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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
10 Meade Avenue, Building 50
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

ARCENT Transition to Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve

LESIONS AND BEST PRACTICES

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Foreword

At the request of the United States Army Central Command (ARCENT) Commanding General, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) organized and conducted a collection with key members of the ARCENT/Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) staff. The ARCENT Commander approved the following areas of focus for the collection:

- Joint manning document gaps, permissions, and authorities of the joint task force
- Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational interoperability
- Coalition and host-nation partnerships

The CALL team, consisting of 14 subject matter experts and military analysts, conducted the collection from 20 through 22 OCT 2015. The team interviewed 29 members of the ARCENT headquarters, and took part in the transition of an Army Service component command to a combined joint forces land component command, which then became the core of CJTF-OIR. CALL conducted an in-brief with the ARCENT staff on 20 OCT 2015 and an out-brief with the ARCENT commander and staff on 22 OCT 2015.

CALL produced this IIR based on the insights and perspectives gained from the analysis of the interviews conducted at the ARCENT headquarters.

Paul P. Reese
COL., AR
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned
The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Executive Summary

Background

In June 2014, the situation in Iraq reached a level of crisis and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) was directed to commence military operations against Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL). The USCENTCOM commander designated the Army component, the United States Army Central Command (ARCENT), as a joint force land component command (JFLCC) for operations in Iraq. The availability of forces already in theater under ARCENT’s regional security plan enabled the JFLCC to have rapid access to Iraq with the appropriate mission command, security, and sustainment capabilities for initial assessments, and it had the ability to provide initial assistance to Iraqi Security Forces. The JFLCC also had reachback capability within easy access in the area of responsibility that included long-range fires and myriad sustainment functions.

Allies and partner nations began to express their desires to contribute capabilities, and in mid-September, the JFLCC was designated as the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I). The challenges now included not only integrating coalition capabilities, but establishing the mission command system networks to support coalition operations.

Recognizing that operations against Daesh required full joint integration, USCENTCOM designated CJFLCC-I as Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), eventually becoming a combined joint task force (CJTF) in mid-October. The joint manning document (JMD) was created to sustain a CJTF while continuing theater army responsibilities for a command that was also designated as a combined joint forces land component command (CJFLCC) by USCENTCOM for operations in the joint operations area. The time frame from submission of the JMD until boots on the ground was anticipated at 120 days from the Secretary of Defense’s approval. To mitigate this gap, ARCENT was able to work with joint Service component commands in theater — another ARCENT standing relationship that proved vital — to assist with joint fills until the respective Service headquarters could assess their requirements. ARCENT was further able to request augmentation from the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command and joint intelligence support element, both of which provided significant assistance with joint functions and capabilities oversight.
ARCENT transitioned its CJTF responsibilities to a U.S. Army Corps headquarters in September, which served a dual role as the ARFOR for the theater and a CJTF headquarters.

From the start of USCENTCOM’s operations against Daesh, to the deployment of U.S. Army III Corps as the CJTF, 15 months had passed. In this time, ARCENT was designated as a CJFLCC, and then later also served as the ARFOR and ultimately CJTF-OIR.

Since 2001, ARCENT has transitioned to a CJTF three times, and four times since 1991. The assignment of an Army Service component command (ASCC) as a JFLCC or a JTF will happen again. Therefore, ARCENT wanted to tell the Army its experiences in order to find a more effective transition if required in the future.

Late September 2015, ARCENT contacted the Mission Command Center of Excellence with a request for a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) collection team to document the ARCENT headquarters’ experience transitioning from an ASCC to a CJFLCC to a CJTF.

CALL recruited, organized, and trained a collection and analysis team from the Combined Arms Center and the joint community. The team deployed to ARCENT headquarters, Shaw Air Force Base, SC, in October 2015 to conduct key leader interviews. The team consisted of members from the following organizations:

- Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
- Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)
- Directorate of Training and Strategy (DOTS)
- United States Army Information Operations Proponent (USAIPO)
- Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)
- Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Directorate (JCOA)
- United States Air Force Air Combat Command
- United States Air Force Lemay Center

**Key Lessons and Insights**

- Building an ad hoc JMD for an ASCC is not easy because it requires field grades with specific skill sets not usually found within the ASCC headquarters. This is particularly true when the requirements trend toward the need for skills and personnel inherent in a tactical headquarters.
• When planning for and developing the JMD, ASCCs must carefully consider the impact of the force management level (FML). Consider assigning dual roles and responsibilities to positions where practical when the FML restricts the number of personnel permitted in the headquarters. Be prepared for some members of the headquarters to have a dual-hatted role (for example, ASCC, ARFOR, CJFLCC, or CJTF).

• The Joint Staff should develop off-the-shelf JMD packages, including certification requirements to key billets such as targeting intelligence, cyber, and information operations military occupational specialties as a ready starting point for building a contingency headquarters JMD. Build mission packages for small, medium, and large command posts that balance austerity with the potential length of the mission.

• Consider the critical lines of effort (LOEs) when building the JMD and headquarters. Prioritize LOEs, weight the main LOE for resources, then resource the remaining LOEs.

• ASCCs must train for the rapid deployment of their contingency command post as a CJFLCC or CJTF. Having a forward presence facilitates the situational awareness and deployment of the JTF into the area of operations and strengthens relations with the host nation.

• The planning effort must include a thorough review of orders and tasks assigned in order to identify and understand all the authorities and funding authorizations available to the JTF.

• When standing up a JTF headquarters, seek assistance from the joint agencies that provide training and assistance such as the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, joint public affairs support element, joint planning support element, and 1st Information Operations Command.

• Getting the message out is important. Appoint a coalition spokesperson to represent the JTF when disseminating information to the media and the public. This can reduce the perception that the force is U.S.-dominated with a mission focused solely on the United States.
Topic 1

Joint Manning Document

1.1 **Observation:** A preplanned, predesigned joint manning document (JMD) for a combined joint task force (CJTF) headquarters is needed to facilitate the forming of a contingency headquarters.

**Discussion:** From start to finish, the process of identifying and manning the CJTF required approximately 180 days. The practicality of having a deployable, scalable, and tailorable team within the United States Army Central Command (ARCENT) headquarters as the starting point for building a joint task force (JTF) headquarters came up several times.

Building a team ad hoc is not only labor intensive but also allows for a great margin of error. The idea of having either a fully manned, responsive contingency command post or an on-call contingency command post — or crisis action team — was a recurring topic. The desire is to have the capability to move on a moment’s notice in response to an event or crisis. The idea of a pre-identified roster to fill a CJTF headquarters was suggested as a remedy to the ad hoc CJTF option. A dedicated team of Army Service component command (ASCC) personnel to man the cell, trained to perform the duties of a JTF staff in support of a contingency operation, would reduce the reliance on the ad hoc solution. Further, this concept would minimize the learning curve needed for team members to gain the required knowledge and skills for a contingency situation.

