



HANDBOOK



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
MISSION COMMAND



IN THE DIVISION AND CORPS SUPPORT AREA

LESSONS AND BEST PRACTICES

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Mission Command in the Division and Corps Support Area

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Foreword

During warfighter exercises, it had become apparent that division and corps commanders were challenged with mission command of forces in their support areas. The commander of United States Army Forces Command directed commanders to establish a support area command post (SACP) to improve mission command. The Army's new Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (06 OCT 2017), incorporates this guidance by modifying the geographical organization of an area of operations. FM 3-0 scales down the size of the support area and adds a consolidation area. The consolidation area will be assigned to a maneuver brigade or division. This enables the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) to perform its traditional mission and focus efforts on operations in the support area. FM 3-0 formalizes the requirement for divisions and corps to establish a SACP (its doctrinal name, which is used throughout this handbook) to assist in controlling operations in the support and consolidation areas.

This handbook provides divisions, corps, and their enablers several ways to implement recent guidance and doctrine for mission command in their support and consolidation areas. It provides the new doctrine that has been released in FM 3-0 as well as examples of how divisions and corps have employed their SACP.

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Introduction

Purpose: This handbook serves two purposes. First, it provides emerging doctrine for organizing and controlling operations in the support area and newly defined consolidation area. Second, it provides examples of the organizational structure of a support area command post (SACP) and suggested roles and responsibilities of corps and division SACPs.

Problem: Corps and division commanders lack the doctrine, manning, and equipment to operate three dispersed command posts to leverage mission command over the support and consolidation areas.

The counterinsurgency fight redefined the operational environment. Corps and divisions consolidated their command posts to manage operations in a noncontiguous environment. The rear was redefined as the support area, and corps and divisions transferred mission command of the support area to maneuver enhancement brigades (MEBs). Doctrine and unit modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) allocations were changed, as the need to provide a division or corps CP in the support area was not required.

Through multiple corps- and division-level exercises, units rediscovered the need for a command post with capabilities to support operations in the support and consolidation area. Corps and divisions found, however, that doctrine was not in line with this requirement. Furthermore, they faced challenges in manning and equipping a separate command post to execute mission command over the support and consolidation areas.

Contributing Factors: Recent corps and division warfighter exercises revealed multiple factors contributing to the problem of forming a support area command post.

First, doctrine does not clearly address the roles, responsibilities, and organization of a corps/division SACP. Doctrine is not to be prescriptive, but it should provide adequate guidance for a commander to proceed. In this case, the doctrine leaves a lot to the commander's interpretation.

Army Techniques Publication 6-0.5, *Command Post Organization and Operations* (01 MAR 2017), does not mention the requirement for a support area command post. It states: "Corps, divisions, and brigade combat teams are capable of employing a main CP, tactical CP, and mobile command group" (para. 1-19).

Field Manual (FM) 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations* (21 APR 2014) states: "The corps establishes a support area when required. The support area requires a controlling headquarters; the minimum responsible echelon is a MEB. For major operations, considerably greater capabilities may be required" (para. 5-124).

The new FM 3-0, *Operations* (06 OCT 2017), does address the SACP and provides a general overview of the tasks associated with operating it. Chapter 1 of this handbook goes into more detail on SACP operation.

Second, the Army has not resourced the SACP with personnel and equipment on unit MTOEs. Corps and divisions are internally resourcing the SACP, taking away capability from the main or tactical CPs. When resourcing the SACP, corps and divisions must include all warfighting functions. This will ensure that the SACP is capable of planning and executing the full spectrum of military operations while remaining synchronized with the corps' and division's deep and close fight.

Finally, the support area currently may be assigned to the MEB. However, the MEB does not have command authority over corps and divisional units operating in the support and consolidation area. Therefore, an additional command post is needed, with the SACP being one potential solution. To form a SACP, corps and divisions have augmented the MEB with additional staff personnel and placed the deputy commanding general—support as the support area commander. This has both provided the SACP with the ability to deconflict issues between adjacent units and provided the corps and division commanders with mission command over support area operations.

As commanders and their staff plan for and develop a SACP, factors to consider include:

- The SACP must have control over the functions occurring in the support area. MEBs lack the capability and expertise to provide mission command for specific types of units, key functions, and tasks required to conduct successful sustainment operations within the support area.
- The unit should resource the SACP to ensure parallel capability with the main CP and tactical CP, without degrading the capabilities of either. All warfighting functions should be present in the SACP.
- The commander needs to identify and define the roles of the SACP. The SACP has to be able to plan and execute operations across all phases of the operation. The commander has to identify the desired capability and capacity of the SACP to enable resourcing solutions.

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- The MEB can provide security and life support to the SACP. If possible, the SACP should be collocated with the MEB. However, the MEB needs to retain its doctrinal mission and maintain the support area while the SACP provides corps/division mission command over the support and consolidation areas. The division commander/G-3 should explicitly outline this delineation of tasks and responsibilities in the orders establishing the SACP.
- While the SACP may not need to be as mobile as the main and tactical CPs, mobility is still a consideration and requires external resources to facilitate SACP movements.

This handbook provides readers with possible ways to address concerns on how to implement the SACP into support and consolidation area operations. Units continue to test ideas, and doctrine is under development to ensure that gaps are addressed in future iterations. The desired outcome is to ensure that the commander is free to focus on the deep and close fights and not hindered by support area operations.

Chapter 1 discusses new doctrine and compares it to what units are currently executing in corps and divisional warfighter exercises. Chapter 1 introduces new doctrinal terms from FM 3-0 and highlights gaps to assist in developing future doctrine.

Chapter 2 provides examples of III Corps' and three divisions' SACP layouts, key points, and lessons learned. Each unit addressed the above planning considerations in its own way as it related to legacy doctrine.

Chapter 3 discusses the required roles and responsibilities of the SACP. It details augmentation needed for the MEB to conduct rear area operations, as well as the advantages of collocating the SACP with the MEB.

Chapter 1

Current SACP Operations Compared to Current and Future Doctrine

This chapter discusses emerging doctrine for the support area command post and a comparison of current practices observed in corps and divisional warfighter exercises. It introduces the consolidation area as it interacts with the support area and highlights gaps in doctrine that will assist in future doctrine development.

The objective of rear operations [now the support and consolidation area] is to ensure freedom of action and continuous operations. Rear operations were numerous, complex, and never ending. Commanders and their staffs synchronized the rear operations functions of sustainment, terrain management, movement control with close and deep operations, and security in consonance with the commander's concept and intent. (Field Manual [FM] 71-100, *Division Operations* [28 AUG 1996])

Support Area Command Post

From FM 3-0, *Operations* (06 OCT 2017):

“Depending on the situation, including the threat, size of the support area, and number of units within the support and consolidation areas, division and corps commanders may form a support area command post (SACP) to assist in controlling operations. The SACP enables division and corps commanders to exercise mission command over disparate functionally focused elements operating within the support and consolidation areas that may exceed the effective span of control of the MEB [maneuver enhancement brigade] or to the division or corps main CPs [command posts].

“The SACP is not a separate section in the unit's table of organization and equipment. Commanders form a SACP from the equipment and personnel from the main and tactical CPs. The SACP normally collocates with the MEB, which provides the SACP with signal connectivity, sustainment, security, and workspace. Functions of the SACP include:

- Planning and directing sustainment
- Terrain management
- Movement control
- Area security

“When augmented by the MEB staff, the SACP may also:

- Plan and control combined arms operations with units under division or corps control.
- Manage airspace.
- Employ fires.

“Normally, an assistant division commander for a division or a deputy corps commander for a corps leads the SACP. The specific functions and responsibilities assigned to the SACP will be assigned or designated by corps or division commanders to their deputy or assistant commanders through an order. “A properly resourced SACP assists corps and division commanders in shaping the support and consolidation areas that complement the corps’ or division’s scheme of maneuver. This allows the main CP to focus on close and deep operations.” (FM 3-0, paragraphs 2-174—2-178)

Defining New Terms


Doctrine as of September 2017 had the battlefield divided into three areas: deep, close, and support. FM 3-0 introduces a fourth area: the consolidation area. “Commanders will always designate a close area and a support area. They designate a deep area and consolidation area as required” (para. 1-141).

Both the support and consolidation areas have unique tasks focused on maintaining momentum of the corps/division. While each is in command of a brigade, a corps/division command node will be needed to prioritize efforts, synchronize movements, and provide overall mission command of the support and consolidation areas.

Support Area. “The support area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations” (FM 3-0, para. 1-155, citing Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, *Operations*). The support area executes sustaining/support operations, terrain management, line of communication security, movement control, mobility support, and clearance of fires. A division may assign an MEB to provide area security and overall control of the support area. Actions in the support area have a profound effect on current and future operations in the deep, close, and consolidation areas.

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**Figure 1-1. The four areas within a unit's area of operation.
(Source: FM 3-0)**

Consolidation Area. “The consolidation area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for freedom of action in the close area and to support the continuous consolidation of gains” (FM 3-0, para. 1-158, citing ADRP 3-0). Normally used in the offense to exploit tactical success and maintain momentum of offensive forces, the consolidation area may or may not contain support area base clusters.

The consolidation area requires a task-organized combat arms unit to conduct area security and stability tasks, and to employ fires/clear fires. This will allow the corps/division commander to continue focusing on the close fight and shape the deep fight for future operations. A brigade combat team will normally be assigned to the consolidation area.

Analysis of Units Exercising SACP Operations

In the absence of doctrine, units have adapted a wide range of best practices when establishing SACP operations. Below is quick comparison of what units are currently executing to current and future doctrine. Chapter 2 will provide detail into each unit’s course of action.

III Corps

III Corps internally resourced the SACP and collocated it with the MEB. While resourcing the SACP, the corps found that the SACP needed capability similar to that of the main CP to ensure that support area operations did not encumber the main’s CP’s ability to perform its designated functions. Resourcing the SACP required the staff to think “laterally” to ensure that the SACP was fully capable of conducting missions on par with the main CP. While resourcing the SACP, III Corps identified a mobility issue, as the corps did not have enough equipment to support movement of all three CPs. The corps concluded that the SACP might not have to be as mobile as the main CP, but would eventually be required to move as the support area expanded.

III Corps SACP Roles and Responsibilities. During its warfighter exercise, III Corps identified responsibilities required of the support area in addition to those discussed in FM 3-0. Coordination with the host nation was critical to preserving the access to ports, rail, and highway networks necessary to maintain operational tempo and freedom of maneuver for the corps as a whole. The deputy commanding general–support (DCG-S) held command of the SACP, providing mission command over the corps support area. Additionally, III Corps determined that planners would work from the SACP until line of departure, move forward with the tactical and main CPs, and then return to the SACP for Phase IV planning.

1st Infantry Division

The 1st Infantry Division (1ID) referred to the description of “battlefield framework” in FM 71-100 to provide a framework for support area operations and SACP formation. The division found that collocating the SACP with the MEB was critical to coordination of protection assets and allowed the MEB to articulate issues to the division quickly. 1ID also found that the roles of the SACP must be detailed and understood at all levels. 1ID focused on functionality when designing the SACP and resourced it appropriately. Applying more assets, staffing, and equipment to the SACP increased the division’s flexibility and adaptability when executing critical decisive operations. (**Note:** FM 71-100 was superseded by Army Techniques Publication 3-91, *Division Operations* [17 OCT 2014].)

1ID SACP Roles and Responsibilities. In addition to the roles outlined in FM 3-0, the SACP needed to plan and synchronize division sustainment operations with exercise higher control (HICON). The SACP’s ability to synchronize sustainment operations within the division commander’s intent was critical. The SACP conducted host nation coordination as well as integration and synchronization of the division’s rear operations with the host nation actions. 1ID also considered it important for the SACP to begin planning stability operations while the division may still have been conducting offensive and defensive actions.

3rd Infantry Division

The 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) augmented the MEB with divisional staff to build the SACP. The division found that the MEB required staff augmentation in the following areas to conduct SACP operations:

- Movement control and LOC management
- Synchronization of division sustainment operations
- Air traffic services
- Intelligence management in the division support area

The MEB provided the majority of personnel to support the SACP except for a few areas where the division had shortages. The 3rd Sustainment Brigade provided personnel to aid in synchronizing sustainment operations with support operations. The division pulled personnel from the main command post–operational detachment (MCP-OD) to provide the required intelligence analysis capacity. Equipment shortages identified were transportation assets and mission command information system (MCIS) support for the MCP-OD. There was also a concern that the added requirements of the SACP might exceed the MEB’s organic communication and power generation capacity. In the future, units may face a similar problem and should address this in their planning process.

