Foreword

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is combating an insurgency and simultaneously rebuilding its infrastructure to become a strong sovereign state no longer requiring assistance from the U.S. government (USG) or other nations. Key to the success of this effort is the provincial reconstruction team (PRT). The U.S. Army established PRTs from a need to stabilize the operating environment by developing the infrastructure and building capacity necessary for the Afghan people to succeed in a post-conflict environment.

By design, PRTs have grown into interagency and multinational teams in both organization and scope. PRTs have become an integral part of International Security Assistance Force’s long-term strategy to transition the lines of security, governance, and economics to the Afghan people. As we look to the future we know the PRT effort will draw to a close and transition its efforts toward the provincial government. Until that event occurs and while it occurs it remains vital that new PRT personnel are familiar with the concepts, structure, and management of PRTs and the lessons learned and best practices established by their predecessors.

This handbook focuses on Afghanistan PRTs; the information contained in this handbook comes from multiple sources inside and outside the USG with the understanding that the way PRTs operate has changed and evolved over time.

The intent of this Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) publication is to share knowledge, support discussion, and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This publication is not a doctrinal product. The information provided in this publication is written by USG employees for those individuals who will serve in a stability and reconstruction environment.

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AFGHANISTAN PRT HANDBOOK

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. Concept 5
Chapter 3. Guidance 15
Chapter 4. Implementing Guidance 21
Chapter 5. Management Structure 31
Annex A. National and Provincial Data 53
Annex B. District Stability Framework 129
Annex C. Lessons Learned and Best Practices 155

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Chapter 1

Introduction

A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semipermissive environments usually following open hostilities. The PRT is intended to improve stability in a given area by helping build the host nation’s capacity; reinforcing the host nation’s legitimacy and effectiveness; and bolstering that the host nation can provide security to its citizens and deliver essential government services. The PRT assists provincial-level governments meet the expectations of their citizens. In Afghanistan, provincial-level governments are applying a synergistic, whole-of-government approach that encompasses the following objectives for Afghanistan:

- Establish a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant government.
- Commitment to a just, representative, and accountable government.
- Avoid being a safe haven or sponsor of terrorism.
- Become integrated into the global economy.
- Contribute to regional peace and security.

U.S. national policy focuses on transitioning from military to civilian lead in Afghanistan. The focus of the whole-of-government approach is to diminish the means and motivations for conflict, while developing local institutions to take the lead role in national governance (i.e., provide basic services, foster economic development, and enforce the rule of law). Success depends ultimately on the host nation and on the interrelationship and interdependence of the ensuing dynamics:

- The legitimacy of the government and its effectiveness as perceived by the local population and the international community.
- The perceived legitimacy of the freedoms and constraints placed on the force supporting the government.
- The degree to which factions, the local population, and other actors accede to the authority of the government and those forces supporting the government.

The strategy for Afghanistan identifies the following policy priorities for PRTs:

- Focusing on improving stability by reducing the causes of instability, conflict, and insurgency while simultaneously increasing the local government’s institutional capacity to handle these on its own.
• Strengthening the capacity of Afghan governmental and civil society institutions to protect the rule of law, confront corruption, and deliver basic services.

• Linking the people with their government while transforming the environment to ensure both of these efforts are enduring.

• Actively engaging and helping develop, in concert with other development actors, the capacity of the governor, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan officials, provincial councils, provincial development committees, district development assemblies, community development committees, *shuras*, and other established and/or traditional bodies.

• Providing a platform for the United Nations (UN) and other organizations seeking access to provinces. Committing to consulting and/or working with international partners to include intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

• Encouraging investment and economic diversification with regulatory frameworks and investment promotion.

• Reporting ground-truth data and providing accurate assessments.

A PRT stabilizes an area through its integrated civilian-military focus. It combines the diplomatic, military, and developmental components of the various agencies involved in the stabilization and reconstruction effort. The PRT is designed to help improve stability by building up the capacity of the host nation to govern; enhance economic viability; and deliver essential public services such as security, law and order, justice, health care, and education. Once the stability objectives have been fulfilled, PRTs can begin to dismantle. The traditional diplomatic and developmental programs then will operate within their normal venues.

This handbook provides a knowledge base to individuals operating in, adjacent to, or in support of a PRT, enabling these individuals to work effectively as a team achieving the purpose of the PRT and providing PRT members with shared operational guidelines and insights into PRT best practices.

Operations in Afghanistan are complex and evolving. This handbook is a supplement and subordinate to current International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) orders, instructions, guidance, and importantly the ISAF PRT Handbook. The lead countries have latitude on the methods and practices employed by the PRTs under their supervision. Defer to those local structures, methods, and practices. This handbook provides information useful to PRT members and contains lessons learned and best practices.
History of Afghanistan PRTs

PRTs find their origin in the coalition humanitarian liaison cells established by U.S. military forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in early 2002. A dozen Army civil affairs (CA) Soldiers staffed these small outposts, dubbed “Chiclets,” with the task to assess humanitarian needs, implement small-scale reconstruction projects, and establish relations with the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and nongovernmental organizations already in the field.¹

In late 2002, in an effort to augment the CA effort, the United States expanded this program with the creation of the first PRTs. The first PRT was established in Gardez in November 2002² and became fully operational on 1 February 2003. The PRT was collocated with U.S. Special Forces “A” team members. A CA team provided the daily contact with locals and tribal leaders. A contingent of the 82nd Airborne Division provided security in and around the compound. The sole civilian when the PRT became fully operational was from the Department of State. The U.S. Agency for International Development provided a contractor in March 2003; later that year, three agricultural experts from the Department of Agriculture joined this and other PRTs.³

PRTs in Bamyan, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Herat followed throughout 2003. These initial sites were chosen to provide a U.S. military and central government presence among key locations, including Afghanistan’s four primary ethnic groups, the former Taliban headquarters, and the base of the country’s most difficult warlord, Ishmael Khan.⁴

Late in 2003, the number of PRTs rose dramatically. The expansion was coincident with the arrival of Zalmay Khalilzad as U.S. ambassador in Kabul, and a push by the U.S. military to flatten its force posture throughout the country while still maintaining a relatively light footprint.⁵

As the PRT program took off, the United States began to hand over some PRTs to coalition allies. In December 2003, the ISAF took over command of the German-led PRT in Kunduz. By October 2006, ISAF had command over all PRTs.⁶

PRTs have been expanded throughout most of the provinces in Afghanistan. The first PRT laid the critical cornerstones to future PRT initiatives throughout Afghanistan.

Endnotes


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


Chapter 2

Concept

The provincial reconstruction team (PRT) concept envisions an integrated civil-military organization that expands the reach of the U.S. government (USG) and the wider international community assistance efforts from the environs of the host-nation capital to the provinces and local communities. A PRT is generally responsible for covering one province; however, a PRT may have responsibility for two or more provinces or a large segment of a single province.

The PRT seeks to improve the governing capacity of the host-nation. PRTs perform a vital role in occupying the vacuum caused by a weak government presence and deterring agents of instability. The PRT focuses on three elements of stabilization and reconstruction:

- Assisting with the establishment and improvement of the local government, including its connection to the central government and local populace, by advising and empowering stakeholders, legitimate governing bodies, and tribal leadership.

- Increasing provincial stability by working closely with the international military presence and assisting in developing host-nation security and rule-of-law capacity.

- Facilitating reconstruction that begins to:
  - Provide basic services.
  - Provide an economic system that supports the people.
  - Gain popular buy-in for change and support of representative government.
  - Ensure popular expectations for international assistance are met or abated.

The PRT’s role is to ensure international efforts are in line with the host-nation’s development intentions and to mitigate any development constraints. As the security environment improves, the PRT is intended to phase out as stabilization and reconstruction programs shift to longer-term development programs. The PRT ceases to exist when normal development operations can be carried out without its assistance. This evolution in the execution of the PRT mission requires a change in focus and an increased number of civilians with core competencies to address the development aspects of stabilization and reconstruction.
Purpose

Operations are dynamic and may not progress in a linear manner. Different parts of a country may require different combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability operations to transition from violent conflict toward stability and ultimately to peace. Full-spectrum operations involve simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability operations.

The components of full-spectrum operations are not considered phases. Commanders consider the concurrent conduct of the components of full-spectrum operations in every phase of an operation. As the operational focus shifts from predominantly offensive and defensive to predominantly stability tasks, operational gaps can exist that prevent the development of an indigenous capability and capacity that supports the country’s transition to peace and stability. Areas of the country can get “stuck” in instability, and the danger exists that they may “slip back” into open hostilities if security forces are removed. Ideally, stability operations in these areas lay the groundwork for long-term transformational development efforts designed to ensure the area does not “slip back” into instability or violent conflict, as depicted in Figure 2-1.

The inability of most actors, other than the military, to operate in unstable areas can contribute to operational gaps that lead to an area getting “stuck” in instability. For the military to transfer responsibility for an area (i.e., exercise its exit strategy), it must deliver some level of stability. Moving these areas further along is more appropriately conducted by civilians. While such expertise does reside in diplomatic and development agencies, many of these agencies are unable to operate in these areas using their traditional delivery mechanisms because of the instability. Exceptions would be some nongovernment organizations (NGOs) that traditionally operate in unstable security environments.

PRTs were devised to solve this problem. Because of the combined capabilities of the diplomatic, military, and development components, PRTs are able to stabilize these areas. When the capabilities brought by the military component of the PRT are no longer needed, the military component can withdraw, and the diplomatic and development components can revert to more traditional means to pursue their aims. This process is gradual. PRTs in more unstable areas may require the capabilities of the military component for longer periods of time. In stable areas, where security is sustainable by the local government and civilian agencies are capable of accomplishing their tasks without military assistance, PRTs can and should begin to draw down their military component.
PRTs are extremely expensive in terms of personnel, maintenance, and activity costs. Therefore, it is incumbent on the embassy country team, military chain of command, troop contributing nations, participating agencies, and PRT leadership teams to keep the PRTs focused on their goals and avoid all activities that do not directly contribute to accomplishing the mission.

Figure 2-1. Spectrum of intervention.
Intent

Once the PRT is established, the leadership must gain access to local power centers to determine the issues that the PRT should address, as well as the challenges and obstacles impacting on these issues. A PRT develops plans to achieve desired effects within the environment. The civil-military team, using the core competencies provided by Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other agencies should complete both assessment and strategy development. The PRT develops an implementation plan guided by the provincial stability strategy, based on a realistic time frame, for the anticipated tenure of the PRT and the dynamics of the area of responsibility (AOR).

Successive PRT leaders continue to adjust the implementation plan based on the changing nature of the AOR. The PRT’s plan should take into account other development strategies at work in the AOR. Those might include work by other USG-affiliated groups, international organizations, and efforts of the host government. The plan should also attempt to leverage, rather than counter, reconstruction and development efforts in adjacent provinces or regions.

The optimal situation is to have a plan owned and, at least in part, drafted by the PRT’s local interlocutors that supports a local strategy for the province. The civil-military team reviews the assessment, strategy, and implementation plan at regular intervals.

This process of active review ensures that the civil-military team achieves a common operating picture of the AOR and a common vision on how to affect the environment, which in turn provides for unity of effort within the PRT and with other PRTs. The PRT determines its resource needs based on the assessment and the subsequent plan it develops. PRT leaders should identify issues that are beyond their capacity to successfully effect and request assistance, as necessary, from the embassy country team, higher military headquarters, or both. PRT leaders should review how their plan will support or enhance national programs.

Principles

The primary activities of the PRT are to conceive, plan, coordinate, and execute reconstruction and initial development projects and programs. Though PRTs are not development institutions per se, PRTs should adhere to the following principles to the extent possible:

- **Focus on stability** — The missions and objectives of the PRT are based on the PRT’s operating environment. However, stability must be a key aspect of any PRT mission statement. Though context and constraints of the environment remain dynamic, only by achieving
a specific level of stability will the PRT be able to “exit” and more traditional actors take its place.

• Fill the gaps — PRTs were created because of the lack of local capacity within government and traditional governing bodies. As local governance structures, traditional authorities, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the private sector, and other entities gain capabilities and effectiveness, the responsibilities of the PRT will shift and potentially shrink to mentoring, advising, and training. The PRT will do everything that is not being done by these other entities to advance stability, short of being the government. It is extremely important to link all PRT actions to governing bodies and local institutions as much as possible. Balance is the key; it may be preferable to have a local solution that is less optimal than a PRT solution.

• Coordinate and integrate — The PRT should seek to create conditions that allow these other entities to continue to increase their capacity, effectiveness, and presence. To do this effectively and efficiently, the PRT should coordinate and integrate with the goals, plans, strategies, and activities of all stakeholders at all levels of government, civil society, private sector, traditional governance structures, IGOs, and NGOs. At times, this process may conflict with the desire to achieve quick results and successes. As host-nation governing bodies gain capacity and effectiveness, the PRT should cede responsibility for what has to be done.

• Focus on effects not outputs — For the PRT, outputs are only important in so much as they forward the ultimate effect of stability. As with any diplomatic, defense, or development institution, there is a danger that PRTs may fall prey to pressure to deliver immediate but inappropriate proxy indicators of progress, including number of projects completed or quantity of funds expended. Perhaps what is not so clear is that some indicators that are considered effects within the development community are really only outputs for a PRT. For example, the development community may consider an increase in literacy or a decrease in child mortality to be an effect.

• Unity of effort — Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among government departments and agencies with NGOs, IGOs, and with the host-nation. Unity of effort in an operation occurs vertically and horizontally for all involved chains of command. Unity of effort’s source is the nation’s will and it flows to individuals at the point of activity. Without unity of effort, the probability of success for any endeavor is diminished and limited resources are wasted.
Within the PRT there are often various agencies with differing mandates that are generally comfortable with their ways of doing business. There is considerable potential for friction and competing agendas. If not directly addressed and managed by the PRT leadership and its higher management authority, the results may hinder the process, delay completion of objectives, or contribute to total failure of the mission.

The integration and alignment of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful stability and reconstruction operations. PRTs must focus on supporting the host-nation’s local governments and the populace across the stabilization and reconstruction sectors. This support requires balancing an emphasis on nonmilitary programs with the measured use of force.

Political, social, and economic programs are most commonly and appropriately associated with civilian organizations and expertise. However, effective implementation of these programs is more important than who performs the tasks. Civilian organizations bring expertise that complements that of military forces. At the same time, civilian capabilities cannot be employed effectively without the security that military forces provide.

Effective PRT leaders understand the interdependent relationship of all participants, military and civilian. PRT leaders must orchestrate their efforts to achieve unity of effort and coherent results. If adequate civilian capacity is not available, military forces may be required to fill the gap. Reconstruction programs for political, social, and economic well-being are essential to achieving stability and developing the local capacity that commands popular support. To effectively work together, PRT planners should consider the following:

- Know the roles and capabilities of the U.S., NGOs, IGOs, and the host-nation government.
- Include other participants, particularly host-nation partners, in planning at every level.
- Support civilian efforts, including those of NGOs and IGOs.
- Conduct, facilitate, or participate in political, social, informational, and economic programs.

**Continuity of operations** — Continuity of operations is the degree to which there is continuous conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a mission. It includes the functions and duties of the team leader, as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by members of the team.
PRTs can require a significant amount of time to effect change within an area or province. The various agencies involved in providing PRT team members must ensure that there are no gaps in functional coverage or a wholesale turnover of personnel over long deployments. Either of these situations will result in the PRT losing valuable understanding of the environment and could affect relationships with the local government and the people as a whole. Try to avoid rotating the leadership positions (team leader and deputy team leader) at the same time. Have their changeovers scheduled by their parent department or agency to ensure continuity of interface with local leaders.

• **Flexibility** — The components of a PRT are adaptable to any situation, from immediate post conflict with no governance structure (PRTs will not act as a government structure) to an unstable but developed structure requiring assistance. This flexibility is essential for PRTs to be effective across the full spectrum of potential situations requiring interagency and multidisciplinary coordination and cooperation. Flexibility in the PRT framework facilitates scalability of management and response activities.

• **Guiding ideals**
  
  ○ *Ownership*: Build on the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people.
  
  ○ *Capacity building*: Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies.
  
  ○ *Sustainability*: Design programs to ensure their impact endures.
  
  ○ *Selectivity*: Allocate resources based on need, host-nation goals, local commitment, and foreign policy interests.
  
  ○ *Assessment*: Conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions.
  
  ○ *Results*: Focus resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focused objectives.
  
  ○ *Partnership*: Collaborate closely with provincial and local governments; communities; donors; local representatives of NGOs; local representatives of IGOs; and any other economic or agricultural entities.
  
  ○ *Flexibility*: Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency.
  
  ○ *Accountability*: Design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption.
Objectives

Execution of the mission should be designed around reaching the objectives. The key steps are understanding designated tasks and the intent provided in higher-level direction. In general, most objectives will require efforts across multidisciplinary programs. For instance, achieving a desired effect may require:

- Political leverage on the government (local and/or central).
- Economic or development projects to mitigate the impact of a desired outcome.
- Increased USG security presence or support to host-nation forces to deter potential violence.

Given the integrated capacity of PRTs, they are well-situated and should be fully resourced to achieve the following objectives:

- **Improve stability.** Determine the causes and means of conflict including resource competition, tribal/ethnic clashes, insurgency, criminal elements, and political instability; identify the triggers or opportunities to instigate conflict; determine ways to affect the causes and triggers; identify ways to mitigate or resolve the conflict; increase capacity of civil society and legitimate traditional processes to adjudicate and deter conflict.

- **Increase local institutional capacity.** Build individual, organizational, and structural capacity to provide public safety and basic services such as sewage, water, electrical, and trash-health (SWET-H). Where relevant, tie legitimate informal governance (traditional) leaders to nascent formal government organizations; tie appropriate reconstruction and stability projects to legitimate governing bodies.

- **Facilitate reconstruction activities.** Develop job-creation programs for infrastructure activities; provide microlending as soon as practicable; tie road improvements to commercial as well as political integration; and create value-added facilities to improve agriculture and natural resource capabilities within the local absorptive capacity.

- **Execute a strong strategic communications program.** Expand local information dissemination capacity, especially by local institutions (remember that actions speak louder than words); take advantage of face-to-face communication (where traditional and expected); encourage provincial leaders and authorities to seek out district population and traditional leaders; tie reconstruction activities to legitimate governing bodies.
Imperatives

As a PRT works to its objectives, both the general objectives outlined above and those established based on the environment of the situation, it should keep the following imperatives in mind:

- Focus on improving stability.
- Operate as an integrated military-civilian organization.
- Lead from behind, ensuring host-nation ownership. Promote host-nation primacy and legitimacy. However, at times, it may be necessary to illustrate that the U.S. is doing something for the people (remember and respect that the operational pace will be that of the host-nation).
- Actively engage with the governor, host-nation central government officials, and the local communities and population through provincial councils, provincial development committees, and other established and traditional bodies.
- Facilitate the visibility of the host-nation government’s presence in the province by assisting official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., providing transportation and communications).
- Promise only what you can deliver; manage expectations (under-promise and over-deliver). Never promise unless the money or assets are in hand. Even interest in a topic or project can be interpreted as a “promise.”
- Plan sustainability at the outset.
- Ensure that interventions at the provincial level support the host-nation’s national processes and development plan or strategy.
- Lay the foundations for long-term sustainable changes.
- Be committed to consulting and/or working with international partners, such as IGOs and NGOs.
- Be aware of and respect civil-military sensitivities — lives may depend on it.
**End State**

Usually the end state of a PRT occurs when the host-nation’s provisions for security and public safety are sufficient to support traditional means of development, and political stability is sustainable after the withdrawal of international forces. The PRT should design measures of effectiveness that delineate the perception of safety, the reduction of security incidences that impact daily life, the capacity of the government to provide basic services and rule of law, and the popular acceptance of legitimate formal and informal organizations and leaders by both the majority of the population and disaffected elements of the population. These measures will provide an accurate measure of progress in either a time- or conditions-based environment.
Chapter 3

Guidance

Guidance for provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan comes from two directions. The primary guidance comes from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); the secondary guidance comes from the member nations assigned to the various PRTs. As the funding for PRTs comes from member nations, the caveats that come from the political apparatus of those countries often drive how PRTs will operate often resulting in different types of operations being conducted from PRT to PRT. However, by agreement between member nations, there is an effort for all member nations to follow the precept established in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The ANDS is Afghanistan’s guiding document for achieving its reconstruction goals. The strategy focuses on improving the country’s security, governance, economic growth, and reducing poverty. The ANDS also provides information on the resources needed to carry out the strategy and on the shortfall in Afghanistan’s projected revenue. The ANDS was released in 2008 and is effective through 2013.

It is highly encouraged that PRT members be familiar with the ANDS. However, this handbook focuses on U.S. guidance and will address, where applicable, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/ISAF guidance.

Guidance Framework

Within the U.S. government (USG), senior officials provide strategic guidance through cabinet-level principals’ committees (PC) or deputies’ committees (DC). The committees are chaired by the National Security Council (NSC) and reflect the strategic goals as laid out by the president. In turn, the PC or DC may task existing interagency policy coordinating committees or country reconstruction and stabilization groups to develop implementation based on the strategic guidance.

In the field, operational guidance normally runs through the relevant combatant command to a joint task force (JTF) or other appropriate formation on the military side and through the chief of mission (COM) or presidential envoy on the civilian side. Whichever department has the lead, all efforts at the field level should integrate the directives from both the supported and supporting departments. The geographic combatant command’s strategic plan should delineate the agreed stability and political conditions necessary to shift the military from a supported command to a supporting command, wherein the COM will assume lead for USG efforts. Certain circumstances may result in the recognition of joint civilian-military command, preserving unity of effort if not unity of command.
National Command Authority may designate a specific USG department as the lead agency. In a situation where active combat is expected or underway, the Department of Defense (DOD) may be the lead with other agencies in a supporting role. Where the environment is clearly post-conflict and instability has diminished, the lead shifts to the Department of State (DOS), which is responsible for coordinating the efforts of other civilian departments and agencies.

Overarching Strategic Guidance

It is within this framework that two relevant strategies were developed — the *U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan* in March 2009 and *Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy* in January/February 2010.

- **U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan** — This strategy is based on a policy review the president of the United States requested upon taking office. The goal of the strategy is to defeat, disrupt, and dismantle al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to prevent their return to either country. The strategy initiates a regional approach by linking Afghanistan and Pakistan in a common fight against violent extremists. It incorporates input from the Afghan and Pakistani governments, NATO, and international partners and organizations in Afghanistan. The strategy emphasizes economic assistance to Pakistan as well as an expectation that Pakistan will combat al-Qaida and violent extremists in sanctuaries in Pakistan. For Afghanistan, the strategy commits to increasing U.S. troop levels to fight extremists along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, train Afghan security forces, and provide civilian experts to help the Afghan government. In December 2009, the president reaffirmed this strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan and announced the planned deployment of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan to target the insurgency, secure key population centers, and train Afghan security forces. The president also stated the additional troops would accelerate efforts and allow the transfer of U.S. forces out of Afghanistan beginning in July 2011. He reaffirmed the need to pursue a more effective civilian strategy and focus assistance in areas, such as agriculture, that could make an immediate impact.

- **Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy** — The regional stabilization strategy, signed by the secretaries of defense and state, focuses on U.S. non-military efforts and states that the U.S. combat mission is not open-ended; however, the strategy states that the United States is committed to building a lasting partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan. The strategy focuses on building
the capacity of Afghan institutions to combat extremism, deliver high-impact economic assistance, create jobs, and reduce insurgent funding from the illicit narcotics trade. The strategy identifies key initiatives such as building the capacity of government in population centers in eastern and southern Afghanistan, improving agricultural development, and reintegrating Taliban who renounce al-Qaida.

It must be understood that these strategies support the concepts as established in the Bonn Agreement, December 2001; the Afghan Compact, January 2006; and the London Conference Communiqué in January 2010.

Within the construct of these overarching strategies the NSC, U.S. Central Command, and leadership within Afghanistan developed several plans. In addition, the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (ICMCP) — signed by the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and the commanding general of U.S. Forces—Afghanistan and developed collaboratively by the U.S. agencies working in Afghanistan, the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, ISAF, the government of Afghanistan, and other partner nations — provides guidance for U.S. personnel in Afghanistan and lays out a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign to secure and support the Afghan people and government. The ICMCP calls for integrated civilian and military teams to address lines of effort by working on 11 specific efforts called transformative effects which can be aligned along three lines of effort: security, governance, and development.

**Transformative Effects**

- Security success will be defined as:
  
  ○ *Population Security* — Afghans feel free from violence and coercion by insurgents, criminals, and terrorists and increasingly trust security forces to protect them, enabling resistance to the insurgency and support for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

  ○ *Action against Irreconcilables* — Irreconcilable insurgent leaders and networks are defeated. They are rejected by the Afghan population and cannot threaten the security of Afghanistan or legitimacy of GIRoA. Al Qaida is unable to use Afghanistan to launch international terror attacks.

  ○ *Countering the Nexus of Insurgency, Narcotics, Corruption and Criminality* — Key nodes within the nexus of criminals, narcotics, illicit finance, and corrupt government officials which feed into the insurgency are identified, targeted, and disrupted significantly raising the costs and risks of this network.
• Governance success will be defined as:
  ○ *Elections and Continuity of Governance* — Elections are credible, inclusive, and secure with minimal disruption enabling a smooth post-election process.
  ○ *Expansion of Accountable and Transparent Governance* — Increasingly responsive, capable, and accountable governance at all levels competently serves the people reinforcing a growing sense of connection and legitimacy.
  ○ *Access to Justice* — Afghan access to fair, efficient, and transparent justice in both state and traditional justice mechanisms is increased and Taliban influence on the informal system is reduced.
  ○ *Claiming the Information Initiative* — Government and community leadership communicate with the Afghan people on a common vision of hope and progress that convinces Afghans to resist insurgent influence and reject violent extremism.
  ○ *Community- and Government-led Reintegration* — Mid- to low-level insurgents are reintegrated into Afghan society, reducing the strength of the insurgency.

• Development success will be defined as:
  ○ *Creating Sustainable Jobs for Population Centers and Corridors* — Licit small and medium enterprises create jobs and grow incomes in population centers and corridors while improvements in the business-enabling environment encourage large-scale investment in strategic sectors and extend opportunities to rural areas.
  ○ *Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access* — Viable agriculture-related employment and market development provide licit alternatives to narcotics and insurgent-related activities and connect people to their government.
  ○ *Border Access for Commerce, not Insurgents* — Afghanistan works with regional partners to increase licit cross-border commerce and activities and reduce infiltration of insurgents and illicit goods.
Operational Guidance

U.S. agencies in concert with international partners use a whole-of-government approach emphasizing unity of effort, to provide an agile, flexible, and responsive COIN strategy to promote stability. This is accomplished by integrating planning and operations in a framework, which synchronizes all USG resources by sector and geographical region to assist the GIRoA in establishing a viable society and government.

Working with the GIRoA national and local leaders, USG agencies ensure all development efforts align with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. This applies to all programs focused at the public sector, the private sector, and civil society.

At the national level, U.S. monetary assistance is channeled through the GIRoA budget. USG personnel are required to involve ministry staffs in program design, procurement, monitoring, assessment, and evaluation.

At the field level, staffs are involved in planning and implementation, as appropriate, to ensure proposed activities contribute to, and are consistent with, U.S. COIN goals.

Operationalizing Interagency Guidance: Roles Played by the PRT

Operational interagency guidance is the implementing glue between overarching strategic goals, operational goals, and local execution. This guidance delineates the separate agency areas of responsibility (AORs). The guidance should tie national/sector development programs with the stability objectives and activities of the PRT.

Each agency active within the PRT provides appropriate implementing guidance to its respective agency elements deployed in the PRT. Depending on the actual makeup of the PRT, the relevant agencies are likely to include DOD, DOS, U.S. Agency for International Development, and others — including the Department of Agriculture and Department of Justice. Drawing on the integrated operational guidance developed at the embassy/JTF level, each agency provides a framework for its PRT personnel to identify key issues, priorities, timelines, and possible measures of effectiveness.

Although PRTs mostly focus on the tactical level, the interagency nature of their structure and activities cuts across any number of sectors (security, governance, and economy) and must be aligned with corresponding national and sector efforts. Any discontinuity or gaps in these local efforts are likely
to manifest themselves as difficulties in achieving unity of effort within the PRT’s AOR. Therefore, PRTs play an important role in informing and refining operational guidance from intermediate or higher headquarters and ensuring that the local objectives are effective, attainable, and aligned with operational and strategic goals.

It is vitally important that the PRT leadership ensures that the guidance coming in from multiple agencies is carefully coordinated and mutually reinforcing, and that the PRT leadership reports to higher headquarters when there are inconsistencies or when difficulties occur. The PRT is an important “ground truth” check on interagency coordination at higher levels; if differing guidance cannot be integrated at the PRT level, it may well be indicative of disjointed coordination or planning at the regional or national level. The PRT’s activities are then developed through a common assessment of the situation and integrated implementation plan.

Endnote

Chapter 4
Implementing Guidance

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are deployed to foster stabilization and support U.S. national goals. A PRT’s actions, projects, and programs should all support these goals. To develop a multi-year strategy PRT members need to assess and understand the factors that cause instability and conflict in their area. The local causes of instability and conflict may be similar to those driving the national conflict, but there likely will be additional complexities and local aspects of the problem (e.g., local resource issues and relationships among local actors, tribes, sects, or groups). The PRT’s job is to understand what is causing the instability and conflict in its area, so that its interventions can reduce conflict and promote a more stable environment.

Conflict is frequently conceptualized and assessed in terms of sources/causes, parties, actors, “drivers,” and potential triggers. The sources and root causes of conflict can be described in terms of stakeholders’ frustrated needs and grievances. The “drivers” of conflict are the dynamics of how those frustrations and grievances are expressed and manipulated. Triggers are often thought of as shocks to the system (a drought) or events (an election) that spark conflict. The PRT needs to assess the potential drivers of instability and conflict in its area of responsibility (AOR). These may include resource competition, sectarian animosity, ethnic violence, lack of meaningful economic opportunity, and culturally sanctioned vendettas. This assessment entails mapping the social, cultural, political, and economic networks that the population lives with daily. The mapping is not a doctoral dissertation, but it should touch on the key aspects of the environment that impact the level of conflict.

Integrated Assessment

Within Afghanistan, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s District Stability Framework (DSF) is used by most U.S. government (USG) departments (to include a number of military units), agencies, and bureaus, as well as by some of our international partners. The DSF helps these entities identify and take action to mitigate the root causes of the instability, as identified from the local population’s perspective. See Annex B for a full description of DSF.

Whether a PRT uses the DSF or another system, the key element of any assessment is to listen to and engage with the local population including different levels of society and the various groups in the PRT’s AOR.
Typical steps in an assessment include:

- Collecting data (through interviews, observations, field-based activities, or secondary sources). Data should include information on background factors and underlying risks, such as stakeholders’ interests/needs; opinion leaders’ motivations/means; potential triggers; potential “spoilers”; and international or regional actors or factors.

- Describing the dynamics (conflict drivers) that are factors that contribute to escalation of the conflict.

- Prioritizing the “drivers” according to the degree they contribute to escalation of the conflict.

- Identifying conflict mitigation and resolution mechanisms.

**Focused Planning**

PRTs have used a variety of formal and informal planning processes, as well as short-term and long-term focus throughout their existence. However, a consensus is emerging that PRTs are most effective when they develop a multi-year plan of action based on their mission analysis and shaped by their analysis of what is driving instability and conflict in their area. The PRT plan should be:

- **Driven by its mission guidance and directed tasks.** In addition to the PRT’s own plans, the PRT needs to interface with and help implement other plans. There may be multiple documents (host nation, USG, international [e.g., United Nations or North Atlantic Treaty Organization]) that should be acquired and understood. Some U.S. planning documents may be classified, so the PRT may need to work with contacts, usually at the embassy, to learn what strategies are relevant. Although the responsibility for coordinating these various frameworks falls at a higher level than the PRT, to be fully effective, the PRT leadership needs to be cognizant of all relevant strategies and the degree to which the PRT will interface with each strategy. Whether the mission is counterinsurgency, post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction, or capacity building, the PRT must ensure its strategy, plans, and actions support and further those overarching objectives.

- **Shaped by a full understanding of the area assigned to the PRT.** The plan should be developed following an assessment of the threats to stability in the PRT’s AOR, including factors that increase and decrease the likelihood of conflict. The assessment should strive to determine the key impediments to achieving mission success. There may be instability based on tribal competition, conflict perpetrated by criminal or insurgent activities, or weak local institutions that prevent
effective extension of the national government. This assessment provides a common operating picture for all USG actors in the province that will shape, sequence, and focus their efforts toward achieving the PRT’s mission.

- **Multi-year.** PRT team members understand that achieving success in their AOR will take many years even though they are often deployed for no more than a year. Rather than a series of one-year plans, it is important to develop a multi-year (three to five years) strategy that promotes continuity of effort. The strategy should include: (1) Key strategic interventions that are necessary to address the causes of instability and conflict; and (2) A long-term end-state goal and the required objectives to achieve sustainable stability sufficient to provide an environment where normal development programs can flourish. The strategy can and should be reviewed and routinely revised, particularly before unit rotations or large personnel turnovers, or as guidance or conditions change. The strategic objectives provide the basis for a multi-year implementation plan that should cover a time frame of at least two years to facilitate continuity.

- **Interagency.** The PRT is an interagency team and needs to plan as a team. Ideally, the PRT’s planning team should include functional, regional, and planning experts representing all the agencies active in the PRT. There may be a tendency for each agency to want to perform separate assessments and then build separate action plans based on those assessments. Institutional culture, personal expertise, rotation cycles, and separate reporting chains can all push PRT members in this direction. But without a joint assessment, strategy, and implementation plan, the PRT will lack a common understanding of the situation, making it hard to agree on where resources should be focused and prioritize and integrate each agency’s efforts.

**Mitigate Conflict and Build Local Capacity**

In the follow-on planning phase, PRT planners decide how to mitigate the dynamics that “drive” the conflict and strengthen the dynamics that mitigate or defuse the conflict. Factors that demonstrate local and regional capacity usually contribute to mitigation of the conflict. These factors include the legitimacy and effectiveness of the host government; its political, social, economic, and security institutions; and the resilience of civil society.

In most interventions in countries in crisis, the USG’s goal is to achieve a sustainable peace where the host government is able to meet the fundamental needs of its citizens for security, social well-being, just governance, and economic livelihood. In many reconstruction and stabilization environments, this institutional capacity is limited or absent.
Identifying the areas of need, mentoring key individuals, facilitating training, and focusing intervention are all potential tools.

Building governmental capacity above the provincial level is clearly beyond the scope of the PRT and is the responsibility of the national-level program; however, the PRT is best positioned to understand the specific needs within the province, district, or regional area within its responsibility and to use the information to design local programs and inform national-level planning. While every situation is different, local governments often need help developing processes for citizen input, prioritizing government programs and projects, implementing budgeting processes, and establishing public security capabilities. Keep in mind that not all institutions are governmental; building the capacity of traditional governing mechanisms and civil society (religious groups, business institutions, and political parties) may also be required.

Figure 4-1 provides a visual summary of planning process goals (to increase the capacity of local institutions to respond to local needs and wants, while reducing the drivers of conflict).

Figure 4-1. Planning process goals
Develop Long-Term Objectives

Once the PRT has assessed local needs, identified key drivers of conflict, and built connections to local institutions, it needs to develop intervention strategies to be implemented through an action plan. For example, if the two major tribes in a PRT’s area are engaged in ongoing, low-level hostilities over historic grievances and competition for scarce water resources, the PRT may decide it needs a strategy for a peace-building process supported by a water management strategy to address this underlying source of conflict. Taken together, the major mission elements or objectives should be:

- Developed from an assessment of the causes of conflict and instability.
- Necessary to achieve the goal and succeed.
- Sufficient to achieve the overarching objectives or goal.
- Stated as measurable, realistically ambitious objectives.
- Integrated across agency stovepipes when necessary to achieve the goal.
- Able to help identify cross-sector issues that may be overlooked by the bureaucracy.

The PRT may not have the resources and tools to address larger and more complex issues. In these cases the PRT should flag these parts of the plan for consideration by the embassy and higher military headquarters. For example, the PRT may identify a corrupt and poorly trained police force as a significant factor undermining local support for the national government. Police training likely needs to be conducted as part of a national program and should be raised with the embassy. However, setting up a public safety commission to represent citizen interests in interactions with police authorities might be something the PRT could help with at the local level.

