
At any moment, it is possible that a necessity might arise for my relief and consequent demotion. If so, you are not to worry about it. . . . If it becomes expedient to reduce me, I would be the first to recommend it.—General Dwight D. Eisenhower, letter to his son, 1942

THE GENERALS IS a controversial but nonetheless important read for military professionals seeking to understand the management of Army generals over the last 70 years. General Eisenhower’s letter to his son indicates that even Eisenhower thought he could be relieved at any time. Clearly, there have been changes in the management of generals in the Army. Readers may be tempted to dismiss Tom Ricks’ book as one written by a prejudiced outsider, a journalist who has never served as a soldier. This would be a mistake. The Generals contains considerable research, much from first-hand sources of soldiers, officers, and general officers. Those sources frame Ricks’ discussion. Ricks also draws material from letters, journals, and duty logs. The reader gets the feeling of looking over the shoulder of people engaged in one of the most dangerous and vital endeavors in which military professionals engage: fighting and winning the wars.

The Generals centers on accountability, using General George C. Marshall as the gold standard. Ricks claims that the current general officer management approach removes generals for moral lapses that embarrass the institution, not for a lack of competence. Marshall fired several generals after Pearl Harbor and instituted a “hire and fire” approach to general officer management. Ricks claims the relief of a general officer under Marshall was not an indication of something broken within the institution; rather, it was viewed as the system working properly. He cites instances where relief of a general did not necessarily end that general’s career, with some doing well in later commands.

Ricks claims the Army suffered devolution from the Marshall “hire and fire” approach to one where generals only rarely depart their jobs owing to their incompetence. Ricks’ negative examples include Generals Tommy Franks and Ricardo Sanchez, both of whom he views as overly tactically focused. Both lacked a vision of the strategic aims of the wars they prosecuted. Ricks suggests they epitomized generals who understood how to start a war but not how to end one. Ricks quotes Colonel Paul Yingling who famously claimed, “As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war.” Ricks’ suggests a solution to this imbalance is to return to the Marshall approach.

Ricks also holds Marshall up as the standard to meet in military to civilian relations. He describes Marshall as at times cold and impersonal, one who kept his personal distance from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Ricks describes incidents where Marshall stood up to and disagreed with him—a role Marshall would probably argue as vital for a general in his position. Ricks also shows Marshall as dedicated to speaking truth to power, engaging the president in the strategic approach to the war.

Ricks describes General Maxwell Taylor in contrast to Marshall as the quintessential politicized general officer. He describes Taylor’s use of the White House as his base, a politically motivated disposition for improving his own status at the expense of the institution and the nation. The most notable difference Ricks describes between Marshall and Taylor is their use of candor. He describes Marshall as a straight shooting, “what-you-see is-what-you-get” kind of general, whereas Taylor tended to be less forthright. Ricks argues that this approach at the top infected the entire institution. He cites the results of a 1972 opinion poll of the “perceived truthfulness of 20 occupations, army generals ranked 14th behind lawyers . . . but ahead of politicians and used car salesmen.”
Ricks argues for a return to Marshall’s style as a professional, that of candid discourse between generals and their civilian leaders. This is so, Ricks’ says, because wars waged by a democracy must be executed through a dynamic collaboration between military and civilian leaders.

The last chapter of The Generals is among the most compelling. Here, Ricks makes his case for how to proceed. Military professionals should engage in a meaningful dialogue. Some recommended discussion questions: Is it true that the general officer corps needs more accountability and if so, is firing generals an effective way to manage them and improve accountability? How can we better groom officers (potential generals) to lead us through the challenges of an uncertain future? What are officer promotions based on, performance or potential? If potential, how should potential be measured and by whom?

Both civilian and military DOD personnel should read the book. Some readers may find Ricks’ premises questionable and his conclusions unsatisfying. However, rather than avoiding a controversial discussion, the Army and the rest of the Department of Defense should face this discourse head-on and use it to improve itself. Even if some think he fails to diagnose the disease, the symptoms he describes are undeniable, as evinced yet again in the recent series of senior officer meltdowns. The Generals is an excellent source for leader development programs.

LTC Richard A. McConnell, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

JOE ROCHEFORT’S WAR:
The Odyssey of the Code Breaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway,
Elliott Carlson, USNI Press, Annapolis, MD, 2011, 616 pages, $36.95

On 2 December 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel joked to Lieutenant Commander Edwin T. Layton, “What, you don’t know where the carriers are? Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn’t know it?” Layton replied that he hoped they would be sighted before then. In fact, the Japanese strike force was actually steaming northwest of Oahu en route to its rendezvous with destiny.

Pearl Harbor is an American disaster that has attained iconic status. “Remember the Alamo,” “Remember the Maine,” and “Remember Pearl Harbor” all have this stature. There is a tragic sense that Pearl Harbor could have been avoided in the same way it seems unreal the Titanic sank on her maiden voyage.

What matters about Pearl Harbor is not what might have been but what we have yet to learn from the sad events of that Sunday more than 70 years ago. Understanding what enabled a surprise attack illuminates aspects of American decision making that seem to be enduring, but need not be.

Joe Rochefort’s War is an essential addition to the library of any military professional who wants to learn the nature of signals intelligence from soup to nuts, including traffic analysis, which was particularly useful during the war. Commander Rochefort and his team later enabled the U.S. Navy to ambush the Imperial Japanese Navy at Midway and defeat them decisively. But in 1941, Joe Rochefort got it wrong. He came close to getting it right, but in the end, his analysis and equally important his assumptions led him to estimate the Japanese would attack, but not at Pearl Harbor. Rochefort was not alone in this assumption. U.S. decision makers widely shared this belief; it was an article of faith.

