capabilities or network enabled operations. Network enabled capabilities have the potential for increasing military effects through improved use of information technology systems.

The underlying vision for establishing these complex, ad hoc multinational environments is the linking up of decision makers via information technology and communication networks to enable improved, synchronized decision making. The idea is that people with authorized access to the network, wherever they may be in physical or hierarchal terms, can log in, coordinate operations, and retrieve and submit relevant information. Frans Osinga has already added a critical note to the high expectations of network-enabled capabilities. In “Netwerkend de oorlog in?” (Militaire Spectator), he addresses the practical and moral complexities of high technology from a philosophical perspective.

In this contribution, I discuss the routine practice of the networking soldier and examine a number of problems inherently connected to the use of technology. I present these problems as possible pitfalls and use the case of the Kunduz airstrike to illustrate these pitfalls in daily military practice.

Three Pitfalls

Although I could discuss several other pitfalls, I will limit myself to three:

- The danger of developing a so-called “Predator view.”
- The misinterpretation of visual data.
- The prevention of streamlined communication.

The use of a technological network is not a neutral activity but a hidden dimension that is almost completely ignored and may lie at the heart of many problems that rise to the surface. The insights discussed come from a technological-philosophical approach to network-enabled capabilities. I endeavour to clarify the underlying problems by use of the concept of practice, as developed by a number of philosophers. I conclude with a suggestion to alert users to potential pitfalls at an early stage. This may contribute to a more responsible use of network-enabled capabilities.

Case Study: The Kunduz Air Strike

The Kunduz air strike was requested based on information about insurgents hijacking two military vehicles carrying fuel for troops of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Information had surfaced to the effect that the trucks would perform a suicide attack on the nearby German PRT camp.

The information reached the commander through an Afghan informant, who had spoken to an intelligence officer by telephone. That night, the commander received images of the trucks via video footage transmitted from an aircraft flying over the location. These images were projected onto a screen in the tactical operations center.

In reality, not everyone in the vicinity of the fuel trucks was an insurgent. Most of those close to the trucks were civilians from a nearby village. The trucks had become bogged down in the riverbed, and the insurgents had asked the civilians to tap some of the fuel in order to lighten the trucks’ loads. The final result was that the majority of the victims of the airstrike were civilians.

This news was painful in view of the fact that ISAF commander General McChrystal had drawn up a new tactical directive shortly before aimed at preventing civilian casualties. The new directive also tightened up the rules regarding air support. The incident led to fierce debates, particularly in political circles in Germany. Various investigative reports, pointing fingers at the guilty party, were also published. However, the focus here is on the role of technology in decision making and not on who was responsible for the tragedy.

In this incident, the remotely operated video-enhanced receiver (ROVER) device played an important role. Manned or unmanned aircraft use the ROVER to capture video images and...
immediately transmit them to ground locations. One can see these live images on a screen, such as on a conventional laptop computer, making real-time information on the situation on the ground available to the Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC) and third parties on the network. In the case of the Kunduz air strike, the ROVER images were available to both the JTAC and the PRT commander.

Two U.S. F-15 pilots were involved in the air strike. After arriving at the location, the JTAC requested that they prepare two 500-pound bombs for release. However, the pilots wanted to have more certainty on the situation before launching an air strike and were continuously searching for alternatives. For example, they made a request to carry out a show of force first, i.e., make a low-level pass and let people possibly run for cover, before launching an attack.13

The PRT commander had a different interpretation of the situation and was not convinced that further delays would benefit matters. The pilots wanted to consult senior commanders from the U.S. Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar. A 45-minute discussion between the pilots, JTAC, and the PRT commander ensued. What should be done and who should be involved?14 Finally, the JTAC and the PRT commander managed to allay the pilots’ concerns by designating the trucks as an imminent threat.15

First Pitfall: The “Predator View”

The first pitfall in network-enabled operations is the development of a “Predator view.” Steve Call in Danger Close (2007) describes this term as having two aspects.16 First, observers can get so caught up in what they are seeing on the screen that they lose sight of what is happening elsewhere. Second, at any given moment, they have a powerful tendency to mistake the view through the camera lens for the “big picture.” The real time images show only a specific part of an area, yet these images are screen-filling, implicitly suggesting that there is nothing more going on other than what the screen shows.
What may have happened in the Kunduz air strike incident is that the PRT commander in Kunduz had mentally adopted the “Predator view.” Perhaps he was caught up in what he saw and mistook it for the “big picture.” Rear Admiral Gregory J. Smith, a senior member of the U.S. assessment team for the Kunduz incident, states, “When you’re sitting at a command center, it may look like you’re seeing nothing but insurgents, but the reality can be pretty complex.” This statement appears to allude to the Predator view phenomenon. Call describes the consequences:

When the two problems combine—when people in headquarters get sucked into the Predator’s tiny view of the unfolding action and insist they have a real lock on the battle and try to influence events based on that view—it can lead to some unfortunate, even unprofessional, confrontations as different observers argue over what needs to be done, where, and when.

Bad consequences can come from decisions made based on limited images. We clearly see the interaction between man and technology in the Predator view. The associated pitfall of the Predator view relates to knowledge and experience. In this example, the JTAC completed intensive and ongoing training in the interpretation of maps, aerial photographs, and the use of the ROVER system. From March 2009, the JTAC commander had directed between 40 and 50 air strikes. Based on his training and experience, he was the so-called “qualified observer” and the “release authority.” A local commander can request an air strike, but he or she has no authority as to where, when, and how to release a bomb. These are not part of the “rules” connected to his position. Likewise, during close air support, the pilot is not authorised to eliminate a target without permission from the JTAC. Guaranteeing the safety of friendly forces, civilians, and infrastructure during air strikes inextricably links to the position of the JTAC. The ROVER system serves to support the JTAC in this process; the JTAC has also trained to interpret the images. In contrast, the local commander (in this case the PRT commander) must keep a clear overview of the situation and guarantee the tactical direction.

It seems in this case that the PRT commander was less engaged in keeping a clear view of the situation and more on focusing on the details shown on the screen (i.e., the purview of the JTAC). Thus, we can say that technology is not a neutral thing. It has a tendency to distract or persuade people in a certain direction. The local commander’s task is to keep a clear view of the overall operation, respect the rules of engagement for the mission, and adhere to standing operating procedures (SOP), in this particular case, SOP #311 regarding close air support.

Second Pitfall: Misinterpretation

The second pitfall of the Predator view concerns the misinterpretation of video images. The commander had the opportunity to watch the ROVER images on the screen, which are initially meant to guide the JTAC, guiding the air support from the tactical operations center. However, these images are projections of temperatures within a certain range, and result in grainy, gray images with imprecise black dots. It was possible to distinguish the trucks stuck in the river bed and the people around them, but not whether these people were carrying weapons. In interpreting the ROVER images, it seems that the PRT commander acted solely on his own insight and made decisions without accepting the views of others on the network.

For example, the F-15 pilots suggested consulting ISAF Headquarters in Kabul and the U.S. Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar. However, the commander did not want to lose his window of opportunity of eliminating actual terrorist threats. Given the information he had, he thought the situation was threatening and this belief colored his interpretation of the images on the screen.

Tragically, he misinterpreted the persons on the screen for insurgents, partly owing to the information relayed to him by an Afghan informer. This fragmentary information led him to believe an attack was forthcoming. However, it was hard for him to tell whether some of the black dots on the screen might be villagers coming to take free fuel from the trucks.

Although information technology and network technologies can even out the differences in information available to the various partners, they cannot bridge the differences between partners in knowledge of “rules of the game” to deal responsibly with network information. This may lead to people taking matters into their own hands and assuming authority without actually being formally authorized to do so.
The 2007 Apache incident in Iraq described at the beginning of this article is a similar case of U.S. airmen misinterpreting video images. The helicopter crew was convinced that the men they were following on-screen were carrying weapons and a rocket launcher. In reality, the crew was observing a team of news reporters carrying cameras. Two reporters died in the ensuing attack because the aircrew and the military on the ground mistook their cameras for weapons.27

The way in which we interpret information depends on the situation of the observer, his expertise, and the way the information is presented. Technology plays a vital role in presenting information. Therefore, pointing fingers at certain persons involved is only a partial, one-sided assessment of the situation. When we assess incidents, we must take the role of technology into account as well.

Third Pitfall: Prevention of Streamlined Communication

The third pitfall relates to communication between the various partners on the network. Missions such as the one in Afghanistan will generate more tension owing to conflicting rules between coalition partners. There are sometimes also differences in the interests of the various allies’ headquarters.

These tensions are especially noticeable at lower levels, where soldiers have to act rapidly in dealing with situations: One frustrated observer notes that, “It used to be, the ground commander requested a bomb, and a bomb he got. Now, the ground commander requests a bomb, and the joint terminal attack controller, the aircrew, and the ground commander talk about it.”28 The multinational character of network-enabled capabilities amplifies such discussions. For example, rules of engagement may differ. The aim or the direction is clear: namely, to find a better solution than the release of a bomb. However, sometimes these discussions only complicate a situation, as we saw in the Kunduz air strike.

The third pitfall is that the prevention of streamlined communication during an operation attenuates clarity. It took 45 minutes of arduous debate between the German commander, the JTAC, and the U.S. pilots to get clarity on how best to act.29 The commander did not want to request support from Qatar, because of the emergency of the situation. He believed the involvement of more partners in the network would further delay and block a fast interpretation, which was necessary in his view.30 This made things even worse.

**Technology is not Neutral**

Why do such pitfalls develop? Let us look at the problem from two perspectives. The first perspective employs an insight from the philosophy of technology, that technology is not neutral. We often assume information technology and network technology are neutral, in the sense that these technologies merely facilitate information exchange, nothing more. Douglas Pryer in an earlier 2012 issue of this journal noted, “Many still do not understand that the most profound impact of information technology on warfare can be seen in the rising importance of war’s moral dimension.”31

A number of philosophers of technology have shown that technology is actually far from neutral and influences human behavior and actions.32 Peter Paul Verbeek has used the term “technology mediation” to describe the phenomenon. Technology stands between the user and the real world, so we can say it mediates between the user and reality. Verbeek partly explains his views by referring to the field of ultrasonography. New dimensions exist in medical practice because of the availability of the so-called ultrasound scan’s technology-mediated images of the fetus. However, as a technology, the ultrasound scan is not neutral. It creates new dilemmas for users. For example, the question may arise as to whether an unborn child that the ultrasound scan shows as having medical defects should be born.33

In other words, the technology-mediated image influences the decision-making behavior of the medical practitioners and the parents involved. The same is apparent in the case of ROVER. However refined ROVER’s graphic images may be, they only suggest that you are looking at events on the ground. In reality, you are looking at a technology-mediated image of those events.
This technology provides a mediated image of reality by sending real-time video or thermal images from a manned or unmanned aircraft to a laptop computer screen. The dots on the screen do not show the reality the onlooker sees, but interpretations of reality, in this case, through thermal images. Much like the ultrasound scan, the ROVER images can help gather information where this was once impossible. However, we have to be careful when working with these technologies.

Several factors influence the way these images are used. One of them relates to the choices designers of technological interfaces have made as to underlying scripts, colors, icons, positions of buttons, etc., all of which influence what the user thinks is important from his perspective. (“If a red light starts flashing, it must be important.”)

This technology also changes people’s behavior. In the case of the Kunduz incident, the ROVER images influenced the commander’s perception of reality and possibly changed his decision-making. The insight that technology provides a mediated view and is not neutral can help us better understand the first two pitfalls, the Predator view and the misinterpretation of images.

The Concept of Practice

The second perspective examines the concept of “practices.” Several philosophers use the concept of (normative) practice to suggest there is a relationship between right or correct actions and the context in which these actions are carried out. The concept of practice asserts among other things that actions take place in a specific context with specific standards, in the sense of “rules of the game” for the practice.

Those rules of the game even define a practice to some extent. For example, the rules of soccer or chess not only define their respective games, they make them possible. Further, defense doctrine determines military actions, and rules of engagement allow military personnel to carry out military actions. In the case of the rules of engagement, these rules may change during a mission.

Structure and direction. One should distinguish between structure and direction with respect to the concept of practice. Rules, procedures, and standards that ground a practice’s actions and competencies also characterize its structure. In this regard, the term “rules” means the “rules of the game” or standards which constitute the practice.

Think again of soccer, where the rule stating that no use may be made of the hand defines the game. This rule makes the game of soccer possible, making it clear that it is not rugby. Manuals, codes of conduct, and guidelines often document a practice’s structure.

Various rules played roles in the case of the Kunduz air strike—the rules for command and control in the hierarchical structure between the commander and the pilot; a directive from General McChrystal; the rules of engagement applicable to the operation; rules for requesting air strikes in specific situations; standards for communication between informants and the command center; and procedures for releasing bombs. These rules make sense only in the military context.

Direction refers to the underlying convictions that drive people to perform their tasks in their various practices. These are one’s deepest convictions regarding the actions that he performs. The convictions are also the ethos of the profession. Direction relates to cultural background and worldview. It influences the way rules work in a practice and the way we interpret rules in specific situations.
Members of the military involved in the Kunduz incident had a conviction regarding what their work was ultimately about. ISAF commander McChrystal’s first concern was for the security of Afghan civilians. The German commander’s top concern was to protect his own people against insurgents.

**Technology connects practices.** We cannot understand technology’s role in military practice without referring to the specific social context in which we use the technology.

How does the concept of practice work in the framework of network-enabled capabilities? We currently refer to actors in a network-enabled operation as nodes. This term relies on a mechanistic view of how military personnel work in network-enabled operations. Thinking that their technologies are neutral, developers and users of technologies assume that connecting different military nodes by means of technology is a neutral activity.

However, in the case of the Kunduz air strike, we have seen that as soon as we introduced technology, the technology not only merely connected nodes in the network, it connected practices that previously operated more or less separately (such as the pilot-practice, the JTAC practice, and the commander-practice). The use of the ROVER system, intended to support the JTAC, also linked the pilot with the PRT commander, thus “blurring” the structure and direction of two separate practices. This blurring can lead to the pitfalls mentioned at the beginning of this article, as well as misinterpretation of information. Procedural errors ensue as the direct consequences of it.

The concept of practice allows for the view that a soldier is not only a node in a network, a button pusher directed by rules, a goal-driven agent, but also someone with convictions about how to perform his task in the right way. This conviction also relates to the rules of the game in various practices. A pilot who does a good job does so in a different way than an engineer who does a good job in the field. In a network environment, practices connect to each other with unprecedented speed.

**Hierarchy versus network.** A critical reader might note that a great deal of cooperation has always existed among the practices within the
military setting. That is certainly true, but hierarchical means of communication traditionally connected the practices, and traditional means of communication, such as radio, served to confirm this hierarchical structure, enabling vertical information exchange via lines of command.

What is different today is that network technologies connect all these various practices. These supposedly “neutral” technologies can cause clashes between the different “structures” that apply to these various practices. It has suddenly become unclear which practice’s rule should prevail and which role ones practice plays. An example is drone pilots that execute both the task of fighter pilots and reconnaissance personnel.

This problem did not previously arise because of the hierarchical nature of the military practice: if clashes did occur, the hierarchy prescribed the solution. However, with the advent of network technology, the number of interactions have increased and become multidimensional. As a result, the likelihood of clashing rules and guidelines has increased.

The introduction of network technology can also lead to clashes in the directions of the various practices, especially if users of the technology are not aware that their own practice may easily infringe upon the boundaries of another area of practice. In the Kunduz case, the direction of the pilots and the PRT commander clashed: the pilots wanted to carry out the air strike as safely as possible with regard to harming civilians and the infrastructure, but the PRT commander believed he had to protect his own people from an attack by insurgents.

We can therefore draw the conclusion that a technology presumed to be neutral can and does link up practices that were previously unconnected. Moreover, even if the practices did interact in the past, it was along clear lines; namely, via one commander communicating with another commander.

If we take a close look at the various practices upon which individuals made decisions and acted, we conclude that network-enabling technologies may in fact have been partially to blame for the tragedy in Kunduz. We assumed that it was clear which set of rules should prevail, while in reality, there was no such clarity.40

**Dynamic Communication**

One of the assumptions related to network-enabled operations is that they will improve communication and decision making. This does not always prove to be the case. Sometimes, the opposite may even be true, as I have demonstrated by referring to the Kunduz air strike.

In dynamic communication in network-enabled operations, a clear view is often missing of who is the relevant expert in the field and who is authorized to make decisions. Military personnel working in a network environment may therefore encounter a number of pitfalls:

- The first is the danger of developing a “Predator view.”
- The second is misinterpretation of on-screen images.
- The third is the prevention of streamlined communication and information exchange at critical moments.

To clarify the underlying causes of these pitfalls of network-enabled operations, I have demonstrated that technology is not neutral. The visual information that it presents gives a mediated view of reality.

I also introduced the concept of “practice” to demonstrate that tensions can arise during network-enabled operations due to a blurring of the structures and directions of different practices of users on the network. In the Kunduz air strike case, the differing “rules” of the JTAC, the pilots, and the PRT commander clashed.

We must introduce new measures to avoid such clashes in the future. Training in how to deal with clashes is required. For example, during a network enabled operation, users can ask themselves whether their particular area of practice requires them to interpret visual information as technical, tactical, or strategic information. In the case of the ROVER images, it appears that the commander used visual images intended to serve the JTAC to make a decision that had far-reaching consequences.

Underlying tensions do not surface as long as circumstances are predictable. Visionaries in the area of network-enabled operations tend to forget about military practice, the social context in which these military operations take place. Inherent to military practice is the fact that circumstances are not always predictable. Only when stressful and nebulous situations occur (such as the hijacking of a fuel truck)
9. Philosophers of technology focus on how technology can best be understood by making use of concepts from the field of philosophy.

