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Thom Shanker, a Pentagon correspondent for The New York Times, has served as a reporter in a variety of conflicts and has made numerous reporting trips to Iraq, embedded in corps, division, and down to small-unit levels. Major General Mark Hertling recently returned from his third tour of duty in Iraq (the first during Desert Storm, the second as a deputy commander in Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the third as commander of 1st Armored Division and Multinational Division-North).

After this most recent deployment, Hertling convened an after-action review conference in Garmisch, Germany, and invited Shanker to attend. During the conference, the two had an opportunity to continue their ongoing dialogue on military-media relations. Their conversation shows the relationship becoming increasingly complicated, as these two men from different professions debated the contentiousness—and the common ground—that exists between the military and the media during this time of conflict and expansive news coverage.

**Hertling:** I sure am glad your editors allowed you to attend this conference, given the economic pressures throughout your industry. It seems to me that these are exactly the kind of forums we need to help us understand each other, since we’re certainly going to have a working relationship whether we want to or not.

**Shanker:** About that. You know, it’s always seemed to me that the relationship between the military and the media is like a marriage. It’s a dysfunctional marriage at times—to be sure—but we stay together for the kids. For you, the Soldiers are your “children,” and you serve them as their commander. For me, my dependents are my readers—the citizens of this Nation who offer up ample portions of the national treasury and, even more valuable, their sons, daughters, siblings, and spouses for your missions. They deserve to know what is going on within the military and in the formulation of security policy, especially in a time of two wars.

**Hertling:** I’d agree—to a degree. You certainly have the requirement, both from your professional ethic and what’s in our Constitution regarding freedom of the press, to inform our citizens. The public has the right to know what’s going on as the military fights and executes policy. But I’d also suggest that the military’s responsibility is to more than the servicemen.
and women we lead... We also have the requirement to protect and defend our Constitution and our Nation’s ideals and values. That’s in our oath, and it’s an important facet of who we are and how we act. So while we want Americans to be informed on what’s going on, we’re also focused on them understanding the intricacies of our “fights.” What we do—and how it is perceived—is so important to our Nation. For that reason, it’s also important to our young lieutenants and sergeants who are doing the tough work on the ground... and those are the ones that also sometimes deal with the media. We’re all excessively passionate about how we are perceived by those we serve—especially when lives are on the line. Sometimes that blinds us. But mostly, we have a desire to ensure when journalists report what we’re doing, they get the intricacies right for the American people.

And there’s an even greater challenge today, because what is reported in an American newspaper or what airs on CNN or Fox will often find its way into the media in other parts of the world. More impetus to get it “right” for the audience, because who we are and how we are viewed by our adversaries is also important.

Oh, and as for the dysfunctional marriage analogy... it certainly sometimes feels that way. But could it be our relationship becomes dysfunctional due to a lack of trust and communication?

Shanker: Could be. There is an old line you’ve heard before: Truth is the first casualty of war. But in the information age, the first casualty of war is trust—trust between those who fight the wars and those whose job it is to report them. Military officers have to build trust now, in any way possible across a variety of venues for interaction, so that when things go bad, as they always do, that reservoir of trust is there to explain and understand. And remember, critical assessments are not a sign of disrespect.

There is another old line for reporters: You go off to cover war, but it covers you. I would simply add to that: You can never, ever completely wash it off. And you spoke about career military personnel being passionate—that applies to those in both our professions. But you know that.

Hertling: Your point about building trust is spot on... all the time. I’ve found that to be at the heart of what makes us function so well as teams within our military. Units won’t get anything done without mutual trust. But journalists have just as much responsibility in building that trust with the military. Unfortunately, all of us wearing the uniform have been “burned” by a report or a reporter at one time or another and that certainly influences any relationship.

I’ve seen us treat reporters like our own... for short periods of time, when they’re embedded or when we establish a personal relationship and ensure they have access. But in the military, we build trust from being with people, from sharing the same kind of environment, and from having the same kinds of values... all the time. We give journalists complete access and openness only when we know that trust exists. It’s tough to build trust—and give the continuous information that allows the “critical assessment” that you mentioned—when reporters are constantly moving in and out of our area, or when we have to train those to see what they are looking at who have never been in a war zone before. And it’s harder to rebuild trust once it’s been lost with an individual. There were times in Iraq when I had journalists who were there for months or even years and who truly understood what was happening... but there were other journalists who were continuously coming in and out of theater thinking they were experts; or worse, there were those who were there for the first time who decided they already knew more than they did. And there were some that just felt they had to make an immediate impression on the editors or bureau
chief with the “whatta story.” Now, none of these journalists are bad people—and we certainly have the same kind of personalities in the military—but when they wield a pen or a video camera they have a mouthpiece that can negatively affect—in a short period—things that have taken months to turn positive. In complex counterinsurgency environments, this can be catastrophic. That’s what some of our younger officers and service members sometimes see when they deal with the media.

And by the way, we have old adages, too. I always try and remember the one that says a person is usually at a disadvantage when he or she disagrees with someone who buys ink by the barrel.

Shanker: I want to drill down on the point you made regarding embeds. For the war in Iraq, we’d both agree, embeds were a success. Since the end of the draft, newsrooms were no longer filled with veterans of military service. Our cultures were deeply divided. But now, hundreds if not thousands of reporters are salted across the media landscape who have shared tents, MREs—and battlefield risks—with your troops. Understanding on both sides increased.

But Iraq also was likely the end of the road for large-scale embeds. It is quite possible that the successful program for Iraq was a one-off deal. It was a large ground campaign that provided numerous opportunities for embedded media. As we look to possible contingencies for the future, those embed opportunities seem to be to be pretty scarce: North Korea? Taiwan Straits? Upheaval in Pakistan? Countering Iran’s nuclear ambitions? We may not be marching off to war together next time.

Hertling: I’m not sure. Since embeds came to be, I’ve come to know literally hundreds of reporters. And I’ve mentally placed them in several categories on my own “trust spectrum”: There are those I’d want with me when the going gets tough and complicated because they are true professionals who do the kind of critical analysis and quality reporting you talked about earlier. But there are also those who are predisposed to a certain view and who don’t apply the kind of rigor we in the military think they need to truly and properly inform the American public. And there are a few that just flat-out have an agenda because they want to make a name for themselves or they want to please their editors or bureau chiefs with the least amount of work and the most amount of bombast possible. All professions have these kinds of personalities and characters, but journalists are so critical because of their ability to influence the public.

I know that whatever kind of conflict I’m involved with “next time,” I’ll want an embed or two with me because of the demands associated with the information dynamic. I truly believe—as you do—that the American people have the right to know what we’re doing.

Shanker: Regardless of the fire next time, I’m sure you’ll agree that the military must understand that it has surrendered its historic monopoly over control of the battle space.

For the future, wherever you operate, reporters will probably be there first. American reporters were traveling with Northern Alliance fighters in Afghanistan before the first special forces ODA [operational detachment-alpha, or “A-team”] put boots on the ground; Baghdad was swarming with press before the first J-DAMs and cruise missiles found their targets.

And you have surrendered your monopoly over communications from the battle space, too. As recently as Vietnam, reporters had to return to Saigon to file. When I was first posted to Moscow in the mid-1980s, the Soviet customs authority—read that as KGB—confiscated my computer modem as an “encryption device,” and I was forced to file by punching telex tape that could be intercepted and read by Soviet intelligence. By the time I got to Bosnia in 1992, I could file from the middle of an artillery duel in Tuzla by satellite, although the transmitter was about the size of a suitcase. Today—in Iraq and...
Afghanistan—TV reporters file sparkling video and use old-fashioned Gutenberg print type; reporters have satellite Internet providers smaller than a laptop, real-time, no censorship.

Hertling: All that’s true. We’re sharing the area of operation with journalists, non-governmental officials, interagency officials, and a host of others. And my Soldiers and I have been amazed at reporters’ ability to file quickly from the most austere conditions. But if I were a reporter wanting to give the American public information about military activities, I would at least want it informed by those who are considered experts in the field…the military. The reporters you mention who were in Baghdad, or those with the Northern Alliance, certainly knew their piece of the environment, but they probably only knew a part of the story because of their sources. They may not have known the tactical plans or operational context or the strategic outcomes that the executors were attempting to achieve. Being with a 12-man ODA team is pretty cool and heady, but it doesn’t qualify an assessment on the operational end state.

For example, I often had to field questions from reporters who had been with a squad in Baquba who used their limited experience in one part of my area to quiz me on battalion operations in Mosul, a radically different part of our area. It’s tough judging the whole from a part. And again, what they might be reporting to the American people will soon end up on foreign websites, and will influence our adversaries. That’s where the line between public affairs and information operations becomes a bit blurry.

Shanker: We could spend all day debating the virtual battle space and the marketplace of ideas. But when it comes to the debate over how to divide responsibility between public affairs and information operations, the press has not been as precise as it should in helping our readers understand those differences, as well as the differences in the tools of battlefield deception and tactical psychological operations versus strategic communications.

But I know one thing for certain: When I hear that the military assesses its theater communications strategies in units called “strategic effects,” I know something may not be right. This is not a military occupational specialty, like artillery.

You can’t fire a message downrange and measure its effects against your enemy the way you conduct bomb-damage assessment. Ideas are not electrons that you can positively charge, and then measure the illuminating effect. I have sat with strategic effects officers who counted the number of so-called “positive” stories they have placed in Iraqi media as if that tally meant anything in the real world where content is suspect—and the supplier of that content even more so.

I spent five years in Moscow—although my wife marked the time as five winters—and so I have learned how citizens of a dictatorship, or of a former dictatorship like in Iraq today, distrust their local media. These tallies of so-called “positive” stories in Iraq are meaningless in the real world.

The bottom line: You can’t spread democratic values through means that are undemocratic. And if there are cases where, perhaps, such propaganda or deception is required to reach a specific tactical end endorsed by senior leaders, then it should be done by those people who operate under Title 50—and not those in uniform who operate under Title 10. In a world linked by Internet and satellite TV, tactical information operations downrange, even in enemy territory, will play to folks in Peoria in a few hours.

Hertling: I admit, we’re wrestling with all this…how to place metrics on strategic effects. We’re finding it’s like nailing Jello to a wall. There are some studies done that prove there is no silver bullet in this arena, and the quantification of “messaging” is certainly not a refined science. But the military is a culture where metrics are important, and there are some well-meaning individuals in our ranks who need a little more experience in strategic communication. Fact is—and we in the military need to focus on this critical point—while information and public affairs are still called “non-lethal fires,” we usually can’t ensure they have timely or reliable effects.

You know, the chairman of the joint chiefs recently said that information is the critical realm
of the future battlefield. Military leaders try to control all aspects of every fight, but the fact is, a message-centric battlefield is hardly manageable because it changes and the messages that are sent are so unreliable to read in the receiver.

But this gets back to the point about our relationship, because as we—military and media—interact, our responsibility remains giving the most informed, best analyzed, and factual information to the public. That’s tough for us, because our profession has so many complications.

What kind of “fixes” do you think are appropriate to help our relationship improve and help our marriage get beyond dysfunctional?

Shanker: I can offer some rules of the road for this military-media relationship. Maximum disclosure with minimum delay. When a question is asked, there are only three allowable answers: the truth, “I know but I can’t tell you due to classification,” and “I don’t know, but let me see what I can find out.” If you are in the public affairs community, do not ever lie. Or, as a very smart captain once told me: Once something bad has happened, you can never change that. All you have control over is how the public learns about it.

Ever since the invasion of Iraq, senior officers like to speak of “the speed of war.” And that speed is only increasing. Yet your system for reporting information up the chain of command for release to the media is shackled by the rusty chains of the industrial age. I have been with your forces in contact with the enemy. I know that when you cover a war it covers you, and completely, and so I cannot expect a new directive for a squad leader to break contact just to file a press release. And I know to distrust first reports.

Even so, when it takes 8, 12, 16, or 20 hours for the military command or the Pentagon to comment—perhaps clarify, perhaps correct—reports from downrange on an incident that was broadcast live over satellite TV—well, you have surrendered several news cycles before your version of events is laid before the unblinking judgment of public opinion. That time can never be recovered. Those first impressions may never change. The adversary responds faster with its statements, whether truth or falsehood. Absent your timely response—you lose.

Hertling: You raise some interesting points. I’ll take a few for comment.

First, you’ve only given me three allowable answers for any question, but I would contend there needs to be many, many more. I certainly agree with you on always telling the truth, but often the truth is extremely complicated and reporters are usually looking for quick and easy answers that can be either written succinctly or pushed into a video sound bite. In war—as old Carl Clausewitz said—even the simplest things are difficult. Those difficulties are not always understood immediately, and even if they are, they are hard to explain. If a reporter is willing to spend the time and discuss the implications of an event, most of us in the military are willing to expand on the story . . . if we have time. In combat, time is a scarce resource.

Along with this, I’ve seen an inherent lack of trust when senior military leaders attempt to provide answers to the press; I always get the impression you think we’re trying to “spin” you. I know that’s sometimes the case, but I also know that many reporters are always looking for the “gotcha” moment when they can spin a story to cause more
conflict. So speaking the truth—without all its complications—is sometimes something a soldier doesn’t have time for, but reporters on deadline often discount.

Second, the military maxim of “never believe a first report” is one that—with age and experience—I put increasing stock in. Military commanders with any savvy will always allow even the most seemingly disastrous event to percolate . . . because we know from experience that there is usually something more to the report. But the reporters seem to have a need for instantaneous gratification . . . especially in this age of the 24/7 news cycle. So how do we fix this problem? Earned trust—on both sides—may be the only solution.

You are absolutely right on the increasing ferocity and tempo of combat . . . the “speed of war” as our special operations brothers say. But you make a good point in that “first impressions never change.” To you, that means it’s imperative to get the first report out as fast as possible. To us, that means getting whatever report to the press as accurate and informative as possible. Truthfully, I’ve been in organizations that have taken an inordinately long time to get our press releases out, and on several occasions it hurt the cause and frustrated me as a commander. But no matter how hard we try, I don’t ever think we will get those releases to you as fast as you would like them. We need to continue to address this in our relationship.

Finally, our adversaries do often get information to the press, the TV, the Internet faster than we do. That’s because we have an enemy that is preplanning and entrapping, not “responding.” Information is the current coin of the realm in the extremist war we’re fighting, and much of the information our enemies give is designed before the event occurs, as part of an information campaign. But as you know, there’s a difference between info ops and public affairs. We have to be truthful when we talk to the press; our enemies do not.

Shanker: I know that men and women in uniform justifiably rankle when media describe the armed services as a monolith, as if there is some “capital M” military. Of course, there are different branches and, within each, different occupational specialties and so on. So tell me, please: Why do so many in the military criticize my profession as if there is a news monolith, a “capital M” media?

We are different. There is the big-time, mainstream media with vast resources to cover this building, to maintain large staffs in such places as Baghdad and Kabul, and to publish numerous stories every day on those missions. There are small-town outlets that depend on the wire services for their information from the front. Some reporters have studied the military, some have not. TV has different needs. There is foreign media, and divided again between reporters from allies and those from more, shall we say, hostile capitals. Then there are the blogs, where increasingly persuasive reporters show up for work at their kitchen tables in the standard uniform: T-shirt and boxer shorts.

Just as you study an adversary, you must tell your subordinates in the field that they must striving to understand how different are the reporters in contact with you. And just as you conduct disciplined planning for possible contingencies, with branches and sequels for potential outcomes, you are not completing the planning process without doing the same for your media engagement.

Hertling: As I became more experienced with the media, this is the one area that I realized needs Ph.D.-level skills. Not all reporters—or outlets—are created equal, and not all of you want the same kind of care and feeding. I didn’t learn that until I was a brigadier general, as prior to that I was lumping all of you into one amorphous group. Our
younger leaders are learning these kinds of intricacies in combat earlier . . . placing the right type of media at the right places to get the right access at the right time. But our young lieutenants or sergeants who haven’t yet learned the difference between an AP stringer and a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist are the same as some of the cub reporters that have come into my ops centers who don’t know the difference between a tank and an artillery piece. We can all take some friendly advice from the other side, but this is sometimes as difficult as laser brain surgery to folks on your side and mine.

For example, even as an older brigadier general, I had an epiphany during a battle in 2003 in Iraq. We had a very complicated operation which needed finesse, but we also needed to send a message to the enemy that we would be unrelenting and lethal. We had a few options as to where we wanted to locate and embed the dozens of media that we shared information with. Should they go with a unit that was doing a tank thunder run, or with an infantry unit that would see some tense negotiations and nuanced battlefield operations. Our final decision? Place the TV journalists with the units that would be getting the exciting film footage with tough combat, and place the print journalist (one from your paper) with the unit that would require the deeper analysis. It was masterful, everyone was initially happy as they pleased their editors and bureau chiefs, and we looked smarter than we were! But even that changed when the reports were filed, and each journalist thought the other side of the grass was greener and wanted us to switch them to their competitors’ locations.

Shanker: Newspapers, television, and radio remain your most vital means of remaining connected to the rest of American society. This is especially important because the default mode of our democracy is peace, and it is hard to keep a nation on war footing. Constant hostilities are not part of our national DNA, and for that we should be proud. But I know that many of you feel uncomfortable with the bumper sticker that America is a nation at war—while it’s really just a military at war, along with the intelligence community. Okay. That’s on the home front. And downrange, reporters are as much a part of the battlefield as weather and terrain. You would never abandon the battlefield because of inclement weather. You would never surrender to difficult terrain. So why on earth would you choose not to engage with us?

I am a reporter. I look for narratives that will attract readers and inform them. If a military officer talks to reporters, I can’t guarantee your story will be told the way you want it. But if you don’t speak with reporters, I can guarantee your side of the story may not be told at all. Or it may be told by others who spend little time trying to understand what you do and cannot appreciate your interests at all.

Hertling: You got me on all these points! As a senior commander, I’ve learned how important it is to establish relationships, forge the trust, and allow access (when appropriate and earned!) with those of the journalistic profession.

But while you’re asking us to do all these things, there are a few things reporters can do, too. The military prides itself on its schools and training facilities. We continuously polish our skills, and self-critique our actions, even to the point of “scab-picking” as we try to get better. And we define ourselves by our code of ethics and our values. Professionals are defined by these things. In my discussions with several journalists, they all find fault with editors, chiefs, and fellow reporters for not policing themselves and improving. Journalists need time to train, expand their professional view, self-critique, and develop a precise code of ethics. It works for the professional military, for lawyers, for doctors, and for the ministry. It seems it might also work for members of the fourth estate.

Shanker: One final thought from my side. Prior to the Iraq invasion, I was at Fort Benning and spoke with Lieutenant General Hal Moore, who commanded the first major ground engagement in...
Vietnam, the battle at Ia Drang in November 1965. His book became a movie: *We Were Soldiers Once... and Young*. He had mutually beneficial relationships with correspondents in a war for which that was not the norm. I asked his secret.

General Moore said: “I told reporters ‘Don’t get in the way. And don’t give up my plans.’ And I told my troops, ‘Talk from your level—don’t speak for the highers. And tell the truth.’” He knew that he was the most important public affairs officer in the entire unit. He sets commander’s intent, from the top.

**Hertling:** Good advice. General Moore also had the distinct advantage of having Joe Galloway as his “marriage partner.” I tell all my subordinate commanders that they are their unit’s public affairs officer. Getting accurate information to the people who are watching is a critical part of our 21st-century battlefield dynamics, and that’s why our relationships with the press need to be strong.

**Shanker:** As I said at the beginning: The military-media relationship is like a marriage. But perhaps my awful metaphor is out of order. It is most important of all for us to remain engaged. *MR*

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WITH LESS THAN one half of one percent of the U.S. population in
the Armed Forces, it is not surprising that many Americans know little
about their military or the sacrifices military members and their families make
for the Nation. The professional military is often viewed as a breed apart, a
closed hierarchal organization resembling a monastic order. Indeed, some
scholars have identified not just a cloister wall, but a growing chasm between
the military and American society as a whole. Meanwhile, the necessity for
operations security and an institutional penchant for controlling information
flow do little to bridge gaps or break down walls. Recent incidents ranging
from the Jessica Lynch saga to the Abu Ghraib scandal indicate just how
vulnerable that flow is to miscalculation and mismanagement. Whatever the
reason or rationale, impairments to information dissemination can easily
damage the Army’s reputation and estrange the American public from one
of its most trusted institutions. Since neither of these developments bodes
well for the future of the U.S. Army, “job one” in the communications arena
should be to keep Americans informed and connected with their Armed Forces. For this and other reasons, the Army must embrace a “culture of engagement” that actively seeks to tear down barriers and build sustainable relationships with the American public.

The Evolution of Media-Military Relations

The U.S. military and the primary instrument for engagement, the media,
have been joined at the hip in an up-and-down relationship that dates at

PHOTO: CPT Andrew Schoenmaker, with the 5th Marine Regiment, talks with leaders at a meeting in the Nawa

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel Shawn Stroud, U.S. Army; and Mr. Anton Menning
least to the first half of the 19th century. Since that time, the military-media relationship has moved through four distinct periods: censorship, openness, controlled access, and cooperation. As we peer into a less than a certain future, the changing contemporary mediascape and its significance in an era of “persistent conflict” demand that the military embrace a fifth period: “engagement.”

The first modern media coverage of an American conflict occurred during the Mexican War (1846–1848). The advent of a new technology—the telegraph—made communication near instantaneous and according to at least one scholar, enabled reporters to scoop the president. Little more than a decade later, during the Civil War, widespread complaints over violation of what we now call operational security surfaced. Consequently, War Secretary Edwin Stanton, “seized newspapers that were too liberal with military information, while manipulating others into publishing false reports.”

The conflict also saw various forms of military censorship, a mainstay for dealing with the media that would persist for the next century.

During the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Navy censored cable communiqués in an effort to maintain operational security. Restrictions became more draconian during World War I. The Espionage Act, adopted in 1917, “prohibited the publication of any information that could even remotely be considered to aid the enemy.” A year later, the Sedition Act made criticism of the war itself illegal. These two acts ushered in an era of prior restraint that imposed broad limits on how journalists could report during times of war. Two legal cases, Schenk v. U.S. and Near v. Minnesota, “recognized national security interests as justification for prior restraint.”

Media docility probably hit its zenith during World War II. Journalists voluntarily accepted censorship and accreditation rules in return for access to the battlefield. The price for access was high—sanitized reporting meant little or no bad news, so items about setbacks such as the failed raid on Dieppe rarely made the headlines. As Philip Knightly has pointed out, “It wasn’t good journalism,” he [the correspondent] said. “It wasn’t journalism at all.”

The forced harmony rooted in media docility began to break down during the Korean War, and then simply evaporated during the Vietnam War. Initially, the Korean conflict featured no censorship. However, reporters themselves volunteered for censorship, fearing they might inadvertently compromise operational security. By the end of the conflict, the military-media relationship soured, setting the stage for outright mutual antagonism in Vietnam, a decade later.

In contrast with Korea and World War II, American involvement in Vietnam grew gradually, and no one initially saw the need to muzzle the press. Thanks in part to slow entanglement, media coverage of the war was characterized by an openness perhaps unparalleled in earlier conflicts. As the historian Douglas Porch has observed, “Journalists were allowed practically unrestricted access, accompanying units and freely filing stories.” Journalists were no longer accustomed to forced-feeding, and they soon grew skeptical of exaggerated claims for American military success. Against this backdrop, General William Westmoreland added to already suspect expectations during a public relations tour in late 1967 when he famously spoke about light at the end of the tunnel. The Tet offensive the following year shattered the illusion that victory was just around the corner.
According to a 2004 Rand report, *Reporters on the Battlefield*, “Tet clearly exposed the falsehood of administration claims and pushed many reporters from skepticism to outright mistrust of the military.” Beyond the immediate fallout, mutual recriminations and mutual distrust between the media and the military left a lasting impression on the way the military perceived its relationship with the media.

As a result, the Pentagon’s treatment of the media during the 1980s sought to limit its access and to employ a press pool system to control the message. Thus, during the Gulf War in 1990–1991, with the exception of the U.S. Marine Corps, very few media embedded with military units. In fact, some of the most crucial battles of the entire war were almost lost to history because there was no press coverage.

After several humanitarian missions went awry in the 1990s, the military decided it needed a better way to relate to the media. Operations in Somalia and Haiti witnessed greater latitude for media coverage, but true cooperation did not become the dominant leitmotif until the Balkan intervention at the end of the millennium and the subsequent onset of the War on Terrorism. Operation Iraqi Freedom witnessed the wholesale adoption of media embeds. This departure from previous practice stemmed in large part from the realization that the advent of the new media had made controlling access to the battlefield almost impossible. However, there were also other forces at work, as is evident in the assertions of a former U.S. Army officer about the goals of the embed program:

> We wanted to neutralize the disinformation efforts of our adversaries. We wanted to build and maintain support for U.S. policy as well as the global war on terrorism. We wanted to take offensive action to achieve information dominance. We wanted to be able to demonstrate the professionalism of the U.S. military. And we wanted to build and maintain support, of course, for the war fighter out there on the ground.

If sheer numbers indicate success, then the embed program more than fulfilled expectations. More than 700 members of the media embedded with combat units during the initial drive to topple Saddam Hussein.

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**The New Mediascape: Potentially Chaotic but Overflowing with Opportunity**

Much as the telegraph revolutionized the speed of communication, recent technological advancements have engendered their own revolution—ubiquity. The media are nearly everywhere in today’s modern information environment. Rapidity of transmission remains important, but accessibility and variety of means for distribution have emerged as characteristics with which to reckon. The impact of these and related developments means that absolute control over access to real and metaphorical battlefields is now impractical, if not nearly impossible. An individual with a satellite uplink and computer can instantly transmit images and words around the world. Consider, for example, the role new media played in protests over the recent Iranian elections. Traditional media were nearly shut out. However, social media, or “Web 2.0,” became an organizational enabler and an important vehicle for dissemination of protestors’ messages around the world. The blunt fact is that social networking sites have created virtual communities larger in membership than the population of many countries. If for no other reason, the inherent dynamism in the contemporary media environment demands the Army rethink its media strategy to foster a culture of engagement.

Consider only a few recent changes to the mediascape. In 2008 alone, the top 50 Internet news sites recorded a 27 percent jump in visitors. During the last two years, newspaper advertising revenues have fallen 23 percent. As major traditional newspapers like the Rocky Mountain News and the Seattle Post-Intelligencer fold their tents, and as the *Detroit Free Press* limits delivery to three days per week, other hybrid types of reporting are emerging. For example, the NBC television network has created a position called “digital correspondent” that features a young journalist who “[combines] video, photographs and blogs to tell stories more completely...
This style of reporting enables a single correspondent to report a story across multiple platforms with little of the production costs historically associated with such endeavors. Just as the craft itself continues to evolve, so does the type of stories that appear to merit coverage. In 2007, Iraq War coverage dominated the headlines in both print and broadcast venues. During much of 2008, however, a hotly contested U.S. political race and an international economic meltdown eclipsed Iraq coverage by 75 percent in comparison with the previous year. The debate over war policy and strategy in the news declined from eight percent of the so-called “news hole” in 2007 to just one percent in 2008. As more and more Americans lost their jobs and as the government bailed out both the financial sector and the ailing domestic auto industry, coverage of Iraq became the proverbial “hard sell.” Although important in itself, the burgeoning economic crisis decisively diminished other coverage that was also serious on its own merits: the military’s need to tell its own story in Iraq and elsewhere during a time when the nation was at war.

Even as the type of dominant news stories changed in 2008, “durability,” a measure of the staying power for particular news stories, did not. Throughout 2008, the durability index continued to display the “one-week wonder” effect. For example, both Russia’s invasion of Georgia and the whiff of scandal surrounding New York Governor Eliot Spitzer garnered about 25 percent of the news hole during a single week in late summer. In the weeks immediately following breaking headlines, coverage for each story declined precipitously.

For the military, this phenomenon is a challenge and an opportunity. Although coverage of ongoing conflicts may not persist, bad news stories seem to display less than traditional staying power. It appears plausible to argue, therefore, that military engagement in the new media sphere, where control of information after dissemination remains almost impossible, now involves less risk. That is, at least for the present, it seems less likely that a particular event of a less than positive nature will trigger a lasting scandal or backlash against the military, particularly in the fast-changing new media world. The same fast pace of change seems inexorably to give rise to fragmentation, whether in coverage, durability, audience, or attention span. This characteristic of the new media sphere garners additional reinforcement from the rise of citizen journalism. Now, virtually anyone with access to the Internet and a cell phone can make an impact on the news cycle. An acute observer of the phenomenon, Dan Gillmore, has written that grassroots media is part of a “formidable truth squad.” In the contemporary media environment, Gilmore holds that “information no longer leaks, it gushes through firewalls and other barriers... what gushes can take on a life of its own, even if it’s not true.” Recent experiences indicate that this assertion, made in 2004, perhaps retains even greater validity today.

New means and a shifting landscape argue that the Army can no longer stand pat or stand still in the face of rapid change within the media realm. For the first time in history, we are witnessing the onset of a truly democratic media permitting nearly anyone to publish nearly anything with sometimes profound results. To contend with this phenomenon, the Army must get beyond “business as usual” to embrace a culture of engagement. At the same time, however, there is the realization that novel things rarely come without requirements. This culture comes with its own emphases and tenets.

**Foundations of a Culture of Engagement**

Although Army doctrine does not define “culture of engagement,” the phrase frequently appears in business and human resource models to describe productive working relationships among employees, corporate leaders, and stakeholders. In the U.S. Army context, the same kinds of relationships find their origins in a common set of beliefs, behaviors, and values, including a sense of devotion to the importance of sharing the Army experience with both the public and the media. The present argument holds that the Army’s version of a “culture of engagement” must bear certain hallmarks to fulfill its promise. To be effective, the culture must be proactive, innovative, adaptive, leader driven, and sustainable.

...the Army must get beyond “business as usual” to embrace a culture of engagement
**Proactive.** To be proactive means to seize the initiative, to be agile in engaging with the media. Being proactive means anticipating news stories and addressing information requirements associated with stories by identifying the relevance of one’s own organization to a given news story. The capacity to be proactive enables leaders to “get out front,” to communicate their perspectives and experiences on newsworthy topics. To retain the initiative, leaders must build strong working relationships for outreach, beginning with the local media and extending to international outlets. The intent is to establish trust, confidence, and mutual understanding.

A good case in point occurred in May 2008, when a Soldier assigned to Multi-National Corps-Iraq used a Koran for target practice at a range west of Baghdad. Recognizing the potential strategic impact of this Soldier’s actions on coalition efforts in Iraq, senior leaders seized the initiative by consciously choosing to “go public” with the incident. Major General Jeffrey Hammond wasted little time in meeting with community leaders and issuing a formal apology. His message was forthright: “I come before you here seeking your forgiveness. In the most humble manner I look in your eyes today and I say please forgive me and my Soldiers.”

This announcement, accompanied by a written apology from the Soldier, received broad media coverage. Other senior leaders met with various media outlets, while General Hammond’s public affairs staff worked to keep both the Iraqi leadership and the media informed of the ensuing investigation and command actions.

Consider another example. During January 2007, Multi-National Corps-Iraq recognized a gross imbalance in reporting on Iraq between major Arabic television networks and mostly Western-based news outlets. Two major Arab news stations, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, had only rudimentary reporting capacities in Iraq. Therefore, the U.S. military resolved to take the story to the consumer. The U.S. Central Command and Arabic media outreach teams in Dubai and Qatar began working with representatives from Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya to provide updates on conditions in Iraq and to give voice to the United States and coalition concerns. Joint studio sessions became fruitful opportunities for mutual learning and the fostering of stronger working relationships. In turn, these relationships with Arab media executives led to later strategic opportunities for live satellite broadcasts of critical events.

There are many ways to encourage a proactive mind-set at the installation and tactical levels. One of the more effective techniques is the frequent hosting of media roundtables or luncheons with local press, editors, producers, bloggers, commanders, and leaders. These events afford opportunities for relaxed information sharing, and such recurring informal contacts go far in building trust and mutual understanding between the media and organizational leadership. The same kind of initiatives can provide commanders with a better understanding of and insight into the media during times of crisis. For its part, the media benefits from the opportunity to gain additional perspective and appreciation for the demands of leadership and the rigors of military operations.

Responsiveness is another important element within a proactive posture. Both the competitive nature of the media business and the insatiable demand for news guarantee an incessant media search for fresh stories. Yesterday’s news is proverbially today’s fish wrapper. Therefore, Army leaders must ensure that appropriate personnel within their organizations are at least abreast of the news curve, while remaining sensitive and responsive to the fast-breaking requirements of media organizations. To be responsive also means to remain in instant readiness to counter inaccurate news stories or misinformation. Whatever the requirement, responsiveness mandates that the Army provide timely and transparent information proactively. All too often, the most common media complaint is lack of response from military leaders and public affairs professionals.

At the local level, responsiveness is especially important. Many local media outlets operate on limited budgets and resources. If an unfolding news story involves local installations, we must inform the local media, even if being proactive requires frequent updates before all the facts are available. Responsiveness coupled with transparency ensures that media outlets receive as much information as possible from military leaders and public affairs professionals.
possible, as rapidly as possible, with sufficient context to make sense of a developing story. Context facilitates accuracy and balance.

**Innovative.** To be innovative means to exercise ingenuity in seeking new and more effective ways to communicate. However, the ability to innovate relies on more than just raw creative thinking. To innovate requires an understanding of the characteristics and capabilities of the new media, along with an understanding of the pace of change. The sheer ubiquity of the new media affords near-boundless opportunities for the Army to share its story with a wide range of publics. Like everyone else in this new world, the military now has the ability to generate its own content. As former Army Secretary Pete Geren once pointedly noted, “We have more reach than NBC had 20 years ago.”

Such potential notwithstanding, some institutions shun the innovative promise inherent in the Internet and Web 2.0. Various versions of institutional rigidity often confront local commanders in pursuit of Web-based initiatives with a mind-boggling web of restrictions, including information security precautions, overly prescriptive organizational regulations and policies, and stifling home-grown information management and information assurance directives. Overly restrictive policies can hamper the best efforts at innovation and creativity within garrisons and in the field.

A prime example of self-defeating restrictiveness was Multi-National Corps-Iraq’s battle to employ YouTube. In early February 2007, two young civilian employees floated the idea of building a YouTube channel to display video footage of coalition forces in Iraq. Recognizing the immense potential for this powerful video sharing tool, the command immediately authorized measures to build an MNF-I channel. Unfortunately, network restrictions prohibited even senior leaders from accessing YouTube on DOD-based computer systems. Meanwhile, extremist groups in Iraq were routinely using YouTube to post disinformation, propaganda, and graphic images of attacks against civilians and coalition forces. Nonetheless, Multi-National Corps-Iraq senior leaders and communication specialists could neither access the extremist videos nor air the coalition’s own story.

Exceptions to policy and interventions at the highest levels finally yielded a YouTube channel. The site was activated on 7 March 2007, and within the first 10 days of operation, it logged more than 15,000 channel views and surpassed 39,000 total views. The channel now has more than 8,000 subscribers with nearly 1,000 videos, all the while counting more than half-a-million channel views. A whole audience lay in waiting, but it might have lain there forever had it not been for the persistence of leaders and their willingness to entertain “work-arounds” and technological solutions to the obstacles created by blind adherence to requirements for network security.

Yet, innovation is more than blowing holes through obstacles and embracing new media and various Web 2.0 platforms. Innovation also means finding new ways to employ more traditional assets in communicating with members of the media or other audiences. For example, installation commanders and local television news producers constantly wrestle with the challenge of covering on-site activities with assets limited by location, time, or resources. Innovators might mitigate some shortfalls with television studios equipped to support satellite-capable access through the Digital Video and Imagery Distribution System. This broadcast option comes as a public service.
from Third Army/U.S. Army Component of U.S. Central Command on behalf of the Department of the Army.29 With the Digital Video and Imagery Distribution System, leaders might post videos of newsworthy events or use the system as a hub for live satellite broadcast and link ups with both local and international news outlets.

Adaptive. Modern media thrive in a fast-evolving, instantaneous, and interconnected information environment that presents enormous challenges to rigid and inflexible organizations. The key to success in this environment is adaptability, the ability to adjust to changing circumstances on the run. If an organization is agile and adaptive, it has the capability to avail itself of the myriad opportunities the Internet affords to media organizations and bloggers. These opportunities constitute leverage for engaging ever broader audiences.

Several years ago, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center recognized the importance of engaging the blogosphere for both organizational outreach and direct educational purposes. The Combined Arms Center launched one of the Army’s first blogs on a “mil” domain in mid-2008, even though the center was neither equipped nor manned for this effort. It hired a new media strategist—a position requiring a Web-savvy individual who could also write, moderate, and market the blog site. Realizing new media is synonymous with “now” media, the center adapted its policy for moderating all comments prior to posting. In addition, the Combined Arms Center empowered its subordinate organizations to start and manage their own blogs. Without adaptation in blog policy and management, little would have been possible. With an emphasis on adaptation, however, the Combined Arms Center accorded blog users and subordinate organizations a tremendous amount of freedom, and it also assumed risk.

In retrospect, the rewards appear to have justified the risk. Various adaptive decisions facilitated rapid postings for blog users and leaders, increased blog participation, and stimulated greater intellectual exchange among virtually all participants. Today, the Combined Arms Center manages more than 40 different blogs ranging from a student blog to a blog dedicated to counterinsurgency and security force assistance. The site attracts more than 120,000 visitors a month. The website has also grown in viewership from 98,000 monthly in June 2008 to more than 300,000 recently. The redesigned website now showcases video and provides links to other new media sites CAC utilizes.

Leader driven. Just as leaders the world over are responsible for imparting purpose, priorities, and objectives to their organizations, Army leaders must confront modern media realities by fostering a culture of engagement in their subordinates and commands. Without leadership to instill focus and function, no climate for constructive media engagement is likely to emerge and persist. Leadership is key, followed by dedicated resources, manpower, and time.

These assertions assume that leaders must first embrace the importance of the media and the role it plays in winning wars and keeping the American public informed.30 Of equal importance, these assertions take for granted the willingness of leaders to embrace an attitude that actively seeks opportunities to communicate an organization’s mission and its Soldiers’ stories. The culture of engagement is highly leader driven, but it always remains Soldier-centric. Some leaders might perceive active pursuit of the media as self-serving, but they should temper such perceptions with an understanding that a leader’s duty is to inform and educate the American public about its Army and the men and women who serve in it.

Leaders must also establish a culture that is transparent and welcoming to the media. Culture speaks volumes, especially with regard to the importance of open and timely communication with the media, regardless of the situation. Leaders must share their vision of desired outcomes from media engagements and understand communications strategies, both internal and external.
Leaders set the command climate by making themselves available to the media, especially during times of crisis. Leaders provide context and clarity during developing news stories. General Max Thurman, former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, reputedly once said, “When in charge, take charge.” This maxim applies to the “take-charge” attitude leaders must display when confronting crises or negative news stories. The media wants to hear directly from decisive organizational leadership, not a spokesperson.

**Sustainable.** The final significant hallmark for a culture of engagement is sustainability, perhaps the most overlooked and the most difficult characteristic for leaders to implement. To be sustainable means having the material prerequisites for staying power, the ability to persist.

Sustainability requires dedicated resources and manpower to build enduring capabilities to enable a culture of engagement. The various hallmarks or attributes of this culture, including the abilities to be proactive, innovative, and responsive, require hiring or committing a full-time work force to perform vital media functions. The subject matter expertise required for dealing with various forms of media, both traditional and Web-based, exceeds the knowledge of most public affairs officers and their staffs. Contractor positions can meet work force requirements for the near-term, but building an enduring capability requires authorizing permanent positions capable of institutional memory.

Contending with the modern media revolution is an integral part of the larger doctrinal picture concerning information. General Martin Dempsey, Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, has highlighted the importance of information: “I would like to see us adopt it as a war-fighting function as a Nation, or as a military, because it will cause us to resource it and to clarify its use in a way that we’re still blurring. We’re setting up firewalls, and we’re just not as agile as we need to be. And generally, those that use it well are probably violating some particular form of policy. So we’ve got to get after that.”

His comments, echoed by other senior Army leaders, underscore the necessity for building a sustainable capability for dealing with information, including older and newer media in the struggle for information superiority during an era of persistent conflict.

In the end, sustainability requires an entire organization’s support for a culture of engagement. Everyone within an organization must embrace a philosophy for openness and transparency. For the Army, officers and Soldiers must see themselves as important parts of the whole for implementing this culture. This culture begins with leader development for both uniformed personnel and civilians. The values and advantages inherent in a culture of engagement must permeate the workplace.

**Fulfilling the Nation’s Mission**

Dwight Eisenhower once remarked, “public opinion wins wars.” This statement is as true now as when he uttered it as Supreme Allied Commander Europe in 1944. America’s adversaries have proven adept at utilizing many mediums to convey their messages. Cumbersome regulations regarding the use of new media tools only hinder the Army’s ability to share its story with the American public and ultimately allow adversaries to fill the vacuum with their version of events. More than 20 years ago, the Army adopted the slogan, “Be all you can be.” As the Army adapts to a changing mediascape and embraces a “culture of engagement,” it will continue to be all it can be in the eyes of the Nation.
NOTES

15. Shepard, 11-12.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Dan Gillmore, *We the Media* (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media, 2004), XVI.
Until 14 August 2008, the American military’s Joint world was well on the road to formulating a doctrine called “effects-based operations” (EBO). However, the EBO effort’s trajectory was brought to a sudden abatement when Marine Corps General James N. Mattis, commander of Joint Forces Command, announced the untimely death of all “effects-based” terms of art. Effects-based operations had attempted to describe the practice of predicting effects in the physical and moral dimensions of war and the subsequent targeting to produce them. This “effects-based approach to operations” (EBAO) remains a NATO policy that focuses on the whole of government—a comprehensive interagency approach to operations. NATO’s EBAO does not evoke the same assumption sets that EBO does, but it does possess the same fundamental logic. The U.S. military has been training and practicing along these lines for some time, and substantially continues to do so.

The mind-set behind EBO persists in planning circles throughout the U.S. military, and the mind-set looms behind any effort to conduct U.S. whole-of-government operations as well. This approach, by whatever name, has little potential to accommodate important moral concerns that have proven to have strategic ramifications, and I therefore want to critique the effects-based perspective to drive more nails into its coffin.

The EBO mind-set fundamentally lacks any moral quality because it fails at the level of theory. The practitioners of effects-based thinking profess many assertions and defend their methods at the level of doctrine. But, while EBO advocates were busy writing its doctrine, they failed to pay attention to its theory. While their emphasis on systems thinking was well-intentioned, these systems zealots failed to pay attention to the philosophical nuances between mechanical and living systems. The presumed theory underlying the effects-based approach rests on several philosophical mistakes:

- Metaphysical errors relating to ontological assumptions and facts of existence.
● Epistemological errors relating to gaining knowledge and matters of mind.
● Logical errors in drawing conclusions from the evidence available.