Roberta Wohlstetter’s Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision is arguably the standard for understanding just how Japan managed to surprise the United States that December morning. Wohlstetter’s examination of the decision-making apparatus in the United States that enabled good people to reach catastrophically wrong conclusions is, in a word, brilliant.

Decision makers often demonstrate an almost terminal capacity to ignore evidence that does not meet their expectations. Mistakes similar to those made before Pearl Harbor occurred in the run up to 9/11 during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Bureaucratic organization and competition often preclude unity of effort, let alone unity of command. Cohesion among decision makers limits their ability to examine alternatives or challenge assumptions. Excessive background noise inhibits their capacity to interpret the data accurately.

Other important books about Pearl Harbor include Alan D. Zimm’s Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Myths, Deceptions; Thomas B. Steely, Jr.’s, Pearl Harbor Countdown: Admiral James O. Richard-
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son; and George Victor’s *The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable*. Japanese sources include Hiroyuki Agawa’s *The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy* (translated by John Bester); Admiral Matome Ugaki’s *Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-1945* (translated by Masataka Chihaya); and *God’s Samurai: Lead Pilot at Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon.

What emerges from these books deepens and enriches Wohlstetter’s effort. Each book has something to say that deserves hearing. Zimm’s analysis of the attack on Pearl Harbor focuses on a systems analysis approach to the problem largely from the perspective of the Japanese. He illuminates Japanese motives, their preparation, and most important their objectives for the attack. In doing so, he largely debunks the commonly held view of Japanese brilliance. The myth, according to Zimm, is that visionary Japanese officers, including Yamamoto, Genda, and Fuchida, managed to conceive and execute with genius in the face of recalcitrant admirals. Yet Yamamoto’s attack aimed not at the carriers but at the battleships. Yamamoto, too, appears to have concluded that sinking battleships would preclude effective action by the remainder of the U.S. Pacific fleet. Zimm is convincing on a number of counts including how big a risk the Japanese perceived they were taking. Why then did they succeed?

What seems least likely is the explanation offered in Victor’s *The Pearl Harbor Myth*. Victor raises a number of excellent questions that challenge the “official” story of the events leading to Pearl Harbor, but in the end, he suggests Pearl Harbor happened because President Roosevelt and his senior leaders used the Pacific Fleet to tantalize the Japanese into attacking. While the idea is plausible—given the way governments work—as an explanation for Pearl Harbor, it requires a level of cynical competence that seems unlikely at best. A more likely explanation for Roosevelt’s decision to leave the fleet in Hawaiian waters following Fleet Problem XXI in the spring of 1940 is that he genuinely thought the presence of the battle fleet in Hawaii would deter the Japanese.

James O. Richardson, the admiral who preceded Husband E. Kimmel in command of the fleet, did not agree. In *Pearl Harbor Countdown*, he focuses on the considerable resource problems that emerged with the fleet crammed into Pearl Harbor, which was too small and too hard to get in and out of and lacked sufficient means to overhaul vessels. Pearl Harbors’ limitations were such that Richardson kept the fleet at sea or in anchorages nearby when he could. He lobbied against the decision to leave the fleet in Hawaiian waters until the president relieved him.

Reading the Japanese sources is important, too. Wohlstetter did not have them at hand when she studied the problem. Like their American opponents, Yamamoto, Ugaki, and Fuchida often made faith-based decisions. In October 1941, Ugaki confided in his diary, “Our capacity to produce planes and replenish air crews are two causes of anxiety.” But in the next sentence, like Stonewall Jackson, he determined not to take counsel of his fears. Fuchida quoted Admiral Nagumo, the striking force commander, “When men work as hard as we have on this operation, providence will favor them with its blessing.” Yamamoto’s reservations about going to war with the United States are well known. Less well known is that in September 1941 he said, “The Pearl Harbor raid has become an article of faith.” Clearly, Yamamoto, the poker player and cold-blooded rationalist, had his convictions. *Humans, whether Japanese or American, find it difficult to accept evidence of things they do not believe.* Here ends the lesson.

COL Greg Fontenot, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


*An army marches on its stomach.*—Napoleon Bonaparte

*Amateurs talk about strategy. Professionals talk about logistics.*—Omar N. Bradley

*Logistics has become the key to American power and prosperity.*—David Axe

After reading reporter David Axe’s missives on war and technology for years, I had no doubt his book, *From A to B*, would accurately depict logistics from an “on-the-ground” perspective and incorporate the latest in technological advances. He did not disappoint.

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From A to B is a great survey of the importance of logistics to our military and our globalized economy. Axe examines all possible modes to transport men and materiel around the globe—from cars and trucks to ships and airplanes to zeppelins and space planes.

The book begins by establishing the importance of logistics to our military operations and makes it clear that it is dirty, dangerous work that is probably the most complex aspect of military planning. He provides as an example the logistical surge of mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) trucks into Iraq and Afghanistan to protect American troops. Axe discusses an alternate solution to the expensive MRAPs—robotically controlled logistical transport. Consider the merging of today’s commercial trucks with the technological power of unmanned aerial vehicles. These vehicles could decrease the need for manned vehicles on dangerous roads and provide more time and attention to manned security vehicles.

