Preface

In October 2006, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center published a volume of selected articles in conjunction with the release and distribution of the Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Subsequently, numerous articles have been written exploring other dimensions of counterinsurgency not treated, or not well understood, when the first volume was published. These articles reflect both the vastly expanded range of knowledge and experience that U.S. land forces have obtained as well as the painful cost of such lessons with regard to fighting and defeating insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Many outline the first-hand lessons learned in the current operational environment. As the Intellectual Center of the Army, the Combined Arms Center recognizes the importance of sharing these first-hand documents. The Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) and editors of Military Review have designed this second collection to complement the recently released FM 3-0, Operations and the soon to be released Counterinsurgency Handbook (produced by the COIN Center); FM 3-24.2, Counterinsurgency Tactics; FM 3-07, Stability Operations; and FM 3-28, Civil Support. While doctrinal field manuals lay out principles and supporting theory for dealing with the asymmetric aspects of warfare inherent in insurgency conflicts, these articles are intended to provide specific lessons and observations drawn from operations in the field.

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2 America’s Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts
Congressman Ike Skelton
Congressman Ike Skelton suggests how to overcome the threat of asymmetrical warfare by examining yesteryear’s battles to develop strategies and tactics for tomorrow’s conflicts.

8 Developing a National Counterinsurgency Capability for the War on Terror
John Hillen, Ph.D.
The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Dr. Hillen calls for a COIN strategic framework that incorporates all the instruments of national power.

11 Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won
Lieutenant Colonel Conrad C. Crane, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D
The United States has rarely accomplished long-term policy goals after any conflict without an extended U.S. military presence to ensure proper results from the peace.

21 Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis
Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, U.S. Army, and Major Mark S. Ulrich, U.S. Army
A new tool from the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center can help bridge the gap between COIN doctrine and real results on the ground.

28 Using Occam’s Razor to Connect the Dots: The Ba’ath Party and the Insurgency in Tal Afar
Captain Travis Patriquin, U.S. Army
Long ago, Saddam Hussein positioned loyal Ba’athists in Tal Afar to neutralize political and ethnic enclaves, and they now support the insurgent forces in the city.

38 Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach
Colonel Gregory Wilson, U.S. Army
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines offers a template for how to succeed in counterinsurgency.

Thomas A. Marks, Ph.D
The former pupil has eclipsed its teacher. Under President Uribe and a dynamic cast of military reformers, Colombia has now neutralized its longstanding insurgency.

65 Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point
Major Niel Smith, U.S. Army, and Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army
The “Anbar Awakening”—what some have called the “Gettysburg of Iraq”—resulted from the careful application of multiple lines of operation, among them the deliberate cultivation of local leaders.

77 Addendum: Anbar Awakens
Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army
A major player in the Anbar Awakening recalls how joint-force cooperation led to the turnaround in Ramadi.
79 Commander’s Assessment: South Baghdad  
Lieutenant Colonel Ross A. Brown, U.S. Army  
A former squadron commander discusses his unit’s year in Iraq and lists his 11 commandants for winning the COIN war in South Baghdad.

87 Fighting “The Other War”: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005  
Lieutenant General David W. Barno, U.S. Army, Retired  
The former commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan offers his assessment of operations in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban.

100 Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan  
Colonel (P) Patrick Donahue, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fenzel, U.S. Army  
Two principals describe how Combined Task Force Devil employed a balanced strategy of kinetic, non-kinetic, and political actions to quiet eastern Afghanistan during OIF VI.

116 HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment  
Colonel Ralph O. Baker, U.S. Army  
In a companion piece to an earlier article on information operations, a successful BCT commander describes how he revamped his intelligence approach for COIN.

126 Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step to Winning the COIN Fight  
Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr, U.S. Army; Major John Cushing, U.S. Army; Major Brandon Gamer, U.S. Army; and Captain Richard Thompson, U.S. Army  
Human terrain mapping offers a systematic method to obtain the information Soldiers need to succeed in counterinsurgency.

133 Paper and COIN: Exploiting the Enemy’s Documents  
Major Vernie Liebl, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired  
We are ignoring a valuable source of intelligence by failing to search documents, hard drives, and other exploitable detritus found in the course of operations.

138 Everything Old is New Again: Task Force Phantom in the Iraq War  
Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Whalen Jr., U.S. Army  
Using cold war doctrine, long-range surveillance (LRS) companies are meeting an urgent, enduring need in Iraq.

145 A Synchronized Approach to Population Control  
Population control measures are an important part of the current plan to stabilize Baghdad.

148 The Art and Aggravation of Vetting in Post-Conflict Environments  
Sean McFate  
Creating a professional indigenous security force depends on the competent vetting of candidates for that force.

157 Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs  
Montgomery McFate, J.D., Ph.D  
To defeat the insurgents who employ improvised explosive devices, commanders should focus less on the bomb than on the bomb maker.
161 Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve
As the “Anbar Awakening” suggests, tribal engagement could be a key to success in Iraq. MR presents a useful primer on the subject.

177 Money as a Force Multiplier in COIN
Lieutenant Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
During the second battle of Fallujah, civil affairs teams in Marine Regimental Combat Team 1 wielded money to shape the battlespace.

185 Stabilizing Influence: Micro-Financial Services Capability
James E. Shircliffe Jr.
Micro-financial services that offer very small loans and savings accounts to the less affluent should be part of all U.S. stability operations.

192 From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines
Major Gary J. Morea, U.S. Army
Islamic separatists in the Mindanao island group are slowly being assimilated back into Philippine society through a process of amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation.

203 Protection of Arts and Antiquities during Wartime: Examining the Past and Preparing for the Future
Major James B. Cogbill, U.S. Army
Well before D-Day, America planned to protect European art and cultural treasures. Failure to do the same in Iraq suggests we need a permanent DOD structure to ensure we don’t repeat our mistake.

210 Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army
General Petraeus talks on the essential tasks necessary for successful COIN.