Develop an Implementation Plan with Tasks, Activities, and Actions

The implementation plan consists of the major mission elements or operational objectives the PRT has identified and the tasks, activities, and actions the PRT should undertake to achieve them. In the example involving competition over water resources, the PRT may want to seek input from a hydrologist. The hydrologist might recommend a regional solution, which might be expensive and need to be referred for higher-level action. The hydrologist might also identify smaller local projects that would improve lives in the short term and provide space for the peace-building process to
proceed. The completion of these projects might be identified by the PRT as essential tasks. Essential tasks should be:

- Necessary and, taken together, sufficient to achieve the major mission element (MME)/objective.
- Stated as measurable outcomes.
- Managed by implementing agencies or PRT members.

The action plan should identify which agency or PRT member has the lead for a specific program or action and the source of funding. However, not all the essential tasks involve expending program funds; some may involve diplomatic, political, or other initiatives undertaken by the PRT’s leadership and advisers. The plan’s time frame varies according to the circumstances, the nature of U.S. involvement, and the overall strategic plan but should be at least two years long to provide continuity of PRT personnel. While actions and programs for the current year will need to be identified, the MME/objectives will likely be multi-year.

The PRT constantly needs to balance conflicting goals. Is effective direct intervention in local disputes more important than efforts to increase the capacity of local security forces? Should limited reconstruction funds be used to build necessary government infrastructure or to increase the general population’s general welfare? (Are police stations more important than sewage systems?)

There will always be trade-offs in the planning process, including staffing and budgetary cycles, limits on uses of funds, national versus provincial imperatives, different time frames for achieving immediate security requirements versus stability, and other constraints that will affect what can be done. But a good planning process and framework leads to the best use of resources within the inevitable constraints.

Given the changing nature and stability dynamics of the AOR, the implementation plan should also identify triggers for contingency plan activation to support local and national government response. For instance, natural disasters significantly strain nascent government capacity. The ability of the local government to respond to natural disasters can reduce resulting instability and impact the population’s perception of government legitimacy. A PRT plan with goals, objectives, and action officers to support provincial government response can help the provincial government address short-term stability requirements while also addressing long-term capacity building.
Measuring Performance (Metrics)

PRTs will be asked to assess and report on their progress. This assessment will probably include the development of indicators or metrics as part of a process called performance monitoring. Performance monitoring involves the repeated review of reported information to inform decision making. The reported information is a combination of metrics, other information gathered, and the review and analysis of that information. The purposes of performance monitoring are to gather and present systematic, analytic information for the PRT’s own use in assessing the impact and effects of its efforts; to inform decision makers up the chain of command; and to report to Congress and the public. The best time to consider how to measure the success of the PRT’s plan is while the plan is being developed. Note that there also will be demands from higher agency levels for assessments that may or may not track those of the PRT.

Impact assessment can be difficult in a reconstruction and stabilization context — the full impact of a PRT’s activities may not become clear for some time, and public databases that might track changes in indicators over time may not exist or be reliable. Nonetheless, it is important that the PRT assess its output — the immediate effect of its activities — and the short- and long-term impact of these activities. Ultimately, the impact is what matters. Output is usually easiest to measure, (e.g., number of wells drilled, schools built, and police trained), but it does not measure the effects the PRT is trying to achieve. Outcomes or intermediate effects (how many have access to clean water, growth in school enrollment, public perception of police) and longer-term impacts of activities on the overall situation (impact of wells on local power structure, perception of education’s impact on social values or economic prospects, impact of police training on public security, and support for the government) may require more creativity. A few clear, insightful measures are better than many indirect or less obvious ones. Examples of indicators include:

- **Impact indicator.** Overarching goals are achieved:
  - Functioning economy that provides tax revenue and facilitates licit economic activity:
    - Percent of country’s economy that can be taxed by the federal government.
    - Relative personal income rates across key identity groups.
  - Government that ensures the rule of law and protects civilians:
    - Polling on “how safe citizens feel” across identity groups.
    - Human rights assessments.
○ Political processes that are seen as legitimate and credible.
○ Participation in political processes by major groups or factions.
○ Civil/political rights assessments.

• **Outcome indicator.** Measures the effect of activities on achieving broader objectives:
  ○ Increase in employment.
  ○ Shorter pre-trial detention periods.
  ○ Increase in participation in political processes by former combatants.

While output indicators can help PRTs track their efforts, when USG planners and policymakers use the terms “performance” or “results,” they are referring to those objectives nearer the top — at least at the outcome level.

**Continuity Process**

PRT staff is subject to a high rate of turnover. Civilians generally serve 12 months but often have gaps between assignments, while core military members serve 9 months. Unfortunately, changes in personnel often result in changes in PRT direction, objectives, and programs. Without a long-term plan, new arrivals are left to improvise their own programs, drawing on their own expertise, which results in choppy and ineffective PRT programming that wastes time and resources.

A long-term common operating picture and strategic implementation plan assists with continuity. During their predeployment training, PRT members should strive to understand the specific area analysis and implementation plan provided by their predecessors. The new PRT should be aware of the causes of instability and conflict; strategies and implementation interventions, programs, activities, and measures of effectiveness as they relate to its work; the objectives of the maneuver brigade and other PRTs in the particular region; and the longer term USG provincial goals and objectives. In addition to forwarding the planning documents, during the last month of deployment, PRTs and military teams should complete the following tasks:

• Capture their experiences (both lessons learned and good practices) and present them to the incoming PRT, maneuver commanders and staffs, and implementing partners.

• Send materials from briefings to PRT training units, both military and civilian, in the U.S. to update training materials.
• Attend and assist with training incoming teams and overlap with their successors, if possible.

• Highlight particularly valuable lessons learned on how to work in the environment; how to be a team player with civilian/military teams; how to engage the local community appropriately; and how to alter programming based on local input, while making it complementary to PRT and the maneuver commander’s goals.

**Funding Guidance and Authorities**

Funding for activities within the PRT AOR will likely come from several sources. Examples include: Economic Support Funds (ESF), Quick Response Funds (QRF), Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).

In many cases, such as ESF, QRF, and INCLE, the PRT is likely to play an oversight or supporting role. In Afghanistan, the CERP provides military commanders with funds they can directly program and disburse. Legal restrictions on the use of certain funds and the existing sanctions on the country in question require the separate management of these funds by the organization responsible for their expenditure. In addition, constraints, including prohibitions on certain uses of the funds, must be taken into account in planning how and whether the PRT will undertake specific activities.

In cases where a PRT has discretionary authority in funding, PRT leadership must be fully aware of the guidelines and authorities that are attached to each funding source and determine the best use of these funds. This responsibility includes which funds are best used for specific projects. Balancing this multitude of considerations is an essential task of the PRT’s interagency leadership to ensure an effective, efficient, and sustainable plan.
Chapter 5
Management Structure

Lines of Authority

There are multiple lines of authority affecting provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) as noted in Figure 5-1. These multiple lines have the potential to cause operational and administrative impact on the way a PRT accomplishes its mission in regards to unity of effort, uniform measures of effectiveness, and sharing lessons and best practices. Therefore, it is prudent for members of a PRT to understand the various lines of authority. Though the discussion that follows is about lines of authority affecting U.S. PRTs, these same lines of authority exist in virtually every other nation’s PRTs, with lines running from their defense, foreign affairs, and other participating ministries.

Coordination Lines

As complex as the lines are, the coordination between these lines is key to the successful completion of operations in Afghanistan. There are two key international coordination elements with which the U.S. government (USG) participates — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC). Additionally important are the coordination elements within the USG which occur at the strategic level in Washington, DC, and the country-level coordination in Kabul.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The USG is actively involved in discussions that occur at the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the highest decision-making body in NATO, and other civilian and military committees. The permanent representative from each of the member countries form the NAC, and they meet together at least once a week. The NAC also meets at higher-level meetings involving foreign ministers, defense ministers, or heads of state, and it is at these meetings that major decisions regarding NATO’s policies are generally taken. However, it is worth noting that the NAC has the same authority and powers of decision making and its decisions have the same status and validity at whatever level it meets. The meetings of the NAC are chaired by the secretary general of NATO, and when decisions have to be made, action is agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord. There is no voting or decision by majority. Each nation represented at the NAC or on any of its subordinate committees retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions.
Figure 5-1. Lines of authority

Legend:
ACO: Allied Command Operations
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command
CJTF: Combined Joint Task Force
CSTA–A: Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan
COM: Chief of Mission
DoS: Department of State
GIRoA: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IJC: ISAF Joint Command
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
IPA: Interagency Provincial Affairs
JFC: Joint Force Command
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA: National Command Authority
NTM–A: NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan
PRT ESC: PRT Executive Steering Committee
RC: Regional Command
RP: Regional Platform
SCA: Bureau of South and Central Asia
TF: Task Force
UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
USFOR–A: U.S. Forces–Afghanistan
The second pivotal coordination element within NATO is the Military Committee (MC). It comprises each country’s delegation military representative, a senior officer from each country’s armed forces, supported by the International Military Staff. The MC is a body responsible for recommending to NATO’s political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defense of the NATO area. The MC’s principal role is to provide direction and advice on military policy and strategy. It provides guidance on military matters to NATO strategic commanders, whose representatives attend its meetings, and is responsible for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the alliance under the authority of the NAC.

**Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee**

Another key coordinating structure is the PRT ESC. It is an ambassadorial-/ministerial-level body, co-chaired by the Afghanistan minister of interior (MOI) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander (COMISAF). The PRT ESC provides guidance for and oversight of all existing and proposed PRTs in the country. Its membership includes the ambassadors of all the PRT troop contributing nations (TCNs) and potential contributing nations; the Afghanistan Minister of Finance, Minister of Reconstruction, and Minister of Rural Development; United Nations (UN) Special Representative of the Secretary General; NATO Senior Civilian Representative; and the European Union Special Representative. The ESC meets as necessary and endorses policy notes that give specific guidance on PRT support for certain elements of security sector reform and reconstruction and development.

The PRT working group is a subordinate body of the ESC. Its role is to resolve operational issues, prepare the ESC agenda, and prepare issues for decision. It meets approximately once a month and consists of representatives from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), ISAF, and PRT TCN embassies. The working group is chaired by the head of the PRT section at MOI, with representatives from UNAMA and ISAF serving as co-chairs.
Interagency Strategic Coordination

Key to USG strategic coordination is the activities depicted in Figure 5-2 below.

Figure 5-2. Major U.S. interagency Afghan assistance coordination mechanisms

Key interagency decisions for U.S. PRTs within Afghanistan are coordinated primarily through daily meetings of the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group. The group includes representatives from the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), Department of Agriculture (USDA), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other participating departments and agencies.

Incountry Interagency Coordination

The national-level working group process is the mechanism used in Kabul to achieve interagency coordination. It is led by a principals group led by the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and the U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR–A) commander. An executive working group provides the day-to-day management of the process and oversight of the following working groups: economic and finance policy; infrastructure; population security; illicit finance; gender policy; elections; anti-corruption; border issues; agriculture policy; information initiatives; reintegration; counternarcotics; governance; rule of law; and border coordination.
Coordination for PRTs issues is accomplished within the Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA). IPA was created in 2009 to provide strategy and policy guidance on sub-national governance, stabilization issues, Afghan capacity-building programs, and civil-military integration. For these issues, IPA facilitates exchanges on sub-national issues among offices in the embassy, senior U.S. military commanders, Afghan officials, and nongovernmental organizations. The IPA consists of the coordinator and one deputy from each agency: DOS, USAID, USDA, and DOD. IPA is also responsible for logistical and management support of embassy civilian staff deployed at PRTs across Afghanistan.4

NATO Lines of Authority5

NATO assumed responsibility from the UN for command, control, and coordination of ISAF in Afghanistan on 11 August 2003 following a NAC decision on 16 April 2003. The NAC also provides overall coordination and political direction for ISAF through the MC in close consultation with non-NATO ISAF TCNs. The MC in turn directs the two principal NATO military organizations — Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation. ACO in Mons, Belgium, has the overall military command of all the NATO-led operations, including ISAF operations.

ACO’s subordinate headquarters, Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) headquarters (HQ) in Brunssum, Netherlands, runs the ISAF operation, which implies the planning and command of the force. It also provides a force commander. JFC serves as the operational-level HQ between ISAF HQ in Kabul and the strategic command at ACO.

The ISAF command structure consists of a higher strategic HQs, ISAF HQ, and two subordinate, intermediate HQ, — the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM–A) and ISAF Joint Command (IJC). The three HQs are located in Kabul.

COMISAF focuses on the more strategic political-military aspects of the ISAF mission, synchronizing ISAF’s operations with the work of Afghan and other international organizations in the country. COMISAF is dual-hatted as the commander, USFOR–A, thus coordinating and deconflicting ISAF operations and U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) operations.

The IJC commander is responsible for executing the full spectrum of tactical operations throughout the country on a day-to-day basis. Under his command are six subordinate regional commands (RCs): RC–North (RC[N]) in Mazar-e-Sharif, RC–West (RC[W]) in Herat, RC–South (RC[S]) in Kandahar, RC–Southwest (RC[SW]) in Helmand, RC–East (RC[E]) in Bagram and RC–Capital (RC[C]) in Kabul. The RCs act as tactical military
headquarters providing military command and support to both PRTs and other military force elements. In addition, the IJC commander ensures the coordination of ISAF and Afghan National Security Force operations.

Each PRT, which covers one or more provinces, is established by a lead nation. In many instances, the lead nation is assisted by one or more partner nations who contribute assets and personnel. The following map and chart depict the location of the PRTs and which nations support them. It must be noted that the U.S. provides assistance in the form of a DOS and USAID representative to virtually all PRTs. In addition, the USDA provides assistance to a number of PRTs.

Figure 5-3. ISAF RCs, Major Units, and PRTs
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<th>Regional Command</th>
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U.S. Military Operational and Administrative Authorities

Within the U.S. military the lines of authority are often blurred by trying to understand the operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and administrative control (ADCON) authorities. This book will not try to distinguish between the three and will treat OPCON and TACON as the same for simplicity.

Regardless of which control is discussed, the ultimate authority for the U.S. military rests with the National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA consists of only the president and the secretary of defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.

Services retain ADCON of their personnel assigned to PRTs within Afghanistan to fulfill administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10 of the U. S. Code. This control includes such actions that relate to discipline and personnel management (e.g. assignment, performance reports, and awards and decorations). However, by direction, administrative and support responsibilities pertaining to PRT operations (e.g., organizational alignment, resources, and logistics support responsibilities), which normally are retained by the individual services, are assigned to one service—the U.S. Army. This allows for ease of operations and removal of duplication of effort, as PRTs are manned by more than one service.

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), located at MacDill Air Force Base, FL, has OPCON over all military personnel within Afghanistan. Its areas of responsibility (AORs) include the Middle East and Central Asia. Its mission, with national and international partners, is to promote cooperation among nations, respond to crises, deter or defeat state and non-state aggression, and support development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity. The component commands of USCENTOM include Air Forces Central

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(AFCENT), U.S. Army Central (ARCENT), Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MARCENT), and U.S. Navy Forces Central Command (NAVCENT). Each of these components exercises their respective service’s ADCON in the AOR. In 2008 USCENTOM established USFOR–A to be the operational headquarters for the Afghanistan AOR.

USFOR–A, located at Kabul, Afghanistan, serves as a “functioning command and control headquarters for U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan” that operates independently of ISAF. The mission of USFOR–A, in coordination with ISAF, is conducting operations to defeat terrorist networks and insurgents by developing effective governance; building the Afghan National Security Force for effective security throughout Afghanistan and continued regional stability; and increasing economic development for the people of Afghanistan. USFOR–A has OPCON/TACON authority over an array of Air Force, Army, Marine, and Navy units as well as several joint commands, to include Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A). CSTC–A serves as the U.S. military’s component of NTM–A providing training support for the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, and their respective departments.

All U.S. PRTs report to their respective RC aligned U.S. division with the exception of the Farah PRT that reports to the division aligned with RC(SW). As of January 2011, these divisions were the 101st Airborne Division in RC(E), 10th Mountain Division in RC(S), and 1st Marine Division in RC(SW). The divisions serve as the single joint command responsible to USFOR–A for all military functions with their region.

U.S. Department of State Authority

As with all ambassadors, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan was nominated by the president, confirmed by the senate, and answers to the secretary of state. The secretary further delegates oversight and day-to-day operations to the under secretary of state for political affairs and the regional bureaus; for Afghanistan it is the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

The ambassador is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees in Afghanistan except those under the command of USFOR–A. As the president’s direct representative, he is also responsible for providing the GIRoA the official United States’ position on matters and provides the in-country interface between the president and the president of Afghanistan. To ensure all U.S. PRT efforts are synchronized, the ambassador established the PRT Sub-National Government Office, which in August 2009 became the IPA. The new name increased the emphasis on unity of effort among USG agencies and to indicate that the scope would be beyond just PRTs.
The IPA’s organizational structure parallels military command and control structure. It has regional platforms that mirror the RCs, each with a senior civilian representative (SCR), who is the counterpart to the military commander in the RC. The SCR’s main task is to foster civil-military integration through the civilians working under them at the task force, PRT, and district support team (DST) levels.\textsuperscript{14}

**Other Department/Agency Authorities**

Other departments and agencies mirror the DOS line of authority but will normally have a functional versus regional bureau providing guidance to their mission chiefs and onward to their field representatives assigned to assist PRTs.

**PRT Structure and Functions**

Initial guidance on the structure and functions of U.S.-led PRTs within Afghanistan was agreed to by senior civilian and military leadership in Afghanistan and approved by the U.S. Deputies Committee in June 2003. The guidance envisioned that civilian representatives and military officers in the PRT would work as a team to assess the environment and develop strategies to achieve the three primary objectives.

DOD was assigned responsibility for improving security in the PRT’s area of operation as well as providing all logistical support and providing force protection for all PRT members, including civilians. USAID was given the lead on reconstruction, and DOS was responsible for political oversight, coordination, and reporting. All members of the PRT leadership structure — military and civilian — are required to approve reconstruction projects and coordinate with local government offices and national ministries. The concept anticipated that as PRTs matured and conditions changed, additional capacity would be available through reach-back to additional military and civilian assets.
The size and composition of U.S. PRTs are relatively constant depending on the availability of personnel from civilian agencies. Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan did establish a model, which U.S. PRTs still generally emulate (see Figure 5-4). According to the model, there is a military complement normally commanded by a U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel or U.S. Navy commander. This complement, with members from the commander’s service or the U.S. Army, provides the administrative, operations, support, and force protection for the PRT. The complement also includes a number of enablers — civil affairs, engineers, and military police. The model also provides for a civilian component of advisers, which generally includes representatives from the DOS, USAID, and USDA. Each of these representatives in conjunction with the military commander form what is known as the integrated command group, which provides guidance to the overall operations of the PRT. There is also an Afghan MOI representative and a liaison officer from the Afghanistan Engineering District (AED) who works with the PRT.
Roles and Responsibilities

Though the actual numbers of people assigned and the positions filled may change from PRT to PRT, the responsibilities should remain the same as delineated below.

Integrated Command Group\textsuperscript{15}

A PRT has an integrated command group composed of senior military and civilian officials. Ideally the integrated command group should have a highly consensual and considered approach to decision making. There should be regularly scheduled meetings involving all members of the integrated command group. The integrated command group is responsible for taking ISAF top-level direction and, in combination with U.S. national priorities (with those of other contributing nations’ priorities on non-U.S. PRTs), determining the PRT strategy to include approach, objectives, planned activities, and monitoring and evaluation systems. It is the integrated command group that must write a plan for the PRT consisting of an end-state, objectives, and coordination between lines of operation. Without an integrated command group, a PRT will be unable to harmonize the diplomatic, economic, and military lines of operation and will fail to act with unity of effort. To succeed, PRTs must become truly integrated civil-military structures and not just military organizations with “embedded” civilian advisers or bifurcated organizations with two separate components (military and civilian) that operate separately from one another.

The ‘House’ [a PRT] must have internal harmony [be in good working order] before it can expect to work effectively externally [and succeed in its mission]. Sound internal working comes before external results.

—Fletcher Burton, Director PRT Panjshir, 2005-2006

Commander responsibilities include:

- Commanding the military component of the PRT.
- Developing PRT strategies in conjunction with the integrated command group.
- Conducting key leader engagements (KLEs) with high-level GIRoA officials.
- Coordinating project funding with PRT elements.
- Ensuring all lines of authority have the same situational awareness on PRT activities/issues.
- Harmonizing all activities within the lines of operations and understanding the network of PRT tasks.
**DOS representative responsibilities include:**

- Developing PRT strategies in conjunction with the integrated command group.
- Being the lead on policy, governance, and political issues.
- Political reporting through various lines of authority.
- Conducting KLEs with local actors (e.g., governor, elders, and tribal leaders).

**USAID and USDA representatives responsibilities include:**

- Developing PRT strategies in conjunction with the integrated command group.
- Providing development advice to the PRT and local governance and agricultural structures.
- Performing PRT development interventions (projects, programs, and policy).
- Conducting KLEs with development actors (e.g., governor, donors, UN, and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]).

**District Support Teams**

DSTs were formed to keep PRTs from being stretched too thin over large amounts of territory. They operate at the district level of government. They are similar to PRTs in that each DST normally contains three civilians — one each from DOS, USDA, and USAID. These civilians will remain at the district center for a year or longer to establish long-term relationships with district-level officials. Typically, they interface with a company-sized maneuver element and together work with district government leadership and Afghan security forces. The DST supports activities such as creating workable district development plans and forming representative community councils. DSTs seek to strengthen the district government’s links with provincial authorities ensuring the needs of the district are conveyed and that appropriate ministries in Kabul address their needs.16

**PRT noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) responsibilities include:**

- Being the first sergeant to the PRT commander.
- Advising the commander on enlisted Soldier matters.
- Coordinating unit administration functions.
• Overseeing and providing counsel and guidance to NCOs regardless of branch of service.

• Inspecting unit activities, personnel, and facilities, observing discrepancies and initiating corrective actions.

• Enforcing standards and discipline within the unit.

Public affairs responsibilities include:

• Advising the commander and PRT personnel on public affairs capabilities and public affairs matters.

• Developing working relationships with media representatives.

• Developing plans and operational procedures for communication about PRT activities and other spot news events concerning coalition operations.

• Planning communication programs to ensure military and civilian members are informed about current issues and policies of the PRT, USFOR–A, ISAF, and parent services.

Deputy commander/executive officer responsibilities include:

This position only exists at PRTs where the Navy has the lead. The Air Force-led PRTs have an executive officer who is normally the senior civil affairs officer and holds this position as an additional duty. Both of these individuals perform the following duties:

• Principal assistant and adviser to the commander.

• Coordinates and supervises the details of day-to-day operations and administration.

• Ensures the instructions issued to the PRT are in accord with the policies and plans of the commander and the integrated command group when applicable.

• During the commander’s temporary absence, he represents him and directs action in accordance with the policies.
Administration/Operations

- S-1/S-4 (Personnel and Logistics) responsibilities include:
  - Planning, coordination, and management of personnel matters to include readiness and casualty reporting, evaluation reports, and awards.
  - Planning, coordination, and management of official visitors.
  - Planning, coordination, and management of all logistic support and local logistic support contracts.
  - Recruiting, vetting, and managing local interpreters.

- S-2 (Intelligence) responsibilities include:
  - Managing, coordinating, analyzing, assessing, and the timely dissemination (both to the PRT and higher headquarters) of information from diverse sources.

- S-3 (Operations and Planning) responsibilities include:
  - Planning, coordinating, and executing the full range of operations, to include information operations, to achieve the PRT mission, objectives, and joint effects.

- S-6 (Communications) responsibilities include:
  - Managing the operation, maintenance, and security of all communications and information systems internal to the PRT.

Support services responsibilities include:

- Managing the supply, vehicle maintenance, and fuels requirements internal to the PRT.

- Monitors the health and well-being of PRT personnel to include medical treatment and extraction by rotary- or fixed-wing assets of casualties.

- Trains, coaches, and mentors Afghan medical counterparts on all aspects of health development and management.

Force Protection/Security

- Plans, coordinates, and executes convoy security, route and site reconnaissance, and site security.

- Coordinates with and augments the security detail for visiting officials and dignitaries.
Enablers

• Civil affairs:
  ○ Plans and coordinates civil-military activities in accordance with direction from the integrated command group to assist achievement of PRT mission and objectives.
  ○ Supports interagency partners development offices.

• Engineers:
  ○ Monitors construction and other related engineer projects, and advises the integrated command group and AED on the daily situation and changes to construction efforts and activities in the province.
  ○ Ensures the provincial government is capable of performing engineering assessments, designing scopes of work, conducting quality assurance and quality control, accomplishing construction processes, and managing projects.
  ○ Trains, coaches, and mentors Afghan engineer/construction counterparts on all aspects of project development and management.

• Military police:
  ○ Assists in the development of local police units to include training, mentoring, partnering, and advising (normally done in conjunction with NTM–A but may also include interagency partner activities).

PRT Functions

PRTs in Afghanistan have a broad mandate that covers the following areas:

• Engage key government, military, tribal, village, and religious leaders in the provinces, while monitoring and reporting on important political, military, and economical developments.

• Work with Afghan authorities to provide security, including support for key events such presidential and parliamentary elections, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militia forces.

• Assist in the deployment and mentoring of Afghan police units assigned to the provinces.

• Partners with the Afghan government, the UN, other governments, and NGOs on providing needed development and humanitarian assistance.
Examples of PRT Activities

The following is a list of the types of activities a PRT may accomplish. This is by no means all inclusive and is meant to provide an indication of the type of activities that might be performed to meet the mandate.

• Reporting
  ○ Develop and mine extensive networks of government officials, religious and tribal figures, businessmen, political leaders, and others.
  ○ Provide timely, front-line reporting on political, economic, security, social, and other issues.

• Representing U.S. strategic interests:
  ○ Provide a constant USG presence in the provinces to counter negative influences.
  ○ Generate dialogue on national issues with local members of national parties and tribes.
  ○ Carry the U.S. official message to all provinces to reinforce major U.S. initiatives.
  ○ Provide the embassy, ISAF, and USFOR–A with ready, personal access to an extensive and diverse array of political, religious, and tribal leaders.

• Political development:
  ○ Promote popular political participation.
  ○ Support civil society organizations and NGOs that promote popular political participation.
  ○ Perform election support to include:
    * Logistical support for election monitors.
    * Post-election contact with elected officials.
    * Enhancing political participation by vulnerable groups (women, minorities, etc.).

• Governance
  ○ Encourage Afghan solutions to Afghan problems.
  ○ Conduct daily engagements with elected officials to provide mentoring in democratic practices and procedures.
○ Assist in development of capital budgets that address the needs of the population and promote private investment.

○ Develop effective legislative oversight capabilities to reduce government corruption and inefficiency.

○ Organize and support technical training programs to enhance effective delivery of essential services.

○ Assist in the development of professionally developed, detailed, scientifically based strategic plans.

○ Transparency:
  * Support media access to government meetings.
  * Facilitate effective dialogue between different levels of government (national, provincial, and local).

• Education:
  ○ Facilitate establishment of cooperative/sister school relationships between Afghanistan and U.S. schools and universities.
  ○ Provide books, computers, and other educational materials.
  ○ Refurbish schools and related facilities.
  ○ Support vocational technical training for youth and women.

• Health:
  ○ Facilitate medical training and mentorship for health care providers.
  ○ Refurbish medical care facilities.

• Reconciliation/Human rights:
  ○ Promote public dialogue on human rights.
  ○ Monitor and encourage displaced persons integration.
  ○ Monitor detainee integration.

• Economic development:
  ○ Advise and assist in the planning and development of infrastructure essential to support private investment, including the planning and construction of transportation, communication, water, and sewage networks.
Encourage private sector development:

* Facilitate business and government integration/lobbying initiatives through support for trade and business associations, business to government conferences, discussion groups, and seminars.

* Promote U.S. foreign direct investment.

* Support small business development centers.

* Assist in development of provincial investment plans.

Banking

* Establish and support bankers’ associations to promote public use of banks, checking, and electronic funds transfer.

* Provide micro-grants and lending for women and other vulnerable populations.

Agricultural capacity development:

* Support agricultural extension offices and university programs in areas such as drought-resistant crops, soil-testing labs, efficient irrigation systems, and greenhouse farming.

* Provide financial support to and development of agricultural cooperatives.

* Support development of cooperative ventures.

Rule of law

* Support development of bar associations.

* Facilitate development of law school curricula and standards.

* Support continuing legal education initiatives.

* Facilitate police training in investigative techniques, evidence collection, constitutional law, and forensic evidence.

* Develop appropriate relationships between police and investigative judges.

* Monitor trials and detentions for signs of legal corruption, intimidation, or favoritism.

* Maintain close relationship with judges to monitor problems in the judicial system and to elevate the standing of the judiciary.

* Conduct public awareness campaigns in support of the rule of law.
Endnotes


7. Ibid.


14. Ibid.


Annex A
National and Provincial Data
National Information

Background
Ahmad Shah Durrani unified the Pashtun tribes and founded Afghanistan in 1747. The country served as a buffer between the British and Russian Empires until it won independence from notional British control in 1919. A brief experiment in democracy ended in a 1973 coup and a 1978 communist counter-coup. The Soviet Union invaded in 1979 to support the tottering Afghan communist regime, touching off a long and destructive war. The Soviets withdrew in 1989 under relentless pressure by internationally supported anti-communist mujahedeen rebels. A series of subsequent civil wars saw Kabul finally fall in 1996 to the Taliban, a hard-line Pakistani-sponsored movement that emerged in 1994 to end the country’s civil war and anarchy. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, a U.S., allied, and anti-Taliban Northern Alliance military action toppled the Taliban for sheltering Osama Bin Laden. The U.N.-sponsored Bonn Conference in 2001 established a process for political reconstruction that included the adoption of a new constitution, a presidential election in 2004, and National Assembly elections in 2005. In December 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan and the National Assembly was inaugurated the following December. Karzai was re-elected in November 2009 for a second term. Despite gains toward building a stable central government, a resurgent Taliban and continuing provincial instability — particularly in the south and the east — remain serious challenges for the Afghan government.

Government
The country is officially known as the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (locally: Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Afghanestan). It is an Islamic republic whose constitution was ratified 26 January 2004. The constitution provides for universal suffrage for those at least 18 years of age. The constitution also provides for three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial.

Executive Branch
The executive branch consists of a president, two vice presidents, and 25 ministers. The president and two vice presidents are elected by direct vote for a five-year term; if no candidate receives 50 percent or more of the vote in the first round of voting, the two candidates with the most votes will participate in a second round. A president can only be elected for two terms. The ministers are appointed by the president and approved by the National Assembly.
Legislative Branch
The bicameral National Assembly consists of the Meshrano Jirga or House of Elders (102 seats, one-third of members elected from provincial councils for four-year terms, one-third elected from local district councils for three-year terms, and one-third nominated by the president for five-year terms) and the Wolesi Jirga or House of People (no more than 249 seats) whose members are directly elected for five-year terms. On rare occasions the government may convene a Loya Jirga (Grand Council) on issues of independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity. This Jirga has the power to amend the provisions of the constitution and prosecute the president and is made up of members of the National Assembly and chairpersons of the provincial and district councils.

Judicial Branch
The constitution establishes a nine-member Stera Mahkama or Supreme Court (its nine justices are appointed for 10-year terms by the president with approval of the Wolesi Jirga) and subordinate high courts and appeals courts. There is also a minister of justice. The legal system is based on a mix of civil and shariah law. A separate Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission established by the Bonn Agreement is charged with investigating human rights abuses and war crimes. In addition, Afghanistan has not accepted compulsory International Court of Justice jurisdiction.

Flag Description

![Figure A-1. Afghanistan national flag](image)

The national flag consists of three equal vertical bands of black (hoist side), red, and green, with the national emblem in white centered on the red band and slightly overlapping the other two bands. The center of the emblem features a mosque with pulpit and flags on either side. Below the mosque are numerals for the solar year 1298 (1919 in the Gregorian calendar, the year of Afghan independence from the United Kingdom). This central
image is circled by a border consisting of sheaves of wheat on the left and right. In the upper-center is an Arabic inscription of the *Shahada* (Muslim creed), below are rays of the rising sun over the *Takbir* (Arabic expression meaning “God is great”), and at bottom center is a scroll bearing the name Afghanistan.

**Geography**

![Map of Afghanistan](image)

**Figure A-2. Map of Afghanistan**

Afghanistan is a landlocked nation located in southern Asia, bordered by China to the east at the end of the Wakahn Corridor, Pakistan to the east and south, Iran to the west, and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to the north. The country covers an area of 652,230 square kilometers. Nearly half (49 percent) of the total land area lies above 2,000 meters, with plains in the north and southwest. The Hindu Kush mountains that run northeast to southwest divide the northern provinces from the rest of the country.

The country is divided into 34 provinces. The time is determined by adding 4 hours, 30 minutes to Coordinated Universal Time (ZULU or Greenwich Mean Time) or 9 hours, 30 minutes to U.S. Eastern Standard Time.
Demography and Population
(2010 Estimates Except as Noted)

Afghanistan has a total population of 29,121,286. Most of the population (76 percent) lives in rural districts, while 24 percent lives in urban areas. Around 51 percent of the population is male and 49 percent is female. Dari is spoken by 50 percent of the population. The second most frequent language is Pashto spoken by 35 percent of the population. The two languages are the official languages of the country. Other languages (over 30), primarily Uzbek, Turkmens, Balochis, and Pashais, are spoken by the rest of the population. The country is ethnically diverse with the following breakout: Pashtun, 42 percent; Tajik, 27 percent; Hazara, 9 percent; Uzbek, 9 percent; Aimak, 4 percent; Turkmens, 3 percent; Balochis, 2 percent; other, 4 percent. The vast majority of the nation is Muslim (Sunni, 80 percent; Shia, 19 percent). Afghanistan has a large (approximately 3,000,000) population of Kuchis (nomads), with at least 60 percent remaining fully nomadic.3

Infrastructure

About a third of the households use safe drinking water; 5 percent have safe toilet facilities (defined as an improved/flush latrine); and about 20 percent have access to electricity, with over half relying on public electricity.4 The transport infrastructure varies between provinces, with about 30 percent of all roads paved. There is a limited fixed-line telephone service, but an increasing number of Afghans utilize mobile-cellular phone networks, with over eight million mobile-cellular devices in operation.

Economics

Afghanistan’s economy is recovering from decades of conflict. The economy has improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, largely because of the infusion of international assistance, the recovery of the agricultural sector, and service sector growth. Despite the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan is still highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture, and trade with neighboring countries. The majority of commercial activity is related to growth and trade in agricultural and livestock products. Agriculture is the major source of revenue for over half of households in the country. In addition, about a quarter of the households derive their incomes from trade and services and around a third through non-farm-related labor.5 Primary products are wheat, fruits, nuts, wool, mutton, and sheepsksins (karakul skins). In addition, there is small-scale production of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, apparel, food products, non-alcoholic beverages, mineral water, cement, hand-woven carpets, natural gas, coal, and copper. Most of these products are for domestic consumption.6 Afghanistan’s primary trading partners are Pakistan and India.
**Education**

The overall literacy rate in Afghanistan is 28.1 percent; however, while 43 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 13 percent of women. On average, 36 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in the nearly 10,000 primary and secondary schools in the country. Boys account for 65 percent of students, and 28 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There are almost 160,000 teachers working in schools in the country; 28 percent were women. Afghanistan has 22 public universities; seven private higher education facilities; 34 vocational, health, and technical institutes; and 46 teacher training institutes (eight are private).

**Provincial Information**

Information follows on Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, which are:

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Badakhshan Province

Badakhshan is located in the northeastern region of the country between the Hindu Kush and the Amu Darya. It is part of the Badakhshan region. Currently there is a German-led PRT in the provincial capitol, Feyzabad.

History

Badakhshan’s name was given by the Sassanids and derives from the word badaxš (an official Sassanian title). Badakhshan and Panjshir were the only provinces that were not occupied by the Taliban during their drive to control the country. However, during the course of the wars, a non-Taliban Islamic emirate was established in Badakhshan, paralleling the Islamic Revolutionary State of Afghanistan in neighboring Nuristan. The province was about to fall to the Taliban when the American invasion allowed the Northern Alliance to reclaim control of the country with the aid of American military air power and assistance.

Geography

Badakhshan province is bordered by Takhar province in the west and Nuristan province in the south and shares international borders with Tajikistan in the north, China in the west, and Pakistan in the south. The province covers an area of 47,403 square kilometers. Nearly nine-tenths of the province (89.9 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 9.7 percent is made up of flat or semi-flat land. The province is divided into 28 districts.

Demography and Population

Badakhshan had a total population in 2008 of approximately 845,900. There are 134,137 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Almost all (96 percent) of the population lives in rural districts, while 4 percent live in urban areas. Dari is spoken by 77 percent of the population and 80 percent of the villages. The second most frequent language is Uzbeki, spoken by the majorities in villages representing 12 percent of the population. Other languages such as Pashtu, Turkmeni, and Nuristani are spoken by less than 1 percent of the population each. Badakhshan province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 9,417 individuals, or 0.4 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Badakhshan living in 34 communities. Nearly two-thirds of these (64 percent) are short-range, partially migratory, and the other one-third have settled in the province. In the winter, both groups stay mostly in one area and do not move around during the season. In the summer season, nearly
175,000 long-range migratory Kuchis come from Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, and Nuristan provinces to the Kistam, Tashkan, Taqab, and Arghanj Khawa districts of Badakhshan province as summer pasture areas. The Kuchi population in the summer is 185,452 individuals.