The force management level (FML) also impacted the decisions on manning for the mission. Tasks associated with the lines of effort (LOEs) were inconsequential to the extent that the restriction placed on the CJTF FML was not to exceed 300 personnel. This personnel threshold took priority, and, in essence, limited ARCENT staff planners in constructing a functional headquarters. The ARCENT commander mentioned in his comments during the after action review the need for an off-the-shelf manning document.

**Insight:** To reduce the ad hoc nature of headquarters manning in the early phase of an operation, a standing team (or at least previously identified team) that has members who worked together and shared common tactics, techniques, and procedures should be retained at the ARCENT level. (Presently, this ability resides in the ARCENT headquarters in some form.) Thinking back to the Army’s modular concept (modularity), a preconfigured JMD would benefit the Army as a whole. Each operation plan would have a designated JMD package that can be filled at the onset of a crisis or contingency. A thorough mission analysis must be completed to determine manning levels for each package and operation.
1.2 Observation: Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I) and Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) had to overcome multiple manning issues.

Discussion: It took approximately 180 days to fill the JMD, and some billets were never filled. Many of the problems encountered in filling the JMD can be attributed to the amount of Army forces already available in theater supporting the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) (contributing to the overall boots-on-the-ground limits), the influence of political sensitivities related to a resurgence of U.S. forces in Iraq, and the latency of the request for forces (RFF) process. The number of routine summer personnel moves exacerbated an already stressed manning situation for both the forward deployed element and the main command post.

ARCENT had a variety of theater enabling commands deployed in the area of responsibility. These commands played a vital role in providing the manpower needed to form the CJFLCC and CJTF. When forming CJFLCC-I, and later the CJTF-OIR headquarters, ARCENT drew personnel from these enablers to fill the JMD. The command’s ability to leverage the capability resident in these entities allowed it to have rapid success.

Insight: Theater-enabling commands played a vital role in the success of CJFLCC-I and the CJTF-OIR. Without the robust support of these entities, the commands would not have had the rapid successes that they did.

1.3 Observation: Many of the ARCENT staff members had dual-hatted roles during support to CJTF-OIR.

Discussion: One lieutenant colonel interviewed had a dual-hatted role as both the key leader engagement chief and ARCENT desk officer from January through April. He had little experience planning deliberate engagements intended to shape and influence the information environment. His ability to focus on integrating and synchronizing a critical information-related capability into staff planning was diminished by competing priorities.

Insight: Conduct a detailed troop-to-task assessment throughout the staff to ascertain strengths and weaknesses. Determine shortfalls in personnel and/or technical knowledge, prioritize responsibilities, and then allocate expertise appropriately. Use more seasoned staff to coach newly formed cells and/or tasks not practiced in a garrison environment. Leverage both organic and reachback formations within information-related capabilities, such as 1st Information Operations Command, to develop a functional foundation.
1.4 Observation: There was a strong need to institute a joint force requirements board.

Discussion: At the beginning of the Iraqi crisis, USCENTCOM ASCCs all submitted immediate RFFs directly to USCENTCOM in accordance with normal RFF staffing procedures. Additionally, within ARCENT, numerous staff sections submitted uncoordinated RFFs directly to the deputy director for special actions and operations (J-38) requesting approval from the operations staff section (J-3) and CJFLCC-I commander. The volume of immediate requirement requests, the lack of requirements coordination between Service component commands, and the established FML all highlighted the need for a CJFLCC requirements clearinghouse.

Insight: Upon USCENTCOM’s designation of ARCENT as CJFLCC-I, the CJFLCC-I J-3 must institute a joint force requirements board in order to solidify a process and forum for submitting, validating, and tracking emergent force requirements; ensure sufficient socialization, deconfliction, and prioritization of component requirements; and ensure CJFLCC-I compliance with appropriate FML guidance.

1.5 Observation: CJTF-OIR took advantage of enablers to bridge initial shortfalls in manning and expertise.

Discussion: ARCENT did not initially understand what training support packages or other enablers were available. However, once they were discovered, ARCENT took full advantage of external assets to augment the staff. Approximately three months after CJTF-OIR was established, it received subject matter experts from the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), Joint Staff, Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development (J-7), Deployable Training Division, Joint Information Operations Command, and USCENTCOM who temporarily embedded and provided training to the staff. For example, the USCENTCOM fires section deployed personnel to train and certify the CJTF-OIR targeting and fires cell personnel before target approval authorities were transitioned to the CJTF level.

Insight: ASCCs must assess their ability to transition to a CJTF and understand what enablers are available and how to request them efficiently.
1.6 **Observation**: ARCENT allowed Service habits to influence its manning and equipping.

**Discussion**: ARCENT’s transition from its dual role as an ASCC and the theater CJFLCC to its designation as the CJTF headquarters was hindered by unfamiliarity with the JMD process and its associated timelines. Initially, ARCENT’s personnel structure reflected its typical tasks of theater logistics and theater engineer support and ballistic missile defense, and was not manned sufficiently to fulfill its increased requirements. ARCENT lacked expertise in skill sets such as intelligence, targeting, fires, information operations, civil affairs planning, and cyber operations. ARCENT filled positions from within instead of formally identifying the functions and processes required of the JTF and submitting an RFF or request for capabilities from both the joint and coalition communities. Although this method rapidly filled positions, those personnel lacking requisite skills ultimately slowed the process of attaining qualified personnel. As a result, the first permanent fills for the JMD were not manned for nearly nine months.

**Insight**: Once the requirement for a CJTF is created, the designated headquarters must rapidly make the transition to combined and joint processes and solutions rather than relying on habitual Service manning and equipping.

1.7 **Observation**: JECC deployed a mission-tailored package consisting of JECC capabilities to support formation of a CJTF in support of Operation Inherent Resolve.

**Discussion**: JECC provided subject matter experts from its joint communications support element, joint public affairs support element, and joint planning support element. JECC personnel assumed critical CJTF staff positions in the areas of knowledge management, logistics and sustainment, engineering, communications, operational planning, and public affairs. Some of the specific capabilities provided included planning support to establish a CJTF battle rhythm; a joint intelligence support element; nonlethal fires/information operations and future operations; sustainment; engineering, land use, and facility agreements; campaign planning and assessments; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence infrastructure and network design; and public affairs, strategic themes, and messages. Overall, JECC provided CJTF-OIR with a wealth of experience and facilitated the maturing of the staff to accomplish the mission.