Axe’s section on our “most capacious and under-appreciated logistical system: her naval ships” is amazing. The depiction of how difficult, yet crucial, at-sea refueling is to power projection throughout the world provided me a much greater appreciation of how the United States is unlike any other navy in the history of the world.

When Axe moves to airlift, it is obvious his example would be Afghanistan. He has covered this subject extensively in his reporting. Anyone paying attention to the war will understand the sheer magnitude of logistically supplying the country, as well as transporting troops throughout this diverse and hazardous geographic area. Axe does a great job of describing the criticality of robust logistical lift capabilities like the CH-47 Chinook.

Finally, Axe delves into two future capabilities for logistics—airships and space planes. The fact that modern airship technology could transport an entire battalion 4,000 miles, at 100 miles per hour, at 60 percent the cost of an airplane was astounding. While he does discuss the difficulty airships have in adverse weather, he does not address how airships could overcome the adverse conditions war always brings (such as antiair defenses). His discussion of a space plane that could carry materiel, and possibly personnel, anywhere in the world in two hours was intriguing.

From A to B is an engaging look at the diverse influences future technologies will have on our ability to move and supply our troops and our economy. Axe continues to entertain and inform—and his closing comment is a clarion call: “World-beating logistics requires investment on a national scale. That kind of investment requires political will.”

CPT Nathan Finney, USA, Belmont, Massachusetts

THE SCHOOL OF HARD KNOCKS: Combat Leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces
Richard S. Faulkner,
Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2012, 392 pages, $65.00

Richard S. Faulkner has rightly named his book The School of Hard Knocks. The combat leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) did in fact learn the lessons of war the hard way, often at the expense of soldiers’ lives. Our history, leadership, and tactics books conveniently ignored the faults of the AEF’s combat leadership for years. After all, the war, a short one, at that, was won in part because of America’s involvement.

Some recent books on AEF leadership failures, such as Robert Ferrell’s 2004 Collapse at Meuse-Argonne: The Failure of the Missouri-Kansas Division, are about specific units, as if they were an anomaly, but Faulkner exposes how widespread the unpreparedness of our combat leadership actually was. There were indeed many hard lessons learned in World War I, as NCO and commissioned officer selection and training set the conditions for leadership challenges on the battlefield.

Faulkner guides the reader from officer training just before the war, during the vast buildup, and in France, where the hard knocks would fall. He also addresses the junior officer “ninety-day wonders” and ad-hoc methods of selecting NCOs, or “jumped-up sergeants.” The relationships between the leaders and the led, including those of supposedly experienced allied army trainers, are revealing.

Faulkner has invested years of research to produce this insightful and entertaining book. He combines factual information with real-life occurrences. Sending young and fully prepared NCOs
and officers to lead units in combat after their initial training is a daunting task. World War I was an example of the price this country paid in blood because of an inadequately trained NCO and officer corps. Faulkner makes the point that the young officers and NCOs were patriotic, educated, dedicated, and brave, and did the best they could under the conditions they faced. Most of their difficulties were due to systemic problems associated with America’s lack of preparedness to fight a modern, extremely lethal war. Perhaps just as critical was the Army’s willingness to accept quantity over quality during the massive build up of the AEF, in the belief that maintaining a small army is preferable during peacetime because “we can always ramp up” during times of war.

LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

VICTORY FOR HIRE: Private Security Companies’ Impact on Military Effectiveness

THE UNITED STATES used more private security contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq than deployed military. Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) sold logistical services to the United States in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, and Blackwater sold diplomatic security services in Iraq. Victory for Hire looks at how private security contractors affect military effectiveness.

The use of private security contractors as “force extenders” has grown recently, as have the scandals in which the contractors became involved. DynCorp employees were involved in Bosnian child prostitution, the murder of an Iraqi taxi driver, and wasted millions of dollars in Iraq. Over 380 KBR employees were wounded and about 80 were killed in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan. KBR’s president went to jail for bribing Nigerians, and KBR paid $570 million in fines and settlements in related cases. Blackwater staff murdered Iraqis, and senior board members illegally possessed automatic weapons in the United States. Citizens and politicians question the legality, value, and morality of using contractors instead of military members in war zones. Scandals involving force extenders are not new. Mercenaries have served nearly every army from ancient Egypt to the present. However, the repeated controversies about force extenders have not stopped their use.

How can we best use private security contractors? Should they deploy with the U.S. military, work independently, or replace part of the military’s fighting forces? What problems and benefits come from each role? Can hiring private security contractors sometimes hurt the military’s effectiveness so badly that the contractors should not even be used? These are the issues Molly Dunigan analyzes in Victory for Hire.

Dunigan uses past examples to illustrate when and how contractors have succeeded or failed. Her examples, analysis, and conclusions will be valuable for military leaders who work with security contractors, to citizens concerned about security contractor use, and to policy makers who decide whether to use them. Dunigan concludes with specific recommendations for policy and regulatory changes.

MAJ Herman Reinhold, USAF, Retired, Athens, New York

CARTEL: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars
Sylvia Longmire, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011, 256 pages, $26.00

EXPERIENCED BORDER SECURITY expert Sylvia Longmire’s Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drugs Wars addresses the Mexican cartels’ origins, sketches their operations within Mexico, and tackles their security implications for the United States and Mexico.