Infrastructure
On average, only 13 percent of households use safe drinking water; and only 1 percent of households in Badakhshan province have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity. There is currently no information on the overall percentage of households having access to safe toilet facilities. The transport infrastructure is not well developed, with only 25.4 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. In 56.5 percent of the province there are no roads.

Economics
Badakhshan is an agricultural province. The majority of commercial activity is related to trade in agricultural and livestock products. Agriculture is the major source of revenue for 55 percent of households in the province. In addition, 32 percent of households derive their income from trade and services, and 29 percent earn income through non-farm-related labor. Unlike agricultural or animal products, there is not a very large production of industrial crops, with sesame, tobacco, sugar extracts, and cotton being the major products. The sector of small industries specializes in honey, dried sugar, karakul skin, confection and sugar candy, and silk. There is also a considerable amount of production of handicrafts in Badakhshan province, especially in rugs, pottery, and jewelry. Forty-six percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 65 percent have access to rain-fed lands. The most important field crops grown include wheat, barley, maize, rice, flax, melons, and watermelons. The most commonly owned livestock are cattle, donkeys, sheep, and goats.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Badakhshan province is 31 percent; however, while 38 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 22 percent of women. On average, 46 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, a total of 263,360 students attended the 628 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 55 percent of students, and 20 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 9,540 teachers working in the schools; 28 percent were women. The province has a university and a teacher training institute.

Health
In 2008, Badakhshan province had 48 health centers and two hospitals with 191 beds. Data from 2008 also showed that 75 doctors and 339 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health were working in the province. The province also has 120 privately owned pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Access to health care is difficult for many people in the province; 16 percent travel more than 5 kilometers to reach the nearest health facility.
Badghis Province

Badghis is located in northwestern Afghanistan, between the Murghab and Hari rivers, extending as far northward as the edge of the desert of Sarakhs. The province was carved out of portions of Herat province and Meymaneh province in 1964. The provincial capitol is Qala-i-Now. The PRT in Badghis province is led by Spain.

History

The name “Badghis” is from the Persian word Bādghezz, meaning “lap of wind” or “home of the winds.” The province was one of the last captured by the Taliban in their military offensive before the American invasion in 2001. Even after their official takeover of the province, the largely Tajik population of the province never welcomed the Pashtun Taliban. The province was quickly retaken by Northern Alliance forces as the United States initiated hostilities, which was followed by a brutal cleansing of the Pashtun minority in the province.

Geography

Badghis province is surrounded by Faryab province in the northeast, Ghor province in the southeast, Herat province in the west, and Turkmenistan in the north. The province covers an area of 20,068 square kilometers. More than two-thirds of the province (69 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 22 percent is made up of flat land. The province is divided into seven districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Badghis had an estimated population of 441,900. There are 84,909 households in the province, and households, on average, have 5.5 members. Around 97 percent of the population lives in rural districts. The most frequently spoken languages are Dari, spoken by 56 percent of the population, and Pashto, spoken by 40 percent of the population, followed by Uzbeki, spoken by five out of 964 villages, Turkman by four villages, and Balochi spoken by only one village. Badghis province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons.

In winter and summer, 115,100 individuals or 4.7 percent of the overall Kuchi population stay in Badghis living in 30 communities. All of these are short-range, partially migratory, and overall 94 percent of the community migrates. In the winter they stay mostly in one area and do not move around during the season. There are no long-range migratory Kuchi who use Badghis as their summer area, and none of the communities in Badghis named another area outside of the province as their preferred summer pasture.
Infrastructure
In Badghis province, on average, only 15 percent of households use safe drinking water; and 7 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities. In terms of meeting the basic requirements for energy, currently the Badghis province has two power stations: diesel generator power and a hydraulic waterpower network. The transport infrastructure in Badghis is not very well developed, with 33 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 37 percent of the province there are no roads. Telecommunications support is provided by the main mobile telephone operators Roshan and Afghan Telecom throughout parts of the province.

Economics
Badghis is both an agricultural and an industrial province, and it is rich with minerals such as gypsum, lime, construction stones, coal, and fuel. In terms of industry, one gin press (pressing cotton for packing) is working in the province. The majority of commercial activity is related to trade in agricultural and livestock products. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 59 percent of households in the province, including 65 percent of rural households. Livestock also accounts for income for nearly half (45 percent) of rural households. However, 7 percent of all households in the province derive some income from trade and services. Around 5 percent of households earn income through non-farm-related labor. Unlike agricultural or animal products, there is not a very large production of industrial products in Badghis. Sesame and tobacco are produced in the province. Small industry is absent, and there is only a small production of handicrafts mostly related to rugs, carpets, and jewelry. Thirteen percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 94 percent have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, melons, watermelons, rapeseeds, and flax. The most commonly owned livestock are donkeys, cattle, goats, sheep, and poultry.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Badghis province is 11 percent; however, while 14 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 7 percent of women. On average, 19 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 362 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 74 percent of students, and 56 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 1,459 teachers working in the schools; 18 percent were women. There is a teacher training institute.

Health
In 2008, Badghis province had 26 health centers and two hospitals with 120 beds. Data from 2008 also showed that 36 doctors and 247 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health were working in the province. The province also has 113 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present in their community. Only 11 percent of the population lives within 5 kilometers of a health unit.
Baghlan Province

Baghlan is located in the northern region of the country. Its capitol is Puli Khumri. The lead nation of the local PRT is Hungary.

History

The name Baghlan is derived from Bagolango or “image-temple,” inscribed on the temple of Surkh Kotal during the reign of the Kushan emperor, Kanishka, in the early second century A.D.

The Chinese Buddhist monk Xuanzang traveled through Baghlan in the mid-seventh century A.D., and referred to it as the “kingdom of Fo-kia-lang.” As a province, Baghlan was created out of the former Qataghan province in 1964.

Geography

Baghlan province is surrounded by the following provinces: Bamyan and Samangan to the west, Parwan and Panjshir to the south, Takhar to the east, and Kunduz to the north. The province covers an area of 20,362 square kilometers. Nearly half of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and one-third of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 15 districts.

Demography and Population

Baghlan had a total population of approximately 804,000 in 2008. There are 95,109 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Around 80 percent of the population lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups living in Baghlan province are Tajiks and Pashtuns, followed by Hazaras and Uzbeks. This includes major tribes such as Hussainkhil (Pashtun), Ahmadzai (Pashtun), Gadi (Pashtun), Aimaq (Tajik), and Arab (Tajik). Dari is spoken by 70 percent of the population and 73 percent of the villages. The second most frequent language is Pashtu, spoken by the majorities in 528 villages representing 22 percent of the population. Baghlan province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 97,500 individuals, or 4 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Baghlan living in six communities. In the summer season, some 820 long-range migratory Kuchi households come from Parwan and Kapisa provinces to the Khenjan and Doshi districts of Baghlan province. The Kuchi population in the summer is 59,776 individuals.
Infrastructure

In Baghlan province, on average, only 19 percent of households use safe drinking water; 15 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity; and only 2 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 42 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons and 32 percent able to take car traffic in some seasons. However, in a quarter of the province there are no roads. Communications support is provided by Roshan and Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC), in the province.

Economics

Baghlan is both an agricultural and an industrial province, and it is rich with minerals such as gold, coal, and uranium. The majority of commercial activity is related to trade in agricultural and livestock products. Agriculture is the major source of revenue for 45 percent of households in Baghlan province, including 54 percent of rural households and 18 percent of households in the urban area. However, more than half of households in the urban area and one-quarter of households in rural areas derive their incomes from trade and services. Around a third of households in both urban and rural areas earn some income through non-farm-related labor. Industrial products such as sesame, tobacco, cotton, and sugar extracts are produced in the province. Small industry is absent in Baghlan, and there is there is only a small production of handicrafts mostly related to rugs and jewelry. On average, 62 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, whereas three-quarters of rural households and 14 percent of urban households have access to rain-fed lands. The most important field crops grown include wheat, barley, rice, maize, rapeseeds, and flax. The most commonly owned livestock are cattle, donkeys, sheep, and goats.

Education

The overall literacy rate in Baghlan province is 21 percent; however, while 29 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 12 percent of women. On average, 29 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 405 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 62 percent of students, and 15 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 8,388 teachers working in the schools; 20 percent were women. Baghlan province also has a number of higher-education facilities. The province has a university, a teacher training institute, and an agricultural vocational high school for men.

Health

In 2008, Baghlan province had 39 health centers and three hospitals with 249 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 126 doctors and 325 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 156 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Access to health care is difficult for many people in the province; four out of five people having to travel more than 5 kilometers to reach the nearest health facility.
Balkh Province

Balkh is located in the northern region of the country, and its name derives from the ancient city of Balkh, near the modern town. A Swedish-led PRT is located in the capitol city of Mazar-e Sharif.

Geography

Balkh province borders Uzbekistan in the north, Tajikistan in the northeast, Kunduz province in the east, Samangan province in the southeast, Sari Pul province in the southwest, and Jawzjan province in the west. The province covers an area of 16,840 square kilometers. Almost half of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain (48.7 percent), and 50.2 percent is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 15 districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Balkh had an approximate population of 1,144,800. There are 119,378 households in the province, and households, on average, have seven members. Around 66 percent of the population lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups living in Balkh province are Tajiks and Pashtuns, followed by Uzbek, Hazaras, Turkman, Arab, and Baluch. Dari is spoken by 50 percent of the population and 58 percent of the villages. The second most frequent language is Pashtu, spoken by the majorities in 266 villages representing 27 percent of the population, followed by Turkmani (11.9 percent) and Uzbeki (10.7 percent). Balkh province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 52,929 individuals, or 2.2 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Balkh living in 80 communities. Half of these are short-range, partially migratory; another third are long-range, partially migratory; and 18 percent are settled. In the summer season, some 120 long-range migratory Kuchi households come from Sari-Pul province to Balkh province. The Kuchi population in the summer is 59,776 individuals.

Infrastructure

In Balkh province, on average, only 31 percent of households use safe drinking water; 12 percent have access to safe toilet facilities; and 49 percent of households have access to electricity, with 41 percent relying on public electricity. Access to electricity is much greater in the urban area where 95 percent of households have access to electricity; however, this figure falls to just 26 percent in rural areas, and a little more than half of these (14 percent) have access to public electricity. The
transport infrastructure in Balkh is reasonably well developed, with 38 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 27.5 percent of the province, there are no roads. Chimtal, Balkh, Dihdadi, Khulm, Char Bolak, Nahri Shahi, and Dawlatabad districts have mobile phone coverage.

**Economics**

Balkh is both an agricultural and an industrial province. In terms of industry, a fertilizer factory is working in the province. The majority of commercial activity in Balkh is related to agriculture and small businesses. Agriculture is the major source of revenue for 42 percent of households in Balkh province, including 61 percent of rural households and 7 percent of households in the urban area. However, 58 percent in the urban areas and 21 percent in rural areas derive their income from trade and services. Thirty-five percent in urban and at least 25 percent in rural areas earn some income through non-farm-related labor. Balkh produces industrial crops such as cotton, sesame, tobacco, olives, and shashma. The sector of small industries is dominated by one commodity — karakul skin. In the area of handicrafts, rugs are the most prominent, and carpets, jewelry, and shawls are also produced. On average, 67 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, whereas 28 percent of rural households and 14 percent of urban households have access to rain-fed lands. The most important field crops grown in Balkh province include wheat, barley, maize, flax, melons, and watermelons. The most commonly owned livestock are cattle, donkeys, poultry, sheep, and goats.

**Education**

The overall literacy rate in Balkh province is 44 percent; however, while more than 54 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 32 percent of women. On average, 58 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 378,294 students in the 465 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 59 percent of students, and 22 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 10,316 teachers working in schools; 50 percent were women. The province has a university, a chemical technology school, and an agricultural school for men.

**Health**

In 2008, Balkh province had 57 health centers and 11 hospitals with 880 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 335 doctors and 870 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 252 pharmacies. The majority of communities do have a health worker permanently present. However, 32 percent of men’s shuras and 35 percent of women’s shuras reported that there was no community health worker present, and both groups commonly said that a hospital was their closest health facility.
Bamyan Province

Bamyan, or Bamian, is located in the center of the country. Its capitol is also called Bamyan. A New Zealand-led PRT is located in its capitol.

History

In antiquity, central Afghanistan was strategically placed to thrive from the Silk Road caravans that crisscrossed the region trading between the Roman Empire, China, and central and south Asia. Bamyan was a stopping-off point for many travelers. It was here where elements of Greek, Persian, and Buddhist art were combined into a unique classical style known as Greco-Buddhist art. Bamyan was the site of an early Buddhist monastery from which Bamyan takes its name from the Sanskrit varmayana ("colored").

Geography

Bamyan province lies on the highlands of Afghanistan and is bordered by the provinces of Sari Pul and Samangan in the north, Baghlan and Parwan in the east, Wardak and Ghazni in the south, Daykundi in the southwest, and Ghor in the west. The province covers an area of 17,414 square kilometers of mostly dry, mountainous terrain with a number of rivers, the largest being the Punjab. Nearly the whole entire province is mountainous or semi-mountainous, while only 1.8 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into seven districts.

Demography and Population

The total population in 2008 was approximately 398,000. There are 55,513 households in the province, and households, on average, have seven members. Around 80 percent of the population lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups living in Bamyan province are Hazara, followed by Tajik, Tatar, and Pashtun. Dari is spoken by 96 percent of the population and 98 percent of the villages. In another 24 villages with a population of approximately 5,000, the main language spoken is Pashtu. Bamyan province is only a summer area for Kuchi; no Kuchi stay there during winter. In the summer, 962 households of long-range migratory Kuchi come to Bamyan province from Nangarhar, 300 households from Logar, and 80 households from Balkh. Bamyan is one of the provinces where access to summer pastures is quite severely constrained. An additional 2,000 households from Logar, 970 from Nangarhar, 662 from Balkh, 517 from Khost, 370 from Samangan, and 50 from Saripul said that Bamyan province is their preferred summer area. The Kuchi population in the summer is 2,255 individuals.
Infrastructure
On average, 8 percent of households in Bamyan use safe drinking water; 6 percent of households have access to electricity, and there is no provision of public electricity. No one in the province have access to safe toilet facilities. The transport infrastructure in Bamyan is not well developed either, with 21 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. In 21 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, Roshan telecommunications company is operating in the province and Areeba mobile communications is planning to establish some antennas soon.

Economics
The majority of commercial activity in Bamyan is related to trade in agricultural and handicrafts. Agriculture is the major source of revenue for 86 percent of households. The production of industrial commodities such as cotton, sugar, sesame, tobacco, olives, and sharsham is restricted to a few villages. Small industries are also scarce with honey, silk, confection, Karakul skins, and dried sugar being their major products. Handicrafts, on the other hand, are produced in all districts with rugs, jewelry, and carpet the most common. The most important field crops grown in Bamyan province include wheat, barley, and potatoes. On average, 93 percent of households in rural areas in the province have access to irrigated land, and 58 percent have access to rain-fed land. The most common crops grown in garden plots include fruit and nut trees (80 percent) and vegetables (8 percent) such as potatoes.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Bamyan province is 29 percent; however, while 41 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 12 percent of women. On average, 39 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 104,095 students in the 294 primary, secondary, and high schools. Boys accounted for 62 percent of students, and 36 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 2,986 teachers working in the schools in 2008; 21 percent were women. There is one main university in the province.

Health
In 2008, Bamyan province had 35 health centers and four hospitals with 137 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 28 doctors and 285 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 22 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Access to health care is difficult for many people in the province; three out of four people having to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach the nearest health facility.
Daykundi Province

Daykundi (also spelled Daikondi, Daykondi, or Daikundy) falls into the traditionally ethnic Hazara region known as the Hazarajat. The province was established in 2004, when it was created from the isolated Hazara-dominated northern districts of Uruzgan province. Daykundi’s capitol is Nili. There is no PRT in the province.

Geography

Daykundi province is located in the Central Highlands region and is bordered by Ghazni province to the east, Uruzgan province to the south, Helmand province to the southwest, Ghor province ranging from the southwest to the north, and Bamyan province to the northeast. The province covers an area of 16,655 square kilometers. Most of the province (96.6 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and only 2.6 percent of the area is made up of flat or semi-flat land. The province is divided into nine districts.

Demography and Population

Total population in 2008 was approximately 410,300. There are 84,430 households in the province, and households, on average, have five members. Around 99 percent of the population lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups living in Daykundi are Hazara (86 percent), followed by Pashtun (8.5 percent), Baluchi (3.5 percent), and Sayeed (2 percent). Dari is spoken by 91 percent of the population and 85 percent of the villages. The second most frequent language is Pashtu, spoken by the majorities in 151 villages representing 13 percent of the population. Turkmani is spoken in two villages and Baluchi is spoken in one.

Infrastructure

In Daykundi province, on average, only 3 percent of households use safe drinking water; and 25 percent of households have access to electricity; however, there is no public provision electric power. There is currently no information on the overall percentage of households having access to safe toilet facilities. The transport infrastructure is not very well developed, with only 7 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 31.1 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, digital phone services are operating in Nili, Shahristan, Miramor, and Khedir districts. No information is currently available regarding mobile phone coverage in the province.
Economics
Daykundi is an agricultural province. The majority of commercial activity is related to almonds. Agriculture is the major source of revenue for 71 percent of households, including 71 percent of rural households. However, 5 percent of households in both urban and rural areas derive their income from trade and services. Thirty percent of households in both urban and rural areas earn their incomes through non-farm-related labor. Unlike agricultural or animal products, there is not a very large production of industrial crops in Daykundi. Cotton, sugar extracts, sesame, and tobacco are produced in the province. Small industry seems almost absent in the province. There is a small production of handicrafts mostly related to rugs, carpets, and shawls. On average, 91 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 8 percent of rural and urban households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, and barley. The most commonly owned livestock are goats, cattle, sheep, and donkeys.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Daykundi province is 28 percent; however, while 38 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 18 percent of women. On average, 50 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 104,263 students in the 271 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 61 percent of students, and 15 percent of schools were boys’ schools. Also that year there were 1,517 teachers working in the schools; 28 percent were women. The province has no higher education facilities.

Health
In 2008, Daykundi province had 22 health centers and two hospitals with 55 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 14 doctors and 82 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. The great majority of people seeking medical attention must travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health facility.
Farah Province

Farah is located in the western part of the country. Its capital is Farah. A U.S.-led PRT is located in the capital.

History

Shahr-e Kohne, or Fereydoon Shahr, is located in Farah city. This old and ancient city is more than 3,000 years old. It was one of the ancient places of the Persian kings because Farah belonged historically to the Sistan Empire; that is the reason why it is also called Fereydoon Shar or Shahr-e Fereydoon (Fereydoon is a hero in the Persian book of Shahnameh). Following the 1992 collapse of the communist-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Farah province, like Herat, Nimroz, and Badghis provinces, came under the influence of Herat-based powerbroker Ismail Khan, who was able to stymie the Taliban until late 1995. Due to its isolation from the Taliban’s area of focus, Farah exerted some small level of local control during Taliban rule. Following the coalition entry and union with the Northern Alliance following 11 September 2001, the Taliban withdrew from Farah due to the heavy coalition aerial campaign.

Geography

Farah province is bordered by Helmand province in the east, Nimroz province in the south, Herat province in the north, Ghor province in the northeast, and Iran in the west. The province covers an area of 47,786 square kilometers. Almost half (46 percent) of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 49.9 percent is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 11 districts.

Demography and Population

Farah had a approximate population of 426,600 in 2008. There are 80,183 households in the province, and households, on average, have five members. Around 93 percent of the population lives in rural districts. Dari is spoken by 50 percent of the population and 544 of the 1,125 total villages in the province. The second most frequent language is Pashtu, spoken by 48 percent of the population and 566 villages. Farah province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 166,070 individuals, or 6.8 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Farah living in 34 communities. Almost three-quarters of these are long-range, partially migratory, while 15 percent are short-range, partially migratory and 12 percent settled. In the winter, both groups stay mostly in one area and do not move around during the season. In the summer season, short-range
migratory Kuchis arrive in the districts of Shib Koh, Anar Dara and Gulistan. The Kuchi population in the summer is 44,080 individuals.

**Infrastructure**

In Farah province, on average, only 37 percent of households use safe drinking water; 7 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 9 percent of households have access to electricity, with 1 percent relying on public electricity. The transport infrastructure in Farah is reasonably well developed, with 49 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 16 percent of the province there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, Afghan Telecom, Roshan, and AWCC cover the province.

**Economics**

Farah is both an agricultural and an industrial province, and it is rich with minerals such as gypsum, lime, construction stones, gold, coal, and uranium. In terms of industry, 15 manufacturing firms are working in the province. Agriculture is the major source of revenue for 50 percent of households, including 56 percent of rural households. However, 21 percent of all households in the province derive some income from trade and services. Around a quarter of households in both urban and rural areas earn income through non-farm-related labor. Unlike agricultural or animal products, there is not a very large production of industrial products in Farah, with cotton, tobacco, honey, and silk being the main products. Small industry is absent in the province, and there is there is only a small production of handicrafts mostly related to carpets, rugs, jewelry, and shawls. On average, 92 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 6 percent of households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat and barley. The most commonly owned livestock are goats, cattle, poultry, and sheep.

**Education**

The overall literacy rate in Farah province is 21 percent; however, while 27 percent of the men are literate, this is true for just 14 percent of women. On average, 32 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 83,803 students in the 253 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 70 percent of students, and 57 percent of schools were boys’ schools. Also that year there were 2,090 teachers working in the schools; 22 percent were women. There is a teacher training institute and an agricultural vocational school for men.

**Health**

In 2008, Farah province had 16 health centers and two hospitals with 92 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 54 doctors and 220 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 42 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present in their community. Seventy-three percent of the people have to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health facility.
Faryab Province

Faryab is located in the western part of the northern region of Afghanistan. Its capital is Maymana, where a Norwegian-led PRT is located.

History

Faryab is a Persian word meaning “irrigated land.” The modern province is named after a town that was founded by the Sassanids and later destroyed by the invading Mongols in 1220. Faryab province has been one of the more peaceful areas in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban after the U.S. invasion of 2001.

Geography

Faryab province is bordered by Turkmenistan in the west and north, Jawzjan and Sari Pul provinces in the east, Ghor province in the south, and Badghis province in the southwest. The province covers an area of 21,146 square kilometers. Approximately two-thirds of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain (63 percent), and 29.6 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 13 districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Faryab had an approximate population of 884,400. There are 121,625 households in the province, and households, on average, have seven members. Around 89 percent of the population live in rural districts. The major ethnic groups are Uzbeks and Pashtuns, followed by Tajiks and Turkmens. Uzbeki is spoken by over half (53.5 percent) of the population and 49 percent of the villages. The second most frequent language is Dari, spoken by the majorities in 311 villages representing 27 percent of the population. Pashtu is spoken by 17 percent of the villages and 13 percent of the population. Faryab province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 98,220 individuals, or 4 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Faryab province living in 28 communities. In both winter and summer, the Kuchi mostly stay in one location and do not migrate anymore within the season. During the summer, some 230 households come to Faryab province from Balkh province. The Kuchi population in the summer is 101,460 individuals.
Infrastructure
In Faryab province, on average, only 23 percent of households use safe drinking water; 2 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 17 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority relying on public electricity. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 43 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 22 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, Roshan Mobile Company has signals along the main road through Faryab province and in the city of Maymana, with a 15 kilometers radius around the city.

Economics
Faryab is both an agricultural and an industrial province. The majority of commercial activity is related to trade in carpets, dried fruits, and animal leather. Agriculture is the major source of revenue for 53 percent of households, including 60 percent of rural households. However, 25 percent of all households in the province derive some income from trade and services. Almost a third (31 percent) of households in both urban and rural areas earns income through non-farm-related labor. Industrial commodities such as cotton, sesame, tobacco, and herbs occupy many villages in Faryab. For all practical purposes, the sector of small industries is nonexistent, with the exception of Karakul skin and silk. The sector of handicraft is dominated by rugs, carpets, jewelry, and shawls being produced in a reasonable number of villages. On average, 37 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land and 79 percent of households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown in Faryab province include wheat, barley, maize, potatoes, and flax. The most commonly owned livestock are donkeys, sheep, and goats.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Faryab province is 27 percent; however, while 31 percent of the men are literate, this is true for just 22 percent of women. On average, 32 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 232,237 students in the 360 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 61 percent of students, and 40 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 5,600 teachers working in the schools; 25 percent were women. There is a higher education institute and an agricultural vocational school for men.

Health
In 2008, Faryab province had 37 health centers and three hospitals with 152 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 126 doctors and 292 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 62 pharmacies. Fifty-eight percent of the people have to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health facility.
Ghazni Province

Ghazni is located in the central region of Afghanistan. Babur records in his Babur-Nama that Ghazni is also known as Zabulistan. Its capitol is Ghazni City. A U.S.-led PRT is located in its capitol.

History

Ghazni was a thriving Buddhist center before and during the seventh century A.D. Excavations have revealed religious artifacts of both Hindu and Buddhist traditions. In 683 A.D., Arab armies brought Islam to the area and attempted to conquer the capitol of Ghazni, but the local tribes fiercely resisted. The resistance was so famed that the Saffarids completely destroyed Ghazni in 869 when they ranged the region, conquering in the name of Islam. A substantial portion of the local population including Hindus and Buddhists, were converted to Islam by Mahmud of Ghazni. After the rebuilding of the city, it became the dazzling capitol of the Ghaznavid Empire from 994 to 1160, encompassing much of northern India, Persia, and Central Asia. The capitol was razed in 1151 by the Ghorid Alauddin. It again flourished, only to be permanently devastated in 1221 by Genghis Khan and his Mongol armies.

Geography

Ghazni province is bordered by Paktya and Logar provinces in the northeast, Paktika in the southeast, Zabul in the southwest, Daikundy and Bamyan in the northwest, and Wardak in the north. The province covers an area of 23,378 square kilometers. Over half the province (59.8 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 35.7 percent is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 19 districts.

Demography and Population

Ghazni had an approximate population of 1,092,600 in 2008. There are 163,638 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Around 11 percent of the population live in urban areas. The main tribes in the province are Andar, Tajik, Suleman Khail, Taraki, Kharoti, Niazi, Sulemanzi, Alikhail, Hazara, Daptani, Durani, Miya Khail, Bayat, Jalalzai, Khogiani, Musa Khail, Hotak, and Wardak. The most commonly spoken languages are Pashtu, which is spoken by about half of the population, and Dari, which is spoken by 47 percent of the population. In addition, Uzbeki is spoken by about 1,000 residents (0.1 percent), and about 23,000 people in 53 villages speak some other language. Ghazni province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, the Kuchi population in Ghazni is quite small, with just 31,230 individuals.
In summer, this figure rises to 121,356, representing nearly 5 percent of the total Kuchi population. A total of 8,339 households currently migrate to Ghazni in the summer from provinces such as Kandahar, Nangarhar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Helmand, and Khost.

Infrastructure
On average, only 35 percent of households use safe drinking water; 1 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 37 percent of households have access to electricity, but only 2 percent are supplied with public electricity. The transport infrastructure in Ghazni is quite well developed, with 38.2 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 3.2 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, all the main mobile telephone operators — Roshan, AWCC, and Areeba — are present in the province.

Economics
Ghazni is both an agricultural and industrial province, and it is rich with minerals yet to be exploited. Agriculture is the major source of revenue for 57 percent of households in Ghazni province. 18 percent of households earn their income by trade and services, 29 percent of households earn income through non-farm-related labor. In terms of industry, there is a salt factory and a chocolate factory working in the province. Industrial commodities such as cotton, sugar, sesame, tobacco, olives, and sharsham are produced in the province. Fifty-five percent of the province is engaged in the production of handicrafts; the most common are rugs, jewelry, carpets, and shawls. Eighty-five percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 29 percent of rural households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown in Ghazni province include wheat, barley, potatoes, alfalfa, clover, and other fodder. The most commonly owned livestock are sheep, cattle, poultry, and goats.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Ghazni province is 35 percent; however, while 48 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 21 percent of women. On average, 39 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 257,372 students in the 509 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 68 percent of students, and 45 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 5,156 teachers working in the schools; 17 percent were women. There is a training institute and one university in Ghazni.

Health
In 2008, Ghazni province had 64 health centers and four hospitals with 220 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 139 doctors and 451 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 157 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. More than half the population travels more than 10 kilometers to get medical attention at health centers. However, given the nature of the terrain, it may take much more time and be much more difficult to reach health facilities.
Ghor Province

Ghor, also spelled Ghowr or Ghur, is located in central Afghanistan, towards the northwest. The capital is Chaghcharan. The Lithuanians operate a PRT out of the capital.

History

Remains of the oldest settlements discovered in Ghor by the Lithuanian archaeologists in 2007 and 2008 date back to 5,000 B.C. Ruins of a few castles and other defense fortifications were also discovered in the environs of Chaghcharan. A Buddhist monastery hand-carved in the bluff of the river Harirud existed in the first centuries during the prevalence of Buddhism. Ghor was converted to Islam in the early part of the 12th century after Mahmud of Ghazni raided it and left teachers to instruct the Ghorids in the precepts of Islam. Ghor was the center of the Ghorid dynasty in the 12th and 13th centuries. At its zenith, its empire stretched over a vast area that included the whole of modern Afghanistan, the eastern parts of Iran, and the northern section of the Indian subcontinent as far as Delhi. The remains of its capital Firuzkuh, including the Minaret of Jam, a U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization World Heritage site, are located in the province.

Geography

Ghor province is bordered by Heart, Badghis, and Faryab provinces in the northwest; Sari Pul and Bamyan provinces in the northeast; Daykundi province in the southeast; and Helmand and Nimroz provinces in the south. The province covers an area of 38,666 square kilometers. More than nine-tenths of the province (91.8 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 5.1 percent is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 10 districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Ghor had an approximate population of 614,900. There are 111,741 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Around 99 percent of the population lives in rural districts. Dari is spoken by 97 percent of the population. The second most frequent language is Pashtu, spoken by about 15,000. Ghor province is only a summer area for Kuchi, no Kuchi stay there during winter. For the long-range Kuchi; of Afghanistan, Ghor is the third most important province, after Kabul and Logar. In the summer, the Kuchi population is 166,640 individuals, with 63 percent being long-range, migratory Kuchi from Farah, Helmand, Herat, and Laghman.
Infrastructure
On average, only 14 percent of households in Ghor province use safe drinking water; 1 percent have access to safe toilet facilities; and 3 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity. The transport infrastructure is not very well developed, with only 12 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 38 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, the telecommunication department is actively operating in the province, and Afghan Telecom and Roshan mobile networks cover the city of Chaghcharan. Around 10 percent of the population have access to phones in the province.

Economics
The majority of Ghor residents are involved in agriculture and animal husbandry. Agriculture is the major source of revenue for 56 percent of households. Forty percent of households in rural areas earn income through non-farm-related labor. Industrial crops include tobacco and sugar extracts. Small industries are very scarce in Ghor, and they produce a wide range of products. Handicrafts are considerably more widespread than industries. A majority of villages production produce rugs, carpets, shawls, and jewelry. Seventy-eight percent of households have access to irrigated land, and 68 percent have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown in the province include wheat, potatoes, maize, and barley. The most commonly owned livestock are donkeys, goats, sheep, camels, and cattle.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Ghor province is 19 percent; however, while 28 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 8 percent of women. On average, 28 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 126,301 students in the 557 primary, secondary, and high schools. Boys accounted for 69 percent of students and 49 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 2,964 teachers working in the schools; 4 percent were women.

Health
In 2008, Ghor province had 30 health centers and two hospitals with 80 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 34 doctors and 121 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 115 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present in their community. Eighty-three percent of the people have to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health facility.
Helmand Province

Helmand is located in the southwest region of the country. Its capitol is Lashkar Gah. A British-led PRT is headquartered in the capitol.

History

The Helmand valley region is mentioned as Haetumant, one of the early centers of the Zoroastrian faith, in pre-Islamic Persian times. However, owing to the preponderance of non-Zoroastrians (Hindus and Buddhists), the Helmand and Kabul regions were also known as “White India” in those days. Some scholars also believe the Helmand valley corresponds to the homeland for the Indo-Aryan migrations into India around 1500 B.C.

Geography

Helmand province is bordered by Paktya, Ghor, Daikundy, and Uruzgan provinces in the northeast; Kandahar province in the East; Nimroz province in the West; Farah province in the northwest; and Pakistan to the south. The Helmand River is the largest river running through the province — from Baghran district in the north of the province to the fishhook of the Helmand River running west into Nimroz province, then into Iran. The province covers an area of 61,829 square kilometers. More than a quarter of the province (28.9 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 61 percent is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 13 districts.

Demography and Population

Helmand province had an approximate population of 821,800 in 2008. There are 189,552 households in the province, and each household, on average, has nine members. Around 94 percent of the population of Helmand lives in rural districts; 51 percent of the population is male. The population is largely Pashtun, although there is a significant minority made up of Balochi tribes. Pashtu is spoken by 92 percent of the population. The second most frequent language is Dari, followed by Balochi. Helmand province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 95,325 individuals stay in Helmand. Seventeen percent are short-range, partially migratory (all belonging to the Baochi tribes) and 63 percent are long-range, partially migratory. In the summer season, the Pashtun tribes travel to Ghor, Ghazni, and Zabul provinces.
Infrastructure
In Helmand province, on average, only 28 percent of households use safe drinking water; 5 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 21 percent of households have access to electricity, with more than two-thirds of these having access to public electricity. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 62 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 5 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, both the main mobile telephone operators, Roshan and AWCC, are present in the province. The signal of these two mobile operators covers mainly the provincial capitol and Route 1 from Lashkar Gah to Kandahar City.

Economics
Helmand is mainly an agricultural province. There are two industrial crops grown in the province, cotton and tobacco. To a smaller extent, sesame and sugar extracts are also produced. The majority of commercial activity in Helmand is related to agriculture, animal husbandry, transport companies for import and export, and the production and trafficking of narcotics. Helmand is the world’s largest opium-producing region, responsible for 42 percent of the world’s total production. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 69 percent of households in Helmand province. However, 26 percent of households in rural areas derive their income from trade and services, with 20 percent of all households earning some income through non-farm-related labor. Small industry is absent in Helmand, and there is only a small production of handicrafts mostly related to jewelry, rugs, and karakul skin. Ninety-seven percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 5 percent of households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, melons, and watermelons. The most commonly owned livestock are poultry, sheep, cattle, and goats.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Helmand province is 5 percent; however, while 8 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 1 percent of women. On average, only 6 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 128,049 students in the 279 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 88 percent of students, and about 90 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 1,702 teachers working in the schools; 20 percent were women. There is one university, an agriculture school, a mechanics school, and a teacher training institute.

Health
In 2008, Helmand province had 42 health centers and three hospitals with 185 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 55 doctors and 121 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 115 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present in their community. Eighty-three percent of the people have to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health facility.
Herat Province

Herat is in the northwestern region of the country. Its primary city and administrative capitol is also named Herat. Italy leads the PRT within the province.

Geography

Herat province borders with Iran and Turkmenistan. It has internal borders with Badghis province in the north, Ghor province in the east, and Farah province in the south. The province covers an area of 63,097 square kilometers. More than one-third (39 percent) of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 53 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 16 districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Herat had an approximate population of 1,642,700. There are 226,650 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Around three-quarters (77 percent) of the population live in rural districts; 50 percent of the population is male. Dari and Pashtu are spoken by 98 percent of the population, with Turkmeni and Uzbeki spoken by the rest. The province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 98,506 individuals stay in Herat, 75 percent of these being short-range, partially migratory, 12 percent are long-range, partially migratory; and 13 percent are settled. The Kuchi population in the summer is 112,311 individuals.

Infrastructure

In Herat province, on average, 31 percent of households use safe drinking water; 14 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 22 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with more than 56 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 9 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as communications are concerned, the telecommunication department and private companies such as Roshan, AWCC, Areeba, Connection, and Afghan Telecom are active in the province. All the districts’ centers have access to digital phones, and over 70 percent of the population have access to phones in the province.