**Insight**: JECC should be requested each time an Army headquarters is directed to form a joint headquarters.
2.1 Observation: Resourcing Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) required the Army Service component command (ASCC) assistant chief of staff, financial management (G-8) (later to be the force structure, resource, and assessment directorate of a joint staff [J-8]) to start planning early, and fully understand the combination of authorities and authorizations used to fund a joint task force (JTF).

Discussion: As was the case for much of the JTF, the United States Army Central Command (ARCENT) G-8 had a dual-hatted role as the CJTF-OIR J-8. The ARCENT G-8 organizational structure was sufficient to perform both functions in theater (United States Forces-Afghanistan and the CJTF-OIR).

The ARCENT G-8 began planning soon after the ARCENT headquarters was notified of its mission to form a combined joint forces land component command (CJFLCC). The G-8 established a forward element in the ARCENT operational command post as a stand-alone entity to support the re-missioning of ARCENT as Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I). This forward G-8 staff section became the core of the JTF J-8 as the headquarters transitioned to a combined joint task force (CJTF).

Authorities and authorizations came from multiple sources including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). Early in the process, the ARCENT G-8 used Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds using a functional account from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation New Dawn (OND) to support CJFLCC-I.

As it became operational, CJTF-OIR also used funds authorized in the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) under Section 1236, Authority to provide assistance to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (commonly referred to as Iraq Train and Equip Program Funds), and Section 1209, Authority to provide assistance to the Vetted Syrian Opposition.

In the initial period of standing up the operational centers in the Baghdad area, CJTF-OIR also used Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Funds authorized by the Secretary of Defense under United States Code Title 10, Section 127, Emergency and extraordinary expenses, Part 1, Subtitle A.
As the coalition within CJTF-OIR was formed, ARCENT (as the JTF) headquarters provided support to non-U.S. coalition partners within the Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA), managing accounts with the ACSA Global Automated Tracking and Reporting System.

**Insights**: The G-8/J-8 must clearly identify all the authorities and authorizations given to the headquarters in order to execute operational mission requirements. The G-8/J-8 must fully comprehend the purpose and limitations of each of these authorities and authorizations in order to properly align resources and mission requirements.

**2.2 Observation**: ARCENT and the CJTF-OIR required two operation orders processes to account for different authorities.

**Discussion**: In its haste to transition from ARCENT to a CJTF headquarters, while conducting operations against Daesh and building partner capacity (BPC) through Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) development, the CJTF-OIR headquarters published orders under several U.S. Code Title 10, OCO, and NDAA authorities (Iraq Train and Equip Program Funds). Early in the process, some of these orders used authorities that should have been published under the Title 10 authorities residing with ARCENT. In March, as CJTF-OIR began planning for the next rotational unit, it realized the need to separate Title 10 responsibilities (for example, building, basing, training, and financing) from CJTF roles authorized under the sections of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA or OCO funds.

**Insight**: In forming a CJTF, a deliberate distinction must be made separating ASCC and CJTF authorities and responsibilities.
3.1 Observation: The lines of effort (LOEs) for Operation Inherent Resolve were not synchronized and did not provide for complementary focus of efforts to achieve the common objective.

Discussion: The National Command Authority established nine LOEs, assigned responsibility, and designated who was the supported and supporting entity. Seven of these LOEs were the sole responsibility of the Department of State and the United States Ambassador to Iraq. The remaining two were the sole responsibility of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). This combined joint task force (CJTF) was responsible for countering and defeating Daesh and building partner capacity to contribute to regional security and stability. When CJTF-OIR attempted to collaborate and coordinate actions to assist with the Department of State and the ambassador’s LOEs, CJTF-OIR was informed that those LOEs were not its responsibility. The apparent divisive relationship between CJTF-OIR and the Department of State in relation to LOE responsibility seems to counter a whole-of-government or comprehensive approach to successfully accomplish goals and objectives to achieve a common end state.

Insight: In operations involving nonmilitary factors, LOEs may be the only way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state. LOEs are often essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support other instruments of national power. They are a particularly valuable tool when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces, U.S. Government agencies and departments, and civilian organizations, where unity of command is elusive, if not impractical. Commanders and staffs should consider cross-cutting LOEs involving more than one instrument of national power in order to create a more effective system for interagency coordination. Cross-cutting (outcome oriented) LOEs, such as establishing essential services or civil security operations, creates a tendency toward more dynamic and open interagency coordination because LOEs require the synchronization of efforts of multiple departments and agencies. This type of construct brings to bear the capabilities and expertise of multiple elements of the U.S. Government, which makes it particularly effective toward achieving more complex objectives or outcomes. Paramount to achieving unity of effort is
building relationships among U.S. military, U.S. Government agencies and departments, and multinational senior leaders.

3.2 Observation: The CJTF-OIR command and control structure was non-doctrinal, adopting a linear flow of command — USCENTCOM to a combined joint task force (CJTF) to a combined joint forces land component command (CJFLCC) — rather than having a CJTF over multiple components and functional commands.

Discussion: ARCENT transitioned from a joint force land component command (JFLCC) to a CJFLCC under a geographic combatant commander and then became a CJTF with the 1st Infantry Division as Combined Joint Force Land Component Command–Iraq (CJFLCC-I). Special Operations Joint Task Force-Iraq was not subordinate to Combined Joint Force Land Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I) and reported directly to the CJTF-OIR. The combined force air component commander remained under USCENTCOM and operated in a supporting role as opposed to the subordinate role to the CJTF-OIR. The division in the operation is currently labeled as a CJFLCC but is operating similar to a tactical headquarters, considering that there are no subordinate combat brigades, regiments, or battalions.

Insight: Consider introducing this form of a CJTF and command and control structure to joint doctrine. Current templates have a CJTF headquarters over numerous functional and component headquarters.

3.3 Observation: Information sharing and communication in a joint environment are hindered when all Services operate on different enterprise models.

Discussion: CJFLCC-I deployed forces to Iraq where contingents from Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), Special Operations Component, United States Central Command, United States Naval Forces Central Command, and United States Marine Forces Central Command affected link-up and established the joint operations cell for USCENTCOM. The joint operations cell (within the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq [OSC-I]) provided the communication infrastructure, to include email services. As the situation; command, control, communications, and computer capabilities; and staff matured, the joint operations cell considered moving back to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), which provided Enterprise Email to eliminate Global Address List latency issues. During mission analysis, it was determined that as many as nine different email domains were providing services to the joint partners,
effectively eliminating DISA as a sole source email coalition operational area. The joint operations cell experienced similar challenges with access to SharePoint, common operating picture platforms, and Web services.

**Insight:** A joint task force (JTF) headquarters must establish clear policies, procedures, and decision points for requesting DISA-hosted services such as email, instead of establishing a joint communications support element service or expanding existing theater collaboration and file sharing.