3ID SACP Roles and Responsibilities. The SACP needed division senior leadership to provide mission command of the support area operations. The MEB was responsible for the security and mobility of the support area but by itself did not have command authority over all units operating in the division rear. Having the senior leadership in the SACP helped deconflict issues and provide continuity to support area operations.

The MEB might not have the same deployment timeline as the division. Having senior leadership in the SACP familiar with the commander's intent and the division's mission will facilitate support operations until the MEB arrives in theater.

- The SACP must have the ability to issue orders specific to support area operations and the ability to conduct both current and future operations. Integration of the SACP battle rhythm into the division battle rhythm is a key factor.
- The SACP must conduct boards and working groups that produce outputs supporting the division's battle rhythm events/outputs.

1st Armored Division

The 1st Armored Division (1AD) identified the following planning considerations for SACP development:

- Span of control
- Friendly forces in the area of operations (AO)
- Phase of operation
- Size of AO
- Terrain characteristics
- Enemy activity
- Host nation activity
- Continuity of operations

The division internally resourced the SACP team headed by the DCG-S. Each staff section provided personnel, to include the following special staff: surgeon cell, fires cell, protection, and staff judge advocate. Also included were liaison officers from the sustainment, medical, and combat aviation brigades and the air mobility liaison officer. The SACP was collocated with the MEB. The division found that the SACP needed the ability to make independent decisions on issues directly affecting units and conditions in the division's rear area, relieving the main CP of responsibility for rear area operations.

1AD SACP Roles and Responsibilities. 1AD also realized the importance of having a clearly articulated SACP mission because doctrine was vague. Although the new FM 3-0 lays out the roles and responsibilities of the SACP, additional roles have been identified and should be added as doctrine is revised. 1AD SACP roles:

- Controlling:
 - Allocation of forces, resources, and fires
 - Movement and maneuver control (air and ground)
 - Tasking and decision authority
- Coordinating:
 - Host nation support
 - Synchronization of enablers and assets
 - Reverse joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (R/JRSOI) management

Resourcing the SACP is another challenge. Doctrine dictates that units must internally resource. However, shortages of personnel and equipment may hinder or reduce SACP operations. Commanders must think laterally and determine what capability the SACP needs, and in what capacity, to determine the best resourcing solutions. Depending on the course of action, the division may pull from subordinate units to fill gaps in capability. However, units should exercise caution when augmenting the SACP from subordinate units. They have to understand that this will decrease the overall capability of the unit, thus decreasing combat power. Augmenting the MEB is an option; Chapter 3 of this handbook addresses areas of interest when augmenting the MEB.

Chapter 2

Corps and Division SACP Organization

This chapter provides examples from the III Corps support area command post (SACP) and selected division SACPs. The 1st Infantry Division (ID) developed the initial SACP concept. The 3rd ID and 1st Armored Division (AD) refined the SACP concept based on personnel and equipment limitations due to Focus Area Review Group (FARG) II. Army National Guard (ARNG) division headquarters are not under the same modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) reduction, so they have more personnel to use in manning a SACP. The 40th ID SACP concept is a way for ARNG divisions to proceed.

III Corps

The following is taken from III Corps standard operating procedure (SOP). The corps refers to the support area command post as the corps support command post (CSCP).

1. Manning

The base assumption for CSCP C2 is the DCG-S [deputy commanding general – support] will be the senior III Corps leader deploying. Other options may include the DCofS [deputy chief of staff]. There must be sufficient staffing and equipment available to allow the DCG-S to conduct mission command of corps/CJFLCC operations within the CSA/JSA [corps support area/joint security area]. This is from the corps/CJFLCC rear boundary to the division's rear boundaries (division security areas). Synchronize activities between theater/Army organizations and the corps; among maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) and functional brigades; and other corps enabler units and organizations to accomplish the corps' mission. In practice, the base CSCP corps staff consists of sustainment, protection, and engagement WfFs [warfighting functions], as well as representatives from the corps G-1, G-2, CUOPS (Current Operations), and Engineer sections. Modifications to the manning requirements will be made based on the mission/function the CSCP is fulfilling or additional duties assigned to it from the C-Main (corps main command post).

A. DCG-S: Responsible for the CSA/JSA on behalf of the CG/CJFLCC.

B. DCG-S Deputy/MEB CDR: Integrates CSCP and MEB staffs to provide the means to conduct operations across the CSA supported by Fires, Intel (ISR), and the planning spectrum.

C. Deputy Chief of Staff: Responsible for coordinating staff/WiFs for meetings, taskings, and missions. Coordinates closely with the MEB CDR to ensure corps operations are synchronized.

D. Battle Major/CUOPS: 1 x day, 1 x night. Set up and update/maintain current CSCP COP [common operational picture] and running estimate. Facilitate CSCP FRAGORDs (fragmentary orders) with Main. Operations POC (point of contact) with C-Main. Exercise control of operations in the CSA/JSA, including unit deconfliction and clearing air/ground fires.

E. Sustainment. 1 x day, 1 x night.

F. Protection: Manning: 1 x day (w/ additional 1 CPOF [Command Post of the Future] operator), 1 x night. Functions: provide and/or coordinate with the Protection cell in the Main CP to provide protection support to include military police subject matter expertise (detainee operations, maneuver and mobility support, rule of law). Personnel recovery coordination, CBRNE [chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive] expertise, and coordination across engineer, SOF [special operations forces], AMD [air and missile defense], force health protection, safety, and other protection-related WiF elements as needed. Provide comprehensive protection policy and functional advice to the DCG-S during operations, contingencies, or exercises; conduct required or directed internal corps, multi-command, or interagency coordination or tasking support; provide comprehensive protection expertise as directed or required to the DCG-S and other CSCP elements.

(1) Key protection efforts across the corps area:

(a) Air Threat: Counter dismantled threat to friendly aircraft along air LOCs [lines of communication] from the corps' area to divisions' rear boundaries (coordination with MEB/SOF/HNSF [host nation security forces]).

(b) SPF [special purpose forces]/Insurgent Threat: Stop level 1-3 and hybrid threats against LSAs [logistics support areas], C2 nodes, and sustainment assets (coordination with MEB/MP BDE/HNSF).

(c) Defended Assets List [DAL]: Conduct assessments and coordinate protection on DAL assets (coordination with MEB/DAL units).

(d) Criminal Threat: Identify and counteract criminal threat across the corps area (networks, money flow, connections to enemy forces) (coordination with MEB/HN Police/G-2).

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(e) MSRs [main supply routes]: Coordinate protection of MSRs and protect sustainment convoys (coordination with MEB/MP [military police] BDE/Sustainment).

(f) Detainees (generated from DIV-level fight): Theater detention facility.

(g) MP BDE, to include repatriation of detainees in Phase IV/V and/or rearward evacuation of high-value detainees as required (coordination with MP BDE/MEB/G-2/Higher HQ)

(2) All Protection support to the corps area is coordinated ICW the Protection MCP [main command post] element.

G. Engagement. 2 x day, 2 x night. Perform Engagement WfF across the corps area in coordination with the Main.

(1) Advise DCG-S on engagement operations across the corps area.

(2) Coordinate with unified action partners operating across the corps area.

(3) Facilitate HN security forces for supporting security operations.

(4) Coordinate CMO [civil–military operations]. Support population and resource control measures.

(5) Support foreign humanitarian assistance.

(6) Support civil information management.

(7) Synchronize operations with SOF operating across the corps area.

(8) Support stability operations.

(9) Conduct or coordinate KLEs [key leader engagements] when required.

H. G-2. Size will determine the capability. A two-man cell will only be able to conduct situation awareness and the running estimate. A larger section would permit the CSCP to conduct in-depth analysis and coordinate Intel activities among the various BDE units operating in the CSA. An Intel fusion cell capability would greatly increase the effectiveness of all the various Intel organizations.

I. G-3/Engineers. Corps Staff Engineer Section (CSES) will provide 5 personnel assigned to the rear command post (CSCP). There will be 1 OIC to oversee Engineer CSCP activities for both ENG protection and construction-related operations. Two operators will man both the protection/construction CPOF/SIPR stations for a 12-hour shift both day and night. CSES will collocate with the corps Protection Cell within the CSCP. The CSES Protection cell will maintain and update the corps DAL requiring specific engineer assets for protection and survivability, MSR/ASR route status across the corps area, and disseminate planned route clearance (RC) schedules from the MEB or MSC [major subordinate command]. The CSES construction will track construction tasks published in the FRAGORDs to the MSC engineer units and ensure construction schedules are received to reflect start/completion times and monitor progress, priorities of support, additional engineer assets required, and issues and concerns. Construction will also assist with coordinating higher-level infrastructure assessments and projects that the MSC engineer cannot accomplish due to limited civil works capabilities. The CSCP CSES will attend the engineer synchronization brief (internal to all ENG units), protection working group, distribution working group, sustainment working group, and the DCG-S update brief. Key inputs of the CSCP CSES protection/construction are to coordinate and synchronize with MSC ENG BDEs, MEBs, and DIV ENGs combat power, current and future operations (next 24-48 hours), and resolve issues and concerns. Key outputs of the CSCP CSES are initiating FRAGORDs to change the ENG task organization, priority of support, and/or provide guidance. The CSES CSCP will also generate relevant engineer information for the corps CUB/BUB, DCG-S update briefs and huddles, and assist with synchronization and collaboration of engineer operations in the next 48-72 hours as well as recommending issues that require higher resolution.

J. G-1.2 x day, 1 x night. The corps G-1 Rear will serve as a liaison between the corps DCG-S, unit HR liaisons, and the corps G-1 Main. When the corps Main moves or loses capability, the Rear G-1 will assume full responsibility as the G-1 and will hand over responsibility to the Main CP upon relocating or as dictated by METT-TC [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations].

G-1 Key Tasks.

K. LNOs. It is important for the BDEs and enablers (MP, CA [civil affairs], sustainment, and JSOTF [joint special operations task force]) across the CSA to provide LNOs to inform the DCG-S of operations and significant activities in their respective areas.

2. Equipping

Critical to the CSA is the ability to call and clear fires. The MEB must have TAIS [Tactical Airspace Integration System] and AFATDS [Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System]. Should the Rear CP collocate to a supporting unit without TAIS and AFATDS, the corps JFC [joint force commander] will need to be leveraged to identify those capabilities to call fires. WfFs and staff sections must provide their own systems, to include NIPR, SIPR, CPOF, VoIP, and SVoIP automation.

A. Tent (J): 22 tables, 42 chairs, 2 projectors and screens, 1 NIPR printer, 1 SIPR printer

B. Tent (small): 4 tables, 7 chairs, coffee station

C. Automation Networks: SIPR, NIPR, commercial phone lines

D. Staff Automation Equipment

(1) Battle Major/FUOPS. 1 x CPOF, 1 x SVoIP

(2) Sustainment. 1 x CPOF, 1 x BCS3 [Battle Command Sustainment Support System], 1 x SIPR, 1 x NIPR, 1 x SVoIP

(3) Protection. 1 x CPOF, 1 x SIPR, 1 x NIPR, 1 x VoIP, 1 x SVoIP

(4) Engagement. 1 x CPOF, 2 x SIPR, 2 x NIPR, 1 x SVoIP, 1 x VoIP

(5) G-2. 1 x CPOF, 1 x SIPR, 1 x NIPR, 1 x VoIP, 1 x SVoIP

(6) G-1. 2 x SIPR, 1 x NIPR

(7) Engineers. 2 x CPOF, 1 x NIPR (TCMS [Theater Construction Management System]), 1 x VoIP, 1 x SVoIP

3. Corps CSCP Layout




Figure 2-1. Corps support command post current operations integration cell.




Figure 2-2. Corps support command post, Sustainment 1.




Figure 2-3. Corps support command post, Sustainment 2.




Figure 2-4. Corps support command post, 593rd Sustainment Command (Expeditionary).

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


Figure 2-5. Medium Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelter (DRASH) 2, DCG-S layout.




Figure 2-6. Corps support command post conference room.

Key Take-Aways/Lessons Learned

Control and Coordination of Airspace. The corps support command post is responsible for clearing and deconflicting airspace. The CSCP must be involved in the development of the critical assets list (CAL)/defended assets list (DAL) to ensure that critical assets are protected in order to maintain freedom of maneuver of the corps.