The mind-set underlying EBAO has become, and remains, a strategic liability. It will be so, as long as faith in its theoretical foundations persists.

Doctrine can change by fiat, but it is the underlying conceptual milieu that matters here. We should expect mistakes as a result of a practice resting on a mistaken theory, for only by accident and not by design could anything good come out of it. My critique of effects-based thinking is thus based on its unreliability as a theory, and my argument will unfold at the level of theory, avoiding the politics of the quasi-doctrinal level of discourse. I want to carry out a dialogue on the academic front of reason and theory rather than the political front of decision makers at their headquarters and directorates. I will therefore be drawing upon the academic debate as it exists among the theorists (particularly that which is in print) rather than the political debate as it exists among decision makers (especially that which is in email traffic or on PowerPoint).

**Overcoming Aristotle:**

**Assumptions We Fight By**

Western perspectives are steeped in Aristotelian scientific and philosophical assumptions. The general idea of the effects-based approach has therefore perhaps always been looming in the recesses of the Western military practitioner’s consciousness. Its practice seems to have bloomed in Desert Storm, as the concept took root when the intellectual leaders of the Air Force began thinking and talking and writing about bombing in terms of what effects they wanted to achieve rather than simply what targets to service. Those roots have grown so deep and spread so far up to the present day that practitioners now take the concept for granted. The general concept helped to guide operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and it continues to do so.

Heavy focus on the idea of an effect naturally moved some people to think of the metaphysical correlate to an effect—that of a cause. So, they began to think of military operations as a chain of events, chains of cause and effect.

All planners and commanders had to do was to start with a desired effect and move backward through the chain of events, doing things to cause the effects to take place. The backward planning process lends itself perfectly to laying out an elaborate sequence of causes and effects so that the military can achieve what it desires at the end of the day, or week, or operation. Ironically, while we can give credit to leaders who recognize the vagaries of an effects-based approach and who even work to expunge the vestigial remnants of it in our doctrine, we still proceed to do strategy within this Aristotelian box when we start the discussion with “ends.”

**Sacred cows make the best hamburgers.** The Aristotelian box includes the uncritically accepted article of faith—which we take for granted—that revolves around reasoning about means and ends. The logic of this type of reasoning has burgeoned over the centuries (at an accelerating rate recently) in the form of “problem-solving” enshrined as...
a sacred principle. This mode of reasoning may be appropriate for the tangible realm of tactics: identifying objectives (ends) and developing plans (means) to reach those objectives. But when we leave the world of tactics and enter into the realm of strategy or the realm of operations (the realm of mediation between strategy and tactics), the problem-solving techniques embedded within the logic of means/ends reasoning quickly become dysfunctional. Strategy is not about problem-solving.

Problem-solving as a mode of action is appropriate when goals or objectives are simple and clear.\(^2\) Complex situations that strategists should be thinking about are anything but simple and clear, so strategists are making multiple errors when they reduce ontological complexity and then apply an inappropriate epistemological model (i.e., means/ends reasoning via problem-solving). Means/ends reasoning is laced with assumptions buried in an Aristotelian metaphysics naively wrapped around simplistic notions of cause and effect.

So, the first mistake that EBAO makes is a metaphysical mistake in the way it handles causation in ontological complexity. The mistake is simple to explain. Most philosophers think of cause and effect as being operative in the mechanical world of waves and particles that abide by the laws of physics. Accordingly, most philosophers of social science do not see causation as operative in the realm of human activity. Causation entails regularity in the form of laws, and laws possess causal features somewhere between minimal necessity and maximal sufficiency, any of which is too much to attribute to human action. On the other hand, most social scientists (including historians and political scientists) believe causation is operative in human affairs and simply take the idea for granted.

Philosophers of science consistently demonstrate that scientists are not aware of the deep structures of their practices, and philosophers of social science perform the same critiquing function. They consistently demonstrate that social scientists are not aware of their flawed assumptions. Consider, for example, the vast intellectual resources wasted on searching for the so-called root cause(s) of conflict. This difference in viewing the concept of causation in human action has perhaps always separated those who approach human activity with philosophical rigor from those who ostensibly approach it “scientifically.” Within the effects-based approach, the military is attempting to cause effects outside the realm of the physical world using assumptions borrowed from that realm. They try to bring about effects in the realm of human activity when causation is not the proper concept for dealing with human activity.

Many advocates of the effects-based approach have even attempted to make their so-called “scientific approach” appear to be philosophical by looking toward the philosophical literature on the logic of causation. They mistakenly believe that something as complex as human activity can be rendered and reduced and mutilated to fit the Procrustean bed of behaviorism, choking the mental realm into lifelessness with their chains of cause and effect. This theoretical perspective in EBAO advocates a spurious illusion of accuracy from a pseudo-scientific and a pseudo-philosophical posture. That illusion, much more often than not, is counterproductive for moral reasons I will soon get to.

**Action theory.** When dealing with human activity, a theory of action is better than an inherently flawed, categorically misplaced causal study. We should be turning toward action theory rather than causal theory. Action theory is not well-known outside of the disciplines of philosophy and cognitive science, but philosophers carved out a niche for it decades ago, largely in reaction to the behaviorist assumptions that pervaded the social sciences. To speak of behavior is important for many social scientific disciplines because behavior fits neatly into the language and concept of cause and effect. The deep assumption here is that people can be

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[Effects-based approach advocates] mistakenly believe that something as complex as human activity can be rendered and reduced...to fit the Procrustean bed of behaviorism...
caused to behave, and modifying behavior is simply a matter of adjusting input to get a different output. Action theory recognizes that the mental realm falls outside the physical realm of cause and effect. One simply cannot cause another person to act in a certain way: people act for reasons, not causes. 3

While some take reasons to be causes, reason explanations are categorically different from causal explanations. Action involves intention, which is a combination of beliefs and desires involving agency. Military theorists who talk of the enemy’s will have only concerned themselves with the desire part of intentionality and pay no attention to the belief part or how beliefs and desires relate to each other. The old behavioral black box disappears in action theory because the black box opens up.

Behaviorism reigned supreme for decades, and it became firmly entrenched in the military when social scientists took over the leadership business. However, in the university, behavioral science was slowly replaced by cognitive science over the last half-century. The military has simply not kept pace. While the language of behavior disappeared more and more from philosophical and cognitive science literature, that same language (along with its assumptions) remains alive throughout the military. The linguistic archeological evidence is abundant. Both West Point and the Air Force Academy have academic departments named “Behavioral Science and Leadership.”

Military and political leaders have long thought that they could cause people to act the way they wanted, bringing about desired results by breaking or shaping their will. The assumptions are built into the discourse of power dynamics founded in historically authoritarian social structures. In World War II, German leaders thought they could cause England to capitulate by bombing its population centers. French leaders thought they could cause terrorist attacks to stop during the Algerian war of liberation by finding and eliminating the terrorist cells. And the authors of the Project for a New American Century thought they could cause stability to take root in a region through a regime change operation in Iraq.

Positing a false chain of events made up of fabricated causes that will create “predictable” effects when that chain—in a metaphysical sense—does not exist, is a mistaken approach grounded in nothing more than wishful thinking. The realm of human activity operates outside the strictly physical chain of causes and effects. This perspective error describes the metaphysical (i.e., ontological) problem associated with EBAO, in that the approach posits a false reality, a state of affairs that simply does not exist and cannot be created as such. The military often finds itself stunned and bewildered that its force has not caused a strategic victory. Much of the mess we are in now grew precisely because of assumptions bound up in this effects-based approach, from the strategic through to the tactical level via operational art (if there is an operational level, it is an epistemic one, purely, despite the fact that we have layered our institutional hierarchies with such a level).

Shadows on the Wall

The second problem is about the nature of knowledge and is closely associated with the first: how we can know this chain of causes and effects. Where the first problem is a metaphysical one questioning ontological fact, the second is an epistemological one questioning how we go about understanding the world with the mind. A great example that demonstrates the difference between an ontological reality (world) and an epistemological construct (mind) is the distinction between chance and probability. Chance (ontological) is the actual potential of something occurring in the real world, and probability (epistemological) is the mental model, or construct, that attempts to measure that chance that exists in the world. 4 Unless we pay attention to the difference between that which exists in the world and that which exists in the mind, we are prone to confuse the two. Whenever we conflate mind with world, we commit the error explained by Plato (in The Republic) in that we chase shadows on the wall, mistaken the shadows for a reality we fail to recognize as a separate entity.

Numerous doctrinal manuals lay out a program with which to conduct operations according to the effects-based approach. When EBAO was enjoying its heyday, one such manual was Pamphlet 4 from the Joint Warfighting Center. 5 This pamphlet is representative of the doctrinal cementing of the effects-based approach that took place prior to August 2008 and, to some extent, is still going on. It lays out the framework that attempts nothing less than a science. The language of cause and effect
suffuses the doctrine. Even Francis Bacon is quoted in the front pages: “For knowledge itself is power.” Important in this so-called scientific approach is the establishment of what the pamphlet’s authors refer to as an operational net assessment (ONA). The ONA is an ostensibly elaborate analysis of the system and all of its parts. The authors recognize that we are not dealing with a single system, but a system of systems, so the language of systems engineering makes its way into the concept. Science is about functions, limits, constants, variables, factors, and so on—and effects-based thinking attempts to pursue a scientific approach. A database is constructed that highlights linkages of sets of “effects—nodes—actions—resources.” And through this complex and bewildering array of causes and effects that identify nodes (that become targets) and resources (that become units and capabilities planned to service those targets), the military can bring about the effects it wants through causal means.

How can we actually know how a real system works in the real world based on such a reductionist representation, notwithstanding its elaborate appearance? The assignment of what becomes a node, for example, is more arbitrary than not, usually chosen because it may be more tangible and therefore potentially more serviceable as a target. In other words, we reify entities in the framework (nodes, actions, effects, etc.) on the basis that we know something about them, when in fact they will not exist in the real world in the manner in which we have assigned them this notional ontological status. The whole framework, as a representation, is a lot closer to what we think we know than what exists in the real world. It thereby gives us more comfortable illusions than real knowledge. This epistemological problem is connected to the metaphysical problem because many of the elements of the framework deal with the human, social, or political dimensions, all of which fall strictly outside the realm of cause and effect.

No Room for Dinosaurs on the Ark

Teleology is the idea that something is shaped for a final purpose. The third problem I will deal with is a logical problem about teleology. It has to do with the way we think about time (a mental construct) and it is connected to both the metaphysical and epistemological problems but worthy of its own treatment. The effects-based approach presumes that “final causes” are operative. While final causes were present in scientific thinking since Aristotle, and existed throughout scientific communities influenced by Scholastic teachings (i.e., religious philosophy), the modern era of scientific thinking abandons the notion of final causes and thinks in terms of “efficient causes.”

By starting with the desired effect and moving through a backward-planning process, military planners and commanders actually apply teleology to their approach, which renders an allegedly scientific EBAO to be actually unscientific. It has more in common with alchemy than real science. The effects commanders seek to bring about in the future actually influence their decisions about events that occur temporally prior to the desired goal.

In other words, the future is helping to cause the present. This is a mistaken view of what really takes place in the real world, but it is a mistake of logic as well. The philosopher Francois Jullien exposes this flawed logic in his book, A Treatise on Efficacy: “Given that I myself am constantly evolving in the presence of the enemy, I cannot tell in advance how I shall win the day. In other words, strategy cannot be determined ‘in advance,’ and it is only ‘on the basis of the potential of the situation that it takes shape.’”

Imposing a telos or causal purpose into a so-called “scientific” process is to misunderstand the whole enterprise of modern science.

Efficient causation. Final causes dropped out over 400 years ago when modern thinkers abandoned the scientific view of the Scholastics. Instead of final causation, efficient causation became the hallmark of a scientific world view. The logical mistake of injecting a telos back into science persists so prevalently in the United States today because of the teleological framework in the predominant American world view—specifically a religiously informed world view.

The understanding of evolution is an important litmus test, because proper understanding of it requires an appreciation of efficient causation and abandonment of final causes as a key feature of modern science. Many who want to preserve a notion of a divine plan or the principle of sufficient reason (roughly the idea that everything happens
for a reason) have a difficult time giving up the idea of final causes or embracing efficient causes. Many mistakenly think that abandoning a divine being will leave evolution to the vagaries of chance. However, biological evolution depends upon great stability and comparatively miniscule variations over huge periods of time that defy the imagination. Chance is the wrong concept with which to understand evolution. The important concept is that of *contingency*. Contingency is the opposite (the logical complement) of necessity. Causation entails necessity; evolution entails contingency.

Evolution has no laws, and laws are necessary for causal analysis, if even statistical laws. If we were to rewind the world to its beginning, it would evolve in a completely different way. Contingency is yet another example why causation is the wrong locus of study and concern. Evolution does not and cannot proceed necessarily or according to a plan—in other words, evolution is not caused. Likewise with effects-based operations: *effects in the human dimension of war are not caused.*

Critiquing this world view is important now, for moral reasons discussed later, given the failure of the mechanical approach taken early in Iraq and Afghanistan and the proven success of subsequently taking a complex, more human-centered perspective. We as a nation, imbued with this teleological world view, need to reflect, critique ourselves, and take the lessons we have learned in Iraq to heart.

**The sacred discourse.** Theology has cemented the Aristotelian world view that embraces final causation. Gregory Paul examines the influence of religiosity in prosperous democracies in an informative article from the *Journal of Religion & Society*. Taking the 17 most advanced countries in the world, he finds a positive correlation between religiosity and an inability to understand the scientific theory of evolution. The less religious a country is, the more understanding; the more religious, the less understanding. For example, among the 17, Japan is the least religious and has the greatest understanding and appreciation of evolution while the United States is the most religious and has the least understanding and appreciation of it. Paul goes further to examine the many measures of human development and societal health and correlates these features with religiosity as well. He finds a positive correlation between religiosity and social dysfunction. “In general, higher rates of belief in and worship of a creator correlate with higher rates of homicide, juvenile and early adult mortality, STD infection rates, teen pregnancy, and abortion in the prosperous democracies. The most theistic prosperous democracy, the U.S., is exceptional . . . The United States is almost always the most dysfunctional of the developed democracies, sometimes spectacularly so, and almost always scores poorly.”

Just as our unscientific world view can make other sectors of society dysfunctional, it can make our military (or even the “whole of government”) and its effects-based proclivities dysfunctional as well.

I will reply to the objection of correlation not amounting to causation here. I would not even admit of the notion of causation in an open system, without boundaries, that involved human activity. However, there is good reason to believe that there is a deep systemic relationship between religiosity and dysfunction, and this is explained by the process of applying an unscientific world view in each case. This mistaken teleological view is similar to, and related to, the mistakes that behavioral science rests upon. Arthur Koestler aptly describes this problem when he writes about the temporal displacement assumed in operant conditioning, where the stimulus-response model is reversed because the stimulus occurs after the response—it is out of time—the effect comes before the cause. “Behaviorism is indeed a kind of flat-earth view of the mind,” says Koestler. By way of analogy, EBAO is the flat-earth view of military operations, because of its professed goal of *shaping behavior*. Behaviorism is relevant here because EBAO carries with it behaviorist assumptions that if we reduce human activity to behavior, one can cause someone to behave a certain way: “Effects-based operations are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war.”

**Causation entails necessity; evolution entails contingency. Evolution has no laws, and laws are necessary for causal analysis...**
Trying to make something scientific when it cannot be so attributes precision beyond the degree that the subject matter allows—inevitably with disappointing if not dangerous inaccuracy. We need to think more in terms of human action and turn to action theory instead. Since human beings act for reasons, having intentions made up of beliefs and desires, the realm of human activity possesses much more difficult and much less scientific predictability.

From Effects to Potentiation

Representing reality on the basis of cause and effect does not develop robust enough understanding to enable informed and meaningful action. At the level of strategy—and operational art as the mediation between strategy and tactics—we need to focus our attention on something other than ends or effects. Whenever people respond to such a claim by questioning how we can proceed without ends or goals or effects to think about, I respond by pointing them to some of the intellectual traditions that offer an alternative.

Two such traditions have been around for a long time, one in the Eastern world and one in the West, the one in the West developing concurrently with the development of the mainstream of Western thought (beginning with Heraclitus who lived a hundred years before Socrates). Each of these traditions challenges the teleological basis of the Aristotelian framework. Each of these, in their own way, would acknowledge the importance of beginning where we are, rather than beginning where we may like to end up. Instead of thinking about the end we want to reach or the effects we want to bring about, we should think about positively influencing the potential inherent in the situation, or potentiation.

The inherent language and concepts that sustain the framework of problem-solving, ends and effects, simply cannot address this very different concept of potential. In classical Chinese thought, potential, the potential of the movement of forces for example, depends upon position.

Simply consider the current positive command assessment of how we are doing in the Middle East based on metrics that depend upon concepts from within the Aristotelian box. The command is so busy creating metrics that measure some kind of...
success in relation to ends, or effects, that it completely misses the worsening of our position as well as the worsening of future potential. We have metrics for the terrorist network, but we cannot measure (and are hence ignoring) the terrorist movement or the larger resistance itself.

The Ethical Sphere

Now that we have looked at only the most glaring philosophical mistakes of the theory associated with the effects-based approach, we can turn to the approach’s accommodation of morality. There are three levels of ethics:

● Meta-ethical (what theory underlies morality).
● Descriptive (what is).
● Normative (what ought to be).

It is not accidental that none of the doctrine associated with EBAO contains anything remotely connected to moral concerns at any of these levels of inquiry. My article up to this point lays the groundwork for a philosophical investigation of the effects-based approach at the meta-ethical level. In fact, there is a built-in contempt for morality embedded deep within the effects-based perspective, for morality will simply get in the way of pursuing the desired effects. Furthermore, causal claims, whether they are scientific or unscientific, are descriptive in nature. Morality is normative. In the case of EBAO, never the twain shall meet.

What is. Morality can be usefully described along the lines of what people intend, what people do, and what consequences people bring about. Human intention is masked by effects-based thinking because of the behaviorist assumptions that undergird it. The focus on effects means that any assessments or judgments of the approach have to do with effectiveness, or the degree to which an operation brings about the effects. Hence, there is a lot of discussion of evaluating the degree of bringing about the effects through what they call measures of effectiveness. There is no discussion and no measure that has to do with an evaluation of whether the actions performed to bring about the effects are morally right. There is no theory of right action present in the effects-based approach. Most philosophers take a theory of right action seriously, with the right taking priority over the good (the language of good and bad is about consequences and the language of right and wrong is about actions).

With EBAO’s emphasis on bringing about certain effects, which are also consequences, the approach presumes consequentialism—a utility calculation that can lead to accept doing a wrong to come to a predicted good. Consequences do play a role in morality. However, since EBAO advocates focus solely on the effects or consequences they want to bring about (which seldom works as planned), they will completely ignore the vastly more harmful unintended consequences they bring about from their pursuit. The means we used to bring about victory to end World War II in large part created the Cold War, and the means we used to prosecute the Cold War in large part created the conditions for the conflict today.

For example, EBAO advocates will shrug their shoulders at collateral damage, believing that collateral damage is just the price of doing business. By collateral damage we are talking about doing unintended harm to noncombatants. The 20th century—leaving over 100 million war dead—has devolved from having a noncombatant casualty rate of 10 percent in wars fought at the beginning of the century to roughly 50 percent in World War II to an appalling 90 percent by the end of the century. Is the current century following this trend? The percentage of innocent people killed in terrorist attacks well exceeds 90 percent. But the casualty rate that we have inflicted in Afghanistan and Iraq may exceed this rate as well. Isn’t it ironic that the United States is responsible for the vast majority of noncombatant deaths in a war against terror? Estimates begin at 30,000. If terror has anything to do with fear induced by harming noncombatants, whether that harm is intentional or not, then who is terrorizing whom?

In Afghanistan today, success probably hinges on our attitudes toward this trend. If we characterize most of these casualties as collateral damage,
then we are at a minimum subverting the English language because this level of harm is no longer collateral in the sense that it is concomitant, secondary, subordinate, or accompanying—it should be of primary concern; it by definition can no longer be “collateral.”

Of the two general approaches to explore human activity, the scientific approach has had as its project the goals of explanation and prediction while the philosophical approach has worked toward understanding. One general strategy is the scientific one, maintaining that reason explanations could also be causal explanations. Adopting this first strategy, of which the effects-based approach remains a part, are the disciplines of social science that want to render human action under scientific regularities, such as empirical political science, economics, and so on. The other general strategy moves away from a scientific view of human activity and remains philosophical.

What ought to be. An alternative to the effects-based approach is called systemic operational design (SOD), and a simplified doctrinal version of “design” is currently taught in the School for Advanced Military Studies curriculum at Fort Leavenworth. The more philosophically sophisticated version of SOD promises a greater understanding of current operating environments and therefore more coherent operations. Its roots grow from modern science and philosophy while EBAO remains pseudo-scientific and pseudo-philosophical. EBAO is an attempt to gain a level of certainty and control through a decision procedure, while design is a critical method. Decision procedures are closed, complete, decidable, while critical methods remain open, incomplete, and acknowledge uncertainty. The first is pseudo-scientific because one of the features that differentiates between science and pseudo-science is the concept of falsifiability, which is not a featured concept in current operations. No matter how much contrary evidence appears in front of EBAO advocates, they can deny that the evidence falsifies their pursuits. The model can be completely backwards from reality, yet the model can persist—this is how we failed to recognize or acknowledge something as significant as the insurgency in Iraq (the military was denying one as late as 2005, and only in the fall of 2006 did a select few individuals decide to buck the common wisdom).

In Afghanistan today, success probably hinges on our attitudes toward this trend... in...collateral damage...

In Afghanistan today, success probably hinges on our attitudes toward this trend... in...collateral damage...

Holism in war. Some are skeptical of SOD today because they think it is rooted in Israeli history, culture, and practice. Some writers even mistakenly see no difference between EBAO and SOD. This conflation has lured some into fallaciously attributing the debacle of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the

An aerial starboard bow view of the USS New Jersey. Tomahawk missiles were used in Operation Desert Storm to attack Iraqi infrastructure.
summer of 2006 to SOD thinking. Even a passing familiarity with the idea would prevent this mistake. But Israeli theorists do not see SOD as being a uniquely Israeli artifact without application outside of the Middle East. They like the theory because it is more reliable as a theory, and they recognize that because of their open, philosophical frame of mind. Many also resist this alternative because of practical problems facing the implementation of the idea: the vocabulary is different, and U.S. military culture obviates dialogue, and so on. As aforementioned, this paper is more about theory than about the practice. We should get the theory right first. Practical questions will resolve themselves naturally, and the military will adapt only after we answer the theoretical ones.

Advocates of SOD understand the power of the theory of evolution as a scientific theory, and many EBO advocates do not. SOD has to do with capitalizing on emergences rather than teleologies, recognizing the way people act in an open system in the real world rather than misrepresenting human behavior through a fundamentally flawed representation. Deadly force is not ruled out in the SOD concept, but the application of force is not the central focus either, so SOD opens the door for considerations within the moral (ethical) domain as a central feature of necessarily chaotic operational milieus. Considerations of human complexity in SOD are thus in keeping with the classics of holistic war theory found in Sun Tzu and Clausewitz.

Understanding SOD is difficult for it requires one to be able to understand evolution, the way systems change naturally forward through time. Systems (particularly systems of systems) cannot be made to change artificially backwards through time based on some preconceived plan, and that is the crippling assumption found in effects-based thinking.

Ridding ourselves of the errors of thinking in terms of effects will bring us closer to a holistic understanding of war. It was a good decision on the part of the Joint forces commander to question the effects-based mentality. I have attempted to explain why it was a good decision, giving a theoretical rationale and a deep justification. We can avoid the logical error of instrumentalism (that which may work in practice, but not in theory) only by disclosing our paper trail of reasoning. Otherwise, we simply have a paper trail of decisions; what then is to prevent the next Joint forces commander from putting effects-based thinking back into the doctrine? The practice of operational design differs from our current practice because it requires the institution to extend the rationale for all to see through the application of public reason and abandons the black boxes of potentially arbitrary decision-making taking place behind the closed doors of private reason. MR

NOTES

1. The two types of systems thinking, mechanical and human, have come to be referred to as hard and soft systems approaches. Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1999).
3. Alexander Rosenberg, The Philosophy of Social Science (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), chap. 2. “Intentionality turns ‘mere’ behavior into action. Action is intentional, for behavior is only action if there are intentional states—desire and belief that lead to it.”
10. I’m interested in the academic and theoretic pursuits on the part of the theorists. The theorists include Shimon Naveh from the Operational Theory Research Institute in Israel and Jim Schneider at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, KS. There are several headquarters and directorates that have a vested interest in how these alternatives may be worked into doctrine. I represent none of these interests; my views are wholly my own, bounded only by the constraints of logic, pursued in the spirit of academic freedom and free inquiry. There are also experiments being conducted to see which alternatives are better or worse. My work on the theories of these doctrines is completely independent of these experiments, as it is independent of the political decisions. My interest is purely an academic interest. If the story of the political development of this doctrine is to be told in print, it will have to be told by someone else.
11. “People did not want to hear about the Fedayeen. It was an undefined enemy. So we ignored it… If you cannot put a name or a face to an enemy, then why dedicate combat power to them?” LTC D.J. Reyes, G2, 10th ASALT Division, in Rick Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers (New York: Owl Books, 2005), 160.
DESIGN IS A U.S. ARMY conception for the practice of strategic and operational art in the 21st century. Design enhances battle command and decision making, and its incorporation into doctrine is the subject of much recent professional dialogue. I wish to contribute to the debate from an ally’s perspective, based on insights gained during design experiments at the U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies in 2008 and 2009. I pursue three goals here:

- To provide an analysis of the current U.S. Army design debate and introduce the methodology.
- To call for a multinational expansion of the design methodology and to open up a debate in the German armed forces about the doctrinal usefulness of design.
- To propose a logical expansion of design from the operational domain to the domain of the institutional military [institutional domain].

The “value added” of design to U.S. military doctrine will have mid- to long-term implications for NATO and German doctrine. Early multinational collaboration is necessary to define doctrinal trade-offs and to ensure interoperability. These goals should also help to solve a challenge that affects both German and U.S. forces: how to create a comprehensive military culture that enables the military institution to learn and adapt in an era of persistent conflict and uncertainty.

Why Design?

Design initiates change in man-made things; it is a sequence of distinct, predictable, and identifiable activities. In the current U.S. Army debate, “design is a [way] to think critically and creatively, and it enables a commander to create understanding about a unique situation and, on that basis, to visualize and describe how to generate change.” Design thus addresses the need for deep appreciation of the contemporary operational environment that pushes operational art down to even the battalion level. Guidance provided by political and higher military authority may be insufficient to frame complex situations. Where political, social, economic, and ideological boundaries are blurred, particularly in Joint and coalition operations, such guidance could even do more harm than good.
Design aims to overcome the deficiencies of industrial-age tools for operational art and planning that—like one author expresses—“have been nearly impotent for making any sense of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions.” Design will complement the traditional forms of military planning, the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP), which can have reductionist, simplifying, and mechanical effects inappropriate for war’s political and moral dimension. Design enables the blend of military art and science in a creative way in order to harvest the corporate genius of an organization in an effort to manage and solve the complex problems that confront today’s military practitioners.

Design thus builds on intellectual and academic rigor and emphasizes cognitive skills. Design thereby aims to achieve shared understanding among superiors, key subordinates, partners, and allies based on varied viewpoints. Stakeholders learn about the different interpretations of a situation and where they can use their collective intelligence to manage it. Critical thinking undergirds design as a precondition for self-initiated learning to achieve an evolved understanding of the relevance of military operations. This evolution reflects a group approach to organizational learning and management over time. Design in the military will stimulate a cultural change and will be a significant paradigm shift from the power model of military leadership and bureaucratic compartmentalization. Design recognizes that no one perspective is sufficient in a complex environment, so design propagates a model of emphasizing servant leadership and social integration. This paradigm shift is the necessary condition for the military to succeed with design. Design means to take responsibility for a moral imperative that results from awareness of the complex social fabric of the 21st century security environment.

**Design Expansion—Background and Arguments**

The release of an issue paper called Design (pre-decisional draft) in March 2009 has elevated an academic debate in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to the doctrinal level. In addition to the issue paper, recently published articles in Military Review and Joint Force Quarterly have taken the discussion to the wider Army. Also, the U.S. Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and the recent speech given by the German chief of defense to the German Parliamentary Society on Armed Forces Transformation suggest a multinational and logical expansion of design.

Taking on the multinational aspect, the German Army released the latest version of the Heeresdienstvorschrift 100/100 Truppenführung (the equivalent to Field Manual [FM] 3-0) in 2007. Moreover, the chief of defense directed the production of a Joint doctrine equivalent to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 “Einsatz- und Operationsführung der Bundeswehr” (Mission and Operations Command), Centralized Armed Forces Regulation 1/01, the missing link between German service doctrine and NATO allied Joint publications. The question is whether design culturally fits into, and is useful for, German operational doctrine given the fact that U.S.-German military cooperation requires interoperability and so doctrinal harmonization.

Further contributions of the German and U.S. chiefs suggest the logical expansion of design into the institutional military. The German Army released the latest version of the Heeresdienstvorschrift 100/100 Truppenführung (the equivalent to Field Manual [FM] 3-0) in 2007. Moreover, the chief of defense directed the production of a Joint doctrine equivalent to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 “Einsatz- und Operationsführung der Bundeswehr” (Mission and Operations Command), Centralized Armed Forces Regulation 1/01, the missing link between German service doctrine and NATO allied Joint publications. The question is whether design culturally fits into, and is useful for, German operational doctrine given the fact that U.S.-German military cooperation requires interoperability and doctrinal harmonization.

In the operational domain, design can add value to German doctrine in spite of contextual and cultural disparities in German and U.S. approaches to planning. From an institutional domain perspective, limiting design to operational affairs does not fully exploit its potential as a driver for cultural change,
learning, and adaptation. Design will alleviate the pressure that a bureaucratic hierarchy imposes on organizational responsiveness. Such responsiveness is a precondition for relevance in today’s and the future’s complex environments. The method of design encourages the ability to work with a deeper understanding of the environment and to make the whole organization more adaptive.

**U.S. Army Design**

Analysis of the U.S. Army design concept from a German standpoint must consider the discussion of “design” in U.S. joint doctrine and developments in NATO and German armed forces, and recognize the effects-based approach to operations. In the context of operational art, the word “design” has been in U.S. doctrine since the publication of Field Manual (FM) 100-5. Joint doctrine also recognized “operational design” as the practical extension of operational art in 2005 and 2006. However, U.S. Joint doctrine implies an effects-based approach to operations based on a deductive “systems perspective” of the environment (systems of systems approach and operational net assessment). NATO has fully embraced this approach, and its impact has reached German Army doctrine. In the meantime, the U.S. Joint community has partially questioned its suitability for operational art in complex situations. Its “hard systems” approach rests on the simplifying mechanistic understanding that reality consists of a fabric of predictable and static causal chains. From an ally’s view, there is currently a competitive relationship between design and effects-based operations that will influence the discussion in both NATO and in the German armed forces. This is a by-product of effects-based operations’ theoretical underpinnings in behaviorist cause-effect approaches to the political and moral dimension of war. In contrast, design’s theoretical bedrock is a cognitive approach to dealing with emergences in chaos and rejects the possibility of accurately projecting cause-effect relationships in the political and moral dimensions.

**U.S. Army Design Development**

Up to now, U.S. doctrinal development left open what design might entail. In 2004, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command began to assimilate the experiences of the Iraq war, outcomes of the capstone war game Unified Quest, and a series of high-level seminars and experiments with the concept of “systemic operational design” to inquire about the practical application of design in military operations. The idea was to develop a strategy for action in the absence of clear guidance in a discourse between higher headquarters and the design group. The Training and Doctrine Command directed the Army Capabilities and Integration Center, supported by Combined Arms Center and the Army War College, to execute the inquiry. The inquiry resulted in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, released in 2008. The pamphlet was a springboard for further development of the design idea in the Army, the Joint community, civilian government agencies, and multinational partners. It built on the ideas of Joint doctrine in application to a holistic understanding of the operational environment. However, it recognizes the importance of design as a precursor to planning and its potential to synthesize the expertise and insights developed within a functionally constrained staff. The School of Advanced Military Studies has been contributing significantly to this endeavor since 2005 by providing the test ground and research environment to harmonize theory with practice.

In close cooperation with the school, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate has begun to address the intellectual aspects of design more specifically in the latest versions of U.S. Army FM 3-0, Operations; FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency; FM 3-07, Stabilization Operations; and FM 5-0, The Operations Process (Draft). In 2008, the Training and Doctrine Command produced a design issue paper to provide a more comprehensive account of this approach formulated in U.S. doctrine.
various stakeholders, FM 5-0 will contain the most recent thinking on “why design,” “design fundamentals,” “design methodology,” and the “design-plan interface” and be the document to which a potential design debate in the alliance should refer.

Second, the doctrinal U.S. Army debate must resolve the common misconception conflating design with existing planning tools (i.e., MDMP and the JOPP), and design’s relationship to those tools as a precursor or companion. In the author’s view, design should be a closely connected, parallel but separate and complementary activity that creates a deeper understanding of problems, which in turn improves decision making and tactical planning efforts.

Third, the debate must clarify whether design exclusively informs campaigning at the operational level of war, or whether a complex reality suggests that campaigns are the business of lower levels too. Limiting design seems artificial, and current U.S. Army design conforms to the latter statement. However, FM 3-0 attributes “operational art” exclusively to the operational level. Even so, U.S. Army design takes into account the Iraq war, which has seen operational art at the battalion level.

Today’s tactical level commanders simultaneously confront both operational art and tactics because of the problems a counterinsurgency campaign unveils. The unlimited number of solutions, the absence of indisputable rules for optimization, and the reliance on subjective value judgment and creativity are all qualities of operational art. These qualities justify the argument that operational art cannot be bound to the operational level of war. The debate will have to clarify whether the term “level” should be replaced by “functions” of strategy, operational art, and tactics without restriction to unit size. A multinational expansion of design needs to consider this development because NATO follows current U.S. doctrine, and German doctrine follows FM 3-0 and JP 3-0. These facts trumpet a need for a discussion in NATO and the German armed forces on their future doctrinal development.

**A Design Methodology**

A sequence of distinct, identifiable, and predictable activities comprise the design methodology developed and proposed by Army Capabilities and Integration Center in the design issue paper. The methodology represents ideas about change theory, learning organization, and complexity theory, and it unifies them in one approach. Design ideally prepares a commander with systemic understanding of a situation as a precondition for more relevant planning and future decision making. This systemic understanding enables him to be the chief innovator, strategist, and strategic communicator in his area of accountability. He decides whether a situation justifies the use of design or not. A litmus test for such justification would be the degree of uniqueness a situation presents, its perceived uncertainty and complexity, and the concomitant need to act.

Design, planning, and execution reflect a layered architecture. They inform each other during a campaign or operation in response to events. Design, at inception, emphasizes an exploratory approach to challenges better suited to innovation than the conventional, functionally based mission analysis. The methodology builds on continuous learning through setting, framing, and reframing problems as an interplay between a commander and his design group, selected staff, and external members. Additional internal and external “non-designers” can augment the design group case-by-case and periodically to contribute with subject matter expertise.

Participants overcome their cultural bias by intentional questioning understanding that might stem from ostensibly irrelevant experiences and previous mental models. Another fundamental is the commander’s active cognitive involvement. An attitude that the design group designs, and the commander either agrees or does not agree with, nullifies advantages of design.

**Environmental space.** The group first develops and agrees upon the logic behind the guidance in the aims and objectives of the higher commander. The group then frames the operational environment to help understand the context for the design. Through individual research and subsequent collaborative discussion, the group agrees on the current situation and any perceived changes essential to accomplish the commander’s aims and objectives. The design group develops an initial *problem statement* that describes the gap between the current system as derived from the group’s shared understanding and an agreed-upon desired system. With more understanding, the true nature of the problem begins to take shape.
address the problem successfully, the design team explores the relevant environmental aspects in detail. Choices about boundaries, areas of possible intervention, or areas of exploitation are necessary.

**Problem space.** The choices noted above help define the *problem frame*. The group develops an operational approach that, along with the problem statement, form the problem space. The politicians’ or commander’s feedback may lead to a reframing of it based on his evolved understanding of the problem. Without losing sight of the world outside the problem frame, the design team finally makes a decision on how to act to manage the problem based on a direct or indirect approach on elements of both.

**Solution space.** Once the political echelon or higher commander has approved the problem frames, a commander can define the problem statement and operational approach that link the solution space and design concept. The *design concept* is the product provided to the planners to conduct the Military Decision Making Process and the Joint Operations Planning Process.

**Challenges for Design and Recommendations**

Four factors can challenge and influence the use of design in contemporary environments: the interplay between design and planning, time, leadership and personnel, and outcome.

**Design-plan interplay.** The methodology suggests the production of a planning directive as a design-plan interface. Lower command levels possess fewer staff resources for a separation of design and planning. Nevertheless, to avoid quick fixes based on staff default reactions, leadership is necessary to provide the proper orientation while travelling through the spaces of the design methodology and focusing the work.

**Time.** Creativity and innovation cannot be forced or planned. Design work takes time. A design group achieves mental access to the environmental space only through a difficult process of evaluating many complex social networks. The use of structuring tools can help alleviate time constraints and indecisiveness. Close cooperation between designers and planners, from inception onward can avoid undue pressure imposed by “slow” designing. Hence, the designer and planner interface should be continuous throughout operations.

**Leadership and personnel.** Proactive leadership is necessary to prevent the design group from using simplifying tools. Impatience, an overemphasis on deadlines, and pushing the group will suffocate creativity; a laissez-faire type style, on the other hand, will lead to endless information processing and superfluous talk. Effective leadership, with a clear method to organize design work at the inception, can overcome these problems. Moreover, training for group design work requires a different approach than decision-making training. The social fabric of the design team has immediate influence on the design performance. A group’s homogeneity and intellectual capabilities can vary significantly, and affect the challenges a leader faces when attempting to harvest the group’s genius. Design requires leaders to guide and structure adaptive work. Leaders must push work back to stakeholders to develop solutions at the lowest levels where understanding of the problem is the best. Hence, design leadership education should entail not only leading design, but also design methods and application.

**Outcome.** Like JOPP and MDMP as conventional planning techniques, the outcome of design is actionable. Additional and more detailed planning steps follow from the understanding evolved in the design process. Design offers military leaders at all levels of command a deliberate way and a stronger and more relevant basis of knowledge to proceed while trying to avoid tactical missteps with strategic implications. Design’s reflective methodology does not provide a so-called “silver bullet” to solve complex problems, but neither does any known traditional process. What design can contribute is an approach to improve nuanced understanding and enhance the final outcome of conventional planning methods by complementing them to ensure better management of complex problems.

**Design and German Doctrine**

Can design inform the German operational domain? German equivalents of current U.S. JP 3-0...
and FM 3-0 are the ZDv 1/01 and HDv 100/100. ZDv 1/3 (analogous to JP 5-0) is under way.\textsuperscript{26} NATO membership requires the alignment of German doctrine with allied doctrine, and because of the U.S. role in NATO, German doctrine indirectly aligns with U.S. doctrine. Therefore, German doctrine and U.S. doctrine are largely congruent within the NATO operational-level planning process, the discussion of operational art, and supporting tools.\textsuperscript{27} However, a change in U.S. doctrine will entail adaptations in NATO and in German doctrine.

\textbf{German military thought.} The culture of German military thought will determine the debate about design in the German armed forces. There is no “design” term separated from planning in German doctrine; “planning” comprises the creative and the mechanistic part of the process. Speed, focus, standardization, taxonomy, openness, and flexibility characterize German military thought, which rejects the checklist thinking Americans have grown used to. “Mission assessment” \textit{(auswertung des auftrages)} is a step in the operations process that anticipates mission analysis. The bedrock of the overall planning process, and the main difference from the Joint and U.S. decision-making processes, is this analysis.\textsuperscript{28} Here, the commander, the chief of staff, and selected staff personnel frame the problem at hand as the precondition for a focused staff process. “The differences between the [U.S and German Army] in this respect [approach to decisions] are reflected by their thought-processes and even by their language. A German officer, confronted with some task, would ask: \textit{worauf kommt es eigentlich an?} (What is the core of the problem?) An American [officer]. . . would inquire: what are the problem’s component parts?”\textsuperscript{29} At first glance, this cultural heritage appears to make design (as a problem setting and framing methodology) in a sense obsolete for a German commander. However, design as articulated in the U.S. design methodology in close cooperation with Americans and initiate dialogue within NATO. Like current U.S. doctrine, German doctrine builds heavily on end states, be they political or military. However, reality looks different: There are “buzzwords with no foundational concepts,” and “the military must deal with the impreciseness,” a German press note recently stated.\textsuperscript{30} In a complex environment, it is necessary that politics stay ambiguous to make room for later policy choices. However, without clear political guidance, there is no clear task with which to start a focused operations process.

The operational process drilled during German officer education appears timely and effective. It may synchronize efforts toward a group product appropriate for problem solving, but it may never solve the right problem because it cannot produce an accurate frame of reference in the environment. Its intellectual economy overemphasizes the importance of experience—a dominant logic of the military culture of seniority. During conditions of ambiguity, or conditions where experience has no purchase, the process must pretend to certainty. It does so largely through the authority of rank and hierarchical level. The system pretends to an objective understanding that does not exist. It thereby environment is a coherent frame that assesses the network of people, groups, and organizations. This assessment accounts for diverse motives and opposed interests, but current German doctrine does not answer how to do it.

HDv 100/100, paragraph 6002, in fact stresses that the German operational process is suitable for making feasible decisions in a complex and dynamic operational environment, even under time pressure. Irrespective of the favorable heritage of its military thought process, the German Army should be anticipative: there is no contemporary proof that this paragraph could withstand the scrutiny of reality. The differences between current U.S. Army operations using design thinking and German military operations after the fall of the “wall” have caused an experience gap. Closing this gap requires organizational learning based on sound evaluation of foreign developments and the selection and transfer of ideas.

\textbf{Design in German doctrine.} The German armed forces should quickly begin considering the U.S. design methodology in close cooperation with Americans and initiate dialogue within NATO.
pushes decision making into the comfort zones of past experience that are absolutely irrelevant. Effects-based thinking follows this flawed logic.

Military clichés such as “there are no problems, only challenges” or “offer solutions, not problems” often minimize the fact that complexity cannot simply be confronted with will. Reflection and a posture of openness to learning must accompany that will. Military culture is notoriously biased against reflection because, to many, it implies hesitation. Yet without reflection, the obtuse practitioner involves himself in a deliberate oversimplification of mission needs. These conditions best reflect the power model of military leadership common where authority and overwhelming force make up for lack of creativity. Such a mind-set represents bad-faith, because the pressure of convention is overruling reason. In combination with a perceived need for time compression, there is the danger of looking only superficially at a “challenge,” of failing to see any difficulty, or of pretending that there is no real complexity. At this point, the operations process can degenerate to a useless process of self-deception without feedback.

