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Unmanned aviation systems, popularly known as drones, are playing an increased role in armed conflicts. They are used both for collecting intelligence and for deploying lethal force. In 2007 there were 74 U.S. drone strikes in Afghanistan. That year, there were five strikes in Pakistan. By 2012, the American military was executing an average of 33 drone strikes per month in Afghanistan, and the total number in Pakistan has now surpassed 330. Recently the United States has proposed further expanding its deployment of drones, developing plans to set up additional Predator drone bases in Africa that would allow these drones to cover much of the Saharan region.

Drones have been employed in multiple theaters of the counterterrorism campaign, including Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, and Libya. They are now included in the arsenal of many nations including Israel, China, and Iran. They have even been operated by a non-state actor, Hezbollah, which has flown at least two drones over Israel. Several nations are currently developing drones that will be able to carry out highly-specialized missions, for instance tiny drones able to enter constricted areas through narrow passages. If the American military continues to move away from deploying conventional forces on the ground (in Iraq and Afghanistan) to a “light footprint” strategy of “offshore balancing” (as employed in Libya), drones are likely to play an even more important role in future armed conflicts. Like other new armaments (e.g., long-range cruise missiles and high-altitude carpet bombing) the growing use of drones has triggered a considerable debate over the moral and legal grounds on which they are used. This debate is next reviewed.

Excessive Collateral Damage?

Critics argue that a large number of civilians, including women and children, are killed by drones. Some hold that the number of civilians killed amounts to an overwhelming majority of all those killed. Syed Munawar Hasan, who heads the influential Islamic political party Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, has claimed that the drone strikes “are killing nearly 100 percent
innocent people.” Former military officers David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum argued in the New York Times that in Pakistan drones kill 50 civilians for every militant. Other critics put forward somewhat lower numbers. A study conducted by the Columbia Law School estimates that 35 percent of the victims of drone strikes in 2011 were civilians. In contrast, American counterterrorism officials put the number as low as 2.5 percent. Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan claimed that “there hasn’t been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities we’ve been able to develop.”

Researchers who conduct comprehensive analyses of the data often provide statistics that fall between these two extremes, though their numbers also differ considerably from one another and fall across a wide range. While the Bureau of Investigative Journalism puts the number as high as 26.5 percent, others estimate that the percentage of civilian casualties falls between 4 percent and 20 percent, and The New America Foundation put the number at a low of 8 percent.

There is no way to settle these differences because often the drone strikes are in areas that are inaccessible to independent observers and the data includes reports by local officials and local media, neither of whom are reliable sources. The most cited statistics on the drone strikes in Pakistan—a data set compiled by the New America Foundation and Peter Bergen—relies completely on media reports. It is a problem that plagues a majority of the media stories on any particular strike: estimates of civilian casualties are often based upon other media reports, producing what the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School calls “an echo chamber” effect.

In short, there is no fully reliable—or even highly reliable—way to determine the ratio of civilian to militant casualties caused by drone strikes. For reasons that follow we shall see that it stands to reason that these strikes cause less collateral damage than other instruments of warfare, though unfortunately are still likely to cause some.

Promiscuous Use?

Critics like The Atlantic’s Conor Friedersdorf argue that the drone campaign is an “unprecedented campaign of assassination with no apparent end,” while Glen Greenwald, writing in Salon.com, has described it as a set of “ongoing policies of rampant slaughter, secrecy and lawlessness.” Army Chaplain D. Keith Shurtleff, as quoted by P.W. Singer in The New Atlantis, warns that “as war becomes safer and easier, as soldiers are removed from the horrors of war and see the enemy not as humans but as blips on a screen, there is a very real danger of losing the deterrent that such horrors provide.”

Actually the use of drones is kept in check by an extensive set of rules, is subject to considerable a priori and a posteriori review, and is regulated by Congressional oversight.

Drones are used by the U.S. military—especially the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—and by the CIA. Much more is known about the rules that the military is using in its attempts to limit collateral damage in general (that of drones included) than those used by the CIA. Of the three existing drone programs, the one run by the Air Force in Afghanistan (and to a much lesser extent in Iraq) has the most clearly defined scope and targeting procedures. Drone strikes in Pakistan, which are mostly under the charge of the CIA, and those in Yemen, some of which are operated by the CIA and others by the JSOC, operate with a greater degree of secrecy. As far as is known, these CIA and JSOC strikes follow targeting procedures similar to those used by the military.

The military rules include a long list of “no strike” targets including diplomatic offices, medical facilities, prisons, schools, and structures whose destruction will result in uncontainable environmental damages. They also include a host of other structures which are generally restricted from being targeted, including agricultural facilities, water and power utilities, recreational complexes, parks, restaurants, and retail stores. These regulations also cover a range of potential “dual-use” targets—targets that

As far as is known, these CIA and JSOC strikes follow targeting procedures similar to those used by the military.
perform a combination of civilian and military functions—which are generally disallowed for military targeting absent higher-level authorization or specific intelligence demonstrating that only the military functions of the building in question are being used.

The more sensitive the target, (i.e., the more likely that innocent civilians might be involved), the higher in the ranks that approval must be sought, sometimes extending all the way to the president or the director of the CIA. President Obama is reported to personally review the files of all known terrorists before he approves their inclusion in a hit list.16

Michael Scheuer, formerly of the CIA, scoffs at the charge that the review process is not rigorous. He reports that the procedure for nominating individuals for targeted killings is so exhaustive that the CIA often failed to kill those who ought to have been eliminated. Quoted in a 2011 article for Newsweek, Scheuer stated that each nomination, including a short document and “an appendix with supporting information,” was passed along to departmental lawyers, who were “very picky. Often this caused a missed opportunity. The whole idea that people got shot because someone has a hunch—I only wish that was true.”17

John Brennan puts together a weekly “potential target list” based on Pentagon recommendations, which his staff then discusses with other agencies (such as the State Department) before making final recommendations to the president, according to the Associated Press. It is the president who then makes the final decision regarding whether to target someone with a kinetic strike.

Further, the Department of Defense (DOD) employs multiple teams of lawyers that are responsible for determining the legality of specific strikes. These lawyers have undergone “special training in the Geneva conventions,” and are instructed to guarantee that each targeted killing upholds international humanitarian law, official rules of engagement, and mission-specific instructions, reports The Guardian’s Pratap Chatterjee.18 The DOD employs some 12,000 lawyers.19 During the Iraq War surge, there was one lawyer for every 240 combatants.20 Some may wish there were even more, but no one should argue that orders to kill terrorists were not subject to close review.

In an op-ed for Foreign Policy, Jack Goldsmith argues that the review process for designating an
individual for a strike “goes far beyond any process given to any target in any war in American history.”

In effect, these lawyers and other staff conduct hearings of a sort, in which evidence is presented and lawyers are instructed to guarantee that each targeted killing upholds all applicable laws and rules before the target is approved. I would add to this process a position for a lawyer explicitly charged with acting as a “guardian” of the terrorists who, in effect, are tried in absentia. All lawyers of course have and ought to have the proper level of security clearance.

The Senate Foreign Relations committee reports that the military requires “two verifiable human sources” and “substantial additional evidence” that a potential target is an enemy. The first requirement for all drone strikes is to establish “positive identification” of the target in question, which constitutes “reasonable certainty that a functionally and geospatially defined object of attack is a legitimate military target in accordance with the law of war and applicable ROE [rules of engagement].”

As for oversight, Senator Dianne Feinstein, who according to The Los Angeles Times, had been previously critical of the drone program’s lack of transparency, released a statement on 7 March 2012 affirming that the “Senate Intelligence Committee is kept fully informed of counterterrorism operations and keeps close watch to make sure they are effective, responsible and in keeping with U.S. and international law.” Specifically, staffers from the intelligence committees watch footage of the previous month’s drone strikes and review the intelligence used to justify the killings. They also learn about the number of civilian casualties. According to Feinstein, the staffers “question every aspect of the program including legality, effectiveness, precision, foreign policy implications and the care taken to minimize noncombatant casualties.”

In early February 2013, the media obtained a confidential Department of Justice white paper detailing the conditions under which the Obama Administration considers the overseas targeted killing of U.S. citizens who are “senior operational leaders” of Al-Qaeda or “an associated force” to be legal. The memo, which had been distributed to members of the Senate Intelligence and Judiciary committees in June of 2012, states three criteria that must be met if a strike is to be judged lawful.

First, the target must be considered an “imminent threat.” The white paper’s definition of “imminent” is an expansive one. According to the paper, the government can label a threat as “imminent” even if it does not have “evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future.” Rather, a person might be viewed as an “imminent threat” if an “informed, high-level” government official determines that the target has been recently involved in activities that pose a threat of violent attack and “there is no evidence suggesting that [the target] has renounced or abandoned such activities.” This definition has troubled some legal observers such as Jameel Jaffer, deputy director of the ACLU, who contends that the white paper “redefines the word imminence in a way that deprives the word of its ordinary meaning.” As I see it Al-Qaeda and such other groups are not dual-purpose organizations; one does not join them to provide social services and maybe engage in terrorism. They are dedicated to perpetrating
harm. Being a member seems enough to condemn someone—just as if he were a soldier in an attacking army. He would qualify as a target even when not actually engaging in an attack but say training, or regrouping, or taking a break.

The second criterion for a targeted killing to be considered lawful by the administration is that the capture of the target must be “infeasible.” This is understood to mean “undue risk to U.S. personnel conducting a potential capture operation.” Good enough for any sensible person.

The third criterion is that such strikes must be in accordance with “fundamental law-of-war principles,” namely that they do not violate principles of “necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity (the avoidance of unnecessary suffering).” Critics of the program argue that such standards are an insufficient check upon the powers of the executive. For instance, James Downie argues in the Washington Post that the willingness of the memo’s authors to favorably interpret various terms within the criteria suggests that the administration could functionally “set its own standards” based upon how it decides to interpret phrases like “informed, high-level officials.” Similarly, the ACLU’s Jameel Jaffer argues that the document “recognizes some limits on the authority it sets out, but the limits are elastic and vaguely defined, and it’s easy to see how they could be manipulated.”

This point was made perhaps most clearly by Law Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, who argues in The New York Times that:

The paper’s sweeping claims of executive power are audacious. For a threat to be deemed “imminent,” it is not necessary for a specific attack to be under way. The paper denies Congress and the federal courts a role in authorizing the killings — or even reviewing them afterward. In doing so, it cites the authorization of force that Congress granted to President George W. Bush after 9/11.

These concerns might be addressed by adding what in effect amounts to a drone or counterterrorism court. Senator Feinstein has recently proposed developing a special court to oversee the implementation of lethal drone strikes—one that might serve as a check on executive power. Similar to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a court which meets in secret to rule on requests to wiretap suspected terrorists, this proposed court would grant judges some oversight of who could be targeted by drones.

James Robertson, a retired federal judge, has argued in The Washington Post that monitoring and approving policy runs counter to a long and widely-accepted view of the role of the judiciary in government. He contends that a judge issuing an “advisory opinion” to condemn a person who is not present to defend himself is a violation of the defining features of American justice. Instead, Robertson argues that such decisions should be left to Congress or the executive branch.

Indeed, others have argued that such an approach jeopardizes counterterrorism efforts and that oversight would be best located within the executive branch. Former solicitor general Neal Kajtaz, for example, has argued that federal judges lack expertise and could delay counterterrorist operations, as they are unused to operating on fast timetables or making the sort of pre-emptive judgments that would be required of a court that oversees drones. Rather, he argues that a better review process would be one that takes place within the executive branch, with the most senior national security advisors adjudicating cases argued by expert lawyers.

One can disagree about which reviews by what kind of authority would serve best our system of justice while not unduly hobbling security. And adding a layer of review might be justified. However no one can argue that these decisions are made lightly and without careful deliberations, both about the individuals involved and the principles that guide these deliberations.

These restraints are maintained despite evidence showing that terrorists are both aware of these self-imposed limitations and use them to their advantage by stationing combatants, supplies, and weapons in mosques, schools, and private homes. In his book The Wrong War: Grit, Energy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan, Bing West quotes American servicemen reporting that the “Taliban fight from compounds where there are women and children . . . [so] we can’t push the Talibs [sic] out by mortar fire without being blamed for civilian casualties.” West also reports that Taliban troops often fired at American soldiers from private homes, mosques, buildings owned by the Red Crescent, and other locales where civilians were likely to be.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, author of another book on the war in Afghanistan, notes how “In many cases, insurgents would seek refuge in compounds inhabited by women and children—so as to use them as human shields or, if the house was bombed to bits, as pawns in their propaganda campaign to convince the Afghan people that coalition forces were indiscriminate murderers of the innocent.” This problem was exacerbated by the fact that the “new rules prevented air strikes on residential buildings unless troops were in imminent danger of being overrun or the house had been observed for more than twenty-four hours to ensure no civilians were inside. If the bad guys ran into a home, they would have a free pass, unless the Americans were willing to wait them out.” Chandrasekaran further quotes Brigadier General Larry Nicholson, who, citing these rules, worried that “If we have to treat every house like a mosque, it’ll result in a whole lot more casualties.”

The discussion over drones tends to conflate two issues: should the United States set out to kill the particular person in question—and, if so, should drones be used rather than Special Forces, bombers, cruise missiles, or some other tool? The drone issue is irrelevant to the first question. At the same time it is clear—or at least should be—that if we must, drones are the preferable instrument. Compared to Special Forces and even bombers, the use of drones precludes casualties on our side—not a trivial matter. Moreover, because drones can linger over the target for hours if need be, often undetected, they allow for a much closer review and much more selective targeting process than do other instruments of warfare. This important fact is even recognized by the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Jakob Kellenberger. In his 2011 keynote address at the 34th Round Table on Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law, Kellenberger conceded that because drones have “enhanced real-time aerial surveillance possibilities,” they “thereby [allow] belligerents to carry out their attacks more precisely against military objectives and thus reduce civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects—in other words, to exercise greater precaution in attack.”

Other critics argue that drones strikes engender much resentment among the local population and serve as a major recruitment tool for the terrorists, possibly radicalizing more individuals than they neutralize. This argument has been made especially in reference to Pakistan, where there were anti-American demonstrations following drones strikes, as well as in Yemen. However, such arguments do not take into account the fact that anti-American sentiment in these areas ran high before drone strikes took place and remained so during periods in which strikes were significantly scaled back. Moreover, other developments—such as the release of an anti-Muslim movie trailer by an Egyptian Copt from California or the publication of incendiary cartoons by a Danish newspaper—led to much larger demonstrations. Hence stopping drone strikes—if they are otherwise justified, and especially given that they are a very effective and low-cost way to neutralize terrorist violence on the ground merely for public relations purposes seems imprudent.

“Extrajudicial Killing” and outside “Theaters of War”? Critics employ two lines of legal criticism. One labels the killing of terrorists by drones (or other means) as “extrajudicial killings,” implying that only courts can legitimately mete out a death sentence. Michael Boyle, for example, contends in The Guardian that “the president has routinized and normalized extrajudicial killing from the Oval Office, taking advantage of America’s temporary advantage in drone technology to wage a series of shadow wars.” Similarly Conor Friedersdorf has argued in The Atlantic that the drone policy is passing death sentences “based on the unchecked authority of the president, who declares himself judge, jury, and executioner.” The assumption underlying these criticisms is that terrorists (those who are non-Americans and operating overseas)
are nevertheless to be treated as ordinary criminals (i.e., captured and tried in American civilian courts). However, these critics do not address the question of how America is to treat terrorists that either cannot be captured or can only be captured at a very great risk to our troops and, most likely, following the invasion of other countries (for instance, capturing those that make Northern Waziristan their base).

Nor is it clear on what grounds citizens of other nations, attacking our embassies, ships, and forces overseas, should be treated as American citizens, with all the rights thereof. Obviously if they were wearing a uniform or otherwise distinguish themselves from the civilian population (as the rules of armed conflict require) they would be killed and no one would see this as a legal issue. This is what takes place in all instances of war. Why one would hold that we ought to grant numerous extra rights to people just because they fight us in an unfair way (so to speak), and, at the very least, illegally, seems difficult to comprehend. In addition, as Philip Bobbitt and Benjamin Wittes have pointed out, trying terrorists in civilian courts would not only force us to reveal sensitive sources and methods used to gather evidence in the first place, but such trials would also tend to lead to plea bargains because the evidence—collected in combat zones—often does not meet the stringent standards of civilian courts. We would also be forced to let terrorists loose once they completed their—historically short—sentences. (By the end of 2011, civilian courts had adjudicated 204 cases of terrorism: 63 percent of convictions were garnered through a plea bargain, 40 percent of the sentences were under 5 years in length, and 30 percent were between 5 and 10 years. These statistics and others have been diligently recorded by Karen J. Greenberg et al., in a report published by the Center on Law and Security at the NYU School of Law.) To reiterate, as the preceding discussion has shown, terrorist
executions are carefully and extensively reviewed, albeit by different authorities and according to different procedures than those of our civilian courts.

Another line of criticism takes the opposite viewpoint, treating terrorists not as if they were criminals but as if they were soldiers. They hence are to be treated in accordance with the rules of warfare, such as the Geneva Conventions. These rules require that America strike terrorists only in “declared theaters of war,” and treat those it captures as prisoners of war. In a 2010 debate at Fordham Law School, Mary Ellen O’Connell contended that “Targeting with the intent to kill an individual is only lawful under international humanitarian law or LOAC (the Law of Armed Conflict) within armed conflict hostilities, and then only members of regular armed forces, members of organized armed groups, or direct participants in those hostilities . . . [thus, because] the United States is only engaged in armed conflict in Afghanistan, targeted killing elsewhere is not commensurate with the law.” By this view, drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere are legally impermissible.

Regarding the first point—that we must only target terrorists within declared theaters of war—one notes that terrorists readily move from one country to another. Taliban and Al-Qaeda move often and rather freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan. For example, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence is working with the Haqqani network that has offshoots in Afghanistan and elsewhere according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Further, the Council reports that Al-Qaeda members and Jihadist fighters are moving in and out of Yemen, Somalia, Mali, and Libya. If we can confirm that a person either is a terrorist or has plans to—or has planned on—killing our troops, civilians, or allies, then the fact that they disregard and cross an unenforced line hardly seems a reasonable criteria for shielding them.

Critics often ask “well if the whole world is now treated as a theater of war, would you kill terrorists even when they were located in a democratic nation?” The question is asked rhetorically, the absurdity of such a move assumed to be self-evident. However, one should not be too quick to concede this point, for if Washington had reliable intelligence that some terrorists based in Germany were preparing to strike us, we would ask the German government to deal with them. If the German government refused—perhaps on the grounds that German laws do not allow a response—we surely would neutralize these terrorists one way or another. This is what we are doing in Pakistan, a democratic country who we consider to be our ally, and this is what we did when we captured and surreptitiously removed suspected terrorist Osama Moustafa Hassan Nasr from Italy. If the current counterterrorism campaign takes the whole world as its theater, the distinction between democratic and authoritarian allies is quickly replaced by the distinction between cooperative and non-compliant counterterrorism partners.

Once captured, treating terrorist suspects as prisoners of war presumes that they can be held until the war is over. However, counterterrorism campaigns as a rule have no clear starting or ending dates; as it has been put elsewhere, in these campaigns there is no signing ceremony of peace treaties on aircraft carriers. Rather, they tend to peter out slowly, leaving no clear guide for how long we can hold captured terrorists if we to treat them by the rules of war.

As others have pointed out, we need distinct legal procedures and authorities for dealing with

**CW2 Dylan Ferguson, a brigade aviation element officer with the 82nd Airborne Division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team, launches a Puma unmanned aerial vehicle, 25 June 2012.**
(U.S. Army, SGT Jonathan Shaw)
terrorists who are neither criminals nor soldiers. So far they have been left in a sort of legal limbo, a legal ambiguity that surrounds not merely drone strikes, but all counterterrorism endeavors. The proper legal status of these individuals will not be cleared up until we move beyond the simplistic dichotomy that terrorists must be viewed either as criminals or as soldiers and instead recognize that they are a distinct breed of enemy, with a distinct legal status: that of fighters who violate the rules of armed conflict and often deliberately target civilian populations in order to wreak terror. To call them soldiers is to unduly honor them; to view them as garden variety criminals is to undervalue both their misbegotten deeds and the danger they pose.

The media carried a report on 4 February 2013 about a “white paper” that reflects the Obama Administration’s rationale for carrying out what are called “extrajudicial killings.” Accordingly, the Administration is considering as legal and legitimate the killing of terrorists—including Americans overseas—as long as such action meets three criteria: the targets are considered an imminent threat to the United States, with imminence being broadly defined to include individuals judged by “high-level” personnel to have been recently involved in activities that posed a threat of violent attack with no evidence that said individual has “renounced or abandoned such activities”; their capture was “infeasible”; and the strike was to be conducted according to “the law of war principles.”

The memo shows the deliberations to be far from complete given that the third criterion raises more questions than it answers. Critics correctly point out that the memo basically stated that such strikes are legal—if a high ranking administration official so rules. Critics argue that drone strikes alienate the population and thus help Al-Qaeda’s recruitment, generating more terrorists than are killed. These statements, which may at first seem “obviously true,” are not supported by data. In fact, the resentment of the United States has many sources, and this resentment was high before drones were used and is high in several nations in the Middle East where drones were never used.

For example, a comparison of drone strike frequency in Pakistan and anti-American sentiment in the country reveals little correlation. From 2004 to 2007, there were few drone strikes in that country (only 10 over the four year span). However, starting in 2008 the United States carried out a total of 36 drone strikes, with this number increasing in subsequent years to 54 strikes and 122 strikes, respectively. From this peak in 2010, the number of drone strikes per year began to decline with 73 strikes in 2011 and 48 in 2012. In the same years, data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project reveals that the percentage of Pakistanis who held an “unfavorable” view of the United States remained relatively steady from 2008 to 2010, beginning to increase only after the United States scaled back the number of drone strikes starting in 2011. Moreover anti American sentiments were as high or higher in the same years in Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and the Palestinian territories.

Thus, in 2007, 2009, and 2010, the United States’ unfavorability in Pakistan held steady at 68 percent (dropping briefly to 63 percent in 2008), but then began to increase, rising to 73 percent in 2011 and 80 percent in 2012—even as the number of drone strikes was dropping significantly. At the same time, anti-American sentiment was on the rise in countries where no drone strikes were taking place. In Jordan, for example, U.S. unfavorability rose from 78 percent in 2007 to 86 percent in 2012 while Egypt saw a slight rise from 78 percent to 79 percent over the same period. Notably, the percentage of respondents reporting an “unfavorable” view of the United States in these countries is as high, or higher, than in drone-targeted Pakistan.

Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries into making and using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the co-founder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK and author of a book about drones argues that, “The proliferation of drones should evoke reflection on the precedent that the United States is setting by killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.” Indeed scores of countries are now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can be little doubt that the fact that drones have served the United States well has helped to popularize them. However, it does not follow that United States should not have employed drones in the hope that
such a show of restraint would deter others. First of all, this would have meant that either the United States would have had to allow terrorists in hard-to-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage.

Further, the record shows that even when the United States did not develop a particular weapon, others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind that the international environment is a hostile one. Countries—and especially non-state actors—most of the time do not play by some set of self-constraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further their interests. The United States correctly does not assume that it can rely on some non-existent implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the avoidance of new military technology by nation X or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains from employing that technology.

I am not arguing that there are no natural norms that restrain behavior. There are certainly some that exist, particularly in situations where all parties benefit from the norms (e.g., the granting of diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of mass destruction). However drones are but one step—following bombers and missiles—in the development of distant battlefield technologies. (Robotic soldiers—or future fighting machines—are next in line). In such circumstances, the role of norms is much more limited.

Industrial Warfare?

Mary Dudziak of the University of Southern California’s Gould School of Law opines that “[d]rones are a technological step that further isolates the American people from military action, undermining political checks on . . . endless war.” Similarly, Noel Sharkey, in The Guardian, worries that drones represent “the final step in the industrial revolution of war—a clean factory of slaughter with no physical blood on our hands and none of our own side killed.”

This kind of cocktail-party sociology does not stand up to even the most minimal critical examination. Would the people of the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan be better off if terrorists were killed in “hot” blood—say, knifed by Special Forces, blood and brain matter splashing in their faces? Would they be better off if our troops, in order to reach the terrorists, had to go through improvised explosive devices blowing up their legs and arms and gauntlets of machinegun fire and rocket-propelled grenades—traumatic experiences that turn some of them into psychopath-like killers?

Perhaps if all or most fighting were done in a cold-blooded, push-button way, it might well have the effects suggested above. However, as long as what we are talking about are a few hundred drone drivers, what they do or do not feel has no discernible effects on the nation or the leaders who declare war. Indeed, there is no evidence that the introduction of drones (and before that, high-level bombing and cruise missiles that were criticized on the same grounds) made going to war more likely or its extension more acceptable. Anybody who followed the American disengagement in Vietnam after the introduction of high-level bombing, or the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan (and Iraq)—despite the considerable increases in drone strikes—knows better. In effect, the opposite argument may well hold: if the United States could not draw on drones in Yemen and the other new theaters of the counterterrorism campaign, the nation might well have been forced to rely more on conventional troops and prolong our involvement in those areas, a choice which would greatly increase our casualties and zones of warfare.

This line of criticism also neglects a potential upside of drones. As philosopher Bradley Strawser notes, this ability to deploy force abroad with minimal United States casualties may allow America to intervene in emerging humanitarian crises across the world with a greater degree of flexibility and effectiveness. Rather than reliving another “Blackhawk down” scenario, the United States can follow the model of the Libya intervention, where drones were used by NATO forces to eliminate enemy armor and air defenses, paving the way for the highly successful air campaign which followed, as reported by The Guardian’s Nick Hopkins.

As I see it, however, the main point of moral judgment comes earlier in the chain of action, well before we come to the question of which means are
to be used to kill the enemy. The main turning point concerns the question of whether we should go to war at all. This is the crucial decision because once we engage in war, we must assume that there are going to be a large number of casualties on all sides—catastrophes that may well include innocent civilians. Often, discussions of targeted killings strike me as being written by people who yearn for a nice clean war, one in which only bad people will be killed using surgical strikes that inflict no collateral damage. Very few armed confrontations unfold in this way.

Hence, when we deliberate whether or not to fight, we should assume that once we step on this train, it is very likely to carry us to places we would rather not go. Drones are merely a new stepping stone on this woeful journey. Thus, we should carefully deliberate before we join or initiate any new armed fights, but draw on drones extensively, if fight we must. They are more easily scrutinized and reviewed, and are more morally justified, than any other means of warfare available.

**MR**

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**NOTES**

1. I am indebted to Jeffrey Gianattasio for research assistance and to Jessie Spafford for editorial comments.


9. Ibid.


17. Ibid.


23. “No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 13 February 2009.


DRONE USE


52. Ibid.


54. Ibid. 55. Ibid.


The Rise of the Machines

Why Increasingly “Perfect” Weapons Help Perpetuate our Wars and Endanger Our Nation

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Pryer, U.S. Army

Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.

— Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

The saddest aspect of life right now is that science gathers knowledge faster than society gathers wisdom.

— Isaac Asimov

At the start of 2004, when I was the commander of a military intelligence company in Baghdad, my company received five of the first Raven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) deployed to Iraq.1 The Raven UAV is a small, hand-launched reconnaissance plane that has probably never figured prominently in any discussion about the ethics of waging war via remote-controlled robots. This drone is not armed, nor can it range more than a few miles from its controller. It looks more like a large toy plane than a weapon of war.

To my troops, I seemed quite enthused about this capability. Not all of this excitement was for show. I actually did find the technology and the fact that my troops were among the first to employ these drones in Iraq to be exciting. I had fully bought into the fantasy that such technology would make my country safe from terrorist attack and invincible in war.

I also felt, however, a sense of unease. One thing I worried about was so-called “collateral damage.” I knew that, because of the small, gray viewing screens that came with these drones as well as their limited loiter time, it might prove too easy to misinterpret the situation on the ground and relay false information to combat troops with big guns. I suspected that, if we did contribute to civilian deaths, my troops and I would not handle it well. But at the same time, I worried that we might cope quite well. Since we were physically removed from the action, maybe such an event would not affect us much. Would it look and feel, I wondered, like sitting at home, a can of Coke in hand, watching a war movie? Would we feel no more than a passing pang that the show that day had been a particularly hard one to watch? And, if that is how we felt, what would that say about us?
STRATEGY AND UAVS

It did not take long for a vivid nightmare to bring my fears to the surface. In this dream, I saw a little Iraqi girl and her family in a car, frightened, caught in the middle of a major U.S. military operation, trying to escape both insurgents and encircling U.S. forces. Believing the car to be filled with insurgents, my troops followed this car with one of our Ravens and alerted a checkpoint to the approaching threat. When a Bradley destroyed the car with a TOW missile, the officers in our command post cheered, clapping each other on the back.

I awoke filled with dread.

I now recognize this dream as a symptom of cognitive dissonance, the psychological result of holding two or more conflicting cognitions. In this instance, my identity as a U.S. Army officer and all this identity’s attendant values (duty to follow legal orders, loyalty to my fellow soldiers, and so on) clashed with my fear of harming innocents. It also clashed with a growing feeling that there was something fundamentally troubling about how we were choosing to wage war.

In this essay, I will not argue that waging war remotely does not have ethical advantages, for it clearly does. For one, armed drones and other robots are incapable of running concentration camps and committing rape and other crimes that still require human troops on the ground. Indeed, removing combat operators from the stress of life-threatening danger reduces their potential to commit those crimes that they could still conceivably commit via drones. Neuroscientists are finding that the neural circuits responsible for conscious self-control are highly vulnerable to stress. When these circuits shut down, primal impulses go unchecked. This means that soldiers under extreme physical duress can commit crimes that they would normally be unable to commit.

Another ethical advantage is that, compared to most other modern weapons systems, armed drones do a better job of helping combat operators to distinguish and target combatants instead of non-combatants. The New America Foundation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan think-tank based in Washington, D.C., and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), a British nonprofit news organization, provide the best known, most comprehensive estimates of civilian casualties from America’s armed drones. In Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the New America Foundation estimates that the ratio of noncombatant to combatant deaths is about 1:5 (one noncombatant death for every five combatant deaths). The TBIJ estimates that this same ratio in the FATA is 1:4, a ratio their estimates hold roughly true for America’s drone strikes in Yemen and Somalia as well. This kill ratio is not nearly as clean as proclaimed by some UAV enthusiasts, but it is much better than what is delivered by other modern weapons systems, which in total is something like a 1:1 ratio.

As drone technology improves, this ratio of noncombatant to combatant deaths will only get better. The “U.S. Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047” envisions tiny nano-sized drones that enter buildings and, in pursuit of reconnaissance, sabotage, or lethal objectives, swarm autonomously like angry bees. Not far beyond this future, it is easy to imagine drones the size of an assassin’s bullet flying into a building, conducting surveillance, and then—rather than exploding and taking out everything within 15 meters of this explosion—quietly and lethally entering the body of its intended target.

Most importantly, I do not argue in this essay that waging war via armed robot proxies is unethical. Instead, my thesis is that the way we use them is deeply unwise because it seems unethical to the very populations abroad we most need to approve of our actions—the populations our enemies hide among, the wider Muslim world, and the home populations of coalition allies. The negative moral blowback that armed drones generate when used as a transnational weapon, I contend, is helping to fuel perpetual war. That is, due to obstacles lying within the moral realm of human perception, the strategic disadvantages of drone strikes in any role other than close-air support to troops on the ground will almost always outweigh the fleeting tactical advantages of these strikes.

Armed UAVs and Moral Outrage

For the September 2012 report, “Living Under Drones,” teams from Stanford Law School and the New York University School of Law interviewed more than 130 FATA residents regarding their experiences with U.S. drones. The result is a disturbing portrait of the lives of these civilians. The report describes a population in the grip of Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) on a massive scale. Residents frequently experience such PTSD symptoms as emotional breakdowns, hyper-startled reactions to loud noises, loss of appetite, and insomnia. Residents are afraid to gather in groups, such as at funerals and meetings of tribal leaders.

It should thus come as no surprise to anyone that hatred for America is spiraling out of control among these people. The New America Foundation reports that, while “only one in ten of FATA residents thinks suicide attacks are often or sometimes justified against the Pakistani military and police, almost six in ten believe those attacks are justified against the U.S. military.” Consequently, as the United Nations reports, “many of the suicide attackers in Afghanistan hail from the Pakistani tribal regions.”

Moral reprobation against U.S. drone strikes among other Pakistanis is just as strong. According to a 2012 Pew Research Center poll, only 17 percent of Pakistanis support America’s drone strikes in the FATA. This low regard is probably the main reason that 74 percent of Pakistanis consider the United States to be their enemy. A solid majority of Pakistanis also believe U.S. drone strikes in the FATA to be acts of war against Pakistan.

Increasingly entrenched anti-Americanism among Pakistanis works against America’s short-term interests, such as the need of our military forces in Afghanistan for reliable resupply and overflight routes via Pakistan. However, it is also working against America’s long-term interests by helping to destabilize this nuclear power. Anti-U.S. demonstrations, frequently violent and often spurred by drone attacks, have become routine in the major cities of Pakistan. The terrorist groups claiming the majority of suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan justify their actions and gain new recruits by condemning the Pakistani government as a “puppet” of the hated U.S. government. Pakistan’s foreign minister was almost certainly not exaggerating when she said last summer that U.S. drone attacks in the FATA are the...
“top cause” of anti-Americanism in her country. Dr. David Kilcullen, the noted counterinsurgency expert, stated what should be obvious: “The current path that we are on is leading to loss of Pakistani government control over its own population.”

Anger over U.S. drone attacks has helped destabilize Yemen as well. When these attacks began in earnest in Yemen in December 2009, Al-Qaeda had 200 to 300 members and controlled no territory. Now it has “more than 1,000 members” and “controls towns, administers courts, collects taxes, and generally, acts like the government.”

Said Mohammed al-Ahmadi, a Yemeni lawyer: “Every time the American attacks increase, they increase the rage of the Yemeni people, especially in Al-Qaeda-controlled areas. The drones are killing Al-Qaeda leaders, but they are also turning them into heroes.”

Anger regarding U.S. drone attacks exists far beyond the locales in which armed Predators and Reapers hunt; it is stoking the fires of anti-Americanism throughout the Muslim world. The author Jefferson Morley wrote last summer:

The politics of drone war drains the proverbial sea of America’s ideological supporters and undermines the only basis for waging effective war: popular support of the people who feel threatened. In the Muslim world, it negates every other American message from democracy to rule of law, to women’s rights.

The Pew Research Center has described just how deep and widespread opposition to these attacks is. Their 2012 survey recorded, for example, that only nine percent of Turks and six percent of Egyptians and Jordanians approve of these attacks. This intense disapproval has made anti-drone protests commonplace in the Muslim world. Such demonstrations, often violent, are destabilizing the fledgling Islamic democracies birthed last year during the Arab Spring. They also continue to fuel the anger that provides a seemingly endless supply of recruits and money to anti-American terrorist groups. As the New York Times reported, connecting an earlier symbol of moral failure in America’s “war on terror” with the one that persists today: “Drones have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants.”