The video images were released online by Bild: <http://www.bild.de/video/clip/an/kunduz-10591806.bild.html> (12 March 2013).
15. Ibid.
16. Steve Call, Danger Closer: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq (College Station: Texas A&M University, 2007). This refers to the addictive quality of footage captured and sent back by the Predator, the most frequently used UAV in Afghanistan.
18. Call, 72.
21. Ibid.
26. This report circulated by the media is contradicted in a leaked report. In the leaked report, district managers claim that the media made hay with the story about free fuel. The report was leaked via wikileaks.org.
27. “Light’m all up,” NRC Next, 7 April 2010.
30. Ibid.
31. Pryer, 32.
34. The most well known is Aalstair Macintyre. See Alastair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1981).
35. Henk Jochemsen, Jan Hoogland, and Gerrit Glas, Verantwoord Medisch handelen, proeve van een christelijke medische ethiek (Amsterdam: Buijten & Spipperheijen, 1997).
36. This distinction is made by Jochemsen, Hoogland, and Glas (1997).
37. The analogy with a game of chess can make this clearer: the rules of the game make the game of chess possible; they constitute the game. A player can learn the rules of the game by heart in order to be able to play, but this “know-how” is not enough to become an excellent chess player. Players must actively become involved in chess playing in order to know how best to apply the rules in specific situations. Hoogland and Jochemsen state, “Knowing how” is an intuitive awareness of rules, consisting in the ability to act according to a rule and to evaluate the correctness of its application.” Jan Hoogland and Henk Jochemsen, “Professional autonomy and the normative structure of medical practice,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (2000): 457-75.
38. Hoogland and Jochemsen, 466.
39. In the case of the game of chess, direction is the strategy that a player uses in playing the game. Normativity also comes into play here, since we can speak of good or bad strategies. The rules of a game do not determine the course of the game, but how to play the game correctly.
The Human Shield in Islamic Jurisprudence

Major Benjamin Buchholz, U.S. Army

The outcome of the IDF operation was harsh: The goal of eliminating Salah Shehade was achieved; however, fifteen civilians were also killed, among them nine children.¹

— Amos Harel, Ha'aretz, 24 July 2002

The killing of Salah Shehade and the associated deaths of civilians surrounding him point to a dilemma in the present-day military balance of power, a dilemma with both tactical and strategic implications, as strikes continue against non-uniformed, nonstate actors. On the one hand, the current technology and capacity of Western armed forces precludes any insurgent attempt at uniformed resistance in keeping with the codes and norms of the Geneva Convention, leaving recourse only to drastic measures, such as the use of human shields.² On the other hand, even targeted killing of non-uniformed personnel has drawbacks, not only ethically in terms of collateral damage, but also strategically insofar as it presents an opportunity for media exploitation.³

Much has been written in both English and Arabic on the ethics of using human shield tactics in war, but Western and Islamic theories have developed almost wholly within self-referential frameworks. Western theorists resort to Kant, to a secular utilitarianism styled on Jeremy Bentham, to treaty accords such as the Geneva Convention, or to Christian notions of right and wrong.⁴ They assume the canon of Western legal ethics is, ipso facto, the governing principle.

Richard D. Rosen, in his article “Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror,” says, “The Geneva Conventions have achieved universal acceptance.”⁵ To this he adds, by way of justification: “The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 [are] the first in modern history to . . . [have] been formally accepted by all 194 states in the world.”⁶ Thus, Rosen seems to proclaim, state acceptance equates with popular and universal acceptance. He neglects the fact that the primary combatants in modern warfare operate at a level below and between the functioning of modern states. He also has failed to observe that many of the Geneva Convention’s signatory states exhibit little control or responsibility for the actions of agencies or personnel within their jurisdiction.⁷

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This article contains the author’s personal views and does not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or its components.
The Western norms of war are not circumscribed by international law, however. A better understanding of the historical underpinnings of Islamic theories with respect to the ethics of using human shields in battle will suggest the possibility that the Western reaction to the depredation would have more resonance in the hearts and minds of Islamists if framed in terms that show an awareness of Islamic discourse on the subject. In other words, the universal principles involved evince themselves in Islamic experience and might best be couched in an awareness of that tradition.

Human Shield

To start with, it is important to note that Islamic writing on the subject of the human shield has a much more specific basis than that of the West. Almost all commentaries on the subject cite or flow from the Prophet Muhammad’s use in war of a catapult-like device called a mangonel, annotated in Abu Jafr Muhammad Ibn Jarir al-Ṭabarī’s Tarikh:

And the Muslims were not able to enter their walls. They closed (the gate) against them, at which time he struck those persons within by means of arrows (mangonel). . . Then the Prophet (PBUH) besieged them and killed them vehemently and launched arrows until it was a day of smashing the walls of Ta’if . . . for he launched arrows straight upon them and killed their men.  

The interplay between this traditional story and later exegetical justifications or condemnations of human shield tactics depends on the fact that Muslims already inhabited the city or had been taken captive within it. Therefore, the firing of an indiscriminate weapon like the mangonel would harm not only lawful combatants but also civilians in general and other Muslims specifically.

Before turning to the classical discussion of the human shield problem with regard to this episode at Ta’if, it is worth noting that (in contrast to the sahīh or verified) hadith collections of al-Bukhārī and Muslim), al-Ṭabarī himself says, “There are, in my book, incidents mentioned by others which the reader might disapprove or the hearer find ugly. It is not known of them whether they are valid and they do not [always] mean truth.”  

Commentaries

The collections of both al-Bukhārī and Muslim contain traditions that include the siege of Ta’if. But neither of them confirm the story about Muhammad’s use of a mangonel. This places some doubt on the veracity of the story, although jurists and theologians nonetheless use the less well-attested version of the episode as al-Ṭabarī recounts it.

Commentaries both prohibiting and allowing the human shield in the classical tradition also use Ṭabarī’s version:

The Ḥanbalī opinion (from Ibn Qudāma’s al-Mughnī). And if they shield (themselves) in war with their women and their children, it is permitted to fire upon them and (to fire upon them) with the intention of killing; for the Prophet (PBUH) fired on them (at Ta’if) with the mangonel when women and children were with them. And this is because if one desists when Muslims are among them it leads to a crippling of jihad. When they (the fighters) know that the enemy uses them
(civilians) as a shield it causes trepidation.\textsuperscript{12} Ibn Rushd, providing the pacifist position. If there are Muslim captives and Muslim children in the fortress then, according to a group, mangonels should not be used, and that is the opinion of al-Awzā‘ī. Al-Layth permitted this. The reliance of those who do not permit this is on the words of the Exalted, “If they (the believers and the disbelievers) had been clearly separated we verily had punished those of them who disbelieved with painful punishment. (Qur’an 48:25)\textsuperscript{13}

Debate

Much of Islamic debate on the legality or morality of using human shields stems from or offers a slight variation on these opinions.

Two issues from the above quotes are of particular importance. First, there is a palpable presence of utilitarianism. The theologians say the use of the human shield should not be allowed to impede jihad. Second, both opinions deal with the issue of discriminating between lawful and unlawful targets. Ibn Qudāма resolves this by raising the distinction, but then justifying attack in all cases. Al-Awzā‘ī takes the opposite course. He bans the mangonel, and by implication, any use of an indiscriminate force against groups of intermixed persons. These are the simple solutions.

Other jurists call for greater discrimination between civilians and combatants. For example, the Ḥanafī opinion as given by al-Kasani’s Bada’i’ al-Sana’i’ fi Tartib al-Shara’i’ states, “If they shield with Muslim children, there is no harm in firing upon them, for necessity provides the command. However, they should intend (to aim for) the infidel rather than the children.”\textsuperscript{14}

In al-Kasani’s construction, the Islamic ethical concept begins to creep closer toward a secular utilitarianism familiar to the West (but \textit{not} in accord with the Geneva Convention’s total prohibition against the human shield).\textsuperscript{15} Emmanuel Gross sums up this Western utilitarian position as follows:

\begin{quote}
The moral value of an act is determined in accordance with its impact on happiness in the world . . . It follows that if injury to civilians who provide a human shield will lead to injury to the terrorists and comprise an essential measure in the war against terror, significantly eroding the force and capabilities of the terrorists, the injury to the innocent civilians will, in effect, lead to better results than avoiding harm to them.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

This principle of utilitarian proportionality has been incorporated into the U.S. military’s Joint Publication 3-60: Joint Targeting.\textsuperscript{17} It also forms the basis for the next layer of Islamic ethical commentary.

\textbf{This principle of utilitarian proportionality has been incorporated into the U.S. military’s Joint Publication 3-60: Joint Targeting.}

This layer consists of several opinions.

First, as stated above, al-Awzā‘ī preferred total “abstention from direct attack.”\textsuperscript{18} Al-Thawrī and Abu Ḥanīfī “permitted attack provided that the jihadists intend to shoot the unbelievers; the killing of believers (including women and children) would be regarded as killing by mistake.”\textsuperscript{19}

Al-Shāfi‘ī advises attack on “fortified places and castles, but not on the houses; however, if fighting was at close range, they ought not abstain from shooting, even if it results in killing believers.”\textsuperscript{20}

Finally, al-Ghazzālī (from the Shāfi‘ī madhhab) moves to an ethical position that matches the utilitarianism of Joint Publication 3-60, basing his opinion on the idea that, in the event of a confrontation using a human shield, the killing of a few believers “would serve the greater interests of the Muslim community.”\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Current Islamic Ethics}

This brings us to the current state of Islamic ethics with regard to human shield tactics in war. Matthew Ezzo and Amos Guiora cite Moshe Yaalon of the \textit{Washington Post} as having written, “Terrorists are fanatics, but they are not idiots. If the terrorist tactic of using human shields helps them achieve
their goals, they will utilize it. If it undermines their goals, they will abandon it.” This statement goes to the heart of the utility question.

Whether the answer is positive or negative with regard to the utility of the tactic, the issue is a contemporary one. It is also a concern that does not exhibit consensus in current Islamic jurisprudence or in the actions of those who employ the technique.

For instance, during the al-Anbar Awakening in 2006, when Iraqis turned against Al-Qaeda in Iraq and reestablished local control of their province, one of the foremost complaints from Iraqi dissident fighters was that “Al-Qaeda members . . . were using the population as a human shield, without consulting with the clerics on this matter.” This demonstrates the internal perception, even among other participants in jihad, that the human shield is a sensitive, ambiguous topic that requires legitimizing.

Suicide martyrdoms are a closely related phenomenon. David Cook, in his article “The Implications of ‘Martyrdom Operations’ for Contemporary Islam,” examines 46 recent fatwa related to martyrdom operations and says, “Most of these pieces start out with a political commentary, leading us to note the primary reason for martyrdom operations: the perceived situation of the Muslim world [which is] presented as lacking all choice or volition in the contemporary world.”

Furthermore, he says, “The fact that martyrdom operations are very new to Islam leaves these legal opinions . . . open to the deadly accusation of being an ‘innovation.’” While human shield traditions and legal opinions are well-founded enough in the history of Islamic jurisprudence to avoid a charge of ‘innovation,’ the presence of conflicting, even quietist opinions on the subject—along with strong injunctions in the Qur’an and in sahih ahadith from both the life of the Prophet and the Caliphate of Abu Bakr—require radical Islamists to constantly justify, within the framework of their own ethics, the tactical and strategic uses to which they put the human shield.

For example, Abu Yahya al-Libi, a young Al-Qaeda leader said to be among the successors of Bin-Laden, devotes a monograph specifically to the subject of the human shield in modern warfare. He discards 14 centuries of Islamic jurisprudential tradition and goes to bat against “Qur’anic and hadith passages regarding the prohibitions against killing innocent Muslims.” This should alert his co-religionists to the possibility that he and other radical Islamist organizations are not interested in a limited justification of the use of human shields but in a far-reaching subversion of the terms and inherent powers of shari’a law. It would be far simpler and would leave the matter much less open to accusations of innovation if al-Libi simply adopted the time-honored utilitarianism of al-Ghazzālī, which provides adequate precedent for using the human shield but does not allow a radical usurpation of wider religious authority. Were Abu Yahya al-Libi, Al-Qaeda, and other similar organizations to adopt Al-Ghazzālī’s utilitarianism, they would put themselves on an exact moral footing with current U.S. military doctrine.

Opportunities

Al-Qaeda’s choice to discard Islamic traditions with regard to the human shield leaves the door open for exploitation in three ways.

First, the U.S. military should explain more effectively how doctrine regarding countering adversaries that employ human shields is consistent with the Geneva Conventions.
Second, we should bring to attention, when operations such as the IDF bombing of Shehade occur, the innovation inherent in Al-Qaeda’s human shield theories and practices as propounded by al-Libi. Certainly the Islamic tradition leaves plenty of room, depending on the madhhab, for employment of the tactic. Drawing positive parallels between the discriminatory permission granted by al-Shafi’i or the utilitarianism of al-Ghazzālī and the United States’ own doctrines of proportionality will be, if not satisfactory, then at least more understandable to the intended audience.

Third, creating an awareness of al-Libi and Al-Qaeda’s innovation should lead to a marginalization akin to that which occurred in al-Anbar. Mainstream opinion in classical Islamist jurisprudence with regard to the permissibility of using a human shield in war is closer to current Western military practices than to the impractical prohibitions to which Western powers nominally subscribe.

If the United States decides to engage in communications with a Muslim audience regarding the innovations of Al-Qaeda’s human shield tactics, it would be wise to explain how U.S. doctrine is consistent with the Geneva Convention, and it would also be wise to acknowledge the various strands of utilitarianism and pacifism in traditional Islamic jurisprudence, calling upon verses from the Qur’an that explicitly outlaw the practice or upon sahih hadith that fail to canonize the Prophet’s use of indiscriminate weapons as sunna, i.e., the proper observance of Islam. **MR**

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**NOTES**


6. Ibid., footnote 177.


8. For purposes of brevity, I omit other related texts that are used to support and argue the case of the human shield, including both the more antagonistic and pacific verses of the Qur’an (such as 48:25, 9:8, 5:32, 1:190, and 2:194) and also two Prophetic traditions, one related on the authority of ‘Aliqma b. Marthad and Ibn Burayda, “Nor should you mutilate or kill children, women, or old men” (Sahih Bukhari 4:26:3014) and another related on the authority of Rabih Ibn Rabii, “Hurry and go to Khālid Ibn al-Walid (and convey to him) that he must not slay infants, serfs, or women,” (Ibn Rushd, 459-60). A further tradition from the practice of Abu BuIrā in which he lays out ten rules for the conduct of armies also comes into play in the exegetical material, taken from al-Tabarī’s *Tarikh al-Rusul wal-Mu‘āmalat*, 1:1850, Vol. 3, 226.


10. Ibid., 1-7, vol. 1, 8.

11. The relevant hadith are Sahih Bukhari, 109 and 572; and Sahih Muslim 2309, 4074, 4393, and 5415.


15. Gross, 255, says: “Article 51(7) of Protocol I prohibits the parties from using the civilian population as a human shield or as a means of achieving immunity from military attack.”

16. Ibid., 465.


19. Ibid., 107.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


25. Ibid., 134.


28. Ibid.
IF “THE FIRST, the supreme, most far reaching act of judgment that statesmen and commanders must make is to establish,” as Clausewitz put it, “the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature,” it is sobering to realize how often they get it wrong.1 Today, the difficulty that Western political leaders have in articulating clear and coherent aims is a profound problem. No amount of informed thinking about concepts and plans would have prevented the planning shortfalls that bedevilled the occupation of Iraq in 2003. But, beyond the political smoke and mirrors, operational planning itself often fails to generate the level of understanding required to embark on wars in complex social settings. In Afghanistan and Iraq, military planners would preside over inappropriate operational approaches and tactics, and were slow to perceive, understand, and manage transitions. Learning on the job proved a costly business, and strategic aims had to be left by the wayside.

In the light of Afghanistan and Iraq, the apparent shortcomings of operational planning have been much discussed. In traditional approaches to planning, commanders often dealt with the conceptual component of operations in rather intuitive ways. The concept of operations was often assumed in the commander’s initial guidance and the formulation of objectives. But, in the context of today’s wars in complex social settings, the commander by himself is unlikely to know enough about the political context, operational environment, and opponents to make fully informed judgements, and a poorly appraised concept of operations is likely to go straight to the school of hard knocks. What seemed to be required was a more collaborative planning process that drew on a broader base of knowledge to better understand the complexity and the conceptual options available.

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U.S. soldiers with 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, plan their next movement during combat operations in Korengal, Afghanistan, 22 April 2009. (SGT Matthew C. Moeller, U.S. Army)
The U.S. Army addressed the conceptual-deficit with “design,” and the Training and Doctrine Command primed work at the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate and School of Advanced Military Studies to foster a reform discourse and write new doctrine. Design would be institutionalized in Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, and FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, and described “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.”

In comparison to traditional planning, a design-plus process envisaged a far more systematic handling of the conceptual component (Figure 1). Once strategic aims had been handed down by national command authorities and interpreted in the commander’s initial guidance, a design team was to review a mass of potentially relevant information about the operational environment, the problem at hand, and the choices of operational approach available. Then, after distilling the key information from the environmental frame, problem frame, and operational approach space, an initial design concept could be synthesized; it was essentially a hypothesis about solving the problem. Thereafter, the design concept was to be rendered into a campaign narrative and visualizations that could be handed on to planners, informing their selection of objectives and tasks (and focusing warfighting functions related to intelligence, force generation, movements, kinetic action, logistics, etc.) through the Military Decision Making Process.

Design promised to build a better bridge between strategic problem and desired outcome by better aligning mission aims, purposes, objectives, and tasks. In this sense, if designers generated an understanding of the why and the what of a mission, detailed planners rolled-out the what and the how (Figure 2). However, while the need for design and the process by which it could be undertaken was well described in the emerging discourse and doctrine, a methodology for delivering the products of design was less well developed, leaving designers to jury-rig their own descriptions and visualizations.

A number of concepts already existed that might support design work, notably Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Full Spectrum Operations (FSO), but

![Figure 1](image-url)

*Figure 1*

*The stages of the planning process.*
there were issues with both. EBO problems are well known. And, while FSO was a useful tool for describing the differing combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability operations that might be included in a given operation, it did not of itself embody the underlying purpose of a mission; the purpose being why something is to be done to an opponent and to what end. FM 3-0 simply noted that full spectrum operations begins with the commander’s concept of operations “based on a specific idea of how to accomplish the mission.” In other words, FSO was good at constructing the “what-to-how” component of the mission bridge, but did less to help with the “why-to-what” part. And, if the operational concept does not fully capture the purpose of a mission, it does not capture the essence of the war and warfare being embarked upon. Design needed to be clear about the whys of the mission, and as Major Ben Zweibelson argued in *Military Review*, this meant finding ways of incorporating meta-understanding, questioning, and problem-solving in the design process: as Zweibelson put it, to look above the “chess pieces” in play, and what they might or might not do on the chess board, to instead ask deeper questions about the nature of skill, the motives that drive the human players, and the purpose of games altogether. Design was more the realm of “why-centric” questions than “what-centric” ones, although designers had ultimately to synthesise both. Zweibelson noted that “design deliverables should achieve a fine balance between a deep understanding and the ability to explain it in the organization’s preferred language. The deliverable must be compatible with detailed planning and tactical execution.”