She outlines how the Guadalajara Cartel led by Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo aka El Padrino (The Godfather) flourished in the 1980s. Regarded as Mexico’s first drug czar and cartel lord to control all illegal narcotics trafficking in Mexico and associated corridors or plazas into the United States, Gallardo divided Mexico’s trafficking corridors during the late 1980s, and created a group of trusted protégés to manage them. Three of these protégés remain today, operating the Sinaloa, Juárez, and Tijuana Cartels.

Longmire identifies kidnapping as the second-biggest cartel moneymaker. However, she fails to
address other illicit cartel ventures such as counterfeit product sales (CDs, DVDs, and apparel), human trafficking, prostitution, and money laundering. She recognizes that the cartels are the “biggest armed force south of the border” and use increasingly effective and powerful weapons. However, she does not discuss their use of more advanced weapons systems such as the rocket-propelled grenade.

The author defines these organizations as a hybrid threat, a combination of terrorists, insurgents, and criminals and discusses how the United States and Mexico (and their subordinate agencies) are failing when it comes to law and policy. Unfortunately, she misidentifies not only the groups themselves, but terms such as “spillover violence.” She observes that adding the concept of “winning” into the equation muddies the waters and makes it even harder for agencies to secure funding.

Longmire offers practical solutions to many of the critical problems addressed in her monograph. *Cartel* is a necessary read for those wanting a comprehensive look into the decade’s-old drug war affecting the United States and Mexico.

Tony Scheidel, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**THE NEW LEGIONS: American Strategy and The Responsibility of Power**

Edward B. Atkeson, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Lanham, MD, 2011, 211 pages, $35.00

Retired U.S. Army major general and senior fellow at the Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army, Edward Atkeson has written an interesting book recommending an unusual strategy to foster American strategic interests around the world. His thesis is that the United States could effectively use a U.S.-led foreign legion to extend its global reach as the world’s sheriff. The legionnaires would be motivated by the offer of U.S. citizenship after a number of years of service. He proposes paying the legionnaires less than the United States pays its active duty forces to avoid their being confused as mercenaries. The foreign legion soldiers would presumably be better trained and led than host nation police or military units and more readily accepted. Atkeson’s preferred example is the French Foreign Legion.

Atkeson first details the evolution of current international events that have been shaped by policies and decisions focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. He prefers to quote extensively from other national security observers and newspapers including Anthony Cordesman, Fareed Zakaria, Max Boot, the Washington Post, and the New York Times. His analysis provides nothing new to the discussion, but the summary is a spirited review of events.

In the second part of the book, Atkeson uses Dr. Thomas Barnett’s approach to analyze regional dysfunctions that are similar to Barnett’s “non-integrating gap.” While these country and regional excursions are informative, they do not enhance the argument for a foreign legion as a tool of U.S. policy. The chapters on Latin America, Cuba, Africa, and Asia provide details on the current political-military situation, but the reader gains little insight as to how the United States might use a legion there or if the host nation would support it.

Well written and footnoted, the book could be useful for scholars conducting research on this subject. The book’s biggest shortcoming is its inadequate discussion of the legality, perception, and potential use of American foreign legions. The book’s regional and country assessments are useful, but the author never uses the analysis effectively to further his case for a legion, nor does he question his assumption that U.S. domestic and international public opinion would support the legions.

LTC Stephen G. Whitworth, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**LEADING THE NARRATIVE: The Case for Strategic Communication**


If you are a public affairs officer (PAO), information operations officer, a commander at battalion and higher, or a professional communicator, *Leading the Narrative* is worth the time to read and refer to often. Mari K. Eder, a communication professional within the Army and the Department of Defense, examines various forms of communication to demonstrate how to use strategic communication and lead the narrative.

Eder skillfully explains all this via quotes and past communication events, lessons learned, and
advice from communications field operators in the media, military, and civilian sectors. One such piece of advice comes from journalist Richard Halloran, who counsels that the most important element in the relationship between the PAO and the journalist is the commander’s intent. The commander who has an open or transparent communications attitude and fosters a similar command climate will enable the PAO and his subordinates to do their jobs. A commander who wants a “palace guard” to avoid the issues and avoid communication will get “bad” press and provide inaccurate information to the public.

Eder’s discussion of strategic communication, an often ill-defined, overused expression that few understand and fewer know how to implement, is the best I have seen to date. She discusses the uses of new technology, social media, and trends in public opinion and weaves together a mosaic for both the professional and the layperson to grasp.

COL Steve Boylan, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE PAKISTAN CAULDRON: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability

THE PAKISTAN CAULDRON revolves around Benazir Bhutto’s rise, her assassination, and the actions and reactions of the Musharaf administration in dealing with her. Pakistan’s politics are tough to comprehend until one understands the role of the military (the corps commanders), the ethnic and class divides of the society, and the cultures of those divides and how they influence government and politics. Throw in relations with neighbors and allies, the Sunni-Shi’a split, the long history of government noninterference in the Western frontier regions, and the plunging economy, and the reader faces a very complex array. All of these factors are apparent to the author, although not to the average reader, who needs a better introduction to Pakistan and its environs. Once author James P. Farwell hits his stride, the book travels a smoother road and turns into a textbook on “strategic communications.”

The military professional should read this book for three reasons. First, it is about a vital region that borders on Afghanistan. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is a Western invention having little to do with the reality of the region and the lives of its populace. Yet a lasting solution to the Afghanistan conflict depends on the resolution of its border with Pakistan. Second, the book is about contemporary politics and U.S. influence on those politics. Americans understand little about Afghanistan yet deliberately exert their influence without sufficient regard for its culture, history, and geography. Third, Pakistan is a regional power in Southwest and Central Asia and a key Islamic country. The book’s emphasis is on presidential strategic communications, not military information operations. However, some of the best U.S. contacts with Pakistan are military-to-military, and the U.S. military needs to learn more about a troubled and sometimes troublesome region.