Systems and Infrastructure to Perform CSCP Mission. The CSCP requires capabilities similar to those of the Main CP. The current MTOE does not support these requirements, and the corps will have to resource internally to supply the necessary expertise. Control measures are required to avoid degrading the capability of the corps Main.

Protection in the Sustainment Area. Movement requirements may be minimal for the CSCP. Movement of the CSCP will require coordination with support assets. Mobility assets will remain with the Main CP and the tactical command post (TAC).

Mobility. The SACP may be required to move weekly or perhaps fortnightly, but not daily. The CAL/DAL must be updated to protect critical assets. Fuel farm and ammunition supply points have movement requirements similar to those of the SACP.

Mission Command for CSCP. III Corps identified the following additional capabilities required of the corps SACP:

- Ability to publish orders
- Routine engagements: host nation meetings to ensure continued access to ports, rail, and highway network
- Corps support area management: Major general or equivalent
- Serve as an economy of force ground holding HQs.
- CSCP conducts all mission command over the corps support and consolidation areas
- Corps SACP needs to facilitate coordination between unit MPs and host nation police force.
- The MEB requires a corps command node to perform support area operations.

Planning Functions From the Main CP to the CSCP. Planning functions should move back and forth by phase or as needed. During reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), as the Main builds, the planners would most likely work from the CSCP until line of departure (LOD). As the TAC and Main go forward during Phase II, planning capability would remain in the Main. The planning for Phase IV would most likely come back to the CSCP.

Tactical Combat Force (TCF). Typically, the MEB does not have any assets that can provide ground-based reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) other than a TCF. The decision was made by the DCG-S to authorize a portion of the TCF to the MEB to be incorporated in the reconnaissance, surveillance, and area security plan of the corps support area (CSA). This gave the MEB the ability to employ proactive measures by providing early warning of enemy movement toward a logistics support area (LSA) within the corps support area.

1st Infantry Division

This section lays out the 1st Infantry Division (IID) SACP concept as it was configured for Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 16-04 in 2016. The division provided a concept that follow-on units could adapt for fiscal year 2017 WFXs based on the division commander's guidance and resources available. FARG II has been implemented for all active duty divisions, and these divisions have adapted.

In each case, the SACP collocated with a MEB for support. This included network connections, intelligence, operations, and life support. Each SACP example includes the relationship with the MEB, SACP roles and responsibilities, and configuration for operations.

During preparation for WFX 16-04, IID identified the need to establish a non-doctrinal command node within the division's support area. The establishment of this command node allowed the division to succeed during WFX 16-04, seizing objectives and engaging forward targets at a rapid pace while maintaining logistical support to forward maneuver units. The SACP tasks identified in the example below proved critical while conducting command post activities during WFX 16-04.

Although it is not current doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 71-100, *Division Operations*, Change 2 (August 1996), provided the framework for support area operations. Following are terms as IID defined them based on FM 71-100.

Support Area Operations. The objective of support area operations is to ensure freedom of action and continuous operations. Commanders and their staffs synchronize the support area operations functions of sustainment, terrain management, movement control, close and deep operations, and security in line with the commander's intent. The deputy commanding general-support (DCG-S) plans and controls division support area operations from the SACP. The SACP battle-tracks locations and activities of friendly units in the division support area. It has the ability to clear ground and airspace for joint fires in the support area.

Sustainment. Support area operations include planning and directing sustainment. Synchronizing these actions with the concept of operations is critical to the success of close and deep operations. Support area operations also ensure that sustainment does not limit the force commander's freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. The SACP anticipates, plans, and coordinates the division's rear, providing oversight of tenant units. Support facilities disperse to minimize the effect of threat attacks. Normally, the SACP enables sustainment operations while the sustainment brigade focuses on execution. The G-5 works with the SACP and the sustainment brigade to procure any needed host nation sustainment support.

Security. The SACP coordinates and assigns specific security responsibilities to all forces in the support area to ensure that sustainment is not interrupted. Support area security includes intelligence and early warning actions.

Command Post Functions

Main Command Post

- Control and synchronize current operations
- Monitor and assess current operations (including higher and adjacent units) for their impact on future operations
- Plan operations, including branches and sequels
- Assess the overall progress of the operation
- Prepare reports required by higher headquarters and receive reports for/from subordinate units
- Provide a facility for the commander to control operations, issue orders, and conduct rehearsals

All Command Posts

- Maintain running estimates and common operational picture (COP)
- Control operations
- Assess operations
- Develop and disseminate orders
- Coordinate with higher, lower, and adjacent units
- Conduct knowledge management and information management
- Perform CP administration

Reference: Field Manual 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*

Due to the non-doctrinal nature of the SACP and the current state of growth within the Army, IID's operational planning team (OPT) understood that the SACP would have to be resourced internally. Using FM 71-100, the commanding general (CG) made the DCG-S the commander of the SACP.

MISSION COMMAND IN THE DIVISION AND CORPS SUPPORT AREA

Per the CG's guidance, OPCON personnel were kept to a minimum so as not to degrade the capabilities of the division Main (DMAIN) and the division TAC (DTAC). The following details the functions of the three division command nodes and responsibilities.

DTAC Recommended Functions

- Control units and activities conducting decisive operations or shaping operations
- Maintain the current operations estimate
- Maintain and disseminate the COP throughout the division
- Tailor the COP to meet the commander's intent
- Monitor division-level sustaining operations
- Provide:
 - A forward location for issuing orders and conducting rehearsals
 - A forward short-term planning facility when the DMAIN must displace
 - The majority of the personnel and equipment to form an EECP
 - Personnel for the mobile command group

DMAIN Functions

- Control all division operations
- Serve as the primary plans, analysis, and sustainment coordination command post
- Monitor and assesses operations for impact on future operations
- Plan for major operations and battles
- Write operations plans and contingency plans
- Integrate intelligence activities into both current and future operations
- Produce single-source and all-source intelligence
- Produce terrain products
- Synchronize the division's targeting process
- Integrate, coordinate, and synchronize cyber electromagnetic activities, network, and network security operations
- Conduct information management and knowledge management
- Coordinate and manage force structure to include requests for forces and equipment
- Coordinate the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks within its AO
- Prepare and maintain division staff estimates, plans, and orders to support future operations
- Prepare all reports required by higher headquarters

Continued on next page with SACP Functions

SACP Functions

- Support-area security
 - Movement control/ LOC management
 - RSOI/force flow
 - Coordinate and manage force structure to include requests for forces and equipment
 - Manage initial stability tasks
 - Support-area terrain management
 - Host nation engagements
 - Support-area civil affairs operations
- ◆ Plan and synchronize division Army Health Services support with the supporting medical organizations
 - ◆ Plan and synchronize division sustainment operations with supporting sustainment organization
 - Support-area interagency integration
 - Mission command for TCF
 - Support-area Air Traffic Services
 - Route classification

◆ Functions which are currently listed under the DMAIN in Army Techniques Publication 3-91, Division Operations




Figure 2-7. Layout of the SACP based on roles assigned according to the functions listed in the table at top of page.

11D Commanding General's Five Key Tasks

Tempo: Anticipate transitions to synchronize fires, maneuver, and sustainment to rapidly cross the Agshu River, seize OBJ TEXAS, and destroy the 17th and 19th DTG.

Aggressive reconnaissance: Employ heavy advanced guard to enable flexibility and mass combat power at the decisive point.

Fires: Maneuver to emplace fires forward and leverage information collection to detect and destroy division high-payoff targets.

Protection: Disciplined and consistent use of tactical dispersion, camouflage, entrenchment, active patrolling, and aggressive counter-reconnaissance to protect the force.

Partnership: Partner with Atropian Security Forces to build the capacity for Atropia to exercise its authority within its boundaries.

Six Essential Elements of a CP

- Receive information
- Make recommendations to the commander
- Distribute information
- Integrate resources
- Analyze information
- Synchronize resources

Key Take-Aways/Lessons Learned

- Having the SACP collocated with the MEB headquarters improves the coordination of protection assets and allows the MEB commander to articulate shortfalls quickly to senior leaders in the division.
- Commanders must define the roles and responsibilities of the SACP. These will drive personnel and equipment requirements. All staff and subordinate units must have a shared understanding of the SACP's capabilities and functions.
- Divisions should design the SACP with functionality in mind. All warfighting functions (WfF) should be represented in the SACP to ensure shared understanding across WfFs. This allows the staff within the SACP to share information not only within the SACP but also with counterparts within specific WfFs located in the other divisional command nodes.
- It is critical that the division's senior leader enhance the ability of OPCON commanders to obtain and distribute information. This is critical to a shared understanding of the CG's intent and enables the division staff to employ assets across the entire division area in later phases of the operation.

- The division staff's understanding of subordinate units' MTOE was critical to their optimal employment within the division area of operations (AO) throughout the exercise.
- Distribution of protection and collection capabilities during initial entry and early phases of the operation allowed the division freedom of maneuver across the support area during later operations and permitted the SACP to push assets forward in later phases in order to maintain tempo.
- The more equipment and staff given to the SACP, the greater the division's ability to conduct critical decisive operations. More assets, both in staffing and equipping, allocated to the division's support area and the SACP increase the division's flexibility and adaptability when executing critical decisive operations.
- Distributing/broadcasting key meetings via speakers in command nodes is vital to creating shared understanding.
- Integration of multiple WfFs within the SACP increases shared understanding within all command nodes.
- Important functions of the SACP included:
 - Security in the division support area
 - Route classification
 - Planning and synchronization of division sustainment operations with higher command
 - Host nation force engagement/integration
 - Planning and execution of initial stability operations

3rd Infantry Division SACP

This section presents the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) SACP concept design used during WFX 17-01. The 3ID design provides terms of reference for the DCG-S and responsibilities that the SACP has in conjunction with the DMAIN and DTAC. The division initially used the MEB as the base organization for the SACP and augmented additional capabilities from within the division staff.

SACP Background. The SACP is a division mission command node built upon an assigned MEB headquarters (HQ) that is augmented primarily from the division HQ and the main command post–operational detachment (MCP-OD), with personnel and equipment to manage additional support area functions not typically associated with a MEB HQ. The SACP provides a division MC node focused on all aspects of support area operations, to include sustainment. The MEB commander functions as the SACP commander; the DCG-S provides operational oversight as required.

SACP Mission and Functions

Mission: Execute 3ID mission command across the division's security and support areas in order to synchronize security, sustainment, and engagements in support of decisive operations.

Inherent MEB Capabilities

- Area security
- Terrain management
- Manage initial stability tasks
- Mission command for TCF
- Clearance of fires/targeting
- Route classification
- Host nation engagement *
- Interagency integration *
- Civil affairs (CA) operations *

Staff Augmentation Required

- Movement control/
LOC management
- Synchronize DIV sustainment operations with higher command
- Air traffic services
- Intelligence management in the DSA

* Based on CA assets assigned

3ID MC Node Functions and Responsibilities

FUNCTIONS	3ID FCP	MEB	SB	SACP
Area security		X		X
Terrain management	X	X		X
Manage initial stability tasks	X	X		X
Mission command for TCF		X		X
Clearance of fires /targeting	X	X		X
Route classification	X	X		X
Host nation engagement	X			X
Interagency integration	X			X
Civil affairs operations	X			X
Movement control /LOC management	X	X		X
RSOI / force flow			X	
Coordinate and manage force structure, to include requests for forces (RFFs)	X			
Plan and synchronize DIV sustainment operations with corps / ESC	X		X	
Air traffic services	X			X
Produce single-source and all-source Intel	X			

Example of Security Area Working Group Format

Purpose, Frequency, Duration, Location

Purpose: Synchronize and deconflict activities within SA

Frequency: Daily 1700

Duration: one hour

Location: SCA-P conference room (CPOF units unable to attend)

Composition

Chairperson: DCG-S. Attendees:

- Rep from each SACP Wff
- Rep from each 3ID Brigade
- Rep from partner organizations outside SA (130th MEB, 4ID, 135 ESC, political adviser, defense attaché, Office of Regional Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development, Atropian partners)

Inputs

- SACP Wff running estimates: Intel, M2, Fires, Protection, Engagement, Sustainment, Mission Command
- Tenant partners: Changes to location, task, purpose (24/48/72 hours):
2/3 IBCT, 1/3 ABCT, 30th ABCT, 3SCR, 3CAB, DIVARTY, 75th FAB, 3SB
- 3ID Brigades: Composition/disposition/strength of rear-trace elements within security area (28/48/72 hours)
- 130th MEB / 4ID / 135 ESC: Location of elements to occupy / traverse or affect 3ID security areas (24/48/72)

Outputs

- Updated SA synch matrix / checklist
- Coordination / recommendations

Agenda

- Roll Call
- Opening comments
- 3ID Brigades: 2/3 IBCT, 1/3 ABCT, 30th ABCT, 3 SCR, 3 CAB, DIVARTY, 75 FAB, 2SB
- Other tenant partners within SA: Political adviser, defense attaché, Office of Regional Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development, Atropian partners
- SACP Wffs
- Due-outs
- Closing remarks




Figure 2-8. 226th MEB TOC layout.

