
A fanatical religious sect ready to use violence and accept martyrdom to advance its vision of a theocratic state; governmental corruption; torture; assassination; opportunist criminals; propaganda and “information operations”; profiteering “contractors”; “nationalists” against “imperialists”; puppet regimes; refusal to negotiate with “infidels”; clash of civilizations? Is this a description of the contemporary Middle East? Yes. It is also an accurate description of the situation in prevailing Judea during the mid-first century, a situation described in great detail by an observer of an erstwhile participant in the tragic events that led to the destruction of Jerusalem and its temple and the dispersal of the Jews throughout the world—an event that continues to have enormous resonance in today’s geopolitics.

A healthy dose of historical reading is perhaps the greatest antidote to the idea that the present operational environment is new or unprecedented. The significance of culture, the continuum of violence now known as “full spectrum operations,” the importance of information, informal leadership, and the primacy of political goals, all featured prominently in the Jewish revolt against Roman domination of 66-73 A.D. Fortunately for us we have a treasure-trove of information on one of the most tumultuous periods in Middle Eastern history stowed in the works of Josephus—especially the book known variously as The Jewish War, The Wars of the Jews, or History of the Jewish War.

The author known to us as Josephus was, in his own words “Joseph, the son of Matthias, by birth a Hebrew, a priest also, and one who at first fought against the Romans myself, and was forced to be present at what was done afterwards.” Smart, well-connected, politically ambitious, and intellectually restless, Josephus tried to steer a middle course between faithfulness to his aristocratic Jewish heritage and self-serving accommodation with the Roman hegemon. He has been considered in turn a traitor, a spineless opportunist, and an apologist for Jewish culture and religion. He certainly played all these roles; but, most importantly, he was a good writer. Josephus was a complex personality who lived in trying times and, whatever one might think of his personal morality, he succeeded in penning substantial historical narratives that shed light on what became a watershed in world history.

Despite the inevitable biases, intentional or unintentional, Josephus took his responsibilities as a historian seriously as he set out to explain to his contemporaries the “wars of the Jews.” Most modern scholars agree that, as a whole, the Jewish War is factually sound, except for some self-serving passages. Josephus wrote his work initially for his fellow Jews living in Mesopotamia and then reworked it in Greek for the educated readers of the Roman world—who preferred their books in Greek. Like all good narrative history, Josephus’ story unfolds with a sense of inevitability that culminates in the great tragedy of the destruction of the Jewish nation and its temple.

There are many situations mentioned by Josephus that have had their parallels through the centuries. However, one of the crucial hard lessons learned from Josephus is that those who are not bound by modern Western humanistic values or modern Judeo-Christian morality can and have crushed insurgencies successfully. The lack of moral qualms is what made the Roman gladius more deadly and decisive than the atomic bomb. This may be one of the most fundamental differences between the Roman Empire and the new “American Empire.”

Far from advocating a “Roman approach” to the problems of the present day this reviewer advocates that the full impact of self-imposed limits on the use of military power be thoroughly considered by policy makers before establishing strategic goals and committing U.S. forces overseas.

The Jewish War should certainly be required reading for all those who seek a deeper understanding of Ancient history, the Middle East, and human nature in peace and war. The Loeb Classical Library edition with texts in both the original Greek and English remains the standard scholarly reference today. Another, more accessible, slightly abridged version is the Penguin edition translated by Betty Radice. The Jewish War is also available online in English and Greek at http://classics.mit.edu/Josephus/jw.html; and in the 1732 English translation by William Whiston at www.gutenberg.org/etext/2850.

Most readers who are not specialists in the ancient Jewish and Roman worlds need a good interpreter to guide them through this alien landscape. With Jerusalem’s Traitor, Desmond Seward meets this need by providing a guidebook that offers
a balanced critical appreciation of Josephus and his work. Despite the condemning title, Seward does not judge Josephus especially harshly; rather, his eye-catching title reflects the views of the Jews who belonged to the zealot party.

Seward places the author in the context of his time and place as an upper class Jew who does what he believes is best to avert total personal and national disaster. After failing in his attempt to navigate a middle road between the uncompromising patriotism of the zealots and the abuses of the Romans, Josephus serves as a Jewish general and governor of the “Two Galilees.” Then, cornered with a few companions inside a cave he makes a suicide pact, but after most of his companions have taken their lives, he reneges and surrenders to the Romans. From this point forward Josephus begins to collaborate openly with the Romans, justifying his actions to himself and others as the reasonable course of action when faced by an “invincible” superpower. After successfully “prophesying” that his captor Vespasian would become emperor, he is granted freedom in exchange for his continued services as guide and propagandist. Later, after witnessing the destruction of Judea, Josephus wrote his history from a comfortable exile in Rome and became an apologist for his culture and his religion to the Roman world.

While not groundbreaking scholarship, Seward’s book provides a nuanced view of Josephus’ work and his complex and elusive character. It succeeds in furnishing the modern non-specialist reader a solid, balanced critical commentary as well as a good bibliography for those seeking further study.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The U.S. is under attack argues Eugene Jarecki in The American Way of War, the print version, more or less, of his award-winning 2008 documentary Why We Fight. According to Jarecki, “the republic” is being attacked not by terrorists, People’s Liberation Army cyber-warriors, or South American Marxists but, ironically, from within, by the military-industrial juggernaut erected to protect it and the venal politicians elected to lead it.

This argument is hardly new; in fact, Jarecki spends considerable time tracing its genealogy, from the founding fathers forward to such critics as Chalmers Johnson, whom he cites liberally from Sorrows of Empire (2003). A.J. Bacevich (not mentioned here, oddly) made a similar case convincingly in The New American Militarism (2005); and very recently, President Bush’s former ambassador for counter-narcotics to Afghanistan, Thomas Schweich, decried the overweening influence of DOD in all aspects of government. “We no longer have a civilian government,” Schweich wrote in the Washington Post: “Our Constitution is at risk.”

