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Empirically Based Leadership

Integrating the Science of Psychology in Building a Better Leadership Model

Major Sean P. McDonald, U.S. Army

There are very few tasks in the Army more important than developing effective, competent leaders. As a significant part of this effort, the Army provides Field Manual (FM) 6-22, which establishes leadership doctrine and fundamental principles to guide leaders at all levels. In support of this important objective, the manual offers a comprehensive framework for leadership that explicitly outlines the highly valued characteristics and competencies all leaders are expected to aspire to and emulate. However, as valuable as this framework may be, much of its content is based upon intuition and experience. As expressed in FM 6-22, the manual “combines the lessons of the past with important insights” in establishing a model for competent leadership.

While this approach has value, it has a significant limitation that potentially overlooks other highly influential factors. Similar to flaws in relying exclusively on anecdotal evidence, empirical literature is absent or lacking emphasis in FM 6-22. Further, certain characteristics or competencies are more important than others depending on the context. These limitations in the FM suggest a review of relevant research is necessary to enhance the Army’s current model of leadership.

I will identify those empirically based factors most important to a model of influential, competent leadership in this article. Three areas require further exploration. First, I will compare relevant research on key individual characteristics or traits of effective leadership to those characteristics established within FM 6-22. Second, I will examine the contemporary research on leadership psychology, which has placed greater emphasis on social context over individual traits in effective leadership. Finally, in light of this analysis, I look at possible improvements to the Army’s current model of leadership as part of the broader effort to cultivate a better understanding. While experience and intuition are valuable sources of information, integrating relevant empiricism into the process is necessary for a more complete model of leadership.
Individual Characteristics of Effective Leadership

The possession of certain individual characteristics is a critical element of the Army’s leadership model as expressed in the simple phrase, “what leaders DO emerges from who they are (BE) and what they KNOW.” According to this conceptual framework, particular attributes along with appropriate knowledge serve as the foundation from which desired competencies emerge. In other words, certain characteristics are an essential aspect to being an effective leader, and in their absence, desirable competencies will not fully develop. While the identification of necessary attributes is valuable in structuring and communicating the expectations for leadership, what remains unclear is the validity of the inclusion or exclusion of particular characteristics beyond the basis of intuition and experience.

Field Manual 6-22 identifies 12 individual characteristics necessary to competent leadership, organized into three categories: character, presence, and intellectual capacity. Analyzing all 12 characteristics is beyond the scope of this paper, so the discussion in this section will primarily focus on the key areas of interest within the empirical literature on leadership characteristics or traits. The first major area involves ethical reasoning, which most closely aligns with the category of character defined by FM 6-22: “A person’s moral and ethical qualities help determine what is right and gives a leader motivation to do what is appropriate.”

Based on this definition, there is little doubt that ethical reasoning is a critically important area within the Army’s model of leadership. The consequences, both good and bad, of moral reasoning carry far greater weight in leaders than in followers. In the context of life and death situations, this is especially so. However, what is less known or understood is the effect of ethical reasoning on leadership performance, which is generally assessed by the attainment of goals or objectives within a leadership context.

Leanne E. Atwater, Shelly D. Dionne, John F. Camobreco, Bruce J. Avolio, and Alan Lau (1998) examine the relationship between moral reasoning of U.S. military cadets and their development and effectiveness as leaders as ranked by both their peers and supervisors. Not surprisingly, these researchers found that higher levels of moral
reasoning were related to leader effectiveness in obtaining established objectives, which subsequent studies have supported.\textsuperscript{7}

In examining this relationship in a slightly different light, Nick Turner, Julian Barling, and Olga Epitropaki (2002) postulate those leaders with higher moral reasoning would be perceived as more transformational than leaders who exhibited lower moral reasoning. Transformational leadership is defined as a style of leadership that inspires followers to look beyond self-interests for the good of the group as opposed to transactional leadership that motivates followers through corrective transactions, which is based more on reward and punishment. These researchers developed their hypothesis from moral development theory, which asserts that leaders with more complex moral reasoning will be able to use greater sophisticated conceptualizations of interpersonal situations. Such leaders are more likely to think about problems in different ways and are cognizant of a larger number of behavioral options. Consequently, leaders with more complex moral reasoning are more likely to value goals that go beyond immediate self-interest and to foresee the benefits of actions that serve the collective good (i.e., transformational leadership). The outcome of the study found a significant relationship between higher moral development and transformational leadership.\textsuperscript{8}

While the collective outcome of these studies is not particularly surprising, an understanding of the professional literature in this category remains an important element in developing a model for leadership. To some, such an analysis would seem to be a pointless endeavor considering the obvious need for sound ethical decision making, especially for the military leader who frequently confronts complex “gray” situations. However, the science on the topic not only refines our understanding of the role of ethics within leadership, but more importantly, these studies provide critical insight on the need for ethical and moral development among leaders to obtain the greatest outcomes related to leader performance.

Another significant area of interest within the empirical literature is emotional intelligence (EI), which in recent years has been the focus of considerable attention in relationship to leadership efficacy. Emotional intelligence involves an awareness of one’s own emotions as well as the ability to control them, social awareness of others and their emotions, and the capacity to understand and manage relationships and social networks.\textsuperscript{9} Based on this description, EI is relevant to all three categories of Army leader attributes, especially the attributes of empathy and interpersonal tact. In discussing empathy, FM 6-22 defines it as “the ability to see something from another person’s point of view, to identify with and enter into another person’s feelings and emotions.”\textsuperscript{10} Empathy is not typically a quality that most soldiers would readily identify as an essential characteristic to effective leadership or necessary to producing positive organizational outcomes. Further, FM 6-22 tends to reflect this perception. The manual devotes only four paragraphs to discussing empathy. However, the research in this area suggests it is an important quality for competent leadership, especially as it relates to EI.

In examining this characteristic, one study analyzed the relationship between EI and leadership effectiveness among U.S. Navy human resource officers.\textsuperscript{11} The researchers administered a measure of EI, which provided four subscales: perceiving emotions, facilitating thought, understanding emotions (both in self and others), and ability to manage emotions. The researchers then compared scores to managerial performance. Results from the study revealed a positive and significant correlation between the officers’ overall emotional intelligence and effectiveness as a leader. More specifically, when analyzing the subscales, the researchers detected significant relationship on facilitating thought, understanding emotions, and ability to manage them to leadership effectiveness. In understanding others emotions, an important contributing factor to the success of the more effective officers was their ability to empathize with their subordinates.\textsuperscript{12}

In another study, researchers conducted a meta-analysis to ascertain if a consistent,
A research-based link could be established between EI and effective leadership. A meta-analysis is a particularly powerful study because it statistically analyzes the outcomes of a large collection of research results for the purpose of integrating the findings versus relying upon the results of a single study. Based upon the analysis of 48 studies examining this relationship, results of the meta-analysis suggested a strong relationship between EI and leadership effectiveness. While there have been some studies that have minimized this relationship, the empirical data strongly supports the inclusion of EI characteristics within a model of leadership best designed to produce competent leaders.

A third area of considerable interest in the empirical literature is the trait of hardiness or resiliency and its relationship to leadership effectiveness. As part of the Army’s model of leadership, the characteristic of resiliency is listed as one of the 12 attributes of a competent leader. Field Manual 6-22 describes resilient leaders as those who “recover quickly from setbacks, shock, injuries, adversity, and stress while maintaining their mission and organizational focus. Their resilience rests on will, the inner drive that compels them to keep going, even when exhausted, hungry, afraid, cold, and wet. Resilience helps leaders and their organizations to carry difficult missions to their conclusion.” Unfortunately, FM 6-22’s description of resiliency contained in four short paragraphs primarily revolves around its application to combat with little discussion on its relevance to leadership within a broader context.

Prior to discussing the research on resiliency or hardiness, it is important to discuss its conceptual framework. While FM 6-22 characterizes resiliency as a behavior, the professional literature generally considers it an element of personality that develops early in life and is relatively stable over time, although amenable to change and trainable under certain conditions. Hardy or resilient persons have a high sense of life and work commitment, a feeling of control, and are open to change and challenges in life. They tend to interpret stressful and painful experiences as a normal aspect of existence, part of what makes life interesting and worthwhile. Although there is some consistency with the description provided by FM 6-22, the important difference is that it contains a broader application extending well beyond a particular context (e.g., combat). With this understanding established, the research on the topic can now be more intelligently examined.

An extensive body of research has accumulated demonstrating that resiliency and hardness acts as a protective factor against stress while increasing performance. In one study, researchers examined personality factors, psychological hardiness, and social judgment (an element of EI) as predictors of leader performance. The researchers analyzed data collected over four years on West Point cadets and graduates. Although they analyzed a number of different factors relevant to leadership performance, hardness emerged as the strongest predictor of performance in a variety of contexts over more commonly associated qualities like mental abilities or emotional intelligence. Similar results have been obtained in other studies with a variety of occupational groups. In addition to moderating against combat exposure in Gulf War soldiers, hardness has emerged as a stress buffer in other populations such as U.S. Army casualty assistance workers, peacekeeping soldiers, Israeli soldiers in combat training, officer candidates, and members of the Special Forces. This data strongly supports the inclusion of resiliency or hardness as a necessary element of competent leadership.
The final characteristic is intellectual capacity, which has been a longstanding area of interest in relation to job performance. Field Manual 6-22 makes a similar connection between intellect and performance in its definition of intellectual capacity: “mental resources or tendencies that shape a leaders’ conceptual abilities and impact effectiveness.” The interest in this relationship intuitively makes sense: as leaders gain responsibility, they generally experience greater demands in the complexity of problems therefore requiring greater intellectual capacity. However, while there is validity to competent leaders possessing higher intellect, recent studies suggest that the impact of intelligence to improved performance as a leader is generally moderated by other factors not directly related to intelligence. In other words, even though intelligence is important to leadership, it makes little difference in isolation unless a leader is able to effectively complement their intellectual capacity with other important characteristics.

For example, the quality of resiliency is an extremely important moderator in the pragmatic manifestation of intelligence within a leadership role. In a review of professional literature, Fred E. Fiedler and Frederick W. Gibson (2010) found that intellectual ability contributed little to performance among leaders who possessed poorer stress tolerance (i.e., low hardiness) while subjected to greater levels of situational stress. Conversely, for participants who possessed higher resiliency, greater intellectual ability tended to have a meaningful impact on leadership performance, especially as responsibilities increased.

One possible explanation for this dynamic is that increased anxiety or stress places greater strain on an individual’s ability to concentrate on more complex tasks as commonly required in leadership positions of greater responsibility. Therefore, individuals who possess higher resiliency are better equipped to moderate the effects of stress, allowing for greater commitment of their intellectual resources to their job demands.

Another important factor in the manifestation of intellect in relation to leadership performance is EI. Similar to resiliency, general intelligence has little impact on a leader’s performance unless he or she possesses some of the social and interpersonal skills necessary in motivating and directing a group to a common objective. Paul T. Bartone, Jarle Eid, and Scott Snook’s study (2009) found that leader performance was best predicted by a combination of intellectual abilities, hardiness, and social judgment (i.e., EI) versus intellectual abilities alone. This empirical data suggests that while intellectual capacity is an important attribute in a model of leadership, it must be complemented by other factors in order to make a meaningful contribution to overall performance.

Contextual Factors to Effective Leadership

As seen in the discussion up to this point, much of the past research on leadership has primarily centered on the individual traits, abilities, or characteristics of effective leaders. Field Manual 6-22 is no different, with its primary focus on the individual characteristics and behaviors an Army leader is expected to demonstrate in order to be most effective. However, more recent research indicates this preoccupation on the individual leader is missing a powerful contributor to effective leadership: social contextual factors. This substantive area of empirical interest strongly suggests that what matters most with regard to leader efficacy is not only possessing a set of certain qualities but also having a relationship between leaders and followers.

In conducting extensive research on this issue, S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen D. Reicher, and Michael J. Platow (2011) determined that context played a more significant role than individual traits as emphasized by more traditional views on leadership efficacy. More specifically, they discovered three critical factors to effective, influential leadership. The first factor they identified is that leaders must be viewed by their followers as highly representative of their group. This point may seem patently obvious, but often leaders fail in this respect simply because they do not recognize or understand their group’s identity and they fail to see the value in closely aligning themselves with the group they supposedly represent.
In elaborating further, these researchers found that the more an individual is viewed by group members as “one of us,” the more influential he or she will be within the group and consequently, the more willing other group members will be to follow the leader’s direction. One of the most important areas of interest within the field of leadership is to understand why and how some people within a group become more influential than others. As seen in much of the past research, many researchers have sought to address this issue by identifying a set of specific qualities—attributes and behaviors like those in FM 6-22—that aspiring leaders need to display to differentiate themselves from their followers. In contrast, Haslam, Reicher, and Platow’s analysis suggests that prospective leaders’ primary goal should not be to differentiate themselves from those they seek to lead, but seek to emphasize their commonalities.24

There are a broad range of studies that have demonstrated that the most prototypical members of a group are the most influential and that, given a choice, their fellow group members will often prefer leaders who display in-group prototypical characteristics ahead of those who display qualities that are stereotypical of leaders in general.25 For example, one study explored leader influence on separate groups whose members either perceived the leader as similar to them (“friendly,” “easy going,” and “tolerant”) or different (“intellectual,” “high achieving,” and “serious”). The researchers found that when group members perceived the leader as embodying the characteristics of the group, the leader was rated as more influential and charismatic, even though the leader lacked characteristics commonly associated with effective leaders (e.g., “high achieving,” “intellectual”). Researchers found this to be particularly true if those leaders appeared to demonstrate greater
interest in the group and framed their leadership in transformational rather than transactional terms.  

A second critical factor in effective leadership identified by Haslam, Reicher, and Platow is that leaders must be viewed by their followers as an “in-group champion”—an individual who exerts considerable effort for the greater good of the group. To engage followers in a powerful and influential way, leaders’ actions and visions must promote group interests consistent with the norms and values for that particular group. Similar to the last factor, this point may seem rather obvious, but again, many leaders fail to understand it and, more importantly, fail to apply it. According to the researchers, the key to this factor is not a leader exerting great effort on behalf of his or her group, but one exerting effort within the framework of the group’s own norms and values.  

To accomplish this objective, aspiring leaders must first understand their group’s identity as well as the concept of social identity—a term that relates to an individual’s self-concept derived from group membership distinct from other groups.  

To illustrate this factor, the Army is a large organization with its own set of well-established values and standards. While most of these values are explicit and standardized, there are many different units within the Army that possess their own unique group norms and values as well as distinct group identities from which members derive a significant aspect of their self-concept (i.e., social identity). For example, the 101st Airborne Division, 3rd Brigade “Rakkasans” possesses an identity distinct from other infantry units in the Army to include other brigades from the 101st Airborne Division. This unique group identity serves to communicate a positive distinctness from other groups, which serves to affirmatively shape the self-concepts of each soldier who is a member of the unit. Further, within the Rakkasans, each battalion, company, platoon, and squad possess slightly different group identities from which soldiers further derive significance. While an infantry officer from another unit can be very successful within the Rakkasans, his success as a leader is most likely predicated upon understanding the group’s unique identity as well as the unique values and norms that govern it, not his simply exerting great effort on behalf of the group.

To extend this point, research strongly suggests that leaders who are perceived by their followers in this way glean a number of important benefits. In addition to receiving endorsements from their followers, they are likely to be viewed as charismatic, influential, and much more capable of enlisting the efforts of their followers in bringing their visions for the group to fruition. These are all important elements to being an effective leader, but their achievement is based upon a leader’s understanding of the group’s social identity and advocating consistently within the norms and values of the group.

Finally, Haslam, Reicher, and Platow identified that effective leaders actively construct an identity for their group that is translated into reality. Research in this area indicates effective leaders are not permanently bound to a group’s identity where they simply operate within its boundaries, but they become masters of it. In support of this point, history has repeatedly demonstrated that the most effective leaders create and shape their groups’ identities, and consequently, those identities create and shape institutions, organizations, and entire societies. These leaders accomplish this by recognizing that a group of people with a shared identity possesses much more power than people without it. Indeed, one of the central reasons why great leadership is so admired is that it gives evidence to the simple fact that history is not made by groups with the greatest resources or numbers, but by those groups whose energies have been galvanized by leaders into the most coherent social force. These leaders take the ideas, values, and priorities of the group and translate them into reality. In analyzing this factor, research strongly suggests that group identity is the source of this coherence and transformation, and therefore, for leaders, it is the most powerful of all leadership resources.
In addition to empirical support, military history is filled with examples that demonstrate this factor in action. For instance, the British commander William Slim, during World War II, took over the 14th Army in Burma at a time when it was defeated, in disarray, and composed of soldiers from very different nationalities. When he assumed command, the 14th Army’s identity was best expressed in its informal name, “The Forgotten Army.” However, in spite of these tremendous challenges, under Slim’s leadership the 14th Army in Burma eventually became highly successful against the Japanese. Another example is Matthew Ridgeway taking command of the 8th Army in South Korea in December 1950. Similar to Slim, Ridgeway took over a multinational army that was defeated, fragmented, and possessing poor morale. However, like the 14th Army under Slim, the 8th Army obtained considerable success under Ridgeway’s leadership.

While Ridgeway and Slim possessed different personalities, leadership styles, and leader characteristics, one of their first courses of action after taking command was to understand their groups’ identity and to begin aggressively reshaping it in a positive way. Both these leaders supported these actions through establishing a vision for their respective groups and creating the organizational structures necessary to translate their army’s reshaped identity into reality. They recognized in their men that in spite of their past failures, they innately desired to be successful, to attain victory, and to accomplish the worthwhile. Both leaders effectively tapped this desire in order to form a new identity. Extensive research on social identity and leadership suggests it is highly unlikely that either of these leaders would have been nearly as successful without understanding the group’s identity, recognizing the critical need to reshape it, and implementing the necessary actions to translate the reshaped identity into reality.

Potential Improvements to the Army’s Model of Leadership

Reflecting on this relevant empirical information presents a number of important opportunities for improving the Army’s present model. First, while FM 6-22 identifies several leadership attributes consistent with leadership efficacy, greater emphasis should be placed on certain characteristics that clearly possess a strong empirical relationship to it. The most significant is the attribute of resiliency. To the Army’s credit, it recognized the importance of this leadership characteristic by including it in the most recent version of FM 6-22. However, the manual devoted only four brief paragraphs to this attribute and primarily framed its application around combat. Within the empirical literature on leadership, the characteristic of resiliency or hardness possesses one of the strongest relationships to leadership efficacy. Further, the data suggests that the positive manifestation of other leadership qualities like intellect is primarily tied to the possession of strong resiliency. Resiliency also contains a much broader application beyond combat in the execution of competent leadership. The majority of leaders in the Army will not directly experience combat; nonetheless, positions of leadership in the Army possess considerable demands and responsibility that require substantive resiliency to produce positive and lasting results. The Army leadership model needs a more balanced emphasis on leadership characteristics to reflect this research.

Second, the empirical information suggests that the Army should consider reconceptualizing its major categories within the leadership model. Presently, FM 6-22 divides 12 leadership attributes into three categories consisting of leader character, presence, and intellectual capacity. While the FM logically places most of the attributes within these three categories, the placement of empathy and interpersonal tact in their present categories does not fit conceptually within their respective domains. For example, when considering intellectual capacity, the attributes of mental agility, judgment, innovation, and domain knowledge are conceptually linked; however, interpersonal tact represents a different skill domain from intellectual capacity. Research indicates that interpersonal tact as reflected by emotional intelligence measures a different skill set from intellect. An individual with low intellectual ability is unlikely to demonstrate much mental agility, innovative thinking, and the ability to effectively assess complex situations and formulate sound decisions on limited information (i.e., the attribute of sound judgment). However, the same individual could still potentially possess high interpersonal tact. The same argument could be directed toward the inclusion of empathy under leader presence. Both empathy and interpersonal
tact are much more conceptually linked to emotional intelligence. Given the importance of EI within the empirical literature, empathy and interpersonal tact should be placed within a separate domain, which would also provide more appropriate emphasis to their importance in competent leadership.

Finally, the empirical information on leadership suggests that the Army’s model should place much greater emphasis on leaders understanding and utilizing social contextual factors. Although FM 6-22 provides some emphasis on the relationship between leaders and followers within leader competencies, the model is ultimately leader-centric, suggesting the foundation of competent leadership begins with an individual possessing certain attributes. As indicated in the last section, the research does not support this approach to establishing a model of leadership. A balanced model of leadership clearly needs to incorporate the understanding and application of group identity to produce the most effective outcomes for an organization. Undoubtedly, the attributes contained in FM 6-22 are important to effective leadership; however, an effective leader also recognizes, understands, and actively shapes their group’s identity consistent with organizational values, norms, and goals. Although FM 6-22 does an excellent job in explicitly communicating leadership standards, it is ultimately negligent in applying appropriate and balanced emphasis on empirically based factors of leadership.

A Comprehensive Model

Field Manual 6-22 provides a valuable and comprehensive model for understanding leadership and the competencies required to be successful as a leader in the Army. However, an analysis of relevant empirical literature suggest that the model needs to change to better reflect the factors necessary for developing the most effective leaders. While the model stresses several leadership attributes that are empirically based, the Army’s model requires greater emphasis on certain characteristics (e.g., resiliency, EI) that possess the strongest empirical relationship to leadership efficacy. Further, more recent research on leadership psychology stresses the significance of social contextual factors; however, FM 6-22 has not fully incorporated this critical data into the model’s conceptual framework. Although the Army’s model relies upon valuable information in formulating the basis for competent leadership, this review indicates that the next revision needs to integrate greater empirical data to establish the best model for influential, competent leadership. MR

NOTES

2. Ibid., v.
3. Ibid., 4-11.
10. FM 6-22, 4-9.
12. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 137.
21. Ibid., 173.
23. Ibid., 75.
24. Ibid., 106.
25. Ibid., 103.
27. Haslam, Reicher, and Platow, 133.
30. Ibid., 163-64.
33. Ibid., 208-209; Purins, Uncle Bill of the Forgotten Army, 212-15.
34. Haslam, Reicher, and Platow, 162-64.
**Building the New Culture of Training**

General Robert W. Cone, U.S. Army

Our Army is approaching a crossroads.

Even as we continue examining wartime lessons, transitioning to an Army of preparation, and realizing the digital revolution’s potential, we are confronting a number of crucial decisions. Among them is defining our approach to reinvigorating how the Army trains and readies for future conflicts. What we already know is that any future progress rests upon inspiring this young generation of soldiers. There is little chance such inspiration can be found in a haphazard approach. Rather, we must take a slight pause in our tempo to engage in serious reflection and assess the future of training.

Ultimately, three imperatives emerge as the foundation for training the Army of 2020:

- Return ownership of training to commanders and hold them responsible for engaging our young leaders.
- Refine and improve our understanding of the human elements of warfare.
- Harness the promise of technology to allow us to train faster, better, and more efficiently.

Reviewing the lessons learned following our last transition from a major war is helping to craft these imperatives into a coherent narrative. Our Army has been through this before. The Army that left Vietnam faced many of the challenges we confront today. At that time, General William DePuy and the newly formed U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command stepped forward to lead an intense, introspective review of how our Army trained and educated itself. TRADOC’s efforts were controversial and took years to implement. However, the reward for this perseverance was a set of four innovations that changed our Army forever: standards-based training, the Noncommissioned Officer Education System, operational concepts, and “the Big 5”—the Abrams, Bradley, Paladin, Apache, and Blackhawk.
Driven by an increasingly bellicose and adventurous Soviet Union, these innovations sparked a renaissance in operational thought and unit training. New initiatives, such as the School of Advanced Military Studies, meaningful doctrine, and a pioneering leader development system produced the most professional and competent leaders in the world. The results, obvious to anyone within our Army, were demonstrated to the world when U.S. forces shattered the Soviet-equipped Iraqi Army twice within a decade.

Just as impressively, 40 years after the “DePuy revolution,” the system he instituted remained robust enough to see the Army through a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. We may be a bit battered and frayed, but we remain the most capable fighting force in the world.

Emerging from Vietnam, our predecessors left us something of inestimable value—a culture of training. In succeeding decades, the personal commitment of commanders to training excellence built the superb Army that performed so magnificently in recent conflicts. Our ability to adapt and to remold units while in contact with the enemy was built on this foundation of excellence. Furthermore, Army leaders, forged in the crucible of training, were

our strategic reserve who led wartime adaptation. Simply put, our culture of training created an unbeatable combat overmatch against our enemies—no one could train faster or better than the U.S. Army.

The “New” Reality

Before we can arrive at a compelling vision of future training, we must first appreciate the impact 11 years of war has had on the Army. The moral imperative to prepare our young men and women for the situations they would face in Iraq and Afghanistan forced trainers to focus on a narrow range of skills. This entirely appropriate training focus came at the expense of broader leader development and the critical individual, collective, and staff skills required for large-scale combat operations.

While these training deficits are reversible, doing so means significantly changing how the Army trains now. For a decade, efficiency in generating readiness for a specific theater was vital to our success. To accomplish this, we centralized training and training resources, and our commanders became experts in creating readiness for missions they faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. But they did so by following cookie-cutter templates at the expense of seeing their traditional roles in designing and creating training programs marginalized. By maximizing unit readiness, fundamental training skills were allowed to atrophy. Commanders lost ownership of their training—the warrior’s art during times of peace.

The good news is that as I talk to today’s generation of young leaders, I find that they are excited about getting back to the business of training. At the same time, they recognize that despite enviable combat records, they have little experience in training management. But this is a skill that can be rapidly taught and learned. When coupled with combat experience and this generation’s innate understanding of technology, it will transform training.

Our Army inspired the Cold War generation. Grafenwoehr Range 117, Sicily Drop Zone, and the Central Corridor inspired our gray-haired colonels and sergeants major because these places were about solving the problems of their time—the Soviet Union, Panama, and Iraq. This generation has grown up in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and we will only inspire them about training by bringing the problems of our modern world into the training environment.