Manning and Equipping

- The MEB headquarters provides the majority of personnel and equipment necessary for creation of a SACP.
- Significant personnel shortages:
 - Sustainment management and coordination (provided by 3SB)
 - Intelligence analysis capacity (provided by MCP-OD)
 - Airspace management capability (TBD)
 - Engagements (TBD)
- Significant equipment shortages:
 - Movement assets to displace SACP (TBD)
 - MCiS to support 3ID/MCP-OD augmentees (TBD, likely to be sources from within 3ID)
- Significant possibility of exceeding MEB's organic communications and power generation capacity

SACP Staff By Warfighting Function (176 PAX Total)

Mission Command

* DCG-S (O-7)	Telecom Ops Chief (25W40)
Commander (O-6/01C)	IA Staff NCO (25B30)
CSM (OOK60)	Senior Info Tech (25B20)
Deputy CDR (O-5/01C)	Info Tech Supervisor (25B40)
XO (74A/O-4)	Info Tech Team Chief (25B30)
Team Chief (01C/O-4)	COMSEC Acct Mgr (25B30)
LNO (12A/O-3)	Electro Spectrum NCO (25S30)
LNO (31A/O-3)	SATCOM Ops NCO (25S30)
LNO (74A/O-3)	IA Staff Asst (25S30)
LNO (74A/O-3)	Senior Cbl Instl Mnt (25L20)
S-6 (25A/O-4)	LNO NCO (12N40)
Network Def Tech (255S/W-3)	LNO NCO (31B40)
Info Svcs Tech (255A/W-2)	LNO NCO (74D30)
Net Mgmt Tech (255N/W-2)	Sig Support Sys Chief (25U50)

** Denotes augmentation to MEB*

Movement and Maneuver

S-3 (01C/O-5)	Civil Engineer (12A/O-3)
Asst Ops Officer (13A/O-3)	As/Fp Officer (31A/O-3)
Asst Ops Officer (31A/O-3)	Plans Officer (31A/O-4)
Infosys Mgmt Officer (53A/O-3)	Plans Officer (74A/O-4)
Asst Ops Officer (74A/O-3)	Contr Eng Tech (120A/W-3)
Strength Mgr (42B/O-2)	Chief Ops SGM (11Z60)
Ops Officer (57A/O-4)	Ops SGT (12Z50)
Ops Officer (01C/O-3)	CBRNE Ops SGT (74D50)
Ops Officer (01C/O-3)	Asst Ops SGT (12C40)
Ops Officer (01C/O-3)	Ops NCO (31B40)
Plans Officer (12A/O-4)	Ops NCO (31B40)
Asst Ops Officer (74D/O-2)	CBRN NCO (74D30)
LNO (74A/O-3)	Chief Ops SGT (11Z60)
Asst Ops Officer (74A/O-2)	Ops SGT (11Z50)
Ops Officer (02B/O-4)	Ops SGT (11Z50)
Eng Ops Officer (31A/O-4)	Ops SGT (31B50)
As/Fp Officer (31A/O-4)	Const Inspector (12H40)
CBRN Officer (74A/O-4)	Senior Tech Eng NCO (12T40)
Ops Officer (02A/O-3)	CBRN Staff NCO (74D40)
Area Damage Officer (12A/O-3)	Ops SGT (11B40)

Continued on next page

SACP Staff By Warfighting Function (Continued)

Protection

Operations Officer (31A/O-3)	Eng Tac Asst Officer (12A/O-3)
Assistant S-3 (31A/O3)	Operations NCO (31B50)
MMS Ops Officer (31A/O-3)	Operations NCO (31B40)
MMS Ops Officer (31A/O-3)	Operations NCO (31B30)
Prot Serv Officer (31AA/W-3)	Operations NCO (31B30)
Operations Officer (74A/O-4)	C/D NCO (31E20)
Intel Officer (74A/O-4)	Operations SGT (89D50)
Intel Officer (74A/O-3)	CBRN Staff NCO (74D40)
EOD Officer (89E/O-3)	Asst Ops SGT (12B40)
Eng Tac Asst Officer (12A/O-3)	Geospatial Eng SGT (12Y20)
Eng Tac Asst Officer (12A/O-3)	Geospatial Eng SGT (12Y20)

Intelligence

S-2 (35D/O-4)	* <i>Intel Analyst (35F30)</i>
Intelligence Officer (35D/O-3)	* <i>Intel Analyst (35F10)</i>
Vulnerability Asst Off (31A/O-3)	* <i>Intel Analyst (35F10)</i>
Criminal Intel/Ops Off (311A/W-3)	* <i>Intel Analyst (35F10)</i>
Chief Intel SGT (35X50)	* <i>Intel Analyst (35F10)</i>
Vuln Assessment NCO (31B40)	* <i>Humint Analyst (35M10)</i>
Intel Analyst (35F20)	* <i>Humint Analyst (35M10)</i>
Intel Analyst (35F10)	* <i>Geoint Analyst (35G10)</i>
Intel Analyst (35F10)	* <i>Geoint Analyst (35G10)</i>
Intel Analyst (35F10)	
Intel Analyst (35F30)	

Engagement

Civil Affairs Officer (38A/O-3)	* <i>Civil Affairs Officer (38A/O-4)</i>
Civil Affairs NCO (38B40)	* <i>Civil Affairs Officer (38A/O-3)</i>
Public Affairs Ops NCO (46Z40)	* <i>Civil Affairs Officer (38A/O-3)</i>
Public Affairs SGT (46Q20)	* <i>Civil Affairs NCO (38B40)</i>
	* <i>Civil Affairs NCO (38B40)</i>
	* <i>Civil Affairs NCO (38B40)</i>

Intel capabilities gap can be covered by:

- One MICO OPCON via task org; or
 - DIV HQs augmentation; or
 - 3ID MCP-OD augmentation
- CA personnel replicate attached CA BN

* *Denotes augmentation to MEB*

Continued on next page

SACP Staff By Warfighting Function (Continued)

Sustainment

S-4 (90A/O-4)	Physician Asst (65D/O-3)
Maint Officer (19A/O-3)	Chaplain (56A/O-4)
Maint Officer (90A/O-3)	Senior Food Ops SGT (92G50)
Senior Food Adviser (922A/W-3)	Sr Mvmnt NCO (88N40)
Mobility Officer (882A/W-2)	Mvmnt Supervisor (88N30)
Property Acct Tech (920A/W-2)	Property Book NCO (92Y20)
S-1 (42H/O-4)	Senior HR SGT (42A40)
HR Tech (420A/W-2)	HR SGT (42A20)
Strength Mgr (42B/O-2)	Paralegal NCO (27D30)
SJA (27A/O-4)	BH Officer (67D/O-3)
Trial Counsel (27A/O-3)	Health Care NCO (68W40)
Surgeon (62B/O-4)	Senior Supply SGT (92Y50)
Med Ops Officer (70H/O-3)	

Fires

Fire Support Coord. (13A/O-5)	Battle Systems Operator (14G10)
FSO (13A/O-4)	Ops SGT (13Z50)
Targeting Officer (131A/W-3)	EW SGT (29E40)
Asst FSO (13A/O-3)	Effects NCO (13F30)
Asst Ops Officer (14A/O-3)	EW SGT (29E30)
Airspace Mgmt Officer (15A/O-3)	Targeting NCO (13F20)
C2 Sys Integr (140A/W-3)	* <i>Air Force Staff NCO (E-7)</i>
A2C2 SGT (15Q40)	* <i>Air Force Staff NCO (E-7)</i>
Team Leader (14G20)	* <i>Air Force Staff Officer (O-4)</i>
TAIS Operator (15Q10)	

3ID Augmentation

* <i>G-5 Planner (02A/O-4)</i>	* <i>G-5 Planner (02A/O-4)</i>
--------------------------------	--------------------------------

3SB Augmentation (Sustainment Fusion Cell)

* <i>Brigade XO (90A/O-4)</i>	* <i>SPO PLANNER (??/??)</i>
* <i>Movement NCOIC (88N/E-7)</i>	* <i>SPO CL V NCO (89A/E-6)</i>
* <i>MCT NCO (88N/E-6)</i>	* <i>SPO CL V NCO (89A/E6)</i>
* <i>MEDLOG Planner (70H/O-3)</i>	* <i>AFSBn LNO (90A/O-4)</i>

* *Denotes augmentation to MEB*

Key Take-Aways/Lessons Learned

- A senior division commander (such as DCG or chief of staff) must be in charge of the SACP in order for it to execute effective mission command of units operating in the division support area.
- The MEB might not arrive in theater with the division headquarters. The SACP provides continuity between mission planning and execution as the staff integrates the MEB into division operations.
- Collocating the SACP and MEB headquarters allows the MEB commander to articulate shortfalls quickly to senior leaders in the division and is critical to the division staff's coordination of protection assets.
- Division senior leaders must clearly define each command node's function and ensure that the staff distributes this information laterally and to subordinate units. This creates a shared understanding of responsibility and allows leaders to react faster in time of need.
- The use of liaison officers between task-organized units, corps units, and other commands occupying terrain is critical to the SACP. Liaison officers (LNOs) provide the commander's intent and changes to operations between commands. However, LNOs must work both ways so the common operating picture is seen at all levels.
- Understanding of the MTOE for all units within the battlespace allowed the division to leverage assets while those units were within the division AO.
- The SACP must have the ability to conduct current operations as well as future operations. The SACP must have the ability to issue orders specific to the support area and those elements occupying terrain within the division support area.
- The SACP battle rhythm must be integrated into the division battle rhythm. The SACP conducts boards and working groups that produce outputs which are then considered in the division battle rhythm events and outputs (see quad chart on Page 31).

- At a minimum, two personnel from each warfighting function must be present in the SACP, which should also include the following special staff personnel:
 - Civil affairs
 - G-9
 - SOF personnel
 - CUOPS/FUOPS
 - Fires
 - Air defense
- Host nation LNOs provide the SACP with greater understanding of the operational environment and are critical to maintaining a common operating picture of host nation units executing operations in the division rear.

1st Armored Division SACP

The 1st Armored Division (1AD) SACP concept design used during WFX 17-03 is presented on the following pages. The 1AD design provides terms of reference for the DCG-S and responsibilities that the SACP has in conjunction with the DMAIN and DTAC.

The division determined the importance of ensuring that the SACP is not just a coordinating CP. It needs to be able to execute control over units operating in the support area. As a controlling CP, it will be able to allocate resources and fires and execute movement control, terrain management, operational control (OPCON), and tactical control (TACON) of units entering the division AO.

Tasks, functions, manning, and other considerations are illustrated on the following pages.




Figure 2-9. 1AD SACP considerations.




Figure 2-10. 1AD SACP tasks and functions.

SACP Manning and Equipping (Control)




Figure 2-11. 1AD SACP manning and equipment.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The following illustrations portray the construction of the SACP. It was collocated with the MEB to provide added security. The division internally resourced the SACP, and division staff augmented the MEB to provide needed capability and capacity. Equipment needs are identified below.




Figure 2-12. 1AD SACP equipment.




Figure 2-13. 1AD MEB and SACP layout.

MISSION COMMAND IN THE DIVISION AND CORPS SUPPORT AREA




Figure 2-14. 1AD SACP Expando Van layout.




Figure 2-15. 1AD SACP tent layout.

40th Infantry Division, Army National Guard SACP

The 40th ID SACP concept was used during WFX 17-05. The 40th ID concept demonstrates the ARNG working relationship with the MEB.




Figure 2-16. 40th ID SACP mission statement.




Figure 2-17. 40th ID SACP organization.

MISSION COMMAND IN THE DIVISION AND CORPS SUPPORT AREA




Figure 2-18. 40th ID SACP layout.

Chapter 3

Planning Considerations for SACP Operations

This chapter describes the possible roles and responsibilities of the support area command post (SACP). It discusses how collocating the SACP with the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) can enable support operations in conjunction with consolidation area operations.