**3.4 Observation:** The joint air component coordination element (JACCE) was not included in the Army Service component command (ASCC) mission planning.

**Discussion:** ARCENT provided a battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) to AFCENT, but AFCENT did not supply a JACCE to ARCENT until combat operations were initiated. The JACCE was valuable for synchronizing operations with the United States Air Force once it was established.

**Insight:** Resource a JACCE to the ASCC as a permanent feature, similar to how a BCD was provided to Air Force forces headquarters.

**3.5 Observation:** JACCE employment and composition roles were not identified.

**Discussion:** The initial JACCE sent to support ARCENT primarily consisted of tactical warfighters whose initial focus was the problem of keeping Baghdad from falling. Although this focus was important to a land component commander, once the headquarters transitioned to a CJTF, the appropriate liaison officers were not in place. With the transition to a JTF, the headquarters planning staff lacked airlift, air defense, and airspace management expertise.

**Insight:** Identify the role of the headquarters in order to obtain the correct types of liaison officers for the level of war supported.

**3.6 Observation:** CJTF-OIR did not establish a space coordinating authority (SCA).

**Discussion:** When CJTF-OIR was established, headquarters did not establish an SCA inside the task force. The SCA was established by the supporting theater SCA, AFCENT. Because Daesh did not have any offensive space capabilities, the requirement for space integration and
employment was limited. However, had the adversary been far more capable in its space capabilities, the space personnel may have had a bigger role.

**Insight**: When planning, the JTF must establish criteria for when to establish a CJTF SCA and when to transfer authorities to the theater SCA.

### 3.7 Observation

The CJTF-OIR command structure lacked unity of effort.

**Discussion**: Duplication of effort and friction existed between parties operating in Iraq early in the conflict. Special forces, OSC-I, ARCENT, AFCENT, and other organizations were operating separately with no unification. Establishing supporting and supported relationships helped stabilize efforts; however, no single organization was in charge of all LOEs against Daesh.

**Insight**: Establish a clear command and control hierarchy with command and support relationships early in the conflict. Command and control hierarchy and support relationships must address non-DOD entities.

### 3.8 Observation

Planning of a JTF headquarters prior to requisitioning resources was inadequate.

**Discussion**: The first requests to AFCENT for assistance were for assets and capabilities, implicating that planning had been conducted and ARCENT, as the JTF, had a plan for integrating these assets and capabilities into the mission. The first request to AFCENT from the JTF should have been for planners to assist the JTF planners in ascertaining the correct assets and capabilities to request, along with a clear vision to integrate them into joint air assets.

**Insight**: Request planning support from other ASCCs before requesting assets in order to develop a plan for employment and integration.

### 3.9 Observation

OSC-I and CJTF-OIR did not collaboratively synchronize planning, coordination, and operating efforts to accomplish seemingly shared objectives.

**Discussion**: OSC-I and CJTF-OIR were both three-star headquarters without a common senior leader (general officer or ambassador) in command of both headquarters. OSC-I reported to the United States Ambassador to Iraq and the CJTF-OIR reported to USCENTCOM.
Some of the OSC-I and CJTF-OIR responsibilities, to differing degrees, overlapped (for example, engagements with Iraqi senior military, training, foreign military sales, advise and assist, and building partner capacity). On occasion, staff officers from OSC-I and CJTF-OIR would cross paths while attempting to accomplish similar responsibilities with the same Iraqi entity. This, at times, caused confusion and, in some cases, resulted in heated discussions.

**Insight:** Although both OSC-I and CJTF-OIR were different headquarters with similar responsibilities reporting to different senior leadership, it would have been logical to have an agreement between the two headquarters, which could have reduced friction. One option is to have two three-star commanders schedule a meeting with their staff to develop memorandums of understanding and define roles and responsibilities that can facilitate collaboration, coordination, and LOEs. Some arrangement was needed to have appropriate staff members from each headquarters to brief during the battle rhythm. Another option is to develop OSC-I and CJTF-OIR working groups to facilitate complementary planning to achieve common objectives.
Topic 4
Coalition and Host-Nation Partnerships

4.1 Observation: Synchronization was nonexistent among security force assistance (SFA), building partner capacity (BPC), and security assistance activities across Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) and interagency communities.

Discussion: The responsibility of providing supervision over CJTF-OIR’s efforts toward BPC of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) fell primarily to the ISF development cell. The initial leadership of the cell was created from within the United States Army Central Command (ARCENT) staff. This ad hoc organization primarily consisted of joint individual augments, coalition officers, and volunteers from the SFA community of interest within the joint force. The cell’s primary activities included supervision of the BPC training locations throughout Iraq, tracking ISF force generation and combat power development, and supervising the procurement and distribution of equipment for ISF. These activities were accomplished through foreign military sales, presidential drawdown authority, excess defense articles, coalition donations, or through procurement using the pseudo-foreign military sales program, the Iraq Train and Equip Program Fund for fiscal year 2015.

Although the ISF development cell functioned as a part of the combined joint staff of operations (CJ-3), its true role within the CJTF encompassed almost all of the functional and special staff areas. In addition, the ISF development cell served as the focal point for the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I), Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-I), and Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) with regard to the procurement of equipment in support of BPC activities. The cell also served as the office of primary responsibility for the CJTF with regards to the management and implementation of the Iraq Train and Equip Program Fund. These training and procurement duties also required daily interactions with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) combined joint plans staff (CJ-5) office.

The ISF development cell staff Manning was a combination of joint and NATO officers that included the following:

- Cell chief: Italian colonel (O-6)
- Deputy: United States Marine Corps lieutenant colonel (O-5)
• Two U.S. Army lieutenant colonels (O-5)
• One U.S. Army captain (O-3)
• One U.S. Army sergeant first class (E-7)
• One French lieutenant colonel (O-5)
• One Spanish lieutenant colonel (O-5)

Although the ISF development cell was at the center of these various organizations, entities, and staff sections, it possessed neither the authority nor the level of command to compel the action necessary to support operations. The ability of the cell to accomplish its designated tasks was more of a testament to the goodwill and support of the community rather than the result of a deliberate organizational structure or command relationship. The ad hoc nature of the cell exacerbated the situation because this organization was not a traditional staff element within the ARCENT structure in its role as an Army Service component command (ASCC). Although the cell was able to develop an initial operating concept, and was prepared to bridge a short-term manning gap pending the approval and assignment of manpower from the joint manning document, the delay in fielding the forces required to support the cell prior to the turnover with the U.S. Army III Corps personnel detracted from the ability to accomplish the assigned mission.