Creating such a transformation begins with seeing our world through clear eyes and understanding that the future remains uncertain and dangerous. While technology continues to impact the character of modern war, the precision strikes have not been a panacea. The “easy war theories” have not provided the answers necessary for overcoming the messiness
of operations amidst large and civilian populations. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to change. Too often, enemies will possess a strategic lever, forcing us into operations we would rather avoid. In the end, those who bear the scars of combat know there is no easy, antiseptic narrative for conflict. As problems arise, the nation will turn to the Army to solve them. We must be ready.

**Commander’s Ownership of Training**

Only by designing training that matches the real-world problems confronting us can we assure such readiness. Unfortunately, the range of problems we face is great, and training time is limited. We do not have the luxury of focusing on one area of conflict, nor can we master every facet of each possible mission. As one young major told me, “We are going to have to take some rocks out of the Iraq and Afghanistan rucksack.” Instead, our focus must center on those few critical skills that are broadly applicable across the full range of military operations and those that enable units to rapidly adapt to the challenges of specific missions.

The art behind this new training emphasis is in picking the right fundamental skills. For this, the Army relies on commanders who possess the vision, focus and understanding to create the right balance. Higher commanders should provide intent and priorities, and then allow subordinates to craft training within those boundaries. In effect, mission command applies in training just as it does in operations.

Senior leaders do, however, remain essential in this process. Battalion and brigade commanders provide the cornerstone of effective training. They understand the variety of training tools, can articulate a vision, and possess the experience to guide discussions on risk. In the words of one squadron commander, senior mission commanders “provide organizational acumen in setting the conditions for commanders at all levels to takeover training.” Together, these commanders possess the ability to reestablish predictability, establish “white space” for subordinates and guide rebuilding critical skills and systems. In the end, we simply must again make commanders at all levels the responsible agent for training their units and provide them the resources to do so effectively.

**Addressing the Human Nature of War**

As we reinvigorate our training systems and return training ownership to commanders, we cannot forget the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan about the human nature of warfare. Our experiences in these conflicts demonstrate the importance of investing in language, culture, advisory, and other specialized “people” skills, on top of our foundational competencies of shoot, move, and communicate. Maintaining our close linkages with special operating forces as we train and fight also remains critical. We learned these lessons in Vietnam, and we paid dearly to relearn them in our recent wars. These new skill-sets are fundamental to our profession and can only be retained if they are codified within our doctrine as a warfighting function.

Moreover, our wartime experience has laid bare the impact prolonged combat exposure has on soldiers and leaders. Only by embedding resiliency skills into our training can we start mitigating such debilitating effects. This is about more than our current challenges. Rather, it is about providing leaders with the tools to navigate through the terrible human cost of combat in a variety of conditions and levels of intensity. In the words of one company commander, “When we lost [a soldier] in Najaf, it took great leaders to refocus soldiers on the larger picture.” Resiliency is about accomplishing the mission as much as it is about taking care of the soldier. While specific training is central to the effort, challenging training builds the foundation of resiliency.

**Unchanging Fundamentals**
- Shoot
- Move
- Communicate

**The New Fundamentals**
- Culture and language skills
- Advisory skills
- SOF integration
Additional help is on the way for commanders trying to include enhanced soldier and unit resiliency into their training programs. The growing field of human performance science demonstrates great potential to aid commanders in building more resilient soldiers and improving the efficiency of training. Science provides methods of assessing individual soldier strengths and weaknesses and tailoring their training for faster learning and greater skill retention. Simple, emerging tools, such as memory enhancement exercises or games, allow us to analyze and train the most important muscle in modern warfare, the human brain. Furthermore, advancements in decision science help train leaders to make accurate situational assessments and decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Finally, improving our understanding of the physical and mental requirements for various military specialties allows commanders to ensure they are putting soldiers into jobs where they will succeed.

The Promise of Technology

While advances in the science of human learning and training help us train soldiers faster, the truth is that it can barely keep up with the expanding list of training requirements. The Army is working on giving commanders tools that help them train more tasks quickly in almost any training environment. TRADOC has two overriding goals in this process: creating only those tools that fundamentally reinvent training development and delivery and ending the days of soldiers standing in lines at field tables or sitting through 100-slide presentations. Through technology, we are creating engaging training opportunities and delivering the right training at the point of need.

The potential for simulations in training cannot be overemphasized. Moreover, the use of simulations is grounded in our history. Thousands of hours in tank and aircraft simulators produced the best armor and Apache crews and teams in the world. As another example, when our intelligence community faced challenges in Iraq, they developed the foundry to build superb intelligence professionals and teams.

Live training remains essential. However, in a busy training schedule, simulations provide commanders options for certifying leaders, building fundamentals and training on tasks that may be too expensive or dangerous for live training. While some lean toward live training, this generation gets the potential of simulators or simulations and "The S2 Game"

At the Intelligence Center of Excellence, during the course for new intelligence analysts, they are immersed in an interactive avatar-based game. This experience is designed to reinforce the training they have already received, but in a virtual environment. Soldiers moved their avatar, talked to people, received missions, and performed other tasks. Retention has increased four-fold, and a day’s worth of lecture was shortened to two hours of interactive training. Additional time was invested in briefing and writing skills that analysts previously did not receive and which were a noted gap.
games. Their combat experience, coupled with their instinctive understanding of technology, enables them to blend live and simulation events to train faster and achieve greater proficiency than we ever imagined possible. They will help craft a set of live, virtual and constructive rheostats and train masterfully with the resources on hand.

Realizing this promise will not occur through happenstance. After 11 years of war, there are a thousand flowers blooming in the training arena, and the time has come to decide which ones we are going to pick. A coherent strategy for training, linking resources to desired outcomes, is the essential foundation for making hard decisions that advance our capabilities effectively and drop the programs we do not require. This decision begins with a simple question: Why do we want this piece of technology? If it does not dramatically improve training efficiency, we need the strength to walk away. Most importantly, we owe commanders and soldiers training tools that are easy to use.

While the details require discussion and debate, one clear point has emerged. The greatest payoff is in investing in company-level training technology. Such investment includes extending the tactical network to the company level, thereby delivering critical training capability to the company.

**Technology Necessity Test**

- Does the system improve efficiency?
- Does the system allow us to achieve training objectives we cannot currently train?
- Is it easy for soldiers to use?
- Has it been integrated into our strategies?
The future of digital training lies in low overhead drivers at the point of need, not large simulation centers. Furthermore, experienced trainers know that unit assessments and training preparation are often the hardest and most labor-intensive jobs. Yet, in many ways, they are the easiest to automate. By perfecting company-level commanders’ tools that allow them to see their units, plan their training, and coordinate training resources, we will give them more time to conduct training, rather than oversee training administration.

Exciting times lie before the training community. As commanders sift through the lessons of 11 years of war, they will reshape the fundamental skills for fighting. Demanding, effective training will remain fundamental to our ability to adapt on the battlefield. Creating such training begins by reestablishing commanders as the owners and stewards of training in the Army.

Commanders in both the operational and institutional Army will lead our process, cementing the lessons we have learned in the human elements of warfare. They understand both the evolution of our fundamental skills and improving our preparation of soldiers to face the rigors of combat. By further leveraging their knowledge and experience in assessing the application and value of virtual training, we will choose wisely. Those intelligent investments will dramatically expand the quality and quantity of training.

Together, commanders will build the new culture of training for the next 40 years. That culture will contain the seeds of our future success. Victory will start here. MR
UNDER THE PRESSURE of fiscal restraint and a new strategy that excludes the probability of large-scale stability operations, the Army must manage a deliberate drawdown. Most notably, it must reduce its end-strength by 80,000 soldiers, including eight brigade combat teams (BCTs). Historically, the Army has not fared well during drawdowns, and its Achilles heel is retention of special talent. The Army’s enduring axiom, “Soldiers are the centerpiece of the Army,” reflects the institution’s deep investment in its personnel.

The Army’s most expensive—and most important—resource is its people. Over the last decade of war, the Army created models that enabled rapid growth, e.g., Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Now it must modify these models to meet its future needs. As the Army marches toward a smaller, capability-focused force (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational), it must implement an effective system of talent management to preserve its body of irreplaceable experience.

Recognizing the Army was “out of balance” in early 2009, the Secretary of the Army established “institutional adaptation” to “more effectively and efficiently deliver trained and ready forces that are capable of meeting the needs of the commanders.” The Army stressed existing systems, stretched resources, and modified its practices to meet the needs of an insatiable wartime environment. Under institutional adaptation, the primary purpose of personnel systems was to optimize and synchronize the resource of soldiers to the operational Army. Transformation changed the distribution of officers to BCT-centric growth and created a structural shortfall of field grade officers. The increase of theater requirements compounded the problem. Out of wartime necessity, the Army focused on resourcing the BCT-centric structure. Adverse trends such as school backlogs, lack of broadening experience, and personnel turbulence emerged as officers continued to recycle into combat.
To fill the gap, the Army accelerated promotion windows and elevated officer promotion selection rates. These measures, along with the newly implemented practices of universal attendance by majors to Intermediate Level Education and the removal of numerical stratification for company-grade Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs), created younger officers who progressed through diluted competition.5

To its credit, the Army’s leadership prevented the institution from breaking under wartime stress; however, the resulting defects or pathologies from institutional adaptation intensified cultural parochialism and the triviality of broadening experience. With the successful transition out of Iraq and the imminent transition out of Afghanistan, senior leaders are signaling the importance of maintaining high-quality volunteers and keeping “the right ones.”6 Current force-stabilization strategies subjugate officer developmental time, which inhibits the Officer Personnel Management System’s ability to design career development.

The inherent defects preventing talent management are a lack of standardized doctrine, a lack of consistent practice, and the influence of a “muddy-boots” culture in career development.7 To observe these defects, I will explain the emerging trends within our officer corps after 10 years of conflict, and then outline the implications should the system remain unchanged. I propose that the Army accepts short-range fixes as a bridging strategy until it adopts an effective system of talent management. Finally, I will provide a strategic model for talent management as an innovative long-term option.

The Legacy of War and Emerging Trends

The wartime environment’s insatiable personnel demands caused current theater needs and future developmental wants to diverge. For short-term survival, the Army emphasized BCT-centric assignments at the expense of education and broadening assignments, thus eviscerating critical windows of officer developmental timelines. Educational
backlogs grew for majors and lieutenant colonels by 30 to 40 percent per year group, and educational broadening programs, such as fellowships and scholarships, suffered as fewer officers applied for these programs. In addition, joint duty became deemphasized; nearly half of infantry and armor general officers served their first joint assignment after brigade command. Current statistics for joint-qualified maneuver field grades demonstrate the decline: colonels less than 33 percent, lieutenant colonels less than 5 percent, and majors less than 1 percent. To further illustrate, the joint staff has roughly 50 percent of its statutory requirement for infantry officers. Army doctrine does not provide a suitable frame of reference for joint assignments in developmental models. Each career branch defines key and developmental assignments, but fails to define broadening assignments, let alone a logical assignment sequence. Consequently, officers become fixated on five career assignments: platoon leader, company commander, operations/executive officer, battalion commander, and brigade commander. Maneuver officers believe that all other duty assignments are of less value and will place them at risk for nonselection for promotion.

Under the current trends, this belief is correct. The legacy of war intensified an existing cultural trend of muddy-boots experiences, skewing selection practices in favor of combat-centric assignments. Over the last two years, all infantry battalion commander-selects averaged 36 months in key developmental assignments as a major and 36 months as a captain, with just fewer than four percent having a joint duty assignment. Few had any assignment outside of the BCT; in fact, the most common broadening assignment was aide-de-camp. The scope of time demonstrates the disparity, as officers in each grade-plate served upwards of 80 percent of their developmental time within the BCT. Not only did gravity pull toward BCT-centric assignments, but their performance measures escalated as well.

Officers selected early for promotion, or “below the zone,” comprised 40 to 50 percent of those selected for command. Less than 10 percent of the officers ever received an average evaluation report. Brigade combat team-centric assignments became a valuable commodity for selection; hence, those in older year groups failed to rotate out of the BCT. The resulting effect prevented an opportunity for junior officers to move up. In some cases, 25 to 30 percent of the officers in older year groups filled company command and brigade level staff positions. Promotion board selections demonstrated the difference in value between tactical and broadening assignments.

The rise in value of tactical assignments sponsors the “muddy-boots” culture. For instance, the Officer Record Brief (ORB) is the officer’s résumé to the Army. The top-left corner of the ORB lists an officer’s combat experience—a fortuitous location considering how Western society reads—as it enables a reader to quickly ascertain the officer’s “combat-currency” and thereby the relevancy of his merit. Assignment histories prior to the war are not considered important. Their recent devolution decouples the link between assignment histories and performance evaluations. A developing trend influencing ORBs is recording duty titles twice—once while deployed and once in garrison to distinguish the separate roles. For a captain with seven years time in service to fill all twenty of his previous assignments fields after completing four combat tours is common.

While officer evaluations have a sordid history of inflation and have endured over 20 revisions, they remain the most important means to differentiate officers. Force ranking was added, removed, and modified numerous times, yet cultural practice deflated the numerical stratification as senior raters failed to adhere to a rating profile that forced them to make hard choices screening talent at the micro-level, instead of pushing the difficult decisions to a macro-level selection board.

The mismanagement of the OER has led to its current condition, which leaves “haves and have nots.” Field grade maneuver officers who receive
a single average report, known as a center of mass report, are virtually eliminated from competition at the next gate for selection.13 Likewise, the “muddy-boots” culture creates an inequity within the evaluation system. Large pools of ratees are more competitive, and an assignment to a unit with complex and unique missions adds more value to one’s OER. For example, special operations and Ranger assignments are selective; therefore, their evaluations are seen as having more value. Worth noting, the Office of Congressional Legislative Liaison is equally selective, and arguably has greater applicability to the Army’s future, yet “muddy-boots” culture does not value this assignment as much as it values a Ranger regiment assignment.

Implications for the Future

Critics argue that the Army’s lack of a talent management model led to a diminished bench of strategic leaders. The growing discord stems from an inflexible personnel system that groups or batches promotions by service time instead of competence, arbitrarily distributes assignments, and possesses an evaluation system that is neither evaluative nor systemic.14 Dissention includes the core of middle-grade officers, who noted there was “a gap in some espoused and in-use practices within the Army Profession.”15 This gap is a recurring theme within the profession of arms.16 In fact, it is the same language General Westmoreland surveyed over 40 years ago, and that General Shinseki surveyed a decade ago. Even over the last year, there has been critical feedback about the departure of talent for the private sector due to a command structure that rewards conformity and ignores merit.17 Accordingly, how does the Army manage talent when its practice of selection is very narrow at the critical strategic gate of battalion command?

General Creighton Abrams, when told that company grade officers are idealistic, replied, “Yes and it’s our job to keep them that way.” Advice given to young officers who seek a successful career path are typically told to stay with troops. The five assignments resemble a progression up a steep ridgeline—platoon leader, company commander, S3/XO, battalion commander, brigade commander. Yet, these five assignments constitute perhaps only 10 years out of a 26-year career.

What else is there for an officer to do? Doctrine should define broadening assignments at each grade, stratify those assignments, and then organize them into a logical progression. This sequencing should reinvest the officer’s experience into a higher headquarters and give predictability to the family. Without doctrinal changes, officers will continue to develop narrowly and the Army will become challenged to conduct succession planning as its strategic bench strength erodes.

When reviewing the anatomy of a selection board, it becomes evident that some boards are better equipped for selection than others. For instance, the colonel promotion board is a statutory panel comprised of 17 general officers, with the board president a lieutenant general. The panel must be representative of joint duty, previous BCT command, and demographics.18 This board considers nearly 3,000 officers in 14 days, creating a workload of 200 to 250 files a day. Reviewing files for 10 hours per day gives a board member two to three minutes per officer file. In that small window of time the board member reviews an officer’s ORB, official photograph, and OERs, then determines a numerical standing of the officer relative to his peer group. This panel of very senior leaders have written evaluations for lieutenant colonels and colonels.
and possess depth in broadening assignments. It is clear that this board is well-suited to select the best candidates for promotion.

Conversely, when reviewing the same metrics for a policy board, such as the lieutenant colonel command/key billet board, the panel has only one general officer, the rest are colonels. The experiential composition is considerably less. In fact, the broadening experience of a colonel is the same as a lieutenant colonel. With selection rates at 30 percent, battalion command is the Army’s first arduous board.

The same problems persist for another policy board, the Senior Service College board, and the size of the zone it must consider nearly doubles, exceeding 5,000 files—the zone of consideration may span six year groups—creating a daunting workload. If the Army continues this practice for selection boards, it may decide the fate of an officer—a million-plus dollar investment that took 16 years to build—in only three minutes.19

A Bridging Strategy: Small Fixes to Effect Large Change

The Officer Record Brief needs to regain its résumé form. It should display the officer’s depth of experience in the Army and overtly display any special skills that are important to the Army. With minimal assistance, a CEO of a Fortune 500 company should be able to read and understand an ORB. There is considerable difference between Army curriculum vitae and those of civilians. Changing this will provide better interoperability for the officer in broadening assignments.

To avoid grade-plate pooling by having junior year groups ballast senior year groups evaluations, the Army should institute force ranking annually within their respective year groups instead of grade-plates. As the officer grows, so should his ranking, which provides a clear point of reference each year. Brigade combat teams should conduct the comparative analysis within their command, and then selection boards can conduct the analysis across the Army.

In addition, BCT commanders have too large a profile to manage. It is important to reduce their span of control for evaluations. Restoring block checks to captain evaluations will increase magnitude. Realign the rating chains for a trade-off. For example, deputy commanding generals (DCGs) at the division level should senior rate those in BCT S3/XO “key and developmental” assignments, especially if the officer is promotable. The DCGs have a better perspective for comparative analysis across the relative BCTs, and this would add weight to the evaluations.

The lieutenant colonel policy boards (command selection and senior service college) need changing too. They should reflect the same statutory requirements as the colonels’ promotion board. Except for the board president, the membership of those policy boards lacks requisite experience to discern talent. Moreover, they find themselves inundated with files that are not competitive for selection. Select the best talent early by having the strategic leaders picked at the strategic gate, and reduce the number of officers on the board. Ensuring the board is comprised of officers with broadening experience is a good way to increase the value of broadening.

A method to reduce mirror-effect bias is to remove or “mask” names on evaluations and remove pictures. The Army could do this by only displaying page two (the backside) of the OER, or replace all names with identifying numbers. With two to three minutes per file, board members spend little time on the first page of the OER, except to see the name and rank of the senior rater and height and weight of the officer. The Army’s senior leaders should review the demographic results of the board. Attributing trends to the boards becomes a tautology, especially when the boards comprise the collective membership.

Last, Army regulations and manning guidance need compliance management. For example, as the lack of professional military education attendance created backlogs at Intermediate Level Education and senior service colleges, the Army chief of staff directed lieutenant colonels to complete Intermediate Level Education prior to command. He personally adjudicates brigade command slating for those colonels who defer senior service college attendance.20 A simple measure to ensure BCT commanders manage officers’ developmental time effectively is to require monthly reporting on the unit status reports. Brigade combat team commanders are held accountable for the readiness of their equipment, why not for their indentifying officers’ developmental time? It is a finite resource.
Creating a Meritocracy in the Profession of Arms

Large organizations are constrained with respect to the resources of time, structure, and budget. The sheer size of the competition may obscure a service member’s merits. Classifying today’s Officer Personnel Management System as a meritocracy is inaccurate. The system transformed to meet the Army’s needs of growth and readiness for operational requirements. Doctrine, practice, and culture are contributing factors to its current condition. To continue to refine, the fixes must apply to all three critical components. Transitioning to a talent management system is a strategic-level problem. There are more steps in the process than “screen, vet, and cull.” While all three are functional imperatives, the Army needs to adopt the practice of succession management, sharing talent selection in an open dialog with its collective membership. The Army has the basic requirements for discerning talent, but it needs to arrange a complementary framework to create a system of talent management. A Creative Metrics white paper frames this line of thought: “Although succession management is one of the most long-term and strategic investments an organization can make, it doesn’t have to be one of the most complicated.” Following this line of thought, the Army could modify existing procedures and incorporate a five-step model for “strategic talent management.”

Conclusion

The Army modified its personnel practices to meet the persistent demands of war. The constraints of manpower and time stressed the institution, and its modification of existing practices led to pathologies. While the muddy-boots culture is a long-standing trend, its intensified parochialism affects the way we select future leaders, thus causing a deeper cleavage between espoused and in-use practices. Downsizing is only one of the certain changes the Army must manage to create a credible meritocracy. The Army needs to adopt a system of talent management.
Our current narrow wartime selection practices will not serve the Army well in the 21st century. Continuing to select future leaders on culturally valued criteria from the last conflict will reduce experience and educational diversity in our officer corps. The way of the future is to implement practices that emphasize broadening experiences to develop a wide range of skills, capabilities, and aptitudes. This nation’s decisive force possesses unmatched lethal capacity; however, its capacity to build relationships within the future Joint Force 2020 requires experience in joint, interagency, inter-governmental, and multinational assignments. These broadening experiences should be the culturally valued criteria for the next conflict. \(^{23}\) 

NOTES


3. Michael Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1994). Young introduces the concept of meritocracy in 1957 as a credible alternative to grievances of nepotism. It is designed as “a system of managing talent, which the talented are chosen and moved ahead on the basis of their achievement.”


5. Stratification, known by the Army as “block check,” refers to the senior rater’s assessment of the rated officer’s overall potential in comparison with all other officers of the same grade. (The intent is for senior raters to use this box to identify their upper third in each grade.) In order to maintain a credible profile, the senior rater must have less than 50 percent of the ratings of a grade in the top box. In addition, accelerated promotion windows enabled officers to pin-on rank 6 to 12 months earlier and elevated promotion rates 20 to 30 percent higher than the 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (1980) established zones. With promotion rates to major and lieutenant colonel exceeding 95 percent, typical nonselects were those not in keeping with Army values.


7. U.S. Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 February 2010), defines developmental as “all officer positions are developmental” and broadening experience as “assignments outside the officer’s core branch or functional area.”

8. The Army was structurally growing more majors and faster, yet its seats available to educate did not change. As theater requirements grew, operational deficiencies for Senior Service College rose 200 percent in 10 years.

9. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 changed personal management of military officers. Officers were required to progress through levels of Joint Professional Military Education and, routinely, serve in joint duty positions as part of their career development. Service compliance is briefed to Congress, annually. Officers must meet these requirements or they are not eligible for promotion to general/lieutenant general. While surveying all 428 general officer biographies, infantry and armor composed nearly one-third of the body or 129 general officers. Of the 129 infantry and armor general officers, over 45 percent completed their first joint assignment as a colonel. Additionally, most of their joint experience was in combat theater structure and the average joint service in months for colonel-promotable was 23 months.

10. Data from the United States Army Human Resources Command, OPMD-MFE-I.

11. U.S. Code, Title X, Section 661, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, available at <http://uscode.house.gov/> This statutory requirement states that the Secretary of Defense will ensure that one-half (50 percent) of Joint Duty Authorized List positions in the grade of major and above are filled to ensure joint matters.

12. Data from the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, OPMD-MFE-I.

13. Ibid.


18. Department of the Army, Memorandum, FY12 Officer and Enlisted Board Membership Requirements Tasking Matrices (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Office the Chief of Staff, G-1, August 2011.).

19. The average cost of a college education is $200,000. The pay and entitlement averages exceed $80,000 over 16 years. Added costs for training, movement, and education are contributing factors.

20. Broadening assignments, or as current culture refers “take-a-knee” assignments, are culturally conflicting. Officers learn to exemplify leader attributes by enduring with their soldiers. The distinction of commanding soldiers, above all, in combat, is the most revered duty and any staff assignment outside of “muddy-boots” is not of noble-merit and will put an officer at-risk for promotion.


Security Cooperation in Support of Theater Strategy


Our ability to sustain . . . alliances, and to build coalitions of support toward common objectives, depends in part on the capabilities of America’s Armed Forces. Similarly, the relationships our Armed Forces have developed with foreign militaries are a critical component of our global engagement and support our collective security.

— National Security Strategy, May 2010

The execution of security cooperation in the service component commands around the globe is an evolving process that occurs in many forms and utilizes a myriad of methods. Requests for assistance for security forces also come in many forms. They may be country or country-team-nominated; they may be at the request of an international organization (e.g., UN, NATO) or subregional organization (e.g., European Union, African Union); they may be directed by Office of the Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, or geographic combatant commands; or they could be requested by a sister service component. However, the huge number of events, the variety of outside actors with separate agendas, and the difficulty in linking these actions and activities to strategy create a challenging environment in which to execute a coherent plan. The problem for the strategist is to synergize or fashion these efforts and players through a process that supports the commander’s’ goals and objectives.

Key Components of Security Cooperation

The purpose of this article is to identify and link the key components of security cooperation and strategy development processes for those outside the small group of practitioners who wrestle with them normally. Critical steps in building and maintaining a viable theater level strategy are listed below:

- Set the theater security cooperation strategy.
- Align, develop, and prioritize security cooperation activities within the theater.
- Use the security cooperation planning process.
All are critical steps to build and maintain a viable theater-level strategy. The challenge at the component level is planning with and synchronizing a large number of activities and agencies. When coordinating with his parent service or higher headquarters, the strategist often finds a “map with a thousand pins” approach to security cooperation. Briefings often include multiple screenshots of the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System or similar databases on which maps of countries or regions suddenly become filled with thousands of map pins depicting the entire spectrum of U.S. military activity from conference attendance to major exercises. This gives the impression of a robust and creative Theater Security Cooperation program, when in reality the activities may be of little substance and require minimal coordination. Even if a command’s staff fully understands security cooperation strategy and planning and also executes it well, it can become an ad hoc or purposeless drill if the staff ignores or loses its expertise. The process needs codifying in doctrine and standard operating procedure publications to make it deliberate, much the way the Army has ingrained the military decision making process into generations of officers. The benefit of a successful Theater Security Cooperation strategy or Phase 0 concept plan ultimately is conflict avoidance, so we must resource Theater Security Cooperation.