Doctrine is currently reevaluating SACP operations and is endeavoring to identify the roles and responsibilities of the SACP. Chapter 2 of this handbook highlights what corps and divisions are currently determining to be the role of the SACP in synchronizing support and consolidation area operations with the deep and close fight. The capabilities of the SACP must parallel those of the main and tactical command posts, and the SACP must have the ability to plan and execute a wide range of operations.

Roles and Responsibilities

Possible responsibilities of the SACP may include the following (this is not an all-inclusive list):

- Consolidating gains
- Coordinating and planning operations with the host nation
- Conducting security operations in conjunction with the host nation
- Conducting information management and knowledge management in conjunction with the division main CP as it relates to the support area
- Coordinating the critical assets list (CAL) and defended assets list (DAL) in the support area
- Controlling division-assigned airspace with the assigned air support operations center (ASOC)
- Controlling and coordinating airspace in the support area
- Clearing/synchronizing fires in the support area with division
- Enabling sustainment operations (the sustainment brigade executes sustainment operations)
- Commanding the tactical combat force (TCF)
- Controlling all division support area operations
- Supporting planning for future operations
- Performing terrain management

- Serving as the primary location for sustainment coordination
- Monitoring and assessing operations for impact on future operations
- Producing operation and contingency plans for the support area
- Integrating intelligence operations into both current and future operations
- Producing all-source intelligence products for the support area
- Producing terrain products in support of support area operations
- Securing terrain in support area operations
- Coordinating and managing force structure to include requests for forces and equipment
- Preparing and maintaining running estimates, plans, and orders to support future operations
- Preparing all reports required by higher headquarters
- Communications

SACP and MEB Integration

Operations to the rear of the close area may include more than support or sustainment tasks. The SACP will require a vast array of capabilities and expertise to be functional. Doctrine currently assigns responsibility for the support area to the MEB; future revisions will call on the SACP either to augment or to collocate with the MEB.

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-91, *Division Operations* (17 OCT 2014), states:

“The division commander’s terms of reference establishes area security responsibilities for the division support area. Those terms of reference usually state that the commander of the division’s attached, OPCON [operational control], or TACON [tactical control] maneuver enhancement brigade will have TACON of all units within or transiting that area for security and defense. It specifies that individual’s broader TACON authority for the protection, security, defense, movement control, and terrain management. The content of those terms of reference will be reflected in division operations orders” (para. 8-88).

If corps and divisions plan to use the MEB to assist in SACP operations, the staff must assess the MEB’s readiness and deployment timelines. The MEB might not deploy with the division; staffs must plan accordingly to cover gaps until the MEB arrives in theater. Corps and divisions also must be prepared to execute the SACP mission without the MEB altogether if it is not available due to readiness or mission requirements.

The MEB lacks the capability to function as the SACP. The MEB does not have command authority over units that will be operating in the support area and will require the SACP to leverage mission command. An example of this would be interaction with the sustainment brigade that is operating under a separate logistical chain of command. The SACP will facilitate coordination with adjacent units and enable sustainment operations in the support area.

Possible Additions to the MEB to Execute SACP Operations

The MEB also lacks the organic capacity to support SACP operations. The MEB is designed to support its doctrinal mission; adding the requirement to operate a SACP could exceed the MEB's organic communication and power production capacity. Corps and divisions will have to augment the MEB with personnel as well as equipment. (See appendix B for more information on MEB capabilities.)

Tactical Combat Force (TCF). The MEB requires a TCF to find, fix, and destroy Level III threats. The TCF should include tactical air control party (TACP) capability to provide terminal attack control of close air support (CAS) missions. Currently TACP capabilities are assigned to BCTs and their subordinate battalions.

Air and Missile Defense (AMD) Company. The corps/division may attach the SAO AMD to the MEB. Normally the supported command will direct AMD unit locations in the support area to support the protection efforts, particularly of the CAL/DAL. Close coordination between the MEB, the supported command, and the AMD units is required to ensure protection of units operating in the support area. The SACP will significantly assist in coordination and synchronization of air defense assets.

Fires. MEBs require responsive precision fire to fix and destroy Level II and III threats in the support areas. A possible course of action is to attach a fires battery to the MEB. If fires are not attached to the MEB, the joint force land component command (JFLCC), corps, and divisions should also give MEBs priority of support when a Level III threat is identified within the joint security area (JSA) or SA. The SACP will provide corps/division oversight and direct-fires unit locations that best support the corps/division fires plan.

Aviation Support. Corps and divisions should give MEBs priority of support when a Level III threat is identified in the support area. If possible, the corps/division should attach aviation assets to the MEB to provide flexibility and assist in destroying Level III threats. The SACP can significantly assist in coordination and synchronization of aviation capabilities within the support and consolidation areas.

Benefits of Collocating the MEB With the SACP

There is benefit to collocating the SACP and the MEB, but each has a distinct mission. The MEB provides security and life support for the corps and division, although its primary focus is providing terrain management and movement control within the support area.

648th MEB Support to III Corps Warfighter Exercise, FY15. Prior to the exercise, the III Corps commanding general (CG) put together a CSCP, headed by his deputy commanding general for support (DCG-S) and staffed by a solid group of deputies. The CSCP collocated with the 648th MEB throughout the mission.

“They greatly facilitated our MEB mission and acted as our conduit to the corps CG and the staff primaries. This helped ensure the corps support area fight received some level of notice. There were some growing pains, but we did grow. I foresee the lessons learned through this exercise, if captured and shared, as moving the needle forward for the Army, corps, divisions, and the MEB community. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used here will be useful at corps or division, and I think divisions would be wise to adopt the rear CP concept in some form. Having the DCG-S (physically present and involved in the rear CP) as a champion for the corps support area effort was essential to our success.”

COL John T. Gentry, Commander, 648th MEB

Collocating the DCG-S and the SACP with the MEB assists in planning, prioritizing, coordinating, resourcing, synchronizing, and conducting JSA or corps and division support area operations (SAO). The JSA and SAO involve multiple subordinate brigades; the DCG-S ensures compliance with the supported commander’s priorities and ensures unity of effort across all organizations operating within the SA.

Conclusion

Corps and divisions have many considerations to address when establishing a SACP. It has to have capabilities on par with the corps/division main CP to leverage mission command in the support and potentially the consolidation areas. Current doctrine assigns the MEB to serve as a SACP; however, SACP requirements may exceed the capabilities of the MEB to leverage control of both the support and consolidation areas effectively. Units have arrived at this conclusion and have begun to internally resource SACP to augment or collocate with the MEB to provide mission command of both the support and consolidation areas and allowing the MEB to focus on the support area.

Appendix A

MCTP Observations of SACP Operations

This appendix discusses trends and best practices observed by the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) during warfighter exercises.

Observations

- Units struggle at delineation of roles and responsibilities for integrating and executing security and protection within the division support area (DSA).
- Maneuver enhancement brigades (MEBs) are not resourced to conduct sustainment missions in the DSA.
- MEBs lack the capability and expertise to provide mission command (MC) for the specific types of units, key functions, and tasks required to conduct successful sustainment within the DSA.
- The MEB attempts to conduct MC of the support area functions between two to four other brigades and a host of other division and corps assets with very little division oversight.
- Sustainment, combat aviation, field artillery brigades, and other division and corps units residing in the DSA often ignore security, terrain management, and movement control requirements the MEB assigns.
- Units lack predictive analysis as a protection staff element.
- Critical assets lists (CALs) and defended assets lists (DALs) usually are not available or updated.
- Gap-crossing analysis does not include smoke and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense operations in their task organization or coordination.
- Units lack command and control of the security area (also known as the support area).
- The weapons of mass destruction (WMD) appendix does not include detailed WMD data, mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) guidance, or CBRN threat condition guidance.
- Baseline WMD–elimination (WMD-E) guidance is not published.
- Units lack air defense asset and integration planning.

Discussion. Currently doctrine does not provide mission command for the division support area.

Recommendations. Divisions must integrate and synchronize deep, close, and support fights simultaneously. The division should tailor and deploy a support area command post (SACP) to the division support area with the sole purpose of conducting MC of DSA functions. This command structure should be integrated from planning to execution. When a MEB is in direct support for that division, that brigade CP can serve as the location for the SACP.

Operating the SACP at or near the MEB or sustainment brigade CP enables the SACP to better execute the functions of terrain management, area security, movement control, mobility support, clearance of fires, and tactical combat force support. With a general officer in charge, a division-level CP, tailored to MC of the DSA functions, would provide unity of command and synchronize operations in the DSA to better shape future fights.

Other SACP Considerations

- The SACP requires clear delineation of roles, responsibilities, and authorities separate from other CPs.
- In previous exercises, the role of the SACP took the form of a working group, similar to a combined sustainment/protection working group.
- With all MEB formations in the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve, corps and divisions cannot fully plan (i.e., no habitual relationships), leading to the risk of not having MEBs ready in time to deploy. This increases the need for SACP oversight.
- The SACP has competing roles: security focus versus sustainment focus versus host nation/interagency coordination focus.
- What equipment/capabilities are required for the SACP?
- Will the SACP increase the liaison officer (LNO) requirement from subordinate brigades to the division (i.e., LNOs needed at both the main CP and the SACP)?

Plan/Execute Support Area Operations (SACP/MEB)

Observation: Units struggled to monitor and track tenant units within the DSA.

Discussion. The Area Operations section struggled to leverage division-level authority as the division SACP to obtain positive control over tenant units in the DSA. Although given authority over tenant units in the DSA in doctrine and in the division operation order (OPORD), the Area Operations section used embedded LNOs to provide daily roll-ups of units operating in the DSA. However, this method did not provide real-time tracking of tenant units moving through the DSA. This degraded the capability of the SACP to battle-track and clear fires as well as the ability of the MEB to respond effectively to incidents involving tenant units.

Recommendations. Develop and publish a DSA standard operating procedure (SOP) for tenant units with reporting requirements, base cluster duties, security, battlefield update assessment, commander's update assessment, and working groups. Add reporting requirements in the division OPORD. Emphasize the daily SACP working group as a mandatory event attended by tenant units, facilitated by the MEB, and chaired by the deputy commanding general for support (DCG-S). This will provide clear reporting guidance and will empower the MEB to establish positive control over tenant units. (Reference: Field Manual 3-81, *Maneuver Enhancement Brigade* [21 APR 2014], paragraphs 3-39—3-46)

Observation: Unit successfully coordinated to use host nation artillery in the security area.

Discussion. The coordination for host nation artillery provided an increase in fire support capabilities and responsiveness in the security area. However, the unit had little preparation on the employment of the host nation assets. The unit did not build host nation units into the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) or place their icons on the analog map to enable expeditious tactical fire direction decisions. The addition in AFATDS eventually occurred, but it happened during a call for fire mission from a subordinate unit, increasing response time to provide fires on the target.

Recommendations. Continue to improve running estimates within the fires cell to capture all available fire support assets by adding a process to integrate host nation fire support assets. (Reference: FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Operations and Organization* [05 MAY 2014])

Observation: Unit created effective themes and messages, resulting in positive communication to the local populace.

Discussion. Maintaining updated themes relevant to the unit is significant in telling the unit's story while supporting operations for mission success. The unit's efforts created partnerships with host nation police and army leaders in the area of operations (AO), allowing for use of indirect fires and security forces, while also informing the local populace of routes and camps for internally displaced persons to keep lines of communication open.

Recommendations. Continue to develop unit-specific themes and messages. Capture which BOE key tasks, themes, and messages enabled mission success, and codify that in the command post SOP. (References: FM 3-13, *Inform and Influence Activities*, Change 1, [25 JAN 2013]; FM 3-61, *Public Affairs Operations* [01 APR 2014], para. 2-58)

Observation: Warfighting function (WfF) inputs to the SACP working group require modification.

Discussion. The unit developed a SACP working group on the first day of the exercise. Initial working group iterations had no supporting products. However, products were developed for subsequent iterations. Warfighting functions used battlefield update assessment/commander's update assessment products for the SACP working group. These products focused on information for organic/assigned MEB units. WfF products for the SACP working group should focus on information that is beneficial to tenant units.

Recommendations. Review WfF input into the SACP working group to ensure the provided information is beneficial to tenant units. Codify the SACP working group into the CP SOP, including required input and output examples for the staff and tenant units, and a 7- minute drill for the meeting outline. (Reference: FM 3-81, paragraphs 3-39—3-46)

Military Intelligence Company (MICO) Support to SACP

Observation: The SACP requires MICO analytic, collection, and force protection support to fill intelligence gaps in DSA.