Economics

Herat is an agricultural and industrial province. Salt, marble, gypsum, coal, cement, and construction stones are produced there. Agriculture is the major source of
revenue for 36 percent of households in the province, including 5 percent of households in the urban area. Twenty-one percent of households derive their income from trade and services. Forty-six percent of households earn some income through non-farm-related labor. The major industrial crops are cotton, tobacco, and sesame. Together, these three products account for 86 percent of the industrial commodities produced in the province. The sector of small industries is not particularly well developed; silk, confection, and sugar candy are the chief products. In the area of handicrafts, carpets and rugs are the most prominent. On average, 67 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 42 percent of households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops include wheat, barley, maize, and rice. The most commonly owned livestock are goats, sheep, and donkeys.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Herat province is 36 percent; however, while 43 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 28 percent of women. On average, 55 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 575,263 students in the 641 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 55 percent of students; and 19 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 11,039 teachers working in the schools; 41 percent were women. Herat province also has a number of higher education facilities, to include a university, an agricultural school, and a teacher training institute.

Health
In 2008, Herat province had 61 health centers and five hospitals with 699 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 279 doctors and 559 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 522 pharmacies. Half of the communities do not have a health worker permanently present in their community. More than half the households must travel more than 10 kilometers to access a health care facility.
Jawzjan Province

Jawzjan, also spelled Jowzjan or Jozjan, is located in the northern region of the country. Its capital is Sheberghan. Turkey has a PRT operating in the province.

Geography

Jawzjan province borders Turkmenistan in the north, Balkh province in the east, Sari Pul province in the south, and Faryab province in the west. The province covers an area of 10,326 square kilometers. More than one-quarter (29.4 percent) of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 68.9 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 11 districts.

Demography and Population

Jawzjan had an approximate population of 476,700 in 2008. There are 50,900 households in the province, and households, on average, have seven members. Around 80 percent of the population lives in rural districts; around 50 percent of the population is male. The major ethnic groups are Uzbek and Turkmen, followed by Tajik, Pashtun, and Arab. Uzbek is spoken by the largest proportion of population (39.5 percent). Turkmen is second with 28.7 percent of the population. Pashtu and Dari are spoken respectively by 17.2 percent and 12.1 percent of the total population. Jawzjan province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 76,850 individuals stay in Jawzjan. In the summer, the number increases to 81,480 individuals.

Infrastructure

In Jawzjan province, on average, only 24 percent of households use safe drinking water; 15 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 42 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 45 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 12.1 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, both Roshan and AWCC are present only in the provincial capital.

Economics

Jawzjan is an agricultural province that is rich with natural resources such as oil and gas. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 48 percent of households in Jawzjan province, including 8 percent of households in the urban area. However, 37 percent derive some income from trade and services. In addition, 37 percent of
households earn income through non-farm-related labor. Industrial commodities such as cotton, sugar, sesame, tobacco, olives, and sharsham appear to occupy a relatively substantial number of villages. Small industries are scarce in Jawzjan, with karakul skin and silk as the products. Carpets, rugs, jewelry, and shawls are the common handicrafts of the province. On average, 74 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 30 percent of rural households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown in Jawzjan province include wheat, barley, melons, watermelons, and maize. The most commonly owned livestock are donkeys, goats, sheep, and cattle.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Jawzjan province is 31 percent; however, while 40 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 21 percent of women. On average, 40 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 127,739 students in the 243 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 51 percent of students, and 32 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 2,905 teachers working in the schools; 37 percent were women. Within the province there is one university, two vocational schools, and a teacher training institute.

Health
In 2008, Herat province had 230 health centers and five hospitals with 2,640 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 279 doctors and 559 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 98 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Approximately 43 percent of the population must travel more than 10 kilometers to access a health care facility.
Kabul Province

Kabul, or Kabol, is located in the eastern region of the country. The capital of the province is Kabul City, which is also Afghanistan’s capital. There is not a PRT located in this province.

History
Kabul’s history dates back more than 3,000 years. It was once the center of Zoroastrianism and subsequently also a home for Buddhists and Hindus. The Arabs conquered the area in the seventh century but the area was slowly taken back by the Hindu Shahi of Kabul. It was then conquered by Mahmud of Ghazni in 1002, when the Hindu Shahi king committed suicide. For much of its time, Kabul was independent until it became part of the Durrani Empire in the 1700s. During the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1839, the British army took over Kabul. This was followed by multiple occupations by the British throughout the 19th century.

Geography

Kabul province is bordered by the provinces of Parwan in the northwest, Kapisa in the northeast, Laghman in the east, Nangarhar in the southeast, Logar in the south, and Wardak in the southwest. The province covers an area of 4,585 square kilometers. More than half of the province (56.3 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 37.7 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 14 districts plus the provincial capital city of Kabul.

Demography and Population
Total population was approximately 3,449,800 in 2008. There are an estimated 78,593 households in the province, and households, on average, have seven members. Around 81 percent of the population lives in urban areas. Pashtu is spoken by around 60 percent of the population, and Dari is spoken by around 40 percent. A small number of people located in five villages speak Pashaie. Kabul province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 49,754 individuals, or 2.1 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Kabul. Of those Kuchi that live in Kabul in winter, 47 percent are short-range migratory, 16 percent are long-range migratory, and 37 percent are settled. The population of Kuchi in the summer is 220,251, which represents 9.1 percent of the total Kuchi population.
Infrastructure
On average, 65 percent of households use safe drinking water; 25 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 61 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity. Access to drinking water and electricity is greater in the urban areas. The transport infrastructure in Kabul is reasonably well developed, with around 68.1 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 5.4 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, all districts in the province except Musahi and Khaki Jabbar are covered by both the AWCC and Roshan networks.

Economics
Kabul is a center for trade and commerce, particularly in the urban center, as well as an agricultural province with production concentrated in the rural districts. More than half of all households (53 percent) in the province derive their income from trade and services, 27 percent earn some income through non-farm-related labor, and 11 percent having agriculture as a major source of revenue. The production of industrial commodities appears to be concentrated in specific districts; main products are cotton, sugar extracts, tobacco, olives, silk, and karakul skins. Handicrafts are common throughout the province, with carpets, jewelry, pelisse, pottery, and shawls the most common produced. Fifty-one percent of households in both rural and urban areas in the province have access to irrigated land, and 3 percent have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown in Kabul province include wheat, maize, and barley. The most commonly owned livestock are poultry, cattle, sheep, and donkeys.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Kabul province is 58 percent; however, while 66 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 48 percent of women. On average, 46 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 848,602 students in the 449 primary, secondary, and high schools. Boys account for 60 percent of students, and 26 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 27,923 teachers working in the schools; 64 percent were women. There are four universities and nine vocational schools in the province.

Health
In 2008, Kabul province had 96 health centers and 26 hospitals with 3,560 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 1,519 doctors and 3,087 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 3,083 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. A little more than half of the population has to travel less than 5 kilometers and more than one-fifth of population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Kandahar Province

Kandahar, or Qandahar, is one of the largest of the 34 provinces and is located in southern Afghanistan. Its capital is the city of Kandahar, which is located on the Arghandab River. The Canadians have a PRT in the capital city.

History

Kandahar, the city and province, dates back to 3120 B.C. The city has been a frequent target for conquest because of its strategic location in Asia, which connects Southern, Central, and Southwest Asia. It was part of the Persian Achaemenid Empire before the Greek invasion in 330 B.C. It came under the influence of the Indian emperor Ashoka, who erected a pillar there with a bilingual inscription in Greek and Aramaic. Under the Abbasids, and later Turkic invaders, Kandahar converted to Islam. Kandahar would go on to be conquered by the Arabs in the seventh century, Turkic Ghaznavids in the 10th century, and Genghis Khan in the 13th century. Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of Afghanistan, gained control of the city and province in 1747 and made it the capital of his new Afghan Kingdom. In the 1770s, the capital was transferred to Kabul. British-Indian forces occupied the province during the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars from 1832 to 1842, and from 1878 to 1880. It remained peaceful for about 100 years until the late 1970s. During the Soviet occupation of 1979 to 1989, Kandahar province witnessed many fights between Soviet and local Mujahedeen rebels. At the end of 1994, the Taliban emerged from the area and set out to conquer the rest of the country.

Geography

Kandahar province has borders with Zabul province in the east, Uruzgan province in the north, Helmand province in the west, and an international border with Pakistan in the south. The province covers an area of 47,676 square kilometers. More than four-fifths of the area is made up of flat land (84.5 percent), and 7.6 percent of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain. The province is divided into 16 official and two unofficial districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Kandahar had an approximate population of 1,057,500. There are approximately 14,445 households in the province, and households, on average, have seven members. Around 68 percent of the population of Kandahar lives in rural districts; 51 percent of the population is male. The major ethnic group living in the province is Pashtun. This includes major tribes such as Barakzai, Popalzai, Alkozai, Noorzai, and Alezai. Pashtu is spoken by more than 98 percent of the population.
Balochi and Dari are spoken by a small portion of the population. Kandahar province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 79,949 individuals stay in Kandahar, while in the summer the population decreases to 39,082 individuals. Only 1 percent of the population are short-range, partially migratory; 51 percent are long-range, partially migratory; and the rest are settled.

Infrastructure

In Kandahar province, on average, only 64 percent of households use safe drinking water; 22 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 27 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity. The transport infrastructure in Kandahar is well developed, with 76.8 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in a very small area of the province (3.3 percent), there are no roads. As far as telecommunication is concerned, the three main mobile networks — AWCC, Roshan, and Areeba — are accessible in Kandahar City and on main roads.

Economics

Kandahar is both an agricultural and industrial province. The majority of commercial activity is related to trade and services, agricultural, and livestock products. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 28 percent of households, including 8 percent of households in the urban area. Twenty-nine percent of households derive some income from trade and services, and 34 percent of households earn income through non-farm-related labor. The major industrial crops grown in Kandahar are tobacco, cotton, and sugar extracts. The sector of small industries is almost absent in the province; honey, karakul, and sugar candy are the primary products. Handicrafts, jewelry, and rugs are not a well-developed sector either. On average, 46 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 17 percent of rural households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, potatoes, melons, watermelons, maize, and opium. The most commonly owned livestock are sheep, goats, donkeys, camels, and cattle.

Education

The overall literacy rate in Kandahar province is 16 percent; however, while 26 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 5 percent of women. On average, 23 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 150,582 students in the 340 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 83 percent of students, and 81 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 2,931 teachers working in the schools; 12 percent were women. The province has a university and teacher training institute.

Health

In 2008, Kandahar province had 32 health centers and two hospitals with 391 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 102 doctors and 300 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 94 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. A little more than half of the population (51 percent) has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Kapisa Province

Kapisa is located in the eastern region of the country. Its capital is Mahmud-i-Raqi. A U.S.-led PRT administers the stabilization and reconstruction effort and is located at Bagram Air Base in Parwan province.

History

The earliest references to Kapisa appear in the writings of fifth century B.C. Indian scholar Pāṇini referring to the city of Kapiśi, a city of the Kapiśa Kingdom, and to Kapiśayana, a famous wine from Kapisa. The city of Kapiśi also appeared as Kaviśiye on Graeco-Indian coins of Apollodotus I and Eucratides. Archeological discoveries in 1939 confirmed that the city of Kapisi was an emporium for Kapiśayana wine, bringing to light numerous glass flasks, fish-shaped wine jars, and drinking cups typical of the wine trade of the era. The grapes and wine of the area are referred to in several works of ancient Indian literature. The epic Mahabharata also mentions the common practice of slavery in the city. According to the scholar Pliny, the city of Kapiśi was destroyed in the sixth century B.C. by the Achaemenid emperor Cyrus. Based on the account of the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsang, who visited in 644 A.D., it seems that in later times Kapisa was part of a kingdom ruled by a Buddhist Kshatriya king.

Geography

Kapisa province is bordered from the north by Panjsher province, from the east by Laghman province, from the south by Kabul province, and from the southwest by Parwan province. The province covers an area of 1,871 square kilometers. Fifty-four percent is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 43 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into seven districts.

Demography and Population

Kapisa had an approximate population of 392,900 in 2008. There are 51,730 households in the province, and households, on average, have seven members. About 99 percent of Kapisa lives in rural districts. Dari is spoken by about 176,000 people and 304 villages representing 30 percent of the population. The second language is Pashtu, spoken by 107,000 people and 168 villages representing 27 percent of the population. A third language spoken by a sizeable portion of the population (17 percent) is Pashaie. Kapisa province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. 29,286 Kuchi stay in Kapisa province in the winter. Five Kapisa communities with a total of 105 households also
migrate from Alasayi district of Kapisa province to Dawlat Shah district of Laghman province. The Kuchi population in the summer is 4,610 individuals.

**Infrastructure**

On average, only 27 percent of households use safe drinking water; 3 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 6 percent of households in Kapisa province have access to electricity, with only 2 percent having access to public electricity. The transport infrastructure in Kapisa is reasonably well developed, with 58 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 31 percent of the province, there are no roads.

**Economics**

Kapisa is an agricultural province. The majority of commercial activity is related to trade in agriculture, livestock, and trade and services. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 62 percent of households. However, 32 percent of households in rural areas derive their incomes from trade and services, and 35 percent of households in rural area earn income through non-farm-related labor. The production of industrial commodities seems to be scarce in this province; cotton, sesame, tobacco, confection, honey, karakul skin, and sugar sweets are the main products. Even though the number of villages producing handicrafts is more than five times the number of villages engaged in industries, overall production remains relatively weak. Three handicrafts stand out — carpets, pottery, and jewelry. Ninety-six percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 7 percent of rural households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, and barley. The most commonly owned livestock are poultry, cattle, oxen, sheep, and goats.

**Education**

The overall literacy rate in Kapisa province is 39 percent; however, while 53 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 23 percent of women. On average, 60 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 112,544 students in the 181 primary, secondary, high schools. Boys accounted for 66 percent of students, and 51 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 3,657 teachers working in the schools; 12 percent were women. The province also has a number of higher education facilities, with one university and a teacher training institute.

**Health**

In 2008, Kapisa province had 24 health centers and two hospitals with 110 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 34 doctors and 154 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 72 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. A little less than half of the population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Khost Province

Khost, or Khowst, is located in the southeast region of the country. It used to be part of Paktya province in the past. Its capitol city is Khost, which was the first Afghan city to be liberated from communist rule during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A U.S.-led PRT is located in the city of Khost.

History

During the Soviet-Afghan war, Khost was the object of a siege that lasted for more than eight years. Soon after the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, Afghan guerillas took control of the only land route between Khost and Gardez, effectively putting a stop to the Soviet advance. Khost has been in U.S.-held territory since 2001.

Geography

Khost province is bordered by Paktya province to its north, Paktika province to its west, and the Pakistani-ruled tribal areas of North Waziristan to its east and south. The province covers an area of 4,029 square kilometers. Fifty-nine percent of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 37 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 13 districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Khost had an approximate population of 511,600. There are 87,199 households in the province, and households, on average, have eight members. Ninety-eight percent of the population lives in rural districts. The major ethnic group living in the province is Pashtun. This includes major tribes such as Zadran, Mangal, Mandozi, Ismaiel Khil, Tani, Gubuz, Matoon, Lakan, Jaji, Sabari, Alishir Terizi, and Babakker Khil. Pashtu is spoken by 99 percent of the villages. Dari is spoken in two villages of approximately 1,000 residents. Khost province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. Among the 104,965 Kuchis living in Khost, 75 percent are long-range migratory and 25 percent are settled. Among the long-range migratory Kuchis, generally over 50 percent of the community migrates from a winter to a summer area. An estimated 74,179 individuals migrate across the border in winter, which would raise Khost’s Kuchi population to 179,144, making it the province with the second highest Kuchi population in the country (after Nangarhar).
Infrastructure
On average, only 34 percent of households use safe drinking water; 1 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 4 percent have access to electricity, but only half of these have access to public electricity. The transport infrastructure is well developed, with 59 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 3 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, the province has a well-developed network — 74 percent of the community have access to mobile phone coverage, with Roshan and AWCC as the main mobile telephone operators.

Economics
Khost province is both an agricultural and industrial province. In terms of industry, cold drink, soft drink, iodine salt, and plastic factories are working in the province. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 46 percent of households. However, 45 percent of households in rural areas derive their incomes from trade and services, and 24 percent earn income through non-farm-related labor. A variety of industrial crops are produced in Khost to include sugar cane, sesame, and olives. Small industries include honey and silk. Handicrafts, to include carpets, rugs, and jewelry are produced in a number of villages. Sixty-four percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 41 percent have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown in the province include wheat, maize, alfalfa, clover, and other fodder. The most commonly owned livestock are cattle, goats, donkeys, and sheep.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Khost province is 28 percent; however, while 44 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 7 percent of women. On average, 38 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 155,570 students in the 216 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 74 percent of students, and 42 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 3,047 teachers working in the schools; 3 percent were women. The province also has a number of higher education facilities, to include a university and a mechanical school.

Health
In 2008, Khost province had 21 health centers and one hospitals with 100 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 98 doctors and 215 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 207 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present.
Kunar Province

Kunar, (also known as Konar or Konarha), is located in the eastern part of the country. Its capitol is Asadabad. It is one of the four “N2KL” provinces (Nangarhar province, Nuristan province, Kunar province, and Laghman province). N2KL is the designation used by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan for the rugged and very violent region along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border opposite Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North-West Frontier province. Kunar is the center of the N2KL region. A U.S.-led PRT is located in Asadabad.

Geography

Kunar province borders with Nangarhar province to the south, Nuristan province to the north, Laghman province to the west, and has a border with Pakistan in the east. The province covers an area of 4,339 square kilometers. Eighty-six percent of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 12 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 15 districts.

Demography and Population

Kunar had an approximate population of 401,000 in 2008. There are 64,588 households in the province, and households, on average, have eight members. Ninety-six percent of the population lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups living in Kunar are Pashtun, Ashkun, Gawar-Bati, Gujari, Pashayi, and Waigali. This includes major tribes such as Safi, Salarzai, Mashwani, Mamon, and Shinwari. Pashtu is spoken by 705 villages out of 771 and more than 90 percent of the population. Dari and Uzbeki are spoken in two villages each, Pashaie is spoken in 15 villages, and Nooristani in 35 villages. Kunar province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 13,200 individuals, or 0.5 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Kunar living in 20 communities. The Kuchi population in the summer is 1,355 individuals.

Infrastructure

On average, only 24 percent of households use safe drinking water; 11 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 41 percent of households have access to electricity, with no public provision of electricity in the province. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 39 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 47 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, AWCC and Roshan mobile company are active throughout the province.
Economics
The majority of commercial activity in Kunar province is related to trade in timber and gem products. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 74 percent of households in the province. However, 33 percent of households derive some income from trade and services, and 28 percent of households earn income through non-farm-related labor. Unlike other agricultural crops, industrial crops are not produced in large quantities. Sugar cane is the most important industrial crop in the province. Small industries are dominated by two commodities — dried sugar and honey. Handicrafts are very scarce; jewelry is the main craft. Eighty-eight percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 31 percent of rural households having access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown in the province include wheat and maize. The most commonly owned livestock are poultry, cattle, goats, sheep, and oxen.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Kunar province is 21 percent; however, while 47 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 18 percent of women. On average, 43 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 129,661 students in the 332 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 63 percent of students, and 33 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 3,268 teachers working in the schools; 5 percent were women. In the sector of higher education, there is one vocational school catering only to men.

Health
In 2008, Kunar province had 24 health centers and one hospital with 123 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 38 doctors and 121 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 93 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. A little less than one-quarter of the population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Kunduz Province

Kunduz, or Konduz, province is centered on the city of Kunduz, its capital, in northern Afghanistan. The Germans have a PRT in its capital.

Geography

Kunduz province borders on its north with Tajikistan. The province also borders with Baghlan province to its south, Takhar province to its east, Balkh province to its west, and Samangan province to its southwest. The province covers an area of 7,827 square kilometers. More than three-quarters (78.8 percent) of the area is made up of flat land, while about 12 percent is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain. The province is divided into seven districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Kunduz had an approximate population of 882,900. There are 86,756 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Approximately 69 percent of the population lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups are Pashtun and Tajik, followed by Uzbek, Hazara, and Turkmen. Major tribes include: Tajik, Aimaq, Sujani, Sadaat (hazara), Shikh Ali, Ismailia, Omarkhil, Ibrahimkhil, Amadzaee, Uzbek, Qarluq, Toghi, Arab, Kochi, and Balooch. Pashtu, Dari, and Uzbeki are spoken by 90 percent of the population. A fourth language, Turkmeni, is spoken by 8 percent of the population. Kunduz province has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 88,208 individuals stay in the province. Of these, 52 percent are short-range migratory, and 48 percent are long-range migratory. The Kuchi population in the summer is 45,570 individuals.

Infrastructure

On average, only 25 percent of households use safe drinking water; 18 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity. Only 2 percent of households in the urban area have safe toilets; virtually none exist in rural areas. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 68 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 4 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, Roshan, AWCC, and Areeba Digital phone networks are active throughout the province.
Economic
Kunduz province is mainly an agricultural province with fertile lands. The main industry in the province is the manufacture of cotton. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 66 percent of households in the province, including 34 percent of households in the urban area. However, 28 percent of households earn some income from trade and services, and approximately 15 percent of households earn income through non-farm-related labor. Kunduz produces industrial crops to some extent. Besides cotton, the other major product is sesame. The sector of small industries is almost nonexistent in the province, and karakul skin is the primary product. Handicrafts are not produced on a large scale either, but rugs and jewelry are produced to some extent. On average, 85 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 12 percent of rural households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown in the province include wheat, rice, watermelons, melons, and maize. The most commonly owned livestock are sheep, cattle, poultry, donkeys, and goats.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Kunduz province is 33 percent; however, while 40 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 24 percent of women. On average, 62 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 226,975 students in the 380 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 62 percent of students, and 16 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 4,767 teachers working in the schools; 26 percent were women. The province has a university, an agricultural school, and a teacher training institute.

Health
In 2008, Kunduz province had 48 health centers and two hospital with 300 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 75 doctors and 215 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 95 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. More than half of the population (56 percent) has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Laghman Province

Laghman is located in the eastern portion of Afghanistan. The capitol is Mehtar Lam, where a U.S. PRT is located.

History

During the invasions of Alexander the Great, the area was formerly known as Lampaka. Later, during the Mughal era, Laghman was recognized as a dependent district of Kabul province. There are Aramaic inscriptions that were found in Laghman, which indicated an ancient trade route from India to Palmyra.

During the Soviet-Afghan war and the battles that followed between the rivaling warlords, many homes and business establishments in the province were destroyed. In addition, the Soviets employed a “barbarism” strategy that targeted and destroyed the agricultural infrastructure of Laghman.

Geography

Laghman province is connected to six other provinces. Laghman borders Nangarhar province in the south, Kunar province in the east, Nuristan province in the northeast, Parwan province in the northwest, Kapisa province in the west, and Kabul province in the southwest. The province covers an area of 3,408 square kilometers. More than half of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain (55.4 percent), and approximately 40.9 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into five districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Laghman had an approximate population of 396,000. There are 60,048 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Ninety-nine percent of the population lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups are Sapi, Tajik, Nasir, Ibrahimkhail, Hoodkhail, Nuristani, Kharoti, Jabarkhail, Pashaie, Niazi, Pashtun, and Gujjars. Pashto is spoken by 345 villages out of 620 and around 58 percent of the population. The second most frequent language is Pashaie spoken in 210 villages by a third of the population. Dari is spoken in 57 villages, representing just over 9 percent of the population. Laghman province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 94,020 individuals, or around 4 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Laghman living in 40 communities. The Kuchi population in the summer is 3,670 individuals.
Infrastructure
On average, 39 percent of households use safe drinking water; 4 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 13 percent of households have access to electricity; however, none of this is public electricity. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 60.7 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 28.3 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, the Roshan, AWCC, and Areeba Digital phone networks cover most of the province.

Economics
Poppy growing is widespread, although the area devoted to the crop varies from place to place. In terms of industry, Laghman province is characterized by the production of fruit, nuts, agriculture, animal husbandry, mining of gems, timber cutting, small shopkeepers, and an ice factory. Non-farm-related labor provides a source of revenue for 39 percent of households, and 36 percent of households derive their income from trade and services. Unlike other provinces, Laghman province houses a relatively large number of villages that grow industrial crops, in particular cotton, sugar, sesame, tobacco, olives, and sharsham. On the other hand, the sector of small industries is very weak with honey and dried sugar in particular. Handicrafts are produced in even smaller numbers and consist of jewelry and rugs. Ninety-three percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 1 percent of have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops produced are wheat and rice. The most commonly owned livestock are cattle, poultry, and goats.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Laghman province is 14 percent; however, while 22 percent of the men are literate, this is true for just 5 percent of women. On average, around 48 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 122,862 students in the 234 primary, secondary, and high schools. Boys accounted for 63 percent of students, and 43 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 3,327 teachers working in the schools; 6 percent were women. There is one teacher training institute in the province.

Health
In 2008, Laghman province had 24 health centers and one hospital with 100 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 81 doctors and 202 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 156 pharmacies of which 154 are owned privately. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Sixty-three percent of the population has to travel more than 5 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Logar Province

Logar, or Lowgar, is located in the eastern zone, southeast of Kabul, and the geography of the province centers on the large Logar River, which enters the province through the west and leaves to the north. The word Logar is built from two Pashto words: Loy (great) and Ghar (mountain). Its capitol is Pul-i-Alam. A Czech-led PRT is located in Logar.

Geography

Logar province is surrounded by Nangarhar and Kabul provinces in the northeast, Paktya province in the south, and Wardak and Ghazni provinces in the west. The province covers an area of 3,955 square kilometers. More than one-third (37 percent) of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 58 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into seven districts.

Demography and Population

Logar has an approximate population of 349,000 in 2008. There are 44,209 households in the province, and households, on average, have eight members. Seventy-two percent of the population lives in rural districts. About two-thirds of villages and 60 percent of the population speak Pashto, and one-third of villages and 40 percent of the population speak Dari. Logar province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 96,280 individuals, or 4 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Logar living in 29 communities. During summer, the Kuchi population figures rise to 208,339, which makes Logar the province with the second highest number of Kuchi in the summer after Kabul province.

Infrastructure

In Logar province, on average, 45 percent of households use safe drinking water; and 21 percent of households have access to electricity. Access to electricity is greater in rural areas reaching 28 percent of households, and 10 percent of households have access to public electricity. There is little to no access to safe toilet facilities. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 78 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in a small part of the province (5 percent) there are no roads.
Economics

Logar province is an agricultural province, and it is rich with minerals such as copper and chromites. In terms of industry, one textile and one copper factory are working in the province. The majority of commercial activities are related to agriculture, trade and services, and livestock products. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 31 percent of households. However, 30 percent of households in rural areas derive their incomes from trade and services, and 46 percent earn some income through non-farm-related labor. The two major industrial crops are tobacco and sugar extract. Small industries are scarce; honey production is the main industry. A small number of villages produce jewelry, pottery, and carpets. Eighty-four percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land and 6 percent of households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, potatoes, alfalfa, clover, and other fodder. The most commonly owned livestock are sheep, cattle, camels, and poultry.

Education

The overall literacy rate in Logar province is 21 percent; however, while 31 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 9 percent of women. On average, 22 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 104,987 students in the 198 primary, secondary, and high schools. Boys accounted for 69 percent of students, and 55 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 2,228 teachers working in schools; 15 percent were women.

Health

In 2008, Logar province had 32 health centers and one hospital with 137 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 48 doctors and 218 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 156 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Most of the population has to travel 5-to-10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Nangarhar Province

Nangarhar is located in the eastern region of the country. Its capital is the city of Jalalabad. A U.S.-led PRT is located in Jalalabad.

Geography

Nangarhar province borders Kunar and Laghman provinces to the north; Kabul, Logar, and Paktya provinces in the west; and has an international border with Pakistan in the east and south. The province covers an area of 7,616 square kilometers. More than half (54.8 percent) of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 39.5 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 21 districts.

Demography and Population

In 2009, Nangarhar had an approximate population of 1,333,500. There are 182,425 households in the province, and households, on average, have eight members. Eighty-seven percent of the population lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups living in Nangarhar are Pashtuns (90 percent) followed by Pashaie (7 percent) and other ethnic groups such as Tajiks and Gujjaris (3 percent). This includes major tribes such as Momand, Shenwari, Khogaini, Sapi, Nasir, Ibrahimkhail, Hoodkhail, Kharoti, Jabarkhail, Nuristani, Pashaie, Niazi, and Tajik. Pashtu is spoken by 92.1 percent of the villages. The remaining 8 percent speak Pashaie (60 villages), Dari (36 villages), and some other unspecified languages. Nangarhar province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 558,627 people, representing 23 percent of the total Kuchi population, stay in Nangarhar living in 151 communities, which makes Nangarhar the province with the highest number of Kuchi in winter. During summer, the Kuchi population in Nangarhar province is 82,817 individuals.

Infrastructure

In Nangarhar province, on average, 43 percent of households use safe drinking water; 19 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity. Access to electricity is much greater in the urban area where 83 percent of households have access to electricity; however, this figure falls to just 9 percent in rural areas, with 3 percent having access to public electricity. Around one-third (33 percent) of households in urban areas and only 2 percent of rural households have access to safe toilet facilities. The transport infrastructure in Nangarhar is reasonably well developed, with 54 percent of roads in the province
able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 12 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, Roshan, Areeba Digital, and AWCC cover many districts of Nangarhar with a network that is being increased constantly.

Economics

Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 48 percent of households in Nangarhar province, including 55 percent of rural households and 12 percent of households in the urban area. However, 58 percent of households in the urban area and 28 percent of households in rural areas derive some income from trade and services. Twenty-seven percent of households in urban areas and 40 percent of households in rural areas earn some income through non-farm-related labor. Industrial crops that produce cotton and sugar are concentrated in certain parts of the province. Small industries are very scarce, and sugar and honey are the primary products. Handicrafts are specialized in jewelry and rugs. Ninety-six percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 4 percent of rural households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, rice, alfalfa, clover, and other fodder. The most commonly owned livestock are cattle, donkeys, goats, and sheep.

Education

The overall literacy rate in Nangarhar province is 29 percent; however, while more than 41 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 15 percent of women. On average, 39 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in schools. In 2008, there were 443,017 students in the 471 primary, secondary, and high schools. Boys accounted for 63 percent of students, and 17 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 8,654 teachers working in the schools; 8 percent were women. Nangarhar province also has a number of higher education facilities, with one university, an agricultural school, and teacher training institute.

Health

In 2008, Nangarhar province had 83 health centers and six hospitals with 815 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 314 doctors and 897 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 393 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Around a third of the population can access a health unit situated less than 5 kilometers away. People seeking medical attention travel more than 10 kilometers, and because of the nature of the terrain, it may take more time to reach the closest health unit than distances would suggest.
Nimroz Province

Nimroz, sometimes spelled Nimruz, is located in the southwest region of the country on the borders of Iran and Pakistan. The name Nimruz means “mid-day” in Persian. Its capitol city is Zaranj. There are no PRTs within the province.

History

The area now composing Nimroz was once part of the historical region of Sistan, which over the centuries was held by powers ranging from the Medean Empire to Alexander the Great, to the Kushan Empire before being conquered and converted to Islam by the Arab Rashidun Caliphate. The area later came under the Saffarid dynasty (861-1003 A.D.), one of the first Iranian dynasties of the Islamic era. Under the modern Afghan governments, the province was known as Chakhansur province until 1968, when it became Nimroz province.

Geography

Nimroz shares borders with two other provinces — Helmand to the east and Farah to the north — and two foreign countries — Pakistan to the south and Iran to the west. The province covers an area of 41,356 square kilometers. Nearly the entire province (95.3 percent) is made up of flat land. A substantial part of the province is the desert area of Dashti Margo. The province is divided into five districts.

Demography and Population

Nimroz had an approximate population of 139,900 in 2008 and is the most sparsely populated province in the country. There are 13,940 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Around four-fifths of the population (85 percent) lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups living in Nimroz province are Baluchi and Pashtun, followed by Tajiks and Uzbeks. Baluchi is spoken by 61 percent of the population. The second most frequent language is Pashtu, spoken by 27 percent of the population, followed by Dari and Uzbeki each spoken by 10 percent of the population. The province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. About 29,500 Kuchi stay in Nimroz. All of these are short-range, and migratory, and the population of Kuchi in summer is therefore the same as in winter.
Infrastructure
In Nimroz province, on average, only 38 percent of households use safe drinking water; 15 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 32 percent of households have access to electricity, with the great majority of homes relying on public electricity. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 60.8 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 7.1 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, public phones service about 5 percent of the population. No clear statistics are available on mobile telephone network coverage.

Economic
Nimroz is both an agricultural and industrial province. In terms of industry, people are engaged in handicrafts producing carpets, embroidery, pottery, and jewelry. The majority of commercial activity is related to trades and services, livestock products, and fruits including melons, watermelons, and grapes. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for only 14 percent of households. However, 32 percent of households derive their incomes from trade and services, and 17 percent of households earn some income through non-farm-related labor. There is not a very large production of industrial crops in Nimroz — one area grows onions and another grows potatoes. Almost all (97 percent) of households in the province have access to irrigated land, whereas due to its geographical location, the province has no access to rain-fed lands. The most important field crops grown beyond those already mentioned include alfalfa, clover, and other fodder. The most commonly owned livestock are poultry, goats, sheep, and donkeys.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Nimroz province is 22 percent; however, while 30 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 11 percent of women. On average, 33 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 38,293 students in the 85 primary, secondary, and high schools. Boys accounted for 59 percent of students and 27 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 795 teachers working in the schools; 48 percent were women. Although there is currently no governmental or private university in the province, there is a teacher training institute.

Health
In 2008, Nimroz province had five health centers and two hospitals with 50 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 25 doctors and 38 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. In 2004, the province had 30 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Two-thirds (67.5 percent) of the population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Nuristan Province

Nuristan (also spelled Nurestan or Nooristan) is a region in Afghanistan embedded in the south of the Hindu Kush valleys. Its administrative center is Parun. It was formed in 1989 and officially established in 2001 from the northern parts of Laghman province and Kunar province. Before 2001, its capitol was situated in Laghman province due to Mujahedeen control over Nuristan province. The U.S. has a PRT within the province.

History

Until the 1890s, the region was known as Kafiristan (Persian for “land of the non-believers”) because of its inhabitants, the Nuristani, an ethnically distinctive people who practiced animism, polytheism, and shamanism. The region was conquered by Emir Abdur Rahman Khan in 1895-96 and the Nuristani were then converted to Islam. The region was renamed Nuristan, meaning “land of the enlightened,” a reflection of the “enlightening” of the pagan Nuristani by the “light-giving” of Islam.

Geography

Nuristan is one of the most impassable regions of eastern Afghanistan, lost among the steep spurs of the eastern Hindu Kush. It is almost locked by sheer cliffs, and only in the extreme south and southeast, the mountainous terrain goes down towards the Kabul River basin. It is bordered on the north by Badakhsan province, Panjshir province to the west, Laghman and Kunar provinces to the south, and Pakistan to the east. The province covers an area of 9,942 square kilometers. Nearly the entire province (99 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 1.1 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into eight districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Nuristan had an approximate population of 131,900. There are 19,788 households in the province, and households, on average, have seven members. The entire population lives in rural areas. The major ethnic groups living in the province — are Kats, Kunish, Pashayi, Wama, and Paroni, collectively called Nuristanis — make up 99 percent of the population. These groups are split into six individual tribes: Katta tribe is the largest (38 percent) and mostly resides in Waigal, Wamma, and Do Aab; Kalsha tribe (30 percent), residing throughout Nuristan, is the next largest; Ashkori or Wamayee tribe (12 percent) resides mostly in Wama; Kam tribe (10 percent) resides mainly in Kamdesh, Barg-e-Matal, Kantewa and Mandol; Satra tribe (5 percent) resides throughout the province; and Parsoon tribe (4 percent) also
resides throughout the province. Nuristani is spoken by 78 percent of the population and 84 percent of the villages. The second most common language is Pashayi, spoken by the majorities in 39 villages representing 15 percent of the population. Nuristan province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 3,160 individuals, or 0.1 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Nuristan. In summer, the Kuchi population in Nuristan rises to 4,777, with some Kuchi migrating from Laghman province into Do Aab and Kamdesh districts.

Infrastructure

In Nuristan province, on average, only 2 percent of households use safe drinking water; 62 percent of households have access to electricity, however, there is no public electricity provision. There is little to no access to safe toilet facilities. The transport infrastructure in Nuristan is not very well developed. Only 10 percent of roads in the province are able to take car traffic in all seasons. In 73 percent of the province there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, only an Afghan-Indian joint digital company is active in Paroon.

Economics

Today, like centuries ago, the main occupations of the Nuristanis are agriculture and sheep and cattle breeding. The majority of commercial activity in Nuristan province is related to trade in agriculture, timber, gems, drugs, and weaponry. Agriculture and livestock represent sources of income for 88 percent of households. Fourteen percent earn some income through non-farm-related labor. There is very little production of industrial commodities such as cotton, sugar, sesame, tobacco, olives, and sharsham. The sector of small industries is dominated by one commodity — honey. Handicrafts are predominately rugs. On average, 97 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 3 percent have access to rain-fed land. The major crops grown in Nuristan province are maize, wheat, millet, and pulses. The most commonly owned livestock are cattle, goats, and donkeys.