**Insight:** ARCENT headquarters, if called on to transition from an ASCC to a joint task force (JTF), should perform an internal review to ensure that the organizational structure and command relationships are appropriate to support the nature of the specific mission. The organizational flexibility required to meet the nonstandard challenges of the dynamic global operational environment means that the Department of Defense community needs to be increasingly comfortable with being uncomfortable, to include operations with unique or unusual command relationships or staff sections with constraints. Although every operational environment is unique in its own way, operations often take place in a joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational environment, involving interactions with host-nation security force elements. Support to foreign governments will include advising, training, and equipping. The sooner these activities and responsibilities are incorporated and integrated into the warfighting headquarters, the better.
4.2 Observation: Geography and location imposed challenges on CJTF-OIR’s operations.

Discussion: Although some may associate the current force management level (FML) in Iraq with an effort to maintain a small tactical footprint in theater, the reality is that the operational level headquarters’ staffs are most affected by the current manning level caps. In order to remain within the specified troop cap inside of Iraq, CJTF-OIR headquarters and staff were based out of Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.

Although the headquarters’ location in Kuwait provided the physical footprint required for a command of this size and scope, its location outside of Iraq led to additional command and control and unity of effort challenges. Some of the challenges included the following:

- Limited access to the commander
- Little to no interaction with ISF or their designated representatives
- Limited access to the subordinate and adjacent staffs (OSC-I, SOJTF-I, CJFLCC-I, and the U.S. Embassy)

The lack of a co-located headquarters from each of these elements prevented the CJTF-OIR staff from effectively filtering information requirements coming from its higher command headquarters.

The CJTF-OIR commanding general spent approximately 75 percent of his time in theater forward in Iraq. This allowed the commanding general to be at the point of friction and increase synergy by interacting daily within the CJTF; joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational partners; and Government of Iraq communities and leaders. Although his reasons for positioning himself forward were clear, the CJTF-OIR staff in Kuwait was not able to benefit from the same interactions that the staff’s forward were receiving.

As the higher headquarters in theater, CJTF-OIR staff was responsible for planning and conducting a broad and varied range of operations. From conducting BPC activities to full combat operations, CJTF-OIR staff engaged in several planning actions and staff activities related to the Iraqi force operations in theater. Unfortunately, the lack of access to Iraqi military personnel at the CJTF level meant that these activities either took place in a vacuum or required frequent inputs from the subordinate commands to ensure the information was accurate. This lack of access prevented natural unity of effort throughout CJTF-OIR (especially with regard to the international coalition members) that would have existed with the benefit of a fully integrated campaign plan. Additionally, many of the plans developed at the CJTF level had a decidedly U.S.-centric operational approach. This was understandable, given the lack of host-nation input. Security force
assistance operations are specifically designed to focus on the areas of overlapping interest between the U.S. and the host-nation forces. Lacking accurate input from the host-nation force can result in a misalignment of interests and campaign objectives.

Finally, the geographical separation along with challenges of maintaining full situational awareness at the CJTF level prevented CJTF-OIR staff from filtering requests for information from higher headquarters away from the undermanned staff sections from CJFLLC-I and SOJTF-I. Almost all specific questions pertaining to Iraqi BPC operations, to include both training and equipping the ISF, had to be routed to the staffs forward in Iraq to answer with the level of fidelity required. The CJTF-OIR staff was able to consolidate information requirements and did conduct most of the synthesis and analysis of data, lightening the load on the subordinate headquarters. However, the burden of collecting the required raw data fell on staff sections that were ill-equipped to handle such tasks given the FML restrictions in place.

**Insight:** The coalition simply did not have the ability to relocate the entire CJTF-OIR staff to Baghdad. Given this reality, the CJTF-OIR staff had to carefully review what capabilities to bring forward to maximize the effectiveness of the space available. The ISF development cell, CJ-5, and key leader engagements are examples of those CJTF staff sections that would benefit greatly from being co-located with the subordinate headquarters elements. The staff should avoid the temptation to bring forward representative slices of all of the staff sections, and instead focus specifically on areas with the greatest overall need to be in Baghdad. With the commander and most of the action taking place in Baghdad, the situation demanded emplacing strict control measures that were rigorously enforced to ensure that the spaces available were allocated based purely on mission requirements.

**4.3 Observation:** There is a need to establish a main effort when using multiple headquarters.

**Discussion:** A small forward element requires more support and will be limited in production capability. However, the supporting headquarters relies heavily on information obtained from the forward headquarters. The initial intelligence team sent forward was overwhelmed with requests for information from the main headquarters because situational awareness was low across the joint operations area. This affected the forward elements’ ability to operate because the questions and requests came from the rear headquarters, which was not where the senior leaders were located.
**Insight:** Establish supporting and supported relationships when using multiple headquarters along with establishing proper roles. These roles may change based on the location of leaders.

**4.4 Observation:** The use of several disparate information networks inhibited CJTF-OIR headquarters’ ability to maximize information sharing among coalition partners.

**Discussion:** As discussed above, forming a coalition is the predominant approach for military campaigns of the future. CJTF-OIR experienced severe difficulty sharing information among coalition partners because of convoluted digital systems. Even after more than six months into the operation at the CJTF headquarters, coalition partners, depending on their security clearance, were operating on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR), SIPR Releasable, United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems, Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network, United States Central Command’s Partner Network, or Trusted Network Environment. Sharing information among these systems was a cumbersome process that was exceedingly slow. Further complicating information sharing was the tendency to overclassify products. CJTF-OIR eventually learned to write for release, but this practice must continually be reemphasized.

**Insight:** In forming a coalition, a classified network that provides greatest partner access must be used as the primary network and be established early in the formation of the CJTF. Teach the coalition members to write for release at the lowest classification level to maximize coalition partner participation.

**4.5 Observation:** A JTF headquarters did not promote maximum information sharing among coalition partners.

**Discussion:** The likelihood that the United States will conduct large-scale unilateral operations in the foreseeable future is low. The prevailing strategy is to form a broad coalition consisting of traditional allies, regional partners, and other friendly countries with interest in the region.

CJTF-OIR saw the value of U.S. coalition partners as evidenced by establishing battle rhythm events to maximize inclusion. CJTF-OIR organized boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups at the broadest classification to include all coalition partners. As meetings progressed, the classification level of the information discussed sometimes exceeded the clearance level authorized for a specific coalition member. Often, the practice was to adjourn the meeting until those members cleared the room before the next higher security level of information was discussed.
Eventually, the CJTF staff learned to write for release, but emphasized that this practice must continually be reinforced because of the tendencies to over-classify products.

**Insight:** Conduct the battle rhythm events at the lowest classification level to maximize participation of coalition partners, and excuse participants as necessary.