Lester W. Grau, Ph.D., LTC, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ARC OF EMPIRE: America’s Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam

THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION has captured significant attention in the last year. Events in the Middle East and Central Asia continue to vex U.S. foreign policy and military efforts, but they are increasingly becoming a landscape in the rear-view mirror as more emphasis on the greater Pacific region moves to center stage. Arc of Empire: America’s Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam provides insight into this complicated region. Authors Michael H. Hunt and Steven I. Levine offer a thought-provoking study of the four U.S. wars in the Pacific.

Hunt and Levine contend that the war with the Philippines, the war with Japan, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War were not separate and unconnected, but “phases in a U.S. attempt to establish and maintain a dominant position in eastern Asia sustained over some seven decades against considerable resistance.” Recognizing the provocative nature of this thesis, the authors devote their introduction to explaining how they use the term “empire.” They provide an objective, historically
based definition of the loaded term and reinforce
the definition with four case studies. The studies
appear as chapters, one for each of the four wars,
and provide an excellent overview of each conflict,
drawing connections among them. Primary sources
substantiate their perspective, and the book has a
strong international emphasis that details both sides
of each conflict.

Even though Levine and Hunt concede that U.S.
involvements in the Pacific have demonstrated
most of the features of an empire, concluding that
the United States has engaged in intentional empire
building is a stretch. Generous post-World War II
agreements and American-led reconstruction efforts
helped Japan achieve enough autonomy to become
a formidable economic competitor in the late 1980s.
Japan, whether rebuilt as a counterpoint to China or as
a consumer for American exports, does not seem to be
the result of a purposeful American plan for empire.

The authors do not discuss General George
Marshall’s efforts to broker a peace between the
Chinese Communists and Nationalists in 1945, nor
his request to Chiang Kai-Shek to halt his offensive
against the Chinese Communists in June 1946.
Would not a real empire have pushed the National-
ists to overcome the Red Army since the National-
ists were far more sympathetic to U.S. interests?

On the other hand, the United States did allow
the French to regain control of Indochina after
World War II. As the authors indicate, U.S. support
for neo-colonialism in this instance had disastrous
repercussions after the French lost Indochina after
the battle for Dien Bien Phu in May 1954.

Professors and students of the Asia-Pacific will
benefit from considering Levine and Hunt’s thesis,
even if they decide to disagree with it. Additionally,
students will profit from reading a useful 15-page
appendix, “A Guide to the Historical Literature”
from 1898 to the present. Altogether, Arc of Empire
is provocative and engaging and will challenge offi-
cers researching this complex region of the world.

CPT Nathaniel Moir, Fergus Falls, Minnesota

IN LATE MARCH 1972, after most U.S.
combat forces had withdrawn from Vietnam,
the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) launched the
Easter Offensive, a massive invasion of South
Vietnam that included over 130,000 soldiers with
14 divisions and 26 separate regiments supporting
massive numbers of tanks and heavy artillery. The
attack focused on three objectives—Quang Tri in
the area just south of the DMZ, An Loc in Binh
Long Province just 65 miles from Saigon (where
this reviewer served in 1972), and Kontum in the
Central Highlands. Although the Easter Offensive
was the largest enemy operation of the war, only
a handful of books have been written about it, pri-
marily because no U.S. ground combat troops were
involved. Most books on this period make only a
passing reference to the battle at Kontum. Thomas
P. McKenna, who served as an advisor with the 23rd
ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Division
during the battle, has written the only book focused
solely on Kontum.

McKenna combines his personal experiences
and extensive research from primary sources,
media reports, and first-person interviews to pro-
duce a riveting account of the bitter fighting in the
highlands. After addressing the background to the
offensive and its opening phases, including the
less than stellar performance of the ARVN at Tan
Canh and Dak To in the early days of the battle in
Kontum Province, the author turns his attention to
the battle for the city of Kontum itself. During the
course of the battle, three enemy main force divi-
sions surrounded and attacked the ARVN defenders.
It was a desperate battle for high stakes: if the North
Vietnamese won, they would cut South Vietnam in
half. McKenna, a small group of his fellow advi-
sors, and the 23rd ARVN—with the help of U.S.
airpower — found themselves in a fight against
overwhelming odds as bombs fell on the defenders
night and day. They repeatedly turned back human
wave attacks supported by 36-ton Soviet-made
main battle tanks. In the end, the South Vietnamese,
despite some early missteps, triumphed over some
of the best troops in the North Vietnamese Army.

Kontum: The Battle to Save South Vietnam is an
insider book that reads like a novel. It is a story of
courage and perseverance under extreme conditions
in a level of sustained combat seldom encountered
in the Vietnam War. This book is an invaluable

KONTUM: The Battle to Save South Vietnam
Thomas P. McKenna,
University Press of Kentucky, Lexington,
2011, 376 pages, $34.95
addition to the historiography of the war and I strongly recommend it for military historians and the general reader.