Unfortunately, Jarecki’s predecessors have been received like Cassandras. Even supposed liberals have allowed a reflexive militarism to color their worldview, as the congressional rubberstamping of Iraq II demonstrated. The American Way of War is a well-meaning attempt at intervention. However, applauding an attempt is one thing; being persuaded by it another. In general, I found myself “persuaded, but.” Jarecki’s description of America’s seduction into militarism is credible, and his description of “front-loading” and “political engineering,” tactics deployed by defense contractors to subvert political stewardship, is as enlightening as it is depressing. A long look at Eisenhower, unlikely coiner of the pejorative “military-industrial complex,” gives more than pause, and two other veteran voices, retired colonel Lawrence Wilkerson and Pentagon watchdog Chuck Spinney, add color and ballast to Jarecki’s claim that it is working an slow coup d’état.

What I found most compelling, though, were the simple numbers. DOD employs five million people. Those people work in 164 countries. The department owns several hundred thousand buildings. It controls over 30 million acres of land. Its budget (nearly $700 billion for 2009) eclipses Russia’s GDP. No matter how you view it—even as a percentage of U.S. GDP—these are astonishing figures. To borrow from Ike, how many schools and hospitals, how many miles of highway and bushels of wheat might just half that bounty buy?

Despite the undeniable extravagance of our military spending, those looking to dismiss Jarecki have been given some fodder. His move from bemoaning militarism to belaboring Bush et al. seems, at this late date, superfluous. The book relies too much on Wilkerson and Spinney. A section on John Boyd overplays the role of culture in Boyd’s OODA Loop theory. And then there’s the language, which lapses occasionally into naïve indignation and exaggeration (bad though it was, Abu Ghraib was not an “atrocity”).

These blemishes notwithstanding, The American Way of War does a fine and useful, even necessary, job of exposing our national fondness for force over diplomacy, for the missile over the example.
Military professionals need to read more books like this. As a group, we exhibit a high degree of moral certitude. We take it for granted that we fight for truth, justice, and the American way. The reality could well be that the “way” is anathema to our pursuit of the first two ideals, and to the realization of a truly healthy society.

LTC Arthur Bilodeau, USA, Retired, Louisville, Kentucky


Thomas E. Ricks’ latest book—The Gamble is a follow-up to his best-selling and critically acclaimed 2006 book Fiasco. Its title refers to the strategic gamble taken by President Bush to send approximately 30,000 additional troops to Iraq in the spring of 2007 in what is commonly referred to as “the surge.” Ricks’ thesis is that the surge succeeded militarily, but failed politically. It succeeded militarily because it accomplished the operational objectives laid out by senior U.S. military commanders on the ground. Ricks believes the surge failed politically in both the United States and in Iraq because nearly every key political issue remains unresolved.

In Iraq, he cites the strained relationship between Shi’as, Sunnis, and Kurds; continued influence of former Saddam Hussein regime officials and Baath Party members; Iran’s influence and the influence of other Middle Eastern nations in Iraq’s affairs; the uncertain future role of Moqtada al-Sadr; and conflict between Arabs and Kurds over oil revenue sharing and the status of Kirkuk. Ricks also discusses how difficult it will be for the Government of Iraq to assimilate the primarily Sunni neighborhood watch groups, commonly referred to as the “Sons of Iraq” and how potential future actions by those groups could derail the relative calm that has existed in Iraq for the past 18 months.

Ricks believes the surge also failed politically from an American perspective, because the core problems in Iraq have regional and potentially global implications which, if not addressed properly, could reverse the progress seen in Iraq. He believes the U.S. military will have to have a presence in Iraq for many years and uses simple logic to make his case. If the challenges facing Iraq are daunting with a large American military presence, they will be no less so without such presence.

The book highlights the pivotal roles played by General David H. Petraeus and General Ray T. Odierno, and how they both challenged conventional wisdom as well as many members of their chain of command—directly and indirectly—to push for the additional troops and major changes in tactics. It also emphasizes the prominent role played by retired General Jack Keane, former vice chief of staff of the Army. Odierno and Petraeus rolled the dice with other huge gambles. Both agreed the surge of additional troops would only be successful if accompanied by a comprehensive change in tactics. These involved changing the priority from building up the capabilities of the Iraq Security Forces and attacking Al-Qaeda elements and insurgents to protecting the Iraqi people.

That first change necessitated another paradigm shift—instead of staging primarily from large forward operating bases fairly isolated from the Iraqi populace, units would be repositioned on smaller and dispersed combat outposts and Joint security stations positioned throughout Baghdad and other municipalities. It placed Soldiers in the midst of the chaos, exposing service members to even greater risk. Those tactics required yet another fundamental change: from a heavy reliance on mounted/mobile patrols to dismounted/foot patrols.

In the middle of the sectarian violence and bloodshed that was prevalent in Iraq during 2006 and much of 2007, and considering the heavy volume of attacks against coalition forces at that time, many people thought all these changes in tactics represented last-ditch acts of desperation. But Ricks reminds us that “surge” tactics had been used before in other successful counter-insurgencies and had even worked previously in Iraq, when the 3rd Armored Cavalry regiment used them successfully in Tal Afar in 2004–2005.

Throughout The Gamble, Ricks discusses the influential role played by what he refers to as the “Petraeus Brain Trust,” a group of current and former military officers of varying ranks—nearly all possessing a PhD. This inner circle served on Petraeus’ personal staff in Baghdad, advised him on everything, and kept him sharp.