To set the stage for understanding security cooperation in the context of theater strategy, it is important to be familiar with the historical context. The geographic combatant commands have had authority and responsibility for theater engagement planning since 1948 under the Unified Command Plan. The geographic combatant commands’ appreciation of security cooperation necessarily starts with an understanding of the National Defense Strategy. The strategic environment portrayed in the National Defense Strategy identifies a spectrum of challenges, including violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers, natural and pandemic disasters, and a growing competition for resources. Climate, demographic, and environmental challenges, along with globalization and increasing economic interdependence, create an environment characterized by uncertainty and risks.

Guidance for Employment

Building on the National Defense Strategy, the Guidance for Employment of the Force takes this strategic guidance and consolidates and integrates it into a single, overarching document. The Guidance for Employment of the Force provides strategic policy guidance. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, its companion document, provides the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff implementing guidance and formally tasks the development of specific campaign, campaign support, and contingency plans. Importantly, the Guidance for Employment
of the Force transitions DOD planning from a contingency-centric approach to a strategy-centric approach.

Restated in clearer terms, the Guidance for Employment of the Force approaches planning from the perspective of achieving broad theater or functional end states, not contingencies. Notably, the guidance contains the requirement for geographic combatant commands to develop campaign plans that integrate and synchronize the “steady-state” activities and operations they must perform to achieve the regional or functional end states specified in the Guidance for Employment of the Force. This is the mandate for the Theater Security Cooperation Support plan at the service component command level. Critically, for the service component commander as part of the joint team, the emphasis in the Guidance for Employment of the Force on “steady-state” activities to achieve end states and objectives reflects the centrality of security cooperation activities in our national strategic guidance documents.

To understand where steady-state security cooperation fits in the service component commander’s mission essential tasks, it is important to understand what we have asked him to accomplish. In simple terms, he must support ongoing operations, fulfill Title 10 U.S.C. responsibilities; be prepared to deploy a contingency command post (previously a JTF-capable headquarters), and, execute theater security cooperation missions. Arguably, security cooperation is the most important because it is a condition-setter and enabler for the other three tasks. The definition in JP 1-02 describes how it performs as an enabler for the other three tasks:

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.3

To build on the above definition and to better align security cooperation activities with theater strategy, a process is necessary to avoid the “pins on the map” analogy. The nuances of the process may differ from command to command and service to service, but there are basic parts that should look the same regardless of service or location. The Army’s targeting methodology (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) is a time-tested model that can serve as a foundation upon which to base the process.4 The creativity of the service component commander and staff is the only limit on the development of theater- or service-specific security cooperation planning models or methods. What is important about any process is that it accomplishes what the commander needs it to accomplish. We can envision this process in its simplest form as a matching game—a column of security activities on the left, matched or paired against a column of theater strategic objectives on the right. The synchronization of strategy and security cooperation hinges on several key activities: identification of component supporting objectives, identification of requirements, prioritization of countries and resources, and assessment.

Objectives

The development of component security cooperation objectives (effects or goals, depending on the doctrinal perspective) facilitates synchronizing the myriad efforts. Development of proper objectives facilitates and encourages the linkage of action to the geographic combatant command’s theater security objectives. Ideally, these objectives would be purpose-focused and linked to the commander’s intent for security cooperation. While not an exhaustive list, some purpose-based objectives include gaining access, improving regional

A successful security cooperation planning process will curtail purposeless or episodic activities...

U.S. force readiness, building partner capacity, increasing interoperability in assigned regions, strengthening partner relationships, and improving partner nation leadership and ministries. Identifying objectives also helps develop task sets and allows planners to focus their efforts.

We deem that certain operations, activities, and actions aligned with the task set, and then
we prioritize them. Prioritization leads to concept development, followed by assessment. From a doctrinal perspective, these tasks could be part of the Universal Joint Task List along with measures and criteria. Verb tense aside—the most important criterion for a task will be linking the activity to posture requirements and overseas bases such as cooperative security locations and forward operating sites. Security cooperation activities should also incorporate national requirements and link joint and combined exercises with day-to-day events and contingency plans.

A successful security cooperation planning process will curtail purposeless or episodic activities with limited potential for long-term impact—in effect, bringing a common sense approach to the “pins on the map” analogy. Maneuver officers will recognize this as the purpose side of the task and purpose approach—because the main question the security cooperation planner and strategist must ask himself is “Why?” Why are we doing this activity, and how does it support our goals and objectives in theater? The best way to get after the answer to this question is to prioritize—allowing the matching of valuable security cooperation resources against outcomes or effects in countries deemed important. The prioritization process can be as simple or complex as the planner desires it to be, but in general terms, it should prioritize activities and countries to determine where to best spend the command’s security cooperation dollars. Activities with a low “why” score should be at the bottom of the “to do” list, or disappear altogether.

The criteria against which we measure security cooperation activities and countries may vary from theater to theater. However, in a generic sense they
could align with the Guidance for Employment of the Force, support specific theater objectives and outcomes or end states, service partnership guidance, follow guidance from the geographic combatant commands, use country prioritization or commander’s intent, constrain themselves to set fiscal resources, obey authorities conducting the engagement, link to other events, respond to the source of the requirement, or take advantage of potential opportunity for “real world” linkage.\(^5\)

Once we evaluate these events, the next step in many commands is for a requirements board or its equivalent at the geographic combatant command and service component command level to vet it.

A successful prioritization process should result in a prioritized list of theater security events—e.g., military-to-military relationships, foreign military sales, and senior leader engagements, exercises—that will focus the command’s fiscal and planning efforts. If the activity, event, or requirement is valid, then it generates a concept, or plan, a staff lead is assigned, and the general support of the staff is employed to make the event a success.

Critically, operations, activities, and actions and concepts that do not meet planning guidance or priorities are eliminated and purposeless or episodic activities therein with limited potential for long-term impacts are curtailed.

To understand how well these activities meet the service component commander’s objectives and support the security cooperation intent, we must assess all events against the goals and objectives identified in the theater campaign plan for the geographic combatant command and the theater campaign support plan for the service component command. After action reports and trip reports are vital to the service component command’s strategy development efforts. The assessments inform campaign plans, facilitate adjustments to the integrated priority list and comprehensive joint assessment, and help refine resource requirements. Ultimately, the objective is to inform the service component command leadership on the progress of the mission and the status of effects in support of desired outcomes, strategic objectives, or goals. This process should be quantitative and link the key tasks, objectives, lines of effort, partner nations, and operations, activities, and actions so the command can develop theater priorities in terms of objectives for each partner nation and determine whether the efforts and activities synchronize with the priorities.

**Trends**

During a cycle of constrained defense spending, we cannot be everything to everyone. A commander’s most important security cooperation decision is where to spend his resources to most effectively support theater and national security priorities. Although the United States conducts security cooperation to assure creation of a dominant coalition, enhance its influence, and gain regional access and access to decision makers, we may not have the processes and systems in place to execute an effective security cooperation strategy. In this era of a new fiscal reality, we will need to better manage, align, and synchronize security cooperation resources. The development of these resources is paramount to being proper stewards.

There are two key trends, both with negative connotations, that we need to address. The first is the tendency to accept quantity over quality. The number of engagements in a certain country has little bearing on the effectiveness in an overarching strategy. The second trend is failing to define future security cooperation strategy beyond that of our most recent experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan. Building a security force is far different from building and maintaining a coalition.

The fact that there may be several hundred “engagements” with a specific country may be a great data point, but it should raise further questions for the strategist. He should focus on the quality of the engagements as they affect larger strategy. The service should prioritize the types of engagements as part of a global strategy that addresses gaps or shortfalls and weighs resources to accomplish that strategy. For example, the National Security Strategy states, “Our ability to sustain these alliances, and to build coalitions of support toward common objectives, depends in part on the capabilities of...
America’s Armed Forces. Similarly, the relationships our Armed Forces have developed with foreign militaries are a critical component of our global engagement and support our collective security.6 The services should define the broader strategy of how they fit into the National Security Strategy and how they intend to allocate the strategy to the theaters along with the resources.

Our most recent prominent reference point should not impede our ability to look at future requirements. The capability to build a security force from nothing is a component of a larger strategy, and should not necessarily be the primary focus. Interoperability with capable allies and partners requires mission command and operational units to ensure future coalitions integrate quickly and operate across the spectrum of operations. Improving and, in some cases, sustaining interoperability with future coalition partners is more complex and perhaps more expensive than teaching individual skills and small unit tactics, but remains a vital investment in our national security and ultimately provides significant and often overlooked cost savings. An example is current NATO contributions to ISAF. Approximately 85 percent of contributing members to ISAF are NATO allies contributing the equivalent of 8 to 10 brigades’ worth of forces.7 Those forces occupy battle space and execute missions that U.S. forces would otherwise be required to execute. Coalition operations will remain the norm, and activities focusing on enhanced proficiency and increased interoperability with allies will pay off many times over in the future.

Ultimately, the goal of theater security cooperation is to improve national security through well-postured, prepared, and interoperable partners. Synchronized and nested phase zero operations are a vital component in preventing the requirement for later phases. A clear, coordinated strategy with measurable end states applied to security cooperation at the theater and national levels will assure the execution of a broader national security strategy. While acknowledging the current superb security cooperation activities going on around the globe, it’s clear that a well considered and understood security cooperation planning methodology will bring about successful execution with maximum efficiency and ensure we expend resources only on activities that will achieve the desired results. MR

NOTES

2. Department of Defense, Unified Command Plan 201.
5. U.S. Army Africa Assessment Brief, November 2010.
Seizing the Initiative by Establishing the Rule of Law During Combat Operations

Colonel John F. Hussey, USAR
With Colonel Larry W. Dotson, U.S. Army

“And let me say also we will not be judged on how we do the combat part, but it is how we leave it in the eyes of the world—and that’s that nation-building part that is so essential . . . the forces will have to transition to peacekeeping and stability, because you can’t afford a lull.”

— General Carl W. Stiner

If you break it you own it,” Colin Powell told President George W. Bush as the president considered the invasion of Iraq. Powell’s statement should resonate in the minds of operational planners as they prepare contingency plans for future U.S. military operations. In any future military operation, U.S. commanders will be expected to plan for stability operations and integrate non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans. As part of that responsibility, the U.S. government is accountable to the rule of law. Preparation of forces for rule of law operations is critical for success of the strategic end state; the failure to consider and plan for those factors may have strategic consequences that can undermine national objectives.

FM 3-07, Stability Operations, defines the rule of law as—

A principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles.

Rule of law in a war-torn nation is a critical, paramount requirement in achieving stability operation objectives “to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment; provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” and allowing for essential service to be restored. Military commanders must plan, train, and resource an adequate number of military personnel to implement order, protect property, and maintain security to prevent lawlessness. Lawfulness is the foundation of stability. Operational planners must anticipate U.S. military forces will likely encounter a failed, broken, destroyed, or simply nonexistent justice apparatus (i.e., policing courts and corrections institutions). The situation

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PHOTO: Iraqi civilians rush to kick the torn-down statue of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Bagdad, 9 April 2003. (AP Photo/Laurent Rebours)
RULE OF LAW

will likely require immediate attention to protect the indigenous people of the area, their property, and their economic livelihood. Successful planning and execution of a rule of law plan by troops on the ground (United States, allied, coalition, or UN forces) will enable the U.S. military to achieve or ensure stability. In turn, creating the conditions necessary for U.S. forces to transition from combat operations to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations will eventually enable the United States to achieve its strategic end-state goals.

Uncontrolled Lawlessness

In April 1992, America watched as lawlessness broke out in Los Angeles. Riots erupted on 29 April 1992 after a jury acquitted four LA police officers accused in the beating of an African American motorist. The verdicts were announced around three thirty in the afternoon. Within 45 minutes, an unruly crowd had formed at the intersection of Florence and Normandie Avenues. The mob assaulted pedestrians, pelted vehicles with bricks and rocks, and smashed shop windows. Police officers called to the scene immediately tried to arrest the boldest troublemakers, but failed, and rather than call for emergency backup, they retreated from the area.

The mob rapidly grew, and without a police presence, its actions became increasingly violent. In an act of brutality that shocked the nation, an incensed mob attacked a helpless victim who had driven into the gauntlet of their fury. Several men dragged the victim from the cab of his truck, knocked him to the ground, and kicked him. He was then struck in the head with a fire extinguisher, pounded several times with a hammer, and hit with a brick. The following day the Los Angeles Times posed the question, “Where were the police?” The Times said the riots might have been averted had police responded with a massive effort to quell the initial unrest.4

The events during the riots in Los Angles were destined to be repeated. While it is impossible to predict what challenges military forces will encounter, operational planners must glimpse into the future and plan accordingly. During the planning for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, one of the most contentious issues was troop strength. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld believed, after a successful operation with limited conventional forces in Afghanistan, that the United States could invade Iraq with a relatively small footprint. During testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee, then-Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki stated that something “on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” in addition to troops already committed would be necessary for the invasion force and post-war stabilization.5

Nonetheless, the United States invaded Iraq with a force of only 130,000 troops by the end of 2003. After Baghdad fell, widespread looting broke out in the streets of that capital. U.S. forces soon reported that they were overwhelmed and did not have the capacity (or plan) to quell the disturbances.6

A 2003 Rand study concluded that “successful nation-building” required a minimum of 20 soldiers per 1,000 residents (or about 1 soldier per 40 inhabitants).7 At about the same time, only 25,000 U.S. personnel enforced the rule of law in Baghdad, a city of approximately 6 million. The ratio was one U.S. soldier for each 250 citizens. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the U.S. Joint Forces Land Component commander, noted, “That’s not enough to control a city of 6 million people.”8 The widespread and uncontrolled looting in Baghdad not only cost the Iraqi society billions of dollars, but
also set conditions that favored and fueled Iraq’s initial insurgency.\(^9\)

The pervasive sense of lawlessness conveyed a widespread, lingering message to the citizens of Baghdad, the American public, and the international community: No one is in charge. To those intent on doing harm, it also signaled an opportunity to expand the chaos and havoc for political purposes. In addition, the inability of the American and Iraqi forces to secure munitions allowed looters to pillage the vast munitions supply of the former military regime. Stockpiles of arms, ammunition, and artillery shells fell into the hands of anticoalition forces who immediately used them against the coalition. Lastly, the looting of government offices and damage to infrastructure directly affected the restoration of essential services. Dick Mayer, a former police officer and deputy director for the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, noted that as Iraq descended into lawlessness, the ability of the United States to create a stable government in Iraq was also diminished.\(^{10}\) Together, the detrimental effects of the looting directly undermined U.S. strategic goals.

Comparing the riots in LA to the looting in Baghdad highlights the culminating point. In both situations, the inability of security forces to maintain decisive control from the onset of the disturbances created a situation that quickly grew out of control and exacerbated an already complex situation. Just as the world watched in horror as truck driver Reginald Denny was dragged from a truck and beaten in LA, the world also witnessed U.S. forces reduced to sideline spectators as looters overwhelmed U.S. forces in Baghdad and destroyed key infrastructure essential for SSTR efforts. In both instances, the security forces were not prepared to deal with the situation and quickly became overwhelmed. Regardless of the circumstances, in Iraq the U.S. government did not perform one of its core functions: providing security to the populace. It, therefore, was viewed as inept. When crowds become unruly, potential to cause violence or destruction arises; then commanders and forces need to recognize this decisive point and move quickly to establish order.

One of the key findings of the recent Rand research on establishing internal security in nationbuilding is that establishing security during the “golden hour” after combat operations conclude is critical to preventing additional unrest. The “golden hour” is the short time of several weeks to several months after combat operations when external intervention may enjoy both popular support and legitimacy and the opposition has not had the time to organize.

To take maximum advantage of the “golden hour,” planners must anticipate and ensure the right mix of forces and proper rule of law training. The “golden hour” is a critical time to gain security during stability operations because it can prevent unrest from quickly spiraling out of control as during the LA riots or the lawlessness in Baghdad.

In Afghanistan, coalition forces missed the opportunity to seize the initiative immediately following the overthrow of the Taliban regime. Future efforts should be particularly mindful of the period following major combat operations. The inability to react and take advantage of the “golden hour” risks losing the initiative and jeopardizes long term stability and transition to civil authority.\(^{11}\)

A New Paradigm

In 1994, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes coined the term “fourth generation warfare” as a new type of warfare between a nation-state’s military and an irregular, nonstate actor. In fourth generation warfare, insurgents seek to incorporate different elements of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, and terrorist acts to demonstrate a willingness to fight “across the political, economic, social, and military spectrums” and achieve the strategic goal of “changing the minds of the enemy’s policymakers.”\(^{12}\)

Many accuse U.S. military leaders of fighting the nation’s last war. This means strategic leaders often use their experiences gained on the battlefield and in academia to plan contingency operations based on the paradigm of old. This creates a situation best expressed by General Wallace during the U.S. invasion of Iraq, when he noted that this was not the enemy we war-gamed.\(^{13}\) As U.S. forces face the long-term prospect of fighting fourth generation conflicts, operational planners must adjust their planning and prepare to fight what the former commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, General
Charles Krulak, dubbed “the three block war.” Krulak believed that the three main categories of military operations are combat, stabilization, and humanitarian support performed simultaneously and tactically within a confined geographical space. To be successful in fourth generation warfare, U.S. commanders must provide security to populations of large cities and rural areas.  

To be successful in fourth generation warfare, U.S. commanders must provide security to populations of large cities and rural areas.

Field Manual 3-07 established the rule of law as an essential element in transitioning from SSTR operations to enabling civil control. The difficulty with this concept is that rule of law is often discussed as a strategic policy and at the operational level is planned by those with a background in international law. Too often, the planning is long term in nature and focused on top-down host nation government institutional level. As noted by the senior counterinsurgency adviser to General David Petraeus in Iraq, David Kilcullen, the rule of law is one of the critical foundations of societal order and fundamental to a functioning society.

The coalition in Afghanistan continues to struggle with rule of law operations, mainly because they are trying to create national-level institutions, while rule of law functions are usually at the local level and community based. The Taliban are focused at the local level and thus are having more success with rule of law and often displace the coalition. One only need look at the initial failings of the Coalition Provisional Authority experiences in Iraq to understand the difficulty. A focus on long-term institution building does not meet the immediate need to resolve a corrupt, incompetent, nonfunctioning judicial system. Taking years to build credible national institutions ignores the immediate need to provide a system that can resolve both criminal and civil cases and undermines stability efforts. Local militias formed in Iraq to fill a judicial vacuum and the Taliban exploited such vacuums in Afghanistan on two occasions.

In an unstable environment, people need security and such security depends on some local form of law and order. While long-term goals that led to a successful exit strategy are important, what does the lack of a functioning justice system mean for the U.S. soldier or marine on the ground fighting the three-block war at the tactical level? Units from the brigade level all the way down to the team level must deal with irregular forces creating the chaos and fueling the insurgency. How does a team of soldiers led by a 23-year-old sergeant establish security against a nonstate actor who seeks to combine guerrilla tactics with a willingness to fight “across the political, economic, social, and military spectrums”? What does a squad leader do with a petty criminal or someone accused of a more serious crime such as rape or kidnapping? How does the team deal with minor civil issues such as land disputes that exacerbate tribal tensions and lead to violence? Have operational planners provided the necessary guidance, resources, and training for this situation?

Existing U.S. policy and UN resolutions obligate military commanders and forces to plan and conduct rule of law operations. To help the United States or allied nations reform the rule of law in post-conflict combat environments, planners must consider an interim criminal and civil code adopted by the international community to enforce the rule of law and settle civil issues. Internationally accepted laws are pivotal to establishing the rule of law during post conflict operations. For a military force to enforce laws, the laws must have international legitimacy, be accepted by the population, and conform to basic international human rights. A code of interim transitional laws will enable military forces to enforce the rule of law and thus ensure public safety and security.

Throughout previous conflicts, the international community recognized the inability of military forces to enforce the rule of law. In the latter part of the 1990s and in early 2000, the subject of the rule of law was widely debated. The UN issued the Report of the Panel on UN Operations, also known as the Brahimi Report. Within a year of the report’s release, the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Irish Centre for Human Rights launched the Model Codes Project. The project included over 300 international experts who developed a set of codes.
for post-conflict reconstruction based on extensive research and best practice principles—the Model Criminal Code, the Model Code of Criminal Procedure, the Model Detention Act, and the Model Police Powers Act. Although the international community has not implemented the model codes, they offer a valuable alternative and starting point for criminal justice reform in post-conflict.¹⁶

When considering stabilization and reconstruction (SSTR) operations and logical lines of operations (LLO), planners should consider Maslow’s hierarchy of needs model. The model can help envision SSTR and the development of LLOs via the basics that any population will require in a war-ravaged environment. Such needs consist of basic human requirements to survive: food, water, and safety. In most situations, people who do not feel safe will move their families to seek safety and rely on the goodness of others by way of an international or nongovernmental organization. This is why there are so many internally displaced civilians during a time of war. For civilians to return to an area they vacated, they must feel a sense of security and a sense of justice. This is a basic concept that military planners must recognize during any deliberate or crisis action planning. Without security, the conditions necessary to fulfill the other hierarchy of needs in Maslow’s pyramid will never be met.

Under this model, the population does not focus on elections, construction, and economic development until the basic rule of law is established. The situation that occurred in the streets of Egypt and various locations throughout the Middle East in early 2011 are prime examples. Egypt, a place war had not ravished, provided the population a sense of security through the Egyptian military and police. The rule of law in Egypt enabled the Egyptian protesters to demonstrate for legal and political reform. Their main concerns were state-of-emergency laws, free elections, freedom of speech, corruption, and economic issues, including high unemployment. If the rule of law had been absent, the protesters would not have had an opportunity to focus on secondary and tertiary issues on Maslow’s pyramid.
At the operational level, this focus may require a planner to consider the police, the judiciary, and corrections to resolve current criminal justice and civil law requirements and develop a more stable justice system under the control of the population. The U.S. public and indigenous population has to understand that this is a long-term concept that may take years to implement in war-torn nations or failed states. Planners must consider what personnel and resources are necessary at the tactical level of war to achieve the goals and move stability and reconstruction forward along the various LLOs.

As U.S. forces continue to fight an elusive enemy in fourth generation warfare, establishing security will be paramount to counterinsurgency operations. To transition from phase III thru phase IV, commanders must implement and enforce the rule of law via a justice system acceptable to the population they serve. This is especially true if phase III operations destroy or cripple preexisting order. In many instances, military forces are unfamiliar with the concepts of the rule of law and do not have the expertise to administer justice in a nonfunctioning justice system, and those forces may not understand or appreciate the cultural sensitivity of the law in relation to the country or region to which they deploy. For example, deployed forces often bring with them an ethnocentric bias that could complicate nation building or counterinsurgency. Often the deployed force will enforce criminal justice or civil justice principles based upon “what they know” as opposed to what may be important to the culture in which they serve. This might entail using a tribal chief to resolve disputes at the local levels. Some may argue that this might not be the long-term goal, and it negates the purpose of a regional or federal legal system. However, it may be necessary in the early stages of SSTR. As LLO are developed, the establishment of a regional or national justice system may be contemplated; however, this may take decades to implement. For the U.S. forces fighting the three-block war, the crucial time is the present.

Soldiers at the tactical level must have the tools to establish the rule of law. These tools include not only an internationally recognized code of law, but also training, rules for use of force, and the right to bear arms. Unfortunately, the U.S. military often discovers too late that it has failed to provide the requisite tools for soldiers on the ground to deal with insurgents or common criminals. We must train soldiers in apprehension and detention and in basic police techniques to include that they emphasize human rights.

Many in the military are familiar with the saying “if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” Providing U.S. forces with weapons such as F16s, MK19s, and M249s when they are dealing with a civilian population is fraught with danger. If the only resource U.S. forces have is weapons that inflict serious injury or death, then everything starts to look like the proverbial nail, and they will use their hammers. A lethal weapon will bring about a resolution. If the United States only provides soldiers with combat weapons and does not invest in culturally appropriate training, then an overuse of force is likely to occur, exacerbating relations with the local population and sowing the seeds of an insurgency.

As noted in the command guidance to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), this creates animosity and may be detrimental to the overall mission. More important, deployed forces must convey that they are operating under the host nation’s rule of law rather than governing by the use of force or the threat of the use of force. The excess use of force will result in ill feelings and mistrust between the military and the population the U.S. military is trying to protect and gain the trust of.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. military leaders learned that cordon searches and the mass arrests of locals were alienating Iraqis and rendering the operations counterproductive. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez noted multiple indicators that the U.S. iron-fisted approach was beginning to alienate Iraqis. Indeed, some named the mass incarceration of Iraqis in prisons such as Abu
Ghraib as a contributing factor leading to some of the abuses that occurred within the facility. To avoid these types of mistakes, planners must recognize and ensure that deployed forces are trained, equipped, and resourced to conduct the rule-of-law operations of policing, corrections, and establishing a judiciary during operations that occur between phase III and phase IV.

In fourth generation warfare, the operational commander and the forces at the tactical level must demonstrate restraint. This is especially true when provoked by insurgents mixed within the civilian population. Soldiers must be agile and capable of moving from the use of deadly force against enemy combatants to using less lethal weapons in counterinsurgency operations to incapacitate people and equipment while preventing the loss of life and damage to property.

In Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal had previously issued orders aimed at minimizing civilian casualties to the point of restricting airstrikes. He noted that while his policy may create risks to coalition forces, alienating the Afghan population was a far greater strategic risk and actually created greater risk to the troops at the tactical level in the long term. While the ISAF commander, General David Petraeus stated that “forces must secure and serve the population”—a phrase reminiscent of a common American police force motto “to protect and serve,”

...the decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the center of gravity. Only by providing them security and earning their trust can the Afghan government and ISAF prevail.18

Corrections and the Judiciary

The concept of arresting large numbers of military-aged males using cordons and searches and incarcerating them for extended periods without due process is unacceptable and may lead to a greater insurgency. Major General Douglas Stone, the former commander of Task Force 134 Detention Operations in Iraq, estimated that over 160,000 detainees processed through the detention operations process. Additionally, each detainee U.S. forces incarcerated potentially had a network extending beyond the wires of the camps and linked into the overall strategic goals of the United States.19 The perception of torture and human rights violations in Guantanamo Bay and throughout the U.S. detention system has increased recruiting and funding for Al-Qaeda and has damaged the U.S. reputation internationally.

American forces must be careful to differentiate between a common petty thief and a hardcore insurgent. We should never incarcerate these two types of individuals together because of the possible consequence of detention camps becoming a recruiting ground and training institution for the insurgency. We should house hardcore insurgents in a separate facility so as not to allow common criminals to become insurgent groups. We must manage detention camps using a policy of engagement rather than incarceration. Similarly, soldiers conducting detention operations must minimize their ethnocentric bias and understand the culture in which they are operating. This does not mean that soldiers have to coddle detainees, but they should understand a detainee’s culture to avoid errors in judgment that may affect the overall strategic mission of the United States.

Long-term judicial reconstruction projects will require international assistance and aid. It could take several years for the public to regain confidence in a judiciary that in many instances has a reputation for bias and corruption. However, a system must be in place that can hear grievances and issue rulings on the incarceration of people detained by military forces as well as resolve civil issues. To ensure due process, there must be a functioning court system that fairly, impartially, and expeditiously determines the innocence or guilt of detainees based on rules of evidence. The civilian population will quickly see a judiciary that is not free from corruption, bias, and human rights violations as inept, undermining the policing and correctional aspects of the rule of law. Failure to implement a functioning court system could also increase the violence through organized crime and extrajudicial killings, as in Iraq during sectarian violence.

Planners must consider implementing a functioning judiciary as part of the planning process to ensure due process for persons apprehended by U.S. forces and to resolve civil issues in accordance with local laws or custom or religious practices. There are several different methods, including working with the host nation and staff judge advocates to
combine cultural and religious sensitivities with the rule of law. The following incident that occurred in the Balkans further illustrates the importance of creating an independent judiciary. In Kosovo, the Albanian judiciary failed to apply the law equally between the ethnic Albanians and Serbs. Due to obvious discrimination, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General attempted to improve the judicial system by permitting internationals to serve on the judiciary. After the conflict in Kosovo, the UN Mission in Kosovo established an independent judiciary by appointing international judges and prosecutors. It was the first time this had been done, and it resulted from discrimination within the courts and a lack of trained judges and prosecutors. The after action conclusion of the program was that the international participation in establishing the judiciary should have been immediate rather than incremental and crisis-driven.20

**The Critical Juncture**

Operational planners focused on fourth generation warfare or counterinsurgency must place more emphasis on the immediate concerns of military forces entering operational areas without a functioning justice system. They must anticipate and accept the fact that military forces in conjunction with international organizations will be necessary, and they will play a significant role in providing security and stability via rule of law operations. Planners must consider rule of law operations throughout all phases of the operation. Effective planning must address how the joint force and international organizations, host nation forces, and rule of law personnel will resource, train, and implement rule of law functions to sustain the force until achieving the end state.

The military has the obligation and ability to create the conditions necessary to provide a stable and secure environment by properly planning for rule of law operations throughout each phase of an operation. Often, planners are more concerned with rule of law operations during stabilization and enabling civil authority; however, preventing lawlessness during combat operations, or as the operations wind down, is necessary to reduce lawlessness and achieve stability. An effective, accountable justice system supported by trained and resourced security personnel at the tactical level of war is essential to establishing the rule of law at a critical juncture of combat operations. Preparation and resourcing of forces for rule of law operations should be part of the initial operational plan.

A functioning justice system with the ability to resolve both criminal and civil cases is critical for success of the strategic end state. The inability to plan, train, and resource U.S. military forces in police operations, detention operations, and the judiciary will have strategic consequences that will be detrimental to national objectives. *MR*

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3. Ibid., Glossary.
9. Ibid., 43.
10. Ibid.
IN 2001, THE U.S. Army entered a period of sustained conflict that continues to this day. Through successes and hardships, in multiple theaters, the Army has conducted and continues to conduct operations in defense of the Nation. The past 11 years have been intense in terms of demands placed on soldiers and leaders as well as in efforts to capture key changes to doctrine resulting from changes in operational environments. In fact, since 2001, the Army has published four versions of its capstone doctrine on operations. In a sense, this is a statement of recognition that change is constant, and Army doctrine needs to keep pace with change. In dynamic operational environments, what may be true today may not be true tomorrow.

Thus, the Army has an opportunity to develop doctrine that fulfills the 38th CSA Marching Orders by defining what Army forces do and how they should best be organized. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, and its associated Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) provide direction for how the Army will operate in the future. This article discusses the development process of ADP 3-0 to inform the Army and responds to questions and concerns about the rationale for the various conventions used in the publication.

The Purpose of Doctrine

Doctrine provides the Army with a common philosophy, language, purpose, and unity of effort for the employment of forces. It represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as right. It provides a common perspective from which to train and fight. To meet the challenges of the future, Army
leaders must understand the fundamental principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures articulated in doctrine publications. As changes occur in an operational environment, the doctrine development process provides Army forces the ability to make rapid doctrinal changes to techniques through active participation by soldiers and leaders in the force.\(^5\)

Army leaders must reflect on the past but also look to an uncertain future. The concept of unified land operations provides a common operational concept for a future in which Army forces must be prepared to operate across the range of military operations, integrating their actions with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as part of a larger effort.\(^6\) Unified land operations is a natural extension of doctrine that has advised the Army for many years. Lessons learned over 11 years of combat have honed the Army’s views of what the Army is, how the Army operates, and how the Army contributes to unified action.\(^7\) ADP 3-0 was developed in the context of a new way of presenting doctrine, one that would provide ease of access and review to the reader.

**The Beginning of Doctrine 2015**

Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 is the Army’s first manual published under a concept known as Doctrine 2015. This concept, once completed, will provide soldiers with doctrine that is more collaborative and accessible.\(^8\) In 2009, senior leaders in the Army expressed a concern that soldiers were not reading doctrine due to the length of the manuals. Additionally, main ideas were often buried within the text. Finally, there was a sense that there were simply too many field manuals in the Army inventory. As a result, in 2009 the Combined Arms Center began an effort known as Doctrine Reengineering. Doctrine Reengineering was intended to reduce the number of field manuals, as well as review the size of the manuals.

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U.S. Army Photo
Warriors with 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team and 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade of 2nd Infantry Division alongside their Republic of Korea Army counterparts with 27th Armor Battalion and 125th Mechanized Infantry Battalion of the 75th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 26th Mechanized Infantry Division engage in a 2010 combined arms live fire exercise in Suwon, Republic of Korea.
In 2010, based on an inquiry from the CSA concerning the size of existing doctrine manuals, work began on developing a 10-page doctrine manual. This manual, called an Army Doctrine Publication, and a hierarchy of associated publications were the first manuals under what is now known as Doctrine 2015. Approved by the CSA in 2011, the intent of Doctrine 2015 is to provide a more logical flow of doctrine to the force, to categorize content by fundamental principles, tactics, procedures, and techniques. Each category corresponds to a specific type of publication. Material is available to soldiers through a variety of digital platforms, and soldiers will have the opportunity to shape the development of techniques publications through providing input via a Mil-Wiki site.

The intent is to develop concise, relevant, and accessible doctrine that will guide Army forces in the conduct of operations through the near future. Individual study, education, training, and professional dialogue are means to develop a common understanding. Professional discussion is also a means to improve doctrine. Through verbal and written discussion, soldiers and leaders achieve the benefit of multiple perspectives formed through experience and education. These perspectives often form the basis for further development of fledgling concepts that may become doctrine of the future. Clark claims that Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 “avoids nuanced discussion in favor of a numbing series of definitions, a taxonomy of operational functions and methods.” However, Unlike legacy doctrine, ADP 3-0 highlights the key fundamentals and principles. It intentionally avoids detailed explanatory material, while providing the reader with a concise listing of ideas that all soldiers need to know and understand.

An example can be found in an article written by Major J.P. Clark, published in the July-August 2012 Military Review titled “The Missed Opportunity: A Critique of ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations.” The article provides perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of ADP 3-0 and the doctrine of unified land operations. Clark highlights what he deems are missed opportunities to provide doctrine that emphasizes key characteristics of today’s operational environment while clarifying what Army forces are expected to do in support of the joint force and offers suggestions on how the Army could improve its capstone doctrine. The points Clark makes in his article are certainly worthy of discussion.

Naming of the Parts

One of the hallmarks of a profession is a common language among its members. Physicians, scientists, and engineers use terminologies founded within their respective professions. Ideally, the same should be true for Army forces, and in many cases is. However, under legacy doctrine, capstone and keystone doctrinal manuals were often lengthy and separated principles that define what the Army is and what it does.

Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 follows a logic map that links the broad concept of unified land operations to specific foundations and tenets intended to introduce what the Army does in a fashion that can be remembered by the broader audience. For example, ADP 3-0 defines unified land operations, and provides the six tenets of unified land operations (flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, synchronization). By providing specific lists associated with the larger concept, soldiers can easily read and study the material and, over time, remember the content. Every soldier in the Army will be expected to read and have a working knowledge of the fundamentals and principles found in the ADPs.

This common baseline of knowledge is the end state of Doctrine 2015: an Army that can professionally discuss the material in ADP 3-0 and the other 14 ADPs within Doctrine 2015.

It is important to step back and recognize the net effect of Doctrine 2015. The reader benefits from the conciseness and clarity of the presentation of main ideas in ADP 3-0. If that ignites a deeper inquiry into Army doctrine, it has served its first purpose. If it stimulates further research into successive layers of doctrine, it has advanced the profession.
Conceptual Emptiness

One of the primary objectives of Doctrine 2015 is to provide Army doctrine that is more collaborative and accessible. However, simply creating 10-page ADPs does not in itself achieve this objective. There are several keys to meet the objective. First, develop the ADPs with the intent of avoiding redundancy with existing Army or joint doctrine. For example, ADP 3-0 recognizes the joint definition of an operational environment, while focusing the discussion of the operational environment as related to Army forces. In addition, ADP 3-0 discusses the operations process as part of the operations structure while avoiding redundancy with the larger discussion found in ADP 5-0, The Operations Process.

Another key to making doctrine more collaborative and accessible is ensuring that major topics and the associated detail appear in the proper doctrinal manual. Clark states that ADP 3-0 suffers from conceptual emptiness due to lack of a glossary and detailed discussion of the various fundamentals and principles.15 It is true that ADP 3-0 focuses on the fundamentals and principles of unified land operations. ADP 3-0 also contains a one-page doctrinal glossary that defines key terms and acronyms. However, under Doctrine 2015, a reader would access ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, for a more detailed explanation of the fundamentals and principles.16 ADRP 3-0 provides the foundational understanding so everyone in the Army can interpret the fundamentals and principles the same way.17

Every ADP has an associated ADRP that expands on the ADP’s major topics. For example, ADP 3-0 summarizes the Army’s contribution to Unified Action, while ADRP 3-0 dedicates a chapter to a detailed discussion of the concept. ADP 3-0 introduces the concept of decisive action, but ADRP 3-0 goes into a more detailed discussion of how the tasks of decisive action (offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities) change with echelon, time, and location. For even greater detail, ADRP 3-90, Tactics, describes how the Army intends to fight by providing an in-depth discussion of offensive and defensive tasks and sub-tasks.18 ADPs and ADRPs complement each other. The ADRP provides the details that a 10-page ADP cannot fully explore.

Knowing Ourselves

Clark states, “In an ideal world of linear processes, capstone doctrine would be the basis for other doctrine, as well as policies for equipping, manning, and training.”19 In fact, ADP 3-0 is the basis for doctrine found in all other ADPs. Because of the parallel development, Army leaders were able to ensure that all 15 ADPs nest with ADP 3-0. In other words, all ADPs recognize the fundamentals and principles of unified land operations, while the fundamentals and principles found in the associated ADPs both complement and reinforce ADP 3-0 doctrine. The process Army leaders use to accomplish this effort reflects their desire to directly influence emerging doctrine through collaboration and dialogue.

Multiple conferences hosted by the Combined Arms Center bring together ADP proponents as well as leaders from various FORSCOM units. These conferences are dynamic venues for attendees to discuss the draft doctrine and provide recommendations that ultimately shape the final versions of the manuals.20 Where disagreements arise between Army leaders, all sides voice their concerns, with the TRADOC commander or, depending on the ADP, the CSA making the ultimate decisions. The doctrine found in the ADPs represents the consensus of Army leaders.
By developing the ADPs in tandem, leaders could resolve conflicting ideas and keep redundancy to a minimum.

Major Clark recognizes that doctrine should not be overly prescriptive.\(^{21}\) As stated earlier in this article, doctrine is by its very nature dynamic, impacted directly by events within an operational environment. Although it is not possible to determine future doctrinal needs with absolute certainty, the Army is able to consider possible changes to doctrine as new ideas and enduring trends emerge from multiple sources. Concept developers, lessons learned from training centers and theaters of operation, and academic institutions all contribute to what may be doctrine of the future.\(^{22}\)

What current doctrine should not do is stymie these processes. Doctrine should provide the force the latitude to adjust as necessary based on specific missions. Over time, changes in doctrine will certainly occur. Unanticipated events within an operational environment often determine how dramatic the change is, but change is inevitable.\(^{23}\) Change in operational environments drive Army forces to modify mission command systems to assist commanders on the battlefield.

**Looking to the Future**

ADP 3-0 and the associated Doctrine 2015 manuals were developed by Army professionals who shared ideas born out of experiences in combat over the past 11 years. It is a product of collaboration and dialogue among individuals who care deeply about their profession and desire a common language for the profession. The Army must encourage such collaboration and dialogue and welcome professional critiques to grow and mature as a force. Leaders should embrace the opportunity to engage in the development of doctrine through discussion forums as well as Mil-Wiki and encourage subordinates to do likewise. Only through this exchange of ideas can the Army prepare itself to meet the challenges it will face in future conflicts. *MILITARY REVIEW*

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### NOTES

1. The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 1-02).

2. The 2003 and 2008 field manuals were titled Operations. In 2010, TRADOC published Change 1, FM 3-0, Operations: Following publication of change 1, FM 3-0, extensive work was conducted in the development of what would have been known as Revised FM 3-0. However, as the Army approved Doctrine 2015, this version of the operations manual became the basis for Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0.

3. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], October 2011). Paragraphs 7-10 discuss operational environments, and the fact that operational environments are not static. Change is constant, and commanders adapt to change within their operational environments.

4. Published in January 2012, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Marching Orders represents GEN Odierno’s initial guidance to the Army. This quotation is an excerpt from his concluding thoughts.

5. Although not formally defining the term, the Army’s operations doctrine has traditionally viewed doctrine as a body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as an integral part of a joint force. Doctrine focuses on how to think—not what to think.

6. ADP 3-0, Foreword from CSA.

7. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1).

8. Doctrine 2015 Information Brief 2 May 2012 <https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/orgs/mccoe/cadd/Doctrine%202015%20Library/Forms/Document%20Management%20View.aspx>. It is important to note that as the Army’s Chief of Staff, GEN Martin Dempsey was actively involved in the development of ADP 3-0. ADP 3-0 then became a template for the development of all other ADPs under Doctrine 2015.

9. As an example, current Army doctrine concerning mission command and wide area security was first introduced in “The Army Capstone Concept: Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, 2016, 2028,” 21 December 2009. In 2011, change 1, FM 3-0, Operations, introduced mission command as both a philosophy and a warfighting function. Then, in 2012, ADP 3-0 introduced wide area security as one of the Army’s core competencies.

10. FM 1, The Army, June 2005, 1-11, discussion of professions: “To that end, they develop particular vocabularies, establish journals, and sometimes adopt distinct forms of dress.”


12. ADP 3-0, iii).

13. Ibid., 1, 7-8.

14. The current Doctrine 2015 distribution plan is to ensure that every commander above company level receives copies of all ADPs and ADRPs in hard copy and/or electronic form via disk. Copies will also be available on the Reimer Library Web Site.


17. Doctrine 2015 brief developed 7 July 2011 in preparation for the August 2011 Doctrine Conference conducted at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

18. ADP/ADRP 3-07 discusses the decisive action task of stability, while ADP/ADRP 3-28 discusses the decisive action task of defense support of civil authorities.


20. The Combined Arms Center utilizes two formal conferences to resolve doctrine. Councils of Colonels bring together individuals directly involved with the development of respective doctrinal manuals. These individuals have decision making authority where decisions must be made on aspects of doctrine. General Officer Review Boards convene when issues arising in the Council of Colonels cannot be resolved. Attendees are usually general officers, with one senior officer heading the Board.


22. The Capability Development Integration Directorate, Mission Command Center of Excellence has a major role in examining emerging concepts that may become doctrine of the future. Center for Army Lessons Learned and Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate actively participate in this process.

23. As an example, leaders from within and outside TRADOC are already examining the utility of the Army’s core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security to determine if these competencies will continue to effectively serve the Army in the years ahead.
“America’s Army—Our Profession”

Major General Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr., U.S. Army, and Colonel Jeffrey D. Peterson, U.S. Army

“Our past 237 years, the United States Army has proudly served the nation by winning its wars and securing the peace. Our history is marked by decisive action over a wide range of missions—including regular and irregular warfare, humanitarian assistance operations, engagement with allies, and support to civil authorities. Today, our Army is entering not only a period of transition, but also of great opportunity.”

— Foreword to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, The Army, 17 September 2012.

As our Army enters this period of transition—underscored by an impending drawdown in Afghanistan, preparing for a new mission post-2014, a forecasted reduction in Army end-strength, and the challenges of developing capabilities for the Army of 2020—we have an exceptional opportunity to learn, grow, and posture our profession for an uncertain future. While we cannot predict the future, we know the nation will call upon our Army to undertake some of its most difficult challenges. The American people we serve trust us to accomplish our assigned missions effectively, efficiently, and ethically. All Army professionals must consciously work to maintain that trust through their demonstrated competence, character, and commitment.

We are not just maintaining the Army Profession; we are strengthening the Army Profession based on findings and recommendations from the 2011 Army Profession Campaign which was designed to study the state of our profession. Directed by the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, the campaign was the most comprehensive, holistic study of the profession ever conducted by the Army. Over the 15-month study, more than 40,000 Army professionals across all cohorts and components provided feedback on the state of the Army Profession and helped codify a common understanding of the components of our unique profession that had been lacking. The “America’s Army – Our Profession” education and training program for calendar year 2013 was developed to inculcate a shared understanding among the members of our profession—soldiers and Army civilians—and thus begin the process of strengthening the Army Profession from within.
The results of our 2011 study and our education and training program in 2013 will continue informing our efforts to build and improve resilience and readiness in shaping the Army of 2020. The momentum created will be carried forward into the future as we work together maintaining the honorable standing of the Army Profession. The remainder of this article will explain the newly codified components of the Army Profession and lay out how we will execute the “America’s Army—Our Profession” program in 2013.

Our Army maintains its status as a military profession when all members remain faithful to the five essential characteristics of the Army Profession: trust, military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship of the profession. Maintaining our status as a profession is why we take time to reflect on and discuss the nature of “America’s Army—Our Profession.” Doing so enables us to learn and understand ourselves better, reaffirm our commitments, and steward the Army for future generations as the Army evolves during this transition.

Marching Orders

America’s Force of Decisive Action, 38th Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, January 2012

- Provide trained, equipped, and ready forces to win the current fight while maintaining responsiveness for unforeseen contingencies.

- Develop the force of the future, Army 2020 as part of Joint Force 2020 – a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment.

- Sustain our high-quality All-Volunteer Army – Soldiers, Civilians, and Families, in the Active and Reserve Components.

- Adapt leader development to meet our future security challenges in an increasingly uncertain and complex strategic environment.

- Foster continued commitment to the Army Profession, a noble and selfless calling founded on the bedrock of trust.

http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/cidownloads/232478.pdf

Our Profession

The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Marching Orders concludes with an important emphasis on one of the five essential characteristics of the Army Profession: “Trust—the Bedrock of our Profession.” Reinforcing the importance of trust, General Raymond T. Odierno announced “America’s Army—Our Profession” at the October 2012 AUSA Conference. “America’s Army—Our Profession” is a Calendar Year 2013 (CY13) education and training program designed to build a common, Army-wide understanding of the Army Profession. This program provides information and resources to facilitate dialogue, educate, train, and inspire all members of the Army on the meaning and practice of the Army Profession. Many of these new doctrinal concepts are introduced in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, The Army, and further explained in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1 (Initial Draft), The Army Profession.
The Army’s capstone doctrinal publication (ADP 1) and its companion on the profession (ADRP 1) define and describe the five essential characteristics of the Army Profession, membership and certification criteria for Army professionals, and the Army Ethic. The “America’s Army—Our Profession” education and training program is specifically designed to teach and inspire understanding of the Army Profession and to enhance commitment to our professional obligations—to ourselves, others, the Army, and the American people.

The CSA’s intent is to generate dialogue for soldiers and Army civilians, to increase their understanding of the Army Profession, to reaffirm their understanding of what it means to be a professional, to recommit to a culture of selfless service, and to internalize the Army Ethic. The primary goals of the “America’s Army—Our Profession” program are to create an enduring emphasis on the Army Profession, to strengthen our professional identity, and to inspire future generations of Army professionals. Ultimately, Army professionals must—

- Know and understand the Army Profession doctrine and concepts.
- Conduct themselves in a manner worthy of their professional status and calling.
- Ensure stewardship through accountability of conduct and performance and constant improvement of the Army Profession.
- Generate and sustain their own dialogue about the profession.

The “America’s Army—Our Profession” program will be executed through the following quarterly themes over the course of the calendar year:

- 1st Quarter (January-March 2013): Standards and Discipline.
- 2nd Quarter (April-June 2013): Army Customs, Courtesies, and Traditions.
- 3rd Quarter (July-September 2013): Military Expertise—Certified Army Professionals.
- 4th Quarter (October-December 2013): Trust—The Bedrock of Our Profession.

The 1st Quarter theme, “Standards and Discipline,” focuses on an Army professional’s decision to
do what is right in the face of temptations, obstacles, adversity, frustrations, fatigue, and fear. All Army professionals are expected to uphold standards and develop discipline in themselves, others, and their organizations. Discipline requires attending to the organizational and administrative details that are essential for effectiveness and efficiency. Discipline enables Army professionals to practice good stewardship of the Army Profession by performing proper maintenance, practicing supply management, training to standards, and accounting for property. Discipline enables Army professionals to practice high moral standards of conduct and behavior under challenging conditions. Disciplined leaders provide coaching, counseling, and mentoring, which are essential to being stewards of our people, the Army’s most important resource.

Some may associate discipline only with negative outcomes such as the many requirements of regulations, punishment for breaking regulations, or the consequences of errors in judgment. However, it is important to understand that our professional discipline is fundamentally positive. Standards and discipline are what set us apart from common living. They provide the basis of trust at all levels between Army professionals, civilian leaders, the American public, and Army families. They give us pride and esprit de corps, while providing us the “why and how” we practice our profession.

The 2nd Quarter theme, “Army Customs, Courtesies, and Traditions,” sustains our connections with preceding generations of citizen-soldiers. These observances enhance our esprit de corps (winning spirit) and reinforce our commitment to steward the Army Profession. The Army Profession has a proud history of completing its challenging missions on behalf of the American people with courage and honor. Today, Army professionals are respected and appreciated for their service to the nation. Army customs, courtesies, and traditions sustain and foster this legacy of service within the Army culture.

Focusing on our customs, courtesies, and traditions motivates an enduring commitment to the Army Profession, our mission, our people, and ultimately our culture. Traditions bind us across more than two centuries of honorable service. They provide a living connection with all the generations of citizen-soldiers of the past, extending the lineage of all patriots who have honorably defended our nation and our freedoms. As good stewards of the Army Profession, we must ensure that our customs, courtesies, and traditions are embraced and practiced by future generations.

The 3rd Quarter theme, “Military Expertise—Certified Army Professionals,” highlights our expert knowledge and how we certify Army professionals in their competence, character, and commitment. Our professional military expertise is the design, generation, support, and ethical application of landpower. This is our unique contribution to the defense of our nation. Our professional responsibility is to continually create and advance our expert knowledge and skills in landpower. We accomplish this by ensuring every Army professional is continually certified through a lifelong commitment to learning and developing expertise in our Army’s four fields of expert knowledge:

- **Military-Technical**—How the Army applies landpower to accomplish its missions.
- **Moral-Ethical**—How the Army accomplishes its missions in ways congruent with our moral and ethical framework.
- **Political-Cultural**—How the Army, mindful of its subordination to civil authorities, understands and operates in a multi-cultural, complex world.
- **Human Development**—How the Army recruits, develops, and inspires Army professionals.

Through certification, the Army validates the expertise of its individual professionals and of its organizations. The role of certification within the Army is two-fold. First, it demonstrates to the American people that the Army is qualified to practice its profession effectively, efficiently, and ethically. Second, certification milestones motivate Army professionals to achieve higher performance standards in the pursuit of excellence. Some examples of certification include selection for promotion in grade, successful completion of professional education and training, selection for key positions or assignments, or the award of specific skill identifiers or badges. The Army certifies its members relative to rank, grade or position to ensure they meet the nation’s needs and the expectations for military expertise. Certification ensures each Army professional demonstrates three critical traits:

- **Competence**—An Army professional’s demonstrated ability to successfully perform his/her duties...
America’s Army – Our Profession
Education and Training Program (CY13)

Quarterly Themes

![Themes](image)

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| Videos and Case Studies | Military Review Special Edition | Interactive Video Decision Making Simulators | Digital Applications | Training Support Packages | Brochures | AP Pamphlet | Doctrine ADP 1 | Doctrine ADRP 1 |

Figure 2

and to accomplish the mission with discipline and to standards.