James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., LTC, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE 14-HOUR WAR: Valor on Koh Tang and the Recapture of the SS Mayaguez
James E. Wise, Jr., and Scott Baron, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2011, 295 pages, $34.95

On 12 May 1975, the Khmer Rouge captured the crew and seized the U.S. cargo ship SS Mayaguez. The United States mounted a military operation to recapture the ship and free its crew. The 14-Hour War recounts the story of the marine assault on Koh Tang Island and the recapture of the Mayaguez.

Authors James Wise and Scott Baron argue that the Mayaguez incident is worth recounting “because of the current, almost unstoppable hijacking of foreign merchant ships transiting the Gulf of Aden and waters as far south as off the coast of Kenya in the Indian Ocean.” The authors say The 14-Hour War is about American military heroes, human tragedy, and piracy. However, the book achieves only two of these objectives: it describes the heroic actions of the military that fought a numerically superior enemy force and the human tragedy of the Marines who were missing after the evacuation. The book falls short in its connection to today’s piracy.

The 14-Hour War is an in-depth account of the strategic and operational aspects of the crisis. Wise and Baron concentrate on the tactical fight and on the assault and evacuation of Koh Tang Island. Unfortunately, the book does not draw any lessons learned about piracy or counter piracy operations nor does it connect the Mayaguez incident to piracy today in the Gulf of Aden.

This book is not a comprehensive analysis, but the recollections of the participants involved (written in their own words) give the book strength. The authors also shed light on some aspects of the operation not previously explored. For example, even though the war in Vietnam had just ended, many of the Marines involved in the Mayaguez incident had no prior combat experience.

Wise and Baron’s writing style is factual and straightforward, which makes the book easy to read. In the end, it is a cautionary tale about “come as you are warfare.” Because of its personal recollections, I recommend the book to those readers interested in the Mayaguez incident.

LTC Robert Rielly, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

STATE VERSUS DEFENSE: The Battle to Define America’s Empire

STATE VERSUS DEFENSE is the latest addition to scholarly works about the rise of the military industrial complex of the United States during the years after World War II and the rise of the Cold War. Works of this genre talk about bargains the government made with the people after the war—butter on their tables in return for guns in their backyards and government in their lives. The work largely disregards social history and focuses instead on the diplomatic and political aspect of militarization. However, it is not a study of rivalry between the Department of Defense and the Department of State. That competition ended in the late 1940s when the Department of State failed to stop the communist takeover of China and Eastern Europe.

Into the breach stepped the defense establishment. With or without presidential backing, the Department of Defense and related agencies have dominated the executive branch, driven foreign relations, and pushed diplomacy aside for a military option. The restructuring of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the mid-1980s made the chairman independent of the service chiefs and the establishment of area commands gave generals imperial authority.

The Department of Defense afterward owned foreign affairs. This was a mistake. Stephen Glain cites numerable examples of presidents and other officials disregarding the diplomatic approach for the military approach in ventures that failed and inevitably wasted American lives and wealth. Glain finds the cost of the Cold War appalling and unnecessary, as the Soviet Union was crumbling through most of the era.
Glain’s interpretation is in keeping with the scholarly consensus that most Cold War military activity was unnecessary and that containment and patience would have attained the same end. What sets the work apart is the variety of resources Glain uses. Newly released Soviet archival material confirms the Soviet system was frail for decades before it collapsed and that at least some in the U.S. government were aware of the frailty. This work will stand in the first rank of studies concerning the mistaken militarism of the United States during and after the Cold War. It should generate a significant amount of debate.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D., Houston, Texas

CARRYING THE WAR TO THE ENEMY: American Operational Art to 1945
Michael R. Matheny, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2011, 334 pages, $25.95

CARRYING THE WAR to the Enemy addresses an important but often overlooked facet of military theory and practice—the planning and conduct of warfare at the operational level. Michael R. Matheny’s thesis is that “although the American Army did not officially recognize operational art as a third level of war, it did develop operational art during the interwar period, 1919-1940, and practiced it to great effect during World War II.” The operational level of war refers to those aspects of military art that tie tactical actions to the overall strategic goals in order to realize the military and political aims of the war.

Although most military historians credit the invention (or at least the formal recognition) of the operational level of war to German and Soviet military thinkers of the interwar period, Matheny makes a good case that during the same period, the U.S. Army developed and taught doctrinal principles that allowed it to conduct successful large-scale joint and combined operations in World War II. He does so through an empirical examination of the curriculum at the U.S. Army War College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He believes the concepts of culmination; lines of operation; phasing; center of gravity; leverage; and the linking of tactical, operational, and strategic objectives were developed by the U.S Army in the interwar period.

Carefully selected instructors and student officers at CGSC and the War College practiced the application of these concepts in rigorous exercises that sharpened their conceptual and practical skills. These officers were to serve as commanders, chiefs of staff, and primary staff officers at division, corps, and army levels during the coming world war. In these positions, they were able to translate operational theory into successful operational concepts and plans in the North Africa, Normandy, Philippine, and Okinawa campaigns.

Carrying the War to the Enemy explores the intellectual development of the Army as an organization preparing for an uncertain future the best way it could—through the critical study of history and war gaming likely scenarios. It also explores the role of the Army’s own institutions of higher learning in providing the opportunity to develop and practice that most critical of skills for the officer corps—planning and prosecuting large-scale combat operations. For these reasons, Carrying the War to the Enemy should be required reading for faculty members and all who are or have been associated with these institutions.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


By the close of World War II, the German aviation industry had become the largest branch of Germany’s armaments industry and one of the largest German employers. Daniel Uziel, author of Arming the Luftwaffe, has meticulously researched the rise of German Air Force aircraft production from its creation in 1935 to its final days in April 1945. Through eyewitness accounts, German records, and Allied intelligence, he describes the history of the Luftwaffe aircraft industry in detail and explains German social, economic, and working conditions during this 11-year period.