### 4.6 Observation

**Observation:** ARCENT, as a combined joint force land component command (CJFLCC) and CJTF for USCENTCOM, received numerous requests for information directly from the National Command Authority (NCA), Department of State, and the United States Ambassador to Iraq.

**Discussion:** During ARCENT’s transition to a CJFLCC and CJTF, the NCA, Department of State, and United States Ambassador to Iraq circumvented USCENTCOM and sent requests for information directly to the three-star headquarters for immediate response in anticipation of getting the most recent updates to the requested information. Gathering this information and conducting research to formulate a response, writing and editing the response, and getting command approval for the response required time and affected the ability of the command and senior leadership to focus on planning, decision making, and operations. The three-star headquarters would answer the requests for information and provide an informational copy to USCENTCOM.

**Insight:** The President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority, direction, and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command and control. One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands. For purposes other than the operational direction of the combatant commands, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments and, as prescribed by the secretaries, to the commanders of Service forces. The military departments, organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the secretary of that military department. The secretaries of the military departments exercise administrative control over Service-retained forces through their respective Service chiefs. Combatant commanders prescribe the chain of command within their combat commands and designate the appropriate command authority to be exercised by subordinate commanders.

It may be awkward to explain or inform the NCA, Department of State, and the United States Ambassador to Iraq that a chain of command exists for a purpose. If the chain of command is circumvented, the potential for miscommunication and misdirection becomes more likely and could
adversely affect operations, not to mention the potential adverse impact when the military chain of command is not kept informed, which could affect the decision-making process.

4.7 Observation: The Third Army assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) did not have the training/certification for all authorities.

Discussion: USCENTCOM required that the CJTF-OIR headquarters intelligence staff section (J-2) be certified in target development prior to being given targeting authority. The U.S. Air Force also required Army personnel to be trained as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tactical coordinators prior to working with U.S. Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.

Insight: Have geographic combatant commanders identify theater and Service requirements so headquarters can coordinate proper certification and training.

4.8 Observation: CJFLCC-I had difficulty obtaining the authorities needed for the mission.

Discussion: There was no formal education on the authority process, how to request authorities, or where to look in order to find inherent authorities. For example, the lack of lower-level cyber authorities hampered cyber operations and caused a latent targeting capability.

Insight: Once CJTF-OIR stood up, the ARCENT commander, in his role as a CJTF commander, received strike authority at the one-star level. As a result, CJTF-OIR staff and the commander were able to focus at the operational level rather than the tactical targeting level.
ARCENT TRANSITION TO CJTF-OIR IIR

Topic 5
Mission Command

5.1 Observation: To resource the joint task force (JTF) headquarters, the United States Army Central Command (ARCENT) leveraged the capabilities and manpower of its deployed theater-assigned Army forces that participated in named operations since 2001 within the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of operations, building on the habitual relationships established by those units.

Discussion: ARCENT, as the Army Service component command (ASCC) for USCENTCOM, had its headquarters (main command post) stationed at Shaw Air Force Base, SC, and its forward command post deployed to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. Since 2001, ARCENT participated with its theater-assigned Army forces in named operations such as Lucky Warrior, Freedom Sentinel, Internal Look, and Lion Focus. The habitual relationships and operational experience obtained with its theater-assigned Army forces during these operations facilitated collaboration, coordination, and mission command during Operation Inherent Resolve.

When ARCENT deployed its contingency command post to Baghdad, Iraq, the relationships and experience gleaned from previous operations provided the foundation to support USCENTCOM’s theater engagement plans and security cooperation, providing the USCENTCOM commander with command and control capabilities for immediate crisis response, assessment, and control of operations. Additionally, the participation of multinational forces in named exercises with ARCENT further enhanced the collaboration and coordination that resulted in successful planning and operations during Operation Inherent Resolve.

Insight: The opportunity for theater armies to conduct exercises and operations as ASCCs with the geographic combatant commands, to include Service components and multinational forces, built relationships and experiences to enhance collaboration, coordination, planning, and execution for future operations. Further, the transition of ARCENT from an ASCC to a combined joint forces land component command (CJFLCC) and then to a combined joint task force (CJTF) provided ARCENT with a wealth of experience in conducting major operations that provided lessons and best practices to be used by Army, joint, and multinational forces.
5.2 Observation: Upon receipt of mission, ARCENT did not understand how to build capacity and increase proficiency to accommodate the tasks associated with JTF responsibilities.

Discussion: ARCENT seemed to operate under the assumption that any significant expansion of responsibility would be shouldered by another element as it had been in the past. However, as a result of the military drawdown and the additional obligations that accompany the regional alignment of forces, no U.S. Army divisions or corps were immediately available to fill the role of JTF.

Insight: Maintain a comprehensive joint training plan that includes individual and collective refresher training to improve the staff’s ability to perform additional responsibilities.

5.3 Observation: The lessons learned from previous operations are inaccessible and therefore cannot be used as tools to help coordinate and build a JTF or CJTF.

Discussion: The idea of a lessons learned activity is to provide the knowledge needed to alleviate problems and to possibly expedite steps to gain efficiencies. Current ASCC personnel are not able to locate lessons learned from past efforts.

Using the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) request for information (RFI) system did not provide the desired result. In many cases, the subject requested was so broad that a multitude of documents were found and forwarded to the unit in a bulk delivery. The unit could not hope to research all the materials provided given the short amount of time to prepare. The counter was also true. The information requested was too ambiguous and could not be found (for example, searches for the topic did not hit any metadata tags).

Personnel within the ASCC and CJTF did not contact other agencies for assistance because they were unaware that such agencies existed, such as the 1st Information Operations Command.

Although Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) did not maximize the available reachback resources due to its unfamiliarity with assets and the lack of concise or specific RFIs, there was an observable limitation in the ability of stateside organizations to synthesize information from the sizable repository of available historical data. In its raw form, the data was readily available, but the manpower required to draw conclusions, make recommendations, and shape future actions was limited.
For units deployed on a short timetable, searching and training on lessons learned may be too late. CJTF-OIR relied on the CALL-embedded liaison officer to obtain information.

**Insight:** Having an officer and/or a noncommissioned officer familiar with both the CALL website and the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) for research would resolve issues in obtaining lessons learned. Units need to be proactive in sending personnel to training instead of waiting until it appears on the patch chart for deployment. Training early provides units with the ability to learn lessons early and train on the skills needed. Trained personnel can also use their knowledge to train others. (Note: CALL has taken steps to update its RFI process, sending targeted information to requesters instead of bulk delivery.)