- **Character**—An Army professional’s dedication and adherence to Army Values and the Profession’s Ethic as consistently and faithfully demonstrated in decisions and actions.

- **Commitment**—The resolve of an Army professional to contribute honorable service to the nation, to perform his/her duties with discipline and to standards, and to strive to successfully and ethically accomplish the mission despite adversity, obstacles, and challenge.

**Trust**

The 4th Quarter theme is “Trust—The Bedrock of our Army Profession.” Trust is assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, and truth of someone or something. Trust is the core intangible, which is essential inside and outside the Army Profession. The ability to accomplish our mission depends upon trust. Our Army Values, consistently reflected in our decisions and actions, reveal our character and result in trust. By living our values in all our endeavors, personal and professional, we sustain and develop trust inside the Army among fellow professionals and outside the Army with the American people.

Trust with the American people is earned and maintained when the Army Profession consistently demonstrates military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and effective stewardship. The nation trusts the Army to provide landpower when, where, and how it is required to protect and defend the security and interests of the American people. Army professionals have a duty to serve society in an effective, efficient, and ethical manner, thus preserving the trust we earned throughout our history and to sustain that trust during a period of transition.

Trust among Army professionals is the foundation of our success. We earn and develop trust with
our fellow soldiers and civilians by consistently demonstrating our competence, character, and commitment. In every situation, we perform our duty with discipline and to standards.

Mission command requires trust and stresses reliance on competent leaders of character and commitment. Every Army professional demonstrates military expertise and professional judgment to accomplish the mission with disciplined initiative, consistent with their commander’s intent. Simply put, successful mission command depends on trust.

Finally, we must strive to maintain trust between civilians, soldiers, families, and the Army. People are the Army and when a soldier or civilian joins the Army Profession, their family joins the Army family. Therefore, the Army is committed to a supportive and caring culture that strengthens Army family bonds and provides a secure, nurturing quality of life for our families. Continuing to honor this commitment is essential to preserving trust among civilians, soldiers, their families, and the Army.

The Way Forward

The active support of Army leaders, military and civilian, is the key factor in the success of the “America’s Army—Our Profession” program. Army leaders are called upon to integrate Army Profession concepts, to motivate all members of the profession to reflect on and discuss these concepts, and inspire professional behavior while role-modeling that behavior themselves. Leaders can integrate Army Profession concepts by emphasizing them in training and leader development guidance, public remarks, professional development sessions, ceremonial events, soldier and NCO boards, and organizational functions.

Leaders do not have to build these programs on their own because the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) provides multiple resources to support all organizations. Leaders can conduct their own “America’s Army—Our Profession” training, made possible with ready to use, interactive, and engaging training resources available on line at <http://CAPE.army.mil>. They can send appropriate personnel to a Master Army Profession and Ethic Training (MAPET) course which provides each graduate with a deep understanding of Army Profession doctrine, prepares them to facilitate professional development discussions, and enables them to advise the commander on integrating the Army Profession into all organizational events. Additionally, there are limited opportunities for leaders to host a MAPET course at their installation at minimal cost to the unit in return for 50 trained personnel at the end of the five-day course. Organizations can also host a CAPE-supported Army Profession seminar, a two- to three-hour leader development session that will inform participants of Army Profession doctrine, demonstrate the web-based training and education resources, and demonstrate a technique for facilitating an Army Profession leader development session.

These are but a few of the many other creative ways leaders can engage and inspire the profession in their subordinates and organizations. But regardless of how you choose to support “America’s Army—Our Profession,” the importance of the training is clearly articulated by General (Retired) Fred Franks in a 2011 Special Edition of Military Review. Franks emphasizes the importance of our identity as Army professionals who have a legacy of honorable service. We do not know the conditions of future warfare, but we must be ready for any challenge and any mission. That readiness begins with a clear understanding of who we are, what ethic we follow, who we represent, and what we do as Army professionals. Uniformed and civilian leaders at all levels are charged to support “America’s Army—Our Profession,” to understand our doctrine, and to inspire a culture where all Army professionals conduct themselves in a manner worthy of their professional status. The future of the Army Profession depends on each and every leader ensuring these fundamental principles are practiced and passed on to the next generation of Army professionals. MR

“Soldiering is a matter of the mind and heart...That takes character, competence, and leadership and continuous development in a profession that demands and encourages that continuing growth.”

General Frederick Franks, U.S. Army, Retired
IN THEIR REVIEW of Army Leader Development and Leadership in the January-February 2012 issue of Military Review, Ryan Hinds and John Steele detail how many of today’s Army leaders are dissatisfied with their Professional Military Education (PME), particularly in the areas of critical thinking and problem solving. This revelation is not new. A search for the words “critical thinking” in the Army War College library database will yield hundreds of articles, ranging from calls for cultural change to prescriptions about leadership development. Despite years of writing about it, teaching it, and calling for more of it, the profession remains rather unsettled about its success.

For some insight as to why, try this critical thinking exercise: put any 10 Army leaders in front of a white board and ask them to come up with a good definition of the word “bold.” They will think it is easy until they begin. Most quickly discover that despite Webster, words convey different understanding to different people (bold to a young armor platoon leader means something very distinct from what it means to a mid-career finance officer), and they hit an impasse. Few are able to provide an effective defense of their views or to challenge the views of their peers with more than a personal opinion. Often they give up, yielding to time, the majority, or a dominant voice. The above is an admittedly unscientific experiment, but it reveals a lot about how we apply the critical thinking skills we have developed through years of PME. Our common understanding of what to do often fails us when we try to apply our knowledge in a real-world setting.

In their excellent analysis, Hinds and Steele recommend that we review the Army’s PME curricula, and add somewhat offhandedly that if we find that content is relevant and up to date, then “the process in which we deliver the content to leaders would then become the most likely reason that leaders are not learning the skills they need to be effective.”

MAJ Erick Vega, Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico, and CPT Melvin Arreaga, Bayamon, Puerto Rico, both of the Puerto Rico National Guard; work together on a case study of the countries involved in the 1956 Suez Crisis using the ends-ways-means methodology during Intermediate Level Education, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, 30 September 2010. (U.S. Army MAJ Jorge I. Medina-Cintron)
Antithetical to Honest Critical Thinking

They are correct. The Army’s PME system needs work. Although we profess to teach “how to think,” not “what to think,” the amount of content to which we expose our students works to impede that development. If we want better results, we should consider Hinds’ and Steele’s thoughts and change the way we teach.

A better strategy for the Army’s PME is to adopt an educational philosophy that focuses less on knowledge and content and more on the ability to question and argue. Critical thinking means the ability to construct and defend an argument using reason, applying intellectual standards of epistemic responsibility, and recognizing and countering logical fallacies as we see them in others and ourselves.

Argument is not conflict but the ability to form a logical conclusion from a set of premises; argument means supporting a claim with reason. One source for the intellectual standards we use to develop arguments is Linda Elder and Richard W. Paul’s infamous *Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking*, “The Blue Book” that most Army leaders get at some point during their PME.

Think of fallacies as the dirty tricks we see from pundits on television or radio talk shows nearly every day—appeals to authority or fear, ad hominem attacks, red herrings, straw men, “begging questions” (circular arguments), and emotional blackmail. Developing and practicing these tricks (in pedagogical good faith) is an effective way to develop critical thinkers because knowing the pitfalls of logic can hone one’s understanding. Because logic is so important for parsing complexity, such understanding can prepare a soldier for the rigors of the current operational environment and the perceived needs of “mission command.”

If we pay attention to our doctrine, this shift in thinking about professional education is a strategic imperative. We now accept as common knowledge that military operations defy rules, calling them instead “human endeavors, characterized by the continuous, mutual adaptation of give and take, moves, and countermoves among all participants.”

We agree that war is about identifying and solving ill-defined problems where experts can and do disagree on the range of solutions. In this operational environment, leaders have to prepare themselves to do more than apply doctrine and follow rules. Army doctrine—Mission Command—welcomes this possibility and gives us license to be unorthodox if the situation warrants. Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0 states that it is “a guide for action rather than a set of fixed rules,” adding that effective leaders know when the doctrine or training and experience no longer apply, when they must adapt. This is not a legal indemnification; it is a call for honest critical thinking.

The problem is that we have a PME system that relies on an educational approach in which instructors are guides for each new class to rediscover the same hackneyed truths as their predecessors. Although in some ways a useful program, the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) curriculum for majors is a good example of this ossification. It uses active learning, with a syllabus dominated by practical exercises, group discussions, case studies, and writing assignments. Although most of the learning objectives are at the top of Bloom’s taxonomy (synthesis, analysis, and evaluation), students receive grades predominantly on how they apply the content their small group leaders teach.

This formula is antithetical to honest critical thinking. Students should be able to do more than gather and assess existing information. They should be capable of forming and defending original hypotheses, even if these suppositions run counter to published doctrine. If critical thinking is the learning objective, this flexibility of mind is not only prudent but also essential.

Presupposing that teaching to Bloom’s “knowledge, comprehension and application” is easier than developing creative and critical thinking and that officers at the operational level are capable of reading any material necessary (such as doctrine) to underwrite their knowledge of process and procedure, it should be acceptable to deemphasize the role of doctrine in our educational program. This is not a call to ignore or toss out doctrine as principle. Structure serves a useful purpose in that it prevents chasing “intellectual novelties, or encouraging rudderless behavior.” Yet Army leaders in favor of developing a mission command culture should know that too much systematic thinking hinders creative and critical thinking. In an environment characterized by ambiguity, our penchant to break thinking down into hyper-rationality may cause us...
to miss the big picture and mistake the compiling of products for sound judgment. Leaders should be able to reassemble and synthesize the parts to complete their understanding.

**Responding to the Objection**

Proponents of the content-laden PME curriculum might reasonably argue that the objective of the program is to teach doctrinal literacy to the Army’s diverse leadership, and that my proposal strays too far from that intent. Yet the program’s own mission expresses a broader sentiment, stating that the ILE mission is to “educate and train officers to be adaptive leaders, capable of critical thinking.” This debate is not new. Sixty-five years ago, when speaking at Oxford University, the novelist Dorothy Sayers likened our method to learning how to play a musical instrument by memorization. We might get remarkably good at playing particular songs and congratulate ourselves on our performance, but it is not the same as mastering the instrument and understanding music. When asked to play a new song, our limited knowledge forces us to memorize anew. She lamented that society had simply lost the tools for learning, that we focus too much on established content and therefore fail to teach discernment. Our PME strives to teach “how to think,” but recent articles, including Hinds and Steele’s article, appear to resonate with Sayers, saying in effect that we are still far from the operational culture we need.

The defense of content is representative of the Army’s culture and is typical of bureaucracy. In 2010, Dr. James Pierce studied the Army’s culture looking for evidence that it was sufficiently receptive to this adaptability. He found that at present it was not, that it was dominated by stability and control, rules and policies, coordination for efficiency, and hard-driving competitiveness. Nevertheless, he found a strong desire to build a mission command culture of innovation and creativity, risk taking, and emphasis on flexibility and discretion. In many large organizations, teaching and learning exist to affirm the role of the organization’s doctrine, not to expand the body of knowledge. Protecting “what is” creates an institutional bias against change, and when faced with calls for reform, an organization’s leaders often stymie calls for reform by debating old truths in new forms, accepting and cherishing these “acceptable minor heresies.”

Mission command requires that we do more than allow for minor heresies. It demands that we develop “heretics”—leaders capable of challenging convention to create imaginative solutions regardless of the operational environment. An inquiry-based educational approach is the best way to develop these “heretics” because it is about questioning, and good questioners unequivocally make better thinkers. A classroom focused on inquiry asks students to always use their own ideas—not someone else’s ideas—and to use evidence to support their assertions or inquiries. The act of asking and answering is not between student and teacher but reciprocal between students. They are seeking answers to their own lack of understanding, knowledge gap, or misconception, not to teacher prompts. There are also no wrong answers because judging an answer correct or incorrect is not the goal. The goal is to judge the quality of the thinking that led the student to the answer, which requires that we apply intellectual standards or break our thinking down into discrete elements to “improve and recast it as necessary.” Understanding the need for change requires that we see thinking as a social activity where students actively learn how to share ideas and argue with the purpose of finding the best solution, not winning.

According to author and psychologist Deanna Kuhn, good thinking comes from the discourse people engage in to advance their individual or shared goals. She explains that good thinking is a function of the perceived value of that thinking, and that people will seek expediency over quality if a group believes consensus is paramount. Dr. Irving Janis came to similar conclusions in 1971. He labeled this function “groupthink,” showing how group norms such as this hinder critical thinking with predictably disastrous results.
Too often, we see argument as inimical to teamwork, but arguing is not the same as bickering. We are used to untrained argument that is more like a series of “egocentric monologues” where the participants incur no obligation to modify their views in response to another’s. Skilled argument helps leaders discriminate between fact and opinion, and to tie conclusions to evidence while avoiding familiar cognitive traps such as “false cause,” or an “appeal to unqualified authority.” Argument helps leaders expand their perspectives and opens up new alternatives.

Implications for Army Leadership

For mission command, this shift is crucial because the very nature of ill-defined problems is that they do not have apparent or distinct answers. A military staff’s ability to wrestle with a problem’s dimensions may prove more valuable than trying to decipher a solution. The ability to argue well does not come naturally, so it is imprudent to assume operational leaders will simply pick it up during their career or studies. The ability to think well takes training, and practice.

If ILE were organized around critical thinking and not content, students would spend far less of their 300 hours learning the content prescribed by the syllabus (where there is always just enough time to debate some minor heresies before the discussion yields to the pressure of moving on to the next module). Instead, they would learn more about creating and sharing knowledge developed through problem solving.
Currently ILE graduates do a 60-hour end-of-course exercise during which they apply what they learned in the first 240 hours. This is backwards. They should start with a complex problem and little guidance (an ambiguous environment) and have days—if not weeks—to hypothesize, research, learn content, and write out their reasoning and conclusions. Their faculty advisor should guide them and hold them accountable for intellectual rigor and sound reasoning. Notably, they should be held to standards of documentation of reference material evinced in good research papers. Advisors should never provide answers. We are looking for a program similar to what the Naval War College famously did during the 1930s when leaders like William “Bull” Halsey not only exchanged ideas but also had the chance to test “pet theories” in an unconstrained environment.²⁶

Such a program caters to a more diverse set of learning styles and personality traits. Defending ideas through facilitated discussions encourages discourse and reflection, not approval or winning, and reflective thinkers have time to process and form responses. Even the manner in which the faculty requires students to develop and ask clarifying or challenging questions should foster learning and improved critical thinking.

Adjusting an educational strategy to this degree has risks and tradeoffs, and we must be ready to accept them or mitigate their effects. For instance, allowing debate of major heresies accepts that, as students explore their course work, they may find current doctrine ill advised or even epistemologically contemptuous. A seminar may ignore convention and doctrine completely. These are prudent risks. The facilitator can ask the seminar to go back into the doctrine to explain their specific reasons for rejecting parts of it. When asked to apply lessons (as they return to their assigned duties), they will have a keener understanding of doctrinal strengths and weaknesses, and one might improve upon use in the field. They will also have a greater sense of circumstances that suggest abandoning convention and creating their own way.

**Ignoring the Current Learning Model Dangerous?**

There is another risk to an inquiry approach. Some students may graduate from a PME program without the same basic knowledge of operations found in the current learning model. With nearly 300 hours devoted to study and learning, this is unlikely. There is still ample time to master fundamentals, and colleges using this approach report that having an appreciation for inquiry and reflection is more valuable to success than simply being grounded in fixed, accepted knowledge.²⁷ Students will have the confidence and incentive to obtain missing knowledge through reading, and are more apt to evaluate this new information on their own. If there is a tradeoff, it is on the positive side; that is, gaining students capable of critical and creating thinking as opposed to having doctrinal experts who become what Professor Greg Foster calls captives of the “military mind.”²⁸

Despite the risks, there are opportunities. Having operational leaders from each of the services is an occasion to standardize what critical thinking means and reinforce the message that it is not just a classroom activity. No matter their branch or educational background, leaders will find this approach a model for all staff interaction. These graduates will also have tremendous influence on the future of the profession. Even if they conflict with peers or superiors more interested in easy answers or rationalizing instead of making decisions, they can still let imagination, questioning, and criticality flourish where they have control.
Regardless of how you structure the course, the intent is to maximize the time when students can work face-to-face to practice questioning and arguing, to become more comfortable with ambiguity, and to minimize the time allowed for the familiar processes that put us at risk of regressing to the comfort of old truths.

There is some irony in the question of what to do about critical thinking because it happens to be an ill-defined problem without a simple solution. Nonetheless, the strategic imperative is clear, and it calls for disciplined but “heretical” thinking.

Today’s PME attempts to balance knowledge with critical thinking, but falls short and produces officers well schooled in content, but unable to see beyond “what is.” We owe our officers an educational experience commensurate to the demands of today’s operational environment, one where they can envision what “ought to be.” An anecdote from the Army War College relating a general officer’s quip captures the sentiment of this choice. The general said, “Stop sending officers who understand the system and start sending those who could identify creative solutions to unforeseen problems.”

By adopting an inquiry-based learning model, we can turn all PME facilities into leadership laboratories focused on the development of critical thinkers and send the general the kind of operational leaders he needs.

NOTES

4. ADRP 6-0, vii.
8. Klein, 269.
15. King, 122.
20. Kuhn, 125.
21. Ibid., 114.
23. Harter, 80.
27. Interview with Aaron Berman, 24 February 2010.
29. G. Reed (Assistant Professor, University of San Diego and former USAWC faculty member and retired colonel), email to author, 30 January 2010.
Why would a leader in the Army or in any organization choose to micro-manage subordinates; show a lack of respect for them; choose not to listen to or value their input; or be rude, mean-spirited, and threatening? Most leaders would not. Most people do not choose to act like this. However, it is clearly happening in the uniformed services and in society as a whole. The Army recently released a study reporting that 80 percent of the officers and NCOs polled had observed toxic leaders in action and that 20 percent had worked for a toxic leader. This problem is not new. Within the past few years, the Army has relieved two brigade commanders and a general for alleged toxic—and arguably narcissistic and abusive—behavior. A division commander who served in Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom was “asked” to retire following an investigation of his leadership style and toxic command climate. Toxic leaders have been around for years and will continue to serve in all branches of our military. The Navy has recently relieved a number of commanders owing to toxic behavior and unhealthy command climates.

One can argue that most, if not all, toxic leaders suffer from being narcissistic. What is a narcissistic and toxic leader? These leaders are selfish and self-serving individuals who crush the morale of subordinates and units. In the best of circumstances, subordinates endure and survive toxic leaders—then the leader or the subordinate moves, changes units, or leaves the military. However, at worst, a toxic leader devastates the esprit de corps, discipline, initiative, drive, and willing service of subordinates and the units they comprise.

Narcissism

Because narcissism is a critical and large part of the toxic leadership paradigm, the Army should begin to consider looking at it—its pros and cons—and developing methods to enhance its positive attributes and raise awareness of its negative ones. By definition, narcissistic leaders have “an inflated sense of self-importance and an extreme preoccupation with
themselves.3 Their total focus, either consciously or unconsciously, is on themselves, their success, their career, and their ego. Everything is about them. They are the center of gravity for everyone around them and their unit. On the other hand, for leaders, especially in the military, there are aspects of narcissism that are appropriate (if controlled and self-regulated) and important for the leader’s and unit’s success.

One study described them as “gifted and creative strategists who see the big picture and find meaning in the risky challenge of changing the world and leaving behind a legacy. Productive narcissists are not only risk takers willing to get the job done but also charmers who can convert the masses with their rhetoric.”4

It is too simplistic to imply that all narcissistic behaviors are inevitably toxic. However, when narcissism becomes a disorder (like alcoholism, drug addiction, and depression), the results hurt morale and group effectiveness and can potentially lead to disaster. Signs of a leader being narcissistic to the detriment of a unit include—

- Being a poor listener.
- Being overly sensitive to criticism.
- Taking advantage of others to achieve one’s own goals.
- Lacking empathy or disregarding the feelings of others.
- Having excessive feelings of self-importance (arrogance).
- Exaggerating achievements or talents.
- Needing constant attention and admiration.
- Reacting to criticism with rage, shame, or humiliation.
- Being preoccupied with success or power.5

As noted by Richard Wagner in “Smart People Doing Dumb Things: The Case of Managerial Incompetence”—

Narcissistic individuals also tend to be egotistical, manipulative, self-seeking and exploitative. Narcissists do not accept suggestions from others. Doing so might make them appear weak, which conflicts with their need for self-enhancement. Some narcissists have such an inflated self-confidence that they do not believe that others have anything useful to say to them. They also take more credit than they deserve, often at the expense of taking credit for the contributions of co-workers and subordinates. Conversely, they avoid taking responsibility for shortcomings and failures. Narcissistic individuals often are influential in group settings because they have such conviction in the worth of their ideas that others tend to believe them and follow.6

Many current or former member of the military have experienced a leader that fits this description. Soldiers who have experienced toxic and narcissistic leaders often relate stories of how they were treated or how they witnessed this type narcissistic leader treating others. What follows are real examples:

- A colonel (division chief of staff) addressed a major after the major reported to the colonel while the major’s immediate supervisor, a lieutenant colonel, was unavailable. “Get the ___ out of my office!” he said. “There is nothing that a major in the U.S. Army can tell me that I don’t already know!”
- A commander is about to take a new unit on its first winter training exercise, a 110-mile deployment with limited vehicles and key equipment to keep people warm. At the last in progress review before the exercise, he spends the entire time talking about his fishing and hunting exploits while numerous soldiers stand in below zero temperature for hours waiting for transportation and warming facilities. The commander communicated a total disregard for soldiers’ welfare and a lack of self-awareness, demonstrating a clear sign of narcissism.
- A battalion command sergeant major berates and insults a squad for being dirty and unshaven after they just returned to the FOB following a grueling seven-day mission.
- A brigade commander takes full credit for a risky training exercise in front of the commanding general, even though months before the event the

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brigade commander had told his operations officer that the idea for the training event was the stupidest idea he had ever heard.

The above are examples of leaders selected and deemed successful by our Army and rewarded with the honor to lead America’s finest, but they are not the kind of leaders the Army wants or needs.

Individuals like these are a cancer spreading throughout the profession of arms, although the Army culture has systemically supported this behavior pattern over the years in many ways. Acceptance of narcissistic and toxic leader behavior is part of the culture in our services—if it were not, they would become extinct. Certainly, this type of culture and behavior is more prevalent in some organizations or units than in others—and it changes over time as these abusive leaders move from unit to unit.

Narcissistic leaders support and perpetuate toxicity on a daily basis. As long as the imagined view of a successful leader (whether it is true or not) remains the screaming, yelling, selfish, berating commander standing in front of a soldier or a staff, then it is not likely that we will remove this cultural aspect from our services. As the old saying goes, “If the leader walks by and observes something wrong without making the correction, he has just established the new standard of behavior.” If the Army refuses to address narcissism as part of the toxic leader methodology, then it will continue to turn a blind eye to the problem of toxic leadership.

This leads us to a few thought-provoking questions: Do narcissistic leaders know they are narcissistic? If so, do they care? Do they want to be toxic leaders? Are we continually encouraging toxic and narcissistic leadership models by limiting the metric we use to judge successful leaders and commands?

Perhaps two less affectively loaded questions are more appropriate: How aware are leaders of their narcissistic behaviors? How does someone recognize his own narcissism and its toxic outcomes?
Practical Explanation

In practical and behavioral terms, people’s actions (behaviors) are either conscious or unconscious. This means they either make an intentional and conscious decision to behave as they do or they simply act without thinking (unconscious behavior). To illustrate this point, a narcissistic battalion commander can consciously behave in a toxic manner (i.e., know exactly what he is doing because it is a conscious decision). This leader can decide not to listen with empathy or not even acknowledge the opinion of one of his or her company commanders. This leader can then “chew out” the company commander for being stupid and not listening to the commander’s guidance. This leader knows exactly what he is doing and is comfortable with this behavior. However, in contrast, it is possible that a battalion commander may not even be aware he is not listening with empathy (perhaps he doesn’t know what empathy is or does not believe in the importance of listening to others). For leaders to be unaware that they are not truly listening to others, especially subordinates, is not abnormal. This is a classic case of a lack of self-awareness, and perhaps a sign of an unknown and undiagnosed narcissistic disorder (something to address in leader development training and education).

Another illustrative example: a narcissistic first sergeant is berating a subordinate platoon sergeant in front of other soldiers—the exact words, tone, and location of the dressing down are intentional decisions, and the first sergeant is acutely aware of all three. However, if the first sergeant is not conscious of his behavior, he will not even think about the words, tone, or location of his interaction with the subordinate. He is doing something without thinking. Doing without really thinking is a lot more prevalent in our military and society than we think it is. This “mindlessness” is a lack of conscious awareness or not using all available information in deciding how to act, and it explains how narcissistic behavior can become a problem in our ranks. A study of mindlessness argues that some behaviors become so routine they are performed almost automatically—without self-awareness. Many narcissistic and toxic leaders fit this description. In addition, when individuals are acting bad or doing wrong, they may morally “disengage” parts of their thinking so they won’t hurt their self-image (how they feel about themselves) or they may lie to themselves (self-deception) to rationalize inappropriate behaviors. Leaders who are intentionally conscious can choose to think, choose not to think, or choose some intermediate level of thinking. However, in each case, the leader is making a conscious choice, as opposed to just being mindless. Nathaniel Braden notes that human beings (in contrast to animals) have the “free will and choice to turn consciousness brighter or dimmer.”