Over time, the arrival of the 30,000 additional troops and equipment, coupled with fundamental changes in tactics, significantly reduced the level of violence in Iraq—especially in and around Baghdad. After an initial spike in April and May 2007, a period Petraeus refers to in The Gamble as “excruciating,” attacks against American and coalition forces dropped precipitously.

Ricks capitalized on his extensive contacts in writing The Gamble—a book derived from thousands of interviews with hundreds of people in the United States, in Iraq, and other locations over several years. The book focuses on what Ricks feels went right in Iraq during this period. However, it tends to be Baghdad and Al Anbar province-centric and does not include the great work by U.S. and coalition forces in other areas of Iraq. So effusive is Rick’s praise of Petraeus, Odierno, and Keane, it casts a shadow over many of their peers and makes some appear irrelevant at best and inept at worst. Not everyone will agree with Ricks’ assessments. Despite these shortfalls, The Gamble is an excellent book and should be read by military professionals.

COL Mike Galloucis, USA, Washington, DC

Westport, CT, 2008, 250 pages, $49.95.

The fundamental thesis of *America’s Army* is that the national defense of the United States is more than a military challenge; it is a challenge for the nation’s entire apparatus of government. The title of this timely and relevant book gets right to the point: the Army provides an excellent example of the practices needed for what’s now known as the “comprehensive approach”—a term coined in Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations* to address the need to bring together multiple partners comprised of diplomats, the military, nongovernmental organizations, multinational players, and the private sector.

Zeb B. Bradford and Frederic J. Brown provide an excellent complement to the principles of this emerging doctrine. Their long-term insights reflect their backgrounds as former general officers. They provide numerous practical examples of how the Army’s model is useful for the interagency. One key solution is embodied in the concept called “Teams of Leaders.” Members of these teams have a shared vision, trust, competence, and confidence. They rely on information technology that enables social networking, podcasting, and blogging. The Army set the foundation for these teaming behaviors in the post 9/11 period. Now, the authors argue, is the time to create teams of leaders across the government.

True to their Army roots, Bradford and Brown pay tribute to the Army’s ability to adapt and produce quality leaders. They articulate the need to revitalize the Army, stressed by years of deployments, and voice concern about two decades of an “impoverished” generating force. Despite these challenges, they praise the Army’s ability to align decentralized operations with strategic objectives—using information and knowledge management to empower “teams of leaders”—and see this approach as the key ingredient for interagency effectiveness.

Like many other works published during the second half of the Bush administration, the book says ineptness and ineffectiveness at the highest levels of civilian governance substantially constrained the military. The authors emphasize that the Army cannot operate independently or assume the responsibilities of other organizations, as it often has had to do. Thus, *America’s Army* is an important contribution to the intellectual framework for U.S. national security and the operations of any large organization today. Those involved in defense, management, and leadership will gain immensely from the book’s holistic perspective and insightful examples.

COL James J. Galvin Jr., USA, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Louis DiMarco’s *War Horse: A History of the Military Horse and Rider* is a fascinating one-of-a-kind book that looks at military history through the evolving science of horse riding, training, and breeding. Its unique approach offers a fresh interpretation of classic military history from the ancients through operations in World War II.

*War Horse* is a remarkable book on many levels, beginning with the ancient Egyptians’ use of the chariot. DiMarco describes how the desire for increased mobility and economy drove the creation of the warrior on horseback and traces the evolution of horse breeds, horsemanship, tack, the evolution of cavalry warfare, and the contributions of cavalry to warfare: its tactics, operational art, and even grand strategies through the centuries. These developments produced operational and tactical mobility, shock, and firepower. DiMarco illustrates through battle and campaign narratives how the great captains skillfully translated an understanding of mounted forces into battlefield success. He also describes how a lack of appreciation for horses and mounted forces could lead to failure.

The book’s ability to penetrate to a level of significant detail, overturn repeated myths, summarize succinctly, and back up its judgments and conclusions is significant. When I began teaching at SAMS I wanted a book like *War Horse* to educate the officer corps on the constant and turbulent evolution of operational art. The book demonstrates how ideas about doctrine, weapons, branches of service, and organizational designs evolve in a messy but inexorable way.

DiMarco is uniquely qualified to write about horse cavalry. He is a retired Army officer and has served in positions from cavalry troop through joint staff. He served as a doctrine writer at the Armor School, specialized in reconnaissance doctrine and urban and counterinsurgency warfare at the Combined Arms Command, and is currently teaching military history at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Most importantly, DiMarco is an accomplished horseman who has actively owned and trained horses for more than 20 years.

As a horse book and horse cavalry book *War Horse* is in a class of its own. The natural sentiment toward the horse and horse cavalry doesn’t get in the way of solid and deeply researched history. The book provides many detailed facts about horse types and breeds not often found in books on horse cavalry and delves deeply into the details of riding “tack” and cavalry weapons. I find the battle reconstructions more credible due to DiMarco’s research and knowledge of horsemanship, tack, and weapons.

This is my kind of history reading: interesting and intellectually stimulating. It’s the kind of book I like to move through slowly, mulling over the content, fitting the pieces into the messy filing system of my mind. In short, the book is a fascinating and detailed account of an important contributor to human history—the war horse.

BG Huba Wass de Czege, USA, Retired, Easton, Kansas

**THE MODERNIZATION OF ISLAM and the Creation of a Multipolar World Order**, Dr. Susmit

The Modernization of Islam is a detailed and highly engaging study into global Islamic militancy and the diverse challenges of the Middle East. Based on sound analysis and historical descriptions, Dr. Susmit Kumar’s central argument is that what we are witnessing today is not a clash of civilizations, as prophesied by Samuel Huntington and many others, but the transformation of Islam. The author notes that “in order to give birth to a beautiful child, a woman has to go through the pains of labor,” and asserts that the violence in Iraq and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism are simply manifestations of a difficult birthing process.