The argument to be made in this article is that the why-to-what and what-to-how of mission planning can be better synthesized and visualized by modeling the interplay between two variables that capture the essence of mission purpose—a concept of warfare and a concept of the engagement/operations—with the nexus between them indicating four basic kinds of operational approach (Figure 3). The model provides a holistic picture of mission purpose (why-to-what), but is also capable of imparting mission intent to planners (what-to-how). Other concepts and warfighting techniques may also be contextualized within the visualization. Different operational approaches are associated with different supporting theories, concepts, and doctrines. Referring to a number of historical cases, the article goes on to highlight some of the factors that may get in the way of realizing the most appropriate operational approach for a mission.

**Understanding the Why-to-What of the Mission: The Concept of Warfare**

Warfare is an interaction, a duel with a political aim, pursued with a purpose (why something is to

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**Figure 2**

* Bridging the why-what-how of the mission.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Problem</th>
<th>The Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aims</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why</td>
<td>What</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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be done to an opponent, and to what end) calibrated to prevail in the duel and so achieve the aim. In *On War*, Clausewitz developed a concept of warfare in which, fundamentally, there were two kinds of purpose: the first was to completely overpower the opponent, if not destroy it altogether; the second was the more limited purpose of extracting concessions from an opponent. But, limited purpose did not necessarily mean limited means, with both purposes demanding the destruction of the will and capacity of the opponent to resist. However, Clausewitz also exhibited a growing awareness that the ideal of overpowering the will and capacity of the opponent might be modified by political considerations and friction. Not all wars could or should be waged to the maximum exertion and extent; “in war many roads lead to success.”

In reality, total and limited warfare are normally calibrated at a different level of destructiveness. The purpose of total warfare—hereafter to be described as decisive warfare— involves the overthrow or destruction of the “will and capacity” of the enemy to resist. The purpose of limited warfare—hereafter to be described as persuasive warfare—primarily involves an attempt to persuade the opponent to give up or come to terms. Persuasive warfare might include the application of substantial increments of violence, but ultimately its purpose is not to destroy the will and capacity of the opponent, but to change its will and behavior short of decisive warfare. Thus, in the concept of warfare represented in Figure 3, the degree of persuasiveness-decisiveness is calibrated according to the intent to destroy the “will and capacity” of the opponent to resist (decisiveness) versus the more limited intent of acting upon the opponent’s will and behavior (persuasiveness).

The difference between persuasive and decisive purpose is often reflected in the information domain of warfare. The force engaged in decisive warfare is likely to be focused upon information operations intended to demoralize, confuse, and misdirect the opposing force as a prelude to destroying its will and capacity to resist.

![Figure 3](image-url)

**Figure 3**

*Nexus of the concept of warfare and concept of the engagement/operations.*
capacity to resist. The force engaged in persuasive warfare tends to be more concerned about changing human minds and behaviors through incentives and disincentives, bargaining, and compromise.


Conceptualizing the “what-to-how” of a mission is not straightforward. The way that battle is joined changes over time, and there are numerous equally valid ways of representing how the combat is to be conducted. Clausewitz himself employed a distinction between offense and defense to cast insight upon the battle and campaign, but he was aware that every age produced its own modus operandi. The proposition made in this article is that perhaps the best way of capturing the essence of operations in the contemporary world is not through the offense-defense distinction but instead in terms of relative degrees of physical-centricity and functional-centricity.

Clearly, almost all combats embody some element of the physical and functional, but different degrees of emphasis are evident. A force with a physical-centric approach to the engagement and operations tends to think about the duel with the opponent, first-and-foremost, in terms of the physical clash of forces: of manpower, weapons platforms, and supporting logistics. On the other hand, a force with a relatively functioning-centric approach is inclined, and must be able, to scan the battlefield for the nodes and links of its opponent’s systems of functioning, prioritizing attacks on such things as command and control targets, bottlenecks in deployment and logistics, or some aspect of the broader political context in which the opposing force functions.

Synthesising the “Why-What-How”: The Four Approaches to Operations

Clausewitz himself did not put together his concept of warfare and concept of the engagement/operations in any systematic way. It is perhaps one of the things that he was still to work through at the time of his death. As Michael Howard observed of On War—

The two types of war and the possibility that each might need to be conducted according to different principles receive . . . only the most glancing of references. In general the strategy dealt with in this book is simply the strategy, as Clausewitz saw it, of Napoleon; of war as “absolute” as the dictates of a powerful political motivation could make it.16

For any mission, political and military leaders must determine—wittingly or not—what concept of warfare and concept of the engagement/operations are to be adopted (and why). Turning to Figure 3, it is clear that once leaders have made their choices between different concepts of warfare and concepts of engagement/operations, there are four basic kinds of operational approach: the attrition, the incapacitation, the armed suasion, and the inducement.

While any mission, in principle, might be addressed with any of the four kinds of operational approach, in practice, the choices are often constrained. Political and military leaders may have preconceived ideas about the purpose of war and how to wage it. The choices available to leaders may also be limited by the nature of their own military’s capabilities, or because certain kinds of operational approach are forced upon them by an opponent. Powerful states that possess more broadly equipped armed forces will have more choices of operational approach available to them.

The other point to make is that the two axes depicted in Figure 3 represent spectrums. In this sense, no one operational approach can be entirely separated from the others. All missions are likely to incorporate the traits of more than one of the four approaches. Moreover, it is possible that multiple approaches might be quite deliberately weaved together to achieve the overall aims of the mission. One of the four approaches may be appropriate at a particular time and place during a mission, and another in another time and place. And, most campaigns transition over time, either by design or as the duel between opponents unfolds.

The Attrition

When the purpose of warfare is to seek the decisive defeat of an opponent and a relatively physical-centric concept of the engagement/operations is adopted, the operational approach is one of attrition.
In the 19th and early 20th centuries in Europe, attrition was the dominant operational approach with the outcome of wars determined in the combat between bodies of men, guns, tanks, airplanes, ships, etc. The period was also associated with concepts and doctrine, such as Jomini’s geometry, that promised to deliver a more efficient attrition. While the German army’s ability to maneuver its forces did more to threaten opponents with an eventual functioning crisis (by clattering through rear areas and supporting logistics, etc.), the massive encirclement battle remained a very physical-centric kind of approach. And, in any case, the German army’s maneuvering style of attrition would completely break down into a head-on clash on the Western Front in World War One. In terms of the planning challenge, attrition is relatively straightforward; thus, traditional forms of planning process may suffice.

The Incapacitation

Where the purpose of warfare is the decisive defeat an opponent principally by means of a systematic attack on its systems of functioning, the operational approach is what might be called one of incapacitation. Throughout history, armies have attacked both the physical existence of their opponent and the way that they function. For Alexander the Great, the physical and moral prowess of the Macedonian army got him a long way, but some of his greatest victories were won because he understood how to disrupt the opponent’s functioning: specifically, how a penetrative attack toward the opponent’s commander, whether successful or not, could undermine the ability of very hierarchically run armies to remain on the battlefield.

In the 20th century, the possibility of choosing an incapacitation approach was greatly increased by new technology. The modern incapacitation battle grew out of the stalemate attrition of World War One. The German army, which had long preferred a maneuvering style of attrition, would develop what was to become known as the blitzkrieg. While World War II would eventually break down into a giant attrition, the German army would initially find great success with the use of motorized airland penetrations toward distant incapacitation targets in conjunction with techniques that sent pulses of physical, moral, and temporal disruption through opposing forces. The incapacitation battle used surprise, mobility, and deception to preempt, dislocate (to render the opponent’s dispositions irrelevant, bypass its greatest physical strength), and disrupt (the opponent’s cohesion, positioning, and willpower).

U.S. airpower theorists were not far behind. Amid the strategic air war over Europe, the U.S. Army Air Force aspired to a different approach to that of the attrition being pressed by RAF Bomber Command. Mapping the systems of the German war economy, U.S. air planners scanned the battlefield for key nodes and links (ball-bearings, synthetic oil, bridges), the targeting of which might have a disproportionately large effect on the enemy’s functioning. In the latter part of the 20th century, the U.S. would go on to develop the technologies and concepts that would bring a functioning-centric approach to a new level. U.S. Air Force Colonel John Warden did describe a historic step-change in what it was possible to think about doing to the functioning of an opponent, and the approach was to be written up as EBO. By the 1980s, the U.S. Army had also developed the AirLand Battle.17

The Armed Suasion

When the purpose of the duel is to persuade the opponent to do one’s will as a consequence of a physical-centric method, the operational approach is one of armed suasion, which includes compellence and deterrence. Compelling an opponent to stop doing something or to concede to some demand may involve the use of considerable amounts of force, but it is the psychological effect of the threat or actual use of force that is intended to achieve the desired outcome. The “show of force” and the demonstration of physical prowess are the stock-in-trade of compellence. The attempt to deter an adversary from taking a course of action that it might otherwise choose tends to embody lower levels of actual force, although it often relies on the threat of unleashing great physical force. It is the threat conveyed to the adversary about likely failure (denial) and/or the prospect of losses (punishment) that persuades the opponent to abstain from the undesired behavior.

Armed suasions are prone to escalate, perhaps best demonstrated by the record of strategic bombing in the 20th century. When deterrence fails, armed suasions may quickly transition to compellence, and thereafter across the persuasive-decisive boundary
toward outright attrition. However, armed suasion constituted the dominant operational approach in the main U.S.-Soviet balance over more than 40 years of the Cold War.

The Inducement

When a persuasive purpose is pursued with a functioning-centric method, the approach is what might be called an inducement. Whereas the essence of armed suasion is to change the opponent’s will and behavior by virtue of physical intimidation and actual physical harm, the inducement is more concerned with changing the opponent’s functioning, systems of functioning, and the broader context in which it functions. While inducement often involves direct negotiation, an inducement approach may achieve its purpose without necessarily forcing a conscious moment of decision from the opponent; on occasions, the opponent may almost imperceptibly evolve (or be evolved) to do something else or even be something else.

The inducement may involve the application of force as a precursor to other inducing techniques or as an inducing tool itself. But, since the use of force often produces resistance that runs counter to inducing change in the opponent’s system or its broader environment, inducements tend to involve more other-than-war techniques including bargaining, creating alternative systems of functioning, constructing new social narratives, and addressing the deeper causes of conflict in the broader environment. Where an opponent itself is resistant to change, or cannot be induced because of some political consideration or friction, changing the entire context in which the opponent functions may be the only way forward. Needless to say, this less direct approach to inducement is likely to be very time- and resource-consuming.

The inducement-type approach has become associated with the counterinsurgency and stabilization operations of some Western states, with the focus being on tackling the causes of subversion and “winning hearts and minds.” And, the conceptual updating of inducement operations by U.S. forces was among the most important developments of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the lessons of previous COIN campaigns were supplemented by the additional streams of culture-centric warfare, information operations, immersed Full Spectrum Operations, and systems-based stabilization operations. If the U.S. Army did not exactly make itself the master of the inducement operation, it did write up a new conceptual state of the art.

Friction in the Operational Approach Space

In an ideal world, statesmen and commanders would be clear about the purpose of any mission, be aware of all the operational approaches conceivable, and have the flexibility to select whatever approach seemed best. In reality, military leaders rarely consider all approaches equally. National command authorities may influence the approach selected, but commanders are also limited by powerful frictions. The most important of these frictions are: 1) the predisposition of the force; 2) conceptual dissonance or disagreement in the joint/coalition campaign; 3) physical, cognitive, and institutional frictions in identifying and managing transitions.

The predisposition of the force. In On War, Clausewitz argues that the nature of war is to escalate toward the overthrow or destruction of the opponent’s will and capacity; he was predisposed to think that a head-on trial of strength is “the first-born son of war.” To this day, commanders remain wedded to retaining the decisive warfare option, keeping it in the bank lest one day they meet a decisively minded opponent. Indeed, with the emergence of Unified Land Operations in 2011, the U.S. Army has given renewed emphasis to the utility of decisive force. Of course, this is a cognitive and moral statement likely to predispose the operational approach of the force across the breadth of missions.

The reality is that armed forces are rarely in a position to be truly flexible in the selection of their operational approach. When a military has had an overriding national mission or has had much of a certain kind of experience, it will have specialized its organization, equipment, doctrine, culture, and training, and will be predisposed to address problems using the familiar approach. Indeed, a particular kind of operational approach may become so deeply entrenched that it produces its own vested interests. Commanders and soldiers may actively resist attempts to employ unfamiliar approaches as undesirable and dangerous. And, it must be said, the
military that seeks to multi-role across a breadth of operational approaches risks being jack-of-all-trades and master of none in comparison to its more specialized competitors.

The institutional resistance to certain operational approaches may be particularly marked when their selection requires significant changes in the organization, culture, and planning systems. For instance, the force developed for decisive warfare is likely (for good reasons) to be more hierarchical in its organization, command culture, and planning technique than one more practiced in persuasive warfare. Clearly, this was the challenge that faced U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the introduction of design being part of the inter-approach reform process.

Furthermore, no matter how many times it is said that doctrine should guide rather than prescribe, all militaries have a problem with mechanistic application; it is inherent to hierarchical organizations. The either prime a series of quite spurious actions or paralyze decision making altogether. Short of some technological breakthrough in the realm of reading and influencing human intentions and behaviors, it just may be that other kinds of supporting concepts are more useful in persuasive warfare.

**Conceptual dissonance or disagreement in the joint/coalition campaign.** War planning is never a fully rational business. While design promises a more systematic process for selecting the best approach, it is perhaps optimistic to believe that it can finally trump the dysfunctional political and bureaucratic machinations that go on behind the scenes. Today, in our age of democratic politics, bureaucracy, joint and coalition operations, and warfare in complex social settings, the potential for political and bureaucratic “churning” is perhaps greater than ever. The Iraq war in 2003 grew out of a deeply dysfunctional planning process, with its contested legitimacy contributing to the failure to specify clear strategic aims, never mind chart and resource the required operational transitions.

The war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 is another illuminating case. In the initial stages of planning, the political leadership at the Pentagon appears to have been minded to try out an armed suasion—specifically, a demonstration of physical dominance in order to persuade the leadership of the Taliban to give up Osama bin-Laden and his lieutenants—but with the military leadership slow to articulate a plan, the CIA would take the lead. The CIA’s analysis was that the leader of the Taliban, Muhammad Omar, would never give up Bin-Laden, and this meant that the only realistic aim was regime-change to be pursued with a decisive purpose. Thus, two concepts and plans were initially in play, and they do not seem to have been entirely reconciled by the time that the air campaign started on 7 October 2001. Rather than focusing airpower against Taliban forces in the north, in order to support a decisive attrition and advance using Northern Alliance allies, much of the early bombing was focused on target sets around Kabul and Kandahar that looked more appropriate to an armed suasion. In fact, there would be an awkward hiatus in the campaign, and it was not until the refocusing of aerial bombing in the latter part of October 2001 that the ghost in the machine seemed finally banished.

In an ideal world, statesmen and commanders would be clear about the purpose of any mission, be aware of all the operational approaches conceivable, and have the flexibility to select whatever approach seemed best.

problem does not simply concern well-established doctrines. Western militaries have also been prone to the fad. For instance, EBO is undoubtedly a powerful tool when used in support of an incapacitation approach; it maps the nodes and links of the opponent’s functioning, enabling the most efficient and effective selection of targets. However, while EBO can, in principle, be applied to support any of the four operational approaches, its efficacy is more questionable on the persuasive side of the concept of warfare spectrum where it is more difficult to map the nodes and links, much less be sure about the intangibles of the human mind and social behavior. In persuasive warfare, EBO risks constructing a tangle of speculations that might
Nevertheless, it must be said that the Afghan campaign in 2001 was to be something of a conceptual *tour de force*. Following the attrition of Taliban forces across northern Afghanistan, as a precursor to an advance on Kabul and the south by the forces of the Northern Alliance, the campaign would undergo a rapid inter-approach transition. The pathway to the transition began with the aerial bombing that destroyed the Taliban’s defenses on the Shomali plains, just north of Kabul. With the breaking of Kabul’s defenses, it became clear to many Pushun tribal factions associated with the Taliban that the movement was about to lose control of Kabul and so would soon cease to be a national government. At that point, many of these Pushun factions sold much of their stake in the Taliban, instead choosing to bargain new deals with the new order.

Thus, the Shomali moment was where an attrition suddenly transitioned to the incapacitation-inducement boundary: it was a “demonstration of functional dominance” that precipitated what could be regarded as a “trading cue” that manifested a new political game in town; a game that functioned under the supervision of the United States (see Figure 4). The subsequent convening of Afghan and international stakeholders at the Bonn conference in December 2001 was a further demonstration of this functional dominance. However, the supporting concepts, plans, and resources required to progress the move to an inducement would not be marshaled until much later in the decade, and in that time the Taliban would recover and reorganize some of its functioning. In that period, the operation in Afghanistan would drift back toward an attrition.

**Physical, cognitive, and institutional frictions in identifying and managing major transitions.** Gaining and retaining the initiative is one of the principal reasons for thinking more systematically about the conceptual component. Yet, once a course of action is established, commanders may be reluctant to conduct major reviews in case they reveal serious flaws. Militaries may talk of “critical thinking,” Zweibelson observes, but rarely know how far to take it, and the “problematizer” risks “marginalization” and “obstructionism” if attempts to “reframe” the mission go too far. Unless major transitions in a mission are identified and planned in the original design concept (or an option for them

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**Figure 4**

Track of the operational approach in Afghanistan, September-December 2001.
is), the attempt to reframe a mission may encounter varying degrees of friction.

Whereas intra-approach reframing may involve some refinement of the objectives, techniques and tasks, inter-approach transitions may involve changing the whole concept of warfare and/or concept of operations. If the concept of warfare has to be reframed unexpectedly, the original purpose of the entire campaign is under question. Reframing the concept of operations may raise fewer questions about the feasibility of the original purpose, but is still more demanding on the force than an intra-approach transition. For instance, the belated move of U.S. forces in Iraq after 2003 to an inducement approach required a tremendous refit of the U.S. Army’s supporting concepts, command culture, organization, lines of effort, and tactics. And, these changes took between two to six years to roll out.