The reaction of the populations of America’s allies to our use of armed drones does not reflect much greater support. The Pew Research Center recently reported that the approval rating for drone strikes in seven European countries ranged from a high of 44 percent (United Kingdom) to a low of 21 percent (Spain). Of course this disapproval works against U.S. strategic interests. Germany for example, has limited the amount of intelligence that it will provide America for fear that this intelligence may lead to politically unacceptable targeted killings of German citizens in U.S. drone-patrolled countries. Of even greater import to America’s warfighters, it is no coincidence that those European populations with the lowest opinion of armed drones are most against their nations’ providing much assistance to the United States on the battlefields where they are employed, such as in Afghanistan.

...it is no coincidence that those European populations with the lowest opinion of armed drones are most against their nations’ providing much assistance to the United States...

Now we arrive at what is wrong with the number one justification cited by UAV enthusiasts for the use of armed drones—the idea that fighting war remotely makes America and her service members safer. This view is short-sighted. How many people have been killed in suicide bomb and other attacks fueled by the hatred of America that transnational drone strikes inspire? It is reasonable to assume that those deaths far exceed the number of civilians killed directly by America’s drones. It is also reasonable to assume that a significant number of American service members have been killed in such outrage-fueled attacks. When long-term effects are considered, the clear conclusion is that armed robots, when used in certain ways, cost American lives and make America less safe.
Sometimes, Laws are Inadequate

Why do America’s armed UAVs generate such negative moral blowback? Does the world believe that America is breaking just laws, and is it anger at America’s hubris that is generating such condemnation? It is hard to see how this could be the main reason for such widespread censure, since it is unclear to most lawyers, let alone to legal laymen, that America actually is breaking any laws in its use of armed drones.

Nowhere in the canon of international law is it explicitly written that the use of armed robots in war is illegal, unless these robots use prohibited weapons like poison gas or exploding bullets. The legal debate, rather, is whether existing international law should be interpreted to mean that America’s use of armed drones for a specific purpose—targeted killings—is unlawful. This debate revolves around two broad questions. One involves sovereign rights: can one state kill an individual in another state without the other state’s permission? The other, more controversial question asks when a government has the right to kill an individual: when is a state-sponsored killing lawful, and when is it murder or assassination?

In 2010, Harold Koh, a Department of State lawyer, succinctly expressed the U.S. government’s justification for drone strikes, which has been consistent for more than a decade. Drone strikes are legal, he said, because America is involved in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliate groups, and in accordance with international law, the United States may use force consistent with self-defense.29

Some lawyers and legal scholars have countered this viewpoint by noting that, under the UN charter, America is prohibited from using force within another country without the consent of that country’s government. Supporters of the U.S. government parry this criticism by pointing out that this charter contains an exception to this prohibition, namely, such force can be exercised for self-defense in the case of a country that is incapable or unwilling to help another country defend itself.

Other lawyers attack from a different vantage point, arguing that the killing of suspected terrorists should be treated as a law enforcement rather than a military action. One indicator that this is the case, they contend, is that the CIA—the agency that is America’s lead in the use of armed drones to hunt transnational terrorists—has historically operated outside of military laws and regulations and has not been governed by, or benefitted from, Geneva Convention protections. Since drone attacks are largely conducted by the CIA and thus governed by civil law and not military law, the argument goes, drone attacks are a type of political assassination, which is expressly forbidden by both international law and domestic executive order.

U.S. government supporters retort that, in terms of weaponry, capability, and actions, armed groups like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are clearly military organizations, and thus the Laws of Armed Conflict appropriately apply to America’s operations against them. The world has changed, they argue, and with it, the CIA’s role.

From all this, one thing is clear: it is not clear at all that, by using armed drones for targeted killings, the United States is actually violating the letter of any law. The confusion is so great that this perception cannot possibly be what is fueling such widespread and sustained moral reprobation. This does not mean that people do not see America’s use of armed drones as an affront to their sense of justice—quite the opposite. A great number of people are obviously outraged.
by America’s use of armed robots. Rather, what this means is that, sometimes, the laws on the books do not adequately address moral concerns.

To understand what is really fueling this moral reprobation, you must leave the realm of law and enter the realm of ethics. This is because, when it comes to moral matters, ethics is the deeper study. Plato’s most famous allegory can be adopted to describe why this is so: in a cave (the human heart) lit by a fire (feeling), laws are the flickering shadows cast by objects (moral perceptions and judgments), while ethics is the study of the objects themselves.

Ethics begins with the judgment that all human beings have something in common—a human “essence,” if you will. The commonality of this essence means that principles of conduct can be formulated that guide anyone to live their life in the best possible way. Actions are “good actions” if they are based on principles that sufficiently account for this shared essence. Different ways of best accounting for what all humans want or need fall somewhere between the poles of utilitarianism (a purely outcome-based approach) and idealism (a purely act-based approach). These approaches in turn generate different sets of principles of conduct. At the core of all approaches, though, is a single ethic, what Christians know as “the Golden Rule” and philosophers call “the ethic of reciprocity.”

The ethic of reciprocity is not only the broad foundation for all ethics, but it also specifically supports Just War Theory. This theory, in turn, is the basis for the Laws of Armed Conflict. The degree to which the ethic of reciprocity supports Just War theory and the Laws of Armed Conflict is obvious on a very basic, broad level. When a nation defines the conditions under which it should choose to go to war, this nation is really asking: “Although we do not want someone to attack us, what would we have to do to someone else, in order for us to feel that they are justified in choosing to go to war with us? Once I know this, then and only then, will we know when we are justified in choosing to go to war.” Similarly, when determining how a war should be waged, a nation is really asking: “If we have so offended another nation that they must wage war with us, how must they wage war, in order for us to feel that the manner they are waging this war is justifiable? Once we know this, then and only then, will we know how we must wage war to wage war justly.”

One cause of the moral reprobation regarding America’s current use of armed drones involves this usage’s failure to meet the fundamental standard of reciprocity. It is difficult to imagine how anyone could feel that their enemies were justified in waging war against them via remote-controlled machines, no matter how serious the offense, if there were no way they could reply in kind. When a people are subject to death from the guns of another nation, and they have no means to fight back directly against those warriors who are harming them, the situation seems fundamentally unfair, unjust, or unreciprocal. Without the support of a fair, transparent judicial process, such killing seems wrong, more summary execution or assassination than war.

It also looks more like summary execution than warfare when an enemy soldier, facing a superior force and imminent death, is given no opportunity to surrender. American soldiers do not go to war expecting no quarter from their enemies. Yes, we soldiers know that we will receive no quarter from some jihadist cells, but there is also the chance we will be held as a hostage and survive. That is why a short course on surviving, evading, resisting, and escaping enemy capture is required of every soldier who deploys to Afghanistan. Enemies who show us no quarter, we say, are inhuman, cruel, and violate the laws of war (which they do). Why would our enemies feel any differently about us, when we wage war in such a fashion that it offers them no quarter? Sadly, a barbaric medieval enemy prone to beheading captured prisoners actually holds a moral advantage over America in those places where America’s drone strikes are not coordinated with ground forces who can receive surrenders.

The United States is the only country of 21 surveyed in which a majority of the population supports America’s use of armed drones against designated terrorists. If the way we are targeting and killing suspected enemy warriors in
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia seems wrong to foreign populations, how is it that a majority of Americans do not perceive such wrongness? The obvious, short-term advantages of using armed drones have something to do with it. However, the deeper answer is one as old as philosophy itself: these Americans are allowing their passions (feelings of anger, fear, and self-righteousness) to cloud their reasoning and limit the scope of their vision. This irrational cloud of self-deception takes two major forms. One form is the failure of some Americans to recognize their enemy as sharing something basic with themselves—a common humanity. As mentioned above, ethics starts with the judgment that human beings share something essential, and from this judgment, conclusions are reached as to how human beings should treat other human beings. However, if this core judgment is missing—if you hate or fear your enemy (“the other”) so much that they no longer appear fully human to you—the ethic of reciprocity no longer applies, and people feel free to treat this “other” any way they want (or are ordered to) treat him. Their conscience now permits them anything. Thus, some Americans may reason that, by killing our enemies safely from afar, we are treating “evil terrorists” exactly as they should be treated—as a foe worthy of only the most sterile, let’s-not-get-our-hands-dirty kind of extermination.

Another way that some Americans are obscuring moral reality is via a failure of imagination. It is extremely difficult for these Americans to imagine the life of Pakistanis, Yemenis, or Somalis under the ever-watchful eyes of armed drones. If America’s skies were filled with armed drones that were hunting Americans and that were guided by pilots safely ensconced in battle stations on the other side of the planet, those Americans would no longer need their imaginations to feel the wrongness of such attacks. Even if they did not support the actions of the Americans who were being targeted, they might still riot, demonstrate, or join whatever forces America could field to fight their apparently inhuman enemies.
On the Importance of Appearing Human

Before my nightmare in which my soldiers used drones to help U.S. combat troops kill a little Iraqi girl and her family, I suffered from this same failure of moral imagination. I offer a simple thought experiment to save a few of my fellow service members from having similar bad dreams.31

The setting for this experiment is taken from the second of James Cameron’s Terminator movies. The scene is a colorless, dead landscape strewn with human detritus—hunks of metal, human skulls and bones, discarded and misshapen children’s playthings. Over this landscape stride tall, humanoid robots that hunt human beings with heavy weapons. These robots—remorseless, tireless, strong—are clearly inhuman, with metallic limbs and glowing orbs for eyes. Patrolling the skies above, large death-machines hover, seeking to shoot and kill any humans who might be hiding or fleeing in the wreckage below.

The robots appear unstoppable. A human paramilitary unit is in full retreat. Then, at last, hope appears in the form of John Connor, a strong, resolute, battle-scarred man. He is refreshingly, recognizably human. He is, importantly and fundamentally, “one of us.” Connor, the apotheosis of the warrior as savior, strides to a position where his troops can see him. Inspired, they counterattack and destroy the attacking robots. A narrator tells us that the human race is saved and Skynet, the self-aware supercomputer that had made and launched these “terminator” robots, is ultimately destroyed.

Watching this scene, the viewer has no doubt about which side he wants to win. It is not important what kind of people these humans are, nor what their ideas may be. All that matters is that they are human and their foes are not. Identifying with the humans, the viewer is distressed when he sees the robots kill human beings and exultant when the humans destroy a “terminator” robot or flying drone.

The stage is now set for the conclusion of this thought experiment.

First, imagine that the terminator robots and killer drones in the scene above are not controlled remotely by a computer but by human beings sitting in battle stations on the other side of the planet. Also imagine that the humans being hunted are deemed “terrorists” by the nation controlling the robots and drones, and that they consider John Connor to be the evil leader of a terrorist organization. Then, replay the battle scene described above in your mind.

Done? Good. Now, ask yourself this question: on this same junkyard battlefield pitting humans against machines, do you still want John Connor and his soldiers to win? Chances are, you do. Also ask yourself: do you feel that what the nation on the other side of the planet is doing, sending these terminator robots to kill these human “terrorists,” is fundamentally unjust? Again, chances are, you do.

Thus it is that the moral sympathies of onlookers naturally lie with the human side of any human-against-machines conflict. One of the most troubling things about armed robots is how they ignore this moral reality and promote dehumanization, the sine qua non condition of any act of genuine atrocity. It is upon the stage of dehumanization that man’s inhumanity to man has been performed, generation after generation.32 On this stage stood 20th century German Nazis, who generally treated captured Western soldiers humanely but dealt with Jews, Roma, Slavs, and others as diseased vermin in need of extermination. Also on this stage stood America’s forefathers, who set lofty new standards in war for the humane treatment of European prisoners, but who also tended to deal with Native Americans and black slaves imported from Africa as despicably as any group has ever treated fellow groups of human beings.

Some of us are not only dehumanizing others as “evil terrorists” in order to justify our use of these weapons, but all Americans are being dehumanized by drones. The face that America shows her enemies, foreign populations, and coalition allies in those countries the U.S. patrols exclusively with armed drones is a wholly inhuman face. Our enemy hides from, and occasionally fires at, machines. Our enemy, who is at war with America, is at war with machines. America—home to a proud, vibrant people—has effectively become inhuman.

Such willful self-dehumanization is tantamount to a kind of slow moral suicide, motivating our enemies to fight and prolonging our current wars. It is troubling just how financially, politically, and militarily committed our nation is to a course of action that encourages the very worst of human impulses—our species’ seemingly limitless capacity to dehumanize other members of our same species.
At the rate America is currently bleeding blood and treasure, China may become the world’s great economic power in as soon as four years. With its deeper pockets, slowly but surely, China’s military preeminence will follow, probably most conspicuously in the form of the world’s most technologically advanced killer robots. Other competitors (a revitalized, resource-rich Russia perhaps?) will follow suit.

It is distressing to think of life for Americans in a world in which wars are fought by killer robots stronger than our own and in which we have squandered much of our political support and moral influence abroad. What is certain (albeit very uncomfortable to imagine) is that Americans will feel nowhere near as secure and prosperous as we have felt since the end of the Cold War. Although our generation is making the bed, it is our children and grandchildren who will be forced to lie in it.

Isaac Asimov, the scientist and prolific writer once sagely observed, “The saddest aspect of life right now is that science gathers knowledge faster than society gathers wisdom.” Jeffrey Sluka, an anthropologist, expressed this insight in terms a military strategist can understand: “The drive to technology often creates an inertia that works against developing sound strategy.” The truth of Asimov’s and Sluka’s words is nowhere clearer than with regard to America’s use of armed robots.

The Rise of the Machines

Despite the short-sightedness of America’s transnational drone strikes, there are promising signs that our nation and military are beginning to recognize the primacy of moral concerns in human conflict. Most notably, the Obama administration has ended torture and “extraordinary renditions” as a matter of policy. Also, some American leaders (albeit too few active politicians) have publicly decried drone strikes. For example, Kurt Volker, the U.S. ambassador to NATO from July 2008 to May 2009, opined in a recent Washington Post editorial:

What do we want to be as a nation? A country with a permanent kill list? A country where people go to the office, launch a few kill shots and get home in time for dinner? A country that instructs workers in high-tech operations centers to kill human beings on the far side of the planet because some government agency determined that those individuals are terrorists? There is a “Brave New World” grotesqueness to this posture that should concern all Americans.

Within the military, the 2006 counterinsurgency manual came loaded with morally-aware ideas. One such idea was the maxim that, “Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be”—a saying that explicitly recognizes the importance of long-term effects in determining how best to protect service members and a maxim with clear applications to drone warfare. U.S. military journals increasingly publish essays that apply the moral dimension of warfare to U.S. operations and, often, authors’ analyses find these operations lacking. In May 2008, the Army established the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic for the purpose of studying, defining, and promulgating our professional ethic. The Command and General Staff College has added the role of an “Ethics Chair” to its faculty and, since 2009, has run an annual Ethics Symposium—something not seen in our military since our Army’s brief flirtation with such a conference at the end of the Vietnam War. Also, promisingly, the School of Advanced Military Studies last year implemented a block of five lessons dedicated to the study of the moral domain of war.

In a better, wiser world, such positive seeds would take root and flower. A majority of our nation’s voters and military leaders would recognize and accept what should be obvious: much of the rest of the world is outraged by the way we use our armed robots, and this outrage profoundly matters. Senior generals would steadfastly and strongly warn civilian leaders of the inherent flaws of these illusory “perfect weapons,” to include the anti-Americanism they tend to generate and the counterproductive effects of this feeling; the utter lack of efficacy in the long run of any application of coercive air power unsupported by ground forces, as our military has gleaned from a century of experience in various wars; and the dangers of entrusting civilian agencies and contractors with the U.S. military’s core mission—that of employing and managing violence in defense of the nation. America’s civilian leaders would listen to voters and their military advisors, and our nation would steer a new, morally aware course.

One such course might be for our nation to avoid the perception of unlawful, unethical executions by using armed drones to target suspected terrorists in
noncombat zones (such as Pakistan and Yemen) only if these suspects have been sentenced to death via a fair and transparent judiciary process. An even more radical, alternative course might be, after realizing the threat these tools will pose someday to our own nation’s security and deciding that it is time to fully regain the moral high ground our nation lost soon after the 9/11 attacks, our leading the charge to put these weapons on the list of malum in se weapons prohibited by international law.

For whichever morally aware course we choose, we would replace the current deeply flawed, cookie-cutter solution to how we attack terrorists in noncombat zones with solutions precisely tailored to the problem at hand. Rather than enflame anti-Americanism via unsupported coercive airpower in the FATA, for example, we might try a policy of containment instead, beefing up U.S. troop presence and cargo scanners at Afghanistan’s major border crossing points while redirecting drones over the FATA to perform border surveillance missions.\(^4\)

We would, in general, employ the “soft” weapons of diplomacy, money, and moral influence abroad to better effect, resulting in our actually subtracting from, rather than adding to, the total number of enemies our nation has in the world.

Sadly, there is little chance that America will temper, let alone end, her development and use of armed drones. In the last decade, America’s passion for armed drones has become deeply entrenched, politically, economically, and militarily. Some Americans—their moral judgment clouded by passion—are dehumanizing others and suffering from a failure of empathy on a grand scale. When the world responds by becoming outraged, rather than listen, these Americans effectively put their hands over their moral ears and repeat, “Na na na, we can’t hear you.” Or, they become angry and essentially reply, “Be quiet! You are wrong to feel the way you do. Armed robots are just tools of war like any other tool, such as manned bombers or artillery. Besides, we’re protecting you from the bad guys, too.”

I wish I could be more hopeful that, in 50 years, America will look back upon her use of transnational drone strikes as a morally disastrous policy that our nation briefly toyed with at the turn of the century, before gaining wisdom from this folly. This hope, though, seems too polyanannish even for me, a U.S. military officer.

Instead, it seems heart-breakingly obvious that future generations will someday look back upon the last decade as the start of the rise of the machines, and, as President George W. Bush said in a speech at the Citadel in 2001, they will see many more armed robots on patrol “in space, on land, in the air, and at sea”—robots so advanced that they make today’s Predators and Reapers look positively impotent and antique. These killer robots, though, will share one thing in common with their primitive progenitors: with remorseless purpose, they will stalk and kill any human deemed “a legitimate target” by their controllers and programmers.

What will it take for some Americans to fully wake up and understand the disturbing precedent that America is setting with her transnational drone strikes today? Or, is it too late for them to wake up? Are they like the slumbering passengers on the Titanic, on a huge vessel too committed and going too fast to avoid the huge iceberg, now visible against the night sky, just starting to block the stars in their ship’s path? Tragically, in a political climate still ruled by passion rather than morally aware reason, it may take the sounds of the crash itself to awaken these Americans. This crash, after the passage of a couple decades, would not be the sounds of ice scraping and tearing metal; it would be quiet humming noises (or, perhaps, supersonic booms) high in America’s own skies, punctuated by intermittent explosions, as enemy armed drones hunt America’s leaders and soldiers.

Of course, by then, it would be far too late for Americans to alter this fate. \textit{MR}
The new drones, for example, are being used in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, which is a war that has been going on for over a decade. According to the United Nations, the war has resulted in the deaths of over 11,000 civilians and soldiers. The World Health Organization estimates that over 3,000 civilians have been killed in Afghanistan since the start of the war.

In Pakistan, the U.S. has been using drones to target al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. The Pakistan government has expressed concerns about the use of drones in its territory, and has called for a reduction in the number of strikes.

The U.S. military has also been using drones in other parts of the world, including Yemen and Somalia. In Yemen, the U.S. has been using drones to target al-Qaeda fighters. In Somalia, the U.S. has been using drones to target Al-Shabab fighters.

The use of drones has been controversial. Some argue that they are an effective way to carry out targeted strikes against terrorist fighters. Others argue that they violate international law and violate the rights of civilians.

In 2011, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing monthly reports on the number of drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These reports have been criticized by some for not providing enough information about the targeted strikes.

In 2012, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing annual reports on its drone programs. These reports have been welcomed by some as a step towards transparency, but others have criticized them for not providing enough information about the targeted strikes.

In 2013, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing quarterly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been released on a regular basis, and have been seen as a positive step towards transparency.

In 2014, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing monthly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2015, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing annual reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2016, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing quarterly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2017, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing monthly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2018, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing annual reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2019, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing quarterly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2020, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing monthly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2021, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing annual reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2022, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing quarterly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2023, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing monthly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2024, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing annual reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2025, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing quarterly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2026, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing monthly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2027, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing annual reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2028, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing quarterly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2029, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing monthly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2030, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing annual reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2031, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing quarterly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2032, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing monthly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2033, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing annual reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

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In 2050, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing monthly reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

In 2051, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing annual reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.

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In 2060, the U.S. government announced that it would begin releasing annual reports on its drone programs. These reports have been seen as a significant step towards transparency, and have been welcomed by many as a positive development.
Applying Mission Command through the Operations Process

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Flynn, U.S. Army, Retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Schrankel, U.S. Army, Retired

MISSION COMMAND AND its associated framework, the operations process, are central concepts that underpin how our Army fights. Mission command is both a philosophy of command and a warfighting function. The operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) is the Army’s framework for the exercise of mission command. Army doctrine publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command*, and ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, describes the latest evolutions of these concepts. This article provides a brief history of mission command in the U.S. Army, summarizes the main ideas contained in ADP 6-0 and 5-0, and offers a way ahead for institutionalizing these ideas in our Army.

Evolving Doctrine

Aspects of mission command, to include providing a clear commander’s intent, exercising disciplined initiative, using mission orders, and building effective teams based on mutual trust, are not new to our Army. Grant’s orders to Sherman for the campaign of 1864 and Sherman’s supporting plan are models of clear commander’s intent, mission orders, and understanding based on trust. Eisenhower’s intent for the 1944 invasion of Europe and a flexible command system guided Army forces as they fought their way from Normandy to the Rhine. The ability of 3rd Army and its corps to make quick adjustments combined with low-level initiative of Army forces to exploit opportunities during the 1991 Gulf War are other examples of effective mission command.
More recently, guided by a broad intent and a philosophy of mission command, Army Special Forces teams operated virtually independently with elements of the Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban in 2001. Another example of mission command in action is the 3rd Infantry Division’s march to Baghdad in 2003 and subsequent “thunder runs.” Lieutenant General David Perkins (a brigade commander during this operation) writes, “These thunder runs were successful because the corps and division-level commanders established clear intent in their orders and trusted their subordinates’ judgment and abilities to exercise disciplined initiative in response to a fluid, complex problem, underwriting the risks that they took.”

While Army forces have a long history of applying aspects of mission command in operations, doctrine on the subject was limited. In 2003, the Army published FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. This manual provided a common framework for command and control and described mission command as the Army’s preferred method of command. In addition, FM 6-0 explained the operations process in detail and highlighted the importance of rapid decision making during execution.

In 2005, the Army published FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. Focused on planning and problem solving, this manual complemented FM 6-0. In 2010, FM 5-0 was significantly revised from a manual strictly devoted to planning, to one that addressed all the activities of the operations process. This edition of FM 5-0 described a mission command approach to planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations.

In early 2011, the Army began a massive restructuring of its doctrine known as “Doctrine 2015.” The intent of doctrine 2015 is to create shorter, more accessible, and more collaborative doctrine for the Army. In October 2011, the Army released its new doctrine for operations—ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations. This short publication focused on the fundamental principles that guide Army forces in the conduct of operations. A more detailed explanation followed in May 2012 with the publication of Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0. The release of these publications mark a significant change to the Army’s doctrinal structure. Unified Land Operations modifies Army operations doctrine based on the many lessons learned from over a decade of sustained conflict.
In parallel with the development of ADP and ADRP 3-0, the Army was updating its doctrine on mission command and the operations process. In May 2012, the Army published ADP and ADRP 6-0 and ADP and ADRP 5-0. Together, these publications reflect the latest evolution of doctrine for mission command and the operations process and are nested within the Army’s operational concept of unified land operations.

**Mission Command**

Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 and its associated ADRP provide fundamental principles on command, control, and the mission command warfighting function and describe how commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art of command and the science of control to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and accomplish missions.

The doctrine of mission command (both as a philosophy of command and as a warfighting function) derives from an understanding of the nature of operations. Historically, commanders have employed variations of two basic concepts of command: mission command and detailed command. While some have favored detailed command, the nature of operations and the patterns of military history point to the advantages of mission command.9 As described in ADP 6-0, military operations are human endeavors, contests of wills characterized by continuous and mutual adaptation among all participants. In operations, Army forces face thinking and adaptive enemies, differing agendas of various actors, and changing perceptions of civilians in an operational area. This dynamic makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the uncertainty of military operations. Uncertainty pervades operations in the form of unknowns about the enemy, the people, and the surroundings.10

During operations, leaders make decisions, develop plans, and direct actions under varying degrees of uncertainty. Commanders seek to counter the uncertainty of operations by empowering subordinates at the scene to make decisions, act, and quickly adapt to changing circumstances. This is the essence of mission command philosophy as described in ADP 6-0.

**The Mission Command Philosophy**

ADP 6-0 defines *mission command* as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”11 This philosophy of command requires an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It demands a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to accept prudent risk and exercise disciplined initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent. Through mission orders, commanders focus on the purpose of the operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. Doing this minimizes detailed control and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action. Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary conditions for success by allocating appropriate resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks.

Mission command does not negate the requirement for control. A key aspect of mission command is determining the appropriate degree of control to impose on subordinates. The appropriate degree of control varies with each situation and is not easy to determine. An air-landing phase of an air assault, for example, requires tight control. The follow-on ground maneuver plan may require less detail.

### Principles of Mission Command

- Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.
- Provide a clear commander’s intent.
- Exercise disciplined initiative.
- Use mission orders.
- Accept prudent risk.
Determining the degree of control and delegating authority and the amount of risk to accept are part of what ADP 6-0 describes as balancing the art of command with the science of control.

**The Mission Command Warfighting Function**

Mission command is also a warfighting function. The mission command warfighting function is “the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command with the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions.”

It consists of a series of commander and staff tasks and a mission command system that support the exercise of authority and direction by the commander as depicted below. The primary purpose of the mission command warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other warfighting functions into a coherent whole to mass the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.

ADP 6-0 emphasizes that commanders are the central figures in mission command. While staffs perform essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, commanders are ultimately responsible for accomplishing assigned missions. Under the mission command warfighting function, commanders perform three primary tasks:

- Drive the operations process through their activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.
- Develop teams, both within their own organizations and with joint, interagency, and multinational partners.
- Inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations.

The staff supports the commander in the exercise of mission command by performing the following tasks:

- Conduct the operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess.
- Conduct information management and knowledge management.
- Conduct inform and influence activities.
- Conduct cyber electromagnetic activities.

In addition to the primary tasks of mission command, each commander has a mission command system—“the arrangement of personnel; networks; information systems; processes and procedures; and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations.” Commanders organize their mission command system to support decision making, manage information and knowledge products, prepare and communicate directives, and facilitate the functioning of teams.

**The Operations Process**

Where ADP and ADRP 6-0 provide the fundamental principles of mission command, ADP and ADRP 5-0 describes a model for putting mission command into action. The Army’s framework for exercising mission command is the “operations process—the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation.” Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.

Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 describes the dynamic nature of the operations process. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process. Upon
completion of the initial order, planning continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparing begins during planning and continues through execution. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities.

Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 describes a mission command approach to the operations process by emphasizing the role of the commander. Commanders drive the operations process by understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing as shown in Figure 1.

The relationships among the commander activities and the activities of the operations process are dynamic. All of the commander activities occur in planning, preparation, execution, and assessment, but take on different emphasis throughout the operations process. For example, during planning, commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing. During execution, commanders often focus on directing, leading, and assessing while improving their understanding and modifying their visualization.

The staff’s role is to assist commanders with understanding situations, making and implementing decisions, controlling operations, and assessing progress. In addition, the staff assists subordinate units (commanders and staffs), and keeps units and organizations outside the headquarters informed throughout the operations process.

Commanders and staffs use the operations process to integrate numerous tasks that are executed throughout the headquarters and with subordinate units. Commanders must organize and train their staffs and subordinates as an integrated team to simultaneously plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations. In addition to the principles of mission command discussed in ADP 6-0, commanders and staff consider the following principles for the effective use of the operations process (Figure 2).

**Planning.** ADP 5-0 defines planning as “the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about.” Army leaders plan
to create a common vision among subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action partners for the successful execution of operations. Planning results in a plan or order that communicates this vision and directs actions to synchronize forces in time, space, and purpose for achieving objectives and accomplishing missions.

Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 discusses the importance of integrating the conceptual and detailed components of planning. Conceptual planning involves understanding the operational environment and the problem, determining the operation’s end state, and visualizing an operational approach. Detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Army leaders employ three methodologies to assist them with integrating the conceptual and detail components of planning:

- Army design methodology.
- Military decision making process.
- Troop leading procedures.

Preparing. “Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation.” Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It requires commander, staff, unit, and soldier actions to ensure the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations. Effective preparation helps commanders, staffs, and subordinate units better understand the situation and their roles in upcoming operations.

Mission success depends as much on preparation as on planning. Higher headquarters may develop the best of plans; however, plans serve little purpose if subordinates do not receive them in time. Subordinates need enough time to fully comprehend the plan, rehearse key portions of the plan, and ensure soldiers and equipment are positioned and ready to execute the operation. To aid in effective preparation, ADP 5-0 offers the following guidelines:

- Secure and protect the force.
- Improve situational understanding.
- Understand, rehearse, and refine the plan.
- Integrate, organize, and configure the force.
- Ensure forces and resources are ready and positioned.

Execution. Planning and preparation accomplish nothing if the command does not execute effectively. —FM 6-0 (2003)

Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 lays out the fundamental principles of execution. “Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission.” During execution, commanders, staffs, and subordinate commanders focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions. They apply combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage. Execution activities include—

- Continuous monitoring and evaluation of the situation (assessment).
- Making decisions to exploit opportunities or counter threats.
- Directing action to apply combat power at decisive points and times.

Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 describes the fluid nature of execution. During execution, the situation may change rapidly. Operations the commander envisioned in the plan may bear little resemblance to actual events in execution. Subordinate commanders need maximum latitude to take advantage of situations and meet the higher commander’s intent when the original order no longer applies. Effective execution requires leaders trained and educated in independent decision making, aggressiveness, and risk taking in an environment of mission command. During execution, leaders must be able and willing to solve problems within the commander’s intent without constantly referring to higher headquarters. Subordinates need not wait for top-down synchronization to act. Guides to effective execution include seizing the initiative through action and exploiting opportunities.

Principles of the Operations Process

- Commanders drive the operations process.
- Build and maintain situational understanding.
- Apply critical and creative thinking.
- Encourage collaboration and dialogue.

Figure 2
Assessing. Assessment—the determination of progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective—is a continuous activity of the operations process. Assessment is part of planning, preparation, and execution. The focus of assessment, however, changes for each operations process activity. During planning, assessment focuses on understanding current conditions of an operational environment and developing an assessment plan, including what and how to assess progress. During preparation, assessment focuses on determining the friendly force’s readiness to execute the operation and on verifying the assumptions on which the plan is based. During execution, assessment focuses on evaluating progress of the operation. Based on their assessment, commanders direct adjustments to the order, ensuring the operation stays focused on accomplishing the mission.

Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 describes assessment as continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation to determine progress of an operation. Broadly, assessment consists of the following activities:

- Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.
- Evaluating progress toward attaining end-state conditions, achieving objectives, and completing tasks.
- Recommending or directing action for improvement.

Primary tools for assessing include running estimates, after action reviews, and the assessment plan. Running estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendations from the perspective of each staff section. Running estimates help to refine the common operational picture and supplement it with information not readily displayed. Both formal and informal after action reviews help identify what was supposed to happen, what went right and what went wrong for a particular action or operation, and how the commander and staff should do things differently in the future. The assessment plan includes measures of effectiveness, measures of performance, and indicators that help the commander and staff evaluate progress toward accomplishing tasks and achieving objectives.

Throughout the conduct of operations, commanders integrate their own assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners in the area of operations. To aid in effective assessment, ADP 5-0 offers commanders the following guidelines:

- Prioritizes the assessment effort.
- Incorporate the logic of the plan.
- Use caution when establishing cause and effect.
- Combine quantitative and qualitative indicators.

The Way Ahead

Mission command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of the profession of arms. — General Martin E. Dempsey (2012)

The doctrine in ADPs 5-0 and 6-0 is a starting point for inculcating the ideas of mission command and the operations process into our Army. However, as General Dempsey notes, mission command is a learned behavior and must now be institutionalized and operationalized into our education and training. Below is a summary of General Dempsey’s thoughts on how to do this:

Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging as officers and noncommissioned officers progress in rank and experience. Leaders must be taught how to receive and give mission orders, and how to clearly express intent. Students must be placed in situations of uncertainty where critical and creative thinking and effective rapid decision making are stressed. Training must replicate the chaotic and uncertain nature of military operations. Training must place leaders in situations where fleeting opportunities present themselves, and those that see and act appropriately to those opportunities are rewarded. Training must force leaders to become skilled in rapid decision making. Training must reinforce in commanders that they demonstrate trust by exercising restraint in their close supervision of subordinates.

In the article “Mission Command: Do We have the Stomach for What is Really Required?” Colonel Tom Guthrie writes, “If we intend to truly embrace mission command, then we should do it to the fullest, and that will require commitment to changing a culture from one of control and process to one of decentralization and trust. We cannot afford to preach one thing and do another.” The Army can continue to write doctrine on mission command and its benefits, but if it is not read, studied, debated, and trained on, doctrine has little value.
NOTES


2. In a letter to MG William T. Sherman, LTG Ulysses S. Grant outlined his 1864 campaign plan describing the overall operation and his intent for Sherman's Army. Sherman responded in a letter back to Grant that outlined his specific plan. Sherman's letter demonstrated he understood Grant's intent and his role in the overall operations. See The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Vol. 10: January 1–May 31, 1864, edited by John Y. Simon. (Ulysses S. Grant Association, 1982), 251-254.


6. The United States Marine Corps adopted mission command in its doctrine with the publication of Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 6, Command and Control, in 1997.


8. There are four types of publications within the Doctrine 2015 framework. Army doctrine publications (ADPs) are concise publications that address the fundamental principles of a particular subject. Army doctrine reference publications (ADRP), expand upon ADP Field manuals, provide the “how to,” and address tactics and procedures of a subject. The fourth type of publication is an Army techniques publication (ATP). ATPs are designed to be collaborative and offer various techniques (ways to) perform missions and tasks.


11. Ibid.

12. U.S. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 16 May 2012), 3-2. This term and definition replaced the “command and control warfighting function.”

13. This tasks was formerly associated with the term “battle command” which is no longer an Army term.

14. ADP 6-0, p. 11.


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 6.