**5.4 Observation:** CJTF-OIR’s lines of effort (LOEs) need equal weighting of resources.

**Discussion:** The Department of Defense (DOD) was responsible for two of the nine LOEs in the U.S. Government’s plan to counter Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The two LOEs can be summarized as destroying Daesh by denying it a safe haven in Iraq and Syria, and building partner capacity (BPC) of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The kinetic LOE seemed to have priority, especially at the end of 2014 and the start of 2015, as demonstrated by the disproportionate assignment of personnel and resources between the LOEs and the relative amount of time allotted to each LOE (in terms of battle rhythm events and briefings to the commander). There are four reasons why the kinetic LOE appeared to take precedence over the BPC LOE.

The kinetic LOE is better known as a warfighting function. Most DOD personnel are familiar with this line of operations. The CJTF staff was built around traditional functions. There were more personnel assigned to collect and process intelligence, deliver fires, or coordinate information operations than personnel dedicated to BPC. BPC is not a standing part of a traditional warfighting headquarters that has working relationships, standard operating procedures, and the functional partnerships derived from these interactions.

The kinetic LOE is also easier to track, manage, assess, and report because the metrics are easily defined and measured. When comparing the BPC LOE challenges associated with assessing, it is easier to report on the number of kinetic strikes conducted or enemy vehicles destroyed.

The kinetic LOE is also easier to shape and control at the CJTF level. BPC operations rely on the cooperation and participation of the host-nation government and its associated security forces. In comparison, the kinetic
LOE remains completely under the command and control of the CJTF — changes can be effected immediately without seeking buy-in from the host nation. The resources available can be managed, allocated, and controlled by CJTF-OIR staff in order to provide an effective and responsive capability to the commander.

Finally, in comparison to the kinetic LOE, BPC accomplishments are slow to develop and difficult to measure, the job requirements often fall outside of the normal military occupational specialty of assigned personnel, and most CJTF-OIR personnel may not understand the BPC mission or how they can assist. Security force assistance is a niche skill set and a difficult job; personnel are not rushing forward to join that effort in theater.

**Insight:** The kinetic LOE must receive a weighting of resources equal to those of the other LOEs within the CJTF. Time with the commander, personnel, computers, and even workspaces are all resources to be managed in support of this effort. The recent questions pertaining to the accuracy and effectiveness of the kinetic LOE and the train-and-equip mission in Syria, point to a requirement to re-examine the priorities within the campaign plan and to allocate resources accordingly. The strategy shift to being more aggressive in offensive operations and the kinetic support offered to the forces fighting Daesh in Iraq and Syria threaten to overshadow the larger BPC effort in theater. Focusing on kinetic efforts may beat back Daesh in the short-term. However, long-term success can only be accomplished by achieving the other eight LOEs in the overall campaign plan.

**5.5 Observation:** Assessments were focused primarily on crisis management and current operations and not on long-range plans and objectives.

**Discussion:** During the time USCENTCOM was developing a regional campaign plan, information was marked U.S. REL FVEY (known as the Five Eyes alliance of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States), precluding review and comment by the other coalition partners. Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I) and CJTF-OIR worked with USCENTCOM to complete the regional campaign plan. However, there was not sufficient data to develop pertinent questions and conduct the qualitative analysis needed to facilitate development of a substantive assessment of ISF, defense of Bagdad, Iraq, and potential future plans and operations. Considering that a task and purpose or troop-to-task analysis was not solidified, standing up a joint headquarters without an approved joint manning document (JMD) complicated the assessment process. Further, with new, inexperienced personnel, coupled with coalition partners, staff coordination and collaboration defaulted to current operations.
Assessments are part of a commander’s program and their value is determined by where they rank on the commander’s priorities. During a crisis, staff members will focus on immediate and future problems, as opposed to assessing mission accomplishment. If assessments are not conducted during operations, it might take time before the staff realizes its actions are not achieving the desired goals. Commanders set priorities; if they want an effective assessment process, they will need to make it a priority.

The battle rhythm changed on a daily basis and, at times, resulted in additional requirements that precluded staff sections from conducting internal assessments, planning, and collaboration with other staff sections. The assessments section worked with the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2)/intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) to develop operational and strategic questions that the assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5)/plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) reviewed and distributed to the staff for input. During the assessment briefing to the commanding general, staff sections provided input that seemed to address the commanding general’s concerns. When the commanding general provided guidance or required more information, the staff was quick to respond.

When the assessment briefing was conducted without the commanding general in attendance, staff input was lacking and did not effectively support the plan, prepare, decide, and execute process. As a result, the staff focused on the current fight at the expense of long-range plans and objectives.

**Insight:** The staff must continually monitor current operations with a view toward long-range plans, objectives, and end states. The staff must continuously assess an operation’s progress to determine if the current order is still valid or if there are better ways to achieve the end state. Assessments by staff sections form the foundation of running estimates. Assessments allow joint force commanders to maintain accurate situational awareness and revise their visualization or operational approach appropriately. The commanding general is key in the assessment process. In the commander’s absence, the deputy or chief of staff must focus the staff on accurate assessments to facilitate the commander in his decision making.

**5.6 Observation:** Assessment plan and evaluation criteria are not well understood by members of the nonlethal LOE.

**Discussion:** The combined joint staff of operations (CJ-3) ISF development staff conducted the nonlethal LOEs related to BPC. One member of the ISF development staff knew of major objectives related to BPC, but could not recall discussion of measures of effectiveness, measures of performance,
or indicators developed as part of the assessment framework. A staff member who is unaware of the assessment framework will likely possess information essential to the assessment plan and to the commander’s situational understanding. Field Manual 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 05 MAY 2014, states that “primary tools for assessing progress of an operation include the operation order, the common operational picture, personal observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan.”

**Insight:** Ensure an environment of shared understanding through collaboration and coordination. All members of the staff need to understand the indicators of success, measures of performance, and measures of effectiveness to strengthen unity of effort across multiple objectives. (See Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, 17 MAY 2012, page 2-2, about creating shared understanding).

**5.7 Observation:** U.S. connectivity requirements need to be set up early in order to exchange U.S. intelligence that cannot be shared with coalition partners.

**Discussion:** Although coalition connectivity and information sharing is important, it is vital that U.S. information requirements are set up first. If U.S. connectivity and information flow are not established early, headquarters limits information sharing to the level of the coalition. Limiting information sharing can be an issue in an environment that requires high U.S. intelligence exchange and interconnectivity with Special Forces.

**Insight:** Establish a small U.S. information hub early in the conflict due to limitations on the type of information shared among coalition partners.

**5.8 Observation:** ARCENT was not trained for rapid deployment of the contingency command post to become a CJFLCC or CJTF.