Conceptual Capability

The advent of design has put U.S. forces on the verge of a step change in conceptual capability, and the kind of gross oversights or misconceptions stemming from a neglect or ignorance of the conceptual component seem less likely to be repeated. However, work is still to be done. A methodology for delivering the products of design has yet to be clearly described and agreed.

The argument made in this article is that a holistic picture of the conceptual choices available to statesmen, commanders, and designers can be realized by charting mission purpose in terms of a nexus between a concept of warfare and a concept of the engagement and operations. Figure 3 is capable of describing and visualizing the purpose of a mission and the choices of operational approach available. It is also capable of communicating to planners the mission intent of the operational approach and the anticipation of any transitions.

The other point made in the article is that design by itself will not necessarily deliver the conceptual step-change. A lot can still go wrong in the design-enhanced planning process. Beyond the problem of getting clear and coherent strategic aims from national command authorities, design may be distorted by powerful forces and frictions, some of which designers themselves may scarcely be aware. The most important of these relate to the physical and cognitive predisposition of the force, conceptual dissonance in the joint or coalition campaign, and the various frictions involved when confronting inter-approach transitions. The result of these frictions may be the selection and/or maintenance of an inappropriate operational approach or an operational approach that does not properly align the why-what-how of a mission. 

MR

NOTES

4. FM 5-0, 3-11, point 3-58.
9. Zweibelson, 81-82.
10. Ibid., 83.
11. Ibid., 86.
15. Ibid., 717-18.
18. In Chapter 2 of Book One of On War, Clausewitz argued that “we must not fail to emphasize that the violent resolution of the crisis, the wish to annihilate the enemy’s forces, is the first-born son of war. If the political aim is small, the motives slight and the tensions low, a prudent general may look for any way to avoid a major crisis and decisive actions, exploit any weaknesses in the opponent’s military and political strategy, and finally reach a peaceful settlement. If his assumptions are sound and promise success we are not entitled to criticize him. But he must never forget that he is moving on devious paths where the god of war may catch him unawares. He must always keep an eye on his opponent so that he does not, if the latter has taken up a sharp sword, approach him armed only with an ornamental rapier,” Clausewitz, 113-14.
22. Zweibelson, 83 and 84.
The following passage reflects the feelings of Ulysses S. Grant during his first engagement in the Civil War. During the run up to the engagement, Grant thought about the Confederate enemy only from his own perspective, never really wondering how the enemy commander might be thinking about the upcoming battle:

As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris’ camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept right on. When we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view, I halted. The place where Harris had been encamped a few days before was still there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. My heart resumed its place. It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but it was one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his. The lesson was valuable.1

As Grant and his regiment crested the hill, and looked down below upon an empty enemy camp, it dawned on him that he had never taken the alternate perspective, looking at the situation from the enemy commander’s view.

Most people are barely conscious of the cultural factors and biases that control their own actions. Culture is an overwhelming force, one that forms mental models that ultimately guide most of our actions. Culture also has a tendency to narrow our thought processes to the point that we believe most
people think as we do and view a problem as we would. Trying to break out of the “cultural cocoon” that guides our actions and look at a situation from another person’s perspective is difficult. However, the ability to do so is crucial to understand how others will act in a given situation.

In organizations that conduct some form of red teaming activity, looking at alternate perspectives of the enemy and other actors in the operational environment improves decision making. This article examines two commanders who gained insight into the enemy’s perspective to achieve success on the battlefield.

**Try to Understand the Hated Enemy**

Gaining the perspective of one’s enemy, especially if he comes from a different society and culture, is a daunting task. In classical Greece, one great commander developed such an insight into his enemy while absolutely despising its society. In the early fourth century BCE, having defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War and expanded her direct influence throughout Greece, Sparta (known as Lacedaemon) dominated the Hellenic world. The Spartan oligarchy did this through a confederation of allies funded with Persian gold. Using its military might, Sparta forced numerous cities throughout Greece into their coalition. Sparta’s rule enforced a conservative oligarchy like their own in each of the city-states among its allies, conditions abhorrent to democratically minded factions that had formerly dominated in Attica and Boeotia.

Thebes was the major city-state in Boeotia, the northern region of Greece south of Macedonia and Thessaly. Sparta came to dominate Thebes in 382 BCE, when a Spartan general, Phoebidas, installed a pro-Sparta oligarchic regime in place of the democratically elected council. One of the leaders of the anti-Spartan faction, Epaminondas, then organized a revolt against the regime and, in 378 BCE, cleared Thebes of all pro-Sparta forces.

Over a six-year period, the Spartan forces tried to retake the city but were rebuffed each time. During his protracted defense of Thebes, Epaminondas grew to hate every aspect of Sparta’s xenophobic culture as well as their political oligarchy. More importantly, he gained vast experience fighting the Spartans. He began to understand their conservatism in warfare and the centers of gravity in Spartan society. Even though he passionately hated the Spartans, he had developed a deep appreciation for Lacedaemonian perspectives. Epaminondas’s knowledge of Spartan ways helped him break away from a purely ethnocentric Theban view and facilitated his ability to predict how Spartan leadership looked at military situations.

On the strategic level, Epaminondas realized that Spartan subjugation and exploitation of the helots of the Peloponnesian peninsula was crucial for Sparta to raise highly professional military forces. Without the helots, Spartans would have to work their fields themselves, limiting their ability to train soldiers for war. Further, due to changing financial parameters that defined a citizen in Lacedaemonian society, Sparta’s ability to generate well-drilled professional forces was diminishing. Sparta could no longer field large numbers of Spartiates (professional Spartan soldiers). It had to depend on lower tiers of Lacedaemonian society and upon its allies to fill-out its phalanxes.

Epaminondas understood the link between Sparta’s scarcity of Spartiates and its traditional insistence on placing its best hoplites on the right side of the extended phalanx. With only limited manpower, and the natural inclination for a phalanx to wheel counterclockwise (due to the individual hoplite unintentionally edging to the right to be covered by his neighbor’s shield), Spartan generals always weighted the right side of the Lacedaemonian phalanx. Their best-drilled hoplites, traditionally the citizen Spartiates, would thus defeat the enemy left and roll up the line of battle.

By the time of Epaminondas, much of the Lacedaemonian phalanx consisted of Dorian Perioeci—a class one tier down in Spartan society—who were not as well drilled but who nevertheless were formidable infantry backing up the Spartiates. As the xenophobic and insular Spartiate population declined significantly after their heyday during the Persian invasions, the Perioeci increasingly provided the center core of Sparta’s army. The left wing of the Lacedaemonian phalanx now consisted of allies, helot hoplites, and even freed helots, the “newly enfranchised,” who were given land in exchange for service, essentially a feudal militia. However, the extreme left flank was strong, as the Spartans posted the Arcadian Sciritae there, a unit of hardy semi-professionals whose status was the same as the Perioeci.
Spartan society reflected this cultural division of the heavy infantry hoplite phalanx, on the spectrum from Spartiates to enslaved helots. The phalanx was a manifestation of both the security needs and the culture of the state. The Spartiates’ first duty was to keep the helots subjugated, then to achieve success on the battlefield against rival city-states.

Only on rare occasions during the Peloponnesian Wars did the Spartans adapt to changing situations—they remained a mentally entrenched and hide-bound military society incapable of imagining the flexible tactics Epaminondas had in mind. During most of the first war, Lacedaemon depended on its highly trained hoplites to awe the Athenian League and rarely needed to actually fight large-scale land battles. However, at the battle of Sphacteria in 425 BCE, a Spartan citizen mora (a Spartiate regiment) was forced to surrender to Athenian light troops who pelted them with impunity. The Spartiates proved incapable of learning from this tactical harbinger, but the lesson was not lost on later soldiers like Iphicrates of Athens and Epaminondas of Thebes.

Sparta’s army and military philosophy had developed over centuries, and it remained a severely conservative organization ripe for exploitation. Epaminondas understood Lacedaemonian tactics and military conservatism, and he sensed that he could take advantage of Sparta’s reliance on its reputation for unbeatable heavy infantry. He began his fateful campaign to free Thebes by further developing Thebes’ trained forces. He realized that he could never defeat the Spartans in a normal phalanx battle. However, Epaminondas made up for quality with quantity. He built up the Theban army with vast numbers of Theban freedmen and farmers, augmented by his Boeotian neighbors. This is one of the first times a military organized as a levee on masse. All Thebans and their allies, no matter their economic status, were conscripted to take up arms to defend their city-states. This was a revolutionary step in the ability of a city-state to augment its forces.

When he took this much-enlarged force to the field, Epaminondas also radically changed the
organization of the Theban-Boeotian phalanx. He looked at the situation from the Lacedaemonian viewpoint and knew the Spartan generals would organize to fight in their traditional manner. Epaminondas also realized that the Spartan leaders would keep the army’s movements relatively slow to maintain the cohesion of the phalanx while maneuvering. Epaminondas’s larger militia-type forces only had to stay massed to be effective. As long as the Theban forces remained compact, Epaminondas could maneuver his force to bring greater mass against a numerically weaker Lacedaemonian right flank. Because trained Lacedaemonian professionals were the source of Sparta’s leadership and power, Epaminondas realized that real success meant killing as many Spartiate citizens as possible on the enemy right wing. He reasoned that by thickening his left flank he would oppose the Spartiates on their right flank where he could fight an attritional battle, forcing the Spartans to expend precious skill and leadership that they could never replace. Lacedaemonian losses would then compel the Spartan generals to conserve their own best forces and use greater numbers of lesser-trained or unwilling allies.

Epaminondas planned to form his left wing into over 50 files of troops, instead of the usual 12. He also reformed an elite unit of 300 lovers known traditionally in Boeotia as the “Theban Sacred Band” to serve as a Boeotian veneer of quality needed to spearhead his anticipated overwhelming quantity of mass. The Sacred Band would break into the lines of Lacedaemonian Spartiates followed by the massed phalanx. Epaminondas also planned to thin out and refuse his right wing, securing that flank in an economy of force that would pin down the Sciritae on the Lacedaemonian left wing. Epaminondas understood that the Spartans, being extreme traditionalists, would not counter these moves by thickening their own lines, because making such a change would radically go against Spartan tradition and training. He also knew they would not be able to discern how much he had weakened his own right wing for the economy of force mission. The Sciritae had been accustomed to waiting for the shock of the enemy right, and Epaminondas anticipated that they would persist in that expectation.

The two armies met on 6 July 371 BCE in a wide valley in southern Boeotia at Leuctra (Figure 1). Epaminondas deployed his forces in his planned unorthodox style, a left-flank-heavy echeloned formation and a withheld right in an economy of force. He crushed the Spartan army in what amounted to a mental ambush. Approximately 45 percent of the Spartiates were killed (400 Spartans), including their king, Cleombrotus. Epaminondas’ massed free militia force had decisively defeated the finest military heavy infantry force in the Western world. Sparta never really recovered from this defeat. The Boeotian League, led by Epaminondas, followed up its victory at Leuctra with campaigns into the heart of Lacedaemonian territory. By 360 BCE, Sparta had to accept defeat and negotiate an end to the war.

Epaminondas’ shattering of the Spartiate’s reputation for invincibility started a social revolution within the Peloponnesian peninsula. Sparta gradually lost control of its enslaved helot population through the intervention of the invading Boeotian League and its inability to control the remaining helots owing to lack of Spartiate power (directly related to the losses at Leuctra). Eventually Sparta lost control of all helots, thus destroying her managed economy. In 336 BCE, Greece finally succumbed to the newly powerful state of Macedon, led by Alexander the Great’s father, Philip (who had studied as a royal hostage in Epaminondas’ household), and the era of Spartan superiority was over.

Being able to develop an alternate perspective about an adversary gives any general a huge advantage. Further, having the capability to look at a situation from the enemy’s perspective, even when absolutely hating one’s enemy, is rare. Humility is the operative principle in achieving such presence of mind. Epaminondas’ success sprang directly from his ability to consider and understand the Spartan perspective and how that perspective would react in war.
Trying to Gain Perspectives on Another Culture

Comprehending an opponent’s perspective when both sides come from similar cultures is hard enough, but it is much more difficult to do so if one comes from a radically different culture. A number of military leaders have understood the need to gain such an insight, but history finds few examples of any successes. While in command of the Third Fleet during World War II, Admiral Halsey tried to establish an organization to better understand the Japanese decision-making process. According to journalist and historian Evan Thomas—

The Department of Dirty Tricks spent much of 1943 pondering what [Halsey’s chief of staff] called “the Oriental mindset.” They found it “baffling” at first. “We couldn’t put ourselves into the minds of the Japanese,” recalled Carney. Japanese decision making seemed “irrational” and thus difficult to predict. They seemed to favor complex elaborate operations that, once started, could not be stopped or altered. “There was no such thing as turning back once committed. Whether this was considered as cowardice or a violation of the Samurai code, whatever it was, I don’t know,” recalled Carney.6

American society before World War II had little interplay with Japanese society. None of the senior military American leaders in the Pacific, except for Douglas MacArthur, had ever lived in Japan. No anthropologist with a Japanese background (if any existed in the U.S) was on the senior level decision-making staffs in the Pacific.

This situation is not unusual. Most commanders throughout history have gathered the best intelligence available on the enemy, trying to figure out how the enemy will act, but usually looking at the problem from their own perspective and mindset. This is “mirror imaging,” believing you are thinking like the enemy, when in reality you are looking at the problem from your perspective.

Therefore, it is rare to come across an individual who was successful in thinking outside the cultural parameters that bind most people. Edward Lansdale is one such person. He had the unique ability to see another person’s view of a problem, even if that person came from a very different culture. This ability to see the alternate perspective helped him successfully influence and affect key individuals in the Philippine political and military establishment during the 1940s and 1950s, ultimately helping the Filipino leaders defeat the Communist insurgency called the People’s Anti-Japanese Army (Huks) and strengthen the democratic process.

Praised and pilloried in press and film in the last four decades, Lansdale is a controversial figure. Portrayed favorably in the book and movie The Ugly American, but vilified by Graham Greene in The Quiet American and by Oliver Stone in the film JFK, Lansdale is the ultimate insider who can think and act like the people of the culture he inhabits.

Lansdale was born in Detroit, Michigan, to an upper middle class family. His father was an executive in the auto industry, and Lansdale’s family moved around the country as Lansdale’s father moved up the corporate chain. The family eventually moved to California when Lansdale was 14. Upon graduation from high school in 1926, he enrolled at UCLA where he concentrated on journalism. Lansdale left UCLA in 1931 to try
his hand at journalism. However, it was the height of the Great Depression, work was scarce, and Lansdale drifted through a number of jobs until he finally found a spot in an advertising agency in San Francisco.

Working in the advertising business taught Lansdale to develop strategies and information campaigns to sell different products. To be successful, Lansdale had to imagine what would appeal to the populace. To do this he had to think like the targeted audience. This experience in advertising would be his introduction to thinking in alternate perspectives.

Lansdale volunteered for the military at the start of World War II. Through a series of acquaintances he had made in the advertising industry, Lansdale maneuvered himself into a position with the newly formed Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA. Lansdale’s duties in the OSS provided him with opportunities to develop solutions that were not the standard “Army way” of accomplishing the mission. At the end of the war, Lansdale was reassigned out of the OSS, which was being dismantled, to the occupation command in the newly recovered Philippines.7 Lansdale was placed in a situation and location where his ability to intuitively understand an unfamiliar culture could be put to good use.

The Philippines was a war-torn land when Lansdale arrived in October 1945. The 1942 Japanese invasion interrupted the process of transferring power from the United States to an embryonic Philippine national government. Three years of Japanese occupation had created deep fissures in the Philippine social structure. American invasion and reoccupation caused massive death and destruction throughout the archipelago. The American government had negotiated with the Philippine national leadership in 1935 to grant independence to the islands in 1945. Upon reoccupation in 1945, the United States decided to continue with the power transfer, and on 4 July 1946, the Philippines became an independent state.

Though independent, the new regime had problems, including a growing communist insurgency initiated by the Huk. The Huk, one of many groups resisting Japanese occupation, had a politburo for political guidance and a subordinate military organization to conduct large-scale guerrilla war. Their political actions and rhetoric focused on the inequitable distribution of land and the lack of government support for the common peasant. The upheaval of World War II created a political vacuum throughout the Philippines archipelago, which the Huk quickly filled. The new Philippine government of President Manuel Roxas, hampered by internal political divisions, massive corruption throughout the political process, and the huge task of rebuilding the country, could not contain the growing communist insurgency. The Huk political platform of land reform and egalitarian government appealed to a vast majority of the Philippine people, who were disgusted with a government that provided neither a voice for their complaints nor an economic avenue for advancement. This was a situation where Lansdale could thrive.

Lansdale, initially in the G-2 (Intelligence) section of the Army Forces Western Pacific, quickly recognized that the information developed by the G2 from U.S. and Philippine sources was either false or misleading. He knew that to truly understand the situation in the countryside he would have to leave his secure office in Manila and meet the average Filipino on the ground. He started traveling alone throughout the countryside, stopping unannounced in obscure barrios (villages) and talking to the local leaders and common peasants alike. These conversations illuminated the culture and custom of the society, the problems that the local people were facing, and the vision that they saw for the future.

Lansdale also opened up his house on the U.S. compound in Manila to all Filipino visitors (mostly military commanders) who were conducting business with the U.S. command.8 The ensuing conversations gave him another avenue to gain insights into the Filipino culture and an understanding of the conditions on the ground in the fight against the
Huks. Once Lansdale developed numerous contacts throughout Philippine society, he decided to search out Huk fighters to truly understand their perspective. The Huks were concentrated on fighting the new Philippine government, and saw the remaining U.S. forces in the Philippines more as an overarching authority that was leaving than as a threat. On numerous occasions, Lansdale infiltrated his way into Huk camps and safe houses and, through long conversations with Huk leaders and fighters, gained insights into the movement at the grass roots level.

As Lansdale took in all this information he began to comprehend the Huks’ perspective concerning the Filipino people and society. At the end of his tour in the islands in 1949, he could view the situation in the Philippines from a Filipino perspective, but he was not in a position to change the situation.