18. ADP and ADRP 5-0 no longer contain the details for conducting the MDMP, TLP or formats for plans and orders. These details will be addressed in a new field manual entitled Commander and Staff Organization and Operations due out in October 2013. In the interim, ATTP 5-0.1 provides these details.

19. ADP 5-0, 10.

20. Ibid., 12.


22. Ibid., 6-7.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT IS in need of a jumpstart. The Center for Army Leadership’s most recent study suggests a need to address an area of seemingly waning importance to many units. The study found that Army leaders who believe their organization places a high priority on developing subordinates reached an all-time low of 35 percent (versus 46 in 2010 and 53 in 2009). In fact, the Develops Others category obtained the lowest favorability rating among Army leader core competencies from 2006 to 2011, falling well short of the accepted threshold of two-thirds favorability.

This trend is alarming. The Army classifies itself as a profession, a categorization that requires a commitment to continuing education and lifelong learning. Regaining a focus on professional development requires a renewed commitment to effective leader development training, perhaps unintentionally forsaken because of the hectic operational tempo of the last 11 years.

While one model is hardly a panacea for the Army’s current mentorship challenges, the U.S. Military Academy’s (USMA) capstone course, Officership, offers one possible solution to help rekindle the enthusiasm for leader development across the Army.

Expertise through Human Development

In The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington describes the Army profession as being unique. Not a standard occupation, it requires adherence to a self-policing ethic, or corporateness; it entails a responsibility to serve the American people as its client, and the Army requires expertise in its professional ability to “manage violence.” Similarly, the Army’s 2010 white paper The Profession of Arms emphasizes the need for professionals to “produce uniquely expert work” and stresses “intrinsic factors like the life-long pursuit of expert knowledge.” The application of unique expert knowledge allows the profession to gain and maintain legitimacy with its client.

Expert knowledge, of course, cannot exist in a vacuum. In fact, the professional embraces a life-long pursuit of knowledge through three primary
means: self-development, operational assignments, and institutional training.5

Self-development places responsibility for professional growth on the individual and includes professional reading, research, and self-assessment.

Operational assignments encompass on-the-job training and experiences gained through duties and positions.

Institutional training includes the Army’s professional military education program and schools.

Put another way, “We learn through self-study, from our own experiences, and from others’ experiences.”6

Beyond the Army’s formal professional military education program, institutional training should include an effective leadership development training plan, tailored to the battalion and company levels. This implies, of course, that leaders in units must prioritize time to do some amount of teaching of subordinates. Precisely this pedagogical component—what Don Snider calls the “human development” cluster of the profession’s expert knowledge—is what has been lacking recently in our force.7 Yet, never before has learning from others been more critical to the continuing professionalization of the Army, particularly with the wealth of knowledge acquired from having fought two wars simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Interestingly, the data suggest that we recognize the benefits of leader development in preparing ourselves for positions of greater responsibility. Consider that leaders have consistently rated highly the effectiveness of the operational experience and self-development domains; they now rest at 80 and 78 percent, respectively. While the institutional training domain rates significantly lower at 65 percent, one may still safely conclude that leader development has perceived benefits for the force. If these benefits are real and result in a stronger Army, leaders should strive to prioritize it. Yet, only 35 percent of those surveyed actually believe their unit affords them the time to develop themselves.8

This concerning disparity between a “will” and a “way” is further reinforced in the operational experience domain, where leaders have consistently pointed to work experience as an important factor in preparing them for positions of increased responsibility. Field grade officers and senior NCOs, for example, currently value such experience at 90 and 88 percent, respectively. When evaluating their own role in the process, field grade officers (67 percent) largely believe they have sufficient time to develop subordinates, while junior officers (32 percent) do not. When it comes to engaging in certain on-the-job developmental activities, however, 46 percent of leaders say they rarely or occasionally have opportunities to learn from superiors; 52 percent say they rarely or occasionally engage in formal leader development programs; and 55 percent say they rarely or occasionally receive developmental counseling from immediate superiors.9

Where is the breakdown? It seems that although our leaders have the desire to grow professionally through self-study, and they clearly value the importance of learning from operational experiences, there is an insufficient leader development program in place at the unit level to capitalize on the motivation for professional growth and to convert what has been learned through experiences into development opportunities. A lack of a program also seems to belie a lack of emphasis on its importance. With the desire to develop readily apparent, Army leaders must restore the capacity for effective professional development programs and prioritize their implementation in unit training plans.

A Model for Leader Development Training

After witnessing the benign neglect of leader development over the last decade, where can Army leaders turn to reinvest in professional development? Where can they find ideas that will breathe life into their leader development training programs? One model originates at West Point’s Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic, which directs the senior cadets’ capstone course, MX400 Officership.

Founded in response to a recommendation of General (retired) Frederick Franks, Jr., the seminar course bridges the gap between being a cadet and being an officer. Franks had identified a “need in the cadet curriculum for a common, culminating, integrating, and transformational experience, designed to tie the various strands of officership instruction together at the end of the cadet career.”10

The course evolved from an elective examining the ethos and behavioral considerations of the profession to a capstone class applying case studies to practical situations in an effort to discover enduring
truths of leadership. According to West Point’s superintendent, Lieutenant General David Huntoon, “MX400 was developed to transcend the total cadet experience—military, academic, and physical, tying its various components together, forging leaders of character as cadets complete their final preparation to enter the officer ranks.”

Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Officership encourages a teaching environment that closely resembles a focused leader development program. It polishes cadets’ self-concept of officer identities, including what it means to be a leader of character, a warrior, a member of the profession, and a servant to the nation. The course consists of four blocks of instruction: Officership in Action—Mission Command, The Military Profession, Company Grade Officer, and Servant to the Nation, each of which offers a mature approach to professional growth. Converted into more flexible modules, the Officership curriculum has real applicability and transferability to professional development training programs in the force.

**Officership in Action—Mission Command**

The first block, entitled Officership in Action—Mission Command, introduces mission command, defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of full spectrum operations.” Class mentors may explain the recent doctrinal change from the battle command phrase, a subtle but important distinction placing emphasis on junior leader empowerment and discretion in making command decisions.

Just as it is important for cadets to understand the premium placed on disciplined initiative consistent with commander’s intent at the small-unit level, a discussion of mission command is also useful for officers in the Army writ large. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, argues—

> With our shift to mission command, we must take a careful look at how we adapt our leader-development programs and policies to develop leaders who can effectively operate in a much more transparent, complex, and decentralized operational environment. Aligning and connecting our leader-development programs and policies with our conceptual foundation and doctrinal changes such as mission command become the most critical adaptations we can make within our campaign of learning.

The Officership course is one attempt to address this issue upfront with cadets, prior to commissioning, and the Mission Command block fosters this professional development with old-fashioned war storytelling. Experienced junior and field grade officers share their combat experiences with the cadets in both small and large group settings, where facilitators also contribute to the experience by pausing a story at the moment of decision, forcing cadets to examine and discuss what they would do under similar circumstances, and drawing conclusions about proper conduct in the process. This leader development methodology is transferrable to the force.
With so many soldiers knowing how to fight today, experienced leaders in the Army must share their stories with their units as a means to self-improvement and discovery. While combat-tested leaders may initially be reluctant to share personal stories with their subordinates, particularly if they reveal vulnerability, Franks encourages leaders to resist the “unspoken stricture against telling war stories.” They may offer much to inexperienced and experienced subordinates alike. The experienced storytellers may achieve a cathartic effect if they are struggling with post-traumatic stress. For the listener, Franks sees clear value in the knowledge that they can share, and he argues that the “commander who shares his experiences, good and bad, encourages a climate of open exchange and honest appraisal. These stories are valuable. They stimulate, they enrich, they teach.” Furthermore, his suggested method for discussing stories through the lenses of character, competence, and leadership offers a useful framework for professional discourse in combat-proven formations across the Army.

Elizabeth Samet, an English professor at USMA and author of Soldier’s Heart: Reading Literature through Peace and War at West Point, shares this concern and believes that in war stories, there may be a danger in surrendering too much to authenticity. In other words, officers—particularly those with little to no combat experience—may yield too much to the authority of their storyteller, potentially of higher rank, presenting only one point of view. Here, the instructive value may be in jeopardy when everything is accepted as fact or as “best practice.”

To hedge against this problem, Samet suggests “triangulation” in storytelling. Three participants share their version of the same event, or one narrator shares her story through three mediums (i.e., sharing a journal entry, a letter home, and verbal narrative leaning on memory) in order to present a clearer picture. For Army leaders to avoid a “bottom-line-up-front” mentality is also important. They should avoid the insistence on resolution and emphasize open-endedness in discussing these stories. By focusing on the good, bad, and ugly, as Franks suggests, and by making an effort to triangulate for accuracy, as Samet recommends, small unit leaders can preserve narrative value and convert combat experiences into valuable learning opportunities.

As units capitalize on the stories warfighters bring to their leader development programs, they might also consider complementing others’ experiences with scheduled leader self-study sessions and weaving the mission command theme through their leader development training plan. For example, Officership encourages cadets to begin their professional reading journey with David Hackett Fischer’s Pulitzer-Prize winning book, Washington’s Crossing. Focusing on Washington’s command during the pivotal Battle of Trenton, cadets learn the enduring human truths of mission command and compare leadership lessons with the Combat Studies Institute’s detailed account of Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008.

Some may be skeptical about the value of war stories as a means to leader development. Tim O’Brien, author of The Things They Carried, an award-winning collection of stories detailing the experiences of a U.S. Army infantry platoon in Vietnam, urges caution about the unreliability of war stories in his novel. In the chapter “How to Tell a True War Story,” O’Brien presents the paradox inherent in war stories:

In any war story, but especially a true one, it is difficult to separate what happened from what seemed to happen. What seems to happen becomes its own happening and has to be told that way. The angles of vision are skewed. When a booby trap explodes, you close your eyes and duck and float outside yourself. When a guy dies, like Lemon, you look away and then look back for a moment and then look away again. The pictures get jumbled; you tend to miss a lot. And then afterward, when you go to tell about it, there is always that surreal seemingness, which makes the story seem untrue, but which in fact represents the hard and exact truth as it seemed.

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At Trenton, Washington showed tremendous perseverance despite a seemingly impossible mission under terrible winter weather conditions. Similarly, U.S. soldiers at an austere outpost in Afghanistan overcame overwhelming odds after the enemy’s tactical surprise to persevere in defending the outpost despite the relentless efforts of 150 heavily armed Taliban fighters. As such, the case studies of Wanat and Trenton are snapshots of character, competence, and leadership that have real application and relevance to officers. They realize what went well, what did not go well, and what they would or could have done under similar circumstances. Effective leader development programs must make every effort to draw historical parallels with modern accounts of war to reveal these enduring principles of mission-type command that can have a lasting impact on professionals.

Proper facilitation is critical to learning. Perhaps nothing is more destructive to professional exchange than a canned PowerPoint presentation, which “stifles discussion, critical thinking, and thoughtful decision-making.”21 Instead, Officership proposes a system in line with “the need to move away from a platform-centric learning model to one that is centered more on learning through facilitation and collaboration.”22 Army organizations can successfully build expertise by combining self-study, storytelling, and learning from others.23 They can do so through experiential learning, practice at solving real-world problems, reflection on lasting impressions that are useful, and through using the Mission Command block for a revamped leadership development program. Not only do these lead to the lifelong learning incumbent upon professionals, but they also capture lessons learned over a decade of war.

The Military Profession

The second block of Officership—and another module idea for leader development training—is The Military Profession. With the Army Profession Campaign in 2011 came a call to “take a hard look at ourselves to ensure we understand what we have been through over the past nine years, how we have changed, and how we must adapt to succeed in an era of persistent conflict.”24 Assuming that the United States will frequently continue to use the military as the preferred instrument of power for the foreseeable future, a successful leader development model must focus on grooming professionals to be high-performance warfighters. The army should not lose sight of what war ultimately demands, even amidst calls for a return to the soldierly standards of a so-called “garrison Army.”

However, without also defining what the profession is, not just what it demands, self-examination is difficult. An effective leader development program should endeavor to frame this discussion. How is the profession different from a bureaucratic agency, or even a professional baseball team? Just what is the Army’s jurisdiction as it moves from what Huntington called the “management of violence” to what political sociologist James Burk called “the broad jurisdiction of the management of peace?”25 How do officers serve as moral exemplars for their soldiers, in times of relative peace but particularly while in combat? Officership seeks to address these questions and others with cadets in a seminar-style forum that encourages analysis and debate—questions that are clearly relevant to a military profession seeking to redefine itself while adapting to meet strategic challenges.

Returning to the idea that professions require a certain expertise and a commitment to lifelong learning, units can better frame a healthy examination of the profession in their leader development programs with a mentoring approach involving four clusters...
of expert knowledge, which the Officership course examines in depth: military-technical expertise, moral-ethical development, political-cultural understanding, and human development abilities. Focusing on the clusters in the force will allow units to grow and develop in these areas, ultimately improving the profession as a whole:

- The military-technical field helps leaders understand that building a unique skill set is, namely, the ability to employ lethal and nonlethal force in support of defending the nation’s interests, is paramount. This requires a commitment to lifelong learning.
- Moral-ethical considerations demand right action. Professionals must understand the moral dimension of fighting a war. Ethical considerations shape the professional discourse by placing emphasis on the Army Values. These values include loyalty (beginning with the Constitution and ending with one’s soldiers), duty (a moral obligation), respect (to subordinates, superiors, civilians, and the enemy alike), selfless service (the nation’s needs over one’s own), honor (living one’s core values), integrity (doing what is right when no one is watching), and personal courage (moral and physical). Forming the acronym “LDRSHIP,” the Army Values must be more than a pious slogan of vaguely defined virtues. These values have to guide soldierly action and direct leaders’ decision making in combat and at home station.
- Political-cultural expertise is necessary in developing officers who understand the human dimension of the battlefield, even in a data-driven world. They must realize a commitment to understanding the environments in which they operate. Only by doing so can they serve their clients, the American people, correctly.
- The human-development cluster of expertise acknowledges the necessity of investing in the personal improvement of our leaders and soldiers.26

**Company Grade Officer**

Not surprisingly, Officership’s third block of instruction, the Company Grade Officer, has widespread appeal to West Point senior class cadets enrolled in the capstone course. While the Military Profession block may be more theoretical in nature, the Company Grade Officer block is more concrete and practical. Each lesson brings another opportunity for officer development by pooling and consolidating readily available, contemporary combat stories from the company commanders’ online forum. This forum allows junior Army leaders to network, share ideas and best practices, and post questions and responses to leadership challenges they may be facing. The module is relevant not only to soon-to-be officers but also to officers refining their unit leader development programs and incorporating the mission command theme.

One class exercise, a tactical decision game, involves a computer recreation of battles in either Iraq or Afghanistan, during which cadets evaluate the friendly and enemy situations, consider the terrain, time available, and civil considerations, and draft mission and concept paragraphs directing their subordinate units, as they would if they were in the leader’s position. For example, the Army Training Network offers an excellent video on the Wanat battle that is useful in presenting cadets with a scenario to which they must react, as if they were the acting platoon leader on the ground or quick reaction force leader. This experiential exercise forces leaders to consider their actions in place of the soldiers they study.

Another lesson on Understanding Your Unit covers methods that leaders can use to enhance their awareness of their units’ strengths and weaknesses—whether through command climate surveys, sensing sessions, focus group feedback, or simply talking with soldiers in the motor pool. This instruction may seem elementary to some, but it deserves renewed attention with an Army attempting to better know itself. It also serves as an effective launch pad for the Incentives and Disincentives lesson, which examines methods for best motivating soldiers and subordinate leaders. Motivating soldiers after first taking some time to understand them is easier.

Counseling in the Officership curriculum is an important component. Effective counseling deserves consistent attention in regular Army units striving for healthy command climates. The Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Relationship class gives cadets a chance to counsel platoon sergeants (role-played by former platoon sergeants assigned to West Point), an experience that many of them are anxiously anticipating as they approach their commissioning.27 Given the abysmal survey results on the question of counseling, it appears that future lieutenants are not the only ones who could benefit from a training session on proper leader-subordinate
counseling. Counseling—setting expectations for subordinates and keeping them posted on their progress—deserves attention across the Army at large.

Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of the Company Grade Officer module is the opportunity to integrate Army-oriented social media sites maintained by West Point’s Center for Company-level Leaders. This center is the home of the companycommand.com and platoonleader.com professional online forums, both of which allow junior leaders across the force to network and share leadership ideas through MilSpace, a site accessible to all Army officers and similar in style and format to Facebook.

The Leader Challenge inculcates the idea that “leader development programs should be responsive to the environment, including such factors as law, policy, resources, force structure, world situation, technology [italics added], and professional development.” For future lieutenants and current platoon leaders, platoonleader.com has a host of Leader Challenge videos, which present difficult decision-making scenarios and solicit short written responses by the viewer in a technological approach that will be familiar to this generation. The scenarios include platoon leader-platoon sergeant relationships, security force partnership problems, combat integrity and leadership issues, and difficult rules of engagement situations. Conveniently, most of the Officership lessons have a Leader Challenge that coincides with their themes or learning objectives.

The Leader Challenge requires officers to view a short war story—told by a recent junior officer Iraq or Afghanistan veteran—and type a 500-character response at the decision point. After completing their response, they can complete the video and see the responses of other leaders in the MilSpace community. A highly effective tool for sparking dialogue and debate, the Leader Challenge clips allow a facilitator to filter and consolidate responses of the members he or she values.

For example, a small-group instructor can isolate the responses of his class from the larger MilSpace community, just as a battalion commander could isolate the responses of subordinate lieutenants and captains. This ability lends a very personal feel to the site and is a tremendous resource for sparking discussion on important tactical, moral, and professional questions.

The Leader Challenge Workshop format (see figure below) brings online responses to the small group

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**Leader Challenge Workshop**

Intro: 90 sec  
Round 1: 10 min  
Round 2: 15 min  
Round 3: 15 min  
Wrap up: 10 min

Dynamic, inspired, high-energy interactions about real-life challenges that a lieutenant recently faced.
and forces young leaders to evaluate their responses in a more personal setting. More senior leaders in the unit can serve as facilitators for groups of three younger leaders, circulating from table to table to receive as much feedback and as many perspectives as possible for any given challenge. Feedback from more senior officers, as well as peers, in the organization provides for a unity of command and allows young, inexperienced leaders to calibrate their decision-making in a productive, nonthreatening manner.

**Servant to the Nation**

Until now, most of the content of the *Officership* modules has focused on cadet and junior officer development. The last block of instruction, Servant to the Nation, can help units better incorporate field grade officer professional growth. With its emphasis on lifelong service, this *Officership* module stresses the importance of officer development, understanding and adhering to proper civil-military and military-media relations, and hearing from senior leaders who can impart lessons learned from their perspectives at higher echelons of command.

This module, too, is transferable to unit leader development programs in the force. For example, a battalion commander could consider hosting a senior leader (brigade commander or above) on subjects ranging from field grade officer development to professional considerations for taking command at the next echelon. The goal is continuous learning: if previous lessons seem too basic, units can take it to the next level and focus on developing leaders as they transition to positions of increased responsibility.

The officer development lesson presents an opportunity to highlight the administrative areas of leadership neglected because of the military’s prolonged focus on combat—for instance, property and supply accountability, training management, maintenance, physical readiness training, effective writing of awards and evaluation reports, or wherever unit leadership sees weakness.

Lessons in civil-military and military-media relations seem especially relevant to units’ more senior leaders in light of recent civil-military miscalculations. In the aftermath of General Stanley McChrystal’s relief by President Obama, scholar Marybeth Ulrich concluded that “[professional military education] institutions should seize and create opportunities to promulgate a set of civil-military relations norms that will promote effective civil-military interactions, promote trust and respect, and contribute to effective policy and strategy.” Ulrich’s prescription for a skill
set (eroded because of the strain of a decade of war) should extend beyond the schoolhouse and become a regular fixture in units’ leader development training programs.

With the military’s obligation “to do no harm to the democratic institutions and the democratic policy-making processes of our government,” continued leader grooming in the social-political area of expert knowledge must set proper expectations and standards for interacting with media and the nation’s elected officials. The last decade of war has revealed the strategic impact that both platoon leaders and division commanders can have in a media-rich environment. A module on selflessness at the field grade level and beyond reinforces the concept that mission command is a burden of responsibility for all echelons of leaders.

Already at an AKO Hub near You

The Officering model, while not a complete cure for what ails the profession, may generate ideas to help improve leader development programs at the battalion and company levels and even in other Army commissioning sources. At best, it offers concrete lesson plans, which are already available to the Army Knowledge Online community. The lesson plans provide learning objectives and recommended readings flexible enough to adapt to training objectives.

While the Officering model is flexible, the depth of expertise required to serve is not. It demands continual self-improvement and a commitment to developing others. We can extrapolate the enduring truths of leadership to serve as a model for development even as the nation explores reducing the military. The Army’s mission must be to prepare for conflict.

With the wealth of experienced soldiers, just sharing a particularly meaningful combat story can achieve the desired effect of developing others by forcing them to evaluate how they would respond under similar circumstances. This is simple to accomplish, is not extravagant or costly, and yet it drives a large component of the Officering program.

Telling stories alone will not solve the Army’s leader development problem, but leader development as a priority on a battalion’s long-range training calendar will. What the program does call for—and is nonnegotiable—is the prioritizing of leader development across the Army. In this sense, the means are less important than the ends. Only by commanders personally investing time to plan and implement leader development training will the Army be able to harvest and codify the tremendous insights developed over the last more than a decade of war. 

NOTES

8. Riley et al., 2011 CASAL, 60.
11. David H. Humble, Jr., letter to MX400 mentors, 8 August 2011.
20. Ibid.
28. 29. Department of the Army, AR 600-3, 8.
30. LTC Christopher Norrie, email to the author, 8 March 2012.
32. CAPE, The Profession of Arms, 17.
33. 34. MX400 Officering leader development program module/lesson plans are available to the AKO community at the following link: <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/folder/38990071>.
The Evolution of Mission Command in U.S. Army Doctrine, 1905 to the Present

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In late 2009, the then commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Martin Dempsey, directed the Army to redesignate what had been the “command and control warfighting function” to the “mission command warfighting function.” This capped a long evolution of the concept of mission command within the U.S. Army. To understand this evolution, we must understand what mission command is.

Current doctrine sees mission command as both a philosophy and a warfighting function. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command, explains the philosophy of mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, describes the mission command warfighting function as “the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions.”

Important mission command principles found in ADP 6-0 include mission orders—“directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them.”

Two other essential principles found to help us understand mission command are disciplined initiative and commander’s intent, as described below:

Disciplined initiative is action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. . . . Commanders rely on subordinates to act, and subordinates take action to develop the situation. . . .

The commander’s intent defines the limits within which subordinates may exercise initiative. It gives subordinates the confidence to apply their judgment in ambiguous and urgent situations because they know the mission’s purpose, key task, and desired end state. . . . Using disciplined initiative, subordinates . . . perform the necessary coordination and take appropriate action when existing orders no longer fit the situation.”
These ideas are not new. No better example of this exists than General Grant’s guidance to General Sherman in 1864:

You, I propose to move against Johnston’s Army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their War resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of Campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute in your own way. (emphasis added).5

Mission Command in Early Manuals

This article traces the evolution of mission command in doctrine primarily through the senior manuals governing combined arms operations. Until 1905, there were no true combined arms manuals, only branch manuals. (See Kretchick, U.S. Army Doctrine, for a discussion of the evolution of our senior manuals.)6

In 1905 the Army published Field Service Regulations (FSR), the first true combined arms manual approved by the War Department. This manual contained the following words that directly relate to current mission command:

An order should not trespass on the province of the subordinate. It should contain everything which is beyond the independent authority of the subordinate, but nothing more. When the transmission of orders involves a considerable period of time, during which the situation may change, detailed instructions are to be avoided. The same rule holds when orders may have to be carried out under circumstances which the originator of the order cannot completely forecast; in such cases letters of guidance is more appropriate. It should lay stress upon the object to be attained, and leave open the means to be employed.7

In another passage, it reads, “The commanders of large units to whom sections of the front and intermediate objectives have been assigned should be allowed to retain freedom of action and initiative in order to be able to take advantage of opportunities to make progress toward the enemy.”8

The first quotation above was repeated almost verbatim in every FSR from 1910 to 1949. This was further expanded upon in FSR 1914, in the introduction by then Army chief of staff Major General Leonard Wood:

Officers and men of all ranks and grades are given a certain independence in the execution of the tasks to which they are assigned and are expected to show initiative in meeting the different situations as they arise. Every individual, from the highest commander to the lowest private, must always remember that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error in the choice of the means.9

This is a clear invocation of one of the key ideas in mission command, that of individual initiative and the need to make decisions in the absence of information or orders. The 1914 FSR also states:
Commanders of subordinate units cannot plead absence of orders or the nonreceipt of orders as an excuse for inactivity in a situation where action on their part is desirable, or where a change in the situation upon which the orders issued were based renders such orders impracticable or impossible of execution. If the subordinate commander knows what the general plan—the end in view—is, lack of initiative on his part is inexcusable.10

Thus, understanding commander’s intent (the end in view) and the necessity to act when circumstances change, even in the absence of orders, was firmly established prior to our entry into World War I.

The 1923 FSR captured the lessons of World War I. The emphasis on the elements of mission command remained almost unchanged. All of the above quotations from 1905 and 1914 were repeated verbatim in 1923. The 1923 version also notes that some operations require more initiative and decentralization (the later term first used in 1923) when it stated: “Effective pursuit requires the impulsion of leadership and the exercise of initiative in all echelons of command in the highest degree . . . wide decentralization in the assignment of missions and the control of supporting artillery.”11

Both the 1939 Interim FSR (which was dually designated Field Manual FM 100-5, Operations) and the 1941 FSR contained most of the relevant statements from the 1923 version, to include, “neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error of judgment in the action taken” and “a subordinate unit cannot plead absence of orders or the non-receipt of orders as an excuse for inactivity in a situation where action on his part is essential.”12 They also expanded on the necessity of initiative in several places, citing it as a desirable characteristic of leaders.

The 1944 version, produced during World War II, contained many of the same points raised earlier, but initiative played an even greater role. It was again mentioned with respect to the inculcation in individuals, but was also stressed in several different places in the manual, in paragraphs dealing with artillery support, offensive operations, pursuit, urban operations, and jungle operations.13 Probably the strongest support for initiative at that time was this statement: “When conditions limit the ability of the commander to exercise a timely and direct influence on the action, the initiative of subordinates must be relied upon to a great extent.”14

This manual also stressed the requirement for mutual understanding and decentralization, as demonstrated in these passages:

Personal conferences between the higher commander and his subordinates who are to execute his orders are usually advisable, that the latter may arrive at a correct understanding of the plans and intentions of their superior . . . . Better support or coordination frequently can be effected by decentralized control such as during marches or in rapidly changing situations.15

Five years later, in 1949, FM 100-5 was again updated, retaining much of the material from the 1944 version. Initiative again featured prominently. For example, the foreword read: “Set rules and methods must be avoided. They limit imagination and initiative, which are so vital in the successful prosecution of war. They provide the enemy a fixed pattern of operations which he can counter more easily.”16

The importance of individual initiative was stressed in eight paragraphs, each dealing with a different situation in which initiative was the key to success.17 Finally, decentralization was addressed in a significant paragraph that laid out when it was desirable and necessary.

Situations which justify decentralized control of this type are an obscure tactical situation; necessity for rapidity of action over excessive distances; or operations over such extensive areas that centralized control is impracticable due to difficulties of signal communication.18
The 1949 edition had an interesting appendix (repeated in 1954, but not thereafter), *The Lessons of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, the result of a congressional investigation. According to the appendix—

The Chief of Staff of the Army approved the simplicity, soundness, and applicability to the conduct of war . . . [and] directed that the 25 principles be studied throughout the Army and that they be explicitly enunciated in appropriate field manuals and other publications.19

The following series of quotes from the appendix directly relate to mission command:

Orders issued to subordinates must be clear and explicit and as brief as is consistent with clarity . . . to make certain that the intentions of the commander are understood. When it is necessary to place a subordinate in a position in which he must act on his own judgment, the object to be obtained must be made clear.

Subordinate commanders must understand not only the orders of their superiors but also the intentions which inspire them.

Liaison officers, who are . . . fully informed of the situation and the intentions of the senior commander, should be employed to insure that the subordinate and the senior commander have . . . a mutual understanding of plans and orders.

When the subordinate is close at hand, personal conferences between the higher commander and the subordinates . . . must be held in order that the subordinates may arrive at a correct understanding of the plans and intentions of the superior.

Any procedure which limits the imagination or initiative of subordinate commanders should normally be avoided.

ADM James O. Richardson, USN, takes the oath prior to giving testimony during a Congressional investigation of the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. ADM Richardson was the commander in chief, United States Fleet, from January 1940 until February 1941.
Every commander must make sure that he understands the wishes and intentions of his superiors. Not only must he understand his orders but he must be sure that he understands the intention which lies behind the orders.20

The 1962 FM 100-5, while shorter than the previous two, had significant entries related to mission command. The concept of centralized planning and decentralized execution was specifically mentioned, with decentralization being favored in 12 paragraphs.21 Individual initiative was mentioned in seven paragraphs—to include a section headed “Initiative.”22 Most notable is the first use of the term “mission-type orders.” While the term was not defined, the manual stressed allowing subordinates maximum latitude, which was tied to individual initiative:

Orders must be timely, simple, clear and concise. Mission type orders are used to the greatest practicable extent, but should provide the commanders concept, or intent, to insure [sic] that subordinate commanders, acting on their own initiative, direct their efforts to the attainment of the overall objective.23

The importance of decentralized execution and individual initiative was demonstrated in the lessons such as the following:

Modern warfare demands prompt action, decentralization, and a high degree of individual initiative. Detailed instructions must frequently give way to broad direction which subordinates can interpret and implement in accordance with the situation which prevails at the time of execution.24

The appendix also included lessons learned regarding the fluidity of the battlefield and the necessity to allow subordinate commanders to make decisions.

The mission is usually stated in terms sufficiently broad to permit the commander considerable freedom in determining his course of action. As the battle progresses, modifications and changes in mission may be anticipated. As the situation becomes more fluid the mission may be correspondingly broadened with increased reliance placed on the initiative of subordinate commanders.25

With respect to mission command, the 1968 edition was only a minor adjustment from 1962. Most of the discussion of individual initiative and decentralization was lifted verbatim from the 1962 manual. Mission orders were strongly reinforced in 1968:

Cold war operations normally entail mission-type orders. While the limits of the commander’s authority will be prescribed, particularly in relation to the responsibility of diplomatic officials, the commander will usually be given the necessary latitude to determine how best to accomplish his assigned mission.26

The 1976 manual, produced following both the Vietnam War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, reflected a significant departure from past manuals. It took many lessons from the Israeli experience and was much more focused on technology than previous manuals. The centerpiece of the manual, “Active Defense,” was seen to require much tighter control of operations than in the past. For example, one excerpt reads, “The battle must be controlled and directed so that the maximum effect of fire and maneuver is concentrated at decisive locations.”27

Another paragraph includes the following:

The prime requirement is for commanders to be forward where they can see, feel, and control the battle. . . . Not since the war between the North and the South, will commanders of brigades and divisions as well as battalions be so personally and closely involved in the battlefield direction of combat elements.28

These passages would indicate a preference for much closer control of the fight than seen in previous manuals. The phrase “centralized planning and decentralized execution” is not in the 1976 manual, and there was little carryover of ideas related to mission command from previous manuals. Contrast the above paragraphs with the only paragraph in the manual that addresses mission orders specifically:

The strength of our Army lies in the decentralization of responsibility and authority to the commander on the ground. We cannot afford to lose that additional combat effectiveness which derives from the intelligent actions of trained leaders operating under a
Mission Command

flexible system of mission-type orders. Thus, each officer must be imbued with the idea that success will depend upon the skill, initiative, and imagination with which he seeks to accomplish the assigned mission within the intent and concept of his commander.29

With respect to mission command, the 1976 manual represented a step backwards. With the exception of the one paragraph above, the mission command elements got little attention, and countervailing ideas seemed to be more in evidence and favor.

The 1982 FM 100-5 represents a significant milestone in the evolution of mission command. All of the components of mission command are in place—a significant step up from 1976, and indeed from all previous manuals. With the adoption of AirLand Battle, the manual also laid heavy emphasis on the key elements of mission command and made it clear that these elements were central to successful AirLand Battle. For example, one of the four tenets of AirLand Battle was initiative:

Initiative implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. The underlying purpose of every encounter with the enemy is to seize or to retain independence of action. To do this we must make decisions and act more quickly than the enemy to disorganize his forces and to keep him off balance. To preserve the initiative, subordinates must act independently within the context of an overall plan. . . . They must deviate from the expected course of battle without hesitation when opportunities arise to expedite the overall mission of the higher force. . . . Improvisation, initiative, and aggressiveness—the traits that have historically distinguished the American soldier—must be particularly strong in our leaders.30

Here again are two key elements of mission command, disciplined initiative (subordinates must act independently within the context of an overall plan) within commander’s intent (to expedite the overall mission of the higher force). There are ten other paragraphs that highlight the central importance of individual initiative for the success of AirLand Battle.31 Another major advance in 1982 was a more robust discussion of mission orders, again linking commander’s intent and individual initiative.
Mission orders require commanders to determine intent—what they want to happen to the enemy. Their intent must be consistent with their superiors’ and must be communicated clearly to their subordinates. While detailed orders may be necessary at times, commanders must trust their subordinates to make correct on-the-spot decisions within the mission framework. Such decentralization converts initiative into agility, allowing rapid reaction to capture fleeting opportunities. The subordinate commander must fully understand his commander’s intent and the overall mission of the force. If the battle develops so that previously issued orders no longer fit the new circumstances, the subordinate must inform his commander and propose appropriate alternatives. If this is not possible, he must act as he knows his commander would and make a report as soon as possible.

The 1982 manual also strongly advocated decentralization. Whereas it had been deemphasized in 1976, it became an important component of AirLand Battle. There are a dozen paragraphs that emphasize the necessity of decentralization. The one below emphasizes the linkage between mission orders, initiative, and decentralization:

As battle becomes more complex and unpredictable, decision making must become more decentralized. Thus, all echelons of command will have to issue mission orders. Doing so will require leaders to exercise initiative, resourcefulness, and imagination—and to take risks.

It is generally recognized that the 1986 edition was an evolution of AirLand Battle which refined the operational concept and basic ideas set forth in the 1982 manual, to include those of mission command. The preface to the 1986 manual essentially repeats the same statement found in the 1982 edition: “FM 100-5 emphasizes flexibility and speed, mission type orders, initiative among commanders at all levels, and the spirit of the offense.” The two following quotations, unique to the 1986 version, clearly reinforce the basic ideas of mission orders, decentralization, individual initiative and working within the commander’s intent:

In the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level because overcentralization slows action and leads to inertia. . . Decentralization demands subordinates who are willing and able to take risks and superiors who nurture that willingness and ability in their subordinates. If subordinates are to exercise initiative without endangering the overall success of the force, they must thoroughly understand the commander’s intent. In turn, the force commander must encourage subordinates to focus their operations on the overall mission, and give them the freedom and responsibility to develop opportunities which the force as a whole can exploit to accomplish the mission more effectively.