Education

The overall literacy rate in Nuristan province is 25 percent; however, while 31 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 19 percent of women. On average, 47 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 35,401 students in the 221 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 59 percent of students, and 34 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 1,185 teachers working in the schools; 9 percent were women.

Health

In 2008, Nuristan province had 14 health centers and no hospitals with 30 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 24 doctors and 80 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Most of the population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Paktika Province

Paktika is located in the southeast region of the country. Its capitol is Sharan, where a U.S.-led PRT is located.

History

Paktika was once part of a greater province, Paktya, which has itself now further split into Khost province. The province was the site of many battles during the Soviet occupation of the country and the lawless years that followed.

Geography

Paktika province is surrounded by Paktya, Khost, and Ghazni provinces in the north; Zabul province in the west; and has an international border with Pakistan. The province covers an area of 19,336 square kilometers. Half of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 41 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 19 districts.

Demography and Population

Paktika had an approximate population of 287,300 in 2008. There are 115,075 households in the province, and households, on average, have eight members. Approximately 99 percent of the population live in rural districts, while 1 percent live in urban areas. Pashtu is spoken by more than 96 percent of the population. Five villages with a total population of about 15,000 speak Uzbeki, and another four villages with a total population of about 5,000 people speak other languages. Paktika province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 51,074 individuals stay in Paktika. Of the Kuchi that are in Paktika during winter, only 50 households are settled and the remaining 99 percent are short-range migratory. However, most of this group is only partially migratory. On average, 26 percent of the community does not migrate. Both in their summer area and in their winter area, they remain stable in one location during that season. The Kuchi population in the summer is 6,117 individuals.

Infrastructure

In Paktika province, on average 28 percent of households use safe drinking water; 6 percent of households have access to electricity, with only 1 percent of the population having access to public electricity. Almost no households have access to safe toilet facilities. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 33 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in about 4 percent of the province there are no roads.
Economics
Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 65 percent of households in Paktika province. However, 48 percent of households in rural areas derive their income from non-farm-related labor. Unlike agricultural products, there is not a very large production of industrial products; tobacco and sugar extracts are the major products. Small industries are very scarce in the province; honey is the main commodity. Handicrafts are more common than small industries, but they are still very scarce. Jewelry and rugs are the most prevalent. Almost all households in the province (96 percent) have access to irrigated land, and 4 percent of households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown in the province include wheat, barley, maize, alfalfa, clover, and other fodder. The most commonly owned livestock are cattle, sheep, donkeys, and goats.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Paktika province is extremely low at just 2 percent. While 4 percent of men are literate, the average literacy rate for women is zero. On average, 9 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 111,869 students in the 311 primary, secondary, and high schools. Boys accounted for 77 percent of students, and 50 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 5,630 teachers working in the schools; 2 percent were women.

Health
In 2008, Paktika province had 22 health centers and three hospitals with 90 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 37 doctors and 99 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 193 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Most of the population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center. Because of the nature of the terrain, travel over even short distances can be difficult and time consuming.
Paktya Province

Paktya, or Paktia, is located in the southeastern part of the country. A U.S.-led PRT is located in the provincial capitol of Gardez.

History

Paktya used to be a unified province with Khost and Paktika. These three provinces are now referred to as Loya Paktya, meaning “Greater Paktya.” Paktya came to prominence during the 1980s, when a significant portion of Afghanistan’s leadership originated from the province. Some of the more notable leaders include: Najibullah Ahmadzai, Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, Shahnawaz Tanai, and Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi. More recently, Paktya was the site of heavy fighting between Taliban and NATO forces following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Paktya was one of the last redoubts of organized Taliban resistance; much of Operation Anaconda took place in Zormat, one of Paktya’s larger districts.

Geography

Paktya province has borders with Logar province in the north, Ghazni province in the west, Paktika province and Khost province in the south, and Pakistan to the east. The province covers an area of 6,259 square kilometers. Around two-quarters of the province (65.1 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 32.3 percent of the area is made up of flat lands. The province is divided to 11 districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Paktya had an approximate population of 490,900. There are approximately 71,317 households in the province, and households on average have eight members. Almost all (96 percent) of the population lives in rural districts. Pashtu is spoken by 97 percent of the population, Dari is spoken by 21,000 individuals, and around 1,000 individuals speak other languages. Paktya province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 9,588 individuals and in spring 4,226 individuals of the Kuchi population stay in Paktya.

Infrastructure

In Paktya province, on average, only 30 percent of households use safe drinking water; 3 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; 16 percent of households have access to electricity, with only 1 percent having access to public electricity. The transport infrastructure is well developed, with nearly two-thirds (64.2 percent) of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 3 percent of the province there are no roads.
Economics
Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 59 percent of households in Paktya province, including 61 percent of rural households. In addition, half of households in rural areas derive their incomes from non-farm-related labor, and 20 percent gain income from trade and services. Unlike agricultural or animal products, there is not a very large production of industrial crops; cotton, sugar, sesame, tobacco, olives, and sharsham are the mainstays. The handicraft sector is very small in the province; honey, jewelry, and carpet are the main products. Nearly all households in the province (94 percent) have access to irrigated land, and 30 percent of rural households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, potatoes, alfalfa, clover, and other fodder. The most commonly owned livestock are sheep, donkeys, cattle, and camels.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Paktya province is 35 percent; however, while 42 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 26 percent of women. On average, 65 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 116,493 students in the 247 primary, secondary, and high schools. Boys accounted for 77 percent of students, and 38 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 2,617 teachers working in schools; 5 percent were women. There is one university and a teacher training institute in the province.

Health
In 2008, Paktya province had 25 health centers and three hospitals with 100 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 116 doctors and 222 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 363 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Most of the population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Panjshir Province

Panjshir, or Panjsher (literally “Five Lions” in Persian), is in east central Afghanistan. Containing the Panjshir Valley, it was established from the Parwan province on 13 April 2004. Its capitol is the town of Bazarak. A U.S.-led PRT is based in the province.

Geography

Panjshir is surrounded by Nuristan province in the east, Kapisa province in the south, Parwan province in the west, Baghlan province in the northwest, Takhar province in the north, and Badakhshan province in the northeast. Panjshir province covers an area of 3,531 square kilometers. Nearly the entire province (91.2 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and only 4.4 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into seven districts.

Demographics and Population

Panjshir had an approximate population of 136,700 in 2008. There are 17,158 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. The entire population lives in rural areas. The major ethnic group living in Panjshir are the Tajiks, along with a very small population of Pashtun Kuchis.

Infrastructure

In Panjshir province, on average, only 16 percent of households use safe drinking water; 1 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 16 percent of households in have access to electricity, with about 3 percent of these relying on public electricity. The transport infrastructure is not well developed, with 32.9 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 45.5 percent of the province there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, mobile telephone operators Roshan, AWCC, Areeba Digital, and Afghan Telecom are present in the province, with Afghan Telecom operating in all administrations of the government at the provincial and district levels.

Economics

Panjshir is an agricultural province, and it is rich with minerals such as rubies, emeralds, and sapphires. The majority of commercial activity is related to agricultural products. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 38 percent of households. More than half of households in the province (51 percent) derive their incomes from non-farm-related labor, and 29 percent of households earn
incomes from trade and services. For all practical purposes, the production of industrial commodities are absent in Panjshir. Sesame, tobacco, olives, honey, karakul, dried sugar, confection, and sugar candy are produced throughout the province. Handicrafts are produced mainly in Paryan district, with the majority of the households specializing in rugs and jewelry. Animal products are largely produced throughout the province, wool being the prime product. On average, 94 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 5 percent of households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, barley, and potatoes. The most commonly owned livestock are horses, cattle, poultry, sheep, and goats.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Panjshir province is 33 percent; however, while 43 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 20 percent of women. On average, 42 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 32,365 students in the 100 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 63 percent of students, and 34 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 878 teachers working in schools; 19 percent were women.

Health
In 2008, Panjshir province had 12 health centers and one hospital with 100 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 23 doctors and 58 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. One-quarter (26 percent) of the population lives within 5 kilometers from a health center, 20 percent of the population lives within 5 kilometers of a dispensary. Another quarter of the population (26.5 percent) travels more than 10 kilometers to reach a health center or a dispensary (24 percent).
Parwan Province

Parwan, also spelled Parvan, once also the name of an ancient town in the Hindu Kush Mountains, is today an administrative province in central Afghanistan. Its capitol is Charikar. The Republic of Korea leads a PRT within the province.

History

In 329 B.C., Alexander the Great founded the settlement of Parwan as his Alexandria of the Caucasus. It was conquered by the Arabs in 792. In 1221, the town was the site of the battle between the invading Mongols and the Khwarezmian Empire, where the Mongols were defeated. In 1840, Parwan was also the site of a major battle in the First Anglo-Afghan War, where the invading British were defeated. Parwan’s modern history began with the construction of a new textile factory in the town of Jabal Saraj in 1937. Since then, Parwan was involved in the Soviet war in Afghanistan as some of the fiercest fighting took place in the area. In the 1990s it was the site of heavy resistance against the Taliban.

Geography

Parwan province is surrounded by Bamyan province to the west, Wardak province to the west and southwest, Kabul province to the south, Kapisa and Panjshir provinces to the east, and Baghlan province to the north. The province covers an area of 5,868 square kilometers. Nearly two-thirds (60 percent) of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 26 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 10 districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Parwan had an approximate population of 589,700. There were 65,577 households in the province, and households, on average, have seven members. Around three-quarters (73 percent) of the population lives in rural districts. Dari and Pashto are the main languages spoken in the province; however, Dari speakers outnumber Pashto speakers by a ratio of 5-to-2. Parwan province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 30,290 Kuchis live in Parwan province, of which 66 percent are short-range migratory and the remaining 34 percent are long-range migratory. During the summer, Kuchi migrate to Parwan from Laghman, Kapisa, Baghlan, and, to a lesser extent, from Kabul, Nangarhar, and Kunar. The Kuchi population in the summer is 121,517 individuals.
Infrastructure
In Parwan province, on average, 32 percent of households use safe drinking water; 1 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; and 22 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority of these (16 percent) relying on public electricity. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 61 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 18 percent of the province there are no roads.

Economics
Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 39 percent of households in Parwan province, including 43 percent of rural households. However, 30 percent of households in rural areas derive some income from trade and services. Around half of households in rural areas earn income through non-farm-related labor. Many industrial crops are produced in the province, with the most frequent being cotton and tobacco. The production of herbs is also an economic activity in Parwan. The most prevalent herbs produced in the province are chicory, licorice, aniseed, hyssop, caray, zerk, and asfitida. Small industries are very scarce but produce honey, silk, karakul skin, dried sugar, and sugar candy. The most prevalent handicrafts are carpets, rugs, jewelry, and shawls. Sixty-two percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and around 6 percent have access to rain-fed land. The most common crops grown in garden plots include fruit and nut trees, grapes, potatoes, beans, flax, alfalfa, clover, and other fodder. The most commonly owned livestock are sheep, cattle, goats, and donkeys.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Parwan province is 37 percent; however, while 51 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 20 percent of women. On average, 42 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 164,446 students in the 372 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 66 percent of students, and 34 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 5,687 teachers working in the schools; 13 percent were women. There is one university, an agricultural school (men only), and a teacher training institute (men only).

Health
In 2008, Parwan province had 42 health centers and two hospitals with 80 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 54 doctors and 111 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 190 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. One-third of the population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Samangan Province

Samangan is located in northern Afghanistan. Its capitol city is Aibek. Afghanistan has various archeological sites where caves were hewn out of rocks and inhabited by Buddhists. Archaeologists are desperate to work in this province, as wars have destroyed many of these artifacts. The capitol is known for its ancient ruins including, most notably, the Takht e Rostam. There is no PRT located within the province.

Geography

Samangan province borders Baghlan province in the east, Bamyan province in the south, Sari Pul province in the southwest, and Balkh province in the west and north. The province covers an area of 11,218 square kilometers. Four-fifths (80 percent) of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain (80 percent), and 12 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into seven districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Samangan had an approximate population of 344,400. There are 47,799 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Around 93 percent of the population lives in rural districts, with about 51 percent of the population being male. The major ethnic groups living in the province are Uzbek and Tajiks, followed by Pashtuns, Hazaras, Arabs, and Tatars. Dari is spoken by more than 72.5 percent of the population. The second most frequent language is Uzbeki, spoken by 22.1 percent of the population. Samangan province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 14,150 individuals stay in the province, all of whom are currently settled. A few communities with approximately 350 households migrate into the province in the summer, which almost doubles the number of Kuchis in the province to 26,610.

Infrastructure

In Samangan province, on average, only 7 percent of households use safe drinking water; 5 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity. There are virtually no safe toilet facilities. The transport infrastructure in Samangan is not very well developed, with 28 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 28 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, both the main mobile telephone operators, Roshan and AWCC, are present in the province.
Economics

The majority of commercial activity in Samangan province is related to trade in agricultural and animal husbandry. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 36 percent of households. However, 28 percent of households earn some income through non-farm-related labor. Trade and services also account for income for 17 percent of households. Industrial crops are grown in comparatively few locations within the province, with the majority producing sesame, cotton, and tobacco. For all practical purposes, the sector of small industries is nonexistent in Samangan, with the primary product being karakul skin. Handicrafts are more prevalent. Rugs, shawls, jewelry, and carpets are produced throughout the province. Forty-three percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 85 percent of households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, barley, potatoes, and flax. The most commonly owned livestock are donkeys, goats, cattle, and sheep.

Education

The overall literacy rate in Samangan province is 19 percent; however, while 28 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 10 percent of women. Just over one-third (37 percent) of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 80,088 students in the 218 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 67 percent of students, and 39 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 2,020 teachers working in the schools; 21 percent were women. There is one government university within the province.

Health

In 2008, Samangan province had 19 health centers and two hospitals with 85 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 41 doctors and 121 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 24 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Sixty-eight percent of the population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Sari Pul Province

Sari Pul (also spelled Sar-e Pol, Sar-e-Pol, Sar-i-Pul, or Sar-e-Pul) is located in the northern region of the country. Its capital is the city of Sari Pul. There is no PRT operating within this province.

Geography

Sari Pul province borders Jawzjan province in the north, Balkh province in the northeast, Samangan province in the southeast, Bamyan and Ghor provinces in the south, and Faryab province in the west. The province covers an area of 16,360 square kilometers. Seventy-five percent of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 14 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into seven districts.

Demography and Population

Sari Pul had an approximate population of 496,900 in 2008. There are 73,266 households in the province, and households, on average, have seven members. Around three-quarters (74 percent) of the population lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups are Uzbek, Pashtun, and Hazara, followed by Arab and Tajik. The major tribe is Uzbek in all districts. Dari is the most dominant language in the province. It is spoken by 56 percent of the population. The second most frequent language is Uzbeki, spoken by 19 percent of the population. Sari Pul province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 59,843 individuals stay in the province; 57 percent of these are short-range, partially migratory; 2 percent are long-range, partially migratory; and 40 percent are settled, partially migratory. During both the winter and the summer, they still migrate in search of good pastures within their respective summer and winter areas. The Kuchi population in the summer increases slightly to 60,292 individuals.

Infrastructure

In Sari Pul province, on average, 45 percent of households use safe drinking water; 20 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; 6 percent of households have access to electricity, and only half of these have access to public electricity. The transport infrastructure in Sari Pul is not well developed with only 12 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. In 21 percent of the province, there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, both the main mobile telephone operators, Roshan and AWCC, are present in the province.
Economic
In terms of industry, there is some natural gas extraction and a number of small businesses working in the Sari Pul province. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 75 percent of households. However, 13 percent of households derive some income from trade and services, and 45 percent earn income through non-farm-related labor. Industrial commodities including sesame, tobacco, and cotton are produced. The sector of small industries is almost nonexistent in Sari Pul, with the exception of karakul skin and silk. The sector of handicrafts is dominated by rugs but also includes jewelry, shawls, and carpets. On average, 17 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 90 percent of rural households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, alfalfa, barley, and flax. The most commonly owned livestock are donkeys, goats, sheep, cattle, and oxen.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Sari Pul province is 12 percent; however, while 18 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 6 percent women. On average, 29 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 113,834 students in the 323 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 64 percent of students, and 37 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 3,183 teachers working in the schools; 25 percent were women. There are no private or government universities in the province.

Health
In 2008, Sari Pul province had 25 health centers and two hospitals with 120 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 53 doctors and 155 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 48 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Most of the population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Takhar Province

Takhar is located in the northeast part of Afghanistan. It was established in 1964 when Qataghan province was divided into three provinces: Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar. Its capitol is Taloqan. There are no PRTs in the province.

Geography

Takhar province is surrounded by Badakhshan province on the east, Panjshir province to the south, and Kunduz and Baghlan provinces to the west. The northern part of the province borders with Tajikistan. The province covers an area of 12,376 square kilometers. More than half of the province (56.8 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 36.7 percent is made up of flat land. The province consists of 17 districts, including the provincial capitol.

Demography and Population

The population of the Takhar province in 2008 was approximated at 870,900. There are 121,276 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Around 86 percent of the population of Takhar lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups living in Takhar province are Uzbek and Tajiks, followed by Pashtuns and Hazaras. Takhar province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 172,530 individuals stay in Takhar, with more than a third of these being short-range, partially migratory and the rest long-range partially migratory. The Kuchi population in the summer diminishes to 59,430 individuals.

Infrastructure

In Takhar province, on average, only 29 percent of households use safe drinking water; 1 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; 5 percent of households have access to electricity, with only 3 percent of households in urban areas and none in rural areas having access to public electricity. The transport infrastructure in Takhar is reasonably well developed, with 43.1 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 26.1 percent of the province, there are no roads. Roshan, AWCC, Afghan Telecom, Areeba Digital telecommunications companies operate in most districts of the province.
Economic
Takhar is an agricultural province and is rich with minerals like lapis lazuli, gems, and coal. In terms of industry, one textile and one cement factory are working in the province. The majority of commercial activity is related to trade in agricultural and livestock products. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 60 percent of households in Takhar province. However, 23 percent of households derive some income from trade and services. Additionally, more than a third of households (38 percent) earn income through non-farm-related labor. On average, 48 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 65 percent of rural households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, barley, rice, and flax. The most commonly owned livestock are donkeys, cattle, goats, poultry, and oxen.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Takhar province is 16 percent; however, while 21 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 10 percent of women. On average, 32 percent of children between the ages of 6 and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 245,377 students in the 375 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 59 percent of students, and 15 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 6,244 teachers working in the schools; 21 percent were women. The province has one university and a teacher training institute.

Health
In 2005, Takhar province had 50 health centers and four hospitals with 180 beds. Data from 2005 also showed there were 111 doctors and 453 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 71 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present.
Uruzgan Province

Uruzgan (also spelled Oruzgan, Urozgan, or Rozgan) is located in the south central area of the country, though the area is culturally and tribally linked to Kandahar in the south. On 28 March 2004, the new Daykundi province was carved out of an area in the north, leaving Uruzgan with a majority Pashtun population and Daykundi with a majority of Hazaras. Its capitol is Tarin Kowt, also spelled Tirin Kot. A Dutch-led PRT is in the province but in the near future will become a U.S.-led PRT.

Geography

Uruzgan province borders with Zabul and Kandahar provinces in the south, Helmand province in the east, Daykundi province in the north, and Ghazni province in the west. The province covers an area of 12,640 square kilometers. Around three-quarters of the province (72 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 21 percent of the area is made up of flat land. The province is divided into five districts.

Demography and Population

In 2008, Uruzgan had an approximate population of 311,900. There are approximately 44,896 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Most of the population (97 percent) lives in rural districts. Pashtu is spoken by 90 percent of the population and 90 percent of the villages. The second most frequent language is Dari, spoken by the majorities in 46 villages and approximately 19,000 people. Uruzgan province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 37,115 individuals, or 1.5 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Uruzgan. Of these, 74 percent are short-range migratory and 26 percent are long-range migratory. Almost all of these Kuchis are in fact partially migratory, with, on average, 25 percent of the households staying behind in the winter areas when the others migrate. The summer areas for the short-range migratory Kuchis are Chora and Khas Uruzgan districts of Uruzgan province. In the spring, some 1,400 Kuchi households migrate into Uruzgan province (Khas Uruzgan and Tirin Kot districts) from Kandahar. The Kuchi population in the summer is 39,480 individuals.
Infrastructure
In Uruzgan province, on average, only 8 to 9 percent of households use safe drinking water; 3 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; 8 percent of households have access to electricity, but only 1 percent have access to public electricity. The transport infrastructure is well developed, with 61 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 5 percent of the province, there are no roads.

Economics
Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 40 percent of households in Uruzgan province, including 42 percent of rural households. In addition, a further 37 percent of households in the rural area derive some income from livestock. Around 16 percent of households in rural areas earn income through non-farm-related labor. The production of industrial commodities is small. Cotton, sugar, sesame, tobacco, olives, and sharsham are produced. Small industries are also very scarce in the province. Honey, silk, karakul skin, dried sugar, and sugar candy are the main products. Handicrafts are produced in all districts — primarily rugs, jewelry, and shawls. On average, 69 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 14 percent of rural households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, rapeseeds, flax, and opium. The most commonly owned livestock are cattle, sheep, goats, and donkeys.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Uruzgan province is 5 percent; however, while 10 percent of men are literate, the literacy rate of women is recorded at zero. On average, 1 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 58,838 students in the 200 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 90 percent of students and 86 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 1,543 teachers working in the schools; 4 percent were women. Regarding higher education, the province has an agricultural school with an all-male student body.

Health
In 2005, Uruzgan province had 10 health centers and one hospital with 40 beds. Data from 2005 also showed there were 27 doctors and 36 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 55 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Seventy-five percent of the population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center. Given the nature of the terrain, travel times can be lengthy to cover even relatively short distances.
Wardak Province

Wardak province (also spelled Wardag or Vardak), or Maidan (Maydan), is located in the central region of Afghanistan. The capitol city of the province is Maidan Shar. A Turkish-led PRT is in the province.

History

During the communist times, the people of Wardak never gave significant support to the communist government. The province was significant during the civil war in Afghanistan due to its proximity to Kabul and its agricultural lands. Most of the area was captured by the Taliban in the winter of 1995, and after the capture of Kabul, the Wardak Taliban were significant in the fight for Parwan province and Kapisa. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the area enjoyed relative peace. By 2009, the government’s ability to control the vital highway out of Kabul was called into question and much of the province was again in Taliban control.

Geography

Wardak province is situated on the southern outcrops of the Hindu-Kush mountain range. It borders with Parwan and Bamyan provinces to the north, Kabul and Logar province in the east, and Ghazni province to the south and west. The province covers an area of 9,023 square kilometers. More than four-fifths of the province (84.1 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and a little more than one-tenth of the area (11.4 percent) is made up of flat land. The province is divided into eight districts.

Demography and Population

In 2009, Wardak had an approximate population of 531,200. There are around 83,984 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Nearly all of the population (99 percent) lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups living in Wardak province are Pashtuns, followed by Tajiks and Hazaras. The most frequently spoken languages are Pashtu, which is spoken by 70 percent of the population and Dari, which is spoken by 27 percent. Wardak province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. During the winter, approximately 10,670 individuals, 0.4 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Wardak. The vast majority (89 percent) of these are settled. The summer area for the long range migratory Kuchis from Wardak is Kabul province, while long-range migratory Kuchis from the provinces of Nangarhar, Logar, and Laghman, and to a lesser extent Kabul, Khost, Kunar, and Parwan move to Wardak in the summer, mostly the districts of Bihsud and Jalrez. The Kuchi population in the summer is 122,810 individuals, 5.1 percent of the total Kuchi population.
Infrastructure
In Wardak province, on average, only 22 percent of households use safe drinking water; 4 percent of households have access to safe toilet facilities; 9 percent of households province have access to electricity, but only 1 percent of households have access to public electricity. The transport infrastructure is quite well developed, with 27 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, 16 percent of the province has no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, there is a partial coverage from AWCC and Roshan mobile networks.

Economics
Wardak province is both an agricultural and an industrial province, and minerals such as gems and marble are found in the mountains of the provincial center, although the government has banned the extraction of these resources. The majority of commercial activity is related to trade in agricultural and livestock products, although stone quarrying is also a growing business in the area. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 43 percent of households. However, 24 percent of households in the province derive their incomes from trade and services, and 45 percent of households earn some income through non-farm-related labor. Unlike agricultural or animal products, there is not a very large production of industrial products in tobacco and sugar extracts. The sector of small industries is dominated by one commodity — honey. There is also a significant production of handicrafts mostly related to rugs, carpets, jewelry, and shawls. Eighty-three percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and around 18 percent have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, barley, maize, rice, and rapeseed. The most commonly owned livestock are sheep, goats, donkeys, poultry, and cattle.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Wardak province is 25 percent; however, while 38 percent of men are literate (38 percent), this is true for just 10 percent of women. On average, around a third (31 percent) of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, there were 124,921 students in the 305 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 75 percent of students and 29 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 3,186 teachers working in the schools; 5 percent were women. There is a teacher training institute.

Health
In 2008, Wardak province had 35 health centers and four hospitals with 181 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 62 doctors and 364 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 100 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. One-third of the population (29 percent) has to travel more than 5 kilometers to reach their closest health center.
Zabul Province

Zabul, or Zabol, is a historic province in south-central Afghanistan. Zabul became an independent province from neighboring Kandahar in 1963, with Qalat being named the provincial capitol. There is a U.S.-led PRT in its capitol.

Geography

Zabul borders Uruzgan province in the north, Kandahar province in the west, Ghazni and Paktika provinces in the east, and shares an international border with Pakistan in the south. The province covers an area of 17,293 square kilometers. Two-fifths of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain (41 percent), and more 28 percent is made up of flat land. The province is divided into 11 districts.

Demography and Population

Zabul had an approximate population of 270,600 in 2008. There are 34,259 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Around 96 percent of the population of Zabul lives in rural districts. The major ethnic groups living in Zabul province are Tohki, Hotak, Suliman Kheyil, Khaker, Popalzai, Naser, Shamulzai, Ludin, and Kuchi. Pashto is spoken by four persons out of five. The second most frequent language is Dari. Zabul province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 53,030 Kuchi stay in Zabul province. Eighty percent of these Kuchi are short-range migratory and 20 percent are long-range migratory. All are, in fact, only partially migratory, and an average of 30 percent of these households remain behind in their winter area during the summer. The Kuchi population in the summer is 46,022 individuals.

Infrastructure

Around nine-tenths (87 percent) of households in Zabul province have direct access to their main source of drinking water within their community; 83 percent have a traditional covered latrine, with none having an improved or flush latrine; 2 percent of households have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity. In rural areas, only 1 percent of households have access to electricity. The transport infrastructure is reasonably well developed, with 39 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. However, in 5 percent of the province there are no roads. As far as telecommunications are concerned, Roshan and AWCC mobile networks are active with patchy, but improving, coverage.
Economics
Zabul is an agricultural province. The majority of commercial activity is related to trade in agricultural products and animal husbandry and transport companies for import/export. Trafficking of narcotics also plays a significant role in the economy in the province. Agriculture is a major source of revenue for 50 percent of households, including 52 percent of rural households. Thirty-seven percent of households earn some income through non-farm-related labor. The major industrial crops grown are tobacco, sesame, and sugar extracts. The sector of small industries is practically nonexistent. Handicrafts also are scarce; rugs, jewelry, and shawls are the major crafts. On average, 85 percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 18 percent of rural households have access to rain-fed land. The most important field crops grown include wheat, maize, and potatoes. The most commonly owned livestock are sheep, goats, donkeys, cattle, and camels.

Education
The overall literacy rate in Zabul province is 1 percent, which comprises 1 percent of men and a small number of women. Very few children between six and 13 are enrolled in school — on average, 0.1 percent of children, including 0.2 percent for boys. In 2008, there were 53,483 students in the 172 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 89 percent of students and 87 percent of schools were boys’ schools. There were 812 teachers working in the schools; 7 percent were women.

Health
In 2008, Zabul province had 14 health centers and two hospitals with 90 beds. Data from 2008 also showed there were 28 doctors and 63 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health working in the province. The province has 62 pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Sixty percent of the population has to travel more than 10 kilometers to reach their closest health center. Given the nature of the terrain, travel times can be lengthy to cover even relatively short distances.
Endnotes


Annex B

Summary of the District Stability Framework

Overview

The district stability framework (DSF) is an analysis and program management process specifically designed to help practitioners improve stability in a local area. The framework encourages unity of effort by providing field implementers from various organizations with a common framework to:

- Understand the environment from a stability-focused perspective.
- Maintain focus on the local population and its perceptions.
- Identify the root causes (sources) of instability in a specific local area.
- Design activities that specifically address the identified sources of instability.
- Monitor and evaluate activity outputs and impacts, as well as changes in overall stability.

DSF has been successfully employed by U.S. and coalition military and civilian personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. The framework has four basic steps. Ideally, all relevant agencies and organizations in the area are included in the entire process, organized into a comprehensive stability working group (SWG). The four basic steps are:

- **Situational awareness:** DSF requires population-centric and stability-oriented situational awareness. The SWG achieves this by examining the area of operations (AO) from four perspectives: the operational environment; the cultural environment; stability and instability dynamics; and local perceptions.

- **Analysis:** The SWG applies the information gathered in the first step using a specifically-designed analytical process to identify and prioritize the sources of instability (SOIs) in a given local area.

- **Design:** The SWG develops activities that will diminish the SOIs identified during the analysis phase. The process begins by brainstorming potential stabilization activities, then filtering and refining the proposed activities against a series of stabilization fundamentals, design principles, and prioritization criteria.

- **Monitoring and evaluation:** DSF implementers measure their effort and achievements on three levels: output (which measures
activity completion), impact (which measures the effects achieved by individual activities), and overall stability (which measures broad stability conditions and trends). The lessons learned from this step then feed into the adjustment and development of future stabilization activities.

![Figure B-1. DSF implementation methodology](image)

**Situational Awareness**

DSF uses four different “lenses” to examines the local environment and achieve a comprehensive understanding of stability conditions and the factors that underlie them:

- **Operational environment**: DSF uses two acronyms as checklists for identifying key information about the operational environment: PMESII (political/governance, military/security, economic, social, infrastructure, and information) identifies operational variables in the local area, while ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events) focuses on civil considerations. Significantly, DSF practitioners not only identify a list of facts about the operational environment, but more importantly, also the relevance of those facts to their stabilization mission. For example, they do not just identify that the local government is hampered by corruption, but also that they may have to work around and marginalize corrupt officials to be effective.
• **Cultural environment:** DSF looks at seven categories of cultural information — identifying the major cultural groups; their interests; important cultural characteristics; traditional mechanisms of resolving conflicts; traditional authorities; current conditions that may be undermining traditional mechanisms and authorities; and how spoilers use these factors to their advantage.

• **Stability/instability dynamics:** DSF identifies potential sources of stability and instability as seen from an outsiders’ perspective. For sources of stability, these include resiliencies in the society (institutions and mechanisms that help the society function peacefully), events that present a window of opportunity to enhance stability, and key actors (individuals) who are helping to enhance stability. On the other side of the equation are sources of instability, composed of local grievances, events that present a window of vulnerability in which stability may be undermined, and key actors (individuals) who are instigating instability.

• **Local perceptions:** Doctrine says that the population is the center of gravity in a counterinsurgency (COIN) — a truth that is no less applicable to other types of stability operations. Because instability is a matter of perspective, understanding the local population’s perceptions is a critical factor in any effort to improve stability. DSF is particularly focused on identifying the population’s priority grievances — i.e., issues about which a significant percentage of the population is concerned or upset. DSF identifies local perceptions using several possible tools, including population surveys, focus groups, key leader engagements, and polling conducted by external organizations.

One methodology for collecting local perceptions is the tactical conflict survey (TCS) — a simple, four-question survey that can be easily utilized by military units while on patrol, civilian agency implementing partners, and host-nation government and security forces. Each question is followed up by asking “why” to ensure full understanding of the interviewee’s perspective. The four questions are:

• Has the number of people in the village changed in the last year?

• What are the most important problems facing the village?

• Who do you believe can solve your problems?

• What should be done first to help the village?

In addition to the four survey questions, collectors also document some contextual information that will facilitate further analysis. This includes the location and characteristics of the interviewee, including occupation, ethnicity/tribe, age, and gender.
The answers to these questions are then entered into a simple database or spreadsheet using drop-down menus to “bin” the survey answers into standardized categories. By turning this qualitative information into quantitative data, the SWG can then create charts and graphs that make the local perceptions data quickly and easily understandable. A pie chart, for example, represents a snapshot in time, while a line graph can be used to track changes in public opinion over time. An example of these pie charts, created for each neighborhood of a provincial capital in Afghanistan, is shown in Figure B-2 below.

![Figure B-2. DSF local perceptions data by neighborhood](image)

**Analysis**

After collecting information to gain situational awareness, SWGs analyze this data to identify the SOIs and to define an objective and impact indicators that will measure progress in addressing each one. The primary tool used to identify SOI is the SOI analysis matrix. This matrix is at the heart of DSF’s “targeting” process. The first three situational analysis lenses typically result in a long list of potential problems and grievances that could be driving instability in an area. As the first column of the SOI analysis matrix indicates, all of these problems may be regarded as “needs.” In the three subsequent steps, however, this matrix helps to whittle this list down to a limited number of core SOIs:

- The first step is to use the fourth situational analysis lens, local perceptions, to identify which problems the local people really care about — i.e., their priority grievances. When using the TCS, this can be as simple as selecting each grievance that polls as a priority for, say, 10 percent or more of the population.
The purpose of a stability operation is not simply to fulfill every wish of the local population, but specifically to create a more stable environment. To further narrow its focus, therefore, the SWG next applies the three SOI criteria — i.e., does the priority grievance:

- Decrease support for the government (based on what locals actually expect of their government).
- Increase support for anti-government elements (which usually occurs when spoilers are seen as helping to solve the priority grievance).
- Undermine the normal functioning of society (where the emphasis must be on local norms; for example, if people have never had electricity, the continued lack of electricity can hardly be regarded as undermining the normal functioning of society).

Just meeting one of the three SOI criteria is sufficient for a priority grievance to be regarded as a SOI. The more criteria an SOI meets, however, the higher priority it may be given.

Finally, the SOI analysis matrix distinguishes between SOIs that are symptoms versus those that are causes. If an SOI is a symptom, then addressing one or more of the other SOIs may be expected to fix the symptom as well. If an SOI is a cause, then addressing other SOIs will have little or no positive effect on it. A cause SOI must be addressed independently because it is a problem in its own right. SWGs should focus on addressing the causes of instability, not symptoms.

After identifying a discrete number of cause SOIs, SWGs fill out a tactical stability matrix (TSM) for each one. The TSM is a key DSF tool that helps further analyze and (subsequently) design activities to address each significant SOI. The TSM consists of nine columns. The first six columns are included in the analysis process, while the final three are regarded as part of the design phase. The columns in the TSM are filled out by identifying:

- The targeted SOI.
- The local population’s perceptions of the SOI (perceived causes).
- The systemic causes of the SOI (i.e., other “root causes” of which the general populace may be unaware).
- An objective (a succinct goal statement or end state that will address the SOI).
- Impact indicators, also known as measures of effectiveness (MOEs) (changes in the environment that would indicate progress toward achieving the objective).
• Impact indicator data sources (where information on the impact indicators can be obtained).

• Stabilization activities to be conducted.

• Output indicators, also known as measures of performance (MOPs) (metrics related to each activity that indicate progress toward activity completion).

• Output indicator data sources (where information on the output indicators can be obtained).

**Design**

Once the causes, objective, and impact indicators for each SOI have been identified, the next step is to determine what stabilization activities should actually be implemented. This process starts by brainstorming possible activities, then putting those ideas through a series of filters to eliminate poor options and refine/improve others. The first filter consists of three questions known as the stability fundamentals:

• Does each activity:
  ○ Increase support for the government?
  ○ Decrease support for anti-government elements?
  ○ Increase institutional and societal capability and capacity?

Any proposed activity that does not meet at least one of these criteria should be eliminated. Activities that meet more than one of these criteria are preferred and may be prioritized.

Proposed activities that survive this first filter should then be refined using the seven design principles. To the extent possible, practitioners should design or modify each activity such that it:

• Ensures sustainability by the local government or institutions.

• Facilitates local ownership.

• Considers the trade-offs between short-term and long-term impacts.

• Leverages/supports other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and host-nation programs.

• Fits the local political and cultural context.
- Strengthens governmental accountability and transparency.
- Provides flexibility.