Certainly, the foremost intellectual challenges in today’s stabilization and counterinsurgency operations are complex situations requiring reflective deliberation about evolving conditions. One must endeavor to identify core issues from the bottom-up and identify, how they relate, how to act on them to further mission needs, and how to communi- cate them to the political echelon. This exercise describes the ultimate raison d’être of design.

In the long term, incorporating design is a necessary condition for updating German doctrine. Germany too needs to meet the requirements of stabilization operations, counterinsurgency, and major combat operations. Design presents a proven vehicle for improving military relevance and effectiveness.

“Mission assessment” could be the place to anchor design in the German operations process. Commander-led, the mission assessment step could reshape the process from solution focus to collective, creative, and critical inquiry as the precondition for fully understanding operational problems. More relevant planning would result.

On the strategic level, incorporating design in German doctrine will help develop a better culture of learning. It will empower military leaders to enter a more proactive, self-confident discourse with the political echelon, founded on a more comprehensive and relevant knowledge base, to clarify ambiguous guidance or to inform strategy.

**Recommendations for an Institutional Military Design**

The institutional domain is the foundation of operational forces. In an era of persistent military operations, the institutional domain deals with the preparation for war in shaping the product that a political or military leader uses to achieve national objectives. The product’s value defines its relevance and hence determines budgetary policies. Recognizing that militaries should be open systems that cannot evade national realities, the challenges require self-initiated and evolutionary adaptation across military institutions. Such adaptation is necessary for efficiently using limited funds within a national-level system of competition and for eventual operational effectiveness.
Such transformation is eventually a problem of organizational learning and bureaucratic innovation. Organizational change requires communication of a shared vision, ability to scrutinize paradigms, systemic thinking, and promotion of team learning. The principal challenge of innovation is to identify a problem and establish a clear understanding on how to solve it. Therefore, learning and problem solving are tightly intertwined. A military organization requires a comprehensive approach to such an undertaking because of its difficult, hierarchical bureaucracy entailing differing cultures. Timeworn bureaucratic principles, compartmentalization of responsibilities, and rigid processes resist change and peacetime innovation in the institutional domain. But the military also possesses a more flexible, task-oriented culture in its operational domain, which constantly adapts to steep learning curves based on urgency-fueled, wartime innovation.

However, the similarity of the institutional and operational domains could affect their symbiosis. Lack of clear guidance, operating with complex adaptive systems, and an unlimited number of choices characterize both operational and institutional dynamics. Advancing the military’s institutional domain (i.e., doing peacetime innovation) translates eventually into operational art because it takes an unstructured problem and gives it form so that further planning can lead to useful action. This suggests that the design’s methodology is as suitable for the institutional domain as it is for the operational.

**Peacetime innovation by design.** Peacetime innovation can occur when both intellectual and organizational (i.e., inertial) components work with and within the given bureaucracy. Design is such an approach: human-centered and comprehensive. It respects the military’s political and complex nature and acknowledges its basic governing principles.

The goal of design in the institutional domain is to develop and pursue a strategy for innovation that simultaneously addresses structure, processes, and culture. It does so by developing visions, communicating those visions, and negotiating them with a political sponsor. In this context, design can enable “telling oneself the truth” and avoiding the kind of deliberate bureaucratic self-deception that leads to strategic ramifications. Effective design leadership, gives notice to stakeholders who eventually are responsible for change. It does not outsource the responsibility for innovation to separated subsystems (e.g., centers for “excellence” or “transformation” or to consultants). The danger of such practices is familiar: it enables judging proposals for change based on old power paradigms.

Design overcomes existing mental models and the fixation on inherited traditional conceptions because it creates a counter concentration through the collective genius of the military organization. Design prevents organizational myopia. It collectively, actively redirects self-reflexive behavior to
the relevant environment, where the real problems are. It breaks up functional and service walls, and it uncovers knowledge hidden in hierarchical stovepipes. Finally, it backs up the institutional leader with relevant knowledge and ability for more substantiated strategic communication.

**Institutional design implementation.** Joint and interagency design groups representing different stakeholders could be the organizational anchors of the design methodology. Such groups can best capture ideas across functions and link them to relevant decision making. On all levels of the institutional hierarchy, design could be an effective methodology for change. However, on the ministerial level and the higher commands and offices, it seems to be mandatory.

Design groups in the institutional domain have to answer five hard questions:

- Where are we now? (vs. Where do we hope to be?)
- Where do we want to go (direction, vision)?
- How do we get there?
- Are we doing the things that we know how to do right (lines of effort)?
- Are we doing the right things?

The heterogeneous structure of such design groups should support commitment to the truth, since it provides the arena for genuine intellectual competition that is a precondition for successful interaction with complex “adjacent” systems. Creative tension between the (military or political) leader and a design group will define the problem as a gap between how the organization is and how it ought to be.

**Institutional design execution.** An institutional design group would operate temporarily outside routine work, outside the “everyday” chain of command. Member selection would follow ability and qualification—not rank or functional role considerations (i.e., the officer’s “functional area”). Selecting the best person for the kind of thinking needed would determine the group’s composition. Major tasks of the group would be to achieve a shared understanding about a problem in a specific situation and to develop shared commitment to a possible solution. In a complex social system like the military, consensus among varied functional and service perspectives is virtually unachievable. Broad consensus-based approaches favor common denominators and generally oppose innovation. This opposition suggests that shared understanding has to precede consensus-building. Shared understanding will facilitate coherence among the stakeholders before any proposed strategy for problem management is submitted to the service or functional staffs. Since the members of a design group belong to these staffs, the likelihood of achieving an active consensus increases. For interagency products, this aspect of design is especially relevant.

To overcome bureaucratic cultural drawbacks to the largest extent possible, the logic of design would suggest that a group spread itself over more than one hierarchical level. A superior’s position in the hierarchy, and his area of accountability, determines the range of levels and functions he can access while making his choice of design group members. For instance, in a ministerial staff, the director level and above should account for design routines. All civilian and military leaders and staff members can make a request to address a specific issue with the design methodology. They should submit a proposal to their immediate and next higher-level superior who takes the decision. There should be a design custodian or full-time design nucleus (two or three staff officers) in each staff that can facilitate the staff-wide application of the methodology. With support of the highest-ranked senior leader, the team acts as a full-time mediator between staff directorates and external influences. In the long term, such a team has the potential to become the change agent in the staff. The team would support the formation of a core design group (six to eight members) when a senior leader decides to use the methodology in a given situation. The participation of additional group members (e.g., members from other services and interagency) would require previous agreement by their respective superiors. To ensure broad acceptance, a design group develops its own procedures, which require the initiator’s and the external superiors’ approval.

Such an approach provides for flexible design group management on a case-by-case basis and a process-like design organization with fluid network structures within the tight fabric of a bureaucratic hierarchy. Such organization would not harm the logic of the methodology, but it would enable its logical fit into the institutional domain. As in the operational domain, designing occurs in workshops,
discourse sessions, and research spin-offs subject to a rigid quality regime and effective leadership that ensures iterative learning.

The institutional domain (e.g., a ministerial staff) can apply a routine-based and incident-driven version of design. Routine design is about corporate responsiveness, and it pursues the detection of business strategic inflection points and the support of the military leaders to shape their visions. In this context, design serves to reframe the narratives on which present transformation activities build. Routine design is about defining a need faster, more precisely, and better founded to win, for instance, the competition for funds for future operational effectiveness. Besides routine matters, incident-driven design responds to unknown situations unleashed by internal or external events, incidents, or new knowledge in the staff. It builds heavily on the environmental knowledge provided by routine design. The goal of incident-driven design is to achieve effective rather than efficient results and to avoid potentially irrelevant and time consuming actions by a staff.

**Challenges to design in the institutional domain.** No gain comes without a price. In the institutional domain, the price of design can be the perception of additional time constraints and a loss of influence. However, the institutional domain is in a more favorable position as to the factor of time than the operational one. The abandonment of internally focused, self-reflexive, time-consuming action to favor a more relevant future attentiveness will uncover hidden time resources.

Those hierarchical leaders who have to release a subordinate to a design group they do not lead might feel a loss of influence and control. The military’s role culture (with its power model) links position and rank with responsibility and knowledge, and eventually with the capability for creativity. Noncompliance with this paradigm is out of the question, and it thereby filters out any possibility of another heteronomy. However, overcoming this military tendency is a necessary condition for the higher goal of corporate progress. In this regard, design has a flattening function that creates a virtually leaner structure. When rank matters less than ideas, the organization is much more effective, scientifically speaking. Real transformation can happen that ensures the overall military organization’s relevance in the long term.

**Military Relevance and Design**

The methodology of design, a wartime innovation of the U.S. Army to cope with the operational challenges of 21st-century security environments and a conception for the practice of operational art, will assure the relevance of its doctrine in the coming years. Design should make operational forces capable of innovation without external imposition and lead the way to a true mission-command structure. Design complements existing concepts for operational art and expands the U.S. Joint and interagency community of practice and purpose. Design ideas have the undeniable potential for the U.S. Army to become a strategically thinking institution instead of remaining the tactically orientated force of the past.

In spite of contextual and cultural differences in approaches to military thought and operational problems, design can also inform German doctrine. Even more than the U.S. Army, the German armed forces’ thinking is tactically driven. For the long-term relevance of its doctrine and future interoperability, German armed forces should quickly enter the debate about the use of design and carry the debate into NATO.

Design is a driver for cultural change in both the operational and the institutional domains. In the institutional military, design can help spur a rethinking of bureaucratic entanglements. It can also create a systemic “holding environment” in which military bureaucracy can overcome its intrinsically inertial mechanisms against responsiveness. The capability to think critically—deeply anchored in the military organization—and a supervised innovation that embraces a free flow of creativity while not violating necessary bureaucratic structures will eventually lead to a true learning organization.

If simultaneously applied in the operational and the institutional domain, design can provide for a common operational picture across the military to empower the coherence of processes, practices, and the congruence between speaking and doing. This can lead to rapprochement of both domains and defragmentation of the services, enhancing the military’s overall long-term relevance.

2. For instance, Department of Defense (DOD), higher commands, military agencies without operational missions.


4. The design team is co-chaired by Commander CAC and Director Army Capabilities and Integration Center. Its core members are Combined Army Doctrine Directorate, Joint and Army Concept Division, Defense, Joint and Army Concept Division, Defense, Joint and Army Concept Division, Defense, and Operations. Assisting members are TRADOC centers, operational headquarters, service and joint headquarters, senior service colleges, other government agencies, and multinational doctrine centers.

5. HDv 3-0, c. 6-1.

6. Concept Development & Experimentation Directorate, Army Capabilities and Integration Center; U.S. TRADOC, “Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design Overview Briefing” (2 February 2009).

7. Director School of Advanced Military Studies, COL Stefan J. Banach, 8 April 2009.


10. There is discussion in literature as to the optimal group size. In the military environment, this decision should be left to the commander’s discretion based on experience required, the problem on hand, the degree of creativity needed, time constraints, and outcome.

11. HDV 100/200 Führungssystem der Landstreitkräfte (Command System Land Forces) comprises aspects of FM 5-0 too.


16. HDV 100/100, 1.c. 13242, 13240, 13240, 13245, 5008. Synonymic use of the “art of troop command” and the U.S. term “operational art” in German Army doctrine.


19. The design team is co-chaired by Commander CAC and Director Army Capabilities and Integration Center. Its core members are Combined Army Doctrine Directorate, Joint and Army Concept Division, Defense, Joint and Army Concept Division, Defense, and Operations. Assisting members are TRADOC centers, operational headquarters, service and joint headquarters, senior service colleges, other government agencies, and multinational doctrine centers.

20. FM 3-0, c. 6-1.


22. Director School of Advanced Military Studies, COL Stefan J. Banach, 8 April 2009.


25. There is discussion in literature as to the optimal group size. In the military environment, this decision should be left to the commander’s discretion based on experience required, the problem on hand, the degree of creativity needed, time constraints, and outcome.

26. HDV 100/200 Führungssystem der Landstreitkräfte (Command System Land Forces) comprises aspects of FM 5-0 too.


Introduction by General Peter W. Chiarelli

We, as leaders, must contribute to the development and growth of our profession and our Army by encouraging and nurturing the learning process. We must be willing to challenge the status quo and promote honest, professional discussions, and even debate, about important issues. This paper was the result of my request for a think piece that would encourage discussion on the topic of rapid deployment capability versus survivability in light of our experiences over the past eight years. The thoughts expressed are those solely of the authors but provide a good start point for the discussion. Our Army of today is comprised of smart, aggressive, innovative, flexible leaders at every level who have a wealth of experience after eight years of persistent engagement. As the Army develops equipment and spins it out to the field, Soldiers are constantly finding new and innovative ways to adapt and employ the technology we provide them. It has been this way throughout our history. Whether driving the M4 tank in World War II or the M1A2 Abrams today, whether flying the Huey in Vietnam or the Blackhawk today, it always has been, and continues to be, our people who make the equipment work and accomplish the mission. It is the adaptive, intuitive nature of our Soldiers and leaders that makes it better. We must never forget that.

The time has come for our profession to question a long-standing belief in the power of information technology to remove the fog of war. Major acquisition programs were initiated and continued in the belief that the Army could accept risk in survivability to achieve rapid deployment capability. “Perfect” situational awareness gained through a network of sensors and information-sharing devices became a substitute for passive armor. Yet the modern battlefield has illustrated the limits of sensor technology in preventing attacks on our Soldiers. The organizational response to purchasing improved armored vehicles is a testament to the realities that we face an enemy who...
can still get the first shot and that movement to contact is not extinct. As a profession that answers to the American public, we have an obligation to question the trade-off between survivability and rapid deployment capability in light of battlefield realities. We owe it to our Soldiers who are shedding their blood every day on the battlefield. This is not an argument against technological improvements, but rather a reassessment of priorities and assumptions based on what we’ve learned in today’s conflicts.

As leaders and as professionals, we should vigorously debate this issue because the outcome will define the composition of our Army in the decades to come. Become part of the discussion, whether via personal discussions, educational forums, professional writing, or blog postings. Make your voice heard. Through these discussions, we will truly help the organization learn and adapt for future requirements.

—General Peter Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

T HE CENTRAL EXPERIENCES that guided Army Transformation during the last two decades have been the difficulties of deploying army combat forces and the nature of missions during the 1990s that seemed to call into question the Army’s relevance in an age of peacekeeping operations and precision weaponry. In light of most military operations before 2003, trading a certain amount of seemingly excessive protection to gain strategic and operational mobility made a good deal of sense. However, the primacy of rapid deployability as the driving factor for force design necessarily increased survivability risk to our Soldiers as the Army attempted to reduce combat vehicle weight to enable rapid deployment by C-130 aircraft.

The Army decided that lighter vehicles were acceptable. Network-centric technologies, some thought, would reduce the “fog of war,” making the vehicles less vulnerable. This vision of combat portrays the battlefield as a networked system with an array of targets that can be incapacitated by the proper application of precision fires. This vision has held sway in spite of mounting operational experiences in the Balkans, Kurdistan, and Haiti that demonstrated these standoff capabilities were not essential to mission success. Although these operations brought into question the importance of the “network” component of the transformed Army, they remained largely devoid of close combat and thus they did not expose the potential vulnerability of a force primarily dependent on the network of sensors and long-range fires for its protection. However, the Army later discovered in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq that network-centric warfare advocates underestimated the nature of future combat at the muddy-boot or dirty-track level and overestimated the capability of technologies designed to identify or suppress the enemy before he engaged Army forces. The Army found that it needed to engage the enemy (violently or nonviolently) at close range, that friendly forces did not always make the decision of where and when an engagement would occur, and that Army forces still required the capability to survive unexpected contact.

In spite of these recent experiences that supply ample lessons about the importance of survivability and the limits of technology, weapon system deployability continues to trump crew member survivability in future force design. The lessons learned in operations, at the cost of Soldiers’ lives and limbs, have exposed the vulnerabilities of the network-centric vision of warfare. The enemy’s ability to circumvent technology and to exploit technological vulnerabilities calls into question the foundational assumption of network-centric warfare. While these technologies provide benefit in some situations, the Army is in danger of incurring too much force-protection risk in pursuit of an expeditionary objective while expecting network-centric technologies to make up the difference in the reduced passive armor protection that protects Soldiers from a variety of direct and indirect fire engagements. The consequences of this misplaced priority are too great to ignore and are, unfortunately, measured in the loss of Soldiers’ lives. Survivability of Soldiers must take precedence over rapid deployment of equipment. If the Army does not incorporate the lessons learned from recent...
battle experience and design equipment with appropriate and effective force-protection measures, it risks losing the confidence of the American public.

The Army’s Role in Future Conflict

Any discussion concerning the priorities for the design of future forces must begin with the role of the Army in future conflict. Without an understanding of what is expected of the Army, debate about the trade-off between rapid deployment capability and survivability can lead to the wrong conclusion. Army doctrine clearly describes future expectations for an expeditionary, campaign-quality Army that is proficient at full spectrum operations. In response to trends of modern warfare, the Department of Defense recently placed competency in irregular warfare on equal footing with proficiency in conventional warfare. In layman’s terms, the Army fills the role of a “utility player” on the joint warfighting team. The Army must be able to conduct conventional warfare, hybrid warfare, irregular warfare, humanitarian assistance, stabilization operations, and any other mission America gives it. Fulfilling these multiple roles requires a versatile, flexible, agile force that can quickly adapt to the operating environment and mission in the theater of operations. The key to success in this environment is less about the equipment and more about leaders and Soldiers adapting to the situation.

The complexity of the mission requirements defy the concept of a “one-size-fits-all” force structure. There are too many variables and uncertainties to expect a homogenous army to be equally proficient and optimally organized for any mission in any scenario. Some situations will require a heavy force capable of conventional warfare, and others will require lighter forces capable of conducting irregular warfare in restricted terrain. This combination will most certainly require trade-offs in force structure, training proficiency, and future acquisition programs. While the Army often acknowledges these trade-offs, it must do a better job of clearly articulating and measuring them to understand the risks and potential costs of implementing its design priorities.

Trade-offs

As mentioned earlier, one of the first trade-offs is between rapid deployment capability and survivability. The pursuit of expeditionary capability is driving the Army towards lighter vehicles that can be deployed by air. Interestingly, Army doctrine acknowledges that the need to match forces to available lift requirements drives this capability, thereby implicitly subordinating survivability to deployability and designing a force that is optimized for transport rather than fighting. The reduction in weight comes at the expense of Soldier protection as armor is diminished to reduce the weight of the vehicle.

One example of this trade-off is the Stryker combat vehicle. The foremost design parameter for the Stryker was transportability—the vehicle had to be small and light enough to be transported by a C-130 aircraft. Meeting this design criterion required reduced passive armor protection. The Stryker provided passive protection against heavy caliber machine guns, but once deployed, Stryker units were soon fighting an enemy armed with rocket-propelled grenades. Additional armor added to the Stryker increased its survivability against this new threat, but the increased weight and larger dimensions meant that without removing the supplemental armor the vehicle was no longer deployable by the C-130.

As the Iraqi conflict continued, additional protection was added to the Stryker. Department of the Army-directed sanctions included improvements such as blast shields around crew hatches and the driver’s compartment to improve passive armor protection. On their own, Soldiers added Kevlar blankets, ballistic glass shields, sniper screens, sandbags, and 5-gallon water cans filled with sand/oil mixture. All of these modifications were attempts to increase passive protection against evolving threats. With the added armor, the Stryker is now more effective for the missions it has been given, and Soldier confidence in the vehicle is high. However, this additional armor also prevents it from fitting inside a C-130.
This trade-off between force protection and rapid deployment requires the Army to solve a difficult problem: in the contemporary operating environment, is it more important to deploy a force quickly or to arrive with a force that can sustain heavy combat with the enemy? Judging from its acquisition programs, the Army’s current answer is to deploy faster and accept the risk. However, lessons learned in most recent conflicts, the enduring characteristics of warfare, and the future role of the Army suggest the Army should change its priorities and have survivability, rather than deployability, as the key performance parameter of any future system. This is not to say the Army should move toward a single solution of mega-ton combat vehicles to achieve perfect Soldier protection. Nevertheless, when having to decide between deployability and a slight improvement in survivability, the Army should choose survivability.

How Fast is Fast Enough?

The Army should also consider how fast it needs to respond to possible contingencies and what combat capability it requires for those contingencies. Rapid deployability may not be the best measure of the Army’s expeditionary capability. Additionally, the Army should clearly identify how other services contribute to the expeditionary capability of the entire joint community to ensure it is pursuing a unique capability beyond that which already exists.

Army doctrine is ambiguous about deployment requirements, using such phrases as “rapidly deploy” and “quickly deploy on short notice.” Initially, the objective was to design a medium-weight brigade combat team that could deploy anywhere in the world 96 hours after notification. Rather than having been derived from a plausible combat scenario, this objective seems to have served as a catalyst for lighter force design. Given the limitations of strategic airlift, the current capabilities of the joint force in rapid response, and the most likely contingencies, this 96-hour objective may not be possible or necessary for the entire force. If strategic airlift cannot deliver the newly designed force within the established time line, and if there are few scenarios that require rapid deployment capability, then it is time the Army questioned the design criteria that forced it to accept survivability risk.
Perhaps it is sufficient for the Army to design a portion of the force for rapid deployment for contingencies that require an immediate response, while designing the rest of the force to survive in full spectrum operations. By relaxing the ambitious, 96-hour deployment goal, the Army can go a long way in solving the trade-off predicament derived from making rapid deployment the driver of design.

**A Broader Look at Survivability**

In the simplest sense, survivability helps prevent casualties during expeditionary, full spectrum operations. In the trade-off between deployability and survivability, survivability refers to a vehicle’s ability to withstand direct hits from enemy fire. It is a subset of the larger concept of force protection, which includes an entire suite of capabilities that enable Soldiers to survive. This suite includes passive armor, but also extends to network-centric warfare capabilities that help avoid engagement by the enemy, updated doctrine that enables units to perform more effectively, and improved training that makes leaders and Soldiers more competent in combat operations.

Ideally, the Army would like to achieve 100 percent protection for its Soldiers, but the complexity and uncertainty of war make this an unattainable goal. Although there is no way to protect a Soldier from every threat on the modern battlefield, the only relatively certain way to survive the inevitable, unexpected first contact with the enemy is through sufficient passive protection. We do not propose a future force design that equips the army with 100-ton mobile pillboxes invulnerable to enemy weaponry. However, at least a portion of the force should retain some capability at the higher end of the protection spectrum, and all of the force (both combat and support units) should have satisfactory passive protection against the most likely threats. This level of force protection should be the priority over rapid deployment capability.

Any discussion about survivability and force protection should expand the scope of survivability and fully consider the ramifications of not having enough protection. For instance, survivability is about more than protecting individual combat Soldiers. Force protection and survivability considerations must also extend to combat support and combat service support elements of the Army’s deploying units. On the modern noncontiguous battlefield, all forces are susceptible to attack from an enemy who seeks to engage the logistical support units in locations the Army previously considered safe from enemy influence. To ignore improving the survivability of these forces is a neglect the Army cannot tolerate and a risk the Army should not accept.

Human factors also increase the importance of survivability. Appropriate force protection makes Soldiers more confident and more willing to accept necessary risks to complete the mission. From the...
Soldier’s perspective, the most tangible form of protection against enemy fire is passive armor. One need not look far to find examples of Soldiers who installed various forms of improvised armor on their HMMWVs and Strykers during combat operations in Iraq. Soldiers felt more secure and were more confident and aggressive in the conduct of their mission, regardless of whether or not the armor actually helped protect the vehicle.

Additionally, force protection gives commanders more options to develop the situation when information about the enemy is ambiguous or unavailable. Numerous historical examples from Operation Iraqi Freedom highlight the benefit of armor in developing an uncertain situation in the face of enemy fire. Passive armor was an important factor in giving commanders tactical options because they knew their forces could survive on a battlefield with imperfect situational awareness.

Finally, the Army must provide sufficient protection for its Soldiers to maintain the trust of the American public. The public expects war to result in as few casualties as possible—both civilian and military. America, in general, has confidence in the Army and expects it to do everything possible to protect its Soldiers. However, a significant backlash could occur if the Army does not incorporate the lessons learned about survivability from Iraq and Afghanistan in future force design. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s comment about “going to war with the Army you have, not the Army you want” leads to the question, “What kind of Army does America want for future warfare?” While the American public does not often think about the topic of survivability, it is a safe assumption that it would choose a well-protected Army over an Army that can deploy somewhere quickly. The Army risks undermining the confidence of the American public if it pursues rapid deployment capabilities at the expense of survivability and many Soldiers suffer preventable casualties in the next conflict.

Survivability versus Rapid Deployment

The operational environment is noncontiguous, requiring support units to be as survivable as combat units; population-centric, requiring units to operate in the midst of an enemy who lives among the population; and rapidly changing in intensity, requiring survivable units across the conflict spectrum. Passive armor protection that increases survivability during close combat is a necessity. Although warfare has changed in the past 20 years, movement to contact at the tactical level is not extinct. The common characteristic of most engagements in today’s environment is that the enemy is only identified when he fires at friendly elements. Information dominance and various electronic and active countermeasures augment force protection, but they cannot match the primary means for survival—having passive armor protection and competent Soldiers.

In the future, Soldiers will be expected to use force in a manner that does not maximize lethality. This will require combat forces to expose themselves more frequently without relying on massive firepower. A campaign-quality army must maintain a sustained presence in an unstable and dynamic operational environment—one that will often require a consistent level of passive protection to facilitate interaction with the population. This extended mission will provide the enemy time to figure out and exploit weaknesses in the network-centric technologies—increasing the need for different methods to provide protection. Additionally, most missions will not require rapid deployment capability; the Army will have weeks and in some cases months to deploy.

Finally, the Army should prioritize survivability over deployability because the Army’s enduring professional values and its relationship with the American public require it to pursue every available option to improve Soldiers’ protection. This is a fundamental responsibility of Army leaders for an all-volunteer force in an era of persistent conflict.

How Should the Army Invest

Survivability cannot be solely about passive armor. The Army should continue with the holistic approach to force protection, which includes
investments in some network-centric warfare technologies. However, as the Army considers where to invest scarce dollars, it should be cautious about placing too much faith in network-centric technology as the primary source of force protection. Network-centric technology can work in some scenarios, but the capabilities are relatively easy for the enemy to bypass and are limited by the characteristics of future battle (close combat, urban environment, interaction with the population).

Furthermore, network-centric technology is a materiel solution for the type of warfare that will be characterized by human interaction and adaptability. Removing the fog of war through network-centric technology is not possible. There will always be uncertainty and a corresponding requirement to survive an unexpected first contact.

Finally, network-centric technology does not envision a battlefield characterized by close interaction with people and the enemy—the very type of interaction that is almost universally accepted as the norm for future warfare. Because of these limitations, the Army should not bet on network-centric warfare technology to be the primary means of force protection.

The Army should avoid or stop investing in programs that provide less force protection than the current force structure. As the Army enters an era where budgets will decrease, any future force added to the current force mix should provide a leap-ahead capability in survivability. In a budget-constrained environment, the Army cannot afford to invest in programs that do not provide capability well beyond that which already exists in the force structure. If an overall investment only results in similar capability, the Army would be better off spending its money on proven technologies it can use now rather than unproven technologies that provide similar capabilities sometime in the future. The Army should ask itself: what niche in the current force mix does the new system fill more effectively than what the Army already possesses? Is the capability the new force provides sufficiently different to warrant the cost? If the new force does not provide a unique capability beyond the current force mix, then further investment is not warranted.

Investments in human capital development and improved armor packages are more likely to provide a higher return in force protection and operational capability in the contemporary operating environment than investments in network-centric warfare technologies. The understanding that there are diminishing returns to what network-centric technologies contribute to operational capability should guide future investments. Just because a network-centric technology adds some improvement to operational capability does not mean it results in the greatest increase to operational capability.

A campaign-quality Army must be capable of sustained ground combat operations for an indefinite period. Yet, the longer the Army conducts a campaign, the greater the opportunity for the enemy...
to adapt and bypass the technological advantage designed to contribute to force protection. Passive armor and leader competence will be the best forms of protection when the enemy inevitably figures out a way to penetrate the technology protection bubble. Investment in human capital should include increasing leader development training, retaining the highest quality Soldiers and leaders, and managing personnel more effectively to ensure the Army has an “expeditionary mind-set” capable of adapting to the situation. Investment in improved armor could include extensive materials research and vehicle designs that allow the Army to install scalable armor packages on combat vehicles tailored to the local threat and the commander’s assessment. In order to have a campaign-quality army that provides sustained ground presence in a complex environment with an adaptive enemy, these investments must take priority over rapid deployment capability.

The Way Ahead

As the Army continues developing forces for full spectrum operations, it must not succumb to the temptation to pursue rapid response capability at the expense of force protection and survivability. With an environment of persistent conflict and shrinking budgets, the Army may find itself tempted to search for the “silver bullet” of network-centric technology to erase the fog of war and protect Soldiers through perfect situational awareness. However, nothing in the Army’s current or historical experience of warfare points to a battlefield where such information dominance is possible. In the complex, confusing, and often chaotic missions of the future, the enemy will bypass or circumvent network-centric warfare technologies. When that happens, all that remains to protect a Soldier is the passive armor protection of his vehicle and his ability to fight. If we sacrifice passive protection in the name of rapid response, then we have handicapped our units for the most difficult aspect of their mission—closing with and destroying an enemy that hides among the local population. We have learned this lesson on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army cannot afford to ignore it. To do so would mean having too many Soldiers return home in body bags at the beginning of the next war because the Army depended too much on network-centric technology to protect them. It is time for the Army to put survivability in its rightful place. **MR**

NOTES

2. "Expeditionary capability is the ability to promptly deploy combined arms forces worldwide into any operational environment and operate effectively upon arrival." FM 3-0, paras. 1-71, 1-16.
3. Ibid.
4. One of the research team members, Colonel Jeffrey D. Peterson, commanded a Stryker-equipped Task Force in Baghdad from July 2006–September 2007. He has personal experience with the additional armor protection added to the Stryker vehicle and use of the vehicle in full spectrum operations.
5. A similar story could be told about the HMMWV. For example, the 2d Cavalry Regiment was rapidly deployed to Iraq and equipped with an earlier version of the HMMWV that didn’t provide protection against machine gun fire. As the unit operated in Sadr City, it quickly began to add steel plates to the vehicle’s undercarriage and doors to provide more protection against the emerging IED threat. These were the first steps in adding armor packages to HMMWVs in Iraq. The continued quest for passive armor protection eventually resulted in a mine-resistant, ambush-protected military vehicle. Once again, the importance of passive armor protection emerged as a critical factor for combat operations.
7. There is a common belief that America is casualty-averse. The most commonly cited example of the public’s low tolerance for casualties was the Battle of Mogadishu during which 18 American casualties precipitated the withdrawal of combat forces from Somalia. However, detailed historical analysis and survey data do not support the conclusion of casualty aversion in America. For a thorough examination of this topic, refer to Richard Lacquement, “The Casualty-Aversion Myth,” Naval War College Review (Winter, 2004).
8. "Campaign capability... is an ability to conduct sustained operations for as long as necessary, adapting to unpredictable and often profound changes in the operational environment as the campaign unfolds." FM 3-0, paras. 1-74, 1-16.
Lieutenant Colonel Mike Ryan, U.S. Army, and Captain Jason Coats, U.S. Army

Change is the law of life. Those who only look to the past or to the present are certain to miss the future.

—President John F. Kennedy

The past 24 months have been a period of dynamic change in Iraq. Beginning with the U.S. troop surge in 2007, a number of factors have combined to create improvements in Iraq’s security situation that would have been all but unimaginable only a few years ago.

In addition to gains brought about later by the “surge,” the Anbar Awakening and the subsequent Sons of Iraq program helped bring stability to areas of Iraq that had previously been hotbeds for Al-Qaeda and sectarian violence. Similarly, the cease-fire declared by Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al Sadr significantly reduced attacks on coalition forces by Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi and other militias. Finally, intensive training and partnering efforts between coalition forces and Iraqi security forces have begun to pay dividends, as the Iraqi forces steadily developed into a highly capable force.

With the improved security situation, the Iraqi government has taken steps to reinforce Iraq’s status as a sovereign, independent nation. The most notable of these steps was implementing the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.

This article looks at selected provisions of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, focusing on the portions of the agreement that affect U.S. military operations at the tactical level. It examines how, under the terms of the agreement, U.S. forces in Iraq have largely transitioned from intelligence-driven, unilateral combat operations to warrant-based operations led by Iraqi security forces. The article also discusses Iraqi jurisdiction over U.S. forces—an area of significant concern to U.S. commanders.

From Blank Check to Strict Guidelines

From April 2003 through December 2008, the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq operated under the broad, permissive mandate of a series of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). The last of these resolutions—UNSCR
1790—was issued in December 2007. Like its predecessors, UNSCR 1790 authorized the coalition to “take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.”

The resolution’s “all necessary measures” language gave coalition forces in Iraq a tremendous amount of latitude. Acting under the resolution’s broad mandate, coalition forces conducted unilateral combat operations, captured and held detainees indefinitely, built bases, and stationed military forces throughout Iraq, often without the consent or approval of the government of Iraq.

By the spring of 2008, Iraq’s security situation had vastly improved, and increasingly competent Iraqi security forces began to take the lead for security in many of the country’s key provinces. In the United States, the 2008 presidential election was in full swing, and with popular support for the war ebbing, the leading candidates from both parties pledged to make wholesale changes to U.S. Iraq policy if they were elected in November. Just as importantly, the coalition’s legal authority to operate in Iraq—UNSCR 1790—was set to expire on 31 December 2008. Without a new UNSCR or some other grant of international legal authority, the United States would be without a legal basis for conducting operations in Iraq in 2009.

Given the overall lack of enthusiasm among the international community for U.S.-led operations in Iraq, obtaining a new UN Security Council Resolution seemed highly unlikely. Accordingly, U.S. and Iraqi officials began the difficult task of constructing an agreement that would outline not only the conditions for U.S. withdrawal, but also the status of U.S. forces in Iraq from 2009 forward.

U.S. negotiators entered into talks hoping to buy enough time for U.S. and Iraqi forces to capitalize on the hard-fought security gains of the past two years. For its part, the Iraqi government quickly asserted its newfound sense of independence by proposing a number of restrictions on U.S. operations along with a date certain for U.S. forces withdrawal. As is normally the case when nations negotiate with each other, the end result was a grand compromise.

Iraq’s cabinet approved the final version of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement on 16 November 2008. The following day, U.S. and Iraqi officials signed the agreement making it binding on both countries. The final agreement was contained in two separate documents: the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, and the Agreement between the United States of America on Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq.

The first document is a broad statement of principles, the second (the one now commonly referred to as the Security Agreement) includes 30 separate articles covering a wide range of topics, from Iraqi criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel, to taxes, licenses, and property rights. On 1 January 2009, the new agreement replaced UNSCR 1790 as the legal authority for U.S. military operations in Iraq.

In contrast to the broad authority granted to the U.S.-led coalition by UN resolutions, the U.S. Iraq-Security Agreement unquestionably puts the Iraqi government in the driver’s seat. From the outset, the agreement makes it clear that U.S. presence in Iraq is both temporary and at the invitation of the Iraqi government. Not only does the agreement contain a number of very specific constraints and limitations on U.S. personnel and operations, it also includes dates for the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities, and for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces as a whole.

... the agreement makes it clear that U.S. presence in Iraq is both temporary and at the invitation of the Iraqi government.

The Security Agreement and U.S. Operations

The articles of the Security Agreement with the most profound effect on U.S. operations are Articles 3, 4, and 22. A brief synopsis of these articles follows:

- Article 3: Respect for Laws. This article requires U.S. military forces and civilians working with the military in Iraq to “respect Iraqi laws, customs, and traditions.” The U.S. interpretation of this article is that it does not require strict obedience to every Iraqi law; rather, it requires U.S. forces to conduct operations in accordance with Iraqi law to...
the extent possible, and to adhere to the Security Agreement in good faith.

- Article 4: Missions. Article 4 is one of the agreement’s most important provisions. It spells out the baseline rules for U.S. military operations, stating, “the Government of Iraq requests the temporary assistance of U.S. forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq’s efforts to maintain internal security and stability, to include combat operations against Al-Qaeda, other terrorists and outlaw groups.” It further states that “U.S. combat operations will be carried out with the agreement of the Government of Iraq and will be fully coordinated with Iraqi authorities.” Finally, this article reiterates the idea expressed in Article 3 by stating, “U.S. Military operations will be conducted with full respect for the Iraqi Constitution and the laws of Iraq.”

- Article 22: Detention. This article addresses an area that is particularly sensitive to Iraqis—the detention of Iraqi citizens by U.S. forces. Key provisions state that “no detention or arrest may be carried out by U.S. forces except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with Iraqi law” and “in the event U.S. forces arrest or detain an individual, they are required to turn the detainee over to a competent Iraqi authority—preferably an Iraqi judge—within 24 hours.” Most important, this article also states, “U.S. forces will not search houses or other real estate without a search warrant issued by an Iraqi judge.”

**Article 4 of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement**

Article 4 is one of the more unique aspects of the U.S.-Iraq Security agreement. Unlike other international agreements to which the United States is a party, the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement authorizes U.S. forces to conduct combat operations in the host nation. While some have cited Article 4 as blanket authority for U.S. unilateral combat operations in Iraq, a closer examination of its language shows that the permission granted by this article is not without its limitations. In fact, the parameters set by Article 4 differ markedly from the carte blanche operational authority granted by the security resolutions that preceded it.

Article 4 begins by stating that U.S. assistance to Iraq will be temporary. While “temporary” is not defined in the agreement, it is reasonable to conclude that the term indicates Iraq’s desire to limit the period of time that U.S. combat forces remain in Iraq. Article 4 also singles out a relatively specific enemy set, stating that U.S. assistance to Iraq will include “cooperation in the conduct of operations against Al-Qaeda, other terrorists, and outlaw groups.” This provision arguably keeps U.S. combat forces from being involved in operations outside the counterterrorist realm.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Article 4 requires the government of Iraq to agree with U.S. operations, which the United States must coordinate with the Iraqi authorities and conduct with respect for the Iraqi Constitution and Iraqi law. Because most U.S. units habitually partner with Iraqi security forces, the approval and coordination requirements of Article 4 are not as onerous as they might initially seem. This fact notwithstanding, it is undeniable that Article 4 has significantly curtailed U.S. forces’ ability to conduct unilateral combat operations in Iraq.
As discussed in the next section, current U.S. conventional operations in Iraq are conducted almost exclusively “by, with, and through” Iraqi security forces, with the vast majority of missions executed pursuant to arrest warrants issued by Iraqi courts.

Warrant-Based Operations

The provisions of Articles 3 and 4 that mandate the United States to conduct operations with respect for Iraqi law and the concomitant warrant requirements of Article 22 have had a significant impact. In the new operational environment, some commanders have even quipped that the old military axiom, “intelligence drives maneuver,” should be changed to “evidence drives maneuver.” While this observation is in jest, it contains a certain amount of truth. A brief look at how commanders obtain warrants illustrates how much things have changed in Iraq.

In the Iraqi legal system, an investigative judge normally issues arrest warrants. The investigative judge is similar to a magistrate in the U.S. system, one of his primary functions being to review evidence or criminal complaints to determine whether probable cause exists to issue an arrest warrant. Investigative hearings are relatively informal, with the investigative judge asking most of the questions of the witnesses. Once a judge issues a warrant and Iraqi security forces detain an individual, investigative judges review the evidence and determine whether to incarcerate the detainee pending trial. If the investigative judge feels further detention is necessary, he will issue a detention order.

Since the implementation of the Security Agreement, U.S. commanders have become well versed in obtaining arrest warrants and detention orders from investigative judges. Most U.S. divisions and brigades have formed law enforcement task forces made up of individuals with the relevant expertise. The organization of each task force varies slightly; however, most include judge advocates, military police, intelligence analysts, and one or more U.S. contractors known as law enforcement professionals or “LEPs.” These professionals are a relatively new addition to the fight in Iraq. Most are retired police officers from cities around the United States who assist U.S. forces with law enforcement-related tasks and training. The expertise and experience these law enforcement professionals provide has been invaluable during the transition to warrant-based operations.

To obtain warrants, U.S. units routinely use three kinds of information: testimony and sworn statements from witnesses, forensic evidence, and information obtained through various intelligence-collection methods. Because the Iraqi criminal justice system has traditionally been testimony- and confession-based, Iraqi investigative judges are generally most comfortable with testimonial evidence. As a result, U.S. forces secure most warrants and detention orders by presenting witness testimony and sworn statements to an investigative judge. U.S. forces can also obtain warrants by going to the local provincial court or by going to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. The chart on the following page provides an overview of the process.

Methods for presenting witness testimony vary. Some units bring the investigative judge and the necessary witnesses to the nearest forward operating base and allow the judge to conduct the hearing there. For many, this is the most preferable course of action, since it provides a secure location for the hearing and helps protect the identity of the judge and the witnesses. In other cases, units help transport local witnesses to the provincial courthouse where the investigative judge takes their testimony—usually in his office.

As noted above, forensic evidence is sometimes used to secure Iraqi arrest warrants. However, forensic evidence is still a relatively new concept to many Iraqi judges, and many are uncomfortable using fingerprints, ballistic evidence, blood typing, or DNA as a substitute for testimony. To address this challenge, U.S. forces—primarily Army judge advocates and military police—have developed innovative programs to train Iraqi judges and Iraqi prosecutors on forensic evidence. In a companion effort, U.S. police training teams have worked to train Iraqi police on basic crime scene investigation techniques and the fundamentals of actually securing forensic evidence. Finally, U.S. explosive ordinance disposal experts have made great...
Overview of the Warrant Process

strides in teaching the Iraqi Army how to collect basic forensic evidence at the site of improvised explosive device blasts and at the point of origin and point of impact of rocket and mortar attacks. While undoubtedly still the exception, not the rule, Iraqi judges are slowly but surely beginning to understand and accept forensic evidence as the basis for arrest warrants.

By far, the most difficult and sensitive task for U.S. commanders involves using information gathered through various intelligence collection methods to secure Iraqi arrest warrants. The threshold issue, of course, is that very few Iraqi judges are vetted and cleared to view U.S. intelligence products. In a perfect world, each Iraqi province would have at least one judge vetted and cleared—much like the judges assigned to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in the United States. In reality, though, there are very few judges with the proper U.S. security clearance, and the vetting process is lengthy, complex, and rife with bureaucratic impediments. Some U.S. special operations units have had limited success in this realm; U.S. conventional force units rarely have.

Once the judge issues the warrant, most U.S. units act on the target in a combined operation with their Iraqi security force partners. By and large, Iraqi security forces take the lead in these operations, with U.S. forces in support. In addition to their overall competence, the Iraqis bring local knowledge, cultural sensitivity, and the ability to speak the language. In turn, U.S. forces provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, long-range communications, and lift aviation.