Another passage notes, “Mission orders that specify what must be done without prescribing how it must be done should be used in most cases.”

The 1993 edition continued the emphasis on individual initiative (willingness and ability to act independently within the framework of the higher commander’s intent), decentralization (initiative requires the decentralization of decision authority to the lowest practical level), and mission orders (specify what the subordinate commands are to do without prescribing how they must do it).

This manual was the first with a clear definition of commander’s intent. While the term had been used before, it had not been defined or discussed as a separate topic:

The commander’s intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation and must be understood two echelons below the issuing commander. It must clearly state the purpose of the mission. It is the single unifying focus for all subordinate elements. Its utility is to focus subordinates on what has to be accomplished in order to achieve success, even when the plan and concept of operations no longer apply, and to discipline their efforts toward that end. It should be concise and clear; long, narrative descriptions of how the commander sees the fight tend to inhibit the initiative of subordinates.
The 2001 manual stressed individual initiative to an even greater extent than previous manuals. Almost 30 paragraphs contained mentions of individual initiative, several of which tied individual initiative directly to commander’s intent and mission orders. For the first time, the specific wording “disciplined initiative within commander’s intent” made its appearance—the linkage stated several times in the manual. The 2001 manual continued to foster the use of mission orders and decentralization, and highlighted the need for trust as a critical component of this concept:

Initiative requires delegating decision making authority to the lowest practical level. Commanders give subordinates the greatest possible freedom to act. They encourage aggressive action within the commander’s intent by issuing mission-type orders. Mission-type orders assign tasks to subordinates without specifying how to accomplish them.

By 2001 all of the elements of mission command had now been discussed and defined in one of the senior manuals, and every senior manual had contained some elements of mission command.

By 2001 all of the elements of mission command had now been discussed and defined in one of the senior manuals, and every senior manual had contained some elements of mission command. What remained was to bring these all together into a complete discussion under the title “mission command.” Mission Command became official Army doctrine with the 2003 publication of Field Manual (FM) 6-0. Originally titled Command and Control, at the direction of Lieutenant General James C. Riley, commanding general of the Combined Arms Center and an ardent supporter of mission command, the title was changed to Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. In the introduction it states: “It [FM 6-0] establishes mission command as the Army’s preferred concept of C2 [command and control].” It further lays out mission command succinctly in this paragraph:

Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding. Successful mission command rests on the following four elements:

- Commander’s intent.
- Subordinates’ initiative.
- Mission orders.
- Resource allocation.

FM 6-0 describes and defines each of the components of mission command, focusing significantly on commander’s intent and mission orders: “Mission orders is a technique for completing combat orders that allows subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action in accomplishing missions and leaves the ‘how’ of mission accomplishment to subordinates.”

The manual devotes over eight pages specifically to mission command, to include a discussion of digitization and mission command. This manual culminated the long evolution of the philosophy of mission command within the U.S. Army. While several subsequent versions of FM 3-0 (now ADP 3-0) have been published since the 2003 FM 6-0, and there have been other editions of FM 6-0, and now ADP and ADRP 6-0, none have changed the basic ideas contained in the 2003 manual.

Evolving Doctrine and Functions

The next step in the evolution of mission command was the designation of the command and control warfighting function as the mission command warfighting function. No longer solely an approach to command, it now subsumed the entirety of what was in early doctrine simply “command,” and then became “command and control.”

Field service regulations from 1905 through 1923 do not use the term “command and control.”
The 1914 FSR does have one mention of “command and control,” but only in a graphic. Field Service Regulation 1939 uses the term “command and control” once, and the 1941 and 1944 versions use it twice. The 1949, 1954, and 1962 FSRs use “command and control,” “command control,” and “command, control.” The 1962 FM 100-1 has a paragraph devoted to “techniques of control.” The 1968 manual uses “command and control” over a dozen times and has sections titled “command, control, and communications.” The 1976 version uses “intelligence, command, and control;” “command and control;” “command and control communications;” and “command-control.” Additionally, it has several sections titled “command and control and communications (C3).” Both the 1982 and 1986 manuals used the term “command and control” almost exclusively for these functions and frequently used it as a section heading. All of these manuals did discuss command.

The idea of grouping capabilities into functions used to conduct operations had been around for some time. Both the 1982 and 1986 FM 100-5 included “elements of combat power” (maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership). The 1986 manual also included thirteen “major functional areas.” These functions were formalized in 1987, when the TRADOC commander initiated the “Architecture for the Future Army” (AFA), a “hierarchy of functions that the Army performs on the battlefield at the tactical level of war.” This “functional structure” was called the “Blueprint of the Battlefield.” The “Tactical Blueprint” was organized around Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS).

The original seven BOS were:

- Maneuver.
- Fire Support.
- Air Defense.
- Command and Control.
- Intelligence.
- Mobility and Survivability.
- Combat Service Support.

In the 1993 FM 100-5, the BOS are included, but in a somewhat confused fashion. The heading for the section is “Combat Functions” and the list is the same as the BOS listed above, except instead of “command and control,” the listed function is “battle command.” The paragraph following the enunciation of the combat functions then refers to these functions as “battlefield operating systems (BOS).” There is a glossary entry for “battlefield operating systems,” but none for combat functions. “Command and control” is used only twice in the manual, while “battle command” is used almost 20 times in the same context that “command and control” would normally be used.

The 2001 FM 3-0 used only “battlefield operating systems” (not combat functions). The 2008 FM 3-0 changed “battlefield operating systems” to “warfighting functions” to better align Army and Marine Corps doctrine. Both manuals list “command and control” as one of the functions.

Why Mission Command?

- Command and Control (C2) and Battle Command (BC) are inadequate in describing the role of the commander and staff in today’s fight.
- Emphasizes the centrality of the commander.
- Balances the art of command and science of control.
- Reinforces the imperative of trust and collaboration with myriad partners over command and control.
- Enables a leader’s ability to anticipate and effectively manage transitions.
- Creates an environment of disciplined initiative for more decentralized execution.

Supports our drive to operational adaptability by:

- Requiring a thorough understanding of the operational environment.
- Seeking adaptive teams capable of anticipating and managing transitions.
- Acknowledging that we must share risk across echelons to create opportunities.

Figure 1
In late 2009 the TRADOC commander, General Martin Dempsey, decided that the term “command and control” had become too centered on technology and that we had to get back to a function that acknowledged the centrality of the commander and the essentially human nature of the function. To make this focus clear and unmistakable, he, along with the chief of staff of the Army, General George Casey, decided to change the name of the function from “command and control” to “mission command.” Over the next several months, in conjunction with the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, both the rationale for the change and the structure of the modified warfighting function were formalized. The rationale was summarized as shown in Figure 1. The structure of the warfighting function was laid out as depicted in Figure 2. Of particular note is that the definition of mission command is almost the same as it was in the 2003 FM 6-0, and it has lost none of the essential elements that defined mission command.

Over the past 100+ years, the basic ideas of mission command have evolved continuously, often reflecting combat experience. The fundamental idea, that of issuing orders with desired results and leaving the “how” up to subordinates, has been consistent throughout this evolution. As Army combined arms doctrine has evolved from a single manual (FSR 1905) to a much richer set of doctrine that captures more and more lessons and experiences, so too has the treatment of the elements of mission command in doctrine evolved to capture a more complete set of guidelines and principles. The formal adoption of mission command as a philosophy of command in the early part of this century represented a culmination of this process.

Coming later, but also evolving, was the idea of categorizing the functions used by the Army to conduct operations, originally called battlefield operating systems and later changed to warfighting...
functions. These two threads came together in 2010 with the publication of FM 3-0, Change 1, which combined the two threads into a warfighting function labeled “mission command” and based on the philosophy of mission command.

The end result was recognition that warfare itself required an overarching philosophy of command, backed by systems and organizations, that accounts for the uncertain, rapidly changing environment of warfare. This provides the Army with a foundation for education, training, and materiel development that is grounded in a view of warfare that has been proven effective by Western armies over decades, if not centuries, of conflict. **MR**

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**NOTES**

3. ADP 6-0, 5.
4. Ibid., 4.
8. Ibid., 106.
9. FSR, 1914, 3.
10. Ibid., 78.
11. FSR 1923, 100.
12. FM 100-5, 1941, 25. The 1939 Tentative Field Service Regulations was the first FSR to also carry a field manual number—FM 100-5. It was also the first FSR to carry the subtitle, Operations. The dual designation of FSR with a subtitle, Operations, and the FM 100-5 label were carried forward until 1962, when FSR was dropped entirely. The 1962 manual was titled simply Operations with a subtitle of Army Forces in the Field. This was the only FM 100-5 to have a subtitle. The FM designation was changed to FM 3-0 in 2001 to align the Army manual numbering system with the joint publication numbering system, but the title remained Operations. In 2011 there were two changes. The Army went from field manuals to Army doctrine publications (ADP) for the senior manuals in the hierarchy, and the title of ADP 3-0 for the first time had modifiers to “Operations” when it was titled, Unified Land Operations.
14. Ibid., 127.
15. Ibid., 35.
17. Ibid., para. 82, 84, 87, 433, 737b, 820, 837a, and 938.
18. Ibid., 90.
19. Ibid., 264.
20. Ibid., all above quotations are from appendix, 264-74.
23. Ibid., para. 126d, page 51.
24. Ibid., para. 29b, page 20.
25. Ibid., para. 41, page 23.
27. FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC, GPO, 1 July 1976), 3-3.
28. Ibid., 3-15.
29. Ibid., 3-2.
31. Ibid., 1-3, 1-4, 2-1, 7-2, 7-3, 8-1, 9-11, 15-17.
32. Ibid., 2-7.
33. Ibid., 2-7, 5-2, 5-8, 6-9, 9-2, 9-4, 9-5, 9-17, 9-19, 11-11, 15-2, 16-2.
34. Ibid., 2-7.
35. FM 100-5, 1993, i.
36. Ibid., 15-16.
37. Ibid., 21.
39. Ibid., 6-6.
40. FM 3-5, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 2001), 1-12, 1-13, 1-18, 2-22, 3-2, 3-11, 4-8, 4-15, 4-31, 5-14, 6-2, 6-3, 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-19, 6-22, 7-2, 7-4, 7-18, 7-21, 7-28, 11-15, 11-23, 11-24.
41. Ibid., 4-15 and 4-16, 42. FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC: GPO, 11 August 2003), xiii.
42. FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC: GPO, 11 August 2003), xiii.
43. Ibid., para. 1-67, page 1-17.
44. Ibid., para. 1-70, page 1-17.
45. FM 100-5, 1962, para. 102b, page 43.
47. Ibid., 23.
48. FM 100-5, 1993, 2-12.
49. Ibid., Glossary-1.
INTERAGENCY DYNAMICS

Organizations and individuals habitually align themselves with others to achieve some purpose they could not otherwise attain alone. Whether to gather food, create shelter, obtain wealth, or defend against enemies, human beings frequently require the assistance of others to achieve their purpose. But aligning with another is never simple. Between two individuals, deciding with whom to align and determining the purpose of the partnership and maintaining it over time are difficult tasks. The process increases in complexity when more individuals or groups become involved, and when the process involves multiple federal agencies or even nations, the complexity is nearly unfathomable.

This article addresses that almost unfathomable complexity. It examines interagency teams and the dynamic forces that operate within these teams and attempts to identify major forces that draw and bind parties together or tear them apart. Humans and the organizations they create frequently cooperate to achieve some otherwise unattainable goal, yet the forces of nature work against them. Newton’s Second Law of Thermodynamics states that the entropy—or the degree of disorder—within a system will always increase unless we purposely inject order into it as a counteracting force. We understand this intuitively. We recognize that centripetal and centrifugal forces are constantly at work in any team to bind and tear it apart. This article examines the most significant of these dynamic forces.

The term “interagency team” can be confusing, with multiple definitions and distinctions derived from the types of agencies and number of actors included, interests at play, official mandates imposed, and authorities involved. Although these distinctions are important in some cases, this article concentrates on the more general dynamics of collaborative situations. In this article, the term “interagency team” describes two or more actors representing their parent agency who have agreed to coordinate actions to achieve an outcome preferable to that obtained if each were to act alone. The broad definition applied here covers bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the political, military, and economic spheres.
Numerous theories, hypotheses, and propositions of coordinated or cooperative behavior have been put forth. One 1973 study, attempting to canvass the body of knowledge on the subject, even listed 347 individual propositions affecting team formation, structure, purpose, and duration. Many scholars see multiparty teams, coalitions, and power politics as social-psychological interactions where relationships are important but never subject to empirical mathematical models. However, some have attempted to create models to prove or discount various hypotheses and identify determinate or dominant factors. These models include using the smallest team possible, minimizing resources committed to the effort, optimizing expected rewards, desire for control, and common ideology. The list is long. What, then, should we focus on to best understand interagency team dynamics?

Four major dynamic forces run through the many extant propositions and theories: interests, power/influence, rewards, and decision making. By examining interagency teams from these perspectives, we can better understand the forces that affect team members as they pursue their objectives.

Although some of the discussion in this article mentions national interests and relationships between nations at the strategic level, the forces I examine and principles I discuss apply at the operational and tactical levels as well. Leaders at these lower levels confront the same dynamics but apply them in a necessarily different context.

Motives for Cooperation

By nature, man cooperates to achieve a purpose when it is in his interest to do so. In a team setting, the number, nature, and clarity of interests an actor brings to the situation are critical. These factors will dictate team formation, organization, decision making, maintenance, and ultimately, success.

Affiliation theorists see coalitions and teams as the political reflection of common culture, ideology, values, and institutional systems. They describe them as homogeneous. Implicit in this view is that a common culture, ideology, and so on implies a commonality of interests. One study of 36 war coalitions, from 1821 to 1967 concluded that the closer two states’ ideologies and cultures, the more likely they were to enter into a coalition arrangement.

However, considerable evidence suggests this factor of homogeneity is not as strong as its proponents suggest. A second study examining 130 political, military, and economic alliances concluded that although similar ideological and cultural characteristics do aid in initial team formation, the similarities are not strong enough to predict teaming behavior, have minimal impact on maintaining an alliance over time, and do not ensure success. An example of this is the plethora of law enforcement agencies working security issues along the U.S. southwest border and the unilateral “Fast and Furious” program. For the interagency team leader this means that while it may be easier to form a team with like-kind agencies, we cannot assume that homogeneity will hold the team together or ensure unity of effort in a cooperative endeavor.

In a team setting, the number, nature, and clarity of interests an actor brings to the situation are critical.

Since heterogeneous groups do form teams, it is reasonable to ask what forces operate within the team and why. The theory of expediency, which is a central element of the realist view, proposes that actors are primarily concerned with security and attaining sufficient power to achieve their objectives. It recognizes that ideology and culture aid in coalition formation, but considers their influence minor. Interests emerge as the major dynamic operative force. As an example, while DOD and the State Department—with clearly different cultures and outlooks—wrestled for policy control in Washington in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, provincial reconstruction teams composed of civilian and military members collaborated successfully in the field because it was in their mutual interests to do so.

The number, type, and intensity of interests affect team formation and maintenance. The least complex situation occurs when team members share a single common interest to handle a clear and substantial challenge or threat; however, this situation seldom
exists. Usually, each actor will possess several interests that are not exactly the same as those of other team members. However, agreeing on a single, common purpose is crucial to team success, even though this purpose will usually not satisfy all disparate interests involved. As Clausewitz tells us, “One [agency] may support another’s cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own.”

One of the strongest bonds a team can create is the will to sustain the team’s existence so it can achieve its principal collective purpose or interest. Achieving national policy goals is an interagency team’s single greatest purpose. Simply forming such a team implies that the team can only marshal sufficient capabilities to attain these goals through collective action. Therefore, the preeminent interest is maintaining the team until it either achieves the goals or changes them. The interagency team leader must remember that maintaining the team is critical.

Having team members with a common purpose or interest does not negate the importance of identifying and attempting to satisfy the individual member’s multiple interests. All members understand that by joining a team they may operate to achieve another member’s interest. So long as this interest is not in direct conflict with other team members, the team will not collapse. However, the interagency team leader should recognize that the presence of multiple individual interests is a disintegrating force, and must resolve any problems arising from that presence during team formation and look out for such problems throughout team operations.

To deal with this disintegrating force requires attending to two issues. First, divergent interests need not collapse a team’s efforts. The team can survive as long as members recognize this, look for the differences, and respect them, while emphasizing the commonality of purpose. Take, for example, the work of joint terrorism task forces. The law enforcement elements of these interagency teams want to procure and preserve evidence to use in judicial proceedings because their interest is gaining...
criminal convictions. The intelligence elements of these teams are interested in gaining information leading to threat sources and disrupting, dismantling, or destroying those sources. That the elements’ specific interests are not identical does not have to result in the team’s collapse. Emphasizing their common purpose of defeating terrorism allows them to respect their differences and look for ways to accommodate them.

This issue informs the second issue. Communicating interests is critical to forming and maintaining unity of effort and coordinated effects. Inability to communicate effectively with other team members, either generally or selectively, hinders sharing information and strategies to achieve common interests. Finally, while maintaining the national policy goal, interagency team members must recognize that interests usually shift over time, especially in teams where individual members, agency leadership, plans, and policies are dynamic. Thus, communication becomes increasingly important the longer a team endures.

**Power and Influence of Cooperators**

In all systems, power is sought, contested, and employed to determine outcomes and courses of events. Power plays a central role in forming cooperative teaming arrangements and maintaining them as the teams pursue their interests and disburse their rewards. Some scholars note that power is the *sine qua non* of politics, because many individuals and groups participate in teams only to attain, maintain, or increase their power. Others expand this notion about the quest for power into social psychology and suggest the basis for all social interaction is the attempt to enhance one’s power relative to that of another. Still others view team membership simply as a means to attain an interest and nothing more. The issue is not settled. Regardless, power is a critical and dynamic force—both positive and negative—of any team arrangement.

Three aspects of power are important to the study of multiparty team dynamics: influence, as the dynamic aspect of power; the influence that size and the distribution of power have on team formation; and the affect power has on stability. There are two types of power in every interagency team: authoritative and influential. Authoritative power is the formal structural aspect of power and refers to the sanctioned right to make final decisions. It is unidirectional, flowing from higher to lower. Deriving its source from legal frameworks and team structure, its limits are clearly delineated and static in nature.

However, even in highly structured teams, all actors and the established authority are subject to influence—the informal aspect of power. Sources of influence are personality, expertise, and opportunity. Its basis is knowledge or information. Influence is multidirectional and can flow upward, downward, and horizontally. Not being sanctioned, influence is informal and implies no organizational rights. By its nature, influence is ambiguous and dynamic, often shifting over time and circumstances as the basis for innovation and change within the team.

Whether or not we subscribe to the idea that it is the root of all group dynamics, the impact power has on forming an effective team cannot be dismissed. The “size principle” initially developed by William Riker encapsulates the essence of power’s impact. Riker asserts, “Participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning, and no larger.”

Size is important because it directly affects the distribution of power and rewards. Stated otherwise, power and reward distribution is a function of the number and type of members joining the team.

According to the “size principle,” actors consciously attempt to minimize team membership and resources (or capabilities) to only those that ensure effective power over other competing groups. By so doing, team members maximize rewards while reducing the complexity of team formation and maintenance.

This theory has limitations in practice. First, it relies on zero-sum game theory, where the winner takes all. Second, it assumes the actors have perfect communication and, therefore, knowledge of costs and rewards involved in all potential teaming combinations. Although it never happens, to the degree the situation approaches this condition, the principle is operative. In the case of interagency teams, where a winner-takes-all situation rarely occurs, these limitations also include the desire of teams to include as many capabilities as possible to achieve its aims, while simultaneously trying to manage the distribution of power.
The “size principle” is least applicable in the area of war and conflict. Teams involved in hostile situations tend to be larger than those in a low-risk environment. Because these situations are extremely complex with a high degree of uncertainty, determining the minimum size for success is difficult. In addition, communication among numerous team members dispersed over extreme distances is never in perfect order as the principle assumes.

Although the foregoing discussion somewhat discounts the “size principle,” we cannot entirely dismiss it. There is merit in its general thrust. Smaller teams offer each team member a greater share of rewards—influence on outcomes, advancing an agency’s agenda, credit for success, budget resources—and are easier and take less time to form. The smaller the team is, the greater the visibility and influence over decisions affecting team interests each team member has.

Influence is another force that affects team stability. If the sum total of all members’ influence within a collaborative team is equal to one, then one member increases his influence at the expense of some or all the others. Therefore, within the team, the shifting influence—that dynamic aspect of power—can create episodic periods of instability. A realist view of interagency team dynamics sees conflict and instability as inherent in relationships among members and their agencies absent the presence of a single, overwhelmingly powerful member. However, when a single member has too much power, the team gravitates toward a zero-sum attitude. The hegemonic member forces individual interests to be subordinate to the collective interest. Over time, lesser members view this subordination of individual interests as a loss, and cooperation exists only for short periods. Unless the team can accommodate change by shifting influence, a zero-sum attitude feeds discontent and leads to greater instability and the potential to collapse the team as the tendency to defect increases.

If a team is to endure, its leaders must recognize and accommodate influence as a natural and positive aspect of power. A hegemonic member may facilitate forming a coalition by the sheer force of its power, but eventually situations change, and the longer the coalition is in place, the more likely it will lose its controlling power. When this occurs, that initially powerful member must live with the good or ill will his influence has created.

Small, seemingly weak team members can wield great influence. A member with a moderate or central position along the spectrum of team power and interests will usually possess a degree of influence that exceeds his resource contribution, because his preferences can determine decisions. Similarly, coalition members who control critical resources will command influence beyond that which their size or their place in the structural hierarchy might suggest. Such is often the case with Justice Department representatives on interagency teams. Their legal findings or determinations influence decisions.

Within multiparty teams, the quest for influence by control of central positions or critical resources is dynamic and never ending.

One final aspect of power and team stability deserves mention. The more dangerous the threat, or serious the situation, or dire the consequences of inaction, the more stabilizing the effect has on the team. As Henry Kissinger once stated:

As long as the enemy is more powerful than any single member of the coalition, the need for unity outweighs all considerations of individual gain. But when the enemy has been so weakened that each ally has the power to achieve its ends alone, a coalition is at the mercy of its most determined member.10

Although Kissinger often refers to international coalitions, the concept also applies to national interagency situations such as interagency teams responding to Hurricane Katrina and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Multiple federal, state, and local governmental departments and agencies, along with numerous corporations and nongovernment organizations, created countless multiparty teams when first responding to help affected regions recover from these devastating events. The teams quickly united into stable groups, subordinating many of their individual interests for the common purpose. As the response shifted to recovery, these separate interests became more pronounced and injected instability into the teams’ operations.

Cooperation’s Expected Rewards

Many theorists believe that the desire to maximize rewards—or the “What’s in it for me?” view—is the overriding dynamic in team behavior. Whether one’s efforts are to minimize size, maximize power, or control decisions, the intended effect is to aggrandize rewards.11 A focus on rewards has some not so surprising effects on the decision to join a multiparty team. In general, the greater the certainty and immediacy is of a reward, the greater the pressure is to join a team. Moreover, the likelihood that a team’s efforts will win or succeed affects an actor’s decision to join the endeavor. The prospect of winning and the expectation of reward is a stronger determinant of team formation than size alone. It is better to gain something by participating in a successful effort than to maximize the potential for gain by joining a smaller team with less assurance of winning or by not joining the team at all. This does not entirely obviate the “size principle” discussed earlier, as team members still attempt to minimize the team’s size to protect their interests and increase their power, but it does place the probability of reward and size in perspective.

In political arrangements, if the probability of winning is equal among alternative teams, actors tend to choose the one requiring the least effort or contribution of resources as determined by a cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, the decision to join a particular team is a function of expected rewards based on both the probability of success and the net value of what may be achieved.

Once a team forms and achieves its objectives, how does it determine the appropriate distribution of rewards? Historically, three models have been employed: battle losses, community, and contribution. The battle loss model is limited to war coalitions and determines reward distribution based on losses a nation sustains, such as casualties or the loss of industry, territory, or other national resources. This model posits that the greater a state’s losses, the greater the share of spoils it will receive. Interagency and intergovernmental teams working with or within conflict coalitions should be mindful of this dynamic expectation.

The community model relies on an idealistic view of team behavior, which holds that when actors form coalitions based on shared values and friendly relationships, they distribute rewards on an equity basis. The degree of equity is equal to the degree of friendliness and ideological similarity. This model is seldom used in practice, although when a team is formed based on similarity of culture and ideology, it can apply.
The final model of reward distribution is based on participation and degree of contribution. Stated succinctly, this model bases the distribution of rewards on the amount a team member contributes to the achievement of team goals—the greater the contribution toward attaining the objectives, the greater the share of rewards a member receives. In political teaming, the contribution model does not distribute rewards—such as budgets, power, influence, staffing—in a rigid, mathematical manner. Participants with greater contributions get a larger reward but not necessarily in amounts proportionate to their resource contributions. This is a reflection of the inherent dependency nature of such teams. Although such members expect greater rewards, they cannot attain their objectives without the assistance of the other, smaller members. As a result, smaller members usually command greater influence and a larger share of rewards than is commensurate with their absolute contributions.

Whatever the model used in determining reward distribution, each team member views the reward received relative to satisfying his or her interests. Interests and rewards are sides of the same coin and cannot be separated. The most prevalent model applied in interagency teaming situations is the contribution model. It assumes that the amount and type of resources a member contributes to the team is commensurate with his interests. Unfortunately, interests are not always communicated in a clear and precise manner, are hard to quantify, or are not always heeded by those deciding on reward distribution. When this occurs, and there is a mismatch of interests and rewards, animosity or resentment results. The interagency team leader must understand this dynamic and consider its implications.

Decision Making

How a team makes decisions tends to either facilitate or disrupt the team’s cohesion and performance. In an interagency setting, organizational and a decision-making structure leading to cooperation can come from either existing agency policy or negotiated interagency agreements. When this occurs, the ability of the cooperating team to structure its own decision-making regimen diminishes. For example, if legislation or interagency policy specifies a lead agency, the structure of cooperation is asymmetrical. However, in many interagency teams, the power to make decisions is a shared one.

The first imperative of decision making—beginning with the decision to form or join a team—is communication. Unless one clearly communicates interests and roles supporting those interests during team formation, all subsequent decisions may offend one or more members. In addition, future decision making flounders because members do not know resident interests. This degrades team performance and may eventually frustrate members. Once a team is formed, communicating interests does not become less important. To the contrary, over time leaders must adjust and refine interests in response to both internal and external events and conditions.

It is unrealistic to expect perfect communication among team members. Communication must be continuous through multiple and redundant means. This is especially true in interagency teams where members often have to communicate within their agency before committing themselves within the team. Open communications tend to bind members together by reducing suspicion, misunderstanding, and feelings of distrust. In short, communications within an organization should be ongoing to make it easy to maintain the team and achieve objectives.

Institutional structure can facilitate communication. Some examples of structures that contribute to effective communication and decision making are multiple working groups specializing in well-defined areas of interest to the team, joint or interagency bodies sitting in permanent session, matrix multiparty committees formulating policy recommendations, a dedicated secretariat with a permanent staff, and liaison groups. However, an organization’s structure and the communication it facilitates are only two aspects of the decision-making process.

For a team to pursue its goals effectively, it must decide how it will make decisions, understand the established rules, and then follow them. Methods of granting decision authority include resource
contribution, functional contribution, unanimity, and majority. These methods are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, resource contribution—power and influence—can have significant effect on majority votes and even unanimity. However, regardless of the rules selected mutual consultation with all parties is critical so that no party feels others take its membership for granted or that it does not have an opportunity to voice a position.

Historically a favored decision-making method, resource contribution is a simple proposition: a member’s weight in decision making is relative to the member’s contributed resources. The member who contributes the most to the team has the greatest say on the outcome. This method is not without its dangers. If other team members do not feel the decisions made complement their interests, or at least reconcile their concerns regardless of the level of contribution, the tendency to deflect or derail the effort can become irresistible.

Related to the above is the functional contribution method in which team members have the greatest influence over those areas in which their contributions are most significant. If the members’ contribution is to provide transportation or intelligence, they would be expected to have the greatest influence in those areas even if their influence on the team’s overall approach toward goal achievement is limited.

The functional approach clearly increases team cohesion and enhances long-term relations among its members. Its greatest application is in large interagency teams operating in complex environments and trying to satisfy a multiplicity of interests. In combination with other decision-making methods, the functional method can enhance coalition maintenance and performance; without it, the animosity of smaller members can grow.

The two most pervasive methods of decision making are unanimity and majority. There is an important practical need for unanimity within the
team, even where formal decision-making rules permit hierarchical, chain of command situations and majority decisions. Although we often discuss unanimity and majority decision-making methods as counterpoints to each other, there is a dynamic toward consensus building in both.

Unanimity is the predominant decision-making method used in international coalitions. Unanimity requires the agreement of every member to approve a decision. This has several positive effects on the team. It promotes a spirit of consensus, minimizes opportunities for outside actors to exploit differences among members, and ensures that no member has to accept an outcome it deeply opposes. It determines objectives, policies, operational approaches, and reward distribution in at least a minimally acceptable manner, so no member feels decisions are forced upon him. Unanimity also encourages the implementation of decisions by ensuring that every member shares ownership of the decisions, which precludes members from withholding cooperation in future decisions or withdrawing from the team.

There are negative impacts to unanimity. It is the most time consuming decision-making method, leads to minimally acceptable decisions, and relies heavily on the desire of members to maintain the team. These points are important because they imply that team leaders must expend a considerable amount of energy to broker agreements so the team can sustain its central purpose. This can be difficult in a dynamic environment, so unanimity is not necessarily the best decision-making method for all teams.

The effects of majority voting are nearly the converse of unanimity. Decisions can be made quickly, which facilitates crisis action and issue resolution. More issues and interests are voiced and acted upon. Decisions are not limited to those only minimally acceptable to all. Moreover, it better represents the contribution larger members provide the team. However, majority decision making encourages dominance by a single large member or subgroup, risks disenfranchising some members, and fosters noncompliance by dissenters.

**Interests affect Rewards**

Collaborative and cooperative behavior is a complex subject. Numerous forces that are not well understood nor easily subject to empirical study affect interagency teams. Four major categories of these internal forces impact team behavior: interests, power and influence, rewards, and decision making. Each force acts upon the others and is, in turn, acted upon. Interests affect rewards, which are influenced by power, which is a reflection of decision making, which is largely determined by interests. Appreciating and understanding the sinews of these dynamic forces facilitates their management while pursuing common objectives.

Crosscutting influences affect these four dynamic forces. Agency ambitions, leadership styles, individual personalities, past experience, and long-term strategies all affect forming and maintaining a successful interagency team. Nevertheless, the major dynamic forces of interest, power, rewards, and decision making remain constant in all teaming arrangements. Properly understood and managed, these forces are key to achieving the team’s desired aims.

Individuals, private organizations, and governmental departments and agencies have always endeavored to form teams to advance their interests and achieve otherwise unattainable ends. This will be no less true in the future. By understanding the dynamic forces that bind and tear apart these teams, leaders will be better equipped to manage them and fulfill their responsibilities. **MR**

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**NOTES**

2. Ibid., 220.
THAT MUCH OF our strategic guidance understands the daunting task of stabilizing “failing states” and thwarting nonstate violent and criminal networks is heartening. This challenge faces joint interagency actors and our allies—chief among the latter, the nation hosting us. However, we must consider to what degree our actions and our allies’ choices have created the environment that made instability possible. There is an important difference between the “proximate cause” of the conditions that create instability and the actual “cause-in-fact.”

The joint force has occasionally failed to understand the importance of political causation in creating instability, and has adopted inappropriate operational and tactical solutions for creating stability in pre- and post-conflict situations. Further, special operations forces (SOF), as members of the force who are first in and last out, are in the best position to correct some of these deficiencies.

Our counter-instability strategy broadly calls for persistent engagement and an indirect approach. In addition, we often hear, “It takes a network to beat a network.” The opening quotations of this article indicate the importance of this concept in a strategic context.

Thought Exercise: Supporting Our British Allies

A pro-Western regime is facing instability and the possibility for a full-blown insurgency. The area has typically been a British sphere of influence. However, given their current budget constraints, how might we help them return the area to a fully stable and cooperating member of the international community? The local government provides security to the population and enough individual freedom and regional autonomy that members of...
the society can seek modest economic advancement and have a voice in the government. The pro-government factions enjoy the majority of the benefits from the system, and they have effectively marginalized radical elements of the population that are not content with the arrangement. These radical elements are forming an insurgency to gain control of the government and economic resources. The insurgents have recently baited the local military into attacking the population so as to turn a larger percentage of it against the legitimate government. This is part of a larger insurgent propaganda campaign to depict the British-backed government as corrupt, overbearing, and unable to provide governance to the entire population. The insurgency is currently being backed by external powers wishing to have greater influence over the area. What should our response be?

**Educating the Future Generation**

To answer this question, we might examine our potential response through the lens of training and doctrine currently taught at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, whose Caspian Sea scenario pits the Azerbaijani government against an insurgent movement with backing from external forces.\(^5\) Students and instructors with stability, counterinsurgency, and high-intensity conflict experience engage this scenario. They do so from the shaping and deterrence phase through the initiation of stability operations while assuming responsibilities from joint task force to brigade combat team levels of command and staff planning.

The scenario’s supporting information states that the insurgency is based on the current political and military administration’s corrupt policies. It depicts the ruling elite driving extravagant vehicles in the capital, while the ethnic minorities suffer socially and economically. The radical elements seek to overthrow the government to achieve equitable distribution of wealth and to obtain autonomy to unite with ethnically and religiously similar supporters in a country to the south.

The students generally responded in a manner consistent with the security tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine (as we have done in Afghanistan). Executed plans leveraged joint force security apparatuses to isolate the insurgency and its external supporter. Civil Affairs attempted to find ways to support government legitimacy in providing essential services. Military information support operations promoted the legitimacy of the government and the illegitimacy of the insurgency. At the completion of operations, the same government was in power, but with the external actor’s forces in a substantially diminished state.

What might we conclude from all this? What are the long-term prospects for this arrangement? The exercise of force by the joint and multi-national armed services demonstrated the U.S. commitment to its allies. Beyond this, the country is currently stabilized, although in a somewhat worse condition due to the fighting and the money expended on the counterinsurgency. Should we consider this mission successful? The proximate cause seems to be resolved—insurgency and external force defeated. Yet, was this proximate cause also the cause-in-fact?

A British Army officer, assigned to the 8th Armored Engineer Squadron, talks with a U.S. Army Special Forces company commander assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, as they assess a compound for a new Afghan National Police headquarters in Sangin District, Helmand Province, 9 April 2007.
The answer is a resounding “no.” At no point did any of the intervention change the political institutions to resolve any of the underlying grievances or conflicts over the distribution of political power that created the insurgency.