After this, SWGs flesh out the details of their proposed stabilization activities; as they do so, new information may come to light that requires them to modify their proposed activities and potentially return to previous steps of the design process. Next, SWGs screen each proposed activity against its available resources. Finally, activities for which the necessary resources are available (or can be obtained) should be prioritized based on their anticipated impact in addressing the targeted SOI. This completes Column 7 of the TSM.

Once the appropriate activities are identified, SWGs complete the TSM by identifying output indicators (MOPs) and output indicator data sources that will enable them to determine whether an activity is proceeding as planned and, ultimately, when it has been completed.

Lastly in the design phase, SWGs use the synchronization matrix to synchronize and prioritize identified activities by establishing a logical sequence for the activities, coordinate the activities along the lines of operation, and assign activities and tasks to specific organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Instability</th>
<th>Causes</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We need</td>
<td>Tribal competition prevents people from cooperating to dig wells or irrigation.</td>
<td>GirNoA helps increase availability of drinking water and expand amount of land under irrigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more wells</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more drinking water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We need water for our crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legend:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GirNoA - Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRRD - Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Example tactical stability matrix

135
Monitoring and Evaluation

The final step in DSF — evaluation — takes place during and after the implementation of stabilization activities. Evaluation is conducted on three levels. The first two have already been identified as part of the TSM.

- **Output indicators** (MOPs) simply track implementation of an activity. They answer the question, “Is the activity progressing?” and in the long run, “Is the activity complete?” Examples of output indicators might be the number of miles of road paved or number of police trained. Output indicators are monitored during the implementation of an activity, until it is completed.

- **Impact indicators** (MOEs) measure the effect an activity achieved. They answer the question, “Did the activity have the intended effect?” Examples might be decreased travel time (for a road project) or decreased criminal activity (for a police training activity). They are generally evaluated only after an activity is completed.

The final evaluation level is:

- **Overall stability**, which takes into account the stabilization impact of all the activities a unit has conducted over a period of several weeks or months. It asks, “Is stability increasing or decreasing?” Measuring the change in overall stability is a key component of the DSF process. By identifying and measuring a common basket of stability-focused indicators, it is possible to track the change in stability for a given district. When aggregated, they can provide a measurement of overall changes in stability over time for a given district.

Suggested indicators for tracking overall stability include:

- District government recognition (government legitimacy in the eyes of the population).
- Local-on-local violence.
- Economic activity.
- Host-nation security force presence.
- Population freedom of movement.
- Local perceptions of the government.
- Local perceptions of security conditions.

As each of these three levels of monitoring and evaluation occurs, SWGs should identify lessons that can help them improve future stabilization activities, or sustain successful ones. For example, implementers may learn...
that certain external factors prevented their program from being successful. Subsequent efforts may need to address these external factors first, or take a completely different approach to addressing the SOIs.

Summary

DSF is specifically designed to help overcome many of the challenges to successful stability operations:

• DSF keeps SWGs focused on the center of gravity for COIN and stability operations — the population and its perceptions.

• DSF provides a common operating picture for both military and civilian agencies. By making the population’s perspective the focal point, these organizations can focus their varied resources and expertise on a single, agreed set of priorities.

• DSF helps prioritize activities based on their importance to the local populace and their relevance to the over-arching mission of stabilizing the area.

• DSF enhances continuity between units. DSF data can be easily passed along from one unit to the next — establishing a clear baseline for the problems identified, the steps taken to address those problems, and the impact those activities achieved.

• DSF empowers implementers at the tactical level by giving them hard data that can be used as a basis for decision making at their level and for influencing decisions at higher levels.

• The DSF framework forces us to identify both MOPs and MOEs for our activities — rather than the all-too-common pattern of only tracking the MOPs.

• By tracking indicators of Overall Stability, DSF helps us determine whether we are actually making progress toward stabilizing the environment.

• By identifying the issues that matter most to the population, DSF helps identify information operations themes that actually resonate with the population.
District stability framework (DSF) tool kit

The DSF tool kit on the following pages assists units in implementing the DSF methodology. It consists of the TCS, TCS collection planner, ASCOPE-PMESII matrix, cultural matrix, factors of instability/stability matrix, SOI matrix, tactical stability matrix, activity design matrix, synchronization matrix, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) matrix, and the overall stability index. This tool kit is the basis for a successful assessment program. A successful program will only exist if units conduct proper analysis and effective design, followed up by rapid implementation with comprehensive monitoring and continuous evaluation. Units that only employ the TCS, hoping it is a “silver bullet,” will do more harm than good.

ASCOPE/PMESII matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>ASCOPE-PMESII</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political/Governance: Political actors, agenda, government capability and capacity</td>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>Key elements of the formal, informal, and shadow systems of government which significantly influence the local population</td>
<td>Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military/Security: Capabilities in the AO (equipment, mission, resource constraints)</td>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>Key elements that could influence the security situation</td>
<td>Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic: Trade, development, finance, institutional capabilities, geography, regulation</td>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>Key elements that influence economic activity in the area</td>
<td>Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social: Demographics, migration trends, urbanization, living standards, literacy/education level, etc.</td>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>Key elements that describe or could influence traditional social dynamics in an area</td>
<td>Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure: Basic facilities, services and installations</td>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>Effects on the physical infrastructure: sewage, water, electricity, educational facilities, health facilities, and transportation</td>
<td>Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information: Means of communication, media, telecommunications, word of mouth</td>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>Key elements that facilitate the transfer of information to and among the local population</td>
<td>Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure B-3. ASCOPE/PMESII matrix

One model for describing the operational environment is ASCOPE-PMESII. Each letter stands for an aspect of the operational environment: Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events. The six ASCOPE areas of civil considerations are used to inform the six PMESII operational variables: Political/governance, Military/security, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information.

ASCOPE-PMESII is population-focused rather than enemy-focused. In contrast to a traditional area assessment, ASCOPE-PMESII organizes and examines strategic and operational factors for their relevance to local stability.
Cultural matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Matrix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Major Cultural Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify the major cultural and/or tribal groups in your AO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Traditional Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify the relevant traditional authorities that interact with the population within your AO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure B-4. Cultural matrix

The cultural environment is the second aspect of DSF situational awareness. This awareness starts with a thorough understanding of the organization, history, and interests of local groups.

In depth knowledge of cultural factors is essential to the development of stability-focused situational awareness. In particular, understanding how traditional conflict resolution mechanisms function or how stabilizing or destabilizing actors can leverage these factors for negative and positive effects is critical. Six key factors to analyze include:

- Major cultural groups and their interests.
- Cultural codes, traditions, and values.
- Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.
- Traditional authorities.
- Disruptions to traditional authorities.
- Ways destabilizing elements take advantage of these factors.
Factors of instability/stability matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors of Instability</th>
<th>Events (Windows of Vulnerability)</th>
<th>Actors’ Means and Motivations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the grievances and/or factors that foster instability?</td>
<td>Potential situations that could contribute to an increase in instability?</td>
<td>Who are the actors and what are their means and motivations that enable them to contribute to an increase of instability?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors of Stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resiliencies</th>
<th>Events (Windows of Opportunity)</th>
<th>Actors’ Means and Motivations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the processes, relationships and institutions that can reduce the effect of grievances?</td>
<td>Potential situations that might offer opportunities for mitigating violent conflict and promoting stability?</td>
<td>Who are the actors and what are their means and motivations that enable them to contribute to an increase of stability?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure B-5. Factors of instability/stability matrix

Instability/stability dynamics is the third lens for situational awareness. It focuses specifically on the factors that typically work together to create or prevent instability. Stability occurs when the instability factors “outweigh” the stability factors.

Instability factors

There are three factors of instability to consider:

- Community grievances. Grievances occur when people believe their needs are not being met and/or their interests are not being defended.
- Events with the potential to be destabilizing (windows of vulnerability).
- Individuals with the means and motivations to exploit grievances and windows of vulnerability.

Although there can be many grievances, they do not all necessarily foster instability unless key actors with both the motivation and the means to translate these grievances into widespread instability emerge. Windows of vulnerability are often precipitated by a specific event that key actors can capitalize on — for example, the death of a key leader, an economic crisis, or a natural disaster.
Stability factors
Counterbalancing the factors of instability are the three stability factors:

- Resiliencies, which are the processes, relationships, and institutions that enable the society to peacefully solve its own problems and meet its own needs.
- Events with the potential to mitigate conflict and foster stability (windows of opportunity).
- Individuals with the means and motivations to foster stability.

Most events are fundamentally neutral. That is, the same event may become an opportunity for the environment to become more or less stable, depending on how it plays out. Elections are a good example. If an election plays out peacefully and legitimately, it can help strengthen the political system and mitigate violence. If an election is violent and corrupt, however, it can highlight government ineffectiveness and undermine the legitimacy of the people/parties elected. SWGs identify upcoming events so that, to the extent possible, they can shape the events to become windows of opportunity for stability to improve, rather than for instability to grow.

DSF collection planner
Operational considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Considerations</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Relevance for Collectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How are government officials and security forces viewed?</td>
<td>(Collectors will be associated with the government.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What is the security situation for locals?</td>
<td>(Affects willingness to speak with collectors.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Infrastructure?</td>
<td>(Affects patrol time and the location of the population.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cultural considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Considerations</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Relevance for Collectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What are the major groups and where are they located?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Segmentation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Daily and seasonal routines?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Identify appropriate times and places to speak with locals.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cultural prohibitions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Do not offend locals.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cultural obligations?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(How do locals interact with themselves and outsiders?)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Societal hierarchy?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Whom should you engage first and how will you identify them?)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Common courtesies and greetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Appropriate greetings suggest you understand and value the local culture.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Time orientation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Affects patrol time and appointments)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TCS considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Considerations</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Whom will you engage?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hint: Identify and segment the major groups.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Survey parameters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(How many people do you want to survey and how frequently?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Choosing collectors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Who will conduct the surveys?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure B-6. DSF collection planner**

The collection planner is a tool utilized to help collectors understand the issues at hand and how those issues will impact on the collector to do his or her job. When completing the first two parts, units will identify the specific issues that are of importance for each block to keep in consideration when planning for collection. More importantly than the issues are the specific relevance each of those factors has on a unit’s ability to collect — not overall relevance, just relevance to the unit’s requirement to collect/gather local information. The planner has three parts: operational considerations, cultural considerations, and survey considerations.

**Operational considerations**

Operational considerations simply help the collector understand the area in which he or she is operating.

**Cultural considerations**

The matrix will allow you to pinpoint most of the cultural elements you need to consider prior to surveying the population. The first two considerations help you identify which groups you need to engage and when it is appropriate to do so.

Considerations 3–5 tell you how you need to engage locals and what different elements you need to consider to be respectful and not cause a “diplomatic incident.”
Considerations 6–7 help you engage the locals by putting yourself at their level both during engagements and when planning for them.

All of these elements combined will give standing operating procedures to collectors, allowing for a standardized, seamless survey process.

Survey considerations

Finally, as a part of the collection planner, units need to operationalize the survey process. If this is not done properly, it becomes everyone’s task. And when it is everyone’s task, it is no one’s task, and the collection process collapses. So this is simple — it is the 5Ws (who, what, where, when, and why) and the H (how) of the plan.

ASK: Who will you survey? Identify targeted population segments: number, occupation, gender, and tribe.

ASK: How many people? Sets goal for the number of DSF conversations (2–3 DSF interviews per patrol?). This depends on the population of the area. The goal is to survey 0.1 percent of the population per month in areas with more than 20,000 inhabitants. In smaller areas, you want to probe a minimum of 20 people per month for your data to be relevant.

ASK: How often will you survey them? You want to have the monthly 0.1 percent or more than 20 every month. Make sure you do not send all of your patrols to collect on the same day, as you risk alienating people. Instead, trickle your collection over the span of the month. You want to make sure to target the same segments, not the same people, every month in roughly equivalent numbers.

ASK: Who will conduct the surveys?

- People who are mature.
- People who have good interpersonal skills.
- People who are culturally aware.
- People who are skillful in using an interpreter.
Tactical conflict survey (TCS)

Figure B-7. Sample TCS
Acknowledged problems in a community are not necessarily underlying sources of instability. Effective stability programming relies on careful assessment of potential SOIs against the stability criteria:

- Does the potential instability factor increase support for anti-government elements (AGEs)?
- Does the potential instability factor decrease support for the government?
- Does the potential instability factor undermine the normal functioning of society?

The SOI analysis tool takes factors of instability identified during situational awareness and applies the three stability criteria. Not all priority grievances are destabilizing.
Tactical stability matrix (analysis and design)

![Tactical Stability Matrix Diagram](image)

**Analysis components of the TSM:**

- **Source of instability** — A very brief description of the problem or issue, often just a couple of words, as identified through the analysis of all available operational, cultural, tribal, and local perception data on a given area.

- **Cause (perception)** — The perceived cause of a source of instability (i.e., priority grievances commonly cited by the local population).

- **Cause (systemic)** — The root causes of the problem that relate to the perceived causes. To identify systemic causes, ask yourself what circumstances led to community perceptions? What circumstances allow the problem to continue? What conditions prevent the problem from being fixed?

- **Objective** — A statement of the conditions that will diminish the identified SOI. Often it is simply the opposite of the source of instability and its associated conditions. Keep in mind the three Stability Criteria when developing the objective statement.
Impact indicators — Also called MOE, impact indicators measure the effectiveness of your activities against the predetermined objective and systemic causes. To identify impact indicators, ask: “How will I know if the objective has been achieved?” Example: If “police abuse” is the source of instability, impact indicators might include:

- Increased popular support for the police.
- Population provides more actionable intelligence to the police.
- Police presence in previously no-go areas.

Impact Data Sources — Methods to obtain the information identified in your impact indicators.

The TSM is used during the design phase to identify potential activities addressing the objective and systemic causes as well as to identify output indicators and data sources to monitor those activities.

Design components of the TSM:

- Activities — Things you will do to mitigate the systemic causes of instability and achieve the identified objective.

- Output indicators — Also called MOP, output indicators determine whether an activity has been completed. To identify output indicators, ask yourself: “How can I confirm that the proposed activity is progressing as planned or has been completed?”

  - Number of projects completed.
  - Number of police trained.
  - Number of road miles completed.
  - Number of dollars spent. Example: If “police training” was an activity, an output indicator would be the number of police trained.

- Output data sources — Methods to obtain the information identified in your output indicators.
**Activity design worksheet**

### Activity Design Worksheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brainstorm Possible Activities</th>
<th>Stability Design Criteria</th>
<th>Design Principles</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Is Activity Relevant?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the activity increase support for GIRoA? Explain.</td>
<td>Explain how the activity will increase support for GIRoA.</td>
<td>Explain how the activity will build GIRoA capacity.</td>
<td>Does the activity meet the 7 design principles? Check all that apply.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure B-10. Activity design worksheet**

The activity design worksheet is a tool to assist with filtering activities against the stability criteria, design principles, and resource availability. It should be used while completing the TSM.

- **Stability criteria: “Does the activity … ”**
  - Increase support for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)?
  - Decrease support for AGEs?
  - Increase institutional and societal capacity and capability?

- **Design principles: “Is the activity … ”**
  - Sustainable by the local government and/or local institutions?
  - Promoting local ownership putting local institutions in the lead?
  - Fostering long-term versus short-term results?
  - Leveraging support from other organizations?
  - Politically and culturally appropriate?
  - Strengthening accountability and transparency?
  - Flexible?
• Resource availability: “Do you have the required …”
  ○ Money?
  ○ Personnel?
  ○ Expertise?
  ○ Time?

Synchronization matrix

![Synchronization Matrix](image)

**Figure B-11. Synchronization matrix**

When designing and implementing activities, it is critical to coordinate with other actors working in the same district. The synchronization matrix helps actors in an SWG with the following:

- Planning a logical sequence for activities.
- Coordinating along multiple lines of operation.
- Addressing multiple causes of instability.
- Maximizing impact and minimizing effort/cost.
Monitoring and evaluation matrix

**Figure B-12. Monitoring and evaluation matrix**

The M&E matrix is a program management and reporting tool that measures activity output and impact. It tracks progress against a baseline to assess the impact activities are having. The M&E matrix focuses on the first two levels of M&E.

- Level 1, activity output, focuses on:
  - Have activities been completed?
  - Are activities being implemented successfully?
  - Are there external factors affecting the implementation of activities?
  - Are indicators measuring the appropriate outputs? If not, should new indicators be identified?
  - Are your data sources providing the correct indicator data? If not, are new data sources needed?

- Level 2, impact, focuses on:
  - Is the intended impact/change in the environment being observed?
  - Does this change represent progress towards the objective and a diminishment of a root cause?
  - How are external factors influencing and/or causing the changes being observed?
  - Are the activities contributing to the expected impact and the overall objective? If not, consider alternative activities.
- Are indicators measuring the impact appropriately? If not, consider adopting new indicators.

- Are data sources providing the correct indicator data? If not, consider adopting new data sources and/or new means to collect them.

**Overall stability index**

![Overall Stability Index](image)

*Figure B-13. Overall stability index*

Measuring the change in overall stability is a key component of the DSF process and the third level of M&E. By measuring a common basket of stability-focused indicators, it is possible to track the change in stability for a given district. Seven recommended overall stability indicators are listed below; however, they can be modified as needed for adaptation to a specific operating environment. The overall stability indicators are not linked to activities. When aggregated, they can provide a measurement of overall changes in stability over time for a given district. The seven indicators were selected to provide a picture of what life is like in a district and how it is changing for the local population.

- District government recognition.
- Local-on-local violence.
- Economic activity.
- Host-nation security force presence.
• Population freedom of movement.
• Local perceptions of the government.
• Local perceptions of security conditions.

For further information on DSF, DSF materials, or questions, contact the USAID Office of Military Affairs at <DSF@usaid.gov>.
Annex C

Lessons Learned and Best Practices

Definition of Lessons Learned and Best Practices
Lessons learned and best practices are actions that provincial reconstruction team (PRT) members have employed to overcome situation-specific obstacles and achieve a desired outcome. These should not be interpreted as “one-size-fits-all” solutions or doctrines. What works in one place and time may not work in another place and time. Rather, these are actions that have been effective in the past and that should be considered by future PRT members. Deployed personnel must use their own discretion to determine whether such actions or suggestions would be useful in their particular circumstances. The following sections within this annex may also prove helpful:

• **Section 1. PRT best practices indicators** from the 2010 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command PRT Conference.

• **Section 2. Summaries of best practices** from 2009 interviews:
  - Interaction with locals.
  - Planning.
  - Funding.
  - Civil-military relations.
  - Clarifying the mission.
  - Continuity of effort.

• **Section 3. Lessons learned** from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) archives:
  - Develop, encourage, and influence local leaders.
  - Engagement of government officials under difficult conditions.
  - Prepare PRT personnel for key leader engagements.
  - Dealing with corruption.
  - Assist in building medical capacity.
  - Assist in building a competent building contracting and labor force.
  - Communicating to the populace with local media.
Section 1. PRT Best Practices Indicators

Rationale
The purpose is to present a set of indicators governing PRTs’ best-practices aimed at further strengthening Afghan ownership. The PRTs’ role in supporting the promotion of long-term stability in Afghanistan must take into account five factors, which were nonexistent at the inception of the PRT concept:

• The launch of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS).

• The appointment of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) as the leading Afghan government agency on PRT-related issues.

• The endorsement of the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP), addressing existing governance gaps at the district level.

• A sharpened coordinating role for the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) with respect to the overall international assistance effort in Afghanistan.

• A strengthened role for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) civilian representative, following the NATO Summit in Bucharest of April 2008, to enhance coherence of PRTs efforts, in close coordination and consultation with Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), UNAMA, and ISAF.
**Best Practices Indicators**

**Align PRT activities with the Afghan National Development Strategy and provincial development plans (PDPs)**

The ANDS is composed of 18 sector strategies and five cross-cutting themes, each of which has its own structure of management, implementation, and coordination. Full alignment of PRT activities with the ANDS will require that they take full account of these sectoral frameworks in planning, implementation, and evaluation phases of their capacity-building and reconstruction and development activities. This process will improve the aid effectiveness and sustainability of PRT initiatives. When PRTs work within fully articulated national programs, they are virtually guaranteed to enhance the authority and institutional capacity of government. Such alignment should provide for appropriate, and even enhanced, roles for civil society and private sector implementers. But it must reflect the priorities set and pursued by government at national and sub-national level, and the roles and responsibilities assigned to provincial authorities under the new Sub-National Governance Policy developed under IDLG leadership in 2008 and set for cabinet approval in early 2009. This will ensure that PRT activities contribute to a consolidation of the state-building process in a balanced way and on a country-wide scale by meeting specific needs on security, governance, and social/economic development framed at the local and national levels and reflected both in the PDPs and in the ANDS. Three important premises must apply: a continuous interface between PRT personnel and provincial and district governors; the consolidation of PRT relations with provincial development committees (PDCs), chaired by the provincial governor; and PRTs’ sharpened coordination with regard to reporting their developmental activities. In places where PRTs cannot assist in meeting the highest needs as prioritized by the PDCs, they should offer a minimum catalogue of capabilities to meet the specific requirements by the PDCs.

**Strengthen Afghan ownership through PRT activities**

A full-fledged involvement of PDCs in the planning and implementation of PRT activities is essential to strengthen Afghan ownership. The provincial administration should to the greatest extent possible be involved in all phases of project implementation, including contracting. They should reflect national standards and procedures for procurement under existing laws and regulations. In particular, quality assurance and quality control should primarily be performed by beneficiaries. This approach would help to strengthen the footprint and decision-making prerogatives of Afghan sub-national institutions and clarifies the temporary character of PRTs. PRTs are in fact geared, ultimately, towards their progressive disappearance from the scene as conditions for sustainable Afghan-led governance at the sub-national level are gradually established. Specific examples of PRT
activities involving Afghan partners and personnel already exist, including with respect to labor-intensive infrastructural projects, roads construction, and canals rehabilitation. There is a need to build upon this and make PRT contributions more focused to bolster Afghan institutional capacities at the provincial and district levels. This approach would also provide more impetus to the growth of the Afghan economy (through a renewed focus on local procurement) and would create conditions for reducing a sense of dependence on an open-ended commitment of external assistance. In particular, PRTs should be encouraged to engage local firms and NGOs and use local manpower from the province.

**Endeavor towards more long-term and sustainable activities**

A conceptualization of PRT activities in accordance with the timelines established in the PDPs creates the conditions for ensuring a continuity of efforts across successive PRT rotations. This will ultimately entail a progressive shift of mindset from funding short-term projects (usually linked to one PRT rotation timeline) to multiphased programs, particularly national ones, where Afghan counterparts become involved across all stages of planning, execution, and monitoring. Activities towards the consolidation of this trend already exist or are being planned in different sectors, including — among others — agriculture, water sanitation, energy, and police and prisons reforms. National programs to be supported by PRTs include the National Solidarity Program, the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan, the National Area-Based Development Program, the Water and Sanitation Program, and ASOP. In each of these programs, it is optimal for PRTs to play an enabling and supporting role for national implementing partners operating under government leadership. Agriculture, energy, governance, and police are new government priorities agreed during the ANDS launch at the Paris conference in June 2008, for which new national programs are already at the concept, design, and planning stages. A major focus should be directed towards supporting PDPs as they reflect priorities of local population in the province in question. Moreover, PRTs should be encouraged, to the extent possible, to provide contributions through pooled funds.

**Strengthen governance through enhancement of capacity building at the provincial and district levels**

Governance is absolutely crucial to achieving current objectives for stability and development. Specific initiatives are already ongoing in different realms, including training courses for police officers, preparation courses for judges and lawyers, capacity-building initiatives for civil servants, and courses for the development of vocational skills. PRTs should leverage on this and make capacity building a critical component of their activities and identify a point of contact at the PRT to this effect. In this regard, they should link their programs to already existing frameworks at the provincial
and district levels, including, among others, the IDLG five-year strategic plan, ASOP, Focused District Development, and the Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Program run by the U.N. Development Programme. Ultimately, there should be an integrated public administration reform, capacity building, and governance plan for each province, developed under the authority of the governor with the support of the IDLG, Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, line ministries, and international actors. Overall, a steady focus on capacity-building promotes the perception of the Afghan government as exerting leadership in the reconstruction and development effort, helps the consolidation of the institution-building process, and reduces the leverage of local power-brokers. A fundamental premise to achieve this objective and ensure that capacity-building at the PRT level is carried out coherently is to strengthen aid coordination at the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board level (including the Governance and Economic and Social Development Standing Committees) as well as the Provincial Development Committee framework, under GIRoA’s leadership with primary support from UNAMA.

**Bolster cooperation with different actors in the provinces where PRTs are present, in close coordination with ISAF Regional Commands**

Systematic cooperation, coordination, and information-sharing with other national and international partners, in particular UNAMA and IDLG, ensure mutual situational awareness and reduce the likelihood of a duplication of efforts. Various examples exist of regular meetings and thematic working groups/clusters held at PRT sites or at UNAMA or government buildings. In particular, UNAMA should be invited to internal project meetings and also to meetings between PRTs and provincial administrations. Cooperation among various actors should continue and further evolve across different provinces.

**Make military and civilian efforts mutually reinforcing by strengthening PRT civilian components**

The military and civilian components of PRTs ought to concentrate their efforts in those domains where they can bring their respective added value — the military in providing security and building the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces and the civilian in exerting supporting efforts to boost economic and social development and bolster good governance. There are several accounts where such a division of labor is already being consolidated as a result of more civilians being integrated within PRTs. Overall, however, a further enhancement of civilian personnel is required, particularly in more stabilized areas, to support the Afghan sub-national administration with regard to developmental and capacity building. Civilian presence is also essential to guarantee a systematic quality control of programs conducted in a given PRT area.
Extend tour length for PRT personnel
As recent experience shows, longer tour lengths guarantee better continuity of efforts and render Afghan-international partnership more sustainable across various PRT turnovers. Ideally, core PRT staff should stay in the country for at least one year and be rotated individually, phased over time, rather than a whole new team replacing its predecessor team. This would provide for much greater continuity.

PRT support to build up Afghan capacities in disaster relief assistance
Afghanistan is a disaster-prone country: floods, earthquakes, drought, landslides, and avalanches are all common. The primary responsibility for disaster relief rests with the government and then the humanitarian system led by the U.N., the Red Crescent Movement, and NGOs. However, PRTs can provide in extremis support when requested by the government or the U.N. In such instances, PRTs should provide humanitarian assistance to the Provincial Disaster Management Committees (PDMCs) and not to individual departments or the Afghan National Security Forces, and should only distribute humanitarian aid directly to beneficiaries as a last resort. The Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan (approved on 20 May 2008 and endorsed by the ISAF commander) provide specific guidance in this regard. Some PRTs are already considering programs devoted to increase the capacity of local offices of the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority. This is to be encouraged and should continue through close coordination with the U.N., which has an ongoing national project to build Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority capacity. In addition, the PRTs should also help and build up capacity of PDMCs, which exist within the provincial administrations and function under the governor’s supervision.

Promote awareness and respect of Afghan culture and traditions within PRTs
PRT activities should reflect in their conceptualization and execution the understanding and respect for the local history, culture, religion, and traditions. Afghans are fiercely proud of their history and committed to their religion. PRT staff should enter Afghanistan with a full knowledge of the country and its culture, including the specific profile and traditions of the province where they are posted. They should also be sensitive to the way in which Islamic practice and tradition in Afghanistan is a key component of identity and a major potential force for stabilization and peace. In poppy-free provinces, it is consistently the incompatibility of drug production and trafficking with Islamic faith that is cited (along with community
decision) as the decisive factor in ending cultivation. *Ulemas*, imams and other mullahs can be mobilized to similar effect in their fields, as can other traditional leaders at village, district, and provincial levels. Success in this area requires accurate country and local knowledge, including proficiency in local languages and a willingness to participate in local traditions. PRT personnel should build upon this to reinforce their characterization as instruments to assist the consolidation of Afghan ownership.

**Strengthen human rights’ awareness through support to the judicial sector reform**

This is and will remain an essential component of PRT activities, as it is aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of Afghan institutions at the sub-national level. There is a wide array of human rights awareness programs developed within training initiatives for police officers, civil servants, and judiciary officials. Moreover, rehabilitation of government infrastructure (including courthouses and detention centers) also plays an important role in this respect, as it helps to create the conditions to meet international human rights’ standards.

**Section 2. Summary of Best Practices**

The comments are taken from interviews with Department of State (DOS); Department of Agriculture (USDA); U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and U.S. Air Force, Army, and Navy personnel who returned from PRTs in Afghanistan in 2009.

**Interaction with Locals**

**Set up a contracting office attached to the governor’s residence**

One effective best practice that we used was to set up a contracting office attached to the governor’s residence. I highly recommend this to other PRTs if they aren’t doing it. What you can do as a PRT is do all your bidding and contracting and the things you do that support development work in that office, but you do it discreetly. You go in there, Afghan contractors come in, and you sit down and talk with them within the governor’s residence. It reinforces the governor as the one in charge and allows these people to meet with you in some degree of privacy, so that the Taliban watching doesn’t see the contractors meeting with you. That’s a good thing.
Make sure the local population sees local government officials as responsible for development projects

These are the kinds of things that he would welcome, and usually the governor was very good about doing ground breaking ceremonies and ribbon cutting ceremonies for projects that we funded and oversaw. We would stay out of the picture, so he got the benefit of all that. So I think we were on relatively the same page, development-wise.

Provide funding for effective local leaders who need small amounts to gain favor with the population

He did have a small stipend from Kabul to help him do the kinds of things that a traditional Pashtun leader would do, like when you have a meeting giving out turbans or Korans or other little gifts to the people that you’re meeting with to buy their favor. He had a small stipend, but he was always complaining that Kabul wasn’t giving him enough, and that’s probably true.

Get out and interact with locals as often as possible

I think beyond that it would be travel more, get out more, do what you can to get out. Supposedly part of the agreement creating this new senior civilian position was that the military would facilitate the senior civilian and his staff getting out; that it would be useless to have all these civilians sitting in Kandahar and not be able to get out. And get to know the Afghans would be probably the third one, because that was something I just didn’t have the privilege to do, but I would hope that with this new office, there would be a lot more emphasis on working with the Afghan government.

Get access to good information from locals by being a regular presence in important offices and by cultivating relationships with local leaders and other influential actors

I found that I could get access to such information by being a regular presence, by cultivating relationships with the governors, with police chiefs, with other security officials, with anyone that I felt had an ear and a set of eyes on the political and social situation that would help my understanding of the realities that ordinary Afghans were facing. Beyond that, as much as the security situation permitted, I was able to go to the district level and meet with the same caliber of officials and interact with villagers as appropriate as well.
Engage key local leaders; everyone at the PRT focused on that goal

But the buzzword was “key leader engagement,” deciding who the key leaders were, who mattered, who didn’t matter, and who was going to be the one to engage them. So that was one mechanism that was in place.

Enhance interaction with locals at the district and other lower levels, as they represent the most immediate face of the government to the people

The district administrators are the most important people in the government, because they’re the face of the government to the regular Afghan. At the times I was able to get down there to the district level, it was very, very, very productive and I really learned more there than I did by having tea with people at the provincial level. And now we’re moving in that direction with district level teams in the South and East. If that model could be carried forward to the North, that would also be good.

Hire local consultants to assist on a range of aspects for Afghan relations

As I was leaving, we were in the process of hiring as many as eight of what they called cultural advisers. This was with military money, to have a political assistant, an economic assistant, someone who knew tribal dynamics, who could be an adviser. But none of those were available during most of my tenure.

Aggressively go out to meet locals, even if they don’t want to meet with you, to find out who’s who in the region

Get to know all the players in your area and that means cold calling, means being annoying, to the point of asking people for meetings, even though they don’t want to meet with you, but find out what they’re doing. That’s one thing I think we need to do a better job of in Kabul. They need to give us a list of everyone working in our area, so we don’t have to start inventing the wheel from scratch. That set me back a long time, trying to find names of people.

Engage host-nation actors on security issues

When there was an event, a major visit, or an Afghan holiday like the Afghan new year where we needed to coordinate security — or the elections is a better example — then we brought them in, we sat down, and the plan that was developed was an Afghan plan that we were a part of. So on the security level, there was planning and coordination.
At more secure PRTs, take advantage of the good conditions to leave the PRT often and make local connections

My advice was, “Go out as much as you can and you’ve got to be willing to take some calculated risks. You gain nothing by staying inside the PRT.” In fact, one of my objectives throughout the time there was to get us to appreciate the permissive security environment and now, with talk of opening a consulate, I think that message is getting through.

Work with the provisional development committees to keep local government focused on the needs of the people

The PRT commander spent time getting the provincial government to increase its responsiveness to the needs of their people. The team predominantly used the provisional development committees (PDC) meetings to help the local leadership understand the PRT project process by seeing that projects put forward at the PDC had followed the required submission guidance, which focused on “bottom up” requirements rather than “top down.”

Emphasize that PDC is locally run and driven by the decisions of local leadership, not PRTs

The most important organization involved in reaching agreements is the PDC. The PDC is the forum the province uses as a planning cell for projects. The PRT worked long and hard to help improve PDC processes. The PRT went to great lengths to ensure the PDC did not become PRT-led and always emphasized at PDC meetings that the PDC is run by the provincial leadership and not the PRT.

Hire military-aged males for projects.

The PRT always made an effort to hire military-aged males for projects so they would be engaged and not turn to the Taliban for employment. The money they earned gave them the security to settle down, start a family, and remain connected to the provincial community.

Bring in local government officials frequently to build confidence and trust

Sometimes government representatives would travel to the PRT base. The team took the time to host them at the PRT’s base every 2–3 months after their initial meetings. The team held the meetings at the PRT in order to get them out of the normal government environment and away from the
governor’s compound. Initially, some line directors were nervous, but they became more relaxed later as the team connected with them on a personal level.

**Set up PRT offices in the governor’s compound to allow for frequent interaction and coordination**

The PRT team had a set of six offices within the governor’s compound, which worked out very well for coordination and interaction.

**Hold signing ceremonies where local leaders can present a new project**

Holding project signing ceremonies was a useful tool. These were done with local governance and village elders present. The elders would sign that they were responsible for the completed project, and this helped give them a sense of ownership.

**Build up Afghan media, and Afghan government fluency with media**

[The information officer (IO)] was very capable and even taught himself Pashtun [sic]. He was able to map out all the media contacts in Khost province, including professional and network linkages. This IO officer trained the local Afghan press how to function as a real media. The team had a 60-minute battle-drill process that forced the Afghan government agencies to provide information to the Afghan media.

**Support local customs and projects, but be aware of who your projects empower**

The PRT would agree to build a *madrassa* [Islamic religious school] if they were able to vet the mullah (Islamic clergy) who would teach at that school.

**Planning**

**Develop strategies for follow-on PRT members, and try to continue executing strategies of previous PRTs**

The PRT developed a strategy for the follow-on PRT to execute. Previous PRTs left behind a good strategy that they picked up and continued.
Map your projects, and share them with the military and other PRTs.

Upon arrival, there was no single map available that depicted all of the 217 kilometers of roads that were under construction, so the team created a large chart of all the roads in Khost. The same approach was taken for “vertical” construction. These tracking systems were pushed out to the brigade and other PRTs. Having this information readily at hand helped improve the commander’s situational awareness on projects.

Funding

Establish a dual sign-off mechanism for Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to improve coordination and unity of effort

The military commander comes with most of the people and most of the money, so it’s a bit of a revolution now to have the civilian lead the equal counterpart; but now the civilian has to sign off on all the CERP funds as well as the military commander in order for their superior officers to take a look at it. The idea there is to make sure that we’re working in synchronicity with the military so that USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] isn’t planning to pave a road with their OIEE [Office of Infrastructure, Engineering, and Energy] roads program at the same time that the military is doing so.

Manage PRT funding projects according to donor nation guidelines

The Polish PRT’s funding rules required that funds be requested, obligated, and executed within the same fiscal year. Because of this, the PRT gave the Polish team shorter term projects that they could execute inside one fiscal year.

Enforce standards and transparency through constant mentorship of provincial leadership

We found one of the most effective ways to implement [self-sustaining governance] using our most powerful tool, CERP funding, was to enforce standards of project development, which encouraged good stewardship by the provincial development council, line directors, and governor to accurately represent and answer the needs of their people.
Provide funding for effective local leaders who need small amounts to gain favor with the population

He did have a small stipend from Kabul to help him do the kinds of things that a traditional Pashtun leader would do, like when you have a meeting giving out turbans, or Korans, or other little gifts to the people that you’re meeting with to buy their favor. He had a small stipend, but he was always complaining that Kabul wasn’t giving him enough, and that’s probably true.

Ensure projects are important to local leaders by insisting that they contribute their own resources to it

It needs to be their priorities, and they need to buy into it and they need to contribute to it … if a governor really genuinely believes there’s a need for 50 schools, then he has to be prepared to put up 10 percent out of his own budget … It needs to be important enough to the Afghans that they’re willing to provide for some of it out of their own resources.