Discussion. The collection requirements necessary to answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) for the SACP are unique to decisive action and are mostly similar to those found in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. The time-sensitive and geographically diffused nature of these requirements creates a gap in the intelligence collection and analytic capability of the MEB. MICO assets, such as human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams, counterintelligence (CI) teams, and low-level voice intercept

teams, are required for the MEB to collect against the requirements in the DSA. A Shadow tactical unmanned aircraft system (TUAS), organic to the MICO, provides additional dedicated collection platforms that can meet the force protection, reconnaissance and surveillance, and specific information requirements associated with the robust irregular threat throughout the DSA. The current MEB S-2 section modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) reflects two warrant officers (350), one E-5 intelligence analyst (35F2), and three E-1—E-4 intelligence analysts (35F1). The intelligence capability of the MEB is critically limited both in personnel and in equipment. The MEB will need to be augmented to support rear area operations.

Recommendations. Provide the MEB a MICO or requisite sections from within the MICO (HUMINT platoon, CI teams, unmanned aircraft system section with ground-control station and maintenance detachment) to fill the capability gaps. Align the MICO with the S-2 section in order to incorporate all collection requirements, maximize analytic effort, and mitigate the intelligence gap presented in the DSA. (References: FM 3-81, Change 2, page 44; Training Circular 2-19.400, *M1 Gunnery for the Military Intelligence Company of the Brigade Engineer Battalion 1.0* [29 JUL 2016])

Use of the Tactical Combat Force in the Division Support Area

Observation: Aggressive use of the tactical combat force (TCF) and an air-mobile quick reaction force (QRF) to find and destroy the hybrid threat in the DSA is effective.

Discussion. Assigning a maneuver battalion augmented with rotary-wing attack aviation and an air-mobile QRF has shown significant improvement in the MEB's ability to perform the area security mission for a DSA. In the past, many MEBs would not receive a TCF from their supported division or corps headquarters. As a result, the hybrid threat would attack the logistics support areas (LSAs), lines of communication (LOCs), and key infrastructure at will and reduce the MEB to only providing static security at fixed sites. Divisions began providing a battalion-size TCF with dedicated fires and/or rotary-wing assets to increase the MEB's ability to secure the division rear. The MEB would retain the TCF in the LSA and give it priorities for planning to counter a Level III threat. In addition, MEBs have started to use the TCF to conduct aggressive counter-reconnaissance, zone reconnaissance, and area clearance missions to identify and destroy hybrid threats in the rear area. These recent efforts have significantly increased the battle damage assessment (BDA) on the irregular enemy formations and reduced enemy impacts to division critical assets in the DSA.

Recommendations. Continue to task-organize an armored/mechanized force with adequate mobility to address potential Level III armored or mechanized threats. Continue to resource MEBs with sufficient rotary-wing and/or fires assets to reconnoiter and destroy enemy asymmetric threats posed by special purpose and commando forces. (Reference: FM 3-81, paragraphs 3-99, 3-101—3-103)

Observation: The common operational picture (COP) between CPs is inconsistent.

Discussion. The COP is not consistent between the forward command post, mobile command posts, and the SACP. Each CP at the division level has shown various COPs during the initial stages of operations. All the COPs run off Command Post of the Future (CPOF), but the configuration of the information is not the same.

Recommendations. During operations, verify systems configurations, conduct communication checks, and verify the COP at all levels.

Observation: Units continue to search for the right way to conduct mission command of the support area.

Discussion. One unit decided to establish a security working group led by the DCG-S, located at the MEB headquarters. Organizations and units in the support area including the State Department, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and divisional organizations attended the working group. Discussion and products improved with each engagement. The scenario had minimal activity in the support area, so the security working group did have a need to provide courses of action for the commander. The G-9 (a special forces lieutenant colonel) supported the coordination and actions with the Atropian government and military. These actions went smoothly in the absence of tension involving the host nation, logistics, rule of law, and information operations that normally would occur. Having the DCG-S and G-9 working together allowed the DCG-S to direct military action while the G-9 coordinated with the non-military participants.

Recommendation. Continue to work with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) on how divisions command and control the security area.

Observation: Support area command and control.

Discussion. With the reduction of capabilities within the MEB and the reduced size of the division staff, the Army continues to struggle with the right command and control levels for the support area. We did see value in having the DCG-S commanding the support area while being located at the MEB. The use of technology allowed units to participate in developing the threats within the rear areas, while offering recommendations on how to counter these threats.

Recommendations. Continue to challenge the division with realistic enemy threats in the support area in order to improve the security of the division rear. Continue to stress to Army leadership the importance of training counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) and emerging threats.

Observation: Maneuver enhancement brigades struggle to command and control operations in the DSA.

Discussion. Doctrinally, the MEB Area Operations section is responsible for the terrain management and airspace coordination of all tenant units within the DSA. MEBs struggle with compliance by tenant and traversing units. When augmented with division-level leadership and staff to create the SACP, the MEB becomes a division mission command node. The increased level of command authority resident with the division-level leadership allows greater authority to direct tenant and traversing units in the DSA. This results in better-synchronized operations in the DSA, creating and maintaining the conditions to sustain the fight. Consideration should be given to increasing the SACP's authority to command and control operations in the DSA.

Recommendations. Conduct a DSA combined arms rehearsal. Implement a DSA working group to synchronize daily operations with tenant units and assess the hybrid threat in the DSA. Establish clear reporting procedures and responsibilities for tenant units in the DSA to the SACP instead of the division main CP. Revise emerging doctrine on division command post structure to provision a SACP developed around the maneuver enhancement brigade Area Operations section. Expand the responsibilities of the MEB Area Operations section (see Chapter 3 of FM 3-81). Provide a more detailed understanding of the implementation of the Area Operations section to include a graphical chart showing the employment of the personnel assigned to the section. Develop and include the divisional augmentation necessary to form the SACP. Command emphasis at brigade and higher levels must accompany this doctrinal foundation to ensure a synchronized DSA. (Reference: FM 3-81, paragraphs 3-43—3-49)

Observation: The SACP S-6 had no SOP to refer to while conducting network operations (NETOPS).

Discussion. The SACP S-6 SOP was left at home station. As a result, the S-6 had to conduct CP operations on the fly and rely heavily on field service representative (FSR) support.

Recommendations. SOPs are a living document. The SOP should always be available and, if needed, updated. At a minimum, hard copy SOPs should be maintained at each division CP and the Plans section.

Observation: Distributed Common Ground System–Army (DCGS-A).

Discussion. One of 12 DCGS-A systems was operational but not publishing to the intelligence fusion server. The FSR was working the remaining DCGS-A issues.

Recommendations. Intelligence analysts in the SACP S-2 section must be adequately trained to properly power up and configure their basic analyst laptops in order to integrate their products into the COP. CPs cannot count on FSRs to service mission command information system (MCIS) servers or the network after CPs jump and set up at new locations. The enemy situation, geographic locations, and the distance FSRs may have to travel to CPs may preclude them from providing service. Due to the tactical situation during missions and the cost to employ FSRs, the Army is trying to reduce reliance on FSRs.

Appendix B

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Mission and Capabilities

This appendix begins with a brief analysis of the mission and capabilities of the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB). It ends with insight from the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) referring to augmentation needed for the MEB to support the operations of the support area command post (SACP).


The MEB is a brigade headquarters designed to provide mission command to a joint security area (JSA) for a joint force land component command (JFLCC) and conduct support area operations (SAO) and maneuver support operations for corps and divisions. The MEB is specifically designed as an economy of force, terrain-owning brigade to enable JFLCC, corps, and division commanders to apply brigade combat teams (BCTs) to combat operations. When tasked, organized, and employed by doctrine, the MEB is the support area landowner and allows the supported commander to focus on combat operations.

Army Techniques Publication 3-91, *Division Operations* (17 OCT 2014), states that the division commander establishes area security responsibilities for the division support area. Those terms of reference usually state that the MEB will have tactical control (TACON) of all units within or transiting that area for security and defense. The content of the terms of reference will be reflected in division operation orders. ATP 3-91 specifies broader TACON authority for protection, security, defense, movement control, and terrain management.

The supported command's operation order should reflect the command relationship and reporting requirements of support area (SA) tenant units and units traversing the SA. This must be enforced by the SACP. Reporting

CALL Resource

Handbook 16-02, *Commander and Staff Guide to Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) Operations* (October 2015), serves as a rapid reference source for supported division, corps, theater, and joint force commanders. It is available on the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (account and Common Access Card login required) at: <https://www.jllis.mil/index.cfm?disp=cdview.cfm&doit=view&cdrid=85184>



requirements for SA tenant unit and units traversing the SA should be included in the supported unit's tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOP). This is how the SACP and the deputy commanding general—support (DCG-S) can greatly assist in establishing and enforcing priorities within the JSA or SA, which greatly assists the MEB in executing its doctrinal tasks.

Collocating the DCG-S and the SACP with the MEB assists in planning, prioritizing, coordinating, resourcing, synchronizing, and conducting JSA or corps and division support area operations. The JSA and SAO involve multiple subordinate brigades; the DCG-S ensures compliance with the supported commander's priorities and ensures unity of effort across all organizations operating within the SA.

Four Army brigades are currently designed to own and manage an assigned area of operations (AO): armored, infantry, and Stryker BCTs and the MEB. Multifunctional brigades can be used to conduct SAO but require significant augmentation to conduct SAO successfully. This technique increases operational risk in terrain management, fire support coordination, and protection.

The BCTs conduct area security operations as terrain owners. The MEB conducts support area operations (Task Number: 37-BDE-0002).

Supporting collective tasks for AO owners include:

- Terrain management *
- Information collection *
- Movement control *
- Area security *
- Response force operations *
- Base security and defense *
- Area damage control
- Airspace management *
- Fire support coordination *
- Civil affairs activities *
- Personnel recovery *
- Environmental considerations

* Denotes missions requiring synchronization from multiple commands for planning, resourcing and execution. These areas require corps and division oversight, by the DCG-S and SACP, to ensure unity of effort.

MISSION COMMAND IN THE DIVISION AND CORPS SUPPORT AREA

Each MEB is task-organized based on assigned missions and threat. A MEB task organization typically includes a mix of multiple battalions and separate companies, which may include:

- **Intelligence collection capability:** Provides commanders the ability to employ the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capability in formations that do not have organic access to the intelligence architecture (for example, combat aviation brigades, fires brigades, maneuver enhancement brigades).
- **Tactical combat force (TCF):** The MEB requires a TCF to find, fix, and destroy Level III threats. The TCF should include tactical air control party (TACP) capability to provide terminal attack control of close air support (CAS) missions. Currently, TACP capabilities are assigned to BCTs and their subordinate battalions.
- **Civil affairs (CA):** An attached CA company provides the capability to operate a civil–military operations center (CMOC) to interact with the civil component of the AO and unified action partners.

(**Note:** CA officers are found only in Title 10 organizations, the Active Component, and the U.S. Army Reserve. National Guard MEB CA positions are coded 79, “Fill Upon Deployment.” National Guard MEBs can coordinate with their regionally aligned divisions or Army Reserve units for possible individual augmentation support for non deployment training events such as MCTP warfighter exercises. More detailed CA information can be found later in this chapter under “Functions of the MEB CA Officer.”)

- **Air and missile defense (AMD) company:** Assists in the development of the critical assets list (CAL) and defended assets list (DAL). Close coordination is required to ensure protection of units operating in the support area. The SACP can significantly assist in coordination and synchronization.
- **Fires:** The MEB requires responsive precision fires to fix and destroy Level II and III threats in the support areas.
- **Aviation support:** Corps and divisions should give the MEB priority of support when a Level III threat is identified in the support area. If possible, corps and divisions should attach aviation assets to the MEB to provide flexibility and assist in destroying Level III threats.
- **Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN):** Attached chemical units provide the MEB with CBRN reconnaissance, limited decontamination, and enhanced protection capabilities related to hostile use of weapons of mass destruction.


- **Engineer Assets:** Engineer formations provide tactical mobility, counter-mobility and survivability.
- **Military Police (MP):** The MP units assigned to the MEB provide a tactical capability to conduct mounted and dismounted patrols, response force operations, area damage control, route reconnaissance, cordon and search operations, and convoy and personnel escorts.
- **Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD):** The EOD companies and platoon have a direct support/general support (DS/GS) command relationship with their supported MEB.