Problems with Our Indirect Approach and Persistent Engagement

The authors of the recently published Why Nations Fail, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, demonstrate that without breaking the “vicious circle” of “extractive governments” there will be little chance for permanent stability. They provide evidence that governments do not act as they do out of ignorance of proper public administration. These governments act to consolidate power by supporting their constituencies, and the extractive rather than inclusive nature of their economic model reasons it is in their best interest to suppress those outside of their constituency in order to maximize their constituents’ “share” of the “profits.” Patronage politics or cronyism is at the core of all fragile and failing states.6

In fact, this appears to be true in all sovereign states—even the United States. The difference is that in the United States and most other developed nations, the rule of law and governmental accountability mechanisms give the populace recourse to correct egregious attempts to extract wealth from the population. This system prevents widespread dispossession of wealth and oppression of minority political factions.

Pinpointing patronage politics as the cause-in-fact of fragile nations is not a comforting conclusion. Yet, patronage politics has been the elephant in the room in Afghanistan and in most other fragile nations where SOF and interagency actors are engaged in shaping operations.

The success of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is contingent upon a legitimate government partner. Field Manual 3-24 says, “Political factors have primacy in COIN.”7 However, in practice there is insufficient discussion of supporting a government’s legitimacy by improving its accountability and decreasing corruption.8 We often look past these factors as matters of cultural reality and leverage the country’s dominant patronage networks to reach areas of interest. Ultimately, the dominant power lacks credibility or it would not require our assistance, and that alone should raise questions as to the utility of relying on it in these cases.

If political factors have primacy and extractive patronage networks are the cause-in-fact, the joint force cannot afford to look past these problems and only focus on security or supporting the government with resources. Our indirect approach in shaping and stability operations is commonly understood to be the “whole-of-government” approach, supporting the host nation government with training and resources while remaining in the background so that the host nation can at some point stand on its own.

Outside of pure security cooperation, this indirect approach is a failure. Our support only increases the government or military’s ability to extract more from marginalized factions, and this support can be viewed as U.S. consent for this behavior. At times, we correctly identify a marginalized population and support that location with some type of development project. However, without support from the government, those projects quickly fall into disrepair or are never staffed. They become monuments to the inequality suffered at the hands of a corrupt government and an embarrassment to U.S.-supported efforts. Furthermore, we place quite a lot of emphasis on winning the information war. We publicize snapshots of the partner nation providing services and justice, but with few observable deeds, these campaigns easily become discredited as propaganda.

The main reason we have adopted this approach is that the strategic communication of persistent engagement overshadows a nuanced operational and tactical practice of persistent engagement. These governments are the allies of the United States and have invited it to support them. Corruption and inequality are delicate subjects that would require us to judge and in some way condemn their behavior. For fear
of offending our host and damaging the relationship, we would rather ignore the elephant as a matter of cultural reality lest we undermine our persistent engagement.

There is a tendency for Western actors to attribute the host nation’s flagrant mismanagement to backwardness or irrationality. Acemoglu and Robinson call this the “ignorance hypothesis,” which maintains that poor countries are poor because they have a lot of market failures and because economists and policymakers do not know how to get rid of them and have heeded the wrong advice in the past. Rich countries are rich because they have figured out better policies and have successfully eliminated these failures."

However, governments do not exercise power in this manner out of ignorance or backwardness. It is a matter of shrewd political maneuvering. Our inability to correctly identify and influence the process is an indication of our cultural naïveté and lack of regional expertise. The manner in which these governments handle our engagement is a tribute to their shrewdness.

At the tactical and operational level, our indirect approach and persistent engagement have several related flaws. Despite a whole-of-government commitment to a networked approach, our efforts continue to be overly hierarchical and cumbersome. This limits our ability to react to pockets of instability and to adapt as quickly as threat organizations. In part, this lethargy is due to our vision of persistent engagement and the role we play as resource provider to the network. It hinges upon the notion that we must honor our commitments. This is a valid concern. However, it invariably means that we establish ties with a community based on the resources that we bring to that particular community. These resources are often tied to projects and funding.

This resource-intensive approach is far from indirect and is subject to a multitude of problems. First, it is the opposite of flexible. The planning, contracting, and execution require multiple years to be realized and are subject to corruption, mismanagement, and neglect by the receiving community and its appointed leaders as previously described. Second, it is not indirect, because teams are intimately involved in the administration of the projects and cannot break away to engage new areas as priorities change or threat organizations move out of that area. When compounded with the earlier critique of government
management after transition and the resulting information operations failures, it is clear that the resource provider model of our indirect approach strategy is not sustainable.

**Problems in Interagency Collaboration**

To be or not to be is not a question for interagency collaboration. The prevailing narrative that influences our strategic vision assumes that interagency collaboration is the best way to solve problems. The strength of the narrative is supported by examples of failure such as 9/11, when U.S. government agencies were seen to not collaborate well enough to prevent intelligence failures. Failure catalyzed political and public stakeholders to call for a change in practice rather than a traditional enculturation process organized around success. The interagency adapted to these demands by means of regional coordination groups among diplomatic, development, and defense agencies (sometimes referred to as the “3Ds”).

Can one assume that this adaptation will yield improved results? History suggests that it will not. Despite mandated changes in form, each agency has been slow to change its stove-piped nature in function. This is a failure in internal integration. We have the same policy rationale that guided organizational culture prior to the crisis. Collaboration cannot make bad policy good.

This is not the first time a narrative has failed to produce better results. Economic principles of market efficiency and structural reform undergird strong narratives for guiding action in the United States (for example in government contracting) and in foreign policy abroad. Jocelyn Johnston and Barbara Romzek’s work in privatization highlights that factors such as transaction costs and government capacity to manage contracts leave us with a gap between the narrative and reality.

The narrative for interagency collaboration suggests better solutions, but in reality the collaboration does not always yield any better performance. Collaboration did not address the failures of the U.S. agencies’ internal integration process, so we can expect no better performance. Strong organizational cultures should either be grounded in success or connected to a leader’s actions whose narrative moves beyond the undesirable status quo to a clearly articulated successful future. We have neither at present.

What we do have is interagency responsiveness (adaptation) to external accountability demands and a problem-solving network whose internal integration can do little to actually solve problems. Regional interagency collaboration is now using problem-solving working groups like the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). Since the regional interagency network functional design is like a collaborative self-governance effort, the ICAF serves as a useful “interest-based” group problem-solving session. The process facilitates shared understanding of technically complex and divergent approaches to problem solving in a given region. It is an example of effective collaborative planning.

However, there is a lack of comprehensive means to collect data that would allow the regional coordinating body to measure the effects of their proposed solutions. This is a significant shortcoming because without feedback it is almost impossible to know whether or not the policies worked or to hold agency actors accountable for their implementation. Our characterization of the host government as ineffective compounds accountability problems and makes it a convenient scapegoat for failed policies (though it can be partially or wholly true at times). The lack of accountability goes beyond the need to “punish” actors for bad or inefficient practices. Poor feedback means that the interagency lacks the capacity to adapt its internal processes to more effective practices and achievable objectives. There is potential for improvement by addressing this accountability problem and adjusting our narrative. Yet, we must first understand the challenges manifested in implementation at the local level.

**Challenges**

The ICAF produces multiple courses for action for all 3D actors to implement in their respective interagency task forces. Given that all U.S. agencies are operating relatively harmoniously in accord with the agreement outlined in the ICAF process, we still must consider their actions in the local context. If one compares the collaborative ICAF process to the concept of “getting on the balcony” to observe the dance, then one must be wary of the pitfalls such a perspective holds: “Staying on the balcony in a safe observer role is as much a prescription for ineffectuality as never achieving that perspective in the first place.”
Unfortunately, similar to the problematic dynamics encountered by government agencies within the United States who downsize in favor of contracting, government agencies responsible for implementing policy abroad have also downsized.\(^20\) They often have limited personnel to understand the cultural nuances by more directly participating in or overseeing programs in the country.\(^21\) Thus, very few interagency representatives are available to move from the balcony to join the dance.

The conditions are set for an accountability nightmare. Lack of interagency oversight allows programs to be mismanaged by local government officials, nongovernmental organizations, or any other partnership established by the interagency. Since local citizens have little input into how the program is managed there, we lack a critical feedback mechanism to allow programs to be better adapted to their needs. Predictably, this short-circuits the informal accountability dynamics of the market process. The system lacks key facilitative behaviors and accountability relationships that would connect local citizens to implementation partners and the results they produce.

The conditions are set for an accountability nightmare.
ability allows us to partner with people who understand local grievances against state government and develop solutions based on that understanding. We then can build and refine our social-political map to look for stakeholders who can help develop solutions to their own problems, and are at least not hostile to the government. Then we can empower them with resources (ideally, the information and social capital that comes with allying with us).

Simultaneously, we can try to leverage feedback and accountability mechanisms in the sociocultural environment. These mechanisms might not be similar in form to American ones, but in function, social organizations like tribal councils or women’s cooperatives will work. This feedback can correct our interagency accountability mechanism organizational weakness. It also closes the local accountability gap between the citizens the program is designed to help and the implementation partners.

There is one critical element remaining: desired results. Stephan Page’s research demonstrates that success in interagency collaborative networks is built upon a foundation of agreed upon results. The interagency might then work to organize ICAF-like working groups inside a country to allow local experts to agree upon the desired results. Another potential is to leverage more direct public inquiry (town hall style) as suggested by Rosemary O’Leary and Lisa Bingham to increase feedback from local communities. The agreed upon results are a baseline of feedback for desirable action. This feedback is used to inform program development and in subsequent iterations as an accountability mechanism. This process establishes a working informal accountability model consistent with U.S. market efficiencies. The local population grows closer to their governing bodies and increases overall stability of the country. The interagency actors in the country pass feedback on the process
up to the regional coordination group as an accountability mechanism to inform future planning and resource allocation.

Unfortunately, this process might not address all aspects of instability. Disenfranchised or minority segments of society might lie outside of the process.

Development economist, William Easterly, acknowledges this possibility. For example, he describes the difficulty certain societal castes might have in moving into new occupational trades. With the initial success of interagency programs, we have the option to shift resources to the pockets of instability or other initiatives such as gender equality. A fully inclusive society creates greater stability, while gender equality facilitates improved economic performance.

Revisiting the “Thought Exercise”

We now return to revisit the “Thought Exercise: Supporting our British Allies.” The question this time is: should we support the counterinsurgency operation?

We can now reveal that the description of the political situation in the thought exercise is actually a description of the American Revolution, during which a small minority of “radicals” dared to question the legitimacy of the British monarch that can be fairly described as only moderately “extractive.” The American colonists enjoyed much more economic opportunity than most repressed minorities today. Given our initial reaction and proposed response to this scenario, how well do we really understand the grievances leading to instability?

Exercising a more mindful strategy of persistent engagement is necessary to not let these relationships drag us into supporting instability. We must understand the true nature of instability through social mapping, and then base our indirect approach on those realities to enjoy greater operational and tactical mission success.

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OVERCOMING THE REACTIONS TO INTERAGENCY

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2. ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Posture Statement,” before the 111th Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 14 May 2009, 5.

3. Proximate cause is a legal conceptualization that attempts to assign causation in which reality/complexity would demonstrate that multiple factors are contributing causal factors. Using the “but for” helps to move from the proximate to the cause-in-fact. (See Wikipedia entry for an overview).


5. This scenario attempts to provide a hybrid threat in order that officers might, at different stages of instruction, focus on deterrence, counterinsurgency, high-intensity conflict, and operations. It differs from the fictional scenario above, which can be viewed in joint terminology as still being in a shaping and deterrence phase (phase 0 to 1 operation). JP 3–0.


8. Of note, there are efforts by ISAF, MISO, and interagency organizations like USAID that do attempt to influence governmental professionalism by raising awareness and appealing to honor. However, there is little enforcement or emphasis placed on the programs.

9. Acemoglu and Robinson (Kindle Locations, 1133-1135, page 64).

10. We adopt certain priorities and practices based on internal and external expectations. The reigning narrative for the government agencies is that interagency coordination is necessary. See for example Berly A. Radein’s book: The Accountable Juggler: The Art of Leadership in a Federal Agency (Washington DC: CG Press, 2000).


12. This is consistent with organization culture theory put forward by Schein who posits that effective organization change is based on shared success. The organizational shift was not guided by a breakthrough in successful foreign policy or interagency best practices.

13. Dr. Barbara Romzek and Dr. Holly Goehrle “guiding thoughts,” Fall 2011, Public Management and Organizational Analysis, University of Kansas, Department of Public Administration.


15. Easterly’s work provides exhaustive statistical analysis and peer review examples that question the wisdom of structural reform for developing economies. Overwhelming, the reforms have not delivered substantial economic improvement, while those countries that did not follow the reform narrative generally performed better.


17. H. Brinton Milward and Keith G. Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks (Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2006). See “Essential Network Management Tasks” which sagement of accountability is a lynchpin to determining who is to accomplish what with clear results then connected back to the agreed upon goals.


19. Former Secretary of Defense Gates frequently cited the lack of State Department and USAID capability abroad severely limits U.S. ability to respond to problems in a nondefensive manner. Personal experience found this to be true as well.

20. The same problems are then manifested as described by Elliot Sclar, Jocelyn Johnstone, and Barbara Romzek—specifically, inadequate government capacity and expertise to manage the contract. A small number of people managing programs lack the capacity to effectively oversee the program. In order to cope with the problem, the interagency contracts out program implementation, but then must deal with principal-agent challenges like information asymmetry. Elliott Sclar, You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), chap. 1 and 7.

21. Gardner’s leadership strategy of using stories as an innovative leader leverages the latent popularity of capitalism, but adds a new twist to the current macro-economic story (the potential counter story). The effectiveness or good-ness is understood by the unschooled mind, where Malcolm Gladwell’s work The Tipping Point (2000) as a New York Times bestseller speaks to the more sophisticated mind.

22. See MG Michael T Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor’s “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Center for a New American Security (January 2010). Generally, there is not enough collection and analysis of civil information to produce products for senior leaders to make adequate decisions on topics such as politics.

23. In Stephen Page’s work, Vermont and Georgia collaborative groups were the most successful out of those studied, and agreement on results was a key factor in evaluating progress on the path to obtaining objectives. Stephen Page, “Entrepreneurial Strategies for Managing Interagency Collaboration,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 13, no. 3 (2004).

24. This sounds very similar to Afghan shuras—to the extent that these are useful it is possible to use it as a mental model. However, Afghan shuras are a very bad economic reforms considering the lack of expertise that is usually available, and almost wholesale absence of legitimate government partners at the district level and above. In order to make this work, we need both the understanding that would come from political mapping and the ability to engage expertise that is outside of the region. Academics working in the capital with social connections to the region of concern might be an ideal indirect actor to leverage for good effect.
Breaking the Kevlar Ceiling

A National Security Case for Full Gender Integration in the U.S. Army

Major Jacqueline S.L. Escobar, U.S. Army

IN JUNE OF 1975, a young West Point cadet, along with a cohort of classmates, was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Army. After four years of running to “Airborne Ranger” cadences and receiving mentorship from officers wearing Ranger tabs, this cadet chose to branch infantry. He went on to complete Infantry Officer Basic Course and Ranger School and successfully led troops at the tactical and operational levels. He spent a few years mentoring cadets at his alma mater before commanding an airborne battalion and a brigade at Fort Bragg, and he eventually became the commander for all U.S. forces in Iraq. This member of the class of ’75 is General Lloyd Austin, the current vice chief of staff of the Army.

Five short years after Austin graduated, another young cadet graduated from West Point. This cadet ran to the same cadences, was mentored by many of the same infantry officers, and also wanted to join the ranks of the infantry. While at the academy, this cadet actively sought infantry training experience, attending the Jungle Operations Training Course in Panama and Airborne School at Fort Benning. However, joining the infantry was not an option for Lillian Pfluke. Barred from her first branch choice because of her gender, she chose to commission in the Ordnance Corps. Although maintenance was not her first career choice, she thrived on the challenge of leading soldiers. Much like General Austin, Pfluke’s competence and leadership ability moved her up the ranks of the officer corps, and she excelled in every leadership position she held. Although she was a maintenance officer, she still maintained her personal goal of commanding combat troops. However, as she attained higher rank, she realized that because she was a woman, that dream was not going to come true. Reflecting on this realization, Pfluke said, “The Army was content to choose less qualified men over more qualified women for its key leadership positions because of politics and a deeply entrenched and dated attitude. In fact, it [the Army] was fighting desperately for the ability to do so...I wanted to play on the varsity team and be a contributing member of the first string.” So, Major Pfluke made the agonizing decision to retire.
from the Army in 1995. The lack of women serving at the highest levels of leadership is less an issue of unfairness, and more an issue of effectiveness. The Army loses when it relegates the Lillian Pflukes of the country to serving as water boys when they could be calling the plays as quarterbacks.

The impetus for this article came from two leadership classes I took during graduate school at Columbia University. Throughout both courses, I examined how diversity in decision-making bodies leads to better decisions, and how the organizations with the highest percentage of women on their executive boards consistently perform better than organizations with the fewest women. One of the course readings was the White House Project’s report on benchmarking women’s leadership. The report examined various professions within the United States and evaluated each profession on its incorporation of women’s leadership. None of the sectors studied did particularly well, but I was dismayed (though not surprised) to find that the military fared the worst out of all professions examined in the study. This raised a critical question—if diverse leadership is so good for organizations, how can a profession as important as the military afford to be at the bottom of the barrel when it comes to any kind of leadership benchmark?

In 1948, Congress passed the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, which allowed women to serve as regular members of the U.S. Armed Forces. At that time, the highest permanent rank a woman could attain was lieutenant colonel, and women could not make up more than two percent of the force. About 20 years later, the two percent cap and promotion limitations were lifted. Just over two decades after that, in 1988, the Defense Department adopted the “risk rule” to exempt women from assignments near combat units, but it abandoned that rule six years later. Now, the Army has its first female four-star general, and women comprise just over 13 percent of the active duty Army.

The Army has made great strides incorporating the talent of women, but there is still far to go. The U.S. military cannot reach its maximum potential until our personnel system fully integrates women into all facets of service and all levels of leadership. Strategic military decision makers, namely general officers, shape the future of America’s armed forces and direct the use of the nation’s military power in support of national security. Current policy dictating where people can serve and what jobs they can do based on gender creates a “Kevlar ceiling” that prevents a disproportionate number of women from reaching

![Percent of Women in Top Leadership Positions](from the White House Project report, “Benchmarking Women’s Leadership”)

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**Figure 1**

From the White House Project report, “Benchmarking Women’s Leadership”
the very top of the military ladder. As a result, the Army and its mission lose out on valuable perspective and insight from talented officers. When an organization chooses between alternatives, the opportunity cost is the lost benefit that would have resulted from the foregone option. The Army’s failure to effectively incorporate the talent of women creates an unacceptably high opportunity cost in regard to national security. When the United States limits its human capital, it fails to optimize its strategic decision-making ability. Thus, it is actually a matter of national security because the U.S. military fails to meet its full potential, with federal law excluding half of America’s talent pool from ground-combat roles.

This article will not discuss fairness, nor will it dwell heavily on tactical-level arguments, such as physical standards or living arrangements. These levels of analysis detract from the main objective of the military, which is the strategic application of military power to support national security. The tactical level of analysis cannot be completely ignored because the military must grow its strategic leaders beginning at the tactical level. However, viewing this issue through a purely tactical analytical lens creates a myopic perspective, and frankly has been overdone. Instead, this article will begin with a current picture of women’s leadership in the Army and analyze its future, using organizational behavior concepts, combined with scholarly research, to provide a clear understanding of the need to grow more women into the strategic decision makers of the future. The article will conclude with a discussion of different policies the military should explore to meet that need.

You’ve come a Long Way, Ma’am: The Current Status of Women in the Army

“It’s been my experience in my 33 years in the military that the doors have continued to open and the opportunities have continued to expand.”

— General Ann E. Dunwoody

According to the most recent gender-specific data available from the Defense Department, women comprise about 17.5 percent of the active duty officer corps, but barely comprise six percent of the Army’s general grade officers. The military is following the same trend as much of the private sector: women are fairly well represented at lower levels of management, but vastly under-represented at the most senior levels.

As of 2011, women comprised nearly 20 percent of company grade officers, a significantly larger portion than in the overall force, which was about 13.5 percent female. However, women’s descriptive representation drops off sharply at the field grade level, and the drop is even steeper between the field grade and the general grade levels, where just over six percent of the Army’s most senior leaders are women. Further study is needed to determine the root causes of these drops, especially the gap between company grade and field grade women.

When analyzing promotion data, it is important to take into account the branches where officers serve. For instance, according to a 2005 Government Accountability Office report on service member demographics, 37 percent of female military officers belong to the health care community, as opposed to tactical operations and other fields. Only 11 percent of women officers are tactical operators. On the other hand, 43 percent of men work in tactical operations, and
only 12 percent work in health care. The vast majority of generals come from branches that conduct tactical operations, with only 16 of the Army’s 403 generals belonging to the health care branches. Therefore, more than a third of Army women must compete for less than four percent of senior leadership positions. This means that the Army loses out on a significant amount of human capital in its senior ranks.

While women are not explicitly excluded from promotion to the highest ranks, they are at a decided promotion disadvantage because of the prohibition against serving in the combat roles necessary to build the experience needed to fill 80 percent of four-star general billets. Although the entire military is male dominant, for the purposes of this article, “male-only branches” are those that explicitly exclude women: Infantry, Armor, and Special Forces. “Mixed but male-dominant branches” are branches that allow women but limit the positions in which they can serve: Field Artillery, Air Defense, and Engineers. The term “mixed branches” refers to all other branches and functional areas within the Army.

Interestingly, this dominance of the male-only branches within the general ranks does not happen until the three-star level. Generals from the male-only branches make up less than half of all the officers at the one- and two-star levels, but between the ranks of major general and lieutenant general, there is considerable attrition of noncombat arms officers. Given the Army’s mission to fight and win wars, it is not surprising that people who serve in branches traditionally involved in direct ground combat are the ones promoted to the four-star level. This cleavage affects both men and women in noncombat arms branches; however the discrepancy is compounded when gender is taken into account. Of the 179 current combat arms general officers, only one is a woman—air defender Major General Heidi Brown. Women do not have the option to serve in most combat arms branches, and those branches that do allow women severely limit the jobs women are allowed to perform. This limits women’s ability to gain the experience that the Army values in its strategic leaders at the three- and four-star level.

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**Women’s Military Service over the Years**

- **1948**: The Women’s Armed Services Integration Act enables women to serve in the military, but they may only comprise 2% of the total force and may not serve aboard Naval vessels or in combat missions, and may not have command authority over men.

- **1967**: The 2% cap on women in the service and limits on women’s promotions is lifted.

- **1976**: Women are admitted into the service academies at West Point, Annapolis, and Colorado Springs.

- **1988**: DOD adopts the “risk rule,” exempting women from assignments that would expose them to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture.

- **1990**: About 41,000 women deploy to Operation Desert Storm, making up 7% of troops.

- **1991**: Congress repeals ban on women serving on combat aircraft.

- **1994**: The secretary of defense abandons the risk rule, allowing women to serve in all positions for which they qualify, but still prohibits their assignment to direct combat units.

- **2001-present day**: more than 220,000 (about 11%) of Afghanistan and Iraq veterans are women.

- **2008**: The Army promotes its first woman selected, Ann E. Dunwoody, to the rank of four-star general.

- **2012**: Army opens more military occupational specialties to women and moves 200 women to maneuver battalions; the chief of staff calls for a study on sending women to Ranger School.

- **2013**: Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta lifts the ban on women serving in combat.
Critical Mass in Organizational Behavior and Success

“We need a critical mass of women—not just within organizations, but in senior levels of leadership and on boards—to make a difference.”
—White House Project report, Benchmarking Women’s Leadership.

In physics, the concept of critical mass refers to the amount of fissile material needed to start an irreversible chain reaction. It also applies to making permanent change in an organization. When women (the “fissile material” in this metaphor) reach critical mass in an organization, they cease to be seen as token members. Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s book, *Men and Women of the Corporation*, introduced this concept to the social sciences. Kanter delineates four group types in proportional representation: uniform groups, skewed groups, tilted groups, and balanced groups.16 A uniform group is completely homogenous, and uniformity would likely be a fair description of the American military before the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948. Today’s Army falls into the category of skewed groups, where there is “a large preponderance of one type over another, up to a ratio of perhaps 85:15.”17 Tilted groups have a larger minority—a ratio of about 65:35. When a group moves from skewed to tilted, minority members can have a greater impact on organizational culture, and their majority peers begin to see them as individuals differentiated not only from the majority, but also from one another.18 Finally, balanced groups range from a 60:40 ratio to 50:50, and it is here where majority versus minority status seems to no longer matter at all.19

A critical mass of women in the military would move the Army forward from the skewed category into the tilted category, and it would mean that instead of being viewed as “female soldiers,” women would begin to simply be evaluated as “soldiers,” period. Kanter explains that women who were “few in number among male peers and often had ‘only-woman’ status became tokens: symbols of how-women-can-do, stand-ins for all women.”20 Critical mass matters when looking at overall demographics, but it is especially critical at the senior-most levels of leadership. A Harvard study found that without gender balance at the highest levels in organizations, gender continues to be “a negative status indicator for women, despite balanced representation

at lower levels.”21 Until women reach critical mass at the very top, stereotypes will continue to exist and detract from effective use of available talent in decision making. According to a 2006 Wellesley Center for Women study, critical mass occurs in companies with three or more women sitting on their boards. These companies create a “fundamental change in the boardroom and enhance corporate governance.”22 The study found that critical mass at the senior executive level was good for corporate governance in three concrete ways. First, board discussions included the perspectives of a larger set of stakeholders, and this led to better decision making. Second, the women on boards with critical mass were more persistent than their male colleagues in finding answers to the most difficult questions. Finally, they tended to have a more collaborative leadership style, which improved communication among board members and between the board and management.

With an increasingly female national talent pool, the failure to develop and utilize highly talented women in senior levels of leadership is an extremely unfortunate missed opportunity for our armed forces. In the United States, women earn 57 percent of bachelor’s degrees and 61 percent of master’s degrees.23 The military severely limits itself by limiting the opportunity for these educated women to serve in its most critical strategic leadership roles. Furthermore, experience and research have shown that teams with diverse backgrounds make better decisions than teams with singular expertise.24 Overly homogeneous groups are unable to see beyond their particular realm of the possible to find better, alternative solutions. When new and different people are added to a group, they bring knowledge the group did not have before, and thus the entire group becomes smarter.25 Female officers have a different experience set and perspective, so adding a woman (or two) into the group of top-level
decision makers provides a powerful injection of new knowledge to make better decisions.

Studies have confirmed the link between gender diversity and better decision making. Separate studies by UC-Davis’s Graduate School of Management, Catalyst, and Harvard Business Review found that Fortune 500 companies with the highest female representation at the top management levels consistently and significantly outperformed companies with the lowest levels of women executives. The Harvard study found that the companies with the most female leadership performed up to 69 percent better than their competitors.26 The performance gap between companies with more women at the top and companies with fewer women is too wide to ignore as a potential indicator of a way to maximize military performance. The Army should not miss out on the opportunity to make itself 69 percent better, especially when the nation’s blood and treasure are at stake.

Women’s Military Leadership is Crucial to National Security

“We literally could not have fought this war without women.”27— Dr. John Nagl, on the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

The current state of conflict in the world has provided an important opportunity for the military to take advantage of the combat experience of women. Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have had a surprisingly positive influence on the role of women as leaders within the military. More than 220,000 (11 percent) of the approximately 2 million Iraq and Afghanistan veterans are women, compared to the first Gulf War when women comprised seven percent of deployed troops.28 The asymmetrical nature of counterinsurgent warfare obliterates the traditional delineation between the “front lines” and “the rear.” With a continual threat of enemy engagement, regardless of whether soldiers are on a combat patrol or in a supply convoy, women are seeing more combat than ever before. In Iraq, 620 women have been wounded.29 One hundred and ten have been killed since hostilities began.30 As of June 2011, 28 American women soldiers had been killed in action.31 In Afghanistan, 1,788 women have earned the Combat Action Badge.32 Two women have earned the Silver Star, and many women have been awarded Bronze Stars, Purple Hearts, and other awards for valor.

Out of necessity, rules are bent for women to serve in combat and accomplish the mission. Women are not permitted to serve in a unit whose primary mission is direct combat, but they are allowed to serve in support units. When more soldiers are needed, military leaders often “attach” women to combat units while they remain “assigned” to support units. Given this opportunity, women have proven their mettle and earned the respect of their brothers on the battlefield, manning machine guns and driving trucks down roads pocked with IED craters. Some experts, including John Nagl, believe that this ground-level change will be the catalyst for policymakers to adjust the regulations to reflect the reality of women’s participation in modern warfare.33

Without such policy change, the Army stymies its own potential by limiting the ability of talented women to become general officers. Yes, women are allowed to be generals, but under the current policy, there will never be a female Army chief of staff or chairwoman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those positions are traditionally reserved (and perhaps rightfully so) for those who have served in combat arms branches, which women are forbidden
to do. Of the ten four-star positions currently held in the U.S. Army, only two are available to officers who have served in any branch other than combat arms. This means that without action to open these branches to female service members, the Army will never achieve a critical mass of women on its board of executives. If the policy changes so that women’s combat experience is fully acknowledged and capitalized upon the Army would benefit significantly.

Overcoming Barriers to Women’s Leadership Roles

“It is impossible to create a truly cohesive force without remedying the codified inequity between genders in the current system.” Colonel (P) Kim Field and Dr. John Nagl, Combat Roles for Women: A Modest Proposal

Although women continue to be grossly under-represented at the highest levels of military leadership, current numbers show a marked improvement from just ten years prior. In 2002, just over four percent of the Army’s generals were women, and in 1994 it was less than one percent. Clearly there is far to go before the Army has a critical mass of women overall, let alone among its leadership, but the trend is headed in the right direction, albeit at a glacial pace.

One challenge of determining critical mass is recognizing exactly where the demographic tipping point is for a minority group to have a positive impact. Kanter says that organizations with a 65:35 ratio move from the skewed category to the tilted category. The White House Project reports that critical mass happens when one-third of an organization and its leaders are women, and the Wellesley study found that executive boards needed at least three women. So how can this translate to the Army? The Army needs enough women in lower-level units for them not to be seen as tokens. However, given current force structure and demographics, Kanter’s 35 percent goal is probably not a realistic option. Based on the Wellesley study, the Army should have at least three women on its “executive board” of ten four-star generals, so 30 percent is probably the most realistic goal that will actually allow for a positive impact and real organizational change.

Assuming the current rate of increase continues in a linear fashion, it will take 42 years to reach a critical mass of women in the Army officer corps and 82 years to achieve that within the general-officer ranks. Repealing the ground combat exclusion policy is a step in the right direction. Changing that policy could mean that we can grow significantly more women from second lieutenant to brigadier general in the next 30 years, assuming

![Image](image_url)

Army LTG Ann E. Dunwoody smiles during her promotion to general. She was pinned by Chief of Staff of the Army GEN George W. Casey (left) and her husband, Craig Brotchie, during the ceremony at the Pentagon, 14 November 2008. LTG Dunwoody made history as the nation’s first four-star female officer. (DOD, PO2 Molly A. Burgess)

4-Star Generals by Branch

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Branch Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed but Male Dominant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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Figure 3

Number of Army 4-Star Generals from various branches
women are promoted at similar rates to the men in their branches. However, as evidenced by the diminishing representation of women at the field grade and general grade level, this is an overly optimistic assumption to make.

The military needs to look closely at the reasons behind the steep drop in proportional representation of women at the field grade level. It is likely that much of the loss is not because women are being passed over for promotion, but rather because fully capable women (such as Lillian Pfluke) are choosing to leave the military. The Army would do well to study the attrition of midcareer female officers to find ways to stanch the bleeding of talented operational leaders. The Army should also reexamine its policies regarding dual-military families and single-parent households. Dual-military families make up only nine percent of marriages in the Army, but 40 percent of married Army women are part of a dual-military couple. The decision to stay in the military or pursue opportunities in the civilian world is a family matter, especially for families with two service members. So in the case of dual-military couples whose family needs are not being met, the Army often loses out on not one, but two talented officers, or else handicaps them both in ways that inhibit their best development, progression, and utilization. Additionally, women in the Army are significantly more likely to be single parents than are their male counterparts, and so it would benefit the Army to develop policies that would prevent soldiers from having to choose between being a good parent and being a good soldier. Policies ranging from flexible work hours (when mission permits), equal maternity and paternity leave, an au pair system, as well as reconsidering the rigid career map of the typical operations officer would be good options to study for possible implementation if the Army wants to retain talented men and women in its field grade ranks. It is possible that some of these policies will not be feasible in all environments, but the Army would be remiss if it did not look into the feasibility of these and other creative policies that could retain talented officers and grow them beyond operational leaders into strategic leaders.

At this point, there is nowhere to go but up. According to the White House Project’s report, Benchmarking Women’s Leadership, none of the sectors studied had reached critical mass, but the military performed the worst of all, with only 11 percent women in the top five leadership ranks—well below the average of 18 percent. Also, the military is the only profession in the United States where women are explicitly prohibited from performing certain jobs. It is a travesty when the best military in the world fails to include the perspective of half the nation’s talent pool in its strategic decision making. Change will take time, and even with policy change, critical mass won’t be reached for years. This is all the more reason for immediate action. The military should lead the charge in organizational leadership, not come in last. Only when talented officers like Lillian Pfluke can consistently and significantly contribute to strategic decisions will the Army begin to reach its full potential.

So, did Lillian Pfluke retire because she had reached a culmination point and simply had nothing left to offer the military? Based on her achievements since retiring, that seems unlikely. Immediately after retirement, she went on to work with the American Battle Monuments Commission in Europe and helped develop leadership seminars for American Army units stationed in Europe. In 2008 she founded American War Memorials Overseas, a nonprofit organization.
that documents, promotes, and preserves war memorials and grave sites in countries beyond the U.S. scope of responsibility. She also became a world-class competitive cyclist, winning four medals in the World Masters Cycling Championships in Melbourne, Australia. She cycled in a relay across America as part of a team, and then decided to make the 3,300 mile journey again just so she could get a better look. She competed in the women’s equivalent of the Tour de France. She still holds the world record for distance ridden in an hour by a woman 35 or older. Also,
she achieved much of this while battling breast cancer. She now continues to work with other breast cancer survivors, particularly athletes, to provide mentorship and inspiration from her experience. It would seem that Lillian’s departure was the Army’s loss, and she is not an outlier. Every year, talented women leave the military profession to seek opportunities where their gender is less of an impediment to success. The Army will continue to suffer this brain drain of talented women unless policy changes to remove the Kevlar ceiling. **MR**

### NOTES


2. Donna M. McAleer, Porcelain on Steel: Women of West Point’s Long Gray Line (Jacksonville, FL: Fortis Publishing, 2010), Kindle, l.n. #1008-1011.