Use CERP as a tool to promote proper development standards

We found one of the most effective ways to implement [self-sustaining governance] using our most powerful tool, CERP funding, was to enforce standards of project development which encouraged good stewardship by the provincial development council, line directors and governor to accurately represent and answer the needs of their people.

Civil-Military Relations

Establish good relations with the PRT commander

All the U.S. PRTs are commanded by a lieutenant colonel. If you had a good working relationship with the commander and were personality driven, you got a lot done. (Note: Some of the U.S. PRTs are commanded by Navy commanders — lieutenant colonel equivalents.)

If the civilians had a good relationship with the commander, the commander would give consideration to their missions and go along with them.

Create a joint planning board to coordinate civil-military planning

The new head of the British PRT brought military planning officers over, with a senior civilian planner, and created a joint planning board. … And this is what’s really interesting, the civilian, because he had so much experience
doing this, he would issue taskers through the military. So the military understood. And then he would go to the governance team, “What’s your governance plan?” To the health adviser, “What’s your health plan?” And then to the rule of law, counternarcotics, and justice advisers and ask them what their plans were.

Establish informal structures to improve civil-military relations

At our PRT we had a lieutenant colonel who bought into the idea of the interagency leadership team. We were able to cultivate a pretty good relationship and he did listen to us. It was an informal system. We would sit outside the cafeteria about once a week and smoke cigars and talk about where we were going to go that week and that month.

Have a civilian lead sign-off on CERP-funded projects

The military commander comes with most of the people and most of the money, so it’s a bit of a revolution now to have the civilian lead his equal counterpart, but now the civilian has to sign off on all the CERP funds as well as the military commander in order for their superior officers to take a look at it. The idea there is to make sure that we’re working in synchronicity with the military so that USAID isn’t planning to pave a road with their OIEE [Office of Infrastructure, Engineering, and Energy] roads program at the same time that the military is doing so.

Increase the use of the National Guard’s agribusiness development teams

We are using a lot of National Guard. Where we see National Guard more than anything else, though, are the agribusiness development teams, or ADTs, that come with their own security force. They are all Army, coming from different states; states are starting to pair with provinces. Afghanistan is an agro-based economy in both the licit and the illicit economies, and the ADTs provide a lot more agricultural support without having to use the security forces of the PRTs. The ADTs are often located with the PRTs, although they can travel more widely in a province and they do things like help the Afghans learn that if you trellis grapes rather than grow them on the ground, you’ll have more of a yield for your grape crop.
Encourage U.S. civilian and military personnel, as well as coalition partners, to meet at the PRT and exchange information

I take some credit for that, that I was able to get out there, to bring them together, to know what all the police training actors were doing. We called monthly meetings and had everyone come around the table and share with each other what each was doing in the area of police training. I was amazed how much other parties didn’t know what the other was doing, and yet we were all supposed to be doing the same thing. So that level of coordination I think definitely increased from the time I started to the time I left.

Attend all PRT meetings and make sure you sit in the command center

I was at virtually every meeting that we had with the commander. Usually I sat in the command center and that’s what I would recommend for people like me going out: sit in the command center, have your computers there. That way, whenever the PRT commander comes in and convenes his different groups to discuss issues, you’re there and you can pipe up and say, “Oh, I know something on that,” or “Here’s what I recommend on that.”

I was virtually in every meeting that the PRT commander had with his staff and with visitors, Afghan visitors, and officials.

Clarifying the Mission

Be flexible and temper your expectations

My advice is just don’t have that many expectations, don’t think that at the end of 12 months that you’re going to have a significant impact on the country, because you’re not. And that the best advice is to be flexible …

Take the initiative and implement the strategy when direction is not forthcoming

I would come up to the office on several occasions in Kabul and say, “You just don’t want us to report on stuff up there, you want us to roll up our sleeves and get our hands dirty and make things move forward here” and they would say, “Well, if you think you can, go ahead.” They don’t tell us no.
Focus the work of PRTs on strategic areas, not just out in the field randomly

The previous brigades had basically tried to be everywhere, and the third brigade said, “No, we need to really focus on key areas in each province, go where the people are and secure the population, and then build out.”

Establish and maintain close ties between American forces and international partners in common areas of operation

My biggest accomplishment was in actually bringing together the various pieces of the international effort. When I first arrived, there was no civilian presence at all, and the military was not talking to or working with the U.N., or any of the NGOs, or any of the relief agencies. Over the course of my tenure there, we established very close working relationships with the other international partners, and I think my successor carried that on. It was quite a dramatic improvement ... to make sure what the brigade was doing was tied together with what the U.N. and other international organizations were doing, but also tied with the Afghan priorities and strategy.

Formalize a requirement for “handover notes” for transitions from tour to tour

Touching on the handover, one of the things we institutionalized is that every work requirements statement for my section required to have transition notes — and a transition binder in some cases — handover information, and material for the successor because we found that in the past it really depended on the conscientiousness of the departing officer.

Embassy personnel should visit all PRTs

We tried to get out to them so that we had a better understanding of what the conditions were at different places. And the conditions, frankly, varied wildly from place to place.

More usually, being management, we were focused internally, although at one of the PRTs, I did go in to an election event and spoke.

Use a common-sense approach to overly constrictive regulations regarding PRT activities

I made the decision and passed it on to my successor that what we needed to be doing is to keep folks in the field working,
doing the mission with the lightest possible regulatory touch that we can. But we can’t ignore the regulations entirely. We have to stay as close as we can without making them too ridiculous for the folks in the field.

**Maintain situational awareness by reading cables and attending meetings frequently**

The political awareness, to a degree, was looking at cable traffic and attending the PRT Kabul office staff meetings where people discussed mainly non-management issues. So that was a way of staying familiar with events that were happening.

**Clearly define roles and expectations for PRT positions**

I think that my advice would have been probably first and foremost, “Define your role and make sure your role is defined, that someone knows what is expected of you, what you’re supposed to be doing, and what you’re supposed to accomplish because that is something that I never had.

**Use CERP as a tool to promote proper development standards**

We found one of the most effective ways to implement [self-sustaining governance] using our most powerful tool, CERP funding, was to enforce standards of project development, which encouraged good stewardship by the provincial development council, line directors, and governor to accurately represent and answer the needs of their people.

**Increase security by maintaining a low profile**

If I had been driving in a military vehicle, marked as such, it would have been a major issue. But because I was driving a low-profile, unmarked Land Cruiser, I had no problems and was able to travel independently of the PRT. I think that’s one of the takeaways that I would like to stress: security was made possible by our not having a huge footprint. If we can replicate that, I think that officers would have a better experience than going out with a security detail and announcing their presence to everyone.

**Ensure that the goal of poppy eradication be seen as coming from the host government**

Poppy eradication comes to mind. …The governors were strong advocates of it and they enforced it, even though the local farmers might not have liked it. If it was seen as coming
from their government’s side and not being imposed by ours, it was fine, and we were fortunate that that was the case. So four of the five provinces I covered in the north were declared “poppy free.” That was a success that we were able to achieve with their cooperation.

**Maintain a constant presence with the commander and relay useful information to him**

I made a point of being actively engaged in the life of the [Swedish-led] PRT. This means attending all the meetings that I could that didn’t interfere with my own plans and by showing the commander that even though I was not one of his military personnel that I could still make an important contribution. I did that by being present, by adding value, by communicating to them information from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, especially during the election run-up. The U.S. had the big picture because we were everywhere. The Swedes only had one tiny little sliver, and they didn’t have as wide a presence as we did by any means. So that was, I think, important.

**Many locals need training in basic literacy as they train to become soldiers and policemen**

Fortunately, the Swedes and other partners have been training them in literacy. During their training, when they’re brought aboard, they’re given literacy courses to hopefully bring them up to a minimum level of comprehension, but it’s still a long way to go.

**Continuity of Effort**

**Prioritize the overlap between predecessor and successor**

We had several days of overlap, I think four days. I filled him in on the situation, I advised him on the personalities and the main issues to watch out for, had introductory meetings to which I accompanied him with as many of the key officials as possible during the short overlap period.

**Transfer e-mail accounts to your successor**

The nice thing was that I took over his e-mail account, which is where he had a lot of documents — so I could search for things.
Rely on local nationals to get up to speed
   We also had continuity in the form of one of the locally engaged staff, an Afghan. That really helped get me up and running.

Introduce your successor to key local leaders
   The handover at the beginning of my tour was great. I knew my predecessor. We were friends. We spent three days together, driving around, meeting the officials. That definitely gave me a leg up once he left post.

Outgoing and incoming commanders should jointly brief local officials during the transition
   To prevent misunderstandings, the outgoing PRT commander and the incoming commander briefed all the provincial sub-governors on all projects being planned and executed together so that everyone understood what the plan was.

   The outgoing PRT commander introduced the new team to local leaders to ensure the local nationals understood that the new commander was aware of what projects had been approved.

Encourage gradual transition
   There was a 10-day turnover for PRTs. Current people flowed out as their replacements came in. Key team members were kept as long as possible for turnover. The team employed left-seat/right-seat ride technique to gradually transition responsibility to the new team members prior to the transition of authority.

Civilian personnel can provide continuity for PRTs
   The interagency representatives do not rotate at the same time as the military PRT members, but this is beneficial, as they provide continuity for the incoming team.

Send PRT personnel to train with the incoming team
   The PRT commander was tasked to send one person from the PRT back to help train the next PRT during its training exercise.
The predeployment site survey is helpful in learning the local landscape before arrival

The PRT commander went on a predeployment site survey (PDSS) to Kunar, and it was very helpful for him to learn the local players in Kunar and also in adjoining provinces in Pakistan. The civil affairs teams keep running biographies on the local leaders.

Share key provincial issues and lessons learned with your successor

I was replaced by another … officer … and told him it was important to show patience, as nothing happens fast in Afghanistan. I showed him where the province was when I started and where they were now. I also shared mistakes and how to do things differently the next time.

Section 3. Lessons Learned

The lessons discussed in this section are from CALL’s archives and cover the period since CALL has been collecting on PRTs. Though some of the information is dated and may have occurred in areas other than Afghanistan, the lessons still have relevancy and should be adjusted for the reader’s particular situation.

Lesson Learned:

Influencing Leaders. It is difficult for the PRT to develop/influence/encourage leaders at the provincial government (PG) to practice good governance and to accelerate capacity building and development.

Observations and Insights:

The challenges faced by the provinces are complex, multifaceted, and vary due to religion and historical, political, and geographical contexts. A PRT strategy to address these challenges and support the provinces to the path of development should be diverse. What works in one province region does not necessarily work in another, though there are some governance principles and key elements that the PRT will find in common:

- Legitimacy of and trust in state institutions.
- Political will and committed leadership.
- Security.
- Delivering basic services.
- Rule of law.
• Transparency and accountability.
• Civil society.

Provinces often lack enough qualified people to fill positions in the PG. The basic executive, managerial, and technical skills required for provincial ministerial director positions often need to be developed on the job. As a result, the PRT must build the needed institutional capacity within the existing PG.

PRTs can address this problem by emphasizing the mentorship program in Local Governance Program (LGP) III. Program managers can be selected from both the PRT and PG staffs to shape the LGP III mentorship program and scope the main objectives. The PRT must conduct an assessment to link the lessons learned with new long-term objectives.

**Suggestions:**

Develop the scope of the program, select your team, and gain PG buy-in.

• *Selecting a program manager.* Select a program manager early within the PRT to shape the program and guide its initial launch. Although the PRT leader should provide his intent and shaping guidance, he should not take the lead on this project.

  ○ Launching and running a successful program will require significant effort that will likely conflict with the PRT leader’s other activities. Ideally, the PRT leader will have a staff of “advisers” who are subject matter experts and will work directly with the relevant directors general and provincial council members to effect change and capacity building.

  ○ A counterpart within the PG should co-lead the program. This could be the governor, the chief of administration, or one of the governor’s or provincial council’s deputies.

• *Assess internal resources (talent inventory).* Assess internal resources to determine available skill sets. Consider personnel outside the PRT organization, expanding the screening process to collocated maneuver and support units or nearby forward operating bases. Rely on local hires when access to local leaders is difficult.

> “The hardest part for us was interacting with Iraqis on a day-to-day basis. Sometimes getting out was difficult. The amount of time you had with them was limited. Sometimes what they would tell you was limited, so you depended on a lot of these locally hired Iraqis who worked for us to fill in the gaps and help explain things to us.”

—USAID, Basra, Fall 2009
• **Gain PG buy-in.** This program requires “top-down” support from the provincial governor and key ministry directors. However, the program manager and PRT leader should understand their available resources and skill sets before approaching the provincial governor with this program. Using output from the skills inventory, a detailed understanding of available PRT and maneuver unit staff will allow the PRT to set realistic expectations and help guide the subsequent matching of mentors with appropriate provincial staff. This initial analysis supports the first discussions and manages expectations of the governor and key PG staff on the scope of the mentoring program and level of expertise available at the PRT and nearby military units.

• **Assess PG and key staff.** When making this assessment, the program manager should consider both the available staff and the province’s critical needs. Assessing the critical needs of the province includes key directors general and their respective capacities.

• **Launching the program.** Once the PG agrees with the scope, approach, and goals of the program, implementation of the mentorship program can begin.

• **Kick-off meeting.** Launching the program with clear direction and a robust plan increases the likelihood of success. It is important to ensure the program objectives are clear and shared, roles are defined, and both mentors and counterparts understand the processes for interaction.

• **Initial meetings.** Matching mentors with the appropriate counterparts is a key initial task. As the host country has a specific type of society, culture, and education level, consideration should be given to matching mentors with appropriate counterparts. Matching a younger Soldier or staff with a much older counterpart is unlikely to be effective. Key relationships would be better positioned from the outset as supporting or technical-skills-transfer relationships rather than as management-mentor relationships.

• **Coordination with governor.** Throughout the entire process, the PRT coordinates all efforts with the PG to ensure unity of effort. Additionally, the PRT can use this event as a teaching and mentoring tool to show the PG that local leaders can solve key issues of importance to the PG and the local people.

• **Ongoing collaboration.** One approach is to focus the collaboration around a specific project. However, the mentor should resist the urge to take over doing the work. The mentor should help his counterpart to develop and consider options for solving problems.
• **Program evaluation and internal reviews.** The program manager should set out a system to evaluate progress against established and agreed-to criteria. Effectiveness of the mentor-counterpart relationship is assessed by the provincial governor, PRT leader, the PG, and PRT program manager.

• **Transition plan.** Ideally, mentor-counterpart relationships should be transitioned to incoming PRT and maneuver units based an internal assessment of the people on the new team. Priority should be to cover the key positions in the PG, as significant benefits come from continuity in coaching PG members to be better managers. Specific technical subject-matter expertise for mentoring line ministry skills may not be available in the next PRT. The PRT should maintain awareness of other experts within the wider community (other PRT staffs, U.S Forces–Iraq and other staffs, as well as in the interagency community). However, the main focus of the mentoring program involves the transfer of basic management skills. As this basic mentoring does not require specific subject-matter expertise, it should be possible to match incoming staff with current PG staff counterparts for continuity of key relationships.

**Lesson Learned:**

*Leadership Engagement Under Difficult Conditions.* It is difficult for the PRT to advance its long-term mission of enhancing good governance when the current key leaders are corrupt and/or ineffective. The PRT can influence better behavior and performance.

**Observations and Insights:**

The reality on the ground is that some provincial officials will not act in the people’s best interest due to corruption, incompetence, or both, and at times may be uncooperative. The goal is to enhance good governance and encourage transparency. Although the PRT would prefer to avoid associating with corrupt, ineffective government leaders, in the short term, the PRT is required to maintain a professional level of engagement with the existing government. A principal PRT mission is to influence good governance, assist in building institutional governance capacity, and support strategic reconstruction in its area of responsibility (AOR). To accomplish this mission, the PRT needs to engage continually with the provincial leadership and increase access to other ministry directors to build institutional capacity.

Provincial leaders must be determined to fight corruption to free resources for the economic and political development. Emphasize fighting corrupted institutions that negatively impact growth and development. Corruption can have the following negative effects:
• Reduce public revenue and increase government spending, hence contributing to large fiscal deficits and making it more difficult for a government to run a sound fiscal policy.

• Reduce investment and the productivity of public investment and infrastructure.

• Increase income inequality by allowing those in influential positions to take advantage of government activities at the expense of the rest of the population.

• Distort markets and the allocation of resources. Corruption interferes with the government’s ability to impose necessary regulatory controls and inspections to correct market failures, thereby reducing the fundamental role of government (i.e., the PG cannot enforce payment of taxes on property).

One way to address this problem is by maintaining a working relationship with the governor and provincial council head of the security committee while simultaneously engaging the PG at multiple levels across key provincial line ministries. Regardless of the quality of key provincial leaders, PRTs need to continually engage with key leaders while expanding knowledge and relationships across the government. The PRT must employ practical techniques to build governmental capacity.

• Use access to wider PG contacts to communicate (re-emphasize) coalition policy on corruption and counternarcotics. Deliver similar messages in public forums.

• Diplomatically deliver consistent messages in private forums reminding government officials of their duty to uphold the rule of law and govern in the interest of the people.

• Always maintain a dialogue for information sharing on security matters and reconstruction planning. Avoid reconstruction support unless controls are in.

• Provide assessments of key leaders through command channels to influence the central government to make changes in the key provincial leaders.

Suggestions:
Assess the PG (line directors and staff). In most cases, some line ministry directors are ready to work with the PRT. DOS representatives can help maintain the relationship map of provincial officials. Use available resources (time, CERP funding, Quick Response Funding (QRF), and associations) to influence and reinforce good behavior:
• CERP/ORF projects. Work with PG line ministry staff to address projects that can provide timely impacts and be visible to the people. PG directors who are ready to work transparently and to the benefit of their constituents are rewarded with follow-on funding for projects of similar merit. Look for opportunities to engage with less-effective PG staffs during the process. Encourage the PG staff to participate in the progress. Manage possible obstacles to progress closely. The long wait on CERP approval can negatively impact the PRT’s commitment in economic development. If CERP is mentioned, the caveats of a CERP approval should be mentioned as well.

• Developing institutional capacity. Collaborating on a specific project or program with a line ministry director and staff can be an effective vehicle for building capacity. Mentoring programs can help build skills with other PG members after gaining buy-in from the governor and line directors to work with their staff.

• Consider phased development/investment to control funds. Phased project execution allows the PRT to invest in projects that are being managed with transparency and effectiveness. Involving local leaders in shaping projects and creating local work crews can yield the optimum economic benefits while putting in place good project controls for CERP funds. This phased approach also allows adequate time for teaching.

• Reassess the PG. As the PRT continues to engage the PG, subsequent assessments should be made periodically. These assessments should be based on the criteria established in the original assessment of the province.

Lesson Learned:
Preparing the PRT for Key Leader Engagements. Not all personnel assigned to the PRT possess the tools and skills necessary to successfully engage the people, tribal leaders, local government officials, or the provincial governor.

Observations and Insights:
The PRT leader constantly stresses the importance of being security conscious while still being aware of properly interacting with the local population. Although no formal training process has been established, keeping the purpose of the mission at the forefront of most discussions makes service members take this into consideration during mission planning and execution. Ensuring that everyone on the mission knows what they are going to be doing helps everyone to understand their part. Force protection Soldiers should be rotated through the tactical operations center (TOC), guard towers, and missions outside of the wire to get a better appreciation.
for what the PRT is doing and to gain an understanding of the nation’s people and culture.

Suggestions:

- **Leader meeting.** The PRT leader holds a leader meeting where the commander engagement concept is outlined. The PRT is to keep security on the forefront of all planning; however, adverse risk is not going to be an option. Steps are taken to ensure that a friendly appearance is presented when possible. Examples of this behavior are reducing vehicle speeds when driving through town and waving to the people, and taking off armored vests and helmets when meeting with local leaders in their homes or offices or even at some venues. Provided it is a safe and secure location. Additionally, the posture military PRT personnel take with their weapons when on patrols is dictated by the perceived threat in the area.

- **Conducting informal training.** Because PRT operations are often new to many service members, on-the-spot corrections are common; however, covering this during mission briefs keeps it on the forefront of their minds. Additionally, the PRT works to get everyone involved in local engagements on a routine basis. This means occasionally getting force protection personnel out of their vehicles during an engagement to attend a shura or a local meal as a participant rather than a security element. PRTs also rotate all personnel through the TOC to gain a better understanding of mission planning.

- **Conducting formal training.** The PRT intends to develop some formal periods of instruction that will put everyone on the same level of knowledge.

- **PRT mission.** This is more than just the standard mission. Each PRT member’s mission should be covered in detail, including techniques for successfully interacting with the local populace. This instruction might even cover some of the common operational picture (COP) data the PRT is looking to collect while performing its everyday missions.

- **Risk avoidance versus risk mitigation.** It is possible for a PRT to get into the habit of reducing the amount of time it leaves the wire because of risk avoidance. If PRT members do not leave the wire, they are not able to engage with the PG and the local people; therefore, they cannot conduct their mission. Risk mitigation is taking steps to reduce potential security hazards to continue to accomplish the mission.

- **Government structure.** Lessons on how the government was formed, how PG officials are elected or selected for positions, and information on the background of the constitution are important. Understanding these subjects is critical in avoiding embarrassing errors.
• *Religious practices and the mullahs.* Understanding the religious practices of host nationals helps service members figure out why locals make certain decisions. Many people do not understand how mullahs can be so influential in the PG’s decision-making process. Working with cultural experts, reading material about Islam, and talking with local citizens can help service members gain a better appreciation of the local culture.

• *Adopting a local village.* After getting to know the local people, some PRTs have adopted a local village. Donors from the United States send items that service members can share with the local population. This is an effective way to create a bond with little effort or expense.

• *Sporting events.* Because many of the local kids like to play soccer, one PRT set up a challenge against a local soccer team. The national police provided security for the event, which turned out to be a great success. Members of the PG may attend the event and hand out an award at the end.

• *Teaching culture.* One PRT helped its local guards improve their English skills. The PRT had several of the guards talk about life in their country and their religion with service members. Many of the local guards are close in age to the young PRT members. Because of the relationship the PRT members already have with these guards, hearing about the local life and culture from them will have more of an impact than from an instructor the PRT members do not know.

• *Transitioning practice to the next PRT.* Members of the PRT should share their experiences with new arrivals to reduce their anxiety level. Ultimately, anything PRT members can do to help the next PRT understand the local population will help.

**Lesson Learned:**

It is difficult to communicate the positive aspects of the PRTs work to influence and build relationships with the key communicators of a province.

**Observations and Insights:**

Focus on tribe leaders.

• Tribal leaders are often respected members in the communities. In the Shiite province, the top Shiite cleric is respected, but his strength comes from tribal leaders. Depending on the region where a PRT is located, tribal leaders may have influence over policy decision making. Therefore, it is important the PRT establishes a good relationship with the tribal leaders. Political gridlocks are becoming a norm in Iraq, and tribal leaders may assist to resolve political disputes. The PRT’s role will be as a mediator on political reconciliation.
• In Iraq, sheiks have greater influence than religious leaders. However, in some areas of the country, sheiks have been pushed out of the political process. There are tribes that do have influence, and it is important to sustain an engagement. The PRT does have the best opportunities to build a relationship with the sheiks, and if a sheik is important in the PRT’s AOR, then the sheik can be instrumental as a facilitator with the PG officials.

The PRT can engage key populace groups by using religious leaders. Religious leaders are key members of society and can influence the actions and opinions of the local population. The PG and the PRT need to engage this group in a forum to understand their perceptions, build trust, improve perceptions, and proactively respond to their concerns.

Religion is an important factor in the modern culture. Although religion is important to many in our society, it is usually quite separate from our government and educational systems. To truly understand some cultures, one must fully grasp the importance religion plays in almost every aspect of life. Religious leaders hold positions of power, are much respected, and have the ability to heavily influence their followers’ lives. Building a good relationship with them in your province is essential for the coalition.

The PRT is in the best position to establish this relationship in conjunction with the PG. Failure to understand and respect the religious culture could have serious repercussions (e.g., an act, intentional or not, that might be repugnant to Muslims could be mitigated if there is a good relationship with the mullahs in your province). By building relationships with religious leaders, the PRT can understand their perceptions, build their trust, positively influence their perceptions, and proactively respond to their issues. It is important to involve the PG when interacting with religious leaders. This involvement will encourage both the PG and religious leaders to participate in civil society by reaching out to the local population.

Building relationships with religious leaders can provide a variety of positive effects for the PRT. Including religious leaders in the reconstruction decision-making process can positively focus their energies and give legitimacy to the projects. Additionally, there will be improved relationships with the religious community and, consequently, with the populace. These relationships will increase the awareness of the PRT on sensitive religious issues. Once good relationships have been established with these leaders, the PRT’s influence with those that wield the most power in the community will increase. Good relationships encourage all parties, the PRT, the religious leaders, and the PG to consider all the issues.

The PG needs to engage religious leaders and draw them into civil society activities:
• Invite the religious community in the province to a meeting called by the governor. By having the PG invite them, religious leaders are protected from the perception that they are collaborating with the coalition. It is important to clearly identify your audience and where they come from regionally. Knowing your audience is important to any successful engagement.

• Attend the meetings with a minimum number of military and U.S. government (USG) personnel. Use one scribe so the PRT leader can maintain maximum eye contact and gauge the crowd. Bring interpreters to the meetings to catch sidebar conversations. Have the interpreters take any photographs, because religious leaders often think that the U.S. military is taking pictures for intelligence-collection purposes.

• Use the initial forum to explain coalition objectives and review reconstruction activities, while reminding the group of the positive contributions the coalition reconstruction efforts are making.

• Allow religious leaders to vent their grievances; at the same time, use the forum to encourage them to act.

• Maintain follow-up contact and begin to develop an actionable plan to address possible negative perceptions. For follow-on meetings, an agenda including both the coalition’s and mullahs’ topics should help guide and control the length of the meeting.

Suggestions:
The PRT should enlist the help of PG members (e.g., provincial governor and director from Ministry of Religious Affairs) to convene the meeting. Encourage the participation of all key religious leaders in the province. Work with the provincial director of religious affairs to plan the event and agenda format. Ensure the agenda is circulated among invitees prior to the event. Remember that meetings often get off track and will go longer than anticipated if you do not have someone controlling the meeting. Select a secure venue, preferably a local government site and not the PRT or U.S. military site. It is polite to serve refreshments or lunch for all attendees. When transitioning to the next PRT, set up a meeting of the primary attendees and introduce the new PRT during the relief-in-place (RIP) process. It is important to relay as much information as possible about the religious leaders to the incoming PRT members.

PRTs should introduce incoming commanders and/or civil-military operations center chiefs to the PG. Provide background on the PG (can use DOS profile). It is important to transition working relationships to the incoming team.
Lesson Learned:

*Corruption in Local Governments.* Given the prevalence of corruption, PRT personnel must recognize this challenge and determine — on a case-by-case basis — the appropriate incentives and practical techniques to influence the local leaders to mitigate the overall problem and encourage greater levels of transparency.

Observations and Insights:

- Corruption is deeply rooted in both societies, and PRT members often encountered corrupt officials in the course of their duties. One interviewee stated, “In many cases, people’s complaints about corruption are really, ‘His corruption is interfering with my corruption.’” Even local officials who wanted to improve conditions in their communities had to work within an environment that viewed patronage as acceptable. One interviewee stated, “They’re working in an atmosphere where corruption is part and parcel of how things get done.” A DOS employee who has worked in both Afghanistan and Iraq relayed, “If the tribes are on board with this idea of building a provincial government that can provide patronage, because it is essentially a patronage society, you are going to succeed. But if they oppose you, you are going to fail.”

- Several interviewees observed that corruption undermined the legitimacy of local and national governments. Often, the contact that most locals had with the government was negative: “The closest contact they have with their government is the police: the poorly paid, untrained policemen whose job it is to just take bribes from them; that’s their daily contact with their government.” Working with local officials who are perceived as corrupt also undermines the U.S. or coalition credibility. Said another interviewee, “The longer we are linked with corrupt officials, the more we are thought to be corrupt as well, because it is incomprehensible to [locals] who understand all of the stuff that we don’t, that we don’t understand all of the stuff that they do about who these officials are.” Interviewees also noted that it is difficult to remove corrupt officials. Even when PRT members made efforts to report and remove corrupt officials to American and coalition leaders, “Nothing ever came of it. It was never engaged with the [host] government, it was never made an issue with the people who make the appointments. Only a handful of sub-governors were removed or replaced for ineptitude or corruption. Over the last eight years, the U.S. and international community have made a significant investment in fighting corruption in Iraq and Afghanistan, but progress remains limited at best. Afghanistan’s ranking in the 2009 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index was 179th
out of 180 countries — making it, by that standard, the second-most corrupt country in the world. This has caused the Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction to identify corruption as one of the four major oversight concerns and greatest obstacle to progress in Afghanistan.

**Suggestions:**
The following suggestions were discussed by interviewees as possible mechanisms to address the problem of corruption.

- **Identify and mentor local credible officials:** Find official or unofficial leaders that are well respected in their local community and advocate to the relevant U.S. and host-government officials for these individuals to fill official roles. Provide more funding and increase mentorship of these leaders.

- **Withhold funding and remove local corrupt officials:** PRT leaders and members in the field should have a greater voice in the assessment of local officials. If local officials are corrupt or incompetent, designated PRT personnel should be able to withhold funding and then recommend removal if necessary.

- **Increase and improve oversight of funding:** Local officials often lack the capacity to prevent corruption on their own. The international community must assist with oversight of international funding to ensure it is not wasted.

**Lesson Learned:**
*Build Medical Capacity.* PRTs can assist the PG to build sustainable medical capacity in the province.

**Observations and Insights:**
Everything from the way the PRT conducts its medical and public health outreach program to the sourcing of medical supplies can have a positive or negative effect on the how quickly medical capacity is built in the province.

Two areas that have a particular impact are:

- **Sub-practice 1:** How the PRT works with provincial health officials and existing host-nation facilities to build in-situation capacity.

- **Sub-practice 2:** How the PRT plans, sources, and purchases medical supplies, equipment, facilities, rehabilitation, and training to support its medical capacity building in the province.
The PRT should assess the need to use QRF funds to purchase medical supplies for providing support to host-nation clinics and augment collaborative medical outreach events. Medical supplies are hard to source through U.S. channels. However, hasty local sourcing of medical supplies presents a number of risks and could lead to negative effects such as temporary shortages of medicines and/or increases in prices at local pharmacies. Other risks include sourcing of poor quality products (not meeting required quality specifications or medicines past their expiration date).

One PRT addressed this problem by developing a process to mitigate risks and successfully source frequently demanded medical supplies/products through local distribution channels.

- Plan projects well in advance and aggregate the purchasing volume into one sourcing event. The sourcing process could take up to 45 days.
- Build requirements based on inputs from multiple sources.
- Assess input from demand from previous events.
- Develop the technical specifications for required products.
- Develop a “request for quote” that includes the quantities, service level (e.g., delivery time), and packaging requirements.
- Screen and qualify potential vendors from approved vendor-lists compiled by Joint Contracting Command.
- Issue and manage request for quote process.
- Inspect the product thoroughly upon receipt, preferably by qualified or trained personnel.
- Properly store all medicines.

Suggestions:
Implementing steps:

- *Determine requirements.* Assess current and future demand for medical supplies. The PRT should estimate the number of village/township medical outreaches and collaborations with clinics or medical civic action programs that are planned over a longer time horizon and summarize the intermediate requirements for three to six months.
• Develop a list of potential suppliers. Screen potential suppliers in the province and beyond. Develop a long list of suppliers/distributors capable of supplying products and services of the required quality in the quantities needed.

• Screen for potential supplier distributors in the province and beyond. Use available contacts in the province to identify sources of supply. These contacts include provincial directors, USAID, and other aid agencies working in the province. Make it clear that you are just certifying the suppliers. Develop information profiles for potential vendors for future purchases. Collect this information in a standard format.

• Refine criteria selection requirements. Refine requirements, supplier market coverage, distribution range, and order lead time.

• Prepare a request for proposal. Develop a clear request for proposal that sets out the plan.

Lesson Learned:
Establishing a Builder’s Workshop to Improve Building Trade Skills. The PRT can help create and encourage a viable workforce in the province to overcome a shortage of building trade skills and competent contractors.

Observations and Insights:
• Contractors need to be trained as a team outside a formal classroom setting. More trained and qualified contractors will accelerate the pace of quality construction and build a foundation for the provincial construction trades industry. Skilled training is needed to meet long-term reconstruction goals and maintenance standards and provide quality construction. The PG needs to train host-national workers to build reconstruction and development projects to improve building capacity and help meet current and future demands for skilled labor.

• The way a PRT can address this problem is by creating a workshop devoted to training its regular contractors on good construction techniques. U.S. Army engineers can train the national army engineers on quality building trade practices appropriate for a developing country. The national army engineers will then instruct the contractors.

• The course of instruction is the same course work given to the national army engineers. The contractors may bring along up to three workers each to receive the instruction. A set of good tools should be provided to students upon graduation. Graduates would receive a certificate of
completion and a wallet-sized identification card saying they have completed this course. The PG can be represented by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and the provincial engineer.

- The next step is to conduct the class again and upgrade the skills taught to returning attendees. The end result of implementing these practices is to create a small pool of trained employees who will be able to find local jobs. Having trained builders will increase the quality of construction in the province as the PG works towards self-sustaining systems.

**Suggestions:**

Coordinating the concept:

- *Selecting a program manager.* To ensure that a coordinated effort is possible, the PRT should select a volunteer to lead the program. The program manager can be a civil affairs team (CAT) leader who works directly with U.S. engineers.

- *PG interest.* The PRT leader and the program lead should meet with the provincial engineer and the national army leadership to get buy-in on the concept. The meeting should be a basic concept discussion.

Conducting a provincial assessment:

- *Construction quality.* Assessments of provincial construction projects may not always be up to the quality standards required for projects to last. It has been suggested that projects constructed by host nationals are often of a lower quality than those built by workers from another country because of the skills gap. Sometimes all of the contractors may come from outside the province. To be truly effective, the PRT should require that at least 75 percent of workers hired for projects come from the local district.

- *Existing vocational trade schools.* There may not be any trade schools existing in the province to teach proper construction techniques.

- *Job opportunities.* Each contractor should bring three attendees with him. The thought behind this is that the attendees who are not contractors may be able to start their own construction business as a result of this training.

Creating the workshop:

- *School location.* This can be treated much like a U.S. conference. The PRT provides the attendees with lodging and food to ensure as much as possible that students attend the entire six days of instruction.
Developing a curriculum. The CAT/PRT can choose to utilize the Inter-Service Builder Apprentice Training (A-710-0010) and Inter-Service Building Apprentice Training Phases A, B, and C (A-710-033 Army). This will ensure the host-nation army trainers and contractors have a good base of instruction.

Equipping the school. The PRT/CAT can order quality tools from vendors. Part of the problem with local construction is that the tools often break and are not of good quality. Some of the contractors may be interested in becoming tool distributors.

Coordinating with the PG. Throughout the whole process, PRT members should coordinate all efforts with the PG to ensure unity of effort. The provincial engineer should be heavily involved in developing this plan. The provincial engineer could be a guest instructor during the workshop. He will provide the continuity necessary to continue the program.

Transitioning the school to the PG:

- PG provides classroom location.
- PG provides all classroom equipment.
- PG provides the graduation basic tool kits.

Lesson Learned:

**Using the Local Media to Communicate with the Population.** The PRT must reach the populace in the province with targeted messages that build awareness and support for the local government and the USG’s effort.

Observations and Insights:

- The challenge is that there may be little in the way of established communications systems and media. It is important to engage with local government officials and allow them to deliver a message of progress to the people.

- The PRT leader and others should be able to engage the local media in their field of expertise with the guidance of the public diplomacy officer. Roundtable discussions work well, also joint sessions with military leadership.

- Although media engagement may attempt to reach multiple audiences (e.g., U.S. citizens, the international community, deployed coalition forces, and locals), the PRT’s primary audience is the provincial populace. However, there are limited resources provided to the PRT to reach that audience effectively. A local newspaper, one that focuses
mostly on stories of national-level interest and stories that promote coalition efforts, should be engaged.

- Some regional content can be introduced to provide news and targeted public information in the province. There may be a dearth of local language content available for public information. In the end, the people may have little information about their local government at a time when the government needs to build awareness and engage its people in the civil processes of a democracy. The PRT leader needs to reach out to the local audience. He can do this by contacting the state-run television station operating in the provincial capitol.