We are free to—

- Focus our mind, or not to bother, or to actively avoid focusing.
- Think or not to bother, or to actively avoid thinking.
- Strive for greater clarity with regard to some issues confronting us, or not to bother, or to actively seek darkness.
- Examine unpleasant facts or to evade them.

Everyone, whether narcissistic or not, has the
capacity for self-awareness and intentional thinking. We all possess the ability to think about and decide on our leadership model and behaviors. As a result, to address the challenge of toxicity and narcissism in the ranks, our leader development schools and programs may need to focus more on skills that help leaders focus on themselves and their leadership styles.

The Army currently uses such measures and techniques as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), multi-source assessment and feedback, individual development plans, as well as instructor feedback, critical thinking, and other techniques to help the leader understand who he is.

Leadership is fundamentally about leading and interacting with humans, not machines and processes. It is a series of arbitrary choices and decisions. As such, to exercise leadership on the human terrain, emotional intelligence is paramount. Certainly when leaders become more senior (at the operational and strategic levels), they need to manage and lead larger organizations and deal with higher levels of complexity and uncertainty. However, these different complexities and contextual variables do not negate or minimize the human dimension of leadership. In fact, they only highlight its critical nature.

The Army’s new leadership publication, ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, states that leader attributes and competencies include having Army Values (such as respect), empathy (emotional intelligence), interpersonal tact, and the ability to create a positive environment. The Army’s narcissistic and toxic leaders do not demonstrate some or all of these attributes and competencies. In fact, in most cases, such leaders across all services demonstrate the antithesis of these attributes and competencies. At its most basic level and in terms of the Army Values, emotional intelligence is about respect for others. Due to their intense self-focus, narcissistic and toxic leaders routinely demonstrate a lack of respect for others, which enhances the toxic environment of the unit.

However, here we contend that while these tools can have value, their value is assumed simply by their use—as opposed to an assessment or evaluation of the “so what” of their outcomes. For example, if a leader’s MBTI is extroversion, sensing, thinking, judging, so what? If the leader does not do anything with that information (i.e., it has no effect on the leader’s thinking or behavior) then the information is not of use. Additionally, if the institution cannot access this information, or if it is not tracked over time to allow for changes, improvements, or mentoring, then it is of little or no value in making personnel or command decisions further down the road.

The Emotional Intelligence Solution

Narcissistic leaders lack emotional intelligence because narcissists primarily focus on themselves. Emotional intelligence means being focused on “the other” (a peer, subordinate, colleague, etc.). Leadership is fundamentally about leading and interacting with humans, not machines and processes. It is a series of arbitrary choices and decisions. As such, to exercise leadership on the human terrain, emotional intelligence is paramount. Certainly when leaders become more senior (at the operational and strategic levels), they need to manage and lead larger organizations and deal with higher levels of complexity and uncertainty. However, these different complexities and contextual variables do not negate or minimize the human dimension of leadership. In fact, they only highlight its critical nature.

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A leader cannot practice emotional intelligence if he is not self-aware and does not practice self-regulation. As noted by emotional intelligence scholar Daniel Goleman, “Truly effective leaders are distinguished by a high degree of emotional intelligence, which includes self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skill.”

Travis Bradberry and Jean Greaves succinctly and practically describe what emotional intelligence looks like in the work place:

- A rare talent to read the emotions of others.
- The ability to adjust to different situations and build relationships with almost anyone.
- The uncanny ability to spot and address the elephant in the room.
- Does a good job of acknowledging other people’s feelings when communicating difficult news.
- Personal knowledge of people to better understand their perspectives and work well with them.
- The ability to absorb the nontechnical, human side of meetings and become a student of people and their feelings.
Focusing on the self may sound simple but it can be difficult to do. Few leaders in and out of the military have mastered the practice, and many simply do not know what it means to focus on the self. However, a focus on the self is a start point for ensuring our leaders are the best they can be and our soldiers experience the type of leadership they richly deserve. MR

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5. Smallwood, Groves, and Rivas-Vazquez.
7. Examples of unconscious behaviors could include brushing one’s teeth, getting dressed, or even driving a car—an individual can day-dream about a meeting with the boss or a fight with friend while driving.
11. Travis Bradberry and Jean Greaves, Emotional Intelligence 2.0 (San Francisco: Publishers Group West, 2009).
14. Ibid.
Discerning the Role of the Narrative in Strategy Development

Lieutenant Colonel David T. Culkin, U.S. Army

“Not only was there a schizophrenic concept regarding the strategic and operational level objectives and priorities, the ways the German army would be employed were contentious.”

— U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010

During the hectic years of 1940 and 1941, a strategic disagreement among German military staff officers and their civilian leaders grew into an infeasible strategy. Operation Barbarossa was handicapped from the outset, caught between Hitler’s intent to destroy Russian manpower and seize the Caucasus oilfields and his General Staff’s desire to make Moscow the objective of the main effort. Because of this discord, the operational preparations and ultimately the tactical execution of Barbarossa failed. While some may argue about degrees of operational success, there was no shared strategic vision or narrative linked to Barbarossa’s military objectives. Furthermore, a reluctance to discuss diverse perspectives inevitably crippled any operational momentum German divisions might have had. The failure to forge a strategic narrative spelled disaster on the battlefield.

Yet, developing strategies and narratives is not a mystery. There is a misconception that strategic planning is an amalgam of big ideas writ large on white boards by an elite crew of experts isolated from extrinsic realities as well as their own organizations. While policy emanates from top-level authorities and compels strategic leaders to act within set parameters to achieve specific goals, strategy is a more pragmatic process that involves dialogue and results in action.

“Strategy” typically refers to the normative ends-ways-means paradigm describing, in author Ronald Tobias words, a “unified course of action that guides . . . decisions about what choices to make.” Strategy affects all operational participants and is meaningless when national policy is decoupled from actions on the ground. This disconnect becomes even more problematic for those who believe that the U.S. no longer possesses a grand strategic narrative to answer the question, “Where is the U.S. headed?” Strategy is both an object and a process. As one scholar said, it “seeks synergy and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy
success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success.” A strategist, then, links policy to operational planning. He or she attempts this by effectively merging creative methods from literary theory with conceptual models to formulate meaningful narratives. The story must describe how the ends-ways-means outlined will produce the desired effects in time and space. Linking these conceptual frameworks to realistic application requires developing and personally selling the strategic narrative that describes how the ways and means accomplish the ends. It provides the blueprint for success, but it does not guarantee victory.

The strategic narrative is a powerful conceptual tool because it enables leaders to perform the critical function of translating concepts into a logical framework that outlines the organization’s plan of action. Leaders can apply it flexibly to volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments. Because the narrative is conceptual in nature, some may eschew it and dismiss it as academic and impractical. They do so at their organizations’ peril. Indeed, as in the World War II example above, an inadequate narrative at the strategic level which is poorly conveyed can be more detrimental to mission success than tactics conducted flawlessly that result in strategic blunders. Policy adequately devised translates into effective operations that can save thousands of lives. The narrative is a critical element because it enables strategic leaders to link policy to operational design in a logical way.

What is a Strategic Narrative?

According to strategists David Barry and Michael Elmes, the strategic narrative is a flexible sense-making tool that uses language to “construct meaning [and] . . . explore . . . ways in which organizational stakeholders create a discourse of direction . . . to understand and influence one another’s actions.” It attempts to tell the story of a complex problem so that staffs can better understand the environment and leaders make decisions that are more effective. As Venkatesh Rao reiterates in his blog, the challenge is “to develop conceptual models that frame large-scale collective decision making in narrative terms, and effective approaches to synthesis and better decisions based on storytelling.” While some theorists argue that narratives are invalid decision-making vehicles because they introduce bias, narrative thought is inherent to the
human experience, influencing perceptions, biases, and decisions.9 The narrative enables strategists to better understand their environments and link operations to approaches that support their collective interests. Narratives use sense and language to explore unique situations in which strategies can emerge.

Strategists do not start with a draft plan or a blank slate. They rely upon knowledge gained through experience, education, training, and reflection and apply these attributes to their environment to make sense of it. Critical questions are excellent tools with which one can gain deeper understanding. For example, what element must precede another to achieve a desired effect? What elements are concurrent? What are the key networks of players who exert power in a given system? What are the causes and symptoms of the problem?

As strategists iteratively seek the answers to these questions, they refine their understanding of the problem facing their organizations. This does not, however, guarantee that others—particularly those who have not participated in the collaboration—share their understanding. To jump from the basic concept to a common vision requires something more intimate—writing for one another.

The art of crafting a strategic narrative entails answering a fundamental question: How do the critical ingredients fit together in appropriate proportions to create a synergized whole? As with fiction writing, strategy integrates threads of a complex situation—including those of adversaries and other stakeholders—to elicit a meaningful narrative helping to explain the way ahead. In this context, a strategic narrative is necessary to create a logical framework, a pattern of meaning.10 It is effective when it is so understandable the audience can act upon it—that is, execute an operational plan. A strategic narrative that is too detailed and prescriptive risks restricting creativity and initiative and allowing adversaries to adapt relatively quickly.11 Indeed, strategy divorced from reality becomes inflexible and thus doomed to fail. In complex environments, an open mindset is a critical requirement.12 The strategist has a unique opportunity to create luck for his or her own organization without being limited by the means.

To forge a strategic vision, the strategist must work with policy makers and decision makers to understand and then be able to describe the environment. Understanding, visualizing, and describing strategic concepts—via a narrative of some sort—is known in U.S. doctrine as mission command. It enables military commanders to direct their forces to accomplish objectives at all levels in support of sometimes-vague national policy and interests. Strategists must link policy narratives to strategic narratives by writing fiction where intelligence and guidance fall short and help strategic leaders interact with leaders at every level so that policy is not only understood but also implemented. Clearly, one must describe the key actors (characters), their specific environment (setting), key series of linked events (patterns of action), and how conflicts resolve or terminate—all within a logical framework (plot) so that the actions taken will support policy enacted.

Once a strategist drafts a narrative, a commitment has occurred, a commitment to a specified problem and to devoting organizational resources to solve it. On another level, the narrative also commits strategists to each other and to their senior decision makers by deliberately attempting to develop and articulate concepts that will design and pave their future course. In military planning, such design ideas often translate into commander’s guidance, a description of military end states and termination criteria, and ultimately commander’s intent.13

Planning involves a methodical process of linking options to facts and assumptions. Strategy sets the stage for planning operations in which operators can take action. The German army learned this relationship the hard way. In preparing for Operation Barbarossa, they did not develop a cogent strategy; and senior leaders never voiced their concerns about the disparity between Hitler’s strategic guidance and the direction of their planning. The result was a failure to attain operational objectives and the misapplication of innovative tactical means such as the mismatch between means and ways.
Divisions in strategic and operational approaches were papered over in silence during the final planning stages for the invasion, but quickly came into the open once the campaign achieved its initial objectives of defeating the Soviet Red Army in the border regions and German panzer formations leapt into the Russian interior.14

Simply writing down and coming to some agreement about the strategic expectations may have produced very different results. Strategists and operational commanders continue to struggle to develop and translate strategic guidance.

Leaders Must Get Buy-In

A strategy, written to perfection, will be ineffectual if leaders do not personally engage their superiors, peers, and subordinates in a meaningful dialogue. The required levels of human interaction at all levels make “writing strategy” one of the most difficult and significant of political-military pursuits. Some social disciplines are just recognizing the import of using narratological tools to help leaders conceptualize organizational and procedural changes over time.15 Strategic leaders need to interact with key individuals all the way to the “decision implementers” to ensure their vision is integrated and actualized.16

Strategists can play a critical role by linking policy to operations through the narrative. For instance, General Petraeus, as the commander of multinational forces in Afghanistan, saw his primary job as getting the “big ideas right” and then articulating them to his subordinate commanders.17 Only through this collegial dialogue would he realistically earn their understanding and commitment. This task would obviously become more difficult with more persons and decision points. However, through such personal interface, a strategic leader can facilitate the implementation of strategy. Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky have also shown that those big ideas, which more simply describe the strategic requirements of an organization, are more likely to be successfully implemented.18 The narrative’s role, then, is to clearly convey those strategic concepts so that the operators will choose to support and implement them. The degree to which leaders make such choices indicates the level of strategic success achieved during recent operations.

When a Combatant Command Works with a Joint Task Force

In the spring of 2011, the commander of U.S. Africa Command, a combatant command with responsibility for much of the continent, faced a unique challenge. His predecessor had established a joint task force commanded by his principal naval commander with the purpose of preventing a humanitarian crisis in Libya.19 Backed with the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973, the task force and several coalition partners executed its tactical mission expertly: missile strikes from ships and air, coordinated maritime maneuvers, and multinational contingency planning. What made the mission complex was the disparity between political goals and military objectives at the strategic level.

While Secretary of Defense Gates acknowledged that one political goal was regime change, he admitted that the president was not ready to add that to the list of objectives pursued by U.S. Africa Command.20 This strategic disparity presented a challenge to task force planners who had to present alternate courses of action and resource options. Furthermore, the strategic “gap” was not substantially addressed anywhere other than in the media. Hence, cable networks were a valuable source of strategic guidance. In these circumstances, when the strategic narrative was not explicit, the task force commander was asked to conduct tactical operations that were not deliberately linked to strategy. The task force achieved the objectives on the tactical level because of excellent training, operational planning, and experience in coalition operations. On the strategic level, the handoff to a NATO task force was not as clear partly because of the initial obfuscation of the policy. As of this writing, the NATO operation continues.

As an experiment and an attempt to better understand this strategic complexity, I applied the nascent doctrinal concept of design methodology. As we asked fundamental questions concerning the environment and the problem, an operational approach emerged. What is the current environment? What is the desired environment? What problem prevents our organization from achieving the desired environment? What is the description of the way to achieve the desired environment by attacking the problem?
The methodology incorporates creative and critical thinking to produce a design concept articulated in graphic and narrative forms. Applying the methodology, I crafted written responses to the questions in the previous paragraph, proposed conditions if NATO or a non-NATO agency took over the coalition, and suggested a command structure and relationships diagram based upon anticipated strategic requirements. This was a strategic-level mission narrative which did help inform ongoing planning efforts at the combatant command headquarters. Perhaps future strategists will more expertly apply the narrative tool to inform decision makers who must translate nebulous policy into operational plans.

A “Strategic” Command Leading Multi-National Operations?

October 2012 marked 11 years that U.S. forces have been waging war in Afghanistan. For a slightly shorter period of time, coalition and allied forces under the auspices of NATO worked hard to promote security and stability in a fledgling nation struggling with the still-fresh wounds from thirty years of strife. In this most complex of strategic environments, how can the strategic narrative influence the military campaign plan for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)?

The International Security Assistance Force is a strategic-theater command, and its operating area is essentially the land mass and airspace of Afghanistan. In this lead-nation, parallel command structure, the ISAF commander (an American) receives guidance and reports to both the NATO secretary general and the U.S. president. It can be daunting for planners to sift through often-conflicting policies from these two authorities—not to mention every troop-contributing nation. It can be tempting to defer to past guidance or ignore the strategic reality. For example, it would be relatively straightforward to focus on reconciling with former insurgents as a military line of effort. However, that would disregard the reality that many insurgent organizations refuse to ever reconcile with NATO forces, especially when the coalition’s political end state is a drawdown over the next several years. Assuming this context is accurate, would a purely conciliatory policy be feasible and practicable?

When a few planners in this staff environment sat down to write a strategic narrative, the campaign
plan changed dramatically in a short period of time. Assumptions became more fleshed out, because the insurgents were receiving support from both internal and external sources. Kinetic operations and influence initiatives suddenly expanded beyond the scope of specific provinces or groups. Planners could then craft an estimate that holistically described the strategic context, something not available before. Just asking a few well-chosen questions often makes the difference between innovative success and a version of “the last plan.”

With this in mind, what are some key questions to probe a civil-military environment at the strategic level? The answer to this question largely depends upon the individual experience, education, intuition, and courage of a corps of practitioners who want to see the environment clearly for what it is. Questions vary, but they can build upon those derived from the design methodology (and can closely resemble the fiction-writing approach) previously mentioned:

- **Who are the key actors (cast of characters)?**
- **How do they relate to each other—in terms of time and space—and the environment in which they act (setting)?**
- **What motivates the key players, and what are their desired effects (theme—focus and patterns of thought)?**
- **Do we have the resources and will to influence the actors? Which ones (setting, props)?**
- **Why do they behave in the ways they do (theme, patterns of action)?**
- **What are the various tensions, opportunities, and obstacles related to us achieving our desired environment?**

- **What are the possible ways to achieve and organize this environment (plot and resolution)?**
- **How can we influence key actors who will help implement the strategy (plot and resolution)?**

The answers to these questions help strategists develop a deeper and shared understanding of their organizations’ strategic contexts. The written version of this is the strategic narrative. Employed as a means for leaders to gain the commitment of key stakeholders, it can make the difference between success and failure in implementing strategy.

### Eliciting Commitment

The strategic narrative links policy to strategy to military objectives in a logical framework by outlining the plan of action for organizations. Military leaders today have the opportunity to synthesize literary theory with strategic concepts to create unique narratives that help us to address complex problems and create success on the battlefield.

We have even made some progress in recognizing the need for a grand strategic narrative to replace containment. But it must not end there: strategic leaders must elicit commitment all the way from the decision maker to the decision implementer. If the Germans had had a coherent strategic narrative in 1941, Operation Barbarossa might have turned out differently, or not even have occurred. If Hitler had engaged in a true dialogue with his generals, would German now be the *lingua franca* in Moscow today? We will never know, but it is certain that “a battle fought without strategy is nearly always lost.”

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**NOTES**

10. Tobias, 5.
11. Ibid., 9-10.
12. Ibid., 10.
13. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff., Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO] 11 August 2011): III-14, III-16 to III-17. This text also provides a template of a strategic estimate which is new in joint doctrine.
16. LTC Len Lira, review, 29 March 2012.
22. Tobias, 1.
Center for Army Leadership’s Response to “Empirically Based Leadership”

Colonel Tom Guthrie, U.S. Army

THE CENTER FOR ARMY LEADERSHIP commends Major Sean McDonald for winning the 2012 Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing award for his article, “Empirically Based Leadership: Integrating the Science of Psychology in Building a Better Leadership Model,” which appears in this issue of Military Review. However, his conclusion that the Leader Requirements Model (LRM) found in Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership, was not developed based on scientific research and leadership theory is inaccurate, and it has the potential to mislead Military Review readers and the Army as a whole.

That during his time at Fort Leavenworth, Major McDonald did not take advantage of his close proximity to the very researchers who developed and validated the leadership doctrine of FM 6-22 is unfortunate. Had he contacted us, we would have gladly discussed the strong research and theoretical foundation of the LRM and could have helped him avoid making incorrect assumptions. We often help students understand the model and discuss topics that would extend the Army’s understanding of leadership.

The Leader Requirements Model

The following discussion addresses the assertions and revisions McDonald proposed and provides clarification of the research foundation and development of the Army’s LRM. The response addresses these areas:

● Evidence. The Leadership Requirements Model was extensively developed from research and an expert panel of leaders over a several-year effort. It went through the scrutiny of scientific validation and multiple reviews by senior leaders and Army-wide staffing. It continues to undergo empirical validation.

● Redundancy. The constructs proposed by McDonald already relate conceptually, and often literally, to constructs included in the Leadership Requirements Model. Evidence for the value of any single leadership construct identified in research articles may already be accounted for by another construct contained in the LRM.
• **Impact.** The paper provided no evidence that the constructs would produce added value. Existing research in the general field of leadership does identify the relative value of the trait-like constructs proposed by McDonald. Research evidence shows that personality variables like those suggested by McDonald account for considerably less variability in leadership outcomes than do behaviors.

**Background.** The introduction of McDonald’s paper questions whether leadership doctrine is lacking important factors or that some characteristics or competencies may be more important than others depending on context or leadership position. The paper questions the inclusion or exclusion of particular characteristics beyond the basis of intuition and experience. The paper states that integrating relevant empiricism into the process is required to construct a more complete model of leadership; however, it fails to provide the necessary empirical data, through independent data or established research, to support the proposed revisions to the model.

**Evidence.** The paper assumes that the Army’s doctrinal model of leadership is based only on intuition and experience, failing to take into account the scientific approach that drove its development. The Army’s doctrinal model of leadership was developed and validated using a scientific and professionally accepted approach referred to as competency modeling. The development effort was conducted through established management and governance practices of the Army Training and Leader Development Program initiatives (Initiative #7A1).

McDonald asserts that the development of the LRM was based largely on “anecdotal evidence” with content that “is based upon intuition and experience,” and as a result is lacking in many of the critical factors relating to successful leadership. His source for this is the statement from the Introduction of FM 6-22 that states, “FM 6-22 combines the lessons of the past with important insights for the future to help develop competent Army leaders.” McDonald failed to consider that empirical lessons could include theoretically sound content. He specifically fails to take into account the previous research that documents the rigorous effort that was used to develop and validate the LRM.

The effort was extensive in applying a full range of theoretical, conceptual, empirical, expert, and practical sources on leadership. The team of researchers responsible for developing the LRM took into account cutting edge academic theory and applied research to ensure the LRM fully captured those factors associated with leadership effectiveness relevant to the Army. Moreover, to build upon the theoretical and research findings, insights from experienced Army leaders (e.g., subject matter experts) were then analyzed to clearly identify factors related to successful leadership in both field and garrison operations and institutional organizations.

In whole, the model underwent a comprehensive content, construct, and criterion-referenced validation before being incorporated into Army doctrine, all of which was ignored by McDonald in his assertions regarding the LRM.

The following figure documents all of the steps in developing the model. Extensive review was conducted of psychology literature among other bodies of knowledge. The expert review used a Delphi technique to obtain independent judgments from a panel made up of general officers, government and academic researchers, and business practitioners. The technique followed with several rounds with the same set of experts to reconcile initial feedback and to develop a consensus. The expert review was followed by Center for Army Leadership (CAL) review and general officer approval to work toward wider staffing and implementation. The development phase is described in several sources.

This development phase was followed by formal validation conducted by CAL and the Army Research Institute. In parallel with the validation, the model went through a doctrinal concept paper staffing and review process between 2005 and 2006, as well as review and approval by the Leader Development Council of Colonels and the Leader Development General Officer Steering Committee. The LRM was then compared to other existing leadership models to ensure completeness and was deemed to have better coverage and cohesion than any others under consideration. Finally, the LRM was evaluated against the standards of the Office of Personnel Management civilian executive core qualifications and was found to be in complete concordance for Army civilians.

The development and refinement of the LRM did not stop after its initial development and continues to be validated empirically through follow-up.
studies and the annual collection of data from the Annual Survey of Army Leadership. Daily collection of Army 360, Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback data is also a source of validating data for the LRM. The model underwent staffing reviews in 2010 and 2011 as part of the update to FM 6-22, during which 92 different agencies provided 1,559 individual comments with no comments indicating any need to replace or revise the LRM.

Contrary to the claims made by McDonald, the above citations are evidence of the rigorous and empirical approach taken to develop and validate the LRM both from a scientific standpoint as well as from an operational field perspective. It is doubtful that any other doctrinal model or set of requirements in the Army have been more carefully or thoroughly examined, thus ensuring the LRM would be a useful and enduring tool for leaders to understand the requirements and critical components of successful leadership in the U.S. Army.

Redundancy. Another concern with the assertions made by McDonald is the redundancy with elements already in the LRM. More specifically, he makes reference to several “new” factors that should be included in the model, however he does this without analyzing the LRM and supporting literature on these factors in enough depth to realize they are already present in the model. While new research is always useful when considering revisions to models, it is critical to also apply the scientific principle of parsimony. Parsimony establishes the value of seeking the simplest explanation for phenomena. This principle is even more critical when considering the large and dispersed nature of the Army population and the need for maintaining a consistent understanding of leader requirements.

Moreover, adding the many constructs that McDonald suggests in his paper would violate this principle since those factors are already found in the current version of the LRM. The redundancies apparent in the constructs McDonald recommended for inclusion into the LRM are discussed below.

The redundancies begin with the discussion in the paper on the importance of ethical or moral reasoning. The developers of LRM and FM 6-22 are in complete alignment with McDonald’s conclusions.
McDonald also cites the importance of emotional intelligence and its relationship to leadership efficacy, which is referred to as confidence in the LRM. The LRM also includes empathy, presence, resilience, self-awareness, interpersonal tact, leading by example, extending influence, and communication. All of these characteristics are related to the popular concept of emotional intelligence (EI). The concept EI or “EQ” (emotional quotient) has received much criticism from researchers with respect to its lack of predictive validity for leadership as well as the many discrepancies that exist in how it is measured or defined. Emotional intelligence is not a universally accepted and institutionalized construct and has been questioned as to its distinctiveness as a construct separate from personality, general intelligence and ability, and the accuracy of using self-report measures.

McDonald does not address any of these concerns or limitations associated with the construct or measurement of EI. In fact, he even exaggerates the relationship between one measure of EQ and leadership effectiveness as “strong” when even the author of the source article referred to it as moderate. With such conceptual confusion the term “emotional intelligence” has become a sort of catch-all buzzword for all things related to social awareness and interpersonal skills.

Including EI into the LRM would be inappropriate as Army doctrine is written for all levels of leaders, from a specialist seeking to become a corporal up to Army civilians, executive managers, and general officers and as such aims to avoid jargon. The conceptual confusion and overlap with other existing LRM constructs suggests that an additional emotional intelligence emphasis would not add incremental validity to leadership performance and outcomes.

One point of the paper’s criticism is that FM 6-22 has four paragraphs about empathy. Length is one proxy for importance but doctrine is not planned by apportioning length but by including what is important to describe to make relevant points. The attribute of empathy was added along with other attributes and competencies in the 2006 version of leadership doctrine while reducing the length by 25 percent from the earlier version.