4. Ibid.


17. Ibid., l.n. 4301.

18. Ibid., l.n. 4317.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., l.n. 4272.


23. Benchmarking Women’s Leadership, 16.


25. Ibid.

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SOlIAL SWARMING

Asymmetric Effects on Public Discourse in Future Conflict

Major David Faggard, U.S. Air Force

TWEETING DURING THE Arab Spring? That’s so 2010. A future tactic in cyber-based-information warfare is built upon mobile-media wielding e-citizen soldiers employing social swarming tactics to overwhelm a system, a decision maker, or a critical node.¹

These mobile networks are vital to starting and maintaining cyber-based insurgency, drawing physical and moral strength from super-empowered individuals, while also using super-connected-individual networks to spread information, move undetected, and muster support, constantly one step ahead of authorities. It is possible for this swarm to move from the online world into the real world where violence may ensue.

Understanding Swarming

To understand the nature of communication-based social swarming, one must understand the concept of “battle swarm,” introduced by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt of the Rand Corporation in 2000.² Their essay, “Swarming and the Future of Conflict,” studied historical conflicts placing context on smaller, less-equipped individual forces defeating larger, more equipped forces by overwhelming the system and decision makers. Using swarming tactics, by building off the past warfare approaches of melee, massing, and maneuver, “social revolutions would, in coming decades, help bring about the downfall of empires,” according to the Rand study.³ Swarming as a military tactic “implies a convergent attack by many units.”⁴ The Rand report...
argued that swarming must be able to be employed from multiple directions, which clearly the hyper connectedness of the Internet and digital devices allow, and that the swarm must also perform sensory operations on the selected target.5

Imagine a mob of hyper-connected actors—Howard Rheingold referred to it as a “smart mob”—constantly one step ahead of authorities because it employed real-time, GPS-enabled devices. With these devices it could data-burst updates to its swarm.6 The only things in the swarm’s way attenuating communications among members are the seconds it takes for servers to refresh. These conditions mean the 24-hour news cycle would be obviated. This smart mob, as we saw in the 2009 Iranian presidential elections, created melee, had mass, and through exploitable off-the-shelf and widely available data technology, was able to maneuver where government forces were not.7

Social swarming is more than using the Internet or social media; it entails network envelopment of the information aspect of modern command and control. These complex networks are optimal when fully connected and flat with opportunity for direct “horizontal communication” between network peers.8

Swarming model. A working definition for this essay would be that social swarming employs the full computing power of mobile technology with real-time network updates to strategically organize e-citizen forces to overwhelm an opposing force online achieving one’s own political ends.

The overall objective of this information-based social swarm would not be the kinetic destruction of a system or node, but the disruption of the node’s ability to make a decision.9 The implications of this aspect of cyber- or net-centric warfare on a decision maker’s ability to keep order are critical in humanitarian or homeland operations. However, dark-actors, either homegrown or transnational, could potentially employ social swarming for purely kinetic reasons, as was the case with the 2011 Mumbai attacks.10 In addition, social swarms might be used by insurgents of a “connected” state in “phase four” operations.

Overlaying on recent communication-based events, Mia Stockmans’ refined MAO-Model of Audience Development, as well as this author’s personal observations on advocacy-based communication, provides a working model for communication-based social swarming (Figure 1).
Additionally, incorporating Muzammil M. Hus-sain and Philip N. Howard’s working “6-Stage Framework for Political Change” offers an in-depth study on the recent Arab Spring (March 2012), which validates the working model of communication-based social swarming. After explaining the models of Stockmans and Hussain and Howard, this author provides a working graphical representation of the communication-based social swarm model. Here, I interpret Stockmans’ model while overlaying it with personal experience from years of advocacy-based public-communication campaigns. Stockmans’ refined motivation, ability, opportunity (MAO) model of audience development provides a basic starting point for a dynamic model of communication-based social swarming.

**Motivation.** Where Stockmans’ model ends and the communication-based social-swarm model begins is motivation. Stockmans’ model explains that motivation for participation in an event is largely cultural, based on desire and past experience, not life-threatening necessity. Being compelled to overthrow an oppressive regime is a significant investment, a natural reaction to oppression, brutality, or another self-perceived injustice. In other words, this catalyst event, which she calls the “scream,” is a force within oneself that literally “motivates” one to commit some form of action you would otherwise not do under normal circumstances.

**Ability.** The ability Stockmans describes focuses on the resources of time, money, and physical and mental capacity. Time is relative online; quicker is paramount, while monetary resources are minimal. In the ability step of the communication-based social swarm model, it is appropriate to list additional factors required to start mobilizing a swarm online: narrative and medium, as well as target selection, all of which fit within Stockmans’ descriptions of resources.

**Narrative.** Narrative drives action. Narrative allows an audience to relate to the subject rationally. Narrative is as much about the receiver as it is about the message. Narratives explain societal fabric, “beliefs, attitudes, values, and actions,” and allow the receiver to connect with the sender through stories. Moreover, culture, socioeconomic status, and personal beliefs create audience reference points for narrative. Narrative can create third-party advocacy or kill it. Defense Department communicators build reputation-based narrative in the world every day, according to Gallup confidence surveys, which indicate the U.S. military has the highest confidence amongst Americans. Defense Department Public Affairs’ efforts shape these narratives for Americans. Moreover, the narratives shape network-based power. However, depending on the receiver’s lens and narrative interpretation, tremendous effects may result.

**Medium.** The medium for the communication-based social swarm can be the regional, national, or tribal online network based off the globally connected information grid and its ability to employ mobile media. Target selection can occur before or after narrative development. However, if the target is selected before narrative development, the narrative may need to be reworked throughout the process or the final online endstate may not be achieved. The narrative is then translated by way of a super-connected individual across the online medium to the mass base.

**Recruit, rage, change.** The mass base is recruited into this movement, typically through the already-established online followership of the super-connected individual driving towards some form of political rage, otherwise known as the advocacy issue. At this point, there is a potential for violence, melee, or maneuver. Finally, after the rage, there is a possibility for political change. If the political change does not occur, a super-empowered individual can refine the narrative, or a super-connected individual can increase the mass base, change the medium, or continue “pulse-attacking” the government communication apparatus while striving to create confusion.

**Opportunity.** Opportunity described by Stockmans follows “promotion, product, place, and price” (the “4Ps” of marketing, which is a 1960s’ marketing formula that still applies to online communication today). A recent marketing brochure for this online technique says: “Where the voice of one can quickly become the voice of one hundred or one million.” “Promotion” for a social swarm is synonymous with recruitment based on narrative. “Product” is the “purchasing” of a continuation of the current corrupt governmental practices or an attempt to mass together with like-minded actors for the installment of a new government. “Place,”
referred to as “everyplace” in social swarms, will first take root globally online. It is the final P, “price,” which likely weighs on the social swarms’ potential recruits most. The “price” for this endeavor may be a changed life, death, or imprisonment.

Stockmans adds that in opportunity, actors might not be willing to act if there are significant environmental barriers. With a social swarm, this is a decision point where actors may decide it is too dangerous to rebel, and maintain the status quo, or it is too dangerous not to rebel, and suffer more potential disruptive events. This is also the point at which there is a potential for kinetic violence to begin.

**Super Empowerment and Super Connectedness**

Thomas Friedman described super-empowered individuals in his essay on globalization effects, “Longitudes and Latitudes,” as those who could “act much more directly and much more powerfully on the world stage.” Friedman explained how Osama bin-Laden and the effects he could muster, through the results of globalization, would bring about problems nations would have to deal with in the future. The motivating catalyst event is a traumatic event suffered by a victim, which may lead to a super-empowered person providing spiritual, military, or ideological guidance to the masses. This development helps shape narrative. In public relations, this super-empowered individual might be seen as the “influencer,” or the person who might develop narrative in a third-party advocate situation.

However, online mega-influencers can be referred to as super-connected individuals. These are the actors who by their position, celebrity status, or wealth are connected to tens of thousands of others and can build and recruit the network to propagate narrative. Often their followers may take information and retransmit it to their networks, compounding the effects of virally spreading information. The super-connected individual’s reach is potentially unlimited online, especially when the data relayed is of value (potentially carrying life or death importance) to the swarm.

A super-connected individual’s potential threats to U.S. interests in remote hot spots are evident in situations like that of Pakistani citizen journalist Sohaib Athar, who unknowingly tweeted by way of @ReallyVirtual (Figure 2). He conveyed real-time details about America’s covert and secret mission designed to get Osama bin-Laden. Athar’s near-instant accounts are not uncommon in today’s operational environment. Anyone, anywhere can inform a global community regarding any matter in seconds, no matter how classified and compartmentalized. Although no physical social swarm occurred in Athar’s case, one can only imagine the international crisis that may have occurred if a smart mob of a dozen followers of his subscribers (750 at the time) showed up at Bin-Laden’s Abbottabad compound and confronted the Americans. After live tweeting the Bin-Laden mission, Athar, a Pakistani information technology Twitter user, created one of the largest Twitter followings in Pakistan with more than 70,000 followers. Even though Athar was within the closest proximity for his network to directly affect the operation, the real super-connected individual in the Osama bin-Laden example was Keith Urbahn (Figure 3).

Urbahn is a former assistant of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He spread word online that America may have killed Bin-Laden. When Athar tweeted, some of the world took notice; when Urbahn tweeted, many in mainstream media,
as well as prominent social media users in government and society, took notice and perpetuated that message. Based on Figure 4, it is easy to see what nodes in the network offer the biggest reach with the smallest bit of information.33

David Singh Grewal provides an appropriate definition for a network using a communication-based social swarm model: “an interconnected group of actors linked to one another in a way that makes them capable of beneficial cooperation.” Network power, Grewal argues, results from societal coordination and new global standards brought forth through a revolution in technological advancements via the elimination of distance and reach from the concept of globalization.34

Hyper-connected swarming. Social swarms operate in an “all-channel” network; that is, the swarm is capable of being hyper connected to every other member of the swarm, and there is neither a superior nor a follower, but all operate independently and collectively to support the swarm.35 Social swarming is both nodal and nodeless.36

My communication-based social swarming model also builds off Hussain and Howard’s “6-Stage Framework for Political Change.” However, there are some differences based off marketing and public relations experience and the communication aspects of the social swarm model.37 My communication-based social swarm model includes Hussain and Howard’s stated phases with numbers one through six to represent their input. Step one is the “preparation phase,” which they state includes recruitment and narrative development, as well as medium identification. This is the phase where the mass base may start searching for narrative. The “ignition phase” follows a catalyst event. A “protest phase” follows, which organizes networks offline to build larger numbers online and in person. An “international buy-in phase” follows, which, through online media, allows for the global community to be aware. The “climax phase” follows, where real-world actors on both sides of the issue can clash. Finally, a “follow-on information warfare” phase happens where actors clash in the social, cultural, political spheres online and in person, vying to define the new makeup of the movement, government, or the nation.

The communication-based social swarm model in Figure 1 is best understood with recent events in 2009 Iran, 2010 Haiti, and 2010 Tunisia, followed by a future cast of Pakistan.

Iran. The June 2009 Iranian presidential elections appeared to be corrupt when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad defeated Mir-Hossein Mousavi, causing nationwide protests that initially went largely unnoticed in American mainstream media.38 According to Alex Burns and Ben Eltham, “citizen activists” took to the streets in Iran largely due to access that Twitter provided the Iranian people.39 Eventually the Internet’s global reach and influence channelized mainstream media and prominent bloggers to report on the protests. Regional users even altered their personal online settings like time-zone stamps to reflect Tehran time. Many online personas also changed their profile photos to reflect a green tint to go along with the narrative of a “green-color” revolution.40

As a medium, the advocacy-based social-media effort, “Help Iran Election,” gathered 160,000 citizen activists to support the Iranian revolution online from other countries.41 This peacefully led social swarm was further emboldened and assisted
by hackers who attacked Iranian government cyber networks.

One must ask why did the social swarm not topple the repressive Iranian regime. According to Burns and Eltham, it is likely because the Iranian people were not willing to counter the brutal acts of violence committed by the Basij military forces on the streets targeting the cyber activists. These forces were likely the “environmental factors” Stockmans identifies as roadblocks to “opportunity.”

**Haiti.** In 2010, the U.S. Air Force social-media team found itself dealing directly with a communication-based social swarm while Airmen supported Haiti relief efforts following that nation’s devastating earthquake. Haiti’s infrastructure, to include its major ports and airport, were ravaged by the earthquake. On the ground in Haiti, a small team of Air Force special operations airmen filled in as air-traffic controllers. Because the earthquake severely damaged airport capabilities, these airmen determined aircraft-landing priority for the severely overcrowded runway based on aircraft cargo and priority.

A Doctors Without Borders airplane circled overhead because there was literally no more room on the flight line, so they took to the online world and Twitter. When super-connected individual Ann Curry became aware of the issue, she spread the message via Twitter that the Air Force must let the aircraft land. That tweet would go down as 2010’s “most powerful tweet.”

Within minutes the Internet exploded, and the swarm “pulse attacked” with direct messages, questions, and accusations flooding Air Force Websites, chat rooms, forums and blogs, eventually leading to massive amounts of mainstream press coverage. The Air Force social media team replied to the fervor nearly instantaneously, but the social swarm was mobilized and calling upon DOD decision makers for action. A short time later, the Doctors Without Borders aircraft was allowed to land.

Although the successful landing of the aircraft was not directly related to the online attention, the attention the issue caused online made Pentagon senior leadership aware, many who personally respond and interact with followers on Twitter.

**Arab Spring.** The Arab Spring example was of Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian who turned himself into a super-empowered individual through self-immolation in December 2010 to protest increased prices of local goods and local police brutality and corruption. Bouazizi’s self-immolation, recorded on video and used in many online and mainstream media sources, instantly turned Bouazizi into a super-empowered individual by providing the region a narrative for the Arab Spring. Obviously digital and social media did not cause the Tunisian people to overthrow the Tunisian government, but Bouazizi’s suicide and his funeral were captured on mobile-phone video and later broadcasted by mainstream media and online, creating a narrative for the movement that many in the region could sympathize and empathize with.

With Bouazizi’s video so viral, it is impossible to track down who created and distributed it initially, but the narrative was created and exploited through horizontal communication, which made advocacy easier for a social swarm to form.

**Pakistan.** Potential threats to U.S. governmental interests using social swarming could be affected in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan where a lack of U.S. narrative clouds a nation struggling to assert sovereignty and regional power in light of the recent American-led Bin-Laden mission, alleged drone strikes, and transnational terrorism. Placing the expanded MAO model against the backdrop of current tensions in Pakistan and Al-Qaeda front man Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s recent comments calling for national revolution, one must ask, “What is next for the nation of Pakistan?”

In the FATA region, U.S. narrative is nearly dead. This is an area where American strategic interests lay. However, only 12 percent of Pakistanis view the U.S. positively. Furthermore, other nations in the region believe America is a military threat to them, according to Pew research. Host-nation and nonstate propaganda efforts likely frame this...
narrative. Framing allows users to “understand an experience.” Pakistanis develop anti-U.S. narratives at home, at places of worship, and even in the government.

Furthermore, Americans fulfilled Pakistani narratives when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001. Years of negative U.S. framing likely created a damaging U.S. image in the region. The vacuum of a U.S. narrative along the Afghan-Pakistan border contributed to regional, tribal, and familial anti-U.S. narratives, making dynamics favorable for terrorism recruitment. From the Pakistani lens of a nation under attack, allegedly by drone aircraft, almost 70 percent of Pakistanis now want U.S. forces out of Afghanistan. Pakistani perceptions of America will continue to decline as long as these alleged drone strikes along the border continue without explanation or transparency from the governments involved. Is what happens next in Pakistan based off the social swarm model?

One must ask why the Pakistani people have not responded to the issues affecting them, in a way similar to the Arab Spring. Some theories exist. However, the answer to the question is largely unknown. Still, a super-empowered individual, now-Al-Qaeda chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri, recently called on the people of Pakistan to revolt against the Pakistan government and follow a similar path as in the Arab Spring. Using my communication-based social swarm model, if Pakistanis in the FATA region view their nation’s governmental policies regarding Western operations as life threatening, this may be a catalyst event for some of them. Rounding out the items needed for a social swarm to begin, consider this list:

- They have a super-empowered individual, Zawahiri, who has developed narratives of corruption, anti-governmental feelings, and economic decline, and he has engendered swaths of potential recruits.
- Whether those affected by a catalyst event have a super-connected individual is not clear.
- They need a ready and willing person to provide a medium and network.
- They also need someone willing to socially swarm online or in person.
The social swarm’s Pakistan medium is present with 68.2 percent of Pakistanis having access to a mobile phone.\textsuperscript{68} Pakistan’s understanding of the widespread usage of mobile devices as a “terrorism tool” is only beginning to take form, as evinced by that nation’s recent legislation to ban the sale of mobile SIM cards without biometric data.\textsuperscript{69} Additionally, only 37 percent of Pakistanis support that nation’s efforts against extremism in the FATA.\textsuperscript{70} One solid aspect to the opinion polling of Pakistan though is that approval rates of terror groups like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are in decline.\textsuperscript{71}

Alleged drone strikes, reportedly surgical in nature and only killing intended targets, may not be enough of a catalyst for the mass base to rally against the Pakistani government and the alleged U.S. mission there. However, perception can obscure reality, and if the FATA people believe in their narrative, anything can happen.\textsuperscript{72}

According to civilian researchers, the accuracy of the alleged drone strikes is not in question. The aircraft and systemic processes are on target, and, assuming these strikes could be a catalyst, their accuracy could explain why they have not triggered social swarming in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{73} The lack of a social swarm may not be because of insufficient narrative, lack of medium, or low recruitment. It may be because the catalyst effect is not as large and as widespread in the FATA region as it is reported to be by news media. However, the global narrative of perceived civilian casualties stemming from drone strikes is significant.\textsuperscript{74}

\textbf{Cost and widespread usage.} Finally, the concept of a communication-based social swarm has strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in the offense, as well as the defense. The largest strength to the concept of a communication-based social swarm is its cost and widespread usage. Free mobile-media-enabled platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Google offer a wide range of latitude to organizations operating within a constrained budgetary environment. For the United States, these efforts can be relatively quick, in a society that spent the past decade at war. The biggest strength to this free tool is its size; nearly a billion people are on Facebook alone; that is tremendous reach within the network pool.\textsuperscript{75} Additionally, large pools of employees are not necessarily needed to use these tools because of the distributed network of users already in the system. History provides a window into the development of communication; from pretelevised town-square community gatherings, to the printing press, to megaphone-like mainstream media, and now to global town halls not constricted by borders or time zones, the Internet is a game changer.

A weakness in my statements about communication-based social swarming may be the fact that they are rooted in years of personal experience. Additionally, many online strategists believe that the “4Ps” of marketing may be out of sync with the communicators and networks, which operate primarily online.\textsuperscript{76} It would be inappropriate not to mention the collection of effort written against this topic as well; some believe the capability is a utopian view. Evgeny Morozov, in his book \textit{The Net Delusion}, offers his counterpoints to the concept that online media can spur revolution. His arguments provide debate on the growing power of Google, foreign spy agencies collecting data on everyone, and the consequences of an open and free Internet. However, the book is all doom and gloom with little optimism.

In addition, while access is a strength to communication-based social swarming, it is also a weakness; places like North Korea and many others around the world labeled as “Internet black holes” will likely have no ability to create meaningful social swarms.\textsuperscript{77} If a super-connected individual built a network of swarmers within one of these countries, he would likely bear the brunt of national censorship and repressive governmental practices.

\textbf{The bread crumb trail.} A big weakness when employing social swarms is the digital bread crumb trail the Internet user leaves behind. This trail provides an avenue for quick vengeance from proregime forces to locate and neutralize online activists, as was the case in Iran.\textsuperscript{78} Additional weaknesses include mobile-media’s ability to “Geo-Tag” photos and video. These geo-tagged products inherently contain the natural data needed by swarmers to communicate and plan with each other; however, the ironic weakness is that the governmental decision-making node would in theory be able to track the GPS-enabled device either in real time, or through the GPS-enabled photo or video. Furthermore, any data broadcast over air waves would be vulnerable to interception and jamming through a variety of methods.
Opportunities for communication-based social swarming include traditional functions of command and control on the part of the swarming force, as well as the governing decision-making node. In addition, the concept goes further into the areas of foreign intelligence gathering. Avenues like the American Open-Source Center or U.S. Cyber Command may be potential mechanisms to monitor communication-based social swarms. However, transmitting and interpreting that intelligence for real-time battlefield commanders or police officers is another problem all together. An additional opportunity may rest with the U.S. government’s role in cloak-and-dagger missions of organizations that specialize in insurgencies. Communication-based social swarming provides another aspect in fighting, monitoring, and recognizing, as well as defeating insurgency.

Threats to communication-based social swarming include the vertical communication structure found throughout bureaucracies. Any response agency would ultimately need a network-organized structure capable of handling vast amounts of data and directing it downward directly to company-level or police-precint leaders. Waiting weeks, days, or even minutes is far too long for national response agencies to maneuver within the decision space of an online social swarm. Threats additionally might come from dark-network elements attempting to employ communication-based social swarming in fragile or failing states, thus working with rebels to ignite turmoil online instead of taking a target by force—a cyber-social insurgency.

Future Threats

One potential future threat is with warfare itself. A communication-based social swarm may have both assisted and softened Georgian defenses during the 2008 five-day war with Russia. During Russia’s “cyber-softening,” “cyber patriots” allegedly attacked the Georgia infrastructure before kinetic operations ever began.79 It is widely rumored that Russian-hired “hacktivists” enlisted e-cyber soldiers (everyday citizens) from popular social networks to conduct cyber attacks against the Georgian government’s online infrastructure.80 Imagine if, weeks before the cyber offensive, efforts of social swarm recruitment may potentially have affected the outcome of that conflict.

Communication-based social swarming is in no way a panacea. It does offer methods for starting, stopping, and coordinating online insurgencies, while also creating governmental confusion in a moderately connected society. Its methods are furthered when repression and corruption are rampant, when a narrative is easy to come by, and when diplomatic access by other world powers is not easily attainable, as was the case in 2009 Iran. In situations like the Arab Spring in Libya, social swarms employing online social media action can assist with the revolution. In this case, it was possibly because NATO military force limited “barriers” from government forces.81 Without this military checkmate, pro-Qadafi forces might have fared much better.

With a nodeless organization, a fully integrated and funded interagency effort within a joint task force for global communication (operating under a loosely defined role with, but not subordinate to, U.S. Cyber Command) would provide the best possible way for America to identify, counter, or adapt to an online social swarm. The process of forming online groups capable of creating tension to overwhelm decision makers or government forces through a communication-based social swarm is possible. Government decision makers should take these swarms and their access to democratized digital technologies into account in future planning scenarios.

NOTES

3. Ibid.
5. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 22.
7. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 7. Mass, melee, and maneuver are forms of warfare, which historically build upon each other over time leading to the concept of swarming.
ARmed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones are in constant use over Afghanistan and the Pakistan tribal borderlands, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. As Washington and the U.S. military see it, the ideal use of Predator and Reaper drones is to pick off terrorist leaders. In 2007, hunter-killer drones were performing 21 combat air patrols at any one time, by the end of 2009 they were flying 38, and in 2011 they increased to about 54 ongoing patrols. In 2009, the Air Force reported that for the first time they would be training more joystick pilots than new fighter and bomber pilots, creating a “sustainable career path” for those Air Force officers who fly UAVs.

Wonder Weapons
Perhaps out of fear of strategic loss of national will over unpopular U.S. and coalition casualties, Central Command seems to have accepted drones as the current weapon of choice in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Drones are reportedly “knocking off the bad guys right and left.” According to one estimate, by March 2011 at least 33 Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders (high value targets) had been killed by the drones and from 1,100 to 1,800 insurgent fighters had been killed as well. Tom Engelhardt observes in Drone Race to the Near Future that the UAVs are the “wonder weapon of the moment,” and “you can already see the military-industrial-robotics complex in formation.” In fact, as James Der Darian describes in Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network, drones are already part of a massive and expanding “military-industrial-media-entertainment network.”

The hype and hubris surrounding this technology is immense, and the mainstream media has been full of glowing reports on the drones, some of which imply that their use could win the war against terrorism all by itself. For example, an April 2009 report claimed that the drones were killing Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders and “the rest [of their numbers] have begun fighting among themselves out of panic and suspicion.” “If you were to
continue on this pace,” counterterrorism consultant Juan Zarate told the *LA Times*, “al Qaida is dead.”5 In an uncritical *60 Minutes* report on U.S. Air Force drone operations in May 2009, the officer in charge was asked if mistakes were ever made in the drone attacks: “What if you get it wrong?” “We don’t,” was his response.6

The Air Force declares that its priority is to precisely target insurgents while avoiding civilian casualties. They strongly aver that they are very concerned about civilian casualties, that they take extreme measures to avoid them, and that “casualty avoidance can be the targeting team’s most time-intensive task.”7 At the Combined Air and Space Operations Center, Middle East, a military lawyer (judge advocate) is always on duty to provide advice reflecting the Law of Armed Conflict, the international treaties that prohibit intentional targeting of civilians and require militaries to minimize risks to civilians. The Air Force also asserts that a strict NATO protocol requires high-level approval for air strikes when civilians are known to be in or near Al-Qaeda or Taliban targets, and when civilians are detected, strikes are called off. The U.S. military claims its targeting is extremely precise, and that it has called off many operations when it appeared that civilian casualties might result.8 Such claims are consistent with counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics outlined in Field Manual 3-24.

Today, UAV use is being hyped as “the future of war,” the “only good thing to come out of the war on terrorism,” and an effective and highly discriminate counterterrorism and counterinsurgency weapon. No one doubts that robots will eventually occupy a central role in the U.S. military. Surviving aspects of the Army’s now-defunct Future Combat Systems modernization effort (now the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization Program) call for a host of unmanned vehicles and combat drones. As P.W. Singer has shown in *Wired for War*, such modernization entails unprecedented changes in perspective.9

However, that UAVs are more cost effective in lives and money and the sunny view that they will someday take our soldiers entirely out of harm’s way are now appearing to be questionable propositions. The extraordinary hype these weapons still garner as the “greatest, weirdest, coolest, hardware in the American arsenal” is beginning to look like

MQ-1 Predator, armed with an AGM-114 Hellfire missile.
unexamined haste. An article in *Newsweek* in September 2009 went so far as to categorize the drones as “weapons porn.” This view of surgical high-tech precision and effectiveness is beginning to wear thin in the face of available statistics.

Even if we question the statistics that seem to indicate that drone platforms are more inaccurate than thought, the data does point to a need to critique and reassess their use in COIN. The effects of drone-related mistakes could be undermining U.S. goals to have the Afghan security forces take over. Even if U.S. strategy shifts to counterterrorism, the Afghan National Army has to fight a counterinsurgency, and winning hearts and minds will be at the core of their struggle.

**Critique of the Drone War**

The evidence shows that the hyperbole surrounding UAVs and their vaunted precision is sheer fantasy, if not literally science fiction. There have been many mistakes, such as the one in June 2009 when “U.S. drones launched an attack on a compound in South Waziristan. Locals rushed to the scene to rescue survivors. A U.S. drone then launched more missiles at them, leaving a total of 13 dead. The next day, local people were involved in a funeral procession when the U.S. struck again” and 70 of the mourners were killed.

The drone strikes have already caused well over a thousand civilian casualties, have had a particular affinity for hitting weddings and funerals, and appear to be seriously fueling the insurgency. Rather than presenting a picture of them as nearly single-handedly winning these wars, statistics suggest it would be more accurate to say that they are now almost single-handedly losing it. The question is whether tactics are serving strategy. A UN report in 2007 concluded that U.S. air strikes were among the principle motivations for suicide attackers in Afghanistan, and at the end of 2008 a survey of 42 Taliban fighters revealed that 12 had seen family members killed in air strikes, and six joined the insurgency after such attacks. Far more who have not joined have offered their support.

The drone attacks in Pakistan, which have been touted as the most successful, have been responsible for the most civilian casualties. Of the 60...
Predator strikes there between 14 January 2006 and 8 April 2009, only 10 hit their actual targets, a hit rate of 17 percent, and they killed 687 civilians. In total, Pakistan Body Count, which only tracks drone casualties, says that by the end of March 2011, 2,205 civilians had been killed and 909 seriously wounded, and that this represents just a three percent success rate against Al-Qaeda.15

Even David Kilcullen, the author of *The Accidental Guerrilla,* dubbed by the media a “counterinsurgency guru,” told Congress in April 2009 that the drone attacks in Pakistan were back-firing in the COIN fight and should be stopped:

> Since 2006, we’ve killed 14 senior Al-Qaeda leaders using drone strikes; in the same period, we’ve killed 700 Pakistani civilians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly unpopular. They are deeply aggravating to the population. And they’ve given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of extremism . . . The current path that we are on is leading us to loss of Pakistani government control over its own population.17

Kilcullen pointedly observed that the “kill ratio” has been 50 civilians for every militant killed, a “hit rate” of 2 percent, or 98 percent civilian casualties, which can hardly be called “precision.”

Kilcullen argues that the appeal of the drones is that their effects are measurable, killing key leaders and hampering insurgent operations, but their costs have far outweighed the benefits for three reasons. First, they create a “siege mentality” and casualties among civilians, which leads to support for the insurgents. Second, they generate public outrage not only in the local area, but throughout the country, as well as internationally and at home in the United States. Third, their use represents a tactic—more accurately, a form of technology—substituting for a strategy. Kilcullen concludes, “Every one of these dead noncombatants [creates] an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.”18

Furthermore, even when the air strikes have succeeded in killing militant leaders, in many cases this has simply turned them into martyrs. For example, over 5,000 people attended the funeral of rebel commander Ghulam Yahya Akbari, killed in a U.S. air strike in October 2009. Reports said that “thousands wept” and “women wailed from the rooftops” as a long procession of over 5,000 accompanied his body to the grave site near his native village in Herat Province.19

A poll in Afghanistan in November 2009 reported that 76 percent of respondents were opposed to Pakistan partnering with the United States on missile attacks against militants by drone aircraft.20 The reliance on air power has served to undermine public support in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and continued aerial bombing will result in more civilian casualties, leading to more resentment, resulting in more support and recruits for the insurgents, leading to a long, losing war. As Engelhardt argues:

> Force creates counterforce. The application of force, especially from the air, is a reliable engine for the creation of enemies. It is a force multiplier. Every time an air strike is called in anywhere on the planet, anyone who orders it should automatically assume that left in its wake will be grieving, angry husbands, wives, sisters, brothers, relatives, friends—people vowing revenge, a pool of potential candidates filled with the anger of genuine injustice. From the point of view of our actual enemies, you can’t bomb, missile, and strafe often enough, because when you do so, you are more or less guaranteed to create their newest recruits.21

Singer agrees, saying, “We are now creating a very similar problem to what the Israelis face in Gaza. They’ve gotten very good at killing Hamas leaders. They have in no way shape or form succeeded in preventing a 12-year-old in joining Hamas.”22

**Implications for Moral and Strategic Efficacy**

In military operations, targeting decisions must be made to minimize civilian casualties; a decision made otherwise is a war crime—this point is uncontroversial. The further point is that not minimizing civilian casualties is highly counterproductive strategically. Because most drone victims are civilians, hunter-killer drones appear, prima facie, to be criminal weapons of state terror on one
hand and strategically wrongheaded on the other. In the UK, Lord Bingham has compared them to cluster bombs and land mines, weapons that have been deemed too cruel for use. Kilcullen judged their use as “immoral.”23 Such naming does not bode well for attaining COIN objectives. Robert Naiman, in “Stopping Pakistan Drone Strikes Suddenly Plausible,” has observed:

Since it is manifestly apparent that, 1) the drone strikes are causing civilian casualties, 2) they are turning Pakistani public opinion against their government and against the US, 3) they are recruiting more support for insurgents and 4) even military experts think the strikes are doing more harm than good, even from the point of view of US officials, why shouldn’t they stop?24

The answer appears to be because the military argues that they are the only game in town, and they are seen as an alternative to more troops on the ground, thereby reducing U.S. casualties—a strategic concern over national and international will. A further related reason appears to be because now there is a huge and very powerful multi-billion dollar “military-industrial-media-entertainment” complex driving it. The degree to which this influence shapes policy is anyone’s guess, but it likely helps not at all in determining the best strategic approach. Instead, the drive to technology often creates an inertia that works against developing sound strategy. Colonel Douglas MacGregor has observed that, “[American] politicians frequently substitute a fascination with direct action in the form of air strikes or special operations killings for strategy.”25

Perspective is everything in making moral and strategic assessments. To President Obama and most Americans, the drones are seen as terrorist-killers, but on the ground among the civilian populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan they are viewed as fearsome and indiscriminate assassins. From the “top down” perspective, remote controlled hunter-killer drones are perceived as a fantastically successful new weapon, right out of science fiction. But from the “bottom up” perspective of the targeted populations, they have been experienced as a flawed weapon, which is feared, resented, and despised because of the collateral damage they have caused. They have been prime recruiting agents for the militants and have alienated the “hearts and minds” of the population.26

During the 1980s, the use of helicopter gunships by the Soviets in their war in Afghanistan and by the militaries armed by President Reagan in El Salvador and Guatemala generated discussion of the psychology of the fear of aerial attack—of death from above experienced as “state terror”: “Many Afghans now say they would rather have the Taliban back in power than nervously eye the skies every day.”27 A villager who survived a drone attack in Pakistan explained that “even the children, at play, were acutely conscious of drones flying overhead.”28 Psychologically, Afghans and Pakistanis in the tribal zone view the drones as dangerous predators, and they are never going to see them as their protectors. Ignoring this psychology would likely prove to be strategic folly.

For many, the much touted sophistication of UAV technology only makes the civilian deaths more galling. They ask, if it’s so sophisticated, how come in practice it’s so indiscriminate and kills so many innocent people? That is the experience on the ground. As one local politician in Afghanistan expressed it: “They are bombarding villages because they hear the Taliban are there. But this is not the way, to bomb and kill 20 people for one Taliban. This is why people are losing hope and trust in the government and the internationals.” Like many Afghans and Pakistanis, he was starting to suspect a more sinister meaning behind the civilian deaths: “The Americans can make a mistake once, twice, maybe three times,” he said. “But twenty, thirty times? I am not convinced that they are doing this without intention.”29 True or not, this is a perception that is growing in the region, and the trajectory of the perception is making the information realm of coalition efforts nearly untenable.
Michael Ignatief warns that virtual war is a dangerous, seductive illusion: “We see ourselves as noble warriors and our enemies as despicable tyrants. We see war as a surgical scalpel and not a bloodstained sword. In so doing we mis-describe ourselves as we mis-describe the instruments of death. We need to stay away from such fables of self-righteous invulnerability.”

Virtual war dehumanizes the victims, desensitizes the perpetrators of violence, and lowers the moral and psychological barriers to killing.