Returning for his second tour, Lansdale was in a position to affect the Philippine society and the war against the Huks. In 1947, Lansdale transferred from the Army to the newly activated U.S. Air Force. Lansdale’s old contacts in the OSS then recruited him to work at the also newly established CIA. In 1950, Lansdale went back to the Philippines with a small team to help advise the newly appointed defense minister, Ramon Magsaysay. Throughout the 1950s, he would use his positions in the Air Force intelligence organizations as a cover for his CIA activities.

Two senior leaders at the CIA, Colonel Richard Stilwell and Frank Wisner, decided that Magsaysay, a representative in the Philippine Congress, would be the best leader to fight the Huks and possibly lead the new nation. The CIA put pressure on President Quirino to appoint Ramon Magsaysay as defense minister and then placed Lansdale in a position where he would be the key advisor to the new defense minister. Lansdale and Magsaysay hit it off immediately, and over a three-year period they became close friends and compatriots.9

This relationship was remarkable, given the time period, when racial and ethnic biases were openly advocated. Lansdale had the ability to divorce himself from any form of ethnocentrism or racial
biases. He had a strong belief in the American role in the world and the inherent rightness of spreading American values and beliefs to newly independent countries, but these beliefs did not lessen his respect for the Filipino culture. His love of the culture and empathy for the common Filipino endeared him to the country. By 1950, Lansdale had attained a deep knowledge of the Philippine society and the Huk Insurgency. This perspective helped him work closely with Defense Minister Magsaysay because he could see problems from Magsaysay’s and other Filipino leaders’ perspectives.

Lansdale delved further into the multilayered Malay-Hispanic culture of the Philippines to find pieces of that culture to use in the fight against the Huk. He was adept at using superstitions, myths, and focused intelligence to develop and execute successful psychological operations against the Huk. He convinced Magsaysay to follow his example and get away from the capitol to see the counterinsurgency operations of the Army on the ground.

Filipino politicians, who normally came from the upper class, generally focused their activities around the capital, Manila. Magsaysay was a middle class outsider who came from the provinces, with no power base in the Manila elites. Being an outsider gave Magsaysay a different perspective from the average Filipino politician and helped him be more responsive to the average citizen. While visiting troops in the field, Lansdale convinced Magsaysay to look into local conditions near military camps. This helped Magsaysay get a better perspective of the needs of the average peasant, and it gave Lansdale an opportunity to build a power base in the provinces for a future Magsaysay presidential candidacy. Lansdale understood the need of the populace to find a politician not tied into the Manila elites. The people wanted someone who would represent them. Magsaysay, Lansdale decided, would be the people’s choice.

Lansdale’s ability to see the operational environment from the Filipino perspective gave him a huge advantage in influencing the military and political situation. Though the Filipinos leaders knew he was a representative of some element of the American government (at the time they did not know it was the CIA) and had some form of clout beyond the normal advisory relationship sponsored by the U.S. Military Advisor Group, these key stakeholders trusted Lansdale. The strength of this trust came from Lansdale’s ability to see problems from the Filipino perspective and to give advice that seemed to be in the best interests of Filipinos. Other American senior military and civilian leaders had tried to help the Filipino leaders solve the Huk crisis. However, the solutions they proposed were from an American perspective. Lansdale was unique in finding solutions from a Filipino perspective, thereby making it easier for the Filipino leadership to accept his recommendations.10

In 1953, Lansdale facilitated the election of Magsaysay to the Filipino presidency. The CIA heavily funded the campaign, but Lansdale orchestrated the campaign behind the scenes. One of the most persistent and influential grievances the Huk had against the government was the feeling that the previous incumbents had corrupted each of the preceding presidential elections, leaving the average Filipino with no real voice in the election outcome. Lansdale made sure the administration of President Quirino would not corrupt the election. He convinced the Filipino army’s senior leaders, who were mostly reformist, to provide security to the polling places using soldiers and ROTC cadets, virtually stopping election fraud. Using his advertising experience, he had Magsaysay conduct an American-style political campaign, with the emphasis on getting out to see the voter in the countryside.

Lansdale knew this type of campaign would resonate with the average Filipino. Magsaysay campaigned throughout the archipelago with gusto. The results were astonishing. Out of 5 million eligible voters, Magsaysay won in a landslide, garnering 4 million votes.11 With Magsaysay installed as president, the Huk rebellion slowly withered away, until it became a small nuisance for the government, with the rebellion finally disappearing in the 1990s. Lansdale had defeated the Huk rebellion and established a viable Philippine political system by looking at the problem from the Filipino perspective. Interestingly, Lansdale did not stay in the Philippines to see the results of his success. He moved on to Indochina to help the newly independent South Vietnamese government.
Perspective

Both Epaminondas and Edward Lansdale were capable of seeing past the confines of their own culture and society and viewing situations from an alternate perspective. Epaminondas forced himself to view the situation from the point of view of a society he despised. He examined the Lacedaemonian society from a Spartan perspective, looking for weaknesses he could exploit, and molded the Theban and Boeotian forces to take advantage of Spartan shortcomings. At the Battle of Leuctra, Epaminondas knew that the Spartan leaders could not afford a battle of attrition. He placed his forces tactically in a position on the left flank, maximizing his ability to kill the Spartiates. Only an individual who could see from the opponent’s perspective could have executed the plan successfully at Leuctra and then continued the campaign into the Peloponnesian peninsula, freeing the helots and bringing on the downfall of Sparta.

Edward Lansdale faced an even greater challenge. Having no actual forces to influence the situation in the Philippines, he had to learn to see matters from the Filipino perspective and influence the key decision makers in Filipino society. All of Lansdale’s success depended on his ability to see the situation from the Filipino perspective.

In the current operational environment, U.S. leaders are often in situations where the use of force is one of multiple options available to resolve operational issues. Commanders who can understand the perspective of the enemy and other involved actors can better understand the situation they face and effectively use the elements of national power that are available. In Iraq it was the coalition leaders understanding the perspective of the Sunni Awaking Movement and its lead group, the Sons of Iraq, that facilitated a change in policy and the turnaround in the Iraqi insurgency. Gaining an insight into the enemy’s perspective is extremely difficult, but it is a step toward understanding enemy strengths, weaknesses, and intentions. If the leader can attain such insight, he has a much better chance of success. MR

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5. Ibid., 198.
9. Currey, 73.
10. Ibid., 83.
As World War II progressed, tens of thousands of tons of artillery munitions were fired on enemy positions in both the European and Pacific theaters of operation. The quintessential armored officer General George S. Patton depended upon his artillery to batter the Germans into submission before and during any maneuver his 3rd Army undertook. In fact, the spearhead of Patton’s 3rd Army, the 4th Armored Division, would not maneuver unless continuous, or near continuous, artillery fires were placed on and around objectives. The hard lesson learned was simple: firepower provides freedom of maneuver in combat, and no air force or combat arm provides that firepower better than the artillery. This led General Patton to declare: “I do not have to tell you who won the war. You know. The artillery did.”

The cold, hard truth then, as now, is that rolling over and through opponents killed or incapacitated by cannon and rocket fires rather than by directly engaging them with rifles, machine guns, and tanks saves the lives of U.S. soldiers. Nor did World War II ground commanders hold themselves hostage to the weather and the Air Corps. The Air Corps could not be everywhere at once, and the weather affected its ability to put ordinance on target at the right time and place. Nothing has changed. Yet now, in over ten years of combat operations, these facts appear lost on many military leaders and politicians.

The Modern Battlefield

As fiscal realities today descend on the military, the services will scramble and fight to justify their existence, and the same historically unsupported ideas will be repackaged and foisted upon the political establishment as the be-all and end-all to defending our nation on the cheap. The “AirSea Battle” is currently in vogue (in the past, it was the AirLand Battle), and it will in turn be replaced by the next “good idea” from Pentagon and think-tank futurists...
until the harsh realities of ground combat impose themselves again.

Despite contemporary and past experiences in war, the chorus sings the same old song—only now, it is to protect the sea lanes and project power through the air; before it was dominate the air, win the land battle. The assertion remains unchanged: airpower predominates in modern warfare. The presumption is that airpower is the clean, efficient way to win wars. Yet the historical record shows us that war is a brutal and wasteful affair in the mud that has never been decided in the air. The inconvenient truth for the proponents of airpower is that an airplane cannot even hold the ground it parks on, much less the terrain it flies over. With Asia rising, and in the processes rapidly developing land-based forces, the U.S. Army need not justify its future relevance. Yet, we approach another interwar period and its malaise. What should be evident to anyone with even the slightest grip on history and an understanding of the indispensable role of land forces in winning wars is lost on our policymakers. Many seem incapable of learning from history. Wars are won on the ground and in the will. The Army is the decisive force. The current chief of staff of the Army understands this clearly and has said so. Nevertheless, the reality remains that when there is nothing left to discuss, adversaries fight. The great decision by arms, as Clausewitz calls it, is ultimately manifest in combat. In combat, “if one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes . . . [I]t would be futile—even wrong—to try and shut one’s eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality.” Enter the artillery.

Unfortunately, what will soon be left of U.S. artillery will be a depleted and dispirited force endowed with a magnificent array of precision, near-precision, and area munitions that too few artillerymen can employ from too few systems—so much for the once vaunted King of Battle.

Lessons Learned?

Among the bad lessons and habits the Army and to some extent the U.S. Marine Corps have developed from counterinsurgency operations (COIN) is an overreliance on air support. The genesis of this bad habit traces to having no precision artillery capabilities in the operational force until four years into the war, coupled with uncontested, absolute control of airspace, freeing nearly all U.S. tactical aircraft for ground attack. As a result, commanders came to rely on aircraft armed with JDAMs or Hellfires for precision strikes on targets where collateral damage was a concern. The artillery took itself out of the fight through the self-inflicted wound of no foresight. It was not until the fall of 2005 that the M31 (guided rocket) came online and the spring of 2007 until the M982 (Excalibur)
155-mm guided projectile arrived. However, the damage was done. Airspace was ceded to the Air Force and attack helicopters. Despite the precision artillery munitions now available to tactical commanders, the default remains tactical air support because it takes too long to clear the airspace and gain the authority to employ precision artillery fires. This has not come without consequence.

In Afghanistan, fixed wing air support response times average eight minutes. Artillery fires can arrive on target within two to three minutes. For troops-in-contact, two to three minutes is a long time to wait for fire support, and eight minutes is an eternity. This assumes, of course, that air support is always available. Assumptions in combat get soldiers killed. A group of American advisors and their Afghan partners learned this lesson outside of Ganjgal in Kunar Province in 2009. It was bad enough that the assurances of air support being only five minutes away did not materialize until nearly two hours into the fight, but repeated requests for artillery fires were denied, and by the time the helicopters arrived four U.S. Marines and eight Afghan soldiers were dead. The debacle of the Ganjgal ambush demonstrated that the rules of engagement got soldiers killed, while a more insidious threat doomed the operation: a mentality of overreliance on tactical air support.

Junior leaders conditioned to expect combat air patrols or Apaches over their shoulders did not think to plan for anything but tactical air support. Properly coordinated fire support does not lead to rules of engagement debates at the time of crisis. It also obviates reliance on dubious assurances of air cover. As the Napoleonic maxim goes: no one reasons; everyone executes. Instead, the hero that day, Army Captain Will Swenson, received white phosphorus rounds to cover the retreat of his men rather than high explosives to saturate the ridgeline, which would have enabled his forces to close with and destroy the insurgents. One of the primary purposes of artillery fires is to provide covering or suppressive fires, so that troops under fire can maneuver. We learned this through hard experience in previous wars. There is little doubt that day outside of Gangjal would have turned decisively in favor of U.S. and Afghan forces had artillery fires been brought to bear at the right time and place. Air support is not a luxury in major combat operations, nor in COIN. Our combat leaders need to plan for artillery fires first, and employ them without hindrance.
Denying artillery fires to troops-in-contact is egregious, but failing to bring artillery to the fight is a greater blunder. This is the infamy of Operation Anaconda, foreshadowing the Ganjgal debacle. Conventional forces that should have known better left their howitzers in garrison (far away from the Shah-i-kot Valley) and attempted to conduct combat operations relying wholly on tactical air support and mortars. As is typical in mountainous areas, the weather turned poor and helicopters proved of limited capability at high altitude. Mortars engaged in duels with their entrenched and adept Al-Qaeda counterparts. Hundreds of Al-Qaeda fighters escaped unhindered by artillery fire into and through tunnel networks built by U.S. tax dollars during the Soviet-Afghan War and over goat trails permeating the area. Special operations forces (SOF), 101st Airborne Division, and 10th Mountain Division soldiers could not close the loop and suffered unnecessary casualties from a lack of effective fire support. The fog prevented aircraft from dropping ordinance on Al-Qaeda fighters dug into cave entrances, and U.S. troops fighting uphill could only maneuver under the limited cover of mortar fires during periods of bad weather that kept attack aircraft from providing fire support. Mortar rounds were limited to what individual soldiers could carry. Tactical aircraft could not stay on station continuously and limited visibility hampered them. (Organic artillery support operates under no such limitations. Of course, it has to be brought to the battle to affect the battle.)

Unfortunately, seven SOF soldiers lost their lives in Operation Anaconda as RPG fire brought down their helicopter while it tried to insert them into a landing zone (LZ) that had not been prepped by artillery fires (a basic tactic no airmobile unit in Vietnam would have failed to implement).

However, when you do not have any artillery fires, you make do with what you have, which in this case proved to be the U.S. Air Force. The Air Force could not be everywhere at once; therefore, the LZ was not covered.

The Past is Not Dead

Our World War I, World War II, Korean, and even Vietnam War predecessors would be appalled that professional soldiers would operate without artillery, much less do so by conscious decision.

Yet that is the state of professional soldiers today. Either they do not know their history, or they believe the principles that govern warfare have somehow changed. Yet, artillery remains decisive, and its absence proves costly.

The next worst lesson learned from COIN is that fire-finding radars are sufficient sensors for the artillery. They are reactive. The damage is done by the time the radar acquires the incoming rounds, determines the point of origin, and the guns receive a counter-battery mission. Not only does this limit artillery use to artillery duels, it also makes the artillery literally blind. With fire supporters doing almost everything but observing targets and directing artillery fires, basic fire support skills have atrophied. The eyes of the artillery have grown dim.

Once again, rules of engagement complicates matters. Most tactical commanders are not willing to use quick-fire procedures that make counterfire effective. Nor will most tactical commanders doing COIN accept the collateral damage that may result from shooting quickly with area munitions. In Fallujah, the Marine Corps broke the code, but they proved to be the exception, not the rule. Insurgents establishing mortar-firing positions in the backyards of Iraqi residences were fired upon after being...
acquired by either lightweight countermortar radars or larger FireFinder radars like the Q-36. Then the harassing fires against Marine forward operating bases or combat outposts ended rather abruptly. It appeared that most Iraqis were not too pleased with insurgents setting up mortar tubes in their backyards because shortly after they used them, artillery rounds came crashing down, spraying death and destruction. Therefore, the local populace forced the insurgents to take their activities elsewhere.

Contrast this outcome with Army counterfire operations elsewhere in Iraq during the same period in 2006, where valuable time was lost getting “eyes on target” through unmanned aerial surveillance drones or ground forces. Then, once “positive identification” was established, the laborious process of clearing fires began. Eventually, if the insurgents hung around long enough, two 105-mm rounds would be fired at them. Of course, all these parts and pieces rarely came together in time for counterfire to be effective.

Of course, there is more to combat operations than an artillery duel. Artillery fires shape the battlefield. Artillery fires can destroy targets in urban areas without risk to maneuver forces. Artillery fires can provide light during darkness and haze on a clear day. To do these things, the artillery requires more than just forward observers on the ground. It needs eyes that can look deep, that can penetrate into dense urban sprawl.

This was the case at one time in our history. Aerial artillery spotters made their first appearance during our Civil War. On artillery-dominated battlefields during World War I, observers in fabric-covered aircraft proved their worth. In World War II, aerial observation battalions linked observers directly to division and corps artillery assets.

From the Louisiana Maneuvers, to combat operations in both the European and Pacific theaters, aerial observation and direction of artillery fires proved invaluable to striking high-payoff targets, providing preparatory fires, and denying positions of advantage to advancing or attacking enemy forces.10

This aerial observation capability persisted in the Army through the Korean and Vietnam wars, after which it underwent modification in the 1980s, consolidating it into Army aviation formations where it went from fixed wing platforms to helicopters.

When modularity destroyed divisional and corps artillery formations, Fort Sill responded by vesting considerable effort in establishing, organizing, and resourcing fires brigades (FiBs), seen as filling the gap in operational fires capabilities left by the demise of divisional and corps artilleries. The one glaring problem with FiBs is that the only organic observation capabilities they bring to the fight are radars. Fires brigades are dependent on joint sensors. Those sensors are rarely, if ever, dedicated to FiBs, so FiBs end-up blind.

To be relevant in COIN, and major combat operations, for that matter, FiBs must see deep. They must observe the enemy when he is doing something other than putting indirect fires on friendly forces. This takes the artillery beyond the artillery duel and into a proactive fight where insurgents are destroyed as they set up rockets on timers, establish mortar firing points, use safe houses, plant improvised explosive devices, or establish ambushes. In major combat operations, the ability to look deep puts FiBs in a position to preempt enemy actions by striking assembly areas, airfields, command posts, or logistical sites. One would think that, with the advent of unmanned aircraft systems, placing this capability in the FiB would be a foregone conclusion—but no. Instead, the Army debates funding experimental sensor capabilities in other warfighting functions rather than placing a battle-proven capability in the artillery.

...the Army debates funding experimental sensor capabilities in other warfighting functions rather than placing a battle-proven capability in the artillery.

An Identity Crisis

Aside from the budget wars of shortsighted politicians, the problems with the current identity crisis within the artillery community and the bad habits ten years of COIN have instilled in our force are symptomatic of diminished trust among the Army’s combat arms. The ancillary missions into which we have thrust artillerists in COIN have drained their core competencies and with it the credibility of the artillery community to do basic fire support tasks.
The current maneuver force often operates without fire support because confidence has eroded in the planning and clearing of Army fires; therefore, commanders rely on tactical air support. This mentality has two deleterious effects.