Generally speaking, U.S. forces set the outer cordon, and Iraqi security forces execute the warrant and detain the individual or individuals sought, and take them into Iraqi custody in an Iraqi detention facility. Because Article 22 of the Security Agreement mandates that the U.S. turn over captured Iraqis to a competent Iraqi authority within 24 hours, there is little or no utility in U.S. forces actually taking physical custody of detainees. Should U.S. forces need to interrogate the detainee later, they can do so in the Iraqi facility with permission from the Iraqi authorities.

Iraqi Jurisdiction over U.S. Personnel

The Security Agreement’s provisions on Iraqi legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel are a major area of concern for U.S. commanders. As previously discussed, U.S. forces and the civilian personnel who support them are “invitees” to Iraq. The Security Agreement inaugurated a new relationship between two sovereign nations. Iraq insisted on its right to exercise legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel for violations of Iraqi law. During negotiations, the United States was obliged to make certain concessions in this area.

Article 12 of the Security Agreement establishes Iraq’s primary right to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. U.S. personnel fall into three categories as defined by Article 2 of the agreement: members of the U.S. forces, members of the civilian component, and U.S. contractors and U.S. contractor employees. Members of U.S. forces and members of the civilian component enjoy very limited exposure to Iraqi legal jurisdiction. For Iraq to exercise legal jurisdiction over these individuals, certain criteria must be met. The individual must first be suspected of committing a grave premeditated felony. That suspect must also have committed the felony while the individual was in an off-duty status and outside of any agreed upon U.S.-controlled facility or area. An important point to emphasize is that members of the U.S. Armed Forces will not expose themselves to Iraqi legal
jurisdiction for actions they take in self-defense situations as defined by U.S. rules of engagement. The agreement considers these actions as having occurred while in duty status, with no exceptions.

An additional protection U.S. forces and civilian component members enjoy is minimal exposure to Iraqi custody. All individuals are required to carry a chit card, which they are to produce in the case of an attempted arrest by Iraqi authorities. This card states that the individual is in an on-duty status, is not to be arrested, and is to be returned to U.S. military control immediately. Article 12 mandates that in the event Iraqi authorities arrest an individual, they must transfer him to U.S. custody within 24 hours of the arrest.

U.S. contractors and contractor employees do not enjoy the same limited exposure as U.S. forces and civilian component members. Article 12 provides that Iraq has the right of primary jurisdiction over these individuals for any suspected violation of Iraqi law. This is regardless of the individual’s duty status or location, i.e., U.S.-controlled facility or not, at the time of the alleged violation. In addition, Iraq has the right to maintain custody of these individuals during the investigation and prosecution of their alleged crimes. There is no chit card for U.S. contractors and their employees. They are unauthorized to carry the card provided to U.S. forces and government civilians.

Although security has drastically improved and attacks against U.S. forces have significantly declined, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance where a U.S. military or civilian component member would be off-duty and outside an agreed upon facility or area. However, in the future, as relations and security improve, such a circumstance is more conceivable. The more likely current situation involving Iraqi legal jurisdiction and custody will involve a U.S. contractor or contractor employee providing services outside a U.S.-controlled facility or area.

The implementation of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement has created a host of novel issues for U.S. commanders in Iraq. True to form, commanders, staffs, and troops at every level have risen to the occasion, and successfully adapted to a new and very different operational environment. Commanders bound for Iraq should become familiar with the United States-Iraq Security Agreement, as this document will unquestionably shape and frame U.S. operations for the foreseeable future.

**NOTES**

1. The “Sons of Iraq” are primarily young Sunni males who volunteered to assist Iraqi security forces and coalition forces with security in their local neighborhoods in exchange for a modest salary.

2. As one set of experts has noted, "The size and competence of ... Iraq [security] forces have allowed U.S. commanders to maintain population security even as U.S. troop strength has declined significantly since the surge." Stephen Biddle, Michael O'Hanlon, and Kenneth Pollack, "How to Leave a Stable Iraq," Foreign Affairs 5, October 2008.

3. In this article, the term U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement refers to The Agreement Between the United States of America on Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq.

4. The UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1790 on 18 December 2007 during its 5808th meeting.

5. The UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1511 on 16 October 2003 during its 4844th meeting. UNSCR 1511 authorized the creation of "a Multi-National Force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance and stability of Iraq."


7. Article 24 states: "All the United States forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011" and that "[a]ll United States combat forces shall withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities ... no later than June 30, 2009." The agreement does not define "combat forces" nor does it define what constitutes a "city, village, or locality."

8. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) was established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 USC § 1801). The FISC oversees requests for surveillance warrants against suspected foreign intelligence agents inside the United States by federal police agencies.

9. Members of the U.S. forces: any individual who is a member of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard (Security Agreement, Article 2). Member of the civilian component: any civilian employed by the United States Department of Defense. This term does not include individuals normally resident to Iraq, U.S. contractor and U.S. contractor employees: any non-Iraqi persons or legal entities, and their employees, who are citizens of the United States or a third country and who are in Iraq to supply goods, services, and security in Iraq to or on behalf of the United States forces under a contract or subcontract with or for the United States forces. However, the terms do not include persons or legal entities normally resident in the territory of Iraq.

10. Article 12, paragraph 8, states that a Joint Committee is responsible for establishing the list of grave, premeditated felonies. Until this occurs, Iraq may not exercise legal jurisdiction over members of the U.S. forces and of the civilian component.

11. Article 12, paragraph 9, provides that U.S. forces’ authorities will certify whether the individual was in off-duty status. Agreed facilities and areas is a list of locations owned by the Government of Iraq, but negotiated to be occupied and controlled by U.S. forces.

Paratroopers carry chairs after handing over their base in central Baghdad, Iraq, to the Iraqi security forces 22 May 2009.
In HIS FOREWORD to U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, General William Wallace emphasizes that victory in modern conflict will be achieved “only by conducting military operations in concert with diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts. Battlefield success is no longer enough; final victory requires concurrent stability operations to lay the foundation for lasting peace.”

Combat operations thus require further insight largely beyond the conventional canon of military training and expertise. In response to this emergent reality, the Army ushered in a new element to traditional arsenal of war: embedded provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs). These teams consist of a small civil-military cadre drawn from government agencies and experts at the brigade level. Task Force Marne was one of the first to host these groups, serving as home to four teams. Based on the Marne experience, I will examine the origins and definition of embedded provincial reconstruction teams. In challenging some basic assumptions, I will discuss the difficulties encountered as these teams formed and integrated into their brigade-level counterparts. Finally, I will offer recommendations to increase team effectiveness.

**Into the Surge**

By the spring of 2007, U.S. forces in Iraq began receiving the first influx of additional combatants in what came to be known as the “surge.” Simultaneous to this influx was a less publicized discussion about how, beyond military prowess, the United States could directly leverage the full complement of its national power to support the “on-the-ground” efforts of the warfighters. The answer, first articulated in the January 2007 “New Way Forward” speech by President George W. Bush, was to expand the provincial...
reconstruction team concept to create embedded teams. The embedded teams were a joint and interagency construct that “represents the civilian contribution to the military surge.” Department of State Foreign Service officers joined with experts from the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Justice, and contracted specialists from various backgrounds to form a collaborative cell of civilian experts. This cell, augmented with a mid-level military officer as deputy, became a direct component of the maneuver brigades.

Task Force Marne is the element that commanded the Multi-National Division-Center from March 2007 until June 2008. The unit’s operational environment covered an area of 23,190 square miles stretching from the Saudi Arabian border in the West to the Iranian border in the East, encompassing four full provinces (Babil, Karbala, Najaf, and Wasit) and the two largest qadas (counties) of Baghdad Province, Mada’in and Mahmudiyah.

Provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq divide into two primary categories: “paired” and “embedded.” Paired provincial reconstruction teams are largely stand-alone entities, with robust Manning structures and dedicated movement security teams. Their mandate includes government engagement at the provincial level.

Embedded teams, on the other hand, are fully entrenched at the brigade combat team level, sharing the space, resources, and hardships of the units with which they partner. These embedded teams have a capacity-building mandate to engage the Iraqi government and population at the local level and support the brigade’s counterinsurgency effort. Theoretically, these embedded teams have a four-person core element: a team leader, deputy team leader, United States Agency for International Development representative, and bilingual-bicultural advisor. A bilingual-bicultural advisor is a subject matter expert who is native to the region and provides insight to the cultural dimension. Around this core, additional specialized personnel are added based on their availability and the specific mission requirements. A baseline team of 7 to 11 personnel is normal.

In the spring of 2008, Task Force Marne had five paired provincial reconstruction teams and four embedded provincial reconstruction teams operating in its “battlespace.” The Baghdad provincial reconstruction team, whose mandate extended to all of Baghdad Province, shared an overlapping relationship that included Multi-National Division-Baghdad. The Babil team, along with the nominal operations of the Karbala and Najaf teams, operated from the Regional Embassy Office in Hillah. The other provincial reconstruction team was in Wasit Province, near the provincial center of Al Kut. Marne’s four embedded teams were known as “Baghdad 4,” “Baghdad 7,” “Baghdad 8,” and “North Babil.” This served as the crucible which tested the embedded provincial reconstruction team concept and revealed areas of weakness and strength.

### Embedded Team Pedigree and the Afghan Catalyst

The success of the TORCH operation is critically dependent upon the reactions of the authorities, inhabitants and troops of North Africa. With this in mind, General Eisenhower has on his staff a Civil Administrative Section to coordinate the civil and political matters in immediate relation to the operation. He urgently requests that men from the State Department be released to serve on this body... [T]he War Department should undertake to carry out this operation in all respects, but the political and civil phase of the plan could be facilitated by the aid of the State Department.

—Memo, General George C. Marshall for President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 3 September 1942

Embedded provincial reconstruction teams call upon a varied pedigree. Although new, they did not emerge suddenly. The embedded teams are the third evolution of the broader provincial reconstruction team concept, which further traces its civil-military lineage at least to World War II. Battlefield commanders through the centuries have had little cause to consider an official role for civilians among their combat units. This view changed considerably during World War II, and it has been developing ever since. From brevet promotions and the implementation of the Marshall Plan, to codifying pacification efforts
through the Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later Rural) Development Support (called “CORDS”) program in Vietnam, and to the shared operational space of the Balkan conflicts, the direct role of civilians representing other instruments of national power on the battlefield has continued to evolve.

The Army’s counterinsurgency principles, formalized in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, call upon the Army to expand from its singular reliance on the standard sword and shield tools of war. This holistic approach leverages critical elements of society to look beyond a defeated enemy and achieve a more comprehensive victory. A clear example, and an early application of these principles, came when the provincial reconstruction team concept emerged in 2003 in Afghanistan as a precursor to the embedded teams.

The irregular environment of Afghanistan proved appropriate for examining the direct integration of nonlethal military activities using civilians. As FM 3-24 states, “Military forces can perform civilian tasks but often not as well as the civilian agencies with people trained in those skills. Further, military forces performing civilian tasks are not performing military tasks.”

Development is not an art in which the military is trained, nor does it seek to be an agency for the delivery of such a service. The military seeks to set the conditions for development, first establishing security and then providing a platform for the delivery of the immediate needs of the populace. Beyond this a gap occurs.

In Operation Enduring Freedom, something was missing between the immediate tactical application of military activity and the eventual concerted international community development effort. The U.S. government response in Afghanistan created the first provincial reconstruction team for this need. This effort initially was a stand-alone construct, physically apart from the primary military presence and imbued with a distinct nonlethal mandate. Components of this group were civilians, but it was a military organization with military leadership. The Afghanistan environment accorded a large degree of autonomy and the military hierarchy facilitated a degree of natural integration with overall military activities. As a group of combined experts, it largely bridged the development gap and opened the door for the insertion and expansion of the broader international community. Based on this modest success, the military exported the combined civilian-military approach of the provincial reconstruction team to the Iraq conflict.

In Iraq, the provincial reconstruction team program was restructured with a civilian emphasis. The teams now possessed Department of State leadership and a focus on civilian skill sets. The exception was the deputy team leader, usually a lieutenant colonel. By 2006, counterinsurgency principles began to take prominence in coalition force operations, leading to the surge and a devolved, community-centric focus. Expertise in areas such as local governance, business development, and agriculture was now a requirement. This course adjustment precipitated the evolution of the fundamental provincial reconstruction team concept into the embedded team concept.

Truth in Advertising

Embedded provincial reconstruction teams must affect the environment quickly. They must establish bona fides with the combatant commander, stake a claim to legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, and prove they are trustworthy interlocutors to the Iraqi leadership. However, team personnel usually arrive at a disadvantage when compared to their combatant counterparts. The combatant commander leads a robust and highly trained team, has experienced more time on the ground, owns comparatively vast resources, and exhibits a disdain for patience. Additionally, scant training, an unpredictable manning process, and an unfortunate misunderstanding of their mandate often undermine embedded teams. Despite tremendous promise, these groups often experience costly delays in establishing legitimacy and achieving effectiveness due to these largely foreseeable and correctable problems.

Erroneous Expectations

In Task Force Marne, embedded provincial reconstruction teams, as marketed, were more myth
and shadow than realities. This judgment is not to say that they were ineffectual but does suggest that their mission was made more difficult due to the way they were assembled and packaged. The mythology begins with the name “embedded provincial reconstruction team.” The title of a nonfiction book generally describes some truth about what the reader may expect to discover in its pages. A military commander, a host-nation-government official, or an average Iraqi citizen is likely to make some reasonable assumptions when beginning interactions with an organization that calls itself an embedded provincial reconstruction team. That the team provides a cohesive organized unit tasked with addressing reconstruction issues at the provincial level is certainly a reasonable expectation. However, this expectation, though reasonable, would be in error. Not because these groups do not fulfill their mandate, but because their mandate does not match their name; these differences are more than merely splitting hairs or semantics. The name carries ramifications for managing expectations and providing both guidance and structure to the group’s operations.

Three claims make up the label: provincial, reconstruction, and team. Taken individually it is clear how this label creates inherent difficulties in clarifying roles and establishing bona fides.

- **Provincial.** The mandate for embedded teams does not extend to the province. Their realm of interaction is sub-provincial. Aligned as they are with task-organized brigades, they cede provincial level interactions to provincial reconstruction teams, just as brigades defer to the division level. Therefore, they develop a sphere of influence that focuses on local level interactions, not provincial ones.\(^{12}\)

- **Reconstruction.** As a term of art, “reconstruction” may be interpreted as the full spectrum of activities necessary to provide a framework for social, economic, political, and military stability. However, to an Iraqi citizen or company commander, this word conjures an image of hard “brick and mortar” infrastructure projects. Thus, collaborators with the embedded teams inaccurately expect that construction contracts for schools, clinics, and the like will soon follow. While the actual mandate may only touch on infrastructure reconstruction, the expectations of others make actual mission accomplishment more difficult. Thus, the teams’ viability suffers.

- **Team.** The concept of “team” is critical and fundamental to the success of a civil-military group in a counterinsurgency environment. The embedded provincial reconstruction team does achieve the limited standard of the definition for “team” as “a number of persons associated together in work or activity.”\(^{13}\) However, a true team, an effective collaboration of individual skills directed toward a shared vision, requires a higher standard. When thinking of successful teams, one imagines sports teams, a group of lawyers in a complex legal case, or perhaps a military unit. In these cases, people prepare and train together in advance of the endeavor they will undertake. They link their individual skills and actions in direct concert with those of their teammates to produce a coordinated outcome. This result presupposes teammate cooperation; individuals who have specific, appropriate skills; and sufficient numbers to fill the requisite positions of the team. Task Force Marne teams’ inaugural year was fraught with difficulty in these aspects of preparation and appropriate staffing. Thus, the claim of establishing a true team is elusive.

Recognizing that embedded provincial reconstruction teams are not quite what they appear does not delegitimize them. Rather, in breaking down the myth, we create the foundation for understanding what the concept aspires to: a uniquely contributing part of the counterinsurgency effort.

**Manning the Ship**

The true value of the embedded provincial reconstruction team is in its personnel. In Task Force Marne, talented experts made magnificent contributions. For example, the United States Agency for International Development’s representative and member of the North Babil team, Dr. Louis Tatem, collaboratively participated in the revitalization of Jurf as Sukhr. His work was key to transforming this blighted area, and it illustrates the

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**For [embedded provincial reconstruction teams] in Task Force Marne, their inaugural year was fraught with difficulty...**
The high potential of partnerships between teams and units. However, this and other similar successes largely hinged on individual effort and personal relationships, not on an institutionalized standard. As noted in a Brookings Institute report, “Perhaps the most important area of improvement is in how well the new embedded provincial reconstruction teams are working...Unfortunately, State and other civilian agencies have done a poor job providing the needed manpower for the [teams].”

This lack of cohesion owes to two primary factors: staffing and preparation.

Staffing. “In somewhat typical State Department fashion, the mandate to staff provincial reconstruction teams came down from above and the Foreign Service had to respond—without an influx of sufficient funding, training, or personnel.” This quotation from former Foreign Service officer Shawn Dorman refers to the broader process as initially implemented in Iraq, but it applies to the embedded provincial reconstruction team situation as well, with the additional caveat that many individuals comprising the teams come from sources outside of the Department of State. Although the process is somewhat mysterious, and its uneven flow undoubtedly owes to many factors, there is apparently no cohesive staffing plan.

Due to the absence of such a plan, a number of detrimental conditions have emerged. At various stages, the embedded provincial reconstruction teams at Baghdad 7 and Baghdad 8 have been reduced to a fraction of the baseline group, merely 29 to 43 percent required strength. Brigade combat teams and embedded provincial reconstruction teams are seldom able to identify when a replacement may arrive to fill an open vacancy or replace redeploying personnel. In some instances, embedded provincial reconstruction team personnel arrive with impressive credentials in a particular field, expecting to apply those skills in a position matched with their experience, but they soon find themselves in a position that requires them to serve as the subject matter expert for something foreign to their background and qualifications. At Baghdad 4, acute vacancies identified as critical remain unfilled while other positions receive duplicate candidates.

Team positions require a robust vigor due to the rigorous combat environment and extreme climate temperatures encountered. This raises concerns when individuals of significantly advanced age or poor physical fitness present themselves for service. Once assigned to and faced with the austerity of an embedded provincial reconstruction team, some individuals have sought and received reassignment to the relative luxury of Baghdad’s International Zone. Complaints about a general lack of individual comforts such as televisions, DVD players, and refrigerators have been common.

Although anecdotal, these instances articulate two requirements for the embedded provincial reconstruction team positions. Personnel must possess both the requisite expertise of the position and the ability to thrive in a demanding physical environment. A codified and standardized approach to the identification and preparation of personnel is necessary. While many positions fill appropriately, the examples above reinforce the concerns voiced by many. In an informal discussion regarding the criticality of specific skill requirements and the less-than-ideal efforts to match those skills to actual need, one team leader emphasized the “consistent underestimation of how hard the job [really] is” displayed when filling “expert” positions.

Preparation. In the military, you axiomatically train as you fight. In many cases, incoming embedded provincial reconstruction team members have never worked with the military and some have never even worked abroad. The work environment for team members is certainly austere and can be
intimidating. Team members arrive as individuals having never met, much less worked with, fellow teammates or their military counterparts. Newcomers are not systematically prepared for the circumstances they encounter. Instead they must rely on the happenstance of previous personal experiences. The team itself is not systemically prepared to orient, train, and incorporate the newcomer. The brigade, comprehensively engaged in myriad tasks, expects the newcomer to quickly provide insight and deliver value. In short, embedded provincial reconstruction teams and the individuals who comprise them are setup for failure. The simple fact that teams generally do not fail speaks to the quality of the individuals who are involved and the willingness of the broader team to work together to overcome the institutional hurdles.

The in-country oversight responsibility for administration and human resources issues lies with the Department of State’s Office of Provincial Affairs. Thus, it absorbs the brunt of criticism for this ad hoc manning process. However, their task is challenging, involving a selection process that occurs beyond their auspices. It involves coordination of a number of interagency partners and individual contractors over which it has limited authority. The Office of Provincial Affairs is a nascent body, striving to grasp the reins as it works through a chaotic milieu that includes its own Manning shortfalls.

In some cases, the staffing difficulties result in an absence of critical expertise to accomplish the civil-military mission. Baghdad 7 endured significant personnel fluctuation and uncertainty in its brief tenure. Recognizing the limitations, team leader John Smith, a veteran with decades of experience developing teams in tricky situations, worked hand-in-hand with 2/3 Brigade Combat Team to secure the staffing support of talented officers from within the unit itself. While this arrangement worked, it

Bruce Bailey (white shirt), ePRT deputy chief, and John Smith, ePRT chief, walk the streets of Arab Jabour with security from 2-3d Brigade Troops Battalion Soldiers on 14 November 2007.
is another example of success in spite of the lack of established support systems. As the security situation improves and the demand for true subject matter expertise rises, military officers can shore up the dam only to a certain point. The lasting effort needs to be less on point-of-impact creativity and more on influencing systemic change in identifying, preparing, and deploying embedded provincial reconstruction team personnel.

**Achieving Unity of Effort**

The fundamental issues are not new. What is new in the current context is the nature of the conflict, the conditions of service, and the delivery method of the required skills. The vehicle for delivery in the modern environment is the embedded provincial reconstruction team, a viable and valuable asset and an integral component of a brigade combat team’s available tools. As noted in a report from the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “with few exceptions, we observed good civil-military integration and cooperation, and brigade combat team leaders seemed convinced that embedded provincial reconstruction team members provided valuable advice and expertise and constitute a tangible benefit to their battle.” However positive the experience thus far, the teams have only scratched the surface of their potential. A comprehensive and longer term approach to the development of these teams can achieve the full measure of their promise. This optimization process can occur by directing institutional resources toward a three-fold approach:

- Forecast needs and identify individual team members.
- Provide individual preparation and develop the small team dynamics of the embedded provincial reconstruction team.
- Integrate team training with the sophisticated predeployment training of brigade combat teams.

**Beginning at the Beginning**

Any initiative must have a starting point. The embedded provincial reconstruction team deployment process should start when a brigade receives its deployment warning orders. Warning orders provide military units with a notice to begin preparations for an action. In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, brigade combat teams have significant time in advance of their deployments. By now, embedded provincial reconstruction teams are ingrained in brigade leadership, and the planning to fully incorporate the team should take place as a matter of course. However, there are other pieces to the puzzle. The interagency partners providing assets to the embedded provincial reconstruction team must receive notice similar to the brigade’s warning order from their national-level leaders so that they too may develop their support plans. The organizations contributing personnel should appoint a team coordinator for the provincial reconstruction team program who will identify the individuals for selection and coordinate with both the departments of State and Defense to support these personnel with the full preparation process.

**The Individual**

There are three opportunities to influence the incoming team member: prior to deployment, throughout the deployment process, and during the deployment itself. There is no effort currently made prior to deployment. Once the deployment process begins, incoming members attend a two-week training course in the Washington D.C. area followed by a two-day orientation at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. A benefit of these courses is that new members form relationships with others en route to their assignments, and this contributes to a viable support network. The training itself is limited in duration and scope, notably without any real military integration component. Upon completion of the two-day orientation, individuals leave the embassy to join their teams and the team-building process begins. Unfortunately, this is very late in the game to begin team integration. To be effective, the preparation pipeline must—

- Expand to begin at the beginning prior to deployment.
- Provide deeper insight into the nature of the mission.
- Broaden its focus to include critical team elements, especially military interaction.

**The Near Team**

The concept of embedded teams in the Task Force Marne context exists on two levels. At one level is
The larger comprehensive team, embodied by the brigade combat team, but comprised of the full spectrum of actors directing their energies toward influencing the same territory, service sector, or population segment assigned to the embedded provincial reconstruction team. But before the larger team is established, there is the embedded provincial reconstruction team itself, the “near team.” Its internal composition, interpersonal dynamics, and ability to produce a cohesive and relevant product or service is the near team. Efforts to build this team should be ongoing and must begin early in the process. To synchronize the team, Department of State should collaborate with coordinators from the partner agencies and with Office of Provincial Affairs to identify the specific requirements. They should develop embedded provincial reconstruction team templates for the projected brigade locations. These agencies should then identify the personnel they intend to assign to the projected vacancies. In this fashion, the team will begin to take shape, removing much uncertainty. Each location will be different and the environment retains its fluid nature. However, this method identifies team members and tailors them to a template of specific requirements early in the process. Once identified, these team members can communicate among themselves and establish crucial internal relationships with their currently serving counterparts.

The Full Team

As author Shawn Dorman wrote, “Joining military and civilian personnel together for a joint mission is a tall order requiring, among other things, the bridging of cultural divides.” Building this bridge should not begin at the point of arrival. Even if the embedded provincial reconstruction team manages to achieve a degree of internal harmony and function, acceptance among their military counterparts (and their eventual integration into all brigade operations) is a necessity. Historically, individuals have discovered ways to accelerate this process. One case in point is the “Dog-face Diplomat,” Howard Van Vranken, who clearly demonstrated his desire to be part of the team and thus made the integration process much smoother.
However, more can be done to institutionalize this integration and set conditions for immediate, on-the-ground impact. Early contact by at least the key members or even just the team leader can help reduce the uncertainties and delays that characterize the beginning of any integration process. Brigade combat teams must gain confidence in the embedded provincial reconstruction team’s collective counsel, even if its insight reveals that development and other improvements will occur at a seemingly glacial pace. Those in the embedded provincial reconstruction team must learn to appreciate the military’s unique organizational culture. After all, as one team member put it, “You’ll not be living alongside a military culture; you’ll be living in the military.”

Military units embark upon impressively elaborate training exercises prior to deployment. At complexes erected to simulate Iraqi streetscapes, actors role-play local populations and key personalities. Simulated munitions replicate the noise and chaos of battle to create a truly realistic training environment. Just as the brigade strives to ensure that their troops are as prepared as they can possibly be when they encounter the enemy, the embedded provincial reconstruction team should be represented at all of these significant exercises. Beyond the individual training value of these events, one cannot overstate the trust, understanding, and general team-building opportunities of these exercises. Commanders rightfully protest when they must train without even secondary weapons systems. Most acknowledge the importance of stability operations and the role embedded provincial reconstruction teams play in this operational effort. Commanders should insist on team participation at these training events, and embedded personnel should insist on this opportunity to prepare their team for its role.

This early collaboration is not without precedent. Training iterations prior to Bosnia deployments brought together military elements and a training cadre of civilians playing the role of positions they held during previous deployments. In addition, the Pentagon is currently employing a program that pairs members of a “human terrain team” with the units they will support on deployment. These cultural experts join their units well in advance of the deployment and participate throughout the train-up period to shape the unit’s combat preparation and carry on into actual operations once deployed.

While unable to immediately affect those currently on the ground, these recommendations are all within reach for the next rotation of war fighters and their civilian teammates. If the embedded provincial reconstruction teams are to achieve their full potential as pivotal components in the rising importance of stability operations, bureaucratic hurdles inherent in this progress must be minimized.

Effectiveness

The embedded provincial reconstruction team finds its niche as an accepted member of the brigade combat team. When a battlefield’s rubble is freshly formed, the embedded team is best positioned to deliver its expertise: picking up and bolstering worthy leaders, increasing the capacity of local institutions, and mentoring all sides. Coalition forces, men-on-the-street, and local leaders all need mentoring on the structures, formalities, and mechanisms that have proven successful in other strife-torn countries.

Through an interagency process that identifies embedded provincial reconstruction team personnel (and codifies the team-building, preparation, and integration processes), there is potential to make the teams much more effective. Through early integration, the team will serve as a lens to view the operational environment in its many facets, including those perspectives that are beyond the scope of traditional military strengths. Team integration of military and civilian talent, resources, and expertise can better enable “winning the Nation’s wars by fighting within an interdependent joint team.”

Embedded provincial reconstruction teams have borne the burden of interagency hopes and fears in the most unforgiving of environments. War and
political scrutiny have forged the civil-military construct into a rough tool for U.S. foreign policy at the focal point of the War on Terrorism. In the Task Force Marne operational environment of Iraq, this trial by fire has exposed imperfections, and there is clearly room for significant refinement. However, a unique capacity is also clear. The embedded teams demonstrated potential, and successes point to an enduring value in making these teams a permanent fixture in force structure. MR

NOTES

2. A provincial reconstruction team is a unit consisting of military officers, diplomats, and reconstruction subject matter experts that work to support reconstruction efforts. See, for example, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams field manual (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 2007), 69.
3. While the speech itself does refer to doubling the number of provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs) throughout Iraq, according to the accompanying fact sheet distributed by the White House explicitly states as a key element: “Establish PRT-capability within maneuver brigade combat teams (BCTs).” <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html> (23 April 2009).
4. Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 2007), 2007, Dr. Louis Tatem was the United States Agency for International Development ePRT expertise and military resources produced a noteworthy outcome. In the fall of 2006, [and] the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964), 31-32.
5. “...paired PRTs—so named because of their specific alignment with geographic provinces and whose principle focus is the provincial government,” QOL Ralph Baker, statement before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on Provincial Reconstruction Team Programs, 4 October 2007.
6. Early descriptions of Multi-National Division-Center’s ePRTs called for no less than 7 personnel as a starting point, but by 2007 briefings cited required funding for 11 personnel at Baghdad 4; and 7 personnel each at North Babil, Baghdad 7, and Baghdad 8.
8. At the close of World War II, the United States provided brevet promotions to civilians with certain expertise, allowing them to integrate into the post-conflict environment as uniformed members of the overall reconstruction effort. This included the formation of the “Military Government” specialty, the precursor to today’s Civil Affairs branch and military occupational specialty. “The effectiveness of CORDS [Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support] was a function of integrated civilian and military teams at every level of society in Vietnam. From district to province to nation, U.S. advisors and interagency partners worked closely with their Vietnamese counterparts . . . and ensured that military and civilian agencies worked closely together. . . Success in meeting basic needs of the populace led, in turn, to improved intelligence . . . FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 15 December 2006), 2-12.
9. Ibid., 1-27. “While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored national pride.” FM 3-24, 2-9.
10. When walking through Task Force Marne Headquarters, it is difficult to miss the large sign in front of the battalion headquarters proclaiming “No Patience” or fashioned like street warnings depicting the word “Patience” with a red line through it.
11. The United States Agency for International Development’s Republic of Iraq Field Manual, vol. 1, July 2007, vers. 1, addresses “local-level authorities” as those below Provincial or Governorate level, specifically identifying qadas (counties) and nahias (neighborhoods), 14.
13. The transformation of Jurf as Sukr into a bustling commercial center extends back to 2007, when US forces first began to establish a physical presence in the town and the local government took steps to support the town’s development. In Jurf as Sukr, a 24-person ePRT worked locally with a brigade combat team (BCT).
14. At the beginning of 2007, the ePRT led by Colonel or Captain Dorman, 2007, the ePRT led by Colonel Chuck Hunter, team leader for Provincial Reconstruction Team Babil, “with the personnel comprising Task Force Marne is the Third Infantry Division, whose members are respectfully referred to as “Dog-Face” Soldiers, a tradition stemming from World War II. Each morning at division headquarters, Soldiers stand and sing the Dog-Face Soldier song. Howard Van Vranken, ePRT team leader, presented a section of the daily battle-update-brief to the Third Infantry Division commanding general MG Rick Lynch, as well as the brigade’s commanders and assorted leadership of Multi-National Division-Center gathered there. He began with, “Good evening, Sir. It’s another great day to be a Dog-Face Diplomat.”
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16. The circular declared a FOB that received the ePRT the title of “Provincial Reconstruction Team.”
17. The main point of divergence is in the time horizon, says foreign service officer Chuck Hunter, team leader for Provincial Reconstruction Team Babil, “with the personnel comprising Task Force Marne is the Third Infantry Division, whose members are respectfully referred to as “Dog-Face” Soldiers, a tradition stemming from World War II. Each morning at division headquarters, Soldiers stand and sing the Dog-Face Soldier song. Howard Van Vranken, ePRT team leader, presented a section of the daily battle-update-brief to the Third Infantry Division commanding general MG Rick Lynch, as well as the brigade’s commanders and assorted leadership of Multi-National Division-Center gathered there. He began with, “Good evening, Sir. It’s another great day to be a Dog-Face Diplomat.”
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MILITARY OPERATIONS in Afghanistan and Iraq have propelled the issue of detention operations to the forefront of our national discourse. Not since the internment of thousands of Japanese-Americans during World War II has the question of wartime detention played such a significant role in formulating our foreign policy, military strategy, and our constitutional construct. After seven years of armed conflict, the question of who to detain during hostilities and with what procedural safeguards remains unanswered. What was once legally and ethically straightforward has now become complex and nuanced. Detention operations have been mired in political infighting, scandalized by dishonorable acts of cruelty and abuse, and confounded in a labyrinth of interminable litigation, leaving many policy makers and military service members disoriented and disillusioned.

Politicians, the media, and academia have focused on detainees in Guantanamo Bay, the adoption of the infamous torture memos authorizing “enhanced interrogation techniques,” the implementation of extraordinary rendition, and the humiliation and abuse of prisoners at the notorious Abu Ghraib. They have paid little attention to the thousands of detainees under U.S. care and custody in Iraq. Moreover, most citizens and critics are unaware of recent policies and programs that have proved extremely successful for detention operations and the greater counterinsurgency effort in Iraq.

While many thousands of service members serving in Iraq—the military guards, the interrogators, and the judge advocates—share in the unheralded successes of detention operations in Iraq—the motivation and momentum is attributable to one individual, Major General Douglas Stone, a charismatic and inspiring Marine who oversaw detention operations from May 2007 to June 2008 as the deputy commanding general for detainee operations and the
commanding general of Task Force 134. Through his vision and initiatives, Stone fostered an approach to detention operations designed and conducted to support the counterinsurgency strategy, but implemented to protect and promote human dignity, one of America’s highest ideals.

**Battlefield of the Mind**

U.S. forces are currently holding over 14,000 detainees. This is down from a peak of over 26,000 in October 2007. This peak resulted from the surge strategy overseen by General David Petraeus. Overall, over 100,000 detainees have passed through American-run detention centers in Iraq since the inception of the war.

Detainees are housed in one of two primary theater internment facilities. Camp Cropper, located adjacent to the Bagdad International Airport, can hold over 2,000 detainees and is the internment facility that holds high-value detainees and juveniles. Most detainees are in Camp Bucca, located near the city of Basra in southern Iraq near the Kuwaiti border. Camp Bucca is a sprawling facility two square miles in size with the capacity to intern well over 20,000 detainees.

Even after changes made as a result of the Abu Ghraib fiasco, detention operations in Iraq have had a grim record. Camp Bucca was a dysfunctional internment facility. The detention center was overcrowded, detainee assaults on U.S. guards were routine, detainee-on-detainee violence was habitual, and riots were regular occurrences. Extremists mixed with moderates in every compound, turning Camp Bucca into what Stone described as a “jihadi university.” Aggravating the situation was the fact that there was little to no communication with detainees. Most did not know why they were there and when they would be released.

When he arrived, Stone introduced an array of changes to detention operations. Not only did the detainee population begin to decrease, but the violence within internment facilities declined precipitously. More important, released detainees were considerably less likely to reenter the fight and more likely to reintegrate peacefully into Iraqi society and support the Iraqi government and coalition forces, or to at least not actively oppose them.

Stone’s principal operating construct revolved around the concept that there was a “battlefield of the mind.” He employed measures to identify hardened extremists in the internment facilities and separate them from moderates. He initiated programs that gave the moderates empowering intellectual channels that helped marginalize fanatical influences in the detention compounds and in their hometown neighborhoods. The collateral benefit was to separate “the worst of the worst” from the other detainees, giving hard-core insurgents less chance to spread their malevolent ideology.

**Why Fight?**

One of Stone’s first orders contested long-held assumptions. While strategic planners and academics have debated the origins of the insurgency, there was little discourse on what motivated the individual fighter in Iraq. Conventional wisdom held that Iraqi insurgents were religious fanatics motivated by extremist sectarian impulses. A U.S. Institute of Peace study concluded that the motivation of the common jihadi foot soldier was ideological, tribal, or religious. Other experts averred that the insurgents were former regime loyalists fighting for their motherland. U.S. military officials and government strategists alike assumed that most insurgents were “dead-enders” or foreign jihadis—unmarried and angry religious extremists,
compelled to carry out acts of violence primarily by Islamic fervor and hatred for American ideals.\textsuperscript{11}

Intuitively, Stone understood that these broad-brush impressions about the enemy, while perhaps accurate in describing the innermost core of many insurgent groups, failed to precisely portray the ordinary Iraqi insurgent fighter. Stone observed that “warriors fight warriors,” but “there’s a difference between somebody who is psychologically wedded to Al-Qaeda’s doctrine, and somebody who was unemployed and forced to go fight.”\textsuperscript{12} His suppositions not only challenged the views of U.S. military officials in Iraq, but also challenged the overall counterinsurgency strategy employed in detention operations.

On Stone’s orders, Iraqi social workers, behavioral psychologists, and moderate religious clerics extensively assessed each detainee upon capture.\textsuperscript{13} These assessments determined their educational and training level, work experience and occupational interest, as well as religious beliefs and tendencies. The assessments stripped down the hyperbolic images and revealed a more multifaceted picture of the enemy.

In general terms, here is what U.S. forces discovered about the captured Iraqis. Nearly 85 percent of the detainees in custody were Sunni Arabs, the minority sect in Iraq; the other roughly 15 percent were Shi’ites.\textsuperscript{14} Most detainees were not angry young men channeling their religious or patriotic zeal; in fact, most were married with children, and more than a quarter of all detainees had five children or more.\textsuperscript{15} Interestingly, many of the suspected insurgents did not regularly attend mosque.\textsuperscript{16} Many divulged that they drank alcohol regularly.\textsuperscript{17}

The unvarnished truth about the typical insurgent is that his stimulus for joining the fight was either physical or financial self-preservation. The primary incentive was financial gain. The facts revealed that the insurgents were either unemployed or held low-paying jobs and saw the insurgency as a way to get some extra money to supplement their meager incomes.\textsuperscript{18} A close secondary motivation was coercion or fear caused by a handful of insurgents in their neighborhoods. The insurgents forced them to engage in anti-coalition activity by threatening them or their families.\textsuperscript{19}

Some took up arms for higher-order ideals. Some fought out of a notion of nationalism—an expected response to an invading and occupying foreign military—or a wish to restore the old order—a movement that drew from former Ba’ath party members, Iraqi army officers, and security officials who had served under Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{20} A narrower desire for revenge motivated other insurgents. They wanted to strike back simply because they had friends or relatives who had been killed or wounded by coalition forces.\textsuperscript{21} However, these detainees were the exception not the norm.

Religious fervor was only on the periphery as a motivation. The vast majority of captured individuals did not identify with an insurgent or terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda. Less than 2,000 captured detainees claimed or were found to have some genuine allegiance or substantial nexus to organized insurgent groups.\textsuperscript{22}

In sum, the vast majority of the detainees were not religiously or ideologically motivated, and few were engaged in hostilities simply to defend their motherland. Instead, the average detainee who engaged in anti-coalition activity—whether planting an improvised explosive device, hiding a weapons cache, acting as a lookout, or delivering stolen weapons—was doing so out of duress. In essence, the average fighter felt compelled to fight out of financial necessity or because of simple brute coercion.

### Winning Hearts and Minds

Unfortunately, U.S. forces had adopted a model of detention operations that assumed that those interned were “all bad guys” to be “warehoused” for an indeterminate amount of time and released randomly in arbitrary groups. This approach was not only naïve and myopic, it was also dangerous; predictably, it fueled the insurgency inside the wire.

Stone believed that the central focus of a successful strategy required knowing who the detainees were and what motivated them, and he rejected the concept of detention as “warehousing” insurgents. Drawing on General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency strategy, Stone applied combat field lessons to the battlespace inside the wire.
Knowing what actually motivated individual detainees (rather than relying on general assumptions built on stereotypes) allowed the detention center to segregate the hardened ideologues from the moderate detainees. The center offered these detainees the opportunity to participate in a series of bold programs, unprecedented in detention operations, to provide them education and work skills, thus inspiring them to choose peaceful, productive civil action over returning to insurgent activity and a life of violence once released.

In addition to providing first-rate care and custody, at Stone’s direction, the U.S. military offered detainees basic education and dozens of voluntary courses in civics. About 40 percent of the detainees were illiterate, and many others had less than a third-grade education. Instructors accredited by the Iraqi Ministry of Education taught classes in Arab literacy, English, science, and math; detainees could earn elementary and even high school degrees while in U.S. custody.

The largest internment facility at Camp Bucca offered vocational training designed to improve employment opportunities upon the detainee’s eventual release. The assessments revealed that the vast majority of detainees were unemployed or underemployed. To counteract this demographic reality, detainees were offered training and on-the-job experience in tiling, masonry, farming, carpentry, woodworking, painting, and construction—all marketable trades that could lead to gainful employment. But more important, the detainee had an opportunity to earn a salary, diminishing the monetary incentives offered by the insurgency. At the very least, it offered them hope.

The military also brought in imams to teach moderate and mainstream interpretations of Islam and highlight Islamic precepts barring the killing of innocents. Stone, who speaks fluent Arabic and reads the Koran daily, believed that the Koran was the U.S. military’s best weapon in its rehabilitation efforts. Stone asserted that it “would be a surprise to most Americans to find out…the detainees themselves do not seem to have deep understanding of the Koran.” He deduced that they were “more or less following what their local mosque imam is telling them to do.” These Islamic courses were voluntary, but proved to be very popular. The classes washed away the myths extremists used to manipulate them. In fact, after one or two years in detention, and after taking literacy courses, many detainees were able to read the Koran for themselves for the first time in their lives.

Another critical element to Stone’s strategy was strengthening family connections through on-site visitations, video-teleconference calls, and letter writing. This approach was the antithesis to the tactics taken by officials in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Bagram, Afghanistan, where family visitations are not permissible. Stone acknowledged the importance of connection with one’s extended family in Iraqi culture. He also recognized the psychological need to have contact with one’s family, especially while in confinement. Rather than ignoring or disregarding cultural and psychological realities, Stone used them to his advantage in his operations. With the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which offset the cost of a trip for many families with travel stipends, family visitations reached unprecedented levels. By the summer of 2008, Camp Bucca was averaging 2,000 family visits per week.

With these programs, Stone turned detention operations on its head. The unimaginative “warehouse” paradigm had forfeited the battlespace...
inside the wire. While holding all detainees *en masse* and discouraging any meaningful engagement, places like Camp Bucca became a micro-insurgency and a breeding ground for jihadists. The extremists recruited other captured Iraqis, mostly through coercion, and indoctrinated them using structured training programs based on fanatical Islamic study. Fundamentalist Sunnis, practicing an extreme perversion of Sharia law known as *takfiri*, would sentence apostate detainees to have their tongues slit, eyes gouged, and bodies butchered. Prior to Stone’s arrival, Camp Bucca was in essence dominated by religious extremists and illegitimate *takfiri* courts.