The Third Reich’s continuous and often conflicting demand requirements and competition between
the aircraft companies of Henkel, Junkers, Messerschmitt, and Focke-Wulf were the driving factors behind the accelerated growth. According to Uziel, the most significant impact to the aircraft production industry resulted from “Big Week,” five days of coordinated and concentrated USAAF and RAF attacks on the German aviation industry and supporting infrastructure from 20 to 25 February 1944.

Before “Big Week,” German contracting firms, senior government officials, and Hitler continuously pushed the design, testing, and production schedule limits to build one jet airframe that would turn the tide of the air war over Germany. As the author details, the rapid expansion of the industry coupled with the increasing conscription of German employees degraded the high quality of life for the German work force and created a labor shortage for the aviation industry. To fill this void, companies used workers supplied by POW camps, contracted foreign workers, and slave labor. Certain firms within the industry reached out to the Schutzstaffel (SS) to fill their labor shortages with inmates from concentration camps. As the war progressed, an increasing number of firms followed this approach, which eventually led to a large proportion of unskilled workers assembling complex aircraft components.

Uziel also describes Germany’s effort to increase aircraft production and minimize Allied bombing effects by relocating aircraft production sites. An interesting aspect of the relocation effort, as the author reveals, was the apparent oversight of the transportation challenges and the availability of raw materials required to assemble the aircraft components. Germany decided to emphasize using underground aircraft production facilities, as well as forest factories concealed throughout the war.

WORLD WAR I did not have any Sergeant Bill Mauldin to present the Doughboy or GI perspective through Willie and Joe, but Alban B. Butler, Jr.’s, Happy Days and Louis C. Linn’s At Belleau Wood came close. Saucy and direct, while at the same time humorous and touching, some of Captain Butler’s cartoons in Happy Days verge on today’s political incorrectness. However, remember Willie and Joe were not universally popular with the brass at the time.

One of my vivid memories as a GI reporter for Stars and Stripes Europe was examining a photocopy from the managing editor’s files of a note written in longhand to “Georgie.” There was no letterhead and no need for one. The note said simply, “Lay off Stripes” and was signed “Ike.” Presumably, the recipient was General George Patton, who engaged in a famous feud with Sergeant Bill Mauldin, whose Willie and Joe cartoons appeared in Stripes.

Linn’s memoirs and artwork of the Marine battles leading from Belleau Wood were far darker in mood than the cartoon characters of Butler—almost the expressionism of film noir vs. a Popeye comic strip.

Twice wounded, Linn translated his dream sequences into the stark realism of the woodcuts. Even in his narrative, it sometimes seems that Linn invents episodes. His woodcuts, however, verge on museum quality.

The Happy Days cartoons are of historic interest on World War I transport—from the “40 and 8” rail cars (holding 40 soldiers or 8 horses) to the mule-drawn French wine wagons to “the march on Sedan,” with the doughboys on the move along a shell-pocked roadway and the gun limbers and ammunition wagons silhouetted along the crest of the hills behind them.

Every Allied nation established a decorative headquarters in Paris. Odd and exotic uniforms packed the streets for Butler to capture in full flower. His cartoons are precise on regalia and akin to a “Where’s Waldo” in the uniforms of the Great War. Happy Days was originally published on the 10th anniversary of the Armistice. Butler, an aide-de-camp to Major General Charles Pelot Summerall, donated his drawings and sketches to the First Division Museum, which published them in 1928. Butler began drawing in an attempt to build morale following the battle of Cantigny. Long out

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HAPPY DAYS, Alban B. Butler Jr., Osprey Publishing, New York, 110 pages, $14.95

AT BELLEAU WOOD WITH RIFLE AND SKETCHPAD, Louis C. Linn, McFarland & Co., Jefferson, NC, 189 pages, $40.00

R. Scott Martin, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
of print, *Happy Days* is something of a collector’s item, which is the reason for its reissue.

On the other hand, Linn’s memoirs—never before published—recall life in the trenches at Verdun, the battle of Belleau Wood, and his wounding at Soissons and again at St. Mihiel. After the Armistice, he attended the Philadelphia Academy of Fine Art. His *Eastern North America’s Wildflowers* was published after his death in 1978.

George Ridge, J.D., Tucson, Arizona

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**WITH OUR BACKS TO THE WALL:**

*Victory and Defeat in 1918*


The year 1918 saw the collapse of empires, a gradually emerging new world order, and the end to the first “world war.” The significance of 1918 is beyond debate. What may be debated is why the empires collapsed, why a new order emerged, and how and why the global conflict ended as it did. Answering these questions is the task that David Stevenson sets out for himself in *With Our Backs to the Wall*. His success in analyzing the complex factors that brought the “Great War” to an end on 11 November 1918 marks this book as a landmark in modern history.