First, tactical leaders today believe they no longer need to maneuver under an artillery umbrella or arc of fires. This mentality has led seasoned veterans of multiple wars to conclude that America has the most combat experienced force in the world that does not have combat experience, meaning that today’s Army has not been bloodied as it was in World War II, Korea, or even Vietnam, where the result of tactical engagements could, and did, result in either strategic reversals or gains. In Afghanistan, the result of tactical engagements does not jeopardize the entire expeditionary force. Nor do they spell strategic failure despite the hand wringing of many senior military leaders over the “strategic corporal” and “CNN effect.” This was not the case in World Wars I and II or Korea, where the fortunes of entire expeditionary forces hinged on tactical success. When U.S. soldiers again start dying by the hundreds in single battles against a more sophisticated and capable enemy, then operating without artillery support will become unthinkable because it will be fatal. Unfortunately, we as a society and military have allowed matters to reach that point because we cannot see beyond our contemporary experience of a flip-flop clad, AK-47 toting enemy whose best firepower rests in improvised explosive devices and haphazardly fired mortars and rockets.

Second, the mentality of leaving fire supporters in the rear to do other things is the very reason the artillery is no longer the first call for killing by maneuver forces. In southern Afghanistan recently, a retired senior Army leader observing operations queried a tactical commander patrolling outside his forward operating base (FOB) as to where his fire support officer was, to which the commander responded, “back in the FOB doing other things.” When further asked what fire support was planned for and available for the patrol, the commander said he had one mortar tube. This astounding mentality defies comment.

Vietnam was every bit the guerrilla war Afghanistan is today. “Most commanders concluded that the overriding lesson of 1965-66 [in Vietnam] was the importance of firepower. As the battles indicated, American ground forces were vulnerable when they lacked fire support. Because of that, many commanders reluctantly operated beyond their artillery or tactical air support and refused to fight on equal terms with the enemy.” The problem is that the Army is too busy trying to shed this image of being reliant on firepower, and it is filtering down through the ranks—we’ve got one mortar tube, we’re good. Too often, U.S. forces fight on relatively equal terms with insurgents. The tragedy in this is how unnecessary and wasteful of American lives it is. Brigadier General Willard Pearson, commander, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, wrote in 1966 that his unit’s motto was “Save Lives, Not Ammunition.” There is no doubt this mentality would have saved American lives in the Shah-i-Kot Valley and outside Ganjgal. It is far past time to resurrect the once-held and more practical mentality of firepower above all else.

Theory

The artillery’s relevance is in its firepower. The Army’s relevance is in its functionality. They are inexorably intertwined. No senior Army leader needs to look beyond this fact to justify the existence of either. The historical record is there. Use it. The essence of combined arms warfare since its inception is functionality. If Clausewitz is right, then the big three—artillery, infantry, cavalry (now called armor)—bring different functions to battle, which under the “genius of the commander” (his term for how essential a good commander is to everything), are complimentary when coordinated and synchronized correctly (correctly being defined only one way—as victory).

Clausewitz goes to great pains to explain the functionality of the big three. Artillery is firepower and does the vast majority of the killing. Its major drawback is mobility and flexibility. Infantry is versatility. It gains and holds ground. Its major drawback is firepower. Cavalry is mobility, speed, and punch. Its major drawback is versatility. The point Clausewitz is at pains to make is that where one combat arm is strong another is weak. Hence, they are interdependent. We like to believe this notion of interdependence is a post-modern phenomenon, but it was apparent...
in the 19th century and over 2,000 years before to the Romans and Macedonians.

In the recent American military experience we broke the traditional relationships between the big three combat arms, and artillery became subordinate to the other two. To return to becoming the killing power of choice on future battlefields, the artillery must regain its coequal status with infantry and armor. There are many ways to do this, from using the menu of precision artillery capabilities mentioned in this article, to improving the artillery’s observation and range capabilities, to getting back to the basics of shoot, move, and communicate. Yet, the argument begins and ends with the fact that artillery is the most cost effective means of killing. The artillery community must return to lethality as its principal responsibility. Firepower and maneuver are the fundamental elements of combat. The application of artillery fires precedes successful maneuver to permit infantry and armor forces to seize objectives without serious loss. Killing is the business of artillery. No other combat arm or service component kills large numbers of combatants better than the artillery with its all-weather, 24/7 capabilities. For this, the artillery community need not apologize. Until artillery is resorted to its rightful place among the combat arms, the crown is lost. MR

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2. Ibid., 221-22. Army and Marine Corps forces in World War II got to the point where they would not maneuver unless sustained artillery fires were placed on the objective, or used to shape the battlefield. “Reflecting upon the war in Europe, US Forces, European Theater, concluded late in 1945 that firepower and maneuver were the fundamental elements of combat. The application of firepower preceded successful maneuver to permit infantry and armor to take objectives without serious loss of life or injury,” 226.
3. Martin Blumenson in The Patton Papers, 1940-45, notes that on at least two occasions GEN Koechlin-Schwartz told GEN Patton: “The poorer the infantry, the more artillery it needs; the American infantry needs all it can get.”
4. Blogging on the Small Wars Journal, GEN Raymond T. Odierno succinctly laid out the strategic framework for the U.S. Army through the interconnected roles of prevent, shape, and win. According to the CSA, the Army “must be ready to win decisively and dominantly.” Indeed. There can be no real victory, but on terra firma—so says history. At least one policymaker seems to get it.
5. The adherents to Bushido were every bit as fanatical as today’s Islamists. Like Imperial Japan, they have their limits, despite their fanaticism.
7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 75-76. Clausewitz previously chides “kind-hearted people” for foolishly believing that the true object of war is to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed.
8. McClatchy Newspapers, 8 September 2009: “At 5:50 a.m., Army Captain Will Swenson, the trainer of the Afghan Border Police unit in Shakan, began calling for air support or artillery fire from a unit of the Army’s 10th Mountain Division. The responses came back: No helicopters were available.”
9. Sean D. Naylor, Air Force Times, “Learning from Operation Anaconda,” 29 July 2002. This is not just my contention. Here is the Army’s own assessment according to Mr. Naylor: Army COL Mike Hiemstra, [Army Center for Lessons Learned] director, said it would be “a legitimate conclusion” to assume that, had there been a battery of howitzers on the Anaconda battlefield, the guns could have shut down the Al-Qaeda mortars that inflicted casualties on the U.S. force.
10. Dastrup, 207-208. “Despite resistance from the Air Corps, which did not want to lose the observation mission, the War Department ordered a test of organic air observation for the field artillery. The test demonstrated the timeliness of organic air observation in the delivery of artillery fires.” Terrestrial observation [forward observers] combined with aerial observation became essential to shooting deep. By 1943, every artillery battalion had two planes, pilots, and maintenance support. Today, the Army cannot even equip an FIB with one unmanned aircraft.
11. Dastrup, 284.
12. BG Pearson’s mentality was reflected in a 1966 article that appeared in Army Information Digest entitled “Find’em, Fix’em, Finish’em.” Of course, this has become the targeting methodology for high-value individuals. Its genesis is found in a conventional forces commander who prized massive artillery and air strikes as the most effective means for destroying enemy resistance in his airmobile operations.
13. By way of comparison, an M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (the most expensive artillery piece in the U.S. arsenal) costs approximately $2.5 million per system to provide fire support vs. joint assets that cost anywhere from $93 million (F18) to $13 billion (aircraft carrier) to provide fire support to ground forces.
THE MOST VALUABLE lesson I learned from my time at the Intermediate Leadership Education (ILE) course is the importance of consistently applying critical thought, especially as it relates to evaluating our own behavior as leaders. This essential skill has taken on far greater significance to me in light of the complexity and diversity of problems our military currently faces at all levels of leadership: shrinking budgets, strategic realignment, force restructuring, establishing the profession of arms, increased suicide rates, and the list goes on. These issues further highlight the saliency of this invaluable lesson—a lesson that compelled me to write the article “Empirically Based Leadership,” published in the Military Review, January-February 2013. In response to my article, Colonel Tom Guthrie from the Center of Army Leadership (CAL) authored a detailed and thoughtful response that was published in the same edition. While I disagree with many of his points, methodology, and conclusions, I believe that such discourse and constructive dissent is essential to promoting critical thought—the ultimate intent of my original article as well as this current one.

In an effort to remain true to this objective, I respectfully contend that Colonel Guthrie’s article contained several flaws in forming the basis of his rebuttal. Beginning with the most significant, his rebuttal contained a dearth of published, peer-reviewed scientific data to support his position. His references are almost exclusively from presentations, reports, or technical manuals, not professional journal publications that require critical, objective analysis by scholars in the same field (i.e., peer reviewed) prior to publication.

While I valued his detailed explanation of the development process behind the Leadership Requirement Model (LRM), his description of the process and claims that it is “empirically validated” does not make it so, especially in the absence of published peer-reviewed data to support that claim. I greatly appreciate the tremendous time, effort, and research expended in developing
the LRM. Further, I readily acknowledge that the time and research in constructing my own article pales in comparison. Clearly, this is an important limitation that readers should consider in reviewing my original article. However, both Colonel Guthrie’s article and Field Manual (FM) 6-22 source notes section substantially lack empirical support from peer-reviewed journals to support LRM as an “empirically validated” model. Neither does the manual contain any description of the developmental process in formulating its basis. If there exists such support for LRM’s development process, to my knowledge it has not been published and Colonel Guthrie’s article did little to redress the issue.

In his article, he claims “the model underwent a comprehensive content, construct, and criterion-referenced validation…all of which was ignored by McDonald.” This statement implies that I was exposed to the information but chose to disregard it. I respectfully point out that it is impossible to ignore information that has not been published in professional journals, which was the primary focus of my paper. Further, I strongly contend that it is the responsibility of the author(s) of such an FM with claims of empirical validation to publish the appropriate references, not the responsibility of subsequent consumers to seek out those authors in order to understand the empirical basis, as suggested by Colonel Guthrie.

In no way did I intend to imply that the LRM lacks empirical value or that it is irrelevant to being an effective Army leader. Both personally and professionally, I place great value on the attributes contained in the LRM. In fact, in my original article I concluded that many of the attributes identified by the LRM are empirically related to leadership efficacy based upon my review of the published peer-reviewed data. I simply offered recommendations that either certain attributes or contextual factors receive increased emphasis or consideration be given to reconceptualizing the three categories—not the wholesale revision of the model as implied by Colonel Guthrie.

“Empirical validation” requires that an acceptable scientific method be applied, the results subjected to critical peer-review, replication of results through additional studies, and publication of those studies, which is critical to further scrutiny and transparency to the greater scientific community. While Colonel Guthrie noted the LRM model has been validated through extensive research and follow-up studies, his failure to cite published accounts from the larger body of peer-reviewed research significantly undermines claims of “empirical validation.”

Another flaw in Colonel Guthrie’s article is his apparent misunderstanding of the intent of my article as reflected by his narrow discussion of “redundancy.” In beginning his discussion on the issue, Colonel Guthrie asserts that I violate the scientific principle of parsimony in applying it to the LRM, which he defines as “the value of seeking the simplest explanation for phenomena.” I strongly concur with his contention for the application of this principle to the model. However, he suggests that I violate this principle by referencing “several ‘new’ factors” for inclusion in the model and that I recommend “adding many constructs.” In my original article, I conclude by making three recommendations based upon my review of the published literature: more balanced emphasis on leadership attributes already contained in the LRM, further consideration of reconceptualizing the major categories, and greater emphasis on leaders understanding and using social contextual factors. Nowhere in my article is there a recommendation for “adding many constructs.” Additionally, recommendations are intended to be just that—recommendations. As with any set of recommendations or suggestions, all or some can be disregarded, considered, applied, used to stimulate greater thought, or some combination of the last three. In my original article, my hope was to at least stimulate greater thought, but any consumer of Military Review who takes the time to read my original article could obviously opt to disregard my recommendations.
Within the introductory section, my first stated objective was to “compare relevant research on key individual characteristics or traits of effective leadership to those characteristics established within FM 6-22.”8 In other words, in order to identify the most important factors, my intent was to explore the published professional literature on leadership attributes and compare those to the attributes already contained within the LRM, not to create or establish new ones. Clearly, if there is empirical support in the literature for a particular attribute, there is going to be “redundancy” in my discussion of it.

Third, Colonel Guthrie mischaracterizes much of my discussion on emotional intelligence (EI), resiliency, and social identity. My discussion of the literature in these areas primarily supported the inclusion of many of the attributes already contained in the LRM. However, in my opinion, based upon my review of peer-reviewed data, the LRM does not provide adequate emphasis or clarity to those attributes most clearly related to leadership efficacy. For example, EI has been one of the most studied concepts in relation to leadership effectiveness within the professional literature on leadership.9 In my article, I concluded that those attributes most related to EI in the LRM received inadequate emphasis, and as such, consideration be given to reconceptualizing the major categories to reflect the research. This is not the first time this type of criticism has been published in Military Review directed toward the LRM in regard to EI.10

Along the lines of mischaracterization, Colonel Guthrie appeared to be selective in the information he used to support his position, while ignoring other data. For example, he claimed that I exaggerated the relationship between EI and leadership effectiveness by describing the relationship as “strong” when the author of a source article referred to it as “moderate.”11 Colonel Guthrie’s characterization of the author’s description is not entirely accurate and failed to consider the article in its full context. The author, Dr. Lane Mills, described the relationship as “moderately strong,” ultimately reaching the same conclusion that additional consideration be given to EI as a component of leadership effectiveness.12 Colonel Guthrie also focused on this mischaracterization of a singular article while failing to address the other articles referenced in the same section.13

In discussing resiliency, Colonel Guthrie asserted that the current definition is sufficiently defined and applied beyond combat. However, he cites only parts of the FM 6-22 that support his view on resiliency while omitting other sections that primarily frame its application to a combat environment. As with EI, this is not the first time the LRM’s definition of resiliency has been criticized as being too narrowly applied to combat, and consequently, requiring further revision.14

Finally, in concluding his article, Colonel Guthrie again made it clear that he did not appreciate the stated intent of my original article, or alternatively, provide any substantive peer-reviewed empirical support for his position. In his response, he asserted that I failed to “make a cohesive argument or provide supporting evidence that [my] recommended constructs are indeed the most critical factors that contribute to effective leadership.”15 At the risk of being redundant, as previously stated, I concluded my article with three recommendations:

● More balanced emphasis on leadership characteristics clearly linked to an empirical basis.
● Reconceptualizing the three major categories to reflect this research.
● Greater emphasis on utilizing social contextual factors.16

While I did recommend placing certain attributes in a separate domain to better reflect the research, the main underlying thread in all three recommendations was for a more balanced emphasis on those factors most relevant to effective leadership, more so than the addition of specific constructs.

In an attempt to support his position, Colonel Guthrie claims “through CAL research we believe strongly that the Army leader core competencies and attributes are positively associated with leader effectiveness.”9 He goes on to describe the “validation of 360 assessment instruments” and “criterion-referenced validation” in support of his claim, but again, does not provide a single peer-reviewed publication to support this particular position or support for these methods as the most effective in measuring the relationship between the LRM attributes and leadership efficacy. Ironically, my original article provided greater empirical support from professional journals for many of the attributes currently contained in the LRM than Colonel Guthrie did in his rebuttal. He finally concludes that if
my “factual inaccuracies and gaps in assumptions are not corrected, [it] could harm operational performance and cause millions of dollars to be spent unnecessarily. . . .”17 Although I appreciate Colonel Guthrie assigning such strategic significance to my article, I am highly confident that the vast majority of Military Review consumers who take the time to read my original article will apply appropriate critical thought to its content and place it within the proper context.

More important ... is the promotion of critical thought among leaders.

Clearly, Colonel Guthrie and I differ in our opinions as to the intent of my article, the empirical basis, and its contribution to the broader body of knowledge. While I disagree with much of his rebuttal, I am grateful for his clarity and articulation of his position, which has provided me further opportunity to promote, and most importantly, apply the lesson I valued most from ILE. More important than defending my position, winning an academic argument, or even obtaining a highly respected writing award, is the promotion of critical thought among leaders. Regardless of how individuals will fall on these issues, my hope is that Military Review readers will continue this process of critical analysis and always strive to apply critical thought to their actions, especially in relation to those they lead. MR

NOTES

3. Ibid., 67.
5. Guthrie, 69-70.
6. Ibid., 69.
8. Ibid., 2.
11. Guthrie, 70.
15. Guthrie, 71.
17. Guthrie, 72.
Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan
A New, Interactive History

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) has released its first multimedia interactive historical study titled Vanguard of Valor: Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan, Enhanced Edition which is now available in the Apple iBooks format. The new iBook offers eight immersive accounts of combat actions in Afghanistan. This iBook is CSI’s first work that tells the Army’s story in a fully interactive manner. The chapters in the book include features such as 3D digital terrain views, video from combat actions, interactive digital models of weapon systems and vehicles, and interactive maps and charts.

To download the interactive edition of Vanguard of Valor to iBooks on your Apple iPad, go to:

Other Combat Studies Institute publications are located on our web site:

As the study of insurgent-centric conflicts expands, scholars and military professionals have expressed a renewed interest in the U.S. experience in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century. Often the discussions focus on tactics, the psychology of resistance, or the underlying motives of U.S. involvement in the Far East. Too often the human stories behind the events remain forgotten. Matthew Westfall’s The Devil’s Causeway helps to close the gap by resurrecting the fascinating story of how Spanish, Filipino, and American forces participated in one of the most widely celebrated prisoner rescue sagas of the time.

At the close of hostilities between Spain and the United States, a small Spanish garrison in the seaside town of Baler in the Philippines continued to hold out against a siege led by Filipino irregulars. Word of the conflict reached U.S. authorities, who dispatched the USS Yorktown to relieve the garrison. Met by hostility from the Filipinos, the Americans sent out a reconnaissance party to plan a route for a relief expedition. The commander of the scout boat and shore party, Lieutenant James Gillmore, moved further upriver and inland than he had been ordered. Surprised and outgunned by the guerrillas, Gillmore and his surviving crew surrendered.

Thus began an epic journey for both the prisoners and their captors—a tale of the hunter and the hunted. The plight of Gillmore and his crew captivated newspaper audiences across the world, and the U.S. government immediately ramped up efforts to locate the group. Soldiers and sailors trekked across some of the most rugged Philippine terrain, trying to track down the elusive group. The prisoners suffered many deprivations; however, most of them clung to the hope that their countrymen had not forgotten them. For some in Gillmore’s group, the story ended happily. For others, the mistaken assumptions and poor planning of their leaders would cost them their lives.