Stone rightly perceived that internment facilities were another front in the counterinsurgency struggle. U.S. forces began to proactively protect the detainee population by identifying and segregating hardened extremists, and as aforementioned, he directed U.S. forces to engage detainees by using detention operations as an opportunity to educate and empower moderate Iraqis through a whole host of enriching programs. Stone understood the psyche of a typical Iraqi fighter and realized that if U.S. forces could secure the environment and understand his plight, they could offer alternative paths and influence his behavior in the future.

**Stone rightly perceived that internment facilities were another front in the counterinsurgency struggle.**

**Review Boards**

The most monumental change to detention operations was the creation of the Multi-National Forces review boards, which determined whether a detainee remained in detention or was released. Mainstream legal professionals did not challenge the legality of holding these men (and several hundred juveniles). In time of war, a military force can capture and hold enemy fighters, whether in uniform or not. The real question was how to advance a military strategy, while also employing a legitimate and humane system of review.

Captured civilian fighters in Iraq did not have prisoner-of-war (POW) status, nor were they criminals convicted in a court of law (although about 8 percent of civilians captured were eventually referred to Iraqi criminal courts). Rather, they were “security internees” as defined in the Fourth Geneva Convention, the treaty that governs the protection of civilian persons in time of war. When the U.S. invaded Iraq in March 2003, as a matter of law, the Fourth Geneva Convention was the basis to detain civilians; after the handover of sovereignty in June 2004 to the Iraqi Interim Government, the United States applied the Fourth Geneva Convention as a matter of policy. Since the handover of sovereign power, U.S. forces have relied on U.N. Security Council Resolutions, Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 3 (revised), and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as the legal basis to detain civilians as “security internees.” However, applicable provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention govern the operations, conditions, and standards of any internment.

Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention makes explicitly clear that a detaining authority may deprive a person of his or her liberty for “imperative reasons of security.” In contrast to POWs, where mass imprisonment is based on association with a recognized military force, the basis of civilian internment can only be made by individual assessment of that person’s actions; simply put, *en masse* detention of belligerent civilians is prohibited. And where the POW legal regime allows for collective repatriation of fighters at the end of the conflict, Article 78 requires “periodical review . . . every six months, by a competent body” of each detainee’s case. Both the initial decision on detention and any subsequent decision to maintain internment must be decided considering the facts and circumstances of each individual captured.

Prior to Stone, the United States fulfilled this six-month review requirement by convening a review board in Baghdad, the Combined Review and Release Board, made up of six faceless Iraqi officials (two representatives each from the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Human Rights) and three senior U.S. military officers. The Baghdad board made its decisions after review of a paper file describing the circumstances surrounding a detainee’s capture; the board had no current information on a detainee’s behavior.
or attitude while in confinement. The detainee never knew that his case was up for review or what criteria the board was looking for to determine whether or not to release him. If the board’s decision to release was approved, a camp guard handed a piece of paper to the detainee in an unceremonious manner and with no explanation. If the board decided to continue his interment, the detainee never received an answer; he never even knew the board had met and reached a decision about him.

This changed with another innovation during Stone’s command, the new Multi-National Force Review Committee, instituted in July 2007. The committee’s purpose was to provide due process for all detainees in U.S. custody and control consistent with the principles of the Fourth Geneva Convention, while at the same time supporting the security and stability of Iraq.

The committee reviewed each detainee’s case every four to six months. Each board was comprised of three U.S. service members—a field grade officer, one company grade officer, and a senior non-commissioned officer; and frequently these service members were from field units operating in the area where the detainee was originally captured. Each board member had an equal and independent vote, and a majority vote decided whether to recommend a detainee for release or continued internment. The ultimate decision-making authority rested with Stone.

Consistent with the Fourth Geneva Convention, the committee was not a criminal court trying to determine legal guilt in each case. Its members were specifically instructed to determine whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that a detainee is a current “imperative threat to security.” The members were also directed to focus on whether the detainee was a threat currently and not base their decision solely on whether the detainee was a threat when initially captured. They considered the circumstances leading up to and during the initial capture, but also the detainee’s performance while in detention: his behavior, attitudes, disciplinary infractions, and his involvement in vocational training, educational classes, and religious discussion groups.

Notably, detainees could appear and testify before the board. The detainee would walk into the room, and the board president would read him his rights, explain the nature of the proceedings, swear him in, and read the allegation made against him. Through an interpreter, the detainee was able to take an active part in his own release by telling his story and pleading his case.

If approved for release, detainees would have to sign a pledge publicly renouncing any violence and embracing peace before rejoining their communities. The pledge took place in an official ceremony witnessed by an Iraqi judge and a community guarantor, typically a tribal chief or senior family member.

The goal was not to increase the numbers of releases per se, but to enhance the due process of law during an international armed conflict, to engage the detainee in the process of his release, and to better screen those released. The process proved to be a remarkable success.

Military authorities at Camp Bucca described the new process as the single greatest factor in lowering violence in the facility. After it started, Camp Bucca, even with twice the population, had only a fifth of the disturbances of other facilities. The process is an incentive for good behavior, because each detainee is notified of the standards for release and that the board will consider his behavior while in internment. This makes detainees part of the process and gives each hope.

By the time Stone relinquished his command in June 2008, nearly 30,000 new boards had convened. After one year and over 13,000 releases later (a 40 percent release rate), there have been less than 100 recaptures—a less than 1 percent recidivism rate. During the prior process, the release rate was only
The accompanying recidivism rate was 8 percent. The accompanying recidivism rate was 10 percent.

The American Way of Warfighting

Not all detention operations have gone well, however. Unfortunately, in other settings and other venues, officials have employed cruel and degrading actions against detainees and denied those detained any meaningful due process. A policy of cruelty or a lack of meaningful procedural safeguards harms our military strategy in Iraq, obstructs foreign policy in the Middle East, and corrodes our national ethos.

As a Marine, Stone was keenly aware of the oath he took to uphold the Constitution. He drew on these values when he invoked the Declaration of Independence to prove his underlying philosophy in detention operations. He asked, “What are the grievances that our forefathers had?” Answering his own question, he stated that we as a people “didn’t want our citizens taken offshore and confined without any charges.” Stone was not just helping to win the war; he was also trying to preserve American ideals regarding human dignity and fundamental individual rights.

Our Constitution, stemming from the Declaration of Independence, places great significance on the sanctity of the individual, embraces and incorporates the innate dignity of all people, and acknowledges that certain fundamental rights naturally attach to each individual. The Constitution is a watershed document inspired by the conviction that a government does not bestow fundamental rights on its subjects, but only recognizes human rights as unalienable. Unalienable rights, provided by “the Creator,” cannot be taken away by decree, law, or executive fiat. Such rights safeguard and protect human dignity—universally. Because of these rights, we as people (not merely as Americans) believe that due process is mandated by what we are. Cruel and unusual punishment is forbidden—not just as a matter of law, but also as a matter of principle.

Stone was not endeavoring to apply provisions of the Constitution to noncitizens in foreign lands during a war. He was a pragmatic believer in individual rights, and believed that our Constitution’s underlying political philosophy should apply even to a war enemy. He emphasized, “It’s really hard in a counterinsurgency, where your friends are being killed. But at the end of the day, many things in life are very hard. We just have to make sure we don’t violate the fundamental principles on which we stand.”

NOTES


3. MG Douglas Stone, deputy commanding general, detainee operations, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Press Conference, 23 March 2008 (stating that “The size of today’s population is clearly a consequence of the surge and the increased kinetic operations.”).


6. Paley.

7. National Public Radio, Morning Edition, “Troop Surge in Iraq Increases Insurgents in U.S. Custody,” 16 January 2008 (reporting that “much of the anger in the camps stemmed from the fact that the detainees have not been convicted of anything and they have no fixed sentences, so there’s a sense of isolation and hopelessness.”).


12. Elaine M. Grossman and Ali A. Allawi, “The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace,” 16 January 2008 (reporting that much of the anger in the camps stemmed from the fact that the detainees have not been convicted of anything and they have no fixed sentences, so there’s a sense of isolation and hopelessness.”).

13. Pincus.


16. Paley. (According to U.S. statistics . . . 70 percent did not even attend mosque every week.).

17. Dreazen.


20. Ibid.


23. Kelly.


26. Ibid.

27. For interesting account of civilian psyche during armed conflict, see Polanovski Voglis, Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners During the Greek Civil War (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002).


38. Ferris.


40. Rubin.


42. Ibid.
WITH MULTIPLE COMBAT TOURS putting Army families under great stress, commanders are seeking better ways to help. They encourage Soldiers to spend time with their loved ones, but they must balance the requirements of reintegration with compressed pre-deployment training. This is a notoriously tight rope to walk. Morning physical training (PT) determines when Soldiers report for work. Close of business comes when—as a member of a team, squad, or platoon—all the work is finished. There is a more productive way to approach this routine and preserve the cohesion of the unit: make PT an afternoon ritual. If commanders simply shift the physical training time from morning to afternoon and empower company-grade leaders to send Soldiers home when the work is done, the Army will have a flextime schedule that works with regimentation. Soldiers will get the opportunity to spend more time with their families, pursue personal interests, and generally improve their quality of life, with reduced stress, less commute times, and better health.

The Golden Standard

Physical training is a golden standard, and for good reason; it is one of the most critical standards the Army enforces. Its numerous benefits include—

- Camaraderie.
- Leadership training.
- Improved health.
- Physical conditioning.
- Mental and physical toughness.

The problem with morning PT isn’t the program—it’s the timing. Soldiers lose time and productivity as a result of an additional round-trip commute that splinters the morning between commutes and personal hygiene. The
Army’s current garrison “battle rhythm” prevents a time-flexible work schedule and all its empirically demonstrated benefits.

In an effort to provide employees more family time, decrease commute times, increase worker productivity, improve retention, and adapt to sweeping societal changes in family structure over the past four decades, companies and state organizations are increasingly implementing time-flexible work schedules. Referred to as flextime, these schedules are agreements allowing employees to adjust when and for how long they work, as long they accomplish the total number of hours required for the work. These kinds of schedules are designed to help employees cope with work-family pressures.¹

Current Research

One of most important changes to family structure has been the number of working women who are also mothers of children under the age of two. In 2002 this number was 66 percent, up from just 18 percent throughout the sixties. Families caring for an ailing parent will range from 30 to 50 percent by 2010 as the baby-boomer generation retires.² This number will inevitably affect the military. Military families are more diverse now than they were before, but the military workplace still functions based on a family model where only one family member works. The Army has tried to adjust to these demographic shifts over the years, but its garrison battle rhythm is for “stay-at-home” moms representing an increasingly rare family structure. Research conducted by the Military Family Research Institute reports that in 2005, among active duty enlisted members, 46 percent of spouses were employed in the civilian labor force and another 14 percent are service members. Ten percent of those spouses who were not employed were seeking employment. These numbers mirror totals from the civilian sector.³

There is extensive literature among occupational health researchers concerning flextime schedules and the data is compelling—flextime betters productivity, reduces stress, improves employee morale and retention, and lowers absenteeism.⁴ Employers are taking notice. In 2005, 44 percent of companies offered employees a time-flexible work policy, a seven percent increase from 1998.⁵

Recent data from the U.S. National Study of the Changing Workforce show that flexible work schedules help employees deal with fissures between work and home life by reducing their stress levels. The reduced stress provides significant benefits to the overall health and productivity of workers.⁶ Companies that have family friendly work policies have marked increases in their stock performance and profitability. In data collected between 1986 and 1995, companies with flexible work policies had an average annual rate of growth three percent higher than the benchmark S&P 500 index. Firms that didn’t have flexible work policies underperformed the S&P 500.⁷

The Army Day

Since the Army is regimented and standardized, it is assumed the Army day is nearly universal and personal observations and experiences of the reader are about average. This premise will depend on the reader’s personal experiences of an average Army day to make comparisons with the ones established in this paper. There will be differences, of course. Some posts start PT at 0600, others at 0630; the workday may start at 0900, 0845, or 0830, but these differences are insignificant to the overall design of an Army flextime battle rhythm.

For the purposes of this discussion, time is important for its aggregate availability for two key tasks: accomplishment of pre-deployment training objectives and building strong Army families prepared for multiple deployments. Since 1977, researchers have recognized time management is as much about the external influences as it is about work; to manage time correctly, you have to look at it holistically. One study suggests that “spillover has become the accepted concept in the domain of work-life interaction. It is understood that the connection between work and life is bidirectional… Experiences at work can greatly influence our lives away from work, and experiences and conditions outside of work can influence how we do our jobs.”⁸
One ignores either one to the peril of the other, as IBM learned: “Based on responses from almost 42,000 IBM employees in 79 countries, the survey found that work-life balance—of which flexibility is a significant component—is the second leading reason for potentially leaving IBM, behind compensation and benefits. Conversely, employees with higher work-life balance scores (and therefore also higher flexibility scores) reported significantly greater job satisfaction and were much more likely to agree with the statement ‘I would not leave IBM.’”

Many Soldiers and Army spouses can relate to that assessment. Flexible time schedules are the best way to balance work-family pressures.

The common experience. A typical day for an Army staff sergeant (apart from field training), a company supply sergeant for example, officially begins at 0550 when he falls-in for accountability and morning PT. He lives off post with his wife and two children. He sets his alarm for 0430 but doesn’t roll out of bed until 0445 after he hits the snooze button several times. He leaves no later than 0515 every morning to deal with congestion getting onto post; his commute runs about 20 minutes. After PT, he travels back home. He pulls into the driveway at 0720 and, if he is lucky, his children are still waiting for the bus and he says goodbye just as it turns onto their street. His wife is dressed for work and just finishing her hair as he steps in to take a shower. The extra thirty minutes talking without kids is worth the extra forty-minute round trip commute. His wife leaves by 0800. He stuffs several pop tarts in his mouth, washes it down with a glass of milk and departs at 0820. He needs the extra forty minutes since everyone else is squeezing through the post gates, too. He shows up at 0845; the first sergeant calls a formation at 0900. The plan of the day delivered, he gets organized and starts focusing—around 0930—on the mission. He breaks for lunch at 1130. After a big, heavy lunch, he is fighting stress-related fatigue with several cups of coffee. His productivity drops as his body’s metabolism slows down. Mental energy begins to ebb. This typical staff sergeant has been up for over eight hours, and he’d take a nap if he could. He has at least four hours to accomplish several key tasks before he can go home. At about 1500, he gets some extra assignments he could have finished earlier in the day if he’d known about them; he vents. He is going to have to work later then he planned. He pulls into his driveway just past 1800, an average day. It’s been nearly 14 hours since waking. His wife picked the kids up from daycare. They watch some television but he snoozes sometime before 2200. His wife, exhausted, drags him to bed. The alarm goes off at 0430.

If this staff sergeant were on the clock, he would have a seven and a half hour day, not a bad deal—unless you account for the time he and the Army don’t use. His breaks comprise three-and-a-half hours of his day. His commutes an average of eighty minutes a day. In total, there are approximately 290 minutes a day that don’t contribute to either mission accomplishment or family; to put it another way, for every hour spent at work the sergeant spends 38 minutes not working. After a 12 to 14 hour day, he finally begins to focus on his family. This model is as enormously inefficient as it is common. It doesn’t account for lost concentration and stress-related fatigue that robs productivity. The Army may accomplish more by 0900 than most people do all day, but this catchy former recruiting slogan fails...
to tell the whole story. When Soldiers are forced to waste time, they also have to dissemble with “face time,” hiding their resentment at the military’s systematically gross inefficiency. They generally go home primed and ready for friction.

An alternative narrative. Consider a platoon sergeant who has the freedom to conduct afternoon PT. This sergeant first class starts work at 0700. He wakes up around 0530, usually before his alarm goes off. He makes coffee and his wife wakes the kids up at 0600 so they can get ready for school. The family eats breakfast together. He leaves his house at 0630, traffic is light, and he arrives for work in time. He briefs his platoon and tells them that with a little extra hard work they can finish their tasks and go home early. They start work. At noon he and his squad leaders back brief the platoon leader. The platoon is nearly complete so the platoon leader decides on a working lunch. While he briefs the company commander, the platoon eats lunch. This sergeant first class and his platoon have had a five-hour block of solid and productive work without the interruptions of a morning PT schedule. At 1335 they finish their tasks. Two Soldiers leave early for appointments. The others change into PT uniforms in the next 15 minutes and conduct an hour of PT. At 1500 the commander releases them; all tasks have been accomplished to standard, ahead of schedule. He feels great; his body is releasing endorphins after the work out and he feels relaxed. He takes care of some additional paperwork without any significant distractions because his Soldiers are gone. The commute home isn’t during peak hours and he picks the kids up from day care at 1600. He is home a little earlier than his wife and starts warming up dinner. The family spends an enjoyable evening together.

Granting that these two narratives are hypothetical, the meaningful difference is that, with this scenario, PT concludes the day. As a mission goal, it therefore encourages efficiency as it also motivates.

The benefits of afternoon PT. The difference between morning and afternoon PT is readily apparent: for every hour at work, the platoon sergeant spends 13 minutes not accomplishing mission goals or being with his family. Lunch is the one major break in his day; there are two commutes instead of four. The bulk of mission essential tasks are completed when he and his platoon are fresh early in the morning. The total amount of work time before the end of business is seven and a half hours, the same as with morning PT, but the platoon sergeant returns home an hour and a half earlier. This simple comparison clearly shows afternoon PT is a more productive use of a Soldier’s time. However, the benefits of afternoon PT multiply with other factors, so Soldiers don’t just get more time, they get better use out of the time they have.

It halves commute time, adding the remainder to the Soldier, his family, and his pocket book. Half as many energy-inefficient rush hour commutes equals half the cost Soldiers pay just to get to work.

It multiplies the benefits of physical training. Army work is stressful and by the close of business this has created a toxic brew of noradrenaline, cortisol and other stress hormones running rampant through the bloodstream. Without strenuous physical activity after work, Soldiers walk through the front door of their homes loaded and primed for conflict or exhausted and disengaged from family. Families and spouses bear the brunt of this pent-up stress, and while Soldiers are decompressing from work, the quality of family time is adversely affected. It is well documented that stress at work carries over to spouses and children. The best way to beat stress at the end of the day is to exercise. Strenuous physical activity removes damaging stress hormones and gives the Soldier an endorphin rush (i.e., the “runner’s high”) that is as effective at creating feelings of well-being and happiness as anti-depressants. Afternoon PT creates a decompression zone before Soldiers are sent back to their families. Instead of sending leaders and Soldiers back home charged for conflict with other family members, Soldiers go home recharged and relaxed. It helps move Soldiers from a stress-charged work environment into the different emotional climate of the home.
If Soldiers do have to work late, afternoon PT makes them more productive during the longer hours by increasing oxygen and blood flow to the brain and reducing accumulated stress. It recharges the batteries for home life and for those leaders and Soldiers who have to work late to accomplish the mission.

Afternoon PT improves the safety of physical training because it would always be conducted during hours of visibility—regardless of the season. Also, people are more alert and body temperatures are highest, so muscles are flexible, warm, and muscle strength is greatest. These factors all contribute to a lower chance of injury and can increase the performance of Soldiers on the Army Physical Fitness Test. During the summer months it helps Soldiers acclimatize to conducting strenuous activities when temperatures are higher.

On some posts, afternoon PT parallels the work schedules of civilian support agencies and would enable timelier and better coordinated support.

The benefits of flexibility. Flexibility is a necessary ingredient and benefit in any kind of flextime schedule. Nancy McMillan, a workforce diversity specialist at Eli Lilly and Company says—

Flexible work schedules, such as a compressed work week, offer employees a sense of control over their daily work. This flexibility greatly eases the burden of busy employees as they try to juggle their work and home lives. Creating a work environment with this level of employee control and engagement lifts morale and in turn elevates productivity. Today, our employees tell us that flexibility is the single most important aspect of our work-life environment. Unlike business flextime, where the decision of when to arrive and leave work is determined by employees, Army flextime would ideally depend on company grade leaders to make that call.

In the civil sector, this is called “informal flexibility” or “as-needed flexibility,” and it has the same positive benefits as formal flex-time scheduling. The Army entrusts junior leaders to make decisions based on their assessments during combat deployments; it is critical that when Soldiers redeploy these junior leaders are still empowered to make those decisions in a training environment as well.

Informal flexibility depends on an organizational culture that is transparent so that time-off isn’t seen in the context of a reward system. A culture of flexibility includes the following attributes:

- Formal and informal arrangements to handle work-family needs as they arrive.
- Rewarding results instead of “face time.”
- An environment where flexibility is viewed as part of the management philosophy.

Obviously the Army is already here in many ways. The Army is a flexible organization and already has a working culture that could rapidly adapt to a flextime system.

An afternoon PT program enables company leaders to accomplish mission-critical tasks first and then do PT as the last training event in the day. When the mission for the day has been completed to standard, leaders can choose when to start and finish PT. When Soldiers get the opportunity to leave work early, it increases their productivity. The Center for Work and Family reports, “Seventy percent of managers and 87 percent of employees reported that working a flexible arrangement had a positive or very positive impact on productivity.”

This freedom and flexibility to deal with family pressures and work pressures has significant benefits to the health of Soldiers. According to the Stress Institute of America’s latest figures—

Stress is costing U.S. employers about $300 billion per year in lost productivity, healthcare, and replacement costs. Stress is the leading cause of unscheduled absence and is linked to higher turnover. Stress is also a major factor in productivity loss due to ‘presenteeism’ when employees come to work too stressed to be effective. Flextime schedules repeatedly demonstrate the capacity to lower employee stress.

Health, especially mental health, is an important concern for the Army as it deals with the high level of stress on families and Soldiers.

...freedom and flexibility to deal with family pressures and work pressures has significant benefits to the health of Soldiers.
Diane F. Halpern, leader of the Berger Institute for Work, Family, and Children at Claremont McKenna College and a former president of the American Psychological Association, reports that—

The stress of a job does not depend on the nature of the job as much as it depends on whether workers believe that they have the ability to control the stressful aspects of the job. When employees can make decisions related to the way in which they work, they are able to devise coping strategies that can mitigate the effects of stress.19

Empowering junior leaders to make decisions about how they manage their Soldiers’ time will reduce the stress on the force. With an Army flextime schedule, leaders and Soldiers will find it much easier to balance the other needs of life.

All this is not to say that stress is inherently bad and should be eliminated entirely. Stress is a part of life, a part “type A” personalities thrive in. It can motivate and energize people to accomplish things, and it is also inherent to combat operations. A flexible work schedule allows Soldiers to deal with stress more effectively.

Starting work at 0700 makes possible the synchronization of the Soldier’s schedule with the schedule of his family; he can help get his kids off to school. Soldiers who only have one car may find it easier to drive the other spouse to work; this could prevent spouses from sleeping in the car for an hour while the Soldier finishes PT. It sends Soldiers home with more time to prepare for children’s extra-curricular activities, and affords them ample time for community activities that usually start in the evening.

An improved work schedule may also contribute to greater retention just as it does among commercial businesses. This is a major concern to the Army. Secretary of the Army Pete Geren stated, “There’s no doubt it’s a lot of pressure on the Soldier while he or she’s at home, a lot of pressure on the family. Our Soldiers have stood up and continued to hang with us as a nation, they continue to re-enlist. But we all recognize that this is not a state that can go on forever.”20 Managers at six major U.S. firms have reported that their flexible work arrangements enhanced retention. In a 2000 National Work/Life Measurement Project study, “76 percent of the 151 managers surveyed at Amway, Bristol-Meyers Squibb, Honeywell, Kraft, Lucent Technologies, and Motorola indicated positive effects on retention.”21

Objections

There are some objections to this plan. The most imposing bugbear is tradition—the Army has enshrined morning PT into an inertial creed. As an institution of military tradition, it is more than three decades old. But the original conditions that made morning PT appealing have clearly changed. The current Army schedule is stuck in a model from the Cold War. The institution has yet to adapt itself to newer societal trends in working families. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are crippling any arguments from tradition, making them as counter-productive as they are aesthetically pleasing. The Army must continually transform to changing and challenging conditions, and family-related stress is a serious and potentially devastating sea change for an all volunteer force. As the deployment cycle puts increasing strain on families and Soldiers, the Army must be progressive enough to adapt to these pressures. The potential return to Army families is considerable enough that afternoon PT and Army flextime schedules present serious arguments against mere tradition.

Some people really enjoy morning PT and consider this an essential part of the day. Some fear losing the early-morning jolt that gets the day started. Others like working out twice a day and would be loath to give up their individual afternoon PT session to the lock-step formations and schedules of group PT. The obvious rebuff to both of these is you can do PT in the morning on your own—an easy change.

Still others will argue that there will be problems getting people from work to the PT field or that there is too much time lost when people change uniforms. It does not take long to change from a work uniform into PT gear, and PT is conducted immediately next to the workplace, as it is for most units, there is no
problem here. This is obviously unit-dependent; units have the authority to change their own battle rhythms to accomplish PT the right way and with minimal interference to mission accomplishment.

Another concern is that flextime would lead to discipline problems as units would struggle to balance valid family needs with the requirements of the mission. The Army should be up to this leadership challenge. In a study of how hourly managers dealt with the flexibility of their employees, it was found that scheduling and being fair and equitable to the needs of employees and the needs of the business was the largest challenge managers faced. In an asymmetric operational environment, Soldiers and leaders are often trusted to make the calls about mission completion. Missions can change as soon as Soldiers roll out of the forward operating base. The added complexity of a flextime schedule can make leaders practice in garrison what they will practice deployed—flexibility.

Another concern is that units may skimp on PT to go home early. Undoubtedly this could be an issue, but it is incumbent upon leaders to enforce standards and ensure physical training meets them. The statistical research does not indicate there will be any significant discipline problems as a result of a flextime policy. Eli Lilly discovered “no difference in supervisors’ performance rating for employees on the different type of schedules, leading the company to conclude that greater flexibility produces greater job satisfaction without a consequent trade-off in employee performance.”

Army Flextime Battle Rhythm

Afternoon physical training is the key to an Army flextime battle rhythm. As long as the Army continues to emphasize morning PT, the garrison schedule will change little. The plan outlined in this paper is simple, executed quickly, and cost-effective. The compressed operational tempo of the Army shows no sign of slacking in the coming years, and any changes which conclusively provide benefits to families, Soldiers, and the Army should be implemented without delay. Strong empirical evidence confirms flextime works; the findings from corporations are nearly unanimous. Flexible work schedules have had a proven positive impact on productivity, retention, and morale. Research specifically tied to the Army and to afternoon versus morning PT should be conducted. However, lengthy analysis is unnecessary. Leaders who test afternoon PT will know quickly if it works—just as they did in Iraq or Afghanistan.

In a world where the counterinsurgency fight is company-centric, Army flextime represents company-centric personnel management. Complicated and sophisticated plans from headquarters higher than brigades are simply not needed. Informal flexibility and other working arrangements can be implemented and executed at the company level. All that is needed to effectively implement this plan Army wide is a recognition and intent from senior leaders to become flexible. The removal of mandatory morning PT is the key through which flextime can be implemented.

The Army as a whole must prepare for future mission requirements. A flextime schedule for the Army would represent a significant change to the structure of the day, but not to the overall culture of the Army. Combat operations emphasize flexibility and empowerment of junior leaders to eradicate inefficiencies. In garrison, a daily battle rhythm with an overextended lunch hour and twice as many commutes as necessary presents similar inefficiencies. Commanders returning from deployments must balance work with refit, allowing Soldiers the maximum amount of time to reintegrate with their families and rest while meeting training objectives. With the compressed time lines units currently face, leaders balance all the competing demands on their Soldiers’ time with difficulty. Every inefficiency, large and small, must be squeezed out of the Army day if units are to meet the demands on family. Readiness is at stake. MR
NOTES


We’ll get it done, although I don’t know how. I know we promised stuff to eat and wear. Remind him that we’re working on it now — What generators we said we’d repair

I know we promised stuff to eat and wear, But half our unit’s fighting in the hills — What water pumps did we say we’d repair? He has to wait until the fighting stills, ‘Cause half our unit’s busy in the hills.

One truck can’t bring both mortar rounds and seeds. He has to wait until the fighting stills. I understand his problems and his needs —

One truck can’t bring both mortar rounds and seeds! Tell him again: our trucks can’t risk that road, I understand his problems and his needs — Christ, how did they manage before we showed?

Tell him again! Our trucks can’t risk that road — He repeats himself, it’s all in my notes. Christ, how did they manage before we showed? Apologize again for those dead goats.

— He repeats himself, it’s all in my notes. Remind him that we’re working on it now, Apologize again for those dead goats, We’ll get it done. Although I don’t know how.

—Stephen Sossaman, New York, NY

(US Air Force photo, MSGT Jim Varhegyi)
M Y SHOES WERE SHINED, my greens had a razor crease in the trousers, and I believed I was looking pretty sharp as I reported to my battalion commander as a brand new second lieutenant. But my palms soon became sweaty after hearing what he had to say the first morning I arrived in Germany back in 1976.

“Hertling,” said the young-looking, no-nonsense lieutenant colonel, “welcome to the Rogue Battalion. You have one day to meet your Soldiers, find your tanks, and issue an OPORDER. Tomorrow morning at 0400, you’ll be in your assembly area in the GDP [General Defense Plan]—and I’ll meet you there at 0600. While there, you can talk me through what you do as part of the battalion in the event the Soviet hordes come across the border.”

An hour later, I was meeting my platoon sergeant and five tank commanders. Soon after, I realized all the things I had learned in the classroom and in officer basic training didn’t even come close to describing the intricacies of my job, or how important the officer/noncommissioned officer (NCO) relationship is. This became even more crystal clear as the group of NCOs and Soldiers pulled this new “shaved tail” through my first test as a leader. (By the way, the expression “shaved tail” is from the early days of the horse cavalry when the sergeants trimmed the tail of a newly commissioned lieutenant’s horse to ensure others stayed away from that mount while the officer was learning equestrian skills. By the time the horse’s tail had grown back, the lieutenant was probably ready to “earn his spurs.”)

I have had a lot of tests since then, and I’ve learned a lot about our profession. Many of the more important lessons have come from those who bear the title of “sergeant.” At every level where I have had the privilege of commanding and leading Soldiers, the NCOs who I’ve been associated with have shared the toughest of times and the hardest of missions, and they have upheld the most rigorous of standards. Together, we have watched in wonder as our Soldiers accomplished that which seemed impossible; we have laughed and then shook our heads at the crazy things that all young (and sometimes old) Soldiers do; we have struggled together to reach an objective, execute a plan, or accomplish a mission. And we’ve sometimes shed a tear together—in silence, and with self-imposed and needless embarrassment—at a memorial service for one of our own who has made the ultimate sacrifice.

And now, this year marks the second time we as an Army have dedicated a year’s theme to the NCO Corps. The first was back in 1989 when I was
a major, and we celebrated that year with the publication of what is now known as the NCO Creed. Since then, a lot of things have changed, but many things have stayed the same, and there are a few issues that rightfully need renewed dedication that we may want to take a close look at during this Year of the NCO.

What Has Stayed the Same

First, strong relationships between officers and NCOs—at various ranks—remain paramount. We all know that. This relationship—from that of platoon leader/platoon sergeant to that of division commander/command sergeant major (CSM) and echelons above—requires trust and support throughout the officer/NCO chain. This relationship is critical. We must discuss it, build upon it, and continue to improve it. Like a marriage, the officer/NCO relationship needs constant work. We ought to make this part of our discussion during this Year of the NCO.

My initial experience with great NCOs and Soldiers probably had much to do with the positive growth I experienced and the many things I learned in my first assignment, but that sort of constructive relationship is not always present. Not all NCOs are great mentors, and, candidly, not all officers are easily trained. However, that shouldn’t prevent us from understanding that the platoon leader/platoon sergeant relationship needs a team approach, probably with more caring and attention from the NCO, because the sergeant is usually much older and—due to now having multiple combat tours—much more experienced than the new lieutenant. At the company level, the commander/first sergeant relationship needs a lot more communication behind the scenes from both sides, given that the company commander is now the “Old Man,” and the first sergeant is managing and leading Soldiers and subordinate NCOs in a large organization for the first time—and now both the captain and the first sergeant usually have multiple combat tours. The relationship between the battalion/brigade commander and command sergeant major is one of mutual support, with a give-and-take that requires continuous exchange and dialogue between two professionals at the peak of their careers.

Everyone has stories about what happens between officers and NCOs at these various levels of command. As a division commander, I sometimes felt like a referee, receiving new—and extremely interesting—stories from both sides of the chain about how we relate to each other. For the most part, our exchanges are healthy give-and-take, but there are times when both sides need to work through some friction.

For example, when I was a new brigade commander I did not feel I was receiving the support I required from our brigade combat team command sergeant major, who had been in the job too long and had his own thoughts on how I should run the brigade. We often—and wrongly—allowed our “agree to disagree” conclusions to end our discussions.

When he left the unit, I began interviewing new CSMs. The one I eventually picked answered my...
one key interview question perfectly. “CSM,” I asked, “in the future, if I’m thinking about establishing a policy that you don’t support, how will you address it with me.” Having just experienced the actions of my old CSM, who sometimes unprofessionally verbalized his disagreements with me in open forums, I couldn’t wait to hear his answer.

“Well, sir, if I strongly disagree with it, I’ll come into your office; we’ll close the door and discuss it. If I can change your mind, that will be great. I’ll then be able to support the policy 100 percent.”

“Yeah, CSM, but what if I don’t change my mind?”

“Oh, that’s too easy, sir. Given that it’s a legal, moral, and ethical policy, I’ll still close the door; I’ll do my best to present an opposing view. But then, if you really want to make it the policy, then I’ll salute, open the door, and go out and support it 150 percent!” We had an extremely close professional and personal relationship the rest of the time we served together—and we still have that relationship today.

Secondly, an area that has “stayed the same,” but one we don’t pay too much attention to, is a simple requirement imposed on every leader, officer or NCO: mentor one level down, train two levels down. That is part of Army training doctrine, and from my experience, it is the only way to go. As a division commander, I mentored brigade commanders and trained battalion commanders. As a brigade commander, I hopefully gave advice that helped prepare my battalion commanders—if chosen—to eventually be successful brigade commanders, but I also spent significant time in the field and on the ranges with my company commanders showing them how to prepare their forces for the eventualities of combat and how to meet my commander’s intent. And I also know that our great 1st Armored Division command sergeant major spent a lot of time sharing professional opinions and advice with the subordinate brigade CSMs, but he spent a lot more time discussing training, how to care for Soldiers, and the intricacies of supply accountability and sustainment with battalion CSMs—and I know this because I saw him do it.

However, the lower you go in the chain of command, the more you see the same people both “mentor” and “train” the same individuals. How do we address that? Can a battalion commander and CSM really focus on mentoring commanders and first sergeants while emphasizing the training of platoon leaders and platoon sergeants? I believe they can.

There is a great scene in the movie We Were Soldiers Once and Young. Mel Gibson, playing Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore, and Sam Elliott, playing Command Sergeant Major Basil Plumley, are together with all the unit’s officers conducting tough and very realistic combat training in preparation for combat. It’s obvious that the battalion commander is training two levels down, but he and the CSM—together—are showing the leaders their own unique perspective of taking care of Soldiers on the battlefield.

As a division commander, I saw some great and innovative professional development in several battalions, but the best was when a battalion CSM trained second
lieutenant platoon leaders. Another time, the battalion commander conducted a training session on command maintenance and supply discipline with all the platoon sergeants in the unit. During these two sessions, I observed some of the best professional dialogue and command interaction I’ve ever seen during a training session. And I must admit, the battalion in which this occurred was one of our best. They got it.

This brings me to the last point. There is an expression and a philosophy we must work together to eliminate. There is the feeling by some—on both the officer and the NCO side—that some things are only done by officers and other things only done by sergeants, what we sometimes refer to as officer or NCO “business,” as if there was some imaginary boundary line imposed due to the rank we wear. When I hear someone use this phrase, I get suspicious because I feel it is an inappropriate and unprofessional attempt at creating a divide, or worse, a desire to protect a turf. This is not appropriate, because in our profession, we are all in this together, and there should not be any gaps. During this Year of the NCO, as our Army continues to fight an entrenched global foe and we need the best team we’ve ever put together; we don’t have time for such arbitrary and capricious statements.

What Is Different

Just before the Year of the NCO began, we fielded brand new operational and training manuals (FM 3-0, Operations, in February 2008, and FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, in December 2008). This is significant not only because it is the first time in our Army’s history that our operational and our training doctrines have been so linked, but also because it is the first time that the two key manuals have—simultaneously—incorporated recent combat and operational experiences and the results of Army and joint transformation efforts.

FM 3-0 requires us to analyze and adjust the way we do things as leaders and as officer/NCO teams. We must address a newly defined spectrum of conflict in training and deployments, a new construct of stability and information operations, new warfighting functions, the effects of modular forces on leader development, and demands of a complex security environment. If that isn’t enough, the new FM 7-0 requires us to change from “training the force” to “training for full spectrum operations” with the entire training construct shaped by the Army force-generation model. All of this really presses home the point that “this ain’t your father’s Oldsmobile!”

One part of the new operational doctrine specifically grabbed my attention. It states: “Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risks to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.” Whew! Just reading that sentence—and thinking about the specified and implied tasks it entails—tells me we must do a lot of analysis to ensure all Soldiers, platoon through corps leaders, and all professionals in our ranks realize the responsibility we have on our shoulders. And it tells me our Nation expects a lot from its Soldiers—more so than ever before.

As battlefield conditions continuously change and we apply our operational and training doctrine to them, we see all kinds of new and unusual requirements. For example, when 1st Armored Division’s headquarters returned from a 15-month deployment to Iraq in late 2008, we experienced the mass exodus of most of the trained leaders and teams that contributed to our successes, and a new group of leaders and teams that will deploy with the division in the future gradually replaced them.

New Soldiers slowly arrived, but most of the key primary staff officers and “iron majors” who hold a division headquarters together in combat wouldn’t arrive until the summer of 2009. But we had an advantage. The newly assigned staff sergeants major stepped up to bridge the gap between the early departures and the late arrivals. With the great experiences and knowledge that comes from battle staff training, these senior NCOs provided the needed expertise. That’s an issue that we had to address at the division level, but I can think of myriad things which need addressing at the various levels where officers and NCOs share a view of the...
battlefield, and they are only limited by imagination and the state of teaming in the unit.

During this time of high operational combat tempo, the officer/NCO team is—and should be—more focused on family than ever before. We are a professional force, and a more “married” force than we’ve ever been before, and the support of those families is extremely critical to mission accomplishment, the retention of our quality Soldiers, and the sustainment of our professional values.

When our oldest son reported to his first Army posting a few years ago, his welcome was very different from the one I received those years ago during the Cold War that I described in the first paragraph of this article. His unit was training hard and preparing for their eventual deployment as part of the first phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, imagine my surprise when we talked on the phone and he told me about his first day with his team. “It was amazing, Dad,” he told me over the phone. “I arrived at 1500 at the orderly room, and my platoon sergeant told me to meet him at the company at 1800. We then spent the next several hours driving around to every married Soldier’s house where he introduced me to my Soldiers and my Soldier’s families. When we returned, he sat me down and told me how important it was for me to know the families of those we would be taking to war—and how much they depended on the platoon leadership team to bring them all back home. I’ve never felt such responsibility in my life; it certainly told me how important it was to train these Soldiers and make sure they’re taken care of.”

What a simple act, and what a great lesson passed on by a great NCO to his new lieutenant. That platoon sergeant—who now serves as a first sergeant—defined “caring for Soldiers” to this new officer better than any PowerPoint slide or classroom presentation ever could! We need that kind of leadership training throughout our Army.

Finally, there’s something I would ask our terrific NCOs to help us eliminate. While a division commander, I noticed an increase in the use of the derogatory term, “L.T.” (“el-tee”), coming from the mouths of Soldiers, and even some NCOs, when they addressed their youngest officers. When I mentioned this to my wingman—the 1st Armored Division CSM—he smiled and said, “Sir, I’ve noticed that too; and I think I’ve found a way to eliminate it.”

When I told him I was very interested in what that method was, he explained to me that he heard this once and asked the individual what he thought would happen if his Soldiers used the term “Sarge” to address him. That immediately made the point, and the offending individual understood that we all need to eliminate any disrespectful term leveled toward junior officers—whether it’s meant as one or not. If I find a lieutenant who allows Soldiers to use this slang title of “el-tee,” that officer will quickly get counseling from me—and so will the NCO who used the term!

NCO Mentorship

During this Year of the NCO, there will be many opportunities for NCOs to take care of our Soldiers who will fight our next great battles, and there will be many opportunities for our officers to grow from NCO mentorship. All of this is important as we—together—lead the next greatest generation of warriors. Take this as sound advice from a guy who has had the opportunity to serve with the most professional noncommissioned officers in the most respected and most accomplished Army the world has ever seen.

Naming 2009 the Year of the NCO is both timely and appropriate. We need to keep reminding ourselves that in a profession that is based on great relationships, paying attention to the details is the way we continue to improve. MR
The NCO Creed

No one is more professional than I.
I am a Noncommissioned Officer, a leader of soldiers. As a Noncommissioned Officer. I realize that I am a member of a time honored corps, which is known as “The Backbone of the Army”. I am proud of the Corps of Noncommissioned Officers and will at all times conduct myself so as to bring credit upon the Corps, the Military Service and my country regardless of the situation in which I find myself. I will not use my grade or position to attain pleasure, profit, or personal safety.

Competence is my watchword.
My two basic responsibilities will always be uppermost in my mind -- accomplishment of my mission and the welfare of my soldiers. I will strive to remain tactically and technically proficient. I am aware of my role as a Noncommissioned Officer. I will fulfill my responsibilities inherent in that role. All soldiers are entitled to outstanding leadership; I will provide that leadership. I know my soldiers and I will always place their needs above my own.
I will communicate consistently with my soldiers and never leave them unformed. I will be fair and impartial when recommending both rewards and punishment.

Officers of my unit will have maximum time to accomplish their duties; they will not have to accomplish mine.
I will earn their respect and confidence as well as that of my soldiers. I will be loyal to those whom I serve; seniors, peers, and subordinates alike.
I will exercise initiative by taking appropriate action in the absence of orders.
I will not compromise my integrity, nor my moral courage.
I will not forget, nor will I allow my comrades to forget that we are professionals, Noncommissioned Officers, leaders!

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This INSCOM G3 Soldier has deployed twice to Iraq and is scheduled for her third deployment to Afghanistan. She is currently pursuing a Bachelor’s Degree and has served as a Division Intelligence Operations NCOIC, Team Leader and Intelligence Analyst.

I am the NCO!
The Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is pleased to announce the winners of the 2009 General William E. DePuy Writing Competition.