One unique and important capability the MEB provides in support of all echelons is movement corridor operations. Movement corridor operations reflect an expansion of security tasks within the protection function and, therefore, are considered reinforcing capabilities to route and area security operations (see Field Manual 3-81, *Maneuver Enhancement Brigade* [21 APR 2014], Page 4-7). Figure B-1 (next page) represents the essence of movement corridor operations. Movement corridor is frequently confused with the term “mobility corridor,” which is part of intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

Movement corridor operations is another MEB mission that requires synchronization of multiple units. The DCG-S and SACP can greatly assist in prioritizing and synchronizing execution of movement corridor operations to achieve the supported commander’s intent.

Corps and division transportation cells provide critical information to the MEB when conducting movement control planning. Corps and divisions provide the MEB staff with the time frame in which the movement corridor operations are required, duration needed, and what routes will be used. Having the MEB collocated with divisional transportation staff in the SACP allows the MEB to assist the corps transportation officer and/or division transportation officer with route synchronization planning and ensures that the designated routes are protected and clear of explosive hazards. The MEB’s MPs will enforce the supported command’s movement tables, provide additional security, and provide response force as part of the MEB’s movement corridor operation.

MISSION COMMAND IN THE DIVISION AND CORPS SUPPORT AREA



Legend			
ACP	air control point	MSR	main supply route
CSC	convoy support center	NAI	named area of interest
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal	SUST	sustainment
MP	military police	TCP	traffic control point
		TRP	target reference point

Figure B-1. MEB support to movement corridor operations.

MEB Mission Command Training Program Lessons: Needed Augmentation to the MEB for SACP Operations

Divisions do not plan fire control in the support area.

There may be multiple brigade-size fires elements operating in the support area (field artillery brigade, division artillery, and combat aviation brigade). Clearance of airspace and clearance of fires typically are not coordinated with or through the MEB, which is the assigned AO controller. Without augmentation, the MEB is not capable of providing timely fires or close air support to units operating in the support area.

The division must understand the second- and third-order effects of using key enablers originally task-organized to the MEB for other tasks after mission start.

Although it is within the division's right to reassign units to other tasks, the staff must conduct the analysis to determine the impacts of reassigning units. The staff must understand the risk and correctly convey it to the commander to help him understand the effects that unit reassignment could cause. Routinely, MCTP has observed training units pull assets from the MEB to support other units or execute other tasks without fully understanding the impact of that action. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) analysis, combined with a solid understanding of a subordinate unit's capabilities and some creative/critical thinking, will better enable the staff to make an informed decision that is vetted through the command.

There is a lack of staff understanding of the impacts of the expanding division AO as the fight progresses.

The division staff must conduct the analysis to determine how moving the BCT rear boundaries forward will affect the MEB's ability to control the support area. The division staff often struggles with adjusting the task load for the MEB as the AO expands, and the MEB quickly becomes task-saturated. Furthermore, the hand-off of templated obstacles and minefields, adjustment of traffic control point (TCP) locations, and modifying the graphics are often neglected or done poorly. The MEB assumes control of new battlespace and does not know what/where obstacles or minefields exist, or where the BCT's TCPs are located. This forces the MEB to figure it out the hard way, leading to inefficient use of its limited resources. Route clearance/maintenance/security operations are directly tied to the linear length of ground lines of communication (LOCs). Staffs for both the division and the MEB are not doing the battlefield calculus to determine if these operations exceed the MEB's capabilities. Whether the cause is from an expanding AO or reduced capabilities due to casualties or equipment loss, the staffs are not doing

the analysis to make informed decisions. Often, the division staff assigns missions to the MEB that are neither vetted nor synchronized to ensure that the MEB has the capacity to execute these missions in addition to the myriad tasks it is already executing.

Although the MEB is a scalable force designed to control operations in the support area, there are tasks associated with this that are best executed at the division level.

Division training audiences observed in warfighter exercises have struggled with understanding their roles in planning and mission command of the support area. In accordance with doctrine, they typically array their forces in a linear, contiguous framework, placing subordinate units in charge of the entire division AO. While this places responsibility for controlling activities with subordinate brigades, there are still responsibilities for the higher headquarters (HQ) to retain. The division HQ often fails to recognize the amount of coordination required to synchronize efforts and ensure support of priorities. As a result, the MEB staff is often quickly overwhelmed.

The division HQ lies within the support area, which is controlled by the MEB. Many of the support operations, tasks, and activities occurring in the theater are directly supporting the division or the forward BCTs. As stated previously, the division has a responsibility to lead the planning effort for deconfliction of many of these activities:

- Movement control
- Fires support
- Protection
- Detainee operations
- Air coordination
- TCF augmentation/employment
- Key enablers

Movement Control

Movement control is a critical part of this responsibility. The MEB commanders are resourced with seven liaison officer positions to liaise with higher HQ or adjacent units in order to control ground movements into and out of the division support area (DSA). When higher HQ directs multiple units through a subordinate's AO, the HQ has a responsibility to help manage those movements. A MEB also needs assistance from the division in coordinating sustainment activities that transit the support area with adjacent and higher HQs. Division sustainment staffs are not conducting movement control in the division distribution network. Specifically, division transportation officers

and their staffs often are not executing the four major movement control tasks, outlined by current doctrine, necessary to effectively integrate and manage movement and maneuver across the division's operational area.

The division has a role in synchronizing movement among subordinate units by setting up control measures, distributing graphics, and establishing mission command nodes. The division also must ensure that movement control experts (division transportation officers and movement control teams) are involved when planning and supporting subordinate units. The MEB provides route security, clearance, and movement control for the division support area. The division transportation officer provides, at a minimum, a 72-hour convoy movement matrix (start point, release point, number of vehicles, personnel, type of cargo, and routes). This matrix allows the MEB to prioritize which main supply routes (MSRs) and alternate supply routes (ASRs) require more security and clearance assets. The matrix also allows the MEB to identify where TCPs need to be established to facilitate convoy movements along the MSRs and ASRs.

Fires Support

As stated, the division normally does not plan fire support for the support area, and the MEB usually lacks the capability to adequately manage fires and airspace for the support area. However, the MEB does control the AO and is responsible for units transiting the area. MCTP has not observed any planning for fire support to units transiting the support area at either the division or MEB level. Either division staffs do not consider the possibility of ground movements transiting the DSA needing fire support, or there is reluctance to fire in friendly territory, regardless of the threat, due to the potential for collateral damage and/or fratricide. The division either must control fires for the MEB in the support area or augment the MEB with sufficient resources so it can control fires.

Protection

The division must help the MEB manage security, either by allocating specific key enablers or by tasking the MEB wisely. Support area security operations are an "economy of force," meaning all possible resources are used to execute the mission. MCTP observes that divisions typically task-organize MEBs with military police, engineer, air defense artillery, and chemical enablers, but often do not consider other combat multipliers that can pay big dividends. The MEB has few organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and is often low on the priority list for ISR asset allocation. Division staffs tend to focus on the deep and close fights and often fail to incorporate the support area in their collection plans. The SACP can significantly assist in prioritizing, planning, synchronizing, and executing.

Additionally, division protection cells have developed extensive CALs/DALs that exceeded the assigned MEB's capabilities. Corps/divisional functional engineer and military police brigade assets may be a possible solution to support when the CAL/DAL requirements exceed the MEB's capabilities.

Detainee Operations

The division has a responsibility to support the MEB in conducting detainee operations. This includes coordinating the establishment of the division detainee holding area, coordinating with higher and subordinate HQs for detainee transportation, and ensuring that intelligence and interrogation operations are planned and resourced.

Air Support Coordination

The MEB is not resourced with joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) or TACP elements to facilitate close air support requests, and relies on corps/division support. Yet, the MEB has better situational awareness of the support area and tenant units. Corps/divisions must ensure close coordination with the MEB to provide close air support for security while mitigating the risk of fratricide or collateral damage.

Tactical Combat Force Augmentation and Employment

On occasion, the TCF was tasked-organized from the MEB to its parent BCT, leaving the MEB without a force to counter Level III threats. In other observations, the MEB did not properly employ the TCF to conduct patrolling activities in the support area to try to locate and destroy enemy irregular and special operations forces. Corps and divisions should ensure that TCFs are properly resourced and employed to support corps/division priorities.

Key Enablers

The corps or division can use key enablers such as information operations, civil affairs, or public affairs to communicate themes and messages to the local populace that support the MEB's security plan for the support area.

Appendix C

Command Post Layout Examples From Past Doctrine

Division Rear CP

The rear command post (CP) controlled all elements functioning in, residing in, or transiting the division rear area. It also synchronized rear operations for the division battle. Before units left the corps rear area, they coordinated with the appropriate movement control element and the corps rear area operations cell. These elements, in turn, coordinated with the division rear CP. The rear CP clarified and approved routes and locations of proposed bases or base clusters. It integrated this information into the division security plan and addressed requirements for combat service support (CSS) of new or transiting units. The division rear CP passed this type of information to the main CP.

The rear CP and the division support command (DISCOM) CP normally collocated in the established DISCOM base within the division support area (DSA) in the division rear area. This collocation did not imply that together they constituted one command post; they were two separate and distinct CPs with different critical functions requiring close cooperation and coordination. The rear CP's main concerns were terrain management; security of the rear area; tactical, personnel, mail, and logistics movement within and through the rear area; and synchronization and direction of CSS. The DISCOM CP's main concern was the execution of CSS.

Both the rear CP and the DISCOM CP analyzed future division plans for their impact on current and future rear area operations. They worked together to provide logistics and personnel support when and where needed. The rear CP deconflicted tactical and administrative moves and controlled them when required. It managed the terrain in the rear area. It assigned units to bases, designated base clusters when necessary, and appointed commanders for bases and base clusters. The rear CP coordinated and synchronized rear security operations. It integrated base defense plans and coordinated actions of the tactical combat forces (TCFs).

The division rear and DISCOM command posts' layout for legacy infantry and armored divisions are provided on the following pages.




Figure C-1. Typical infantry division rear CP and DISCOM (FM 71-100).




Figure C-2. Typical armored/mechanized division rear CP and DISCOM (FM 71-100).

The rear CP monitored activity in the maneuver brigade's rear, adjacent divisional rear areas, and corps rear area to prevent potential conflicts with the division's rear operations. The rear CP also monitored close and deep operations. When augmented, it could assume control of the fight if the main and tactical CPs could no longer function. The rear CP normally contained three cells: headquarters, operations, and CSS.

Headquarters Cell

The assistant division commander–support (ADC-S) (now the deputy commanding general–support [DCG-S]), normally a brigadier general, functioned as the rear operations commander and was responsible for all rear operations. The ADC-S ensured coordination among the operations cell, CSS cell, and DISCOM CP. He normally remained at the rear CP but, when required, traveled throughout the rear area to synchronize operations. His primary concern was to sustain the division's deep, close, and rear operations.

Operations Cell

The rear area operations cell was responsible for terrain management, security, and movement deconfliction and control. Initially small, the cell became fully capable when augmented in crisis with Reserve Component personnel. The cell monitored current division operations and ensured that the division's rear responded to current and future requirements.

Until augmented, the operations cell accepted risk in the functions it could perform. The operations cell was normally divided into three elements: operations, intelligence, and fire support. Responsibilities included:

- Coordinating response, TCF, and host nation assets.
- Working closely with the provost marshal operations element located nearby. The provost marshal element coordinated traffic control measures when needed, enemy prisoner of war and civilian internee operations, security of designated critical assets, and employment of military police assets.
- Coordinating (through the G-5, Civil Affairs) host nation assistance.
- Coordinating the positioning, status, and security of units that were placed under control of the division rear CP.
- Updating rear area intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The rear CP supplemented IPB products received from the main CP to illuminate rear area terrain, enemy capabilities, and the enemy's most probable courses of action within the rear area.

- Managing the overall division civilian internee effort in the division rear area, coordinating closely with the provost marshal and G-5 to accomplish refugee screening and rear area intelligence collection
- Monitoring the interrogation facility and the division enemy prisoner of war collection point.
- Coordinating fire support for the rear area.

The division's signal battalion provided a small assistant division signal officer element to the rear CP for signal support. Its functions were the same as those for the main CP. When engineer, air defense artillery, or other units were under control of the rear CP, the rear operations element directly controlled each unit. Each unit either established a command post near the rear CP or provided a liaison officer to ensure that the unit's activities were properly integrated, synchronized, and coordinated. The provost marshal element and the G-5 also worked under the supervision of the rear operations cell.