Westfall is a masterful storyteller, weaving together a narrative that is suspenseful and compelling. His work evinces thorough and painstaking research, a fact brought out by the extensive list of primary and secondary sources from three continents. While showing the human toll that the conflict in the Philippines brought, Westfall avoids the temptation to editorialize on the U.S. involvement and its corollary policies. Instead, he shows us that the common soldier and sailor, whether American, Filipino, or Spanish, were caught up in events much larger than they were. Yet their seemingly insignificant choices shaped the nature and extent of the conflict and helped influence the destiny of nations. While the story may be old, the message applies today in an era of low-intensity conflicts shaped by decisions made at the company level. For all these reasons, this book is a must read for both students of military history and observers of human nature.

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COALITIONS OF CONVENIENCE: United States Interventions after the Cold War
Sarah E. Kreps, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011, 240 pages, $27.95

Sarah Kreps, Assistant professor of Government at Cornell University and former Air Force officer, has written an insightful book about the considerations nations make when determining whether to respond multilaterally to a crisis requiring military action. The author’s thesis is that even powerful nations such as the United States that having the capacity to act unilaterally, generally
prefer to act multilaterally in employing military force in order to operate within internationally accepted political and social norms. The implication is that, short of having to deal with a crisis requiring immediate action, nations prefer to have more legitimacy than less when taking military action. In addressing her assertion, the author systematically applies theoretical and empirical analysis to four U.S.-led post-Cold War interventions: the 1991 Gulf War, the multilateral 1994 Haiti intervention, 2001 Afghanistan conflict, and the 2003 Iraq conflict. She chose this U.S.-centric approach because U.S. power has remained robust throughout the post-Cold War period and the United States has intervened around the world more freely and often than other states. Furthermore, all of these operations have had significant military contributions by other states.

Kreps applies structural and normative theoretical arguments regarding state power projection. Her empirical analysis uses appropriate factors that measure coalition vigor, the directness of a threat and response time horizon, and the effect of time horizons and other operational commitments on cooperation. Her analysis soundly supports her contention.

Kreps points out supporting reasons for the use of a multilateral approach, including the burden sharing of military forces and operational costs (both power-conserving strategies). She further identifies some of the trade-offs of taking a multilateral approach such as slower operational response time and decision sharing. She also sheds light on the reasoning behind the specific selection of an intervening approach or combination of approaches and what they may indicate for future military interventions led by large and militarily powerful nations.

Kreps concludes that the United States acts primarily based on time-horizons and other operational commitments more so than an altruistic desire to intervene as part of a coalition. In general, “only because the U.S. military has developed accommodation strategies has it been willing to intervene multilaterally.” Finally, she suggests that in the future, the United States may more often than not want to employ a hybrid approach—starting with a unilateral, bilateral, or “minilateral” approach before gravitating to a multilateral approach when the operation lends itself to such a transition. By doing so, the United States would be able to take full advantage of its military strength and rapid response capability followed by the benefits associated with being part of a multilateral effort.

The book is well crafted, articulate, and painstakingly researched. Arguably the only shortcoming of the book is the excessive detail provided in each of the operational case studies, much of which was unnecessary and detracted from the author’s thesis. Military professionals, military history scholars, and students of political science and international relations will best appreciate this book. It may also be appealing to a more general audience interested in how the post-Cold War U.S. decision process has worked in conducting military interventions around the world and what these experiences indicate for future operations.

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**THE RATIONAL BELIEVER**

*Choices and Decisions in the Madrasas of Pakistan*


For those who believe the madrasas (Islamic schools) of Pakistan are the seeding grounds for the Taliban insurgency—awash with dissatisfied and impoverished youth—they would be wise to read Masooda Bano’s *The Rational Believer*. Although Bano rightly acknowledges that perhaps two of the 7 July 2005 London bombers received religious training in Pakistan’s madrasas—and no doubt other fundamentalists, as well as those who provided protection for Osama bin-Laden—the majority, she argues, are rational believers, keen to exploit the moral and practical benefits of a religious education. Bano contends that madrasas are not ideological training camps, actively or passively, for terrorists or international jihad. Neither are they simply a free education for the poor, downhearted, or unwanted.

Bano sets out her position logically, drawing on a wealth of interviews and impressive fieldwork, including discussions with students and religious teachers at Islamabad’s infamous Red Mosque. In so doing, she elaborates why and how religion
attracts followers, as well as why and how religion is shaped by the choices of its followers. Using investigative tools from the field of New Institutional Economics (NIE) (a means of inquiry gaining momentum across the social sciences) she uncovers the functionalist as well as the ideational forces at play, which encompass the so-called “local logic.” The results challenge many ill-informed, biased, and institutionalized beliefs. Bano articulates that the majority of madrasa students are forward-looking, strategizing, and utility-maximizing individuals.

_The Rational Believer_ is divided into three parts: Institutional Change and Stability, Determinants of Demand for Informal Institutions, and Informal Institutions and Collective Outcomes. Readers will find historical comparisons between learning at Oxford University, England, and the madrasas of South Asia instructive and thought provoking. But it is the chapter that deals with the popular appeal of militant resistance that stands out and will be of particular interest to political and military leaders. Here, Bano explains in detail the decision-making processes of leaders, jihadists, supporters, and sympathizers, uncovering that the pursuit of ideal rewards is not irrespective of the context and that actions that draw on more than one source of ideal utility demonstrate higher commitment.

While by no means an easy read—complex academic papers converted into books rarely are—_The Rational Believer_ is certainly educational and stimulating. Bano notes there are 16,000 official madrasas, registered with 5 regulatory boards, in Pakistan alone—and many more unofficial ones scattered across the country. She also exposes the five levels of madrasas—from level one (which focuses on memorizing the Koran and basic Islamic education) to ultimately elite schools (which include options for doctoral-level research) and explains the attraction for families who commit their child to a madrasa education. Bano notes the draw of a religious education does not reside just with the poor; middle and upper-class children are surprisingly well represented in the better madrasas. The study also uncovers the exponential growth in female madrasas and explains why centuries-old sharia law is increasingly popular among Pakistan’s youth, despite its daily precincts. Equally, the study gives an explanation as to why attempts to modernize madrasas with contemporary subjects such as mathematics, English, and social sciences have failed. In 2002, the U.S. government committed $225 million to madrasa reform. By early 2009, the modernization program was closed; $71 million provided by the U.S. government went unused.

If Bano’s findings are to be believed, and there is no reason not to, Pakistan’s religious schools are an institution for good and not a wasp’s nest of latent insurgency. By using aspects of NIE—a method worthy of military examination—Bano dispels the myths surrounding Pakistan’s madrasas and uncovers a cultural and values-based lens to reassess their utility, motivation, and raison d’être. For those with an interest in politics, social science, or simply an interest in Pakistan’s madrasas, _The Rational Believer_ will not disappoint. Indeed, it is an insightful and balanced study worthy of reflection. Those who wade through the theory, scholastic signposting, and taxing language will undoubtedly be better informed. Perseverance is key to getting the gems out of this first-rate study.

Lt. Col. Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D.,
British Army, Episkopi Garrison, Cyprus

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**THE BUSINESS OF WAR**

**Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe**


One of the legacies of our unhappy experience in Iraq is an ongoing debate about the role of contractors on the battlefield. Should we continue to rely on “private military companies,” as they are called, or should we heed the words of Machiavelli who warned that, “if one holds his state on the basis of mercenary arms, he will never be firm or secure; because they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; gallant among friends, vile among enemies; no fear of God, no faith with men...” (_The Prince_)? Whatever one thinks of Blackwater or Halliburton, historian David Parrott believes that Machiavelli and his contemporaries have given the “military enterprisers” of the early modern period a bad rap. Parrott demonstrates that, for monarchs strapped for
cash, military contractors were a rational and effective response to wars that dragged on for decades. Mercenary colonels often used their own funds to raise regiments recruited around a core of battle-hardened veterans and equipped by a sophisticated network of financiers, arms producers, and transporters. The rewards for the “enterpriser-colonel” were potentially great. He could maintain his force with “contributions” levied on the territories where their troops were billeted. And, if the war went well, he and his merchant allies would receive enhanced social and political status and perhaps the title to a piece of land expropriated from the enemy.

In examining the mercenary “industry,” the author, an Oxford history professor, suggests a rethinking of the much-debated “military revolution” of early modern Europe. According to exponents of that revolution, the demands of war in the 16th and 17th centuries forced monarchs to create new agencies for centralizing power. These agencies, in turn, would serve as the basis for the modern European state. But, if there was a revolution, Parrott believes that it was not based on the articulated tactical formations of generals like Maurice and Gustavus, or the expensive bastions and ravelins that surrounded cities like Breda and Freiburg (as previous explanations would have us believe). Instead, the real “revolution” was set in motion by the increased duration of European wars.

Beginning in the mid-16th century, power struggles like those between Habsburg Spain and Holland, Habsburg Austria, and the Ottomans, or French Huguenots and French Catholics, dragged on for decades. Such wars demanded a mobilization of resources that overmatched the feeble and inadequate revenue-gathering capabilities of early modern governments. The resulting mismatch between political objectives and resources forced a public-private alliance that allowed monarchs to tap into the wealth of European elites. Year after year, “military enterprisers,” whether they were mercenary colonels or merchant financiers, enabled the great houses of Europe to keep armies in the field while fighting their wars on credit.

The Business of War is an impressive work of scholarship that refers to sources in English, German, and French (as well as a handful in Italian, Spanish, and Dutch). More importantly, the book demands a rethinking of both what we think we know about the mercenaries of the early modern period and their role in the creation of the modern state.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., LTC, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE GHOSTS OF CANNAE
Hannibal and the Darkest Hour of the Roman Republic
Robert L. O’Connell, Random House, New York, 2011, 310 pages, $17.00

The first question a reviewer should ask when reading this book is: Why another book about Cannae? The battle of Cannae (216 B.C.E.) between the Romans and the Carthaginians has been and continues to be the ideal example of the “Battle of Annihilation”—the epitome of the “Decisive Battle.” Thus, there is a plethora of books and articles that purport to explain Hannibal’s tactical masterpiece and sing the praises of the great captain who engineered such a gigantic killing field—that is, if the butchery of nearly 70,000 human beings could ever be considered a subject worthy of praise. In addition, the primary sources for this period have long been identified, analyzed from the widest variety of scholarly perspectives, and intensely commented on in their most minute details.

Given these facts: Why another book on Cannae? The answer is that Robert O’Connell not only provides the nonspecialist reader a well-written interpretation of this classic battle, but also its historical context, its immediate consequences, and its ultimate meaning. O’Connell’s narrative encompasses the entire scope of the Second Punic War and explains why it can also be regarded as “Hannibal’s War.” He weaves his narrative around Hannibal’s personality and those of his primary Roman opponents. Central to the story is the role of the survivors of the battle—the “Ghosts of Cannae”—which were disgraced by the Roman Senate for allegedly fleeing the battlefield and who, O’Connell argues, eventually formed the core of veterans in the victorious army, which went on to defeat Hannibal on his home turf under Scipio Africanus—himself a survivor of Cannae.

The author writes with verve, and the book is filled with thoughtful asides that sometimes draw parallels with situations familiar to contemporary readers. The Ghosts of Cannae ranks among the best available
critical narrative histories of the conflict between the “superpowers” of the day—Rome and Carthage. It will provide military officers and students of warfare with material for deep thought about the nature of war, the relationship between tactics, operational art, and strategy, the relationship between civil and military power, strategic geography, alliances, the human element in warfare, discipline, morale, training, and many other timeless factors that affect warfare. It is a remarkable illustration of why strategy trumps tactics. O’Connell surely hits the mark in his judgment of Hannibal’s achievement “nobody was better at winning battles, but not wars, which is what counts.” For this reason, and because it is a good story, well told, The Ghosts of Cannae is highly recommended.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., USAR, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

KEVLER LEGIONS
The Transformation of the U.S. Army, 1989-2005
John Sloan Brown,
U.S. Army Center of Military History,
Washington, DC, 2011, 558 pages, $50.00

The last decade of war has forced the U.S. Army to adjust and “transform” itself seemingly on the fly—creating both ad hoc and permanent solutions to address today’s problems. However, the Army’s ability to meet these challenges and modernize for threats in the future did not begin with the destruction of the World Trade Center. Where we stand today has root in the decisions our senior leaders made in the recent past.

In Kevlar Legions, John Sloan Brown details how the Army transformed institutionally from the end of the Cold War to today’s conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For Brown, the basis of recent transformation efforts were that they were “centrally directed and institutionally driven,” primarily by the chief of staff of the Army, and affected all aspects of the Army—doctrine, force structure, training, administrative and logistical policies, and the culture of the service itself. Finally, Brown contends that transformation efforts from 1989 to the outbreak of war in Afghanistan and Iraq were instrumental in creating the Army that quickly overthrew two oppressive governments and was able to adapt to fight an unconventional conflict in each country.

To support this case, Brown ably and succinctly describes the efforts of Generals Vuono, Sullivan, Reimer, and Shinseki to evolve the Army for the future—detailing the continuity of strategy, technological acquisition, doctrinal thought, and training focus of each Army chief of staff that ultimately led to a modular force that was equipped with “the Big 5” weapons systems and had the doctrinal and training underpinnings to defeat any threat. Brown also does an admirable job describing the break between Generals Shinseki and Schoomaker, as well as the effect two wars had on shifting the focus of the Army from long-range planning to fighting “today’s fight.”

Kevlar Legions is exceedingly pertinent to today’s soldiers and leaders—as the vision, purpose, and force structure of the Army are driven by constrained resources and the conclusions of operations in Iraq and, eventually, Afghanistan, the lessons and solutions to similar problems in the recent past described by Brown are eminently useful.

CPT Nathan K. Finney, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FREEDOM’S FORGE
How American Business Produced Victory in World War II
Arthur Herman, Random House, New York, 2012, 413 pages, $28.00

Rather than a straightforward history, Arthur Herman’s Freedom’s Forge is more a dual biography. It focuses on Henry J. Kaiser and William Knudsen to tell a tale of American business. While the rest of the world went about its isolationist business in the years between the wars, Herman contends Knudsen and Kaiser learned to work around balky government, particularly New Deal bureaucracies, and gained experience in building major works: Knudsen made both Ford and General Motors efficient car makers while Henry Kaiser built Boulder and the Grand Coulee dams. With their experience building large-scale, but highly efficient projects, the two free enterprise entrepreneurs created the almost miraculous armaments industry that won World War II.
Like Herman’s earlier work, *Freedom’s Forge* is popular history; it should be more popular with the conservatives than with liberals because Herman downplays the role of government, emphasizing instead government obstructionism and backwardness in the years between the wars. His view of the military is largely negative as well. His interpretation might have more nuance had he considered scholarly works such as Eric Hammel’s 2009 book *How America Saved the World: The Untold Story of U.S. Preparedness Between the World Wars.* Unlike Herman, Hammel finds virtue in government and contends that military efforts during the 1930s rather than rugged antigovernment individualism laid the groundwork for the rapid mobilization at the onset of the war.

Herman does acknowledge that the war industrialists made good profits from their cost-plus contracts and that government eventually got out of the way, taking an attitude of hang the expense that allowed failure at no financial risk in developing the war machines. And he does nod in the direction of Curtis LeMay, George Marshall, and other political and military figures. Overall the tone is celebratory of the American free enterprise system and condemnatory of the governmental supports that made American industry successful.

Herman is a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and his interpretation is consistent with the flag-waving free enterprise that think tank is noted for. For those seeking a fuller understanding of the recovery of the U.S. military from a woeful state of unpreparedness because of rapid demobilization, budget cuts, and American withdrawal from world involvement after World War, I might start with *Freedom’s Forge,* but to balance this work, reading at least *How America Saved the World* is in order.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D., Houston, TX

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**GOING TO TEHRAN**

*Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran*

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2012, 389 pages, $28.00

**WHAT IS THE** United States going to do about Iran? In *Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran,* Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett put forth their unconventional thoughts in a history about international relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States.

The book’s main argument is that the U.S. posture and thinking toward the Islamic Republic of Iran must change in order to pursue U.S. interests in the Middle East. The authors are critical of five U.S. administrations’ approaches to Iran and assert that diplomacy, cooperation, and top-down leadership starting with the president of the United States will be the only way to avoid another conflict and preserve U.S. interests in the region.

The Leveretts have extensive experience on this subject, which strengthens the credibility of their arguments. Flynt Leverett (Ph.D.) has worked at the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, and is a founding faculty member of the School of International Affairs at Pennsylvania State University. Hillary Mann Leverett (J.D.) has worked with the U.S. State Department and National Security Council in Middle Eastern Affairs for the two Bush and the Clinton administrations. The book is well documented and noted with several outside sources and personal experiences to support their assertions.

Readers in the defense community will find several things attractive about the book. The authors contradict and challenge the conventional wisdom about the U.S. strategic approach to Iran and bring to light new and seldom-heard information on America’s dealings with Iran. The authors’ observations of Iran’s use of “soft power” are instructive as is their candid view of how the Islamic Republic of Iran sees itself and the rest of the world. The authors also provide a historic reference to Nixon’s 1970 engagement with China as an example to break through diplomatic barriers of the past to facilitate normal relations with Iran. This information causes readers to challenge their own understanding of the U.S.-Iran relationship.

The book lacks in a few areas. The Leveretts’ alarmist tone and singular approach to the problem detracts from their argument. Additionally, they imply the United States was partially to blame for the Iran Hostage crisis. The crisis, mentioned only briefly in the book, was quickly and conveniently set aside, while other historical events were discussed at length.
**BOOK REVIEWS**

*Going to Tehran* is relevant mostly to defense officials who work in the Middle East and the U.S. Central Command area of operations at the Combatant Command, and Defense Attaché level. Military members at the unit level who serve in the Middle East may also find the information useful to understand regional interests. The book is also beneficial to help Westerners better understand the Islamic Republic of Iran and how potential future Islamic Republics may form and model their governments.

**MAJ Jacob A. Mong, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**HITLER**

A.N. WILSON’S HITLER is a nonscholarly account about Adolf Hitler and how Hitler, who lacked any interest in politics, could coerce a country and later become chancellor of Germany. Hitler freewheeled through life without much responsibility until age 25 when he was denied a promotion in World War I because of his lack of leadership skills. This draft-dodging individual was awarded the Iron Cross, First Class, not for having any direct combat involvement but because of the officers he knew as a regimental message runner.