1st Place  Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., “Educating the Strategic Corporal: A Paradigm Shift”

2nd Place  LTC Richard G. Malish, “Tactical Combat Casualty Care: A Case Study of Technical Professionalism in the NCO Corps”

3rd Place  MSG John W. Proctor, “Developing NCO Leaders for the 21st Century”

4th Place  MAJ Kenneth R. Williams, “The Noncommissioned Officer as Moral Exemplar”

Honorable Mention
Mr. Jose L. Delgado, “The Role of the NCO in Motivating and Training the Next Generation of Soldiers”
Mr. William B. King, “Military Education During Wartime – Fundamentals are Key to Versatility on the Battlefield”
Ms. Krista L. Selph, “Virtual Environments and the Army: Army Learning from Prospect to Leader”
SGT Jared M. Tracy, “Making Modernity Happen: NCO and Technology in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives”
MAJ (Retired) Donald E. Vandergriff, “A Journey from Wyoming to Kansas: The Revolution in Noncommissioned Leader Development has Already Begun”

Members of the panel who reviewed this year’s contest submissions are:
General Martin E. Dempsey, Commander, Training and Doctrine Command
Command Sergeant Major Kenneth O. Preston, Sergeant Major of the Army
Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege
Dr. Leonard Wong, Research Professor of Military Strategy, U.S. Army War College
IN AN INCREASINGLY complex interagency, joint, and multinational world that oscillates between conventional and nonconventional military missions, transforming noncommissioned officer (NCO) education and leadership development is of paramount importance. The U.S. military assumes that commissioned officers, based upon their level of education and hierarchical roles, will bear the main weight of interagency and intercultural interactions in current and future stability and counterinsurgency operations. That hypothesis is wrong because the era of the “strategic corporal” is upon us. This operative term comes from the article, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” by U.S. Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak. In it he refers to the inescapable lessons of Somalia and other more recent humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and traditional operations, where outcomes hinged on decisions made by small-unit leaders. In these situations the individual NCO was the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and influenced not only the immediate tactical situation but also the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions directly affected the outcome of the larger operation. Today’s NCOs fulfill front-line, nonstandard roles by serving as town mayors in Iraq, negotiating with tribal leaders in Afghanistan, and training indigenous forces worldwide. They are strategic assets.

To address these advanced leadership requirements, U.S. Army educational development should expand to include language training, cultural education, and interagency exchange opportunities at the appropriate levels of the noncommissioned officer education system (NCOES). This expansion will prepare strategic corporals for the complex operations confronting the U.S. Army now and in the future. With existing NCO schooling shifting from training to education as NCOs move up the hierarchical ladder in both rank and position, the first steps of change are taking place. This shifting paradigm provides a window of opportunity to add essential language training, cultural education, and interagency exchange opportunities to the NCO educational portfolio. These three areas provide focus for prescriptive recommendations using best practices from other U.S. services for adapting the noncommissioned officer education system.
The Need for Military Expertise

A recent U.S. Joint Forces Command study on the future of warfare suggests high potential for instability around the globe due to demographic, energy, and climate trends. This Joint Operating Environment 2008 report stated:

The next quarter century will challenge U.S. joint forces with threats and opportunities ranging from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons.³

The analysis implies that U.S. military forces will be engaged in persistent conflict over the next quarter century. This environment will be one where the Army faces adversaries that may be nonstate actors, insurgents, criminals, or dispersed networks of ideological extremists. Distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants will become more and more complex and chaotic since they will be culturally and socially foreign.

Critically, the U.S. Army rarely possesses the language skills or cultural expertise for operating in these regions—the Horn of Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. Language, cultural understanding, and regional knowledge all mesh in different yet complementary ways to produce better intelligence, more credible civil-military operations, and greater insight into the enemy. As noted in the U.S. Joint Forces Command study, “The conduct of war demands a deep understanding of the enemy—his culture, history, geography, religious and ideological motivations, and particularly the huge differences in his perceptions of the external world.”⁴ This understanding can only occur with organic language, cultural, and regional competencies starting at the small unit level—the NCO foundation. As one prominent French expert on complex operations said, “Effective leaders of small combat units must think like human intelligence collectors, counterpropaganda operators, nongovernmental organization workers, and negotiators.”⁵

Doctrinally, the Army’s landmark manual on counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, provides valuable insights into what skills and competencies are required for success in the described environment:

It requires Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies...It requires leaders at all levels to adjust their approach constantly...Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help re-establish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services...The list of such tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination and cooperation with many intergovernmental, host nation, and international agencies.⁶

Post-Cold War military operations are highly decentralized, requiring men and women at all levels throughout the force to exercise complex leadership and management tasks. In the new world disorder, everybody—NCO, officer, and Soldier—not just the best and the brightest destined for generalship—requires a crucial degree of professional military competence.⁷ These trends require the Army to foster a military culture that is aimed at preparing noncommissioned officers to become strategic corporals. As aforementioned, this term refers to the devolution of command responsibility to individuals at lower rank levels in an era of instant communications and pervasive media images.⁸ Developing the strategic corporal includes supplementing his traditional military proficiency with cultural and foreign language knowledge and opportunities to work with civilian government and nongovernmental organizations.⁹

Education Redesign

The first steps of change are taking place with the redesign of the Army’s noncommissioned officer education system to meet the needs of the global war on terror. The noncommissioned officer education system is the keystone for NCO development. It provides leader and military occupational skill

In the new world disorder, everybody—NCO, officer, and Soldier—not just the best and the brightest destined for generalship—requires a crucial degree of professional military competence.
training in an integrated system of resident education at four levels—primary, basic, advanced, and senior. The updated courses will better prepare Soldiers for the greater decision-making and leadership responsibilities required in the global war on terror. In the words of Command Sergeant Major Ray Chandler at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, “We’ve got a better-educated NCO corps than ever before, so we’ve had to update the curriculum to take advantage of that higher education level, to support the full spectrum of operations in this era of persistent conflict.” He said the new curriculum will focus more on the kind of critical thinking and problem-solving skills formerly reserved for officer-level instruction.

Colonel Don Gentry, commandant of the academy, stated:

They [NCOs] have to be educated . . . they have to understand how to solve complex problems. They have to be critical and creative thinkers, because the situations they are presented with in combat are much more complex than they have been in the past. We are talking evaluation and synthesis, versus just understanding and knowledge.

This educational approach would mirror one view of education for NCOs defined as those activities that aim at developing the knowledge, skills, moral values, and understanding required in all aspects of life, rather than isolated skills and knowledge relating to only a limited field of activity. The essential function of academic education, whether civilian or military, is to develop an individual’s intellectual capacity.

Concurrently, this redesign will align the system’s content with the curriculum at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The goal is to unify the material to create a more seamless team that speaks the same language and solidifies the relationship between officers and NCOs: “one is the planner, [and] one is the executor at the most fundamental level.” According to CGSC deputy director Marvin L. Nickels, “CGSC has made its entire curriculum available to [the] United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, which is in the process of adapting our curriculum to meet their needs.” The goal is to have Army field-grade leaders and senior noncommissioned officers share a common frame of reference, so that the single skill set acquired by both types of leaders better supports the commander.

This redesign and curriculum alignment is an ideal opportunity to add relevant “soft skills” education to the Army NCO educational portfolio. Soft skills are those abilities that fall into the range of human dynamics, interpersonal communications and personal relations categories rather than combat skills associated with engaging the adversary by fire and maneuver or other kinetic means. Soft skills facilitate direct engagement of the population through social interaction. The soft skill of foreign language proficiency has a tremendous impact on success in counterinsurgency. Another skill is cross-cultural awareness, and a third is the ability to operate and cooperate within an interagency context.

While there is no doubt that foreign language skills and cultural expertise are critical capabilities needed by today’s military to face current challenges, only a small portion of today’s Soldiers and leaders possess language skills. Until just recently there was no comprehensive, systematic approach to developing cultural expertise. Today’s military should be trained and ready to engage the world with an appreciation of diverse cultures and communicate directly with local citizens. These skills save lives. Whether performing traditional combat missions, or irregular warfare missions, they are critical skills.

Verbal communications skills, such as social interaction, negotiation, and critical and creative thinking, are essential tools for leaders at all levels—from NCOs in the squad to colonels at the multi-national force. Furthermore, since non-conventional operations are essentially a holistic mix of capabilities drawn from the Army and a host of other federal agencies, interagency exposure and experience is essential, especially for senior NCOs. Thus, language training, cultural education, and interagency exchange opportunities for the NCO represent essential requirements.

Language Education

As one field grade officer stated:

If all our soldiers spoke Arabic we could have resolved Iraq in two years . . . [The] point is that language is obviously an obstacle to our success, much more so than [culture]. Even a fundamental understanding
of the language would have had a significant impact on our ability to operate.\textsuperscript{19} Clifford F. Porter, Command Historian for the Defense Language Institute, noted that—

Truly knowing our enemy requires understanding the culture, politics, and religion of the terrorists, which in turn requires experts in their language. Two early lessons learned from Afghanistan are that foreign language skills were absolutely critical for overthrowing the Taliban regime so quickly and that the military does not have enough foreign language capability...Furthermore, foreign language capability is not only important for intelligence gathering and special operations, it is essential for understanding how the enemy thinks from the strategic to the tactical level of war.\textsuperscript{20}

Language affects the intelligence war too. As evidenced by the Russian experience in Chechnya fighting clan and tribal based terrorists, intelligence is a critical factor in counterinsurgencies. Not surprisingly, intelligence success in such a war remains the province of determined human beings, not machines.\textsuperscript{21} Given that America’s global interests and responsibilities still far exceed its human intelligence capabilities, this lack of language capability has led to a predictable gap in intelligence capability.\textsuperscript{22} Limited foreign language capability in intelligence and special operations—as well as other sectors of the government—has already cost lives. Two lessons learned from previous conflicts are that the United States never has enough foreign language capability, and it pays for this deficit in blood.\textsuperscript{23}

For the past two years, the Department of Defense has received quarterly foreign language requirements reports from the combatant commands, services, and defense agencies. The reports have shown a marked increase in requirements from 80,000 to 141,000.\textsuperscript{24} Interestingly, more than half of the requirements are for basic, low-level skills, reflecting demand for them in the general purpose force.\textsuperscript{25} Practical language education should be integrated early in the NCO curriculum to ameliorate effects of the shortage. The goal at this level is basic understanding and communication of the language, not fluency and mastery. Required “tactical” languages like Arabic, Dari, Farsi, Turkish, and Pashto should be the focus. The de facto goal is language basic training, with the further expectation that students are motivated to continue learning the language on their own volition.\textsuperscript{26}

For example, upon returning from the initial invasion of Iraq as the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, General John Mattis prepared for the division’s next rotation with predeployment language training. He provided four weeks of basic Arabic language and cultural instruction for 200 Marines, about one per platoon.\textsuperscript{27} Mattis recognized that language and cultural ability are force multipliers.\textsuperscript{28} His view was that “having someone who can speak Arabic is like having another infantry battalion.”\textsuperscript{29} The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services questioned why these lessons had not been institutionalized, providing models for the future.

Integrating such language education into the four levels of Army NCO education (Warrior Leader Course, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, U.S. Army Sergeants Major Course) would address this deficiency. Career tracking of Soldiers’ language proficiency (and commensurate levels of instruction according to their ability and progression) is one way to achieve this end state while providing the Army NCO with an essential tool for managing complex operational situations.

Cultural Knowledge

While language is important, one should not underestimate how critical cultural understanding is.\textsuperscript{30} As the highly respected British strategist Colin S. Gray noted, the American way of war has 12 specific characteristics—one of which is cultural ignorance. He wrote that Americans are not inclined “to be respectful of the belief, habits, and behaviors of other cultures . . . The American way of war has suffered from the self-inflicted damage caused by a failure to understand the enemy of the day.”\textsuperscript{31} Retired Israeli General Arie Amit

\textit{The American way of war has suffered from the self-inflicted damage caused by a failure to understand the enemy of the day.}
reinforced this view when he told a Washington audience in March 2002 that the United States would not prevail against terrorists unless we understand “their language, their literature, and their poetry,” in short—their culture.

Interaction with the Iraqi people demonstrates the problem. For example, during routine peacekeeping patrols, Iraqi citizens who were upset and angry confronted U.S. forces. The Soldiers’ had no means to communicate in Arabic—a helpless, volatile, and extremely dangerous position. They were unable to explain their nonhostile intent or understand the Iraqis’ reasons for their angst. An explosive situation for U.S. forces ensued. Fortunately, the commanding officer resorted to communicating through sign language by rendering a passive act of kindness and demonstrating no intent of aggression; the Iraqis responded in kind. This situation was extremely dangerous, escalated quickly, and could have gone terribly wrong. The officer was resourceful and made a good judgment call, but he admitted, “Nobody had prepared him for an angry crowd in an Arab country.”

This statement also holds true for all NCOs at the small-unit level in these circumstances. The local population is the center of gravity at the sergeant level. Adequate knowledge about the local culture is paramount for Soldiers’ personal safety.

The U.S. Marine Corps provides a best practice educational approach with its clear definition of the “culture learning end state” it wants to achieve. Simply stated:

[It] is not cultural education for the sake of culture, but a reasonable amount of operationally focused training and education to ensure Marines and leaders make informed decisions and understand the cultural impacts of tactical and operational decisions.

To do this, the Marines established the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning to infuse cultural awareness throughout the Corps’ training and educational continuum.

For instance, a team of deploying NCOs and enlisted Marines trained for three days at the center. During the first day, there were classes on the history of Afghanistan. Other courses taught the basics of Afghanistan:

- Ethnic groups.
- Languages.
- Geography.
- Climate.
- Tactical considerations of training the Afghan National Army.

On the second training day, the instructors gave classes on techniques for communicating with indigenous personnel. They taught how to pass information to the Afghans through cultural barriers and what mistakes to avoid when speaking to them. The teams were also taught the culture of the Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, Hekmatyar’s fighters—a terrorist group operating in Afghanistan.

When Marine units engage with tribal leaders, the intent is for Marines to use the culture of the enemy to advantage. The purpose is to work effectively with the Afghanistan National Army and civilians and to understand the mind-set of the enemy. On each day of training, the Marines receive instruction on Dari and Pashto, the two languages that they
Language training is an essential and complementary component to cultural education. Such a three-day course on language and culture can serve as one model for a “starter” module in the four-week Army Warrior Leader Course.

When thinking about the fields of cultural awareness and language proficiency, some speculate that future junior Army NCOs may need to possess attributes that traditionally have been the province of the Special Forces. However, an enhanced educational regime designed to produce a strategic corporal does not necessarily require wholesale Special Forces training. A systematic program to master a range of additional proficiencies would suffice. Most skills are currently being taught within the Army, but on an ad hoc basis. The institutionalization of enhanced cultural awareness education for Army NCOs would have an immense payoff.

**Working with Agencies**

According to one analyst, the U.S. armed forces largely eschew integrated joint, interagency, and coalition operations, as well as ignore the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Most operations lack cohesion, flexibility, and responsiveness. To remedy this deficit, educational and experiential cross-fertilization between the military and other government agencies would enhance effective interagency command and unity of effort. The military has invested substantial amounts of educational resources to develop a “joint” culture. A true interagency culture that links the U.S. military to its civilian agency counterparts will require a similar effort.

Such an endeavor to link agency counterparts together is especially pertinent for Army NCOs since many civilian government agencies do not have an equivalent leadership function to the NCO ranks; thus, this role is not well understood by most civil servants. This becomes more important as senior NCOs begin to work on equal terms with members of the Department of State, members of foreign governments, and nongovernmental organizations. As the commandant of the Sergeants Major Academy said:

“Training for NCOs is not what we need. Education is what we need so the Army can build their intellectual capacity for full spectrum ops . . . NCOs already are talking with the State Department [and] NGOs. They are mayors of towns.”

For instance, Soldiers and NCOs of the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, were assigned a comprehensive assessment mission on revitalizing Iraq’s aquaculture industry—an interagency task well beyond the boundaries of classical NCO responsibilities.

Given these situations, military leaders need to encourage coordination at the operational and tactical levels. Educating military and civilian agency leaders to work together would be a key step, but no one has put a substantial teaching program into place. Affording senior NCOs a 6 to 12 month fellowship with another agency will increase the cross-governmental ties necessary to accomplish the missions that confront the force.

NCOs do not require deep academic education in military history, diplomacy, or international relations. They do require a basic applied knowledge of these subjects; a “lessons learned” approach that assists Soldiers with their decision making and judgment. Career-tracking adjustments need to ensure that the added interagency education or experience provides benefits in future assignments and promotions.

Equally important for counterinsurgencies or stability operations is the ability to deal with NGOs. There are several thousand NGOs of many different types whose organizing charters govern their activities and members’ motivation. NGOs often play an important role at the local level in operations. Thus, NCOs must be prepared to deal with these sometimes prickly establishments.

Many such agencies resist being overtly involved with military forces because they need to preserve their perceived neutrality; however, establishing some kind of liaison is necessary. Cooperation involves a shared analysis of the problem and building a consensus that allows for the synchronization...
of military and interagency efforts. The military’s role is to—

● Provide protection.
● Identify needs.
● Facilitate civil-military operations.
● Use improvements in social conditions as leverage to build networks and mobilize the populace.\(^49\)

These connections ensure that, as much as possible, the military forces and civilian agencies share objectives and synchronize actions and messages. Achieving this synergy is essential.\(^50\)

There is also a “Catch-22” with the military-NGO interface that affects the security equation. NGOs need a secure environment within which to conduct their job. Without it, they cannot do their work. If NGOs cannot do their work, the U.S. military has to tackle more civic action projects to win hearts and minds. Less troops for security makes it even harder to get NGOs in the field.\(^51\)

Given the position of the NCO at this important nexus, a 6 to 12 month internship with an NGO may be useful after the Advanced NCO Course. The experience would expose the rising Army sergeant first class to humanitarian organizations and their work culture and world outlook. His presence could build a bridge between the military and NGO worlds. It could also assuage or correct preconceived notions about the military in the humanitarian world. The NGO, in turn, would gain an individual with strong leadership, administrative, organizational, and logistical abilities.

**Recommendations and Cross-Service Best-Practices**

To prepare NCOs to carry out nonconventional missions effectively, they need to receive standardized, relevant instruction throughout the professional military education system. Given the ongoing changes from training to education, now is the time to add language instruction, cultural education, and interagency exchange programs to the portfolio. The primary issue will be implementing language and cultural programs in NCO schools whose course length is too short to permit adding instruction to an already full curriculum. One solution for the NCO force would entail offering increased opportunities for language learning through the Defense Language Institute or other organizations.\(^52\)

The following outline is one proposal on how to implement these changes within the existing educational structure. An important prerequisite would be for the U.S. Army to designate the top five or six languages of strategic importance for the force.

● **Warrior Leader Course.** Add a three-day introductory language and cultural education block to identify future NCOs with language capabilities, begin basic language orientation of needed languages, and expose the students to operational cultural constructs. This module includes taking the Defense Language Aptitude Battery Test and also, vetting and earmarking NCOs who are both willing and able to become career-long language learners in one of the strategically important languages.\(^53\)

● **Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course.** Provide both refresher and basic language and cultural education to an extended common core (currently one week), which supplements the leadership training received at the Warrior Leader Course.

● **Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course.** Offer both refresher and basic language and cultural education within the current eight-week, two-day course. Add a short and practical block of education on interagency and joint relationships to the curriculum taught at this level.

● **Interagency Fellowship or NGO Internship.** Offer a 6 to 12 month assignment for selected NCOs in the rank of sergeant first class and above. A foreign language that they will maintain throughout their careers.

Instructional supplements could complement cultural-awareness education via distance learning for the periods between formal courses. Also, NCOs could be assigned a specific language while in the Warrior Leadership Course; a foreign language that...
Again, the goal is to develop an adequate level of basic language and cultural capability among leaders in the general-purpose force. While not considered language professionals, special operations personnel must attain at least some level of foreign language proficiency. Special Forces—whose members do not include junior enlisted personnel—focus their language training by attaining at least rudimentary conversational speaking skills that enable them to interact with local populations.

The Army can seek other organizations who are developing these types of educational offerings for NCO leadership development, and adapt for Army-specific requirements. In language, for example, the Marine Corps is reserving 40 seats annually at the Defense Language Institute as part of a critical language reenlistment incentive program. The program is open for enlisted Marines of any specialty, including those who would not normally require language proficiency as part of their duties. The Corps’ Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning has a tuition assistance program for all non-first-term Marines to acquire training in language, culture, and the economic aspects of an assigned region.

For culture, the U.S. Air Force Air University is growing its cultural awareness initiatives for Airmen by incorporating culture and language education into the Air Force NCO Academy curriculum. In December 2007, the Air Force created the Air Force Culture and Language Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. This Air Force–level organization now has the responsibility for defining, coordinating, and implementing cultural, regional, and foreign language education and training programs to satisfy the U.S. Air Force requirements. Even earlier in February 2006, Air University began language instruction at the Senior NCO Academy in four “strategic” languages: Spanish, French, Mandarin Chinese, and Arabic.

Lastly, foreign armies are also looking at developing their noncommissioned officer corps though enhanced education. The Australian Army provides language training for NCOs prior to deployment for service in East Timor. The French Army even integrates operational and anthropological cultural education at the battalion, platoon, and squad level.

21st-Century Ideals

NCOs will have to engage in the struggle against terrorism and other ideologies that may emerge in the 21st century. They will be called upon to deal with local populations, other government agencies, and humanitarian organizations. Counterinsurgency and policing operations demand foreign language skills, cross cultural understanding, and historical knowledge.

To meet these challenges the Army should invest in the education of its junior and senior NCOs by adapting the current educational framework to incorporate language instruction, cultural education, and interagency exchange opportunities at the appropriate levels of the NCO educational system. Concurrently, this investment establishes the institutional commitment to lifelong NCO professional leadership development, thus building the strategic corporals needed for current and future complex operations.

NOTES

4. Ibid., 6.
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9. Ibid, 141.
11. Fodel.
12. Liddy, 141.
13. Fodel.
17. Ibid., 9.
18. Rosello.
23. Ibid., 15-16.
30. See for example Boré, 108-111.
32. Porter, 4.
35. USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning & USMC Center for Irregular Warfare, PowerPoint presentation, DLCC Meeting (21 March 2008).
38. Liddy, 145. Although she writes about the Australian Army and its NCO corps, the same is applicable to the U.S. Army.
41. Fodel.
45. Liddy, 142.
47. See JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: GPO, 12 April 2001, amended through 17 October 2008), <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/n/9466.html> (2 July 2009). Joint doctrine defines a nongovernmental organization as: A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or for encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.
48. See FM 3-24, 2-7, Counterinsurgency.
49. Ibid., A-7.
50. Ibid., 1-22.
51. Anonymous officer quoted in Bruce Hoffmann, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, June 2004), 16, footnote 98.
52. Warwick, (4 March 2009).
53. Ibid.
55. Ibid., 50.
57. Ibid.
59. Warwick (4 March 2009).
60. Liddy, 142.
Leader development is achieved through the lifelong synthesis of knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through institutional training and education, organizational training, operational experience, and self-development.

—FM 6-22, Army Leadership, October 2006

The Army possesses a corps of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) unparalleled among the world’s militaries. Noncommissioned officers assigned to maneuver units deserve praise for their ability to adapt, with agility, to the roles of Soldier, leader, and trainer. Because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, NCOs have become master communicators, diplomats, strategists, and mediators; however, NCO growth and mastery in technical areas may be overlooked. In specialties such as communications, engineering, and computer science, NCOs have transformed the U.S. land force into an entity for which the word “army” seems simple and antiquated. Due to their dedication and ability to learn, the men and women who deploy in support of U.S. national security represent a team of multidimensional experts.

A good example is combat casualty management. The case fatality rates for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are the lowest on record. Experts credit two items for this development: body armor and battlefield first aid. Arguably, the more dynamic and ethereal component of this two-armed success is medical care. Unfortunately, reducing its actions to the term “first aid” depersonalizes heroic deeds performed by Soldiers within a frightening kinetic environment. The “medic,” or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 91W, is one of many unsung heroes of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Using the combat medic as a case study, I will evaluate technical professionalism in the Army as a micro-revolution in military affairs. To describe the transformation of the combat medic during the first decade of the new millennium, one must trace the roots of change to decades past. In the 1980s, careful analysis of the lessons of the Vietnam War set in motion a chain of events that led to the creation of the modern U.S. medic. During the 1990s, the lessons learned from Vietnam gradually became part of reformed medical training. When war broke out in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, the U.S. military found itself at a crossroads of medical doctrine. Without hesitation, the Army attacked the challenge and instituted a fundamentally new model of battlefield first aid.
The medical NCO was influential in every chapter of this growth in medical professionalism. Medical NCOs first provided proof of concept. Thereafter, the Army entrusted them with the vital task of teaching, training, and mentoring a new breed of combat medic. The Army Medical Department Center and School in San Antonio, Texas, delegated the details of institutional change to the medical NCO. When the luxury of time dissipated with the onset of combat operations in 2001, the medical NCO provided a “hip-pocket” training bridge from old doctrine to innovative practice on the battlefield. The stakes were high, and there was no guarantee of success. At each step, the Army placed more expectations upon the medical NCO. The lower case fatality rates in Iraq and Afghanistan are a testament to the degree in which NCOs have met these expectations. The achievement of this standard reflects a model of organizational leader development. NCOs continually supported, reinforced, and expanded good ideas with professional and technical competency.

Understanding Soldier Combat Medical Needs

Today’s combat medic owes much of his success to the pioneering work of Dr. (Colonel) Ronald F. Bellamy. Using theoretical models and data on wounds and munitions effectiveness in Vietnam, Dr. Bellamy sought to understand how Soldiers died on the modern battlefield. In his 1984 article, “The Causes of Death in Conventional Land Warfare: Implications for Combat Casualty Care Research,” Bellamy reached two important conclusions: first, that 90 percent of Soldiers killed in action suffered unsurvivable, catastrophic deaths while only 10 percent had injuries that were potentially survivable; and second, that 98 percent of patients who reached medical aid stations while still alive, ultimately survived.

The importance of these discoveries became clear over time. First, the work revealed a group of patients with a small subset of injuries for whom medical action would have a life-saving effect. Second, in these patients, the pivotal time and place for intervention was on the battlefield immediately after the injury. If patients were resuscitated sufficiently enough to reach an aid station alive, then survival was highly likely. Finally, Dr. Bellamy found that the most important intervention in preventing death was controlling hemorrhage, particularly in extremity wounds. Instead of attempting to approach specific treatment for myriad potential combat injuries, Bellamy focused resuscitation on the few injuries in which intervention would change outcomes.

In 1996, Frank K. Butler, John Hagmann, and George E. Butler used data from Vietnam (including the Bellamy data) to demonstrate the shortcomings of the military medical training of the era. They formulated a guide for medics that focuses on—

- The medic as pivotal in combat survival.
- Critical early stages of injury intervention.
- A simple and memorable recipe of action.
- Tourniquets and hemorrhage control.
- Procedures to treat tension pneumothorax and airway obstruction.

The article directed guidance specifically to medics who, as first on the scene, truly stand at the nexus between life and death. It recommended that they use practices that were predominantly the domain of physicians in civilian medicine. Included among these actions were the field administration of antibiotics, narcotics, and new-generation resuscitation fluids. Additionally, it recommended the aggressive use of technical procedures such as the application of tourniquets, surgical cricothyrotomies, and needle decompression of pneumothoraces.

An organization must wager much when there is much to gain. The recommended procedures are perilous if performed erroneously or for the wrong indication. The Army mitigated risk in the early stages of medic-directed frontline care by targeting special operations medical NCOs. Because of the environment in which they operate, these
NCOs take care of their wounded comrades from hours to several days without physician support. They receive training beyond that of conventional medics. In some cases, they are required to perform primary care medical missions that may cross into the realm of a physician’s practice. The Butler, Hagmann, and Butler article recommended openly and officially that critical trauma resuscitation knowledge be passed to special operations medical NCOs to allow them to save the small subset of patients whose lives hang in the balance when a physician’s help is impossible. Their article, “Tactical Combat Casualty Care in Special Operations,” captured, at an early stage, a trend of increasing acknowledgment of the combat medic’s importance in reducing battlefield fatality rates. Many believe the article decisively changed battlefield medicine. Individual special operations forces (SOF) physicians and physician assistants immediately began to incorporate the foundations of tactical combat casualty care into training programs.

Enabled with new medical knowledge, SOF medics proved its worth. An article extolling medical NCO-implemented tactical combat casualty care in personnel recovery was published in 1999. The Navy special warfare community rapidly adopted the tactical combat casualty care philosophy for its own medical NCOs. The program guidelines achieved an even greater degree of legitimacy when the American College of Surgeons adopted them and included them in its manual for prehospital trauma life support. In its pilot phase, tactical medical care in the hands of medical NCOs was acknowledged as a quantum leap. In training and limited real-world missions, medical NCOs proved they were capable of advanced trauma management.

**Tactical Combat Casualty Care and the Conventional Medic**

It is not surprising that the tactical combat casualty care model captured the attention of the Army Medical Department for distribution to conventional units. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era of military threat. With no superpower enemy facing the U.S. military, the Army Medical Department recognized the need for a new type of conventional medic skilled in the missions of peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and small-scale conflict. In 1999, to better prepare for this spectrum of threat, the department announced the creation of the new medical occupational specialty: the 91W. Largely the vision of Army Surgeon General James B. Peake, the 91W program created a new medical professional not seen in the civilian world: a combination EMT and licensed practical nurse. Both 91B (medical specialist) and 91C (practical nurse) specialties were subsumed under the new MOS. The Army Medical Department accepted that future conventional combat medics would be operating in small-scale contingency operations familiar to special operations. Colonel Robert De Lorenzo, proponent for the 91W branch, studied the medical NCO model as a possible prototype of the new medic. Furthermore, he stated that tactical combat casualty care would be included in the training. Accepting that the actions of combat medics were more important than all of the care that followed, the 91W program focused on the principle of “far forward care.” In his 1999 introduction of the 91W concept, De Lorenzo discussed the expectations of its predecessor model, the *Future Medic*:

> The future medic was an extension of the physician or PA, enabling these far-forward professionals to extend their care all the way to the point of injury or illness. The future medic was envisioned to be highly skilled in emergency care and capable of providing care to critical casualties on long evacuation legs.

In the 91W program, conventional medics armed with both physician and physician assistant resuscitation skills and knowledge were to populate the ranks. The 91W program is ambitious. Under the new curriculum, medics train for 16 weeks rather than 10. Unlike the 91B program, combat medics have to pass the civilian emergency medical technician qualification test to graduate. Training on computerized mannequin-simulators gives students proficiency in the application of resuscitation procedures. Even more important, the training
The 91W program is ambitious. Under the new curriculum, medics train for 16 weeks rather than 10.

gives students implied permission to perform tasks previously taught only to provide basic familiarity (in order to assist a physician, for example).

From the beginning, the creators of the 91W program relied heavily on NCOs. De Lorenzo left no doubt that the responsibility for the “largest reengineering of the enlisted combat medic in history,” would fall on the NCO. He stated, “Of course, 91W NCOs and drill sergeants, all specially trained and prepared for their faculty roles, will conduct the majority of training.” At every step along the way, medical NCOs proved that the dissemination of important training was in excellent hands.

Early Care by Conventional Units in Combat

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center occurred one month before the 91W training program made its debut. The war in Afghanistan began before the first 91W class had graduated. Even by 2003 and the beginning of hostilities in Iraq, only a minority of combat medics had made the transition from 91B/C to 91W. More importantly, the concepts of tactical combat casualty care had not yet achieved a tipping point in the field. Writing in 2005, Captain Michael Tarpey, a battalion surgeon with the 3d Infantry Division, stated, “There has been very little spread of the use of the tactical combat casualty care guidelines into conventional units.”

Tarpey’s unit, Task Force 1-15 Infantry, 3d Infantry Division (TF 1-15 IN), provides an example. In his article, “Tactical Combat Casualty Care in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Tarpey describes how he, his physician’s assistant, his medical platoon sergeant, and other medical NCOs put enlisted battalion medics through a three-month course in tactical combat casualty care. The course terminated shortly before the unit attacked from Kuwait into Iraq as one of the lead elements of the ground invasion on 21 March 2003. Using scenario-based training techniques identical to those Special Forces units espoused in 1999, the task force medics became so adept at using advanced techniques to treat mock patients that “recognition and treatment, at times, simply involved muscle memory.” In the first 25 days of combat, in spite of 32 wounded, TF 1-15 experienced no killed-in-action. Tarpey became one of many apostles of the tactical combat casualty care message. He stated that the tactical combat casualty care guidelines “have proven to be lifesaving and their widespread dissemination should be first priority.” Other units implemented tactical combat casualty care in preparations for combat. One such unit was the 173d Airborne Brigade that committed to the fight on 26 March 2003 by parachute assault of the Bashur Airfield in northern Iraq. Much like TF 1-15 IN, the 173d used senior NCOs to train medics extensively on tactical combat casualty care before deploying. In addition to classroom and scenario-based training, medics received the appropriate pharmaceuticals and tools to perform tactical combat casualty care procedures. As a further step to ensure that tactical combat casualty care knowledge was always on hand, Soldiers carried laminated “smart cards.” Because the brigade surgeon and battalion physician’s assistants were heavily involved in medical planning, they delegated the important task of training medics in tactical combat casualty care to senior NCOs and early graduates of the 91W program.
The medical NCOs of the 173d played a critical role in the creation of a team of medics of incomparable professionalism. Point of injury care was so complete that, on several occasions, it made the expertise of the brigade surgeon irrelevant. Noting that no further care was necessary at the brigade aid station, the brigade surgeon simply performed rapid reevaluations of patients (without intervention) before evacuating them to the nearby forward surgical team. In these cases, physician-level aid station care was not necessary because NCOs had already completed care at the place and time it was needed most: on the battlefield just seconds after the injury. There is little doubt that the vision of far forward care created by Peake was, in some measure, realized in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Part traditional medic, part nurse, and indeed, part physician, the 91W represented an unparalleled advance in professional medicine and combat resuscitation.

Wide Dissemination of Tactical Combat Casualty Care

While it is unlikely that the experiences of TF 1-15 and the 173d were unique, as time went on, units not trained in tactical combat casualty care became the exception. Consistently leading the way, the special operations community established a “Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care” in 2001. Sitting with the likes of the U.S. Surgeon General and world-renowned experts in trauma and burn surgery, no fewer than seven medical NCOs served on the committee in 2004-2005. Finding tactical combat casualty care under-penetration of the special operations community, the committee, in 2004, recommended the initiation of the “Tactical Combat Casualty Care Transition Initiative Model.” This program, sponsored by the U.S. Special Operations Command, provides a three-day crash course on tactical combat casualty care to special operations units in the six-month window prior to deployment. The curriculum capitalizes on and depends upon the talent and initiative of local medical NCOs. “Train-the-trainer” sessions begin on the first day so that unit medics can assist in follow-on training in the subsequent two days. The program extends its reach by using medical NCOs in this way.

By 2005, tactical combat casualty care in one form or another finally reached the conventional force at large. Conventional units, including the 82d Airborne Division, the 10th Mountain Division, the 3d Infantry Division, and the 101st Airborne Division, are using variations of the tactical combat casualty care “just-in-time” training curriculum. These curricula continue to complement the ongoing population of combat maneuver units with 91W-trained medics from the Army Medical Department Center and School.

Results

While medics have always played an important role in forward care, tactical combat casualty care has rearranged the front-line model. What was once a “hub and spoke” design with the battalion aid station at its center is now a “blanket” or “umbrella” of protection. Medics interspersed among the troops, in many cases, perform all of the functions of the battalion aid station, which is now commonly (and logically) bypassed to get patients more rapidly to surgery.

Surgeon General of the Army Eric B. Schoomaker stated in 2008 that U.S. survival rates in Iraq and Afghanistan were the highest “in the history of warfare.” As of June 2007, the ratio of those killed in action because of severe wounds was 16.1 percent versus 21.1 percent for Vietnam. This represents a 24 percent relative risk reduction between the wars. While there is wide consensus that tactical combat casualty care has contributed to increased survival rates, actual proof of a causal relationship is difficult. As stated earlier, experts attribute survival rate success to the combination of body armor and battlefield first aid. It is unclear what proportion of the improved survival rate is attributable to each variable. Even so, few that have witnessed the results of tactical combat casualty care firsthand (Captain Tarpey, for example) doubt that its contribution is anything but significant.
What was once a “hub and spoke” design with the battalion aid station at its center is now a “blanket” or “umbrella” of protection.

In retrospect, it is easy to regard the successful emergence of tactical combat casualty care (both directly and indirectly through its incorporation into the 91W curriculum) as a fait accompli. However, that conclusion is too sanguine. Tom Philpott put it bluntly when he stated, “It was no small thing for doctors to give battlefield medics more trauma care responsibility.”23 If not for vigilant training and oversight by leaders, both NCO and otherwise, the practices and procedures of tactical combat casualty care could have resulted in harm rather than benefit. In 2005, Major General George W. Weightman, then-commander of the U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School, called the decision to delegate advanced trauma skills to medics, “a giant leap of faith.”24 This statement, if taken at face value, implies an uncertainty that perhaps did not exist. If it did, it was likely balanced by knowledge of the talents of the NCO corps upon whom the responsibility for program implementation would fall.

I do not wish to minimize the importance of innovations in body armor. The creators of that equipment deserve the same admiration as the names mentioned here. Moreover, to focus solely on the Bellamys, Butlers, and Peakes of the Army ignores a critical feature of the system in which they work. Practical success or failure of ambitious initiatives often belongs completely to NCOs. As the leaders, teachers, and implementers of tactical combat casualty care, NCOs represent the center of gravity, the hub of the concept. Beyond being critical enablers of the finished product, NCOs contributed significantly to every stage of tactical combat casualty care development and dissemination. In the future, NCOs will remain essential to the medical and leader development of combat medics from initial entry to the battlefield.

One should not forget that the medical NCO is not unique in his or her commitment to the technical aspects of his profession. The infantry NCO has expanded his professional range to include negotiations and diplomacy. The signal NCO has acquired and honed skills in computer science. The paralegal NCO is able to manage most common legal issues without the presence of a lawyer. Additional examples are legion. The medical NCO is one representative of the increased level of professionalization required of NCOs in the modern world. While theorists debate whether an information revolution in military affairs may be underway, there is no doubt about the revolutionary diversity and depth of expertise required of NCOs. The medical NCO example suggests neither a top-down nor a bottom-up process is responsible for achievement of the current end-state. Instead, a mutually supporting organizational learning and leading process appears to be at play in which cognitive breakthroughs by researchers and analysts are implemented by a corps of intelligent, practical, and vigilant NCOs who possess levels of technical and professional expertise heretofore unseen in the American military. MR

NOTES

7. Ibid. 
12. Ibid., 687.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 35.
20. Ibid., 36.
24. Ibid.

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Developing NCO Leaders for the 21st Century

Master Sergeant John W. Proctor, U.S. Army

Soldiers actually tend to be pretty skilled at this kind of work. A huge fraction of military officers were captains of their soccer teams, scout leaders, student government officers, whatever. They understand leadership. Even at the enlisted level, the basic essence of being a good sergeant is to be a quick study of character, a master of motivation, and a strong communicator, someone who really understands human nature. A lot of basic military work is inherently ‘sociological,’ and this has helped us in our crash effort to building up a working society here.

—Captain Ken Burgess, 2d Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, Baghdad, Iraq, 2004

The key to the Army’s success is our flexibility and willingness to change, to meet the world as it is—without altering the core competencies that make the Army the best fighting force in the world.

—Field Manual (FM) 22-7.7

At the center of Army transformation efforts stands the noncommissioned officer. He leads our Soldiers into 21st-century battle. He cares for, trains, and directs our Soldiers in peace and in war. He is the primary implementer of our new doctrine and concepts. He commands the small units maneuvering our new platforms and engaging the enemy with our new weapons systems. He is the face of the American people as he interacts with indigenous people on counterinsurgency battlefields. An effective leadership development model for the U.S. Army noncommissioned officer waging 21st-century warfare must define the threat correctly, develop leaders of character, and implement knowledge management strategies for disseminating current and emerging doctrine.

In today’s security environment, change is the norm. The 360-degree fight among indigenous populations is probably here to stay. Our capstone doctrine in FM 3-0, Operations explains that—

Army doctrine now equally weights tasks dealing with the population—stability or civil support—with those related to offensive and defensive operations. This parity is critical; it recognizes that 21st-century conflict involves more than combat between armed opponents. While defeating the enemy with offensive and defensive operations, Army forces simultaneously shape the broader situation through nonlethal actions to restore security and normalcy to the local populace.

Soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them. They often face the enemy among noncombatants, with little to distinguish one from the other until combat erupts. Killing
or capturing the enemy in proximity to noncombatants complicates land operations exponentially. Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success.\textsuperscript{5}

The greater part of the panorama of change affecting contemporary operations is the dramatically increased involvement of the American Soldier with indigenous peoples. While changes in weaponry, equipment, force design, communications, technology, information exchange, and an exhaustive menu of threats deluge our Army at war, the human dimension profoundly begs the attention of transformation efforts.\textsuperscript{6} Our NCO leader stands at the heart of this transformation as its primary agent of delivery.

Irregular Warfare

The Army will conduct full spectrum operations among the people. Whole-of-government approaches will include soft power, non-lethal engagements, and effective messaging in information operations. At the blink of an eye, however, situations can and do turn explosively lethal and require disciplined application of combined arms maneuver. In this environment, the shaping of attitudes and values is as important as fire control, economy of force, and rules of engagement. Irregular warfare is about people, not platforms.\textsuperscript{7} Platforms, technology, weaponry, and information superiority are all mission-essential components of successful land combat operations in 21st-century warfare. However, without a thorough understanding of the human dimension, a wily and cunning enemy adept at cultural exploitation may actually leverage military superiority against the Army’s campaign objectives. When examining leader development models for the Army NCO corps for the 21st century, it is imperative that we define the threat environment correctly and apply paradigms that address the requirements of an increasingly human-centric battlefield.

We need NCO leaders who are educated, trained, and inspired to pursue a balanced, human-centric approach to irregular warfare in the 21st century. These NCO leaders must be self-aware and always conscious of the strategic context of their actions and the unit’s actions.

This is not to say that leader development for major combat operations is no longer required or that conventional warfare training is obsolete. We should not sacrifice systematic training in large-scale combined arms maneuver for increased effectiveness in irregular warfare environments. The question of either/or is based on a false premise and disregards the doctrinal azimuth provided in FM 3-0.

Leader development for NCOs must and will include development of leadership capabilities normally honed in more conventional training venues. NCOs will still provide leadership at qualification tables and gunneries; combined live-fire exercises; joint rapid-deployment exercises; force-on-force conventional maneuver in our “dirt” combat training centers; and advanced training in battle command processes and applications. Leadership in major combat operations or in irregular warfare is still leadership. The contexts and threats may vary, but the relationship between the leader and the led still requires education in military art and science and indoctrination in a culture of values and tradition.

Our allies hail from diverse ethnic, national, and cultural origins. Operating in large-scale combined arms maneuver with multinational partners may require cross-cultural association skills for the NCO small-unit leader or the battle staff NCO coordinating actions between commands. Human-centric leadership capabilities honed in our own units require external applications when dealing outside our own cultural comfort zones. Modern warfare has produced the phenomenon of the “global rifle platoon.”