The author’s success rests on his mastery of the latest scholarship supplemented with archival work in at least three different languages. The effectiveness of Stevenson’s argument is founded on the remarkable way he is able to weave complex threads of causation together to show that war tested the endurance of societies as well as armies. After two chapters describing the ebb and flow on the battlefields of Europe and the Middle East, Stevenson examines the essential roles of such factors as technological innovation, shipping, industrial production, finance, home front morale, and political leadership. He shows that during the last 18 months of the war, as the Central Powers staggered to collapse, the Allies themselves overcame crises in manpower, transportation, coal and oil production, food, money, and national will. By employing an avalanche of well-chosen statistics, Stevenson demonstrates that the Allied victory was a remarkable feat of endurance. Yet he goes beyond the statistics to show that leadership, political and military, had a decisive role in timing and shaping the war’s outcome.

The author, a professor at the London School of Economics, points out that the tide of events during World War I had a different shape in World War II. In the second war, more than two years of Allied strategic offensives followed a triumphant Axis advance before 1942. However, when the last year of the World War I began in January 1918, the outcome remained in doubt. In the spring, the German army broke through the Allied lines in multiple places and brought the war to a climax. Explaining how the Allies recovered and fought their way to victory in the final months of the war is a daunting challenge of enormous complexity. *With Our Backs to Wall* meets the challenge. It deserves the highest recommendation.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., LTC, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
We Recommend

**THOSE WHO HAVE BORNE THE BATTLE: A History of America’s Wars and Those Who Fought Them**


At the heart of the story of America’s wars are our “citizen soldiers”—those hometown heroes who fought and sacrificed from Bunker Hill at Charlestown to Pointe du Hoc in Normandy, and beyond, without expectation of recognition or recompense. Americans like to think that the service of its citizen volunteers is, and always has been, of momentous importance in our politics and society. But though this has made for good storytelling, the reality of America’s relationship to its veterans is far more complex. In *Those Who Have Borne the Battle*, historian and marine veteran James Wright tells the story of the long, often troubled relationship between America and those who have defended her—from the Revolutionary War to today—shedding new light both on our history and on the issues our country and its armed forces face today. *From the publisher.*

**HINDUISM AND THE ETHICS OF WARFARE IN SOUTH ASIA: From Antiquity to the Present**


This book challenges the view, common among Western scholars, that precolonial India lacked a tradition of military philosophy. It traces the evolution of theories of warfare in India from the dawn of civilization, focusing on the debate between Dharmayuddha (Just War) and Kutayuddha (Unjust War) within Hindu philosophy. This debate centers around four questions: What is war? What justifies it? How should it be waged? And what are its potential repercussions? This body of literature provides evidence of the historical evolution of strategic thought in the Indian subcontinent that has heretofore been neglected by modern historians. Further, it provides a counterpoint to scholarship in political science that engages solely with Western theories in its analysis of independent India’s philosophy of warfare. Ultimately, a better understanding of the legacy of ancient India’s strategic theorizing will enable more accurate analysis of modern India’s military and nuclear policies. *From the publisher.*
EDWARD PELLEW, CAPTAIN of the legendary Indefatigable, was quite simply the greatest British frigate captain in the age of sail. Left fatherless at age eight, with a penniless mother and five siblings, Pellew fought his way from the very bottom of the navy to fleet command. Victories and eye-catching feats won him a public following. Yet he had a gift for antagonizing his better-born peers, and he made powerful enemies. Redemption came with his last command, when he set off to do battle with the Barbary States and free thousands of European slaves. Opinion held this to be an impossible mission, and Pellew himself, leading from the front in the style of his contemporary Nelson, did not expect to survive.

From the publisher.

WAR, WELFARE & DEMOCRACY: Rethinking America’s Quest for the End of History

Peter J. Munson, Potomac Books, Washington, DC, 2013, 240 pages, $29.95

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY since World War II has actively sought to reshape both domestic and international orders, hoping to hasten the coming of the “end of history” in a peaceful democratic utopia. While the end of the Cold War heightened optimism that this goal was near, American foreign policymakers still face dramatic challenges. In War, Welfare & Democracy, Peter Munson argues that the problems we face today stem from common roots—the modern state system’s struggle to cope with the pressures of market development and sociopolitical modernization. By addressing the inequality of wealth, security, and stability brought on by dramatic economic change and modernization, Munson describes how America can lead in reforming the welfare state paradigm and adjust its antiquated policies to best manage the transformation we must face.

From the publisher.
A horse to ride, a sword to wield,  
An ocean of grass to tame.  
The Seventh was out in the field  
To make George Custer’s name.

The village stretched before them,  
Custer split his force in three.  
Reno’s men struck from the south  
And were taking casualties.

Did Custer reach the river  
Before the native’s struck?  
This hero of the Civil War  
Had just run out of luck.

Major Reno sensed the trap and fled  
And found a place to stand.  
Benteen brought his men to Reno  
To lend a helping hand.

A horse to ride, a sword to wield,  
An ocean of grass to tame.  
The Seventh was out in the field  
To make George Custer’s name.

Out upon the greasy grass  
George tried to make a stand.

Two hundred men surrounded;  
There was a breakdown in command.

Outnumbered and surrounded,  
Some men simply broke and ran.  
But death was not to be denied,  
Their blood fed thirsty sand.

Custer, mortally wounded,  
With a bullet near his heart,  
Did not live to see the rest;  
His troopers hacked apart.

The position held by Reno,  
And commanded by Benteen,  
Survived several furious assaults  
Before the natives fled the scene.

Relieved by General Terry’s force,  
They sought their fallen ones.  
The bodies hacked and naked,  
Decomposing in the sun.

No horse to ride, no sword to wield,  
An ocean of grass untamed.  
The Seventh lay out in the field—  
That was the cost of fame.