Kumar says that contemporary Islamic civilization is going through a crisis similar to the kind Europe experienced in the early 1900s. When World War I and II acted as catalysts to positively change the global-economic and political environment of those times. The long-term prognosis is encouraging, and the tide of fundamentalism will wane; but, it will take time, and the path will be rocky. Kumar notes: “At the end of the current crisis in the Middle East, Islam will come to be the guiding force where it now leads, and the majority of Islamic nations will become secular and democratic, like Turkey.” The author suggests that we are again moving toward the promise of a new world order.

However, in suggesting a positive trend in the Middle East, Kumar also highlights the decline in the U.S. economy and makes a strong case for the socioeconomic premise called the “Progressive Utilization Theory” (“Prout”), devised by Prabhat Raingan Sakar, a renowned Indian theorist and economist, to try and stem the tide of the current financial downturn. “Prout” promotes economic democracy and economic decentralization (i.e., increasing the purchasing power of the individual) and contrasts starkly with the authoritarianism and centralization of capitalism and modern-day communism. Kumar posits that such a strategy will become increasingly necessary as the United States “heads down the [current] path of economic self-destruction.”

Kumar is not afraid of tackling a number of controversial issues head-on, which some readers will find slightly unnerving. For example, he notes: “Incompetent persons like Ronald Regan and George W. Bush won elections as presidents of the world’s superpower because of massive media propaganda using hundreds of millions of dollars donated by big corporations and the ultrawealthy. Were these same people to try and get work as CEOs, however, they would fail . . .” In other areas, Kumar is more even-handed. His dexterous differentiation between those nations trying to promote Islamic fundamentalism and secular democratic states is useful for the lay reader.

In sum, the Modernization of Islam is an immersing, challenging, and probing study. Kumar’s textbook-like approach, clear prose, and coherent historical analysis make for a particularly rewarding read.

MAJ Andrew M. Roe, British Army, United Kingdom


The Gods of Diyala is a platoon leaders’ view of the Iraqi insurgency and as such is a much-needed complement to the “bigger picture” of narratives by senior officers, correspondents, and political analysts. This is the story of two artillery lieutenants who find themselves fighting as infantrymen in the heart of the Sunni Triangle against a growing and evolving insurgency.

Although the book was written as a memoir, it reads like an objective report chronicling the authors’ transition from an army before 9/11 to subsequent combat in Baquba, Iraq, and inconclusively to their eventual rotation out of Iraq. Readers looking for entertainment, excitement, and vivid descriptions of modern combat will be disappointed. On the other hand, those looking for a junior officer’s tip-of-the-spear perspective on counterinsurgency warfare will find this an invaluable addition to the growing volumes of Iraq War literature. The Gods of Diyala isn’t so much about events or how things happened; it is more about the perspectives, leadership, and the adaptability of young officers and their ability to accept increasing responsibilities in difficult and complex situations.

Authors Caleb Cage and Greg Tomlin share their thoughts on a variety of subjects including the successes and failures of leadership. They also discuss the role of the media and the tensions between objectivity, morality, and the responsibilities of war correspondents and photo journalists.

Tomlin describes a personal “clash of cultures” transition that occurred when his American positive “can-do” and “hope is not a method” attitude clashed with the Iraqi’s Ensha Allah [God willing] passive attitude. Initially the clash contributed to his feelings of frustration and hopelessness, but eventually it evolved into understanding, accommodation, and respect. It wasn’t the knowledge of customs and taboos that led to his cultural epiphany, rather it was the realization that he had a date to leave Iraq (the Iraqis he worked with did not) and from this realization came a new perspective on what constitutes progress and courage in this troubled land.

The Gods of Diyala is a well-organized narrative that is easy to read and a much-needed small-unit perspective that will round out any collection on the war in Iraq.

Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Overall the book is well organized, meticulously documented, and comprehensive in nature. To maximize understanding, the authors often present case studies to integrate previous lessons learned with current principles and practices of military medicine. The authors also focus on current research on successful management practices, treatments, and antidotes. The book contains an array of quality figures and illustrations that increase the readers understanding.

I recommend the book for its comprehensive overview of biological defense information. It contains useful information for DOD medical personnel and will, for many years, serve as a valuable contribution to military medicine.

MAJ Peter L. Platteborze, Ph.D., USA, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

BLUE & GOLD AND BLACK: Racial Integration of the US Naval Academy, Robert J. Schneller Jr., Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2008, 437 pages, $45.00.

Although the United States Naval Academy has been fully racially integrated for almost 50 years, Robert J. Schneller Jr.’s Blue & Gold and Black provides the first comprehensive history of African-Americans breaking the color barrier and then surviving what had been a traditionally racist institution. Schneller traces Annapolis’ integration process through three stages. The first stage, the policy of “neglect” before 1965, examines the long history of resistance to enrolling blacks and the confrontational attitude inherent in both white midshipmen and the administration.

In the years following 1965, Schneller uses the second section to analyze how the Academy pressed forward with its policy of integration over the next decade to reach the point of transitioning from institutional persecution of black midshipmen to a policy of empowerment. The final section explores the unique experience of African-American women at Annapolis during their integration process after 1976. These brave midshipmen bore the double-edged stigma of both race and gender. Ironically, many often found the abuse from sexual harassment more damaging than the attacks of bigotry.