As a counterinsurgency weapon, therefore, hunter-killer drones appear to be losers. They are creating more militants than they kill, and their escalating use is alienating or “losing the hearts and minds” of the civilian populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Drones killed more than 700 civilians in 2009 alone. In October that year, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions warned that U.S. drone strikes that kill innocent civilians violate international laws against summary execution and represent extra-judicial killings. In other words, they can be viewed as a terrible and terrifying new form of state-sanctioned “death squad.”

The dark psychology of state terror in the use of unmanned assassination drones is revealed in their names: “Predators” and (Grim) “Reapers.” These names in themselves suggest a willful obtuseness about the efficacy of information operations. Civilians hear these names and are psychologically conditioned by them: they are not only terrified by hunter-killer drones overhead, many are radicalized. Polls in Afghanistan and Pakistan show that a desire to strike back against the United States increases after every drone attack, and when Faisal Shahzad, the Pakistani-American who tried to plant a bomb in Times Square in May 2010, was asked at his trial how he could justify planting a bomb that could kill children he answered: “When the drones hit, they don’t see children, they don’t see anybody. They kill women, children, they kill everybody. . . I am part of the answer . . . I’m avenging the attack.”
Similarly, while the Israelis now routinely use UAVs to bomb the Gaza Strip, this has only served to radicalize more Palestinians: “Robot drones have successfully bombed much of Gaza from secular Fatah to Islamist Hamas to fanatical Jihad.”34 By losing hearts and minds, the UAV war in Afghanistan and Pakistan is losing the fight against and increasing the threat of terrorism, and making further terror attacks on America more likely, not less. MR

NOTES

3. Engelhardt.
7. Cited in Anna Mulrine, “Targeting the Enemy: Inside the Air Force’s Control Stan and Pakistan is losing the losing hearts and minds, the UA V war in Afghani-
34. Ibid.
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER—PTSD—HAS been an accepted diagnosis since 1980. And that’s a good thing. So why is it now making controversial headlines? Why are some clinicians like myself—along with a wide range of veterans’ advocates, women’s groups, and others—arguing for changing the name of the diagnosis, PTSD, to “PTSI” for post-traumatic stress injury?

In large part, General Peter Chiarelli, retired vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, has inspired this argument. After two tours in Iraq, General Chiarelli grew alarmed by rising suicide rates in the Army. He reviewed every case, and concluded that many service men and women hate the term “disorder,” and suffer in silence rather than endure that label. “For a soldier who sees the kinds of things soldiers see and experience on the battlefield today, to tell them what they’re experiencing is a disorder does a tremendous disservice,” he has said. “It’s not a disorder. It’s an injury.”

Jonathan Shay, M.D., Ph.D.—whose pioneering studies of veterans earned him a MacArthur Fellowship—and I agreed with General Chiarelli. We wrote to John Oldham, M.D., president of the American Psychiatric Association, on 7 April 2012, proposing that the new edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, currently under review, adopt the PTSI name. We wrote that there is a crisis of suicide, stigma, and misunderstanding affecting young veterans. Anything that helps them seek help is worth consideration. We then argued that the name affects civilian survivors of trauma as well—crime victims, women who are raped and battered, and others who develop the syndrome. Finally, we explained how the injury model applies to the history, theory, and treatment of this condition. (That includes journalists who cover war
and have high rates of PTSD. We believe journalists, too, are injured on the job and are more like the physically wounded than the chronically mentally ill.)

Since April, this new language has received endorsements from a wide spectrum of individuals, some of whom speak for veterans groups, some for women’s issues, and others who represent organizations that advocate for the needs of traumatized populations.

Women who survive rape, incest, and battering plead with the American Psychiatric Association (APA) for recognition of their dignity. They ask the APA to keep the basic concept behind post-traumatic stress disorder intact, but to improve the name to a phrase that they find more accurate, hopeful, and honorable.

Many endorsers are men and women who have received a PTSD diagnosis, who are grateful for the help they have received, but who ask the APA, on their behalf, to rename the condition an injury. They tell us that they will feel less stigmatized. They also explain how the concept of an injury, rather than a disorder, does justice to their experience. Once they were whole. Then they were shattered. When their counselors, employers, friends, and loved ones behaved as though they were survivors of injuries, with lingering wounds, they could heal. When they felt like mental patients and were treated as persons with preexisting weakness, they could not heal.

Among those who share this concern are longtime leaders in understanding the impact of violence—including a previous director of National Institutes of Mental Health, Bertram S. Brown. Also among these leaders are the founding president of the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies, Charles Figley, and leading feminists such as Gloria Steinem. Several authors of books documenting their traumatic struggles and military and Department of Veterans Affairs mental health professionals are also onboard with this concern.
Jonathan Shay and I shared these letters of endorsement with the APA. We hope those who have the power to name psychiatric syndromes will eventually be persuaded, whether or not the change is adopted for this version of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*.

**Arguments Against**

To date, we have heard the following arguments against a name change from members of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*-5 committee:

- A name change will make no difference.
- There are far more important ways to combat stigma.
- Disorder is a term in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* and it is clearly defined in ways that apply to the reality of PTSD.
- The U.S. Department of Defense can use any name it likes (e.g., The Canadian military refers to “operational stress injury”). The DOD, not the APA, should change names.
- The Purple Heart will confer honor and recognize psychological injury. (Let us work on that for PTSD received under eligible conditions.)
- PTSD has genetic elements and changing the name could reduce emphasis on biological etiology and biological remedy.

**Arguments For**

In response to these six arguments we hear from the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*-5 committee members, we offer these observations:

- A name change will make a difference to the 100-plus people whose letters have been submitted to the APA and to the thousands they have heard from directly on the issue. People who are labeled “disordered” tell us why being labeled “injured” would improve their lives. This evidence should be acknowledged, whether or not it means that more will come forward to seek treatment.

  - Certainly, there may be other important ways to combat stigma. Let us work on all of those. We should also realize that an APA name change will signal something very positive to those who look to us for leadership. It will mean, “We take this seriously. We listen to our patients. We join the movement to speak with respect about those who have invisible wounds.”
  - The APA, in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*, has defined “disorder” in ways that apply to PTSD. We agree. But PTSI is at least equally applicable as a label. We have diagnoses in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* that use names other than disorder. Even if “disorder” seems innocuous to those who write the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*, we should not deny evidence that the term is degrading to so many who carry the label.
  - Canada’s military and veterans agencies did change the titles of their clinics to “Operational Stress Injury” services and they did find that a successful move. This is evidence that names and titles do matter. Instead of simply saying “let DOD change” (a change that would do nothing for traumatized civilians), let’s use the Canadian experience of beneficial name change to move us forward, not to hold us back.
  - The Purple Heart will confer honor, and when the APA changes PTSD to PTSI, the fight for the Purple Heart will be far easier to win. We base this conclusion on soundings we have taken in the United States and Canada. Canada does have a Sacrifice Medal for PTSD, stemming from military service under carefully defined circumstances. However, the Pentagon needs more ammunition to change the rules for a Purple Heart. Leaders have told us that PTSI will be critical.
  - Biological psychiatrists have no reason to fear that a name change to PTSI will inhibit research on genetic factors. There are constitutional factors at play in determining who becomes injured after exposure to traumatic events, and who has difficulty recovering. There is biological vulnerability and biological resilience. The scientific community will have just as much impetus to conduct research and treatment studies on ways to prevent and ameliorate the injury after PTSD is renamed PTSI.

Canada does have a Sacrifice Medal for PTSD, stemming from military service under carefully defined circumstances.
Accurate, Honorable, and Hopeful

There is another concern we must address. Some believe that we who advocate a name change are motivated by a desire to reduce benefits because we are associated with the military or the government. This is a red herring. We are motivated to change the name to “injury” by a conviction that there are many who deserve help, including benefits, and they closet themselves due to stigma and fear. The APA will change the elements of the diagnosis as outlined in *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-5* drafts. These changes are of far more consequence than a name change to third-party payers who may seek an excuse to limit resources. Indeed, if the APA changes the name to PTSI, all of us must make it clear that we are doing this because our patients, our potential patients, and their advocates have convinced us that this is accurate and honorable and hopeful. But we are not suggesting that the consequences of traumatic stress are any less significant, painful, and capable of creating disability. In fact, we believe a name change will help protect benefits by securing broader public awareness and support for those who suffer from the signature psychological injury of war, violence, and human cruelty.

In sum, PTSI is a better term than PTSD. It is accurate. It does justice to the condition. Those who contend with the condition prefer it. The APA would bring credit to itself and respect to its patients by adopting this improvement in diagnostic terminology. *MR*
IN 1939, POLAND was between a rock and a hard place. Two corresponding totalitarian regimes flanked its territory. It did not have a choice between the lesser of two evils, as the Soviet Union and the German Third Reich equally believed that Poland should not exist, and they uniformly regarded huge portions of Polish territory as theirs.

Before the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, Poland did not exist as an independent European state: the Russian, Prussian, and Austro-Hungarian Empires partitioned Poland three times (in 1772, 1793, and 1795). Tadeusz Kościuszko, a Pole and American Revolution hero, led the 1795 uprising against Russia and Prussia, but the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth disappeared from the map. For almost 124 years, Poles repeatedly rebelled against their Russian- and German-speaking oppressors. The Russian authorities executed and deported to Siberia hundreds of thousands of Poles who participated in the 1831, 1863, and 1905-1907 insurrections. Poles deported to Soviet Gulags from 1939 to 1941 encountered the graves of those freedom fighters and sometimes discovered small Polish communities there. Polish rebels living in German-controlled territories fared slightly better; after all, there was no German Siberia.

The occupiers persecuted Poles, dehumanizing them as backward and ignorant, which later helped promote and justify Nazi racial policy, or they vilified them as Slavic double crossers and admirers of the West looking away from Eastern Orthodoxy, an accusation that helped advance Soviet hegemony. Frederic Chopin, Joseph Conrad, and Marie Curie—among others—kept Polish culture alive in exile. A romanticized nationalism marks Polish history.

The brutality two imperial systems applied to their Polish subjects in the 19th century was a shadow compared to the depravity totalitarian rulers visited upon Poles during the 20th century. It took three world powers in the
1700s to dismantle Poland, and it took two dictatorships to do it again in 1939. Poland’s history may be tragic, but a doomed heroism distinguishes it.

Poland’s malicious neighbors met secretly in Moscow on 23 August 1939 and signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which violated the Fourteen Points and started World War II. This treaty consisted of a nonaggression agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, allowing Hitler to invade Poland. In return for Soviet permission to invade Poland, Hitler agreed to share half of Poland with Stalin. Hence, both leaders agreed to decapitate the “bastard of Versailles.” For their part, the Nazis permitted Stalin to annex Finland, the three Baltic States, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and parts of Romania, thus ensuring peace until Hitler violated the terms in June 1941 with Operation Barbarossa.

Today’s visitor to Polish World War II war monuments will see 1 September 1939 marking them along with 17 September 1939; the first date commemorates the German invasion of Poland, and the second, the Soviet invasion. (Soviet-Japanese border battles delayed the Soviets.) The almost simultaneous but acutely catastrophic dual invasions were denied for decades in communist Poland and in the Soviet Union until Poland freed itself in 1989: the communists were fighting fascists; how could they ever be allies?

It would take decades until Andrzej Wajda, in his 2007 film Katyn, portrayed that horrible scene of Western Poles escaping from the Nazis colliding with Eastern Poles escaping from the Soviets on a Bug River bridge, the agreed-upon boundary separating Nazi and Soviet zones in Poland. One still can view video files of joint Nazi-Soviet victory parades.

Invasions and mass killings went hand-in-hand. The atrocities committed may not have been joint operations, but as their respective fronts brought them closer together, the Germans and the Russians did share schnapps and vodka; in their wake lay thousands of dead Polish civilians and military personnel.

The Eagle Unbowed describes war crimes whose magnitude can overwhelm the reader. To make this bearable for the reader, author Halik Kochanski devotes individual chapters to singular examinations of respective German and Soviet actions. Such consideration did not occur for the Poles in real life. From September 1939 to June 1941, the masters of life and death were simultaneously both Nazi and Soviet criminals; from 1941 to 1945 the Germans were the singular tormentors, and from 1944 to 1989 the Soviets were the oppressors. There is evidence that the two regimes’ security forces, the SS Gestapo and NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) met regularly to keep each other informed of their operations to suppress the Polish population. Timothy Synder has called this part of the world at this time the “bloodlands.”

During the first weeks of the war, the Luftwaffe deliberately bombed innocent Polish civilians running from the front. The Germans forcibly expelled eastward the Poles living in Western Poland. They kidnapped “Aryan-looking” Polish children and raised them as German children. Ethnic Germans living in prewar Poland, the volksdeutsche, were Nazi-trained fifth columnists, carrying out various anti-Polish missions. Polish girls and women were seized for sexual slavery. Operation Tannenberg involved the use of an early series of extermination actions targeting Polish intellectuals, professionals, priests, activists, and other leaders; other equally severe operations took place throughout their occupation. The Germans also plundered artwork from private collections and museums, smashed Polish national monuments, and closed down Polish schools and museums. They carried out terror campaigns and large-scale “revenge” reprisals, which consisted of indiscriminate roundups Łapanka and summary executions. Victims of these mass arrests were sent to prisons and labor and concentration camps.

Tadeusz Borowski, author of This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen, was captured in a Łapanka [a military round-up of civilians] and sent to Auschwitz. Three weeks before he arrived there, the Germans changed their policy of immediately gassing non-Jewish Poles, so, among other jobs, he handled the luggage of Jewish victims on train platforms. He survived to later commit suicide.

Unlike the rest of Europe, there was no Polish Quisling or Polish Vichy. The Nazis considered Poles as only slightly above Jews as a race. In his 19 September 1939 Danzig speech, Hitler stated that Polish “leadership lacked intelligence; its organization was Polish.” SS mobile-killing units murdered both Jewish and non-Jewish Poles. By the end of the war, the Nazis had murdered nearly 6 million Poles—2.9 million Polish Jews and 2.8
million ethnic Poles. Around 380,000 Polish Jews survived the Holocaust. In her poem “Starvation Camp Near Jaslo,” the Nobel Prize winner Wisława Szymborska warns us of the danger of rounding off statistics because, when we do so, we erase the existence of the victims. People are not numbers.

The Polish resistance was the largest in all of Europe. Because prewar Poland was a multinational, multiethnic, and multireligious state, Polish rebel groups were by nature diverse, and these fighters often did not get along. In fact, sometimes they attacked and killed one another. Some groups refused to cooperate with the others because their ideologies conflicted. Nearly the same was true of the Polish Jewish resistance groups that fought in the ghettos and Jewish partisans that skirmished in the forests. What tends to be lost in translation, under-reported, neglected, and even forgotten in history books is that Jewish and non-Jewish insurgents did operate together; the tendency was for like-minded political groups to pair up with their Jewish or non-Jewish equivalents.

The first ghetto was established in Piotrkow Trybunalski in October 1939, and 400 more were created thereafter. Ghettoes were Jewish collecting zones. Ghetto conditions were horrendous. Thousands died in them long before the camps opened. Forced labor was building the camps, and so the Jews waited. Operation Reinhard was the mission to murder via gas the almost three million Polish Jews in extermination camps: Belżec (opened March 1942) and Sobibor and Treblinka (May 1942). The reason why so few have heard about these camps is that there were virtually no survivors of these death facilities, so efficient were these murder houses. Chełmno (December 1941 to March 1943 and June-July 1944 as a death facility), Majdanek, and Auschwitz-Birkenau were multipurpose camps—labor and extermination; therefore, one could walk out of one of those places. These diversified camps also contained mixed populations: Jew/non-Jew, Soviet POWs, Roma, etc. Auschwitz also gassed hundreds of thousands of Jews from Europe; it was not exclusively a killing hub for Polish Jews.

Auschwitz is the camp most mentioned in histories about the Holocaust; however, this omits much. Prior to the implementation of Operation Reinhard, the SS Einsatzgruppen (the mobile killing units that shot their victims in forests and ravines) carried out the Holocaust. These units began their work soon after the Wehrmacht conquered Poland; they continued to conduct the Holocaust “by bullets” when the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union (June 1941). Himmler decided to switch from bullets to gas to spare his SS men from the emotional extremes of close-quarter murder; he thought it more humane (for the killers, not for those being killed).

Much has been said about the locations of the death centers being in Poland. To some, this fact seems to prove Polish acceptance of and participation in the Holocaust, and to confirm Polish anti-Semitism. The truth is Hitler did not ask for Polish permission to build the camps because he had already decapitated the Polish government. There were no Polish authorities or even a Polish government. Poland simply did not exist; the Germans called it the “General Government,” and the Nazis did what they wanted there. Occupied Poland was not at all like Occupied France, Denmark, or other Nazi-controlled nations. It is true that numerous Poles did hunt down and sell out hiding Jews, but it also is true that there are over 6,000 recognized Polish Righteous among the Nations, an honor bestowed upon gentiles helping Jews survive the Holocaust. The Nazis did murder thousands of Poles if they caught them helping Jews; not only were the actual people helping Jews killed, so were their families and village neighbors. It was only in Poland that the Nazis established severe laws and the death penalty for assisting Jews. No such punishment existed elsewhere in occupied Europe.

The Nobel Prize-winning Polish (and American) poet Czesław Miłosz has chastised his fellow Poles for their apparent callousness and unconcern while the Nazis were destroying the Warsaw Ghetto in 1943. In poems like “Campo dei Fiori” (1943), “A Poor Christian Looks at the Ghetto” (1943), “In Warsaw” (1945), and “Dedication” (1945), immediate, necessary, and guilt-inspiring words sought to awaken inconsiderate neighbors. To write anything in Polish and be caught meant immediate death. Simply to acknowledge that other Poles who were Jewish suffered would have satisfied Miłosz. To not be like the lotus-eaters of Nazi propaganda would have pleased him. While the Catholic Church did and said nothing about the Nazi extermination policies, individual Polish priests and nuns sheltered Jews. Many have criticized the Vatican for
its silence and inaction on Jewish mass murders; of the 22 million ethnic Poles, most of whom were Catholic, the Vatican was equally mute and passive.

The Polish Jewish film director Aleksander Ford gives a more subtle treatment of the Poles and Jews in Warsaw in his 1948 Border Street. There are Poles who do not care, some who help, and others who sell out Jews. The film’s ending is bittersweet because even though young David is grateful for his Polish friends’ help getting him out of the Nazi destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto (1943), David realizes he must stay with his people, and refuses to hide outside the wall. There were all kinds of Poles.

For centuries, Poles and Jews did get along well. While the rest of Europe expelled Jews (England in 1290, Spain in 1492, etc.), in 1332 Polish King Casimir III The Great expanded previous Polish charters regarding Jews and welcomed them to live in Poland. He vowed to protect them as “people of the king.” Relations soured after the third and final partition of Poland (1795). When Poland resurfaced as an independent state in 1919, there were efforts to expel, make life difficult for, or establish discriminatory laws against Jews, but there were no serious attempts to exterminate them. Poland may have become an authoritarian state in the 1930s, but it was not at all like the Third Reich or Soviet Union. Nonetheless, its behavior toward the Jews was at times negligent and coarse. Portraying this prewar anti-Semitic climate, Andrzej Wajda, in his 1961 film Samson, traces the life of Jakub, a Jewish university student who experiences Polish intimidation, humiliation, and violence. In an act of self-defense, he accidently kills an ethnic Pole, and thereby serves jail time. The Polish authorities release him at the outset of the war and he finds himself behind another wall—the ghetto wall. He escapes only to find that he is conflicted about life without his Jewish people.

On 25 May 1940, Himmler wrote “Treatment of Racial Aliens in the East,” saying, “We need to divide Poland’s many different ethnic groups into as many parts and splinter groups as possible.” One of the aims of the totalitarian state is to foment existing resentment and distort social differences. It seeks to displace familial and communal allegiances in order to subjugate and dominate. Both Nazi and Soviet political agitators provoked various types of internal Polish class warfare. Specifically, they manipulated Polish anti-Semitism, creating propaganda that exploited mistrust, anxiety, and hostility toward the Jews. Not all Polish Jews spoke Polish, nor were they all assimilated; many spoke Yiddish and dressed differently. These distinctions accounted for many of their difficulties during the Holocaust. Communication and appearance were real barriers. Poles were sensitive about upward mobility and aspired to become more than farmers; some coveted the positions of Jewish professionals. In spite of the strong anti-communist sentiment in the country, a small minority of communists existed in prewar Poland. During the little known 1919-1920 Polish-Soviet War, Poland held back a Soviet takeover. Lenin imagined Poland to be his platform to launch worldwide revolution, but few Polish Jews found sanctuary in Marxism. Some Poles thought they saw many Jews in the Polish and Soviet communist parties. The alleged presence of Jews in communist circles led to the irrational and perverse conviction that all Jews are power-hungry communists out to get Poles. This racially charged hatred is known as zydokomuna, and it is anti-Semitism. Both Nazi and Soviet propagandists used zydokomuna to agitate the Polish masses.

Halik Kochanski writes, “The Polish administration of Kresy [eastern Poland] had been heavy-handed in the 1930s, so it is not entirely surprising that the arrival of the Red Army was seen by the non-ethnic Poles as a blessing.” For some of these ethnic minorities, the Soviet forces were their liberators from Polish oppression. The Poles expected the Ukrainians and Byelorussians to embrace the Red invasion, but many were taken aback by the Jewish welcome. There were incidents of Polish pogroms, most notably in Jedwabne. It is important to note that only some Jews accepted the Soviet occupation, and even some who assisted the Communists in their takeover. In some Polish circles, this perception did not polish-Jewish relations. And as Kochanski points out, there were many Jews and Ukrainians who protected Poles from Soviet brutality. Neighbors did help neighbors.

Many historians have insisted that during the mutual German-Soviet reign of terror (1939 to 1941), the Soviets in fact were by far the more severe and bestial toward the Poles. The October Revolution, Civil Wars, Red Terror, and Purges trained the Soviet security forces far longer than
the relatively upstart National Socialists. By 1939, the Communists arrested, deported, starved, and murdered millions of their own people. Before World War II, they had already murdered 100,000 ethnic Poles living inside the Soviet Union. When the Red Army conquered Eastern Poland, it treated it as a part of the Soviet Union; political commissars immediately began Sovietizing the area. The Germans, too, were transforming Western Poland. However, the Communists were setting up sham elections to legitimize their takeover. Molotov said due to the collapse of Poland, the Polish government failed to protect the ethnic Ukrainians and Byelorussians living there, and therefore, the entering Red Army was carrying out humanitarian relief missions. From 17 September 1939 on, Eastern Poland became part of the Soviet Union; even today, those Polish territories remain in Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania.

The ethnic minorities that cheered while the Red Army marched in soon saw that the Soviets did not care about their interests. Poles who refused Soviet citizenship faced arrest, deportation, and death. The authorities repressed Polish cultural, social, and economic identity, and reeducated the masses along Marxist-Leninist lines. For the most part, the Soviet worldview portrayed Poles as bourgeoisie exploiters of poor Ukrainian and Byelorussian peasants, and the day of reckoning had come. Because so many Poles now were Soviet citizens and technically enemies of the state, the exact number of “Polish” victims is difficult to calculate. Studies vary, but conservative estimates state the Soviet Union deported at least 500,000 Polish citizens to Siberia and Kazakhstan from 1940 to 1941. For many decades, historians claimed that over one million Poles were sent eastward. Some Poles did not survive the long train rides. Although under watch, once the survivors arrived at their detention centers, they had to find jobs and dwellings on their own. Poles, too, suffered from the inhuman demands of collective farming quotas.

Once the Soviets became Allies with the British and Americans after June 1941, the Soviets also changed from enemies to alleged comrades of the London-exiled Polish government, and as perceived allies, the Soviets and Poles together now were fighting Hitler. Because of this coalition, the Soviet Union permitted hundreds of thousands of detained Poles to leave. Many died doing so, and those who survived often were in horrible physical and psychological condition. The British were disappointed, even angry when Polish POWs arrived at British military bases to fight alongside them. Polish POWs may have been spiritually willing to fight, but their bodies were not. Moreover, the British viewed these Polish soldiers as ungrateful troublemakers. Not only did the British have to feed extra mouths that could not fight, but the Poles told inconvenient truths about Stalin’s treatment of them. The more the Poles demanded answers and retribution from the Soviets, the more the British disbelieved and mocked them. During the war the British press caricatured the Poles. After the war the British ignored them. What the British and Americans did not want to face up to was that every Pole in the Soviet zone was considered suspicious simply for being a Pole.

Many imprisoned Poles had undergone grisly torture. Halik Kochanski states, “It has been estimated that all 150,000 prisoners on 22 June 1941 were either killed on the spot or moved east and then often killed.” Tadeusz Piotrowski adds, “By the time the war was over, some one million Polish citizens—Christians and Jews alike—had died at the hands of the Soviets.” Given the extraordinary amount of suffering and death Poles endured from their tormentors, it is no wonder people know so little about Polish history. Its history almost seems too incredible, like a bad horror movie. In his book Miłosz’s Alphabet, Czesław Miłosz describes wartime Poland as the “anus mundi.”

The Polish stories were true. However, the Red Army was fighting at the time; the Polish army was not. When the British required military support, the Poles were not in a position of strength and could only offer a symbolic gesture. When they did achieve a better military capability, it was too late. And the most lingering and festering question the Poles kept asking was, “What happened to our missing 25,000 officers who were in Soviet POW camps?”

The Katyn Massacre is one of the most infamous war crimes in history. Not only did the Soviets secretly murder 25,000 Polish officers in 1940, but when the Nazis announced to the world that they found 4,000 of them dead in 1943 and had definitive proof the Soviets killed them, Stalin insisted Hitler
ordered the killings, and Churchill and Roosevelt publicly accepted this lie.

The Soviets maintained their innocence until 1989, and not a few today in Russia still believe it was a Nazi crime. During the Cold War, it was a crime simply to utter “Katyn” in communist Poland, and officers’ relatives faced hardships because they were associated with Katyn. Some historians suggest that these massacres were Stalin’s revenge against the Polish Army for his mismanagement of Soviet forces during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920. By refusing to send an army group in Southeastern Poland to support the taking of Warsaw, the Soviets missed an opportunity to make Poland a Soviet republic. The Polish Army performed their “Miracle on the Vistula,” and drove the Soviets out. This little-known battle thwarted Lenin’s ambition to turn Europe Red. Many of the Polish officers who fought during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920 died in the Katyn Massacre. These officers were the obvious leaders to rule Poland, and Stalin needed them gone in order to fully possess Poland.

Another despicable illustration of the West’s tacit acceptance of Stalinist criminality was the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. Stalin prevented Allied support for the Polish Underground Army fighting Nazi forces, and he ordered his Red Army not to help. For 63 days, the Red Army sat and watched from the east bank of the Vistula River as 150,000 to 200,000 Poles died, and the Nazis obliterated 85 to 95 per cent of the city, shipping many of the remaining 500,000 to 600,000 people of Warsaw to concentration camps.

Yet, Poland did accomplish much during this dark period. The Eagle Unbowed author Halik Kochanski claims that its greatest contribution was breaking the codes for the German Enigma cipher machine. This achievement still is largely unknown, and the British at the time did not give the Poles the proper respect for doing it. Polish naval units sank many German ships and took the port of Narvik during the Norwegian campaign. Again, their role at the time went ignored. Polish spy work accounted for roughly 50 per cent of Allied intelligence. The legendary 303 Squadron (a Polish unit flying for the British) downed three times the RAF average during the Battle of Britain.

A visitor to the war cemeteries of Normandy will find Polish names. General Władysław Anders and his Polish II Corps played a huge role in taking Monte Cassino. Yad Vashem now recognizes over 6,000 Polish Righteous Gentiles. The underground courier Jan Karski snuck in both the Warsaw Ghetto and an auxiliary camp near the Belzec death facility, and he wrote a report detailing the Nazi atrocities against the Jews. The British and Americans politely met him, but they did not believe him.

Polish Army officer, underground member, and “Auschwitz volunteer,” Witold Pilecki allowed the Germans to arrest him and send him to Auschwitz. He was there for nearly two years. He volunteered for this mission to organize a resistance movement in the camp. After escaping, he wrote a report detailing conditions in the camp. Later, because he was not part of the Communist underground, Communist Poland executed him in 1948.

An ally, both disparaged and betrayed during the war, Poland was a country where Just War theory did not apply, a nation where The Hague and Geneva Conventions were not honored. Poland ran with blood. Its wartime history is knotty and complicated, but author Halik Kochanski admirably (and deep down, enviably) has untangled Poland’s multi-layered tragedies. She showcases its unexpected and Herculean perseverance. Because the names and towns can be exotic, the recalled events and their actors unfamiliar, and the truths and consequences bitter, Kochanski ushers the reader along attentively.

In the past, the history student’s imagination focused on the Eastern Front at the expense of the equally important story of Poland. Kochanski’s book corrects this lacuna, making the necessary readjustment. She shows that Poland was not a passive backdrop for Nazi and Soviet war crimes. Her book may be hard reading for some audiences because it discloses the real cost of realpolitik, and it reveals the bluntness of Allied policy and behavior.

The temptation in writing a book like The Eagle Unbowed is to apotheosize Poland’s victimhood, and to whitewash its misdeeds; after all, the full history has been underreported. However, Kochanski’s book is balanced. She does not shy away from discussing Poland’s own pogroms and
the infamous Blue Police. She does not resort to nationalistic chest beating. The Nazis and Soviets are the obvious villains in this story, but how does one characterize the British and Americans? The Soviet alliance (1941 to 1945) was necessary, and Churchill and Roosevelt could not risk upsetting Stalin too much over Polish questions. The war would have lasted longer, and may have required liberating the Soviet Union. The tacit question haunting the book is this: What if Churchill and Roosevelt had really pressured Stalin on Poland? What would Stalin have done in response? We do not know. If Churchill and Roosevelt had done so, the map of Poland might appear much differently today. In the book, Churchill emerges as conflicted, and Roosevelt comes off as indifferent over Poland. This book certainly will challenge established views about the heroism and leadership of these democratic leaders.

For Poland, the end of World War II was not May 1945, as it was for Western Europe. Poland had to wait until 1989 for the war to be over. For Poland, the collapse of the Soviet Union is the real end date of World War II. Poland’s full World War II history was waiting to be written. With Halik Kochanski’s book, it has been. 

MR
THE INSURGENTS: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War,
Fred Kaplan, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2013. 432 pages $28.00

As The Insurgents demonstrates, Fred Kaplan is a journalist and not a historian. The title has the ring of a sensational headline meant to captivate, perhaps, and to titillate. However, it mostly fails to illuminate. The title conveys little about the substance of its implied argument that General David Petraeus was some kind of institutional revolutionary. Kaplan’s suggestion that a handful of really smart men and women—including John Nagl, David Killcullen, Montgomery McFate, Sarah Sewall, and Michelle Flournoy—successfully plotted to change the Army’s wartime culture in the face of hardened resistance just doesn’t hold water. Kaplan instead demonstrates that these so-called “insurgents” succeeded because, in fact, Army leadership supported them. Any resistance they encountered proved ineffective, irrelevant, or powerless.

The insurgents’ supporters included the chief of staff of the Army. Their main supporter, “The Insurgent in the Pentagon,” was the vice chief of staff General Peter Chiarelli. Using the “insurgent” metaphor for the vice chief of staff says all the reader needs to know about its value. If General Chiarelli is on their side, one wonders who the “counterinsurgents” are. So who stands in the way of the insurgents?

Fortunately for his thesis, Kagan was able to find one general who did have issues with the development of FM 3-24. That general was Major General Barbara Fast. She objected to FM 3-24 from her vantage point as the Chief of the Military Intelligence. While no mention is made of the commanding general at the Training and Doctrine Command, one wonders if he did not object too. Who really stood in the way of FM 3-24? The answer is no one who could stop it.

So what is the real story here; what drives the drama in the title of the book? In the style of a Malcolm Gladwell or an Ori Brafmann, Kaplan makes the case that connections and networks matter in institutions. Petraeus is no insurgent, and he never has been. Petraeus’ career trajectory, starting at West Point (USMA), has been that of an enabled and adroit insider. Star man at the Military Academy, Airborne and Ranger School graduate, instructor in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point (called “the master race” by other USMA departments), and aide de camp are the expected highlights of the Petraeus’ patrician pedigree. To describe Petraeus as an “insurgent” is, to say the least, suspect.

One service Kaplan does the Army in this book is in illustrating that the old saw about anti-intellectualism in the institution is not as clear cut as many believe. Teaching at West Point and graduating from elite universities with doctoral degrees did not hold Petraeus or any of the other “insurgents” back. Some of his insurgent cohorts had similar if not as formidable resumes as did Petraeus. All of them also networked with others like them. This is a good story about a group of officers and academics most of whom shared similar experiences in elite institutions and who came together to adapt the Army to fight in Iraq, all with the support of Army leadership.

Kaplan really doesn’t ask whether the solutions they reached as embodied in FM 3-24 were or are sound. The story he recounts is more about how these folks coalesced and how their thinking evolved. The result is interesting and worth taking the time to read about, but Kaplan’s notion of an insurgency is simply not borne out by what he reports. The insurgents never really had a fight on their hands, or at least they never had that they had a chance of losing.

Tangentially, Kaplan’s report of the way Petraeus and these FM 3-24 so-called “insurgents” dealt with their opposition makes them look unattractive at best. The insurgents had little patience with those
who disagreed. People who did not see things their way were not dismissed out of hand, but the insurgents resorted to *ad hominem* arguments to try to intimidate or silence some. Kaplan reports on an argument between one of the insurgents and the writer Ralph Peters, a retired Army officer and gadfly who wrote a critical piece about FM 3-24. Kaplan observed that Peters had never “fought in battle” whereas the insurgent in question had. The implication is that Peters’ objections therefore cannot be valid. Yet the opinions of Michel Flournoy or Montgomery McFate are valid although like Peters they lack combat experience. Peters, like Barb Fast, had no real power to preclude the insurgents from winning their argument. His opposition was never a threat to the insurgents, merely a raising of points that call for rational answers.

The reader is left with the question about why Kaplan would recount this vignette at all. Opposition, however impotent, is required to make the case for Kaplan’s heroes as “insurgents.” Developing this tension in the book appears to be the only good reason for raising this opposition from a writer, one who had no real influence on policy.

In his acknowledgements, Kaplan expresses his gratitude to General Petreaus for giving freely of his time given that Petraeus understood that this book would be “not in the business of hagiography.” Perhaps Kaplan is not in the business of hagiography, but *The Insurgents* is not illustrative of that contention.

**COL Greg Fontenot, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY POWER**

Martin C. Libicki, Howard J. Shatz, and Julie E. Taylor

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA

2011, 170 pages, $32.00

**NOTED RAND RESEARCH** scientists Martin C. Libicki, Howard J. Shatz, and Julie E. Taylor have written an intriguing U.S. Air Force-sponsored study on how demographics influence war and military power projection and the implications of this influence for the Air Force and the United States through 2050. The authors accomplish this study’s mandate by first forecasting global demographic shifts among nations and then assessing these shifts in relation to a nation’s ability to carry out military missions, either in line with, or against, U.S. national security interests. In developing these forecasts, the authors analyze population trends and their impacts on human capital (working-age people) and state income and expenditures. The resulting analysis allows the authors to predict a country’s vulnerability to crisis and conflict.