Another way to view importance is to consider how a construct is framed, and empathy is specifically mentioned in FM 6-22 as one of 12 attributes. More importantly, the LRM describes a cluster of concepts related to empathy, including interpersonal tact, interacting with others, valuing diversity among people, self-control, balance, and stability, as well as composure and resilience.

Another trait McDonald advocates for inclusion is hardness or resiliency. Resilience was also added as an attribute to the current (2006) version of FM 6-22 (notably, well before the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program was instituted). The paper incorrectly reports that the description of resilience in FM 6-22 “primarily revolves around its application to combat.” The manual does provide the story of Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester’s actions under fire and how disciplined training had set the conditions and led to effective response to an ambush. However, the preceding paragraphs in FM 6-22 do not restrict the application of resilience to combat. In fact, paragraph 5-17 specifically uses phrases such as “no matter what the working conditions are... all members of the Army—active, reserve, or civilian... everyone needs an inner source of energy to press on to mission completion.” McDonald later cites research that shows how resilience is especially useful for serving as a stress buffer in combat exposure, the very point he criticizes in FM 6-22. McDonald also incorrectly implies that resiliency is characterized in FM 6-22 as a “behavior” despite its clear listing as an “attribute.”

The paper also discusses the social concept of leadership outlined in S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen D. Reicher, and Michael J. Platow’s book, The New Psychology of Leadership, published in 2011. Based on the book, McDonald discusses the importance of leader-follower commonalities, in-group prototypical characteristics, in-group champion, group identity, and group norms. Army leadership doctrine and the LRM already incorporate social aspects of leadership. LRM competencies are...
focused on constructs that involve an interaction between a leader and one or more people. Existence of interaction is an essential principle adopted in the development of the LRM. FM 6-22 addresses leaders, followers, teams, organizational structures, and connected concepts related to group factors.

Since doctrine uses simple, unambiguous descriptions, performance and development requirements are framed for an individual leader; however, followers, teams, people, units, organizations, situations, resource factors, and adversarial factors are addressed. Leadership is inherently a social process involving interpersonal interaction. The competencies, components, and sample actions listed in Appendix A of FM 6-22 align with the ideas of leadership as social phenomena within and across groups.

McDonald’s paper and the referenced book offer concepts that are not fully operationalized and suggest potential challenges in following other principles such as alignment and nesting of purpose and unit actions across echelons. The Center for Army Leadership has been advancing the body of knowledge on the social aspects of leadership by sponsoring research on collective aspects of leadership, which even goes beyond McDonald’s recommended construct of social identity to address the alignment of purpose and actions across multiple leaders and echelons.

**Impact.** While considering individual constructs and how each is related to leadership, McDonald fails to make a cohesive argument or provide supporting evidence that his recommended constructs are indeed the most critical factors that contribute to effective Army leadership, something his paper says that it set out to do. Despite calling out the need to evaluate factors based on empirical evidence and providing evidence that they relate to leadership outcomes for some of the factors, McDonald does not identify any criteria, rules, or processes that he used to determine that these factors were more important than factors currently in the model or even for other factors that may be addressed in the literature but that he does not review (e.g., conscientiousness, expectations, and cohesion).

McDonald might have considered that empirical evidence of a relationship between a leadership construct and effectiveness by itself is not all that should be considered when identifying desired leadership factors. Leadership can be a catalyst that can set a process into motion, but it can also be disrupted, denied, or reversed through other leaders, followers, environmental circumstances, an adversary’s actions, or other factors. Leaders do not have total control over results, and as such these intervening actions can limit or negate leader outcomes. Unpredictable dynamics and uncontrollable external forces are sometimes stronger than the best leader’s intentions and effort. Not only are conditions unpredictable, subordinates do not always follow guidance or expectations. All of this reminds leadership researchers to be careful in interpreting and generalizing results from a study that may not share ecological validity with military applications, such as several of the empirical references cited by McDonald.

Through CAL research we believe strongly that the Army leader core competencies and attributes are positively associated with leader effectiveness. In validation of 360 assessment instruments for the Army, the 360 ratings of commander behaviors had significant amounts of variance in common with long-term potential (24 percent), competence ratings (49 percent), and overall performance (80 percent).

McDonald focused on characteristics that leadership doctrine identifies as attributes. However, studies show that leader attributes tend to have less impact on leadership outcomes than do leader behaviors. Regression studies can identify how much various factors relate to or predict the variance of outcomes. In an integrative study examining leader traits and behaviors, behavior contributed greater proportions to all four outcomes they examined. The amount of variance in the outcomes predicted by both traits and behaviors ranged from 31 to 92 percent. Leader behaviors had a 3 to 1 contribution over traits on leader effectiveness, 3 to 2 contribution on group performance (the lowest value of 31 percent), a 15 to 1 contribution on follower job satisfaction, and 6 to 1 contribution on follower satisfaction with the leader. These results suggest that leader traits will have less impact on leadership outcomes than leader behaviors and thus are less vital to identify.

Another way to consider the relative importance of attributes and behavior-based competencies is to look at criticality ratings of items associated
with the LRM. The first validation of the model by Army researchers asked for leaders’ ratings of importance, criticality, and degree of emphasis. Among 102 items representing behaviors, attributes, and distracter items, most attributes were rated in the middle third of importance.

Criterion-referenced validation is often considered the most telling of approaches to validation because it determines the degree to which behaviors relate to a performance criterion. In the validation of the Army’s Leadership Requirement Model, the set of leader behavior processes from the model predicted 48 percent of the variance in the criterion ratings given by the leader’s superior. This means that nearly half of the variance in performance across the tested sample can be attributed to characteristics identified in the LRM, a very good level of prediction of performance.

Summary Points

● Army Leadership Requirements Model in leadership doctrine is based in science and effective practice and has been extensively validated.

● Continued discourse on the Army leadership model is vital to sustaining an effective model of requirements. Thus, continued research, review articles, discussion papers, and criticism are necessary. However, published documents need to accurately represent facts and avoid false information and unsupported conclusions. In such cases, a reasoned discourse process is prevented.

● A supported and validated model of leadership requirements has value by informing leaders what distinguishes effective performance and will align the practice of leadership within and across Army units and organizations. An enduring model of leadership provides the ability to align leader development policies, systems, and practices to a core set of requirements for a leader to benefit from throughout a career. Any gratuitous changes to the model come with unwanted costs.

● FM 6-22 was innovative in requiring leaders to establish resiliency and empathy and extend influence beyond one’s unit. These additions and the creation of a cohesive model of attributes and competencies were based on the use of empirical research, theoretical models, and other documented methods and sources.

● FM 6-22 lists a set of multiple attributes and competencies; however, the meaning of leadership is greater than the individual pieces. The labeling of attributes and competencies is not as important as what is represented. The performance of effective behaviors by leaders and followers is an operational imperative. The reference to a particular research construct over a related one is less relevant.

● It is apparent that McDonald’s review of the relevant research was incomplete and his corresponding recommendations were based upon incorrect assumptions about FM 6-22. FM 6-22 and the LRM are based on a process using an empirically valid model of leadership and one that is informed by military leader expertise and operational practice.

● As the director of the Center for Army Leadership, I fully support and encourage students to write papers and articles that offer diverse opinions and ones that challenge the institution. Differences of opinion can exist, but the concerns with McDonald’s article are not opinion differences. They are factual inaccuracies and gaps in assumptions that if not corrected could harm operational performance and cause millions of dollars to be spent unnecessarily in revamping leadership processes, instruction, and leader development systems. MR
“What is the Greatest Challenge to the Army Profession for the Army of 2020 and Beyond?”

The Army has a dual nature—it is both a military department (a part of the Armed Forces) and a military profession. As one of the Nation’s armed services, we carry out the missions assigned by the Commander in Chief in accordance with the law and intent of Congress. As a military profession, the Army is built upon an ethic of trust that buttresses the other four essential characteristics of our profession: military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship. (refer to Army Doctrine Publication 1, The Army, Chapter 2) http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp1.pdf

The Army will only be and perform as a military profession when these five essential characteristics are present in its culture, in its professionals and their units that exhibit competence, character and commitment, and in its external relationships. Together, they represent more than official statements. They embody our shared values that reflect our American approach to warfighting. The Army functions as a military profession when its leaders, and all who support it, remain committed to maintaining these five essential characteristics.

Examining one or a combination of the five essential characteristics of the Army profession, “What is the greatest challenge to the Army Profession for the Army of 2020 and beyond?”

WHO: OPEN TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ARMY PROFESSION - Soldiers, NCOs, and officers of the Profession of Arms, Department of the Army Civilians, and retired Army professionals

WHAT: Papers by up to three authors, approximately 5000 words, to be judged for publication in an upcoming Military Review Special Edition as part of the Calendar Year 2013 America’s Army, Our Profession education and training program

WHEN: Deadline: 28 February 2013, for publication Summer 2013

WHERE: Send submissions to CAPE@usma.edu

At any moment, it is possible that a necessity might arise for my relief and consequent demotion. If so, you are not to worry about it . . . If it becomes expedient to reduce me, I would be the first to recommend it.—General Dwight D. Eisenhower, letter to his son, 1942

THE GENERALS IS a controversial but nonetheless important read for military professionals seeking to understand the management of Army generals over the last 70 years. General Eisenhower’s letter to his son indicates that even Eisenhower thought he could be relieved at any time. Clearly, there have been changes in the management of generals in the Army. Readers may be tempted to dismiss Tom Ricks’ book as one written by a prejudiced outsider, a journalist who has never served as a soldier. This would be a mistake. The Generals contains considerable research, much from first-hand sources of soldiers, officers, and general officers. Those sources frame Ricks’ discussion. Ricks also draws material from letters, journals, and duty logs. The reader gets the feeling of looking over the shoulder of people engaged in one of the most dangerous and vital endeavors in which military professionals engage: fighting and winning the wars.

The Generals centers on accountability, using General George C. Marshall as the gold standard. Ricks claims that the current general officer management approach removes generals for moral lapses that embarrass the institution, not for a lack of competence. Marshall fired several generals after Pearl Harbor and instituted a “hire and fire” approach to general officer management. Ricks claims the relief of a general officer under Marshall was not an indication of something broken within the institution; rather, it was viewed as the system working properly. He cites instances where relief of a general did not necessarily end that general’s career, with some doing well in later commands.

Ricks claims the Army suffered devolution from the Marshall “hire and fire” approach to one where generals only rarely depart their jobs owing to their incompetence. Ricks’ negative examples include Generals Tommy Franks and Ricardo Sanchez, both of whom he views as overly tactically focused. Both lacked a vision of the strategic aims of the wars they prosecuted. Ricks suggests they epitomized generals who understood how to start a war but not how to end one. Ricks quotes Colonel Paul Yingling who famously claimed, “As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war.” Ricks’ suggests a solution to this imbalance is to return to the Marshall approach.

Ricks also holds Marshall up as the standard to meet in military to civilian relations. He describes Marshall as at times cold and impersonal, one who kept his personal distance from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Ricks describes incidents where Marshall stood up to and disagreed with him—a role Marshall would probably argue as vital for a general in his position. Ricks also shows Marshall as dedicated to speaking truth to power, engaging the president in the strategic approach to the war.

Ricks describes General Maxwell Taylor in contrast to Marshall as the quintessential politicized general officer. He describes Taylor’s use of the White House as his base, a politically motivated disposition for improving his own status at the expense of the institution and the nation. The most notable difference Ricks describes between Marshall and Taylor is their use of candor. He describes Marshall as a straight shooting, “what-you-see is-what-you-get” kind of general, whereas Taylor tended to be less forthright. Ricks argues that this approach at the top infected the entire institution. He cites the results of a 1972 opinion poll of the “perceived truthfulness of 20 occupations, army generals ranked 14th behind lawyers . . . but ahead of politicians and used car salesmen.”
Ricks argues for a return to Marshall’s style as a professional, that of candid discourse between generals and their civilian leaders. This is so, Ricks’ says, because wars waged by a democracy must be executed through a dynamic collaboration between military and civilian leaders.

The last chapter of The Generals is among the most compelling. Here, Ricks makes his case for how to proceed. Military professionals should engage in a meaningful dialogue. Some recommended discussion questions: Is it true that the general officer corps needs more accountability and if so, is firing generals an effective way to manage them and improve accountability? How can we better groom officers (potential generals) to lead us through the challenges of an uncertain future? What are officer promotions based on, performance or potential? If potential, how should potential be measured and by whom?

Both civilian and military DOD personnel should read the book. Some readers may find Ricks’ premises questionable and his conclusions unsatisfying. However, rather than avoiding a controversial discussion, the Army and the rest of the Department of Defense should face this discourse head-on and use it to improve itself. Even if some think he fails to diagnose the disease, the symptoms he describes are undeniable, as evinced yet again in the recent series of senior officer meltdowns. The Generals is an excellent source for leader development programs.

LTC Richard A. McConnell, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Joe Rochefort’s War is an essential addition to the library of any military professional who wants to learn the nature of signals intelligence from soup to nuts, including traffic analysis, which was particularly useful during the war. Commander Rochefort and his team later enabled the U.S. Navy to ambush the Imperial Japanese Navy at Midway and defeat them decisively. But in 1941, Joe Rochefort got it wrong. He came close to getting it right, but in the end, his analysis and equally important his assumptions led him to estimate the Japanese would attack, but not at Pearl Harbor. Rochefort was not alone in this assumption. U.S. decision makers widely shared this belief; it was an article of faith.

Roberta Wohlstetter’s Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision is arguably the standard for understanding just how Japan managed to surprise the United States that December morning. Wohlstetter’s examination of the decision-making apparatus in the United States that enabled good people to reach catastrophically wrong conclusions is, in a word, brilliant.

Decision makers often demonstrate an almost terminal capacity to ignore evidence that does not meet their expectations. Mistakes similar to those made before Pearl Harbor occurred in the run up to 9/11 during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Bureaucratic organization and competition often preclude unity of effort, let alone unity of command. Cohesion among decision makers limits their ability to examine alternatives or challenge assumptions. Excessive background noise inhibits their capacity to interpret the data accurately. Other important books about Pearl Harbor include Alan D. Zimm’s Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Myths, Deceptions; Thomas B. Steely, Jr.’s, Pearl Harbor Countdown: Admiral James O. Richard-

Joe Rochefort’s War: The Odyssey of the Code Breaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway
Elliott Carlson, USNI Press, Annapolis, MD, 2011, 616 pages, $36.95

On 2 December 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel joked to Lieutenant Commander Edwin T. Layton, “What, you don’t know where the carriers are? Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn’t know it?” Layton replied that he hoped they would be sighted before then. In fact, the Japanese strike force was actually steaming northwest of Oahu en route to its rendezvous with destiny.

Pearl Harbor is an American disaster that has attained iconic status. “Remember the Alamo,” “Remember the Maine,” and “Remember Pearl Harbor” all have this stature. There is a tragic sense that Pearl Harbor could have been avoided in the same way it seems unreal the Titanic sank on her maiden voyage.

What matters about Pearl Harbor is not what might have been but what we have yet to learn from the sad events of that Sunday more than 70 years ago. Understanding what enabled a surprise attack illuminates aspects of American decision making that seem to be enduring, but need not be.

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Roberta Wohlstetter’s Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision is arguably the standard for understanding just how Japan managed to surprise the United States that December morning. Wohlstetter’s examination of the decision-making apparatus in the United States that enabled good people to reach catastrophically wrong conclusions is, in a word, brilliant.

Decision makers often demonstrate an almost terminal capacity to ignore evidence that does not meet their expectations. Mistakes similar to those made before Pearl Harbor occurred in the run up to 9/11 during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Bureaucratic organization and competition often preclude unity of effort, let alone unity of command. Cohesion among decision makers limits their ability to examine alternatives or challenge assumptions. Excessive background noise inhibits their capacity to interpret the data accurately. Other important books about Pearl Harbor include Alan D. Zimm’s Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Myths, Deceptions; Thomas B. Steely, Jr.,’s, Pearl Harbor Countdown: Admiral James O. Richard-
son; and George Victor’s The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable. Japanese sources include Hiroyuki Agawa’s The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy (translated by John Bester); Admiral Matome Ugaki’s Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-1945 (translated by Masataka Chihaya); and God’s Samurai: Lead Pilot at Pearl Harbor by Gordon W. Prange with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon.

What emerges from these books deepens and enriches Wohlstetter’s effort. Each book has something to say that deserves hearing. Zimm’s analysis of the attack on Pearl Harbor focuses on a systems analysis approach to the problem largely from the perspective of the Japanese. He illuminates Japanese motives, their preparation, and most important their objectives for the attack. In doing so, he largely debunks the commonly held view of Japanese brilliance. The myth, according to Zimm, is that visionary Japanese officers, including Yamamoto, Genda, and Fuchida, managed to conceive and execute with genius in the face of recalcitrant admirals. Yet Yamamoto’s attack aimed not at the carriers but at the battleships. Yamamoto, too, appears to have concluded that sinking battleships would preclude effective action by the remainder of the U.S. Pacific fleet. Zimm is convincing on a number of counts including how big a risk the Japanese perceived they were taking. Why then did they succeed?

What seems least likely is the explanation offered in Victor’s The Pearl Harbor Myth. Victor raises a number of excellent questions that challenge the “official” story of the events leading to Pearl Harbor, but in the end, he suggests Pearl Harbor happened because President Roosevelt and his senior leaders used the Pacific Fleet to tantalize the Japanese into attacking. While the idea is plausible—given the way governments work—as an explanation for Pearl Harbor, it requires a level of cynical competence that seems unlikely at best. A more likely explanation for Roosevelt’s decision to leave the fleet in Hawaiian waters following Fleet Problem XXI in the spring of 1940 is that he genuinely thought the presence of the battle fleet in Hawaii would deter the Japanese.

James O. Richardson, the admiral who preceded Husband E. Kimmel in command of the fleet, did not agree. In Pearl Harbor Countdown, he focuses on the considerable resource problems that emerged with the fleet crammed into Pearl Harbor, which was too small and too hard to get in and out of and lacked sufficient means to overhaul vessels. Pearl Harbors’ limitations were such that Richardson kept the fleet at sea or in anchorages nearby when he could. He lobbied against the decision to leave the fleet in Hawaiian waters until the president relieved him.

Reading the Japanese sources is important, too. Wohlstetter did not have them at hand when she studied the problem. Like their American opponents, Yamamoto, Ugaki, and Fuchida often made faith-based decisions. In October 1941, Ugaki confided in his diary, “Our capacity to produce planes and replenish air crews are two causes of anxiety.” But in the next sentence, like Stonewall Jackson, he determined not to take counsel of his fears. Fuchida quoted Admiral Nagumo, the striking force commander, “When men work as hard as we have on this operation, providence will favor them with its blessing.” Yamamoto’s reservations about going to war with the United States are well known. Less well known is that in September 1941 he said, “The Pearl Harbor raid has become an article of faith.” Clearly, Yamamoto, the poker player and cold-blooded rationalist, had his convictions. Humans, whether Japanese or American, find it difficult to accept evidence of things they do not believe. Here ends the lesson.

COL Greg Fontenot, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FROM A to B: How Logistics Fuels American Power and Prosperity,

An army marches on its stomach.—Napoleon Bonaparte
Amateurs talk about strategy. Professionals talk about logistics.—Omar N. Bradley
Logistics has become the key to American power and prosperity.—David Axe

After reading Reporter David Axe’s missives on war and technology for years, I had no doubt his book, From A to B, would accurately depict logistics from an “on-the-ground” perspective and incorporate the latest in technological advances. He did not disappoint.
From A to B is a great survey of the importance of logistics to our military and our globalized economy. Axe examines all possible modes to transport men and materiel around the globe—from cars and trucks to ships and airplanes to zeppelins and space planes.

The book begins by establishing the importance of logistics to our military operations and makes it clear that it is dirty, dangerous work that is probably the most complex aspect of military planning. He provides as an example the logistical surge of mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) trucks into Iraq and Afghanistan to protect American troops. Axe discusses an alternate solution to the expensive MRAPs—robotically controlled logistical transport. Consider the merging of today’s commercial trucks with the technological power of unmanned aerial vehicles. These vehicles could decrease the need for manned vehicles on dangerous roads and provide more time and attention to manned security vehicles.

Axe’s section on our “most capacious and under-appreciated logistical system: her naval ships” is amazing. The depiction of how difficult, yet crucial, at-sea refueling is to power projection throughout the world provided me a much greater appreciation of how the United States is unlike any other navy in the history of the world.

When Axe moves to airlift, it is obvious his example would be Afghanistan. He has covered this subject extensively in his reporting. Anyone paying attention to the war will understand the sheer magnitude of logistically supplying the country, as well as transporting troops throughout this diverse and hazardous geographic area. Axe does a great job of describing the criticality of robust logistical lift capabilities like the CH-47 Chinook.

Finally, Axe delves into two future capabilities for logistics—airships and space planes. The fact that modern airship technology could transport an entire battalion 4,000 miles, at 100 miles per hour, at 60 percent the cost of an airplane was astounding. While he does discuss the difficulty airships have in adverse weather, he does not address how airships could overcome the adverse conditions war always brings (such as antiair defenses). His discussion of a space plane that could carry materiel, and possibly personnel, anywhere in the world in two hours was intriguing.

From A to B is an engaging look at the diverse influences future technologies will have on our ability to move and supply our troops and our economy. Axe continues to entertain and inform—and his closing comment is a clarion call: “World-beating logistics requires investment on a national scale. That kind of investment requires political will.”

CPT Nathan Finney, USA, Belmont, Massachusetts

THE SCHOOL OF HARD KNOCKS:
Combat Leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces
Richard S. Faulkner,
Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2012, 392 pages, $65.00

Richard S. Faulkner, has rightly named his book The School of Hard Knocks. The combat leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) did in fact learn the lessons of war the hard way, often at the expense of soldiers’ lives. Our history, leadership, and tactics books conveniently ignored the faults of the AEF’s combat leadership for years. After all, the war, a short one, at that, was won in part because of America’s involvement. Some recent books on AEF leadership failures, such as Robert Ferrell’s 2004 Collapse at Meuse-Argonne: The Failure of the Missouri-Kansas Division, are about specific units, as if they were an anomaly, but Faulkner exposes how widespread the unpreparedness of our combat leadership actually was. There were indeed many hard lessons learned in World War I, as NCO and commissioned officer selection and training set the conditions for leadership challenges on the battlefield.

Faulkner guides the reader from officer training just before the war, during the vast buildup, and in France, where the hard knocks would fall. He also addresses the junior officer “ninety-day wonders” and ad-hoc methods of selecting NCOs, or “jumped-up sergeants.” The relationships between the leaders and the led, including those of supposedly experienced allied army trainers, are revealing.

Faulkner has invested years of research to produce this insightful and entertaining book. He combines factual information with real-life occurrences. Sending young and fully prepared NCOs
and officers to lead units in combat after their initial training is a daunting task. World War I was an example of the price this country paid in blood because of an inadequately trained NCO and officer corps. Faulkner makes the point that the young officers and NCOs were patriotic, educated, dedicated, and brave, and did the best they could under the conditions they faced. Most of their difficulties were due to systemic problems associated with America’s lack of preparedness to fight a modern, extremely lethal war. Perhaps just as critical was the Army’s willingness to accept quantity over quality during the massive build up of the AEF, in the belief that maintaining a small army is preferable during peacetime because “we can always ramp up” during times of war.

LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

VICTORY FOR HIRE: Private Security Companies’ Impact on Military Effectiveness

The United States used more private security contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq than deployed military. Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) sold logistical services to the United States in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, and Blackwater sold diplomatic security services in Iraq. Victory for Hire looks at how private security contractors affect military effectiveness.

The use of private security contractors as “force extenders” has grown recently, as have the scandals in which the contractors became involved. DynCorp employees were involved in Bosnian child prostitution, the murder of an Iraqi taxi driver, and wasted millions of dollars in Iraq. Over 380 KBR employees were wounded and about 80 were killed in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan. KBR’s president went to jail for bribing Nigerians, and KBR paid $570 million in fines and settlements in related cases. Blackwater staff murdered Iraqis, and senior board members illegally possessed automatic weapons in the United States. Citizens and politicians question the legality, value, and morality of using contractors instead of military members in war zones. Scandals involving force extenders are not new. Mercenaries have served nearly every army from ancient Egypt to the present. However, the repeated controversies about force extenders have not stopped their use.

How can we best use private security contractors? Should they deploy with the U.S. military, work independently, or replace part of the military’s fighting forces? What problems and benefits come from each role? Can hiring private security contractors sometimes hurt the military’s effectiveness so badly that the contractors should not even be used? These are the issues Molly Dunigan analyzes in Victory for Hire.

Dunigan uses past examples to illustrate when and how contractors have succeeded or failed. Her examples, analysis, and conclusions will be valuable for military leaders who work with security contractors, to citizens concerned about security contractor use, and to policy makers who decide whether to use them. Dunigan concludes with specific recommendations for policy and regulatory changes.

MAJ Herman Reinhold, USAF, Retired, Athens, New York

CARTEL: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars
Sylvia Longmire, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011, 256 pages, $26.00

Experienced border security expert Sylvia Longmire’s Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars addresses the Mexican cartels’ origins, sketches their operations within Mexico, and tackles their security implications for the United States and Mexico.

She outlines how the Guadalajara Cartel led by Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo aka El Padrino (The Godfather) flourished in the 1980s. Regarded as Mexico’s first drug czar and cartel lord to control all illegal narcotics trafficking in Mexico and associated corridors or plazas into the United States, Gallardo divided Mexico’s trafficking corridors during the late 1980s, and created a group of trusted protégés to manage them. Three of these protégés remain today, operating the Sinaloa, Juárez, and Tijuana Cartels.