While this book demonstrates painstaking archival research drawing from numerous institutional records, Schneller allows the former midshipmen to tell the story through what he labels a “biographical” approach to his methodology. Utilizing hundreds of interviews, memoirs, and questionnaires, the personal recollections of those directly involved in the integration process drive the narrative, adding an engaging human element to the institutional history.

Some of the more compelling anecdotes come from the often-graphic depictions of the physical abuse inflicted upon the Academy’s earliest matriculates. Schneller also weaves the narrative of the Academy’s integration into the larger context of the civil rights movement while addressing the broader philosophical issues regarding military service, citizenship, and social equality. His analysis, however, fails to give ample mention to the experiences of the other federal service academies, which could have provided a comparative context with their respective integration experiences occurring at the same time.

In spite of the long, difficult road endured by African-Americans at Annapolis over the last half century, Schneller’s analysis does leave readers with overwhelming hope by reinforcing the progress of both the individual midshipmen and the institution to advance an environment of achievement, harmony, and understanding.

Bradford A. Wineman, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Don’t be fooled by the catchy title and slim silhouette of this intel-
lectually weighty little book: *Sorry States* is a serious piece of heavily documented, exhaustively footnoted scholarship, using case studies to examine the multi-faceted role contribution plays on the international stage.

Belying initial book jacket and table of contents impressions (one of its four chapters is impertinently titled “Not Your Father’s Fatherland,” referring to Germany), Author Jennifer Lind’s real intent is to focus the global analyst’s lens on international reaction to war crimes committed by Japan and Germany—and how and why merely saying “I’m sorry” for genocide, rape, pillage, and other crimes against humanity is not enough to facilitate post-conflict reconciliation. Contrition, Lind says, can indeed sometimes lead to other complications, such as backlash from a not-sorry citizenry that may not share their leaders’ sorry sentiments.

Lind posits that the intimate apology process between transgressor/aggressor and victim states to reestablish social, economic, and diplomatic normalcy is almost impossibly complex, influenced as it is by matters such as culture, geographic proximity, and pressures from regional military threats or aggressive political ideologies.

Her analyses try to make sense of why Germany and France enjoy warm relations as close allies today, while Japan and the countries it colonized and occupied before and during the World War II—chief among them Korea and China—do not.

For instance, American military members currently serving on the Korean peninsula have long believed their reason for being there is to help close allies deter North Korean aggression. They may be startled to learn from Lind’s research that recent opinion surveys show South Koreans dislike Japan more than Kim Jong-II’s capricious regime, bristling with wannabe nukes and genuine hostile intent right on the ROK’s doorstep. And, although Lind admits South Koreans do put North Korea at the top of their “most likely to be invaded by” list, Japan still lurks in the background as a perceived threat.

One explanation for the Chinese and Koreans to harbor a grudge—if so simple a term can be used to describe Lind’s complex characterizations—is Lind’s finding that the Japanese long viewed themselves as the real war victims, for years dismissing claims that they had not been responsible for the Nanking massacre, colonizing Korea, or even for attacking Pearl Harbor. At one point after the war, conservative Tokyo politicians, denying that Korean females had been forced into prostitution as “comfort women” for the Emperor’s army and males dragooned into slave labor in Japanese war-materiel factories, even attempted to make a case that Korea should pay war reparations to Japan.

Lind’s key hypothesis is that “unapologetic remembrance (i.e., forgetting, denying, or glorifying past atrocities) elevates threat perception and inhibits reconciliation. Conversely, apologetic remembrance (or contrition) reduces threat perception and promotes reconciliation.”

Readers hoping for an easy correlation between Lind’s “remembrances of things past” and current events may be disappointed. The author’s gaze seems firmly fixed on history, even though the 21st century situation in the Balkans, where there are few “I’m sorrys” to go around, begs for analysis using her theories. It is unclear, if hypotheses developed so carefully to analyze situations from events so far removed from today’s realities have relevance to new crises plaguing the world community.

Although some argue that human nature remains unchanged as an empirical and genetic given, generational values and the world Geopolitik do mutate over time, and both are vastly different now than 60 years ago, owing in large measure to the globalization that modern technology has created.

Lind also spends a lot of ink (nearly 40 pages of the book are consumed by footnotes) either justifying or defending her hypotheses and conclusions, making *Sorry State* neither a quick nor easy diversion for the recreational reader.

In tackling the job of intellectually ingesting *Sorry States*, only serious, voracious scholars with an appetite for convoluted theories need apply.

**Carol A. Saynisch, M.A., Stellacoom, Washington**


Both within the country and without, Japan is often portrayed as a country bereft of grand strategy; considered, indeed, by some, to possess a “strategic allergy” that borders on the irrational. Others who concede Japan does do strategy claim that strategy is unduly idealistic and pacificist. To the contrary, in his book *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of Asia*, author Richard J. Samuels convincingly argues that over the past 150 years, Japan has been both realist and rational in creating three grand strategies, and is in the midst of building a consensus for a fourth. In cogent detail, he outlines the rationales and the constraints, both domestic and international, of these grand strategies, tracing and describing historical antecedents, key players, and key components down to the present.

Samuels says the key to understanding the drive to build consensus, then create and maintain these national security strategies since 1868 has been the interplay of domestic and international factors tied to Japan’s pervasive sense of vulnerability, and her desire for “autonomy and prestige” on the world stage, motivations Thucydides certainly would have understood. Samuels discusses in learned detail the rise and fall of various currents of thought and actors in the “Rich Nation, Strong Army” strategy of the Meiji revolutionaries, the Co-Prosperity Sphere strategy of the 1930s and 1940s militarists, and the Yoshida Doctrine strategy (building and maintaining an economically prosperous Japan with a
“cheap ride” on defense) of Japan’s cold warriors.