Our military transition teams immerse themselves in the culture of indigenous forces. In counter-insurgency operations, indigenous forces must gradually assume the lead in order for our forces to retrograde. The military transition team must overcome the barriers of language, culture, race,
religion, and experience if it is to succeed in developing the capabilities of indigenous forces. The U.S. Army NCO frequently assumes responsibility for providing leadership for these missions. His education and training may contribute to the success of counterinsurgency operations or fail him at the point of attack. Military transition team members that become a source of irritation of indigenous forces may impede the progress of the campaign plan. NCO leadership for these contexts must be developed intentionally and deliberately.

In the spring of 2008, an American NCO defaced a copy of the Koran by scrawling foul language on its pages and then posted it on a silhouette for target practice on a small arms range shared with Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi security forces found the holy book with 14 holes in it the next day. Their indignant reaction was so severe that several general officers immediately convened councils with Iraqi leaders to issue official apologies. Even the President of the United States publicly asked for forgiveness from the Iraqi Prime Minister.8

While this situation is not the norm, neither is it an anomaly. Irregular warfare requires weaponizing cultural knowledge, not merely routine “check-the-block” cultural awareness classes. Human-centric warfare requires area-specific cultural knowledge as well as tactical adaptability.

The adaptive, multi-skilled leader described in FM 6-22, Army Leadership, is a paradigm for 21st-century NCO leader development. His adaptability is a key trait:

Adaptable leaders scan the environment, derive the key characteristics of the situation, and are aware of what it will take to perform in the changed environment. Leaders must be particularly observant for evidence that the environment has changed in unexpected ways. They recognize that they face highly adaptive adversaries, and operate within dynamic, ever-changing environments. Sometimes what happens in the same environment changes suddenly and unexpectedly from a calm, relatively safe operation to a direct fire situation. Other times environments differ (from a combat deployment to a humanitarian one) and adaptation is required for mind-sets and instincts to change.9

Today’s Soldier knows almost nothing but change and must adapt constantly to a volatile and unpredictable environment. Since 2004, our Army has introduced an entirely new force design (modularity), dozens of new equipment and uniform suites, digital communication command posts, and modifications to training programs of instruction and methods of delivery. Moreover, we soldier within the vortex of an unprecedented doctrinal revolution as the Army has rewritten nearly all its field manuals during this period. This places increasing demands upon squad leaders, platoon and section sergeants, first sergeants, and sergeants major to adapt standards, requirements, and safety considerations to the avalanche of change facing today’s Soldier.

Counterinsurgency operations may provide the best problem set in arriving at the optimal solution for developing adaptive NCO leaders. If an NCO leader can learn to thrive in a counterinsurgency operation, everything else is easier in comparison. General David H. Petraeus has referred to counterinsurgency as “graduate-level warfare.”10 An NCO corps at home in the dangerous, complex, ambiguous environs of counterinsurgency warfare should find conventional warfare less difficult and easier to adapt to.11

The optimal leadership development model for the 21st century recognizes the NCO as the principal agent of change in a transforming force and emphasizes human-centric factors in full spectrum operations. Correctly diagnosing the threat environment of irregular warfare must inform our models for leader development. Adaptive and creative thinking will remain a staple in addressing both the threat and the operational environment.

Traditions, Heritage, and Values
Noncommissioned officers are the stewards of Army traditions, emblems, regalia, and heraldry. From the days when the standard-bearer literally bore the unit’s flag or standards into battle at the
head of the formation to the present, where the command sergeant major safeguards the unit’s colors, NCOs promote reverence for and pride in the Army service. The Army’s customs, courtesies, and rituals pass from generation to generation through the diligent observance of noncommissioned officers who preserve the heritage of the past and project the tradition of *esprit de corps* into the present.

Ceremonies and rituals are a vehicle for displaying the Army’s values. Far from being empty exercises in pomp and parade, they communicate transcendent values such as love of country, liberty, and honor. Whether observing a major ceremony such as a memorial for fallen comrades or a minor ceremony such as Retreat and To the Colors, the NCO stands at the center of the traditions and rituals. The NCO prepares the parade field, the banquet hall, and the chapel. The NCO supervises the firing teams, the pallbearers, and the Color Guard. NCOs stand between commanders exchanging the regimental colors at a change of command ceremony.

These ceremonies and rituals highlight the Army’s values and traditions. They symbolize the honor, discipline, and sacrifices our Soldiers have made throughout our long and storied history. These values must never change; we must conscientiously adhere to them in order to pass them along with fidelity and respect to emerging generations of Soldiers. In an era where change is fast and furious and leaders learn to “adapt or die,” our professional NCO corps must remain firmly grounded in our prestigious heritage of victory with honor. The Army is a values-based organization and requires NCO leaders that faithfully transmit our values at home and abroad, whether during peace keeping or combat.

Army leadership doctrine explains what leaders must be, know, and do. This model translates into the spiritual, mental, and physical characteristics of leadership and provides a metric for self-development that addresses the whole person.

We must begin with character. What a leader must be is a model of Army Values—loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Don Snider, a professor of political science at the U.S. Military Academy, breaks down character development into three strands: the spiritual (what is true); the ethical (what is right); and the social (actions). Snider teaches that a leader of character “seeks to discover the truth, decide what is right, and demonstrate the courage to act accordingly. . . always.” Current NCO development models do not address this highly personal and spiritual quest for truth firmly enough. Should we teach cadets at West Point to employ their personal faith as a leadership tool in this way, but not our NCO corps? While respecting each NCO’s personal choices and beliefs, it is nonetheless material to this discussion to note that morals do not emerge from a vacuum. In his farewell address, George Washington stated:

> Of all the dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. . . . And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid

...
us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.\textsuperscript{14} NCO leader development models should require character development to more closely mirror the educational paradigms employed at West Point. Many NCO leaders inculcate this spiritual dimension into their personal self-development, but the Noncommissioned Officer Educational System is silent on the matter. It is critical for our own NCO leaders to seek truth as our Soldiers face complex ethical dangers conducting full spectrum operations in religiously saturated environments. In an interview with the Combat Studies Institute, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Iacobucci explains the importance of morals and values in conflict. Reflecting on the lessons he learned from this experience [Operation Iraqi Freedom], Iacobucci stresses the importance of “having a good command climate and establishing sound morals and values.” As he explains, “If you’re going to go into this business of exchanging blows with people and taking their lives, it can very quickly erode into something very messy. It’s only values and morals that keep everything together.”\textsuperscript{15}

The Army Leadership Requirements Model detailed in FM 6-22 identifies three attributes of what a leader must be: a leader of character, a leader with presence, and a leader with intellectual capacity. The Noncommissioned Officer Educational System plays a central role in NCO leader development and programs of instruction should emphasize these requirements. Success in 21st-century warfare begins with educational experiences that deepen the professional NCO’s commitment to leading with character.

Knowledge must inform character, and knowledge must be translated into action. The be, know, and do model remains relevant for our professional development efforts in the NCO corps. Knowledge and action not informed by strong moral character may prove ineffective during combat in current and future threat environments.

The demands of 21st-century warfare will continue to pose complex sets of problems for our leaders to navigate and may include religious, tribal, ethnic, social, and political variables. The actions of the “strategic corporal” on COIN battlefields frequently blast throughout the world in real time on digital mass media. Establishing educational and training values that emphasize character development, self-awareness, and personal growth will help our NCO leaders stay true to unchanging principles. Fidelity to these principles will contribute to mission success in constantly changing environments with complex sets of human-centric problems.

Noncommissioned officers are the conduit of leadership that connects commanders and Soldiers. As stewards of our traditions, heritage, ceremonies, and heraldry, NCOs bear our standards in the midst of the daunting challenges posed by 21st-century warfare. Now more than ever before, leadership development for NCOs must be grounded in unchanging principles and values.

**The NCO Leader and Doctrine**

The capstone of Army doctrine, FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, initiated a doctrinal revolution within the Army that is still generating change.\textsuperscript{16} Many of today’s senior NCOs learned doctrine from painstaking study of dog-eared paper manuals by highlighting key passages and making notes in the margins. The shelf life of these doctrinal publications ordinarily lasted five years. While always dynamic in nature, doctrine seemed relatively stable from the early 1990s until the outset of the War on Terrorism. Most NCOs owned their own copies of the field manuals on leadership, physical training, leadership counseling, battle drills, and battle focused training, and their proponent FM or unique-unit FM. In the Noncommissioned Officer Educational System, noncommissioned officers learned how to navigate doctrine by searching for answers to problems using glossaries or other reference aids.

Today, two unique challenges have emerged to complicate the dissemination of Army doctrine: the advent of paperless references and the fluid nature of current doctrine itself. Together, these two factors affect the transmittal of doctrinal knowledge and require a fresh look at how NCOs obtain and retain doctrinal knowledge.
Digitization of operational products, regulations, field manuals, pamphlets, and other distributed information has changed the culture of information exchange. No longer bound by the constraints of researching paper references and painstakingly typing out quoted portions, today’s operator can copy and paste with lightning speed (and perhaps not as much attention to detail). Without paper products, however, NCOs may lose some of the traditional absorption and retention of doctrinal knowledge. This situation results in a professional NCO corps frequently overwhelmed by information and constrained to reading from a desktop computer screen instead of a paper FM that could fit into a Tuff Box, rucksack, or cargo pocket.

Even if today’s NCO leader had recourse to the old paper versions of his doctrine, the doctrine itself presents two additional difficulties: it is fluid in nature (as the recent generation of interim field manuals suggests); and doctrine often yields to battlefield lessons learned. Placing greater emphasis on knowledge management strategies for NCO leader development may mitigate both difficulties.

NCOs in the 21st century should appropriate knowledge management concepts as the principal delivery system for the Army-wide transmittal of current and emerging doctrinal knowledge. Knowledge management is simply the practice of capturing, storing, and sharing explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is delivered in publications, slide shows, spreadsheets, reports, etc. Tacit knowledge such as insights, experiences, advice, analysis, and opinion is experiential. It is delivered in online forums, instant messaging, and other means of social sharing. While both types of knowledge are necessary, it is tacit knowledge that fosters social learning for a community of practice.

Professional online forums such as the Battle Command Knowledge System’s NCO Net hold enormous potential for enabling knowledge management for our NCO leadership. NCO Net provides a secure, professionally moderated discussion and exchange forum for NCOs working out the problems facing our Army at war today. NCOs share questions and problems as well as solutions, experiences, and advice for fellow NCOs. NCO Net has helped thousands of noncommissioned officers in fielding assistance with current issues in near real time. These forums provide a way of discussing doctrine in theory as well as applied and expanded doctrine as members share their own tactics, techniques, and procedures. Current membership in NCO Net tops 37,000 voluntary participants from active duty, U.S. Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserves.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned also offers enormous potential for enhancing the Army’s NCO leadership. We have barely tapped resources like the Battle Command Knowledge System and the Center for Army Lessons Learned as social learning platforms that support transformation. Formal inclusion of these and other knowledge management platforms in all enlisted training programs...
with emphasis on the Noncommissioned Officer Educational System will rapidly multiply organizational knowledge. Unit commanders at every echelon should support participation in knowledge management forums at the organizational and Army levels.

We are a doctrine-based Army, and FM 3-0 sets the direction for the present and the future. It is imperative that our NCO leaders absorb and communicate the doctrinal parameters provided in FM 3-0 and incorporate relevant observations, insights, and lessons into their training efforts. We can optimize this fluid, dynamic learning environment by implementing aggressive, intentional knowledge-management strategies for today’s NCO leaders. Through platforms such as the noncommissioned officer network, our enlisted leaders can share the doctrinal knowledge explained in our publications as well as lessons learned from current operations. Pulling together the doctrinal concepts as well as the battlefield observations, insights, and lessons will also accelerate efforts to develop relevant “dirt” training in the combat training centers. Building synergy between field operators, Training and Doctrine Command developers, and Combat Training Center observer/controllers is a stated goal of the Training and Doctrine Command.

The paperless publication system promotes online presence. NCO leaders that stay current on emerging issues and topics may find a wealth of support on a variety of Battle Command Knowledge System online forums. Communities of practice exist for niche communities (such as executive or training officer network) or macro communities (logisticians network). An active community of practice applies the collective knowledge of its membership to problem-solving. This fosters collaboration and social learning as it facilitates the development of relevant solution sets. A single forum topic posted on the Battle Command Knowledge System Counterinsurgency Forum in 2007, “Suicide Bomber Defeat,” garnered 187 replies from sources as divergent as the Asymmetric Warfare Group, the Multinational Force-I Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. This type of collaboration exponentially multiplies the doctrinal acumen and operational savvy of all participants and their organizations.

It is probably not realistic to assume our corps of noncommissioned officers will master the fluid nature of current doctrinal concepts utilizing pre-digital educational methods alone. Noncommissioned Officer Educational System classrooms practice the small-group method of instruction in order to optimize the experiences, knowledge, and cognitive abilities of the students in a professionally facilitated forum. Virtual knowledge management forums do the same but on an Army-wide scale that maximizes reach and depth. The doctrinal revolution set in motion by FM 3-0 is still reverberating throughout the force; observations, insights, and lessons are still pouring in from combat operations in theater. NCOs are deluged with new information. We can find a more realistic paradigm for the transmission of current and emerging doctrine for our corps of noncommissioned officers by utilizing knowledge management platforms.

**Changing Conditions, Unchanging Values**

Warfare in the 21st century will demand increasingly complex skill sets from NCO leaders and require a human-centric focus for problem solving. The operational environment will almost certainly involve unconventional, asymmetrical threats and intensive human interaction with indigenous populations, indigenous forces, and multinational partners. The volatile, unpredictable nature of irregular warfare will require an NCO corps firmly rooted in heritage, tradition, and a culture of conscientiously observed Army values. The leader with character who seeks truth and acts ethically will be able to model that which must never change in situations that are constantly changing all around him.

Developing this leader will require knowledge management strategies that leverage the collective expertise of the NCO corps for the benefit of all its members. A doctrine-based Army must disseminate doctrine in ways that are practical, deliverable, and relevant to this generation of NCO leaders. To achieve this, we must adapt available learning methods to the intended target audience. Online communities of practice provide social exchanges of experiential knowledge and rapid transfer of emerging best practices in near real time. This process aids the education and training of combat-ready warriors well prepared for a
variety of operational scenarios. Optimization of the experiences of other Soldiers has long been an Army precept and an educational linchpin of our institutional and operational training domains.

The Army NCO is the primary transmitter of transformation. He is also the steward of our heritage, traditions, and values. Deploying the NCO leader to volatile 21st-century battlefields to conduct full spectrum operations will require leadership that can adapt tactics without compromising ethics. Technologies rise and fall, and weapons systems evolve; but human beings will always remain at the center of warfare. The Army NCO leaders of tomorrow will rise to meet every challenge with courage, competence, and confidence—as long as we never forget who we are and how we got here. **MR**

**NOTES**

3. In this article, the pronouns “he” and “him” are generic and refer to both male and female NCO leaders.
4. Trend analysis is the most fragile element of forecasting. The world’s future over the coming quarter of a century will be subject to numerous disruptions and surprises, natural as well as man-made. These disruptions, and many other contiguously forces, can easily change the trajectory of any single trend. The Joint Operating Environment (Norfolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, November 2008) recognizes that many, if not all, trends and trajectories of the future will be non-linear.
6. Ibid. “This conflict will be waged in an environment that is complex, multidimensional, and rooted in the human dimension. Military forces alone cannot win this conflict; winning requires the close cooperation and coordination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic efforts. Due to the human nature of the conflict, however, land power will remain important to the military effort and essential to victory.”
7. Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (Washington DC: GPO, September 2007) “Irregular warfare is about people, not platforms. Irregular warfare depends not just on our military prowess, but also our understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. People, not platforms and advanced technology will be the key to irregular warfare success.”
11. BG Edward L. Cardon, “Recognizing the Army’s Cultural Changes,” *Army*, September 2007. “We do not fully understand how the culture of our junior leaders and soldiers has changed. For example, we know a number of our armor captains have not completed tank gunnery because of an extended deployment. To some, this is a harbinger to a downfall of Army readiness. But to our junior leaders, the reaction is quite different. They are very confident they can rapidly master the required skills. Why do they think like this? New equipment, new tactics, different training—our soldiers know they have to adapt both to win and to stay alive. They are not afraid of the unknown; they use their skills to adapt to the unknown. This is not to suggest or say that we should never conduct tank gunnery. We should, and there is no sound reason why our armor crewmen should not be experts on their tanks as a matter of training, but our junior leaders see a lack of a particular skill as a challenge to overcome, as they have already demonstrated in every combat deployment.”
13. Ibid.
17. FM 6-01.1, *Knowledge Management*, (Washington DC: GPO, 2008), para. 1-17. “Connection provides people with a structure and networks—both technical and social—that facilitate communication. Since knowledge is social and used for the benefit of people, most people seek it from those they know and trust before querying others or accessing databases. Seeking knowledge from other people leads to collaboration.”
18. The Lessons Learned Course, conducted by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, is being designed to train officers, warrant officers, and NCOs assigned responsibility for establishing and managing a lessons learned program in their organization and their subordinate units.
19. Ibid., GEN William S. Wallace, “TRADOC is committed to providing our soldiers with the best, most relevant and innovative training opportunities while transforming a campaign-quality Army with Joint and expeditionary capabilities. We continue to push lessons learned in theater directly to soldiers on the ground and to units across the Army. Our lessons learned are simultaneously providing the foundation and underpinnings for development of Army doctrine that is reinforced and practiced at operational units and our training centers.”

**Visit the Army Training Network (ATN) @ https://atn.army.mil**
Also contact the team at: leav-atn@conus.army.mil

ATN is a web-based resource for all Army training management needs to include a data-based version of FM 7-0 and Training Management How To (replacement for FM 7-1). It also features unit training best practices, lessons, observations, insights, and links to other training management websites. The ATN website is designed to be the location where Soldiers, DA civilians, and leaders can obtain the latest good ideas on how to make FM 7-0 work for them. It is a site where Soldiers can share their good training ideas and solutions.

**ATN is the Soldiers’ one-stop-shop for all their training needs.**
The Noncommissioned Officer as Moral Exemplar

Major Kenneth R. Williams, U.S. Army

“IN WAR, TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUALTY,” according to Greek tragic dramatist, Aeschylus (525–456 BCE). To be sure, war places Soldiers under physical, emotional, spiritual, and moral forces that influence them to violate their personal and professional moral identities. Such violations often have significant, far-reaching effects to the Army’s long-term detriment. The Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) corps can and ought to have a positive moral influence on the Soldiers it leads. Today’s highly deployable Army needs NCOs who view themselves as moral agents and moral exemplars. In the following discussion, I attempt to outline reasons for this need and an ideal for what an NCO as a “moral exemplar” should entail.

Why Does the Army Need NCOs to Be Moral Exemplars?

The introduction to Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership, lists two characteristics of the ideal Army leader as “[of] high moral character” and “serves as a role model.”1 Questions raised in the current operational environments over the last several years indicate why emphasis should be placed now on developing NCOs as moral exemplars. Military service is filled with ethical problems that today have strategic ramifications beyond their normal moral implications. Opportunities for moral collapse abound in complex environments, and there are critical utilitarian reasons for avoiding such failures. Moral collapse has a far-reaching influence not only on unit climate and relationships, but also on mission success, public support of military operations, and relationships between U.S. forces and those of other nations.2 The nature of the “three block war” requires that NCOs, and the Soldiers they lead, be deeply grounded in ethical principles that enable morally adaptive functioning.3 Soldiers must transition from combat to establishing and maintaining law and order, providing humanitarian assistance, and engaging in nation building, while applying not only the technical skills needed, but also the moral principles required for such a transition.

Protracted conflict has always had an adverse effect on combatants’ moral judgment and behavior.4 Nontraditional enemies are elusive, and conflicts can often escalate quickly. Soldiers under such conditions are often tempted to view the local population as the enemy. Because of long exposure to the stresses of trying to discern the enemy, discipline in adhering to protections for
noncombatants may slip. The prohibitions laid out in FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, and in rules of engagement have less purchase in such conditions. The extreme “otherness” of an indigenous noncombatant population cannot help but influence a young person thrust into combat. Highly lethal and disproportionate methods may become more acceptable in mitigating risk at the expense of unintended casualties. In such conditions, a combatant can readily fall into bad-faith and become careless about the innocent population. Reducing the impulse to carelessness is morally and strategically paramount; there should be an active effort to inculcate a moral perspective in the force through front-line leadership example.

The Army continues to experience a significant number of moral failures. During the first four years of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, over 100 crimes occurred, including rape, murder, assault, and theft. There continue to be a significant numbers of sexual assaults, sexual misconduct, and other crimes. The Army places great importance on programs designed to prevent such moral lapses. Emphasizing the NCO as a moral exemplar can help reinforce the modern strategic necessity that Soldiers rigorously conduct themselves according to moral expectations.

**Soldier moral development.** A study of initial entry training indicates a limited effect on Soldiers’ moral development with no significant change in the pattern of moral decision making. The study’s results also indicate a significant influence leaders have in both positive and negative ways, shallow internalization of the Army’s moral code, and the need for continued moral education following training. Ethics educators have strongly asserted the effectiveness of mentors in facilitating moral development. The most effective influence on the moral development of the members of any organization is the first-line supervisor.

**Ethical analysis.** In their study of moral exemplars, Ann Colby and William Damon developed five criteria to describe a moral exemplar:

- Sustained commitment to moral ideals or principles that include a generalized respect for humanity or a sustained evidence of moral virtue.
- Disposition to act in accord with moral ideals or principles, implying consistency between actions and intentions and between the means and ends of actions.
- Willingness to risk one’s self-interest for the sake of moral values.
- Tendency to be inspiring to others and thereby to move them to moral action.
- Sense of realistic humility about one’s importance in the world at large, implying a broader concern than one’s own ego.

A moral exemplar ideally possesses highly developed ethical behavior and understanding. In addition to the five criteria listed above, a moral exemplar engages in four processes, also known as the four-component model of moral action: ethical sensitivity, ethical judgment, ethical motivation, and ethical character:

- Ethical sensitivity involves an awareness of the moral problem, an understanding of the factors involved and the causes, effects, and consequences of various choices, especially the effects on the people involved. A moral exemplar is able to understand the perspective of another person.
Ethical judgment involves the ability to determine which choice is most morally justifiable. Moral exemplars are experts in moral decision-making processes.

Ethical motivation involves one’s level of commitment and personal responsibility to moral values and moral action. Moral exemplars are able to sustain their moral commitments because they incorporate moral values into their self-identity.

Ethical character involves persistence and determination in pursuing moral goals, i.e., the ability to exercise self-control in order to fulfill the moral course of action.

Understanding the code. A moral exemplar is thus ideally an expert in the theory and practice of ethics. Therefore, to ask that an NCO be a moral exemplar is to say that an NCO should be expected to practice the skills related to the Army’s moral codes as exemplified in the Soldier’s Creed, the Warrior Ethos, and Army Values. An NCO should go beyond memorizing the Army’s moral codes. He should internalize them as elements of his personal identity to really understand them in the context of his or her own life. An NCO should therefore understand the logic, not simply the rules by which he or she must soldier.

It stands to reason that a person who has decided to enter a professional career field should strive to live up to the standards entailed in the profession. Swearing an oath to support and defend the Constitution and to obey the legal orders of officers who have sworn that oath is the baseline requirement for the military profession in the United States. A military career thus begins with an explicit moral foundation, as the Constitution entails commitment to all the international treaties regarding Just War as well as to the rights and values Americans see as fundamental. As such, an NCO has a unique value system and professional identity. Failure to live up to these standards is to be a mountebank, a charlatan who does not understand the most basic requirements of the profession.

An NCO should therefore understand the logic, not simply the rules by which he or she must soldier.

Upon entering the profession, then, an NCO takes on both the profession’s and the society’s expectations of ethical identity and behavior. An NCO, as a professional, should consciously deliberate integration of both personal and professional moral codes and identities. Determining if one’s personal identity and one’s chosen professional identity are compatible is essential. One must have examined one’s own life, fully understanding the ethical implications of continuing to be what one is, or to move forward, morally, in another direction. If the military institutionalized this process of integration, the NCO corps would develop a much more constructive and confident professional ethical posture.

Describing the Morally Ideal NCO

Integrating Colby and Damon’s five criteria with the four-components model produces seven extrapolations for describing the ideal NCO as a moral exemplar:

- Moral commitment.
- Moral sensitivity.
- Moral judgment.
- Primacy of moral values.
- Moral inspiration.
- Humility (eschewing airs of moral superiority).
- Character.

Moral commitment. A sustained commitment to a moral lifestyle is ideal. Ethical reliability cannot be found in isolated and convenient spasms of moral actions. Action should correspond to principle. Such sustained commitment should stem from respect for all people as individual ends in themselves, just as one sees oneself (that is to say, not merely as the means to an end). Therefore, this criterion obviates discrimination associated with racism, sexism, and other such generalizations. The NCO, as moral exemplar, ought to commit to this primary moral principle as a matter of personal integrity. Such an NCO’s personal life should thereby serve as the foundation for commitment in professional life. One must first commit to just and fair treatment for all people regardless of one’s bias or prejudice. One must discipline oneself to habitually aligning personal action toward others with the principle of treating each person as an end in themselves and not as a means to an end.

Moral sensitivity. Moral sensitivity requires discernment, the ability to identify the moral issues and forces at play in a moral dilemma. A moral
exemplar should be able to put himself in the position of others and see things from others’ perspectives. This skill involves not only engaging in empathy for others, but also in being sensitive to the need for taking moral action. Perspective-taking ability also recalls the sense of reciprocity that should extend to the local nationals of the countries in which U.S. forces are deployed, and even to the enemy. Perspective-taking and empathy serve to prevent one from committing immoral acts (e.g., war crimes) against these persons.

Moral sensitivity also involves, as aforementioned, “knowing the codes, regulations, and norms of one’s profession, and recognizing when they apply.” Therefore, a morally exemplary NCO would be well-versed on the principles of the Just War tradition, the law of land warfare, the Geneva Conventions, and the Army’s moral codes. As suggested earlier, moral sensitivity does not mean simply having superficial knowledge of or having memorized these standards. It means being able to apply them to a variety of situations with knowledge of their ethical logic. FM 6-22 emphasizes this requirement: “To be an ethical leader requires more than knowing Army values. Leaders must be able to apply them to find moral solutions to diverse problems.” All of this implies a higher degree of ethical education than the Army currently employs.

Moral judgment. Moral judgment involves the ability to think critically and make decisions based on a commitment to ethical principles, to cultivation of virtues (through reasoned values), and to one’s moral sensitivity. Both general principles and specific rules influence moral judgment. Moral judgment entails decisions based on personal interest and benefits, on maintaining the current order of social life, or on core principles and values. The Army’s pattern of moral judgment appears to be based mainly on rules, regulations, and standard procedures. In a recent paper I discussed the moral judgment of Soldiers in military police initial entry training. My study indicated their moral judgment at the start of training and at the conclusion of training was assessed at:

- 42 percent maintaining the norms (rules-based).
- 28 percent personal interest.
- 24 percent principle-based.

The study showed no statistically significant change in moral judgment as a result of military police initial entry training. Although such a study has not been conducted on other populations, there is reason to believe that similar results will occur.

While rules are necessary for structure and order, a rules-based approach is often inadequate for resolving moral puzzles and apparent dilemmas. Rules often come into conflict. Often, one can find a reason to rationalize going around a rule to act in self-interest. A professional takes such ethical judgment seriously, wary of simplistic, superficial justifications for avoiding the implications of moral principle. As two noted experts have observed, “Professional practice is essentially a moral enterprise.” The Army faces an adaptive enemy and changes in warfare; Soldiers must be able to “reason carefully about the dilemmas of one’s profession . . .”

Primacy of moral values. Colby and Damon’s study indicates that to uphold their own moral
values, moral exemplars are willing to set aside personal gain for the good of others. This does not mean that moral exemplars disregard their personal health and welfare, but it does mean that core values take precedence over personal benefits when one faces a moral dilemma. Moral exemplars fulfill their commitment to moral values.

For an NCO, being a moral exemplar epitomizes the Army value of “selfless service.” An NCO chooses moral action over self-interest, does not use Soldiers for personal gain, and sees the Army’s moral code as the overarching premise for long-term success, lasting influence, and making a difference in the world. When faced with a moral dilemma, the NCO defers to principle rather than acting in self-interest. For example, the NCO Creed states, “I will not use my grade or position to attain pleasure, profit, or personal safety. . . I will always place their [Soldiers] needs above my own.” The Army Study Guide also enumerates this principle.19

**Moral inspiration.** Colby and Damon’s study recognizes that a morale exemplar influences the environment surrounding him. Influence is the essence of leadership. Another author defines leadership as “an influence relationship between leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes.”20 Similarly, a moral exemplar inspires others to higher performance through such associated influence.

Ideally, an NCO should facilitate change and growth, build a team, and motivate others to ethical development and moral action. Just as a moral exemplar displays such attributes in his or her life, NCOs should lead Soldiers to incorporate them in their lives. FM 6-22 emphasizes the power of the NCO’s example:

Army leaders of character lead by personal example and consistently act as good role models through a dedicated lifelong effort to learn and develop. They achieve excellence for their organizations when followers are disciplined to do their duty, committed to the Army Values, and feel empowered to accomplish any mission, while simultaneously improving their organizations with focus towards the future.21

**Humility.** Colby and Damon’s study also emphasizes the element of humility. A moral exemplar strives for a realistic self-assessment and does not assume the posture of moral superiority. Such an exemplar gives credit where it is due and understands that he or she is not the fount of all wisdom. Humility is not a sign of weakness but of strength. It is the strength to proactively avoid self-deception by assessing and acknowledging one’s own vulnerabilities and protecting against them by relying on the strengths of the other members of the team.

FM 6-22 indicates that all Soldiers are leaders, whether or not they are in a position of, or have authority for, leadership. Such “leaders without authority,” also known as informal leaders, demonstrate leadership though a combination of self-confidence and humility.22 The words *humility* and *humble* have their root in the Latin word for earth.23 An NCO must be down-to-earth.

**Character.** None of the above has any value unless one follows it up with action that is consistent with one’s values and beliefs. It is not enough to have moral values and beliefs. An exemplar practices such values and beliefs in daily life. The ability to engage in action that is consistent with one’s values and beliefs is often termed self-regulation. Self-regulation involves integrating the elements of moral thinking and moral emotions.

Moral character is one of the elements of the four-component model. According to FM 6-22—

Character, a person’s moral and ethical qualities, helps determine what is right and gives a leader motivation to do what is appropriate, regardless of the circumstances or the consequences. An informed ethical conscience consistent with the Army Values strengthens leaders to make the right choices when faced with tough issues. Since Army leaders seek to do what is right and inspire others to do the same, they must embody these values.24

Soldiers must be able to “reason carefully about the dilemmas of one’s profession...”
Consistency carries with it the idea of integrity. In its description of integrity, FM 6-22 states—
Leaders of integrity consistently act according to clear principles, not just what works now. The Army relies on leaders of integrity who possess high moral standards and who are honest in word and deed. Leaders are honest to others by not presenting themselves or their actions as anything other than what they are, remaining committed to the truth.

To engage in moral action consistent with one’s character, one must often demonstrate personal courage. FM 6-22 provides an accurate description of courage:

Moral courage is the willingness to stand firm on values, principles, and convictions. It enables all leaders to stand up for what they believe is right, regardless of the consequences. Leaders, who take full responsibility for their decisions and actions, even when things go wrong, display moral courage.

The four component model describes character not as a set of traits or qualities but as the persistence and courage to follow through on personal and professional moral values. The NCO as moral exemplar ideally displays professional ethical skills that demonstrate character with consistent action. These skills enable him to—
● Act on the discerned primary moral value.
● Take the role of others.
● Conduct ethical and moral decision making.
● Execute appropriate force.
● Treat all with respect.

**NCO as Exemplar**

Building character involves developing expertise. An NCO is ideally a professional because he or she is an expert, i.e., the master. The subordinate is the apprentice. One applicable process of moral and character development is integrative ethical education, which approaches character development with three basic premises:
● Character is expertise development.
● Cultivation of character is the cultivation of expertise.
● Self-regulation is necessary for sustaining character.

Integrative ethical education thus involves taking a novice and creating an expert through coached apprenticeship. The NCO as a moral exemplar ideally serves as a coach or expert who guides the novice or apprentice to expertise. In this process of coached apprenticeship, the NCO serves as a personal example, as an instructor, and as the creator of a mastery climate.

**Personal example.** In coached apprenticeship, the novice junior Soldier observes the actions and attitudes of the expert, the NCO. Self-regulation is the result of observing the example of leaders and applying the moral code and the organization’s policies and procedures. The NCO as moral exemplar provides the Soldier with a visible model. FM 6-22 states:

Living by the Army Values and the Warrior Ethos best displays character and leading by example. It means putting the organization and subordinates above personal self-interest, career, and comfort. For the Army leader, it requires putting the lives of others above a personal desire for self-preservation.

The personal example of an NCO cannot be underestimated. The results of my 2009 study reveal that the example of leaders in general, and that of drill sergeants in particular, had the most significant effect on Soldiers’ moral development. If Soldiers are to be fully prepared for battle, not just tactically and technically, but especially morally, the Army needs NCOs as moral exemplars.

**Methods of instruction.** The downfall of many programs of ethical and character education is not content but methods of instruction. The instruction that an NCO as moral exemplar provides must include specific elements.

A moral exemplar’s methods are self-construc- tive. That is to say, one must will assimilation for oneself. Susan Martinelli-Fernandez, in referring to Immanuel Kant’s notion of autonomy in moral education, asserts that autonomy does not mean that Soldiers have the right to act on impulse to accept or reject certain moral actions or rules. Autonomy means that Soldiers have the right, the freedom, and most important, the responsibility to participate actively in constructing their moral identity in the light of reason. Because moral action is principled, leaders can’t force Soldiers to change. Soldiers must choose to change.
However, leaders can create the conditions in which Soldiers are enabled, and they can choose to change. If leaders force-feed the rules, the motivation for engaging in or ignoring moral action is reduced to self-interest, avoiding punishment, or obtaining a reward. As Martinelli-Fernandez remarks, “The goal of moral education, therefore, is not merely to get the agent to follow the rules. It is the cultivation of moral agency, an agency that involves one’s becoming an independent, right thinking and right acting person.”

A moral exemplar must develop expertise in two dimensions: conscious, explicit understanding; and intuitive, implicit understanding. Instruction must involve both acquiring specific knowledge of the Army’s moral code and developing the ability to apply it to a variety of situations. A moral exemplar develops a Soldier’s ability for self-regulation and self-monitoring. Soldiers must be able to demonstrate moral character “when no one is looking.” That means that Soldiers must internalize the Army’s moral code. This self-regulation is best developed through observing the moral performance of a leader.

A moral exemplar’s methods involve extensive practice. Units rehearse missions, and they should also rehearse moral dilemmas. Effective instructional methods challenge Soldiers’ current patterns of moral thinking. If a Soldier’s moral judgment is mainly rules-based, the NCO should present dilemmas that create conflict between the rules and guide him to apply moral principles and values to the dilemma. The most effective methods of facilitating expertise in moral judgment include dilemma discussions and role-taking exercises. The most significant element in the process is rethinking an issue by interacting with others.

In my study, Soldiers in focus groups indicated that much of present moral training consisted of correction rather than instruction. This focus on what not to do rather than what to do contributed to a key finding of the study—superficial internalization of the Army’s moral code. However, the instructional methods of the NCO as moral exemplar should include moral reasoning, the moral emotion of empathy, the discovery of meaning and purpose, rehearsal of difficult moral tasks, and the instructional methods must be somewhat pleasurable.

**Mastery climate.** A moral exemplar is a leader who creates a mastery climate that creates the conditions for optimal development. In creating a mastery climate, a moral exemplar uses mistakes as learning opportunities. Everything that occurs is a learning experience about either how to act or how not to act. A moral exemplar makes developing unit cohesion a high priority. A mastery climate fosters positive relationships between peers because such relationships encourage cooperative learning and mutual encouragement.

Within a mastery climate, a moral exemplar reinforces behavior consistent with the organization’s moral code through both public honors and private, personal praise. He solicits feedback from followers on the moral climate of the organization. He makes it safe to discuss issues with no fear of retribution. The exemplar focuses on improving the unit’s performance and moral conduct, not on his or her Soldiers’ personal feelings.

In creating a mastery climate, moral exemplars also encourage the novice-apprentice’s active participation in developing moral character. The NCO’s role in moral and character education is not about “imprinting the messages of a moral code” on the minds of Soldiers. Nor is the NCO a marketing agent who uses posters and slogans in “a public awareness approach to values.” Quick-change approaches to moral and character education tend to produce moral agents who are “fair-weather” moral Soldiers. They adhere to their moral code in favorable situations but tend to fall in adverse or ambiguous situations. Instead, the NCO engages Soldiers in dialogues designed to challenge their moral thinking.

A mastery climate involves the moral exemplar practicing leadership and communication styles that nurture relationships and education for expertise. This means that the leader-follower relationship must be interactive, not one-dimensional, in enforcing the rules and memorizing the code. The NCO’s communication and leadership style must engage Soldiers in practice that leads to expertise.
nurtures ethical behavior, people will, over time, think, feel, and act ethically. They will internalize the aspects of sound character.\textsuperscript{40} And later, “Army leaders must consistently focus on shaping ethics-based organizational climates in which subordinates and organizations can achieve their full potential.”\textsuperscript{41}

Looking to the Future
Noncommissioned officers have a moral obligation to ensure that Soldiers are prepared for battle. Preparation for battle goes beyond tactical and technical proficiency to include the moral application of lethal force. This moral application is the fundamental basis of being a military professional. Increasingly, Soldiers are put in the position of making moral judgments and taking actions that may cause the deaths of their peers and innocent civilians, as well as the enemy. In addition, a Soldier’s behavior on a daily basis must facilitate positive peer relationships to develop strong cohesion. Such actions must adhere to the Army’s moral codes and norms in the Constitution. The most effective means of creating moral Soldiers is through NCOs who demonstrate high moral character every day. \textit{MR}

\section*{NOTES}

2. Ibid., para. 4-62.
12. Lapsley and Narvaez; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma; Thoma.
14. FM 6-22, para. 4-68.
15. Lapsley and Narvaez; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma; Thoma.
17. Bebeau and Monson, 559.
18. Ibid.
21. FM 6-22, para. 3-1.
22. Ibid., para. 3-66.
24. FM 6-22, para. 4-1.
25. Ibid., para. 4-30.
26. Ibid., para. 4-38.
27. Bebeau and Monson.
28. Lapsley and Narvaez.
29. FM 6-22, para. 7-76.
30. Lapsley and Narvaez.
32. Ibid., 2006, 57.
33. Bebeau and Monson, 560.
34. Lapsley and Narvaez.
40. FM 6-22, para. 4-56.
41. Ibid., para. 4-67.

Fighting Morality: A Commandant’s Perspective
What Turned the Tide in Anbar?

Colonel Mark F. Cancian, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Retired

In his recent book, *The War Within*, Bob Woodward attributes the largest role in turning the tide in Iraq to new methods of intelligence fusion and precision raiding that allowed special forces to eliminate insurgent leaders. Although Woodward acknowledges that the surge and the Awakening were important, he gives the role of Special Forces special prominence:

Beginning in May 2006, the U.S. military and the U.S. intelligence agencies launched a series of top secret operations that enabled them to locate, target and kill key individuals in extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda, the Sunni insurgency and renegade Shi’a militias...a number of authoritative sources say these covert activities had a far-reaching effect on the violence and were very possibly the biggest factor in reducing it.

In post-publication interviews Woodward repeatedly cited the key role of intelligence fusion and precision raiding above other factors. Follow up reporting in the *Washington Post* also highlighted the role of Special Forces in eliminating insurgent leadership.

This is not what I saw during my tour in Al Anbar during late 2006 and early 2007 when the tide turned in that province. In Anbar, the Awakening of the sheiks and the surge were the key events. Raiding by various special operations units was extensive, but its effects were unclear.

There is a lot of politics wrapped up in this question, so getting an objective assessment is difficult. The surge was a Bush cabinet initiative, launched against the advice of many military advisors. Woodward has become increasingly critical of the Bush administration, and his book is reluctant to give President Bush credit for improving conditions in Iraq.

Nevertheless, understanding what turned the tide in Iraq is vital. The answer will shape operations and policies elsewhere, particularly in Afghanistan as the Nation looks for a new strategy to turn that failing effort around.

The Awakening—The Key Event

Much has been written about the “Awakening” of the sheiks in Anbar, and there is no need to repeat that story here. A few key elements are worth reviewing.

- The Awakening came first (September 2006), before the surge and the increase in raids. It was a local initiative, driven by Al-Qaeda’s brutal treatment of the population and its war against the sheiks. Although the coalition...
did not cause the Awakening, it was agile enough
to respond quickly, encouraging the leaders and
protecting its members.

- The Awakening was not just a political event.
  It had immediate effects in the field. First, it took
dangerous young men off the streets as the sheiks
made peace with the coalition.
- Most important, the Awakening brought thou-
sands of new recruits into the police. Al-Qaeda
feared the police more than the army or the coalition
because local police knew who belonged and who
did not. Local police also had linkages to the popu-
lace that procured tips and information unavailable
to outsiders. Thus, police could attack Al-Qaeda
cells in a way outsiders could not.

The Surge

The “surge” was also important. In Anbar, it
came early (November 2006) and was relatively
small—one Marine Expeditionary Unit Special
Operations Command was broken up and spread
around the province. Two companies reinforced the
U.S. Army brigade (1-1 Armored Division, later
1-3 Infantry Division) in Ramadi. Two companies
went to the Hadithah “triad,” the three cities of
Hadithah, Barwanah, and Haqlaniyah. The expedi-
tionary unit headquarters and remaining ground
elements went out west to Ar Rutbah. Although
contrary to doctrine, this dispersion allowed
Multinational Force-West to pressure several key
points at once.

Despite the small increase in manpower (only a 10
percent increase), the surge had a significant impact.
In both Rutbah and the Hadithah triad police forces
were recruited and took hold. Prior to the surge,
Rutbah had virtually no police, while Hadithah’s
few police hunkered down in a limited number of
locations. Now they covered their entire towns.
The number of incidents in the Hadithah
triad plummeted. In Ramadi, the number
of police grew and their coverage spread to
every neighborhood, although the level of
violence remained high for many months.

With the surge, there were no longer blank
spots—areas where Al-Qaeda in Iraq could
operate with little fear of coalition interfer-
ence. Further, the surge showed the sheiks of the
Awakening that the U.S. was serious
in its support.