Longmire identifies kidnapping as the second-biggest cartel moneymaker. However, she fails to
address other illicit cartel ventures such as counterfeit product sales (CDs, DVDs, and apparel), human trafficking, prostitution, and money laundering. She recognizes that the cartels are the “biggest armed force south of the border” and use increasingly effective and powerful weapons. However, she does not discuss their use of more advanced weapons systems such as the rocket-propelled grenade.

The author defines these organizations as a hybrid threat, a combination of terrorists, insurgents, and criminals and discusses how the United States and Mexico (and their subordinate agencies) are failing when it comes to law and policy. Unfortunately, she misidentifies not only the groups themselves, but terms such as “spillover violence.” She observes that adding the concept of “winning” into the equation muddies the waters and makes it even harder for agencies to secure funding.

Longmire offers practical solutions to many of the critical problems addressed in her monograph. Cartel is a necessary read for those wanting a comprehensive look into the decade’s-old drug war affecting the United States and Mexico.

Tony Scheidel, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE NEW LEGIONS: American Strategy and The Responsibility of Power
Edward B. Atkeson, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Lanham, MD, 2011, 211 pages, $35.00

Retired U.S. Army major general and senior fellow at the Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army, Edward Atkeson has written an interesting book recommending an unusual strategy to foster American strategic interests around the world. His thesis is that the United States could effectively use a U.S.-led foreign legion to extend its global reach as the world’s sheriff. The legionnaires would be motivated by the offer of U.S. citizenship after a number of years of service. He proposes paying the legionnaires less than the United States pays its active duty forces to avoid their being confused as mercenaries. The foreign legion soldiers would presumably be better trained and led than host nation police or military units and more readily accepted. Atkeson’s preferred example is the French Foreign Legion.

Atkeson first details the evolution of current international events that have been shaped by policies and decisions focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. He prefers to quote extensively from other national security observers and newspapers including Anthony Cordesman, Fareed Zakaria, Max Boot, the Washington Post, and the New York Times. His analysis provides nothing new to the discussion, but the summary is a spirited review of events.

In the second part of the book, Atkeson uses Dr. Thomas Barnett’s approach to analyze regional dysfunctions that are similar to Barnett’s “non-integrating gap.” While these country and regional excursions are informative, they do not enhance the argument for a foreign legion as a tool of U.S. policy. The chapters on Latin America, Cuba, Africa, and Asia provide details on the current political-military situation, but the reader gains little insight as to how the United States might use a legion there or if the host nation would support it.

Well written and footnoted, the book could be useful for scholars conducting research on this subject. The book’s biggest shortcoming is its inadequate discussion of the legality, perception, and potential use of American foreign legions. The book’s regional and country assessments are useful, but the author never uses the analysis effectively to further his case for a legion, nor does he question his assumption that U.S. domestic and international public opinion would support the legions.

LTC Stephen G. Whitworth, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LEADING THE NARRATIVE: The Case for Strategic Communication

If you are a public affairs officer (PAO), information operations officer, a commander at battalion and higher, or a professional communicator, Leading the Narrative is worth the time to read and refer to often. Mari K. Eder, a communication professional within the Army and the Department of Defense, examines various forms of communication to demonstrate how to use strategic communication and lead the narrative.

Eder skillfully explains all this via quotes and past communication events, lessons learned, and
advice from communications field operators in the media, military, and civilian sectors. One such piece of advice comes from journalist Richard Halloran, who counsels that the most important element in the relationship between the PAO and the journalist is the commander’s intent. The commander who has an open or transparent communications attitude and fosters a similar command climate will enable the PAO and his subordinates to do their jobs. A commander who wants a “palace guard” to avoid the issues and avoid communication will get “bad” press and provide inaccurate information to the public.

Eder’s discussion of strategic communication, an often ill-defined, overused expression that few understand and fewer know how to implement, is the best I have seen to date. She discusses the uses of new technology, social media, and trends in public opinion and weaves together a mosaic for both the professional and the layperson to grasp.

COL Steve Boylan, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE PAKISTAN CAULDRON: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability

THE PAKISTAN CAULDRON revolves around Benazir Bhutto’s rise, her assassination, and the actions and reactions of the Musharaf administration in dealing with her. Pakistan’s politics are tough to comprehend until one understands the role of the military (the corps commanders), the ethnic and class divides of the society, and the cultures of those divides and how they influence government and politics. Throw in relations with neighbors and allies, the Sunni-Shi’a split, the long history of government noninterference in the Western frontier regions, and the plunging economy, and the reader faces a very complex array. All of these factors are apparent to the author, although not to the average reader, who needs a better introduction to Pakistan and its environs. Once author James P. Farwell hits his stride, the book travels a smoother road and turns into a textbook on “strategic communications.”

The military professional should read this book for three reasons. First, it is about a vital region that borders on Afghanistan. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is a Western invention having little to do with the reality of the region and the lives of its populace. Yet a lasting solution to the Afghanistan conflict depends on the resolution of its border with Pakistan. Second, the book is about contemporary politics and U.S. influence on those politics. Americans understand little about Afghanistan yet deliberately exert their influence without sufficient regard for its culture, history, and geography. Third, Pakistan is a regional power in Southwest and Central Asia and a key Islamic country. The book’s emphasis is on presidential strategic communications, not military information operations. However, some of the best U.S. contacts with Pakistan are military-to-military, and the U.S. military needs to learn more about a troubled and sometimes troublesome region.

Lester W. Grau, Ph.D., LTC, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ARC OF EMPIRE: America’s Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam

THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION has captured significant attention in the last year. Events in the Middle East and Central Asia continue to vex U.S. foreign policy and military efforts, but they are increasingly becoming a landscape in the rear-view mirror as more emphasis on the greater Pacific region moves to center stage. Arc of Empire: America’s Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam provides insight into this complicated region. Authors Michael H. Hunt and Steven I. Levine offer a thought-provoking study of the four U.S. wars in the Pacific.

Hunt and Levine contend that the war with the Philippines, the war with Japan, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War were not separate and unconnected, but “phases in a U.S. attempt to establish and maintain a dominant position in eastern Asia sustained over some seven decades against considerable resistance.” Recognizing the provocative nature of this thesis, the authors devote their introduction to explaining how they use the term “empire.” They provide an objective, historically
based definition of the loaded term and reinforce the definition with four case studies. The studies appear as chapters, one for each of the four wars, and provide an excellent overview of each conflict, drawing connections among them. Primary sources substantiate their perspective, and the book has a strong international emphasis that details both sides of each conflict.

Even though Levine and Hunt concede that U.S. involvements in the Pacific have demonstrated most of the features of an empire, concluding that the United States has engaged in intentional empire building is a stretch. Generous post-World War II agreements and American-led reconstruction efforts helped Japan achieve enough autonomy to become a formidable economic competitor in the late 1980s. Japan, whether rebuilt as a counterpoint to China or as a consumer for American exports, does not seem to be the result of a purposeful American plan for empire.

The authors do not discuss General George Marshall’s efforts to broker a peace between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists in 1945, nor his request to Chiang Kai-Shek to halt his offensive against the Chinese Communists in June 1946. Would not a real empire have pushed the Nationalists to overcome the Red Army since the Nationalists were far more sympathetic to U.S. interests?

On the other hand, the United States did allow the French to regain control of Indochina after World War II. As the authors indicate, U.S. support for neo-colonialism in this instance had disastrous repercussions after the French lost Indochina after the battle for Dien Bien Phu in May 1954.

Professors and students of the Asia-Pacific will benefit from considering Levine and Hunt’s thesis, even if they decide to disagree with it. Additionally, students will profit from reading a useful 15-page appendix, “A Guide to the Historical Literature” from 1898 to the present. Altogether, Arc of Empire is provocative and engaging and will challenge officers researching this complex region of the world.

CPT Nathaniel Moir, Fergus Falls, Minnesota

In late March 1972, after most U.S. combat forces had withdrawn from Vietnam, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) launched the Easter Offensive, a massive invasion of South Vietnam that included over 130,000 soldiers with 14 divisions and 26 separate regiments supporting massive numbers of tanks and heavy artillery. The attack focused on three objectives—Quang Tri in the area just south of the DMZ, An Loc in Binh Long Province just 65 miles from Saigon (where this reviewer served in 1972), and Kontum in the Central Highlands. Although the Easter Offensive was the largest enemy operation of the war, only a handful of books have been written about it, primarily because no U.S. ground combat troops were involved. Most books on this period make only a passing reference to the battle at Kontum. Thomas P. McKenna, who served as an advisor with the 23rd ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Division during the battle, has written the only book focused solely on Kontum.

McKenna combines his personal experiences and extensive research from primary sources, media reports, and first-person interviews to produce a riveting account of the bitter fighting in the highlands. After addressing the background to the offensive and its opening phases, including the less than stellar performance of the ARVN at Tan Canh and Dak To in the early days of the battle in Kontum Province, the author turns his attention to the battle for the city of Kontum itself. During the course of the battle, three enemy main force divisions surrounded and attacked the ARVN defenders. It was a desperate battle for high stakes: if the North Vietnamese won, they would cut South Vietnam in half. McKenna, a small group of his fellow advisors, and the 23rd ARVN—with the help of U.S. airpower — found themselves in a fight against overwhelming odds as bombs fell on the defenders night and day. They repeatedly turned back human wave attacks supported by 36-ton Soviet-made main battle tanks. In the end, the South Vietnamese, despite some early missteps, triumphed over some of the best troops in the North Vietnamese Army.

Kontum: The Battle to Save South Vietnam is an insider book that reads like a novel. It is a story of courage and perseverance under extreme conditions in a level of sustained combat seldom encountered in the Vietnam War. This book is an invaluable

KONTUM: The Battle to Save South Vietnam
Thomas P. McKenna,
University Press of Kentucky, Lexington,
2011, 376 pages, $34.95
addition to the historiography of the war and I strongly recommend it for military historians and the general reader.

James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., LTC, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE 14-HOUR WAR: Valor on Koh Tang and the Recapture of the SS Mayaguez
James E. Wise, Jr., and Scott Baron, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2011, 295 pages, $34.95

On 12 May 1975, the Khmer Rouge captured the crew and seized the U.S. cargo ship SS Mayaguez. The United States mounted a military operation to recapture the ship and free its crew. The 14-Hour War recounts the story of the marine assault on Koh Tang Island and the recapture of the Mayaguez.

Authors James Wise and Scott Baron argue that the Mayaguez incident is worth recounting “because of the current, almost unstoppable hijacking of foreign merchant ships transiting the Gulf of Aden and waters as far south as off the coast of Kenya in the Indian Ocean.” The authors say The 14-Hour War is about American military heroes, human tragedy, and piracy. However, the book achieves only two of these objectives: it describes the heroic actions of the military that fought a numerically superior enemy force and the human tragedy of the Marines who were missing after the evacuation. The book falls short in its connection to today’s piracy.

The 14-Hour War is an in-depth account of the strategic and operational aspects of the crisis. Wise and Baron concentrate on the tactical fight and on the assault and evacuation of Koh Tang Island. Unfortunately, the book does not draw any lessons learned about piracy or counter piracy operations nor does it connect the Mayaguez incident to piracy today in the Gulf of Aden.

This book is not a comprehensive analysis, but the recollections of the participants involved (written in their own words) give the book strength. The authors also shed light on some aspects of the operation not previously explored. For example, even though the war in Vietnam had just ended, many of the Marines involved in the Mayaguez incident had no prior combat experience.

Wise and Baron’s writing style is factual and straightforward, which makes the book easy to read. In the end, it is a cautionary tale about “come as you are warfare.” Because of its personal recollections, I recommend the book to those readers interested in the Mayaguez incident.

LTC Robert Rielly, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

STATE VERSUS DEFENSE: The Battle to Define America’s Empire

State Versus Defense is the latest addition to scholarly works about the rise of the military industrial complex of the United States during the years after World War II and the rise of the Cold War. Works of this genre talk about bargains the government made with the people after the war—butter on their tables in return for guns in their backyards and government in their lives. The work largely disregards social history and focuses instead on the diplomatic and political aspect of militarization. However, it is not a study of rivalry between the Department of Defense and the Department of State. That competition ended in the late 1940s when the Department of State failed to stop the communist takeover of China and Eastern Europe.

Into the breach stepped the defense establishment. With or without presidential backing, the Department of Defense and related agencies have dominated the executive branch, driven foreign relations, and pushed diplomacy aside for a military option. The restructuring of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the mid-1980s made the chairman independent of the service chiefs and the establishment of area commands gave generals imperial authority.

The Department of Defense afterward owned foreign affairs. This was a mistake. Stephen Glain cites numerable examples of presidents and other officials disregarding the diplomatic approach for the military approach in ventures that failed and inevitably wasted American lives and wealth. Glain finds the cost of the Cold War appalling and unnecessary, as the Soviet Union was crumbling through most of the era.
Glain’s interpretation is in keeping with the scholarly consensus that most Cold War military activity was unnecessary and that containment and patience would have attained the same end. What sets the work apart is the variety of resources Glain uses. Newly released Soviet archival material confirms the Soviet system was frail for decades before it collapsed and that at least some in the U.S. government were aware of the frailty. This work will stand in the first rank of studies concerning the mistaken militarism of the United States during and after the Cold War. It should generate a significant amount of debate.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D., Houston, Texas

**CARRYING THE WAR TO THE ENEMY:**

**American Operational Art to 1945**

Michael R. Matheny, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2011, 334 pages, $25.95

Carrying the War to the Enemy addresses an important but often overlooked facet of military theory and practice—the planning and conduct of warfare at the operational level. Michael R. Matheny’s thesis is that “although the American Army did not officially recognize operational art as a third level of war, it did develop operational art during the interwar period, 1919-1940, and practiced it to great effect during World War II.” The operational level of war refers to those aspects of military art that tie tactical actions to the overall strategic goals in order to realize the military and political aims of the war.

Although most military historians credit the invention (or at least the formal recognition) of the operational level of war to German and Soviet military thinkers of the interwar period, Matheny makes a good case that during the same period, the U.S. Army developed and taught doctrinal principles that allowed it to conduct successful large-scale joint and combined operations in World War II. He does so through an empirical examination of the curriculum at the U.S. Army War College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He believes the concepts of culmination; lines of operation; phasing; center of gravity; leverage; and the linking of tactical, operational, and strategic objectives were developed by the U.S Army in the interwar period.

Carefully selected instructors and student officers at CGSC and the War College practiced the application of these concepts in rigorous exercises that sharpened their conceptual and practical skills. These officers were to serve as commanders, chiefs of staff, and primary staff officers at division, corps, and army levels during the coming world war. In these positions, they were able to translate operational theory into successful operational concepts and plans in the North Africa, Normandy, Philippine, and Okinawa campaigns.

Carrying the War to the Enemy explores the intellectual development of the Army as an organization preparing for an uncertain future the best way it could—through the critical study of history and war gaming likely scenarios. It also explores the role of the Army’s own institutions of higher learning in providing the opportunity to develop and practice that most critical of skills for the officer corps—planning and prosecuting large-scale combat operations. For these reasons, Carrying the War to the Enemy should be required reading for faculty members and all who are or have been associated with these institutions.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**ARMING THE LUFTWAFFE:**

The German Aviation Industry in World War II, Daniel Uziel, McFarland, Jefferson, NC, 2012, 312 pages, $45.00

By the close of World War II, the German aviation industry had become the largest branch of Germany’s armaments industry and one of the largest German employers. Daniel Uziel, author of Arming the Luftwaffe, has meticulously researched the rise of German Air Force aircraft production from its creation in 1935 to its final days in April 1945. Through eyewitness accounts, German records, and Allied intelligence, he describes the history of the Luftwaffe aircraft industry in detail and explains German social, economic, and working conditions during this 11-year period.

The Third Reich’s continuous and often conflicting demand requirements and competition between
the aircraft companies of Henkel, Junkers, Messerschmitt, and Focke-Wulf were the driving factors behind the accelerated growth. According to Uziel, the most significant impact to the aircraft production industry resulted from “Big Week,” five days of coordinated and concentrated USAAF and RAF attacks on the German aviation industry and supporting infrastructure from 20 to 25 February 1944.

Before “Big Week,” German contracting firms, senior government officials, and Hitler continuously pushed the design, testing, and production schedule limits to build one jet airframe that would turn the tide of the air war over Germany. As the author details, the rapid expansion of the industry coupled with the increasing conscription of German employees degraded the high quality of life for the German work force and created a labor shortage for the aviation industry. To fill this void, companies used workers supplied by POW camps, contracted foreign workers, and slave labor. Certain firms within the industry reached out to the Schutzstaffel (SS) to fill their labor shortages with inmates from concentration camps. As the war progressed, an increasing number of firms followed this approach, which eventually led to a large proportion of unskilled workers assembling complex aircraft components.

Uziel also describes Germany’s effort to increase aircraft production and minimize Allied bombing effects by relocating aircraft production sites. An interesting aspect of the relocation effort, as the author reveals, was the apparent oversight of the transportation challenges and the availability of raw materials required to assemble the aircraft components. Germany decided to emphasize using underground aircraft production facilities, as well as forest factories concealed throughout the war.

R. Scott Martin, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WORLD WAR I did not have any Sergeant Bill Mauldin to present the Doughboy or GI perspective through Willie and Joe, but Alban B. Butler, Jr.’s, Happy Days and Louis C. Linn’s At Belleau Wood came close. Saucy and direct, while at the same time humorous and touching, some of Captain Butler’s cartoons in Happy Days verge on today’s political incorrectness. However, remember Willie and Joe were not universally popular with the brass at the time.

One of my vivid memories as a GI reporter for Stars and Stripes Europe was examining a photocopy from the managing editor’s files of a note written in longhand to “Georgie.” There was no letterhead and no need for one. The note said simply, “Lay off Stripes” and was signed “Ike.” Presumably, the recipient was General George Patton, who engaged in a famous feud with Sergeant Bill Mauldin, whose Willie and Joe cartoons appeared in Stripes.

Linn’s memoirs and artwork of the Marine battles leading from Belleau Wood were far darker in mood than the cartoon characters of Butler—almost the expressionism of film noir vs. a Popeye comic strip.

Twice wounded, Linn translated his dream sequences into the stark realism of the woodcuts. Even in his narrative, it sometimes seems that Linn invents episodes. His woodcuts, however, verge on museum quality.

The Happy Days cartoons are of historic interest on World War I transport—from the “40 and 8” rail cars (holding 40 soldiers or 8 horses) to the mule-drawn French wine wagons to “the march on Sedan,” with the doughboys on the move along a shell-pocked roadway and the gun limbers and ammunition wagons silhouetted along the crest of the hills behind them.

Every Allied nation established a decorative headquarters in Paris. Odd and exotic uniforms packed the streets for Butler to capture in full flower. His cartoons are precise on regalia and akin to a “Where’s Waldo” in the uniforms of the Great War. Happy Days was originally published on the 10th anniversary of the Armistice. Butler, an aide-de-camp to Major General Charles Pelot Summerall, donated his drawings and sketches to the First Division Museum, which published them in 1928. Butler began drawing in an attempt to build morale following the battle of Cantigny. Long out

...
of print, *Happy Days* is something of a collector’s item, which is the reason for its reissue. On the other hand, Linn’s memoirs—never before published—recall life in the trenches at Verdun, the battle of Belleau Wood, and his wounding at Soissons and again at St. Mihiel. After the Armistice, he attended the Philadelphia Academy of Fine Art. His *Eastern North America’s Wildflowers* was published after his death in 1978.

George Ridge, J.D., Tucson, Arizona

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**WITH OUR BACKS TO THE WALL:**

*Victory and Defeat in 1918*


The year 1918 saw the collapse of empires, a gradually emerging new world order, and the end to the first “world war.” The significance of 1918 is beyond debate. What may be debated is why the empires collapsed, why a new order emerged, and how and why the global conflict ended as it did. Answering these questions is the task that David Stevenson sets out for himself in *With Our Backs to the Wall*. His success in analyzing the complex factors that brought the “Great War” to an end on 11 November 1918 marks this book as a landmark in modern history.

The author’s success rests on his mastery of the latest scholarship supplemented with archival work in at least three different languages. The effectiveness of Stevenson’s argument is founded on the remarkable way he is able to weave complex threads of causation together to show that war tested the endurance of societies as well as armies. After two chapters describing the ebb and flow on the battlefields of Europe and the Middle East, Stevenson examines the essential roles of such factors as technological innovation, shipping, industrial production, finance, home front morale, and political leadership. He shows that during the last 18 months of the war, as the Central Powers staggered to collapse, the Allies themselves overcame crises in manpower, transportation, coal and oil production, food, money, and national will. By employing an avalanche of well-chosen statistics, Stevenson demonstrates that the Allied victory was a remarkable feat of endurance. Yet he goes beyond the statistics to show that leadership, political and military, had a decisive role in timing and shaping the war’s outcome.

The author, a professor at the London School of Economics, points out that the tide of events during World War I had a different shape in World War II. In the second war, more than two years of Allied strategic offensives followed a triumphant Axis advance before 1942. However, when the last year of the World War I began in January 1918, the outcome remained in doubt. In the spring, the German army broke through the Allied lines in multiple places and brought the war to a climax. Explaining how the Allies recovered and fought their way to victory in the final months of the war is a daunting challenge of enormous complexity. *With Our Backs to Wall* meets the challenge. It deserves the highest recommendation.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., LTC, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
We Recommend

**THOSE WHO HAVE BORNE THE BATTLE: A History of America’s Wars and Those Who Fought Them**


At the heart of the story of America’s wars are our “citizen soldiers”—those hometown heroes who fought and sacrificed from Bunker Hill at Charlestown to Pointe du Hoc in Normandy, and beyond, without expectation of recognition or recompense. Americans like to think that the service of its citizen volunteers is, and always has been, of momentous importance in our politics and society. But though this has made for good storytelling, the reality of America’s relationship to its veterans is far more complex. In Those Who Have Borne the Battle, historian and marine veteran James Wright tells the story of the long, often troubled relationship between America and those who have defended her—from the Revolutionary War to today—shedding new light both on our history and on the issues our country and its armed forces face today. From the publisher.

**HINDUISM AND THE ETHICS OF WARFARE IN SOUTH ASIA: From Antiquity to the Present**


This book challenges the view, common among Western scholars, that precolonial India lacked a tradition of military philosophy. It traces the evolution of theories of warfare in India from the dawn of civilization, focusing on the debate between Dharmayuddha (Just War) and Kutayuddha (Unjust War) within Hindu philosophy. This debate centers around four questions: What is war? What justifies it? How should it be waged? And what are its potential repercussions? This body of literature provides evidence of the historical evolution of strategic thought in the Indian subcontinent that has heretofore been neglected by modern historians. Further, it provides a counterpoint to scholarship in political science that engages solely with Western theories in its analysis of independent India’s philosophy of warfare. Ultimately, a better understanding of the legacy of ancient India’s strategic theorizing will enable more accurate analysis of modern India’s military and nuclear policies. From the publisher.
EDWARD PELLEW, CAPTAIN of the legendary Indefatigable, was quite simply the greatest British frigate captain in the age of sail. Left fatherless at age eight, with a penniless mother and five siblings, Pellew fought his way from the very bottom of the navy to fleet command. Victories and eye-catching feats won him a public following. Yet he had a gift for antagonizing his better-born peers, and he made powerful enemies. Redemption came with his last command, when he set off to do battle with the Barbary States and free thousands of European slaves. Opinion held this to be an impossible mission, and Pellew himself, leading from the front in the style of his contemporary Nelson, did not expect to survive. From the publisher.

WAR, WELFARE & DEMOCRACY: Rethinking America’s Quest for the End of History

Peter J. Munson, Potomac Books, Washington, DC, 2013, 240 pages, $29.95

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY since World War II has actively sought to reshape both domestic and international orders, hoping to hasten the coming of the “end of history” in a peaceful democratic utopia. While the end of the Cold War heightened optimism that this goal was near, American foreign policymakers still face dramatic challenges. In War, Welfare & Democracy, Peter Munson argues that the problems we face today stem from common roots—the modern state system’s struggle to cope with the pressures of market development and sociopolitical modernization. By addressing the inequality of wealth, security, and stability brought on by dramatic economic change and modernization, Munson describes how America can lead in reforming the welfare state paradigm and adjust its antiquated policies to best manage the transformation we must face. From the publisher.
“A Pale Horse: George A. Custer and the Seventh Calvary”  
John F. McCullagh

A horse to ride, a sword to wield,  
An ocean of grass to tame.  
The Seventh was out in the field  
To make George Custer’s name.

The village stretched before them,  
Custer split his force in three.  
Reno’s men struck from the south  
And were taking casualties.

Did Custer reach the river  
Before the native’s struck?  
This hero of the Civil War  
Had just run out of luck.

Major Reno sensed the trap and fled  
And found a place to stand.  
Benteen brought his men to Reno  
To lend a helping hand.

A horse to ride, a sword to wield,  
An ocean of grass to tame.  
The Seventh was out in the field  
To make George Custer’s name.

Out upon the greasy grass  
George tried to make a stand.

Two hundred men surrounded;  
There was a breakdown in command.

Outnumbered and surrounded,  
Some men simply broke and ran.  
But death was not to be denied,  
Their blood fed thirsty sand.

Custer, mortally wounded,  
With a bullet near his heart,  
Did not live to see the rest;  
His troopers hacked apart.

The position held by Reno,  
And commanded by Benteen,  
Survived several furious assaults  
Before the natives fled the scene.

Relieved by General Terry’s force,  
They sought their fallen ones.  
The bodies hacked and naked,  
Decomposing in the sun.

No horse to ride, no sword to wield,  
An ocean of grass untamed.  
The Seventh lay out in the field—  
That was the cost of fame.
Announcing the 2013 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

“What can the Army do to improve the combined effects of training, education, and experience to best develop leaders to apply Mission Command in order to execute Unified Land Operations?”

♦ Contest Closes 8 July 2013 ♦

1st Place $1,000 and publication in Military Review
2nd Place $750 and consideration for publication in Military Review
3rd Place $500 and consideration for publication in Military Review

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