The division civil–military operations center (CMOC), under the staff supervision of the G-5, assisted the division commander and his staff. The CMOC served as the primary interface between the division and the local civilian population, humanitarian organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, the United Nations, and other international agencies. The CMOC passed requests for assistance and other communication it received from these agencies to the G-5 staff in the rear or main CP for action and response. The center was staffed by members of the G-5 staff, augmented with civil affairs functional experts from the supporting civil affairs battalion. The CMOC was normally located near the rear CP and provost marshal elements to coordinate host nation activities. Its positioning was flexible; it was located where the commander deemed most appropriate based on the nature of the operation. The G-5 normally required augmentation from division assets until the arrival of an echelons above corps or U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs element.

Combat Service Support Cell

The major functions of the CSS cell were to plan and coordinate sustainment operations: man, arm, fuel, fix, move, and sustain Soldiers and their systems. This cell also interfaced with the main CP, the rear CP operations cell, and subordinate units. The CSS cell had two major elements: logistics and personnel.

The logistics element comprised the G-4 and division transportation office sections. The G-4 planned, coordinated, directed, and synchronized the division's arm, fuel, fix, and move operations. The G-4 coordinated logistics support that exceeded the DISCOM's capability with the corps rear CSS

cell and corps support command. During movement operations involving the entire division, transportation office and provost marshal personnel may have located temporarily at the tactical or main CP. There they assisted the assault CP staff in monitoring the move and coordinated any contingencies that occurred. The division transportation office, DISCOM movement control officer, and provost marshal representative helped plan and enforce movement priorities.

The G-1 section planned, coordinated, directed, and monitored all personnel operations. In support of combat operations, the G-1 focused on personnel replacement and strength; casualty management; coordination of external support requirements (postal, morale, welfare, and recreation); and medical evacuation. The G-1 developed replacement priorities with G-3 input.

The G-1 section consisted of a plans officer and a personnel management center, which may have been task-organized to support deployment as part of the tactical CP. The personnel management center consisted of two branches: personnel readiness and personnel operations. These branches normally were located within the G-1 support element in the rear CSS cell. The mission of the personnel management center was to sustain division personnel readiness and direct division-wide personnel systems; synchronize the efforts of the personnel network; manage replacement activities; and ensure that commanders, Soldiers, civilians, and other joint or allied personnel received essential personnel services.

The G-1 support element, located near the rear CP, coordinated and executed the personnel element functions. This element comprised the major sections of the G-1 and special staff (such as inspector general, chaplain, surgeon, and staff judge advocate). This support element coordinated strength management, casualty reporting, and replacement operations; combat health support (CHS); religious support; and legal services. It also coordinated morale, welfare, finance, recreation, and community support activities; coordinated postal services; and monitored support. A corps finance battalion supported the division and other units in the area. The positioning of the public affairs officer and the public affairs section was flexible. They were located where the commander deemed most appropriate based on the nature of the operation. The division band provided music to promote troop morale and unit esprit de corps and to support civil–military operations. In combat, the band often filled other roles when properly trained and supervised.

Appendix D

Notes From the 3rd ID Assistant Division Commander–Support

BG (Ret.) Louis W. (Bill) Weber

Following are my thoughts and observations related to efforts to provide command and control (C2) to the division and corps rear areas. They are based on my experience in 2003 while assigned as the ADC-S for the 3rd Infantry Division (ID). In the attack to Baghdad, and of recent Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) warfighter exercises we have observed, divisions and corps struggle with the lack of doctrine, organization, and training to control the battlespace we now refer to as the support area.

Units are attempting to establish command posts and headquarters out of hide because the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) no longer structures them or function to do so, as in the past. In the previous division and corps organizational structures of 2003, we were authorized by MTOE to establish command posts. While one could argue how effectively we were ever trained to control the rear areas, the fact is that the positions and manpower existed to do so and once we deployed and prepared for line of departure (LD), we exercised and worked the D-Rear CP during the time available to get ready for the fight.

The division support command (DISCOM) (commanded by COL Jim Hodge) staff was an integral part of the D-Rear CP staff, and we had the 24th Corps Support Group (CSG) (commanded by COL Roberta Woods) in direct support of the division, initially. The CSG aligned under me at Fort Stewart/Hunter Army Airfield as a direct-report unit (in addition to the division's engineer and aviation brigades, as well as the DISCOM) due to their proximity to Fort Stewart and their war mission to provide that level of support to the division in a habitual relationship. As the war evolved and expanded, they were tasked more appropriately to perform CSG-level functions for V Corps. The D-Rear CP staffing was very robust to conduct sustainment support and operations while providing a capability that was manned and trained for CP operations on a 24-hour basis, by MTOE.

The division G-4 was the principal staff officer involved at the D-Rear, but we had plugs from the other division staff sections that had a role in support operations, which were appropriately represented. Additionally, the 48th Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC), another habitually aligned Reserve unit from Georgia that was an integral part of the division's structure once we mobilized, joined us shortly after New Year's in 2003. They were immediately integrated into the D-Rear and provided additional capability

that greatly contributed to the efficacy of the command post. This element was actually manned, trained, and equipped to conduct rear area operations management — go figure — and was mobilized early after the 3rd ID was deployed. The CSG also had a RAOC assigned to it that eventually caught up with the CSG in May 2003, as I recall, and immediately began gaining control of their area of responsibility with good effects.

The ADC-S was responsible, by doctrine and practice, for sustainment and support operations, as well as the division rear area. The doctrine was clear and well understood on the roles and responsibilities of those associated with the D-Rear CP. The officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) knew what they had to do, and it was essentially a matter of training to develop a rhythm for daily updates, planning, and following execution. The D-Rear was linked into the division main (D-Main) CP for intelligence and battle situational awareness, but we had limited Blue Force Trackers (BFT) and communications. This is no longer as large an issue as it was, due to vast improvements in fielding and distributing these critical command and control tools.

In terms of doctrine, the doctrine for division rear area operations was well written, known, and understood by the sustainment community. I cannot say the same for myself, as I had never before been exposed to it in previous assignments or experience. The combat service support (CSS) and combat support (CS) officers did an excellent job trying to execute the doctrine, but it rapidly became clear that once the division crossed the LD, there was absolutely no control over who was entering or leaving our rear area battlespace. There was never any hand-off of units entering our battlespace, no BFT on vehicles to speak of, no situational awareness of what other non-divisional units were doing, nor any concept that units should coordinate entering or departing the division rear area. The communications were inadequate to do so anyway, as we were dependent on frequency modulation (FM) communications.

The effort today to gain control over the rear area is a good one and much more feasible to accomplish than in the past. However, unless there is effective doctrine and an expanded organizational structure that supports it, we will continue to see ad hoc and generally ineffective efforts to provide some control in this area. RAOCs should be reestablished and organized to assist rear area commanders as they are organized and trained to do what they do, whereas corps and division staffs are not. We just do not get any doctrine exposure or training on how to do this right now.

MISSION COMMAND IN THE DIVISION AND CORPS SUPPORT AREA

Remember that conducting rear area operations during offensive operations is more difficult, fluid, and ambiguous than during static, defensive operations. A methodical approach for controlling the area while units are moving and the rear space is expanding for both the corps and division will never lend itself to a clean solution for controlling the space, but we need to continue to develop and train it.

As discussed, the deputy commanding general–support (DCG-S) at division level has roles and responsibilities defined by the commanding general (CG), and 1st ID and 3rd ID terms appear in Chapter 2 of this handbook. Each term of reference is based upon the CG’s guidance and availability of resources. However, in all three-division structures there is a common set of functions in the SACP. Priorities for the DCG-S would be a combination of security, fires, and priorities of sustainment, movement, host nation engagement, mission command, and command of the tactical combat force (TCF), air movement, and terrain management.

Appendix E

Acronyms and Initials

AC	Active Component
AD	Armored Division
ADA	air defense artillery
AFATDS	Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AMD	air and missile defense
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
ASOC	air support operations center
ASR	alternate supply route
BCT	brigade combat team
BDA	battle damage assessment
BDE	brigade
BFT	Blue Force Tracker
BSA	brigade support area
BSB	brigade support battalion
BSTB	brigade special troops battalion
CA	civil affairs
CAB	combat aviation brigade
CAL	critical assets list
CAM	combined arms maneuver
CAS	close air support
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CG	commanding general
CJFLCC	coalition joint force land component command
Class I	rations, subsistence
Class II	individual clothing and equipment
Class III	petroleum, oil, and lubricants
Class IV	construction material
Class V	ammunition

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Class VII	major end items (launchers, tanks, vehicles, etc.)
Class VIII	medical supplies
Class IX	repair parts
CMO	civil–military operations
CMOC	civil–military operations center
COA	course of action
COIN	counterinsurgency
COP	common operational picture
CP	command post
CPOF	Command Post of the Future
CS	combat support
CSA	corps support area
CSCP	corps support command post
CSS	combat service support
CTO	corps transportation officer
CUB	commander’s update brief
CUOPS	current operations
DAL	defended assets list
DCG-S	deputy commanding general–support
DCGS-A	Distributed Common Ground System–Army
DCofS	deputy chief of staff
DISCOM	division support command
DIV	division
D-Main	division main (command post)
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
D-Rear	division rear (command post)
DS	direct support
DSA	division support area
DTO	division transportation officer

MISSION COMMAND IN THE DIVISION AND CORPS SUPPORT AREA

EAC	echelons above corps
EEFI	essential element of friendly information
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
ESC	expeditionary support command
FARG	Focus Area Review Group (II)
FRAGORD	fragmentary order
FSR	field service representative
FUOPS	future operations
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations and plans
G-6	assistant chief of staff, information management
GS	general support
HCT	human intelligence collection team
HHC	headquarters and headquarters company
HQ	headquarters
HN	host nation
HNSF	host nation security forces
HUMINT	human intelligence
IED	improvised explosive device
IO	information operations
ID	infantry division
IDP	internally displaced person
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JAGIC	joint air ground integration center
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component command
JSA	joint security area
JOA	joint operations area
JTAC	joint terminal attack controller
JTF	joint task force

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

KLE	key leader engagement
LNO	liaison officer
LOC	line of communication
LSA	logistics support area
MC	mission command
MCIS	mission command information system
MCP-OD	main command post—operational detachment
MCT	movement control team
MEB	maneuver enhancement brigade
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
MI	military intelligence
MICO	military intelligence company
MISO	military information support operations
MOPP	mission-oriented protective posture
MP	military police
MSR	main supply route
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
NETOPS	network operations
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIPR	Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router
OIC	officer in charge
OPCON	operational control
OPORD	operation order
OPLAN	operation plan
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PM	provost marshal
POLAD	political adviser
QRF	quick reaction force

MISSION COMMAND IN THE DIVISION AND CORPS SUPPORT AREA

RAOC	rear area operations cell
RFF	request for forces
RP	release point
R&S	reconnaissance and surveillance
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SACP	support area command post
SFA	security force assistance
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIPR	SECRET Internet Protocol Router
SJA	staff judge advocate
SP	start point
SPO	support operations officer
TACON	tactical control
TAC	tactical (command post)
TACP	tactical air control party
TAIS	Tactical Airspace Integration System
TCF	tactical combat force
TCP	traffic control point
TF	task force
TTP	tactic, technique, and procedure
TUAS	tactical unmanned aircraft system
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
ULO	unified land operations
UXO	unexploded explosive ordnance
WAS	wide area security
WfF	warfighting function
WFX	warfighter exercise
WG	working group
WMD	weapon of mass destruction

Appendix F

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NOTE: Some CALL publications are no longer available in print. Digital publications are available by clicking on “Publications by Type” under the “Resources” tab on the CALL restricted website, where you can access and download information. CALL also offers Web-based access to the CALL archives.

CALL produces the following publications on a variety of subjects:

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COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC) Additional Publications and Resources

The CAC home page address is: <http://usacac.army.mil>

Center for Army Leadership (CAL)

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and research. CAL integrates and synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and Civilian Education System. Find CAL products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cal>.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI)

CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp>.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) at <http://www.apd.army.mil> or the Central Army Registry (formerly known as the Reimer Digital Library) at <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G-2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil>.

Military Review (MR)

MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G-2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas.

Capability Development Integration Directorate (CDID)

CDID conducts analysis, experimentation, and integration to identify future requirements and manage current capabilities that enable the Army, as part of the Joint Force, to exercise Mission Command and to operationalize the Human Dimension. Find CDID at <http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/cdid>.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>.

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