Hitler’s failed beer hall putsch of 1923 inspired supporters for national socialism and earned Hitler prison time where he was able to write *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle or My Fight). Subject to misinterpretation, the book, which reeked with self-indulgence, became a best seller throughout Germany. Wilson argues that *Mein Kampf* was not the struggle of Hitler’s life, but the fight yet to come. It was the fight for Germany’s future and the world itself.

Hitler captured his audience with oral and visual stimuli (the Roman salute, which became the Nazi salute) and mass rallies. Wilson claims, “Hitler was the first and most hypnotic artist of post-literacy,” elevating himself as a maestro of political manipulation. However, Hitler was also an incurable liar who lacked any sense of propriety. His Machiavellian exploitation skills, along with his flair for violence, propelled him to unprecedented levels within the National Socialist movement, but only after assuming control from men unlike himself who excelled at leadership and organizational abilities.

Hitler despised Catholicism, yet copied many of its programs, such as duplicating its educational programs to instruct the Hitler Youth. Wilson psychoanalyzes that, as Hitler prepared for war, his mental instability became more pronounced; he threw temper tantrums when he lacked rational decision-making skills or feared the intellect of others. Devoid of a rational sense of perspective, Hitler was unable to portray the same affection to humans as he did canines. Through his final years, he became more withdrawn from reality. Given the portrait Wilson makes of Hitler, it is amazing how he ever became a national leader.

Hitler is poorly documented, consists of secondary research material, and lacks any new information, but it is an easy read, one that absorbs the reader’s attention until the end. Military and nonmilitary historians alike will gain a greater insight into Hitler, albeit from a journalistic perspective.

**Scott J. Gaitley, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**PACIFIC CRUCIBLE**
War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942

T HE TITLE, PACIFIC Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942, implies that Ian W. Toll wrote an analytic narrative of the first 14 months of the naval war in the Pacific, beginning with the Pearl Harbor attack and ending with the Japanese evacuating Guadalcanal. Instead, this book is a narrative of the Pacific War’s first six months, from Pearl Harbor to Midway.

Toll describes how Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concepts of sea control, concentration, and decisive battle governed the prewar plans of the Japanese and American navies. Toll explains the battleship’s domination in naval warfare, the beginnings of naval aviation, the ways both navies trained naval aviators, and introduces the reader to the primary Japanese and American naval personalities, most of whom have faded from popular memory.

The author details the initial American carrier raids in the Central and Southwest Pacific in February 1942.
and gives an account of the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo. After dealing with the expanding list of Allied tragedies—the Japanese conquest of American and British island possessions in the Central Pacific, the fall of the Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and Burma—he proceeds to deal with the Japanese strategic moves against Australia and Hawaii, which resulted in the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway.

However, Toll dwells on narrative set pieces already told too many times (for example apocryphal tales of the first Roosevelt-Churchill wartime conference) and neglects the context of the Pacific War—the struggle for dominion in Eastern Asia. The protagonists included the United States, Japan, Russia, China, and the European colonial powers (Britain, France, and the Netherlands). While dealing cursorily with Russian activities he ignores the role of Chinese nationalism and Japanese militarism in starting the war. In a rush to narrate the history of battles, he deemphasizes the role of the Imperial Navy in Japan by presenting Admiral Yamamoto as a semi-reluctant warrior.

Despite Toll’s over-reliance on secondary material and retelling oft-told tales, Pacific Crucible is a useful, engaging account of the beginning of the Pacific War. While telling a story well known to specialists, but existing as an adjunct to the war against Germany and Italy in the popular mind, he brings the Pacific War to the fore and injects material by including accounts from oral history compilations. Unfortunately he does not demonstrate any knowledge of newly released collections of original source material or mine underused collections, like those in the British National Archives or the Japanese archives, or newly opened collections in the United States, even though he thanks several archivists in his acknowledgements. Although a tale well-told, this work lacks the thrill of discovery one has when doing research in primary sources and communicating this information to the reader. However, his book is designed for a general audience that does not have “the scrupulous ear of a well flogged critic” and it will enlighten the reader unfamiliar with the beginning of the Pacific War.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea

WENDY Z. GOLDMAN has a reputation as an authority on family and gender issues as well as labor history in Stalin’s pre-World War II Soviet Union. She has produced four previous books centered on the Great Terror and its impact on Soviet citizenry. Her latest book, Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, specifically looks at the impact of the Great Terror in five large Moscow factories. To do so, Goldman has researched the stenographic records of Communist Party meetings held in those factories between 1934 and 1939.

The Great Terror (1936-1938) began as the state’s attack on alleged saboteurs and wreckers and the hunt for supporters of Stalin’s former rivals, Bukharin and Trotsky. It turned into a national mania of spy hunting; denunciation of coworkers, friends, and family; and the arrests of millions of people for real and imagined political and nonpolitical crimes. The Soviets admitted to convicting 1.3 million people and executing 638,000. Western historians such as Robert Conquest and Michael Ellman have put the actual figures at least three times higher. Russian historian General Dmitri Volkogonov, working with previously classified records, found that in 1937 and 1938 agricultural collectivization took 8.5-9 million lives; 4.5-5.5 million people were arrested; and 800,000-900,000 were sentenced to death. At the end of the 1940s, between 5.5 and 6.5 million prisoners were held in forced labor camps. Volkogonov estimates that the Stalin era claimed between 19 and 22 million lives in addition to the war casualties. Whatever the scale of the tragedy, the Communist Party was gutted, industrial production was badly curtailed, and the population was demoralized. Stalin finally reined in the mass hysteria but the damage was done and it made resistance to the upcoming Nazi juggernaut just that much more difficult.

Inventing the Enemy is not a good first book about the Great Terror. Robert Conquest’s The Great
Terror: A Reassessment remains the best available introduction. Goldman assumes a base knowledge of the subject that the average reader may lack. She does not really hit her stride until page 81. In fact, getting as far as page 80 is a struggle. Then, she drops from dealing with the fates of millions to the fates of a handful of factory personnel caught up in the hysteria of hunting spies and wreckers in their midst. This is her forte and makes the book.

I recommend the book for historians and students of the Soviet era.

LTC Lester W. Grau, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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BAILOUT OVER NORMANDY
A Flyboy’s Adventures with the French Resistance and Other Escapades in Occupied France
Ted Fahrenwald, Casemate Publishers, Havertown, PA, 2012, 286 pages, $29.95

A WORLD WAR II USAAF fighter pilot is shot down on his 100th mission while supporting the D-Day invasion. He survives to link up with the French Resistance, is ultimately captured by the Wehrmacht, interrogated, and interred in a POW camp. On the eve of his relocation to a Luftstalag deep inside Nazi Germany, he escapes and ultimately makes his way to Allied lines, only to be eyed with suspicion by his liberators. While this may sound like the latest Spielberg blockbuster, it was actually real life, and the basis of Ted Fahrenwald’s thoroughly enjoyable memoir.

Following the end of the war, 24-year-old Fahrenwald documented his adventures in a manuscript, then put it away, and simply closed this chapter of his life and began another—as a business owner and family man. Following Fahrenwald’s death in 2004, his daughter discovered the manuscript and had it published. The result is an account that simultaneously engages and entertains the reader.

Fahrenwald began his flying career in P-47 Thunderbolts and transitioned to the P-51 Mustang. On 8 June 1944, his squadron was interdicting German supply lines leading to the Normandy area, when the ammunition truck he attacked exploded as he flew over. Heavily damaged, Fahrenwald’s Mustang became more and more unstable, and the pilot decided to bail out. After escaping a German patrol, he was discovered by members of the local French Resistance, the Maquis, who successfully hid him from German search parties. Fahrenwald’s passable French helped him blend in with the local population. In his desire to rejoin his unit he continued his quest to reach the advancing Allied lines. His subsequent capture by the Wehrmacht and escape the day prior to his scheduled relocation to a Luftstalag deep in Germany only served to reinforce his drive to find his way back to England.

Fahrenwald’s memoir is a nerve-wracking three-month journey. His wit and humor come through in his writings. He is at once ribald and evocative. According to Fahrenwald’s daughter, he had dreamed of one day becoming a journalist. Instead, he and his brother inherited the family steel mill. He may have been a successful business owner, but if this book is any indication, he would have made a heck of a journalist.

Robert Leonard, Ed.D., Fort Gordon, Georgia

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VETERANS ON TRIAL
The Coming Court Battles Over PTSD

BARRY R. SCHALLER’S Veterans on Trial uses court cases from the Vietnam War to predict the legal costs of America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book’s focus of the legal aspects of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is useful for officers to properly administer the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but the book’s greatest contribution is its estimates relating to the total cost of war on our society. Schaller cites Army studies that show how more soldiers have taken their own lives than have died in combat in Afghanistan. How different would these numbers be if high-risk behaviors linked to PTSD, such as drunk driving deaths were also included?

Schaller’s figures are much higher than one might expect with estimates of between 400,000 to 700,000 total cases of PTSD and 400,000 to 500,000 potential legal cases—if today’s veterans commit crimes at equal rates with Vietnam veterans. This increase of
criminal behavior is impressive because members of the military are selectively screened for criminal tendencies.

Although a judge and legal scholar, Schaller has impressive psychological and historical insights. His definition of PTSD is a combination of scientific and cultural theories. Schaller argues that combat PTSD is the result of a medical condition that affects identity, and the indoctrination that comes with military training and the higher rate of exposure to trauma make combat PTSD a more difficult paradoxical problem. Schaller states, “The view that the Vietnam War was unique and that Vietnam veterans were exceptional among all American veterans does not hold up under close scrutiny.” Schaller challenges the recentness of PTSD by describing research on “shell shock,” Civil War era “nostalgia,” and “soldiers heart.” The chapter “Across the Ages” is among the best historical syntheses about PTSD to date.

Schaller’s work is a pragmatic look at a complicated topic. He posits there is no panacea for PTSD, yet he offers substantive solutions, and he captures the paradoxes of a complex problem. Veterans on Trial’s best assertion is that PTSD is much more widespread and serious than many care to admit. He argues that although there have been key steps forward, the “present measures are not yet as effective as they should be.”

Joseph Miller, Old Town, Maine

THE TWILIGHT WAR
The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran
David Crist, The Penguin Press,
New York, 2012, 623 pages, $36.00

The Twilight War is a detailed history of the relationship between the United States and Iran from the time of the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 through the spring of 2012. In the 1980s, the CIA built a network of spies to help subvert the Iranian regime to prevent them from becoming a Soviet client. What the United States and the CIA failed to realize was that the Soviet Union was not the greatest threat to the region. Iran and its tacit support to the Shi’a in Lebanon had become the greatest threat to stability. It took the United States many years to realize this and refocus its clandestine operations from preventing Soviet influence on Iran to preventing Iranian influence throughout the region.

Author David Crist, who served in the Persian Gulf during Operation Iraqi Freedom, details the complex relationships between Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The United States was never able to develop a holistic long-term engagement strategy for the Middle East because of the constantly changing dynamics in the region. Much of The Twilight War centers on the Reagan years and America’s role in playing both sides of the Iran-Iraq conflict. The author discusses secret efforts and deals the first Bush administration made to secure the release of the Western hostages in Lebanon. Crist explains how Iranian President Rafsanjani took a huge political risk and negotiated the hostage release only to be told afterward by National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft that since the prisoners were released, the United States had no plans to honor their end of the deal. Crist explains the threats, challenges, and missed opportunities in each of the subsequent administrations and how divisive the key members of the second Bush administration were in invading Iraq in 2003. The book provides the implications of the loss of the CIA’s RQ-170 Sentinel drone over Iraq and the recent challenges faced by the Obama administration.

The Twilight War is a current look at the history of U.S.-Iranian relations and reveals the frightening truth about our lack of a comprehensive Middle East strategy. The book is a must read for military leaders and politicians alike.

LTC George Hodge, USA, Retired,
Lansing, Kansas

AFGHANISTAN DECLASSIFIED
A Guide to America’s Longest War
Brian Glyn Williams,
University of Pennsylvania Press,
Philadelphia, 2012, 248 pages, $34.95

BRIAN GLYN WILLIAMS of Dartmouth University, author of the Army’s field guide
to Afghanistan in 2007, has translated the field guide into civilian language. *Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America’s Longest War* retains the organization, takeaways and lessons, and tone of the Army’s field guide but adds a variety of the author’s personal experiences and analysis. Williams has interacted with the Afghans and brings knowledge and experience to his work. He gives a nuanced, hopeful view of Afghanistan and its people.

Williams describes Afghanistan’s ethnic and geographic makeup while weaving in events of historical and cultural significance. The sections on ethnography and geography are useful, but the book’s historical sections are its true strength. Williams uses a chronological approach, but follows the thread of a topic, person, or event to the present day. A treatment of Ahmed Shah Durrani turns into a discussion on centralization within Afghanistan through the present day, and the section on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan leads into a section on Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, which transitions naturally to his continued leadership of the Hezb I Islam Gulbuddin. The topical approach makes the book a useful reference—it uses historical events to teach important lessons on Afghan character, expectations, and culture. This approach also mirrors the sometimes nonchronological historical analysis of many Middle Easterners.

Suicide bombing, first introduced in 2001, has proven alien to the Afghan’s culture and their sense of honor. Afghan suicide bombers have a remarkably low-kill ratio (particularly when compared to Iraqi bombers), which combines their emphasis on military targets over civilians along with their general ineptitude. Williams’ discussion of the Predator and Reaper drones and their impact on Pakistani politics is excellent. Despite frequent protestations and demonstrations against suicide bombing, Williams argues there is tacit Pakistani government support. Further, surveys in the FATA suggest that local tribesmen see suicide bombing as highly effective.

*Afghanistan Classified* is an excellent reference that will prove useful to soldiers preparing for deployment as well as their family members. The book is as current as possible. It is a good scholarly primer on the abuses of the Taliban and a reminder of the significant NATO successes in the region.

*John E. Fahey, Lafayette, Indiana*

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**TOXIC LEADERS**

MSgt Hikmat Hanna, II, Chief, Host Aviation Resource Management (CHARM)—Thank you for your article on toxic leaders (Doty and Fenlason, Jan-Feb 2013). It was well written and insightful. It’s important because raising awareness can prevent those of us in the profession of arms from developing toxic attitudes.

I’d like to point something out. If an E-3 is toxic, we recognize the role their supervisor plays and their responsibility to remedy the problem. Somewhere between E-1 and O-10 this thinking process stops. Leaders at every level are also subordinates. I believe formally changing the term of reference from “Toxic Leader” to “Toxic Subordinate” puts the issue in proper perspective. We don’t usually ask, “Whose leader is that?” We ask, “Whose subordinate is that?” I believe this change will help foster a change in mindset in military culture.
**Masters of the Battlefield: Great Commanders From the Classical Age to the Napoleonic Era,**

Paul K. Davis, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, 624 pages, $34.95

Hailing from the earliest days of Greek warfare to France at the turn of the 19th century, these men stand out for their tactical abilities—generals who made a difference in combat, grasping the way an enemy would think or move and reacting not just to ensure victory, but do so in the face of superior forces.

Davis briefly explores the biography of each commander, considering how his upbringing, early experiences, and social and cultural background might have translated into his leadership abilities. Relying on vast research, Davis describes the nature of armies and warfare of the time, from the phalanx battle of Ancient Greece to the artillery-heavy Swedish army under Gustavus Adolphus. He also examines the course of the wars in which each general fought as a background to the particular battles that best illustrates their abilities, and discusses each battle in detail, aided extensively by detailed battlefield maps. Davis concludes each section with an analysis of the tactical skills and principles at which each general excelled.

*Masters of the Battlefield* tells the stories of men who defined eras, reshaped nations, and who, through the introduction of new weapons and tactics, revolutionized the nature of warfare.

From the publisher.

**Generals of the Army: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Arnold, Bradley**

James H. Willbanks, The University Press of Kentucky, 2013, 264 pages, $27.84

Formally titled “GENERAL of the Army,” the five-star general is the highest possible rank awarded in the U.S. Army in modern times and has been awarded to only five men in the nation’s history: George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Henry H. Arnold, and Omar N. Bradley. In addition to their rank, these distinguished soldiers all shared the experience of serving or studying at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where they gained the knowledge that would prepare them for command during World War II and the Korean War. In *Generals of the Army*, James H. Willbanks assembles top military historians to examine the connection between the institution and the success of these exceptional men. Historically known as the “intellectual center of the Army,” Fort Leavenworth is the oldest active Army post west of Washington, D.C., and one of the most important military installations in the United States. Though there are many biographies of the five-star generals, this innovative study offers a fresh perspective by illuminating the ways in which these legendary figures influenced and were influenced by Leavenworth. Coinciding with the U.S. Mint’s release of a series of special commemorative coins honoring these soldiers and the fort where they were based, this concise volume offers an intriguing look at the lives of these remarkable men and the contributions they made to the defense of the nation. From the publisher.
SPC Joseph Gonzalez, a member of the Farah Provincial Reconstruction Team security force, provides security outside the Farah provincial governor’s compound in Farah City, Farah Province, Afghanistan, 6 February 2013, during a visit from U.S. Ambassador Hugo Llorens, the assistant chief of mission for the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. (U.S. Navy)

Announcing the 2013 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

“What can the Army do to improve the combined effects of training, education, and experience to best develop leaders to apply Mission Command in order to execute Unified Land Operations?”

 Contest Closes 8 July 2013

1st Place $1,000 and publication in Military Review
2nd Place $750 and consideration for publication in Military Review
3rd Place $500 and consideration for publication in Military Review

For information on how to submit an entry, go to http://militaryreview.army.mil
From the Epic of Gilgamesh, Tablets II and III

(3rd-century BCE Sumerian epic poem)

Translated by Maureen Gallery Kovacs

He splashed his shaggy body with water,
and rubbed himself with oil, and turned into a human.
He put on some clothing and became like a warrior!
He took up his weapon and chased lions so that the shepherds could eat
He routed the wolves, and chased the lions.
With Enkidu as their guard, the herders could lie down.
A wakeful man, a singular youth, he was twice as tall as normal men. . .

Gilgamesh, do not put your trust in just your vast strength,
but keep a sharp eye out, make each blow strike its mark!
‘The one who goes on ahead saves the comrade.’
‘The one who knows the route protects his friend.’
Let Enkidu go ahead of you;
he knows the road to the Cedar Forest,
he has seen fighting, has experienced battle.