This work is concise, well researched, and well articulated. The authors derive their data from an eclectic array of credible sources. Their analysis is substantive and their conclusions sound. The authors weigh and ask “what if” of a multitude of factors and the dynamic influences they have on demographic movement, and they produce several key findings.

Their research indicates that by 2050, many of the world’s most populated countries will be in Africa. India’s population will surpass China’s by 2030. With the exception of the United States, high-income countries will experience an aging of their populations along with lower birthrates. Birthrate differentials between high-birthrate developing countries and low-birthrate developed countries will not lead to conflict because few low-birthrate countries border high-birthrate countries. Existing bulges in unemployed male populations between ages 15 and 25 will shrink before they become unstable conflict drivers.

Muslim populations in countries such as France and Germany will not exceed 15 percent by 2050, but in Russia, they may reach 30 percent. Muslim populations are not growing as fast as first thought and when they do, this does not necessarily equate to instability. Aging populations around the world will become an economic burden on states. Demographics and social issues within China suggest that if China’s economy does not surpass the U.S. economy by 2050, it probably never will. The U.S. will likely have the economic resources, birth rates, and migration numbers to continue to be the indispensable global leader beyond 2050. Warfare will increasingly be driven by money, technology, and skilled manpower more so than by the size of military forces. Finally, the U.S. Air Force should not let the shrinking zone of global instability and the current focus on counterinsurgency operations detract from its long-term future and its need to enhance interoperability with partner states.
The book is packed full of interesting statistics, insightful information, and trend analysis. My only qualm is that most of the diagrams used to illustrate, compare, and contrast country data are exceedingly difficult to read. There is entirely too much data packed into these diagrams, making them very difficult to digest. That aside, the book is an interesting read that will appeal to a wide array of readers, from military and government agency professionals to academic scholars and graduate students in such fields as economics, political science, and international relations.

David A. Anderson, Ph.D., LtCol, USMC, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform
Paul R. Pillar, Columbia University Press
New York, 2011, 355 pages, $29.50

During the 11 October 2012 vice presidential debates, Vice President Joe Biden stated that the Obama administration’s initial responses to the 11 September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi were based on the U.S. intelligence community’s immediate assessments of what occurred. For two weeks after the attacks, the administration placed most of the blame for the consulate attacks on a U.S. citizen-made video that purportedly insulted the Prophet Mohammed. Unfortunately, the day prior to Biden’s remarks, U.S. State Department personnel involved with the incident, before the House Committee of Oversight and Government Reform, had contradicted the administration’s initial response to the incident. Many immediate reactions to Biden’s remarks were that he had thrown the intelligence community “under the bus.”

In Paul Pillar’s book, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform, the primary theme is that U.S. political leaders selectively use intelligence to achieve policy goals. In some cases (as in the claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction [WMD], which precipitated the Iraq War of 2003), Pillar accuses the George W. Bush administration of making up its own intelligence and then blaming the intelligence community for getting it wrong. Although Pillar discusses the run-up to the Iraq War of 2003 and WMDs, he also touches on more distant examples of intelligence politicization (Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam), and spends a large portion of the book on 9/11 and the subsequent reform of the intelligence community, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission.

Pillar not only takes the Bush administration to task, but he also gives his perspective of the role of the U.S. Congress in politicization of intelligence. For example, he asks if Congress sufficiently questioned the Bush administration’s evidence for the 2003 Iraq invasion. Pillar’s assertion is that neither the Republicans nor the Democrats did. The larger and probably more relevant part of the book is spent on 9/11 and the subsequent 9/11 Commission, whose subsequent report brought about the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the resulting subordination of the CIA to the DNI. Pillar’s view is that the entire 9/11 Commission report was biased and its reforms misguided and ineffective.

Pillar’s book is extremely detailed and informative, providing a better understanding of just how hard it is to be an intelligence professional in a world where all that matters is being wrong . . . once.

James M. Burcalow, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LIBERATING KOSOVO: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention
Cambridge, MA, 234 pages, $27.00

David Phillips has produced a great diplomatic history about the U.S. intervention in the Balkans and the subsequent independence of Kosovo. He captured unique political insights from his interviews and personal experience as a humanitarian deeply involved in the crisis. Like Dean Acheson and George Kennan in earlier times, he evaluates a State Department leadership that expanded its mission in Europe with renewed activism.

Richard Holbrooke becomes a heroic figure in this book as he wrestles with Slobodan Milosevic during a series of intense negotiations. Phillips details Kosovo Albanian difficulties with the
peaceful leadership of Ibrahim Rugova and the ascendance of violence through the Kosovo Liberation Army. Too often, the United States rewarded the Kosovo Albanians after they behaved badly and used intimidation tactics on Kosovo Serbs. The author is sympathetic to the plight of the Kosovo Albanians but honest about their deficiencies, which has not endeared him to Kosovo leadership since independence.

The book’s strength is its depth of understanding concerning the interplay between U.S. government officials and the Albanians, including their Diaspora. Congressman Eliot Engel and Senator Robert Dole figure prominently as they help develop support for a new U.S. approach against European misgivings.

The book’s weakness is an absence of discussion about how, despite Secretary William Cohen’s misgivings, the Defense Department leadership reluctantly interacted with the State Department on coercive diplomacy. It was a difficult relationship as Secretary Madeleine Albright and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke advocated the use of military force to bring Milosevic to the bargaining table. General Wesley Clark was out of step with Cohen and Pentagon generals. Clark’s later dismissal should be a cautionary tale for other commanders navigating through confusing guidance from Washington.

Phillips sees this humanitarian intervention as controversial but a “multilateral success” in the national interest. A lesson from Kosovo is that the United States “cannot intervene everywhere, but that does not mean it cannot intervene anywhere.” Intervention involves risks like the longer-term implications of the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy—embarrassing China and Russia diplomatically does have costs. Russian President Vladimir Putin still exploits this grievance when it suits his purposes.

It is uncertain if the further fragmenting of Yugoslavia to form Kosovo, one of the poorest countries in Europe, was worth it. The cultural divisions between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs since the war have exacerbated with even greater physical division as more Serbs have moved north of the Ibar River.

David Phillips’ account is worth reading by military officers examining past applications of American military power in pursuit of diplomatic objectives. Phillips’ perspective is especially important since Holbrooke can no longer help us to fill in the missing pieces. The humanitarian impulse within foreign policy circles, which he aptly describes, will continue to be significant as the United States struggles with the responsibility of other nations to protect their people.

James Cricks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WAR, WILL, AND WARLORDS: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001–2011

ROBERT CASSIDY PROVIDES a unique view of past and present challenges in countering the insurrections in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While many authors intend to examine these challenges as a whole, most actually weight their analysis on one side of the Durand Line. However, Cassidy has succeeded in examining these separate but related insurrections. He has a unique perspective as a U.S. Army colonel who served as a special assistant to the commander of the coalition operational-level headquarters for Afghanistan.

The overarching point of War, Will, and Warlords is that there is hope for Afghanistan but not for Pakistan. Cassidy frames his analysis through three fundamentals of counterinsurgency: legitimacy of the host nation government, use of credible force to protect the population, and information operations integrated with other activities. He sets the stage by illustrating how Afghan history includes periods of stability when the methods of governance and security were truly Afghan, demonstrating that foreign methods do not last. Cassidy also explains Pakistan’s long-standing habit of using unconventional warfare to achieve its policy goals and how this affects Afghanistan.

Cassidy argues the first eight years in Afghanistan were a strategic economy of force. Consequently, the effort was unlikely to succeed due to a fundamental mismatch of ends, ways, and means; there simply were not enough resources to achieve the desired ends. Cassidy shows how this led to lack of legitimacy, inability to protect the population, and ineffective information operations. The situation in Afghanistan led to the insurrection
growing in Pakistan, which heavy-handed Pakistani counterinsurgency methods exacerbated. Moreover, the Pakistani government continued its dual game: on one hand, encouraging the insurgents as proxies who protect Pakistan’s regional interests, and on the other hand, conducting operations against the insurgents to protect its internal control of the country and placate the U.S. government.

Counterinsurgency efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan changed dramatically between 2009 and 2011. In Afghanistan, the coalition provided additional resources and the Afghan National Security Forces increased in size and capability, allowing larger counterinsurgency efforts. While guarded in his optimism for Afghanistan, Cassidy paints a much bleaker picture of counterinsurgency in Pakistan. While Pakistani security forces prosecuted less punitive military operations against insurgent groups after 2009, Pakistani operations were still largely conventional in nature. Nevertheless, Pakistan will continue its duplicitous game due to internal politics and its perception of India.

War, Will, and Warlords provides insight into recent counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan and thought-provoking insights and recommendations for the future. While essential reading for those deploying to the area, Cassidy’s work will prove informative for any student of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and irregular warfare. This book is an excellent read for those who wish to understand the strategic and operational challenges of conducting counterinsurgency in the region.

LTC Jon Klug, Fort Leavenworth Kansas

SIMULATING WAR: Studying Conflict through Simulation Games
Philip Sabin, Continuum International Publishing Group, New York 2012, 416 pages, $34.95

The use of war games and simulations as an aid to military education and training has a long history. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that there is so little written about how to use war games in the classroom. This is particularly so given the prodigious amounts of paper that are often devoted to the latest fads of thinking or teaching. Massive computer simulations sometimes take days to run and often focus more on the process of doing something than on the lessons learned from the study of a campaign. Philip Sabin, a professor in the War Studies Department of King’s College in London, has written a book explaining the theory and mechanics of designing and running simulations that actually aids the student in understanding the study of a conflict—no mean feat.

Sabin points out that the main problem with computer simulations (despite the potential for immense levels of detail and the use of sophisticated tools for the user) is that the user often does not need to understand the system the designers have created, whereas with a board or tabletop game, the user has to. The latter “obviously requires a lot more intellectual effort from the user.” In a classroom setting, it is the critical thinking that occurs during the interaction between humans (something that cannot happen with a computer) that is most important for us as we try to create future leaders who need to be adaptive, critical thinkers.

The act of playing the simulation with others is the key to this learning. A simulation includes a set of guidelines that first must be understood by the players (which requires critical thinking) to determine if the guidelines make sense in the context of the scenario being simulated. When done well, this is an excellent method of getting students to think about the implications of their ideas.

The book has three parts. The first part explains the basic theory behind the design of war gaming simulations. Sabin covers the modeling of war, the nature of abstraction and accuracy, the educational utility of the idea, and how to conduct research for constructing a simulation project. The second part covers the mechanics of designing the actual simulation, providing the reader with the tools to design and construct a simulation. The last part contains several actual simulations to aid the user in understanding how the concept works. Particularly helpful is a download from King’s College of actual simulation components used in Sabin’s masters’ classes.

For those thinking of using or who are already playing simulations as a training or teaching aid, I highly recommended Simulating War.

Nicholas Murray, D.Phil., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
WHENEVER A COUNTRY’S government or ruling entity is weak or has trouble controlling portions of its land or population, there likely has been a warlord power-broker to fill the void. In Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States, Kimberly Marten uses current examples to demonstrate how outsourcing security to tribal or ethnic leaders (who play by their own rules) leads to short-term success for a state, but in the end leads to long-term state failure. Marten defines warlords as individuals who control small pieces of territory through a combination of force and patronage. The warlords rule in defiance of genuine state sovereignty, but also exist due to the complicity of the state’s leaders.

Marten puts together a lucid discussion that has two goals: to answer why state leaders allow warlords and their followers to coexist alongside or even in lieu of a legitimate state government and to explain the relationship among warlords, sovereign states, stability, security, and peace. Whether it is because of the fear of increased casualties by the sovereign state or the lack of funds required to pacify lawless areas, the author shows how many countries have opted to empower local power-brokers. They provide a skewed stability and security in their own areas of influence. However, once the genie is out of the bottle, there are significant long-term ramifications.

Although she could have used numerous examples throughout the world (e.g., Africa and Central or South America), Marten chose four contemporary examples to make her case about the problem of sovereign leaders choosing their own short-term political survival at the expense of the long-term interest of their nation.

The author’s first example is an in-depth analysis of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the history of how the British Empire and post-colonial and current Pakistani government supported a system where tribal leaders (warlords) are appointed by the government and have de facto control.

Marten’s second and third examples involve Russia and the fragmentation of the Soviet empire. Her analysis of Georgia shows how President Saakashvili’s failure to remove an anti-Russian warlord led to the disastrous August 2008 war. This is a reminder that compromise with a powerful external actor is sometimes prudent. The second post-Soviet era example is the breakaway Republic of Chechnya. Ramzan Kadyrov was cultivated and later empowered by Vladimir Putin to manage Chechnya in a manner acceptable to Russia. This is a unique example in that Russia sought this relationship (rather than merely accepting it like other examples) as a way to outsource domestic security for the sake of convenience.

In the last example, Marten uses the 2005-2006 Sahwa (awakening) movement by the Sunni tribes when they turned on Al-Qaeda in Iraq and supported coalition efforts to truly turn the tide in that war. Marten points out that the movement known as the Sons of Iraq was highly successful at the operational level, but due to the Sunni-Shi’a divide in Iraq, it could never truly lead to strategic reconciliation.

Marten concludes her book with 11 hypotheses on the advantages and disadvantages of empowering or allowing a warlord situation to develop. She argues that warlords can indeed serve important roles in maintaining the peace, but they come at the cost of state building and development, an economy skewed to patronage networks and criminality, and will likely lead to long-term state failure.

I highly recommend Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States for anyone studying international relations or those working in foreign policy positions in the Department of State when faced with a developing or already entrenched warlord situation. The book is relevant considering today’s worldwide economic concerns and weak states’ limited capacity to control their own people and territory.

LTC David T. Seigel, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DONUT DOLLY: An American Red Cross Girl’s War in Vietnam
Joann Puffer Kotcher
University of North Texas Press, Denton
2011, 384 pages, $24.95

DONUT DOLLY: An American Red Cross Girl’s War in Vietnam is the riveting first-hand account
of Joann Puffer Kotcher’s experiences as a program director for the American Red Cross in the early years of the Vietnam War. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam granted the Red Cross permission to provide recreation for troops anywhere in the combat zone, thus officially permitting women in the battle zone for the first time. The Donut Dollies’ primary mission was to serve as a reminder of home and form a sisterly or girl-next-door-type bond with soldiers. The women greeted military personnel, distributed donuts, coffee, or other provisions, and entertained troops with a variety of recreational games. Kotcher details her daily life as a Donut Dolly and describes the importance of her wartime role.

Kotcher relates the dangers she faced while in Vietnam and the extraordinary fear that became a way of life. She quickly became aware that the light blue uniforms worn by Donut Dollies made them easy targets.

Kotcher also brings to life the specifics of her daily life in Vietnam. While the Red Cross women were instructed to strictly follow rules of modesty and to remain aware of their image, they received an immense amount of attention. It was not unlikely for soldiers to profess their feelings toward the beautiful young women stationed in Vietnam.

Kotcher credits these Red Cross “girls” as being pioneers. They opened doors previously closed to women and their efforts helped the military realize women could be beneficial in a combat zone. At the end of the Vietnam War, women were not sent back into the home as they had been in prior wars. The sacrifices and hard work of the Donut Dollies depicted women as assets in the workforce. I recommend Donut Dolly to those interested in the advancements of the role of women in the armed forces.

Ms. Siobhan E. Ausberry, Washington, D.C.

SAVING BIG BEN: The USS Franklin and Father Joseph T. O’Callahan
John R. Satterfield, Naval Institute Press
Annapolis, MD, 2011, 175 pages, $23.00

There are few times in modern history as dramatic as the Battle of Britain. For months, Great Britain was poised on the edge of disaster against the greatest villain of the 20th century. Brook Stoddard’s World in the Balance captures the feeling of peril in his retelling of Britain’s finest hour. He weaves together technological and diplomatic developments that directly affected the evacuation at Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and Italy’s invasion of Egypt.

World in the Balance starts with the massacre of British and French soldiers in the French town of
Wormhoudt. Stoddard argues that the massacre was part of a Nazi policy of ruthlessness that the Germans used during their invasion of Poland. (The SS committed most of the massacres that Stoddard mentions, but the *Wehrmacht* has recently been shown to have been equally bloodthirsty.)

Stoddard begins his description of the Battle of Britain straightforwardly with the Miracle at Dunkirk and follows the struggles of the British for the next five months. Churchill and the Royal Air Force (RAF) are the clear heroes and protagonists. Hugh Dowding, the head of RAf fighter command, and his subordinates, Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Keith Park, who commanded the fighter groups that took the brunt of the fighting, also play large roles. Stoddard also provides some oral histories and experiences of the RAf fighters who fought off Göring’s *Luftwaffe*.

The book’s organization is perhaps its best feature. Narrative chapters of battles alternate with discussions of technological and diplomatic developments. These chapters focus on Bletchley Park’s race to break the Enigma code, the development of radar, propaganda efforts by both Britain and Germany, and Churchill’s efforts to secure foreign assistance from the United States. These chapters give excellent overviews of technological development and work. The diplomatic chapter gives a sense of Churchill’s broad perspective and foresighted efforts to fight fascist aggression on a global scale. For example, despite the desperate need to defend the British mainland, Churchill dispatched large numbers of tanks to defend Egypt. The British had barely arrived when the Italians launched their ill-fated invasion.

One major quibble with Stoddard’s book is that when discussing the Nazis’ rise to power and ideology, he depends mostly on William Shirer’s *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*—an excellent book but one that is rather dated. Despite this, Stoddard does an admirable job of showing the Battle of Britain for what it was—a struggle between liberal democracy and fascism, which would determine the fate of Europe and the world. This is a fine retelling of one of history’s great turning points.

**John E. Fahey, Lafayette, Indiana**

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**HITLER**

A.N. Wilson, Basic Books

**HITLER BY A.N. WILSON** is a nonscholarly account of Adolf Hitler that explores how such an indolent man, lacking any interest in politics, could coerce a country and later become chancellor of Germany. He is described as a man who not only freewheeled through life without much responsibility until almost 25, but also was denied a promotion in World War I due to his lack of leadership skills. He was awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class because of the officers he knew as a regimental message runner, not for having any direct combat involvement.

His failed beer hall putsch of 1923 inspired supporters for National Socialism and earned Hitler prison time, where he wrote *Mein Kampf*. Hitler’s book—reeking with self-indulgence—became a best seller throughout Germany. Wilson argues that *Mein Kampf* was not necessarily the struggle of Hitler’s life, but the struggle or fight yet to come. It was the fight for Germany’s future and the world itself.

A gifted and passionate orator, Hitler captured his audience with oral and visual stimuli such as the Roman salute and mass rallies. Wilson claims that “Hitler was the first and most hypnotic artist of post-literacy, escalating himself as a maestro of political manipulation.” However, Hitler was also an incurable liar who lacked any personality traits of kindness or decency. His Machiavellian exploitation skills, along with his flair for violence, propelled him to wrest control of Germany from men unlike himself, those who excelled at leadership and organizational abilities.

Hitler despised Catholicism, yet copied many of its programs. For instance, he duplicated its educational programs to instruct the Hitler Youth. As Hitler prepared for war and his mental instability became more pronounced, Wilson psychoanalyzes that Hitler threw temper tantrums when he lacked rational decision-making skills or feared the intellect of others. A man devoid of rational emotions, Hitler was unable to portray the same affection to humans as he did to canines. Through his final years, he became more withdrawn from reality and rationality. With Wilson’s rendition of Hitler, one wonders how it was possible that he ever became a national leader.

The text is poorly cited and consists of secondary research material, but it is an easy read and keeps the reader’s attention until the end.

**Scott J. Gaitley, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**
JOHN PRADOS’ NORMANDY Crucible brings to light new perspectives about the epic battle of Normandy and the impact it had on Allied and German operations throughout the remainder of World War II.

Prados incorporates two perspectives that have not been considered in much depth before. First, he introduces the Allied intelligence feed from ULTRA (the code word for deciphered German high-level communications) into Allied decision making and situational awareness. Second, Prados considers recent analysis of German casualty estimates, which may have been previously overstated. Prados argues that even after decades, German casualty numbers remain unchanged from the estimates given in reports immediately after the battle. It would seem unprecedented for the initial casualty estimates to remain unchanged after incorporating prisoner counts, burials, and German reports. Perhaps more German soldiers escaped from France than was originally thought.

Prados casts the Normandy campaign as a test for both Allied and German tactics, techniques, and even logistics. Lessons learned from this campaign shaped future outcomes: for the Allies, it brought new tensions among the multinational leadership and perhaps an overconfidence and failure to appreciate German capabilities. For the Germans, it brought a greater reliance on night operations to avoid the effects of Allied air superiority as well as the concept for a massive offensive operation directed at American forces (later known as the Battle of the Bulge).

Prados’ primary focus in Normandy Crucible is on the operational level of war. The book talks about specific tactical operations and engagements and relates these to operational objectives and decisions made by Allied and German leaders. The perspectives, combined with a new consideration of intelligence gained from ULTRA and a new view of losses suffered by the Wehrmacht, provide a different framework from which to understand this epic battle. The author sees a cauldron from which new and improved tactics and even faulty assumptions were formed. These assumptions, no doubt, shaped future events of the war.

The book is well written and informative. I recommend Normandy Crucible to anyone interested in World War II history.

LTC Thomas G. Meara, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

VOICES OF THE BULGE: Untold Stories from Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge
Michael Collins and Martin King
Zenith Press, Minneapolis, MN, 2011
320 pages, $29.00

VOICES OF THE Bulge relates battlefield accounts of soldiers and civilians who were on the ground in the Ardennes and Schnee Eifel in December 1944. The personal accounts come not only from U.S soldiers but also from German combatants and civilians.

Authors Michael Collins and Martin King set the stage from the German perspective and then overlay it with the state of the Allied forces in Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. This prepares the reader for the events that begin on 16 December 1944 and last into January 1945.

Each chapter reads as a new day with a situational update and follows with firsthand accounts of soldiers, many never told before. For this reason, the book is a worthy companion to the many accounts on the Battle of the Bulge. Some of the most intriguing stories are of the horrible atrocities committed against U.S. soldiers held as German prisoners of war.

There are thousands of stories from these events that have gone untold over the last 60-plus years. Many of them have been in the thoughts and nightmares of those who were there and have never spoken of them. Collins and King go to considerable lengths to ensure some of these stories are told—captured now on paper for posterity. The authors help capture the experiences of a generation rapidly fading away.

MAJ Daniel Rempfer, USA, Fort Leavenworth, KS
GALLIPOLI
Peter Hart, Oxford University Press
New York, 2011, 544 pages, $34.95

Peter Hart claims in the first sentence of his preface that his verdict of the entire operation in the Gallipoli campaign was “lunacy.” He discusses the 1915 British campaign that was to seize the Dardanelles straits and knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war. The focus of *Gallipoli* is on individual soldiers’ actions in the campaign as recounted from their diaries, letters, and personal memoirs. The book has three interwoven themes: the British War Cabinet was guilty of a gross error in strategy; the British Army failed completely in planning and carrying out the campaign; and the soldiers who fought in the campaign struggled valiantly under terrible conditions to achieve the impossible.

The 1915 campaign was an attempted turning movement on a grand scale. The *Entente* (Britain, France, and Russia) navies were to force the Dardanelles straits and enter the Black Sea. This would open sea lines of communications with Russia, knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war, entice the Balkan states to join the *Entente* powers, and open a new front against the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria). Germany would be forced to move reinforcements from France to meet this new threat. Hart argues instead that the war could only be won on the Western Front; diverting naval assets weakened the Home Fleet and forced Britain’s military to operate at the end of a long line of communications.

After a combined British/French fleet failed to force its way past the shore batteries and minefields in the straits, it was decided that a ground force would have to seize the Gallipoli peninsula on the north side of the straits to permit the fleet to pass. Amphibious landings were conducted by British and French forces to gain control of the peninsula. The landings put troops on the ground but without the combat power to defeat the Turkish defenders. Hart condemns the British Army for poor planning and leadership, particularly the commander, General Ian Hamilton. The newly raised divisions employed in the campaign were poorly trained and badly equipped, especially in artillery.

Hart’s book makes plain the dangers of committing inexperienced soldiers and untried leaders to battle. The debilitating effect on the soldiers of the harsh terrain, weather, disease, and poor supplies is also made clear.

The author may be correct in calling the Gallipoli campaign an act of “lunacy,” but he offers no evidence that the employment of the British Army divisions on the Western Front in 1915 would have accomplished anything. After all, if they were unable to defeat the Turkish Army, what would they have done against a veteran, highly professional Imperial German Army?

LTC David Bryan, USA, Louisville, Kentucky

THE LONG ROAD TO ANTIETAM:
How the Civil War Became a Revolution
Richard Slotkin, Liveright Publishing Corporation
New York, 2012, 478 pages, $32.95

Beyond the strategic premises surrounding the Battle of Antietam on 17 September 1862, eminent historian Richard Slotkin has given us an outstanding operational and tactical chronicle of warfare in the Virginia and Maryland campaigns of the American Civil War. The campaigns immediately led up to Antietam, whose significance lies not in the battle itself, “but in the campaign that produced it.” Slotkin’s narratives of maneuver and combat are enthralling and make up most of the book. This is no dry academic narrative. Slotkin bolsters his book with concise explanations of battlefield tactics and the pre-Antietam strategy that had been at an impasse for the Union, due in part to the vehemence of the Confederacy in their commitment to secession.

Why another book on a battle covered comprehensively by other historians an untold number of times in the past? As Slotkin explains, his new study shows clearly how the Civil War was “a genuinely revolutionary crisis in American history.” This was because of two monumental actions in the history of the United States: President Lincoln settled the question of civil over military authority, and the post-Antietam Emancipation Proclamation. The U.S. government went from a war of compromise and appeasement of...
the Confederacy to one of total victory through a strategic offensive against the South. Undeniably, “the Union could not be saved unless [Lincoln] . . . put slavery on the path to ultimate extinction.” The changes wrought by the Proclamation would indeed be revolutionary, for Lincoln had “negated the fundamental law of slavery,” augmenting the Proclamation through a nationwide suspension of habeas corpus that put even civilian dissenters at risk of arrest for fomenting anti-Proclamation sentiment. The effects of the Proclamation did not simply hold civil implications but national military ones as well, for it “undermined the Southern economy and social order by drawing large numbers of slaves away from their plantations.” Black men were recruited into Union military forces.

Integral to Slotkin’s thesis is the contention between Lincoln and his top field commander, George McClellan—a political general par excellence who’d take no risks in battle if it might have adversely affected his own anti-Lincoln political goals. As vacillation and indecisiveness plagued McClellan’s overcautious approach to embarking on a decisive battle, the Confederacy would seize the strategic initiative and invade the North.

The Lincoln-McClellan conflict was no simple matter of a difference of opinions among national leadership, for a Napoleonic-type seizure of the Federal government was a real option in McClellan’s mind and those of his close supporters. He doubted Lincoln’s strategy, as did many others in Washington, and he would openly offer political opinions to the Lincoln administration that sound treasonous to the modern military ear, and did as well to many contemporaries. But McClellan was a commander whose popularity among all ranks was nearly unanimous, causing Lincoln, in short, to maneuver the vanity and stubbornness of his field generals. Fortunately, for the Union and America’s future, throughout the Antietam-McClellan crisis “Lincoln had maintained his focus on the strategic essentials.”

At the risk of splitting the War Democrats, Lincoln fired McClellan on 7 November 1862, after the general refused to take the offensive against Confederate forces resurging in Virginia. McClellan’s refusal was the last straw. Lincoln ended McClellan’s threat of “crippling internal divisions at the highest level of strategy” in a crisis that had witnessed much fast and loose talk among generals of the need for a military dictatorship to seize the government.

Slotkin’s work has always been eminently readable to this reviewer, and in the current work he does not disappoint. However, what he has given us is not simply an accessible version of a popular subject—the American Civil War—but an incisive study of a monumental event in the history of Western democracy. The Long Road to Antietam is recommended not solely for the professional political and military historian but a much wider American audience, a perfect primer for anyone wanting to look into a pivotal crisis in American history.

Jeffrey C. Alfer, Torrance, California.


AUTHOR JOHN C. Tidball was a U.S artillery officer who served in many of the major eastern campaigns throughout the Civil War. When the war ended, Tidball was a brevet major general and later served as the superintendent of artillery instruction at the Artillery School.

The Artillery Service in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-65, edited by Lawrence Kaplan, is a series of previously published articles by Tidball tracing the evolution of the management and application of artillery in campaigns of the Civil War. As way of a stage setter for the reader, the first chapter gives the reader an overview of artillery organization, materiel, and personnel at the beginning and throughout the war, and defines some concepts that may be foreign to today’s artillerists. As way of reinforcement, Kaplan includes an edited extract from Henry J. Hunt (chief of artillery in the Army of the Potomac), which describes the organization and administration of U.S. artillery prior to and early in the war with discussions of efforts he made to more effectively manage field artillery within the Army of the Potomac.
Tidball discusses the eastern campaigns of the Peninsula Campaign, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and Petersburg. While the author’s personal experience was with the Army of the Potomac in many of these campaigns, for balance, editor Kaplan has included a previously unpublished manuscript by Tidball that discusses three western actions—Stones River, Chickamauga, and Shiloh. With each campaign, Tidball discusses changes in artillery management since the last campaign, the employment of artillery in the action, and its impact, as well as noting possible corrective action to make improvements.

Between 1861 and 1865, there was no artillery branch in the U.S. Army. Field artillery was primarily employed as a crew-served direct fire weapon or mortar; and command and control structure above battery level was marginal at best. Batteries were armed with multiple types and calibers of cannons. Sustainment issues were substantial. Batteries were employed piecemeal early in the war. Brigade or division commanders employed artillery if the terrain in their zone of action adequately supported its use. If the terrain did not, the batteries were sent to the rear and were out of the action. At times, significant amounts of combat power (artillery batteries) were not employed, to the detriment of the overall campaign. More effective artillery organization may have overcome this challenge.

The Artillery Service in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-65, is well written, follows logical paths, is relatively free of difficult military language and detail, and does not require the reader to be an expert in Civil War history. The book is easy to read and quickly gains the reader’s attention. I recommend the book for Civil War enthusiasts, novices or scholars alike, as well as U.S. military professionals, fire support or maneuver.

LtCol Terrance M. Portman, USMC, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
THE SAVIOR GENERALS: How Five Great Commanders Saved Wars That Were Lost: From Ancient Greece to Iraq

Victor Davis Hanson, 2013, Bloomsbury Press, New York, 256 pages, $28.00

Leading military historian Victor Davis Hanson returns to nonfiction in The Savior Generals, a set of brilliantly executed pocket biographies of five generals who single-handedly saved their nations from defeat in war. War is rarely a predictable enterprise—it is a mess of luck, chance, and incalculable variables. Today’s sure winner can easily become tomorrow’s doomed loser. Sudden, sharp changes in fortune can reverse the course of war.

These intractable circumstances are sometimes mastered by leaders of genius—asked at the eleventh hour to save a hopeless conflict, created by others, often unpopular with politics and the public. These savior generals often come from outside the established power structure, employ radical strategies, and flame out quickly. Their careers often end in controversy. But their dramatic feats of leadership are vital slices of history—not merely as stirring military narrative, but as lessons on the dynamic nature of consensus, leadership, and destiny. From the publisher.

HANNIBAL AND ME: What History’s Greatest Military Strategist Can Teach Us About Success and Failure


The life of Hannibal, the Carthaginian general who crossed the Alps with his army in 218 BCE, is the stuff of legend. And the epic choices he and his Roman enemies made on the battlefield and in life offer timeless lessons to us today about how we should respond to our own victories and defeats.

Inspired by ancient history, Hannibal and Me explores the triumphs and disasters in our lives by examining the decisions made by Hannibal and others, including Albert Einstein, Eleanor Roosevelt, Steve Jobs, Ernest Shackleton, and Paul Cézanne. Kluth shows why some overcome failure and others succumb to it, and why some fall victim to success while others thrive on it. The result is a page-turning adventure tale, a compelling human drama, and an insightful guide to understanding behavior. From the publisher.
Lieutenant Colonel Dave J. Banks, Retired, *Canadian Army*—The purpose of this note is to offer some comments on Colonel Thomas Williams’ excellent article, “Education for Critical Thinking” (*Military Review*, January-February 2013). I would also request that you pass my comments to the author. I am a retired Canadian Army Infantry officer, currently employed as a contractor in support of the training of headquarters and staffs for operations. My final military assignments were as a member of the Directing Staff of the Canadian Army Command and Staff College (both the Regular and the Reserve Courses). During my Regular Army career I was a Distinguished Graduate of USMC C&SC Quantico residency, and I had the good fortune to serve in a US CJTF HQ in Afghanistan.

I am in complete agreement with Colonel Williams’ argument, and I share similar concerns about our own PME up here. While we are quite good at teaching process and doctrine, we do not always do as well at educating our students to be critical thinkers. In my current job, when involved in the exercise of a formation HQ, I too often see the results: staff officers who can bang together a mean set of Powerpoint slides in a heartbeat, but whose depth of understanding or analysis of the operational issues is superficial to say the least.

As an example, when we teach the Operational Planning Process (very similar to your MDMP), we stress the importance of Step 2: Orientation. Or, at least, we say we do. Orientation is the step in the process during which the commander and staff develop a shared understanding of the nature and scope of the problem confronting them, and identify the shape of a possible solution (end state). What actually happens all too often (sadly, too frequently with the complicity or even the urging of the Directing Staff) is that the students rush to crank out a Mission Analysis slide deck as fast as they can. Sometimes I have worried that we do too good a job of engendering “check-list thinking,” or “doctrine playback,” instead of real thinking and analysis.

From my own observations, U.S. forces may have similar issues to our own Army. A nice tangible briefing deck is a simple “measure of effectiveness” that everybody can grasp. The depth and quality of the thinking behind it are things that some people may find a bit too “fuzzy” or “squishy” to worry much about. The ultimate result of this type of thinking, in my opinion, is the tendency to fixate on measures of effectiveness that are easy to quantify (and brief well), as opposed to those that are harder to quantify but may actually be much more relevant. I certainly lived this when I was in uniform: counting AK47s confiscated, or number of mines lifted, or number of kilometers of road opened, are all just “measures of performance” masquerading as real “measures of effectiveness.” What (if anything) they actually mean is something that sometimes never gets talked about.

A final complicating factor that the colonel did not address in his article is that our young officers (in both our militaries) are products of societies in which critical thinking is an almost extinct art. The most outrageous nonsense is instantly propagated by digital means, by the media, by politicians of all stripes, etc., all with the spurious air of authority that “being on the ‘Net’” gives it. Some people might be surprised to discover that Twitter is really not a substitute for critical thinking about factual evidence. Teaching people to actually stop and think about something can be a big challenge.
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