- Take a state television station’s camera crew to an event to have local media document the engagement and provide commentary for the event. This practice shows the people of the province that their local government is working toward providing better services for its people and explains how the government is accomplishing this enormous task. The coverage should be balanced and fact-based, discussing the challenges the country faces. If the government is not doing a good job, the news report should show that as well. Because the engagements involve the local government and do not revolve around the direct actions of the PRT, this practice helps to dispel many of the myths about coalition forces.

- The initial videotaping of a governor’s meeting with religious figures where the PRT leader is also in attendance can receive a lot of attention. The PRT should continue to work with the local government on the concept of providing public service messages. The end result of implementing this practice is the creation of media coverage that will promote the PG’s activities and provide public service information.

**Suggestions:**

**Coordinating the concept:**

- **Selecting a program manager.** To ensure that a coordinated effort is possible, the PRT should select its CAT leader to monitor this program.

- **PG interest.** The PRT leader and the program manager meet with the governor and the director of communications to propose, refine, and agree upon the idea being proposed. At the meeting, present the basic concept and review the media capabilities in the province. The PG should agree that the people have a great interest in what goes on in the province and that a more aggressive plan on managing the message could help the people understand how their government is supporting them. The communications plan could also help in the area of public service messages by addressing such issues as health.
Conducting a provincial media assessment:

- **Types and location of media assets.** The program manager should work with the director of communications to agree upon a basic coverage concept of the current media facilities and develop a broad vision of where the PG wants to expand its current resources. The PRT AOR may have state-run television and radio as well as private television stations that reach a large part of the populace due to high population densities in several key areas. Every type of media is usually represented in the province and can be part of a media engagement plan.

- **Capabilities of the local television station.** The PRT can approach state-run television stations and invite them to cover and record events, such as project groundbreakings, grand openings, village medical outreaches, and PG-sponsored religious meetings. The television station may be interested in covering these events but lack basic audio/video equipment. The PRT can purchase a small portable video camera and basic video equipment and give it to the station. The station can then send a cameraman out with the PRT to cover key events occurring in the province.

Working with the state-run television station:

- **Basic media training.** The program manager should work with the local media to help improve their presentation techniques for taped segments. The PRT can encourage the television station to interview members of the PG as part of the film clip introduction. The cameraman can also interview people attending key events to capture their impressions of the event or efforts of the PG. Covering these events leads to more PG involvement and brings a local perspective to the events.

- **Preparing the message for radio and print.** Another benefit of helping the television station create content is that the same content can be used for radio (audio) scripts and played on the radio across the province. The scripts can also be used for print media.

Involving the PG:

- **Public service messages.** The PRT should work with the director of communications and/or the state-run television station to help it package ideas and promote positive public service messages to the province. One planned campaign idea could be sponsored by the director of health to combat a local epidemic that is a common cause of mortality (e.g., the public service message could help dispel the myth that giving more water to infants with dysentery results in their
death, when in actuality, death is caused by dehydration). The PRT can also help the communication director or television station make radio and TV spots.

- **Expanding media coverage.** Current coverage may be limited. The PG has a plan to increase coverage but needs assistance in financing the hardware upgrades. The station could consider selling airtime to businesses for advertising or to NGOs to air information and outreach programming (e.g., farm extension programs and teacher training). The PRT could consider buying airtime for public information campaigns highlighting public health and safety issues or for promoting events such as village medical outreach events.

- **Radio distribution.** The PRT should have money to distribute radios to areas the signal covers but where people do not have radios. This will maximize the efforts of getting information to the people.

- **Suggest modifications.** The PRT must understand that the PG controls many of the media resources. The PRT should monitor the PG’s usage of the systems and suggest modifications to the process when it identifies areas where the PG could benefit.

- **Develop a media campaign.** The director of communications should develop a media campaign to keep the people informed by having the PRT maintain a good relationship with the director of communications and assist in getting the governor to understand the importance of this communication tool.

**Lesson Learned:**

*Relations and information sharing with the embassy in Kabul.* There is a perceived distance and sense of miscommunication between U.S. PRT personnel and their counterparts in the embassy, exacerbated in part by what many interviewees see as a greatly under-resourced PRT office at the embassy.

**Observations and Insights:**

- Few U.S. PRT personnel cited specific positive aspects of their general relations with the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. One interviewee conveyed appreciation for the way embassy personnel showed trust in encouraging the interviewee to “do what you think is best” in the field. This same interviewee portrayed embassy personnel as “responsive and knowledgeable” as well. A second interviewee echoed the first’s sentiments regarding the great degree of trust that embassy personnel showed, adding that those in the embassy consistently “provided a good level of support.” This interviewee continued, “When I had a
Almost all respondents made negative observations about their relations with the embassy during their respective interviews. Most of these negative observations concerned insufficient resources and personnel at the embassy devoted to PRT issues. “The home office for us in Kabul was incredibly understaffed [and] overworked,” said one interviewee, “And one of the casualties of that was not being able to give strategic support and guidance to people in the field.”

Other grievances, concerning miscommunication and lack of communication seemed to stem directly from the perceived dearth of PRT-specific personnel at the embassy. One interviewee explained, “There were many, many instances when I reached up the chain to Kabul to pose a question about reconciliation or this political leader or that strategic decision, to try to get guidance, and it was almost never forthcoming.” Another recalled asking the embassy for support in leveraging its power with local Afghan actors in a particular district: “Can you help us out?” the interviewee had said, “And there’d be silence. So that was a little bit frustrating.”

A third category of grievance concerned the divide between perspectives from the field and from the embassy. One interviewee recalled “arguing with my colleagues at the embassy” over an issue concerning civilian mobility in the field that seemed very hard for individuals far away in Kabul to understand. Another interviewee “did not feel that there was adequate input from the field into the process” of general PRT activities, elaborating that “there were a lot of people making these critically important strategic decisions in Kabul … who had never been to the field.”

There is often and perhaps inevitably a distance between personnel at headquarters (in this case the embassy) and personnel in the field. This is exacerbated by the rapid and sometimes ad hoc deployment of U.S. personnel from various U.S. agencies into a war zone. Nevertheless, no formalized process has ever existed regarding the lines of communication and hierarchy between the PRT office at the embassy and PRTs and their personnel in the field. Like so many other aspects of PRT planning and activities, U.S. personnel working at PRTs around Afghanistan have never known what to expect from their embassy counterparts — leading to a great deal of confusion and frustration as each side strives to carry out their duties.

The problems in PRT relations related to the small amount of PRT-dedicated personnel at the embassy are in the process of being addressed. Two recent interviewees stressed that positive changes...
were already noticeable by the time they left their posts: an increase in the number of personnel working on PRT issues at the embassy, a physically larger PRT office there, and an ongoing clarification of reporting chains.

- At least two interviewees seemed to take the initiative in breaking down the embassy-field divide by making trips to the embassy to explain their problems and requests in person. These interviewees experienced far greater results and much more substantial interactions in general throughout their time at post. As one interviewee explained, “There’s no substitute for sitting down face to face and explaining an idea to somebody at their desk.”

- Two dilemmas highlighted by interviewees stem from long-term, recurring issues regarding the PRT structure in Afghanistan. The first dilemma is the problematic nature of the one-year rotation cycle among all U.S. personnel, which one interviewee felt was an integral reason why embassy personnel did not have the expertise and institutional knowledge required for answering questions and solving problems related to PRT activities. Another dilemma surrounds the fact that most civilian PRT personnel in the field know that their embassy counterparts cannot provide them with the amount of funding as the U.S. military, given the preponderance of CERP funding in many PRT activities. At least two interviewees felt their relations with their embassy counterparts suffered as a result of this discrepancy.

Suggestions:
- Institutionalizing the practice of periodic visits by U.S. PRT personnel in the field to the embassy in Kabul during their one-year tours.
- Mandating the writing of incoming briefs and outgoing back-briefs for PRT members arriving and departing Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Continuing efforts to increase the size of the PRT office at the embassy, provide more PRT-dedicated personnel there, and clarify reporting chains between the embassy and the field.

Lesson Learned:
*Information sharing in the PRT.* The PRT must share information from many sources with its own staff and members.

Observations and Insights:
- The PRT requires practical information collection and display tools to provide a common understanding of the situation in the province. Current information graphically displayed enables better operations.
planning and reconstruction and development. Lack of transition data by RIP units causes a need to collect data about the province. PRTs use different methods of collecting and displaying data.

• Ensure the PRT has a weekly conference call with the desk officer to stay connected. It is important for the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) to provide the PRT staff updates on future plans and policy changes. If the OPA provides the PRT with the opportunity to offer suggestions, the PRT staff will believe it is contributing to the program. Information from these staff calls should be made available to other PRT members for impact or situational awareness.

• Another approach is for OPA to organize periodic conference calls among PRT staff and advisers in specific topic areas, such as governance, rule of law, public diplomacy, agriculture, or public health. This facilitates understanding embassy direction, latest national-level information, and sharing best practices. Information from these staff calls should be made available to other PRT members for impact or situational awareness.

• The PRT needs a system for collecting and storing data that makes the information available to different members of the team. The COP is the visual display that results from setting priority information requirements, developing workable processes for collection, and updating the graphic display to summarize information.

Suggestions:

• Select a program manager. The PRT civil affairs liaison team operations officer/planner is a good choice. The key to a successful COP is to include all members of the PRT.

• PG interest. Teaching the provincial governor about the usefulness of having a reconstruction and development COP would be beneficial; however, based on limitations in technology in the province, using maps and overlays is probably the best implementation method of this practice.

Developing the parameters of the COP:

• Deciding what data to collect. The PRT intelligence staff officer (S-2) should hold a meeting with USAID, DOS, USDA, facility engineer team, police technical advisory team, and any other member of the PRT who has an interest in data collection. An assessment sheet should be developed from this meeting that synchronizes the collection efforts of all PRT members.
• **Determining what system to use to display the collected data.** With today’s technology, it is possible to collect data in a database and display that information using graphical overlays on a basic set of maps. The old-school method of using a map with overlays can be effective; however, it is not as easy to query the data that is collected in reports created in Microsoft Word.

• **Using a shared drive and establishing a standard naming convention.** Rather than storing data under a personal logon, PRTs are setting up naming conventions for storing documents and keeping them on shared drives that can be backed up weekly. Standardizing this practice should be considered by higher headquarters. This standardization will help with retaining information that seems to be constantly lost as people depart the theater.

• **Use of Microsoft SharePoint.** Through SharePoint, PRTs are able to use a specific domain to manage PRT information while having the ability to collaborate with other PRTs. The centralized information technology services management ensures one-time investment in technology and effective manning of the service from one location. Connectivity to this service should be made available to all PRTs.

Visual techniques:

• **PRT website.** Data can be put on this website for others to see. The data can be updated weekly or biweekly. It is difficult to collect data based on the available resources each PRT has. Some PRTs do not have a large ex-patriot or local staff to do this task.

• **Falcon View.** This program allows the PRT to create multiple overlays and digitally lay them over a standard set of maps. The system requires each piece of data to get plugged in with a global positioning system (GPS) grid but does not allow the user to query the system to see trends.

• **ARC View.** Similar to Falcon View, but this program allows for categorizing data enabling the user to develop trend maps and identify key relationships between events. One PRT is currently using this technique with great success. This system requires having users who know how to categorize the data to make it useful to a decision maker. The key to success with this system is consistent data entry.

• **Web-Enabled Temporal Analysis System (WebTAS).** This system is currently under development. One PRT is serving as the test site for implementation. WebTAS allows the PRT to create standard assessment forms that store information and allows the user to create multiple overlays and digitally lay them over a standard set of maps.
The system requires each piece of data to get plugged in with a GPS grid but does not allow the user to query the system to see trends. Bandwidth is a limitation for using WebTAS.

- **Digital Battle Captain.** This system is probably going to be the most useful COP program once it is fully developed. It includes daily event data collected from multiple sources across the operational area. However, the bandwidth at many locations will be a limitation.

- **Maps and overlays.** Although this is a basic system, it gets the point across by using a limited number of overlays and color codes. In the absence of any other visual capability, this is a great option.

- **Microsoft PowerPoint.** This is a low-tech way of displaying limited amounts of data. However, with the “build” feature, you can show what was done in the past, present, and future. You can also display information about key personalities and make personality cards that service members can carry with them on patrols. Once the baseline charts are created, PowerPoint is easy to update. It does not have any query capability.

- **Microsoft Word documents.** This is the most used but least preferred method because it only creates a large amount of text data that cannot be easily queried. It forces new arrivals to read through all the data to pick out what they think is useful, which takes a new team a lot of time to gain operational knowledge of the province and tends to cause the loss of data over time.

Limitations:

- **External hard drives.** The amount of storage space required is extremely large when using better types of software. External hard drives are also very useful for PRTs to backup their data rather than trying to do it on CD-Rs. Storing map sets on external hard drives can help with bandwidth issues.

- **Bandwidth.** Many of these data systems require data to be maintained at locations with limited amounts of bandwidth. As a result, the practical use of these automated systems is reduced, if not totally diminished, because it takes too long to get the data.

- **Plotters.** Currently, PRTs do not have the equipment needed to print large-scale copies of their COP, even if they have the software to create one. Some PRTs have started requesting production of their large-scale products off site; however, this is often very time-consuming. One PRT has a geographic information system (GIS) section working at the PRT with a plotter and appropriate software. This section can produce almost any product within hours of a request.
An investment in a GIS section and plotter would be a worthwhile investment.

- **Software.** Based on the large number of software packages available and the cost involved in buying them, it would be extremely beneficial if the combined joint task force or geographic combatant commander would pick a standard package and purchase it for everyone. Training and technical support are required to support the system. Feedback from the field is necessary to keep the system relevant.

- **Operators.** There are limited numbers of trained operators on the useful software packages described above. Without a dedicated trained operator, expectations of the actual usefulness of these systems are not realistic. Standardized data collection is the key to making these systems work. Without trained personnel, it is often better to just fall back on less technical methods of collecting and displaying data. However, the long-term usability and scalability of these low-tech methods is limited.

Involving the provincial governor:

- **Collecting data from the PG.** It is essential the PRT have a copy of the Provincial Development Strategy. These data points should be put on a map to show how the province will progress in the future. Historical reconstruction and development data is important to allow the PG to see progress and for PRTs to see what has been accomplished in the past.

- **Sharing the COP with the PG.** Developing a reconstruction and development COP and sharing it with the PG and other donors is essential because the military has the best map-making equipment in the country. Often, the lack of maps (or the use of different maps) causes the PG and donors to misunderstand each other because the actual location of a reconstruction and development project is not known.

Transitioning practice to the next PRT:

- Ensure during the RIP that new PRT members are trained on the system used to develop the COP and they fully understand how to maintain the data and why it is important. This common reference is essential to keep things running smoothly as well as to ease future transitions. Good historical files should be built to assist new PRT members during their transition into their specific jobs.

- This system can be shared during the PDSS, allowing incoming PRT elements to start training on the system and have relevant data before they arrive in theater. It also helps for new arrivals to have a basic understanding of their AOR.
Lesson Learned:
Coordinated long-term planning is critical to the success of PRTs, but most PRT metrics and performance evaluations do not credit planning.

Observations and Insights:

- This system can be shared during the PDSS, allowing incoming PRT elements to start training on the system and have relevant data before they arrive in theater. It also helps for new arrivals to have a basic understanding of their AOR.

- Civilian-military strategic planning appears not to be taken seriously. “There was this formal process that was supposed to be done as civil-military planning. But I’ll tell you that the PRT and everyone in the province regarded this as a box to check to get the people above them off their backs and then we were going to go about our daily business.”

- Metrics value performance over planning: “Every time a new commander comes in, he’s got to have his fitness report and he’s going to do a lot of things to drive the numbers. He can’t just say, ‘I made this governor a better governor.’ He’s got to say, ‘I built this many schools, I built this many miles of roads.’ Metrics, metrics, metrics.”

- Civilian-military planning cells only work well if they feed directly into the operational planning.

- Civilian-military planning must be balanced between civilians and military, otherwise the “civilian voice [is] drowned out.”

- Civilian-military planning is a challenge for two main reasons. First, it is difficult to coordinate strategies of civilian and military personnel. Second, planning for medium and long-term projects is difficult when personnel regularly are rotating out, and on different timelines.

- Although there are civil-military planning cells, some interviewees regarded these as impractical activities that did not result in true coordinated or long-term planning and did not drive resource or funding allocation. Instead, most projects are short-term projects that can be completed within single deployments and have measurable effects (e.g., miles of roads and number of schools), even if these are not the most critical programs needed.

- This is largely due to the quick personnel turnover (9 to 12 month deployments), incentive mechanisms to show measurable improvements within individuals’ deployments, inability to access funding and logistic support on a long-term basis to support long-term projects, and the inability to maintain oversight of the long-term projects that are recommended by the local population within a particular AO.
The lack of long-term planning is part of the criticism that PRTs are fighting “one-year wars” instead of having a sustained, continuous effort to build capacity in their AOs.

Suggestions:

- Combining country agency offices related to PRTs (DOS, DOD, USAID, Department of Justice, USDA, etc.) under one roof may help alleviate some of the problems associated with planning and resourcing.

- Since there cannot be effective planning without continuity of personnel, personnel at the national level (OPA-level) should serve longer tours.

Lesson Learned:

*Managing Multiple Projects*. The task of managing multiple projects to support capacity building and development in its AOR is challenging for a PRT.

Observations and Insights:

CERP will not play an important role in Iraq as we enter a new fiscal year and the anticipated drawdown of U.S. troops.

- The provinces are moving towards a liberal market-oriented economy, whereby provinces are requesting foreign direct investment. In Diwaniyah, the Provincial Investment Commission is the local entity in charge of private investment. Many provinces do not have actual data to collect that will support the proper development of economic projects. PRT experts can assist with the data collection. It is important that we put up front the Iraq face and the PRT monitors the process of private investment that will lead to economic growth.

Going forward, PRT’s effort should focus primarily on capacity building and ensuring the Iraqis take ownership of their tasks and have all the support to complete processes end to end.

The PRT staff must efficiently and effectively manage available resources, including delivering projects at the desired quality levels, building project management capacity in the PG staff, and building capacity in host-country enterprises.

One PRT addressed this problem by viewing CERP project management as an end-to-end process from the project formation/generation phase through project closeout and post-delivery monitoring. PRTs are to consider other sources of funding besides CERP, such as QRF. It would be best to
incorporate similar methodology, although funding sources may be different. USAID’s Iraq Rapid Assistance Program proved to be of great resource. The PRT could utilize Defense Agencies Initiative to manage and monitor complex projects that required frequent visits to the sites.

The PRT has organized a project delivery cell with defined roles and a mix of technical project management and control skills.

Key supporting processes:

- **Standard design for projects.** USAID and the U.N. Office for Project Services have standard designs that use simple construction techniques and local materials. One PRT keeps an archive of all standard designs for a range of possible projects (e.g., schools, basic health care clinics, and micro-hydroelectric plants).

- **Pre-bid supplier conference.** Use the conference to describe the project, the expected skills required to deliver, and quality expectations. Set expectations and describe the way PRTs work; progress payments; and the quality dispute process.

- **Bidders’ conference.** One PRT expands the pre-bid conference into a training session. The PRT developed a training manual that is distributed at the pre-tender bidders’ conference. Attendance qualifies the contractor to bid on CERP projects. The certification course aims to orient potential contractors, set their expectations, and prepare them for successful performance on CERP projects.

- **Supplier information management.** Provide contractor/supplier profiles with pictures for positive identification. Maintain records on each supplier, to include previous work performed and references from other work. Assess and record previous level of performance and capabilities (e.g., trades covered and geographic scope of operations).

- **Build detailed request for proposal/quote.** State quality expectations in bid documents so cost of quality can be reflected in the contractors’ pricing. Communicate the quality expectations in the request for proposal/quote document. Reinforce the message again during the certification course.

**Suggestions:**

Organize project delivery cell:

- **Develop project documents.** Plan project documents in adequate detail to support clear communication with potential bidders (i.e., provide contractors with the scope and requirements for the project). These documents can be used to support the bidders’ conference and the core of the bid package.
• **Plan and hold bidders’ conference.** Organize and hold the conference. Rehearse the presentation of the bid documents with the interpreters to ensure requirements are clearly communicated. Leave enough time for clarifying questions from the contractors. Answer all contractor queries in public, allowing the entire group to hear all questions and the same answers. Explain the ground rules for bid and who is on the selection committee.

• **Gathering and managing project and supplier information.** In most provinces some line ministry directors are able to work effectively with the PRT. Assess the PG line directors and their staffs to determine their willingness to work transparently with the PRT. Use DOS representatives to help assess current PG staff, and maintain the influence-relationship map of key provincial officials.

Use available resources (e.g., time, CERP/QRA funding, and associations) to influence and reinforce good behavior:

• **CERP/QRA projects.** Work with provincial line ministry directors to assess the province’s needs and develop a prioritized development plan that emphasizes primary needs first, (e.g., electricity and water). Encourage provincial line ministry directors and other PG officials to follow their prioritized development plan. Build sustainable systems by thinking through the resources for construction and the operating cost to maintain the system. Lack of focus on the sustainability and operations capacity of the host nation may result in the development of assets, which while undoubtedly are sorely needed, cannot be staffed, equipped, or utilized.

• **Developing institutional capacity.** Collaborative project work and mentoring programs can help build skills with other PG members. After gaining buy-in with staff collaborations from the governor and key line ministry directors, form the appropriate working team to develop and manage projects. Ensure the governor and key line ministry directors are kept informed through open progress meetings. By inviting larger participation from the line ministries, the PG can develop greater knowledge and experience in project development and management.

• **Consider phased development/investment to control funds.** Phased project execution allows the PRT to invest in projects that are being managed with required transparency and effectiveness. Involving local leaders in shaping projects and creating local work crews can yield the optimum economic benefit while allowing good project controls of CERP/QRA funds. This phased approach also allows adequate time for teaching.
Lesson Learned:

Build capacity by maximizing assets. To maximize all available assets and capabilities that exist in a province, the PRT coordinates capacity building and development activities with other units.

Observations and Insights:

- PRTs require practical information collection and display tools to provide a common understanding of the situation in a particular province. Graphically displaying current information enables better operations planning and reconstruction and development. Lack of transition data by the RIP unit causes a need to collect data about the province.

- Within the combined/joint operations area, maneuver units own the entire PRT operational environment. Lines of command can become blurred without higher headquarters clearly defining who is in charge. In instances where the PRT and a maneuver unit are collocated, the maneuver commander is the senior commander. In most of these instances, the PRT operates at a reduced level of manpower because it is collocated with a maneuver element.

- However, the difference in missions between the two units can make both parties ineffective without properly coordinating operations. If the PRT is not collocated with a maneuver element and has its full complement of force protection, it is still essential to know what other operational elements are doing in the province.

Suggestions:

The maneuver element operations staff officer (S-3) hosts a weekly meeting that includes the PRT and any maneuver elements in the AO. The meeting is essential because it allows all elements to deconflict their operations over the next week as well as provide support when something happens that requires emergency assistance. The meeting also allows all parties to share information that others might find irrelevant; however, since attendees may be working in different parts of the province and/or working with different people, they ultimately will have information to share that all will find important. The meeting also allows units to find gaps and seams that can be mitigated to help share limited resources. Some future steps in this process would be to include the host government security force so it can learn how to conduct such a meeting and synchronize data sharing.

Coordinating the concept:

- Selecting a program lead. The PRT S-3 is the best person to be the program lead. The CAT-A team leader might want to attend to gather information firsthand from the meeting.
• *PG interest.* This meeting has no primary use to the PG; however, information from it could be used by the maneuver element and the PRT to assist them at the provincial security coordination body.

• *Conduct of the meeting.* The maneuver S-3 hosts the meeting at his location and sets the weekly agenda. Attendees include the maneuver S-3, PRT S-3, embedded training team, and any other coalition force representatives in the province. All invitees must be able to review their missions and patrols for the next two weeks so a COP of events can be determined and deconflicted. When the maneuver element and the PRT are collocated, more time should be spent coordinating missions and patrols because the maneuver element must provide force protection for the PRT to accomplish its mission. This requirement for force protection can be greatly impacted if the maneuver commander has a different plan and is relying on these same limited resources.

• *Transitioning practice to the next PRT.* Review the meeting agenda with new personnel and cover the due-outs for the next meeting. Also, provide historical meeting notes to show the intent of the meeting and its usefulness.

**Lesson Learned:**

*Extending the reach of the PRT.* The PRT must reach to outlying or remote districts within its province.

**Observations and Insights:**

• By design, PRTs are located close to the provincial capitol. As security improves, the PRTs are able to travel to villages more frequently. It is important the PRT focus for its new strategy on the local villages and most vulnerable outside the provincial capitol. The PRT will play a key role in bringing the local issues from the bottom to the top.

• One PRT established three remote patrol bases within the province to help project the presence and impact of the PRT. The patrol bases are located in safe houses, guarded full-time by hired security forces, or collocated on a national police compound. The patrol is commanded by a major with about a 20-person organization and staffed with other PRT skill sets as required. The patrol leader constantly engages the local population and collects information for the PRT.

• The remote patrol base concept allows relationships to form and grow with the local population. It also allows the PRT to make regular assessments and conduct quality control checks on remote projects. Patrols stay out for about three weeks at a time and then return to the PRT site for resupply. The same people return to their remote patrol
base to ensure relationships are maintained with the locals. Because many of the remote locations are snowed in during the winter, the PRT shuts down the patrol bases except for the local security force. The PRT also reduces its staff in the winter months when the location of the remote bases is not trafficable.

**Suggestion:**

*Location of remote patrol bases.* Selection of remote patrol base locations should be based on where they can have the most impact on the local population.

**Lesson Learned:**

*Security environment.* A dangerous security environment is a key impediment to the success of a PRT. It prevents PRT members from regularly meeting with local officials and overseeing projects. A poor/deteriorating security environment also reduces the population’s confidence in the effectiveness of its central and local government institutions.

**Observations and Insights:**

- A majority of interviewees commented that the security situation often made movement difficult for civilian members of the PRT. One USDA PRT member operating in Iraq said, “Movement was the one thing that was most difficult. Competition for security among the PRTs. On ground moves, I had four mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles with up to 16 armed guards.

- Another theme resonating in the interviews is that a poor security situation limits improvements in governance and development and damages the local community’s connection with the government. One Navy PRT commander in Afghanistan stated, “The worsening security situation hampered development efforts and efforts to advance governance. The decrease in security was causing the government to lose its connection with the people of the province, and this was a significant concern.”

- A PRT member in Iraq noted similarly that, “Unless there is a secure environment, improvements in governance are going to be limited. And how can you have true economic development? Security will remain the top issue. On the other hand, heavy security and military presence may lead to less flexibility and less ability to interact with the local officials.”

- It is also critical that PRT members are viewed to be sharing the same risks as the population they are supporting. A PRT member in
Iraq stated, “Part of the problem for PRTs like us that were wholly dependent on the military for security, is that the military has just about zero flexibility to deviate from their template. And a number of Iraqis in Karbala would say, ‘Why do you do this? Karbala’s safe now. You don’t have to do this anymore.’ Our military guys would agree with us, but we can’t make an exception, even if we wanted to.”

- According to the most recent DOD report on stability and security in Iraq, security incidents remain at the lowest levels in more than five years, and progress in the security environment remains generally steady but uncertain.

**Suggestions:**

- *Civilians should participate in all stages of mission planning to ensure civilian missions are viewed as a priority.* All members of the PRT must recognize that interacting with local officials in the field is the primary PRT mission. “I was at virtually every meeting that we had with the commander. Usually I sat in the command center, and that’s what I would recommend for people like me going out: sit in the command center.”

- *Clearly communicate mission and requirements to security personnel.* “We actually did owe these young soldiers much more information, better briefings about what exactly we were doing, because I think it helped. And they appreciated when we would take the time to say, ‘We’re going to a meeting with the governor, we’re going to a meeting with the head of this NGO and this is what it’s about, this is what’s at stake.’”

- *Reduce the visible security footprint.* When the security situation permits, PRT members must be prepared to share risk with the local population they are working with. When appropriate, risk can be mitigated with unmarked vehicles, perhaps utilizing private security.

**Lesson Learned:**
The U.N. does not have an effective presence on the ground because of a lack of resources and an inability (or unwillingness) to fully carry out its activities in a non-permissive environment.

**Observations and Insights:**

- Respondents said that a lack of resources and personnel at the U.N. in both Afghanistan and Iraq — specifically UNAMA and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq — was a primary reason that effective cooperation with PRTs was not possible. One individual felt
that the low number of U.N. personnel outside of the capitals of both nations prevented both U.N. missions from having a truly “national presence.” Another respondent, working in Afghanistan, said that given the U.N.’s lack of resources in the field, “Afghans don’t take UNAMA that seriously.”

- One respondent felt that the U.N.’s slow pace of work was a major hindrance to effective collaboration. While this individual highlighted that UNAMA “has a similar integrated approach effort, trying to figure out how they can expand their effort to some of the more remote provinces,” this respondent went on to explain a telling frustration: “We can’t wait for UNAMA’s integrated approach, because we just don’t have the time and patience of the U.S. taxpayers and Congress to wait for them to move at their pace to determine exactly what they’re going to do in these districts. We need to move out with our effort in the districts faster in order to make a difference sooner.”

- One respondent from Iraq described working “very hard to get the U.N. to be a player,” but said that eventually the U.N.’s collective reluctance and overwhelming security requirements got in the way.

- One interviewee viewed bringing together the U.S. military and the U.N. as his “biggest accomplishment,” noting that he (and his successor) “established very close working relationships with other international partners … to make sure that what the brigade was doing was tied together with what the U.N. and other international organizations were doing, but also tied to what the Afghan priorities and strategy were.”

- The only positive feedback regarding PRT-U.N. interactions came from an individual who had a “mutually supportive” and “very tight working relationship” with a UNAMA desk officer overseeing the same AO.

- The negative reactions of these individuals regarding the perceived inability to establish high levels of cooperation between PRTs and U.N. bodies in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect the difficulties inherent in U.N. engagement in conflict/post-conflict situations. On the other hand, they also reflect problems in American PRTs’ collective ability (and often inexperience) in interacting productively with outside actors in the field — such as those representing nongovernmental and international organizations like the U.N.

- Moreover, the observations of these respondents also reflect the fact that, generally, PRTs are working with a different amount of resources — and within a different timeframe — than U.N. missions.

The Special Advisor on Development to the Special Representative of
the Secretary General for UNAMA once conceded that UNAMA has problems asserting its presence and its priorities given its relative lack of funding (when compared to PRTs). However, he also highlighted the fact that UNAMA personnel have the great advantage of continuity — many of their field staffs have held their positions for four or five years, while American PRT personnel rarely hold their positions for more than a year.

Suggestion:
Given the general ability of U.N. missions to maintain longer-term operations in host countries, PRT members should consistently try to search for and encourage areas of overlap between their own activities and those of U.N. bodies in Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to increase the sustainability of potentially shared projects. One interviewee proudly noted the “dramatic improvement” in relations with local Afghans when members of the military made concerted efforts to work with the U.N. and NGOs in one area. This includes fostering relationships with those UNAMA personnel that seem especially willing to engage in real collaboration, as one UNAMA desk officer described (see last observation).

Lesson Learned:
Allied PRTs have different missions, rules of engagement, and concepts of operations, and there is no mechanism to compel cooperation.

Observations and Insights:
- ISAF has limited resources, and those authorities approved by NATO are granted by participating nations.
- Individual countries cut deals with ISAF about the terms of their involvement, and allies have “sold” their involvement based on different understandings of the mission. The German mission, for example, has been seen as a “humanitarian, reconstruction mission, not a war mission.”
- Allies have varying experiences dealing in an international environment. “The U.K. [United Kingdom] is used to a strong international presence;” many of our newer allies are not.
- Rules of engagement (ROEs) vary greatly. One nation’s PRT was mentioned a couple of times as “not willing to go outside the wire.” Others need permission from their respective capitols to assist other countries’ personnel and PRTs.
- There is a distinct lack of continuity of effort due to widely varying tours of duty among allies, anywhere from six months to two years.
• Because of differences of missions, many allies have limited interaction with the local population.

• Furthermore, there is a cultural divide between civilian and military personnel on many PRTs. One noted that the “U.S. military had a less respectful attitude towards civilians than their counterpart militaries,” e.g., U.K., Canadian, and Dutch.

• The U.N. has such a high security requirement that its presence and influence are minimal.

**Suggestions:**

• Build upon/resource/operationalize NATO’s comprehensive approach envisioned in the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), including credible and functional theater-level capabilities, e.g., flexible command and control and robust civilian-military capabilities (subject-matter experts, deployable civilian experts, and regular exercises).

• Establish a common ISAF mission statement, database, mechanism, ROEs, etc. aimed at fostering cooperation among PRTs and with ISAF headquarters.

• Establish a consistent or at least coordinated ISAF tour-of-duty policy of at least one year in Afghanistan and future conflicts.

• Increase common training opportunities for NATO and allied personnel at the multilateral (e.g., NATO and the European Union) and national level.

**Lesson Learned:**

*Interactions and communications with NGOs.* The most critical aspects for encouraging rewarding communications with NGO actors are PRT personnel establishing the nature of their relationships with individual NGOs in their AOs.

**Observations and Insights:**

• Three of the individuals interviewed gave positive portrayals of their interactions and communication with NGO actors in their AOs. One interviewee described the benefits of gathering information from local NGO actors, highlighting that NGOs were often more able to directly connect with members of the community than PRT personnel. This interviewee specifically mentioned good communication with an Afghan NGO called the tribal liaison office: “They do excellent provincial surveys. … They came and briefed us on their study. They sent people out … for several weeks. … They came back and
put together the results of their study, and it gave you a really good political, ethnographic lay of the land.” One interviewee described learning a great deal from NGO actors by communicating with them about the ways in which they adapted their operations to local conditions: “[They] obviously know how to play the game. … They adapted their operations, their hiring practices, their movement, and their security to be able to operate. … I would contact them frequently. We would learn a lot from them.”

Another interviewee gave great credit to a USAID representative at one PRT for reaching out to NGOs in their area and creating a shared database of all projects the PRT and many NGOs were carrying out in their shared space. This interviewee highlights the fact that this USAID officer was predisposed to assist in this way because he actually worked with an NGO in the country before joining USAID on the PRT: “… Because he had that kind of background, he could speak more freely with NGOs. He was able to pull together a database of projects that were being carried out in Ghazni from about 2005 to the present, which included input from the NGOs. So we had some idea of where some of these NGO projects were. That way we wouldn’t duplicate their efforts or stumble on to them.”

Four other interviewees, on the other hand, felt that their communication with NGOs was severely hampered by antagonistic perceptions, security constraints, and a general reluctance to upset ongoing NGO activities. One interviewee described the pronounced hostility among some NGO actors toward PRTs by saying, “They feel a very strong sense of territory, not geographical but thematic territory, and will assert, fairly often and whenever asked, that the PRTs are ruining the humanitarian aid relationship.” Furthermore, two individuals described the great difficulty in communicating with NGOs — even when both sides were interested in cooperating — given security constraints on PRT personnel. And another interviewee noted that his PRT colleagues actually took great pains to avoid NGO actors, for the perceived benefit of those NGOs: “We really went out of our way to avoid them. … We didn’t want to cause them problems. We had heard all through our training at Fort Bragg how the NGOs didn’t want us stumbling on them, didn’t want to be seen with us, because they felt that put them at great risk, so we honored that.”

As noted in observations, in the best circumstances, PRT personnel can draw on the expertise and depth of local relationships that NGO actors have for valuable information concerning local actors as well as tactics and insight on ways to encouraging the right development projects throughout their shared workspace. Such efforts can be promoted by NGO-related experience among PRT members (such
as the USAID official in Ghazni province) as well as by some NGOs (such as the tribal liaison office), who seem more willing than others to reach out to PRTs with information and support.

- However, given the considerable obstacles to PRT and NGO communication in impermissible security environments, the best practice of PRT personnel may be to simply remain responsive to NGO prerogatives in their area and open to whatever communication is possible given realities on the ground.

Suggestions:

- The most successful examples of PRT-NGO interactions described in the interviews featured PRT personnel tailoring their relationships towards NGO actors contextually in ways that addressed the importance for NGOs of being perceived as independent.

- Leaders at the PRT level could designate development-oriented personnel at each PRT (such as a USAID representative) to cultivate contacts with NGOs in the area, and when permissible, allow this person to make trips to local NGO offices. This individual could be a regular interlocutor between the PRT and NGOs in a given region, encouraging trust and communication through a more personal connection.

- Encourage coordination with NGOs by having PRT personnel initiate and maintain a collaborative project to create a full and open database of all development projects being carried out by both PRT and NGO actors throughout a given area.

Endnote

To help you access information quickly and efficiently, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) posts all publications, along with numerous other useful products, on the CALL website. The CALL website is restricted to U.S. government and allied personnel.

If you have any comments, suggestions, or requests for information (RFIs), use the following links on the CALL home page: “RFI or a CALL Product” or “Contact CALL.”

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