The author also outlines an emerging Japanese strategic consensus in the post-Cold War, post 9/11 era, which he describes as a “Goldilocks consensus, neither too hard nor too soft, too autonomous nor too dependent, too Western-oriented, nor too Asian-oriented.” Japan, over the last several years, has debated vigorously how it should respond to security threats from China and North Korea, the economic threat of a loss of industrial competitiveness, and the fear of abandonment by its one ally, the United States. In what Samuels regards as typical strategic mindedness, Japan has responded by refashioning its industrial strategy to maintain a lead in high-value added, high-technology manufacturing; whittling away at defense constraints and building up a more capable, globally deployable force; and hewing closely to U.S. policy positions, especially with regard to Iraq.

There are some minor errors in the book. He refers to the U.S. Army First Corps as the “First U.S. Army Command,” for instance. Some predictions, such as Japan being “likely” to abandon its cheap ride on defense, are not currently persuasive, and after three years and three prime ministers, each seemingly trying to outdo his predecessor in terms of unpopularity, “Japan’s Goldilocks [as] the pragmatic leader who will get [a new grand strategy] ‘just right,’” seems more distant than ever. But these are minor cavils. Anyone with an interest in national strategy formation, Japan’s historical and current position in the international security system or the likely direction of America’s most important ally in the Pacific will benefit from this well-researched, cogently argued, and entertainingly written book.

COL David Hunter-Chester, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**AMERICA ALONE: The End of the World as We Know It,** Mark Steyn, Regnery Publishing, Washington, DC, 2006, 224 pages, $27.95.

Plans are underway for a new and controversial structure adjacent to London’s 2012 Summer Olympic venue: the London Markaz, known to most locals simply as the “mega-mosque.” As currently envisioned, this 18-acre Islamic cultural center and mosque will hold approximately 12,000 worshippers; the original design called for a far more imposing structure, however, one capable of holding 70,000, which would make it the largest religious structure in England with a capacity approaching that of the Olympic stadium itself. Critics claim an edifice of this size would profoundly and permanently alter the physical and cultural landscape of the area. Adding to the controversy, Tablighi Jamaat—the Islamic missionary group spearheading the project—has been accused by the FBI as being a front for terrorist recruiting.

In **America Alone: The End of the World as We Know It,** author Mark Steyn sees the London Markaz as a sobering manifestation of a larger phenomenon that threatens our society today: the rapid disintegration of Western culture against a rising tide of global Islamism. In his self-described “doomsday book with a twist,” Steyn warns his readers that “much of what we loosely call the Western world will not survive the 21st century, and much of it will effectively disappear within our lifetimes, including many if not most European countries.” Clearly not above hyperbole, Steyn predicts a new Islamic caliphate blossoming in European soil, a “Eurabia” populated by self-segregating and increasingly radicalized young Muslims.

As the text’s subtitle suggests, Steyn characterizes Western Europe as suffering its final death throes due to bloated social welfare programs and a “nanny state” mentality, a paralyzing climate of political correctness and misguided multiculturalism, and, worst of all, drastically declining birthrates, which fall far below the self-sustaining rate of 2.1 births per woman (Spain is at 1.1; Italy hovers at 1.2). These elements, he argues, create the perfect storm for societal suicide—gone with a whimper, not a bang. Unlike in the year 732 at the Battle of Tours, where Charles “the Hammer” Martel rallied his Frankish forces for a final stand against the Moorish thrust into the continent’s heartland, Steyn claims the enemy already resides within the European gates and is rapidly out-populating Martel’s progeny.

All’s not lost though, for Steyn argues that despite its flaws, the United States remains the last bastion of Western civilization. He calls upon Americans to heed the example of their neighbors across the pond: “We have been shirking too long, and that’s unworthy of a great civilization. To see off the new Dark Ages will be tough and demanding. The alternative will be worse.” And Steyn obligingly portrays for his reader a bleak alternative.

Whether you agree with his message or not, Steyn sounds his clarion call with quick wit and rhetorical aplomb. His book is no scholarly tome, for while the author provides ample evidence to support his claims, one is left questioning the source of many of his most shocking statistics. Rather, **America Alone** is a lively and controversial polemic, a strident warning cry, and an unabashed paean to American exceptionalism. It also spotlights one of the most pressing existential questions of our time: how far should we go to preserve our way of life? As he warns, “By the time that Olympic mega-mosque is open for business in the London of 2012, you’ll be surprised how well it fits in.” In the end, though, Steyn leaves the reader wondering, “If you build it, will they really come?”

**LTC John Nelson, Ph.D., Flagstaff, Arizona**

There are histories and there are memoirs. Often, they are not interchangeable. *Defeat and Triumph* works as both a history and a memoir. The author, Professor Emeritus Stephen Sussna is a Professor of Law at Baruch College, City University of New York, and is a respected urban planner. During World War II, he was the helmsman on LST 1012, a U.S. Navy amphibious landing craft that participated in Operation Dragoon—the invasion of Southern France. Unlike most World War II veterans who write books based on their experiences, Professor Sussna has taken his time to examine the events surrounding his war, his operation, and his role in all of it.

The invasion of Northern France through Normandy is known by the most casual students of history. Operation Dragoon, the equally successful and less-costly invasion of Southern France through the French Riviera, is less known, only because it followed two months later. It was successful, but it was also controversial. Winston Churchill opposed it because it took assets that could have been used in a thrust through the Balkans—the “soft underbelly of Europe”—to prevent future Soviet influence in the region. Lieutenant General Mark Clark, whose Fifth Army was struggling up the Italian Peninsula, also opposed it. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, however, pushed it through. Operation Dragoon captured some 80,000 prisoners, destroyed the German XIX Army, and drove 500 miles to link up with Patton’s Third Army. It liberated Southern France, obtaining the ports of Toulon and Marseilles for Allied logistical efforts. It also reintroduced the French as a force on the European continent and assured Charles de Gaulle’s prominent place in post-war politics.