The Impact of Raids

Ascertaining the effect of raids is difficult
because so many other factors produce changes
on the counterinsurgency battlefield. Certainly,
raids captured or killed many targets (“jackpots”).
Intuitively, it seems reasonable to believe that the
loss of key leaders would weaken an insurgency.
Although leaders can be replaced, the replacements
might be less skilled or more cautious. Eventually,
the scale and effectiveness of insurgent actions
would decline.

However, raids also have a significant, but often
unappreciated, downside. Many resulted in “dry
holes”—that is, the target was not present. Maybe
the intelligence was bad. Maybe the timing was bad.
The result, however, was a door smashed, a family
terrorized, and sometimes, unintended casualties.
Generally, the males in the house were detained for
screening anyway since the house was under suspi-
cion. Thus, the after-action report for many, perhaps
most, raids concluded: “No jackpot, X detainees.”
These raids rarely collected the forensic evidence to
sustain a court case, so generally within two weeks
the now-angered detainees were released to return
to their neighborhoods. Occasionally there were
spectacular errors. One such error nearly turned a
key friendly tribe against the coalition.

Raiding organizations tend to be less sensitive
to this downside because they do not own the ter-
ritory. They conduct their operations and return
to base. Line units, who do own the territory, deal
with the aftermath. In early 2007, the multinational
force staff attempted to assess the effect of raids on
the insurgency. No connection was evident. The
number of raids had increased, the number of jack-
pots taken had increased, but the level of violence
(measured by daily incidents) had also increased.
Further, no decrease was visible in the skill level or
sophistication of insurgent operations. To be fair, it might have been that raiding took time to have its effects felt, or that it worked in conjunction with other factors. Perhaps a more nuanced analysis would have turned up a relationship. However, raids against the insurgent leadership were clearly not the dominant factor in reducing the level of violence.

The Attractiveness of Raiding as a Tactic

Counterinsurgency theorists are very critical of strategies that rely heavily on raiding to decapitate insurgent leadership. Some examples:

- The U.S. counterinsurgency field manual (FM 3-24) cites “focus special forces primarily on raiding” as an “unsuccessful practice.”
- Targeting insurgent leadership does not appear in any of the manual’s precepts. General David Petraeus, who oversaw the drafting of the manual, often returns to this theme: “You can’t kill your way out of an insurgency.”

Indeed, he has gone further:

What we have learned over the years is that the killing of a leader does not decapitate an organization in the way that perhaps one might think. It’s an important blow, but let’s recall that Zarqawi was killed in Iraq, and Al-Qaeda recovered from that. Someone else—al Masri—stepped up in his place and in fact, the level of violence carried out by Al-Qaeda in Iraq actually went up.

- The Small Wars Manual, the Marine Corps classic on counterinsurgency, does not even discuss targeting insurgent leadership.

- Proponents of “fourth generation warfare” view enemies as plastic networks of nonstate actors. Decapitation is not just ineffective; it is impossible because networks are self-healing.

- David Galula’s recently rediscovered studies of counterinsurgency in Algeria focus on insurgent members, not the leadership. Thus his strategy includes arrests by the police. This is not part of a decapitation strategy by the military but a broad effort to eliminate insurgent cell members.

- One British study of 44 insurgencies found that targeting insurgent leadership was actually counterproductive.

Instead of targeting the insurgent leadership, all of these theorists focus instead on providing security for and maintaining control of the population. They are not just focused on “soft” power—all advocate violent action against irreconcilable insurgent elements—but they do not envision success arising from decapitation of the insurgency.

If both practical results and theory suggest decapitation tactics are dubious, why then is raiding so highly featured in contemporary discussions about counterinsurgency? The reasons are several. Raids by Special Forces capture the imagination of both decision makers and the public. Decision makers see in such operations the possibility of major gains for small risks and low casualties. Precision attack, on the ground as in the air, promises powerful effects and low collateral damage compared with conventional operations.

Much public imagination revels in the exploits of brave, competent, highly effective warriors. Finally, by necessity so much secrecy surrounds these actions that few can say what is really happening. The public only sees the “high-speed” images.

There are a number of theories about why raiding strategies might not succeed despite hitting targets. The U.S. counterinsurgency manual discusses at length how excessive use of violence can alienate the civilian population, which is the center of gravity for counterinsurgency operations.
Analysts at the Institute for Defense Analysis have offered another theory based on their analysis of counterdrug operations. What they learned was contrary to expectations. Taking out the kingpin was not very effective in suppressing the drug trade. There was always an ambitious and talented “number two” ready to step in. Most effective were actions that discouraged the foot soldiers because a general without foot soldiers was useless. Recent analysis of operations in Iraq indicates that the same dynamic occurs there with the insurgency.

Other Perspectives

If this uncertainty about the effectiveness of a decapitation raiding strategy were the observation of just a single observer, one could dismiss it as an anomaly. But others in Anbar have expressed similar perspectives. For example, then-Colonel Sean MacFarland, who commanded a brigade in Anbar during the time of my tour, analyzed the reasons for the turning of the tide in the provincial capital of Ramadi. He gives primary credit to the Awakening, and notes the contributions of the coalition supporting the Awakening, the building of the Iraqi police, and especially the importance of the effort to secure the population through forward presence. Although he pays tribute to the efforts of Special Forces, he does not mention any weakening of the insurgency because of attacks on its leadership. Other analyses of the events in Ramadi—for example, Andrew Lubin’s “Ramadi: From Caliphate to Capitalism”—share the same perspective.

Marine Corps perspectives not surprisingly focus on the Awakening and the strengthening of the Iraqi security forces, efforts that they were deeply involved with. However, even analyses that focus on Special Forces in Anbar recognize the primary importance of conventional operations that secured the population. None of the analyses mentions the weakening of insurgent leadership as a significant factor in turning the tide.

Lessons for the Future

Of course, what happened in Anbar province may not be representative of other areas, particularly Baghdad. Anbar has virtually no Shi’as, so sectarian conflicts are absent. In particular, there was no Sadr militia, the neutralization of which was a major cause of the reduction in violence in Baghdad. Nevertheless, because the tide began to turn in Anbar first, the experience there is worth considering for success in Afghanistan. If Woodward is right, the way forward in that country would be to hold a network of secure bases from which raiding forces would sally to attack insurgent leaders while negotiators would cajole tribal leaders. No surge would be necessary; boots on the ground provide relatively little value. However, if the experience in Anbar is representative, boots on the ground appear instrumental, even essential.

A thorough study could ascertain the real effect of raids. At issue is not the skill or valor of Special Forces conducting the decapitation campaign. Those qualities have been fully demonstrated. What is uncertain is the effect that this effort has on the overall counterinsurgency campaign. Clearly neutralizing “x” number of insurgent targets is insufficient evidence of success. However, there may be important secondary or tertiary effects that are not immediately evident, the effects may be cumulative over time, or it may be that, in fact, there is little lasting effect. No such study does appears to have been done. Nevertheless, evidence from Anbar indicates that Woodward is wrong—that boots on the ground are important and that, indeed, we cannot kill our way out of an insurgency. 

NOTES

2. Ibid, 380.
3. For example, “Secret killing program is key in Iraq, Woodward says,” CNN, 9 September 2008.
11. For a full discussion of why politicians are drawn to Special Forces, see Eliot Cohen, Commandos and Politicians (Cambridge: MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978).
15. For example, Colonel Michael D. Visconage, “Turning the Tide in the West,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 2008, 8-12.
LEADING OUR LEADERS

When he heard that Marcellus had been killed, [Hannibal] hurried to the spot and stood for a long time by the dead body, admiring its strength and beauty. He uttered not a boastful word, nor did he show any sign of exultation, such as might be expected of a man who has just rid himself of a bitter and formidable enemy. After he had expressed his wonder at the unexpectedness of Marcellus's death, he removed his signet ring, but gave orders that his body should be treated with honor; wrapped in a fine robe, adorned, and burned. After this he collected the ashes in a silver urn, crowned it with a gilded wreath, and sent it to Marcellus's son.

—Plutarch (66 to c. 120 CE), Life of Marcellus

We hear lots of talk about leaders “setting the conditions” for success. And we have lots of leaders taking credit for doing just that. But are we applying a reciprocal level of accountability when leaders set the conditions for failure? There was a long military tradition known as respondeat superior, meaning “let the master answer.” Our legal experts will say that our military does not have such a system. And while that is true, legally, our notions of leaders being responsible, at least morally, for everything their people do or fail to do derives from this tradition. The Nuremberg Tribunals, as it is well known, explicitly established that this tradition did not include an escape clause if our actions violated the law, allowing us to claim we were just following orders. Accountability resided at the level of perpetration. And that is a good thing. But as it turns out, it is a much more straightforward practice to hold those who committed the acts accountable than to hold accountable those who set the conditions that enabled, encouraged, motivated, and created the sine qua non (not without which) potential for those actions.

By the time those in our junior enlisted ranks were crossing over legal and moral lines during the last decade, the conditions had long been set by their leaders for moral failure, from junior grade leaders all the way up through the White House. As military leaders we have an explicit mandate to protect and defend the Constitution. But how were we supposed to do that several years ago when we had policies altered from the White House on down—following the Alberto Gonzales and John Yoo “school of law”—policies that systematically set aside the spirit and letter of legal principles and statutes that had constitutional force? These policies helped to set the conditions that enabled and empowered a global network of interrogation and rendition practices that ultimately resulted in widespread torture and in many cases even murder.

These abuses may be the tip of an iceberg that marks more treacherous depths, dangerous waters that threaten the route bounded by our professional, legal, and moral compass. The cost of carrying out these wayward policies has been incalculably high, not only in terms of people’s lives and money, but also in the intangible currencies of legitimate global trust and respect.
If we look toward the Army’s leadership doctrine for guidance to answer this question, we are told that there is much ado about character and values. Yet the Schlesinger Report concluded that major programs such as the Army’s core values program did very little in preparing service members to know what they should and shouldn’t be doing in detention operations.

As an example, the current leadership manual is substantively the same as the 1999 version, especially the section on character and values and ethics. The original drafts of the 1999 leadership manual included one very important feature of the value of “respect,” the idea that we were to respect our enemies. The idea was drawn from Michael Walzer’s work, in Just and Unjust Wars, about the moral equality of the enemy, as well as Paul Christopher’s work in The Ethics of War and Peace, about treating the enemy with respect as a comrade in arms, albeit on an opposing side. The idea did not survive the staffing and approval process of doctrine development, and it was removed. The Chaplain Corps was incensed that our enemies would have moral equality, and they led the charge in ensuring that the concept of respect did not include any idea of respecting the enemy. So, to this day, the value of respect reads as one that applies only to those on our side. Sadly, this is one value that may have made some difference had its original conception been preserved.

I remember attending a chaplain conference in Orlando, Florida, to argue against a religious foundation in the leadership manual for the Army’s conception of professional ethics. With few exceptions, the Chaplain Corps believed that Field Manual (FM) 22-100 should have such a religious foundation. This is the conference that rejected the notion of the moral equality of the enemy, largely on religious grounds. The conference influenced another change in the doctrine at that time, which still stands in the current manual. There was language in the original drafts to remind leaders to keep a professional perspective when it comes to religion, to prevent religious leaders from applying any undue influence in matters of faith. There may have been a time when it was hard being a Christian in the Army, but the tables have been reversed. It is now hard not to be a Christian in the Army. Instead of language in the manual that establishes proper boundaries between church and state, it contains language that opens the door and enables religious beliefs to be foundational in our institutional professional conception of ethics. The FM’s draft at one time even cited the Constitution about there being no religious tests for public office or service; that too disappeared.

The practices of torture, murder, slavery, and the general disrespect of persons have historically been perfectly consistent with the religions of the world (one need look no further than Al-Qaeda). It is now more important than ever for leaders to keep religion and its potentially coercive influence out of a public, governmental profession. It may be time to ask why we even have a Chaplain Corps, particularly one engaged in the formulation of doctrine. The Supreme Court in Katkoff v. Marsh ruled that the Army could retain a Chaplain Corps out of tradition but required that its only function should

...the Army’s core values program did very little in preparing service members to know what they should and shouldn’t be doing in detention operations.
be providing services to service members who wouldn’t have access to worship, especially when deployed. But why are military chaplains involved in the ethics business? Or the counseling business? Or the policy business? Some militaries today do not even have a chaplains’ corps, such as Japan’s military, which takes religious separation seriously because of its bad experience in World War II.

Now that we are all too aware of the high cost of wayward policies, what can we do as an institution given that we can no longer afford such failure? What can leaders do, given the force of gravity, the fact that everything rolls downhill? Well, we should push some of these rocks back uphill. Leaders at all levels are responsible for ensuring that whatever they are doing makes sense and is justifiable. If not, we should push back wherever and whenever we need to. We should foster a leadership climate in which leaders are accountable not only to their seniors, but also to their peers and juniors. For those who may disagree or find such a suggestion shocking, they should remember that the notion is already implicit within a sound command climate. This will not change from the top; it has to start, like most things, not at the bottom either, but in the middle. If we’re doing the right thing in the right way for the right reason, then we should have nothing to worry about. We just have to say it out loud; we have to start leading our leaders. \textit{MR}

\textbf{...we have to start leading our leaders.}

\textit{\ldots the death of chivalry is not the end of moral judgment. We still hold soldiers to certain standards \ldots Armed, he is an enemy; but he isn’t ‘my’ enemy in any specific sense; the war itself isn’t a relation between persons but between political entities and their human instruments. These human instruments are not comrades in arms in the old style, members of the fellowship of warriors; they are ‘poor sods, just like me,’ trapped in a war they didn’t make. I find in them my moral equals. That is not to say simply that I acknowledge their humanity, for it is not the recognition of fellow men that explains the rules of war; criminals are men too. It is precisely the recognition of men who are not criminals \ldots These judgments are clear enough, I think, and they suggest that war is still, somehow, a rule-governed activity, a world of permissions and prohibitions—a moral world, therefore, in the midst of hell.}”

—Michael Walzer, \textit{Just and Unjust Wars}
FEATURED REVIEW

DAVID KILCULLEN
THE ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,

Rarely does a book strike such a resonating chord on the emerging character of contemporary conflict. Of all the books written since the advent of the War on Terrorism, few have successfully captured the essence of the evolving threats we face in the 21st century, and none have done so within the context of a global insurgency. That is, until now: David Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla accomplishes both and serves as the landmark study of the future of conflict in our time. Drawing on his own vast personal experience and an uncanny ability as a researcher and intellectual, Kilcullen provides a peerless study that redefines our theory of war at a critical time.

With a unique recipe of personal anecdotes and academic rigor, Kilcullen explores emergent conflict through a focused lens of experience and education. The Accidental Guerrilla dives deep into current conflicts to paint a vivid portrait of conflicts to come. And in doing so, Kilcullen details our successes and failures, while offering answers to the many questions we have yet to ask ourselves. His analysis of the evolving character of conflict develops a new paradigm—one that effectively captures the fundamental nature of hybrid threats within an era of complex insurrections. From personal study of tribal culture to professional observations of ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Kilcullen demonstrates understanding of the roots of conflict and how our own actions are adding momentum to a global insurgency already on the verge of altering the balance of the international system. The resulting discussion leaves readers asking for more.

Kilcullen, one of our generation’s foremost experts on counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare, is a former Australian Army officer with extensive combat experience in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Since the tragic events of 9/11, he has served in every active theater: as special advisor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, senior counterinsurgency advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq, and chief counterterrorism strategist for the Department of State. He holds a doctorate in politics from the University of New South Wales, where he focused on the effects of guerrilla warfare on nonstate political systems in traditional societies.

The Accidental Guerrilla should be read by anyone in a position to influence policy or strategy, as well as by leaders deploying into combat operations. For military and civilian readers alike, The Accidental Guerrilla is a reminder that uninformed national policy and strategy cannot be redressed through even the most enlightened military strategy. Readers of political, social, or cultural history will appreciate Kilcullen’s insight and analysis—his efforts provide a crisp, concise, and well-written account of conflict that is as refreshing as it is provocative. His understanding and experience are evident on every page, and his observations are well informed and critically sound. The Accidental Guerrilla is a worthwhile addition to any military or civilian library and is arguably the definitive analysis of emerging conflict produced to date.

LTC Steve Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In the early 1990s, the U.S. Military Academy’s English Department made plebes write about an experience that had taught them an important lesson. Often this assignment called forth the honorable but excruciating “R-dayer”: a three-page, angst-ridden outpouring in which the words “ping,” “sweat,” and “stench” featured prominently en route to an epiphany about teamwork, sacrifice, or another cloying abstraction. Thus it was with no small trepidation that I read the first line of Craig Mullaney’s The Unforgiving Minute: “Get off my bus!” screamed the cadet in charge. “Oh my God,” I thought, “it’s an R-dayer. A book-length one!”

But what an R-dayer. Mullaney, a former infantry officer, has managed to write a fresh and compelling memoir about “A Soldier’s Education,” as his subtitle would have it, in which thrice-told tales about West Point, Ranger School, and the shock of initial combat come alive.

Much of this feat is attributable to our narrator’s eminently likeable persona. It would have been easy for him to pontificate. A U.S. Military Academy graduate (second in his class), Ranger School tabber, Rhodes scholar, and combat leader, Mullaney might have pinned his book on the secret-sacred knowledge most folks can’t know about unless schooled by those happy few who have done what he has done. Unforgiving Minute isn’t completely free of such moments, but Mullaney is usually self-deprecating, amusing, often amused. You like this guy. You root for him.

There’s also a lurking irony to the subtitle that tells you there’s
more going on here than in the usual combat memoir. While Army doings comprise the bulk of the narrative, Mullaney’s voice grows noticeably more animated when describing his Rhodes stint. Oxford is like the first day after Ranger School, only it goes on for two years. Lively friends, beery debates, a beautiful girlfriend, the freedom to travel and indulge his intellectual curiosity—as he recounts his experiences you can hear the former Catholic schoolboy and hard-charging cadet take flight.

He doesn’t slough off his old training altogether; it’s what got him to Oxford, and it will serve him well during trying times in Afghanistan. But there’s a keen sense of intellectual and emotional expansion in the Rhodes writing. This Soldier’s education, you begin to think, is an evolution out of soldiering. In fact, Mullaney, having dispatched his obligation with honor, will leave the Army after his five years are up.

Before that, however, he will undergo the unforgiving minute of combat in Afghanistan toward which his young life had been bending. His descriptions of the fine men in his platoon and the trials they endure—chief among them the death of a fellow Soldier—will be familiar to anyone who has worn a uniform. Again, this is old ground, but Mullaney’s sensitive nature and vivid prose give his war stories sandblown texture and immediacy.

That said, I confess to being just a bit disappointed in some of the takeaways: ineffable camaraderie, the privilege of leading a platoon into combat, the macho posturing of rear-echelon Soldiers. In a book this good, such judgments seem to say in 10 or 20 years, when time has granted him a wider perspective. In a book this good, such judgments seem to say in 10 or 20 years, when time has granted him a wider perspective.

The essays are mutually supportive and build upon each other, which helps the reader progress through the wide range of topics and reveals the complex nature of this field of study. The data supporting the authors’ assertions is generally based on scientific research, which gives considerable credibility to the volume, but may also overwhelm the reader. The authors gather large and thorough bibliographies on their respective topics, which aids in the understanding of this field of study. The book is useful to anyone who desires a better understanding of stress and its ability to influence human performance. It is particularly relevant to the military community given the nonconventional challenges in today’s battlefields and their increasing complexity. Performance Under Stress addresses the subject in a pragmatic way and also offers a detailed and perceptive account of the current limited understanding and prospective future directions of this field of study.


Bees trained to locate landmines? Housefly-sized spybots? Insects are the villains and heroes of the past and future in this intriguing history of the use of insects in warfare. Relevant, engaging, and at times humorous, Lockwood not only shows how six-legged soldiers have been used in past conflicts but provides his readers with a fascinating look at their future employment. In the process of demonstrating how our military might leverage insects as offensive and defensive weapons, Lockwood also points out America’s current vulnerability to bioterrorism and exhorts the government to take action.

Stinging insects have always been our nemeses, and Lockwood shows how tacticians throughout the ages have used them in creative ways. The Tiv people of Nigeria developed a bee cannon—a long horn that could be filled with bees or wasps and then released in the direction of the enemy. The Mayans constructed mannequins released in the direction of the enemy. The Mayans constructed mannequins filled with bees or wasps and then be filled with bees or wasps and then deployed as a “bee cannon.”

A work of history, performance, and futurology, Lockwood’s book is also a tribute to the soldiers who have used insects to fight and to the army that should support their efforts to develop and deploy these weapons to their full military potential.
Lockwood examines some interesting insect characteristics that scientists are attempting either to mimic or to exploit for both peaceful and violent means. A couple of noteworthy examples are bees that can be trained to smell individual landmines (this would be particularly useful in countries like Mozambique where much of the farmable land is still unusable due to landmines), and beetles that can sense heat sources at a distance of 40 miles. Scientists are modeling the locomotion of cockroaches to develop robots (and potentially vehicles) that can traverse uneven surfaces at greater speeds. According to Lockwood, a human-sized cockroach would be able to run the high-hurdles at 200 miles per hour! Perhaps the Army’s future combat system will be “legged” instead of wheeled or tracked.

Finally, Lockwood points out America’s vulnerability to vector-borne diseases and claims that although the Department of Homeland Security is doing its part to thwart other types of terrorist attacks, it is ill-prepared to fight entomological warfare. According to Lockwood, insects are a cheap vehicle for the transmission of diseases. A suicidal terrorist could theoretically infect himself with a disease, create a reproduction room filled with a particular insect (mosquitoes, fleas, or other carriers) and turn them loose on an unsuspecting populace. Terrorists could also target livestock in similar fashion. Lockwood surmises that perhaps the most crippling blow to our nation would be the introduction of pesticide-resistant, crop-destroying pests. The United States is already dealing with several insect threats such as the Mediterranean fruit fly. The deliberate introduction of more destructive non-native insects could cripple the economy.

While some might argue that Lockwood’s work is a primer for the terrorist on a tight budget, I believe that it well serves its primary role of alerting the government and the public to the dangers that exist, so that the risk to the United States can be mitigated. In terms of its significance to the Army, Lockwood’s book has some value at the tactical level in terms of the creative use of one’s environment. However, its real value is at the strategic level and is definitely more geared toward the Department of Homeland Security. Nevertheless, I freely recommend it as an interesting and entertaining look at an otherwise mundane subject.

LTC Shane Baker, USA, West Point, New York


Brian McAllister Linn’s The Echo of Battle is a provocative essay that uses the history of coastal defense as its primary lens in understanding today’s Army—an idea that might not be as unreasonable as it seems. Linn argues that the nation’s vulnerability and fear of attack from the sea stems from U.S. geography and its experiences in both the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. In these conflicts British fleets controlled the sea and landed troops anywhere they liked. They descended on and generally seized U.S. cities at will. Obviously, burning Washington drove home the point convincingly.

Linn argues that for most of the hundred years following the War of 1812 the Army focused its efforts on building an ever-better coastal defense to deter attack, limit penetration in the event of an attack, and enable the mobilization of a citizen army to defeat invasion. The efforts produced three traditions (or intellectual currents) in the Army—guardians, heroes, and managers. The guardians argue that war is both an art and a science and that officers must master both. The heroes argue that war is more of an art than a science because it is more dependent on “will,” both personal and national, than on science. The managers stem from the development of industrial-age warfare and the scale of effort required in the Civil War. They emphasize war’s logistical underpinning, linking successful operations to scientific calculation.

Linn’s model is interesting, but it is too neatly done and holds together best in the context of the 19th century. This might be because Linn is at his best when he is analyzing that period. His understanding of how the Army operated in the 20th century is not as strong and seems uninformed. Much of what has driven the three traditions has more to do with policy than internal debate in the Army. What Soldiers think is best, culturally, does not seem to have motivated policy makers, at least not since the end of World War II.

“No more Vietnams,” was not the mantra of the Army as much as it was the mantra of the country. Yes, the Army turned away from unconventional warfare partly in revulsion, but also because the country and the country’s civilian leaders wanted to avoid a recurrence of Vietnam. Perhaps the Army should have kept studying counterinsurgency and expending resources, but there was no interest in the Army and no stimulus from policy makers to do so. Conventional threats dominated thinking.

Linn tosses out a number of canards about Army efforts that lack context. For example, contrary to what he suggests, REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) was not merely a mobility exercise associated with a forward deployed Army. It reflected an agreement the United States made with Germany to balance forces that had withdrawn from Germany. When Linn asserts that the Army (which was mostly forward deployed) was drawing down, it was not because the threat had declined but because the policy-makers demanded it.

He is right when he argues that the Army used REFORGER to draw conclusions about capabilities based on unrealistic conditions, but he then praises General Donn Starry for drawing conclusions from exercises conducted in the same way in V Corps. The REFORGER
exercises ran the gamut for pretty good to very good with regard to command and control of large formations, but revealed little about tactical acumen, no matter who drew the conclusions.

When Linn depicts the Bradley as a death trap, he misses several important points, not the least of which is that the Bradley replaced the M113, a vehicle that everything but pistol bullets would penetrate and (originally) carried a rubber-bladder fuel cell filled with gasoline. The Bradley is a product of genius when compared to the system it replaced. It remains safer than most of its counterparts in the world today.

The Echo of Battle is not as compelling as Linn’s first book, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, but it should still be read. Linn’s arguments will irritate some but will also resonate. Soldiers need the irritation that comes from arguments that offer insight into how they confront the world in which they operate while trying to anticipate what they might confront in an uncertain future.

COL Gregory Fontenot, USA, Retired, Lansing, Kansas


Jon Stallworthy is a poet and British literary scholar, perhaps best known as the biographer of British World War I poet Wilfred Owen. In Survivor’s Songs, Stallworthy “explores a series of poetic encounters with war” through several essays. Throughout, he elucidates key texts drawn from the deep wells of British literary history. His specific subject is poetry, which, as he says, can fill many roles from “educating and energizing” freedom fighters to “kindling anti-war fury” when there ceased to be a distinction between combatant and civilian.

The first chapter forms an introductory lecture to the wide range of powerful feelings war evokes. Tracing the dying-out of the heroic tradition, value systems came into sharp demarcation, particularly between the ancient and the modern eras. For instance, Walt Whitman saw in Civil War battlefields what British World War I poets Siegfried Sassoon, Herbert Reid, David Jones, and Owen saw in the trenches of World War I. That is, poetry’s evolution marches with society’s. By 1914, war was being seen “through literary spectacles,” the distant past a deep reservoir of allusions. But in the horrors of incipient industrial warfare, chivalric traditions paled for emergent poets.

Stallworthy rightly devotes a considerable amount of space to Siegfried Sassoon, offering an excellent introduction to the psychology of the poet, a man of tremendous dramatic force with his brutal and bitter ironies. As is often the case, an explication of Sassoon comes with a counterpart one for Owen. Owen’s influence on generations of poets to come after him is greater than Sassoon’s. “Owen’s readiness to express his feelings—of grief, tenderness, delight, as well as indignation—is a significant part of his appeal.” Stallworthy skillfully lays to rest the argument that these and other “trench poets” lived sheltered and unrealistically effete lives that caused them to distort the horrors of the war. Indeed, as he shows, the Soldier-poets were right to show “trench mouth as the mouth of hell.”

Stallworthy also shows how the poetry of the First World War resounded with that of the Second in poems such as Britain’s Keith Douglas, a tanker in North Africa, and America’s Louis Simpson, who fought with the 101st Airborne Division, and James Dickey, who served in the Air Corps in the Pacific.

Stallworthy’s most important chapter for its appeal to a wider audience, is on the legacy of the Somme, the World War I battle that swallowed lives by the tens of thousands. Perhaps no battle in modern history shows more the stupidity and waste of warfare. Stallworthy notes the importance of the impressive numbers of literary witnesses to the battle.

Fortunately, he does not forget the aerial warfare in his discussion. Evolving away from classical allusions, “the image of the aviator begins to acquire other associations,” his image becoming complicated through applications of total warfare that included the bombing of civilian populations. These include the vital poetic legacies of Hilda Doolittle and Edith Sitwell, as well as the poetic contributions of American airmen-poets such as Dickey and Randall Jarrell, especially the latter’s monumental poem, “The Firebombing,” and Jarrell’s stark, “Death of the Ball Turret Gunner.”

Stallworthy does American readers a service by discussing Louis Simpson, who, like Owen of the world war before him, also suffered from shell shock from his time in combat. He is careful to point out that “second witness” poetry can often be better than “first witness” poetry. He insightfully concludes, “What do these and other war poems achieve? In that their subject is tragedy, they can—when made with passion and precision—move us (as Aristotle said) to pity and terror; also, I suggest, to a measure of fury.” Stallworthy’s book comes highly recommended, but with the caveat that it’s not a beginner’s study. The book has the tenor of a series of advanced ongoing literary essays, an issue of a scholarly journal, of forays into literary hinterlands. Still, there is much of value here for both the general and specialist reader.

MAJ Jeffrey Alfier, USAF, Retired, Tucson, Arizona


The old adage cautions that you should never judge a book by its cover. This is arguably true of A.R. Oppenheimer’s new insight into the troubles in Northern Ireland—IRA: The Bombs and the Bullets. Despite a needlessly simplistic cover
design—which has the potential to discourage some readers—Oppenheimer’s detailed investigation and comprehensive account is more than just another polished analysis of the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) history, motivation, and strategy. Oppenheimer’s original contribution lies in his skillful explanation of the rapid evolution of the terrorist group’s arsenal, from simplistic improvised explosive devices made of gelignite, to advanced homemade Mark 15 “barricbuster” mortars. In so doing, Oppenheimer deftly highlights the inventiveness, resourcefulness, and intensity of the group’s campaign, played against a complex and dangerous cat-and-mouse game with the security forces. Equally significant, he also uncovers the terrible human effect of the bombing campaign and underscores the reality of how little post-conflict Northern Ireland turned out to resemble the IRA’s demands.

Oppenheimer is undoubtedly a gifted and able narrator. His style is compelling, balanced, and lucid. Few readers will be disappointed by his objective methodology of answering four straightforward questions: How, when, and where did the IRA carry out its bombing campaign? What was the extent of misery and devastation it caused? Why did the IRA not use certain weapons and, significantly, which types of weapons were more successful than others? Why did the IRA not use more of its Semtex explosive store rather than go to the trouble of using homemade explosives? In answering these questions successfully and with great dexterity, Oppenheimer highlights how the IRA improvised their way around complex engineering challenges and evolved into one of the world’s most advanced and lethal insurgencies.

To achieve his objective and place his accounts within the wider political context, Oppenheimer takes the reader on a logical journey covering more than 150 years of Irish republican history. He does this through 11 well-written chapters, but agreeably, breaks each section further into a number of bite-sized and digestible chunks. However, it is arguably not until chapter 5, “Explosives: From Gunpowder to Magic Marble,” that Oppenheimer starts to make his original contribution on how the IRA’s bomb technologies were created, tested, and used to great effect (frustratingly, almost halfway through the book). Despite the previous chapters having been essential background reading, Oppenheimer can be guilty of repetition, superficial footnoting, and on occasion, some frustrations with the chronology of his work. That said, his detailed account of the men behind the bombs and those who, under great danger, had to disarm them, more than makes up for these trifling irritations and will keep the reader engaged. Few will be disappointed with his teasingly titled “Is This the End?”

IRA: The Bombs and the Bullets is an enjoyable, engaging, and absorbing study. At a time when both the Real and Continuity IRA have rocked the peace process with the murder of two off-duty soldiers and one police officer in Northern Ireland, Oppenheimer’s insights have unquestionable utility in helping to understand and provide context to today’s political problems. But equally importantly, IRA: The Bombs and the Bullets highlights the complex and ever-changing relationship between state and insurgent, and sheds new light on how the IRA’s doctrine, targeting, and acquisition of new weapons evolved to overcome repeated attempts to deal with the threat. This is a welcome addition for those interested in how a terrorist group works and a must read for those who follow the troubles in Northern Ireland closely.

MAJ Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D., British Army, Weeton, Lancashire, United Kingdom


During the Cold War, American strategic planners focused on the Soviet Union and largely ignored the small forces of the other nuclear powers. While the growth in recent decades of China’s economy has fueled a concurrent modernization of China’s conventional military, China’s nuclear force has remained small, with an estimated 200 warheads.

Jeffrey G. Lewis thinks that even this number is too high and believes the true size is about 80. The warheads are kept in storage bunkers rather than atop missiles or in bomber bays. China apparently maintains no tactical nuclear weapons. Lewis bases his estimates of Chinese nuclear force on patterns of Chinese behavior regarding nuclear weapons and declassified U.S. intelligence estimates, admitting a lack of transparency from the Chinese government. While the limited nature of China’s nuclear force was understandable given the poverty and instability of the nation in the 1960s and 1970s, the force has remained small, indicating a conscious decision by China’s leaders not to expand their nuclear capabilities.

China apparently has taken the stance that possession of a small number of nuclear weapons is important for deterring aggression and achieving great power status, but little is to be gained by deployment or increasing their numbers. The Chinese government maintains total control of nuclear weapons, making insignificant the chance of accidental use. United States intelligence fears of an expanded Chinese nuclear force have not come to fruition, and Lewis indicates that such an expansion is unlikely given deep-seated attitudes about any potential use of nuclear weapons by Chinese leaders. Lewis believes that aggressive posturing of nuclear weapons by the United States or development of space-based weapons could cause China to abandon its current nuclear posture for something far more threatening.

The book is not so much a history of China’s nuclear force as an argument for American policy
planners to recognize the true size and nature of the force. Lewis has made an important step in a greater understanding of official Chinese concepts of the role of nuclear weapons. Not all readers will be convinced by the apparently benign nature of Chinese thinking on the use of nuclear weapons. Comments by General Zhu Chenghu on 14 July 2005 (not mentioned in the book) indicate that not all in China envisage such a passive role for nuclear weapons. With mixed statements coming from the People’s Liberation Army regarding the potential use for nuclear weapons in a conflict with the United States, the actual state of China’s nuclear forces takes on special importance for contingency planning.

Barry M. Stentiford, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In Inventing Vietnam, James M. Carter covers U.S. nation-building efforts in Vietnam from the initiation of the Michigan State Advisory Group in the mid-1950s through 1968. The author, a history professor at Texas A&M University, chronicles the American attempt to create a new, independent, modern state below the 17th parallel in South Vietnam. In doing so, he draws on a wide array of published and archival sources to assert that the American advisors “invented” South Vietnam’s post-1954 institutions and infrastructure—essentially building a nation where none existed before.

The author asserts it was the failure of this “American invention” and the refusal to recognize the failure that ultimately led to the large-scale war. The war devastated the countryside, generated a flood of refugees, and brought about catastrophic economic distortions, which further undermined the larger U.S. goal of building a viable state. According to the author, by the time of the Tet Offensive in January 1968, the nation-building campaign in southern Vietnam had completely failed. Furthermore, the program contained the seeds of its own failure from the beginning of the effort in the mid-1950s.

The book is provocative and provides a good look at some of the difficulties American officials experienced in their nation-building efforts. It also provides new information on how some of President Ngo Dinh Diem’s allies made private fortunes on his commodity import program. The author addresses how the role of private contractors in their rapid build-up of airfields, ports, and highways disrupted the economic landscape in southern Vietnam.

Despite its contributions to the literature on Vietnam, the book has some shortcomings. Carter’s argument that South Vietnam was an American “invention” is difficult to accept. Many of the state-building programs that the author describes were really continuations of earlier programs that dated back as early as 1950. It is also difficult to accept the author’s assertion that the war was entirely a direct result of failed American nation-building efforts. The narrative, as cogent and eloquently laid out as it is, fails to address the Vietnamese role in all of this. The Vietnamese on both sides were key players in the events addressed in the book, but little is heard from them; it goes without saying that they were active participants in the events as they unfolded.

That being said, the author provides unique contributions to the discussion of American nation-building campaign in Southeast Asia that are worthy of consideration, especially as our contemporary nation-building efforts and stability operations continue in Iraq and Afghanistan.

LTC James H. Willbanks, USA, Retired, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In Last Man Standing, author Dick Camp narrates the epic World War II struggle of the 1st Marine Regiment during the first six days of the battle of Peleliu. Led by the legendary Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, the unit suffered fearsome casualties as it assaulted almost impregnable Japanese defenses. Camp writes the book as a tribute to the unit and its legacy. He succeeds in vividly portraying the difficulties of the battle and the odds the marines had to overcome.

Peleliu was a battle that should not have happened. Prior to the assault, Admiral William Halsey recommended the operation be cancelled but was overruled by Admiral Chester Nimitz. Major General William Rupertus, commander of the 1st Marine Division, predicted a short battle. Unfortunately, the planners underestimated the Japanese defenses, which were dug into the island’s coral terrain. The 1st Marine Regiment landed as part of the division and in six days of heavy fighting suffered 50 percent casualties. Despite the casualties, the division was finally pulled off the line over the objections of Rupertus. The author argues the frontal assaults against the Japanese defenses tarnished the reputations of the senior commanders while enhancing the fighting reputation of the individual Marine.

The book is well written and provides an excellent overview of the operations conducted by the battalions assigned to the regiment. The author describes U.S. and Japanese plans, the commanders, the Japanese defenses, and the Marine assaults. The chaos of the landing is described in detail with personal accounts. Camp draws on personal interviews and a close association with two of the battalion commanders to provide a firsthand-account of the challenges facing the units while fighting in extreme heat and in difficult terrain.

The first half of the book is its strength. The chapters describing the preparations and the landings are rich in detail. The subsequent chapters, which describe the remaining five days of fighting, are not as detailed and many of the eyewitness
accounts are taken from Medal of Honor and Navy Cross citations and other non-first-person accounts. This may leave the reader wanting more information or perspectives.

Camp, a retired Marine colonel, has written extensively on the Marine Corps and is the author of the acclaimed Lima-6, a memoir of his time as a Marine company commander in Vietnam. His latest work provides another resource to the literature of the Pacific War. It sheds light on the operation of a storied regiment during a difficult battle. The book is well illustrated with photographs and maps. I recommend it to readers interested in World War II.

LTC Robert Rielly, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Truman and MacArthur focuses on relationships—between government, between institutions of the government, and between nations. In this engaging narrative of the collision of President Harry Truman with General Douglas MacArthur, author Michael D. Pearlman uses Truman and MacArthur’s relationship to highlight the larger relationship between civil and military institutions in U.S. polity and the tension that naturally results. Pearlman shows how the Cold War intensified this tension and, in part, led to the most famous civil-military conflict in American history when Truman fired MacArthur in 1951. The author also makes a good case that the wonder of MacArthur’s relief has more to do with why it did not happen much earlier.

Pearlman’s life-long research encompasses a comprehensive array of primary and secondary sources. Information from official documents and personal memoirs adds value when interwoven with the ongoing political commentary in the U.S. national news media. Pearlman includes judgments in just about every sentence along with his facts. For example, “MacArthur trusted no one loyal to someone in the White House…” Far too many historians these days shy away from these kinds of useful judgments. Although primarily about Truman and MacArthur, some of the cameos that Pearlman tosses out, almost casually, are worth their weight in gold. Among the most fascinating is the story of General Frank Lowe, a true citizen-soldier who tried to bridge the gap between the two men. Lowe was sent by Truman to fulfill this function on a short fact-finding trip and ended up staying eight months and transferring much of his loyalty from the president to MacArthur.

Pearlman is an equal opportunity critic. For example, he criticizes Mao Zedong for missing a golden opportunity to invade Taiwan in the summer of 1950 when the Taiwan strait became poorly guarded as the Seventh Fleet steamed north to provide MacArthur’s embattled forces naval gunfire and air support. Instead Mao repositioned his forces to Manchuria. Pearlman regards Mao’s actions as something he need not have done, suggesting Taiwan’s fall to a communist amphibious assault as an event that would have halted the American offensive in Korea. The book also makes points that have gone out of vogue in many historical circles: individuals are important, politics is important, and institutions are important. There is a larger argument here that the book also makes points that military history, diplomatic history, and political history—which are elegantly synthesized in the book—are a valid scholarly means of understanding the past and gaining insight for the present.

If the book has a weakness it is that sometimes Pearlman is too clever. His often oblique and biting judgments keep this reviewer on his toes, but others may find the constant “pinging” aside tedious. Editorially the book has its fair share of typos. These minor complaints aside, the book is among the best civil military histories to come out in the last 10 years, exceeding Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command by offering more detail while being more accessible to a broader audience. It deserves a wide, adult readership and has my highest recommendation for military and civilian professionals of all stripes.

CDR John T. Kuehn, USN, Retired, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Buffalo Soldiers provides an illustrated narrative history of the contributions made by African American troops to the U.S. military—from the post-Civil War era to the racial integration of the services shortly after World War II. Originally, the name Buffalo Soldiers was applied by Plains Indians to the black cavalry and infantry soldiers that fought so doggedly against them in the plains and southwest because, to the native warriors, they resembled the shaggy beasts they hunted both in their physical appearance and in their stubborn courage. However the book extends this moniker to all African-American troops that served, not only in the Army, but in the other services too.

The authors are well-known military historians who have written on this and related subjects. Ron Field wrote Buffalo Soldiers 1866–91 for Osprey Publications and Alexander Bielakowski authored another Osprey book—African American Troops in WWII. The present book is good, solid, and very readable. It is intended for the general reader as well as military history enthusiasts—although academic historians will also find pleasure in it.

In true Osprey fashion, Buffalo Soldiers is lavishly illustrated with period photographs, drawings, and impeccably detailed illustrations of Soldiers and their equipment that are an Osprey signature specialty. It also includes first-person accounts
from the experiences of African American servicemen. Curiously, the book suffers from an absence of maps to illustrate the campaigns. On the other hand, it does include a detailed chronology of salient events in the history of black service members.

The book follows the Buffalo Soldiers, not only in their legendary campaigns throughout the western frontier, but also during the Spanish-American War in the Caribbean and the Philippines, the Philippine Insurrection, the Pancho Villa Expedition, and both world wars. Their story is a quintessentially American story; the rise from adversity through valor, sheer willpower, and faith.

It is also a story of frustration and human failure, as in the unfortunate case of Lieutenant Henry O. Flipper—the first African American West Point graduate—and a story of enlightened white leaders such as Colonel Benjamin Grierson—who gallantly and proudly led his Buffalo Soldiers on numerous hard campaigns—and President Harry Truman—who ended segregation in the military.

Although ethnic-based histories have proliferated in both academia and the popular press, and although there are quite a few books written on the Buffalo Soldier, for this reviewer, as for most military historians and “enthusiasts,” there is always room on the bookshelf for another Osprey book—recommended.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas

The Military Review and the Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethics (ACPME) are pleased to announce a call for papers for a Military Review special edition titled “Our Professional Military Ethic and Developing Soldiers of Character” — Deadline for submissions: 30 November 2009 —

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In Recognition of NCOs from the Services

Staff Sgt Zachary Rhyner
Air Force Cross

CPL Jason Lee Dunham
Medal of Honor

SFC Jared C. Monti
Medal of Honor

MA2 (SEAL) Michael A. Monsoor
Medal of Honor