**Discussion:** ARCENT was not operating under the contingency command post and main command post framework for an ASCC. Instead of dividing the staff into a contingency command post and a main command post, mission requirements divided the staff into a main command post, operational command post, and assault command post. The headquarters was doctrinally manned and resourced for a main command post and a contingency command post, but had not been reorganized for its new construct at the time of the mission.
ARCENT had not exercised deployment of its headquarters and, therefore, personnel were either not properly trained or undertrained for the mission. More training and contingency planning was and are needed to be prepared for future missions. The modified table of organization and equipment contingency command post package was not used because it was unfamiliar to personnel. The system was perceived as being too bulky. Therefore, the assistant chief of staff for communications (G-6) elected to build an Internet protocol-based network from scratch.

**Insight:** ARCENT, as the ASCC, must dedicate time and resources to the organization of its command posts, especially when its contingency planning determines a requirement for three command posts.

**5.9 Observation:** Several factors impeded information access and flow, which limited CJFLCC-I and CJTF-OIR capabilities.

**Discussion:** In an information-driven environment, knowledge management was key. There was a lack of foreign disclosure officer support, and the current operating and targeting systems did not support classified information transfer among coalition partners. Ad hoc caveats and processing alleviated but did not fix the problem.

Overclassification of information seemed to be an issue across the command due to SECRET computers defaulting to U.S. SECRET caveats.

The use of the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) software system was not helpful. Only a small number of Army Soldiers understood CPOF. CPOF did not integrate with USCENTCOM’s common operational picture. It was not until the joint operations center went to the Global Command and Control System-Joint that coalition personnel could fully see the required common operational picture needed for the operation.

The U.S.-led command and control construct with integrated coalition partners worked well. The only flaw was the lack of a coalition higher governing body. The National Command Authority attempted to fill this role; however, U.S. Government and National Security Council directives did not always line up with coalition desires, causing friction within the coalition.

**Insight:** Plans for information sharing across the coalition must be in place prior to the operation, including the designation and training of foreign disclosure officers and classification instructions.
5.10 Observation: CJFLCC-I and the CJTF-OIR had to develop new operating constructs to overcome unanticipated operational environment challenges.

Discussion: The headquarters was operating in a hybrid threat, targeting environment. There is a lack of doctrine and best practices for this type of targeting environment. The lack of ample assessments and troops on the ground to provide intelligence and battle damage assessment contributed to this problem.

Insight: Lack of USCENTCOM-specific targeting certifications required augmenters to attend training prior to coming into theater. There is a need to have universal DOD training and certification. Internal military culture had to adjust to working in a sovereign country with cultural sensitivities.

5.11 Observation: The communication support package planning did not clearly crosswalk the JMD with the deployed systems and services required.

Discussion: CJTF-OIR embedded and employed forces to conduct a wide range of operations to better enable ISF to neutralize Daesh. CJTF-OIR had a forward presence (the renewed CJFLCC-I) that partnered with the ISF operations center (Baghdad Operations Center) and Ministry of Defense. The key command and control tasks included synchronizing U.S. and ISF operations, planning and targeting lethal fires, providing and sustaining the joint force communications structure, and developing and refining a common operational picture.

The communications force structure was not adequate — lacking organic communications capability and personnel — to rapidly receive and integrate additional forces into CJFLCC-I. Further, the proposed manning structures and associated requests for forces did not address the need to effectively grow and sustain theater communication or to provide responsive vendor-forward support for service restoration.

Insight: In the future, the Army must develop a standard deployment package of systems and services that provide secure voice and data transfer. These packages should include capabilities such as a Global Broadcast Service System, full motion video that provides the common operational picture and targeting platforms, and combat-net radios (for example, UHF, tactical satellite, VHF/UHF line-of-sight calculator, Blue Force Tracking network, and other systems.)
6.1 Observation: United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) maintained responsibility conducting public affairs activities until the combined joint task force (CJTF) was fully manned and ready to assume responsibility.

Discussion: In today’s 24-hour news cycle, the importance of transparency and full disclosure must not be underestimated. When USCENTCOM designated the United States Army Central Command (ARCENT) to stand up a CJTF, it deliberately maintained responsibility for public affairs activities until the CJTF public affairs section was fully mission capable. This proactive effort established trust with the media and prevented any negative perceptions that might have occurred if the CJTF public affairs office was forced to field requests before it was ready. In a crisis, there is a high demand for information and answers. A command headquarters transitioning into theater will require time to gain situational awareness before it can speak factually and confidently on the actions occurring in the operational area.

Insight: The combatant command should maintain responsibility to conduct public affairs activities until the CJTF is mission capable. Clearly define what the public affairs office in a joint force land component command (JFLCC) or joint task force (JTF) headquarters must accomplish to be considered at initial operating capability and ready to take over strategic messaging from the geographic combatant commander’s headquarters.

6.2 Observation: When operating in a coalition, it is important to use a non-U.S. face as the coalition spokesperson.

Discussion: Western members of the 62-nation coalition recognized the need to put a regional partner as the coalition spokesperson to attempt to limit U.S. exposure. A non-U.S. spokesperson reinforces the position that it is not the U.S. and the coalition, but a true coalition. This technique was used to bolster messaging to the Arab audience. In order to maximize positive influence and legitimacy within the Arab community, careful consideration was made in choosing a regional spokesperson. However, leaders must be mindful of cultural issues and friction points within the coalition. Certain coalition members may not want representation by other members of the coalition.
**Insight**: Identify a non-U.S. member among the coalition leaders who can be the face of the coalition in order to eliminate the perception that it is a U.S.-dominated operation. The instruments of national power — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic — were not maximized in Operation Inherent Resolve because a regional spokesperson was not appointed for the coalition in a timely manner.

**6.3 Observation**: Develop a standard operating procedure for release of full motion video (FMV) and strike videos across the headquarters.

**Discussion**: Headquarters should develop clear standards as to who is responsible for releasing video, how to provide the video, and who will be the customer (such as the news agencies, coalition partners, nongovernmental organizations, etc.). There was a demand for video early in the conflict both by the host nation and the media. However, the videos provided were misused by some of the recipients. As a result, the public affairs office had to embed messaging and information into the video so it could not be used for other purposes.

**Insight**: Prioritize the development of release information for FMV due to the high demand for visual aids by numerous agencies.

**6.4 Observation**: History can cloud perceptions.

**Discussion**: When operating in an area where the U.S. military has operated before, it is vital for the public affairs office to highlight that the military is conducting a new operation. Most news agencies and the general public will use history as a reference for current operations, which can lead to misconceptions. Strategic messaging should highlight what is current to deal with past perceptions.

**Insight**: Quickly develop strategic talking points that highlight differences between past and current operations.
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