Dr. Sussna’s rigorous research puts the operation into the context of the war and its times. He provides new material and reinterprets existing material. He first sets the big picture and then draws together the Army, aviation, naval, and allied perspectives to portray the complexity of the operation. The days when the burden of fighting two wars is borne by less than one percent of the U.S. population, it is instructive to reflect on a time when the burden of combat was borne by over 10 percent of the population and the civilian sector was far more involved in its support and successes. Dr. Sussna has provided a window into that time.

What is not present enough in this memoir is the story about the sailor who wrote it. Over a million young Americans served in the U.S. Navy during World War II, but there are few accessible records of their individual experiences. It would have been nice to have a bit more of young Steve Sussna and his time at sea. But, this modest sailor really wrote this book to honor his shipmates and to provide a record of an operation, his operation, that should not be forgotten. He, like so many of the other veterans, went back to civilian life to build our nation into what it is today. I am glad he has now taken the time to tell us about the war. *Defeat and Triumph* is recommended for students of history and professionals working in joint and combined headquarters.

**Lester W. Grau,**
**Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Upon its completion, there was a search for rationalization and scapegoats for Operation Market Garden. In search of the first, Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery made the astounding statement that his hastily planned airborne assault through the Netherlands was 90 percent successful, and in pursuit of the second, elements of the British army blamed defeat on the valiant commander of the Polish airborne brigade, Stanislaw Sosabowski.

Canadian writer David Bennett effectively cuts through the wealth of post-defeat excuses. He provides an excellent narrative of the campaign, both incisive and well written from a stylistic perspective. Along the way, he sheds fresh light on hertofofore relatively neglected aspects of Market Garden, including the role of Canadian engineers in reinforcing the Red Devils’ bridgehead across the Rhine and then withdrawing survivors to safety.

In addition, *A Magnificent Disaster* puts special emphasis on the personalities of the men involved. Bennett goes beyond Monty, and examines subordinates with an eye that can lead to brutal indictments. For example, of Major General Ivor Thomas, commander of the British 43d Division, he writes that he “was thoroughly detested by all those who came in contact with him. Even the great-hearted and generous commander of the 1st Airborne, Major General Roy Urquhart, could hardly restrain himself when writing of Thomas’s boorish arrogance . . . Known affectionately to the troops as ‘Butcher Thomas,’ he was a poor tactician.”

Others come off much better, especially the American divisional commanders, James Gavin and Maxwell Taylor, and Sosabowski. Even the “SS” Nazi organization enjoys better verdicts than some of the British leaders, in part due to their most un-SS propensity for decent behavior.

Ultimately, Bennett rejects Montgomery’s breezy assurance that Arnhem was anything close to a victory, and the scapegoating of the usual suspects. Instead of blaming individuals, *A Magnificent Disaster* skewers the doctrine and structure of the British Army, concluding that its conventional forces were fundamentally incapable of the mechanized drive needed to achieve victory.

Some of Bennett’s most important work is contained in the book’s six appendices. Besides the standard explanations of terminology and acronyms, he analyzes the logistical elements, Allied airlift capabilities and options, and unwarranted censure of a Polish brigadier for the failures of an entire army.

The book’s greatest shortcoming is a shortage of maps, though there
are also typographical errors. Yet A Magnificent Disaster is a valuable addition to the literature about Operation Market Garden.

Jim Werbaneth, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania


At the beginning of the 20th century, Europeans saw themselves as the leaders of a great march of progress that had made their continent the center of civilization. Their empires covered most of the globe and their cultural hegemony was perhaps even more dominant than their political and military power. Yet, two decades later, much of Europe’s confidence and optimism had been replaced by cynicism and despair. The shift, writes historian Alan Kramer, was a product of the Great War, which saw the mobilization of radical nationalism that supported a European military outlook that demanded the methods of total war to achieve absolute victory.

From these phenomena emerged something unprecedented, a continent-wide “culture of destruction.” It was culture previewed in the imperial abuses of Germany and Italy in Africa and the ethnic cleansing in the Balkan Wars. During the First World War it expanded to include the German atrocities in Belgium in 1914, the industrialized slaughter at Verdun and the Somme, and the mistreatment of prisoners by all combatants on the Eastern Front. However, it went beyond barbarities inflicted on external opponents. Kramer finds that the culture of destruction also inspired terrible persecution of those perceived as internal enemies. Thus, the culture of destruction encouraged the Armenian genocide, the “take-no-prisoners” policy of the Freikorps in post-war Germany, and the massacres of the Russian Civil War.

As the first half of the 20th century fades deeper into the past, some historians have started to look on the two world wars as a single event. In such an interpretation, the passions and unresolved issues of the “Great War” led directly to the even more terrible Second World War. Kramer, a professor at Trinity University in Dublin, rejects this view. He concedes that the fascism that launched World War II was a product of the first war’s culture of destruction. He also understands that horrific events like the Holocaust, the mass death on the Eastern Front, and the bombing of Hiroshima have led us to seek an explanation by looking at the events that preceded the Second World War. Yet, while emphasizing the most awful aspects of the First World War, the brutal exploitation of enemy civilians, the awful experience of common Soldiers, and the genocidal repression of internal enemies, Kramer challenges the idea that these events set the necessary precedent for the greater tragedy that began in 1939. For all its unprecedented horror, the Great War did not make Auschwitz and Dresden inevitable.

Kramer’s argument is a complex and compelling one. The reader willing to follow him through his presentation of evidence will be rewarded with an experience that is both harrowing and thought-provoking.

LTC Scott Stephenson, USA, Retired, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq

Bill Thayer, San Diego, CA—Bing West’s “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq” (March-April 2009, Military Review) is another terrific article about our successes in Iraq. I think the article ranks up there with General Petraeus’s “Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance” (September-October 2008, Military Review), as well as with many other “real world” lesson articles in MR on Iraq.

Field Manual 3-24 is a good guide for our troops, but it is basically theory (with some nice real-world vignettes thrown in). Mr. West’s, General Petraeus’s, and other MR articles (e.g., Colonel MacFarland) have captured invaluable real-world lessons about counterinsurgency in one setting—Iraq.

I would just like to make one other observation. One reason for our success* in Iraq was great leadership by Petraeus, Odierno, MacFarland, and many others. Let me cite one example: The U.S. plan was to establish a democracy in Iraq and not have it revert to a tribal structure. Yet our military leaders had the sense to violate this guidance to empower the Sons of Iraq in Al Anbar (essentially a tribal structure). This led to the Anbar Awakening and the weakening of the insurgency, which in turn helped to make the surge successful. I don’t think it says anywhere in FM 3-24 to violate the plan for governance. But that was clearly the right decision. You can write all the rules you want, but there is absolutely no substitute for good leadership and good judgment (fortunately, we had great leadership and great judgment).

*As Petraeus brilliantly put it: “Success” is not victory and is “fragile and reversible progress.”

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Unifying Physical and Psychological Impact

Dennis M. Murphy, Carlisle, PA—I read with great interest Huba Wass de Czege’s article “Unifying
Physical and Psychological Impact During Operations” (March-April 2009, Military Review). I find two areas of the article worthy of amplification. The first involves General Wass de Czege’s discussion of deception; the second, his emphasis on the psychological implications of actions.

Regarding deception, the warning that “people among whom military operations take place” should not be the messengers for the deceit goes well beyond the realm of grand deception. Today’s tactical commanders are faced with a dilemma created by the empowerment of non-combatants in the operational environment with new media means. Contractors, nongovernmental organizations, and the local indigenous population (among others) with cell phones can report on military operations in real-time immediately to any number of sources. Consequently, the tactical commander cannot completely control operations security (OPSEC) as in the past. Savvy commanders, aware of the challenges posed by the information environment may choose to mitigate the OPSEC risk through the use of tactical deception, but this comes with the potentially significant second- and third-order effects that Wass de Czege rightly points out. While deception can certainly aid in the security of an operation, it can also negate the credibility of any future messages the command wishes to send in an effort to persuade or influence the indigenous population. The strategic communication effort is about trust and credibility and is critical to making a “fence sitting” population a friendly presence, especially in a countersurgency.

Wass de Czege’s discussion of the psychological impact of actions and a consideration of such in military planning cannot be overemphasized. In fact, the Department of Defense’s “Principles of Strategic Communication,” published in August 2008 describes strategic communication as the orchestration of words, images, and actions where actions send the loudest message and words and images provide the context to that message. Consequently, selection of the appropriate military course of action with the desired message in mind in support of achieving the military objective is critical.

Wass de Czege implies that military leaders have not culturally embraced this philosophy. I agree, based on anecdotal evidence established by discussions with many students at the U.S. Army War College. What he fails to provide, however, is the necessary forcing function to drive the required cultural change. The answer lies in the commander’s intent. Specifically, the military end state must include a cognitive (or psychological, if you will) information end state. A properly articulated information end state will drive both planning and execution of the military operation with sensitivity toward the new media environment. Military courses of action will be analyzed against this vision and subordinate military units will carry out the operation in order to meet the end state described within the intent. Sensitized to the commander’s intent, planners then will “wargame” the courses of action with that end-state in mind. Consequently, the planners will consider an enemy’s expected reaction to a friendly action in terms of the desired information end state.

The synergistic impact of combined physical and psychological operations is not new. But the military has moved away from a focus on their integrated value. This article does a good job of reminding leaders of that and charging them to fix the problem.

**Telling the Afghan Military Story…Their Way!**

MAJ Mark S. Leslie, Fort McPherson, GA—While scanning previous issues for Afghanistan information I came across Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Ricks’ article “Telling the Afghan Military Story….Their Way!” (March-April 2006, Military Review). The article contains many lessons that apply to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan in areas other than public affairs. While this article focuses on how U.S. forces can operate within the cultural dynamics of the Afghan society, it provides some valuable insight that can be used in other dimensions of our operations. The same techniques that lead to successful operations in public affairs are applicable to combat operations. We need to learn to operate within the cultural and social norms of the Afghan society as much as possible to avoid possible friction points.

Our way, as the author points out, is not necessarily the best way or the only way. What works for us is not necessarily the best for the Afghans. While we are a technologically based society with systems in place, and we recognize that we maximize our potential with these systems, the Afghans cannot replicate those systems, not because they don’t want to or are intellectually incapable, but because it is simply a matter of society. Our society is different than theirs and what works for us may or not be worthy of replicating for them.

The idea of face-to-face coordination, distribution, meetings, and socializing is still the preferred method for many of our leaders, and we often disdain so-called email leadership. The Afghans respect face-to-face communication. The success of their IO efforts and effects on their Afghan society compared to ours reflect superior understanding of indigenous norms and values. I think it wise to consider and remember this when developing IO campaigns and efforts as well as conducting tactical operations and consequence management operations.

All in all, I think this is an excellent article for any student of countersurgency. Ricks indirectly defines the goal of the countersurgent—to operate amongst the population as transparently as possible whether for IO purposes or combat operations. **MR**